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AGENDA ITEM 93

Question of Cyprus (*continued*) (A/C.1/L.336/Rev.1, L.341/Rev.1, L.342/Rev.2 and Add.1-3):

(a) Letter dated 13 July 1965 from the representative of Cyprus (A/5934 and Add.1);

(b) Letter dated 21 July 1965 from the representative of Turkey (A/5938 and Add.1)

GENERAL DEBATE (*concluded*)

1. Mr. OTEMA ALLIMADI (Uganda) said that the problem of Cyprus hinged on the maintenance of that country's sovereign independence and territorial integrity. When the independence and sovereignty of a small nation was threatened because of the eagerness of certain great Powers to intervene, all countries must inevitably be concerned. It was not too much to ask Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom to work towards a peaceful solution in co-operation with the Cypriot Government, which must be allowed to settle its internal affairs without any foreign pressure.

2. While Turkey's desire to safeguard the interests of Turkish Cypriots was understandable, the maintenance of the national unity of Cyprus was of paramount importance. The example of Uganda, where minority groups of foreign origin had been fully integrated into the population, showed that different ethnic communities could live together in harmony as one people. He agreed with the United Nations Mediator that the division of the island would be a desperate step in the wrong direction. The Cypriot people would gain nothing from such a measure, since they would then be living as two hostile camps on the same island. He was sure that the minority in Cyprus did not want the power to block all legislation if they saw fit; the Cypriot people wished to live in peace, and should be allowed to do so. The Cyprus Government had demonstrated its willingness to achieve a peaceful solution by agreeing to accept United Nations guarantees of minority rights. It was the duty of the United Nations to offer such guarantees, which might open the way to a solution of the problem

based on the unity and sovereign independence of Cyprus. With that end in view, the Powers concerned should refrain from any measures which might aggravate the situation.

3. As a non-aligned country, Uganda judged each issue on its merits. After full consideration of the question, the Ugandan delegation had joined in sponsoring the thirty-one-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.342/Rev.2 and Add.1-3) as the fairest and most sensible of the drafts before the Committee. He hoped that it would receive the Committee's overwhelming support.

4. Mr. NGWIRI (Malawi) said that his country's foreign policy was based on the fundamental principles of the United Nations Charter. Malawi's approach to the question of Cyprus was guided by the same principles: the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus must be respected and its people must be permitted to choose their political future without outside intervention. The principles of the Charter were equally relevant to all States Members of the United Nations, and they offered the only path to a possible solution.

5. He shared the view of the Kenyan representative that the Zurich and London agreements had institutionalized communal strife and given the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey the power to intervene in the internal affairs of the State of Cyprus. While treaties and international agreements must be respected, the dynamics of international relations necessitated their periodic adjustment; the London and Zurich agreements should be reviewed from the standpoint of the new reality: the existence of the sovereign and equal State of Cyprus. It was distressing that the Cypriot people, who had fought together for their independence and dignity, should now be locked in bitter conflict, and that relations between the interested countries should have seriously deteriorated. He appealed to Greece and Turkey to co-operate in reaching a just and acceptable solution. In that connexion, he noted that Greece was prepared to accept the withdrawal from Cyprus of all foreign forces except the United Nations Force; he hoped that Turkey would find it possible to respond to that attitude, so that all foreign troops could eventually be withdrawn from the island. In the meantime, Malawi would continue to support the efforts of the United Nations to maintain peace and stability in Cyprus.

6. Malawi had joined in sponsoring the thirty-one Power draft resolution because it regarded it as a creative compromise which might produce the climate needed for a solution based on the principles of the Charter and the sovereign independence of Cyprus. He hoped that the members of the Committee would give the draft resolution their support.

7. Mr. NSANZE (Burundi) said that his delegation's approach to the question of Cyprus was based on Burundi's policy of non-alignment. Intervention in the affairs of other States was sometimes motivated by racial or ethnic considerations or questions of prestige rather than by a sincere desire to settle the dispute involved. The mediation efforts in Cyprus should not be deemed to constitute a precedent since mediation might not be acceptable to the parties in all cases.

8. Burundi's main desire was to reconcile, not oppose, the two communities in Cyprus. Nature and history had united the destinies of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities, which should shape their future together in harmony. The minority group had the same right to life and citizenship as the majority group, and the same fundamental human rights. Any victory of one ethnic group over another in the same national community could only spell the destruction of the nation. The Cypriot people should realize that they alone could work out their own salvation. They must help themselves before others could help them, and create a single national identity—a Cypriot identity.

9. Burundi appealed to all countries to refrain from offering or imposing their good offices, which would merely spread and perpetuate the dissension in Cyprus. The opposing sides would be in a better position to work for a reconciliation in the absence of outside interference; intervention, which was condemned by international law and by the Charter of the United Nations, would only exacerbate the rivalry between them.

10. It was the duty of the United Nations to ensure that all peoples had the opportunity to decide their own fate. Only then would colonialism be finally eliminated.

11. Mr. BAKOTO (Cameroon) said that his Government regarded Cyprus as a sovereign State in the fullest sense of the word; to question the sovereignty of Cyprus would be to question its status as a Member of the United Nations. Neither Security Council resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 nor the resolutions adopted later on the same subject questioned the independence of the island. Furthermore, the sovereign equality of all Members was proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations.

12. The Cyprus Government had the obligation to protect all its nationals, and its obligations towards the Turkish minority in that respect was particularly strong. The Cameroonian delegation therefore welcomed the Cyprus Government's declaration of intention on that subject (A/6039), and commended Cyprus for having undertaken to accept a United Nations presence to guarantee the implementation of the minority rights.

13. Thanks to United Nations action, the fighting in Cyprus had ceased; what remained was to find a final solution to the problem. The United Nations should suggest guidelines for a peaceful settlement. The parties had appealed to the United Nations for assistance. That assistance should not take the form of a resolution offering nothing new; at a time when the failure of the United Nations to cope with certain

important problems was damaging the Organization's prestige, it would be extremely dangerous to evade the problem of Cyprus once again. An encouraging precedent was to be found in General Assembly resolution 1287 (XIII), in pursuance of which negotiations had been held that had led to the independence of Cyprus. The Mediator had stated in his report that the parties concerned were prepared to enter into discussions and were only awaiting the General Assembly's decision. In its decision, the Assembly should specify that Cyprus should be independent, that the minorities should not be subjected to any discrimination, and that the parties, with United Nations assistance, should conduct negotiations on that basis. The United Nations would thus demonstrate that it was really able to meet its responsibility for the maintenance of peace. For those reasons, his delegation had joined in sponsoring the thirty-one-Power draft resolution.

14. Mr. PAYSSE REYES (Uruguay) said that his delegation's decision to join the sponsors of the thirty-one-Power draft resolution should not be interpreted as an expression of any particular political viewpoint on the question of Cyprus. He would have an opportunity of referring to certain aspects of that question during the Security Council's forthcoming debate.

15. He had decided to sponsor the draft resolution, first, because it would place on record in a United Nations document the Cyprus Government's declared intentions regarding basic issues such as the full application of human rights and the ensuring of minority rights, and secondly, because it stated clearly in operative paragraph 1 that Cyprus was an equal Member of the United Nations. There were no first-class and second-class Members of the Organization. All Members enjoyed equal sovereign rights; and, to dispel any possible doubts, the General Assembly should specifically say so.

16. Even when allowance was made for the very special circumstances in which it had been drawn up, the Constitution of Cyprus was indeed a constitutional oddity. In 1828 his own country, too, had been established as a sovereign State by a treaty concluded between three foreign Powers—the United Provinces of the Río de la Plata, the Brazilian Empire and the United Kingdom; but the unusual circumstances of its birth had never made it feel that its sovereignty and independence were in some way limited. In the case of Cyprus there was a similar situation. In fact, the full sovereignty and complete independence of the Cypriot State were legally unassailable. Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom had all assumed obligations under the relevant agreements to respect the territorial integrity of Cyprus; and the appeal contained in operative paragraph 2 of the thirty-one-Power draft resolution for all States to respect the sovereignty and unity of Cyprus, and to refrain from any intervention directed against it, should help to dispel any fears about the permanence of Cyprus's territorial integrity.

17. At a time when the General Assembly was about to reaffirm the inadmissibility of intervention in the domestic affairs of States, it was surely quite logical to insist that there should be no foreign intervention

or interference in the affairs of Cyprus. The three Powers which were guarantors of the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus should do exactly that, and no more; they should leave the Republic of Cyprus to settle its domestic affairs on its own.

18. Mr. JOUEJATI (Syria) said that his country, which had cordial relations and close cultural affinities with Turkey and Cyprus alike, was anxious above all that peace should be maintained in the eastern Mediterranean, so that economic and social development in that region could proceed unhindered. It also subscribed to the Declaration adopted by the Second Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Cairo in October 1964, which had affirmed that Cyprus should enjoy unrestricted and unfettered sovereignty and independence.

19. Accordingly, his delegation regarded the existence of foreign military bases in Cyprus as a violation of the sovereignty of Cyprus and a threat to peace in the whole area; and it earnestly hoped that the entire Cypriot people, which had fought so hard to secure its independence, would now be able—with tolerance, understanding and active co-operation—to consolidate its independence. The possibilities of mediation were not exhausted, and the differences existing between various sections of the Cypriot population could, and must, be settled. As the United Nations Mediator himself had stated, in paragraph 124 of his report,^{1/} mediation must go on, and all of the parties wished it to do so.

^{1/} Official Records of the Security Council, Twentieth Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1965, document S/6253.

20. The confidence which all the parties were placing in the United Nations mediation effort did indeed give grounds for optimism; but one essential premise for continued mediation and negotiation was respect for the independence and sovereignty of Cyprus. The idea of partition, in any form, was irrelevant; and bitter experience had shown that any proposal to partition the island might have explosive consequences. If the rights of all citizens of Cyprus—regardless of their race or religion—were protected by comprehensive guarantees, all citizens could be expected to fulfil their common obligations and responsibilities.

21. Of the various texts before the Committee, the thirty-one-Power draft resolution most closely reflected the views of his own delegation and seemed most likely to facilitate an early solution to the problem; and he would therefore vote for it.

22. Mr. COLLIER (Sierra Leone) said that the sponsors of the thirty-one-Power draft resolution wished to hold an informal discussion on the possibility of incorporating some of the proposals made by other delegations. Accordingly, he moved the suspension of the meeting under rule 119 of the rules of procedure.

The motion was adopted.

The meeting was suspended at 11.50 a.m. and resumed at 12.50 p.m.

23. The CHAIRMAN suggested that, since the sponsors of the thirty-one-Power draft resolution required more time for their deliberations, the meeting should be adjourned.

It was so decided.

The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m.