

# 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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## Summary record of the 4th meeting

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Tuesday, 28 April 2015, at 3 p.m.

*President:* Ms. Feroukhi ..... (Algeria)  
*later:* Mr. Sano (Vice-President) ..... (Japan)  
*later:* Mr. Logar (Vice-President) ..... (Slovenia)

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General debate (*continued*)

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*The meeting was called to order at 3.05 p.m.*

**General debate** (*continued*)

1. **Ms. Mogherini** (Observer for the European Union), speaking also on behalf of the candidate countries Albania, Montenegro, Serbia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Turkey; the stabilization and association process country Bosnia and Herzegovina; and, in addition, Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine, said that the agreement in principle reached between Iran and the five permanent members of the Security Council and Germany on a joint comprehensive plan of action would help to ensure the exclusively peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear programme and the lifting of sanctions. It was important to build on that foundation and arrive at a comprehensive solution that would enable Iran to fully enjoy its right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in accordance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An important element of the solution would be the need for Iran to fully cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on all outstanding issues including any with possible military dimensions. Iran was urged to implement modified code 3.1 of the subsidiary arrangement to its safeguards agreement and to bring its additional protocol into force. Without those steps, IAEA would be unable to provide credible assurances concerning the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran.

2. The European Union urged all States that had not yet done so to join the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States and adhere to its terms, and to implement all commitments assumed under it or undertaken during previous Review Conferences. The European Union continued to promote full implementation of the action plan contained in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (vol. I)) and called for an assessment of its implementation to date across all three pillars. Ensuring implementation of the 64 actions was a collective responsibility shared by all States parties.

3. The European Union was committed to pursuing nuclear disarmament and stressed the need for concrete progress in the form of an overall reduction in the global stockpile of nuclear weapons. It welcomed the considerable reductions made so far taking into

account the special responsibility of the States that possessed the largest arsenals. It also welcomed the indications that those States had made progress in implementing the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (the new START Treaty) and strongly encouraged them to seek further reductions in their nuclear arsenals, including strategic, non-strategic, deployed and non-deployed weapons. The European Union encouraged the holding of conferences by the five permanent members of the Security Council in follow-up to the 2010 Review Conference, including on such topics as confidence-building, transparency, verification activities and reporting.

4. Multilateral negotiating bodies should be revitalized and consideration should be given to expanding the Conference on Disarmament. The ongoing stalemate in that body remained a source of concern and the European Union reiterated its call for the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations in that Conference on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (fissile material cut-off treaty). The entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty remained a top priority for the European Union; she commended the work of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization to that end.

5. She noted the ongoing discussion of the severe consequences associated with the use of nuclear weapons, including at the most recent international conference held on the topic, which had been organized by Austria. The IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards System was a fundamental component of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and played an indispensable role in the implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The United Nations Security Council had primary responsibility in cases of non-compliance. The European Union condemned the nuclear tests conducted by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and its threat of another nuclear test in outright violation of its international obligations, in particular those under Security Council resolutions that urged the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons programme and return to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and to IAEA safeguards.

6. The European Union deeply regretted that Syria had still to remedy its non-compliance with its

safeguards agreement and called on that country to sign, bring into force and fully implement an additional protocol with IAEA as soon as possible. It also regretted that it had not been possible to convene a conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems and supported the convening of a conference as soon as possible on the basis of arrangements freely made between the States of the region.

7. All parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty had the inalienable right to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with the Treaty. Strengthening nuclear security was a longstanding priority of the European Union and remained an important element in facilitating international cooperation on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It was vital to strengthen nuclear security, reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism and secure all vulnerable nuclear material. IAEA played a leading role in strengthening the nuclear security framework. All States should take safety considerations into account in order to prevent nuclear and radiological accidents and to mitigate the effects of any accidents that did occur. Lastly, the European Union had provided practical training and financial assistance to support implementation of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference and was undertaking a strategic review to ensure that its security strategy was in line with changes in the security environment.

8. **Mr. Al Jaber** (United Arab Emirates) said that the United Arab Emirates had continuously supported the efforts of the international community to limit the spread of nuclear weapons and to implement the Treaty. The peaceful use of nuclear energy was an inalienable right of all States and was one that should be exercised in a transparent manner based on the highest standards of safety, security and non-proliferation. The United Arab Emirates fully complied with those standards in developing its own peaceful nuclear energy programme, which had begun with the construction of its first nuclear reactor in 2012. It was important to strengthen international cooperation to facilitate the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful uses and to assist countries that wished to embark on peaceful nuclear energy programmes in a responsible, transparent and safe manner. To that end, the role of IAEA in providing technical assistance to States should be strengthened.

His delegation supported international efforts to promote nuclear security and safety, and welcomed the entry into force of the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage.

9. Any peaceful nuclear energy programme must be developed in a responsible and transparent manner in compliance with the comprehensive safeguards established by IAEA. Countries developing those programmes should take all necessary steps to address the concerns of the international community regarding the peaceful nature of those programmes. Additional protocols to comprehensive safeguards agreements were an essential tool to enhance the ability of IAEA to fully verify the peaceful nature of nuclear programmes. The terms of the Non-Proliferation Treaty should be strengthened, in particular the clause on withdrawal, to ensure that it was not misused as a tool for the development of clandestine nuclear weapons programmes.

10. The total elimination of nuclear weapons was the only way to guarantee their non-use and the threat of their use. His delegation therefore welcomed the steps taken by the United States and the Russian Federation to reduce their nuclear weapons and hoped that the Review Conference would stipulate practical steps towards disarmament. The lack of progress in that regard was a source of great concern to non-nuclear-weapon States and his delegation supported discussions on the grave humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons.

11. Universalisation of the Treaty was essential to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons and his delegation therefore urged all States to join the Treaty without delay. In particular, it called for Israel to join the Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon State and to place all its nuclear facilities under the IAEA comprehensive safeguards. While his delegation supported the efforts of the facilitator, it had been disappointed at the failure to hold the conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction was a step backwards in that important process. Establishing such a zone was a priority and would be proof of the effectiveness of the Treaty, and the Review Conference should take serious steps to ensure the prompt convening of that long overdue conference with the participation of all countries in the region. Lastly, successful achievement of the objectives of the Treaty relied on full

implementation of its provisions and the strengthening of its principles without exception.

12. *Mr. Sano (Japan), Vice-President, took the Chair.*

13. **Mr. Mavroyiannis** (Cyprus) said that Cyprus, as a small State, relied heavily on the international system of collective security, including the disarmament and arms control regime. It therefore supported further strengthening of the Non-Proliferation Treaty with respect for the delicate balance among its three pillars. It also supported universalization of the Treaty; further reductions in nuclear arsenals and ultimately nuclear disarmament; the downgrading of the role of nuclear weapons in defence and security; the study of the long-term consequences of nuclear weapons; and a focus on nuclear energy safety. Given the very real risk of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of non-State actors, updated early warning systems were vital to alert States to nuclear attacks and should include mechanisms to prevent the escalation of false alarms.

14. The inalienable right of all States to engage in peaceful nuclear energy programmes entailed the responsibility to use nuclear energy carefully, with complete transparency and in accordance with the highest possible environmental and human safety standards. The breakthrough of nuclear technology must remain a blessing, not a risk, for humanity. To that end, States should avoid building nuclear power plants in areas prone to natural disasters, especially if those areas bordered other States. It was vital to develop updated early warning systems for nuclear accidents with transboundary implications, particularly seismic early warning systems for nuclear power plants. The adoption of the Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety was a positive step but safety and security gaps still had to be addressed.

15. Given that the security of Cyprus was directly linked to security in the Middle East, Cyprus attached great importance to the establishment of a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction. It was regrettable that the conference on that issue had yet to be convened and the States involved should engage constructively in that process. His delegation welcomed the progress made between Iran and the five permanent members of the Security Council and Germany and hoped that a definitive agreement would be reached to address all concerns.

16. Cyprus attached great importance to the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban

Treaty and the commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on an effectively verifiable fissile material cut-off treaty. It encouraged all parties involved to demonstrate flexibility to conclude that treaty promptly. Cyprus was deeply concerned at the nuclear activities taking place in a non-verifiable and non-transparent manner. To address those challenges it advocated the use of peaceful diplomatic tools combined with the strengthening of the IAEA safeguards system and universal recognition of the system of IAEA additional protocols as the verification standard.

17. **Ms. Perceval** (Argentina) said that substantive progress needed to be made in implementing the three pillars of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. On non-proliferation, countries should fulfil their obligations under the Treaty and their respective safeguards agreements through active cooperation and by providing information on their nuclear programmes.

18. Through the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials, the Governments of Argentina and Brazil had worked with IAEA to establish a system of control over their nuclear facilities, which provided guarantees that went beyond the requirements of the Treaty. The establishment of areas free of nuclear weapons made a significant contribution to peace and security. Her delegation therefore urged the nuclear-weapon States in the region that had made interpretative declarations to their additional protocols to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean to withdraw those declarations in accordance with that instrument. In that regard, it drew attention to the action of the United Kingdom, which, as part of its militarization campaign in the South Atlantic had deployed submarines with nuclear weapon capacity in the denuclearized zone covered by that Treaty and had refused to provide assurances to the contrary. Like other States that had abandoned nuclear weapons, Argentina had the right not to be threatened by States which had undertaken under the Non-Proliferation Treaty to destroy their nuclear weapons but had not done so.

19. Argentina welcomed the agreement reached between Iran and the five permanent members of the Security Council and Germany and hoped that a balanced solution to the crisis created by the nuclear capacities of Iran would be achieved by June 2015. The agreement reached reflected the principle that any

violation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty would not be validated by the international community but that countries had the right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Argentina had a long history of using nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and international cooperation in that field played a key role in meeting the socioeconomic needs of developing countries. Argentina was therefore open to sharing experiences on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in the interests of social well-being and development and would continue to do so in accordance with the highest standards as set out in the guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. It was concerned about initiatives that were designed to hinder the capacity of States to exercise their right to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.

20. The progress made with regard to non-proliferation and the peaceful use of nuclear technology contrasted with the lack of progress by the nuclear powers in reducing their arsenals, which undermined the balance of the three pillars of the Treaty as well as international peace and security. Urgent steps should be taken to achieve the goal of nuclear disarmament through the complete and verifiable elimination of nuclear weapons, since the continued existence of those weapons constituted a threat to humanity as a whole. It was even more urgent that the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty entered into force and the States concerned were urged to ratify it without delay. Furthermore, political will was needed to break the stalemate in the Conference on Disarmament so that progress could be made in adopting an instrument on negative security assurances.

21. The proliferation of nuclear weapons could not be tolerated and any failure to comply with the Treaty should be strongly condemned. Much work was needed to ensure the universalization of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. At the same time, the right to withdraw from the Treaty formed an inseparable part of the delicate legal balance reflected in the Treaty and should not be restricted. There had been one isolated case of an abuse of that right, which had had serious consequences for international security, and consideration should be given to how any future abuse of that right could be addressed or discouraged without hindering the exercise of the legitimate sovereign right to withdraw from the Treaty in exceptional circumstances. The Treaty was the best tool to achieve a safer, more

peaceful world that was free of nuclear weapons but it had to be applied fully to offer security.

22. **Ms. Frankinet** (Belgium) said that Belgium was firmly committed to creating a world free of nuclear weapons and all States shared the responsibility to ensure that the Non-Proliferation Treaty delivered on that goal. Although nuclear disarmament could only be achieved gradually, her delegation did not believe in a precise timetable for all the steps to be taken to that end. Some measures could be taken in parallel and effective nuclear disarmament would require mutually reinforcing actions.

23. Universalization of the Treaty was essential and its provisions must be respected fully by all States parties. In addition, India, Israel and Pakistan should ratify the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States. Her delegation was encouraged at the progress made in implementing the new START Treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation but efforts should not stop there. Further reductions of all types of nuclear weapons were needed and those two countries should include non-strategic nuclear weapons in the next cycle of negotiations on reducing their nuclear weapons and should increase transparency and confidence measures.

24. In view of the catastrophic consequences of nuclear explosions, urgent action was needed and her delegation welcomed initiatives designed to improve understanding of the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons. However, both humanitarian and security aspects of nuclear disarmament needed to be considered, and the elimination of nuclear weapons required a negotiated framework that would result in irreversible and verifiable reductions. Full nuclear disarmament would take place when the nuclear-weapon States no longer felt the need to hold those weapons and Belgium therefore supported effective multilateral action that was conducive to international peace and stability. Her delegation was frustrated at the slow progress being made in achieving the objectives of article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

25. Despite some encouraging developments in non-proliferation, including the negotiations under way between Iran and the five permanent members of the Security Council and Germany, North Korea continued to violate international rules by developing its nuclear and missile programmes, and the Review Conference should demand that the country fulfil its disarmament

and non-proliferation commitments. It was regrettable that a conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons had not been held and Belgium fully supported efforts to reach an agreement between the parties concerned on the practicalities of holding such a conference.

26. The peaceful use of nuclear technology was in the interests of all regardless of national policies on nuclear energy. Safety, security and guarantees were essential components of a responsible nuclear programme and Belgium applied those principles in developing its innovative nuclear research infrastructure. With regard to nuclear security, Belgium supported efforts to reduce the use of highly enriched uranium for civilian endeavours where that was economically and technically feasible and was therefore working to convert nuclear facilities that were still using that type of uranium. During that complex conversion process, it continued to guarantee its production of medical radioisotopes, which made an essential contribution to health care all over the world. Lastly, all three pillars of the Treaty needed to be strengthened in order to benefit current and future generations.

27. *Mr. Logar (Slovenia), Vice-President, took the Chair.*

28. **Mr. de Aguiar Patriota** (Brazil) said that the continuing implementation gap between non-proliferation and disarmament obligations discredited the bargain struck between the nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States under the Non-Proliferation Treaty and threatened to corrode the foundation upon which the Treaty regime had been built. Implementation of the 13 practical steps towards nuclear disarmament adopted in 2000 and the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference had been poor at best. His delegation was concerned at the lack of real irreversible progress on disarmament, including the failure to convene the conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. The burden of the Treaty regime must not continue to fall exclusively on the non-nuclear-weapon States, with the imposition of obligations that affected only those who already faithfully complied with their obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Attempts to reinforce commitments on non-proliferation without previous concrete progress on nuclear disarmament could only further erode the Treaty regime.

29. The step-by-step approach advocated by the nuclear-weapon States had failed to deliver on initial expectations and the international community was in a stalemate. However, real progress in nuclear disarmament was possible and necessary if there was political will. It was absurd to advocate nuclear non-proliferation while at the same time praising nuclear weapons as indispensable to guarantee security. Resources spent on maintaining and modernizing nuclear arsenals could be used for development assistance.

30. A time frame for nuclear disarmament should take the form of a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons, which would uphold the credibility of the Treaty regime. While that should be a priority, other options could also be considered. Although the Conference on Disarmament was the most appropriate forum for negotiations, in view of the stalemate in that body, Brazil would not object to negotiations being held within the General Assembly. Only decisive action towards the fulfilment of nuclear disarmament commitments could create a more stable and less dangerous world.

31. It was not an option to merely roll over past commitments that had been poorly implemented. The Review Conference must instead deepen current commitments, propose new ones and demand that the nuclear-weapon States specify how and when they would be met. A tentative road map towards nuclear disarmament could provide an important benchmark for future progress and for the negotiations on a comprehensive convention on the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. The Treaty regime could not be simply a tool to manage deeply embedded inequalities; it must correct them in order to uphold its credibility and efficacy as a means of achieving a world free of nuclear weapons.

32. **Mr. Çevik** (Turkey) said that Turkey remained committed to the full implementation, further strengthening and universalization of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and was frustrated at the lack of effective implementation of the action plan adopted at the 2010 Review Conference. However, with enough political will, the ultimate objective of Global Zero could be achieved. The long-term relevance of the Treaty would be closely linked to its effective implementation and universalization, and Turkey wholeheartedly welcomed the accession of the State of Palestine.

33. On disarmament, Turkey called for systematic, progressive, verifiable and irreversible nuclear disarmament and encouraged all States that possessed nuclear weapons to take further practical steps in that direction. The primary responsibility lay with the nuclear-weapon States and the world had been awaiting substantial reductions and limitations since the entry into force of the new START Treaty in 2011. Furthermore, States that were not party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty were encouraged to accede to that Treaty without conditions as non-nuclear-weapon States.

34. Exercise of the right to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty should not prejudice overall obligations under that Treaty and should not threaten international peace and security. The cessation of all nuclear weapon tests was an important step towards both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, and States should ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and ensure its entry into force. Another essential step was to commence negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and verifiable fissile material cut-off treaty.

35. The Conference on Disarmament needed to be revitalized so that it could discharge its mandated functions and negotiate treaties as it had done successfully in the past. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by States was an important non-proliferation and disarmament measure. His delegation was disappointed at the failure to convene an international conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, as that conference would have been a crucial confidence-building measure and a significant stimulus to the Non-Proliferation Treaty review process.

36. Turkey had actively participated in the three conferences on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons. Any new initiative on that subject must complement existing mechanisms and receive at least the same level of support as the Treaty. The risk of acquisition of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery by terrorists and other non-State actors should not be underestimated and States must remain vigilant and cooperate to avoid possible attacks. To that end, Turkey had ratified the amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.

37. Turkey fully supported the enjoyment of the benefits of nuclear energy by States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty in compliance with their obligations under that Treaty, and IAEA played an essential role in assisting States in that regard. Diplomacy was the only viable way to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue and his delegation therefore welcomed the political understanding reached between Iran and the five permanent members of the Security Council and Germany. It hoped that the ongoing negotiations would lead to a comprehensive final agreement that would restore confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iranian nuclear activities.

38. **Ms. Lucas** (Luxembourg) said that the Non-Proliferation Treaty must be preserved as the cornerstone of the global system for the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear disarmament and the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Luxembourg was committed to the creation of a world free of nuclear weapons and to the lowest possible level of conventional weapons.

39. While some efforts had been made to reduce nuclear arsenals, the reductions had been significantly lower than those envisaged under the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference. Nuclear-weapon States should build the confidence of the international community by demonstrating their willingness to reduce their arsenals, increase transparency and create conditions conducive to a world free of nuclear weapons. Member States were urged to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty so that it could enter into force as soon as possible.

40. Luxembourg welcomed the ambitious draft fissile material cut-off treaty and hoped that negotiations would be resumed within the Conference on Disarmament with a view to its adoption. It also welcomed the attention being paid to the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons.

41. Her delegation remained concerned at the proliferation crises unfolding in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Islamic Republic of Iran, former continued to undermine the nuclear non-proliferation regime and contravene the decisions of the Security Council by carrying out nuclear and missile tests since 2006 with no regard for its international obligations. Her delegation urged the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to show

restraint, not to exacerbate tensions on the Korean peninsula and to give priority to the Six-Party Talks. On the Islamic Republic of Iran, her delegation was confident that a strong and verifiable agreement on the Iranian nuclear programme would be reached between that country and the five permanent members of the Security Council and Germany by the end of June 2015. The conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons should be held as soon as possible.

42. To prevent other proliferation crises, States must support the efforts of IAEA, which played a crucial role in the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. To that end, all States should sign additional protocols to their safeguards agreements with IAEA. Controlling exports was also important in ensuring non-proliferation. Concerning the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, all States parties had the inalienable right to conduct research and to produce and use nuclear energy for civilian endeavours but it was essential that nuclear energy was used responsibly in accordance with the highest possible standards of safety, security and non-proliferation.

43. **Ms. Yparraguirre** (Philippines) said that, since 2010, there had been a lack of impetus towards achieving the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. While the Non-Proliferation Treaty was invaluable, it was not an end in itself and it was the legacy of the Treaty that would eventually make a difference by protecting people from nuclear weapons. However, the Treaty was meaningless if States failed to fulfil their obligations under it. The only way for States to truly reaffirm their commitment to the Treaty was to demonstrate consistent and continued implementation of its provisions through tangible, urgent action.

44. The credibility of any State in advocating for the urgent implementation of obligations under the Treaty rested largely on its own actions. Consequently, the Philippines planned to submit a report on the measures that it had undertaken over the previous five years to implement the action plan adopted at the 2010 Review Conference. Nuclear weapons were prohibited under its Constitution and the Government sought to promote a world free of nuclear weapons. The Philippines firmly supported initiatives designed to highlight the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons and called for effective measures to fill the legal gap for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons. It also called for a nuclear weapons convention that

would give meaning to article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and was committed to strengthening the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone through the signing of its Protocol by the five nuclear-weapon States. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty should enter into force and be universalized as soon as possible, and the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency should be observed in implementing the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

45. The Government of the Philippines had worked with civil society organizations and educational institutions to raise awareness of nuclear disarmament and had signed an agreement with IAEA on the application of safeguards in connection with the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It was also working to adopt legislation to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by managing the trade in strategic goods. Concerning the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the Philippines used techniques to secure a safe and clean environment, improve agricultural productivity, enhance industry competitiveness and provide quality health care. It also worked with regional and international partners to promote peaceful uses of nuclear energy and hosted training events on that subject. The Philippines was cooperating with the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism in order to strengthen its nuclear and radiological security infrastructure.

46. The Review Conference must be a step forward from 2010 and must strengthen existing agreements rather than merely rolling over the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference. Specific future actions and timelines must be determined for areas in which implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty was lacking. There had been a real lack of progress in nuclear disarmament and greater attention should be paid to the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons and to the need for effective measures to fill the legal gap relating to the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons. The conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction should be held as soon as possible.

47. **Ms. Bird** (Australia) said that the current Preparatory Conference was taking place against a backdrop of deteriorating relations between the Russian Federation, on the one hand, and the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization



(NATO), on the other, owing to the situation in Ukraine; the continued inability to convene a conference on a Middle East zone free of all weapons of mass destruction; and growing frustration among many non-nuclear-weapon States at the slow pace of nuclear disarmament. There was nonetheless broad agreement about the continuing importance of the Treaty and the relevance of the three pillars. With good will, it would be possible for the 2015 Review Conference to make progress under each of the pillars.

48. The Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, of which Australia was a member, was one reason for such hope. The Initiative brought together a broad, cross-regional group of countries with very different views on how to make progress on nuclear disarmament. Despite their differing views, those countries had been able to reach consensus in 17 working papers presented at previous Preparatory Committee meetings. The Initiative had also agreed on a comprehensive working paper containing consensus language relating to each of the three pillars for possible inclusion in the outcome document of the 2015 Review Conference.

49. While many details remained to be addressed, the recent announcement that the five permanent members of the Security Council and Germany had established the parameters of a possible agreement with Iran to address international concerns about the latter's nuclear programme was encouraging.

50. A core objective of the 2015 Review Conference should be to preserve and strengthen the Treaty and the norms it enshrined as the cornerstone of multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation. The collective commitment to the Treaty had prevented a global nuclear arms race and contained the proliferation of nuclear weapons. It had strengthened the taboo against the use of nuclear weapons in conflict and firmly established the need to eliminate nuclear weapons.

51. The Treaty had also enabled the international community to benefit from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and technologies. Australia was a strong supporter of the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to spread the peaceful benefits of nuclear technology to all States and was also a leader in the use of low-enriched uranium for producing medical isotopes.

52. Australia contributed to the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme and had provided in-kind and

financial support for the Peaceful Uses Initiative. In 2015, the Government of Australia would make an additional voluntary contribution of 350,000 euros to the Initiative, of which 250,000 euros would go towards supporting redevelopment of the Seibersdorf Laboratories and 100,000 euros towards Initiative projects in the Asia-Pacific region.

53. Growing frustration with the slow pace of nuclear disarmament had led some States to call for a treaty banning nuclear weapons. However, it was important to address the security concerns that drove other States to develop nuclear weapons, and it was also important to engage with nuclear-weapon States to persuade them to dispose of such weapons. Australia supported practical, realistic measures to achieve nuclear disarmament.

54. There were some 16,000 nuclear warheads currently in existence, 45 years after the entry into force of the Treaty. While some States had declared moratoriums on the production of fissile material, others continued to produce weapons-grade uranium and plutonium. Some States were developing new, small battlefield-scale nuclear weapons. All of those issues were cause for concern.

55. The 2015 Review Conference should consider practical ways to fulfil States' commitments under the Treaty and the action plan adopted at the 2010 Review Conference. The focus should be on concrete steps, such as the entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, negotiations for a fissile material cut-off treaty and the development of robust techniques for verifying disarmament and the dismantlement of nuclear weapons. Safeguards regimes must remain strong and adequately resourced, as they underpinned non-proliferation efforts.

56. **Mr. Cortorreal** (Dominican Republic) said that the Dominican Republic, a non-nuclear-weapon State, supported the initiatives undertaken to counter the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Universal implementation of the Treaty could protect the world from possible devastation by nuclear weapons.

57. The Dominican Republic, a founding member of IAEA, wished to highlight the efforts of the Agency to guarantee the safe and reliable use of nuclear energy and supported its Technical Cooperation Programme. It also supported the Agency's work to combat cancer, HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria. Those programmes should receive more support.

58. The Dominican Republic had signed a comprehensive safeguards agreement in 1973; accepted modifications to the small quantities protocol approved by the IAEA Board of Governors in 2005; and signed an additional protocol to the safeguards agreement in 2010. The Dominican Republic was in a region with an untarnished record on disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco) had made a particularly important contribution to nuclear disarmament. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones was a positive step towards nuclear disarmament worldwide.

59. In negotiating the outcome of the current Review Conference, States parties to the Treaty should keep in mind that peace, security and development were intrinsically linked. States parties, and in particular, those that were nuclear-weapon States, must demonstrate political will and flexibility in order for the 2015 Review Conference to succeed.

60. **Mr. Simon-Michel** (France) said that the preliminary understanding on an agreement reached by the five permanent members of the Security Council and Germany with Iran in early April was an important step. France would work very hard to transform that understanding into a strong, sustainable and verifiable agreement.

61. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea had conducted a new nuclear test since the previous Review Conference and was continuing its nuclear and ballistic programmes, in violation of Security Council resolutions. There were also many unanswered questions with regard to the Syrian nuclear programme.

62. The delegation of France hoped that during the current conference, lessons would be drawn from regional crises in order to strengthen the non-proliferation regime and address abuse of the right of withdrawal from the Treaty, an issue that had presented a challenge for over a decade.

63. She welcomed the recent consensus adoption of a report by the group of governmental experts on the fissile material cut-off treaty. The conclusion of a fissile material cut-off treaty and the earliest possible entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty were priorities for France.

64. There had been progress on the peaceful use of nuclear energy from each Review Conference to the next. In the aftermath of the Fukushima disaster, the responsible development of nuclear activities for peaceful purposes involved strengthened safety, security and disaster response and the training of elite nuclear power specialists.

65. Over the past 15 years, France had reduced its weapons stockpiles by half and dismantled its nuclear test site and weapons-grade fissile material production facilities, irreversible actions that demonstrated the country's commitment to disarmament and to the fulfilment of its obligations. While France supported the elimination of nuclear weapons, that objective could not be considered in isolation from the international strategic context. Rather, it could be reached only through a phased series of concrete measures. To that end, and because disarmament was based upon trust and reciprocity, the President of France had, in February 2015, announced new transparency measures and solemnly reaffirmed the country's security guarantees to the non-nuclear-weapon States that respected their non-proliferation obligations.

66. France was fully aware of the grave effects of nuclear weapons, which could not be used on the battlefield. French deterrence, in complete compliance with international law, was strictly limited to the defence of its vital interests in extreme circumstances of self-defence.

67. France had submitted an ambitious draft treaty to the Conference on Disarmament, which contained a proposed framework for irreversible measures. The next logical step in multilateral disarmament was to ban access to materials that were the building blocks for weapons manufacture. The relevant negotiations must get under way without delay.

68. The five permanent members of the Security Council had acted collectively, by establishing a regular consultation process to build trust; developing a form for national reports; and preparing a glossary of key nuclear terms.

69. France had ratified the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia, and supported the goal of a zone free of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.

70. France had recently launched a new initiative on strengthening the training available at the international level, particularly for countries that were gaining access to nuclear energy.

71. **Ms. Haekkerup** (Denmark) said that while many had expressed scepticism with regard to the outcome of the 2015 Review Conference, his delegation believed that with sufficient political will, it was possible to achieve an ambitious outcome in the case of all three pillars of the Treaty.

72. There were many incentives to summon political will. Nuclear arsenals must be resolutely downsized and non-proliferation firmly ensured, as must the safety and security of all nuclear materials. Realizing the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons required action. The solemn memory of the victims of Hiroshima and Nagasaki must give rise to the necessary political will. States Members of the United Nations which were not yet party to the Treaty were urged to join as non-nuclear-weapon States.

73. With the entry into force of the Treaty 45 years earlier, a firm foundation had been laid for the achievement of a world without nuclear weapons. It was time for tangible, achievable goals that included full compliance with Treaty commitments.

74. Denmark was proud to be ranked first in the 2014 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index — an achievement that had been possible because Denmark was a trust-based society. Similarly, trust among all States parties to the Treaty and trust among and between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States was needed in order to achieve a world without nuclear weapons.

75. Trust was gained gradually through actions, not words. The current difficult security environment had provoked a return to threatening rhetoric that did not enhance security but only fed distrust. Openness, transparency and verification were essential.

76. The Vienna Group of Ten, of which Denmark was a member, had submitted a paper to the 2015 Review Conference containing a range of proposals which, *inter alia*, emphasized the urgent need for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty to enter into force, called for the universal application of current-standard IAEA safeguards, stressed the need for effective export controls and underlined the central role of nuclear safety and security.

77. **Mr. Korhonen** (Finland) said that the three pillars of the Treaty were of equal weight and were interrelated. Finland attached great importance to implementation and universalization of the Treaty. As nuclear power represented 30 per cent of electricity production in Finland, it attached great importance to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. A functioning nuclear regime as provided for by the Treaty was important to its national interests and was an essential component of international security architecture.

78. Other initiatives and institutions complemented the central role of the Treaty. In that connection, Finland would host the next plenary of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism in Helsinki in June 2015.

79. It was not clear whether maintaining security policies based on the potential use of nuclear weapons was acceptable or even well-founded, given that the use or accidental detonation of such weapons could cause death and unspeakable suffering to very large numbers of people, most of them civilians. Any nuclear war would have a detrimental impact on a global scale. There was general agreement that nuclear weapons could and must be eliminated.

80. Tactical nuclear weapons were not covered by any legally binding, verifiable international arrangement. The current Review Conference must focus on ways to reduce them and create a relevant normative framework. The nuclear disarmament effort required unity and an inclusive approach. Nuclear disarmament was possible only with the involvement of the nuclear-weapon countries.

81. Initiatives on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons had given new impetus to the debate on disarmament and non-proliferation, and there was increasing readiness to participate in the discussion from a humanitarian point of view. He welcomed the fact that two nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, the United States and the United Kingdom, had taken part in the Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, held in December 2014, marking the first participation of nuclear-weapon States in such an event. Other nuclear-weapon States not yet part of that dialogue were encouraged to follow suit.

82. The proliferation of nuclear weapons posed a serious threat to international peace. All States should respect their commitments under the Treaty by

adopting and implementing IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreements together with additional protocols thereto. Finland was continuing efforts to strengthen the IAEA safeguards system and to promote its universalization.

83. Finland supported the creation of zones free of nuclear weapons, including in the Middle East. Her delegation was encouraged by the ongoing efforts to seek a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear situation. The agreement on the parameters for a joint comprehensive plan of action was a major step forward. It was important, however, that all parties built on the current momentum in order to complete the negotiations. Finland continued to support the work of the IAEA under the framework for cooperation signed with the Islamic Republic of Iran in November 2013. All parties to the Treaty should promote the development of the responsible and peaceful use of nuclear energy. There was a balance of rights and responsibilities of all parties to the Treaty regarding the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Countries using nuclear power or embarking on nuclear programmes must have a sound legislative and regulatory framework in place. States parties should continue to strengthen norms that were vital for national security and mutual trust. Finland welcomed the work towards a fissile material cut-off treaty.

84. **Mr. Al-Mouallimi** (Saudi Arabia) said that strengthening international peace and security required genuine political will and strong determination on the part of all countries, particularly those that possessed nuclear weapons, in order to end reliance on them and on other weapons of mass destruction as instruments of national security.

85. The entire international community must embrace existing treaties and legal and ethical frameworks that aimed to achieve a nuclear-free world. That was particularly needed in the Middle East. Cooperation between countries, the pursuit of development and avoidance of an arms race would lead to security and stability. Saudi Arabia had recently announced its support for the pledge made by the Austrian Government subsequent to the Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, held in 2014.

86. Despite the universality of the Treaty and its role as the cornerstone of the international system of disarmament and non-proliferation, international

efforts within the multilateral framework fell short, resulting in a political landscape fraught with ambiguity. The current stagnation would lead to a far more challenging state of affairs, and it was possible the lack of tangible progress towards making the Middle East a zone free of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction would result in a nuclear arms race. His delegation was deeply disappointed that the conference on establishing such a zone, scheduled to be held in Helsinki in 2012, had not been convened, owing to the refusal by Israel. Israel had thwarted the international consensus and the urgent desire in the region to make the Middle East a zone free of nuclear weapons.

87. As long as Israel was not a party to the Treaty, States would doubt the wisdom of accepting an indefinite extension of the Treaty, or even about accession to the Treaty. It was important that States not have such concerns.

88. It was hoped that the framework agreement reached between Iran and the major powers over its nuclear programme would lead to a final, binding agreement that strengthened security and stability and reassured the countries in the region and the international community as a whole. Iran should adhere to the principles of good neighbourliness, non-interference in the internal affairs of Arab countries and respect for their sovereignty. Saudi Arabia reaffirmed the inherent right of the States of the region to the peaceful use of nuclear energy in accordance with IAEA standards and guidelines, and under its supervision.

89. Saudi Arabia had declared its intention to develop an ambitious programme to exploit nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, in order to achieve the goals of sustainable development and preserve valuable hydrocarbon resources for future generations. That was entirely consistent with nuclear security requirements and met the maximum standards set by the guiding criteria of IAEA for the planning, construction and operation stages. Saudi Arabia was committed to establishing a national system of accounting, oversight and control of nuclear materials, and to making every effort to develop customs and border control devices and law enforcement resources to detect and prevent illegal trafficking in hazardous materials.

90. A binding international instrument to ensure the safety and stability of non-nuclear-weapon States was

needed, and the concerns of many non-nuclear-weapon States must be addressed, given ongoing instability in the Middle East.

91. **Ms. Ogwu** (Nigeria), speaking on behalf of the African Group of States parties said that the African Group remained concerned at the threat to humanity posed by the continued existence of nuclear weapons, their possible use and threats of their use and the slow progress towards nuclear disarmament, especially by the nuclear-weapon States, which had failed to eliminate their nuclear arsenals in accordance with their obligations and undertakings.

92. Reductions in deployment and operational status or readiness could not replace irreversible cuts in nuclear weapons, or the total elimination of such weapons. The African Group urged nuclear-weapon States to meet in good faith their legal obligations under article VI of the Treaty and comply with their unequivocal undertakings assumed under the 13 practical steps and the action plan adopted at the 2010 Review Conference, including, in particular, action 5, to achieve the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals. In that context, the Group reaffirmed the importance of the application by nuclear-weapon States of the principles of transparency, irreversibility and international verifiability in all measures related to the fulfilment of their nuclear disarmament obligations.

93. The indefinite extension of the Treaty should not be construed as implying the indefinite possession of nuclear arsenals. Any such assumption remained incompatible with the object and purpose of the Treaty, its integrity and sustainability and the broader objective of maintaining international peace and security.

94. The use of nuclear weapons was a violation of the Charter of the United Nations. Any doctrine justifying their use or threat of use was unacceptable and unjustifiable. The African Group reaffirmed the importance of the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice in its advisory opinion of 8 July 1996, which stated that there existed an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects, under strict and effective international control.

95. The Group reiterated the position reflected in the advisory opinion, which affirmed that the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons constituted a crime against

humanity and a violation of international law, including international humanitarian law. It also stressed the need to start negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on the early conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention towards their complete elimination, including a convention to prohibit their development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer, use or threat of use, and to provide for their destruction, without further delay.

96. The Group cautioned against alternative forms of nuclear weapon test explosions, including the use of new technologies for upgrading existing nuclear weapons systems, as well as the development of new types of nuclear weapons, which could result in the resumption of tests and a lowering of the nuclear threshold. It called on the nuclear-weapon States to put an immediate end to such activities.

97. The Group urged States parties to remain committed to strengthening the objective of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons by ensuring compliance with IAEA guidelines. It also underlined the importance of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, calling for increased accessibility and broader application of science and technology. IAEA remained central to the promotion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including by ensuring States' commitment to the implementation of safeguards agreements in compliance with article IV of the Treaty and verification, but also in such areas as the provision of technical assistance and cooperation through the use of science and technology to promote innovation.

98. The African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba), had entered into force in 2009 and had held three conferences to consolidate its establishment and showcase the enormous benefits that the peaceful application of nuclear energy could bring to Africa. The Treaty had created a mechanism for compliance with undertakings relating to disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful uses through the establishment in 2010 of the African Commission on Nuclear Energy. The Commission played a vital role in working towards the objectives of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Some of its core functions included, inter alia, promoting information exchange; reviewing the application of IAEA safeguards to peaceful nuclear activities; encouraging regional and subregional programmes for cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology; and

promoting cooperation with States outside the zone for the peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology.

99. The Group expressed deep concern that the commitments and obligations of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East and the 2010 action plan regarding the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East had not been implemented as agreed. It was greatly disappointed that the conference on the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, had not been convened as mandated in 2012. The commitments and obligations of the 1995 resolution would remain valid until the zone was established.

100. The mere possession, or any use or threat of use of nuclear weapons was a violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and international law. It was gravely concerned at the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons and called on all States, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, to consider the catastrophic humanitarian consequences that could result from their use. The Group called for the commencement, without any further delay, of the negotiations for the conclusion of a universal, legally binding instrument on effective, unconditional, non-discriminatory and irrevocable security assurances by all nuclear-weapon States to all non-nuclear-weapon State parties to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

101. The African Group stressed the importance of achieving universal adherence to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, bearing in mind the special responsibilities of the nuclear-weapon States in that regard, and encouraged the remaining Annex 2 States, in particular nuclear-weapon States, to sign and ratify that Treaty without further delay, to allow its entry into force.

102. Speaking in her national capacity, she said that 70 years after the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, nuclear weapons remained a threat to the human race. Current weapons were in fact far more powerful and lethal than the early generations had been. The onus was on the international community to work concertedly to avert the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of their use. While nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation were mutually reinforcing, nuclear disarmament was the only effective route to non-proliferation.

103. As a member of the De-alerting Group and the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, Nigeria supported the measures put forward to ensure nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, including increased transparency in nuclear disarmament, the de-alerting of operational readiness of nuclear weapons, continued efforts to facilitate the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and attempts to commence negotiations on a treaty banning the production and stockpiling of fissile material for nuclear weapons.

104. Nigeria supported the growing focus on the humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons, which was firmly anchored in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and reflected in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference. It welcomed the convening of the three conferences on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, held in Norway, Mexico and Austria and endorsed the pledge made by the Austrian Government at the end of the Vienna Conference, held in December 2014. Nigeria supported the joint statement delivered on behalf of 156 States parties by the Federal Minister for Europe, Integration and Foreign Affairs of Austria.

105. Implementation of the action plan remained an excellent basis for deliberations. Expectations should not be lowered, nor should agreed terms be altered. The support of nuclear-weapon States was crucial for compliance with the obligations and commitments arising out of the action plan, especially given that the Treaty faced serious challenges, including, most importantly, non-implementation of a substantial number of actions central to the Treaty.

106. While Nigeria welcomed the gesture by nuclear-weapon States to reduce the stockpile, total elimination of nuclear arsenals by States that possessed them, in compliance with article VI of the Treaty, was still the ultimate expectation. Moreover, it was not acceptable for States that were not parties to the Treaty to continue to threaten the peace of the world by developing and testing weapons of mass destruction and adamantly defending their right to possess them.

107. Nigeria continued to promote the Treaty of Pelindaba and fully supported the establishment of such zones in all regions, including the Middle East. Nigeria called once again for the convening of the conference on the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass

destruction in the Middle East. Such a conference would be the starting point.

108. Nigeria supported the inalienable rights of all State parties to the Treaty to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and called for continued and strengthened collaboration between IAEA and States parties to implement the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety. Nigeria operated research facilities in an effort to ensure a sustainable future for its people and had benefited from technical cooperation with IAEA.

109. Trafficking in nuclear materials and the threat of nuclear terrorism were strong arguments for adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Nigeria had taken steps towards ratifying the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. Given that no nation was safe in the event of a successful act of nuclear terrorism, Nigeria called upon States that were not parties to the Treaty to accede to it without preconditions and to place all existing nuclear facilities under IAEA full-scope safeguards without delay, in conformity with the non-proliferation regime.

110. **Mr. Jones** (United Kingdom), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that the United Kingdom had ratified the Treaty of Tlatelolco in 1969 and fully respected its obligations thereunder. The position of the United Kingdom was unambiguous: it would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States parties to and in compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It was regrettable that Argentina had again made unfounded claims about the military presence of the United Kingdom in the South Atlantic, despite the many clarifications that the Government of the United Kingdom had provided and despite repeated requests that Argentina desist from making such false allegations. The United Kingdom had made every effort to be transparent about the nature of its defensive posture on the Falkland Islands. The Ministry of Defence of the United Kingdom had briefed London-based defence attachés about the purpose and nature of its military assets on the Islands in December 2013 and had issued an invitation for defence attachés to visit the Islands. That invitation still stood.

111. **Mr. Mazzeo** (Argentina), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that Argentina confirmed what it had said earlier and rejected the response of the United Kingdom. Argentina reaffirmed its sovereignty over the Malvinas Islands, South Georgia Islands and South

Sandwich Islands and the surrounding maritime areas, which were part of its national territory. The Islands were illegally occupied by the United Kingdom and were the object of a sovereignty dispute acknowledged by the United Nations and other international and regional organizations. Military activities by the United Kingdom in the Malvinas Islands, which included military exercises twice a year, ran counter to General Assembly resolution 31/49, which called on the two parties to refrain from introducing unilateral modifications in the situation pending resolution through negotiations, as called for by the General Assembly in its resolution 2065 (XX) and subsequent resolutions on the question of the Malvinas Islands.

112. Argentina, like other countries in Latin America, had requested information about the transport of nuclear weapons in the South Atlantic by the United Kingdom. The latter had provided no information that would make it possible to confirm or deny a very serious fact affecting non-nuclear-weapon States. Argentina's concern over British militarization of the South Atlantic was shared by the region as a whole. That militarization had been rejected by international organizations, including the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) and associated countries, the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), the Rio Group, the Summit of the Americas, the South American and Arab Countries Summit and the zone of peace and cooperation of the South Atlantic. The military presence was causing needless and unjustified tensions in the South Atlantic, a region that was committed to peace and constituted a nuclear-weapon-free zone. It was regrettable that the United Kingdom was maintaining its military presence in the South Atlantic, claiming that it was defensive in nature and that Argentina represented a threat, when Argentina had stated its readiness to resolve the sovereignty dispute through peaceful means and in accordance with international law.

113. **Mr. Jones** (United Kingdom), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that the position of the United Kingdom with regard to the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands was very clear. The United Kingdom had no doubt about its sovereignty over the Falkland Islands. The principle of self-determination underlay that position. It was regrettable that Argentina had felt it necessary to raise the issue.

114. **Mr. Mazzeo** (Argentina), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that the principle of the

self-determination of peoples, which the United Kingdom invoked as the sole basis for its position, and solely in relation to the Malvinas Islands, was inapplicable to the sovereignty dispute over the Malvinas Islands, the South Georgia Islands and the South Sandwich Islands. The General Assembly resolutions referred to described clearly the situation of the Malvinas as a sovereignty dispute that must be resolved bilaterally by Argentina and the United Kingdom. The resolutions contained no mention of self-determination.

*The meeting rose at 6 p.m.*