

United Nations  
**GENERAL  
ASSEMBLY**

TWENTY-SECOND SESSION

Official Records



**FIRST COMMITTEE, 1550th  
MEETING**

Thursday, 14 December 1967,  
at 10.30 a.m.

**NEW YORK**

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**Chairman: Mr. Ismail FAHMY**  
(United Arab Republic).

**AGENDA ITEMS 29, 30 AND 31**

**Question of general and complete disarmament  
(continued):**

(a) Report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation  
Committee on Disarmament (A/6951-DC/229; A/C.1/  
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possible use of nuclear weapons and on the security  
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**Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear  
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**Elimination of foreign military bases in the countries of  
Asia, Africa and Latin America: report of the Conference  
of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament  
(continued) (A/6951-DC/229)**

1. Mr. TSURUOKA (Japan): It is my intention today to  
speak mainly on the question of general and complete  
disarmament, agenda item 29, and the urgent need for  
suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests, agenda item  
30, although I shall touch upon the other disarmament  
items.

2. The Japanese delegation deems the question of disarma-  
ment to be among the most important of all the matters  
with which the United Nations must deal under its Charter.

3. To the great grief and frustration of most of the people  
as well as the States of the world, there is very little to  
show for all that has been said for so many years in this  
Committee as well as in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on  
Disarmament. The record of the past amply proves how  
difficult a task it is and how painstaking the effort must be  
in trying to solve the exceedingly complex question of  
disarmament. There have, of course, been some very  
notable achievements, in particular, the partial test-ban  
Treaty of 1963 and the Treaty on outer space of 1967  
[resolution 2222 (XXI)], and these rare achievements show  
what perseverance as well as the aspirations of mankind can  
bring about in the pursuit of peace in our time.

4. It is the very earnest desire of the Japanese Government  
that all States should do their best to break down the  
barriers and overcome the difficulties lying in the way of  
disarmament and arrive as soon as possible at agreements on  
various collateral measures, with general and complete  
disarmament as the eventual goal. We believe that agree-  
ment should be sought first on practical measures subject to  
effective international control, taking into consideration  
the necessity of ensuring the security of States and  
maintaining the military balance of power in the world.  
With these considerations in mind, it is our view that, under  
present circumstances, priority should be given to conclud-  
ing and bringing into force as soon as possible the  
non-proliferation treaty that has been the subject of such  
intensive negotiations at Geneva, and, equally promptly, a  
treaty prohibiting all test explosions of nuclear weapons for  
all time.

5. As for the non-proliferation treaty, my delegation pays  
a tribute to the tireless and painstaking efforts that have  
been made by all the members of the Eighteen-Nation  
Committee on Disarmament, in particular, the Soviet Union  
and the United States. At this stage, referring to para-  
graph 6 of the interim report by the Eighteen-Nation  
Committee [A/6951-DC/229], I should like to express the  
hope and expectation of the Japanese Government that the  
Governments concerned will not only continue but will  
intensify their efforts for the realization of a just and  
equitable treaty at the earliest possible date. This accom-  
plishment will be a truly remarkable milestone on the long  
and difficult road leading to general and complete disarma-  
ment.

6. I should now like to offer a few comments on the  
Secretary-General's report concerning the effects of the  
possible use of nuclear weapons and the security and  
economic implications for States of the acquisition and  
further development of these weapons [A/6858 and  
Corr.1]. This is the subject of agenda item 29 (b).

7. My delegation was one of the co-sponsors of the draft  
resolution which was adopted by the General Assembly on

5 December last year as resolution 2162 A (XXI). This resolution requested the Secretary-General to prepare the report I have mentioned. A Japanese expert, Professor Mukaibo of Tokyo University, participated in the preparation of the report. The great value of that report is apparent to all of us, and my delegation warmly welcomes its timely submission and appreciates highly the Secretary-General's efforts and those of the experts who assisted him in its preparation.

8. The Japanese delegation can think of no better, single means of acquainting world public opinion with the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons, and with the security and economic implications of the acquisition and further development of such weapons, than the widest possible dissemination of the Secretary-General's report. This was the purport of operative paragraph 4 of resolution 2162 A (XXI), and it is the intention, as well, of operative paragraph 6 of draft resolution A/C.1/L.413 and Add.1 and 2, which was submitted by Canada, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Norway, Poland, Sweden, the United Arab Republic and Japan, and is now before this Committee, a number of other countries having joined in sponsoring it. My Government is taking appropriate measures to have the Secretary-General's report published in the Japanese language so as to provide the Japanese people with the greatest possible knowledge of its contents. We very much hope that similar measures will be taken by other Member States. As one of the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.413 and Add.1 and 2, my delegation appeals to all representatives to give their unanimous support to that draft.

9. At this point, I think it is appropriate to express our very sincere appreciation to the members of the Secretariat, who have contributed a great deal to the dissemination of knowledge concerning disarmament by having published various material such as *The United Nations and Disarmament, 1945-1965*.<sup>1</sup>

10. I should now like to discuss the question of the suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests.

11. A comprehensive treaty, including appropriate safeguards, which effectively prohibits all testing, would contribute very substantially, in our opinion, to the slowing down of the nuclear arms race. It would also be a very effective measure for preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In the light of the considerable progress made in the course of discussions in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament regarding the draft non-proliferation treaty, we feel that the prohibition of underground nuclear weapons testing is more urgently needed now than ever, in order to balance the responsibilities and obligations arising therefrom.

12. My delegation is very glad to note and greatly appreciates the fact that the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, as indicated in its interim report, was able to have "a valuable discussion" on the "urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests" [A/6951-DC/229, para. 5] in accordance with General Assembly resolution 2163 (XXI). That discussion must certainly be counted as a step forward. However, without

going into detail, it seems clear that there still remains the question of the best means of ensuring observance of a comprehensive test-ban treaty by signatories. This question may perhaps be summarized as follows: (1) whether national means of detection are sufficient for ensuring observance of the treaty; (2) whether an international control system, including on-site inspection, is indispensable, or (3) whether co-operation in the detection methods of States which have advanced techniques in this field are effective enough to detect and therefore discourage nuclear-weapon tests which are conducted in violation of the treaty.

13. My delegation has considered the idea of "verification by challenge" to be a possible solution to this question. My delegation hopes that both the Soviet Union and the United States would re-examine the feasibility of this idea because we must not, despite acknowledged difficulties, leave any stone unturned in our attempt to conclude the comprehensive test-ban treaty. On the contrary, we must grope for every possible solution to this question. In this connexion, the so-called "black boxes" proposal which concerns seismographic installations, still attracts our attention as one possible solution of this complicated question. We maintain our opinion that such devices might well be a very effective contribution towards the solution if they were placed in geographically suitable regions and in sufficient number.

14. My delegation believes that effective international control, including on-site inspection, is indispensable unless there are adequate scientific grounds indicating that all underground nuclear tests could otherwise be detected and identified. Accordingly, we believe that clear agreement accompanied by effective international control is preferable to an unstable provisional moratorium formula.

15. I should like to emphasize strongly, however, that my delegation estimates, in very high terms, the results of the slow but steady efforts aimed at perfecting detection techniques.

16. As was reportedly made clear in the course of the discussions at the twelfth session of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, the difficulties accompanying detection, identification and verification of underground tests have been considerably reduced by the following factors: (1) the development of highly sensitive seismographic installations; (2) the exchange of seismographic data; (3) the improvement of methods of analysis of data, and (4) the observation of the surface of the earth by satellites. It would be difficult to exaggerate the importance that we believe should be attached to the further improvement of detection techniques along these lines.

17. We are quite convinced that, as these techniques are perfected further, the importance of the question concerning the means of ensuring compliance with the prospective treaty, in other words, the argument over the need of on-site inspection, will be greatly reduced. Thus, early conclusion of the treaty will be promoted. For these reasons, Japan wishes to contribute all that it can to the perfection of the detection techniques. In this connexion, we have supported the so-called "detection club" and we have made a positive contribution to its activities by

<sup>1</sup> United Nations publication, Sales No.: 67.I.9.

sending a team of Japanese experts to the International Conference held in Stockholm in May 1966, for the exchange of seismographic data. As a country with a rich experience of many years of seismology, Japan wishes to continue its utmost efforts to promote co-operation with the "detection club", as the Foreign Minister of Japan, Takeo Miki, made clear in his general debate statement at the 1563rd meeting of this session of the General Assembly on 22 September.

18. I am obliged at this point to refer frankly to an aspect of the problem of nuclear weapons testing which is the source of great regret and sorrow to my Government and the Japanese people. The fact must not be overlooked that both France and the People's Republic of China are continuing to conduct nuclear tests in the atmosphere, while the United Nations, at the same time, is striving to arrive at an agreement on a comprehensive test-ban treaty. My delegation deems it necessary to appeal once again to France and the People's Republic of China, in the most earnest terms, to change their present policies and join other States in their collective efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament, including a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapons tests. This is obviously a matter of the greatest importance because, for so long as certain nations continue nuclear weapons tests and the development of nuclear weapons, not only may doubts arise as to the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, but also the significance of the existing partial test-ban Treaty may in the future be disputed. Accordingly, my delegation urges all States to intensify their efforts for the early conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

19. My Government supports draft resolution A/C.1/L.414 submitted by the eight non-aligned States which are members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, and has therefore decided to join in sponsoring that draft. My delegation hopes that it will be adopted unanimously.

20. The CHAIRMAN: Before calling on the next speaker, I should like to announce that Czechoslovakia has become a co-sponsor of draft resolution A/C.1/L.413 and Add.1 and 2.

21. Mr. CSATORDAY (Hungary): One issue of the present debate on the problem of disarmament is item 31 of the agenda of the General Assembly bearing the title "Elimination of foreign military bases in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America". The interim report of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament [A/6951-DC/229] informs us that, for well-known reasons, the Committee has not yet been in a position to discuss the problem.

22. In the debates in the First Committee during the twenty-first session of the General Assembly, my delegation explained in detail its view on the issue of military bases established on those three continents. Since, however, the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament has had no occasion to take up the matter which we discussed last year, I deem it necessary to touch upon some aspects of this question which in the meantime have attracted our attention.

23. Before turning to the subject, I should like to make a slight detour.

24. Critical remarks are made here and there pointing out that the agenda item does not refer to the military bases built on the European continent. Like other delegations, my delegation has already stated that the socialist countries are ready to liquidate all their military bases immediately. Now I wish to give the assurance that the Government of the Hungarian People's Republic, in conformity with a former proposal made for the simultaneous dissolution of NATO and the military organization of the Warsaw Treaty, is ready to co-operate in the immediate elimination of the military bases in Europe. It is well known, however, that the NATO countries are for the continued maintenance of their military alliance and their broad network of bases in Europe. They adduce, as a reason for this, that the geographical position of the opposing parties makes it necessary for large contingents of United States armed forces to be stationed in Europe on a permanent basis.

25. I have no intention of turning this argument into ridicule, but I cannot imagine any change in the foreseeable future in the geographical position of my country and other States members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. I am confident, however, that the leading NATO Powers will realize sooner or later that the stationing in Europe of foreign armed forces in great strength is not a factor of peace, but a source of tension on that continent and that they will adopt that position and discard the schemes inherited from the cold war era. If they do so, there will be nothing to prevent us from discussing, in the hope of success, the liquidation of military bases on the European continent.

*Mr. Tchernouchchenko (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.*

26. Coming back to our own subject, I wish to state that our debate has been made especially timely by the events of this past year. The international situation has deteriorated considerably, the danger of war has increased, and the source of that is to be found in the steady escalation of United States aggression in Viet-Nam. The war the United States is waging on the Viet-Nameese people is a flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter and of the fundamental principles of international law. The United States at present disregards all these norms and resorts to the use of naked force. It is already almost an established practice in our debates for representatives of the United States—for lack of better arguments—to describe as propaganda all criticism of the war policy of the United States Government. In the condemnation of the unprecedented aggression against the people of Viet-Nam, however, we agree with such American personalities as, for example, the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the United States Senate and the majority of the members of that Committee, as well as with a number of other leading public figures and Church dignitaries who unanimously qualify the aggression on Viet-Nam as an immoral and brutal act. Those persons can hardly be accused of making anti-United States propaganda. A disregard for the principles of international law and the use of naked force are closely linked with the operational use by the United States of its military bases in Asia and in the Pacific region for the purposes of its aggression.

27. In spite of a former news blackout, it is now a known and admitted fact that United States war planes based in air

fields in Thailand make sorties to bomb—of course without a declaration of war—the territory of a sovereign State, the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam. We have often heard the representative of Thailand trying to convince us that the tens of thousands of American troops stationed in his country have been called there to protect the security of Thailand. I wonder how far the security of Thailand is protected by the barbarous air raids in the course of which, until now, more bombs have been dropped on the territory of Viet-Nam than were released over Europe during the Second World War. Is it not clear that the use of military bases in Thailand, Okinawa, Japan and in other places make these countries the promoters, not of a defensive struggle, but of an act of aggression.

28. The advocates of foreign military bases often refer to the requirements of mutual security as an argument in support of their position. But if the United States bombers taking off from bases in Thailand do not serve the defence of that country—for as a matter of fact the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam has never attacked Thailand—the question arises whether there is any convincing proof that they protect the security of the United States. When did the people and the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam endanger the security of the United States?

29. The case of the military bases used for the purposes of the war in Viet-Nam proves more eloquently than anything what my delegation has already pointed out in our debate last year—that is, that those bases serve the imperialist interests of certain Powers and those interests are promoted by the countries which make their territory available for such purposes. Against the elimination of military bases, it is often argued that this demand is prejudicial to the sovereignty of the States concerned and that the establishment of military bases is dictated by the requirements of collective security. I have already had occasion to point out that it is not the elimination of those bases but their use that creates a threat to peace and security.

30. But let us examine the argument once more. I should like to ask the question whether the exercise of national sovereignty is a policy leading to a grave violation of the sovereignty of other States; whether the continual air raids against the territory of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam do not constitute a flagrant violation of the sovereignty of the Viet-Nameese State; whether the Government of Thailand, as a Member of the United Nations, has the right to support an act of aggression committed against another sovereign State; and whether that is not contrary to the Charter of this Organization and the generally recognized principles of international law.

31. Let us examine the reference made to collective security. I wonder whether the security of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and the peace and security of Asia in general are not gravely prejudiced precisely by the fact that the Governments of the United States and Thailand, with reference to collective security, jeopardize the security of other States day after day. The answer is unequivocal. References to sovereignty and to collective security in fact serve to disguise what in the United States is called the arrogance of power. The system of the United States

military bases is meant to serve not peace and security but aspirations for world hegemony, and is therefore contrary to the Charter of the United Nations. It has to be liquidated before it sets the whole world ablaze. It is the duty of the United Nations to put a stop to this increasingly unscrupulous United States aggressiveness and thereby to ensure the peace and security of the world.

32. I do not wish to waste the valuable time of this Committee by enumerating the countries where American armed forces are stationed in considerable strength beyond the frontiers of the United States. Suffice it to say that the greater part of the United States army, air force and navy is deployed abroad. It is well to recall that, because we often happen to bear allegations that the policy of expansionism and intervention in the domestic affairs of foreign peoples is pursued by others. But the picture is quite different. It shows that the United States armed forces are present in several dozens of countries. But they are not simply present there; they actively interfere with the internal affairs of those peoples. They make war on the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam; they landed in the Dominican Republic; they carry out provocations against Cuba from their base in Guantánamo; they threaten, more and more overtly, and even violate, the territorial integrity of Cambodia, and so on and so forth.

33. We often encounter the reply that those bases have been established with the consent of the Governments of the States concerned, and so they do not violate the principles of the United Nations Charter. I have already mentioned Guantánamo. The whole world is aware of the fact that the maintenance of the United States base is opposed by the Government and the entire people of Cuba. It is equally known to all how the people of Okinawa feel about the United States domination over that island. And there is hardly anyone who does not know that the Government of Panama has made repeated efforts to recover its sovereignty over a part of the country, the Canal Zone. In these and in other cases, there can be no doubt that the Governments of the countries concerned are dissatisfied with the existing situation and wish to change it radically.

34. At such times, however, there is introduced in the debate a sort of legal formalism invoking treaties concluded decades ago and practically forced upon those countries. We are convinced that the situation created by unequal treaties cannot be maintained in the era of the latter part of the twentieth century, when the basic rules of contemporary international law are generally accepted. The age of gunboat diplomacy is over, and so is the era of unequal treaties. The activities of this Organization are increasingly inspired by the awareness that we live no longer in the early years of the twentieth century, in the golden age of colonialism. With the suppression of the colonial system, the time has come to do away with the accomplished facts arising from unequal treaties and to give effect to the provisions of the Charter in defence of the territorial integrity of all States.

35. An end must be put to the efforts being made by the colonialists to weaken or undo the results of decolonization by maintaining the military bases and strengthening them further. My Government most resolutely endorses the right

of all countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America to the exercise of full sovereignty without the presence of foreign military bases. We support the rightful demand of the Government of Cuba that the United States withdraw its troops from Guantánamo and stop violating the sovereignty of the Republic of Cuba.

36. The foreign military bases that still exist on these three continents practically serve to repress the liberation movements of peoples. The bases used against the Viet-Nameese people are an example of this policy carried to extremes. But the same policy is served by the military bases established in the African territories under Portuguese colonial rule, which pose a threat to the security of the neighbouring African States beyond being a force of oppression of the peoples of Angola, Mozambique and other Portuguese colonies.

37. The recent scandalous action of the Portuguese colonialists against the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the recruitment and training of mercenaries in those military bases and their intrusion into the territories of sovereign States, are another indication that the existence of those colonies, and the bases built in their territories violate the fundamental principle of the Charter of this Organization. The policies of the South African racist régime, the establishment of military bases in South West Africa and along the borders of independent African States are a challenge to the United Nations. The General Assembly and the Security Council have several times condemned these neo-colonialist intrigues, but the relevant resolutions have brought no results because of the refusal of certain Powers. We are convinced that a comprehensive analysis of the question of foreign military bases can promote the implementation of those resolutions too.

38. In the face of the serious deterioration of the international situation, it is evident that the elimination, as a first step, of foreign military bases in Asia, Africa and Latin America, is an indispensable contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security. In this belief, my delegation supports the proposal that the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee should start considering this important matter at the earliest possible date.

39. I wish now to refer to another subject under our scrutiny: the problem of chemical and bacteriological weapons, dealt with in documents A/C.1/L.411/Rev.1 and A/C.1/L.412. The Hungarian delegation, as a result of the debate in this Committee and prompted by its intention to reach the best solution for the cause of international peace, has held consultations with several delegations, including the delegation of Malta. We found the time was very short to achieve feasible results, the best text on this problem, and to accommodate the different views would really be very difficult. We consider that the problem under consideration is a very serious one which needs very responsible, careful and minute consideration. Any over-hasty step or decision would be harmful not only for this Committee, or for the question of the resolution or decision of this Committee but also for the whole international community. The problem raised in the proposal of the delegation of Malta envisages a change in an international agreement that has been acceded to and

ratified by a large part of the membership of this Organization. We cannot take up this matter lightheartedly, just to sound off a few slogans; we have to examine the facts that necessitate any step taken in this matter. If any change is necessary, and if any new measure regarding the Geneva Protocol<sup>2</sup> was necessitated, it should be clearly motivated; valid reasons should be put before our Committee for our consideration.

40. The Hungarian delegation does not exclude the possibility of discussing the implementation of the principles of the Geneva Protocol. In doing so, the Hungarian delegation does not insist on each and every word of its own draft resolution. We are not working here to maintain some words, nor are we here for an exercise in semantics. On the other hand, we deem it impossible to yield on principles. We keep in mind the main aim, that is the promotion of the cause of disarmament, and any step or any motion that aimed at delaying action or invalidating certain agreements that are useful to promote the cause of peace in the world is unacceptable to my delegation.

41. We have studied very carefully the revised draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.411/Rev.1, and have noted a few changes in it. These changes were introduced yesterday by the representative of the Netherlands. I have extremely high respect for the representative of the Netherlands. His country certainly has great experience in international legal practice, having the International Court of Justice there. But I am sorry to observe that his statement yesterday did not adequately reflect that rich legal experience.

42. The Netherlands proposed some minor changes in the original draft resolution of Malta but, on the other hand, presented a certain concept which conflicts with our basic concept. As I have emphasized, our basic concept is to promote the cause of disarmament, to relieve international tensions and to contribute to the limitation of armaments. Therefore, if there is any international agreement already drawn up and accepted by a great number of countries, it should be implemented. In the proposal of the representative of the Netherlands, the word "implementation" is not mentioned, but he insisted that a study is necessary--this is even underscored twice--and should be undertaken, that a definition should be found, and so on. He even found that it is inconsistent and untimely to adopt a resolution containing the principles already adopted in Geneva in 1925.

43. I consider that, after the introduction of the amendments submitted by the representative of the Netherlands, there is very slight change in the content of the Maltese proposal. It is still a backward step in regard to the Geneva Protocol of 1925. I fail to understand why the Hungarian delegation is invited to withdraw its own draft resolution, which is a reaffirmation of valid, international, legal principles and an international agreement. We have not heard any valid reason why we should do so. No such reason was advanced in the statement of the representative of Malta, nor in the brief statement made yesterday by the

<sup>2</sup> Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva, 17 June 1925.

representative of the Netherlands. Only a formalistic explanation has been advanced.

44. During our consultations, we found that quite a large number of delegations agreed with the approach of the Hungarian delegation, that we should not allow the possibility of an unprincipled compromise that would be detrimental to the already existing international agreement. Many of those delegations expressed the view that the United Nations should give full support to the Geneva Protocol, that it should be implemented in practice.

45. If we consider that the use of chemical weapons in South-East Asia has killed and is going to kill tens of thousands of people, and then step aside now and give a free hand to those who are using chemical weapons in that part of the world, we would contribute to the death of many thousands of people—children, women and others. We would also give an opportunity for the further use of even more sophisticated chemical weapons which might escalate into even more abominable weapons.

46. The Hungarian delegation is of the opinion that, if compromise means giving up principles, we are not going to bargain in human lives. We insist on maintaining the provisions of the Geneva Protocol. If we yield today on this issue, tomorrow, not only in South-East Asia but in Africa, Asia and other parts of the world, the same weapons will be used deliberately, without control and without hesitation. But, aside from this practical and political approach, we are bound by international law. The provisions of the Geneva Protocol constitute a part of contemporary international law, and that is binding on all Governments.

47. We regret that the implementation of contemporary international law as embodied in the Charter, which proscribes war in general, is impossible now and that we have to refer to some other problems—to the law of war; and we have to deal with the problems of the conduct of war. But this is forced upon us by those Governments which commit aggression against other nations. We could relieve the pressure exercised by those Governments by protecting the population from mass extermination, mass destruction and from being killed if we were to adopt resolute steps to implement the Geneva Protocol.

48. This is the task before us. We are not dealing with a laboratory experiment. We could prepare papers, we could have some test tubes and perform laboratory experiments and we could twist words to hide our real intentions. We could even go over to transcendentalism and place some enigma before the international community, and have a semantic exercise in this Committee. We should avoid all these superfluous exercises in polemics. We should get down to the real core of the problem. Those countries who are parties to the Geneva Protocol, as the Netherlands is, among others—indeed, the Netherlands was one of the original parties—should not shy away from the implementation of this international agreement, because perhaps a friend of theirs is involved on the other side and is obstinately and in a high-handed manner exerting pressure upon them, trying to obtain freedom to kill and to continue its aggressive war. It will not excuse them from the crimes committed, but will make them partners to them. In fact, my delegation would have expected the

representative of the Netherlands as a party to the Geneva Protocol, on the basis of that same Protocol which it solemnly signed and ratified, to invite all other countries, and try to convince all other countries, to accede to the Protocol, and try to prevent the use of such weapons by all available means.

49. I should like to make a few observations regarding the new text contained in document A/C.1/L.411/Rev.1. We received it only this morning, so it has not been possible to study it very carefully. However, some points in it are very striking.

50. The fourth preambular paragraph of the revised draft mentions resolution 2162 B (XXI), adopted on 5 December 1966, but it does not mention the content of that resolution; it does not appeal to other countries to accede to the Geneva Protocol: in fact, this small line is almost lost in the whole text of the draft resolution.

51. In the operative part of the draft resolution there are only some provisions to revise, update or replace the Geneva Protocol, so that the operative part is acting against the Geneva Protocol. That is an internal contradiction in the whole draft. I wonder how the author and the sponsors of the draft resolution—whose names do not appear on it—could compromise on this contradiction.

52. The Geneva Protocol is mentioned in the last preambular paragraph, but only to the extent that its interpretation is necessary: it does not speak about the implementation of the Geneva Protocol. It also says that some of its provisions might usefully be reviewed, but it does not say which provisions might be updated or replaced, so it would seem that some of the provisions are applicable and others are not.

53. My delegation pointed out at the 1547th meeting that the Geneva Protocol, as conceived in its original form and wording in 1925, is valid even today. It covers all kinds of weaponry pertaining to chemical and bacteriological warfare. Any further specification would be unhelpful, if not impossible.

54. During my consultations with the representative of Malta, we discussed this problem and he mentioned that some further details should be included, concerning new weapons, in the Geneva Protocol. However, I submit that if we go into details as to the kinds of chemical or bacteriological weapons which come under the general Protocol and are not at present covered, that will first of all give a free hand to use those weapons which do not come under the provisions of the Protocol against other people. That is not preventing the use of these weapons but, on the contrary, promoting their use.

55. On the other hand, any kind of list of weapons is temporary. We all recorded with sadness that large sums are diverted from constructive purposes to the fabrication of and experimentation with new weaponry of all types. The list of weapons is changing day by day. If we draw up a list today it might be outdated tomorrow, and I must add that most of these new weapons are unknown to the members of this Committee, I suppose, since the experiments and the research are conducted in secret. They are not publicized in

papers or books which are available for everyone: they are kept secret. How could this Committee, or even the Geneva Conference, draw up a list that would be stronger, more valid and more binding than the Geneva Protocol?

56. I think any step in this direction would only weaken the Geneva Protocol, would only frustrate its implementation and, instead of promoting the cause of disarmament, would create a big stumbling-block on this already sufficiently arduous road.

57. Now, the draft resolution, in its first operative paragraph, mentions that definition is needed, together with updating, replacement and so on—again semantics, no decision. It recommends that the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament should consider the matter. However, I submit that the Geneva Conference has already before it the problem of chemical and bacteriological weapons.

58. The joint statement made by the United States and the Soviet Union on agreed principles for disarmament negotiations, adopted on 20 September 1961, states in its third operative paragraph, in sub-paragraph (b), that the Geneva Conference should examine the "elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear, chemical, bacteriological and other weapons of mass destruction and cessation of the production of such weapons".<sup>3</sup>

59. I have more respect for the members of the Geneva Conference than to suppose that they do not know what they are dealing with and that we should now recommend them to find out what they are dealing with and to find a definition. I think they have the definition. We have already heard a number of definitions by the representative of Malta. The Hungarian representative tried also to make some definitions known which are included already in some military regulations and other books of armaments and problems of disarmament. So, a definition is not such a paramount problem that we should adopt a draft resolution for that reason, and I think that this joint statement of the United States and the Soviet Union gives a basis for the Geneva Conference to take up the matter and to deal with it in the proper way.

60. The joint statement does not envisage a change in or replacement of the Geneva Protocol. It concurs with the idea of upholding the principles and agreement of the Geneva Protocol and my delegation wants to emphasize it once more.

61. Draft resolution A/C.1/L.411/Rev.1 recommends that the Secretary-General should prepare a concise report on the nature and probable effects of existing chemical and biological weapons. The word "existing" is already making it impossible to implement this task because I do not think that those Governments who are engaged in the research and development of such weapons will easily, or in any way, give away those secrets or would agree that the Secretary-General should publicize them. For the same reason the recommendation in the third operative paragraph seems also to be unfeasible. However, the Hungarian

delegation might consider favourably—and we are ready to conduct the consultations on these lines—that the effects of the already known and existing chemical and bacteriological weapons could be usefully studied and the attention of world public opinion and of all Member States should be called to it. In this way we would certainly promote and strengthen the effect and the implementation of the Geneva Protocol and that is the only feasible way, in the view of my delegation, that we can approach this whole question.

62. My delegation is against any step that tries to weaken that international agreement. On the other hand, my delegation will agree with all constructive proposals that will be advanced in our Committee or during the consultations in order to strengthen the effect of that international agreement.

63. In view of the problems involved in this question, my delegation deems it necessary to have further consultation, to have a real understanding among the different parties and to work out the best possible way and the best possible draft and submit it to the consideration of the Committee. I submit that consultations need time. You, Sir, know it very well personally, and that is why I request your patience and the Committee's indulgence to allow us to get together to have more consultations, to get more understanding and to get a more positive solution to this problem.

64. Mr. VRATUŠA (Yugoslavia): Owing to the late submission of the report by the Eighteen-Nation Committee [A/6951-DC/229], the time at our disposal in this Committee does not permit a more substantial discussion on disarmament. This, in our opinion, could have been avoided if there were a stronger orientation to give our Organization more chance to consider this very complex issue in all its aspects. That is why the brief time at our disposal is not the only cause of our concern. Of additional serious preoccupation is the fact that there is extremely slow progress in the sphere of disarmament, which cannot but have a deteriorating impact on the general international situation and the stability of peace in the world.

65. The policy of force, which is being more and more used with a view to imposing solutions in international relations, is accelerating the process of armaments. The arms race, in turn, provides the material basis for this ever-increasing recourse to such a policy. Since we are entangled in this mutual interdependence, many countries—small and newly liberated, as well as others—are compelled in the interest of their own security to spend on armaments considerable amounts of their resources which they so urgently need to speed up their economic and social development.

66. The Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme, Mr. Paul Hoffman, estimated in his statement at the 1137th meeting of the Second Committee on 30 October 1967 that, in 1967, approximately \$175,000 million will be spent on armaments and armed forces, while external assistance to developing countries will reach less than \$7,500 million. These figures speak for themselves.

67. The situation is being further complicated with the initiation of new forms of arms race in the field of

<sup>3</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixteenth Session, Annexes, agenda item 19, document A/4879.*



anti-ballistic missile systems. Such a race is, however, in the opinion of the Yugoslav delegation, pointless, since it clearly appears from the comparative analysis of the most competent people in this field that, were already existing nuclear armouries ever to be used, they would inevitably bring to an end, in the countries involved in the conflict, civilization as we know it, as well as organized community life.

68. This vertiginous race in the fabrication of more sophisticated and costly weapons runs counter even to the theory of nuclear balance, and cannot contribute to the security of its protagonists nor to general security in the world. In the final analysis, this arms race results in a senseless waste of financial and technological resources which the world needs so much for constructive purposes. It is therefore high time for the international community to undertake more effective measures and to explore new ways and means to change the course of these negative developments before it is too late.

69. In other words, if a balance is needed, why should it not be on a descending line—that is, through the halting of the arms race and by stimulating the process of disarmament? If the risk has to be undertaken, why should we not face courageously the risk of disarmament, instead of persistently continuing the arms race, risking to fail in keeping the peace?

70. The report of the Secretary-General on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons constitutes a very valuable study of the dangers which the use of such weapons could cause to mankind and to every living being on earth. Thanks to a number of new scientific data and the conclusions and suggestions it contains, this document is a useful instrument in the struggle for the mobilization of all peace-loving forces against nuclear weapons.

71. For all these reasons, the Yugoslav delegation has sponsored the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.413 and Add.1 and 2, referring to the above-mentioned report of the Secretary-General. My delegation is of the opinion that this document of outstanding significance should be carefully studied by all institutions and factors dealing with the problems of disarmament. The ideas it upholds should be taken into account also by national decision-making bodies when planning their activities in the framework of their national security. Our Organization would be acting wisely if it were to initiate studies of similar character on other types of weapons, as well, including chemical, bacteriological and biological weaponry. However, it should be stressed in this connexion that what we need in this field, first of all, is to give full strength to the existing agreements in that field—namely, to the Geneva Protocol—and to request all Member States to give full support to those agreements and to implement them in their everyday practice.

72. General and complete disarmament has been accepted by the General Assembly as our ultimate objective. We feel, however, that we are progressing at a disturbingly slow pace towards that end. It has to be noted that the discussions conducted so far on this question have not gone beyond the introduction of the draft treaty on general and complete disarmament and the clarification of positions on a number

of problems falling within this sphere. Although this may be considered as marking a certain progress, we should not be satisfied with such a state of affairs.

73. Furthermore, I should like to point out a specific aspect of disarmament that is of late being ignored. In previous discussions, namely, a number of proposals aimed at transferring part of the resources released by disarmament to meet the requirements of developing countries were brought out. There are many valuable studies which speak of the enormous political and economic importance of such an endeavour. They have not, however, received the attention they merit, especially from those to whom they are primarily addressed.

74. And that is not all: The more some countries are involved in a war, the more theories are being produced on the alleged impossibility of converting military production to peaceful purposes. Those assertions, of course, cannot be given credit: indeed, the Second World War called for an unprecedented level of military engagement of national economies and world economic resources and potentials to defeat the aggressors. We know, however, from the past experience of many countries that the wartime economy was successfully converted, in a relatively short period of time, to peaceful purposes.

75. It would be unjustified and incorrect to contend that no concrete results have been as yet attained in the field of disarmament. Of particular importance in this respect are the initial or partial measures, such as the 1963 Moscow Treaty on the partial prohibition of nuclear tests; the Treaty governing the activities of States in outer space, including the celestial bodies [*resolution 2222 (XXI)*] and the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America [*A/C.1/946*]. Those measures, however, would not be sufficient in the long run if they were not followed by other, more comprehensive ones, and if they were not viewed within the context of complete and general disarmament, which should remain the final goal of all efforts in the field of disarmament and world security.

76. Of equal importance would be the initiation of the dismantling of foreign military bases on foreign territories. They should, naturally, first be removed from the territories of those countries which object to their presence and which demand their withdrawal, as well as from the territories whose peoples are still under foreign rule and are therefore not able to eliminate foreign military presence by their own means.

77. In its memorandum of 3 May 1965, addressed to the United Nations Disarmament Commission,<sup>4</sup> the Yugoslav Government upheld the view that the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, the banning of all nuclear tests, and the prevention of further proliferation of nuclear weapons, followed by an agreement among nuclear Powers to begin their own denuclearization, would constitute the basis for the initiation of a genuine process of nuclear disarmament.

78. I should like to stress in this connexion that, in the view of the Yugoslav delegation, there is no longer any

<sup>4</sup> *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for January to December 1965*, document DC/216.



justification for continued postponement of the completion of the Moscow Treaty with the prohibition of underground nuclear tests, in view of the extraordinary achievements in the field of telecommunications and in effective detection and identification systems.

79. Convinced that it is possible to conclude agreement on a comprehensive test-ban treaty, the Yugoslav delegation, together with eight non-aligned members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, has sponsored the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.414 and Add.1.

80. Speaking on the subject of non-proliferation in the general debate during the twenty-second session of the United Nations General Assembly, the Yugoslav Minister for Foreign Affairs said:

"My Government is in favour of a treaty which will reflect in the broadest possible way the interests of all States. We are also prepared to associate ourselves with the efforts leading to the adoption of such a treaty and aimed at exploring the General Assembly's opportunities for action on this matter and on disarmament in general."<sup>5</sup>

81. In view of the fact that the present General Assembly has not been in a position to deal in detail with this problem, the prevailing feeling seems to be that it would be necessary to request the Eighteen-Nation Committee to redouble its efforts and bring the work on this treaty to a successful conclusion as soon as possible. In parallel fashion, steps should be undertaken to enable all Members of the United Nations, by appropriate ways and means, actively to contribute to the solution of this problem.

82. In conclusion, I wish to emphasize that, in the opinion of the Yugoslav delegation, it is in the interest of all countries to find a solution to the problem of disarmament as a whole. No doubt, the greatest responsibility in this respect falls upon the nuclear Powers themselves. However, we are convinced that it is necessary to utilize all possibilities and explore new ways and means to have all countries included in the resolving of this question which is of paramount importance for peace and security in the world.

83. The programmes and measures which, at a given time, had been considered as sufficient are perhaps no longer quite adequate to the conditions created by nuclear technological achievements and the development of more sophisticated weapons and the new needs of the international community in this field. We do believe, therefore, that there is a need to give the General Assembly the opportunity to consider the over-all problem of disarmament under the new circumstances and to elaborate a programme of measures and steps to be realized in the foreseeable future.

84. Mr. KLUSAK (Czechoslovakia) (*translated from Russian*): General and complete disarmament under effective international control remains, without any doubt, the principal and most important task and purpose of our

struggle for the strengthening of universal peace. Yet the question of concluding a treaty on general and complete disarmament has for a long time remained in the background of our discussions and has not had the attention devoted to it which, in view of its importance, it deserves.

85. Although we realize that recently the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament has concentrated its efforts primarily on the discussion of certain questions which, despite their partial character, are extremely important and urgent—we have in mind, in the first place, the conclusion of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons—we believe that the present situation of stagnation in the negotiations on general and complete disarmament should be viewed in a rather broader aspect. If we really want to break the present deadlock in negotiations on general and complete disarmament, we must first of all recall what are the main reasons for this situation.

86. First of all, this obviously tense situation in the world is caused by the aggressive actions of imperialism against peace-loving peoples and, in the first place, by the aggressive war waged by the the United States against the Viet-Nameese people and its dangerous escalation and expansion. This war not only causes apprehension among all mankind because of its possible consequences for world peace, but at the same time exposes the insincerity of the United States representatives' declaration about their readiness to attain general and complete disarmament.

87. The escalation of the war in South-East Asia leads logically to an increase in the strength of the United States armed forces, the intensification of its military production and the creation and expansion of its military bases. Such developments contradict the very essence of the idea of disarmament and constitute a major obstacle to progress in negotiations on general and complete disarmament. Therefore, the demand that the United States should put an end to its aggression is a demand to create conditions which would enable us to make progress in the negotiations on general and complete disarmament.

88. Another reason why, in the negotiations on general and complete disarmament, we are still marking time is linked directly with the approach of certain countries to the very root of the matter.

89. It is quite natural that the negotiations on the achievement of universal and complete disarmament were, from the very first, rightly devoted to the solution of the key problem: that is, the elimination of the possibility of an outbreak of nuclear war. If the negotiations on this fundamental question, despite all the efforts of the socialist and non-aligned States, have ended in a deadlock, it is because the United States, faithful to its military and strategic concepts, has rejected and continues to reject any solution based primarily on the elimination of the means of unleashing and waging a nuclear war.

90. The Soviet Union, guided by its desire to make progress in the negotiations, and taking into account first of all the persistent reluctance of the United States to work for an immediate and radical decision on nuclear armaments, introduced into its original draft treaty on general and complete disarmament a number of substantial changes

<sup>5</sup> Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, Plenary Meetings, 1580th meeting, para. 84.

which would form an appropriate basis for further negotiations. However, all the attempts by the Soviet Union and the socialist countries to reach a compromise have once again come up against a negative attitude on the part of the United States and its allies.

91. In this connexion it should be pointed out that the United States, in its initial draft treaty, did not make the slightest change that might have made it possible to narrow the gap between the points of view.

92. Such an attitude can lead only to the conclusion that the United States, in the negotiations on general and complete disarmament, does not want to renounce the means which make it possible for it to launch and wage a nuclear war. What other interpretation could be placed on the constant urge to pursue and promote the policy of maintaining mutual nuclear deterrence which was, this year again, so much emphasized in our Committee by the United States delegation?

93. We are speaking frankly about the reasons which are holding up the negotiations on general and complete disarmament because we believe that we must do so if they are to be gradually eliminated. At present the extent to which it will be possible to remove all these obstacles, which the United States and the Western Powers created, depends above all on those countries themselves and on the degree of their readiness to adopt a more realistic and positive attitude so that progress may be made in the negotiations on general and complete disarmament.

94. In the course of the recent negotiations in our Committee on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, the United States delegation and certain other Western Powers advanced the view as a fundamental argument against the Soviet draft convention [A/6834] that the problem of banning the use of nuclear weapons could be solved only within the total complex of general and complete disarmament. That is why it might now be expected that they would proceed from words to deeds and show, in future negotiations, that their reference to general and complete disarmament was not designed merely to weaken interest in the convention, so that the question of general and complete disarmament would not, in their hands, be used purely as a weapon against draft resolutions concerning further important partial measures. But the facts do not give grounds for such optimism.

95. In the circumstances, the Czechoslovak delegation would like to stress again that we must not reconcile ourselves to the existing unsatisfactory situation in the negotiations on general and complete disarmament. We must do everything in our power to find new possibilities and a new basis for reviving a business-like discussion of that major question of disarmament.

96. At the same time it is necessary and feasible to continue to implement all realistic proposals for partial measures designed to ease tension in the world, to put a stop to the arms race and to limit the possibility of an outbreak of nuclear conflict, since such measures create a favourable atmosphere for the solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament.

97. Therefore, we have always viewed and continue to view the negotiations on partial measures not as a deviation

from the main purpose of the question of disarmament, or a replacement of it, but, in the present situation, as inevitable stages in the process towards its attainment. If at the present time we concentrate our attention on such measures in the field of nuclear disarmament as the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, a ban on their use and a ban on all testing of such weapons, it is primarily because these measures are intended to limit the possibilities of an outbreak of nuclear war and to create an atmosphere of trust among States. These are necessary conditions for the solution of complex world problems, the most important one of which is undoubtedly general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

98. And though there may be differences of opinion about priorities or the degree of importance of individual partial measures, nevertheless the effectiveness of such measures from the point of view of the purpose of disarmament is acknowledged today by an overwhelming majority of States.

99. Our awareness of the need for an active struggle on a wide front against the threat of nuclear war is increased as our understanding grows of the danger latent in the present level and destructive force of nuclear weapons. For this reason particularly we value highly the report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons [A/6858], since we have here not only a scientific examination of the question but a document of great importance.

100. Scientific frankness and uncompromising conclusions, revealing the whole extent of the danger which lies in nuclear weapons and their possible use, make this document one of the most important in the field of disarmament. Although it is not a specific proposal for the solution of the problem of nuclear disarmament, nevertheless we can regard it as a document lending strong support to our aspirations, and as an appeal addressed to the conscience of mankind. Therefore, we found it natural, for example, that in the discussion of the Soviet draft convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, a majority of delegations considered it necessary to refer to document A/6858 in justifying their position in relation to measures whose purpose is a limitation of the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons. We believe that the report and its conclusions will be taken into account by all representatives in taking a decision on their approach to further important measures, first and foremost of which is obviously the ban on the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

101. Therefore, the Czechoslovak delegation, which has become a co-sponsor of draft resolution A/C.1/L.413, fully agrees with that resolution's assessment of the importance of document A/6858, and endorses the expressions of gratitude to the Secretary-General for his initiative, and also to all those who took a direct part in the drafting of the report.

102. At the same time, we consider it particularly important that this report should be circulated as widely as possible, as provided for in paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of the operative part of draft resolution A/C.1/L.413. We are convinced that if a wide section of public opinion is made

familiar with the report of the Secretary-General, that will strengthen the feeling of responsibility in peoples for the future fate of mankind, and also the efforts designed to avert an outbreak of nuclear war.

103. The people of our country, which is taking an active part in the struggle for the maintenance of peace, will welcome this document. In our view, an important role in the circulation and dissemination of the report [A/6858] should and can be played also by all existing United Nations information centres, which have sufficient resources and experience in informing public opinion of the tasks and the results of the work of the United Nations.

104. Certain other resolutions were submitted in connexion with item 29 on which we should like to express our views. I have in mind draft resolution A/C.1/L.412, submitted by the Hungarian delegation and draft resolution A/C.1/L.411/Rev.1, tabled by the delegation of Malta.

105. In spite of the fact that both these draft texts refer to a common problem, that is, chemical and bacteriological weapons and consequently to the Geneva Protocol of 1925, the way the question is approached draws a clear dividing line between these two resolutions.

106. The Hungarian draft resolution is designed to strengthen the Geneva Protocol, in particular by demanding strict observance of the principles and norms of the Protocol and calling upon States which so far have not done so to accede to the Protocol. That is the only correct approach in our view, as it is designed to strengthen the international juridical obligation not to use chemical and bacteriological weapons. At the same time, we are firmly convinced that the Geneva Protocol is still a document which fulfils the basic requirements of all peace-loving peoples in their struggle against the possible use of these weapons of mass destruction. That is also demonstrated by the broad measure of support for General Assembly resolution 2162 (XXI), which, like draft resolution A/C.1/L.412 this year, fully supports the Geneva Protocol. I believe that by voting in favour of resolution 2162 (XXI) almost all of us expressed our concern that there might be violations and failures to observe the principles contained in the Geneva Protocol, and our intention is that it should remain in the centre of our attention. That is why we consider it extremely useful to reaffirm our point of view which is fully reflected in draft resolution A/C.1/L.412 submitted by the Hungarian delegation.

107. In contradistinction to draft resolution A/C.1/L.412, draft resolution A/C.1/L.411/Rev.1, submitted by the delegation of Malta—I have in mind here its request for a revision of the Geneva Protocol—would first of all by its consequences divert attention from the main problem, which still remains that of fulfilling the obligation not to use chemical and bacteriological weapons. We consider it quite unnecessary at the present time to have endless discussions about individual provisions of the Geneva Protocol which, as a matter of fact, are fulfilling their role today also in such a way that the majority of States, by acceding to the Protocol, have confirmed their agreement with its principles and norms. We all know that certain States have so far not even taken this fundamental step.

108. So far as concerns the resolution itself [A/C.1/L.411/Rev.1], the very first lines of this draft should give us serious cause for concern since it is proposed that we should agree that:

*[The speaker continued in English]*

“many chemical, biological [and radiological/ weapons”—radiological is in the first text—“which have been or are being developed may constitute a great threat to mankind.”

*[The speaker continued in Russian]*

The adoption of such a wording would mean a weakening of the prohibition of the use of all kinds of chemical and bacteriological weapons without distinction, that is, the creation of a basis for a substantial weakening of the provisions of the Geneva Protocol. Such an approach to the question of banning the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons is unacceptable to us since it opens the way to the legalization of the use of some forms at any rate of these weapons of mass destruction.

109. We cannot agree with the view that the Geneva Protocol has now become so outmoded that it requires immediate revision.

110. The representative of Malta, after listing a number of forms of chemical weapons, stated:

*[The speaker continued in English]*

“It will be noted that the prohibitions of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 apply only to certain of these types: generally speaking, although not exclusively, to the most outdated and the least insidious, such as irritants, lung irritants, skin necrotizers and vesicants. . . . It is highly doubtful that the newer types of anti-personnel chemical agents can be covered by the language of the Geneva Protocol.” [1547th meeting, para. 35.]

*[The speaker continued in Russian]*

111. If we look carefully at the Geneva Protocol, we shall on the contrary find it quite clearly indicated there that its provisions in this regard do take into account the development of chemical weapons, and fully cover them today since it prohibits the use of:

*[The speaker continued in English]*

“all asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices”.

*[The speaker continued in Russian]*

To try to give an appropriate specification and a detailed list of the individual forms of chemical and bacteriological weapons in such an important document could only serve, in our view, to weaken the Protocol and to create loopholes for the violation of the obligations it contained.

112. We believe that in this complex matter it would be highly dangerous, in the tense circumstances which have

arisen as a result of the lack of time, to adopt any hasty decision which would threaten the operation and the legality of the Geneva Protocol.

113. Therefore, we repeat that at the present time when we are witnessing violations of the Geneva Protocol, we have no right to devote our attention to a revision of this effective document and, in the face of this very danger, we must, on the contrary, demand its implementation from all States without distinction.

114. May I express briefly the views of the Czechoslovak Soviet Socialist Republic on the question of the proliferation of, and the ban on, the testing of nuclear weapons by underground explosions.

115. I believe there will be no divergence of views about the fact that the Moscow Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty in three environments has not only had a favourable influence on the international situation but at the same time has shown that where there is goodwill among the interested parties, there can be a way to reach a decision on certain individual problems.

116. Now, when the majority of States are demanding an expansion of the ban on underground nuclear testing and are stressing the usefulness of such a step with a view to weakening and halting the nuclear arms race, they expect that goodwill and the interest of ensuring world security will triumph over selfish interests and the plans of the military circles of certain States. We are convinced that such plans, which are the main obstacle to reaching agreement on the prohibition of underground testing, exist because of the programmes of testing in the United States. In *The New York Times* on 10 December this year, in an article by John W. Finney, we read:

*[The speaker continued in English]*

"The Atomic Energy Commission plans an accelerated test programme with a relatively large number of tests in such areas as new re-entry warheads for intercontinental missiles, guidance systems and warheads for defensive missiles."

*[The speaker continued in Russian]*

117. Where can such plans lead to, if not to intensification of the arms race? What can they demonstrate except a persistent reluctance on the part of the United States to agree to the prohibition of underground nuclear tests?

118. It is becoming ever more clear that the point here is not at all outstanding technical problems of control but political decision on the part of individual Governments. The development of scientific knowledge in the field of seismography shows more and more convincingly that the control of the implementation of the agreement on the ban on underground testing can be effected by national means of detection and identification without detriment to the security of any State. Therefore the stubbornness with which the United States is insisting upon the demands for exercising control through inspection on the spot stands out ever more clearly as an artificial obstacle to agreement on the prohibition of underground nuclear testing. It only

demonstrates the reluctance of the United States Government to put an end to all nuclear testing. We are convinced that, were it not for the consistent opposition of the United States, an agreement on the banning of the use of nuclear weapons could be concluded without any further delay.

119. At the last session of the General Assembly we noted that the existence of military bases on the territory of other States is a source of constant tension and a hotbed of dangerous military conflict threatening the security of States and universal peace, and the development of the international situation, particularly the aggressive actions of the United States in South-East Asia, convinces us of the need and urgency of solving this problem. The developments of events have with growing clarity exposed the active part played by foreign military bases as an instrument in the policy of force and flagrant intervention in the internal affairs of States in the defence of the global interests of imperialism.

120. The maintenance of military bases and the presence of foreign armed forces on the territories of certain African, Asian and Latin American States is a constant threat to the struggle of the peoples of these continents for the total liquidation of colonial and neo-colonial domination, for freedom and the independent choice of their own course of future development.

121. The strengthening and the improvement of the efficiency of the system of military bases, and co-operation in this field, particularly between the United States and the United Kingdom, have one single purpose: that of maintaining and using, with the help of force, imperialist influence in developing countries and doing everything possible to suppress the national liberation struggle of the peoples of these countries.

122. Such a policy, based upon naked force, carries within it a constant danger not only for the peoples upon whose territories these foreign bases are situated, but, because of its consequences, for universal peace as well, for so-called local conflicts directly connected with the existence of these bases may flare up into a world conflagration.

123. Therefore, we think that the struggle for the elimination of military bases from other territories is a constituent part of the struggle against the danger of an outbreak of world war and for a weakening of tension in the world. Our delegation believes and is confident that it will have an opportunity to express itself in greater detail on the draft resolution on the elimination of foreign military bases in Asia, Africa and Latin America in the course of the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, which next year will be paying this question the attention it deserves.

*Mr. Fahmy (United Arab Republic) resumed the Chair.*

124. The problem of disarmament which we are discussing here, and on which my delegation has expressed its views today, requires not only our constant attention but, above all, a concentration of effort aimed at its gradual solution.

125. In this connexion, we still have a great deal of work ahead of us, since the obstacles which persist in the way of

solutions to individual measures of disarmament, and more particularly on general and complete disarmament, are not small ones. If the taking of individual gradual steps seems, as experience and a realistic assessment of the situation show, unusually difficult—and particularly difficult if we want to achieve a final result—we cannot and should not retreat because the struggle for disarmament is an inseparable constituent part of the struggle of peace-loving forces against aggressive war and for the strengthening of international security and lasting peace. In recognition of this, we must strive to see to it that our efforts to solve the whole complex of disarmament and the specific problems connected with it do not slacken.

126. Therefore we believe that both the General Assembly and the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament will in their work next year take into account the whole importance of this task and, with the active participation of all States, will help to implement it.

127. The CHAIRMAN: Before I call on the next speaker, I should like to announce that the following countries have decided to co-sponsor draft resolution A/C.1/L.413 and Add.1-2: Venezuela, Chile, Ecuador, Costa Rica, Colombia, Jamaica, Haiti, Guatemala and Trinidad and Tobago.

128. Moreover, the following countries have decided to co-sponsor draft resolution A/C.1/L.414 and Add.1: Chile, Venezuela, Colombia, Haiti, Guatemala, Argentina, Ecuador, Costa Rica and Trinidad and Tobago.

129. I now give the floor to the representative of Malta in exercise of his right of reply.

130. Mr. PARDO (Malta): The representative of Hungary, in the course of his remarks this morning, referred to unknown sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.411/Rev.1, and the representative of Mongolia also referred the other day to the “authors”—in the plural—of that draft resolution.

131. We have no knowledge of such unknown sponsors, nor has my delegation, like perhaps certain other delegations, ever lent its name to such covert manoeuvres. I hope that the words of the representative of Hungary and those of the representative of Mongolia, to which I have referred, were an involuntary slip of the tongue; in any case, they are false. It is late and I do not wish to detain this Committee. I hope, however, to deal with the other observations of the representative of Hungary at our next meeting.

*The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m.*