

2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Held at Headquarters, New York, on Monday, 27 April 2015, at 3 p.m.

President: Ms. Feroukhi (Algeria)

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The meeting was called to order at 3.10 p.m.

General debate (*continued*)

1. **Mr. Kishida** (Japan) said that, as the only country ever to have endured atomic bombings, Japan attached great importance to strengthening all three pillars of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Both nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States should take joint action to move towards a world free of nuclear weapons. In particular, nuclear-weapon States should fulfil their special responsibilities under article VI of the Treaty. Negotiations on the reduction of nuclear weapons were not possible unless the number of nuclear warheads was known. Transparency was therefore necessary to build confidence, making it imperative for nuclear-weapon States to provide concrete and regular reports with numerical information. Furthermore, such negotiations should be multilateral in nature and the reduction, which had hitherto been limited to strategic nuclear weapons possessed by the Russian Federation and the United States, should apply to all nuclear weapons possessed by all nuclear-weapon States.

2. A shared recognition of the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons and the unity of the international community in support of a world free of nuclear weapons were the driving force for nuclear disarmament. In that connection, some young people from Japan involved in the programme “Youth Communicators for a World without Nuclear Weapons” were attending the Review Conference to convey beyond generations and across borders the tragedy of the bombings that had occurred in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan 70 years earlier. Political leaders and youth, including those from nuclear-weapon States, should visit those cities to see the reality of atomic bombings with their own eyes. Between 30 July and 6 August 2015, Japan would welcome some 24,000 young people from around the world as part of the Hiroshima-Nagasaki Peace Programme. Japan would also host the United Nations Conference on Disarmament and the Group of Eminent Persons of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in late August 2015 and a Pugwash conference on science and world affairs in November 2015.

3. Regarding regional nuclear proliferation issues, a robust message must be sent to North Korea in the light of that country’s continued development of nuclear weapons and missile programmes, which posed a

serious threat to international peace and security and represented a challenge to the Treaty regime. His Government welcomed the political understanding recently reached on the key parameters of a final agreement on the Iranian nuclear issue, and would redouble its efforts to ensure that such an agreement could be reached. It also supported the establishment of a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction. It was important to strengthen export controls and the safeguards agreements of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), including universalization of additional protocols to those agreements.

4. Japan would contribute \$25 million to the Peaceful Uses Initiative over the next five years in order to bring the benefits of nuclear energy to more people in more areas, such as in medicine, agriculture and water management. In the light of the accident that had occurred at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station, Japan was determined to contribute to international nuclear safety and to advance nuclear disarmament.

5. **Mr. Kerry** (United States of America) said that upon signing the Charter of the United Nations, Member States had pledged to save humankind from the scourge of war and to promote social progress and better standards of life and greater freedom. That pledge had become the responsibility of each succeeding generation and was at the heart of the current deliberations, because few things were more threatening to the ideals of the United Nations and to peace and security than the spread of nuclear weapons.

6. While the world was united in its belief that nuclear weapons should one day be eliminated, turning that belief into reality required patience, cooperation, persistence and a change in how conflicts were resolved and how global affairs were conducted. For the past 45 years, the guiding light on those issues had been the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, a straightforward arrangement according to which countries without nuclear weapons would not obtain them; countries with nuclear weapons would move towards disarmament; and all countries would have access to peaceful nuclear energy. Each of those pillars was an essential ingredient of the Treaty. For the Treaty to remain upright, its words should have weight, its rules should be binding, and its parties should be compliant. The world should therefore remain united in rejecting the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

7. There was potential for historic progress towards that end, as the United States, the other four permanent members of the Security Council and Germany had come together with Iran around a series of parameters that, if finalized and implemented, would close off that country's possible pathways to the nuclear material required for a nuclear weapon, and give the international community the confidence that it needed to know that the Iranian nuclear programme was indeed exclusively peaceful. A comprehensive deal that would make the entire world safer was closer than ever. The Non-Proliferation Treaty had always been at the heart of those negotiations. From the beginning the focus had been on ensuring that Iran was in compliance with its obligations under the Treaty. Any deal with Iran would rely not on promises or words but on verification, which was at the centre of the Treaty regime.

8. IAEA safeguards should be strengthened in order to ensure that the Agency was able to verify safeguards agreements. The United States was therefore working to ensure that additional protocols were brought into force globally and to make them the global standard for safeguards compliance. Although critical, verifying compliance with the Treaty regime was not good enough unless parties were held accountable for their violations. North Korea continued to ignore its obligations, to undermine the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and to threaten international peace and security. It must therefore be made clear that North Korea must abandon all its nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes, return to IAEA safeguards, and fully comply with the obligations that it accepted when it first became a party to the Treaty. His Government was working with its regional allies and partners to set the stage for renewed negotiations, but the onus remained on North Korea to show that it was serious about addressing global concerns and that it wanted to be part of the global community.

9. Non-proliferation must be non-negotiable. The Non-Proliferation Treaty did not allow for a country to negotiate its way into becoming a nuclear-armed State. In return for a commitment to refrain from pursuing nuclear weapons, however, nations around the world expected the existing nuclear-weapon States to steadily disarm and fulfil their part of the bargain. The United States was unequivocally committed to doing just that and had scaled down its arsenal and would continue to move, step by step, toward nuclear disarmament. As at September 2014, the number of nuclear weapons in its

stockpile had fallen to 4,717, or 85 per cent below the cold war peak. Over the past 20 years, the United States had dismantled 10,251 warheads, with another approximately 2,500 warheads retired and in the queue for elimination.

10. Although that was complex and costly work, his Government was committed to reducing the backlog. Indeed, the President of the United States of America, Barack Obama, had decided that his country would seek to accelerate the dismantlement of retired nuclear warheads by 20 per cent. The United States had also pledged not to pursue new nuclear warheads or support new military missions or capabilities for its existing weapons; it had not tested a nuclear weapon in 23 years and had reduced the role that nuclear weapons played in its national security strategy. The alert status of its nuclear arsenal had been reduced and the primary purpose of that arsenal would henceforth be to deter nuclear threats from others.

11. Despite significant reductions, the United States and the Russia still possessed more than 90 per cent of the world's nuclear weapons. The Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START Treaty) had put both countries on track to reduce their nuclear stockpiles to the lowest levels since the 1950s. Further cutbacks were possible and the United States was ready to negotiate further reductions of deployed strategic nuclear weapons by up to one third below the level set by the New START Treaty. That offer remained on the table, and his Government urged the Russians to accept it. However, his Government was also deeply concerned about Russia's clear violation of its obligations under the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty), and urged Russia to return to compliance.

12. Further steps that could be taken to build for the future included negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, which should begin soon; initiatives to prepare for future arms control agreements, which his country had started to undertake with its new International Partnership on Nuclear Disarmament Verification initiative; and legal assurances against the use of nuclear weapons against States that met their obligations, as allowed under the

protocols to treaties establishing regional nuclear-weapon-free zones. In that connection, the Protocol to the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty had been submitted to the United States Senate for advice and consent to ratification. In 1994, under the Budapest Memorandum, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States had extended similar assurances to Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine as they returned to Russia the Soviet-era nuclear weapons that remained on their territory. The current disregard by Russia of the Budapest Memorandum was therefore extraordinary.

13. The United States remained committed to the holding of the proposed conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, and supported regional efforts to reach an agreement on the terms for such a conference, which should be agreed upon by all States involved.

14. Turning to peaceful uses of nuclear energy, he noted that the United States was by far the largest donor to IAEA and had provided close to \$200 million to promote peaceful nuclear applications since the 2010 Review Conference. It would make a further \$50 million contribution to the Agency's Peaceful Uses Initiative, which promoted food security by improving the detection of animal diseases in Africa and expanding food safety measures in Latin America. The United States was advancing human health by helping to improve early Ebola detection capabilities and strengthening global capacity to detect and treat cancer. It was protecting the future of the planet by tracing marine pollution, documenting the impacts of climate change, and reducing climate emissions.

15. Lastly, the march towards peace was marked not only by steps taken to dismantle and disarm, but also by steps taken to develop, innovate and build a more peaceful world, where the atom was not about levelling cities, but about lifting whole communities. Nuclear weapons had been an important component of the global system of defence and deterrence for decades, and to eliminate them completely would require a new way of thinking. Sceptics might doubt the international community's ability or will to address a challenge of that magnitude, but the United States was determined to prove them wrong by leaving the nuclear arms race in the past and marching instead towards peace, stability and prosperity.

16. **Mr. Flanagan** (Ireland) said that, as the initiator of the United Nations resolutions that had led to the negotiation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, his country strongly advocated that all provisions of the Treaty should be fully honoured and implemented. Suggestions of an equivalence of achievement between multilateral nuclear disarmament and the other two pillars of the Treaty were simply not supported by facts and the imbalance across the three pillars was increasing. Despite considerable reductions, 17,000 nuclear weapons still existed, with few prospects in the short or medium term for further voluntary reductions outside the Treaty.

17. Ireland welcomed recent efforts to reach agreement on the Iranian nuclear programme and strongly hoped that the agreement would be confirmed by all parties, which would mark a significant achievement for the Treaty's non-proliferation pillar. The agreement would also fuel urgent, article VI-mandated discussions about effective measures for eliminating the nuclear weapons still in existence.

18. The humanitarian dimension of nuclear weapons had moved to the very centre of international deliberations on nuclear disarmament, where it should be. Ireland was grateful to the Governments of Norway, Mexico and Austria for hosting major international conferences on the topic. The evidence presented at the conference held in Vienna in December 2014 clearly showed that the risks of a nuclear detonation were far greater than the international community had realized, and that the capacity to cope with such an event was hopelessly inadequate. He encouraged States parties to study the working paper submitted by the New Agenda Coalition (NPT/CONF.2015/WP.8) on possible legal pathways for pursuing effective measures for nuclear disarmament, which did not seek to prescribe a particular legal instrument to be used or a forum in which discussions on those measures should take place.

19. States parties needed to acknowledge that not a single nuclear weapon had been disarmed under the Treaty or as part of any multilateral process and that there were no structures in place for that to happen. If the Treaty was to retain legitimacy, the effective measures it explicitly required for disarmament under article VI must be put in place in the coming review cycle, before the Treaty's fiftieth anniversary in 2020.

20. His delegation had consistently argued for a balanced implementation of the Treaty across all three

pillars and attached equal importance to its non-proliferation provisions, both on their own merits and as a contribution to the goal of disarmament. It also wished to reaffirm the central importance of the IAEA safeguards system to the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Ireland was an active participant in — and strong supporter of — several export control regimes, to counter the proliferation of nuclear weapons technology, materials and know-how. While it had chosen not to include nuclear power in its energy mix, it recognized the right of all States parties to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes under article VI of the Treaty. It also supported and contributed financially to the IAEA Peaceful Uses Initiative.

21. While considerable work had been done at the 2010 Review Conference to bring forward the prospects of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, it had not been possible to bring that work to fruition in the form of a conference. He strongly hoped that the present Review Conference would provide the impetus for overcoming the final remaining hurdles in that regard. The regional and global benefits made the effort both necessary and worthwhile.

22. Lastly, it was important to discuss the need for women to be given agency in discussions on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. For every two men who died of cancer due to exposure to radiation as a result of a nuclear weapon detonation, three women would die, and the disproportionate effect on children was even greater. States parties owed it to their citizens to ensure that the welfare and safety of women and children remained paramount in the discussions on achieving a world free of nuclear weapons. They must redouble their efforts to ensure not only that others refrained from developing nuclear weapons, but that such weapons were never used again under any circumstances and that a process was started to put all nuclear weapons beyond use for good.

23. **Mr. Selim** (Egypt) said that despite growing international awareness of the dangers of nuclear weapons, they continued to play a role in the military doctrines of States. The international community had still not found a balance between the respective obligations of nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States. His country had repeatedly demanded implementation of the 13 steps for nuclear disarmament agreed to in 2000 and the action plan adopted in 2010. The indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty

agreed to in 1995 in no way implied permission for the nuclear-weapon States to continue to possess nuclear weapons indefinitely. His delegation was also troubled by the failure of the five permanent members of the Security Council to shoulder their responsibility to work for universalization of the Treaty, which was vital to its credibility.

24. The fundamental and inalienable right of non-nuclear-weapon States to peaceful uses of nuclear energy should not be infringed by limitations such as the proposed nuclear fuel bank, or any other conditions designed to pressure States members of IAEA into signing additional protocols. His country, which was building its first electricity-generating nuclear power plant, in full compliance with IAEA safeguards, wished to see the IAEA safeguards regime universalized, but any additional commitments that a country might wish to make should be voluntary.

25. Israel continued to be the only country in the Middle East that possessed nuclear capabilities yet remained outside the Treaty regime. The continued failure to implement the 1995 resolution calling for a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction indicated a lack of political will on the part of the resolution's three sponsors. Despite the efforts of Egypt and the Group of Arab States to work with the facilitator, the planned conference on implementation of that resolution had been unilaterally postponed. His delegation called on the Review Conference to request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to convene such a conference immediately.

26. The success of the Review Conference depended on restoring balance and credibility to the Treaty. The States parties needed to make progress towards a phased timetable for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons by 2025. The 1995 resolution on the Middle East should be implemented. Non-nuclear-weapon States should receive legally binding assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons until such time as those weapons were completely eliminated. The international community should work towards universalization of the Treaty by putting pressure on the States that had not yet acceded to it. States parties to the Treaty should have no restrictions on their right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy as long as they complied with their obligations, and the provisions of the Treaty should not be reinterpreted in ways that infringed on that right. The

world would be all that more secure if States felt that their rights were being respected.

27. **Mr. de Brum** (Marshall Islands) said that, for far too many years, the participants in the circular negotiations on nuclear non-proliferation had failed to listen closely to the several nations and peoples that had experienced nuclear weapons directly, such as the *Hibakusha* from Japan, with whom his country stood in close solidarity. The nuclear tests conducted by the United States in the Marshall Islands when that country was a United Nations Trust Territory, with the explicit authorization of the United Nations pursuant to Trusteeship resolutions 1082, adopted in 1954, and 1493, adopted in 1956, despite the objections of the Marshallese people, had created lasting impacts on the Marshall Islands. Those tests were not only a historical reality, but a source of that country's contemporary struggle for basic human rights. Because no one ever considered the humanitarian impacts of nuclear weapons, the Marshallese people still carried a burden that no other people or nation should ever have to bear.

28. The serious shortfalls in the Treaty's implementation not only included legal gaps, but also a failure to address the incontrovertible human rights clarified by the outcomes of the recent conferences on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, held in Norway, Mexico and Austria. An overwhelming global majority agreed that the humanitarian dimension of disarmament must be the strongest centrepiece of multilateral assurance. It should be the States parties' collective goal to not only stop the spread of nuclear weapons, but also truly achieve the peace and security of a world without them. For that reason, the Marshall Islands served as a co-agent in an action presently before the International Court of Justice on the topic of nuclear weapons. After decades of diplomacy, the Treaty's defining purpose remained unfulfilled and those who were unwilling to negotiate in good faith would be held accountable.

29. Still, his country lent its support to the recent provisional negotiations which opened doors to a framework approach that would prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons. If those negotiations were completed they would prove that multilateral negotiation could still help in averting nuclear danger.

30. While it was true that the world had slowly reduced the number of nuclear weapons, no one could argue that 16,000 nuclear weapons were an appropriate

threshold for global safety. No nation had a right to indefinite possession of nuclear weapons. At the current meeting, States parties needed to adopt legal approaches to pursuing effective measures on disarmament, even if that meant adopting a new legal framework for the time-bound elimination of weapons and risks, with good-faith parameters and meaningful participation from all necessary nuclear actors.

31. The action plan contained in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference was an important benchmark, but it revealed serious shortcomings in implementation which could not merely be rolled over without consequence. States parties had a valid right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy only if they complied with the highest standards of safety and security. They must be held to full account for violations or abuse of withdrawal provisions and should affirm that the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty was vital to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and should enter into force.

32. Lastly, all relevant States parties must take the necessary measures to bring about the entry into force of agreements establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones. Support by the Marshall Islands for a nuclear-free Pacific had long been clouded by other agreements. His Government was encouraged that the United States had provided a new perspective on the protocols to the Rarotonga Treaty and again expressed its aspirations to join with its Pacific neighbours in that endeavour.

33. **Mr. Li Baodong** (China) said that the 2015 Review Conference was of historical significance, as that year marked the seventieth anniversary of the founding of the United Nations and the end of the Second World War, and the forty-fifth anniversary of the entry into force of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. A key component of the post-world war international security system, the Treaty had made an important contribution to upholding international peace, security and stability. Although the overall international security situation had been peaceful and stable, the international and regional security landscape was changing rapidly and uncertainties and destabilizing factors had remained prominent. States parties had a responsibility to promote global nuclear governance and further enhance the universality, authority and effectiveness of the Treaty.

34. To uphold peace and stability, it was important to pursue the ongoing trend of peace and development,

uphold universal security, abandon the outdated cold war mentality and the zero-sum game, increase strategic mutual trust and cooperation, and reduce uncertainties and destabilizing factors in global security. To promote equality and justice, both nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear weapon States must shoulder the responsibility of promoting global nuclear governance in a way that served the common interests of all parties. It was also important to advocate a nuclear culture of win-win cooperation and build a common destiny with the extensive involvement of and mutual accommodation among Governments, international and regional organizations and non-governmental groups.

35. China needed a peaceful and stable international environment to achieve the bicentennial goals for its development and realize its dream of a great national rejuvenation. A staunch champion for the nuclear disarmament process, his country stood for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, having faithfully fulfilled its nuclear disarmament obligations under the Treaty. It firmly opposed the proliferation of nuclear weapons in any form and worked for the diplomatic resolution of regional hot-spot nuclear issues.

36. Lastly, China had recently ratified the Protocol to the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty. It actively promoted and upheld the legitimate rights of all countries to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and vigorously promoted international cooperation in that regard. His country stood ready to collaborate with other States parties on a thorough review of the implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to identify the focus and priorities for the work in the next five years on the basis of the 2010 Review Conference action plan so as to generate further political momentum for the Treaty.

37. **Ms. Anelay** (United Kingdom) said that her country remained committed to the full implementation of the action plan contained in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference, even though some of the actions would take longer to implement than others. The United Kingdom remained committed to step-by-step disarmament and to its obligations under article VI of the Treaty. It had reduced the number of warheads on each of its deployed ballistic missile submarines from 48 to 40 and the number of operational missiles on each of those submarines to no more than eight. As a result, the United Kingdom had no more than 120 operationally available warheads and its overall

warhead stockpile could be no more than 180 by the mid-2020s.

38. Her Government acknowledged that, despite significant reductions in global warhead numbers since the end of the cold war, there was frustration at the perceived slow pace of disarmament. That frustration had been expressed at a number of international conferences devoted to the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, where participants had argued vigorously about the devastating humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons. However, that concern was not new, as it was enshrined in the Treaty itself and informed her Government's approach to non-proliferation and disarmament and its deterrence doctrine.

39. Disarmament could not be achieved too hastily without taking into account the wider security concerns, as that could jeopardize the achievements of the Treaty and undermine its future. As a case in point, the unilateral reductions of the United Kingdom had not always encouraged other nuclear-weapon States to follow suit or influenced States seeking a nuclear weapons capability to abandon their quest. Her Government would therefore retain a credible and effective minimum nuclear deterrent for as long as the global security situation made that necessary.

40. Nonetheless, her delegation stood ready to negotiate in good faith and would continue to work towards building a world without nuclear weapons. It was for that reason that the United Kingdom was making parallel progress on the building blocks for global nuclear disarmament. It had signed and ratified the Protocol to the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty and hosted the sixth Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Nuclear-Weapon States, held in London on 4 and 5 February 2015.

41. With regard to non-proliferation, her Government would continue to support the efforts of the International Atomic Energy Agency to ascertain whether States were in compliance with all their obligations under the Treaty. The United Kingdom, along with China, France, the United States, the Russian Federation and Germany had agreed with Iran the key parameters of a comprehensive agreement on that country's nuclear programme, which would help reassure the international community of the exclusively peaceful nature of that programme. The aim was to finalize the agreement by the end of June 2015. Iran should cooperate fully with the Agency to resolve the

outstanding issues, including in relation to possible military dimensions.

42. Her Government deplored the ongoing nuclear activities of North Korea and its threat of a fourth nuclear test, and was concerned at the failure by Syria to remedy its non-compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Furthermore, the United Kingdom supported the 1995 resolution on the Middle East and the goal of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in that region. It regretted that a conference on the establishment of such a zone had not been held, and hoped that it would be held soon.

43. Although any State had the right to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty in accordance with article X thereof, the current Review Conference should agree on a set of principles to prevent abuse of that right. All States parties had an inalienable right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, provided that they were in compliance with their obligations. The United Kingdom was also willing to help any State to develop safe and secure civil nuclear energy.

44. **Mr. Della Vedova** (Italy) said that the 2010 action plan was a valid basis on which to conduct future deliberations. Italy shared the concern about the catastrophic consequences of the use of nuclear weapons, and therefore believed that effective, verifiable and irreversible nuclear disarmament should be pursued through a step-by-step approach. In that connection, it was organizing a workshop on nuclear weapons and human security through the prism of international law, to be held on 18 June 2015. Italy was also a member of the Group of Governmental Experts on a treaty to ban the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; negotiations on that treaty should commence promptly in the Conference on Disarmament. Moreover, Italy supported the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification and contributed to the International Monitoring System under the Test-Ban Treaty. It also supported the strengthening of the IAEA safeguards system, including by developing the State-level concept.

45. The parameters that had been established for a joint comprehensive plan of action on the Iranian nuclear programme following an agreement between the five permanent members of the Security Council and Germany on the one hand, and Iran on the other were welcome. The role of IAEA in the implementation of a comprehensive final agreement

and in dealing with the possible military dimensions of the programme would be crucial.

46. Nuclear-weapon-free zones were of vital importance for peace and security. In that regard, Italy supported the establishment of a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction, and all States should work to ensure that the conference to establish such a zone took place, although it was primarily the responsibility of countries in the region. Similarly, Italy had supported the Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety and its parliament had just authorized the ratification of the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. Italy would also organize a high-level event entitled “The Nuclear Security Summit 2016 and Beyond: the Role of Training and Support Centres, and Centres of Excellence”, to be held in Bologna on 7 and 8 May 2015. In the area of training, the International School on Nuclear Security in Trieste provided professionals with knowledge of the international legal framework on nuclear security.

47. Lastly, Italy had programmes in place to decommission nuclear plants and manage radioactive waste, and had cooperated with the United States to remove excess highly enriched uranium and separated plutonium from the country. The TAPIRO fast neutron source research reactor played a strategic role in nuclear physics, fission, fusion and aerospace programmes. The Italian nuclear energy agency was also participating in the IAEA Ocean Acidification International Coordination Centre, and the synchrotron accelerator at the National Centre for Oncological Hadron Therapy was being used to treat tumours that were resistant to conventional radiation therapy.

48. **Mr. Beshimov** (Kyrgyzstan), speaking also on behalf of Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, said that the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty was an important step towards strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime, developing partnerships for peaceful uses of nuclear energy and reinforcing regional and international peace and security. The States parties to that Treaty welcomed the signing of the Protocol to the Treaty on the provision of negative security assurances by the five nuclear-weapon States and its ratification by France, the United Kingdom, the Russian Federation and China, and hoped that the United States would complete the ratification process soon. Under that Treaty, the States parties agreed unconditionally

not to allow the production, acquisition, distribution, storage or use of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices on their territory.

49. The establishment of the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone was an important step towards encouraging partnerships for the peaceful use of nuclear energy and the ecological rehabilitation of territories which had experienced radioactive contamination. It was also an effective contribution to the effort to combat international nuclear terrorism and to prevent nuclear materials and technology from falling into the hands of non-State actors, especially terrorists. A multilateral agreement to prevent illegal trafficking of nuclear materials and combat nuclear terrorism in Central Asia was also being drafted.

50. Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan called on the nuclear-weapon States that had not yet done so to ratify the Protocol as soon as possible in order to finalize the institutional legalization of the zone and to significantly raise the level of mutual trust and security in Central Asia. The Protocol represented a substantial contribution by the five Central Asian States and the five nuclear-weapon States to the process of nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

51. **Mr. Shin** Dong-ik (Republic of Korea) said that the recent agreement between the five permanent members of the Security Council and Germany on the one hand, and Iran on the other regarding the parameters for a joint comprehensive plan of action should become a model for successful diplomacy geared to achieving non-proliferation when finalized in June 2015. However, other events, including nuclear testing and ballistic missile launches by North Korea, had undermined global non-proliferation efforts. Similarly, the conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction had not taken place, and there remained a considerable gap between the views of nuclear-weapon States and those of non-nuclear-weapon States in the area of nuclear disarmament.

52. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was not just another treaty. It was the foundation of international peace and security and united all States parties in the common cause of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Its integrity and legitimacy must therefore be maintained. The current Review Conference should send a clear message that instances of nuclear proliferation could not

be tolerated and that withdrawal from the Treaty should be given serious consideration during or after every violation. It was also important to strengthen the IAEA safeguards system by universalizing the additional protocols. In that regard, there was a need for a holistic approach to promote synergy between nuclear security, nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation.

53. Further steps could be taken by nuclear-weapon States to progress towards nuclear disarmament, and the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty was long overdue. The Republic of Korea would soon host the Group of Eminent Persons of the Test-Ban Treaty as part of its contribution to the promotion of the early entry into force of that Treaty, and welcomed the report of the Group of Governmental Experts on a treaty banning the production of fissile material, for which negotiations should start immediately.

54. As the world's fifth-largest nuclear energy producer, the Republic of Korea attached great importance to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, especially assured fuel supply and spent fuel management. While complying with its non-proliferation obligations, his country wished to play a leading role in promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy. As a former recipient and current donor to the Technical Cooperation Programme of the International Atomic Energy Agency, his country wished to share the benefits of nuclear energy with the international community, and had contributed more than \$5 million to the Agency's Peaceful Uses Initiative during the current review cycle.

55. North Korea continued to violate its international non-proliferation obligations. As the self-proclaimed youngest nuclear-weapon State, it had a national agenda that called for the simultaneous pursuit of nuclear weapons and economic development. In the Conference on Disarmament, North Korea had even announced that it had the capability to launch a pre-emptive nuclear strike, a policy that violated Security Council resolutions and the Non-Proliferation Treaty and should not be tolerated. The international community would never grant any status to a country that was known for the most blatant instance of nuclear proliferation. History had demonstrated that its mindless pursuit of nuclear weapons had failed, especially when that was combined with violations of humanitarian and human rights norms. The future of North Korea lay not in the weapons of the past but in heeding the call of the international community to reverse its course, return to

the Non-Proliferation Treaty and IAEA safeguards system, and comply with its international obligations.

56. **Mr. Ashikbayev** (Kazakhstan) said that it was vitally important that States parties should make tangible progress in reducing nuclear weapons with the ultimate goal of totally eliminating them. His Government was concerned by the large number of remaining nuclear weapons, as well as their continued central role in the security and defence doctrines of nuclear-weapon States. It therefore proposed that the international community should adopt a universal declaration on the achievement of a nuclear weapon free world as the first step towards a convention on nuclear weapons. It was convinced that non-nuclear-weapon States had the legitimate right to receive legal security assurances from nuclear-weapon States not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against them. In the face of the deteriorating international situation and breakdown in trust, it was critical that States parties should reaffirm the basic principles of international law, such as the peaceful settlement of disputes, refraining from the use of or threat of the use of force, territorial integrity and the inviolability of borders.

57. Kazakhstan called for the universalization of the Treaty in order to strengthen it and render it truly effective. Formulating clear mechanisms to discourage withdrawal from the Treaty was essential. It also called on all States which had yet to sign or ratify the Treaty to do so without any preconditions or delays. A voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing was not an effective alternative to a legally binding treaty. In order for the Treaty to be an effective mechanism for non-proliferation, all States must show the political will and provide the necessary resources to complete the verification regime under the Test-Ban Treaty and maximize the capabilities of the Provisional Technical Secretariat.

58. His Government called on all States to observe the International Day against Nuclear Tests, which it had initiated. It also expressed deep concern over the nuclear tests conducted by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and urged that State to fully comply with its obligations under Security Council resolutions and return to the Six-Party Talks. It recognized the significance of a fissile material cut-off treaty, which, together with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, would undoubtedly strengthen the non-proliferation regime.

59. States parties should exercise strong political will to negotiate a fissile material cut-off treaty and to bring the

Test-Ban Treaty into effect. Strict implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) was of special importance. Kazakhstan had suffered first-hand from the devastation of nuclear tests, which had led it to eliminate its nuclear weapons and dismantle all related infrastructure on its territory. It encouraged further deliberations on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons in order to give a powerful new impetus to States parties' common efforts to achieve a total ban on nuclear testing and eliminate those deadly weapons.

60. Nuclear-weapon-free zones played a major role in strengthening non-proliferation and global security, which had been the main reason why the countries of Central Asia had established a regional nuclear-weapon-free zone. Kazakhstan welcomed the signing by the five nuclear-weapon States of the Protocol to the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty and its subsequent ratifications by France, the United Kingdom and the Russian Federation. It urged the remaining signatories to complete their ratification processes as soon as possible.

61. His Government noted with regret the failure to implement the 2010 Review Conference decision to convene a conference on the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. It urged all concerned parties to demonstrate strong political will and convene a conference as soon as possible, and strongly believed that the establishment of such a zone would provide a good basis for dialogue and facilitate peace, cooperation and mutual trust in the Middle East.

62. Kazakhstan supported the universal implementation of IAEA safeguards agreements and additional protocols and called upon all other States to sign them. It planned to develop a civil nuclear energy programme; highly valued its work with IAEA and was enhancing its cooperation with the Agency through voluntary contributions to its Nuclear Security Fund and Peaceful Uses Initiative. It was important that States developing civil nuclear programmes should have indiscriminate access to nuclear fuel sources in a predictable and sustainable manner. To that end, Kazakhstan was committed to hosting the IAEA low enriched uranium bank and intended to conclude a host country agreement in that regard in 2015. The bank would not limit in any way each country's inalienable right to develop its own nuclear technology, including the full nuclear cycle.

63. Kazakhstan welcomed the progress made towards achieving an agreement between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the six international mediators to resolve the issue of the Iranian nuclear programme. It had made a practical contribution to the negotiation process by providing a platform for two rounds of talks in 2013 and hoped that the political will of the participating countries would be maintained and a comprehensive agreement would be signed within the agreed timeframe. By giving up its nuclear status and closing its Semipalatinsk testing site, Kazakhstan had shown that it was a consistent supporter of the global non-proliferation and disarmament process and the multilateral approach to resolving global security issues.

64. **Mr. Ulyanov** (Russian Federation) said that his country was consistently fulfilling all the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, including article VI, and that it had reduced its nuclear arsenal to minimal levels, which was a significant contribution to general and complete disarmament. It planned to continue working towards that goal and maintaining a balance between exploring peaceful uses of nuclear energy and strengthening the non-proliferation regime, including through the IAEA safeguards system. It was in the interests of all States parties to maintain and strengthen the Treaty regime. The current Review Conference was tasked with confirming all States parties' commitment to the Treaty's goals and their obligations under it on the basis of the 2010 action plan. The consensus provisions stipulated in the plan must be fulfilled. The Russian Federation hoped that new decisions would be adopted during the current Review Conference to develop that document.

65. The Russian Federation was firmly committed to nuclear disarmament, as evidenced by its consistent fulfilment of its obligations under the New START Treaty. His Government's current priority was reaching the 2018 carrier and warhead levels stipulated in that Treaty. It was ready to discuss disarmament matters, but only in a serious atmosphere without double standards. Such a discussion could only be truly fruitful when, and if, its participants were guided strictly by the fundamental principle of undiminished security for all. Yet, the Russian Federation was observing the exact opposite trend, which was detrimental to the prospects of nuclear disarmament work. States parties had a collective challenge to overcome that threat.

66. It was regrettable that the conference on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East had not yet been convened as planned, despite significant efforts by various States, including the Russian Federation. However, establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in that region remained a priority; it was therefore important to continue working towards urgently convening that conference, particularly since both Arab countries and Israel had demonstrated their readiness to work constructively to that end.

67. The Russian Federation had ratified the Protocol to the Central Asia Nuclear-Free-Zone Treaty and hoped to sign the Protocol to the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Free-Zone Treaty in the near future. Given the latest positive developments in the negotiations on the Iranian nuclear programme, his delegation believed that it would be possible to reach a comprehensive, universal agreement by the 30 June 2015 deadline, which would constitute an important milestone in the history of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. It was pleased that the principles of phasing and reciprocity proposed by the Russian Federation had been at the heart of the discussions and that the right of all States, including Iran, to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, including uranium enrichment, under strict and effective international control, had been recognized.

68. The Russian Federation was deeply concerned, however, about a number of aspects of United States policy related to the strategic stability of nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. Although the United States had expressed its willingness to negotiate a one-third reduction of its deployed nuclear warheads, it claimed that the Russian Federation was hindering that process. In reality, the most serious obstacle to further nuclear disarmament was the United States policy, which objectively undermined global strategic stability through its unilateral establishment of a global missile defence system, the development of its Prompt Global Strike initiative, its opposition to the start of negotiations on the ban on placing weapons in outer space, and its complete lack of progress in the ratification of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

69. The United States had again accused the Russian Federation of violating the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, but refused to, or more likely, was not able to, corroborate those accusations with concrete facts. His delegation believed that the United States was trying to discredit the Russian Federation and to portray it as a State in violation of its international obligations,

while detracting from its overly loose interpretation of the provisions of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty that impeded the development of weapons it considered important. Many questions had arisen regarding its test use of missile drones, which had features similar to short- and medium-range missiles. Moreover, for many years, the United States had produced and used unmanned combat aerial vehicles, which were obviously classified as land-based cruise missiles under that Treaty.

70. The Russian Federation had often declared its commitment to its obligations under the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and all other effective international agreements to which it was a party. It was already prepared to discuss and dispel the other party's or parties' concerns, but was unlikely to find a subject for a professional discussion with a party that made accusations without any factual basis and that gave the appearance of credibility by making references to so-called reliable confidential sources. A testament to the credibility of those sources was the memorable incident of the myth of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction.

71. While accusing others of not complying with their obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the United States forgot that its own record in that area was far from ideal. Articles 1 and 2 of the Treaty were violated in the framework of collective nuclear missions of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), during which military personnel from non-nuclear States received nuclear-weapon-related training and participated in the process of nuclear planning. His delegation called on the United States and relevant NATO members to comply with the Treaty and cease their violations. He hoped that the work of the Review Conference would henceforth take place in a non-confrontational atmosphere and would ultimately be productive.

72. **Ms. Higgie** (New Zealand), speaking on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition, said that the Coalition championed the cause of nuclear disarmament owing to the threat posed by nuclear weapons; only the complete elimination of those weapons could avert a nuclear weapon detonation and the attendant catastrophic humanitarian consequences. The Coalition was committed to all three pillars of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. However, while the non-proliferation pillar had worked well in limiting the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons and the non-proliferation provisions and obligations under the Treaty had been

strengthened, the commitments under the disarmament pillar remained unfulfilled.

73. Positive developments since the 2010 Review Conference included the implementation of the New START Treaty and the signing by all nuclear-weapon States of the Protocol to the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty. However, those developments fell short of the obligations set forth in article VI and did not pave the way for negotiations in good faith on effective measures for nuclear disarmament, nor did they signal implementation of action 5 on nuclear disarmament in the 2010 action plan. The Coalition did not share the view that the action plan was a roadmap for long-term action, particularly if that was intended to imply deferment of the completion or even the commencement of some of the actions in the near term. The New Agenda Coalition could not accept the failure to advance article VI or the lack of progress in the elimination of nuclear-weapon States' nuclear arsenals.

74. The reluctance of nuclear-weapon States to fulfil their legal obligations with respect to nuclear disarmament was evidenced by their attempts to defend the modernization of nuclear arsenals and to praise the purported effectiveness of nuclear deterrence, and by the indefinite entrenchment of nuclear weapons in the military budgets and security doctrines of those States. The Coalition wondered when it would no longer be credible to overlook the failure to implement that core provision of the Treaty.

75. According to the evidence presented at the three international conferences on the humanitarian impact of the use of nuclear weapons, growing urban populations and the greater destructive power of nuclear weapons had amplified the potential health and environmental effects of a nuclear weapon detonation, which would be felt across borders and would disproportionately affect women and children. The evidence had also shown that neither States nor international agencies had the capacity to respond to such an event, and that the risks of an accident, human error or system failure involving nuclear weapons were greater than previously suspected. States parties should therefore pursue the disarmament objectives of article VI and make the 2015 Review Conference a turning point in nuclear disarmament. To reduce the risk of accidental or intentional nuclear weapon detonations, the operational readiness of nuclear weapon systems should be reduced and transparency should be

increased through regular reporting to enable the international community to monitor the implementation of disarmament commitments.

76. Most States were already part of nuclear-weapon-free zones and the initiative by Indonesia to convene the third Conference of States Parties and Signatories to Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Mongolia was commendable. Such zones should also be established in places where they did not already exist, in particular the Middle East. The universality of the Non-Proliferation Treaty was vitally important and India, Israel and Pakistan should join the Treaty promptly and unconditionally as non-nuclear-weapon States. Furthermore, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea should verifiably dismantle its nuclear weapons, return to the Treaty and place all its facilities under the IAEA verification system.

77. Lastly, a selective approach to the implementation of the Treaty's provisions weakened the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime, reinforced inequalities under the Treaty and undermined its credibility. All States parties should use the Review Conference to build a comprehensive, legally binding mechanism for achieving and maintaining a world free of nuclear weapons, whether through the negotiation of a stand-alone agreement or through a framework of mutually supportive instruments, with clearly defined benchmarks and timelines backed by a verification system.

78. **Mr. Labbé Villa** (Chile) said that his country supported general and comprehensive disarmament within the framework of a transparent and democratic multilateral debate and the principle of the indivisibility of international security, based on its belief that all countries, regardless of size or power, had a responsibility to contribute to the consolidation of an international order based on cooperation and the rule of law. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was a central component of that international order but, regrettably, rather than eliminating their nuclear arsenals, nuclear-weapon States had even been modernizing them at great cost, at a time when the post-2015 development agenda was about to be adopted. Those States must eliminate their nuclear weapons in a transparent, verifiable and irreversible manner in order to fulfil their commitments under article VI and thereby boost the political legitimacy of the Treaty regime.

79. All avenues leading to nuclear disarmament were valid and should be followed. His country was therefore working as a member of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative to advance the cause of nuclear disarmament and to implement the action plan adopted by consensus in 2010. It was also working with other members of the De-Alerting Group to reduce the operational readiness of nuclear weapon systems. Chile also supported the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and urged Annex 2 countries that had yet to ratify that Treaty to do so. His country was also committed to the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency and had signed a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol to that agreement. It also welcomed the progress made in negotiations between the five permanent members of the Security Council and Germany, on the one hand, and Iran on the other regarding the Iranian nuclear programme.

80. States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty had the inalienable right to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, subject to the provisions of that Treaty. Internationally recognized and verifiable zones free of nuclear weapons constituted a political and legal commitment made by a majority of States Members of the United Nations as a means of advancing towards the ideal of a world free of nuclear weapons. Education for peace, disarmament and non-proliferation would rid the world not only of nuclear weapons but also of the desire to possess them, and would consolidate a culture of peace.

81. Lastly, Chile was located on the so-called Pacific ring of fire and thus knew all too well the impact of disasters such as the recent earthquake in Nepal, which had highlighted how difficult it was to help the victims of such large-scale disasters. Those difficulties were nevertheless tiny in comparison with the impact of any use of nuclear weapons. Such use would violate the principle of differentiation between combatants and non-combatants, the principle of proportionality and that of not causing irreversible damage to the environment. A new and binding legal instrument was needed to prevent such weapons from being used under any circumstances.

The meeting rose at 6 p.m.