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**Chairman:** Mr. Omar Abdel Hamid ADEEL  
(Sudan).

*In the absence of the Chairman, Mr. Enckell (Finland), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.*

## AGENDA ITEM 90

**Question of general and complete disarmament: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (A/5197, A/5200, DC/203, A/C.1/867, A/C.1/871, A/C.1/875, A/C.1/L.312/Rev.2, A/C.1/L.317/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1) (continued)**

**CONSIDERATION OF DRAFT RESOLUTIONS (A/C.1/L.312/REV.2, A/C.1/L.317/REV.1 AND REV.1/ADD.1) (continued)**

1. Mr. MELO FRANCO (Brazil), speaking on a point of order, said that although practically all the delegations which had spoken on the four-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.312/Rev.2) had supported it, the sponsors felt that the vote should be postponed so that they could hold consultations with certain other delegations. It was not their desire to provide an opportunity for cold war polemics, but to achieve some positive progress towards general and complete disarmament. They remained convinced that their text could still play an important part in helping to resolve the crisis which had recently brought the world to the verge of a nuclear conflict, but they wished to extend the area of agreement as far as possible. Since the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament was to resume its work on 26 November 1962, it would be advisable not to delay a decision on draft resolution (A/C.1/L.317/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1). He therefore proposed that it should be put to the vote as soon as the list of speakers was exhausted, but that the closure of the debate and the vote on the four-Power draft resolution should take place later in the present session, the date to be fixed by the Chairman. The Committee's report to the Assembly would note the result of the vote on draft resolution A/C.1/L.317/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1 and the adjournment of the debate on the four-Power draft resolution. Similar decisions had been taken at previous sessions of the General Assembly, and in any case the procedure he

had proposed was covered by rule 117 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly.

2. The CHAIRMAN said that if there were no objections, he would consider the Brazilian representative's proposal adopted.

*It was so decided.*

*Mr. Adeel (Sudan) took the Chair.*

3. Mr. VELAZQUEZ (Uruguay) said that Uruguay had not taken the floor earlier in the debate because as a small, unarmed country its contribution could only have been of a general nature. The unarmed countries, however, had an important part to play both in the Committee's debates and in the negotiations at the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament at Geneva; and Uruguay was fully satisfied with the way in which the eight non-aligned nations at Geneva had represented the interests of those countries, which made up the majority of the General Assembly.

4. His delegation felt that the current debate should conclude with the adoption of a resolution which, while reaffirming that the primary responsibility for disarmament lay with the General Assembly, referred the unresolved difficulties to the Eighteen-Nation Committee for detailed consideration. It therefore supported draft resolution A/C.1/L.317/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1, particularly in the emphasis it laid on the need for a spirit of compromise and the importance of considering any measures which might in one way or another facilitate disarmament.

5. Uruguay likewise supported the four-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.312/Rev.2), which gave specific form to an idea already approved by the General Assembly on several occasions, namely, the need to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons. It was true that the aim of the resolutions referred to in the fourth preambular paragraph was the conclusion of appropriate agreements in as many geographical areas as possible, but an agreement covering just one area was fully in accordance with the general principle. There were various specific reasons, moreover, why such an agreement should be concluded for Latin America. The recent crisis was not the only such reason, although it was urgently necessary to prevent any recurrence of it. Also important was the fact that Latin America belonged to the under-developed world, for the under-developed countries had no chance of raising their peoples from poverty unless there was peace and trust between nations. Furthermore, the Latin American continent was well known for its peace-loving tradition; perhaps its greatest contribution to the law of nations and to international relations had been to translate its constant desire for peace into a body of legal instruments providing for the peaceful settlement of all disputes between Latin American countries. One of those instruments was the Inter-

American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, signed at Rio de Janeiro on 2 September 1947,<sup>1/</sup> which had been concluded under the terms of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter and which entailed specific obligations with respect to the protection of the hemisphere against armed attack or against any other acts affecting the territorial integrity, unity, sovereignty or political independence of the countries concerned. The Conference which had drawn up the Treaty had expressly declared that its primary aim was to ensure the peace and security of the continent, and that accordingly no provision of the Treaty could be interpreted as justifying the possession of armaments in excess of those necessary for joint defence.

6. It was on the basis of those considerations that his delegation supported the four-Power draft resolution. The draft resolution did not attempt to impose denuclearization on Latin America—an attempt to which there might be valid objections—but merely asked the Assembly to approve a policy which certain Latin American countries considered to be in the interests of the continent. The actual implementation of that policy would have to be effected through agreements freely arrived at between the Latin American countries themselves. The reason why the proposal was being made through the United Nations was that only in that way could the Latin American countries obtain an assurance that the nuclear Powers would respect a denuclearized Latin America. Of course, the adoption of the draft resolution would not prevent the countries of the area from making the entry into force of an agreement subject to the provision of guarantees by the nuclear Powers in an appropriate form. The establishment of a nuclear-free zone in Latin America would be a direct contribution to the cause of disarmament and peace, of a kind which the unarmed countries were peculiarly qualified to make. It would prove that disarmament itself and the corresponding control arrangements were possible without any infringement of sovereignty.

7. Mr. AHMED (United Arab Republic) said that draft resolution A/C.1/L.317/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1, while avoiding fruitless controversy, reflected a certain approach and endorsed a promising trend. Enumerating briefly the provisions of the draft resolution, he said that the seventh preambular paragraph, in welcoming the spirit of compromise which had prompted the United States and the Soviet Union to introduce certain modifications into their disarmament plans, did not prejudge the nature of those modifications or pass judgement on their substance. The eighth preambular paragraph would express the Assembly's hope that the letters recently exchanged between the leaders of the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom would be followed by the resumption of disarmament negotiations with renewed determination and vigour.

8. Operative paragraph 3, which recommended that urgent attention should be given by the Eighteen-Nation Committee to various collateral measures, responded to the wish expressed almost unanimously in the general debate that the negotiations should explore the possibilities of early agreement on initial disarmament measures designed to reduce international tension and strengthen confidence between States, and thereby to pave the way to general and complete disarmament. Recent events had confirmed the wisdom of that recommendation.

9. Operative paragraph 4 requested the Eighteen-Nation Committee to report to the General Assembly periodically, and in any case not later than the second week of April 1963, on the progress of its work. That target date should allow sufficient time after the nuclear test ban negotiations had been concluded to conduct disarmament negotiations and submit a progress report by the second week in April. Of course, there would be nothing to prevent the Eighteen-Nation Committee from submitting earlier periodic reports to the Assembly if the situation warranted.

10. The main intention of the draft resolution was to make some contribution to the progress of the forthcoming negotiations at Geneva, in which the whole world had a very high stake.

11. Mr. ANUMAN RAJADHON (Thailand) said that in the course of the general debate on the question of general and complete disarmament a number of areas of agreement had become evident. There was unanimous agreement on the urgent need for a disarmament agreement and for the early resumption of negotiations by the Eighteen-Nation Committee at Geneva, and general approval of the role of the non-aligned nations in the Geneva negotiations during the current year and of the definite progress made in a decade of disarmament talks, as chiefly reflected in the texts proposed by the Soviet Union and the United States.

12. Both the major Powers had demonstrated an encouraging spirit of conciliation, although there were still significant differences, particularly on the problem of international control and verification, on peace-keeping machinery and on the scope, pace and phasing of disarmament measures. In his delegation's view, some form of control and verification would continue to be indispensable as long as international confidence was lacking and as long as no means existed to ascertain the real intentions of Governments.

13. At the same time, undue delay in reaching agreement on general and complete disarmament could be extremely dangerous; the next major war could bring about the extermination of mankind. The First Committee should therefore waste no time on cold-war propaganda; it should seize the opportunity for advancing the cause of disarmament which was afforded by the "détente" between the United States and the Soviet Union resulting from the Cuban crisis. It should unanimously urge the early resumption of the Geneva negotiations, leaving the details to the Eighteen-Nation Committee and to the Powers most directly concerned. His delegation would therefore give its full support to draft resolution A/C.1/L.317/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1.

14. His delegation sympathized with the desire of Latin American nations to ward off the nuclear danger from their region. However, unlike resolution 1652 (XVI), by which the General Assembly had called upon Member States to consider and respect the continent of Africa as a denuclearized zone, the four-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.312/Rev.2) was basically a regional arrangement, involving a very limited role for the United Nations. The denuclearization of Latin America was a matter which had to be decided first among the States of that region, and to adopt the draft resolution without ascertaining whether the great majority of Latin American States were in agreement with it would be interfering in the affairs of the Organization of American States. His delegation might therefore have to refrain from participating in the vote on the draft resolution unless it was made clear beyond doubt that the States directly concerned were agreed on

<sup>1/</sup> United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 21 (1948), No. 324 (a).

its desirability. In that connexion, the suggestion just made by the Brazilian representative was a commendable one.

15. The proposals submitted up to the present were merely first steps towards solving the problem of general and complete disarmament. The Assembly's task in that connexion would not end with the adoption or rejection of certain draft resolutions; it must continue to facilitate the realization of the objectives set forth in past or possible future resolutions. In addition, the Assembly would have the continuing task of reminding the leaders of the major Powers that only if they showed a spirit of conciliation and compromise, overriding considerations of national interest and ideology, could mankind be led away from nuclear disaster and towards lasting peace and prosperity.

16. Mr. BITSIOS (Greece) said that draft resolution A/C.1/L.317/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1, which called for the resumption of negotiations by the Eighteen-Nation Committee "in a spirit of constructive compromise", contained a message of wisdom and of confidence, and his delegation would therefore vote in its favour. He hoped that the debate in the First Committee had helped to clarify the basic issues for the members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee, including the non-nuclear Powers.

17. It was distrust that caused one nuclear bloc to lay stress on the need for international control of a disarmament agreement and the other bloc to maintain that such control would merely facilitate espionage. While the non-nuclear countries at the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament had a part to play in resolving the differences between the two sides, they should bear in mind that any system of international verification must apply equally to both sides. It must also be realized that each region of the world had its own particular problems. As the United Kingdom representative had pointed out, the Soviet proposal for the elimination of all foreign bases in the first stage of disarmament would leave Western Europe at the mercy of superior conventional armed forces. Those countries which faced the possibility of aggression by neighbouring nuclear Powers were obviously not in the same position, as the Australian representative had observed, as those which were separated by great distances from the nuclear Powers or which did not regard themselves as threatened by their neighbours. They felt that they could not agree to disarmament measures of a regional character and that, until general and complete disarmament was achieved, they must rely on regional collective defence arrangements if they were not to lose their freedom. In that connexion, he wished to deny the Soviet representative's assertion at the previous meeting that Greece had nuclear bases on its territory. Such allegations were apparently designed to bring pressure to bear on countries like Greece which, although they had no nuclear weapons, were determined to defend their existence.

18. His delegation's vote on the four-Power draft resolution calling for the denuclearization of Latin America would be guided by its belief that, while the countries of any region were free to adopt such a measure if they thought it in their interest, it was not for the General Assembly to do so on their behalf by adopting a resolution, but to approve the appropriate agreement when it had been concluded.

19. Mr. ZOUHIR (Tunisia) expressed regret that although the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament had made some progress with

regard to conventional armaments, it had been unable to reconcile the divergent views on the elimination of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery. He wished to praise the efforts of the eight non-aligned Powers to create an atmosphere of better understanding; he hoped that when negotiations resumed they would pursue their efforts to find a solution to the crucial problem of control.

20. His delegation would support the four-Power draft resolution, which called for the denuclearization of Latin America. It felt, however, that the text had been weakened by the deletion of the operative paragraph reaffirming General Assembly resolution 1652 (XVI), which dealt with the denuclearization of Africa.

21. His delegation was glad that draft resolution A/C.1/L.317/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1, of which it was a sponsor, had gained the support of the United States. He hoped that similar support would be forthcoming from the Soviet Union.

22. Mr. BELAUNDE (Peru) said that the Committee's decision, at the suggestion of the Brazilian representative, to postpone the vote on the four-Power draft resolution had been well advised, since it was desirable, in view of its legal and moral significance, that the draft resolution should gain as nearly unanimous support as possible. What the draft resolution sought to do in point of fact, was to confirm a state of affairs which had already been established in Latin America, by the choice of the countries concerned. Those countries had placed themselves under a legal system which regulated armaments and provided for co-operation in self-defence. It would be logical to extend the system to cover the elimination of nuclear weapons from the continent, provided that the necessary guarantees were furnished. It would also be consistent with the resolutions previously adopted by the General Assembly on the need to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons.

23. The four-Power draft resolution derived from certain principles which were part of the Latin American tradition and which had been accepted by the founders of the League of Nations and the United Nations. The basic purpose of those principles was to promote the cause of peace. Although it must be recognized that peace could not be established by decree, any decision by a group of countries to eliminate nuclear weapons was undoubtedly a step towards disarmament and thus towards peace. It would thus be a mistake to think that in adopting the four-Power draft resolution the Assembly would be imposing a new situation in Latin America; it would merely be giving the weight of its moral authority to a proposal which the sponsors believed to be in the interests of the region, while leaving its realization entirely to the parties concerned. An Assembly resolution would in no way limit the sovereign freedom of the Latin American countries with respect to the terms of an agreement to eliminate nuclear weapons and to the guarantees of compliance with the agreement which they might consider necessary. The draft resolution provided explicitly in operative paragraph 1 that the countries of Latin America should negotiate the proposed arrangements through the means and channels which were found most appropriate, thus implicitly referring to the Latin American tradition in the settlement of such matters, a tradition which had culminated in the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, signed at Rio de Janeiro on 2 September 1947.<sup>2/</sup> That Treaty had been concluded

<sup>2/</sup> *Ibid.*

both to ensure the defence of Latin America against attack from outside the continent and to ensure peace within the continent. It was the first such instrument adopted under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, which recognized the right of self-defence, and was the first attempt to contain that right within a legal framework. Article 53 of the Charter, which related to regional arrangements, had also been taken into account. Article 7 of the Treaty was particularly important; it stated that in the case of a conflict the parties, meeting in consultation, were to call upon the contending States to suspend hostilities and to restore matters to the status quo ante bellum and added that a country which rejected the status quo would be considered the aggressor. For all those reasons, Peru supported the four-Power draft resolution, and hoped that the necessary improvements in the text could be agreed upon.

24. Peru would also vote for draft resolution A/C.1/L.317/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1. Undoubtedly the ideal would have been for the Committee to give an opinion on certain legal issues on which the nuclear Powers were divided. That opinion could then have been taken into account at the Geneva negotiations. But that course might have led to lengthy debate, and the resolution ultimately adopted might not have won unanimous support, in which case it would not have had the desired authority. The sponsors of the draft resolution, however, had succeeded in including many essential elements, including an appeal to the great Powers and a mandate for the eight neutral countries. The text noted the existence of a spirit of compromise and referred hopefully to the recent exchange of letters between the President of the United States, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom. Finally, it made provision for collateral measures to reduce tension and facilitate disarmament. If the draft resolution were to be adopted unanimously it would be a milestone in the history of disarmament negotiations.

25. Mr. OKAZAKI (Japan) said that despite the many differences in approach, the debate had revealed a universal desire for general and complete disarmament, a desire which was shared by the Japanese Government and people. The question was how that objective could best be achieved. In Japan's view, any efforts to bring about disarmament should be based on certain principles. First, disarmament could not be in any way one-sided, but must be balanced, reflecting the real situation in the world. Second, experience showed the need for adequate safeguards; in other words, disarmament must be carried out under strict and effective international control. Third, the problem was an exceedingly complex tangle of political, military and technical factors, which could not be unravelled overnight. The most realistic approach, therefore, was to begin disarmament with limited measures which were practicable, thus helping to restore international confidence. One such measure, in itself a great boon to mankind, would be an agreement banning nuclear tests, which must contain the necessary safeguards. Disarmament was an arduous task and it was not reasonable to expect miracles. Although no tangible results had been produced by the Eighteen-Nation Committee, its work had not been in vain but had laid the basis for future progress. It was therefore appropriate that the Assembly should request it to resume its labours with renewed vigour, as was done in draft resolution A/C.1/L.317/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1, which Japan would support.

26. As far as the four-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.312/Rev.2), was concerned, the sponsors had made praiseworthy efforts to improve the original text. The draft resolution now confined itself to Latin America and left any final decisions to the countries of that region. It also contained an essential provision regarding the verification of any arrangements which might be agreed upon. It was often said that the non-nuclear Powers should do what they could to prevent any further spread of nuclear weapons; and denuclearization was a closely related idea. If a proposal for a nuclear-free zone was to have any chance of success, however, certain favourable conditions must exist in the region in question. When, for example, the region was geographically distant from the nuclear Powers or already free from nuclear weapons, it could be made a nuclear-free zone without difficulty. But if the region was one in which the nuclear Powers already confronted each other, or if it was immediately adjacent to a nuclear Power, there was hardly a real basis for a nuclear-free zone. Until the recent events in Cuba, Latin America could have been described as a nuclear vacuum, and its status as such could be recognized without difficulty. A second consideration was that any effort to establish a nuclear-free zone must have the support of all the countries concerned, including those which were essential for its effectiveness, and regional arrangements would have to be entered into by all of them. It went without saying that the co-operation of the nuclear Powers was also essential. The statement made by the Cuban representative on 16 November (1278th meeting) was thus significant, since he had indicated that his country would be reluctant to support the four-Power draft resolution unless certain conditions were met. Finally, the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in any particular region must not upset the world-wide balance of power, on which the peace of the world depended. That factor was not necessarily of importance in the Latin American situation, but it must be borne in mind when considering any proposal for a nuclear-free zone.

27. The primary responsibility for the achievement of disarmament, whether in general or partially, rested with the nuclear Powers. While any proposal aimed at stimulating the efforts of the nuclear Powers deserved serious consideration, the real effects and consequences of such a proposal, particularly its effects on the existing balance of security, must be carefully examined. Any proposed disarmament measure should be studied in the context of general and complete disarmament and carried out in balance with other measures of disarmament.

28. When the four-Power draft resolution or any similar proposal was put to the vote, his delegation's vote would be guided by the considerations he had outlined.

29. Before concluding, he categorically rejected the statements made about Japan by the Mongolian representative at the 1276th meeting, including the assertion that arrangements were being made to supply what he had called the Japanese Army with nuclear weapons.

30. Mr. CHANDERLI (Algeria) said that it was the duty of the First Committee to make clear recommendations which would assist the Eighteen-Nation Committee when it resumed its negotiations at Geneva. The Eighteen-Nation Committee should exercise great care and take a realistic approach, so as to draw up a disarmament agreement that would be acceptable to all

the parties concerned and would not be challenged by one of them at some time in the future.

31. His Government, which had welcomed the adoption at the sixteenth session of a resolution (General Assembly resolution 1652 (XVI), calling for the denuclearization of Africa, was glad to see the same principle extended to Latin America in the four-Power draft resolution. His delegation would vote for that draft resolution if account was taken of certain views which it had explained in private consultations with the sponsors. It felt that the references to nuclear carrying devices and vehicles in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of operative paragraph 1 were couched in such general terms that they would have the effect of virtually depriving Latin America of all means of transport, and that sub-paragraph (c) should also provide for verification measures affecting the nuclear Powers, since they alone were in a position to supply Latin America with nuclear weapons and nuclear delivery vehicles and had a stake in doing so. The wording employed in General Assembly resolution 1652 (XVI) would be preferable in both of the cases to which he had referred. His delegation considered that the nuclear Powers should give solemn guarantees to the countries included in the denuclearized zones, and would have preferred to see an appeal to that effect in the four-Power draft resolution. It also felt that operative paragraph 2 should not draw other areas of the world into the problem of denuclearizing Latin America. In that connexion, his delegation wished to associate itself with the Swedish representative's statement that agreements on denuclearized zones, like other disarmament measures, must be conceived so as not to confer a military advantage on any State or group of States.

32. His delegation, which was a sponsor of draft resolution A/C.1/L.317/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1, represented a country which was more familiar than most with the sufferings of war. It hoped that the resolution would be adopted by a large majority, including the representatives of the nuclear Powers; following upon the adoption of the resolution on nuclear testing (General Assembly resolution 1762 (XVI)), that would surely help to foster an atmosphere of greater confidence at the forthcoming Geneva negotiations.

33. Mr. ZEA (Colombia) said that since the Committee had decided to postpone the vote on the four-Power draft resolution, he would defer his comments on that proposal. Colombia had in any case expressed its views on disarmament at the previous session of the Assembly, and the situation had not changed substantially since then. It hoped that the Eighteen-Nation Committee would make more progress when it resumed its work, and it would vote for draft resolution A/C.1/L.317/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1.

34. Mr. HAJEK (Czechoslovakia) said that if the deadlock on the question of general and complete disarmament was to be overcome and peaceful future development was to be possible, the obsolete slogans of nuclear deterrence and the balance of fear, and the idea that the nuclear bomb could be made the basis for national or international policy, must be abandoned. The represen-

tatives of many non-aligned countries had made clear their view that in the process of general and complete disarmament the main stress should be placed on the earliest possible elimination of the threat of nuclear war. The elimination of vehicles for the delivery of nuclear weapons would be the best means of neutralizing the danger of nuclear war; and at the same time it would ensure that in the second stage of the disarmament process the destructive power of atomic weapons stockpiles would be completely liquidated, as proposed in the Soviet draft treaty on general and complete disarmament. Those who had raised objections to the proposal for eliminating the nuclear danger at an early stage of disarmament had been unable to submit any other proposal which could achieve that objective.

35. Draft resolution A/C.1/L.317/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1 was a sincere expression of the effort of the non-aligned countries to find a way towards an agreement on disarmament. In his delegation's view, the draft resolution should have included a statement of the principle that the danger of nuclear war must be removed in the very first stage of general and complete disarmament; and it should also have called for the dismantling of military bases on foreign territories at the beginning of the disarmament process. Nevertheless, the draft resolution was correct in stressing the responsibility of the General Assembly for disarmament, in drawing attention to the danger of a nuclear holocaust, and in calling upon the Eighteen-Nation Committee to resume negotiations on general and complete disarmament while at the same time directing its attention to various collateral measures.

36. The principle of denuclearized zones in various parts of the world had been supported by his delegation, by other socialist delegations and by delegations of many other countries; moreover, a number of Governments had expressed support for the idea in their replies to the Secretary-General's inquiry made in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 1664 (XVI) (DC/201 and Add.1-3). The General Assembly should therefore not limit itself to approving the principle that a denuclearized zone should be negotiated by the nations of the zone involved; rather, it should suggest certain guide-lines for the establishment of such zones. Governments which based their policies on the nuclear threat had opposed the establishment of denuclearized zones, particularly in Europe. If the objective sought by the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.312/Rev.2 on the denuclearization of Latin America was really to be achieved, the States of the area must be secured against nuclear threats and pressure from other States. The draft resolution should clearly provide that denuclearization should apply particularly to those parts of the area which were currently under the control or occupation of a nuclear Power; moreover, it should unequivocally bind nuclear Powers to use neither nuclear weapons nor nuclear threats against any Latin American country. Lastly, it should contain a clause clearly recognizing the applicability of the principle of denuclearized zones to various parts of the world.

The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.