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**Chairman:** Mr. Francisco URRUTIA (Colombia).

**AGENDA ITEMS 20 AND 68**

**Regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments: report of the Disarmament Commission (A/2685, A/C.1/751, A/C.1/752/Rev.2) (*continued*)**

**Conclusion of an international convention (treaty) on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction (A/2742 and Corr.1, A/2742/Add.1, A/C.1/750) (*continued*)**

1. Mr. Charles MALIK (Lebanon): With the tabling last Friday, 22 October 1954, of the five-Power draft resolution [A/C.1/752/Rev.2] in which the Soviet Union at last joined Canada, France, the United Kingdom and the United States, the next step in the development of this question now seems clear. Indeed, ever since the Soviet Union introduced its draft resolution in the General Assembly on 30 September 1954 [484th meeting] it was almost fated that the procedure would be the one now suggested. The immediate meaning of the Soviet Union draft resolution [A/2742 and Corr.1] of that date, as its very first sentence proves, was that another attempt, in the Disarmament Commission, to solve this great question was now both indicated and inevitable. One might, therefore, have proceeded immediately to this step on 30 September if United Nations procedure had allowed it. One could have done so without any important loss to the cause of disarmament as far as its purely technical aspects are concerned. I think that we have proof of this in the very terms of the joint draft resolution before us since, in that document, there is scarcely any reference to this debate or to the significant exchanges of views which have taken place in the course of it. It would seem to me, therefore, that it would be well for the authors of this text to consider including some reference to what has taken place in this Committee during this session of the General Assembly. It is true that the preamble says "Having considered," but that is about all. I suggest, therefore, that it would not be inappropriate if operative paragraph 2 would contain some reference to what has taken place in the First

Committee, in addition to the phrase "taking into account" which, quite properly, now appears in the paragraph. My very tentative suggestion would be the addition of the words "bearing in mind the debates on this question at the present session of the General Assembly," immediately after the first comma in operative paragraph 2, and then "taking into account," etc.

2. "Bearing in mind" is different from "taking into account." It is quite true that "taking into account" is more proper for the formal proposals that are before us, but it seems to me that out of deference to all the labour which some of us have put into preparing our speeches, arranging our ideas and making our suggestions, it would be well for the authors of this text to include that small reference.

3. I think that this small change would introduce the least possible disturbance into the structure of this text and should be acceptable to the five Powers concerned. I will certainly not press it at all in case that it should cause any difficulty, because I know at what price of toil and care and consultation this unanimity of the five Powers in the matter of the text has been achieved, but it seems to me that, out of deference to the debate which has taken place in this Committee, it would be well to include a reference to it in the text.

4. Now, as I have said, this debate, important as it has been, has not in fact advanced the cause of disarmament, or of agreement on disarmament, one step beyond the situation as it existed on 30 September. Despite all the prodding and questioning to which Mr. Vyshinsky has been subjected during the last two weeks — and I must confess that I think he was right in feeling and saying that, in this momentous matter, the method of question and answer is not altogether appropriate as between the Powers principally concerned, at least in this general, open debate; this method, perhaps, has its rightful place at the moment of concrete, detailed negotiation in a smaller group — the Soviet Union's position is still exactly what it was on 30 September. A misunderstanding here or there may have been cleared up, but on the fundamental question of the juxtaposition of the Franco-British proposals of 11 June 1954 [DC/53, annex 9] and the Soviet Union's draft resolution of 30 September and of the extent to which the principles of the former are really the basis of the principles of the latter, the present debate has not advanced very far.

5. The reason for this is that in these matters, where the ultimate positions of the two sides really come to grips with one another and where, in the end it really becomes a question of yes or no on a dozen or so fundamental issues, negotiations cannot take place in public but must be private, informal, sustained and thorough; and none of this can best be attained in general debates of this nature. In the basic chronology

of disarmament, therefore, this is still 30 September. An apparent move had been made between 11 June and 30 September, and the immediate task is to find out, insistently and unambiguously, how real and how far-reaching this move is. This is the task of direct, serious negotiation, and not of general debate.

6. While, therefore, it would seem that the machinery of the United Nations could, on 30 September, have passed immediately on to the stage now contemplated by the five-Power draft resolution without any substantive loss to the cause of disarmament, does it follow that the debate in this Committee and the general debate in plenary meetings of the General Assembly after 30 September were of no use? Not at all. The exchanges that have taken place have served — and the exchanges that doubtless will take place before this matter is taken up by the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission will serve — many purposes that are more or less good and useful. I shall now list these purposes.

7. In the first place, the debate could not have been avoided because of the rules of procedure of the United Nations. The matter had to be referred to the First Committee, as it has been, and we had to inquire into it here in the manner in which we have done. Thus, as I say, the debate could not have been avoided. In the second place, even if it could have been avoided, it should not have been. The rest of us have something to say about this whole business, as many representatives have already indicated. We are all deeply concerned, and for two reasons. First, if there is war it will afflict all of us and not only the great Powers. In fact, it will be the small Powers which will, perhaps, suffer more from war than will the great Powers, because it is possible that in a war something would be left of the great Powers whereas nothing would be left of the small ones. We all know what happened in the last two wars, when many a small power was obliterated from the map of the world. Second, if there is going to be disarmament, the savings therefrom will, it is hoped — as, indeed, it has been promised — in part enable the less developed peoples and countries of the world to develop themselves.

8. The speeches so far have all been helpful; they have all been marked by a real, positive sense of urgency and of hope. This debate bears the clearest study and the closest examination by any sincere student of world affairs. It reflects the general desire for accommodation that seems to characterize the present epoch. The temper has been, "Let bygones be bygones if only we can proceed from here." By way of a general spiritual basis, as a determinant of mood and atmosphere, and as reflecting and enhancing the now seemingly prevailing spirit of amiability, this has been a most useful debate. In it we are all drawn together into the one common solidarity of mankind.

9. The third use to which this debate has been put is that of clarifying the issues. Thus, for instance, we all understand now what question or questions should, in the end, be determined by the Disarmament Commission. We know, for instance, that everything hinges on the problem of control and what has been called "the problem of simultaneity." The questions of Mr. Moch, the precise explanations offered by Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, the basic problems raised by Mr. Wadsworth, the clarifications of Mr. Martin, the topical distinctions of Sir Percy Spender, the analyses and challenges of Mr. Belaúnde and the trenchant, if also somewhat

playful and sauntering excursions of Mr. Vyshinsky — to mention only a few of those who have participated in this debate so far — must all add to the wealth and depth and clarity of this whole problem. If there has been no real substantive progress beyond the stage of 30 September — if such progress must await more intimate consideration — there has, nevertheless, been considerable progress in the circumscription and definition of problems that have to be faced and solved.

10. Then, in the fourth place, there has been a profusion of suggestions of avenues and alternatives. There are thus diverse ways of reaching a solution of this problem; there seems to remain only the will to choose among those ways. Therefore, the problem is not so much one of machinery as of will and, indeed, good will. The issue, therefore, is focussed upon ultimate moral and political realities, and not upon mere technique.

11. The fifth use or purpose that this debate serves is that it informs an anxious world opinion that the great debate continues; that the nations are trying to come to grips with these tremendous issues; that the facts and possibilities of the atomic age have a sobering influence; that there is, it seems, a reconsideration — or at least the possibility of a reconsideration — of fundamental doctrine; that mankind has really come to a crossroads; that, in the face of what Mr. Belaúnde has aptly described as "the infinite danger of nuclear weapons," we have now suddenly passed into an entirely new dimension of thought and fear and expectation with regard to war and peace, armament and disarmament, international law and international relations, and that, therefore, under this present danger it is incumbent upon all of us, big and small, ruler and ruled, friend and foe, expert and layman, to invent — yes, to invent — as coolly and as wisely as possible new categories of thought with which to grasp and interpret the objective situation.

12. In the utterly unprecedented situation in which the world finds itself there is room for the boldest but also the most responsible possible imagination. I read on Saturday that very responsible gentlemen had said that we had reached the stage now when atomic bombs could be packed in a suitcase. Think of the many suitcases that are about in the world; think of some of them containing actual atomic bombs; it is a very sobering thought. This is the infinitely serious situation in which we seem to live today.

13. The present debate, then, serves this great purpose of reassuring anxious mankind that a major serious, collective effort is being made to come to grips with the infinite dangers of this incredible age — with what Mr. Paul Martin called the other day [688th meeting] "the cataclysmic possibilities of the future."

14. We all know that in mathematics, when one passes to infinity, the rules are altogether different from the rules applicable to finite magnitudes. To be sure, there are still rules, even at infinity — but they are not at all the rules of finitude. With nuclear weapons, we have, analogously speaking, passed to infinity, and therefore we require new rules that can fit the new dimensions.

15. I do not believe the nations are paying only lip service to peace and disarmament. I believe that the realization of the unimaginable consequences of any atomic war has at last sobered people and made them think very profoundly about the future.

16. There is a sixth use to which this debate may be, or may have been, put. In so far as the cold war is still on—and I believe that I am not far wrong in maintaining that international tension has not yet completely abated—and in so far as the nations may wish calmly to examine together the issues of the cold war, the present debate could serve as a fruitful exercise toward that end.

17. I was struck by what Mr. Martin, the representative of Canada, said on 13 October in his first statement on this matter. He said [688th meeting]:

“...in view of the long and unhappy experience which we have all had in negotiations on this subject, we cannot wholly remove from our minds the memory of past manœuvres intended to play upon the hopes and fears of all peoples for the narrow national advantage of one country in the battle for the minds of men. In 1954, the ninth year of the atomic age and the third year in which all countries have coexisted in the fear of hydrogen weapons, it is already much too late for any of us to treat the subject of disarmament as an element in the cold war.”

I myself hope that the absolute seriousness which underlies these remarkable words of Mr. Martin is fully understood.

18. However, be that as it may, there are three obvious ways in which this debate may be useful in the cold war if people want to put it to such use.

19. In the first place, nations can infer, very roughly and very circumstantially, but still more or less infer, one another's preparedness in this or that crucial type of weapon. Thus, for example, both from the apparent relaxation of the Soviet Union's position with respect to the previously proposed unconditional prohibition of the use of atomic or other nuclear weapons and from Mr. Vyshinsky's explicit assertions that Western belief in Western superiority in these weapons may be an illusion—and a costly illusion at that—from both these facts we may, not unreasonably, infer that the Soviet Union is well advanced in being equipped with these weapons. From the rigid or inflexible attitude of some nations with respect to certain sensitive matters, many things may be rightly inferred and adjustments in the prosecution of the cold war may thus be made. Similarly, from the proposal for a conditional declaration of prohibition embodied in the Franco-British memorandum of 11 June 1954 and from the modulations of that proposal, both spoken and tacit that we have since heard made by certain representatives, many matters may be inferred. This, then, is the first way in which this debate may be useful in the cold war.

20. The second way of making use of the debate is, of course, the familiar one of so manœuvring and timing this debate and the stages of its development as to score some political and ideological advantage in other situations and in other areas of this marvellously and sensitively interdependent world. I shall not enlarge upon this point, save to say that such “legitimate uses” of United Nations debate are not beyond the ingenuity of men while the cold war continues, and that therefore it pays for innocence to set limits to itself.

21. The third way in which this important debate on disarmament can be used in the cold war is so to measure and manœuvre one's positions and pronouncements as to make the blame for the failure of disarmament appear to fall upon the other nation and the other

camp, should such failure prove to be the case, whatever its real causes in that event. I suggest in all realism that while the cold war rages, and in so far as it rages—and let us hope that it will cease, so that this suggestion of mine will itself prove useless—no nation can afford to have it appear in the face of world opinion that, in this or other debates, the cause of disarmament was impeded or obstructed by its words, positions or deeds. It follows that, while there still is uncertainty regarding the cold war, every nation must strike such a dialectical posture in this debate as to make it appear that in reality it was all for disarmament and that, if disarmament did not come about, that was not its fault. Such caution and such conduct are not only legitimate; they are the essence of the present international situation. From a dialectical and profoundly human point of view, as also from the point of view of its far-reaching implications, nothing is more striking in this entire debate than the manner in which representatives appear to be vying with one another in the virtues of tolerance, patience, amiability, openness of mind, hopefulness, optimism—no matter how cautious or guarded that optimism may be—and in wishing sincerely never to close the door but to leave it ever open for further consideration, further negotiation, further accommodation.

22. Everyone, it seems, is most anxious to shun any appearance of having been the first to close the door, should the door ever close by itself or be closed. Witness, for example, the following very interesting and illuminating phenomena.

23. Witness, first, how the Western Powers welcomed the Soviet Union proposals of 30 September and repeatedly underscored the difference between the reception that they were giving those proposals and the reception that Mr. Y. Malik had given their earlier proposals.

24. Witness, also, how Mr. Vyshinsky, in remonstrating against that allegation about Mr. Malik, went to great dialectical lengths to explain the difference between opposition and disagreement, on the one hand, and rejection, on the other, and to demonstrate that opposition implied consideration.

25. Witness further how, when the Western Powers depicted the Soviet Union as having been negative in the past and having now become, for the first time, positive and co-operative, Mr. Vyshinsky reacted by tracing the history of the Soviet Union's efforts since 1946 in order to show that, far from having been negative and unco-operative all this time, the Soviet Union had actually been making positive proposals all along and, indeed, it was the Western Powers themselves which were moving towards the Soviet Union's position.

26. Witness, further, how Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, after asking his two crucial questions on 15 October and stressing that positive answers to them were necessary if there was to be further progress, said at the end of his statement [690th meeting]:

“I put [these questions] in good faith because I thought that the answers to them would help to clarify the position. But I certainly feel very strongly that, whatever the answers may be, we must not give up this pursuit of a disarmament agreement, and whatever may be said on this occasion—‘yes’ or ‘no’—we certainly will continue, so far as the United Kingdom delegation is concerned, to seek to

achieve agreement. And we believe that it is still possible to do so."

27. Witness, finally, how the idea of exploring every avenue of approach has in one form or another appeared in every speech.

28. I am not doubting the sincerity of all those expressions. On the contrary, I wish to assert that they are sincere. I am saying, however, that, beyond this undoubted sincerity, it is also legitimate—as long as the cold war has not abated any more than I think it has—for every nation to take every possible precaution so that failure, should it come, God forbid, should not be ascribed to it.

29. Having said all that, having allowed for what I called "legitimate uses" of United Nations debates for cold war purposes as long as the cold war continues—uses that belong to the general rules of the game and that, in any event, are not the monopoly of any one nation but are open to all, so that if some do not take advantage of them while others do, it is decidedly the fault of the former that they are not as alert and as resourceful in this game as the latter—having, I repeat, said all that, I must add at once that there are equally legitimate limits to the freedom with which nations can resort to those uses in the present world situation. For, again in the slightly transposed words of Mr. Martin, it is already much too late for any of us to play upon the hopes and fears of all peoples for the narrow national advantage of one country in the battle for the minds of men.

30. I do not believe that, so far, those limits have been exceeded. I believe that people have been fair and restrained in employing those means to which I have referred. Nor am I going to venture for one moment to predict the future, save to express the hope that it will be as pleasant, as relaxed, as fair and as positive as the present and immediate past have been.

31. The seventh value of this debate lies in the fact that it has culminated in the five-Powers draft resolution which was submitted last Friday, thanks to the untiring activity of Mr. Martin, thanks to the spirit of compromise animating the Western Powers and thanks to the spirit of conciliation of Mr. Vyshinsky. Although the text of that draft resolution is almost purely procedural in nature, although it only says what has been quite apparent all along, from the moment Mr. Vyshinsky made his statement of 30 September—namely, that now it is time for more serious, private conferences—although the wise words of caution uttered by Mr. Johnson of Canada [697th meeting] last Friday were, in my opinion, absolutely necessary, this is still an important step forward, as Mr. Moch was quick to point out at the same meeting. There is agreement at least on hope—not a general and vague hope, but one that is active. There is agreement on the desire to try again and on the judgment that the moment is propitious for such a renewed attempt. Although the draft resolution is only the formalization of an objective situation of whose existence we had already known for three weeks, that formalization itself, when it becomes a fact, is still very significant. The Powers principally concerned now formally agree that they must again meet because there is a chance for further substantive agreement. Since they cannot believe that unless they have solid reasons for so doing, we must conclude that the procedural draft resolution already represents a great deal.

32. I think, therefore, that, in view of those considerations, the five-Power draft resolution before us, with whatever extremely minor embellishments it may still undergo, is fully worthy of the unanimous approval of this Committee and of the General Assembly.

33. I have so far made three points: first, that the procedural step that this Committee is about to take was simply fated from the moment that Mr. Vyshinsky made his speech on Friday, 30 September; secondly, that, as from that date, there has not been any substantive advance in the general disarmament situation, despite the present debate; and, thirdly, that this debate has nevertheless been most valuable in the seven distinct respects that I have enumerated.

34. There is one aspect of this problem to which I wish to call special attention. Since 1945, there has been general agreement between the Soviet Union and the Western Powers on three fundamental principles: first, on the necessity of a substantial reduction of armaments and armed forces; secondly, on the necessity of the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction; and, thirdly, on the necessity of the establishment of an appropriate international system of control for this prohibition and reduction. It has been on the basis of that three-fold agreement of principle that the debate has been carried on all these years. Of course, as we all know, there was disagreement on the timing of those processes and on the nature, functions and powers of the control organ. Timing and control have been the two residual Gordian knots that no one has been able to cut, and Mr. Selwyn Lloyd brought them dramatically to the fore in this debate.

35. These two residual problems do not arise capriciously. On the contrary, they spring from the objective nature of the world situation. They are the expression of the different geopolitical conditions which determine the security of the Soviet Union and of the West. The Soviet Union has always advocated an immediate, wholesale and unconditional prohibition of nuclear weapons because that is in the interest of its security. The Western Powers, on the other hand, again in the interest of their security, envisage that prohibition only at the end of an articulated process, beginning with reductions of conventional armaments and armed forces and the establishment of a fool-proof system of control.

36. But, in London, something very significant happened, and this perhaps has not yet been sufficiently underlined. Some progress has been made towards a way out of this impasse as between timing and control. The Soviet Union proposed a new approach to the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission, which was met more than halfway by the West. With respect to any weapon, it is obvious that there are three phases. You make it, you own it or stockpile it, and you use it. It is also obvious that the total or radical prohibition is the prohibition of the making or manufacture of these things. It is some comfort, but not much, to mankind to know that a country makes and possesses these weapons, but is not going to use them. It is natural to ask why, if they are not going to be used, they are made in the first place. Thus, it would be far better if these weapons did not exist at all, but the realities of trust and fear in the world and the disequilibrium in the means of security—and I quite agree with Mr. Belaúnde that considerations of equilibrium and disequilibrium are of the utmost importance in the determination of war and peace—

are such that a more modest approach than that of radical or total prohibition, while not as ideal, is nevertheless more realistic.

37. The Soviet Union seized upon this point and proposed to disengage the prohibition of use from total prohibition. To them, it was already something, though not everything, if the parties to a disarmament treaty assumed "a solemn and unconditional obligation" not to use these weapons as "a first important step" towards the solution of the whole disarmament problem.

38. This proposal was first made on 1 June 1954 and then repeated by Mr. Y. Malik on 11 June 1954. The Russians desire that this prohibition of the use of atomic weapons should take place before any agreement and, indeed, as a first and important step towards any agreement on the whole problem of disarmament and, in particular, before the establishment of any control organ. From what has been said in this debate so far, it is obvious that the relationship of this type of prohibition to the other aspects or phases or steps of the comprehensive disarmament treaty will mightily engage the attention of the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission, regardless of its modalities, namely, regardless of whether it is conditional or unconditional. Be that as it may, on the very day that the Soviet Union renewed its proposal, namely, on 11 June, the now famous Franco-British memorandum was submitted.

39. The Western Powers had always and consistently refused to envisage any prohibition, whether of use or of manufacture and stockpiling, without previous agreement on the control organ. But, in the Franco-British memorandum, which was supported by the United States and Canada, they seemed to agree partially with the new Soviet approach. Thus, paragraph 1 of the memorandum [DC/53, annex 9] begins as follows:

"The States members of the Sub-Committee regard themselves as prohibited in accordance with the terms of the Charter of the United Nations from the use of nuclear weapons except in defence against aggression. They recommend that the Disarmament Treaty should include an immediate and explicit acceptance of this prohibition by all signatory States, pending the total prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons as proposed in the subsequent paragraphs of this memorandum."

40. In other words, the Soviet Union proposed an unconditional prohibition as a first step towards the solution of the problem of disarmament. The Western Powers proposed what might be called a conditional prohibition as a first step, the condition or reservation being "except in defence against aggression." This reservation is held to be justified by the terms of the Charter of the United Nations, which does not set limitations to the inherent right of self-defence.

41. We may then say, first, that there is agreement on a new approach, consisting of assuming an obligation as a first step towards the solution of the problem of disarmament, and, secondly, that there is further agreement that this first step should be the acceptance of the prohibition of the use of weapons of mass destruction, but that, while the Russians allow no reservation, the West makes an exception in the case of defence against aggression, an exception which, it is maintained, arises from the Charter itself.

42. It is, of course, true that there are tremendous difficulties connected with the notions of aggression

and defence against aggression, and it is doubtless for this reason that Mr. Vyshinsky, in his draft resolution of 30 September [A/2742 and Corr.1] wishes the Disarmament Commission "to study and clarify this question." But the Western Powers pointed out in London that there was an important precedent for this sort of reservation, namely, the double reservation entered by the British Empire, France and the Soviet Union in 1925 when they adhered to the Geneva protocol on the prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons. This double reservation was that this obligation would not be binding upon a Power which had not assumed the same obligation or which, having assumed it, nevertheless violated it.

43. Provided that there be complete transparency of motive, I believe we should have here, in this aspect of the documents of 1 June and 11 June [DC/53, annexes 6 and 8] and the draft resolution of 30 September, a ray of light as a first step, as a beginning in this whole exceedingly complex enterprise. The fear of the Western World leads to their attaching this reservation to their own form of prohibition, and this fear is, simply and frankly, that there is the possibility of many local wars and many internal upheavals turning into expansionist drives by the Communist bloc, and that in the face of such a possibility, the West cannot forego the use of its most decisive weapon. The only way, therefore, to remove this reservation is, first, to remove the grounds for this fear. Two things, therefore, are equally clear. First, unconditional prohibition of nuclear weapons is unacceptable to the West if at the same time no absolute assurances are given that there will be no more attempts to transform any civil war into an international conflict with the ultimate aim of expanding the Communist realm. Secondly, it is equally clear that the Soviet Union will not accept any reservation as to the prohibition which would allow any party to be its own judge in deciding whether and when it is or is not bound by the prohibition. This is a very clear deadlock, and it therefore ought to be tackled by the Disarmament Commission — all the more so since Mr. Vyshinsky himself has asked this Commission to study and clarify this question.

44. The following considerations might prove helpful in this connexion. First, it would be desirable to make the obligation to adhere to the prohibition of the use of weapons of mass destruction dependent upon an obligation which, in fact, will remove the danger of turning local wars into expansionist international conflicts, with the clear understanding that if this latter obligation is violated the United Nations, in deciding upon military action against a violator, will be free within certain limits to decide on the possible use of nuclear weapons to repel the aggressor. Secondly, it would be desirable to give a binding character to the provisional measures envisaged in Article 40 of the Charter of the United Nations, whether applied by the Security Council or under the "Uniting for peace" resolution [377 (V)] by the General Assembly, with view to preventing local conflicts from developing into general wars. In this way, any refusal to comply with the measures would be regarded as a presumption of aggression. Thirdly, at the right moment, and with the right preparations, it might be useful to make a distinction between the tactical and the strategic use of nuclear weapons, and to draw important consequences from this distinction.

45. I believe that meditation upon these matters by the Disarmament Commission or by its Sub-Committee as a first step in connexion with the new approach to the problem of prohibition—the approach which is now largely accepted by both the Soviet Union and the West—might lead to fruitful results. I also think that in this connexion we can all profitably ponder the words of Pope Pius XII in an address to the Congress of the World Medical Association in Rome on 30 September. I now quote from the address of the Pope:

“One must try by every possible means to avoid atomic, bacteriological or chemical war through international understandings or else by placing very clear and stringent limits upon its use so that its effects may not exceed the strict exigencies of defence. When, however, this kind of war escapes completely from human control, its use must be rejected as immoral. In this case no longer would it be a case of defence against injustice or of necessary safeguarding of one's legitimate possessions, but of pure and simple annihilation of all human life within the range of action. This cannot be permitted for any reason whatsoever.”

46. I now come to more important matters—in fact, to the most important matters—namely, to the questions of theory and doctrine and truth. For there is no doubt whatsoever that everything depends on these things. Mr. Vyshinsky and Mr. Selwyn Lloyd and many others have, both in words and by example, set up the maxim that it would be better at the present juncture not to rake the embers of the past, that the future with its glistening possibilities is more important than the past and that we should therefore concentrate on the future. I agree with this maxim and I shall endeavour to abide by it. However, two remarks can be made. There are two kinds of past. There is the past that is entirely dead and had better be forgotten, and there is the past that is very much alive indeed. The living past is such that you do not need to rake its embers at all; it is with you all the time, and if you do not bestir yourself while it is with you then you die. This is my first remark.

47. The second remark is that there is more than one way of raking the embers of the past. It all depends on the spirit with which the thing is done. Surely, raking the embers of the past in the spirit of malice, with view to creating discord and mischief, is not admissible, but to respectfully rake the embers of the living past in a genuine spirit of good will—with view to understanding and resolving difficulties and to find out exactly how much of the past is still living and therefore decisive—this constructive raking of embers is both a duty and a contribution to peace and disarmament.

48. Karl Marx, and Marxism-Leninism in general, do not belong to the dead past whose embers should not be disturbed; they are a most living reality indeed, one which is upon us all the time. I hope that my meaning will not be misunderstood. This is really quite simple. In the ordinary give-and-take of debate all misunderstanding with respect to meaning can be easily cleared up, but far deeper and more important than one's meaning is the spirit in which one thinks and speaks. My sincere hope is that, whether my meaning is understood or not, the spirit in which I speak will at least be fairly and rightly perceived. This spirit is that which animates every member of this Committee, namely the sincere and unrelenting search

for peace and for the foundations of peace. If, therefore, I find myself being puzzled by certain doctrines of Karl Marx and of Marxism-Leninism in general, it is indeed in the name and for the sake of peace that I become puzzled there. I am perplexed and my perplexity is precisely this: that, however I turn this question over in my mind, I find that the problems of disarmament, even in the atomic age—precisely perhaps in the atomic age—cannot for one moment be dissociated from the teachings of Marx and Lenin.

49. A fundamental ideological complication is the essence of all of today's problems.

50. The quotation from Lenin by Mr. Wadsworth which led Mr. Vyshinsky the other day to expatiate on how people misquote the Communist masters, the doctrine of the exportability or non-exportability of revolutions, the doctrine of the endless internal struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, the view that this internal struggle is unrelated to the question of international disarmament as between sovereign States, the doctrine that law is the handmaiden of politics which was expounded by Mr. Vyshinsky on 12 October 1954 [687th meeting] and the now famous formula of peaceful coexistence mentioned by practically every speaker—do you think that these fundamental theoretical questions arose accidentally in this debate, and that they have no bearing even on the practical questions of disarmament? No matter how much we try in this debate to repress theory in the interest of what I would respectfully call false amiability, which is otherwise called diplomacy, theory will embarrassingly force its way to the surface at critical points because theory has most decisively been there all the time.

51. Everybody has pointed out that the ultimate difficulty is that there is no trust. Now, trust may be built up in two ways: either by treating mistrust at its roots or by external acts of accommodation, concession and compromise, either by removing its causes or by reflectively letting acts of concession work back to the roots of mistrust. People have held that a little progress on disarmament here and a little progress there will actively generate or increase trust. This is perfectly true and it should not be despised. But nobody has yet talked about the roots, the causes of mistrust. I submit that there is, in the doctrine of Marx and in dialectical materialism, the root and the cause of this whole problem. There are literally thousands of telling passages which one can quote from communist literature, from the *Communist Manifesto* of 1848 onward, which will illustrate this point. I shall only quote a few taken almost at random. With respect to each one of them, I shall ask these questions: Is this doctrine still applicable? Is it still true? Does it belong to the living past or is it part of the dead past so that it is now superseded or annulled?

The first quotation is a statement made by Lenin in 1920, which reads as follows:<sup>1</sup>

“As long as capitalism and socialism exist side by side, we cannot live in peace; in the end, one or the other will triumph—a funeral dirge will be sung over the Soviet Republic or over world capitalism.”

The questions arise, as I said: Is this doctrine still applicable? Is it still true? Does it belong to the living

<sup>1</sup> V. I. Lenin, *Selected Works*, Volume VIII, New York, International Publishers, 1943, page 297.



past or is it part of the dead past so that it is now superseded or annulled?

52. The second quotation from the Russian edition of Lenin's works, vol. XVIII, p. 158, is as follows:

"To wage war for the overthrow of the international bourgeoisie, a war which is a hundred times more difficult, more prolonged, more complicated, than the most bloodthirsty of wars between States, while renouncing beforehand the use of manoeuvring, of playing off (though for a time only) the interests of one foe against the other, of entering upon agreements and effecting compromises (even though these may be of an unstable and temporary character) — would not such renunciation be the height of folly? We might as well, when climbing a dangerous and hitherto unexplored mountain, refuse in advance to make the ascent in zigzags, or to turn back for a while, to give up the chosen direction in order to test another which may prove to be easier to negotiate."

53. The third passage is again taken from Lenin, as contained in issue number 34 of *Pravda* of 1918:

"Every Marxist, if he is not a renegade, must put the interests of socialism above the right of nations to self-determination. Our Socialist Republic has done what it could for the self-determination of Finland, the Ukraine, and other countries. Nevertheless, if the situation demands a choice between the existence of the Socialist Republic, which is being endangered, and the right of self-determination of several nations, it is clear that the conservation of the Socialist Republic is predominant."

54. The fourth passage, taken from Stalin's *Problems of Leninism*, is as follows:

"What is the meaning of the impossibility of the complete and final victory of socialism in a single country without the victory of the revolution in other countries? It means the impossibility of having full guarantees against intervention, and hence against the restoration of the bourgeois order, without the victory of the revolution in at least a number of countries. To deny this indisputable fact is to abandon internationalism, to abandon Leninism."

Again, with respect to all these quotations, I ask: Are they still applicable? Are they still true? Do they belong to the living past or are they part of the dead past so that they are now superseded and annulled?

55. The fifth quotation, which is taken from a speech by Stalin on 2 December 1927 to the 15th congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, is as follows:

"We cannot forget the saying of Lenin to the effect that a great deal in the matter of our construction depends on whether we succeed in delaying war with the capitalist countries, which is inevitable but which may be delayed either until proletarian revolution ripens in Europe or until colonial revolutions come fully to head, or, finally until the capitalists fight among themselves over the division of the colonies. Therefore, the maintenance of peaceful relations with capitalist countries is an obligatory task for us. The basis of our relations with capitalist countries consists in admitting the coexistence of two opposed systems."

56. To my knowledge this was the first time that the phrase "coexistence" was used. I may be wrong, but according to my researches on this matter so far, I think the first time this phrase appeared in communist

literature was in 1927, in Stalin's speech. The question arises again: Is this doctrine still applicable? Is it still true? Does it belong to the living past or is it part of the dead past so that it is now superseded and annulled?

57. I now come to the sixth passage, taken from Lenin's writings, published in 1917. This is the quotation:<sup>2</sup>

"Socialists cannot without ceasing to be Socialists be opposed to all war... In the first place, Socialists have never been, nor can they be, opposed to revolutionary wars... Secondly, civil wars are also wars... Anyone who recognizes the class struggle cannot fail to recognize civil wars, which in every class society are the natural, and under certain conditions, inevitable continuation, development and intensification of the class struggle... Thirdly, the victory of socialism in one country does not at one stroke eliminate all war in general. On the contrary, it presupposes such wars. The development of capitalism proceeds very unevenly in the various countries. It cannot be otherwise under the commodity production system. From this it inevitably follows that socialism cannot be victorious simultaneously in *all* countries. It will be victorious first in one, or several countries, while the others will for some time remain bourgeois or pre-bourgeois. This must not only create friction, but a direct striving on the part of the bourgeoisie of other countries to crush the victorious proletariat of the socialist country. If we waged a war under such circumstances, it would be a legitimate and just war. It would be a war for socialism, for the liberation of other nations from the bourgeoisie..."

Again I ask, is this doctrine still applicable? Is it still true? Does it belong to the living past or is it now part of a dead past so that it is now superseded and annulled?

58. Of course, in all fairness to the development of communist theory I must also cite two quotations from recent statements by the head of the Soviet Union, Mr. Malenkov. In 1952, according to the "Report of the Central Committee to the 19th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party," on 6 October 1952, this is what Mr. Malenkov said:

"We are confident that in peaceful competition with capitalism, the socialist economic system will prove its superiority over the capitalist economic system more and more strikingly with each passing year. But we have no intention whatever of forcing our ideology or our economic system up on anybody..."

Am I to interpret this to mean that this statement now has annulled or superseded the statements that I read before?

59. Finally, Mr. Malenkov, as we all know, in his speech at Stalin's funeral, on 10 March 1953, which was published in *Pravda* of that date, said:

"The Soviet Union has waged and is waging a consistent policy of preservation and strengthening of peace, a policy of struggle against the preparation and unleashing of a new war, a policy of international co-operation and development of business relations with all countries, a policy based on the Lenin-Stalin premise on the possibility of prolonged co-

<sup>2</sup> V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. XIX, New York, International Publishers, 1942, pages 362-364.

existence and peaceful competition of two different systems — capitalist and socialist.”

60. Therefore, the question with respect to both of these statements by the head of the Soviet Union is precisely whether they now explicitly annul and supersede the fundamental doctrines of communism to which I referred before. I would like to ask whether it is rational to hold that these fundamental doctrines to which I referred — and thousands like them — have no decisive bearing upon the problem of disarmament, indeed, even upon what we are doing here in this Committee?

61. In commenting upon Mr. Wadsworth's quotation from Lenin the other day, Mr. Vyshinsky had the following to say [687th meeting]:

“Is the United States State Department still unaware that over one hundred years ago Marx and Engels in their *Communist Manifesto* laid down the basis for the theory of the inevitable existence in society, at a certain stage of its development, of class struggle...”

Then, omitting the intervening passages, I will quote what Mr. Vyshinsky said a little later:

“We must not forget that while struggles go on within States between different parties and different classes of society, another struggle goes on for certain principles in international life. What we have here is not only such a struggle to achieve certain principles, but also international co-operation. That has absolutely nothing to do with the question of internal political relations.”

62. I suggest, with all respect, that Mr. Vyshinsky cannot be serious here. He cannot be serious in saying that Marxist doctrine has nothing to do with international relations and therefore with questions of peace and security, and therefore with questions of disarmament, because if your national doctrine teaches the break-up of other nations, how can it be seriously maintained that this has nothing to do with international peace and security and, therefore, with disarmament? If communism is the official political doctrine of a certain nation and if communism teaches the doctrine of the class struggle, of the necessity of the class struggle, and if this doctrine signifies for each nation the possibility of internal upheaval, how can it be seriously maintained that the existence of communism, and indeed its existence as the official doctrine of one of the most powerful of nations, or rather of a multi-national State, does not disturb and therefore is not a question of international peace and security, and therefore of disarmament? I say “seriously maintained” because I know that such a point of view can be maintained dialectically, and at once this raises the very same question, namely, whether dialectical materialism, by dialectically maintaining what cannot be seriously maintained, is not itself a threat to international peace and security and therefore of paramount importance in any practical inquiry into armaments and disarmament.

63. One hears of a change in fundamental communist theory, in the theory, namely, that qualitative change need not take place abruptly, as mutation by revolution, but that one quality can supersede another gradually.

64. This sudden change in communist theory with respect to the principle of abruptness in qualitative change, namely, with respect to the principle of revolution, is, if true, of the greatest importance. Thus, it may well be that policy in the Soviet Union has out-

stripped dogma and that dogma is breathlessly panting behind policy, trying as best it can to catch up with it.

65. If the principle of gradualism is now the authoritative doctrine, this is indeed reassuring to the rest of the world. But one would like to see how this principle is practically interpreted, not only to the school children of the Communist realm in their study of themselves, their own society and their own history, but especially to the Communist parties in Italy, France, Europe, the Middle East and Asia, in their relations to their own peoples and to the societies within which they are functioning.

66. One would also like to know the reason for this significant change in communist doctrine. For unless this reason is sufficiently absolute, ultimate and immovable, we shall have no assurance that it will be permanent, namely, that we shall not have at some critical point a sudden reversion to the original doctrine. A change which lacks foundation, namely, a change unexplained in terms of universal principle, may only be a tactical change, and therefore cannot reassure those who, like myself, are perplexed and troubled. In that case, trust will remain profoundly undermined, for trust cannot flourish except on the basis of some common immovable principle.

67. Above all — and this is perhaps the most profound question which disturbs me — one would like to know the limits of change in Communist doctrine. What, in other words, are the things in their theory that will never change?

68. To give but one example, in the Soviet Constitution, freedom of religious worship is allowed, but not freedom of religious propaganda or teaching. It is expressly stated that freedom of anti-religious propaganda is guaranteed, but not freedom of religious propaganda. Is it possible to conceive that communist doctrine in its evolution will so change that one day it will allow complete freedom to religious propaganda and teaching? The determination of the limits of change in communist doctrine is the greatest question, because once we know these limits we will also know the irreducible core that will never change, and we will know what the world is really up against. This determination of the limits of change of communist doctrine is of the greatest possible practical importance to the deliberations of this Committee, of the Disarmament Commission, of its Sub-Committee, and to the individual Governments of the world, with regard to the great questions of security, armaments and disarmament.

69. I might perhaps be permitted, in conclusion, to say again what I said on these grave matters on 28 September 1953, in the general debate in the plenary meeting at last year's session [447th meeting]:

“Above and beyond any difficulty in the political and disarmament fields, and ultimately conditioning every such difficulty, is the great estrangement in the realm of the mind and the spirit. For you may settle every political problem and you may disarm to the bone, still if distrust persists and if there is a fundamental contradiction in idea and outlook, there will be no peace. It happens that dialectical materialism teaches precisely that such contradiction is of the essence. Therefore, what is needed is a theoretical and spiritual overcoming of Karl Marx. When Marxism-Leninism undergoes the fundamental revolution of overcoming itself, then we may hope for real and lasting peace. Physical olive branches are



important and they should never be despised, but when, year in and year out, millions of young minds the world over are moulded in schools and universities according to the unregenerate tenets of dialectical materialism, pray tell me in all honesty, how is peaceful co-existence in a contracted world really possible in the long run?

"The greatest need, therefore, is for an attempt at settlement in the spiritual order, an attempt in which not only the Communist diplomats and statesmen meet and argue with their Western colleagues, but the Communist scientists and theoreticians accept the challenge of conferring at length with the most responsible thinkers of the non-Communist world. When Mr. Vyshinsky announces, not that they have mastered the atomic and hydrogen bombs, but that Soviet textbooks have been radically altered with respect to the necessity of war and revolution, the ultimacy of the class struggle, the development of human society, the laws of history, the place of the economic process, the nature and place of government, the nature and destiny of man, the existence of objective truth, the power of the mind to grasp it, the dignity of the human soul, the glory and necessity of freedom and the character of whatever ultimate reality there is, when Mr. Vyshinsky tells us that profound modifications of doctrine are taking place in Soviet textbooks with respect to these ultimate themes, then the world may relax and look forward to the possibility of a new dawn. Peace is the fruit of goodwill illuminated by understanding, but without some identity of vision, and indeed vision of the good, all understanding is but a snare and a delusion."

70. The CHAIRMAN (*translated from French*): The next speaker on the list is the representative of the Soviet Union. However, he has informed us that his statement may be a long one. I would therefore ask him whether he would prefer to speak this afternoon instead of this morning.

71. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): I am ready to speak either this afternoon or now. I must say, however, that I do not intend to get involved in the discussion which Mr. Malik, the Lebanese representative, wishes — quite inappropriately in my opinion — to substitute for the basic question with which we are concerned. I shall be obliged, however, to clarify certain points, particularly with regard to our basic task, the task which appears in the agenda, the draft resolution [A/C.1/752/Rev.2] on the reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces and the prohibition of atomic weapons. Hence I shall need a certain amount of time, and I would ask the Committee to allow me that time if it feels able to do so. I must say, however, that, as I understood Mr. Malik, it is not a matter of including what he said in the draft resolution. But if he has such a proposal in mind I shall, of course, have to disappoint him, for I cannot undertake to consider any such proposal. To what he has just said I shall, of course, reply in a very few words because the subject of his remarks does not concern the First Committee or the question of disarmament. He probably lost his way today among the addresses he had in his pocket for every occasion and, instead of finding himself in a university lecture-room where he could engage in anti-Marxist and anti-Leninist propaganda, found himself

in the First Committee, where, as far as I can see, such activities are no part of our business.

72. Taking everything into consideration I leave the whole matter up to the First Committee. I should like to take an hour and a half, but not to reply to Mr. Malik. Please do not be unduly alarmed — and I also wish to reassure Mr. Malik beforehand — if I do not attach any serious significance to all that he said, which can be summed up as follows: renounce your ideology, renounce communism, come over to our side, sign up in the ranks of the capitalist parties, and everything will be in order. If that is how he puts the question I shall not disillusion him. If he says we need this to calm us, I should be inclined to advise him to visit the nearest chemist's. They have valerian drops there; he could take them to calm his nerves instead of putting such questions which, as he himself knows, are quite absurd, insoluble and completely inappropriate to our Committee.

73. After those introductory remarks, if the Committee has an hour and a half at its disposal now I am ready to speak right away; for what interests me is, of course, not a discussion with professors from Beirut who demonstrate as they speak their utter incompetence to discuss such questions. I can well imagine how they expound these questions to their unhappy students from their university chairs! What I am concerned with are the questions on our agenda: the questions of the reduction of armaments and armed forces and the prohibition of atomic weapons, about which Professor Malik said very little. He imagined that he was on the rostrum at Beirut University and in a position, as it were, to plunge into an improbable, unscientific criticism of the problems which worry him and which apparently even rob him of his sleep and appetite. I am sorry that he has to live through all this, but there is no help I can give him in this respect.

74. Hence I repeat: I asked for an hour and a half in which to lay my fundamental ideas before you. In passing I shall, of course, have to touch on some of Mr. Malik's excursions into the field of our theory. I would ask for a decision on this, and I leave it entirely to the Committee and to you, Mr. Chairman.

75. The CHAIRMAN (*translated from French*): As the representative of the Soviet Union has just told us that his statement would take an hour and a half, it would be best, in view of the time, to postpone his speech until this afternoon's meeting.

76. Incidentally, I must advise the Committee that there has been a mistake. At the last meeting, the representative of Chile informed us that he did not wish to speak, and we took this to mean that he was not going to take part in the debate. In fact, he was not ready to speak on that particular day, but he still wishes to make a statement. As his statement will be quite short, I propose to give him the floor now.

77. Mr. MAZA (Chile) (*translated from Spanish*): The turn which the debate took at the last meeting of this Committee has obliged me to alter the speech which I had intended to make during the general debate, in which we are still engaged. There will be no need now to dwell so much upon past disappointments and I shall have the more pleasant task of referring to future expectations.

78. The joint draft resolution [A/C.1/752/Rev.2] now before us has dispelled the tense atmosphere which

pervaded our discussion on disarmament, atomic energy and mass destruction.

79. Let us hope that this applies to the world in general, which lives anxiously in hope of a lasting peace on a basis of complete confidence. To achieve this, there must prevail in the immediate future a sincere desire to reach, in good faith, further unanimous agreements which, when properly co-ordinated with the proposed international convention, will guarantee the rights of all and reinforce mutual security. The conclusion of such an agreement would appear to us a miracle, banishing fear and terror from among the peoples and enabling them to devote all their energies to the achievement of ever-increasing prosperity.

80. After the joint draft resolution now before us has been approved by the General Assembly and referred to the Disarmament Commission, the Sub-Committee of that Commission will have to prepare an international draft convention, which will then be referred back to the Commission itself, to the Security Council and to the General Assembly, and after approval of the international draft convention by these United Nations bodies it will, of course, go through the appropriate constitutional channels to be ratified by all nations. It will then have the status of an international convention or treaty.

81. The international draft convention to be prepared by the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission will have to include all the material referred to in operative paragraph 1 of the joint draft resolution now before us, namely:

“(a) The regulation, limitation and major reduction of all armed forces and all conventional armaments;

“(b) The total prohibition of the use and manufacture of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction of every type, together with the conversion of existing stocks of nuclear weapons for peaceful purposes;

“(c) The establishment of effective international control, through a control organ with rights, powers and functions adequate to guarantee the effective observance of the agreed reductions of all armaments and armed forces and the prohibition of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, and to ensure the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only;

“The whole programme to be such that no State would have cause to fear that its security was endangered.”

The Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission is made up of representatives of the great Powers, and it is among them that the general agreement and goodwill which we all desperately desire will have to be achieved.

82. We appreciate the many complicated and difficult features of the undertaking, and we fear that many further stages remain to be gone through and that further obstacles will still be met with, but we must hope for better times and have faith in the bright future of mankind.

83. Should there not be unanimous agreement in the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission, a resolution passed by a majority of the Commission would be inoperative, since such a majority agreement would be subject to the veto in the Security Council and would thus not become the proposed international convention. The votes of the majority have never been

sufficient for this type of agreement, which has always required unanimity.

84. If, on the other hand, unanimous agreement was reached in the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission, acceptance by the Commission itself could be assumed, the Security Council's agreement could be taken for granted and the General Assembly's approval could be counted upon. After that, no country would have the audacity to refuse to ratify the international convention.

85. As I speak, I am taking an over-optimistic view of the near future. I want to imagine that these hypothetical situations have actually come about in order to draw a conclusion.

86. Let us imagine that the proposed international convention has come into force. All the points listed in paragraph 1 of the joint draft resolution now before us, to wit, the limitation mentioned in sub-paragraph (a), the prohibition mentioned in sub-paragraph (b) and the establishment of control mentioned in sub-paragraph (c), would be duly disposed of. The international convention would then give the control organ all the powers listed in sub-paragraph (c), namely the “powers and functions adequate to guarantee the effective observance of the agreed reductions of all armaments and armed forces and the prohibition of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, and to ensure the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only.”

87. If this came to pass, as we hope and trust it will, the control organ's powers and functions would be restricted only as laid down in the international convention itself.

88. Consequently, and this is my conclusion, the control organ's activities would be subject to no one's authority and there would be no reason to fear the Security Council's veto, which would be ineffective because the international convention, like a treaty, which it would in fact be, would be subordinate to no authority having the power of veto over resolutions adopted in conformity with the treaty. For this purpose, it would be immaterial whether the international convention was the result of agreements of United Nations bodies, since the convention would already have become a separate entity.

89. All this seems to me as clear as daylight and I have dwelt on it only on account of the statements made here by the representatives of two great Powers.

90. I have spoken of the necessity for unanimity among the representatives of the great Powers, not in order to make them exclusively responsible for the consequences which would follow upon failure to reach unanimity, but in order to declare that the medium or small Powers will never impede the signing of any peace agreement. They will always be willing to offer suggestions and unbiased co-operation, but they will never make difficulties.

91. In the comity of nations, our countries represent what we call in domestic politics “the man in the street” or the man who wants to know everything about the measures to be adopted by his Government and yet knows nothing, the man who claims consideration when any decision is taken and yet is never considered, the man who wants his fears of the future allayed and who wishes to be freed from further burdens and taxes, but who always has to bear the burdens and pay the taxes, in brief, the man who always desires peace but

is condemned by fate to suffer the consequences of warfare for which he is not responsible.

92. As representing the "man in the street" of the comity of nations, we wish to stress our desire for an agreement on limitation, prohibition and control which, we hope and pray, will result in the proposed international convention. Although we do not possess the secret of the atom, we shall suffer its consequences, as we are now suffering the consequences of the last war by paying inflated prices for what we buy and by receiving controlled prices for what we sell. For our exports are, quite seriously described as strategic materials.

93. As representing the "man in the street" of the international community, we wish to repeat that we do not have much hope that after disarmament the money saved thereby will be used, as it should be, to improve the position of the under-developed countries. Savings never appear in national budgets, and capital always looks for investments which yield the best returns.

94. That was why, in the course of the debate in this Committee and on the same subject at the last session of the General Assembly, a request had been made for the deletion of part of the draft resolution [A/C.I./L.72], which had been approved. That part had stated that some of the savings to be achieved through disarmament were to be used for the benefit of the under-developed countries. The request had been made because the immediate establishment of the Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development had been requested in the Second Committee. It is my very happy duty to recall that this important point of view had been defended [660th meeting] by the representative of Colombia, Mr. Urrutia, who now presides over the discussions of this First Committee with such good judgment and skill.

95. As representing the "man in the street" in this international Organization, we also wish to persist in our unwavering position that a truly stable peace and real freedom from the fear which terrorizes the world will be assured only when there are no more under-developed countries and all peoples have an equal standard of living.

96. It is not easy to make this generally understood, because material progress pays dividends but culture does not. That is why the march of material progress is more rapid than that of culture. That is why railways are built and pipelines are laid across mountains and deserts, while men go barefoot and are victims of epidemics and of illiteracy.

97. I realize that to attempt to speed up the march of something which does not yield a profit is quixotic and at variance with the dehumanizing idea of "realism" which has reached its apotheosis here. Yet the fact is that we, the "man in the street" of the comity of nations, are idealists first and foremost.

98. If we had not been thus, Bolívar would not have liberated half a continent, San Martín would not have crossed the Andes and O'Higgins would not have organized his liberating expedition to consolidate the freedom of South America. If they had been realists, it is probable that the South American continent would have become a leading great Power under a centralized monarchic régime. But we would not enjoy this individual freedom which we wish all the world to have, with material progress and culture fairly shared.

99. Meanwhile, we enthusiastically support every step forward which means a step towards peace, even such a qualified peace as the joint draft resolution now before us is intended to achieve, which in the final analysis will turn out to be another formula to maintain the old "balance" which has in turn been criticized and defended here. It will turn out to be a "balance of power," a "balanced limitation" which, we hope and pray, may be effective in keeping the peace for some time.

100. The joint draft resolution now before us, which my delegation will be very pleased to vote for, undoubtedly represents the beginning of a new stage of agreement which, we hope, will grow uninterruptedly. This more agreeable atmosphere has been noticeable since the first meetings of this Committee and, more noteworthy still, the old-fashioned courtesy, which helps so much to promote agreement and which makes disagreements less painful, has returned. One might even say that wits have been sharpened to draw a smile.

101. We trust that this atmosphere is the result, as I have said, of increased confidence and not, as might also be the case, of increased fear. At the present time no local wars threatening to spread are being waged, which would justify such increased fear. At this moment, perhaps for the first time in the history of the world, there is no armed warfare in progress anywhere. It is certainly the first time that man has ceased to fire upon man with impunity; the first time that there has been no internationally legalized killing. But there has never been greater fear. There has never been greater fear that humanity might be destroyed with undreamed-of cruelty.

102. That is why this atmosphere of courtesy and greater confidence may be due to the fact that, above and beyond all Governments, above and beyond all obstinate heads of States, above and beyond all vested interests an international public conscience is developing which will tip the scales of human destiny on the side of salvation.

103. The agreements signed only the day before yesterday in Paris, which my delegation welcomes, may also be evidence in support of this assertion.

104. Providence has so arranged matters that the functions of the human body are performed by organs which are identical wherever man exists. The men who cultivate the fields or dig in mines, fish in the sea or travel across the desert, freeze at the poles or sweat in the tropics, all eat, breathe, see, hear and love in the same way. But when man began to interfere with nature, he invented the first element of discord, different languages. If language had also been the same everywhere, perhaps there would have been understanding throughout the world for centuries. But amid all those differences there is one word which begins with the same letter in almost all languages. It is the word signifying negation, which begins with the letter "n." Perhaps this miracle was also performed by God, so that when His work of myriads of light-centuries nigh came to destruction by an invention of the brain of man, whom He created, all the peoples should arise and, using that word with the same initial, should respond with a thunderous "No."

105. The CHAIRMAN (*translated from Spanish*): There is still half an hour left until one o'clock. The representative of Peru has asked permission under rule

116 of the rules of procedure to reply to allusions that have been made to his statements.

106. If there are no objections, I shall call upon the representative of Peru.

107. Mr. BELAÜNDE (Peru) (*translated from Spanish*): If my present statement, which will be very brief, can serve to fill a gap, I shall be happy to co-operate with the Chairman in this way.

108. I have some comments to make on things which have been said to me or in reply to me, and I think, too, that it behooves me to give my reasons for my enthusiastic support of the five-Power draft resolution [A/C.1/752/Rev.2].

109. At the outset, I should like to endorse most heartily the tributes paid to the Canadian delegation and to the patience it has displayed in achieving agreement, as also to the good will of the four great Powers which have contributed to this success, because the draft resolution will certainly — at least, so I hope — be adopted unanimously.

110. There is only one point about which I had slight doubts, and in this I was in agreement with the Lebanese representative. I think that paragraph 2 might well read:

“...taking into account the various proposals referred to in the previous resolution and any other proposals within the Commission's terms of reference, and any proposals made or ideas expressed during the debate.”

If I remember rightly, a resolution adopted at the sixth session of the General Assembly included a recommendation to the Disarmament Commission to take into account any ideas expressed during the debate.

111. I do not, of course, intend to submit an amendment. I leave it to the sponsors to decide on this. If they do not see fit to make any change, the Peruvian delegation will, in any case, construe paragraph 2 to mean that the phrase “and any other proposals” means not only any proposals made in the Disarmament Commission or its Sub-Committee, but also any proposal submitted to this Committee.

112. Courtesy demands that I thank the Australian representative for supporting [696th meeting] the Greek and Peruvian suggestion to the effect that, if the control organ was made responsible to the Security Council, as it probably would be, the great Powers should voluntarily waive the use of the veto. He said that he did not quite understand how my delegation got the idea of the simultaneity or concurrence of the two activities, the prohibition of atomic weapons and the reduction of armaments. I have here the text of the statement I made in Paris on 29 November 1951 [458th meeting]. It is a piece of information I should like to give the Australian representative and it may also be relevant to the discussion. At that time, when the discussion was dealing with the various stages and the need for those stages to be indivisible and automatic, I said that the Australian delegation had tried — if I had understood correctly — to meet the view and allay the misgivings of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by suggesting parallel action on the aspect and the disclosure and inspection of conventional armaments. The Australian delegation had used the word “concurrent,” which had seemed acceptable to me.

113. The Australian delegation had probably used the concept of concurrent action in an earlier statement in

order to dispel the Soviet Union's mistrust. I had added that I did not know how the Western Powers would react to the Australian idea, but that it would be one way of solving the problem, to accept frankly the division of labour and, in working on the matter of atomic weapons, to use a standard other than that used in regard to conventional armaments, while at the same time carrying on the work simultaneously would be a form of reconciliation.

114. Such a reconciliation through simultaneity or synchronization was admirably achieved by the Franco-British memorandum of 11 June 1954 [DC/53, annex 9] and it is only fair to say that the Soviet Union has responded to it in a really effective manner, with its proposal in the General Assembly on 30 September [484th meeting]. So much for the background of the question.

115. And now that the harmony, the conformity of the Franco-British proposal and the Soviet proposal of 30 September has been established, I believe that the time has come to draw up a completely impartial and objective balance-sheet before the debate ends.

116. We are all well aware that a great step forward has been taken with respect to the principle of simultaneity in the two operations envisaged, prohibition and the reduction of armaments, particularly as a result of the fact that the reduction of armaments to an agreed level is to begin before any attempt is made to deal with atomic weapons. But to base any exaggeratedly optimistic attitude on this agreement alone would be a mistake. We must see how we stand and I would like to do this as objectively and as briefly as I can.

117. There are great difficulties and we should be fully aware of them. It would have been a good thing if there had been time enough for the various delegations to state their positions on this subject frankly and freely, for that would have helped the Disarmament Commission. This point has been discussed but the Committee cannot believe or act on the assumption that the main difficulty has really been overcome. We have merely laid the groundwork for agreement; we have yet far to go. We have come to the point where a very straightforward discussion of conditional and provisional prohibition is in sight, prohibition which is made conditional on and is only to be suspended by the right of defence in case of aggression.

118. The Lebanese representative has ably set forth all the implications of this problem. I should also refer to an idea put forward by the Mexican representative [695th meeting], whose main point was that the use of nuclear or atomic weapons in the case of resistance to aggression should be confined to military objectives, a provision which seems to me to be of the greatest importance.

119. Then there is an almost insuperable difficulty — I am not saying these things out of pessimism but in order to arouse public opinion to exert pressure on any Governments which place obstacles in the way of agreement — concerning the criterion to be used in achieving the reduction of armaments. The Soviet Union has apparently not relinquished the percentage criterion, while the Western Powers have not altogether abandoned the possibility of reverting to the idea of ceilings, which seems to me to be indicated. Nor can much hope be placed in the other criterion, that of standards rather than arbitrary figures or proportions, for it must be admitted that the complex criteria of size of terri-

tory, geographical situation and political conditions might well lead us into investigations that could postpone the disarmament convention to the Greek calends.

120. This is, then, a tremendous difficulty. But the third difficulty is even greater. There is a kind of progressive scale of difficulties: this one concerns the constitution of the control organ. The issue of the representation of countries on the control organ has not yet been taken up; it has not even been raised and it will give rise to protracted discussion. But we already have before the Committee the very serious problem of the unity of control, since the Western countries maintain — and rightly so — that there should be only one control organ and the Soviet Union maintains in its proposal that there should be two organs, a temporary organ and a permanent one.

121. Then there is something even more serious, and that is the question of when to establish the control organ. The Western Powers maintain that the control organ should be set up first. I believe that such priority is fundamental and absolutely essential, because the only thing that the establishment of other control organs concurrently with the application of the regulations would do would be to upset the work on the prohibition of atomic weapons and on the reduction of armaments. As I have already said, this is a matter of common sense, and perhaps it might even have been worth while for the Committee to come to a decision on this point if we had wanted to adopt another resolution of recommendations. There is no sense in talking of control unless the control organ has been established in advance. The sole guarantee that the control organ will be effective lies in its establishment before control begins, because you cannot exercise control at the same time as setting up the control organ. This is a point which the Disarmament Commission and the Sub-Committee should bear firmly in mind. Any yielding on this point would cause general distrust.

122. And now I will bring out the most difficult point; that relating to the functions of the control organ. There are two working documents on the functions of the control organ: the working paper, the USSR proposal of 11 June 1947 [*AEC/31/Rev.1*] — I think it is 11 June; Mr. Vyshinsky will correct me if that is not the right date — and the United States working paper of 25 May 1954 [*DC/53, annex 4*]. I must say that I welcomed the words of the Soviet Union representative when he recommended to me [*692nd meeting*] — and I have complied — to read the Soviet proposal of 1947. I will not read out what he said, because I do not wish to protract my statement, but I will quote from memory that much water has flowed under the bridges, the situation has changed since 1947. By that he meant that the USSR position was not going to be intransigent and that it was not going to be adamant with regard to those proposals. He let it be understood that he was ready to discuss the possibility of modifying those proposals, but the fact is that nothing has occurred in the debate to give us hope of any such modification.

123. The powers given to the control organ under the terms of the Soviet Union proposal of 1947 were, in brief, powers of inspection regarding States and of recommendation to States and to the Security Council, while the powers accorded in the United States working paper on atomic energy refer very explicitly to effective enforcement action, such as the closing of plants or the

suspension of the supply of nuclear materials to any country which violates the convention.

124. The point has been very seriously discussed because it has been maintained that such measures, which Mr. Moch, with his usual clear-sightedness and accuracy has called conservative, and which I have ventured to call executive, and which Mr. Selwyn Lloyd has called measures of enforcement, are by their nature within the purview of the Security Council and of Article 42 of the Charter of the United Nations. In reality, enforcement measures agreed on in a convention to be signed by a general conference — conservative measures — are not and cannot be, technically speaking, punitive measures.

125. I was very careful in my first statement [*691st meeting*] to read the text of the proposed measures together with the powers suggested by the United States and the text of Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations in order to show that a punitive measure includes other measures; it constitutes an act of authority *urbi et orbi*, addressed to all States, whereas enforcement measures are specific measures carried out by the control organ. This, then, is a matter on which we have no illusions. The difficulties are going to be very great.

126. This leads me to the most important point, the relations between the control organ and the Security Council. It is clear, as the representative of Chile so ably pointed out just now, that the control organ should be completely autonomous, and independent of the Security Council. I shall carry his ideas on this possibility a little further: the disarmament conference would propose the conclusion of a universal treaty which would not depend exclusively on parallel action by the parties for its execution, but would set up an executive organ. The executive organ would thus be subject to the authority of all the signatory countries participating in the conference and would be independent of the United Nations.

127. Hence, it would be possible for us to set up a veto-free control organ, working under rules of procedure that provide for voting by a simple majority; a wholly effective organ that would have nothing to do with the United Nations, provided, of course, that nothing was done to jeopardize peace, for any such measures would be within the jurisdiction of the United Nations.

128. I had thought of that possibility. But will such a solution be acceptable to the Soviet Union? If the Soviet Union, for reasons I respect, declines to relinquish the veto voluntarily, would it agree to a much more serious concession — the establishment of an international authority, an international control organ, subject only to the rules and principles set forth in the treaty and, except for the authority of the signatories themselves, absolutely independent in its interpretations?

129. Given the existing scale of values, it would be more difficult, in my view, to obtain the Soviet Union's assent to such an authority than to obtain its renunciation of the right of veto in the Security Council. Moreover, I certainly foresee — and the Committee will agree with me — that the Soviet Union will have another objection to such a solution.

130. Under the Charter of the United Nations, all disarmament questions fall within the competence of the United Nations, by virtue of either the powers

given to the Security Council, or those given to the General Assembly. It will also be said that no convention, no treaty may be concluded which runs counter to the Charter and that in the event of any conflict between such a treaty and the Charter, the Charter shall prevail. Finally, any serious dispute that might arise between the control organ and a State would obviously come within the jurisdiction of the Security Council, so that in any case we should come back to the Security Council.

131. After considerable reflexion on the matter, I had thought of a juridical solution. Since — and here too the Chilean representative, who is an eminent lawyer, will agree with me — many questions of interpretation that arise in the Disarmament Commission are essentially legal in character, we could adopt the solution of the jurisdiction of a special tribunal. Special tribunals have been set up in a large number of commissions. I realize, however, that such tribunals would not act very promptly.

132. And, finally, there would still be the problem of enforcement, and that problem, under the Charter, would come before the Security Council.

133. Frankly, I can find no way of dispensing with the Security Council, because — to put it in concrete terms on Mr. Vyshinsky's recommendation, which I gladly follow — as soon as there was any disagreement between the control organ and a State, if the State resisted a recommendation or the application of a measure ordered and assuming that the Convention provided that there was no appeal to the Security Council, even assuming its elimination, the matter could not end in an enforcement action against that State, since there is no international police force. The resistance of such a State would inevitably develop into a more or less serious dispute, which would have to be brought before the Security Council.

134. In this matter, therefore, the position of the Security Council is of fundamental importance. It may be said that it is the nerve-centre, the hub, the foundation; and of course the system of voting in the Security Council is already established.

135. I now come to my last point. I am sure that the Disarmament Commission will call upon the services not only of eminent military experts, but also of eminent legal experts, and I am sure that those legal experts will have to deal with this problem: can we legally conceive of a convention that is, in the last analysis, absolutely subject to the ultimate will of one of the parties?

136. That is the legal aspect, and that is the legal point that this Committee, too, must examine: can we give the "green light" to the concept that it is legally possible to conclude a treaty which is ultimately subject to the exclusive and absolute will of one of the parties? And subject in such a way that if that one party should offer resistance, its resistance would not only be consolidated by the fact itself but would also be covered by a cloak of false legitimacy, owing to the legitimacy of its attitude in the use of the veto?

137. That is the legal problem which we must resolve. I doubt whether there is a jurist in the world who could say that it is proper, reasonable, or possible — and nothing is impossible — to sign a convention that is subject absolutely, totally, definitively, finally, and under the cloak of legitimacy, to the will of one of the parties. Merely to speak of such a possibility verges on the

absurd, but these are times in which absurdities seem to be possible.

138. Of course, such a convention has no safeguards to inspire confidence in anyone. That is why I felt that if we wanted to usher in a period of confidence, we should have to say: No, the convention to be signed will be a convention in which the will of one State shall never prevail in the Commission's interpretative and executive functions and shall never prevail, whatever that will may be, under the cover of legitimacy.

139. Mr. Vyshinsky has praised, and rightly so, a valuable little book by Mr. Baruch, the Nestor of international and American policy. I should like the Committee to think about the following words, which I shall read in English:<sup>3</sup>

"Some persons would disregard the nature of atomic energy in the hopes of getting so-called agreement with the Soviets. But no agreement which ignores the nature of nuclear energy can prove to be anything but a catastrophical delusion. If the *needed* controls are unacceptable to any nation, that does not mean we should accept less than what is needed. Either we can bring nuclear energy under control or we cannot. If we cannot, why deceive ourselves by agreements which have no meaning?"

140. An agreement without effective control and an agreement that could be set aside in the Security Council by the will of one of the parties has no meaning whatsoever in the eyes of public opinion.

141. This is not a matter in which differences can be adjusted. There is no room for compromise here. That is the sad fact. I am an advocate of compromise, of friendly settlement, of the Solomonic way; we are, however, living in an era in which the Solomonic way has no place, or, to say the least, we are considering an issue which does not lend itself to Solomonic measures, because the application of such measures cannot lead to a solution of the problem. A Solomonic position of compromise is possible in any readjustment of interests — even economic or political interests — but unfortunately not in the present case. There is a minimum beyond which we cannot go. Mr. Baruch, whom I have already quoted, said himself: "I have always hoped that some plan of effective control would be found that might be acceptable to the Soviet other than the one I proposed on behalf of our government." He thus discards the original plan, to which the Soviet Union objected so vehemently. He discards it. And this venerable and wise old man goes on to say in all honesty: "We should never give up searching for such a plan."

142. That is what we want: never to give up the search for such a plan. I am optimistic in that respect because I feel that, whatever the obstacles, we must go on with our work and never give up searching for such a plan. It is, however, one thing not to give up searching for such a plan and quite another to be satisfied with any plan or to live in the hope that some plan might emerge. Mr. Baruch goes on to say:

"I do not believe that we — or other nations — dare accept less than a truly effective, enforceable system of international inspection and control. This is one case where half a loaf is not better than none."

143. Hence I feel that the Committee did well to prolong this debate, to allow us all to air our views and

<sup>3</sup> Bernard M. Baruch, *A Philosophy for Our Time*, New York, Simon and Schuster, Inc., 1954, Chapter III.



to go into the most minute details, not because we are going to adopt a resolution but because this is mankind's problem *par excellence*, one in which the contradictions and the difficulties of the modern world are involved.

144. Ten years ago the President of the United States appointed a commission of scientists to solve the problem of atomic energy through the application of Einstein's theory, an action which was essential at that time for the defence of a world in danger. The scientists were successful. Today the United Nations is about to instruct its Disarmament Commission to find a legal formula which would prohibit the use of atomic energy for destructive purposes and restrict its use to peaceful ends. We should despair of mankind if we found man able to conquer nature but unable to find a formula which would ensure harmony among men. Why is it more difficult to find a legal formula than a scientific one? Because legal formulae involve mankind and are of greater and very different dimensions, if I may so put it, from those of nature. We can conquer nature but we have not yet learned to dominate ourselves and to organize ourselves on the basis of reason and justice. The history of mankind, two thousand years of that history, bears witness to that fact.

145. This matter has both economic and moral aspects and here I would be less than frank if I did not say, with all due respect and quite dispassionately, that I was distressed this morning to hear Mr. Vyshinsky's reply to the representative of Lebanon.

146. I think that these moral and intellectual considerations are much too delicate to be treated with such disdain. Behind every economic consideration we find a juridical point of view; behind every juridical point of view a moral point of view; and perhaps behind every moral point of view there may be a religious point of view. For the time being, however, I shall confine myself to the moral point of view. Here is the great difficulty: it is possible that, from the point of view of ethics, the Soviet Union and the Western Powers speak a different language.

147. If I had with me — and it is a good thing that I do not, for I do not want to keep the Committee too long — the definition which Voltaire, an author whom I admire but whose views I do not share, gave in 1751 of the European balance, we should see that he explains how, despite wars and everything else, there was an understanding of minds among the European Powers from which emerged a kind of European community which to some extent superseded the Christianity of the Middle Ages. It was because there were the same spiritual values, in one form or another, shared by all

the elements that made up that balance. Those values are what we lack today. We speak a different language and that is why I feel that the statement made by the representative of Lebanon was not only an admirable lecture, from every point of view, but one which served an extremely useful purpose.

148. I cannot end on a note of pessimism, not because I am an optimist by nature but because I am what Professor Ward calls a "meliorist"; I do not take the brightest possible view but I do believe in gradual improvement. This word "meliorist", being of Latin origin, may find its way into every language.

149. There are factors, however, which give us reason for hope. Firstly, there is the fact that we are in contact with each other; secondly, as Mr. Maza so ably put it, there is the element of courtesy in this debate; thirdly, we must make an attempt to understand one another; finally, we shall entrust this matter to the Disarmament Commission with greater solemnity, with more authority, with broader responsibility than was the case with the scientists who discovered the atom. This action is being taken, not by the president of a republic but by the United Nations, the duly accredited representatives of sixty nations from every point of the compass. I believe, however, that there are two factors which may lead towards success. One is economic — and here I am in full agreement with the representative of Chile — because if we carry on the armaments race and the present situation is allowed to continue, then the collapse of the world is clearly inevitable: we are doomed either to sudden death by nuclear energy or to slow death by hunger. This economic factor is of great significance. Then there is a psychological factor, "Operation Candour," as it was called, or making the whole world aware of the danger in which we stand. I believe, too, that there will also be this desire for peace, this desire to work in peace and to hope for a better future, that will contribute to the success of the work of the Disarmament Commission.

150. I conclude my statement with the expression of hope for its success.

151. The CHAIRMAN (*translated from Spanish*): I did not wish to interrupt either the representative of Lebanon or the representative of Peru but I want to make the position clear for the future. I think we should confine ourselves to the subject under consideration. Rule 116 gives only the right of reply; I think that by that we must understand that we concentrate on specific points in which reference was made to the representative who asks for the floor.

*The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.*