

# United Nations GENERAL ASSEMBLY

EIGHTEENTH SESSION

Official Records



FIRST COMMITTEE, 1335th  
MEETING

Wednesday, 13 November 1963,  
at 10.30 a.m.

NEW YORK

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Chairman: Mr. C. W. A. SCHURMANN  
(Netherlands).

## AGENDA ITEM 74

Denuclearization of Latin America (A/5415, A/5447 and Add.1, A/C.1/L.329) (continued)

GENERAL DEBATE AND CONSIDERATION OF DRAFT RESOLUTION A/C.1/L.329 (continued)

1. The CHAIRMAN suggested that considerable time could be saved if, instead of making individual statements, delegations holding the same views on the item before the Committee would appoint a few speakers to make statements on behalf of all of them; that procedure had been referred to in the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Improvement of the Methods of Work of the General Assembly (A/5423, para. 47). He emphasized that he was merely making a suggestion; any representative who placed his name on the list of speakers would, of course, be called on.

2. Mr. CABALLERO TAMAYO (Bolivia) said that the development of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles had removed the distinction that had existed in earlier times between countries inside and outside the theatre of war. Although the peoples of the world were still separated by vast differences between wealth and poverty, education and illiteracy, health and sickness, they were all united in being threatened by nuclear destruction. Every State Member of the United Nations must do its utmost to strengthen world peace; his delegation had therefore welcomed the Swedish

proposal for the creation of a "non-nuclear club",<sup>1/</sup> an arrangement through which the smaller nations could help to prevent the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons.

3. The proposal for the denuclearization of Latin America had first been made during the Caribbean crisis of 1962 by Brazil, and had been supported by Bolivia, Chile and Ecuador; later, at the initiative of the President of Mexico, a joint declaration on the subject had been issued by the Presidents of those five States (A/5415). While the Latin American States were fully competent under the United Nations Charter to sign bilateral or multilateral treaties independently of the United Nations, the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.329, regarding the question of the denuclearization of Latin America as integrally bound up with that of universal denuclearization and general and complete disarmament, had brought it before the General Assembly in order to secure the latter's moral support for their objective and to seek a moral commitment from the nuclear Powers to respect any treaty which might be arrived at.

4. The draft resolution took its inspiration not only from the Charter but also from similar resolutions which had in the past been adopted unanimously or by large majorities; moreover, it was fully consistent with the principle of respect for the sovereignty and self-determination of peoples. He therefore hoped that it would be adopted by acclamation, thus symbolizing the solidarity of the world with the peaceful aspirations of the peoples of Latin America. With regard to the term "Latin America", he wished to make it clear that his delegation shared the view that Latin America included Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago and other States of the region that might gain their independence in the near future.

5. Mr. DE BEUS (Netherlands) said that the Kingdom of the Netherlands, which consisted of three autonomous parts—the Netherlands in Europe, Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles—had a direct interest in the subject of denuclearized zones both in central Europe and in Latin America. The Netherlands was in general agreement with the idea of denuclearized zones, and was willing to co-operate in their establishment wherever they could further their basic purpose of diminishing tension, strengthening peace and security and promoting disarmament. As several previous speakers had pointed out, however, certain conditions had to be fulfilled if that purpose was to be accomplished. First, there must be agreement among the countries in the area; although absolute unanimity was perhaps not essential, such agreement must extend at least to all the countries which had or might possibly acquire nuclear weapons. Secondly, the balance of military power in the area must not be disturbed,

<sup>1/</sup> See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixteenth Session, First Committee, 1178th meeting.*

since a dangerous vacuum might be created, tempting adjacent Powers to bring the area under their domination. Thirdly, effective means of verification must be provided.

6. In the case of central Europe those conditions were obviously not satisfied, and his Government would consequently oppose the creation of a denuclearized zone in central Europe so long as that remained true, so long as denuclearization was not made part and parcel of a general disarmament agreement, and, also, so long as such a zone might serve to perpetuate a situation—he referred to the division of Germany and to the Berlin problem—which it regarded as the chief threat to peace in central Europe.

7. With one possible exception, however, the situation in Latin America was not fraught with any such difficulties. Accordingly, his delegation, speaking in particular on behalf of the Governments of Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles, welcomed the initiative taken by the Heads of State of five Latin American Republics in their declaration of 29 April 1963 on the denuclearization of Latin America (A/5415) and fully endorsed draft resolution A/C.1/L.329, the widespread support for which indicated that the first requirement for a nuclear-free zone was fulfilled. True, there was a possibility that one of the countries in the area might not support the draft resolution, and it was a matter for the other countries concerned to determine whether the non-participation of that particular country would render the creation of a denuclearized zone difficult or ineffective or would affect the question of the military balance, which would not otherwise arise.

8. The sequence of events that had led to the submission of draft resolution A/C.1/L.329 was a happy one and could well serve as an example in other areas. The idea of denuclearizing Latin America had emanated from the region itself, the initial steps had been taken by Latin American countries, and the draft resolution left the initiative to the States in the area. That was entirely as it should be, for in such cases it was not for the General Assembly but for the countries concerned to take the initiative.

9. Finally, he noted that the draft resolution did not refer to the essential question of verification and control, which would take on particular importance if one or two countries on the fringe of the area remained outside the agreement. He assumed however that that aspect of the matter was covered by the "measures that should be agreed upon" referred to in operative paragraph 2; moreover several of the sponsors had shown in their statements that they were aware of its importance.

10. Mr. BOLLINI SHAW (Argentina) said that the Presidents of Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador and Mexico, through their declaration of 29 April 1963, had pressed for the early recognition of Latin America as a denuclearized zone. In that connexion it was interesting to note that although the first areas proposed for denuclearization had all been in Europe, the first area actually recommended for denuclearization by the General Assembly had been Africa. That was because it had been recognized that denuclearization was easier to put into practice in those parts of the world where the atomic Powers were not in direct confrontation, where they had no atomic installations and where the balance of power would not immediately be disturbed.

11. In his reply to the appeal of the five Latin American Heads of State, the President of the Argentine

Republic had made it clear that his country fully supported all measures designed to eliminate the dangers of war and to channel the use of atomic energy towards exclusively peaceful purpose. That was evident from the fact that in 1959 Argentina had ratified the Antarctic Treaty, under which States having territories in Antarctica undertook to use it for peaceful purposes only and to prohibit nuclear explosions there, that it had subsequently supported the resolutions against the dissemination of nuclear weapons and the placing in orbit of nuclear devices, and that it had also adhered to the Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water.

12. Argentina accepted the idea of the denuclearization of Latin America. However, the creation of denuclearized zones raised a number of basic problems, as could be seen from the debates on the draft resolutions on the denuclearization of Africa and Latin America, and from the replies of Member States to the Secretary-General's request for information on the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1664 (XVI)<sup>2/</sup> concerning the prevention of the further spread of nuclear weapons. A number of interesting conclusions could be reached.

13. First, there was almost unanimous agreement that the creation of denuclearized zones would be a useful step towards the relaxation of international tension. With that opinion Argentina was in full agreement.

14. Secondly, there was general agreement that the creation of denuclearized zones must in no way upset the present military balance. That was why it was felt that only Africa and Latin America should be denuclearized to begin with, since neither region contained nuclear installations or vital strategic targets. That idea was acceptable to Argentina in principle, but it required further examination from the standpoint of the balance of military power. For instance, the Government of the Netherlands, in its reply to the request of the Secretary-General for information on the implementation of resolution 1664 (XVI),<sup>3/</sup> had shown concern with regard to the possible consequences for the small European nations of a unilateral renunciation of the stockpiling of nuclear weapons in view of the overwhelming superiority in conventional weapons of the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty. Similarly, in a statement made to the Committee at the 1321st meeting, the representative of India had revealed similar fears in connexion with any disarmament agreement which did not embrace the People's Republic of China, because of that country's immense power in conventional weapons. Both those reactions showed that the question of denuclearized zones was not merely one of a balance of power between the atomic nations; the non-nuclear countries too had to be assured that they would not be put in a position of inferiority to a potential enemy possessing a superiority in conventional weapons. That possibility must also be borne in mind in considering the denuclearization of Latin America.

15. Thirdly, Argentina fully agreed that any initiative for the creation of a denuclearized zone must come from the countries of the region, and that their unanimous consent was essential before the area could be declared denuclearized; the abstention of a single

<sup>2/</sup> See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for January 1961 to December 1962*, documents DC/201 and Add.1-3.

<sup>3/</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 77-79.

country would threaten the balance of power and would also make verification impossible.

16. Fourthly, verification or control to ensure that denuclearization was effective was essential in order to prevent any clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons into Latin America such as had taken place in the Caribbean region in 1962. However, any system of verification must be implemented with full respect for the principle of non-intervention.

17. The fifth point, and the most difficult so far as Latin America was concerned, was the need for a guarantee by the nuclear Powers that they would respect the region as a denuclearized zone; without such a guarantee Latin America's agreement to renounce one means of self-defence would be utterly invalidated. In particular, any instrument for the denuclearization of Latin America would have to contain specific provisions which would be juridically binding not only on all Powers which had colonial territories in the area but also on such territories when they attained independence.

18. For Argentina, the denuclearization of a region was not merely a matter of idealism or a useful expedient for resolving such emergency problems as the cessation of tests in the Sahara or the elimination of nuclear bases in the Caribbean; it meant a vigorous common effort to close the ring which, slowly but surely, was reducing the dangers of war. The denuclearization of Latin America should therefore be studied most carefully by all the countries directly concerned; and that could best be done at the regional level through the Organization of American States. Arrangements would also have to be made to include in any agreement reached such countries as Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, which were not yet members of the Organization of American States.

19. With regard to the machinery of denuclearization, he shared the views expressed by other delegations that the general principles of denuclearization should be studied by the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. The creation of denuclearized zones was a collateral measure of disarmament, and thus should not be separated from the context of general and complete disarmament. Studies of the general principles involved would be of great value when it came to drawing up a multilateral agreement for the denuclearization of Latin America.

20. In conclusion, he said that the Argentine delegation would support draft resolution A/C.1/L.329.

21. Mr. STEVENSON (United States of America) said the United States believed that under appropriate circumstances a Latin American nuclear-free zone would be a most constructive contribution to the cause of peace; his delegation would therefore support draft resolution A/C.1/L.329. Any ultimate decision on the desirability of a denuclearized zone must, of course, be made by the Latin American States themselves, and it was his understanding that the draft resolution had their broad support. The establishment of nuclear-free zones in areas where nuclear weapons did not form part of the existing security arrangements could be most useful in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and thus reducing the threat of war. If the denuclearization of a zone was to be effective, there must be adequate provision for verification to assure the countries participating and those respecting the arrangement that it would be fully observed; in addition, the zone must include all States in the area concerned.

22. Exercising his right of reply, he said that the charge referred to and apparently endorsed by the representative of Tanganyika at the preceding meeting—that the United States was in agreement with South Africa with regard to testing underground nuclear bombs—was baseless and unsupported. He regretted that the representative of any Member State should repeat a charge of such gravity against another State without first consulting the delegation of that State or checking the sources of his information. Moreover, he wished to know whether the Government of Tanganyika stood by that irresponsible charge; if it did, it had made no representation on the matter to the United States Government. The representative of Tanganyika had perhaps been referring to a scientific physics project of the Case Institute of Technology in co-operation with Witwatersrand University involving an experiment undertaken in a South African mine at a depth of some 10,500 feet. That experiment was concerned with the investigation of neutrinos, a subject of fundamental importance to the understanding of the basic constituents of matter and their interaction. The site had been selected because the experiment could be best conducted at a great depth; it bore no relation whatsoever to the testing of nuclear weapons and would be accompanied by no explosions.

23. Mr. ALI (Pakistan) said that the significance of the joint declaration (A/5415) by the Presidents of Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador and Mexico, to whose wisdom and statesmanship he paid tribute, lay in the fact that it could be put into effect without waiting for agreement between the nuclear Powers. His Government would await with special interest the result of the studies envisaged in draft resolution A/C.1/L.329, for the denuclearization of Latin America would help not only to lessen tension throughout the world but, by finding solutions for the problems of unanimity, strategic balance and verification, to solve the problem of general and complete disarmament. Although nuclear-free zones were not a universal panacea, they could be an important step towards total disarmament, which could not begin before rearmament had been halted. The Caribbean crisis of 1962 had shown that there was nothing to be gained by extending the area of nuclear confrontation. It was to be hoped, therefore, that the nuclear Powers would co-operate in sealing off from the nuclear race as many countries and regions as were willing to renounce becoming involved in it; for while that would only stabilize the existing balance of power, the psychological gains would be immense and might pave the way to nuclear disengagement.

24. Since 1957, when the possibility of creating non-nuclear zones had first been suggested under the proposal known as the Rapacki plan, various positive steps had been taken in that direction: Antarctica had been denuclearized in 1959; outer space could be considered a nuclear-free zone thanks to the conclusion of the partial test ban treaty and the pledges given by the United States and the Soviet Union to refrain from orbiting nuclear weapons; the General Assembly, in its resolution 1652 (XVI), had called on Member States to respect the continent of Africa as a denuclearized zone; and the President of Finland had stated that the Scandinavian countries constituted a "non-nuclear club" by virtue of their own unilateral declarations, although two of them—Denmark and Norway—were members of NATO.

25. Those examples, while admittedly peripheral, illustrated the varied conditions in which nuclear-free

zones could be successfully established. In the case of Antarctica and outer space, conditions had of course been exceptionally favourable. The problems encountered in other areas differed considerably, and in that connexion he wished to stress the need to distinguish between proposals to preserve the character of existing non-nuclear zones and proposals to denuclearize existing zones of nuclear confrontation. It would be unrealistic to expect that the latter could be achieved outside the context of comprehensive disarmament. In the last analysis, the prospects for the denuclearization of a given zone depended on the particular circumstances of the zone and the role it played in the strategic balance of power, and those considerations in turn determined the extent to which the various conditions for denuclearization had to be fulfilled.

26. His delegation had suggested at the seventeenth session, in the First Committee (1273rd meeting), that the Eighteen-Nation Committee might study the possibilities of reaching agreement on the establishment of nuclear-free zones in various regions of the world, and it supported the suggestion that the Eighteen-Nation Committee should consider the general principles applicable to such zones.

27. Security was a vital consideration for any State, and it was fortunate that the security of the vast majority of nations was not tied up with the nuclear arms race. The security of the developing countries depended on their success in meeting the economic challenge, and would in fact be undermined by any diversion of resources into a local nuclear race on however small a scale.

28. His country had repeatedly stressed the dangers attendant on the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and was gratified that in the draft resolution that had been submitted on the question of general and complete disarmament (A/C.1/L.382) the Eighteen-Nation Committee was urged, although perhaps not in sufficiently positive terms, to continue its efforts in that field. The primary responsibility for limiting the dissemination of nuclear weapons lay with the countries concerned themselves; recent events had shown that the smaller Powers need not resign themselves to playing a passive role. He hoped that the proposal for the denuclearization of Latin America would inspire similar initiatives elsewhere, and that consideration of the problem of regional denuclearization would lead to a study of zonal arrangements for the reduction of conventional armaments, bringing nearer the evolution of denuclearized zones into the "regional areas of law and limited armaments" advocated by the Minister for External Affairs of Ireland in his statement to the General Assembly (1226th plenary meeting, para. 18).

29. His delegation would vote for draft resolution A/C.1/L.329.

30. Mr. LEKIC (Yugoslavia) said that the proposal for the denuclearization of Latin America represented an effort to prevent that region from being drawn into the cold war and to limit the geographical scope of the nuclear arms race. The establishment of denuclearized zones, by contributing to the relaxation of international tension, served to promote agreement on disarmament and other world problems. As to the general requirement that the initiative for establishing a denuclearized zone should come from the countries concerned, he believed that that point was quite clear and should not present any difficulties. The representative of Ecuador had outlined very adequately, at the Committee's 1328th meeting, what should be understood to repre-

sent a unanimous demand by the countries of a region for such a zone. Nor should the question of maintaining a balance of power or that of verification, which had been fully discussed at recent meetings by the representatives of Brazil, Chile, Ecuador and Mexico, raise any problem in connexion with the present proposal. The countries concerned were obviously best qualified to decide all such matters in accordance with their circumstances. At the same time, it must be borne in mind that the establishment of denuclearized zones did not depend solely on the countries of the area but also called for a firm undertaking by the nuclear Powers to respect those countries' denuclearization.

31. His delegation supported draft resolution A/C.1/L.329.

32. Mr. BAGHDELLEH (Tanganyika), exercising his right of reply, said that while his delegation was glad to accept the United States representative's assurance that the projected experiment in South Africa would have nothing to do with atomic explosions, he wondered whether the United States and South African Governments would be willing to allow representatives of the International Atomic Energy Agency to be present when the experiment was conducted. His own and many other African delegations were concerned lest the racist Government of South Africa should gain access to atomic knowledge and the African continent become involved in the cold war.

33. Mr. BOTHA (South Africa) said that although he had replied at the previous meeting to the Tanganyikan representative's original allegation, he wished to state now that the source on which the Tanganyikan representative had relied in making that allegation was utterly lacking in authority and deserving of no attention.

## AGENDA ITEM 27

Question of convening a conference for the purpose of signing a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons: report of the Secretary-General (A/5518, A/C.1/L.330) (continued)

### GENERAL DEBATE AND CONSIDERATION OF DRAFT RESOLUTION A/C.1/L.330 (continued)

34. Mr. ALI (Pakistan) wished first to place on record his delegation's appreciation of the humanitarian spirit and concern for peace animating the delegations that had requested the inclusion in the Assembly's agenda of the item under discussion. While all who had responded to the Secretary-General's inquiries pursuant to General Assembly resolutions 1653 (XVI) and 1801 (XVII) were agreed that recourse to nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons would result in the annihilation of mankind, not all of them were in agreement as to the practicality of the method proposed for eliminating that threat. The Pakistan Government considered that the question of prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons should be studied in the context of negotiations on general and complete disarmament. The nuclear bomb was a decisive weapon on which all the major Powers based their strategic planning, and it would be unrealistic to hope that it could be outlawed in the absence of a comprehensive disarmament agreement and of foolproof guarantees.

35. The Pakistan delegation would be happy to vote for draft resolution A/C.1/L.330, and hoped that the



Eighteen-Nation Committee would study the possibility of reaching agreement on methods for banning the use of nuclear weapons.

## AGENDA ITEM 26

Question of general and complete disarmament: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (A/5408-DC/207, A/5488-DC/208, A/C.1/891 and Corr.1, A/C.1/L.328 and Add.1-2) (continued)\*

### CONSIDERATION OF DRAFT RESOLUTION A/C.1/L.328 AND ADD. 1-2 (continued)

36. Mr. SEYDOUX (France) said that he wished to reply to the remarks which the representative of the USSR had made at the 1330th meeting concerning the Federal Republic of Germany and its relations with certain members of NATO. The Soviet representative and several other members of the Committee continued to denounce the Franco-German treaty of 22 January 1963, which had been hailed throughout the world as marking the end of the age-old rivalry between France and Germany. Contrary to what some speakers had suggested, the treaty in no sense affected the obligation assumed by the Federal Republic of Germany in 1954 to refrain from manufacturing atomic, bacteriological or chemical weapons. The Soviet representative had referred to a recent agreement between the French Atomic Energy Commissariat and a West German company, which he had said had been concluded under the Franco-German treaty of military co-operation, when in fact it had merely involved the sharing of experience gained by France in the construction of graphite and heavy-water reactors. The Soviet Union had not denied its friends the benefit of similar experience which it had gained.

37. The real cause of tension in Europe was not the perfectly legitimate desire of the Federal Republic of Germany to undertake the defence of its own territory by every means consistent with its obligations. The cause of that tension was, rather, the threat to Berlin and its access routes, the construction of the Berlin wall in violation of international agreements, and the refusal to recognize the German people's right of self-determination.

38. Mr. NOVIKOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said the French representative had made no attempt to refute the evidence that had been presented to show that little remained for the undertaking entered into by West Germany in 1954, since the Western Powers had made one concession after another to German revanchism and militarism. West Germany was today ruled by the same groups which had controlled Germany at the time of its wars of aggression against various other countries, including France.

39. Sir Patrick DEAN (United Kingdom) said that the uncompromising tone adopted by the Soviet representative was not in keeping with the Soviet Union's expressed desire to improve relations between East and West. He wondered whether the Soviet representative was seeking to keep the barriers of distrust and suspicion intact just when they were showing signs of beginning to crumble, or whether his allegations concerning the Federal Republic of Germany were part of a Soviet campaign to justify the division of

Germany, the existence of the unpopular East German régime, the presence of twenty-two Soviet divisions in East Germany and the denial of self-determination to its 18 million people. In his statement at the 1330th meeting the Soviet representative had referred to the tremendous losses suffered by the Soviet Union in the Second World War. The United Kingdom, which had also suffered greatly in that conflict, had the deepest sympathy for the sacrifices made by the Soviet Union. However, the problems of 1963 could not be solved by constantly looking back at what had happened twenty and more years ago. West Germany had armed itself within the framework of a military alliance, not unilaterally; moreover, it had done so in response to a very real threat from outside and in order to be in a position to defend itself if necessary. If the Soviet Union could rid itself of its irrational fears in that regard, it might be possible to work towards a settlement of the German question and thus make a beginning in the process of disarmament in Europe and throughout the world.

40. Mr. NOVIKOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that in connexion with the attempts to depict West Germany as a peace-loving, democratic State, he wished to draw attention to the recent statement by Mr. Adenauer, until recently the Chancellor of West Germany, that the Western countries should withhold aid from the Soviet Union in its present agricultural difficulties as a means of forcing it to make political concessions; his advice to the Western Powers was thus to use hunger as a weapon against the Soviet Union—a policy which would not succeed. It was contended that the Soviet delegation's statements were not in keeping with the present improved atmosphere; however, it was the Western delegations which had criticized the position of his delegation, not the Soviet delegation which had criticized them. The Soviet Union's friendly relations with the Western Powers did not mean that it would tolerate the policy pursued by the German revanchists and militarists.

41. Mr. STEVENSON (United States of America) regretted that some delegations, notably the Soviet Union, were persisting in unjust attacks against the Federal Republic of Germany. Although the First Committee was an inappropriate place for consideration of European security arrangements, he wished to point out that the unprovoked charges against West Germany were, in fact, directed toward the North Atlantic Treaty Organization since West German armed forces, an integral part of the defence of Western Europe, were one and the same with NATO forces. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, of which West Germany was a member, had been established fourteen years earlier in response to a threat to the peace of Europe, and it would not lower its guard until that threat had disappeared. The nuclear weapons now deployed in West German territory were under the exclusive control of the United States and the United Kingdom. It should be recalled, moreover, that it was East Germany which had first begun to rearm after the Second World War. The recent events on the access routes to West Berlin were an example of the type of provocation for which the Western alliance must still be prepared. His delegation hoped that the Committee's efforts to achieve agreement on disarmament would not be impeded by further polemics against the Western defence structure.

The meeting rose at 12.50 p.m.

\*Resumed from the 1332nd meeting.