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*Chairman:* Mr. Leopoldo BENITES (Ecuador).

AGENDA ITEM 27

Question of general and complete disarmament: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (continued) (A/6390-DC/228, A/C.1/L.370/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1/Corr.1 and Rev.1/Add.2-8, A/C.1/L.374/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1, A/C.1/L.378 and Add.1-2, A/C.1/L.379/Rev.1, A/C.1/L.382/Rev.2)

CONSIDERATION OF DRAFT RESOLUTIONS (continued) (A/C.1/L.370/REV.1 AND REV.1/ADD.1/CORR.1 AND REV.1/ADD.2-8, A/C.1/L.374/REV.1 AND REV.1/ADD.1, A/C.1/L.378 AND ADD.1-2, A/C.1/L.382/REV.2)

1. The CHAIRMAN invited those representatives who wished to explain their votes before the voting to do so.

2. Mr. RAFAEL (Israel) said that the sponsors of the various draft resolutions had made laudable efforts to reconcile the different views expressed in the discussion and to produce texts reflecting the consensus of opinion in the Committee.

3. His delegation would vote for the thirty-three-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.370/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1/Corr.1 and Rev.1/Add.2-8) and the ten-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.378 and Add.1-2). Though the vote on the five-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.379/Rev.1) had been postponed, the proposals contained therein deserved favourable consideration. He hoped that after a more detailed study it would be possible to translate them into practical measures.

4. With regard to the eleven-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.374/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1), his people still remembered that millions of men, women and children had been killed by cyanide in the gas chambers of

Nazi Germany, and were naturally determined that chemical weapons should never be used again. He appealed to all delegations to support an agreed text free from any short-term considerations and thereby pave the way for the adoption of really effective measures to prevent the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons. The Eighteen-Nation Committee should be asked to give the matter urgent consideration.

5. Mr. IDZUMBUIR (Democratic Republic of the Congo) said that his delegation whole-heartedly supported the thirty-three-Power draft resolution and the ten-Power draft resolution. It would have been prepared also to vote for the five-Power draft resolution, but not for the two-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.377)—which was no longer before the Committee—as it had been too limited in scope. To avoid unnecessary danger to human life, flights of aircraft carrying nuclear weapons should be prohibited even within national frontiers.

6. He could not vote for the eleven-Power draft resolution unless the Committee adopted the revised four-Power amendments (A/C.1/L.382/Rev.2), which placed the problem of the prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons in its proper perspective within the context of disarmament. If the amendments were not adopted, the draft resolution would appear to deal solely with one specific violation of the Geneva Protocol of 1925.

7. Mr. TINOCO (Costa Rica) said that his delegation would vote for the thirty-three-Power draft resolution and the ten-Power draft resolution.

8. It would vote for the eleven-Power draft resolution if the revised four-Power amendments were adopted.

9. Mr. OULD HASSEN (Mauritania) said that the sponsors of the eleven-Power draft resolution would abstain on the first of the revised four-Power amendments, since they believed—for the reasons given at the 1461st meeting by the Guinean delegation—that the word "contemporary" should be retained in the first preambular paragraph of the draft resolution. They would also abstain on the second amendment, which was not in keeping with their original objectives. They would vote against the third amendment, since the single paragraph proposed as a substitute for operative paragraph 1 and 2 was not entirely satisfactory.

10. However, if a majority of delegations voted for the amendments, the sponsors of the draft resolution would still, in a spirit of co-operation, vote for the draft resolution as amended.

11. Mr. VELLODI (Secretary of the Committee), in a statement on the financial implications of the thirty-three-Power draft resolution, said that on the assumption that some twelve to fifteen consultants would be engaged to undertake the proposed study and that they would meet twice in 1967 at Geneva, each meeting lasting for two weeks, it was estimated that expenditure in 1967 would amount to approximately \$75,000, covering the travel, subsistence and daily fees of the consultants. It would cost less to arrange the meetings in Geneva than in New York. In Geneva, the substantive and technical servicing of the group of consultants could be undertaken by staff members already servicing the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. If the meetings of the group were timed so as not to coincide with those of the Eighteen-Nation Committee, the necessary interpretation services could be provided from available resources.

12. With regard to the financial implications of the ten-Power draft resolution, he had already referred (1449th meeting) to the financial arrangements for the continued servicing of the Eighteen-Nation Committee in 1967 and had nothing to add to his earlier statement.

13. The CHAIRMAN put the thirty-three-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.370/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1/Corr.1 and Rev.1/Add.2-8) to the vote.

*The draft resolution was adopted unanimously.*

14. The CHAIRMAN said that, at the request of the representative of Hungary, a separate roll-call vote would be taken on each of the revised four-Power amendments (A/C.1/L.382/Rev.2) to the eleven-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.374/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1).

15. He put the first amendment to the vote.

*A vote was taken by roll-call.*

*Nepal, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.*

*In favour:* Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Norway, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Finland, France, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico.

*Against:* None.

*Abstaining:* Nigeria, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Rwanda, Spain, Sudan, Syria, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Algeria, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Ceylon, Congo (Democratic Republic of), Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, Ethiopia, Gabon, Guinea, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Jamaica, Kenya, Kuwait,

Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Mongolia, Morocco.

*The amendment was adopted by 55 votes to none, with 47 abstentions.*

16. The CHAIRMAN put the second amendment to the vote.

*A vote was taken by roll-call.*

*France, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.*

*In favour:* Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, South Africa, Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo (Democratic Republic of), Costa Rica, Cyprus, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Finland.

*Against:* None.

*Abstaining:* France, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Guyana, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Jamaica, Kenya, Kuwait, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Spain, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Togo, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Algeria, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Ceylon, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Dahomey.

*The amendment was adopted by 53 votes to none, with 50 abstentions.*

17. The CHAIRMAN put the third amendment to the vote.

*A vote was taken by roll-call.*

*Jamaica, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.*

*In favour:* Japan, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malta, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Norway, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Senegal, South Africa, Sweden, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo (Democratic Republic of), Costa Rica, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Finland, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast.

*Against:* Jamaica, Kenya, Kuwait, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Mongolia, Nigeria, Poland, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Yugoslavia, Algeria, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian

Soviet Socialist Republic, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, Guinea, Hungary, Indonesia, Iraq.

**Abstaining:** Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Nepal, Pakistan, Spain, Togo, Afghanistan, Burma, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Ceylon, Cyprus, Dahomey, France, Gabon, Ghana, Guyana, India.

*The amendment was adopted by 51 votes to 34, with 19 abstentions.*

18. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the eleven-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.374/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1), as amended.

*A vote was taken by roll-call.*

*Austria, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.*

**In favour:** Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Ceylon, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo (Democratic Republic of), Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Finland, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Australia.

**Against:** None.

**Abstaining:** Cuba, France, Gabon.

*The draft resolution, as amended, was adopted by 101 votes to none, with 3 abstentions.*

19. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the ten-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.378 and Add.1-2).

*The draft resolution was adopted by 102 votes to none, with 2 abstentions.*

20. Mr. DENORME (Belgium) said that his delegation had unreservedly supported the ten-Power draft resolution. It hoped that the Eighteen-Nation Committee would be reconvened in Geneva as soon as possible after the end of the General Assembly's current session, and expressed the hope that substantial progress would be made towards achieving agreement. In addition, the Eighteen-Nation Committee should continue to give priority to the negotiation of limited agreements, particularly on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and a comprehensive test ban.

21. In his statement in the Assembly's general debate (1432nd plenary meeting), the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs had supported the Secretary-General's

proposal for a study of the impact and implications of all aspects of nuclear weapons. It was in that spirit that the Belgian delegation had joined the sponsors of the thirty-three-Power draft resolution, which was inspired by that idea. It could see nothing but benefit if the peoples of the world were as fully apprised as possible of the effects and repercussions on mankind of the existence of nuclear weapons. The proposed study should deal mainly with the economic and security implications for States of the acquisition and further development of nuclear weapons.

22. His country, which had special reasons to be concerned with the problem of chemical and bacteriological warfare, had signed and ratified the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925. As the Netherlands representative had suggested, the text of the Protocol might well be brought up to date. His delegation had supported the revised four-Power amendments, which were wholly in keeping with the humanitarian objectives pursued by the Hungarian delegation, but had the advantage of eliminating certain controversial features which had survived in the revised text of the draft resolution.

23. Mr. PARDO (Malta) said that his delegation had voted for the thirty-three-Power draft resolution, mainly because of the interest expressed by the Secretary-General in a study of the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons. But he doubted whether the proposed report would add significantly to the awareness that the peoples of the world already had with regard to the dangers of the nuclear arms race.

#### AGENDA ITEM 28

Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (continued) (A/6390-DC/228, A/C.1/L.380 and Add.1-2)

#### GENERAL DEBATE (concluded)

24. Mr. CORREA DA COSTA (Brazil) said that three factors which had been mainly responsible for the conclusion of the Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, signed at Moscow on 5 August 1963, were: first, the political willingness of the super-Powers to conclude such a treaty; second, the balance in military technology between the super-Powers; and third, the conviction shared by both sides that nuclear tests carried out in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water could be detected without the need for international inspection and control.

25. The problem today of concluding a comprehensive test ban treaty had to be considered in the light of those three factors. The political willingness to conclude such a treaty had been affirmed by the three nuclear Powers concerned, but the balance in military technology might be disturbed at any moment if one side forestalled the other in perfecting an anti-ballistic-missile defence system. The dangers of a new race for anti-missile missiles had been emphasized in the introduction to the Secretary-General's annual report for 1965-1966 (A/6301/Add.1). Consequently, in order to achieve

the desired prohibition of underground tests, the present balance must be preserved and the parties must be assured that the treaty would be fairly implemented and any possible violation promptly detected.

26. The problem of the detection and identification of underground nuclear tests had not been solved so far, despite the many constructive proposals that had been made by his own and several other delegations in the Eighteen-Nation Committee. All those proposals should be further scrutinized, both in the First Committee and at the next series of meetings of the Eighteen-Nation Committee. In his delegation's opinion, the best hope of a solution lay in the establishment of a "detection club".

27. A comprehensive test ban treaty would undoubtedly constitute an important step towards nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament. For the non-nuclear-weapon States the signing of such a treaty would be tantamount to renouncing the development and manufacture of nuclear weapons. Since nuclear-weapon States were little inclined to share the secrets of nuclear weapon technology with non-nuclear-weapon States, the comprehensive test ban treaty would prevent proliferation and dissemination of nuclear weapons. It would also pave the way for at least a partial freeze in the development of nuclear weapons.

28. The USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States had all warned the First Committee that what might be possible today might be impossible tomorrow and that the demands of the non-nuclear-weapon States for collateral measures could jeopardize everything. Brazil had never contended that a treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons should be tied to the implementation of a programme of related measures such as the banning of underground tests and the freezing of nuclear war technology. Brazil was most anxious that the present nuclear-weapon States, in concluding an agreement on non-proliferation based on the principles of General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX), should declare their willingness to implement the collateral measures envisaged in the memorandum of 19 August 1966 of the eight non-aligned members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee;<sup>1/</sup> but it realized that it would be neither wise nor realistic to make the conclusion of the treaty contingent upon the implementation of those collateral measures.

29. Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) said that although the conclusion of a treaty on non-proliferation should not be contingent on the signing of a treaty or protocol for the prohibition of underground nuclear tests, the two instruments were in fact closely related, as the Swedish representative had pointed out at the 1451st meeting, and it was reasonable to hope that they would be signed at the same time. In that way both "horizontal" and "vertical" proliferation of nuclear weapons would be curtailed. Two other aspects of the question ought to be borne in mind. First, so long as underground nuclear tests were allowed to continue, the General Assembly's exhortations to countries which were still carrying out nuclear

tests in the atmosphere would lose much of their moral force. Secondly, in the instrument prohibiting underground nuclear tests, provisions should be included, subject to the necessary safeguards, to permit explosions of nuclear devices for exclusively peaceful purposes.

30. As a sponsor of the draft resolution before the Committee (A/C.1/L.380 and Add.1-2), he wished to point out that the draft resolution referred to the importance of international co-operation in the exchange of seismic data not only as a basis for national evaluation of seismic events but also as a means of verifying the faithful observance of a comprehensive test ban treaty. He hoped that the nuclear Powers would also give due consideration to the other specific proposals which had been made in the Eighteen-Nation Committee with a view to overcoming the remaining obstacles to the prohibition of underground nuclear tests.

31. Mr. IJEWERE (Nigeria) noted that while prospects for the conclusion of a treaty on non-proliferation had brightened considerably over the past two months, the outlook was still very bleak as regards its corollary—a comprehensive test ban treaty. The continuation of underground tests, which were not, as originally believed, free from radio-active debris and contamination, was a manifestation of the continuance of the arms race. The continuation of such tests was a strong inducement to other countries to develop their own bombs, whether or not a treaty on non-proliferation was concluded. The partial test ban treaty permitted the super-Powers to perfect and expand their nuclear weaponry by testing underground, at a cost which only they could afford. If those who already possessed nuclear weapons still felt insecure, they could not blame others for wanting weapons too. Only the total elimination of nuclear weapons would save man from the threat of nuclear annihilation.

32. There was a noticeable reluctance on the part of the nuclear Powers to work towards a comprehensive test ban treaty. One side insisted on verification with on-site inspection, since there were as yet no national scientific instruments capable of detecting all man-made underground explosions. The other side pointed out that on-site inspections could be a cover for espionage and insisted that national means of detection were adequate. In order to satisfy both sides, scientific instruments should be devised which could detect and identify all man-made explosions without on-site inspection. Joint research on that subject was most desirable. In view of the Soviet Union's insistence that national means of detection were adequate, that country presumably possessed suitable instruments or believed that they could be produced in the near future.

33. There were also political obstacles to agreement on a comprehensive test ban. Indeed, the technical obstacles would become less important if the Powers concerned displayed the political will to reach agreement and were prepared to create an atmosphere of confidence and trust.

34. In the opinion of the Nigerian delegation, a test ban based on the twin ideas of the "threshold" and

<sup>1/</sup> See Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1966, document DC/228, annex I, sect. P.

"verification by challenge", supplemented by a "detection club" arrangement, would go a long way to meet the requirements of all sides. All tests that could be detected by national means would be banned and those which could not would be suspended pending the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty. The agreement would be subject to verification by challenge or by invitation only for tests or seismic events below a certain threshold. In addition, efforts would be made by national institutions to collate and exchange seismic data so as to create a more reliable and objective basis for the evaluation of seismic events.

35. However, the idea of verification, and particularly verification by challenge, might present difficulties for the time being. The Nigerian delegation therefore recommended for more immediate consideration the idea of a partial threshold agreement, comprising the following steps. Firstly, all nuclear tests that could be detected and identified by national monitoring systems should be banned immediately. Such a step would be an important achievement and would generate confidence. Since no on-site inspection was involved, there would be no opportunity for espionage and, since the ban could be verified by national means, cheating would be impossible. Secondly, a group of scientists from neutral countries, nominated by the Secretary-General, should be asked to give its opinion on the technical problems involved in the detection and identification of underground tests. Thirdly, if necessary, the scientists would be asked to try to produce an instrument capable of detecting and identifying such tests as could not at present be monitored. Fourthly, efforts would meanwhile continue to find a political solution to the whole problem of underground nuclear tests.

36. The main point of that proposal was that it banned only tests above a seismic magnitude of 4.75 and not tests below that magnitude. Other tests would be banned in descending order of seismic magnitude as more sensitive monitoring instruments were produced. At the same time, efforts would continue to find a political solution to the whole problem of nuclear testing.

37. Mr. FUENTEALBA (Chile) said that his delegation would vote for the draft resolution before the Committee.

38. Unfortunately, the test ban treaty signed at Moscow in 1963 was neither universal nor complete. The two nuclear Powers which had not signed the treaty, France and the People's Republic of China, were still carrying out nuclear tests in the atmosphere. His Government was particularly concerned about the series of nuclear tests held in the Pacific relatively near to Chilean territory. Technical experts had stated that the risks involved were at present negligible, but future explosions of increased magnitude might have unforeseeable consequences. Underground tests were equally dangerous since, as the United Kingdom representative had pointed out, they were used for developing nuclear warheads for anti-missile missile systems. The development of new systems would further intensify the arms race, divert vast sums from

economic and social development and create new tensions and risks of war. Every effort should be made to conclude a comprehensive test ban treaty, which would also help considerably to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

39. The main obstacle to agreement on a comprehensive test ban was the problem of inspection. An agreement without adequate machinery to guarantee its observance would be ineffective. But with the recent advances in techniques for identifying seismic events beyond national frontiers, there were good grounds for hoping that an acceptable system could eventually be developed. The Swedish proposal for a "detection club" for the exchange of seismological data was particularly interesting.

40. In view of the urgent need to curb the nuclear arms race and stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons, his delegation advocated the immediate suspension of underground tests above the threshold at which nuclear explosions could already be identified by national means of detection. It also supported the proposal made at the International Assembly on Nuclear Weapons, held at Scarborough, Ontario, in June 1966, for a moratorium accompanied by a system of verification by invitation.

41. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus) said that political consideration rather than technical obstacles had so far prevented the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty. The nuclear Powers concerned, in weighing the military risks involved in the discontinuance of their own underground tests, must consider also the risks of nuclear tests carried out in the atmosphere by other Powers as well as the possibility of a breakdown of the partial test ban treaty of 1963. A further danger was that the continuance of underground tests would not facilitate agreement on a treaty on non-proliferation.

42. The present differences between the positions of the Soviet Union and the United States on the adequacy of national means of detection and identification of suspicious seismic events could be bridged if both Powers showed the necessary political will to reach agreement, for example, on a verifiable threshold and to accept a moratorium on underground tests below that threshold during a limited trial period. Such an agreement, in his view, would be of positive value. It was similar to the third of six variants outlined in the report of the Sixteenth Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs, which had been held at Sopot, Poland, in September 1966. The proposed establishment of a "detection club" might also facilitate agreement. With respect to the problem of inspection, the possibility of verification of seismic events by the International Atomic Energy Agency, as suggested by the representative of Italy (1457th meeting), should be studied.

43. In 1965 the Disarmament Commission had adopted a resolution assigning priority first to a comprehensive test ban treaty and then to a treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Unless a comprehensive test ban treaty was concluded, the other collateral measures leading to general and complete disarmament would be unduly delayed.

44. Mr. TRIVEDI (India) said that his country, which had always believed that the cessation of nuclear tests was imperative as a first step on the path of nuclear sanity, and also to safeguard the health of human beings, had been the first to appeal to the international community for an end to such tests. Unfortunately, that appeal had gone unheeded, but India had continued to raise the issue in the United Nations year after year, and eventually the General Assembly had adopted resolution 1762 (XVII) condemning all nuclear weapon tests.

45. The high hopes placed in the partial test ban treaty signed at Moscow in 1963 had been belied. That treaty had remained doubly partial. First, it had not been acceded to by all States, and two non-signatories continued to test nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, producing dangerous radio-active fall-out and placing the treaty itself in jeopardy. As stated in the joint memorandum of 17 August 1966 of the eight non-aligned members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee,<sup>2/</sup> the treaty should be adhered to and complied with universally.

46. In addition, the nuclear Powers continued to conduct underground nuclear weapon tests, thus sustaining and promoting the nuclear arms race.

47. The preamble to the partial test ban treaty incorporated a declaration of intent on the part of the nuclear-weapon Powers to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time. That had remained unfulfilled for over

three years and provided an undesirable precedent for a similar declaration of intent to reverse the nuclear arms race which was being referred to in the context of a treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

48. India had consistently maintained that pending the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty the nuclear Powers should agree to discontinue nuclear weapon tests. It had therefore supported suggestions for a formal treaty banning underground tests above an agreed seismic magnitude, together with the suspension of all tests. The threshold would subsequently be lowered as progress was made in techniques of detection and identification.

49. A total test ban would also be an effective non-proliferation measure, at least as far as the non-nuclear countries were concerned. The next logical step would be the prohibition of the further use of fissionable material for military purposes. Those two measures constituted an effective and functional approach to the task of halting the nuclear arms race and the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

50. The negotiations on the question of on-site inspection could proceed more constructively if there were a ban on all nuclear weapon tests. Such a ban would provide an additional incentive for work to improve detection and identification techniques and for the acceptance of constructive suggestions, such as the Swedish suggestion concerning verification by challenge or inquiry and co-operation among national seismic establishments.

*The meeting rose at 5.55 p.m.*

<sup>2/</sup> *Ibid.*, sect. O.