

GENERAL  
ASSEMBLY

SIXTH SESSION

Official Records

DOCUMENTS  
INDEX UNIT

MA



27 FEB 1952

Friday, 11 January 1952, at 3.25 p.m.

Palais de Chaillot, Paris

MTD 5

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Chairman : Mr. Manfred LACHS (Poland).

**Report of the International Law Commission covering the work of its third session (A/1858), including :**  
**(a) Question of defining aggression (chapter III)**  
**(continued)**

[Item 49 (b)]\*

1. Mr. ITURRALDE (Bolivia), continuing the speech he had begun at the preceding meeting, recalled that, though instructed by resolution 378 B (V) of the General Assembly to examine the question of defining aggression and the draft resolution submitted by the USSR<sup>1</sup>, the International Law Commission had not studied the USSR proposal and had even felt doubts as to the true nature of its instructions. Thus, its work on that subject had not produced any definite result. Nevertheless it had attempted to give a definition of indirect aggression as was proved by paragraph 47 of its report (A/1858)<sup>2</sup>. Paragraph 48 of that report explained that the definition proposed by Mr. Alfaro had been modified, and paragraph 49 gave the final text of that definition. In spite of their efforts, the members of the Commission had not succeeded in reaching agreement on that text. For practical purposes, the result had been the same, because the Commission had voted for a text which would be included in the draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind and which, according to paragraph 53 of the report, was based on the definition proposed by Mr. Scelle.

2. The representative of Greece (279th meeting) had said that to produce a definition of aggression would only be a waste of time and that there was no need for that crime to be defined. Mr. Iturralde noted, however, that the International Law Commission had prepared a draft code (A/1858, chapter IV) which contained a list of aggressive acts. That draft did define aggression, because article 2, paragraph (1), provided that the use of armed force in certain circumstances constituted an act of aggression. If, instead of beginning with the words "The following acts are offences against the peace and security of mankind", article 2 had begun with the

words "The following acts are acts of aggression", the contents of the article would not have been affected, and it would have been impossible to say that no definition of aggression was available. The International Law Commission had, then, enumerated a number of aggressive acts which it had described as offences, but that enumeration was tantamount to a definition of aggression.

3. It was claimed by some that no abstract definition of aggression could be given because of the danger of ignoring a number of important aspects of the concept. The Charter, however, defined all acts of force that were contrary to its provisions by laying down the circumstances in which resort to force was permissible. In his opinion, aggression could be defined in the same way—by describing a number of acts, that is to say, by listing a limited number of presumptions which would enable the Security Council to speed up its examination of a given situation and which perhaps might also make it possible to avoid both the obstacle of the veto and lengthy discussions in the General Assembly. In cases of aggression, it was important to act quickly, and the existence of the presumptions could help to secure such speed of action. The same was true in domestic law, in which presumptions could be overthrown only by evidence to the contrary. A State could not be allowed in the exercise of self-defence to adopt measures out of proportion to the danger by which it was threatened. The preparation of an aggression by a particular country was not sufficient justification for another country to invade it. The Charter defended territorial integrity; and every act which ran counter to that principle was an act of aggression. The existence of presumptions did not mean that it would no longer be for the judge to assess the subjective element in criminal acts; but it was the objective action which counted.

4. He then considered the draft resolutions that had been submitted to the Sixth Committee. In his view, the USSR draft (A/C.6/L.208) had some excellent fea-

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 72, document A/C.1/608.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, Sixth Session, Supplement No. 9.

\* Indicates the item number on the General Assembly agenda.

tures. In many respects it was in line with international tradition. The second part of the draft enumerated the grounds which could not serve as an excuse for aggression. A definition of that kind would certainly not deter an aggressor, but it provided a guarantee that in certain definite cases the aggressor would have to deal not only with his victim but also with the whole of the international community. He regretted, however, that the draft resolution made no provision for possible decisions by the General Assembly and the Security Council, and did not state whether, in the cases referred to, sanctions would automatically be imposed.

5. Bolivia had already submitted several draft definitions of aggression, and in particular the one which, at the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace, held at Chapultepec in 1945, had served as a basis for the definition appearing in article 9 of the Rio de Janeiro Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance of 1947. Bolivia had also submitted a draft definition of aggression at the San Francisco Conference<sup>3</sup>; and the discussion of the matter, which had then been deferred, was being resumed and the same arguments were reappearing. Those who believed that a definition was possible were determined to find one. Those who did not want a definition were saying that to define aggression would be to limit the freedom of action of the Security Council as provided for in Article 39 of the Charter. In his view, it was necessary that acts of aggression should be listed. If that were done, the Security Council might increase the speed of its discussions and the General Assembly would avoid protracted debate. As the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom had pointed out, there might in some cases be a possibility of punitive action being taken prematurely, but in Mr. Iturralde's opinion, no one could object to sanctions of that kind if there had been a violation of the Charter.

6. The Bolivian delegation proposed to submit to the Committee a draft resolution (A/C.6/L.211), which he read. He drew the attention of the members of the Committee to action taken by a State to incite the people of another State to rebellion, as referred to in paragraph 2. That point was not included in the draft resolution submitted by the USSR (A/C.6/L.208). He was in full agreement with the representative of the United Kingdom, who had pointed out at the Committee's 281st meeting that the USSR proposal took only one aspect of the matter into account and made no mention of indirect aggression. At the present day, however, it was possible, without occupying a country militarily, to enslave it by attacking its political integrity, and that was certainly a case of aggression. In his opinion, it was also possible to control the will of another State by depriving it of the economic resources which the structure of its economy required. Such economic aggression was intolerable and the result was the same as in the case of armed invasion.

7. The Bolivian delegation would be glad if its draft resolution were adopted. It would at any rate like to see the draft used as a working paper when further efforts to describe aggression were made. The task might be a long one, as had been seen in the case of the attempt to define aggression within the Organization of American States.

8. Mr. AMADO (Brazil) noted that, by referring the question of defining aggression to the International Law Commission in its resolution 378 B (V), the General Assembly had reopened an old controversy, the distinction between *bellum justum* and *bellum injustum*.

9. Article 39 of the Charter, like article 15 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, had not attempted to define aggression and had left it to the Security Council to determine the existence of acts of aggression. He recalled the League of Nations' attempts to solve the problem within the framework of conventional international law.

10. The criteria adopted in article 10 of the 1924 Geneva Protocol on the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes and in the 1933 London Conventions<sup>4</sup> represented the two trends of thought on the problem, in favour of either an abstract, general definition, or a rigid, casuistic definition consisting in an enumeration of acts of aggression.

11. A completely different approach had been made to the problem at the Disarmament Conference in London in 1933. Mr. Litvinov had attempted to draw up a list of *de facto* situations constituting aggression,<sup>5</sup> claiming that aggressive war could be defined by means of one of the acts enumerated. Another list set out the circumstances which could not be invoked to justify the use of force. After revision, the Litvinov proposal led up to the "Act defining the aggressor", a formula devised by Mr. Politis,<sup>6</sup> which sought to define aggression in such a way as to leave no room for doubt in the event of an international conflict. Under that formula, the aggressor was determined automatically. It had not been adopted by the Disarmament Conference owing to the opposition of a number of delegations. During the World Monetary and Economic Conference held in London the same year, however, the USSR had concluded agreements with a number of adjacent countries, embodying the Litvinov-Politis definition.

12. The Brazilian delegation considered the method of definition by enumeration to be dangerous, as particular cases of aggression might be omitted. A system confined to cases of flagrant aggression could not be applied to all situations because of the complexity of international relations.

13. Moreover, the enumeration contained in the casuistic definition proposed by the USSR (A/C.6/L.208) was based on the territorial criterion, the decisive fact in determining aggression being the violation of the national territory of one State by the armed forces of another State; that criterion, however, was of doubtful value when the contending States all claimed *de facto* authority over the territory in question.

14. At the San Francisco Conference, the attempts of the Philippine<sup>7</sup> and Bolivian delegations to embody a definition of aggression in the Charter had failed. He recalled that at the Sixth Committee's 282nd meeting, the United States representative had quoted a passage from Mr. Paul-Boncour's report to Committee 3 of the Third Commission of the Conference.

15. Article 9 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reci-

<sup>3</sup> See Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization, vol. III, pages 578, 579 and 585.

<sup>4</sup> See League of Nations, Treaty Series, vol. CXLVII, No. 3391 and vol. CXLVIII, Nos. 3405 and 3414.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, Minutes of the General Commission, Series B, vol. II, page 237.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, Documents of the Conference, vol. II, p. 683.

<sup>7</sup> See Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization, vol. III, p. 538.

procal Assistance contained a formal definition of aggression, which covered only unprovoked armed attack by a State against the territory, the people, or the land, sea or air forces of another State, and invasion of that territory by foreign forces, the determination of other acts of aggression being left to the Organ of Consultation of the Inter-American System. That definition was still more incomplete than that contained in the London Conventions, as it omitted declarations of war, blockade, and support to armed bands with a view to the invasion of the territory of another State.

16. At the fifth session of the General Assembly, during the discussion on the item entitled "Duties of States in the event of the outbreak of hostilities", the Yugoslav delegation had proposed a solution of the problem<sup>8</sup> which introduced an entirely new criterion. The Yugoslav draft resolution differed both from the flexible general definition contained in the Geneva Protocol and from the casuistic definition contained in the London Conventions. It rejected subjective criteria and introduced an empirical criterion, laying down that a State would automatically and immediately be declared an aggressor if it became engaged in armed conflict with another State or States and did not make a public statement, not later than twenty-four hours after the outbreak of hostilities, proclaiming its readiness, provided that the State or States with which it was in conflict did the same, to discontinue all military operations. Several delegations had pointed out at that time that such a criterion would deprive the Security Council of the powers conferred upon it by Article 39 of the Charter. When the Yugoslav draft resolution was finally approved, the General Assembly, rejecting its most important provision, had decided that the Yugoslav criterion could be accepted only as a supplementary criterion to assist the competent organs of the United Nations to determine cases of aggression.

17. Lastly, in pursuance of a USSR proposal to define aggression by means of an enumeration of acts of aggression, the question had been referred to the International Law Commission. He recalled that the Commission had already studied the problem at its second session, when considering the question of a draft code of offences against the peace and security of mankind. Even at that early date, Mr. Spiropoulos had shown himself sceptical as to the possibility of defining aggression. As the Greek representative had pointed out, Mr. Spiropoulos was merely adopting the attitude which had been taken up by General Nikitchenko, the USSR representative at the International Conference on Military Trials held at London in 1945, since the theory that aggression was a "natural notion", a "concept *per se*" had been defended at that Conference by the USSR delegation, whereas the United States delegation had proposed the adoption of a definition broadly corresponding to that contained in the 1933 London Conventions.

18. At the International Law Commission's third session, Mr. Amado had himself proposed an abstract, general definition embodying the formula he had proposed for incorporation in the draft code of offences against the peace and security of mankind. That formula, which was quoted in paragraph 40 of the International Law Commission's report covering the work of its third session, merely restated the principles contained in the Charter. Sharing the United States representative's conviction that any general definition of aggression contained concepts which themselves

required definition—such as the concept of self-defence—he had been well aware that his definition did not constitute a solution to the problem and was no more than a suggestion which provided an alternative to the method of definition by enumeration which he had always regarded as dangerous. He had always considered that it would be unwise to depart from the Charter by defining aggression; in the International Law Commission, therefore, he had voted against the text drawn up on the basis of the formulae proposed by Mr. Alfaro and himself, explaining that such a vague definition contributed little to international law and was therefore pointless.

19. He stated that though on that occasion he had expressed regret concerning the sceptical opinion of Mr. Spiropoulos, it had not been because aggression seemed to him a "natural notion" or a "concept *per se*". In his view aggression was a fact, and those who had to bear its consequences could testify to the truth of that statement. The practical impossibility of defining aggression was due to the difficulty of foreseeing and cataloguing all the circumstances which might accompany it in the complex field of international relations, and of determining beforehand all the forms it might take. If in domestic penal law the crime of homicide were defined by enumerating the acts which constituted it, a criminal would be left free to kill by any means not on the list which came into his head. Similarly, at the international level an incomplete definition of aggression would undoubtedly assist future aggressors.

20. Examining the various draft resolutions before the Committee, he pointed out that the USSR draft resolution represented a new version of the Litvinov-Politis definition. An important change was immediately noticeable, namely the addition of a new act of aggression in sub-paragraph 1 (d). The Brazilian delegation did not see the need for that sub-paragraph, as the acts of aggression mentioned therein were already covered by sub-paragraph 1 (b) mentioning the invasion of the territory of a State by the armed forces of another State. In addition, in sub-paragraph 1 (f) the USSR reintroduced the idea of support of armed bands, mentioned in the formula of the London Conventions, which it had excluded from its draft resolution submitted at the fifth session of the General Assembly. The USSR delegation had given no explanation either of the deletion of that category from the draft resolution presented in 1950 or of its inclusion in the new draft. In fact it was justifiable to ask whether that delegation itself was quite sure of the contents of its definition, which nevertheless was supposed to contain an exhaustive and limitative list of acts of aggression. Furthermore the list, which already appeared in the annexes to the London Conventions, of considerations which might not be used as justifications for aggression had been revised and expanded.

21. The USSR draft resolution showed an important omission. In view of paragraph 1 (b) of General Assembly resolution 378 A (V), which was a decision of that Assembly, the USSR draft resolution ought to contain a provision that any State should be declared an aggressor which, having become engaged in armed conflict with another State or States, did not immediately, and in any case not later than twenty-four hours after the outbreak of hostilities, make a public statement wherein it would proclaim its readiness, provided that the State with which it was in conflict would do the same, to discontinue military operations.

<sup>8</sup> See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 72, document A/C.1/604.

22. As he had already indicated, the territorial criterion on which the Litvinov definition was based seemed to him inadequate. Moreover, the United Kingdom representative (281st meeting) had pointed out the dangers of that criterion: for example, if it were applied, the United Kingdom, at the time of the invasion of Poland and in pursuance of obligations incurred under an international treaty, would have been guilty of the offence of aggression by declaring war on Germany, which had not attacked it. The case of Ethiopia and Italy could also be instanced, but a single example strikingly illustrated the dangers of applying that criterion.

23. For all those reasons the Brazilian delegation would vote against the USSR draft resolution.

24. Contrary to what had been said, the American States' definition was not based on the Litvinov-Politis formula. As shown by article 9 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, it combined the criterion of an *a posteriori* declaration by the competent organs and the method of enumeration, the acts of aggression enumerated being of course in the nature of examples. Moreover, the definition given by the American States did not mention the considerations which could not be used as justifications for aggression.

25. He regretted that he could not see the advantages of such a definition. In the first place it was difficult to see the point of enumerating a number of acts of aggression and leaving the definition of others to a competent organ. Secondly, that definition also was based on the territorial criterion, the disadvantages of which he had already shown. Lastly, he thought it slightly selfish of the American States to stress, as the Colombian representative had appeared to do, the need for a definition of aggression in order to enable the American States to take the measures specified in article 6 of the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro—in other words, to ensure the operation of their regional system. Moreover, that need was not evident, since the application of article 6, in the event of a conflict within or outside the American continent, was ensured by the additional provision under which the Organs of Consultation were entitled to characterize as aggression acts other than those mentioned in article 9, paragraphs a and b, of the Treaty.

26. He fully understood the anxiety of those delegations which stressed the need to define aggression. He thought it would not be impossible to adapt the provisions of the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro to the international community, but he continued to believe that any effort to do so would be vain until the prevailing atmosphere of mistrust in the international community was replaced by the harmony which existed between the American States. When the great Powers—and, to be quite frank, the USSR and the United States—had knocked down the walls which separated them, confidence would return and the aggression that was no longer feared could be defined. He was not trying to conceal the facts by words of illusory optimism. The Brazilian delegation considered it untimely in the present circumstances to define aggression. However, it was convinced that efforts to make such a definition possible must be continued. In that spirit it would vote in favour of the draft resolution submitted jointly by France, Iran and Venezuela (A/C.6/L.209).

*Mr. Pérez Perozo (Venezuela) Vice-President, took the chair.*

27. Mr. BARTOS (Yugoslavia) wished to correct an error he had noted in Mr. Amado's statement. The

General Assembly had never had occasion to reject the part of the Yugoslav draft resolution to which Mr. Amado had referred, for the Yugoslav delegation itself had amended the resolution in order to propose the words which had become sub-paragraph 1 (e) of General Assembly resolution 378 A (V).

28. U ZAW WIN (Burma) said he wished to make a few remarks on the question of defining aggression, which would not constitute a legal study but would consist of the humanitarian reflections which the subject suggested to him. He considered the question important in view of the present international atmosphere and the threat of war.

29. He associated himself with those who had paid a tribute to the work of the International Law Commission. He was particularly gratified that the International Law Commission had felt that under resolution 378 B (V) it should try to define aggression. Some thought that the failure of all previous attempts to do so proved that definition was impossible. If it had been impossible however, the majority of the members of the International Law Commission would not have felt called upon to seek for a definition. The situation was not altered by the failure of the Commission to formulate a definition. The United Nations and the peoples of the world needed that definition, which the international developments of the last sixteen months had made more essential than ever. He would not quote documents or give historical references; he would merely appeal to common sense, on which all law was based. He believed that all the members of the Committee feared the consequences of aggression and would be unwilling to encourage a possible aggressor. Hence it was necessary to seek a definition of aggression which, even if not exhaustive, would be applicable to the greatest possible number of cases.

30. He compared the international community to a garden surrounded by a wall to protect it against war. But the wall had been badly built and there were a number of breaches in it through which the marauder, war, broke in from time to time and sowed death and destruction. The marauder had to be prevented from breaking in. The wise men of the community advised closing the breaches, keeping guard at the gates, and coming to the help of those who lived near the gates if the marauder succeeded in breaking them down. That advice had been ignored; there were so many breaches and so many gates that those who lived far from them and believed selfishly that they were in less danger than the others preferred to do nothing. One day, however, three powerful bandits had broken through the wall and caused great damage. Then a union had been formed and the bandits captured. The members of the community had decided to set up an organization to prevent any other bandits from breaking through in future; they had agreed to take measures of collective security to guard the gates. However, they had all felt that the bandits had been put out of action and there were no more marauders outside the walls, and so they had made no genuine efforts to close the breaches.

31. The closing of the breaches was a symbol for the defining of aggression by means of enumeration, and the USSR draft resolution was an attempt, so to speak, to close as many breaches as possible. It had been suggested that an incomplete enumeration might encourage aggression. He did not believe that if the proposed enumeration were adopted an aggressor would be able to escape the consequences of his act. However,

to eliminate any such danger, the list might end with some such phrase as "any other act declared by the competent organ of the United Nations to be aggression".

32. Some representatives had given various examples to prove that an incomplete enumeration would be more dangerous than none at all. It had been said, for example, that if the law prohibited the carrying of firearms in the right-hand pocket, malefactors would carry arms in their left-hand pockets and claim to be within the law but still be just as dangerous. That was not a convincing argument; a wise law would prohibit the carrying of firearms at all, and that would be effective. Hitherto it had been possible to speak of a just war or an unjust war. Since the establishment of the United Nations that had ceased to be so, and force could no longer be considered a means by which a State could compel respect for its rights. Those who gave such examples as that to which he had just referred believed that war was still possible. He could not be convinced by any legal argument based on that hypothesis.

33. Representatives in a committee could say that they "disagreed violently" with other representatives without any very serious consequences, but in other circumstances and in a different sphere a similar reaction led to war and aggression. A State which disagreed with another State must therefore be discouraged from proceeding from "disagreement" to "violence", i. e. aggression. That was why aggression should be defined; if acts of aggression were enumerated a State would hesitate to commit one of them, knowing that by so doing it would put itself outside the pale of the community of nations.

34. The question was whether defining aggression would finally abolish war. The answer was both "yes" and "no". It could be "no" if people acted selfishly, like the inhabitants of the garden of the international community before the attack by the three bandits. It could, however, be "yes" now that the situation had changed and the members of the community had reaffirmed the principle of adopting collective measures. To deny that principle was to assert that the measures just taken by the First Committee (A/C.1/696 and 697) were valueless.

35. If a definition existed, it would be possible to decide more rapidly who was the aggressor. Certain representatives had recalled the reasons for which the San Francisco Conference had declined to formulate a definition; they had said that it would be dangerous because it would sometimes result in the premature application of coercive measures by the Security Council. That, however, had been in 1945, when all danger seemed to have been averted. At the present time everyone knew that the danger was greater than ever and that collective measures must be prepared against a possible aggressor. If the cases in which such measures were to be taken were clearly defined, there would be no danger of their being premature, but they would be taken quickly and therefore effectively. All those in favour of the speedy application of collective measures should vote in favour of the definition of aggression.

36. He thought that the Committee might find in the USSR draft resolution a good starting-point for a definition of aggression. Three principal criticisms had been levelled at the draft resolution: first, the enumeration might omit certain acts; secondly, the definition made no provision for cases of self-defence; lastly, the adoption of a list of acts of aggression might imply a retrospective condemnation of certain acts committed in the past.

37. It would be possible to remedy the first defect by adding at the end of paragraph 1 of the operative part the words: "Any other act declared by the competent organ of the United Nations to be aggression".

38. The second criticism might be met by adding a paragraph providing that acts such as those envisaged in paragraph 1 should be justified when States acted in virtue of the right of self-defence, individual or collective, in the circumstances laid down in Article 51 of the Charter.

39. Lastly, in answer to the third criticism the first sentence of paragraph 1 of the draft resolution could have inserted in it, after the words "international conflict" the words "arising after the adoption of this resolution". Those were as yet mere suggestions and not formal amendments. He reserved the right to refer to the matter again.

40. He wondered whether some members of the international community had not forgotten the three bandits who a few years before had devastated their garden. The friendship which had bound them after the victory seemed to be tottering. He hoped that those who hated and feared war would be in the majority and would decide to close the gaps through which an aggressor might penetrate.

41. Some representatives had asked whether a definition of murder would prevent people from killing each other. He thought that there was less chance of murder if there was a code defining and prohibiting the crime and police to enforce respect for the code. Reference had also been made to the right of any man to fire first when meeting someone who threatened him. That theory was dangerous; it could not in any event be transposed to the international plane, since the Charter of the United Nations had banned the use of force. If no State resorted to force even for self-defence, aggression would disappear.

42. A definition of aggression would help to prevent aggression, and he was therefore in favour of one. The French representative had proposed that the question should be examined in conjunction with the draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind. He was in favour of that proposal but thought the question so urgent that a temporary solution must be found at once. He therefore suggested that the word "immediately" should be inserted in the preamble to the Soviet Union's draft resolution after the words "formulate directives". He also suggested that the words "pending the adoption of an international code of offences against the peace and security of mankind" should be inserted in the preamble after the word "necessary".

43. Mr. MAKOTOS (United States of America), in reply to the Burmese representative, said that he understood the praiseworthy motives which had led U Zaw Win to deal with the matter from the humanitarian point of view, and wished he could adopt a similar attitude. However, he felt that in present international relations it was important not to lose sight of the facts. For that reason he was still convinced that the vague and flexible term "aggression" would be a better means of preventing aggression and, in case of conflict, of determining the aggressor, than an enumeration of acts of aggression. That explained why the United States, which had always favoured collective measures, was opposed to defining aggression.

44. He also made it clear that if the United States found itself in violent disagreement with one or more other

countries because its freedom was threatened, it would be obliged to defend itself by every means, including the use of arms, which could not be regarded as reprehensible in case of self-defence.

45. The CHAIRMAN asked those representatives who wished to speak in the general discussion on the question of defining aggression to place their names on the list of speakers, after which the list would be closed.

46. In addition he announced that he had just heard that the Sixth Committee would be able to meet next morning. That would not prevent representatives from attending the plenary meeting at which the draft resolution on reservations to multilateral conventions would come up for discussion, since it was to take place in the afternoon. He also reminded the members of the Committee that the President of the General Assembly had asked all the Committees to speed up their work.

47. Mr. MAJID ABBAS (Iraq) thought that any undue haste in the Committee's work was bound to impair its quality. It would be better, if lack of time made it necessary, to postpone certain items to the next session rather than study very important matters too hastily

only to reach results which would necessarily be inadequate.

48. Besides the matters of interest to the Sixth Committee, the General Assembly was examining a number of other very important questions at its plenary meetings, and many of the representatives on the Sixth Committee would like to attend.

49. He therefore objected to premature closure of the list of speakers and to the suggestion that the Sixth Committee should meet next morning.

50. After an exchange of views in which Mr. LERENA ACEVEDO (Uruguay), Mr. MOUSSA (Egypt), Mr. URUTIA HOLGUIN (Colombia), Mr. MAKTOS (United States of America) and Mr. KERN (Assistant Secretary-General in Charge of the Legal Department) took part, the CHAIRMAN explained, in reply to Mr. MAJID ABBAS (Iraq), that up to the time of closure of the list of speakers, no objection had been raised. He then put to the vote the proposal to hold the meeting of the Sixth Committee next morning.

*The proposal was rejected unanimously.*

The meeting rose at 6.20 p.m.