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Chairman: Mr. Omar Abdel Hamid ADEEL
(Sudan).

Implementation of rule 154 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly

1. The CHAIRMAN drew the attention of the members of the Committee to the letter dated 9 October 1962 addressed to the President of the General Assembly by the Chairman of the Fifth Committee (A/C.5/927), containing the views of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions and of the Fifth Committee on the implementation of rule 154 of the Assembly's rules of procedure.

AGENDA ITEM 77

The urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests (A/5141 and Add.1, A/C.1/873) (continued)

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

2. Mr. POPOVIC (Yugoslavia) said that Yugoslavia regarded the cessation of all nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests as the first step towards disarmament. He reminded the Committee of the statement made on that subject by President Tito on 13 April 1962, which had been circulated to the Members of the United Nations in document A/5117.

3. The differences of view between the two sides had been reduced to a minimum; yet nuclear tests were still being carried out on an ever-increasing scale and at an ever-increasing rate. The problem of underground tests had still not been solved. One side considered that such tests would continue until a solution was found to the problem of inspection, while the other maintained that they should be discontinued until the problem of inspection and control was solved. That difference could be bridged, but the task of doing so was not solely the responsibility of the nuclear Powers. It was the concern of all peoples.

4. In his statement to the World Congress for General Disarmament and Peace at Moscow on 10 July 1962, Mr. Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, had said that the nuclear death potential in the world at the present time amounted to 250,000 megatons, or more than 80 tons of explosives per head. According to statements made in the Gen-

eral Assembly by the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom (1134th plenary meeting), the casualties in a general nuclear war would exceed 300 million dead in the first few days.

5. The military arguments which the nuclear Powers put forward as grounds for continuing tests had become untenable, and the world no longer regarded them as more than pretexts. It was useless to ask who had begun the tests, or how many had been carried out by each side, or which country was to be the last to test, or the next to last. Yugoslavia did not understand reasons of security which could only lead to catastrophe.

6. Since 1954, the question of nuclear weapon tests had been dealt with in an extraordinary number of speeches and statements, which had shed abundant light on their terrible implications. The dangers arising from the arms race were clear. High-altitude explosions had extended it to outer space and greatly increased the danger to peace and security. Nuclear explosions were carried out underground, to improve tactical nuclear weapons so that they could be substituted for conventional arms. The risk of other countries acquiring nuclear weapons had now become imminent. The huge military budgets of the great Powers, particularly their allocations for nuclear weapons, had reached a level unprecedented in time of peace and represented an enormous burden on their peoples.

7. Turning to the negotiations at the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament at Geneva, he expressed the view that the participation of non-aligned countries had been essential. Those countries had played a constructive part, and their efforts deserved the Assembly's recognition. The fact that the Eighteen-Nation Committee had not arrived at an agreement was attributable to the fact that the great Powers showed little readiness to come to an understanding on the problem of control, a problem which did not derive from technical difficulties but from mutual fear and distrust.

8. On the question of control, Yugoslavia believed that it still represented so substantial a problem largely because it had been divorced from its actual context and because attempts were being made to solve through it other problems, present and future, in the field of disarmament. Yugoslavia still held the view that disarmament measures should be subject to the degree and form of control that the measures themselves required. Control and inspection of general and complete disarmament should be dealt with within that context, whereas control and inspection in relation to tests should be considered with regard to that problem alone. It would be much easier to solve the two problems if they were not linked in a negative way. Today it was not easy to believe that military tests of some importance could be carried out in secret; similarly, it was hard to understand why a

country's security would be seriously prejudiced by a minimum of on-site inspection, where such inspection proved indispensable. It was to the credit of the non-aligned countries that at Geneva they had helped to bring about a better understanding of the problem of control.

9. Yugoslavia considered that at its current session the General Assembly should call for the prompt cessation, not later than 1 January 1963, of all nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests. The General Assembly should endorse the eight-nation memorandum of 16 April 1962^{1/} as a basis for negotiation and agreement between the nuclear Powers. In addition, the Assembly should request the nuclear Powers and the Eighteen-Nation Committee to inform the General Assembly during the current session, and not later than the beginning of December 1962, of the results of the negotiations.

10. Mr. OKAZAKI (Japan) noted with regret that the nuclear arms race between the Soviet Union and the United States which increased international tension and represented a growing danger to mankind and to future generations, was still going on, each country claiming that it was obliged to test because the other was doing so.

11. Mankind had thus been exposed to the radioactive fall-out of nuclear explosions totalling some 400 megatons, a figure twenty thousand times greater than the yield of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima in 1945.

12. For many years Japan had been advocating, first, that the question of nuclear weapon tests should be separated from the general problem of disarmament, and secondly, that an agreement which would effectively put an end to such tests should be quickly concluded. Such an agreement would open up new prospects for other major disarmament measures and would help to establish a political climate in which further progress could be made towards total disarmament.

13. The proposals made in the Eighteen-Nation Committee at Geneva justified hopes of a satisfactory solution, and particular thanks were due to the eight new members of that body whose mediating role and initiative had helped to bring the positions of the nuclear Powers closer together.

14. The most important task of the General Assembly at the current session was to evaluate objectively the results obtained at Geneva and to invite the Eighteen-Nation Committee to resume its work as soon as possible on the basis of whatever directives the Assembly might give it.

15. The nuclear Powers might not be as far apart as they seemed. The position of the Soviet Union did not seem to have changed very much since its proposal of 27 November 1961^{2/} that the States concerned should pledge themselves to cease testing in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, using their national detection systems to ensure that other States honoured that pledge. In addition, they would undertake not to conduct any underground tests until an agreement had been reached on a system of control for general and complete disarmament.

16. The position of the United States and the United Kingdom had changed and improved a great deal. In their draft treaty of 27 August 1962, entitled "Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in all environments",^{3/} they proposed a simplified network of control stations which would be nationally manned and internationally supervised, in contrast to the draft treaty of 18 April 1961,^{4/} which had provided for strictly international control posts. The new draft would also extend its application to underground explosions recorded as seismic events of less than magnitude 4.75, whereas the older draft had excluded such underground tests. While maintaining the principle of obligatory on-site inspection, the new draft indicated its sponsors' readiness to accept a substantial reduction in the number of annual inspections and of control stations, and it made significant changes in other provisions.

17. It was even more significant that the United States and the United Kingdom were making an effort to come closer to the positions of other countries and to take into account the most recent scientific findings. They had proposed on the same date another draft treaty, entitled "Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water",^{5/} without any provision for on-site inspection.

18. Thus, as far as the banning of nuclear weapon tests in those three environments was concerned, the proposals of the USSR and of the United States and the United Kingdom were almost identical. There was no good reason why an agreement should not be reached in the very near future. Such an agreement would at least spare humanity from the hazardous effects of radio-active fall-out and help relax international tensions, and might well give impetus to the efforts to achieve a complete ban on tests and total disarmament.

19. He paid a tribute to the proposal made by the representative of Brazil at Geneva as early as 16 March 1962: that tests in those three environments should be suspended immediately and that, with regard to underground testing, studies should be undertaken without delay to determine the minimum degree of on-site inspection that was essential to ensure that the undertakings given were being fulfilled. He hoped that the Brazilian delegation and others which had supported that proposal at Geneva would redouble their efforts in order that it would soon materialize.

20. The contention that a partial prohibition could legalize underground testing was untenable. Such a prohibition would only be one step forward towards the final goal: to stop the nuclear testing race for ever.

21. Noting that it had been suggested that another moratorium should be tried, he said that his delegation would support any serious and considered attempt to stop all tests. However, in view of what had taken place in the autumn of 1961, he did not feel that a moratorium without controls would be sufficient to guarantee the faithful implementation of an undertaking to end all underground tests. There must be firm guarantees, until science and technology were sufficiently developed to render them superfluous.

22. The measures to provide for such guarantees should be limited to a minimum, and the determina-

^{1/} Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for January 1961 to December 1962, document DC/203, annex 1, sect. J.

^{2/} See Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixteenth Session, First Committee, 1203rd meeting, para. 25.

^{3/} Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for January 1961 to December 1962, document DC/205, annex 1, sect. O.

^{4/} *Ibid.*, document DC/203, annex 1, sect. H.

^{5/} *Ibid.*, document DC/205, annex 1, sect. P.

tion of the necessary minimum should be based on scientific and technical data. In that connexion, the suggestion for a joint study by scientists on the question how to deal with the problems of detecting and verifying underground tests deserved serious consideration.

23. The First Committee must continue to maintain an unflagging interest in the Geneva discussions and must encourage the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee. He hoped that it would have a report from Geneva which it could examine, if it saw fit, before the General Assembly adjourned in December.

24. Sir James PLIMSOLL (Australia) said that Australia, like most members of the Committee, wanted to see an end to nuclear tests. The question was to devise a means of bringing that about. The greatest point of hope lay in the apparent agreement reached at the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament at Geneva, that tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water could be detected and identified. The points of remaining disagreement related solely to underground testing: whether existing methods of identification were adequate and reliable; what provisions were necessary or acceptable to cover on-site inspections; and whether a moratorium on underground testing was feasible, desirable or acceptable pending an enforceable and comprehensive agreement.

25. On the scientific means of detection and identification, the United States had circulated a most useful document (A/C.1/873) which answered concretely some of the questions raised in the Committee on the matter. The United States position, as outlined at Geneva, was that at the least there would occur each year between fifty and seventy-five underground events in the Soviet Union, and a somewhat larger number in the United States, which instrument readings alone could not positively identify as earthquakes or underground nuclear explosions. If this was indeed so, it presented a very real problem, since on the average, suspicious occurrences would happen more than once a week. The USSR, on the other hand, maintained that existing methods were adequate not only to detect all underground nuclear tests but also positively to identify them as such.

26. The United States claimed that it did not have instruments enabling positive identification of underground tests, whereas the Soviet Union stated that it did have those instruments. To United States requests that they make those instruments available to others, the Soviet Union had replied that it was unable to do so because in the present state of the world those instruments had security value. But the Soviet Union could not logically argue at one and the same time both that the United States had such instruments and that the Soviet Union's instruments had security value. The Soviet Union should not be expected to produce everything; but they should share a great deal of their methods of identification and detection so that international agreements could speedily be reached. In that connexion, the suggestion of the Austrian representative (1247th meeting) that a convention of seismic scientists should be held to solve that problem was one of the hopeful lines of enquiry and co-operation that could be followed up in Geneva as rapidly as possible. The aim would be to eliminate or reduce as far as possible the element of judgement and to replace it with factual data and criteria of a generally accepted nature. The more the problem

could be reduced to a state of almost automatic criteria and automatic courses of action, the more likely was an agreement which would be generally respected and enforceable.

27. About on-site inspection, too, there was disagreement. The Soviet Union now objected to any automatic right of on-site inspection, although at one time they had conceded this right and had even nominated the number of automatic on-site inspections they would be prepared to allow. The Soviet Union's present position was that the nuclear Power in whose country a suspicious phenomenon occurred should be given the right to invite or not to invite inspection as it thought fit. Australia believed that it was neither necessary nor desirable for on-site inspection of all the many suspicious events which would occur each year. There had indeed been general agreement that there should be a limit to the number of on-site inspections. But the Australian delegation did not think the countries where those occurrences took place should be given the right themselves to decide whether any particular occurrence should be inspected or not. If an international authority or any other duly empowered and competent group decided that it should inspect a particular phenomenon, then it was in the interests of the safety of all countries and of mutual trust among all countries that the phenomenon should be examined. If the mechanics of inspection gave rise to fears, such as those expressed by the Soviet Union, then discussions could proceed at Geneva on modifying the suggested modalities and on devising new safeguards for the inspected country. Of course safeguards already existed. One safeguard was that the number of inspections would be limited. Another safeguard was that the right of inspection would apply to the United States equally with the Soviet Union.

28. The third point of disagreement related to the question of a moratorium whereby the nuclear Powers should agree, or be asked, not to undertake underground testing until a final, definitive agreement was reached on this aspect. The Australian delegation found that very difficult to accept. Australia had in earlier years voted in favour of resolutions calling on the nuclear Powers not to resume tests while discussions were going on at Geneva. But the moratorium which had been in effect had been broken by the Soviet Union after preparations extending over a year or more. That was a lesson which it was natural for the nuclear Powers to feel need not be learned again. That was especially so since it was possible, given adequate precautions and money, to conduct in secret large as well as small underground tests which, as outlined by the United States representative at Geneva on 17 August 1962, could add significantly to weapons development. In those circumstances, no nuclear Power could rest easy unless assured that underground testing was not being conducted by others.

29. Thus it was most important to have adequate means of determining whether any nuclear Power was secretly breaking the moratorium. But it was not just a question of proving that a nuclear Power was cheating. Perhaps even more important was the need to disprove cheating. It would be tragic if a test ban agreement were to end because one side had been detected cheating. But it would be even worse if a nuclear Power were to resume testing because, even though in fact nobody had cheated, suspicions that the other side had broken the moratorium could not

definitely be refuted. It was relevant to recall in that connexion that the United States representative in the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space had stated, on 11 September 1962 (A/AC.105/PV.11), that the Soviet Union had carried out nuclear tests in outer space, and the Soviet Union had denied the charge. That was an illustration of the way in which disagreements could arise and of the need to have adequate machinery for establishing the truth.

30. It was no proof of the adequacy of existing national means of detection and identification to state, as did the Soviet Union, that tests by the Soviet Union, the United States, the United Kingdom and France had been detected and identified by others. There was no sure way of knowing that some of those tests had not been wrongly identified. Moreover, the fact that certain underground tests had been detected did not prove that there had not been others which had passed unnoticed.

31. It should be noted that, under the new proposals for prohibiting tests in three environments only, there would still be no safeguard against clandestine preparations. That would be accepted as a known risk. But it was unreasonable to ask nuclear Powers to go further and have no assurance that tests were not taking place.

32. Both sides had genuine preoccupations over security. Care should be taken in working out progressive programmes of disarmament to see that the countries concerned were not put at a disadvantage relatively to one another.

33. It was essential that an agreement should be reached without delay. The first step should be agreement on ending tests in the atmosphere, in space, and under water. That would be a step towards disarmament, would remove fears of fall-out, would build a sense of confidence and co-operation between countries, and would make the development of nuclear weapons very difficult. Of course, it was not enough to stop there. Further work should be done on the problem of underground tests by devising agreed methods of identification through scientific research and by discussions for an agreed basis of on-site inspections. In that task, the Eighteen-Nation Committee would again have the benefit of the memorandum submitted by the eight uncommitted countries on 16 April 1962, which could serve as a basis for discussion. Certainly, that document contained passages open to various interpretations; but it was the task of the Eighteen-Nation Committee to devise more concrete and detailed forms of giving effect to the document's various provisions.

34. Mr. DAVID (Czechoslovakia) said that the necessary conditions now existed for putting into effect a ban on all nuclear tests, under effective control through national detection systems. As the USSR representative had stressed, there were no technical obstacles to the conclusion of an agreement. All the nuclear tests that had so far taken place, including underground explosions, had been recorded by national means of detection; and it was clear that, given the considerable scientific progress that had been achieved in recent years, the exhaustive system of international control worked out in 1958 by socialist and Western experts was today out of date and redundant.

35. Not long ago, United States officials who were opposed to the cessation of tests had denied that

underground explosions could be detected. Today, they were obliged to admit the possibility of their detection. Czechoslovakia, for its part, had not the slightest doubts on that subject, and none of its statements to the Eighteen-Nation Committee—to which the representative of Australia had referred—justified any other conclusion.

36. In point of fact, the Western Powers' unjustified demands in connexion with the control of underground tests of nuclear weapons were the last obstacles blocking the conclusion of an agreement. That attitude could hardly be interpreted otherwise than as an attempt to exploit the question of control to conceal the fact that the Western Powers did not want to bar once and for all any possibility of carrying out nuclear tests. That attitude had brought the negotiations to a deadlock which must be broken. It was for that reason that his Government had welcomed the efforts made by the eight neutral countries in the Eighteen-Nation Committee. On the basis of the memorandum they had submitted on 16 April 1962, it would be possible to settle the question of control by a reasonable compromise and without prejudice to the fundamental interests of the parties. But, like the realistic proposals of the USSR, the neutral countries' memorandum had had a negative reception from the Western Powers. Although the United States representative had mentioned the memorandum in his statement at the 1246th meeting, he had refrained from making any sort of comparison between the basic principles set forth in it and the demands still being made by the Western Powers, for such a comparison would have shown clearly that those demands were entirely incompatible with the fundamental proposals of the memorandum. The main idea of the memorandum was that control over the ban on nuclear tests should be exercised through existing national detection systems. At Geneva, however, the United States representative had given a diametrically opposite interpretation of the neutral countries' position, contending that their proposals inevitably involved the establishment of an international control system.

37. In the same way, the memorandum included the provision that the international commission assigned the task of investigating suspicious events should visit a country's territory on the invitation of its Government. Nevertheless, the United States representative in the Eighteen-Nation Committee had tried to prove that according to the memorandum the responsibility of deciding that an event should be inspected was to rest not with the State in whose territory it took place, but with the Powers of the opposing side.

38. Those examples showed that the United States and the United Kingdom would not be willing to accept the memorandum of the eight neutral countries as a basis for negotiation unless it reflected their own demands regarding control and inspection. In the draft "Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water", which they had submitted on 27 August 1962, the United States and the United Kingdom had tried to give the impression that they would agree to a smaller number of control posts and on-site inspections. But in present conditions that was no compromise, since effective control could be ensured through national detection systems.

39. The Western Powers said that they were ready to conclude an agreement on the suspension of tests,

on condition that in exchange they were given free access to the territory of the USSR and of other socialist States. That claim was obviously unacceptable, being only a pretext for collecting information on the defence facilities of the countries in question. The Soviet Government, for its part, had proposed the immediate conclusion of an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water; at the same time, the States concerned would undertake to carry on negotiations with a view to solving the problem of underground explosions, which would be suspended by common agreement for the duration of the negotiations. The Western Powers rejected that proposal; they advocated a limited agreement which would not cover underground tests. It was obvious that the conclusion of such an agreement would merely legalize underground testing, that the armaments race would go on, and that suspicion would continue to reign between States.

40. The Western Powers had tried to justify their opposition to the conclusion of a moratorium on underground tests by accusing the Soviet Union of having violated the previous moratorium, which had actually never existed. In reality, the United States wanted to be at liberty to carry out underground tests and thus to secure unilateral advantages for itself at the expense of the security of the socialist States.

41. The adoption of the proposal which the Mexican representative had made in the Eighteen-Nation Committee and had repeated in the General Assembly—that a date should be fixed for the cessation of all nuclear tests—would help toward a final solution of the problem. Many delegations had supported the proposal, but not the Western Powers, which had taken a negative attitude towards it.

42. His delegation was convinced that a halt in the armaments race and in the successive series of experimental explosions of nuclear weapons—started by the United States in 1955—depended on the attitude of the Western Powers, and in particular on how far they would be prepared to give up unilateral advantages which threatened the security of the socialist States and the peace of the entire world.

43. The General Assembly should take effective measures at its current session to put an end to testing. To that end, it should not, as in the past, limit itself to adopting general resolutions; it should take a clearly defined position on the substance of the question. In so doing it would clear the way for genuine progress in the negotiations for the final cessation of all nuclear weapon tests.

44. Mr. BELAUNDE (Peru) said that the question of disarmament—including one of its principal aspects,

the problem of nuclear tests—had reached a decisive stage, at which the beginnings of a solution had become visible. Nuclear experiments were inhuman, endangered the health of the human race and might well do irreparable damage to future generations; the Peruvian delegation was convinced that the only possible solution was for the States concerned to arrive, as soon as possible, at an agreement on the cessation of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests under appropriate international control.

45. The report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament showed that while agreement had not yet been reached on banning the use of nuclear weapons, some progress had been made. In particular, the eight neutral countries had submitted a memorandum which was mainly important in that it envisaged the possibility of establishing a permanent system of effective control on a scientific and not a political basis. Unfortunately, one of the principal suggestions in the memorandum—that dealing with on-site inspections—had been interpreted in different ways, and it seemed preferable, to avoid jeopardizing the unanimity of the eight countries in question, not to ask them to give the Committee an authoritative interpretation. In any case, the Committee would be well advised not to look for a theoretically perfect solution, but rather a practical one which would win the approval and confidence of all those involved.

46. The United States representative had clearly explained all the points of an agreement which could serve as a basis for a solution of the issues in dispute; he had stated that his Government was ready to sign a treaty prohibiting those nuclear tests, excluding underground tests, which could at present be checked through national systems. That attitude, together with the political and legal work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee and recent scientific discoveries in the detection and identification of seismic events, justified some hopes of a solution of the problem, despite the unfavourable factors of mistrust between nations and the accelerated arms race.

47. The conviction of the peoples of the world that a nuclear war would destroy mankind imposed on the nuclear Powers the duty of concluding an agreement without further delay. Voicing that conviction, the Mexican delegation had proposed that 1 January 1963 should be fixed as a cut-off date for nuclear testing. The General Assembly could go still further and invite the great Powers to arrive at an agreement before the end of the present session. In that way the work of the United Nations would be crowned with success after fifteen years of effort, and mankind could at last rediscover optimism and peace.

The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.