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**Chairman:** Mr. Mario AMADEO (Argentina).

## AGENDA ITEMS 73 AND 72

Continuation of suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests and obligations of States to refrain from their renewal (A/4801 and Add.1, A/C.1/L.283/Rev.2 and Rev.2/Add.1, A/C.1/L.291 and Add.1, A/C.1/L.292) (*continued*)

The urgent need for a treaty to ban nuclear weapons tests under effective international control (A/4799, A/C.1/L.280, A/C.1/L.292) (*continued*)

1. The CHAIRMAN reminded the Committee that the general debate on agenda items 73 and 72 had been temporarily adjourned and that the only matter before the Committee was the six-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.283/Rev.2 and Rev.2/Add.1).

2. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus) said that his delegation supported all measures designed to stop nuclear testing. It had consistently supported the inclusion of item 73 in the agenda, and had voted in favour of giving priority to that item and to the draft resolution submitted by India—now the six-Power draft resolution. It had done so in the belief that a moratorium was urgently necessary and more easily attainable than a treaty. Nevertheless, it was entirely in favour of a test-ban treaty, which would be legally binding and would contain provisions on international control. Both the Soviet Union and the United States had stated that such an agreement could be concluded without difficulty. There seemed no reason, therefore, why a treaty should not be signed promptly, especially since many of the necessary provisions had already been agreed upon at the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests.

3. His delegation had also supported the eight-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.288/Rev.1), in which an appeal had been made to the Soviet Union not to carry out its intention to explode a 50-megaton bomb. The Soviet Union, however, had disregarded that appeal, on the ground that it was compelled to do so in order to safeguard its security. Presumably a similar attitude would be adopted to any resolution on a moratorium or a treaty, where a State felt that its security was affected. One could not but ask what United Nations action could be effective in the circumstances.

4. Before that question could be answered, it was necessary to make a distinction between the two aspects of nuclear tests. On the one hand, they could be regarded as preparation for war, and as such related to questions of disarmament, security and defence, and to the antagonism between the two main Power blocs. On the other hand, they were a danger to the life and health of present and future generations, a fact which transcended the immediate political issues. There was ample scientific proof of the harmful effects of radioactive fall-out. The damage it caused and the fears it aroused had been recognized by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Mr. Khrushchev, who had himself stated in a letter dated 4 April 1958 that a solution must be found to the problem of ending nuclear tests if the health of the people of the world was not to be irreparably harmed. The situation had further deteriorated since 1958; fall-out had been almost doubled by the recent series of tests. The fact that one side had broken the voluntary moratorium might lead the other to do the same, until both were engaged in a race in nuclear testing. It might be argued that an ordinary armaments race was mainly the concern of the great Powers, since they alone could solve the problems involved. But a nuclear tests race was the concern of mankind as a whole, because everyone was immediately affected.

5. In the present circumstances, a mere appeal to stop tests could hardly be expected to bring satisfactory results. The break-down of the voluntary moratorium, however unjustified, could be explained by each side's fear that the other was secretly preparing to carry out tests which might give it a military advantage. Such fears could have arisen only because the moratorium had not been subject to inspection and control. Control was imperative; without it a new moratorium would be ineffective, even as a temporary measure. His delegation nevertheless supported all such measures, but felt that they should be seen in the proper light. A treaty would provide the necessary safeguards, but a resolution calling for a treaty might go unheeded. Until a treaty was actually signed, there was no guarantee that nuclear testing would not continue, even if a moratorium was adopted.

6. In the face of the present threat to mankind, the United Nations could not remain inactive; it represented, not the great Powers, but "the peoples of the United Nations", and those peoples wanted an end to nuclear testing, so that their children might be free from the threat of disease, deformity and death. In January 1958, a petition had been submitted to the Secretary-General by 9,235 scientists from forty-four countries. They had stated that every nuclear test increased the quantity of radio-active fall-out, thereby causing damage to the health of human beings all over

the world and threatening the normal development of future generations. It was therefore the duty of the United Nations, as the conscience of mankind, to adopt a declaration banning nuclear test explosions as a crime against humanity and to pass a resolution providing for the necessary international control.

7. Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom) said that now that the Soviet Union had exploded the most powerful nuclear device yet known, the Committee was confronted with an entirely new situation. He understood that there had been two further explosions on the day of the present meeting. In carrying out those tests, the Soviet Union had treated with unconcealed contempt the request addressed to it in a resolution adopted by the General Assembly by an overwhelming majority (resolution 1632 (XVI)). In addition, it had increased the pollution of the atmosphere. That was a crime against humanity which deserved to be denounced in the strongest possible terms. In his own country, it had evoked concern, indignation and revulsion. It was not surprising that the Soviet representative's attempt at the previous meeting to justify the tests had been ineffective, since they were unjustifiable. By no stretch of the imagination could weapons of such size be called defensive. The Soviet Union had merely indulged in a demonstration of its power, in violation of its own solemn undertakings. The United States and the United Kingdom had made genuine efforts at the Geneva Conference to conclude a treaty banning nuclear tests, but it was now clear that the Soviet representative at the Conference had been acting in bad faith.

8. It was in that context that the six-Power draft resolution must be considered. His delegation had the same aim as the sponsors, namely, to stop nuclear weapons tests; but it differed on the best method of achieving that aim. He would therefore be unable to support the draft resolution. The Soviet Union had shown by its action that no reliance could be placed on an uncontrolled moratorium. Moreover, it had rejected the proposal for an immediate and permanent ban on tests in the atmosphere made recently by the United States and the United Kingdom. A further moratorium would remove any incentive to the Soviet Government to conclude an agreement. The only way to eliminate the risks created by nuclear tests was to conclude a treaty prohibiting such tests forever and containing provisions to ensure that it was complied with. Such a treaty should provide not only for international supervision, but also for the continuous and, if necessary, decisive participation of neutral countries. The United States and the United Kingdom had always regarded the text of the treaty as negotiable. They had put forward a text, but were prepared to consider any alternative proposals for adequate control which were fair and reasonable. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, had refused to consider the series of compromise proposals which they had put forward over the preceding six months. Nevertheless, although the United States and the United Kingdom had agreed in the light of the Soviet resumption of testing that the Geneva Conference should be suspended until the Assembly had discussed the matter, they did not regard the Conference as terminated. They would like to see it resumed with the full backing of an Assembly resolution.

9. The six-Power draft resolution, however, was not sufficient for that purpose. The difference between a moratorium and a treaty was not just a legal nicety. Not only was a treaty legally binding, but it was the only means of establishing international control machinery

which could ensure that tests were not conducted. In operative paragraph 2, reference was made to "internationally binding agreements"; but nothing was said about international control, without which no agreement could be binding. Furthermore, as the representative of Peru had said (1179th meeting), the same paragraph implied that an agreement on general and complete disarmament was an acceptable alternative to an agreement on tests. Thus, if the paragraph were adopted, an agreement on tests might actually be delayed by being merged in discussion on and implementation of general and complete disarmament.

10. His delegation was also unable to support the amendment submitted by Afghanistan (A/C.1/L.289/Rev.1). Although that amendment might in itself seem acceptable, misstatements had been made in the Committee that NATO and other Western defensive alliances were responsible for the Soviet decision to resume testing, and the amendment might be interpreted in that light. In actual fact, it was the Soviet Union that had created the Berlin crisis, which it now asserted had compelled it to resume testing. It had also asserted that it had done so in the cause of peace, a flat contradiction of Mr. Khrushchev's own statement that such action would lead to an unlimited nuclear arms race.

11. While he appreciated the sincerity of the sponsors of the six-Power draft resolution, he would urge them instead to support the draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom and the United States (A/C.1/L.280), since anything less than a treaty would be of no avail. Although a resolution calling for a treaty was not the same as a treaty, it was the most effective action the Committee could take.

12. Mr. KALONJI (Congo, Leopoldville) said that his delegation approached the urgent question before the Committee from the point of view of a country pledged to a policy of non-alignment, or active neutrality. Thanks to that policy, his country was able to consider international problems from an independent standpoint, and to take decisions arrived at in freedom from political pressure. It was in line with that policy that it had subscribed to the principles and recommendations adopted at the Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Belgrade in September 1961, and at the various sessions of the Conference of Independent African States. It believed that the United Nations should marshal the force of world public opinion to prevent armed conflict between States.

13. His delegation condemned the Soviet Union's explosion of a 50-megaton bomb in defiance of the resolution adopted by the General Assembly by an overwhelming majority. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Congo (Leopoldville), speaking in the General Assembly (1035th plenary meeting), had emphasized the necessity of banning all nuclear tests, prohibiting the manufacture of nuclear weapons and destroying existing stockpiles of such weapons. He had pointed out that nuclear weapons tests were a matter of concern not only to the great Powers, but to all Members of the Organization, and should be so regarded by the General Assembly. The Assembly should press for the conclusion of an international convention banning tests under adequate international control. Such a convention should be signed not only by the nuclear Powers but by all Member States, and should establish a control body functioning as a specialized

agency of the United Nations. Only thus could the effectiveness of a test-ban treaty be properly guaranteed.

14. His delegation also proposed that the Assembly should without delay send a telegram to the nuclear Powers urging them to stop testing immediately. Further, it proposed that a summit meeting of the great Powers should be held as soon as possible with a view to the conclusion of a test-ban treaty. Finally, his delegation proposed the establishment of an international commission which would have the dual function of implementing all Assembly resolutions relating to nuclear testing and of exercising control over the nuclear Powers to ensure that they did not violate the test ban; its control might also be extended to disarmament in general, subject to agreement between the great Powers.

15. His delegation would vote in favour of the principal draft resolutions before the Committee (A/C.1/L.283/Rev.2 and Rev.2/Add.1, A/C.1/L.280 and A/C.1/L.291 and Add.1). It deplored the fact that no concrete measures had been taken to protect the smaller States, and requested that the Soviet delegation should apologize publicly to the Committee for having violated the moratorium.

16. Mr. BELAUNDE (Peru) said that he had been greatly distressed by the Soviet Union's contemptuous and insulting response to the Assembly's appeal to it to desist from exploding its super-bomb. The purpose of that appeal had been not only to save present and future generations from the perils of nuclear fall-out, but also to offer the Soviet Union an opportunity to make a symbolic gesture in favour of peace, a gesture which might have gone far towards reducing international tension and creating a new and favourable atmosphere for negotiations on a test ban, disarmament and Berlin. However, the Soviet Union, by flouting the Assembly's appeal, had disappointed all hopes and created an extremely grave situation. As a result of its attitude and of its violation of the moratorium, the question of nuclear testing had passed from the moral and parajudicial plane to the purely political plane: since one party to the moratorium had violated it, the other party could not be regarded as still bound by it. In the absence of a moral or legal frame of reference, any problem between States became a purely political issue, to be solved by a naked struggle for power.

17. The United Nations, by making an appeal to the Soviet Union not to explode its super-bomb, had strengthened its spiritual vitality, done its duty and thus retained its dignity. It must continue to do its duty, by bringing to bear its moral force on the Soviet Government and the Soviet people; the various draft resolutions before the Committee should be considered with that in mind.

18. The Peruvian delegation would vote in favour of the six-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.283/Rev.2 and Rev.2/Add.1), provided that certain changes were made in its operative part. There was no conflict between that moral appeal for a test suspension and the United States-United Kingdom draft resolution urging the conclusion of a test-ban treaty (A/C.1/L.280), which Peru would also support. Indeed, if he had had to choose between the two drafts, he would have chosen the latter, because it went to the heart of the issue: under Article 11 of the United Nations Charter, the General Assembly was authorized to make recommendations directly to the Security Council—that is, directly to the great Powers—with regard to the principles governing disarmament; obviously, the prin-

ciples to serve as a basis for disarmament negotiations were a matter for the parties themselves to decide.

19. Reverting to the six-Power draft resolution, he drew attention to what he regarded as the principal defects of the second revised version (A/C.1/L.283/Rev.2), namely, the absence of any provision outlawing nuclear tests and the inclusion in operative paragraph 2 of a reference to an agreement on general and complete disarmament.

20. On the latter point, he emphasized that the duration of a moratorium should not be made contingent upon the conclusion of an agreement on general and complete disarmament, for the suspension of nuclear testing was an urgent, preliminary question which warranted separate treatment and should be the subject of specific negotiations. Indeed, the success or failure of those negotiations would be a useful index of the prospects for effective disarmament negotiations. Experience had shown, moreover, that negotiations on general and complete disarmament were bound to be long and laborious, and to continue a voluntary moratorium pending their successful conclusion would be to prolong it indefinitely with no guarantee that it would be respected, and to weaken pressure for the signing of a test-ban treaty at the earliest possible moment. In point of fact, negotiations for such a treaty could be started immediately, whereas it was hardly likely that the Powers concerned were prepared to "engage themselves with urgency and speed" in efforts to conclude an agreement on general and complete disarmament, as operative paragraph 3 of the six-Power draft resolution would require.

21. For those reasons, Peru felt that there had been some merit in the first revised version (A/C.1/L.283/Rev.1) of the draft resolution. In that text, it was provided that nuclear tests "should stand totally prohibited" and that the nuclear Powers should "refrain from further test explosions pending the establishment of internationally binding obligations for their cessation and prohibition". A better wording of the latter phrase might have been: "...refrain from further test explosions and establish internationally binding obligations for their cessation and prohibition", since the word "pending" implied some delay between the moral moratorium and the legally binding treaty. The General Assembly had no right to impose a test ban on a State which regarded its security as having been imperilled through the unilateral violation of the moratorium by another party. If the sponsors felt unable to meet Peru's views on that point, the Peruvian delegation would request a separate vote on operative paragraph 2 of the second revised version (A/C.1/L.283/Rev.2).

22. He wished to introduce an amendment (A/C.1/L.294), sponsored by Peru and six other Latin American countries, to the second revised text of the six-Power draft resolution. Its purpose was to emphasize that a test-ban treaty should be concluded urgently, and that it should provide for the cessation of nuclear weapons tests under appropriate international control.

23. Mr. VELAZQUEZ (Uruguay) said that the first preambular paragraph of the six-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.283/Rev.2 and Rev.2/Add.1) gave the impression that General Assembly resolutions 1577 (XV) and 1578 (XV) merely called for the voluntary suspension of nuclear tests, whereas in fact those resolutions had emphasized the overriding need for an agreement banning tests under effective international control. His delegation also felt that resolution 1578

(XV) should have been mentioned first, since it was couched in broader terms and was directed not only at "the States concerned" but also at "other States" which might become nuclear Powers in the future.

24. Operative paragraph 1 of the six-Power draft resolution, which expressed regret at the resumption of test explosions, was acceptable in the purely theoretical sense that the people of the world must defend themselves against the threat to their health and lives posed by nuclear testing. However, in making no distinction between the various nuclear Powers, it failed to take account of the fact that the United States had resumed underground testing on a limited scale only after the Soviet Union had violated the moratorium and carried out a large number of tests. Obviously, once the Soviet Union had resumed testing, the other nuclear Powers had no longer been bound by any obligations under the moratorium. He pointed out that in the memorandum accompanying its request for the inclusion of the test suspension item in the agenda (A/4801/Add.1), the Indian delegation had said that any State which resumed testing would become primarily responsible for the deterioration of the entire situation.

25. In operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution, after the words "internationally binding agreements", there should be some reference to effective international control, as was the case in General Assembly resolutions 1402 (XIV) and 1578 (XV). His delegation supported the amendment along those lines which had just been introduced (A/C.1/L.294).

26. His delegation objected particularly to the reference in operative paragraph 2 to general and complete disarmament. During the procedural debate it had argued (1167th meeting) that the items dealing with nuclear testing should be considered separately from the item dealing with general and complete disarmament, and that the conclusion of a test-ban treaty should be given high priority without regard to the possibility of reaching agreement on general and complete disarmament. By urging the Powers concerned to refrain from further test explosions pending the conclusion of agreements on "tests or general and complete disarmament", the paragraph would make it possible for one of the nuclear Powers to prolong a moratorium indefinitely, with all the attendant risks to those States which were observing it in good faith, simply by refusing to conclude a test-ban treaty outside the larger framework of general and complete disarmament. His delegation agreed with the Peruvian representative that the sponsors of the draft resolution should have retained the text of operative paragraph 2 as it was in the first revised version (A/C.1/L.283/Rev.1).

27. His delegation wished to conclude by adding its voice to the vigorous condemnation of the nuclear explosion just carried out by the Soviet Union, which was a challenge to world public opinion.

28. Mr. OKAZAKI (Japan) said that because of its unique experiences with regard to nuclear weapons and atomic radiation, Japan felt a special responsibility to do everything possible to prevent a complete breakdown of efforts to ban nuclear testing. The bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki had taken 200,000 lives, and victims of the bombings continued to die each year from the effects of radiation. In 1954, the death of a Japanese fisherman after his vessel had been exposed to radio-active fall-out as a result of nuclear tests carried out by the United States had aroused the world to the need to halt nuclear testing. The subject

had first been brought to the attention of the United Nations at that time: the two houses of the Japanese Diet had adopted urgent appeals to the United Nations on 1 and 5 April 1954 respectively, and the Prime Minister of India had proposed, on 2 April 1954, a "standstill" agreement on nuclear test explosions.<sup>1/</sup>

29. Since its admission to the United Nations, in 1956, Japan had worked actively for a solution of the problem of testing. While supporting the principle of strict international control over a test ban, at the twelfth session of the General Assembly the Japanese delegation had introduced the idea of a temporary suspension of tests, in the belief that such a measure would help to bring about agreement on a permanent ban under international control and, eventually, on general disarmament. It had at all times supported negotiations as a means of bringing the two opposing camps closer, feeling that so long as both were agreed on the need for an early ban on testing they would do their best to reach agreement. Unfortunately, recent developments had seriously shaken the belief of many persons in the good faith of the major Powers. In the present situation, the Committee's task must be to preserve and consolidate the existing basis for agreement, instead of continuing an endless search for compromise.

30. As many representatives had already pointed out, the Soviet Union, in arguing now that the question of a nuclear test ban could be considered only within the over-all framework of general and complete disarmament, was taking the position which the Western Powers had taken until three or four years ago and which the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Mr. Khrushchev, had condemned in an interview with a correspondent of *Pravda* in 1958 (A/3904). The Soviet Union's change in attitude had in effect turned the clock back, for the United States and the United Kingdom had during the past three years abandoned their earlier stand and accepted the view held by most Members of the United Nations that the problem of nuclear weapons tests should be solved as soon as possible without awaiting agreement on general and complete disarmament. His delegation was surprised that now that the Soviet Union had reversed its position, some delegations seemed prepared to abandon the hard-won principle that the question of nuclear testing should be separated from that of general and complete disarmament.

31. His delegation took exception to the inclusion in operative paragraph 2 of the six-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.283/Rev.2 and Rev.2/Add.1) of the words "or general and complete disarmament", which had not appeared in the first revised text, submitted by India. Even though the representative of Nepal, whose delegation was a sponsor of the draft resolution, had stated on 12 October (1164th meeting) that he did not agree with the Soviet position that the question of nuclear testing should be considered as part of the general question of disarmament, the inclusion of those words clearly had the effect of undermining the principle that the questions of testing and disarmament should be dealt with separately. A moratorium on testing, though necessary and desirable, would be largely meaningless, and indeed dangerous, if it did not lead to the conclusion of a treaty embodying clear legal obligations and an effective control system. Previous General Assembly resolutions had stressed the need both for the immediate suspension of testing

<sup>1/</sup> See Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for April, May and June 1954, document DC/44 and Corr.1

and for the early conclusion of a formal treaty. It was wrong to single out the moratorium today to the exclusion of the treaty. The question of a test-ban treaty was still an urgent one, and to confuse it with the complex problem of general and complete disarmament was not the way to promote early agreement on the banning of nuclear tests under effective international control. The Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests, which was now in recess, had been held with the blessing of the United Nations; the United Nations should now seek to help that Conference to make a fresh start, instead of acting in a way that would undermine the very basis of its deliberations.

32. The Japanese people had felt indignation and disillusionment at the resumption of nuclear testing by the Soviet Union, whose Government had stated on more than one occasion that it would never be the first to resume testing. His delegation deeply deplored the Soviet Union's action in exploding a 50-megaton bomb in utter disregard of a solemn appeal by the General Assembly and of world public opinion. He hoped that the Soviet Union would act to restore belief in its good faith by immediately halting any further nuclear tests and resuming the Geneva negotiations with renewed vigour.

33. The United States had clearly demonstrated at Geneva its sincere desire for agreement, and his Government was in general agreement with the present position of the United States and the United Kingdom in regard to a test ban-treaty. However, Japan was opposed to any nuclear testing at any time, and had therefore protested against the decision of the United States to carry out underground tests following the resumption of testing by the Soviet Union. Although his Government was alert to the necessity of safeguarding the security of the free world, it was also conscious of the peril to the future of mankind which endless competition in nuclear weapons tests would create. It therefore appealed to the United States to show high statesmanship by not carrying out further nuclear tests as a countermeasure to the present series of Soviet tests. He also wished to urge the members of the Committee not to retreat from appeals they had previously made, lest it should be thought that any United Nations appeal could be abandoned or modified in the event of non-compliance.

34. Although his delegation sympathized with the spirit in which the six-Power draft resolution had been introduced, it felt that there was an element of weakness and inconsistency in the text, and might request a separate vote on the words "or general and complete disarmament" in operative paragraph 2 if the draft resolution was put to the vote in its present form. His delegation supported the seven-Power amendment (A/C.1/L.294), which was an attempt to remedy the defect contained in the present text of the draft resolution.

35. In reply to the Soviet representative's statement of 25 October (1177th meeting), in which he had questioned the sincerity and consistency of the Japanese delegation's stand on nuclear testing, he recalled Japan's determined opposition in the United Nations to all testing. At the fourteenth session of the General Assembly, for example, his delegation had joined with twenty-one other Asian and African delegations in

sponsoring a draft resolution requesting France to refrain from carrying out its projected tests in the Sahara, which had been adopted by the Assembly as resolution 1379 (XIV). His Government had also expressed disapproval through diplomatic channels of all nuclear tests, regardless of the country which had carried them out. Thus, it had protested to the United Kingdom on six occasions, to the United States on twelve occasions, to the Soviet Union on eleven occasions and to France on four occasions. Although Japan had a fairly advanced nuclear programme, it had renounced by law the manufacture of nuclear weapons and did not permit such weapons to be brought into the country. It maintained that position in spite of the fact that the Soviet Union, which was carrying out an unprecedented series of nuclear tests at the present time, had sent numerous communications to Japan threatening that country with nuclear destruction.

36. Mr. TURBAY AYALA (Colombia) said that to endanger the existence not only of the present generation but of future generations was one of the greatest crimes that men could commit. His country, although far from the site of the recent nuclear explosions, shared the fears of other countries concerning the effects of radio-active fall-out, the danger of which was generally recognized. No declaration by the United Nations could end nuclear tests directly: it could, however, mobilize public opinion against any Power which continued testing. The great Powers recognized no restraints on their nuclear arms race other than the limits of scientific knowledge. They would always justify their actions on the grounds of security. The recent tests by the Soviet Union were clearly designed to give it an advantage over the other nuclear Powers, who would naturally follow suit. A period of ominous nuclear rivalry would ensue. A suspension of nuclear tests, if not followed by the destruction of stockpiles and control of the production of nuclear weapons, would at best lead to an uneasy peace. But it would at least protect the world from the dangers of radio-activity.

37. The situation was complex and the Assembly was not in a position to adopt the ideal course. No one could be satisfied with a mere resolution calling for a moratorium. But it would at least be preferable to inaction. Furthermore, the six-Power draft resolution did not conflict with the draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom and the United States (A/C.1/L.280); in fact, the two were complementary and had the same aims. His delegation would therefore vote for the six-Power draft resolution with the seven-Power amendment (A/C.1/L.294) and also for the United Kingdom-United States draft resolution, which laid down the essential conditions for a treaty and provided for international control. There seemed no reason why the conclusion of a treaty should present insuperable difficulties. There would be more to be said on that subject, and particularly on the destruction of stockpiles and the control of production, when the Committee came to discuss general and complete disarmament. But before disarmament could be achieved, it was necessary to pass through the stages of a moratorium and a treaty subject to international control.

The meeting rose at 6.30 p.m.