



安全理事会

Distr.: General
29 October 2014
Chinese
Original: English

2014 年 10 月 28 日安全理事会第 2127(2013) 号决议所设中非共和国 问题专家小组给安全理事会主席的信

谨代表安全理事会第 2127(2013)号决议所设中非共和国问题专家小组成员，
随信附上专家小组按照上述决议第 59(c)段编写的最后报告。

请提请安全理事会成员注意本信及其附文并将其作为安理会文件分发为荷。

安全理事会第 2127(2013)号决议
所设专家小组

协调员

Aurélien **LLorca**(签名)

专家

Paul-Simon **Handy**(签名)

专家

Ahmed **Himmiche**(签名)

专家

Ruben **de Koning**(签名)

专家

Carolina **Reyes Aragón**(签名)

* 由于技术原因于 2014 年 11 月 3 日重发。

14-61179 * (C) 031114 031114



请回收



安全理事会第 2127 (2013) 号决议所设中非共和国问题专家小组的最后报告

摘要

尽管 2014 年 7 月 23 日在布拉柴维尔签署了一项停止敌对行动协定，但武装团体仍控制着或影响着中非共和国几乎所有有人居住的地区。

虽然总的安全局势看来已部分改善，特别是在班吉，中非共和国问题专家小组认为，约有 2 000 名前塞雷卡战斗人员(其中不包括驻扎在班吉的人员)以及与“反砍刀”组织有关联的大约 1 500 名民兵继续对这一事实上仍被分割的国家的和平、安全和稳定构成长期威胁。

中非共和国安全局势的任何改善也将取决于邻国持续致力于和平进程。专家小组在任务期中记录了在该国与乍得接壤的北部发生的若干起事件，包括杀害平民，焚烧村庄和被迫流离失所。这些来自身份不明的武装团伙和 Mahamat Alkhatim 准将指挥下的前塞雷卡部队的一再攻击导致在乍得与中非共和国瓦姆省和瓦姆-彭代省之间建立了一个缓冲区。

此外，活跃于该国的各主要武装团体日益分化，中非复兴人民阵线(代表前塞雷卡的新政治结构)最近发生内爆，这对稳定政治环境、从而按计划在 2015 年 2 月举行自由、公正、透明和包容的总统选举和立法选举构成重大挑战。

自 2013 年 12 月 5 日以来，前塞雷卡部队与反砍刀组织部队之间的直接对抗已经很少，但这两个武装团体，特别是反砍刀组织，不断地在攻击平民。在这方面，《停止敌对行动协定》在布拉柴维尔签署一周之后，反砍刀组织中最著名的指挥官之一(他是以 Patrice Edouard Nga ãsona 为首的反砍刀爱国者运动军事分支的指挥和控制结构的成员)进攻了塞雷卡在巴丹加弗(瓦姆省)的阵地，此事说明，政治领导人关于停止敌对的任何承诺，其真假仍然令人存疑。

此外，专家小组的评估认为，各武装团体的政治代表之间竞争部长级职位以及军事指挥官之间争夺资源控制权，这些是前塞雷卡人员和反砍刀组织中敌对派别之间最近发生内斗的原委。一个名为革命与正义的武装团体领导人被任命为新的过渡内阁的青年和体育部长，这加强了政治-军事运动指挥官可能取得政府高官职位的前景，因而证实了政治捣乱者谋略的效果。

自 2013 年 5 月中非共和国被暂停金伯利进程资格以来，估计又有价值 2 400 万美元的 140 000 克拉钻石被偷运出国。2014 年 5 月，比利时当局扣押了 6 634 克拉钻石，这批钻石先经金沙萨然后经迪拜运至安特卫普(比利时)一家名为 Kardiam 的公司。Kardiam 是中部非洲钻石贸易公司 Badica 的比利时分公司。

小组认为，比利时所扣押的钻石部分来自中非共和国东部萨姆万贾和布里亚(上科托省)，那里的前塞雷卡部队对运送钻石的飞机征税并从钻石收购商获得安全费。同时，与反砍刀组织有关团体的成员参与了西部贝贝拉蒂和 Carnot(曼贝雷-卡代省)周围的钻石手工生产。这些钻石往往被走私出境，但也有进入正式的贸易链，这需要大户买家 Sodiam 采取宽解措施。

估计每年约有两吨黄金被运出中非共和国，主要是通过喀麦隆贩运。做这项非法贸易的是来自 Yaloké(翁贝拉-姆波科省)和 Boda(洛巴伊省)的收购者，这些人因反砍刀组织团体自 2014 年 1 月开始的基于宗教的攻击而逃到喀麦隆，反砍刀组织团体发动攻击的结果是占据了 Yaloké 附近的手工开采的金矿。前塞雷卡部队在班巴里(瓦卡省)附近的 Ndassima 每年从当地黄金生产收缴的税款约为 150 000 美元，该地每年的黄金产量估计为 180 公斤。对从班巴里出口到苏丹的咖啡交易也收缴同等数额的税款。这些平行征税制度给前塞雷卡领导人，特别是 Ali Darrassa Mahamat 将军，提供了可持续的收入来源，得以维持驻扎在该地的部队。

小组尚未发现任何旨在支持武装团体的重大违反武器禁运行为，但需要考虑的是，由于后勤和安全方面的限制，小组不能前往中非共和国的东北地区。不过，专家小组继续对走私打猎弹药给反砍刀组织团伙的网络进行调查。专家小组还记录了第一个由西方雇佣军人员培训和援助一武装团体的案例。

中非共和国的人权状况仍不稳定。该国居民为 460 万，约有 250 万人仍然需要人道主义援助。虽然国际非政府组织和人道主义伙伴加强了在该国的存在和行动，但不安全、后勤问题和资金不足等重大挑战仍然阻碍着推动该国摆脱目前的人道主义紧急状况。

从 2013 年 12 月 5 日至 2014 年 8 月中旬，专家小组记录了总共 1 034 起与冲突有关的事件，包括 247 起阻挠人道主义援助的报告。在同一期间，小组还在其数据库中记录了全国各地 3 003 名平民被杀，包括 22 名援助人员。

专家小组在本报告中概述了自 2014 年 7 月 1 日公布其临时报告(S/2014/452)以来，中非共和国的政治和安全情况演变，陈述了新的个案研究，并向安全理事会和关于中非共和国的第 2127(2013)号决议所设委员会提出了建议。

一. 背景

A. 任务和任命

1. 安全理事会根据其 2013 年 12 月 5 日第 2127(2013)号决议对中非共和国实施制裁制度,并设立了一个委员会(安全理事会关于中非共和国的第 2127(2013)号决议所设委员会)和监测其执行情况的专家小组(中非共和国问题专家小组)。安理会于 2014 年 1 月 28 日通过第(2014)2134 号决议,对该决议第 36 和第 37 段所列行为的责任者个人和实体规定了更多措施(旅行禁令和资产冻结),并将委员会和小组的任务期限延长至 2015 年 1 月 27 日。

2. 2014 年 2 月 13 日,秘书长与委员会协商,任命小组五名成员(S/2014/98),包括区域专家(Paul-Simon Handy)、武器专家(Ahmed Himmiche)、金融和自然资源专家(Ruben de Koning)、武装团体专家和小组协调(Aurélien Llorca)及人道主义专家(Carolina Reyes Aragón)。

3. 专家小组在原地办公,但从 2014 年 3 月至 8 月在其任务的调查阶段几乎一直是在班吉。小组还通过陆路到访了以下地方:班巴里、Batalimo、巴丹加弗、贝洛科、Bémal、贝贝拉蒂、博阿利、博大、博吉拉、博桑戈阿、布阿尔、布卡、坎托尼耶、卡诺、达马拉、加济、格里马里、冈、马昆达、姆拜基、保瓦、锡布、Yaloké。由于联合国在中非共和国的空中业务燃料短缺和其他的限制,小组可乘飞机前往的地方只有恩代莱和布里亚。在区域内,小组曾三次前往喀麦隆(Batouri, 贝尔图阿、杜阿拉、肯祖,雅温得),并对加蓬(利伯维尔)、刚果(布拉柴维尔)和刚果民主共和国(金沙萨)各作了一次访问。

4. 2014 年 6 月 26 日,小组按照第 2127(2013)号决议第 59 段向安全理事会主席提交了小组的临时报告(S/2014/452)。2014 年 7 月 1 日,该报告作为 S/2014/452 号文件公布于安全理事会网站,此前小组与委员会在 2014 年 5 月 29 日举行了讨论。

B. 方法

5. 专家小组努力确保遵守安全理事会关于制裁的一般性问题非正式工作组在其 2006 年 12 月报告(S/2006/997,附件)中提出的各项标准。这些标准要求依靠经核实的真实文件、具体的证据和专家的现场观察,可能的话包括照片。如无法亲临现场,专家小组努力用多个独立的消息来源证实信息,适当地达到尽可能高的标准,并较为重视主要行为人和事件第一手证人的陈述。

6. 专家小组打算尽可能以透明方式行事,但如果指明消息来源会使小组成员或其他人面临不可接受的安全风险,专家小组则不会披露身份信息,并将相关证据保存在联合国档案中。

7. 专家小组同样致力于最大限度做到公平，酌情并尽可能地努力向有关各方提供报告中可能提到的涉及他们的任何信息，供他们在规定的时限内审阅、发表意见和作出反应。

8. 专家小组维护其工作的独立性，抵制任何削弱其公允立场或使其被视为持有偏见的尝试。小组根据协调员将本报告转交安全理事会主席之前达到的共识，核准本报告文本、结论和建议。

9. 按照大会关于控制文件和限制字数的各项决议，尤其是第 52/214、53/208 号和第 59/265 号决议，小组决定将一些个案研究和调查结果载于本报告附件。

C. 与利益攸关方和各组织的合作

10. 小组希望再次强调与中非共和国过渡当局，特别是与前总理安德烈·恩扎帕耶凯的政府，进行了高度合作。在总统一级，小组期待着在 2014 年 8 月 26 日任命新内阁之后会任命一位新的协调人。

11. 小组得到了联合国中非共和国多层面综合稳定团(中非稳定团)的宝贵支持，并与红蝴蝶部队和欧洲联盟驻中非共和国部队具有良好的工作关系。小组还与由非洲主导的中非共和国国际支助团(中非支助团)进行了极好的合作，该支助团在必要时为小组前往外地提供武装护送。总体而言，小组与多方面的国际行为者、公司、个人和组织开展了有效的合作。

12. 小组共向 51 个国家、组织和私营实体递交了 84 封正式信函，迄今已收到 45 份答复，其中提供了所要求的信息，此外另有 9 封要求信待发(另见附件 1 完整列表)。与作为中非共和国邻国的会员国的合作情况见下文(见第 13 至 15 段)。

二. 对和平与安全的威胁

A. 政治与区域背景

13. 如在临时报告中所述，中部非洲区域的形势是理解暴力反复循环的关键，这种暴力循环是中非共和国自 1990 年代初以来接连发生的危机之特征(见 [S/2014/452](#)，第 34 段)。为加深其对该区域的了解，并根据安全理事会第 2127(2013)和 2134(2014)号决议，专家小组正式发函请求访问喀麦隆(2014 年 3 月 17 日和 2014 年 7 月 9 日)、乍得(2014 年 6 月 3 日、5 日和 26 日)、刚果民主共和国(2014 年 7 月 16 日)、刚果(2014 年 6 月 10 日和 2014 年 7 月 9 日)、南苏丹(2014 年 7 月 10 日)、苏丹(2014 年 6 月 10 日和 16 日)和乌干达。

14. 除乍得、刚果民主共和国和乌干达外(两封信中的一封)，小组没有从中非共和国邻国的常驻联合国代表团得到对其前往访问提议的正式回复。有时，即使有委员会主席的推动，也未使专家小组得到关于其访问有关国家请求的回复。主席于 2014 年 9 月 12 日召集了一次与这些邻国的会议，讨论对专家小组索取资料和

进行访问的请求不作回复问题。该区域的一些国家，包括刚果，南苏丹和苏丹这种低程度合作阻碍了小组按计划开展涉及其任务的重要问题的调查。¹

15. 不过，小组希望感谢喀麦隆和刚果民主共和国两国政府为几位专家在本报告所述期间的访问提供了便利，尽管两国没有作出正式答复，并且一些提供信息的请求也尚待答复。

政治背景

16. 如在本报告关于武装团体一节(见下文第 47-111 段)中所述，塞雷卡和反砍刀组织的内部冲突都有增加，致使这些派别力量难以确保指挥与控制。这可能预示新一阶段的更大分化。²

17. 政府和国际调解努力更是激发武装团体显露其目的和立场，在调解期间，紧张局势更加明显。这些调解努力包括 2014 年 7 月 21 日至 23 日在布拉柴维尔举行的中非共和国民族和解论坛(见下文第 25 至 29 段)以及 2014 年 8 月 22 日的政府改组。上述期间前塞勒卡和反砍刀组织内部的紧张关系都大大加剧。

过渡政府

18. 在本报告所述期间，主要政治变化情况是在 2014 年 8 月 22 日任命了以穆罕默德·卡蒙总理为首的新政府，³ 而他是该国独立以来的第一位担任该职务的穆斯林。任命卡蒙受到大多数地方和国际行为者的批评，尽管理由各不相同。因此，他似乎是过渡时期国家元首凯瑟琳·桑巴潘沙现在决心主导政治过渡进程的最明显迹象。

19. 前总理恩扎帕耶凯领导下的前政府执行过渡路线图困难多多，严重妨害了其公信力。2014 年 1 月至 8 月期间，恩扎帕耶凯当局在推动过渡路线图的重要方面上并没有取得多少进展。其在促进前塞雷卡与反砍刀组织之间的和解方面尤其成绩欠佳。除了一些象征性行动，如游行集会一类的活动和体育活动，不存在一个考虑到国家和国际和解举措的连贯一致的战略，这似乎是主要障碍。此外，该国政府没有公开支持国内非政府组织为促成前塞雷卡与反砍刀组织进行直接会谈所作的令人注意的努力，也没有将这些伙伴纳入其和解战略。

20. 地方小型非政府组织，如 Pareto 和 Mou-Da 一直在非常积极地努力促成各主要武装团体之间的和解。因为这些组织最近才成立(2014)，几乎没有任何调解与和解方面的经验，故政府并不认为值得予以支持。然而，Pareto 已取得了重大成

¹ 喀麦隆常驻联合国代表团在 2014 年 4 月 21 日回复了小组，但专家小组计划是在 2014 年 4 月 12 日至 19 日访问喀麦隆。

² 2014 年 8 月 25 日前塞雷卡 Zakaria Damane 将军和武装团体参谋长 Joseph Zoundeko 准将的部队与塞雷卡地区指挥官 Ali Darrassa 将军领导的人员之间在班巴里发生剧烈武装战斗。同样，2014 年 7 月和 8 月期间，反砍刀组织派系之间也发生了暴力冲突(见第 47-110 段)。

³ 新政府和新总统内阁的积极特点之一是，内阁中部长顾问数量远低于前政府，而在前政府中这些顾问大多做事有限。

功，已使前塞雷卡和反砍刀组织部队在班吉(2014 年 5 月~7 月)和班巴里(2014 年 7 月~8 月)坐到了谈判桌前。在布拉柴维尔论坛之前，Pareto 已就拟订了一项停止敌对行动协定做好了准备工作，但由于布拉柴维尔论坛而推迟了签署。⁴ 另一方面，过渡当局与一些国际非政府组织在和解工作方面开展了广泛的合作。一些在中非共和国调解方面榜上有名的组织，如人道主义对话中心和圣艾智德团体，仍在发挥着重要作用，帮助政府。⁵

21. 过渡政府在裁军和安全部门改革领域的成绩也欠佳，特别是在中非共和国武装部队必要的重组和重建军事司法系统方面。颇能说明这方面不足的是，总理在 2014 年 6 月 8 日呼吁自愿解除武装，其结果只是数量有限的主要是老旧步枪和弹药被上交(见下文第 151-186 段)。

22. 政府成员个人之间的争斗事例包括其中一些人拒绝与前塞雷卡部长接触，凭借个人或族裔-地区关系的任命，⁶ 以及没有客观的业绩考评制度。一些官员在临时行政当局中作用不大，因此该当局被视为薄弱。⁷

国际调解

23. 有若干机构和委员会从事旨在解决中非共和国危机的国际调解努力，其目的是支持过渡政府落实其各项决定。尽管一开始遇到了一些困难，但过去几个月来协调工作大大改善了。联合国、非盟、中非国家经济共同体和中非共和国的重要伙伴日益发挥其作为过渡政府战略伙伴的作用(在向中非共和国问题国际联络小组提供支助的 8 个利益攸关方集团⁸ 中)和调解小组的一部分的作用(见附件 3)。⁹

⁴ 根据 2014 年 8 月 17 日在班吉对 Sébastien Wénézoui 的采访和 2014 年 7 月 29 日对 Eric Nériss Massi 的采访，以及 2014 年 7 月和 8 月在班吉同 Pareto 和 Mou-Da 的代表们的会晤。小组还于 2014 年 8 月 1 日在班吉会晤了执行《利伯维尔协定》后续工作委员会主席德尼·萨苏-恩格索的特别代表(见附件 2)。

⁵ 2014 年 6 月 10 日至 12 日，人道主义对话中心协助举行了一次会议，为在 2014 年结束之前在班吉举办和解论坛作准备。人道主义对话中心已在 2003 年的全国对话和 2008 年包容各方的政治对话中发挥了重要的促进作用。圣艾智德团体也自 2013 年以来就参与在中非共和国的调解，并且目前继续提供斡旋。

⁶ 虽然新政府的人数不多，但尤其是总统内阁的显然特点是，许多官员与总统有关系。

⁷ 对安哥拉赠款 10 万美元的管理一直受到公众的批评，此款项目的目的是支付公务员 2014 年 3 月的工资。根据当地的和专门的新闻，总统最密切的合作者之一——现任总理——涉入了部分挪用这项资金。据媒体报道，这是国际货币基金组织暂停其在中非共和国业务的原因之一(见：《盟友失去信心》，《非洲秘闻》第 25 卷，第 17 期(2014 年 8 月 29 日，第 6 页))。

⁸ 该集团除联合国外还包括：非洲联盟和中非经共体、欧洲联盟、世界银行、刚果、法国和美利坚合众国。

⁹ 班吉的一些政治行为体认为，最近国际调解努力方面的一个重要事态发展是，乍得的传统作用减少了，因为在班吉该国越来越被视为是问题的一部分；与一名前总理的会晤，班吉，2014 年 8 月 4 日。

但在《利伯维尔协定》作为过渡的法律依据越来越有争议的局面下，利伯维尔协定技术后续行动委员会仍然需要证明其效率。¹⁰

24. 在最近几个月，除了与所有利益攸关方定期举行协调会议外，国际调解的主要成就是在 2014 年 7 月 21 日至 23 日举办了中非共和国争取全国和解论坛。

中非共和国争取全国和解论坛

25. 在国际调解人刚果总统萨苏-恩格索的斡旋下，于 2014 年 7 月 21 日至 23 日在布拉柴维尔举行了中非共和国争取全国和解论坛。中非经共体在 2014 年 6 月 27 日在马拉博举行的非洲联盟第二十三届常会的间隙举行了一次特别会议，会上就举行一次和解会议的前景作出决定。该次会议还决定将中非经共体的调解转变成国际调解，将非盟和联合国中部非洲区域办事处包括进来。在卡布拉柴维尔论坛的第一天，前塞雷卡代表团要求中非共和国分治，以此作为谈判的前提条件。这一要求在该武装团体的各级很有争议，成为前塞雷卡内部的一个裂缝。¹¹

26. 布拉柴维尔论坛由于其宣布和准备的方式，¹² 遭到一些主要利益攸关方的强烈质疑，他们反对他们所认为的在解决中非共和国危机中中非的行动者被边缘化。¹³ 尽管如此，该论坛还是产生了一项十分需要的停止敌对行动协定，其中除其他外，使签字方承诺，不从事任何旨在使中非共和国分治的活动(见附件 4，《协定》第 3(d)段)。对班吉的若干主要行为体的采访显示，对停止敌对行动协定第 3(d)段的解释各不相同，取决于不同的对话者。前塞雷卡成员认为，该段反对将国家分治作为谈判的一个先决条件，而国际调解方面和政府则认为它是一项维护该国统一的具有约束力的保证。

27. 由于前塞雷卡内部对其谈判立场存在分歧，《停止敌对行动协定》在布拉柴维尔论坛的最后阶段签署，其中包含一些技术上的限制，其可被一些行为体用来拖延执行协定。¹⁴ 但总体而言，《停止敌对行动协定》和论坛也确实产生了积极

¹⁰ 在国际调解小组和中非共和国危机处理小组/8 国集团之间，利伯维尔协定后续工作委员会艰难维持其存在并努力取得具体成就。与一名前总理和一名前外交官的会晤，班吉，2014 年 8 月 4 日和 5 日。

¹¹ 根据 2014 年 7 月和 8 月在班吉对前塞雷卡政治领导人的采访。

¹² 临时总统桑巴潘沙阁下在最后一刻才被邀请参加马拉博会议，并且只得到允许参加部分的审议。由于这一点，并由于该论坛定在中非共和国之外举行，许多地方舆论领袖认为，这是国际社会的强制命令。见法国 24 电视台 2014 年 6 月 27 日对前总理恩扎帕耶凯的访谈，2014 年 6 月 30 日访问的网页：<http://www.france24.com/fr/2014-06-27-2146-le-journal-lafrique-centrafrique-andre-nzapayeke-sommet-ua-rwanda-ramadan/>。

¹³ 小组 2014 年 7 月 26 日在班吉同前总理和促进过渡民主力量联盟的旗下政党促进社会进步共和大会领导人尼古拉·蒂昂盖伊举行了讨论。除了促进过渡民主力量联盟的各政党，其他决定抵制布拉柴维尔论坛的重要人物有 Nicolas Guerekomaye 牧师(他是宗教平台的三位领导人之一)，还有民间社会平台。

¹⁴ 采访中非共和国问题研究员和专家，班吉，2014 年 8 月 5 日。《协定》的一些主要不足之处包括：没有核查委员会，没有关于违反《协定》的制裁规定，也没有明确说明交战各方的阵地和地点。

的势头，最终导致政府改组并以新的决心，以在国际调解者的监测之下执行过渡路线图。

28. 小组访谈了在班吉的许多当地和国际行为体，并由此认为，新政府的组成并未经过《利伯维尔协定》、《恩贾梅纳宣言》和《过渡宪章》所要求的那种协商。当地和国际的多个关键行为体对总理和政府成员的选择持有严重争议。¹⁵ 但是，更重要的情况是，多个原为武装团体领导人的政治领袖担任了政府职务。这种提携方式不仅是奖励暴力，而且违反安全理事会第 2127(2013)号、2134(2014)号和 2149(2014)号决议所述的杜绝有罪不罚现象。¹⁶

29. 为应对中非共和国境内接二连三发生的危机而签署的协定、宣言和不成文的决定的数量越来越多，而《布拉柴维尔协定》在此之上又增加了一个新层面。¹⁷ 由于冲突的长期性质和不断变化的行动者们，已对过渡的法律基础造成了一些混乱。当地和国际行为者们对过渡的定义继续有分歧，这最终可能导致中非共和国体制的不稳定。反对派促进过渡民主力量联盟领导人反复指出，政治行动者们有选择地执行过渡性机构体制。例如，他们指出，根据《利伯维尔的政治协定》，总理应来自反对派政党，但恩扎帕耶凯和卡蒙均非来自反对派。同样，对据称新政府组成没有通过协商，全国过渡委员会的一些成员说，总统因此违反了《利伯维尔协定》。¹⁸

政治上对《布拉柴维尔协定》的违反

30. 自从在布拉柴维尔签署的《停止敌对行动协定》生效以来，中非共和国各地有一些在政治上违反该协定的情况。小组记录了其中的一些情况(见下文第 31-35 段)。

31. 2014 年 8 月 17 日，一份未签署的印有中非复兴人民阵线主席 Michel Djotodia 及其第一副主席 Nourredine Adam 抬头的并呼吁 Darel Kouti 共和国独立的文件散发了新闻界(见附件 5)。该文件出自中非复兴人民阵线成员 Mal-MalEssen，其人是 Nourredine Adam 的知名主要理论家之一。尽管该武装团体的一些著名成员否认了参与，但小组所访谈的中非复兴人民阵线政治局的一些成员证实了该文件的真实性。这些证人指出，计划是在最后阶段实行独立，但消息被泄露了；不过，他们确认，该文件反映了该团体中被认为是激进翼成员们所讨论的问题。¹⁹

¹⁵ 与两位 8 国集团成员和一名全国过渡委员会成员的会晤，班吉，2014 年 8 月。

¹⁶ 2014 年 8 月 22 日，一个相对较小的武装团体正义与革命的领导人 Armel Sayo 被任命为新政府的体育部长。

¹⁷ 人们普遍承认，2008 年《利伯维尔全面和平协议》和 2013 年《政治协定》以及 2013 年和 2014 年《恩贾梅纳宣言》、《过渡宪章》和现在的《布拉柴维尔协定》是中非共和国过渡的基础。

¹⁸ 与尼古拉·蒂昂盖伊和马丁·齐盖莱的会晤，班吉，2014 年 5 月、7 月和 8 月。通过 Skype 对全国过渡委员会一些成员的访谈，2014 年 8 月 25 日。

¹⁹ 对前塞雷卡政治领导人的访谈，班吉，2014 年 8 月 18 日。

32. 上述文书的真实性在 2014 年 9 月 3 日得到间接确认，该日贝宁一家报纸《自由早报》公布对 Djotodia 的采访，其中这位中非复兴人民阵线流亡领导人说，他赞成恢复中非共和国的和平。Djotodia 认为，恢复和平只有两种办法：要么是前塞雷卡重新掌权，要么是实行分治以和平共存(见第 47-110 段，关于武装团体)。²⁰

33. 小组认为，这不仅违反中非复兴人民阵线已签署的《布拉柴维协议》第 3(d) 条，而且任何关于中非共和国分治的要求都可能引发推动更多暴力，并且是在该国播撒分裂的种子，使两个社区不可调和的想法永久化(见 S/2014/452，摘要)。

34. 反砍刀组织也在政治上违反了停止敌对行动协定。2014 年 7 月 30 日，中非共和国武装部队/反砍刀组织领导人 Gilbert Kamezola ĩ 上尉在总理府举行新闻发布会，期间他呼吁各武装团体的所有中非共和国武装部队成员重新整合其部队，并回到军营。Kamezola ĩ 声称，他的举措旨在发出一个强烈信号，声明战争对为反砍刀组织提供了服务的中非共和国武装部队人员来说已经结束。然而反砍刀组织的总协调作出突兀反应，将该团体疏远于 Kamezola ĩ 对反砍刀组织的副总协调员 Sébastien Wénézoui 来说，Kamezola ĩ 的呼吁是无效的，因为它没有得到该团体领导的批准。²¹

35. 小组认为，反砍刀组织总协调员这样做在政治上违反了停止敌对行动协定，因为这是将符合该协定的举措非法化并加以谴责。

区域背景：乍得与中非共和国

36. 乍得是中非共和国的主要邻国之一。两国共同边界长达 1 200 公里，从中非共和国西北部一直延伸到东北部。由于两侧社区的生活方式和贸易惯例，边境地区货物贸易和人员流动一向频繁。特别是过去几十年来农产品和畜牛交易增多，给两侧都带来了经济机会。但是，两国官方一直都未从这些交易中获得收入。²²

37. 在这一背景下，中非共和国与乍得边境地区过去二十年来一再出现不稳定，为此两国和苏丹在 2011 年组建了一个三方部队，以确保共同边界安全，防止匪患和反叛活动。在此之前，三国边境地区的不稳定还导致 2008 至 2010 年期间部署国际部队。²³

²⁰ 见 <http://matinlibre.com/index.php/international/item/192-djotodia-jai-la-capacite-de-reconcilier-chretiens-et-musulmans> (2014 年 9 月 4 日查询)。

²¹ 见 www.rjdh-rca.net/actulites/actualite/bangui-discorde-entre-les-leaders-des-anti-balaka-au-sujet-de-la-declaration-demandant-aux-elements-faca-des-anti-balaka-de-regagner-les-rangs.html (2014 年 9 月 9 日查阅)。

²² 牧民从乍得到中非共和国的跨国流动就是这种情况，这些流动也是牧民与当地农民之间暴力日增的根源；见：“中部非洲畜牧业的安全挑战”，国际联络小组《非洲报告》第 215 号，第 12-18 页。

²³ 安全理事会第 1778(2008)号决议授权在乍得东部和中非共和国东北部部署中乍特派团((Mission des Nations Unies en RCA et au Tchad - 联合国中非共和国和乍得特派团)；欧盟派出的一个特派团，即欧盟驻乍得/中非共和国部队，为中乍特派团的部署铺平了道路。

乍得的利益

38. 同许多邻国一样，乍得在中非共和国有其战略利益，这是过去二十年来乍得在政治和军事上一直介入的原因。²⁴ 由于该区域(乍得、达尔富尔、苏丹和乌干达)复杂的近期冲突历史，加上国家边境管制能力薄弱，各武装团体都很容易利用乍得领土。

39. 乍得的最大利益在于该国南部边境的安全。前乍得武装团体中的一部分参与了中非共和国境内的塞雷卡反叛活动，(见第 47-110 段)，²⁵ 这些团体在边境的存在令政府担忧，政府在战略上高度重视南部边境的监测和管制。²⁶ 离西南边界约 150 公里的多巴油田也是恩贾梅纳立场的重要背景，因为自 2003 年以来，石油一直是乍得最大的外汇来源。

40. 1970 和 1980 年代，乍得接连发生政变，导致大批难民逃往邻国，包括中非共和国。2014 年，中非共和国发生专门杀害穆斯林事件，又导致大批乍得难民和中非共和国公民回头涌入乍得(见 S/2014/452，第五章)。

41. 难民人数众多，严重影响了乍得东南部特别是东洛贡、芒杜尔和中沙里区的稳定，大多数难民聚居在这几个区的营地。难民危机还对来自乍得和中非共和国的牧民造成特别大的影响，他们在迁徙和袭击中失去了部分牲畜，现在又面临乍得南部资源短缺的挑战。²⁷ 乍得与中非共和国边界关闭后，传统的放牧路线 2014 年可能无法继续使用，这给乍得第二重要的收入来源部门造成了更大压力。²⁸

确保中非共和国边界的安全

42. 乍得是中非支助团的部队派遣国之一，该国部队大多部署在与中非共和国边界沿线各省。自 2014 年 4 月 16 日乍得撤出中非支助团、并自 2014 年 5 月 11 日关闭边界以来，专家小组记录到中非共和国境内西北部与乍得接壤地区发生的几起安全事件。引发暴力事态的部分原因是穆斯林与非穆斯林、土匪、牧民之间以

²⁴ 按照次区域和双边安排，中非共和国境内一直驻有乍得军人。他们除了参加三方(苏丹、乍得和中非共和国)部队，还参加了中非经货共同体和中非经共体在中非共和国部署的部队(中部非洲多国部队、中非巩固和平特派团)，以及非洲联盟旗下的部队(中非支助团)。2002 年至 2014 年 4 月，乍得军人在中非共和国总共驻留了 12 年。2003 年至 2013 年，按照双边安排，乍得特种部队为博齐泽提供了近身保护。

²⁵ Alkhatim 将军是前塞雷卡知名成员，他原先是乍得反叛分子，1997 年重返军队；他参与了 2003 年博齐泽政变和 2013 年塞雷卡叛乱。另见第二章“武装团体”一节。

²⁶ 2014 年 6 月与一名目前反对代比总统的前乍得政府官员的会见。

²⁷ “Diagnostic et Propositions Opérationnelles pour le Soutien à l’Elevage Pastoral Perturbé par la Crise Centrafricaine”，乍得畜牧业发展行动平台报告草稿，2014 年 3 月，恩贾梅纳。

²⁸ 小组与乍得和中非共和国农村动态研究员和专家的访谈，2014 年 6 月 3 日，巴黎。

及该地区存在的各种武装团体之间循环不断的袭击和报复。这些暴力事件包括武装团体对平民实施的暴力和虐待行为。²⁹

43. 在专家小组对中非共和国西北部进行考察期间，目击者一致提到来自乍得的不明武装男子团伙参与抢掠和焚烧村庄。³⁰ 边界沿线许多村庄被烧毁，当地居民流离失所，被迫逃往边界两侧的境内流离失所者营地或难民营，或者去向不明。

44. 值得注意的是，目前处于前塞雷卡直接控制下的中非共和国东北部的安全局势与西北部明显不同。专家小组尚未收到任何报告表明来自乍得的不明武装人员在该地区进行类似的袭击，只有土匪在中非共和国境内盗窃车辆，然后越过边界进入乍得。

45. 自 2014 年 4 月 17 日以来，专家小组记录了 17 起事件，表明乍得-中非共和国边界西段存在大量安全部队。最典型的事例如下：

(a) 2014 年 5 月 1 日，来自乍得的不明武装男子袭击了马昆达镇(瓦姆省)。2014 年 5 月 17 日，马昆达县长、秘书长和公立学校校长打算前往乍得寻找马昆达居民。三人在不明情况下被逮捕并押往恩贾梅纳。专家小组设法接触到其中一人，并了解到，这三名官员及其他中非共和国公民遭到至少三个月的长期审前羁押。据班吉的一位部长透露，中非共和国一直试图通过若干外交渠道解救县长，但迄今未获成功。³¹

(b) 2014 年 6 月 23 日，专家小组的两名成员在中非共和国境内进行调查时，在一个边检站被乍得国防和安全部队逮捕。专家们清楚地说明了自己的身份和任务以及特权和豁免，但他们仍被强行从边检站押往戈雷镇(乍得东洛贡区)，拘留四个小时后被送回边界释放。

(c) 2014 年 5 月 20 日，在米亚-彭代县(瓦姆-彭代省)，据报是乍得士兵的武装男子袭击乍得边界附近的三个村庄(Bembéré、Békaye 和 Bédoua 3)并带走三名平民。在编写本报告时，这三人仍在乍得，下落不明。²⁹

46. 中非共和国东北部经常发生的暴力事件和蓄意焚烧村庄的行为不仅迫使当地居民背井离乡，而且使这一带边境地区变成中非共和国与乍得之间事实上的缓冲区。

B. 武装团体

47. 自 2014 年 7 月 1 日专家小组发布临时报告(见 S/2014/452，第 37 段)以来，由于反砍刀团体对仍在前塞雷卡控制下的战略重镇不断施加压力，反砍刀民兵与


²⁹ 专家小组的人道主义事件数据库。

³⁰ 与贝马勒、保瓦、马昆达地区受害者的访谈，2014 年 6 月 23 日和 8 月 12 日；军方人士、联合国和人权组织的若干报告也证实了这一点。

³¹ 与参与处理这一问题的政府官员的访谈，2014 年 8 月 18 日，班吉。更多详情见关于人道主义的一节。

“新”塞雷卡(又称前塞雷卡或共和部队)³² 之间的分隔线略向东部和北部推移(见下文地图)。2014 年 7 月以来出现的主要事态是,反砍刀组织相互对立的指挥官之间以及前塞雷卡各族裔派别之间发生严重内斗,影响了两个团体各自在 Boy-Rabe(班吉)和班巴里(瓦卡省)的据点。

2014 年 9 月 10 日中非共和国武装团体的控制区和影响区



中非共和国问题专家小组——背景地图：粮食署-中非共和国概览，2013 年 7 月 31 日

48. 在首都及其前往的各省,专家小组得以监测安全局势,并监测了反砍刀运动主要政治和军事领导人以及前塞雷卡各派的活动。在这方面,小组认为,大多数安全事件要么是出于反砍刀组织与前塞雷卡争夺地盘,要么是出于这两个武装团体内部与争夺政治或军事领导权或分享资源有关的争端。

49. 本报告第三节还概述了中非共和国武装团体目前使用的武器和弹药的基线,第四节和第五节列出了据报武装团体犯下的阻碍运送人道主义援助和违反国际人道主义法行为清单。

50. 起草本报告时的主要热点包括:(a) 在巴丹加弗(瓦姆省),2014 年 7 月/8 月,Rodrigue Nga bona(又称 Andilo(本报告采用此名)、“Andilo 将军”、“Andilo 上校”、“Angilo”、“Angelo”、“Andjilo”、“Andilou”和“Andiyo”)指挥下的反砍刀团体

³² 除了某些公报、Nourredine Adam 或“中非复兴人民阵线”或其发言人的声明以及联合国文件以外,一般不用“共和部队”这一名称;例如,2014 年 6 月,前塞雷卡军事分支发表的一份正式新闻公报在标题中仍用“前塞雷卡”。大多数当地和国际媒体也仍然称之为前塞雷卡或塞雷卡。

与 Alkhatim 准将指挥下的塞雷卡部队持续发生冲突；(b) 在班巴里(瓦卡省)，国际部队、反砍刀组织、塞雷卡团体和塞雷卡各派别之间事态十分紧张。

51. 下文详述的两个事件说明，反砍刀组织与前塞雷卡之间的全国性冲突与地方活动、报复行为和资源争夺相互交织。特别是，专家小组收集到的信息表明，Patrice Edouard Nga ïsona 领导下的中非人民解放者全国协调会(解放者协调会)(又称反砍刀爱国者运动)以及来自班吉的不明反砍刀团体直接参与了巴丹加弗、班巴里和博达发生的冲突(见第 201-202 和 215 段及附件 63)。

巴丹加弗

52. 自 2014 年 4 月以来，在布卡发生一系列进攻和反攻、“Andilo 将军”指挥的反砍刀团体与 Alkhatim 准将指挥的塞雷卡部队交战之后，瓦姆省西北部局势一直紧张(见 S/2014/452，附件 5)。2014 年 4 月 26 日，Alkhatim 的部下 Mahmat Issa 上校在布卡被 Andilo 彻底击败，这为反砍刀组织进攻巴丹加弗打通了道路。

53. 2014 年 6 月和 7 月，Andilo 加强了军事能力，其主要办法是从班吉盗窃皮卡小货车，然后转移到布卡，³³ 并在巴丹加弗郊区和他在 Bolom 的总部建立训练营。³⁴ 后来在 2014 年 7 月 29 日对巴丹加弗发起主要攻势，造成 20 人伤亡。专家小组估计，100 至 150 名反砍刀战斗人员参加了进攻，并从国际部队了解到，反砍刀组织还用一辆卡车从布卡运送部队到前线。³⁵ 专家小组所获信息表明，这次进攻被 Saleh Zabadi 上校击退，³⁶ 随后 Zabadi 上校晋升将军，被派驻卡博(见 S/2014/452，第 53 段和附件 5.5)。³⁷ 据报 Andilo 于 2014 年 8 月 6 日返回班吉，留下“Simplice 上校”代任主官。在另一起不同事件中，中非支助团两名士兵被打死，涉事方是塞雷卡巴丹加弗地区指挥官 Mahamad Zine 上校指挥下的一个团体。

54. 2014 年 8 月 4 日，前往巴丹加弗增援中非支助团的法国部队在向北行进途中，在巴丹加弗以南三公里处遭到有经验的塞雷卡部队伏击。据法国国防部网站报道，³⁸ 在战斗中，法国请求空中支援，包括调用部署在恩贾梅纳的法国喷气式战斗机。这与 2014 年 5 月 5 日红蝴蝶部队在 Bémal 与博吉拉 Boguila(瓦姆省)之间的公路上与效忠 Alkhatim 的部队遭遇交战的情形如出一辙(另见 S/2014/452，第 52 段)。塞雷卡虽然损失重大，但第二天就对法国部队流动指挥部进行反攻，导致后者再次动用空中资产进行干预。

³³ 与一名反砍刀组织军事指挥官进行的访谈，2014 年 7 月 22 日，班吉。

³⁴ 与一名了解巴丹加弗安全局势的秘密消息人士进行的访谈，2014 年 7 月 27 日。

³⁵ 与国际部队的会见，2014 年 6 月 24 日，布卡。

³⁶ 与实地有联系的秘密消息人士的电子邮件，2014 年 8 月 10 日。

³⁷ 与实地秘密消息人士进行的电话交谈，2014 年 9 月 6 日。

³⁸ 见 www.defense.gouv.fr/operations/centrafrique/actualites/sangaris-prises-a-partie-par-des-groupes-lourdement-armes-dans-le-nord-de-la-rca。

55. 法国国际电台报道，这场战斗中约有 60 名塞雷卡战斗人员被打死，但塞雷卡当地领导人只承认其部队有 7 人被打死。³⁹ 法国部队随后采取了建立信任措施，并试图安顿塞雷卡部队驻扎下来(见下文第 177 段和附件 56)。

56. Zine 也在与红蝴蝶部队交战时被打死。在与专家小组的会见中，Mohamed Assil 上校介绍自己是新的代理地区指挥官，Ahmad Ibrahim Ahmad 上校是他的副手。但是，另一名上校 Moussa Maouloud 也向专家小组介绍自己是巴丹加弗地区指挥官，负责与国际部队谈判，并自称是 2014 年 6 月被 Joseph Zoundeko 准将派到该地区的；不过，Maouloud 显然未被同僚们认作领导(见附件 6 提供的塞雷卡巴丹加弗领导人照片)。³⁹

57. 2014 年 8 月 14 日，红蝴蝶部队还决定在控制着布卡的三个反砍刀团体中采取建立信任措施，其中两个团体在 Andilo 指挥下，另一个团体更被视为自卫民兵。红蝴蝶部队向社区领导人宣布该决定时，专家小组在场。

班巴里

58. 根据专家小组 2014 年 5 月 20 日至 23 日和 2014 年 7 月 2 日至 4 日在班巴里的实地访谈和观察，班巴里及其周围地区的冲突涉及多个不同的反砍刀团体，包括地方自卫民兵，以及“新”塞雷卡的不同派别，包括富拉尼族武装团体。实际上，专家小组认为，班巴里的富拉尼族武装团体不一定都听命于 Ali Darrassa Mahamat，因为他来自富拉尼族一个养羊而不养牛的分支乌达族。总体而言，由于这些团体内部的决策过程即使对内部知情人也缺乏透明度，加上政治和(或)军事联盟变化频繁，主要取决于短期利益以及对自然资源收入和检查站的控制情况(另见下文第 111-150 段)，因此，当地动态和助长当地冲突的外部因素显得错综复杂，不易理解。

59. 但是，专家小组根据若干第一手证词确定，班巴里显然存在被称为外来人或班吉人的反砍刀小团体(见附件 7)。例如，专家小组在观察一个反砍刀小团体时，听一位知名社区领袖说，这些民兵是“外来”的。专家小组还听当地消息来源说，至少有两名反砍刀指挥官来自班吉而且有中非共和国武装部队背景。这两个人被称为“Douze couteaux”和“Risqueur”。

60. 这些证词说明，班吉的反砍刀组织看似参与了地方冲突，但也有可能是在全国实施了一项针对前塞雷卡部队的战略。

61. 在塞雷卡方面，专家小组取得了中非共和国第 5 军区(瓦卡省)司令 Darrassa 签署的任命书，其中任命 Zakaria Santiago 和 Amadou Bello Hissen 上校为军事领导人(见附件 8)。

³⁹ 与塞雷卡军事领导人的会见，2014 年 8 月 13 日，巴丹加弗。

62. Darrassa 的任命受到前塞雷卡对立派别的挑战。在“新”塞雷卡作出将总部设在班巴里的决定之后，他失去了对瓦卡省首府的全面控制(见 S/2014/452，附件 6)。⁴⁰ Zakaria Damane 将军控制着班巴里的塞雷卡古拉派，他是乔托迪亚所属的民主力量团结联盟(民主团结联盟)的创始人。Zakaria 于 2014 年 5 月 22 日从布里亚(上科托省)来到班巴里，与他同来的还有“新”塞雷卡参谋长、前民主团结联盟参谋长 Zoundeko 和 2013 年乔托迪亚任命 Darrassa 以前的军区司令、先前控制 Ndassima 金矿的 Tom Adam 将军(又名 Ben Laden)(见附件 9 中 Adam 的照片)。

63. 2014 年 8 月 25 日，“新”塞雷卡两个派别之间的紧张关系达到顶峰。次日，据法新社和路透社等一些媒体的报道，有 17 名塞雷卡战斗人员在富拉尼人与古拉人的战斗中丧生。根据不同消息来源，这场冲突的起因是多方面的，既有收入引起的矛盾，也有塞雷卡的富拉尼部分与“阿拉伯”部分合并以及 Darrassa 与来自乍得和苏丹地区萨拉马特游牧部落的 Alkhatim 联盟之后产生的内部政治因素。⁴¹ 出于报复，Nourredine Adam 又会命令 Damane、Ben Laden 和 Zoundeko 将军率领古拉人解除富拉尼人的武装。

64. 专家小组认为班巴里前塞雷卡分子的内斗与收入分享有关。一名富拉尼族出身的高级别指挥官告诉专家小组说，古拉族部队先试图向班巴里的电信公司地方分支机构勒索钱财，然后在镇上设立一个检查站维持自己在该镇的部队，分歧是在这之后爆发的。据报 Darrassa 力争撤销导致这两个群体内斗的检查站。已达成了一项协议，在编写本报告时，古拉族和富拉尼族联合控制着班巴里北部检查站，而据报 Alkhatim 也在该镇，古拉族的增援正从布里亚赶来。⁴²

65. 2014 年 9 月 17 日，一份由 Alkhatim 和 Ali Darrassa 签署的公报宣布了前塞雷卡的分裂并谴责中非复兴人民阵线政治领导层的“不負責任和无能”。⁴³ 上述签署人的意图是创设新的政治结构，他们认为，国家分治和 Michel Djotodia 的重返均非解决办法。

⁴⁰ 这一决定是 2014 年 5 月 10 日前塞雷卡在恩代莱召开秘密会议期间作出的。会议期间，Damane 将军发挥了突出作用，而 Ali Darrassa 则留在班巴里。

⁴¹ 在此背景下，2014 年 8 月 21 日，据称是 Alkhatim 准将发表的一份假公报宣布，他的组织支持在取代恩扎帕耶凯总理职位的竞选中落败的候选人 Karim Meckassoua。还有谣言说，Meckassoua 斥重金换取 Alkhatim 的支持。Alkhatim 向专家小组否认自己幕后操纵成立 Forces Républicaines pour le Changement (FRC)，也否认收过任何金钱，并谴责企图削弱“新”塞雷卡和加深其目前分裂状况的政治操作；与 Alkhatim 准将的电话交谈，2014 年 8 月 25 日。2014 年 9 月 16 日，在起草本报告时，关于 Meckassoua 参与班巴里事件的谣言仍在盛传。

⁴² 2014 年 9 月 6 日与 Nourredine Adam 的私人秘书的电话交谈。

⁴³ 2014 年 10 月 10 日与前塞雷卡一位领导人的电话交谈。签署新闻稿的还有 Nedjad Ibrahim Ahamat 上尉(Zoundeko 的班巴里前发言人)和 Abdoulaye Faya Ahamat 将军(原知他是上校，2014 年 5 月 10 日在恩代莱被任命为 Zoundeko 的“军事顾问”)。


反砍刀组织

66. 专家小组的临时报告中概述的结构(见 [S/2014/452](#), 附件 5)详细说明了反砍刀组织内部四个不同的团体, 这一结构仍然反映了该运动当前的状态。事实上, 在布拉柴维尔论坛、Wénézoui 第二次访问刚果共和国、解放者协调会总书记 Romaric Vomitiadé 被任命为新的过渡政府旅游和文化部长以及 Robert Namséné 被任命为环境部长之后, 各派之间的不和与分裂加深了。

67. 尽管在布拉柴维尔会议之前已启动了和解，并签署了《停止敌对行动协定》，但反砍刀组织运动仍然严重分裂。实际上，即使该运动最有组织的部分 Nga ĩsona 的解放者协调会，目前也面临一些外部和内部挑战：(a) 反砍刀组织运动政治领导权的争夺；(b) 反砍刀组织内巴亚人族裔血统与非巴亚人团体族裔间以族裔为界线的分裂；(c) 反砍刀组织军事指挥官之间的内部冲突。

68. 此外，专家小组认为，Nga ĩsona 为组建反砍刀组织四个不同部分所作的一切努力扩大了他在班吉以外的领导力，为他的运动提供了一个真正的组织的所有属性，包括正式的指挥和控制结构以及一个政治外表，这一方面加强了 Nga ĩsona 作为反砍刀组织在国际社会的代表的合法性，但另一方面又削弱了他对自己的组织的掌控，加剧了对抗、戒备和紧张的局势。

Patrice Edouard Nga ssona 的解放者协调会政治和军事部门结构



注：另见附件 10 中的指挥和结构，其中附有解放者协调会 32 名军事指挥官和 4 名政治领导人的姓名和签字。

69. 例如，专家小组在 Boda 博达记录了 Nga ĩsona 设立的解放者协调会新的地方机构，该机构由中非共和国武装部队下士 Soussou Habib 领导(见附件 11 和 63)。⁴⁴ 在贝贝拉提，专家小组会见了 Nga ĩsona 派往该区域协助建立解放者协调会地方分支机构的代表 Jean-Louis Nga žounou。专家小组在 Nga žounou 和反砍刀组织贝贝拉提地区指挥官 Chrysostome Berba Yapele 及其参谋下榻的宾馆里偶然见到 Nga žounou 与喀麦隆边界的甘布拉地区指挥官 Nice Demawanesse 的会晤。⁴⁵ 在锡布，专家小组和国际部队约谈的反砍刀组织指挥官还提到格里马里(瓦卡省)和代科阿(凯莫省)存在来自班吉的小团体或反砍刀组织。⁴⁶

政治竞争和族裔分裂

70. 在政治层面上，Nga ĩsona 经过几个月对在第一届过渡政府中正式代表反砍刀组织的前青年和体育部长利奥波德·纳西斯·巴拉的合法性提出质疑，成功地使他靠边站。Nga ĩsona 还指责在被任命为部长之前住在法国的巴拉是法国当局强加给过渡时期国家元首的。⁴⁷ 这场冲突的高潮发生在 2014 年 6 月，当时巴拉以青年和体育部长的身份宣布暂停 Nga ĩsona 领导的中非共和国足球联合会委员会，Nga ĩsona 反过来在 2014 年 6 月 24 日公布一份公报，将巴拉从解放者协调会除名，巴拉实际上并不是其正式成员(见附件 12)。

71. Joachim Kokaté 和 Wénézoui 仍然是 Nga ĩsona 作为反砍刀组织运动主要代表身份的强大竞争对手。当地一个非政府组织 Mou-Da⁴⁸ 2014 年 6 月 20 日在联合国开发计划署举行了一次和解会议后，Wénézoui 的确被提拔为解放者协调会副总协调员，这时离他被驱逐出解放者协调会还不到一个月后，他被来自南方的团体选举为反砍刀组织协调员(见 S/2014/452，附件 5)，⁴⁹ 然后又在他应接替 Nga ĩsona 任调解人的萨索·恩格索总统邀请前往布拉柴维尔之后于 2014 年 8 月 19 日再次被停职。⁵⁰ 在最后一次被停职之后，Wénézoui 创建了他自己的政党“未来爱国运动”。

72. 同样，Nga ĩsona 对专家小组说，他不承认 Kokaté 作为反砍刀组织的合法代表。⁴⁷ 但是，Kokaté 以他以前作为前总理的复员方案顾问和南方反砍刀组织代表

⁴⁴ 2014 年 7 月 9 日对博达的访问。

⁴⁵ 2014 年 7 月 10 日对贝贝拉提的访问。

⁴⁶ 2014 年 7 月 23 日对锡布的访问。

⁴⁷ 2014 年 5 月 3 日在班吉与 Patrice Edouard Nga ĩsona 的访谈。

⁴⁸ 在桑戈语中，Mou 的意思是收集，Da 的意思是家庭；Mou-Da 由过渡时期总统的女儿 Anaketé Samba 领导，2014 年 6 月 18 日作为非政府组织在班吉注册。

⁴⁹ Wénézoui 2014 年 5 月 15 日当选为来自南方的反砍刀组织总协调员，2014 年 6 月 20 日被任命为解放者协调会副总协调员(见附件 13)。

⁵⁰ 根据 Patrice Edouard Nga ĩsona 作出的决定，Sébastien Wénézoui 由于“叛国、冒充和不服从”而被停职；《反砍刀组织爱国者运动副总协调员被停职》，非洲新闻社，2014 年 8 月 20 日。

的身份已获得一定的知名度并成为关键角色，包括在解放者协调会和国际社会之间发挥调解作用。

73. 主要由巴亚人族裔组成的北方反砍刀组织与主要由雅科马人和过渡时期总统的班齐里人等来自乌班吉河的族裔群体组成的南方反砍刀组织之间的分裂仍然很大。然而，在由于收入的分配发生暴力冲突和和人称“Rombhot”的 Alfred Yekatom 2014 年 6 月 23 日被红蝴蝶部队逮捕并随后释放之后，由 Rombhot 指挥的团体失去一部分影响力，特别是在国际机场(称为波音社区)南部地区、班吉第六区的一些地方和邻近的宾博市(关于 Rombhot 团体，详见 S/2014/452，附件 5.4)。

74. 有一个较小的团体也在力争反砍刀组织运动内部的政治代表权。该团体由 Danzoumi Yalo(别名“Daz 上校”)、他的兄弟 Sani、Alain Hassan Donday 和弗朗索瓦·博齐泽政权有争议的著名人物中非共和国武装部队指挥官 Anatole Ngaya 组成，称为中非共和国武装部队恢复联盟或国防和国土民主联盟。被称为穆斯林反砍刀组织分子的“Daz 上校”告诉专家小组说，他在政治层面上代表“Rombhot 的团体”。⁵¹

75. Daz 上校还告诉专家小组说，他说服 Rombhot 停止从他控制的毗邻地区攻击班吉 PK5 居民区，即当时还被 Wénézoui 和 Kamezola i 控制的波音、科科罗和法蒂马社区。专家小组从两个其他独立的消息来源得到信息，Rombhot 的团体在 2014 年 2 月和 3 月对班吉的穆斯林飞地开展了基于宗教的攻击。⁵² 同一消息来源表示，自 2014 年 4 月/5 月以来所有的袭击都是与 Nga ĩsona 的解放者协调会或与前复兴共和与民主人民军指挥官 Jean-Jacques Larmassou 有关的其他反砍刀组织团体进行的。

解放者协调会的分裂

76. 解放者协调会军事派别内部在布拉柴维尔和平会议之前、期间和之后显现分裂。更具体地说，由中非共和国武装部队 Yvon Konaté 中尉支持的 Andilo 团体和由已知以前与 Eugène Nga ĩkosset 有关联的中非共和国武装部队上尉 Olivier Koudémon(别名“Gbangouma”)支持的另一名国家武装部队中尉 Guy Mazimbélet 的团体之间在班吉第八区反砍刀组织的据点博伊拉贝区居民区爆发了战斗。⁵³ 与 Mazimbélet 联合的班吉第四区战斗人员居民区的反砍刀组织指挥官 Gabin Inga 在

⁵¹ 2014 年 4 月 12 日在班吉与 Daz 上校的访谈。

⁵² 2014 年 4 月 9 日在班吉与穆斯林代表的会谈；2014 年 4 月 26 日在班吉与一位反砍刀组织政治领导人的访谈。

⁵³ 2014 年 7 月和 8 月在班吉与反砍刀组织军事指挥官的访谈和会谈；根据在博伊拉贝区福音传教士教堂举行的和解会议的记录，Andilo 指示所有中非共和国武装部队反砍刀组织人员向他行军礼，惩罚一个名叫 Naminda 的中非共和国武装部队中尉做俯卧撑，之后战斗就开始了，Mazimbélet(可能是 Andilo 的叔叔)、Koudémon 和 Andilo 的代表 Olivier Arsène Fe ĩsona 参加了这次会议。

2014 年 7 月 18 日的战斗中受重伤，次日在公立医院内死亡。⁵⁴ 接替他的是一名叫“Zanguilo”的，专门小组对他不了解。在 2014 年 5 月 27 日已遭受手榴弹袭击的 Yvon Konaté 的司机(见 S/2014/452，附件 5)也被打死，而据报 Andilo 所藏匿的 Konaté 在班吉 Fou 居民区的住宅则被摧毁。⁵⁵

77. Oliver Koudémon 不是解放者协调会指挥和控制结构的正式组成部分。专家小组认为 Koudémon 是反砍刀组织第三个团体最重要的领导人之一，该团体主要由不一定属于 Nga ïsona 和解放者协调会的军队和安全人员组成。“Gbangouma”声称他不是反砍刀组织成员，尽管他的名字大量与该运动联系在一起，但他向专家小组证实了他在组织博伊拉贝的中非共和国武装部队分子反对 Andilo 团体中的角色。⁵⁶ 当地媒体指控他受过渡当局的委派和资助带头打击 Andilo，而另一些人则认为博齐泽家族支持他的行动。⁵⁷

78. 2014 年 8 月 9 日，地方和国际媒体再次报道这两个派别之间发生激烈战斗，造成两人死亡，专家小组也听到这一消息。⁵⁸ 根据秘密消息来源提供的信息，在前博齐泽政权陆军参谋长 Jules Bernard Ouandé 将军、中非共和国武装部队指挥官 Charles Ngremangou、2014 年 2 月被任命为国防部长的参谋长的反砍刀组织前领导人和前安全部长的亲自干预下，Andilo 在获得 4 辆车作为补偿后停止了敌对行动。⁵⁹ 一位反砍刀组织军事指挥官向专家小组解释，Andilo 需要车辆和资金在瓦姆省保持对塞雷卡军事压力。⁶⁰

79. Andilo 是目前最神秘、最让人害怕和最强有力的反砍刀组织军事指挥官。他在军事方面积极反对前塞雷卡，2014 年 7 月 29 日率领对巴丹加弗据点的进攻，Alkhatim 的部队也在那里与法国部队对抗。然而，班吉的一个秘密消息来源向专家小组报告，在起草本报告时 Andilo 正在躲藏，力量被削弱，要求被纳入解除武装、复员和重返社会方案。⁶¹

80. 根据专家小组 2014 年 4 月获得的一项秘密来源情报，Andilo 被认为是来自瓦姆省和翁贝拉-姆波科省的反砍刀组织最有魅力的领导人。除 2013 年 12 月 16

⁵⁴ 2014 年 7 月 17 日与一名反砍刀组织指挥官的访谈；然而，一位著名的本地记者在 2014 年 7 月 25 日与专家小组面谈时质疑了这种说法，他说 Inga 是在玩耍机枪时打死自己的。

⁵⁵ 见 <http://apanews.net/news/fr/article-fas.php?id=801681>。

⁵⁶ 2014 年 8 月 17 日在班吉与 Olivier Koudémon(别名“Gbangouma”)的访谈。

⁵⁷ 见 <http://centralafricanrepublicnews.wordpress.com/2014/08/09/centrafrique-info-weekend-Boy-Rabe-la-main-cachee-de-samba-panza/>。

⁵⁸ 法新社：“班吉民兵战斗人员在数千人举行和平游行时发生冲突”，2014 年 8 月 9 日。

⁵⁹ 2014 年 8 月 17 日在班吉与一名参加与 Andilo 谈判的反砍刀组织军事领导人的访谈。

⁶⁰ 2014 年 7 月 22 日在班吉与一名反砍刀组织军事领导人的访谈。

⁶¹ 2014 年 9 月 6 日与了解 Andilo 下落的秘密消息人士的电话交谈。

日接受法国新闻社一名记者采访外，⁶² Andilo 避开媒体和国际社会，据报道他约 25 岁，不会讲法语。他来自巴丹加弗，他的祖父母仍住在那里，而他的母亲住在布卡郊区，⁶³ 人知他在布卡和巴丹加弗一带有抢牛行为。⁶⁴ 几个熟悉中非共和国安全局势的组织认为他是反砍刀组织最有影响力的军事指挥官。班吉博伊拉贝社区的平民一直在抱怨各种恶行，包括 Andilo 和他的反砍刀组织团体成员的勒索和敲诈。⁶⁵

81. 2014 年 7 月 30 日，Kamezola i 在一项前过渡时期总理支持的倡议中呼吁所有军人重返军营，离开反砍刀组织运动(见上文第 34 段)。Kamezola i 称，他的呼吁得到博伊拉贝区一些反砍刀组织指挥官，包括解放者协调会一些知名指挥官的拥护。⁶⁶ 然而，这一倡议遭到 Nga ĩsona 的解放者协调会的谴责，他们声称 Kamezola i 无权解散 Nga ĩsona 政治运动的军事部门。

82. 这进一步说明，尽管签署了《停止敌对行动协定》并任命了新的民族团结政府，但 Nga ĩsona 仍多么需要给人造成军事部门处在他的指挥之下的印象，为他充当关键政治人物的角色创造理由。Kamezola i 在 2014 年 8 月给过渡时期总统的信中谴责了这一情况和某些政客对自卫民兵的利用，并揭露说，他在 2014 年 7 月 14 日新闻发布会之后就受到了威胁。⁶⁷

安全事件

83. 根据专家小组数据库中的信息，2013 年 12 月 5 日至 2014 年 8 月 14 日期间，被认为是反砍刀组织的团体杀死了 854 名平民和 7 名人道主义援助工作者，尽管 Nga ĩsona 在布拉柴维尔签署了《停止敌对行动协定》和 2014 年 8 月 28 日指定 Salomon Fe ĩganazoui 作为过渡时期新总理任命的指导委员会内反砍刀组织的代表(见附件 14)。

84. 在博达，尽管 Nga ĩsona 在 2014 年 6 月 28 日指定了新的领导，反砍刀组织仍继续发起基于宗教的袭击、杀害平民和袭击国际部队(见第 69、201、202 和 215 段，以及附件 63)。

⁶² 登载此次采访文章的包括《年轻非洲》网站(www.jeuneafrique.com/actu/20131216T181246Z20131216T181223Z)。

⁶³ 2014 年 4 月 30 日在博桑戈阿与熟悉中非共和国安全局势的秘密消息人士的会谈。

⁶⁴ 2014 年 8 月 18 日在班吉与秘密消息人士的访谈。

⁶⁵ 2014 年 5 月 22 日在班吉与外交人士的会谈。


⁶⁶ 即中非共和国武装部队军官 Hervé Ganazoui 和 Aimé Abel Denamgana ĩ 见上文第 68 段所述解放者协调会军事部门的指挥结构。

⁶⁷ 2014 年 8 月 Kamezola i 给中非共和国总统、军队总司令的信。

塞雷卡

85. 到目前为止统一前塞雷卡的政治代表和军事指挥的反复努力未能成功。于 2014 年 5 月 10 日在恩代莱指定新的军事领导人,并于 2014 年 7 月 10 日在 Nourredine Adam 担任领导期间在比劳建立一个新的政治运动中非复兴人民阵线,⁶⁸ 并没有将前塞雷卡的不同部分团结在统一的领导之下。相反,国家分治的支持者和愿意支持政治过渡及和解进程者之间的分裂以及族裔分裂自 2014 年 5 月以来加深了。

中非复兴人民阵线的结构



86. 此外,前塞雷卡的一些主要政治和军事人物继续追求自己的议程而牺牲了运动的团结。例如,专家小组认为,编入军队的前乍得反叛分子并于 2003 年作为解放者参加博齐泽政变的 Alkhatim,在 2014 年 5 月 10 日恩代莱的秘密会议之前在军事方面特别活跃。在秘密会议之后,Alkhatim 由于被提名担任共和国部队第一副参谋长而获得他的同僚某种形式的承认,因为他仍是掌权权力的军事指挥官,在中非共和国的最大领域中具有影响力(见附件 17 中 Alkhatim 部队的照片)。

87. 此外,似乎前塞雷卡各个派别,特别是 Damane 的古拉人族裔,利用决定在班巴里这一 Darrassa 军指挥的富拉尼人族裔派别的据点建立新“塞雷卡”军事总部的机会,挑战富拉尼族对资源,特别是对黄金(见第 135-143 段)和咖啡(第 144-145 段)的控制。就权力平衡、领土控制和资源开采来说,这一重大变动仍在影响“新”塞雷卡的政治和军事结构,并已导致上文第 58 至 65 段所述在班巴里的严重内斗。

⁶⁸ 中非复兴人民阵线取代在 2014 年 5 月恩代莱会议期间由另一个隆加族人 Abdoulaye Issène 建立的临时政治协调会(见附件 15 和 16)。

88. 不同的塞雷卡派别内对领土的控制基本划分如下：

(a) Mahamat Alkhatim 准将(萨拉马特族)：Kabo(他将其以前设在 Moyenne-Sido 的总部挪至此地)、巴丹加弗(瓦姆省)、Kaga-Bandoro、Mbrès(纳纳-格里比齐省)和 Dékoa(凯莫省)；小组还确定，Alkhatim 定期在 Nana-Bakassa、博吉拉(瓦姆省西部)和 Bémal(瓦姆-彭代省)地区开展行动(见 S/2014/452，第 51-53 段和附件 6)；

(b) Ali Darrassa Mahamat 将军(富拉尼族)：班巴里、Ippy、Kouango 和 Ngakobo (瓦卡省)；

(c) Zakaria Damane 将军(古拉族)：布里亚、萨姆万贾(上科托省)；

(d) Mahamat Nourredine Adam 将军(隆加族)：恩代莱(巴明吉-班戈兰省)、比劳(瓦卡加省)。

89. 在主要经济中心，即比劳、恩代莱、布里亚和班巴里，存在几个派别。在比劳和恩代莱，传统领导人瓦卡加的苏丹 Ahmad Moustapha Am-Gabo(卡拉族)和巴明吉-班戈兰的苏丹 Senoussi Ibrahim Kamoun(隆加族)还有着较大的政治份量，并总是参与决策进程，如 2014 年 5 月在恩代莱和 2014 年 7 月在比劳组织秘密会议(见附件 16)。

90. 专家小组获悉，Darrassa 把他的军事控制扩大至与刚果民主共和国接壤的瓦卡省的 Kouango 县，该县以黄金交易中心而闻名(见第 143 段)。以前，据报，Kouango 被来自班吉的反砍刀组织的团体用作一个向班巴里、Grimari 和 Ngakobo 发起进攻的中心。后勤和安全方面的限制妨碍了专家小组前往没有国际人员存在的该地区。

91. 在政治方面，一些前塞雷卡主要政治领导人的个人野心加剧了该运动内部的紧张关系，他们是：Nourredine Adam(隆加族-争取正义与和平爱国者同盟-教旨爱国者同盟)、Abdoulaye Issène Ramadane(隆加族-爱国者同盟)、Mohamed-Moussa Dhaffane(古拉族-拯救科多罗爱国公约)、Herbert Gontran Djono Ahaba(古拉族-民主团结联盟)和 Ousmane Mahamat Ousmane(阿拉伯族-变革革命军运动领导人，与 Darrassa 有关联)。

92. 专家小组在 Nourredine Adam 于 2014 年 7 月 9 日和 10 日在比劳组织和主持会议之后收集的第一手证词提供了有益的帮助，可洞察前塞雷卡不同政治领导人之间的权力平衡如何仍然是了解这一运动内部任命领导人进程的主要关键。⁶⁹ 根据这些领导人介绍，如果说在比劳召开的成立中非复兴人民阵线的大会是中非复兴人民阵线第一副主席 Nourredine Adam 的权力的明确表现的话，那么，他未能远距离地保持忠诚和这一运动内的纪律。而且，关于中非共和国的第 2127(2013)

⁶⁹ 2014 年 7 月和 8 月期间，对前塞雷卡的多位政治和军事领导人进行了采访和与其会面。

号决议所设委员会 2014 年 5 月 9 日对 Nourredine Adam 的旅行禁令影响到他行动的能力，更具体地说是在布拉柴维尔领导塞雷卡代表团的能力。

93. 自从在布拉柴维尔签署停止敌对行动协定以来，Nourredine Adam 发表的几个新闻公报反映了中非复兴人民阵线内部没有纪律这一状况：

(a) 2014 年 8 月 6 日，在布拉柴维尔签署停止敌对行动协定后暂停了中非复兴人民阵线第二副主席 Mohamed-Moussa Dhaffane 的职务，并决定中非复兴人民阵线撤出该协定；

(b) 2014 年 9 月 1 日，在中非复兴人民阵线第三副主席 Mahamat Taïb Yacoub 以负责养牛的副部长的身份参加新政府之后，他被驱逐出该阵线。

94. 事实上，代表中非复兴人民阵线作出的所有声明和决定仅由 Nourredine Adam 签字，并经与他有联系的前塞雷卡领导人核准，其中包括 Arda Hakouma 将军和 Mahamat Abrass。⁷⁰

95. 因此，专家小组认为中非复兴人民阵线是事实上由 Nourredine Adam 领导的一个政治运动，目的是推动他自己的政治议程，其中包括国家分治，因此，不代表前塞雷卡。在这方面，值得一提的是，中非复兴人民阵线秘书长 Moustapha Saboune 代表前塞雷卡参加为监测停止敌对行动协定的执行情况而设立的指导委员会(见附件 14)。

96. 考虑到关于中非共和国的第 2127(2013)号决议所设委员会于 2014 年 5 月 9 日将 Nourredine Adam 列名，原因是他参与或支持破坏中非共和国和平、稳定与安全的行为，专家小组认为，中非复兴人民阵线符合同样的列名标准。专家小组还注意到，自 Djotodia 于 2014 年 9 月 3 日被指定为中非复兴人民阵线负责人以来他发表的第一个公开声明(见第 32-33 段)，其中他向总部设在科托努的一家报纸宣布，结束中非共和国冲突只有两个备选办法：让前塞雷卡重新掌权，或国家分治。²⁰

97. 正如在其临时报告中所述，专家小组认为，任何促进国家分治的行为都是对中非共和国和平、安全与稳定的重大威胁(见 S/2014/452，执行摘要和第 44 和 55 段以及附件 6)。

安全事件

98. 根据专家小组的数据库，前塞雷卡对 2013 年 12 月 5 日至 2014 年 8 月 14 日期间 610 名平民和 7 名人道主义援助工作者被杀害负有责任。

⁷⁰ 2014 年 8 月 23 日，电话采访了 Nourredine Adam、Hakouma、Abrass 和中非复兴人民阵线其他两名成员。

99. Alkhatim 和他 600 多人的部队，仍然是对中非共和国的和平与安全的一个主要威胁。⁷¹ 除了专家小组已报告的包括杀害平民和人道主义援助人员以及对国际部队的激烈袭击等几起严重事件外，专家小组在 2014 年 9 月 3 日和 4 日得到的详细报告表明，2014 年 9 月 2 日，Alkhatim 的巴丹加弗部队在 Nana-Bakassa(瓦姆省)再次参与破坏和掠夺财产以及杀害 5 名平民。

革命与正义

100. 革命与正义组织是 2013 年 10 月成立的，由在中非武装部队中有上尉军衔的 Armel Ningatouloum Sayo(又称 Armel Bedaya 或“指挥官 Sayo”)和 François Toussaint 成立的，后者又称为 Ngoy 将军，他是一名居住在加蓬的比利时国民，他因在比利时的谋杀指控受国际通缉，他还被控在刚果民主共和国境内培训马伊-马伊武装团体。⁷²

101. 2013 年 11 月 1 日，Sayo 和 Toussaint 在 Baiboon 地区越过喀麦隆和中非共和国边界，并在 Boloum 地区的保瓦的郊区建立革命与正义的第一个训练营地。指挥链由充当 Sayo 的副手的前复兴共和与民主军军官 Waluba Espilodja“上校”、来自布阿尔的中非共和国武装部队的一名中士 Luther Betuban“上校”和 Raymond Belanga“中校”组成。Toussaint“将军”负责训练和军事战略。

102. 据 Toussaint 说，革命与正义于 2013 年 12 月 24 日开始对该地区的富拉尼族团体和塞雷卡部队开展军事行动。当时，该团体有大约 1 000 名战斗人员，来自从马昆达(瓦姆省)到 Bang(瓦姆-彭代省)的广大地区，后者是与乍得和喀麦隆交界的一个村庄。革命与正义得以在 2014 年 1 月控制了保瓦周围的若干村庄，然后迫使塞雷卡部队离开保瓦，事先与中非支助团喀麦隆特遣队有协定，他们不会进行干预。Toussaint 还声称，2014 年 1 月，中非支助团向革命与正义提供了多箱弹药，以便与在保瓦东南部活跃的富拉尼族团体交战。

103. Sayo 的副手 Espilodja，是前复兴共和与民主军的一名军官，于 2014 年 4 月率数百人离开了该团体，后于 2014 年 8 月 14 日在与位于保瓦的中非支助团部队冲突期间被杀。据国际部队说，在 2014 年 6 月，Sayo 仅指挥在 Gadoulou(保瓦以东 15 公里)、Bang 和 Bodjomo 的 60 人。⁷³

104. Sayo 和 Toussaint 向专家小组称，他们已与乍得官员讨论过几次。Sayo 声称，乍得已派出几个特使，以便“收买”他的支持，而 Toussaint 说，Sayo 要求

⁷¹ 专家小组的估算依据了其本身的观察和我的军事来源提供的数字；细目是：200 至 400 人在 Kaga-Bandoro，100 人在 Batangafo，60 人在 Dékoa，余留部队用作机动部队。

⁷² 2014 年 6 月 23 日在保瓦采访 Armel Sayo；2014 年 7 月 17 日在班吉采访 François Toussaint；2014 年 8 月 18 日在班吉会晤 Armel Sayo；2010 年 3 月 2 日在 Makala 中心监狱大厅的军事法庭作出的判决。另见 <http://kongokinshasa.afrikblog.com/archives/p300-10.html>。

⁷³ 对 Armel Sayo 的采访，2014 年 6 月 23 日在保瓦；与国际部队的会面，2014 年 6 月 24 日，保瓦。

乍得提供支持，并于 2014 年 1 月派 Espilodja 前往乍得，他在那里会见了乍得总统卫队的特使们，尽管据报道双方之间没有达成任何协定。据 Sayo 说，革命与正义后来在 2014 年 4 月/5 月，在马昆达地区和中非共和国(瓦姆省)，与乍得国民军军事单位发生过几次冲突(另见上文第 36-46 段)。Sayo 向专家小组宣称，革命与正义从马昆达进行了战术撤离，而专家小组在当地收集的证词提及，革命与正义避免了对抗，在来自乍得的一个“身份不明”的武装团体到达的前一天离开了该镇，该团体被描述为富拉尼人、乍得人和塞雷卡的战斗人员的混合体，该团体于 2014 年 5 月 1 日控制了马昆达。⁷⁴

105. 根据收集的证据，以及向 Toussaint 本人向专家小组所作的声明，Toussaint 在 2013 年 11 月至 2014 年 2 月期间培训革命与正义部队，并为其提供咨询意见，成为中非共和国目前的冲突中第一个已知的西方雇佣军。

106. Toussaint 称，多达 1 500 名新兵在 2013 年 12 月期间加入革命与正义。他每天对新兵进行体能训练，并就军事战术和进攻技术向 Sayo 提供咨询。Toussaint 声称，曾计划革命与正义于 2013 年 12 月 24 日对 Beboura 进行的第一次重大攻击，根据他的陈述，打死 45 名塞雷卡战斗人员。他还在 2014 年 1 月就如何攻占保瓦向 Armel Sayo 提供过咨询意见，并牵头与中非支助团的讨论，以谈判达成他们不干涉的结果。Toussaint 然后宣布，在 2014 年 2 月 5 日与 Armel Sayo 再次发生争议后离开革命与正义。Toussaint 还出现在 2014 年 1 月 1 日在因特网上张贴的一段视频中，他站在数百名革命与正义战斗人员前，在录像中，Sayo 在将革命与正义的指挥权交给他之前，介绍说 Toussaint 是一位将军(见附件 18)。但是，Sayo 声称，Toussaint 从未参加过战斗，仅担任顾问。

107. 2014 年 7 月 7 日，François Toussaint 在布阿尔被中非支助团逮捕，并移交至班吉，在起草本报告时，他仍被拘留，等待被引渡回比利时。

108. 2014 年 8 月 22 日，Armel Sayo 被过渡总理穆罕默德·卡蒙任命为青年和体育部长。但是，他的武装团体仍由 Laurent Dim-Woei Biti 代表，负责监测《布拉柴维尔协定》的执行情况而任命的指导委员会(见附件 14)。

上帝抵抗军

109. 上帝军仍活跃在中非共和国西部各省，更具体地说是在上姆博穆省、姆博穆省、上科托省和下科托省。根据专家小组数据库的信息，上帝军对 2013 年 12 月 5 日至 2014 年 8 月 14 日期间的 42 起事件负有责任，其中包括绑架、抢劫、破坏财产、强迫流离失所、性暴力和杀害 2 名平民。

110. 根据向专家小组提供的资料，在 Okello Palutaka “上尉”指挥下的一个上帝军团体和在 Ahmed Sherif “上校”指挥下的一个塞雷卡团体，在 Nzako 县(姆博

⁷⁴ 2014 年 8 月 12 日对马昆达的访问。

穆省),在后勤一级相互合作(见附件 19 中的指挥官照片)。⁷⁵ 专家小组打算调查这两个武装团体之间进一步的联系。

C. 开采自然资源

钻石

呼吁警惕非法贸易问题

111. 2013 年 5 月暂时中止中非共和国的金伯利进程证书制度资格,迅速增加了中非钻石的非法跨界贩运。在 2014 年 6 月 6 日接受媒体采访时,前矿业能源和水利部长 Olivier Malibangar 估计,中非共和国 80% 的钻石产出是通过欺骗出口国外的。⁷⁶ 就数量而言,专家小组估计,中止该国金伯利进程证书制度的资格使该国的走私钻石数量比未中止资格时走私出国的数量增加了 140 000 克拉,其价值可达 2 400 万美元。这一估计数考虑到了生产放缓⁷⁷ 以及 Sodiam(中非钻石协会)和 Badica(中非钻石采购公司)等私营公司正在进行的正式购买的情况(见第 122 和 128 段)。⁷⁸ 这一估计数是依据 2013 年上半年的出口数字相当低这一情况计算出来的。⁷⁹

112. 2014 年 7 月,金伯利进程参加者和观察员发布一项行政决定,旨在确保不让来自中非共和国的钻石进入合法贸易。⁸⁰ 该行政决定提及 6 月 9 日至 12 日在中国上海举行的金伯利进程闭会期间会议上提出的载有来自中非共和国的钻石的国际货运案件。2014 年 5 月 30 日,金伯利进程主席(中国)给安全理事会关于中非共和国的第 2127(2013)号决议所设委员会发去一封信,鼓励委员会呼吁中非共和国非金伯利进程证书制度的邻国提高警惕,防止来自该国的非法毛坯钻石贸易。

113. 2014 年 6 月 19 日,制裁委员会主席将来信转给喀麦隆、乍得、刚果民主共和国、刚果、南苏丹和苏丹各常驻联合国代表,表示特别关注来自中非共和国东部两个钻石产区,即萨姆万贾和布里亚以及中非共和国西部曼贝雷-卡代省的一个产区的毛坯钻石产量,这是因为这些地区有反叛团体活动。

⁷⁵ 信息依据是 2014 年 3 月 11 日非洲联盟区域工作队在 Obbo(上姆博穆省)举行的上帝军叛逃者情况汇报会。

⁷⁶ 2014 年 9 月 5 日查阅了 <http://www.france24.com/fr/20140606-reporters-Centrafrigue-diamants-maudits-guerre-sangaris/>。

⁷⁷ 采矿当局估计,自危机开始以来,采矿活动放缓 35-40%。矿业、能源和水利部,采矿业的发展战略(2015-2020 年),2014 年 4 月,在联合国存档。

⁷⁸ 自从中止金伯利进程证书制度以来,班吉储存了约 40 000 克拉的钻石。在联合国存档的正式采购记录。

⁷⁹ 截至 2013 年 5 月 23 日中止前,中非共和国在正式出口 118 964 克拉钻石。中非共和国金伯利进程常务秘书 2013 年年度报告,在联合国存档。

⁸⁰ 2014 年 9 月 2 日查阅了 <http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/en/2014-administrative-decision-car>。

114. 在其信中,委员会重申,根据 2014 年 1 月 28 日第 2134(2014)号决议第 37(d)段,安全理事会已决定,该决议第 30 段规定的措施(旅行禁令)和第 32 条规定的措施(金融制裁)应适用于委员会指定的诸如下列个人和实体:在中非共和国以非法开采自然资源,包括开采钻石和野生动物及野生动物产品的方式,为武装团体或犯罪网络提供支助。

Kardiam 公司/Badica 公司

115. 2014 年 5 月 23 日,比利时联邦当局在安特卫普钻石办公室扣押了一批运送的可疑毛坯钻石(见附件 20)。在审查了这些钻石的数字图像后,金伯利进程钻石专家工作组指出,有很大的可能性这些钻石来自中非共和国(见附件 21)。所宣布的扣押涉及两批经金伯利进程证书制度认证的发运货物,它们来自阿拉伯联合酋长国,被运送至位于安特卫普的 Kardiam 公司。⁸¹

116. Kardiam 公司是中非的 Badica 公司驻比利时分公司(见 S/2014/452, 第 60 段)。Kardiam 公司向专家小组证实,它的两个包裹于 2014 年 5 月被扣押,并提供了 6 月初被扣押的第三个包裹的细节(见附件 22)。

117. 两家公司从阿拉伯联合酋长国向安特卫普发运所涉钻石。Ditrex Diamonds 公司出口了一批钻石,2 702 克拉,价值 89 827 美元。Reya Diam 公司出口两批;其中一批 3 397 克拉,价值 1 596 452 美元,一批 554 克拉。⁸¹ 2014 年 5 月被扣的包裹是宝石质量级的,来源是混合的。关于被扣押的货物,2014 年 7 月 2 日,迪拜钻石交易所主席通过一个专门关于珠宝的在线媒体机构指出,“迪拜收到来自刚果民主共和国的这一包裹,并附有有效的金伯利进程证书”(见附件 23)。

118. 阿拉伯联合酋长国当局与专家小组合作,追溯查出进口的这批货物重又出口,并提供了所附的金伯利进程证书的细节。阿拉伯联合酋长国金伯利进程办公室追溯调查,发现 Reya Diam 公司有 10 批进口货物,其中 5 批来自刚果民主共和国,3 批来自黎巴嫩,一批来自南非,一批来自毛里求斯。对 Ditrex Diamonds 公司的货物的追溯调查发现有 8 批进口货物,其中 3 批来自刚果民主共和国,3 批来自黎巴嫩,两批来自欧洲联盟内部。来自刚果民主共和国的货物中,一批除外,其余均涉及 Afrogem、Saga 和 Solidiam 等公司,是通过阿拉伯联合酋长国的中介商出口给 Reya Diam 和 Ditrex Diamonds 公司的。Afrogem 公司的一个包裹被直接发运给 Ditrex Diamonds 公司(见附件 24)。Afrogem 是 Primogem 公司的再现,⁸² Primogem 公司是直至 2008 年一直在班吉运营的 Primo 公司(见第 130 段)

⁸¹ 与金伯利进程参加方和观察员的电话交谈,2014 年 6 月 13 日和 14 日;采访钻石商人,2014 年 6 月 24 日,安特卫普。

⁸² 采访钻石商人,2014 年 8 月 22 日,金沙萨。

的一个姐妹公司。⁸³ Saga 公司给 Reya Diam 的三次货物是以 Abbas Fakih 的名义发运的, 至少 Solidiam 公司(给 Ditrex Diamonds 公司)的一批货物是以 Ahmad Ibrahim 的名义发运的。⁸⁴

119. 阿拉伯联合酋长国当局还向专家小组提供了 2013 年 1 月至 2014 年 8 月期间 Ditrex Diamonds 公司和 Reya Diam 公司给安特卫普, 包括给 Kardiam 公司的所有出口情况。⁸⁵ 自从 2013 年 9 月以来, Ditrex Diamonds 公司向 Kardiam 公司出口了 6 批宝石质量级的钻石包裹。自 2013 年 6 月以来, Reya Diam 公司向 Kardiam 公司出口了 13 批宝石质量级的钻石包裹。19 个包裹与在安特卫普被扣的那些包裹大小类似。

120. 刚果民主共和国采矿当局承认有中非钻石可能已进入刚果的正式供应链的风险, 但同时认为, 这些钻石可能是走私进入阿拉伯联合酋长国的, 以列入出口货物中, 从而取代较差的钻石, 使公司发运的克拉记录与收到的克拉数量相匹配。对钻石的数码图像的审查, 其中包括比较刚果出口的钻石图像与被扣押的钻石的图像, 应能更明确地表明, 在安特卫普扣押的具有中非共和国已知钻石形态特征的钻石是否在刚果民主共和国核证过。

121. 根据金伯利进程钻石专家工作组主席与比利时联邦当局之间的电子邮件通讯(由工作组主席提供给专家小组), 被扣货物的图片中包含的一些毛坯钻石显示中非共和国西部 Nola 地区(桑加-姆巴埃雷省)出产的钻石的典型特点, 而其他一些钻石则显示该国东部萨姆万贾和(上科托省)的特点(见附件 21)。

122. 截止 2014 年 7 月 2 日, Badica 公司正式购买的钻石共达 2 896 克拉, 其中大部分来自布里亚和萨姆万贾(见附件 25)。⁸⁶ 在中非共和国当局 2014 年 3 月 4 日、4 月 22 日和 7 月 2 日派出存货核查团之后, 这些毛坯钻石被储存在班吉。Badica 通过其姐妹公司 Minair 以及 Laparra 公司的航班将其钻石从布里亚和萨姆万贾运出。⁸⁷ Minair 和 Badica 两公司都属于由 Abdoul-Karim Dan Azoumi 负责的 Abdoulkarim 公司(www.groupeabdoulkarim.com)。Minair 还经常得到法国部队的包租(见附件 26)。

123. 专家小组在其临时报告中指出, 国际部队于 2014 年 4 月抵达布里亚之前, 前塞雷卡部队曾在布里亚飞机跑道征收 75 美元的降落税(见 S/2014/452, 第 66 段)。在萨姆万贾从卫星图像来看, 几个月来毛坯钻石生产迅速增加(见附件 27),

⁸³ 采访钻石商人, 2014 年 6 月 24 日至 26 日, 安特卫普。

⁸⁴ 刚果开采官员的电子邮件, 2014 年 9 月 15 日。

⁸⁵ 文件存档在联合国。

⁸⁶ 文件存档在联合国。

⁸⁷ 关于核查班吉的收购公司存货的报告存档在联合国。

而并没有国际部队的驻扎。受前区指挥官 **Beya Djouma** 控制的前塞雷卡部队征收 100 美元的飞机着陆税。⁸⁸ 几乎每一个星期都有商业航班飞往布里亚和萨姆万贾。⁸⁹ 税款通常由包租飞机的公司支付。⁹⁰

124. 萨姆万贾的收购商(钻石贸易中介商)也向看护他们房地的前塞雷卡士兵提供每日津贴。⁹¹ 在布里亚, 专家小组还于 2014 年 5 月观察到前塞雷卡士兵守卫大户收购商和商人的房地。反舞弊特别股的一名指挥官证实, 在萨姆万贾, 前塞雷卡部队通过与收购商的保安安排而从钻石贸易中获益。⁹²

125. 专家小组从业界和政府的消息来源处获得了详细的证词, 声称 **Badica** 公司还从事源自中非共和国但贩运到国外的钻石的交易。⁹³ 根据这些来源, 有一名叫 **Al Hadj Idriss Goudache** 的人为 **Badica** 贩运钻石。前塞雷卡派总统 **Djotodia** 于 2014 年 1 月辞职后, **Goudache** 离开中非共和国前往喀麦隆, 在加鲁阿、**Boulai**、**贝尔图阿**和**杜阿拉**小住后到喀麦隆最北端靠近乍得首都恩贾梅纳的 **Kousseri** 定居下来。⁹²

126. 此外, 根据 **Kenzou** 和**贝贝拉蒂**(曼贝雷-卡代省)的收购商的说法, **Badica** 的一名代理人**阿里·穆罕默德**在喀麦隆开展业务, 代表 **Badica** 购买从 **Nola** 和中非共和国西部**贝贝拉蒂**贩运的钻石。⁹⁴

127. 专家小组认为, 由 **Badica** 或以其名义从前塞雷卡控制下的地区**布里亚**和**Ouandja** 非法交易的钻石最终进入了在**安特卫普**被扣押的装运货物。**Badica** 公司从这些地区合法和非法的购买为前塞雷卡提供了持续的财政支助, 这违反了联合国的制裁制度。专家小组已在 2014 年 4 月力图与**班吉**经理总管讨论 **Badica** 公司的采购, 后者拒绝了专家小组的询问, 声称该公司已停止购买钻石。⁹⁵ 2014 年 6 月, 专家小组要求与**安特卫普**的 **Kardiam** 公司总管会晤, 但没有人回电话。2014 年 9 月 4 日和 16 日, **Kardiam** 书面答复了专家小组关于提供资料说明 2014 年 5 月扣押事件的要求(见附件 22)。在回答该公司是否了解或参与中非钻石的非法贩运和(或)将其钻石纳入**金伯利进程证书制度**的问题时, 该公司否认有任何参与。

⁸⁸ 2014 年 9 月 4 日电话采访萨姆万贾的收购商。

⁸⁹ 联合国档案中的关于中非共和国航班轮调情况的文件。

⁹⁰ 采访外交官, 2014 年 7 月 21 日, 班吉。

⁹¹ 2014 年 9 月 4 日电话采访萨姆万贾的收购商。

⁹² 采访美国空军司令, 2014 年 7 月 21 日, 班吉。

⁹³ 采访班吉中非宪兵的一名上尉, 2014 年 7 月 22 日, 班吉; 采访钻石商人, 2014 年 8 月 11 日, 杜阿拉; 采访钻石商人, 2014 年 8 月 18 日, 杜阿拉。

⁹⁴ 采访 **Kenzou** 的收购商, 2014 年 7 月 12 日。采访**贝贝拉蒂**的钻石收购商, 2014 年 7 月 11 日。

⁹⁵ 采访 **Badica** 的经理总管, 2014 年 4 月 28 日, 班吉。

Kardiam 还告诉专家小组, Kardiam 和 Badica 都未曾与 Goudache 合作过, 而 Badica 的采购商阿里·穆罕默德过去以贝贝拉蒂为经营地, 但他所有的财产都被抢劫一空, 随后被迫逃往喀麦隆, 目前居住在杜阿拉。

Sodiam 公司

128. 专家小组的临时报告(见 S/2014/452, 第 59 段)着重指出, Sodiam 公司仍是在班吉购买和储存钻石的大户正式购买商家, 但其购买量正在减少。在 2014 年 3 月的存货核查和 2014 年 7 月 2 日期间, Sodiam 又购买了 7 655 克拉钻石, 使总量达到 48 231 克拉。⁹⁶ Sodiam 两次应矿业和能源部长的要求准备了供出口的钻石包裹, 支付税款以便帮助采矿业务的运行, 由此确保其采购是可以追查的。⁹⁷ 这些钻石包仍然存放在班吉。根据中非共和国境内的金伯利进程当局, 为钻石作出口准备不构成违反金伯利资格暂停规定。Sodiam 的采购集中在中非共和国西部。⁹⁸

129. 在其临时报告中, 专家小组强调了 Boda-Guen-Carnot 轴线(曼贝雷-卡代省和洛巴耶省)上钻石贸易中反砍刀组织人员的出现增多, 此前曾发生出于族裔和宗教原因对钻石收购商进行的袭击(S/2014/452, 第 63-65 段)。目前沿轴线购买钻石的收购商 Jacob Moussa 告诉专家小组, 他在 Sasele(曼贝雷-卡代省)从反砍刀组织领袖 “Mama Drogba” 处采购钻石。⁹⁹

130. 贝贝拉蒂的主要钻石收购商 Hassan Ali Fawaz 和 Bassem Bahim 告诉专家小组说, 他们不能保证所购买的钻石未为武装团体谋利, 因为反砍刀组织部队作为挖掘者和中间商出现在大多数采矿区域。¹⁰⁰ 贝贝拉蒂的另一个收购商艾哈迈德·阿德南告诉专家小组说, 他从未走访过任何矿场去核实安全状况。¹⁰¹ Fawaz 是采购商家 Gemca 的前任经理, 而 Bassem 是采购商家 Sopicat 的前任经理。阿德南与采购商家 Primo 有业务联系。¹⁰² 2008 年 10 月, 中非共和国政府吊销了 Primo 和 Gemca 的许可证, 此后其雇员开始作为收购商而不是出口商经营业务。¹⁰²

131. 收购商 Jacob Moussa、Fawaz 和 Bassem 向 Sodiam 公司出售钻石(见附件 28)。Sodiam 的总经理告诉专家小组, 该公司的政策是, 不购买来自军事人员和武装团

⁹⁶ 联合国记载的存货核查报告。

⁹⁷ 电话采访 Sodiam 总经理, 2014 年 9 月 6 日。

⁹⁸ 在联合国存档的采购记录。

⁹⁹ 采访 Jacob Moussa, 班吉, 2014 年 4 月 24 日。

¹⁰⁰ 采访 Fawaz 和 Bassem, 贝贝拉蒂, 2014 年 7 月 11 日。

¹⁰¹ 采访 Ahmed Adnan, 贝贝拉蒂, 2014 年 7 月 11 日。

¹⁰² 采访矿业和能源部的一名前官员, 巴黎, 2014 年 9 月 4 日。

体成员的货品，该公司指示其收购商也这样做，以避免发生间接从据称为反砍刀组织成员处购买。¹⁰³ 与此同时，Sodiam 的总经理指出，也被 Sodiam 公司排除的供应商有可能轻易地将钻石出售给向国外贩运钻石的网络。The Panel believes that Sodiam's purchases have incidentally financed anti-balaka members, but that the risk of such financing is now being mitigated by the company with the implementation of due diligence procedures. 专家小组认为，Sodiam 公司的收购无意间为反砍刀组织成员融通资金，但该公司现已实施应有注意程序，这种融资可能性就减少了。

向喀麦隆贩运

132. 虽然贝贝拉蒂和班吉的钻石收购商承认，在中非共和国靠近喀麦隆边界的西部地区出产的大部分钻石都是在 Gamboul 和 Gbiti(曼贝雷-卡代省)私运出境、进入 Kenzou 和 Kette(喀麦隆东部省份)，随后并运往 Batouti 贝尔图阿、雅温得和杜阿拉，但这些收购商否认亲自参与这些活动。2014 年 5 月 20 日至 7 月 2 日，Sodiam 在贝贝拉蒂购买了 442 克拉的钻石。据贝贝拉蒂矿业和地理区域主任说，这在该地区的总产量中仅占一小部分。¹⁰⁴ 区域主任 2014 年第一季度的报告指出，在对收购商的采购和出售保证管制方面存在严重的安全和后勤问题。¹⁰⁵

133. 一些消息来源告诉专家小组，喀麦隆的采购商家 Gems Africa 公司有一个分部，设在 Kenzou，而 Patrick Ayandho 是这家分部的一个买主。¹⁰⁶ Ayandho 曾经与班吉的采购商家 ADR 有业务联系，当时他与前总统博齐泽总统的儿子 Socrate Bozizé 合作密切(见附件 29)。Ayandho 目前帮 Gems Africa 从贝贝拉蒂购买钻石。¹⁰⁶ 2014 年 8 月 15 日之前，Gems Africa 曾正式向阿拉伯联合酋长国出口了 815 克拉的毛坯钻石(见附件 30)。Ayandho 在一个专业联络网站上自定的身份是巴黎地区 Patson et fils 公司的钻石采购员。¹⁰⁷ 专家小组试图通过这一网站与 Ayandho 联系，但没有得到回复。

134. 2014 年 6 月 3 日，喀麦隆当局没收了怀疑来自中非共和国的 23.78 克拉毛坯钻石。¹⁰⁸ 这批钻石被提交给喀麦隆的金伯利进程主管部门以供核证，但没有提供任何产销监管链证件(见附件 31)。

¹⁰³ 采访 Fawaz 和 Bassem，贝贝拉蒂，2014 年 7 月 11 日。

¹⁰⁴ 采访西南区域矿业和地理主任区域主任，2014 年 7 月 11 日，贝贝拉蒂。

¹⁰⁵ 在联合国存档的报告。

¹⁰⁶ 采访钻石收购商，2014 年 7 月 12 日，Kenzou。采访运输管理当局，2014 年 7 月 11 日，贝贝拉蒂；与贝尔图阿的民间社会代表进行电子邮件通讯，2014 年 7 月 18 日。

¹⁰⁷ 见 fr.linkedin.com/pub/patrick-ayandho/70/70a/196，2014 年 8 月 24 日。

¹⁰⁸ 采访喀麦隆金伯利进程国家常任秘书，2014 年 8 月 14 日，雅温得。

黄金

135. 中非共和国官方的黄金尽管年产量估计约达两吨，相当于每年的价值超过 6 000 万美元(S/2014/452, 第 68 段)，但几乎不存在贸易。经许可的大户采购商 Dera d'or 于 2014 年购买了一公斤以上的黄金，主要来自 Yaloké(翁贝拉-姆波科省)(见附件 32)。这家公司把黄金变成 300-500 克的金链，从而便利地将黄金作为首饰、而不是毛坯锭块转运，这样，每克黄金仅需付 0.6 美元的税，而如果作为供出口的未加工黄金，每克就要付 1.3 美元的税(毛坯金出口税)。¹⁰⁹ 因此，从官方角度看，该公司并不出口任何供加工的黄金。

136. 2014 年有两家公司以官方身份出口未加工黄金。5 月，Badica 向在喀麦隆杜阿拉的 Djibrilla Abbo 公司出口了 827 克由 Yaloké 出产的黄金(见附件 33)。根据喀麦隆的贸易统计数字，2014 年这家公司正式出口了超过 7 公斤的黄金(见附件 34)。2014 年 2 月，中非全国矿产合作社联盟向设在达喀尔的 Africa Metal 公司出口了 889 克由 Bangandou(洛巴耶省)出产的黄金。

137. 2014 年 7 月，专家小组访问了 Yaloké 镇，这是中非共和国与 Ndassima/班巴里(瓦卡省)并列的一个主要黄金贸易中心。地方当局和在班吉的黄金交易商告诉专家小组，在塞雷卡于 2014 年 1 月底离开该地区前，Yaloké 有三名尚在经营的收购商：Djibrine Amine、Idriss Salleh 和 Ismaila Sylla。

138. Ismaila Sylla 曾经为 Adamas Swiss 工作，但这家收购公司在塞勒卡于 2013 年 3 月在班吉掌权后停止了业务。Sylla 在 2013 年 4 月 1 日的法国 24 台一则新闻报道中现身，正从一名塞雷卡部队指挥官收购黄金和钻石(见附件 35)。¹¹⁰ 2013 年 7 月，Dera'or 从 Sylla 购买了 731 克黄金(见附件 36)。2014 年 2 月，Sylla 向 Sodiam 公司出售了 29 克拉的钻石(见附件 37)。一些黄金商人告知专家小组，Sylla 打着一般进出口公司的幌子在中非共和国继续从事黄金和钻石交易，并前往迪拜出售货品。¹¹¹

139. 2014 年 1 月，Amine 离开 Yaloké 到喀麦隆的 Garoua Boulai 定居，以便继续买卖来自 Yaloké 的黄金，同时也交易包括 Ndassima 等地出产的黄金，估计该地每月出产 15 公斤的黄金(见第 141 段)。¹¹² Amine 在喀麦隆的贸易伙伴包括在贝尔图阿的 Oumarou Sanda 和 Djibrilla Abbo。¹¹² Djibrilla 是 Badica 公司在杜阿拉

¹⁰⁹ 采访 Dera'or 公司总经理，2014 年 7 月 7 日，班吉。

¹¹⁰ 见 www.france24.com/en/20130401-diamond-trade-central-african-republic-rebels-fund-coup, 2014 年 8 月 23 日。

¹¹¹ 采访班吉的黄金商人，2014 年 7 月 6 日和 7 月 16 日；电话采访迪拜的黄金交易商，2014 年 7 月 18 日。

¹¹² 采访宪兵官员，2014 年 7 月 19 日，Yaloké；采访班吉宪兵高级官员，2014 年 7 月 22 日，班吉；采访班吉的黄金商人，2014 年 7 月 16 日和 7 月 22 日。

的正式黄金贸易伙伴(见第 136 段),也是 Badica 在 Boda(Lobaya 省)的前钻石收购商。¹¹³ 黄金在喀麦隆贝尔图阿的熔炼设施中铸成锭块,并经由喀麦隆杜阿拉出口。专家小组尚未收到喀麦隆当局关于黄金出口的详细统计资料以核查 Djibrilla 公司 2014 年是否正式曾出口任何黄金。

140. 截止 2014 年 7 月,一名有执照的收购商 Emmanuel Boyembé 仍在 Yaloké 经商。Boyembé 告诉专家小组说,由于塞雷卡在 Yaloké 迫害信基督教的黄金贸易商,他到班吉避难,随后又于 2014 年 3 月返回 Yaloké。¹¹⁴ 他还告诉专家小组,反砍刀组织指挥官 Séverin Richard 和一个人称“Le Bleu”的男子一起监管那些他前往采购黄金的手工矿井,但现在这两人已经“复员”。根据在班吉的黄金贸易商和在 Yaloké 的一名当地警卫指出,Boyembé 参与了反砍刀组织在 Yaloké 的反叛,但是却向因此而被迫赶走的像 Amine 那样的喀麦隆穆斯林收购商出售货品。¹¹⁵

141. 2014 年 7 月,专家小组重访班巴里镇,而手工采矿者占据的黄金特许矿区 Ndassima 出产的黄金就在那里交易。专家小组在其临时报告(S/2014/452, 第 70 段)中指出,没有发现前塞雷卡部队征收任何税款的证据。然而,发言人 Ahmat Nadjat 上尉于 7 月告诉专家小组说,由 Ali Darrassa 率领的第 5 军区(瓦卡省)开始为手工采矿者发放许可证并为收购商发放授权书(见附件 38),每月分别收取 200 美元和 300 美元的税款。¹¹⁶ 手工采矿者在矿井管理采金挖掘队。他们在当地向收购商出售,后者运送黄金供应市场的转售。目前共有最多 50 名的采矿者和收购商在 Ndassima 活动,这可为第 5 军区每年提供 150 000 美元的收益。前塞雷卡当局目前也正在向 Ndassima 地区的数百名手工采矿者发放采掘许可卡(见附件 39)。2014 年 8 月 21 日,暴雨冲塌了一个矿井,致使至少 25 名采矿者死去。¹¹⁷

142. 据 Nadjat 说,对税收的规范化是为了防止士兵在 Ndassima 抢劫。¹¹⁷ Ndassima 的采矿者和交易商于 2014 年 5 月告诉专家小组, Tom Adam(见附件 9 中第 62 段和照片)2013 年初洗劫了当地采矿人,而在 Djotodia 于 3 月在班吉上台后不久此人就被 Darrassa 取而代之。¹¹⁸

143. 收购商将黄金从 Ndassima 带到班吉,随后再带到喀麦隆(见 S/2014/452, 第 70 段)。其中一部分进入喀麦隆贸易网络,详见上文第 139 段。来自 Ndassima

¹¹³ 采访班吉宪兵高级官员,2014 年 7 月 22 日,班吉。

¹¹⁴ 采访黄金收购商 Emmanuel Boyembe, 2014 年 7 月 19 日, Yaloké。

¹¹⁵ 采访班吉的黄金商人, 2014 年 7 月 16 日。

¹¹⁶ 采访塞雷卡发言人 Ahmat Nadjat, 2014 年 7 月 3 日, 班巴里。

¹¹⁷ 见 www.reuters.com/article/2014/08/22/us-centralafrica-mine-idUSKBN0GM0Q420140822, 2014 年 9 月 2 日。

¹¹⁸ 采访矿工和交易者, 2014 年 5 月 22 日, Ndassima。

的一部分黄金在 Satema 和 Kouango(交易, 两地都处于与刚果民主共和国班吉河接壤的乌班吉河畔。¹¹⁶ Kouango 是前塞雷卡据守的最南端位置(见第 88 和 90 段)。

农产品

144. 塞雷卡第 5 军区和第 6 军区(瓦卡省和下科托省)对牲畜、咖啡和农产品运输及一般商品也规定了并行的征税制度。牲畜拥有人须对每头牲畜支付 10 美元的保安税(见附件 40)。对咖啡的征税是每公斤 0.12 美元。国家农产品规定、管制和处理办事处曾经对咖啡征税, 但目前不办公(见附件 41)。此外, 植物检疫税是咖啡(每袋 2 美元)、动物皮和毛皮(20 美元)、芳香植物(每袋 1 美元)和车辆(每辆 40 美元)(见附件 42)。最后, 对每一离开班巴里的卡车征收 130 美元海关税,¹¹⁹ 随后向司机发放通行证(见附件 43)。上述税收均不送交班吉。¹²⁰

145. 根据设在班巴里的咖啡运输公司 Ouaka Café 公司经理的说法, 前塞雷卡几次在前往苏丹的道路上征税, 而瓦卡省和下科托省的几乎所有咖啡都运往该地。每辆卡车的海关税为 2 500 美元, 加上道路状况差和不安全的状况, 成为咖啡出口下降的原因。Ouaka Café(附件 44)是班巴里尚存的唯一运输公司, 它目睹咖啡出口量由每年 7 000 吨下降到 2014 年的 1 000 吨, 显示卡车轮用 40 次。到 2014 年 7 月, 随着雨季的到来, 卡车的轮用停止了。根据这些数字, 在班巴里的前塞雷卡人员 2014 年将从咖啡贸易税收收入上赚取大约 145 000 美元左右, 而沿前往苏丹的公路上其他地方的前塞雷卡部队有将会赚得 94 800 美元。

畜牛

146. 专家小组在临时报告(S/2014/452 附件 13, 第 13 段)中着重指出穆斯林和少数族裔富拉尼族的畜牛拥有者受到反砍刀组织部队的包围, 已经被杀害或被迫逃离。专家小组与在 Yaloké、贝贝拉蒂和 Kenzou 流离失所的富拉尼族民众会面, 其中一些人称失去了几百头畜牛。反砍刀组织部队偷走畜牛, 等着其主人拿现金将其赎回。¹²¹ 受害者指控在 贝贝拉蒂的反砍刀组织领导人 Derbara Seregaza 采取了这种做法。¹²²

147. 专家小组在 Guen-Carnot 轴线沿线看到, 反砍刀组织在城镇屠宰、烟熏并出售肉类(见 S/2014/452, 附件 13, 第 5 段)。在 Carnot, 反砍刀组织分支首长 Aimé Blaise Zoworo 控制了肉类市场。从贝贝拉蒂地区偷来的畜牛也穿越 Gbiti 边界被带到喀麦隆 Kette(东方省)附近的每周肉市上销售。反砍刀组织领导人, 包括已故

¹¹⁹ 采访卡车司机, 2014 年 7 月 4 日, 班巴里。

¹²⁰ 采访财政部官员, 2014 年 8 月 19 日。

¹²¹ 采访来自 Guen 的富拉尼族畜牛拥有者, Kenzou, 2014 年 7 月 11 日。

¹²² 采访 Kenzou 的穆斯林畜牛拥有者, 2014 年 7 月 11 日。

的 Rochael Mokom, 将偷来的畜牛存放在 Adama Gaza 省内离 Gbiti 不远的营地 (S/2014/452, 附件 5, 第 4 段)。¹²²

148. 根据在班巴里的富拉尼族社区发言人撰写的报告, 自危机开始以来富拉尼族居民也成为前塞雷卡派系袭击的受害者, 其畜牛也遭到他们偷走, 控制这些派系人员中一部分人是在博祖姆(瓦姆-彭代省)、而现在转到 Bria 的 Yaya Scout 上校以及在班巴里的 Tom Adam。¹²³ 在班巴里从富拉尼族偷走的畜牛被运到苏丹贩卖。¹²³

野生动物

149. 专家小组在其临时报告中提到了 2014 年 2 月 17 日在桑加雷内·桑加国家公园内逮捕了大象私猎者 René Sangha Zélé, 此人非法拥有一支 0.375 口径的 Mauser 猎枪(见 S/2014/452, 第 75 段)。2014 年 7 月, Zélé 被判处两年监禁, 后从 Bayanga(僧巴埃雷省)移交到班吉服刑。Zélé 告诉专家小组说, 他曾杀死一头大象, 但是象牙已经被偷。¹²⁴ 他还提到, 在 Nola 的一个名叫 Narcisse Kotto 的宪兵向他提供了上述步枪, 而 0.375 弹药则是在喀麦隆 Yokadouma 的国际足联大楼内一个弹药库私下出售的。

150. 中非的象牙通常通过喀麦隆以每公斤 180 美元的当地销售价格交易。¹²⁴ 喀麦隆当局和自然保护者各自证实, 名为 FifenHosniMoubarack、别名“Watt”的喀麦隆象牙贸易商在 Yokadouma 购买中非象牙。2012 年, Moubarack 由于在喀麦隆 Djoum 贩运象牙而遭到逮捕, 但获得保释, 此后于 2013 年 12 月在 Yokadouma 再度被捕。¹²⁵

三. 武器禁运

151. 自 2014 年 7 月 1 日提交临时报告以来, 专家小组利用分析国际部队缴获武器、(在实地访问期间)直接观察正规部队和武装团体持有的武器、分析该地区主要行为体的情况报告以及媒体报道等手段, 继续监测武器禁运的执行情况。专家小组还与中非共和国武装部队及参与执行武器禁运的警察和宪兵高级领导保持着透明合作关系。专家小组在实地访问期间还会见了几乎所有当地武装团体领导人。

152. 专家小组定期与班吉和该区域机场主管部门互动, 并访问了与刚果和喀麦隆交界的三个过境点以及与乍得交界的一个关闭的过境点。专家小组有计划地与国际部队总部和在当地的战地指挥官互动, 使其能够更好地了解行动环境、安全

¹²³ “Rapport liminaire sur la situation de la communauté Peuhl en République Centrafricaine”, (中非共和国富拉尼族境况介绍报告), 2014 年 2 月, 联合国存档。

¹²⁴ 采访 René Sangha Zélé, 2014 年 7 月 17 日, 班吉。

¹²⁵ 2014 年 8 月 13 日在雅温得与一名对外关系司官员的访谈。

威胁以及武器和弹药的流通。专家小组在 2014 年 6 月 29 日和 30 日(中非共和国东部姆博穆省)Nzako 地区的冲突之后,分析了非洲联盟区域工作队中的乌干达人民国防军部队(乌干达部队)从前塞雷卡手中缴获的武器和弹药清单。¹²⁶

153. 专家小组在分析和追查中非共和国境内流通的武器和弹药工作中面临的一个主要挑战是,会员国和武器制造商在何种程度上向专家小组提供在该国发现或缴获的武器的相关信息。¹²⁷ 另一个挑战涉及到在中非共和国流通的小武器的多样性,其中许多武器最初以合法方式提供给一些会员国,但后来作为过剩武器流入中非共和国。

154. 例如,专家小组传送了一份列有国际部队缴获的中国制 56-2 式突击步枪的 120 个序列号清单,请求确认这些武器是否以及在何时由中国提供给中非共和国。由于中国当局的合作,专家小组获悉,该清单中仅有 49 件武器在 2008 年合法转让给中非共和国,而其余部分(总数的 60%)可能由于第三方转让而非法进入该国(见附件 45)。¹²⁸ 专家小组要求一些武器制造商和会员国提供信息,目前仍在等待答复,以查明走私网络及确定武器如何、何时在可能违反武器禁运的情况下转让给中非共和国。专家小组还期待发给制造商的一份索取有关 AKM 突击步枪资料的请求能够得到答复,这些枪的序列号已通过机械打磨被特意磨掉,但仍被专家小组查明并传送给制造商。¹²⁹

A. 向武装团体非法提供支助并转让武器和弹药

155. 安全理事会第 2127(2013)号决议对中非共和国实施武器禁运不到一年之后,专家小组尚未观察到违反禁运向武装团体转让大量武器的情况。不过,专家小组在实地观察到前塞雷卡战斗人员使用与专家小组在临时报告中确定的武器基线数据不相符的武器(见 S/2014/452, 附件 16; 以及本报告附件 47)。同样,专家小组还在反砍刀组织活跃的地区发现走私猎用弹药的案件。专家小组还记录了一起比利时雇佣军人 François Toussaint 向革命与正义团体提供技术援助和培训的案件(见上文第 100-108 段)。

¹²⁶ 在 2014 年 7 月 2 日的一篇路透社文章中,乌干达部队表示,塞雷卡现在是其敌人,因为国防军正在中非共和国追捕上帝军。<http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/02/us-uganda-security-idUSKBN0F643520140702>, 2014 年 7 月 1 日查阅;在专家小组发出索取资料书后,乌干达提供了大量资料,并邀请专家小组访问驻(中非共和国上姆博穆省)奥博的非盟区域工作队中的该国部队;由于后勤制约因素,专家小组到目前为止无法前往奥博。

¹²⁷ 专家小组希望强调指出,中国和乌克兰等会员国以及以色列武器工业公司、西班牙 MAXAM 和新加坡 ST Kinetics 等公司及时答复了其追查武器请求。

¹²⁸ 其他型号,如新加坡出产、在中非共和国发现的 SAR 80 步枪,是 1980 年销往南斯拉夫的一批枪中的一部分。

¹²⁹ 专家小组在分析后发现一支 AKM 步枪的序列号为 TH1633,并要求制造工厂提供信息(见附件 46)。

前塞雷卡

中非共和国西北部

156. 专家小组在该国三个不同地点，即班吉、贝贝拉蒂和博吉拉，发现了一种据悉不属于国家武器库一部分的以色列制加利尔突击步枪。

157. 加利尔步枪(序列号 2066204)是 2014 年 5 月 5 日在该 Boguila 附近被法国部队摧毁的一辆汽车残骸中发现的。当天在同一地区，Mahmat Issa 上校领导的前塞雷卡分子与红蝴蝶部队发生激烈战斗。法国部队实施了空袭并摧毁了该车辆。早些时候，同一武装团体一直在该地区四处活动，对当地居民施虐。

158. 这一武装团体使用的车辆，一辆丰田越野车，在 2002 年 3 月出售给联合国难民事务高级专员公署(难民署)班吉办事处(见附件 49)。专家小组已请求提供关于该车的补充资料，但目前尚未收到答复。¹³⁰

159. 红蝴蝶部队在博吉拉袭击后收缴的序列号为 2066204 的加利尔步枪是 2008 年出售给乍得国防部的一批武器的一部分，该批武器的最终用户证书保证武器不会转让给另一个国家(见附件 48)。¹³¹ 专家小组在乍得观察到国家机构安全服务总局的内部安保人员携带着类似的步枪。¹³² 在中非共和国其他地区缴获类似步枪后，专家小组在 2014 年 6 月 5 日致函乍得，要求提供关于这些武器的补充资料，并提议访问乍得以讨论这一问题。乍得常驻代表团承认收到了专家小组的信函，并请求将截止日期延长两个星期。迄今未收到答复。

160. 关于上文所述的一系列袭击，专家小组收集的证据表明，一个来自乍得的身份不明的武装团体一直在中非共和国沿乍得边界一带积极活动。

161. 2014 年 8 月 12 日，专家小组对边界城镇马昆达(瓦姆省)进行了一次实地访问并注意到该镇的居民已完全撤空，还记录到大量破坏活动。根据第一手证词和实地观察，来自乍得境内的武装人员被指对平民实施若干次袭击，而且自 2014 年 5 月以来，这些人一直阻止马昆达和周边地区的居民返回家园。

162. 在该次实地访问期间，小组得以检查在博吉拉附近被法国部队消除作战能力的车辆残骸。专家小组收集了武装团体携带并在袭击中发射的 14 个弹壳残骸样本。6 枚弹壳带有已知代表中非共和国武器弹药标识，符合专家小组临时报告列出的基线特征，而 8 枚带有此前未见过的标识。专家小组评估认为，这些带有

¹³⁰ 分别在 2014 年 8 月 25 日和 2014 年 9 月 24 日发送了两份正式信函，请求提供更多信息。

¹³¹ 以色列武器工业公司 2014 年 5 月 25 日的答复。

¹³² 2014 年 6 月 23 日，专家小组的两名专家在(瓦姆-彭代省)保瓦以北的 Bémal 镇与乍得边界之间的中非共和国领土上开展调查时遭到乍得安全部队逮捕。两名专家被国家机构安全服务总局人员送往乍得 Goré，拘留了四个小时。专家小组在这一场合注意到，国家机构安全服务总局人员携带的加利尔步枪和在博吉拉被消除作战能力的车辆残骸中缴获的步枪是同一类型。

未见过标识的子弹可能是在最近引入该地区的(见本报告附件 50; 以及 [S/2014/452](#), 附件 16)。

中非共和国东北部

163. 专家小组收到信息显示, 前塞雷卡在遭到制裁的领导人 Nourredine Adam 带领下在比劳进行作战集结, 包括有经核实的报告称, Adam 得以迫使三方部队中的中非共和国武装部队分遣队和苏丹军队在 2014 年 6 月 26 日离开该镇。专家小组认为, 三方部队在距离苏丹边界 8 公里处的 Am Dafok 村重新部署显然是 Nourredine Adam 力量加强的结果。出于后勤和安全原因, 专家小组无法前往瓦卡加省。

164. 2014 年 7 月 11 日在比劳出席了前塞雷卡大会的中非支助团部队指挥官 Martin Chomu Tumenta 将军向专家小组表示, 他没有看到任何迹象显示在比劳及当地机场存在新的军事装备。¹³³ Nourredine Adam 也在与专家小组的电话访谈中否认违反武器禁运收到(或)带来了军事物资和装备。¹³⁴ 专家小组对 2014 年 1 月 12 日和 9 月 18 日摄下的 Birao 地区卫星图像作了分析, 也未发现任何重型军事设备或重大军事集结。¹³⁵

反砍刀组织

165. 通过与民兵会谈及检查从反砍刀组织团体缴获的武器和弹药, 专家小组认为, 反砍刀组织战斗人员主要使用在中非共和国流通的小武器。此外, 除 2014 年 4 月缴获的违反武器禁运的 12 毫米口径猎枪弹药外, 中非支助团部队在博达缴获了用于 AK 步枪的 7.62×39 毫米猎枪子弹, 专家小组检查了这些子弹。¹³⁶ 如专家小组临时报告中所述, 反砍刀组织团体主要依靠手工步枪和 12 毫米口径猎枪弹药, 他们还改造这些弹药, 加入更多的铅以增加其杀伤力(见 [S/2014/452](#), 附件 18)。

166. 包括猎用弹药在内的武器和弹药的正式供应商在班吉和专家小组访问的所有中非共和国城镇已停止运营。猎用弹药后来被从喀麦隆、刚果民主共和国和刚果走私进入该国。2014 年 2 月至 4 月期间, 走私者特别使用了 Gamboula(曼贝雷=卡代省)和坎托尼耶(曼贝雷省)的两个过境点, 其靠近喀麦隆的 Garoua Boulai 镇,

¹³³ 2014 年 8 月 23 日在班吉的访谈。

¹³⁴ 2014 年 8 月 23 日与 Nourredine Adam 及其 4 名顾问的电话访谈。

¹³⁵ 专家小组在联合国制图科地理业务股帮助下从商家购买的卫星图像。

¹³⁶ 中非支助团博达分遣队缴获了一支 AK 步枪和带有(俄罗斯联邦)Barnaul 工厂 Б П 3 标识的 7.62 x 39 毫米新子弹。俄罗斯联邦常驻联合国代表团告诉专家小组, 这种标识属于猎用弹药, 对此类产品不签发最终用户证书。还向专家小组提到, Barnaul 弹药工厂的产品不仅在俄罗斯联邦出售, 而且还在德国、美国、加纳、纳米比亚和其他一些国家出售; 专家小组打算继续进一步调查此案。

专家小组在 2014 年 4 月 27 日目睹了这种活动，当时中非共和国海关部门缴获了一箱从喀麦隆走私的猎用弹药(见附件 51)。专家小组当时注意到，驻扎在坎托尼耶的反砍刀组织团体控制着主路北、南两侧的走私活动以及向该国其他反砍刀组织团体的弹药供应。中非支助团驻贝贝拉蒂部队证实，猎用弹药在其整个行动区内流通，这促使喀麦隆当局在 2014 年 5 月采取措施制止这一现象。¹³⁷

167. 2014 年 7 月 10 日在贝贝拉蒂期间，专家小组获悉，一名曾销售弹药的当地人在喀麦隆被拘留。¹³⁸ 喀麦隆当局已向专家小组证实，一名名为 Ousmane Roger 的走私者试图在雅温得购买武器和弹药，但他出具的进口许可证日期为 2011 年，不能被接受(见附件 52)。中非的水、林业、狩猎和渔业部当局告诉专家小组，Roger 并未作为武器和弹药交易商登记，虽然该许可显示他获准在贝贝拉蒂、布阿尔和 Nola 销售。

168. 喀麦隆主要进口商传送的有关 12 毫米口径猎枪子弹统计数据反映出，将 2013 年 2 月至 4 月期间(440 995)和 2014 年同期(681 765)相比，出售给五个主要零售商的子弹数量净增加超过 54%(见附件 53)。¹³⁹ 专家小组联络了子弹销售额增加了五倍多和增加了 70% 的两个零售商，以及喀麦隆有关当局，他们未能提供任何解释。

169. 专家小组注意到，喀麦隆这些零售商的弹药销量增加与以下两个现象存在很强的相关性：(a) 反砍刀组织团体在中非共和国活动达到高峰；(b) 国际部队缴获的类似猎用弹药增多。实际上，在喀麦隆销售的所有类型的 12 毫米猎用弹药，尤其是 RedStar、Flash 和 Kemen 牌的弹药，2014 年 2 月至 5 月间经常被国际部队在中非共和国缴获。

170. 专家小组还检查了 MACC 公司在(刚果)黑角制造的 12 毫米口径弹药，喀麦隆的进口公司不提供这种弹药。

171. 专家小组在 2014 年 9 月 2 日获悉，在班巴里的反砍刀组织战斗人员在 2014 年 8 月下旬被首次看到携带机关枪和火箭榴弹发射器，这表明该武装团体的作战能力有了重大发展。¹⁴⁰ 专家小组打算返回实地时进一步调查这一问题。

B. 武器扩散

172. 由于该国解除武装的谈判缺乏进展武装团体利用其拥有的武器和弹药作为讨价还价的工具和个人安全的保障。自布拉柴维尔会议以来，在班吉和该国西部

¹³⁷ 2014 年 7 月 10 日在贝贝拉蒂与中非支助团分遣队主管 Onana 上尉的访谈。

¹³⁸ 2014 年 7 月 10 日在 Berberati 与当地官员的会谈。

¹³⁹ 专家小组根据主要供应商提供的统计数据所作估计。存档于联合国。

¹⁴⁰ 2014 年 9 月 2 日在班巴里与中非支助团分遣队指挥官的电话访谈。

地区，武装团体拥有的武器和轻武器不如从前显而易见。然而，武装团体能够很容易地收回其武器，最近在班吉和 Boda 的事件就显示了这一点。

173. 反砍刀组织和武装团体革命与正义继续依靠小武器，并将摩托车和被盗或征用的轻型车辆仅用于运送和保护地区指挥官。反砍刀组织拥有的全部车辆估计不超过 12 辆。有人观察到中非人民民主阵线和革命与正义人员仅徒步行走或使用少数摩托车。

174. 虽然前塞雷卡曾拥有更精良的武器和车辆，但他们与红蝴蝶部队的战斗似乎已影响到其作战和机动能力。专家小组记录了红蝴蝶部队摧毁前塞雷卡分子拥有的 5 辆皮卡的情况：2014 年 5 月 5 日在博吉拉消除一辆，2014 年 6 月 24 日在班巴里消除两辆，2014 年 8 月 5 日在巴丹加弗消除两辆。非盟区域工作队中的乌干达部队构成部分在 Nzako 缴获了一辆皮卡。专家小组估计，前塞雷卡分子在恩代莱、班巴里和布里亚使用的车辆不足 24 辆。专家小组观察到，在班巴里和巴丹加弗的前塞雷卡拥有小武器、轻机枪、榴弹发射器和 60 毫米迫击炮，用于对付红蝴蝶部队。乌干达部队从 Nzako 的前塞雷卡手中缴获的武器未改变专家小组确定的武器禁运前在该国流通的武器基线(见附件 54)。来自公开来源的照片未显示比劳的前塞雷卡除装在一辆皮卡上的一部无后坐力步枪之外拥有任何重大武器(见附件 55)。

175. 自从 2014 年 3 月以来，专家小组发现，在自愿或强迫解除武装方面几乎没有取得任何进展。总体而言，国际部队自 2013 年 12 月 5 日以来收缴了大约 1 200 件军用小武器、1 150 支猎枪和 180 件轻武器。¹⁴¹ 不过，2013 年 12 月 5 日至 2014 年 2 月 28 日期间缴获的武器总数中有 84% 是在前塞雷卡战斗人员进驻营地时没收的。2014 年 3 月 1 日至 8 月中旬左右，国际部队缴获了不到 200 件小武器和类似数量的手工步枪。在此期间未从武装团体手中缴获轻武器。

176. 2014 年 3 月 14 日，中非支助团回收了在班吉 Mpoko 空军基地的一个储藏设施内的大量武器和弹药。¹⁴² 专家小组追踪调查被回收的 12.7 毫米的弹药，并获悉，这批弹药是乌克兰于 2012 年 12 月转交给中非共和国的，这是在实行武器禁运一年之前，这些弹药用于 Mil Mi-24 型直升机。

¹⁴¹ 专家小组根据欧盟中非共和国部队、中非支助团和红蝴蝶部队收缴和储存的武器库存计算出的数字。截至 2014 年 8 月底，中非支助团已缴获 597 488 支猎枪和 117 件轻武器，红蝴蝶部队已缴获 605 件小武器、661 支猎枪和 60 件轻武器，其中包括欧盟中非共和国部队缴获的武器。小武器是指设计供个人使用的武器，除其他外，包括左轮手枪和自动手枪、步枪和卡宾枪、冲锋枪、突击步枪和轻机枪。“轻武器”是指设计供二人或三人一组使用的武器，除其他外，包括重机枪、手提式管下榴弹发射器、轻型防空炮、便携式反坦克炮、无后坐力炮、便携式反坦克导弹和火箭系统、便携式防空导弹系统以及口径在 100 毫米以下的迫击炮。(见 A/60/88，联合国大会 2005 年 12 月 8 日通过)。

¹⁴² 中非支助团在班吉机场北部拆除大量武器，非洲联盟新闻公报，在联合国存档。

177. 2014 年 6 月 21 日在班巴里，2014 年 8 月 4 日在巴丹加弗，红蝴蝶部队企图让前塞雷卡分子宿营和解除武装，但这些企图大体上不成功。在两个镇，前塞雷卡对宿营安排进行挑战，结果导致交火。在专家小组 2014 年 7 月访问班巴里和 2014 年 8 月访问巴丹加弗时，战斗人员公开在街上携带武器。在班吉，在 PK5 小区强行解除武装也导致红蝴蝶部队和穆斯林自卫团体之间的武装对抗。这些地方方的穆斯林战斗人员反对解除武装和宿营，因为害怕反砍刀组织的攻击。红蝴蝶部队开始执行所谓的建立信任措施，其目的是拆除有武装的检查站和阻止武装战斗人员的流动，引发了班巴里和巴丹加弗在上述日期的群众起义，起义是前塞雷卡挑起的(见附件 56)。

178. 中非支助团部队指挥官 Tumenta 将军告诉专家小组，在巴丹加弗执行建立信任措施是不成熟的，未与中非支助团协调。在他看来，国际部队的军事能力非常有限，无法确保对平民的适当保护。在班巴里，专家小组在 2014 年 7 月 4 日观察到，反砍刀组织在靠近天主教堂的一个境内流离失所者营地的行动畅行无阻(见附件 7)。国际部队并不是长期存在的，因此无法防止 2014 年 7 月 8 日发生的前塞雷卡与反砍刀组织之间的对抗。

C. 不遵守规定的案例

179. 专家小组记录了两起不遵守武器禁运的案例，中非共和国警察和宪兵在未事先征得安全理事会关于中非共和国的第 2127(2013)号决议所设委员会同意的情况下接收装备。第一起案例所涉及的是，2014 年 5 月 1 日在班吉，在地方当局在场的情况下，一名多哥官员向警察和宪兵移交了大量装备，中非国家电视台对此进行了报道。2014 年 5 月 6 日，专家小组要求多哥常驻联合国代表团提供补充资料。2014 年 6 月 16 日，常驻代表团发出普通照会答复说，多哥当局正在调查此案，日后将提供答复。目前仍未收到该答复。

180. 第二起轻微违规行为是当地媒体所报道，案例涉及的是，2014 年 8 月 21 日欧洲联盟驻中非共和国部队区域协调中心爱沙尼亚特遣队向中非武警部门捐赠了物资。¹⁴³ 爱沙尼亚部队指挥官向专家小组解释说，他的特遣队捐赠了非致命的用于控制人群的物资，包括 88 枚“闪光”弹、600 发口径 12 的橡胶子弹和 12 发红色信号弹。未就这一捐赠与驻中非共和国欧洲联盟部队和中非支助团进行协调。

181. 专家小组没有发现，除根据 2127 安全理事会关于中非共和国的第 2127(2013)号决议所设委员会核准的豁免而供应的单兵小武器和资产外，中非共和国国防和安全部队部署或使用任何大量的军事装备。红蝴蝶部队已经在得到委员会批准的两次豁免后，用单兵使用武器装备了警察和宪兵。

¹⁴³ 见 www.lanouvellecentrafrique.info/centrafrique-les-troupes-estoniennes-offrent-du-materiel-a-la-police，2014 年 8 月 21 日查阅。

182. 就中非共和国武装部队而言，其人员似乎越来越多地配备突击步枪，迄今专家小组一直无法对此予以检查。配备武器的武装部队人员为中非当局履行静态安全和近身保护任务。

183. 中非共和国武装部队的一名高级军官告诉专家小组说，该武装部队要求以前与反砍刀组织有关联的军事人员交出武器。专家小组获悉，中非共和国武装部队已经收缴其中一些武器，但尚未能对这些武器做任何检查。专家小组审阅了 Rombhot 的反砍刀组织属下的士兵名单以及打算上交的武器的序列号。与 Rombhot 有关联的 Kamezolari，与专家小组共享了给中非共和国总统的一封信，他在信中宣布，他正在重新融入国家武装部队，打算上交他保管的 5 件武器。

184. 关于与军事活动有关的援助、技术援助、培训、财政或其他援助方面，专家小组向一些会员国通报说，来自中非共和国的国防和安全人员继续在那里会员国的军事机构学习，并提醒这些会员国，它们有义务请求安全理事会关于中非共和国的第 2127(2013)号决议所设委员会的事后批准。有关会员国包括喀麦隆、科特迪瓦、法国、尼日尔、摩洛哥、塞内加尔和苏丹。迄今，只有法国已根据第 2127(2013)号决议第 54(f)段采取步骤，请求安全理事会关于中非共和国的第 2127(2013)号决议所设委员会进行事后豁免。中非当局计划继续根据现有的双边合作协定培训中非共和国武装部队人员，目前正在讨论今后可能在安哥拉和苏丹开展的培训方案。专家小组已正式通知这两个国家，它们有义务就今后对安全和军事人员的军事训练请求对第 2127(2013)号决议第 54 段规定的措施的豁免。

185. 专家小组还掌握了中非共和国武装部队总部指定的在摩洛哥军事机构学习课程的 136 名候选人名单。专家小组认为，这些候选人没有经过适当的审查进程，特别是将那些对侵犯人权行为负有责任者排除在外。

186. 专家小组尚未被允许对中非共和国的军事和准军事部队的武器和相关物资进行有系统的检查以有效监测武器禁运执行情况。专家小组期待中非稳定团执行安全理事会第 2149(2014)号决议第 31(d)段规定的与监测武器禁运有关的任务，酌情在不事先通知的情况下进行此类检查。

四. 阻碍向中非共和国运送人道主义援助

187. 安全理事会在其第 2134 (2014)号决议第 37(b)、(c)和(e)段中决定，旅行措施(旅行禁令)和金融措施(资产冻结)应适用于委员会指认的以下个人和实体：筹划、指挥或实施中非共和国境内违反有关国际人权法或国际人道主义法的行为，或侵犯人权或制造暴行的行为，包括性暴力、攻击平民、出于族裔或宗教原因发动袭击、袭击学校和医院、绑架和强迫流离失所的行为；违反有关国际法，在中非共和国武装冲突中招募或使用儿童；以及阻碍向中非共和国运送人道主义援助物资，或阻碍在中非共和国境内领取和分发人道主义援助。在本节中，专家小组列述了与上述制裁标准的每条标准有关的若干案例研究，资料来自小组的实地调查。

188. 中非共和国的人权状况仍然具有挑战性，且具有波动性。在一个有 460 万居民的国家内，有 250 万人仍然需要人道主义援助。虽然国际非政府组织和其他人道主义伙伴增加了它们的存在和行动，不安全、后勤和资金不足仍然是推动该国摆脱人道主义紧急情况所面临的一些主要挑战。从 2014 年 5 月到 8 月，雨季是人道主义界面临的制约因素之一。例如，由于道路的状况不佳，后勤工作更加困难和昂贵。

189. 据人道主义事务协调厅报，截至 2014 年 8 月 13 日，全国各地共有 509 000 名境内流离失所者。2014 年 8 月，班吉的境内流离失所者有 84 000 人(根据人道主义事务协调厅)，比 2014 年 4 月 30 日的 135 050 人(根据难民署)有下降。据信，首都及其周边地区的安全状况改善促成境内流离失所者返回家园。班吉 PK5 小区最近发生的由武装团体和国际部队之间的对抗引发的事件(2014 年 8 月 18 日至 21 日)表明，首都并不是完全安全的。在该国的其他地区，境内流离失所者并未大量减少。关于流离失所方面的更多细节，见附件 57。¹⁴⁴

190. 与境内流离失所者人数减少形成对照的是，中非在邻国(喀麦隆、乍得、刚果和刚果民主共和国)的难民总数有所增加。根据难民署，截止 2014 年 8 月 15 日邻国共收容 406 786 名中非难民。从 2013 年 12 月至 2014 年 5 月，邻国查明了 120 472 名新难民。截至 2014 年 8 月底，在大约三个月期间查明了 50 801 名新难民。

按邻家分列的中非共和国难民数

国家	2013 年 12 月-2014 年 5 月的总数	2014 年 5 月-8 月 的总数	差异
喀麦隆	191 265	231 037	39 772
乍得	100 520	93 305	-7 215
刚果	16 062	18 232	2 170
刚果民主共和国	57 608	62 212	4 604

191. 只有在乍得的中非难民人数有所减少。其原因可能是 2014 年 5 月 12 日彻底关闭了边界。更多详情，请见附件 58 的难民流动图。

192. 2013 年 12 月 5 日至 2014 年 8 月 14 日期间，专家小组记录了 247 起阻碍本国和国际援助工作人员在中非共和国提供人道主义援助的事件。其中 131 起事件发生于 2013 年 12 月 5 日至 2014 年 4 月 30 日期间，116 起发生于 2014 年 5 月 1 日至 8 月 14 日期间，显示出每月平均事件数略有减少(见附件 59)。¹⁴⁵

¹⁴⁴ 另见 https://gallery.mailchimp.com/9e62930dcaf29260cf72aa7f9/files/CMP_hors_Bangui_IDP_movements_01_09_2014.pdf，2014 年 9 月 2 日查阅。

¹⁴⁵ 专家小组尽可能输入 8 月份的资料，但时间有限，且获得具体信息的机会有限，阻碍了整个 8 月份发生事件数的完整性。

193. 过去五个月中，在恩代莱的人道主义行动遇到了各种问题。自 2014 年 5 月 1 日以来，由于总体安全局势、与地方当局的困难关系以及艰难的道路，人道主义组织大幅度减少了行动。专家小组记录了恩代莱及其周边地区的 7 起事件，包括国际非政府组织基地遭袭击和劫掠的 4 起事件；3 起抢劫和偷窃运送人道主义援助的卡车的事件；地方当局阻挠分发人道主义援助的 1 起事件(另见附件 59)。在恩代莱以外，几个月来国际非政府组织无法进入这些地区。

194. 日益增加的运输费用也阻碍了人道主义行动。由于越来越多的人为路障，特别是反砍刀团体设置的路障，这些团体要求卡车和车辆支付通行费，一些人道主义组织不得不增加给私营承包商的付款，以在全国各地运送人道主义物品。¹⁴⁶ 尽管国际人道主义组织的政策是拒绝支付此类款项，但其私营承包商更有可能满足武装团体的要求。

195. 在专家小组记录的事件中，有近 40%(100 起)阻碍人道主义援助事件的肇事者仍不知晓。28%(70 起)的事件据称是由反砍刀团体实施的，20%(50 起)的事件据称是由塞雷卡团体所为，其余的事件据称是由革命与正义、政府部队、中非支助团和其他方面所为(见附件 60 和专家小组的数据库)。

196. 据报，阻碍人道主义援助的大多数事件是在班吉发生的，其次是瓦姆和瓦姆-彭代等省。班吉发生了 80 起事件，占总数的 32%，据报瓦姆省和瓦姆-彭代省发生了 56 起事件，占 22%。这三个省报告的事件数量比较大，反映了这些地区人道主义组织和行动数量相对较高这一情况(见专家小组的数据库，全面概况见附件 60 和 61 的图表)。

197. 从 2013 年 12 月 5 日至 2014 年 8 月 14 日期间，专家小组记录到 22 名援助工作者被杀。这类事件已列入上述事件总数。其中 16 起事件发生于 2013 年 12 月 5 日至 2014 年 4 月 31 日期间，6 起发生于 5 月 1 日至 8 月 14 日期间。专家小组的临时报告记录了在第一阶段 14 名援助工作者被杀害这一情况可解释为当时能更好地获取人道主义部门的信息(见 S/2014/452, 第 98 段，援助工作者被杀的具体时间见附件 62)。

198. 2014 年 5 月 1 日至 2014 年 8 月 14 日期间，专家小组记录了援助工作者被杀害的下列 6 起案件：

(a) 2014 年 5 月 1 日，反砍刀团体在班吉和达马拉之间的公路上，在 PK16 处，杀害了一名难民署工作人员。

(b) 2014 年 6 月 3 日，一个反砍刀小组在 Kemo Gribingui 省的 Sibut 杀害运送人道主义援助卡车上的一名私人助理。

¹⁴⁶ 专家小组与各机构负责人、国际非政府组织代表团团长和人道主义组织的后勤人员举行了若干次会议。

(c) 2014 年 6 月 3 日，武装的富拉尼人在瓦姆-彭代省巴丹加弗附近，杀害了一名国际非政府组织工作人员。

(d) 2014 年 6 月 4 日，据称一群富拉尼人在 Batagafo 周围杀害了一名当时正在过路的国际非政府组织工作人员。

(e) 2014 年 7 月 7 日，在瓦卡省班巴里的境内流离失所者营地，一个国际非政府组织的一名 62 岁的工作人员在一次袭击中被打死。根据所收集的资料，约在下午 4 时，一群武装穆斯林青年强行进入教堂，开始不分青红皂白地向在那里避难的平民开枪。上述被杀男子遭到大砍刀肢解，他的尸体在第二天被他的家人复原，并妥善掩埋。

(f) 2014 年 8 月 10 日，在巴丹加弗医院，一名国际非政府组织工作人员被一名不明身份的肇事者刺杀。

199. 正如其临时报告指出的那样，专家小组发现，杀害援助工作人员并不遵循某一趋势或模式或服务于任何(军事)战略目的。某些案件是随机的暴力行为，也许出于经济利益，而另一些事件则似乎是个人事务引发的(见 S/2014/452, 第 98 段)。

200. 从 2014 年 5 月 1 日至 8 月 14 日，专家小组记录了运送人道主义物资的 7 个卡车车队受到攻击、伏击和(或)抢劫的情况：

(a) 2014 年 6 月 3 日，由 27 辆卡车组成的一个车队(有些是私人租用的，另一些则属于国际非政府组织)在中非支助团的护送下离开班吉。在达马拉之后，一个反砍刀团体袭击车队，中非支助团进行还击，赶走了袭击者。许多卡车受到袭击的影响。其中一些相当迅速地修好了，另一些车则在受损害的情况下继续工作，但一辆国际非政府组织的卡车不能继续前行。后一辆卡车上的乘客请求中非支助团等他们，但这一请求被拒绝，这辆卡车被抛在后面。修复后，这辆卡车在 Mabo(凯莫-格里宾吉省)附近继续遭到同一群反砍刀人员的攻击。司机没有停车，但袭击者能够迅速跳上卡车后部，用砍刀砍死学徒，把他的尸体从卡车扔下，并从卡车的后部掠夺了几袋粮食和物资。

(b) 2014 年 6 月 8 日，在下午较早的时候，一个从班吉来的人道主义车队在达马拉(翁贝拉-姆波科省)以北 60 公里处遭到一群反砍刀人员的袭击。袭击中两名年轻女孩被打伤，她们得到中非支助团加蓬部队的协助。

(c) 2014 年 6 月 23 日，大约 11:00 时，在 Grimari(瓦卡省)以南 15 公里处，一个联合国机构由四辆卡车组成的运送 100 吨种子的一个车队，被反砍刀人员拦住，他们要求将他们送往班巴里。司机们拒绝了，民兵们朝一辆卡车开枪，打坏了一个车轮。卡车都能够继续前进。

(d) 2014 年 7 月 18 日，联合国机构雇用的运送人道主义用品的一个卡车车队在从班吉到博桑戈阿(瓦姆-彭代省)的路上，在博桑戈阿，遭到不明身份的武装人员的攻击和抢劫。

(e) 2014 年 7 月 17 日, 在离 Yaloké(翁贝拉-姆波科省)10 公里处的主要道路上的桥梁坍塌, 阻挡了该地区的所有交通。第二天, 一些车辆试着走一条不适合卡车的备选路线。载有三名国际非政府组织工作人员的一辆车辆决定走那一条路前往班吉。在通过一个叫 Zaoua 的小村庄之后, 一群武装分子从丛林中冲出来, 拦住这辆车。这些武装人员拿走了所有贵重物品, 并威胁开走这辆车。该小组得以通过谈判逃脱。

(f) 2014 年 7 月 19 日至 2014 年 8 月底, 瓦卡加省和巴明吉-班戈兰省的多个地方传统当局阻拦了从苏丹来的载着人道主义援助前往中非北部各省的一些卡车。

(g) 2014 年 7 月 23 日 15:00 时左右, 在 Galafondo 村庄(凯莫-格里宾吉省)外围地带, 由 9 辆私人订约的卡车和一辆国际非政府组织卡车组成的一个运送人道主义援助前往班巴里的车队, 在一个反砍刀组织的检查站被拦, 要求每个司机支付 50 000 非洲金融共同体法郎(100 美元)后通行。专家小组的两名专家恰好在同一地点, 能够与反砍刀组织人员谈话。卡车获准通过, 没有再遇到其他事。

201. 专家小组监测了该国西部的穆斯林少数群体的情况。根据机构间常设委员会保护问题专题组设立的“预警系统”, Ndinguiri、Djomo、Guen 和 Gadzi 等社区(Mambéré-Kadeï 省)被确定为少数族裔高风险飞地。¹⁴⁷ 自 3 月以来, Boda(洛巴伊省), 然后 Yaloké(翁贝拉-姆波科省)也被确定为面临风险的社区。此外, 专家小组已证实 Boda 的局势是专题组指定的那些社区中情况最严重的一个。

202. 虽然人道主义应急大有改善, 但目前生活在 Boda 飞地的大约 6 000 名穆斯林, 他们在村庄中部, 仍然非常脆弱。专家小组记录了不同的反砍刀团体至少杀害 168 名平民, 其中包括 5 名儿童。也记录到针对人道主义援助工作者的多起事件, 增加了过去几个月的事件数目。虽然整个一年中发生了各种替代和结构改变, 专家小组获得的文件表明, 2014 年 6 月 28 日 Nga'isona 直接任命了一名新的区指挥官(见附件 11, 有关 Boda 的一份详细个案研究, 见附件 63)。

五. 违反国际人道主义法行为¹⁴⁸

203. 2013 年 12 月 5 日以来, 专家小组记录了多方肇事者杀害 3 003 名平民。其中, 小组中期报告中报告了 2 569 起案情(见 S/2014/452, 第 104 段)。2014 年 5 月 1 日至 8 月 14 日, 又记录了 436 起杀人事件。整个 2014 年期间全国各地平民死亡人数显著减少, 但是应注意的是, 仍有一定程度的报告不足和信息延迟。

204. 全国杀害平民事件减少, 原因可能是: 国际部队增加, 使总体安全局势改善; 武装团体不同派别争夺地区减少; 人道主义组织越来越活跃, 这意味着事件

¹⁴⁷ 见 <https://ewarningcar.crowdmap.com/reports/view/14>, 2014 年 8 月 30 日查阅。

¹⁴⁸ 关于方法的评论, 见附件 64。

可能被记录，因此有可能上报给国内和国际组织，而这些组织又有可能对其采取法律行动(杀害平民的趋势和详情见附件 65-67)。

205. 2014 年 5 月 1 日至 8 月 14 日，根据专家小组收集到的有关杀害平民的信息，塞雷卡对其中 34% 的事件负责，13.4% 的事件据称是反砍刀组织团体所为，而 23.7% 的事件没有关于肇事者的报道。据报，13.2% 的案件是其他团体或一些武装团体合伙所为(见附件 65 和 67)。

206. 专家小组过去三个月记录的一些最严重事件如下：

(a) 2014 年 6 月 2 日，据报，两卡车塞雷卡人员袭击了班巴里西北 Louba 周围的 Bakala、Saboyombo 村和矿区。Bakala 县长和该地区的国际非政府组织初步估计有 50 名受害者。大屠杀之后，大多数尸体被扔进河里。县长称，塞雷卡人员绑架了 Bakala 教会牧师，因为牧师拒绝提供有关某人的信息。在撰写本报告时，这位牧师仍身陷囹圄，给用作人体盾牌以阻止攻击。

(b) 2014 年 6 月 10 日，据称的塞雷卡分子攻击了(瓦姆省)的 Bodjomo 和 Boguila 村。在 Bodjomo 村，估计表明，至少 30 人伤亡。关于随后发生对 Boguila 的进攻，尚无人员伤亡记录。一名驾摩托车者在 Bodjomo 村看到据称的塞雷卡袭击者，他试图逃往 Boguila 村，以向那里的人报警。塞雷卡人员追上了他，把他杀害在村庄北口。有些人从 Boguila 逃到保瓦(瓦姆-彭代省)寻找栖身之所。保护小组报告，这些袭击之后，很多人被迫流离失所。

(c) 2014 年 6 月 23 日，反砍刀组织袭击了班巴里十公里处的富拉尼人村庄 Liwa，据说杀死 17 名平民。小组得到了村民代表的证词，他们向小组出示了照片，表明妇女和儿童被杀死和烧死。富拉尼人代表和红蝴蝶部队称，反砍刀组织人员是从离班巴里只有 7 公里的 Ouabé 村发起进攻的，但该地无法进入，因为战斗人员摧毁了通往该村的桥梁。

(d) 2014 年 7 月 29 日，反砍刀组织武装分子攻击了 Batangafo 市的塞雷卡阵地。一场冲突后，塞雷卡人员击退了攻击。这导致许多国内流离失所者到非洲中非支助团基地寻求避难。22 人死亡，其中包括 2 名中非支助团士兵，众多人员受伤，尤其是平民。

207. 小组对非洲中非支助团部队是否在中非共和国违反了国际人道主义法作了调查。小组重点调查了最严重的指控，在非洲中非支助团会晤了人权小组，听取他们对事件的陈述，并通报他们不知道的情况。附件 68 的表格列出了非洲中非支助团被调查的进行情况和有关指控。除此之外，小组还详细调查了具体杀人案情(见附件 69)。向非洲中非支助团人力资源科通报了调查进展。调查是与班吉的公共检察官办公室合作进行的。¹⁴⁹ 小组收到了非洲中非支助团袭击反砍刀组织

¹⁴⁹ 与非洲中非支助团人权科召开的一些会议。

指挥官的多个报告。小组记录了两起事件，其中反砍刀组织一人员和一名革命与正义指挥官被打死；另一次事件是反砍刀组织人员被捕(见附件 68 中案例 11 和 19-21)。

208. 2014 年 5 月至 8 月，专家小组记录了 329 起绑架，不过一些事件是 5 月前发生的，由于无法进入事发地区，几个月后才得到信息。根据小组记录的情况，这些绑架事件的主要肇事者是与上帝抵抗军相关的武装人员团伙。上帝抵抗军目前活跃在中非共和国东部省份、邻近的刚果民主共和国和南苏丹。中非共和国境内的大部分袭击发生在姆博穆、上姆博穆和上科托省。向小组提供的报告证实，上帝抵抗军惯常的手法是小股人员潜入村庄，绑架平民。近几个月有人从上帝抵抗军叛逃，但没有确切的数字。¹⁵⁰

攻击学校和医院

209. 现有资料表明，2014 年期间，中非共和国的冲突共影响到 693 所学校。年内，教育专题组及合作伙伴收集的信息表明，全国 351 所公立学校遭到武装团体或平民洗劫或占据、遭各种爆炸物损坏或受到直接攻击。此外，342 所私立学校至少成为上述一种犯罪活动的受害者。确切袭击日期和详情不清，只有联合国儿童基金会(儿基会)和教育专题组合作伙伴的核查日期(案情详情、地点和数量见附件 70)。

210. 根据世界卫生组织(世卫组织)2014 年 6 月前收集的数据，中非共和国有 26 家医院被完全摧毁，198 家医院部分被毁。世卫组织的数据没有列明事件发生确切日期或肇事者，但很快应能得到这些数据。¹⁵¹

性暴力

211. 为建立将中非共和国境内性暴力定性为违反国际人道主义法行为的判断基线，专家小组得到了在保护专题组下工作的基于性别的暴力问题分组的数据。根据该分组提供的数据，2013 年 12 月 5 日至 2014 年 7 月 31 日期间共发生 784 起性暴力：纳纳-格里比齐(省)223 起，瓦姆-彭代省 62 起，翁贝拉-姆波科省 350 起，洛巴耶省 3 起，上姆博穆省 1 起，瓦姆省 9 起，班吉 132 起。受害者总数中，651 名为妇女，5 名男性，107 名未满 16 岁女孩和 4 名男孩。

212. 小组调查了反砍刀组织在班巴里(瓦卡省)犯下的一起具体案情(见附件 71)。调查程序非常严格，有助于在心理和医疗方面帮助性别暴力受害者。因此，小组只调查了一宗特别案情，因为其十分严重(一个家庭中三个女孩在同事件中被强奸)，而且还因为受害者能够获得医疗和心理服务(见附件 72)。

¹⁵⁰ Skype 会议和电子邮件；追踪上帝抵抗军的数据，见 <http://www.lracrisistracker.com/>。

¹⁵¹ 与设在班吉的卫生组织人员的电子邮件往来。

儿童兵

213. 2014 年 6 月和 7 月，中非稳定团儿童保护顾问和儿基会监测和报告机制一成员向小组提供了关于中非共和国境内儿童兵的信息。¹⁵²

214. 2014 年 1 月 16 日至 2 月 28 日，236 名儿童兵从塞雷卡组织复员。这些儿童给从在班吉的塞雷卡营地分开，或在 Damara-Sibut 一带休整。一些休整的儿童已经自行退出塞雷卡组织，从班吉向北撤退。此外，2014 年 6 月 19 日，43 名儿童(其中一名女孩)从班巴里、Ippy 和 Mbucho(瓦卡省)的塞雷卡组织获释，给带到上科托省布里亚的国际非政府组织过渡中心，目前正重新融入平民生活。已查明总共有 279 名儿童曾参与前塞雷卡并担当各种不同职能。¹⁵³

215. 监测和报告机制和儿童保护顾问查明有 1 114 名儿童与班吉、Boali、Yaloké 和 Boda 等处的反砍刀组织有关联。在班吉的许多儿童是孤身儿童，他们并非来自班吉。在班吉，中非稳定团到 7 月底查明了 76 名儿童(53 男，23 女)，他们目前正在临时营地，接受身份查证。2014 年 8 月 18 日，联合国儿基会在一份新闻稿中报告，103 名儿童，其中包括 13 名女孩，从反砍刀组织获释，并被带到国际非政府组织的一个过渡中心。¹⁵⁴ 从反砍刀组织中查出的儿童总数是 1 114 人，其中 179 人已经复员。¹⁵⁵

216. 在 Batangafo，专家小组有一次看到未成年士兵，当时小组正与塞雷卡指挥官会面。¹⁵⁵ 由于塞雷卡和国际部队之间最近发生战事，小组无法验证这些士兵的年龄。

217. 此外，小组记录了上帝抵抗军绑架儿童的 3 起案情。这些绑架发生在 2014 年 6 月和 7 月。

六. 旅行禁令和资产冻结的执行情况

218. 继 François Bozizé、Nourredine Adam 和 Lévy Yakité 受到 2014 年 5 月 9 日第 2134(2014)号决议第 30 段(旅行禁令)和第 32 段(资产冻结)所规定的措施制裁后，小组要求中非共和国和区域内金融机构，包括全球汇款机构，提供信息，说明这些人及其家人和同伙的账户和转账信息，确保任何资金、金融资产或经济资源不转给或用于安全理事会关于中非共和国的第 2127(2013)号决议所设委员会指定的个人。

¹⁵² 2014 年 6 月商定，与小组联合派人出访，但未能成行，原因不明。小组还联络了一些其他有关方面，如国际非政府组织和中非共和国有关当局。小组到访了班吉的一个重新融入社会的儿童过渡中心，不过查询的所有文件均是 2013 年的。

¹⁵³ 2014 年 7 月 17 日，会晤了中非稳定团儿童保护顾问 Charles Fomunyan。

¹⁵⁴ 儿基会新闻稿，2014 年 9 月 8 日，见 http://www.unicef.org/media/media_74816.html。

¹⁵⁵ 访问 Batangafo，2014 年 8 月 13 日。

219. François Bozizé和 Nourredine Adam 在中非共和国 Ecobank 银行开有账户。Bozizé账户中的余额是 28 979 美元，是开户时存放的，但在 2013 年 1 月 1 日至 2014 年 6 月 26 日期间无任何活动。Adam 账户上最后一次活动是在其列上制裁名单之前的 2014 年 3 月 31 日，当时，他受到中非共和国国库汇来的 2 480 美元的薪水。他的账户余额为 5 358 美元。Levy Yakité在萨赫勒撒哈拉投资贸易银行的中非分行开有账户。这一余额为负 600 美元的账户被列为可疑账户；该账户自 2013 年 12 月以来一直无活动。

220. 专家小组还要求这 3 名被指定的个人现居住、曾居住或曾前往的会员国说明其遵守旅行禁令和资产冻结的情况。这些国家包括乍得、法国、肯尼亚、尼日利亚、卡塔尔、南非、苏丹和瑞士。

221. 到目前为止，小组只收到来自法国和卡塔尔的答复。法国常驻联合国代表团向联合国通报，Yakité现居住在法国，法国正在研究如何限制他在申根地区的出行，但没有提及冻结其资产的措施。卡塔尔常驻联合国代表团报告，其政府部门没有发现 Nourredine Adam 在卡塔尔有商业利益。

222. 关于被指定个人的现居住地，小组从 2014 年 5 月 9 日前的汇款记录中得知，Yakité现住法国南特。¹⁵⁶ 2014 年 6 月 6 日，小组在乌干达恩德培见了 François Bozizé。在那里，乌干达总统向他提供了人身保护和司机。¹⁵⁷ 2014 年 8 月 23 日，Nourredine Adam 打电话告知小组，他身在中非共和国比劳。¹⁵⁸ 2014 年 8 月，国际刑警组织报告小组，没有收到这三个被指定个人违反旅行禁令的通知。¹⁵⁹

七. 建议

223. 专家小组建议：

区域

(a) 安全理事会在下一项决议中要求中非稳定团优先在目前无国际存在的中非共和国地区，特别是在与乍得、苏丹和南苏丹接壤边境地区部署军队，加强巡逻，部署航空资产，包括无人驾驶飞机，监控跨境活动；

¹⁵⁶ 文件存档在联合国。

¹⁵⁷ 在恩德培会晤了 François Bozizé，2014 年 6 月 6 日。

¹⁵⁸ 电话采访了 Nourredine Adam 及其 4 名顾问，2014 年 8 月 23 日。

¹⁵⁹ 2014 年 6 月 18 日，安理会、国际刑警组织和专家小组达成的协议生效，开始交换有关信息，包括公布国际刑警组织-联合国安全理事会特别通告。特别通告是要公示安理会制裁措施所针对的个人和实体。其主要功能是提醒各国执法机关注意某些制裁措施适用于指定的个人和实体。关于委员会制裁清单上的 3 名个人的特别通告，见以下链接：<http://www.interpol.int/notice/search/un>。

(b) 安全理事会关于中非共和国的第 2127(2013)号决议所设委员会敦促中非共和国、乍得和苏丹政府执行 2011 年 5 月 23 日在喀土穆签署的三方协议，与中非稳定团合作，通过联合巡逻，增强共同边界地区的安全；

(c) 安全理事会在下一项决议中考虑第 2127(2013)号决议第 54 段规定措施不适用于仅用于增援三方部队、或其中非稳定团合作使用的用品，安理会将要求三方部队向委员会报告这方面采取的措施；

(d) 委员会鼓励喀麦隆政府加强监测境内狩猎弹药的进出口和销售；

(e) 委员会鼓励喀麦隆和刚果民主共和国政府批准和实施《中部非洲管制小武器和轻武器及其弹药和一切用于制造、维修或组装此类武器的零部件公约》(《金沙萨公约》)；

(f) 委员会要求中非稳定团支持在于邻国接壤的省份恢复国家权力，提供航空资产，部署公务员和后勤装备，并与国家主管部门合作，发展必要的交通基础设施；

武装团体

(g) 委员会再次要求中非共和国过渡当局向委员会证实，已经指认、为中非共和国武装团伙的防务和治安人员，已经从防务和治安职位上解职；

(h) 委员会立即着手考虑指认参与或支助破坏中非共和国和平、稳定和安全行为的个人和实体，对其采取有针对性的措施；

武器

(i) 委员会再次要求过渡当局报告，与中非稳定团合作采取了哪些措施，确保武器弹药的安全管理，包括登记、分发、使用和维护，并找出任何培训和基础设施需求；

(j) 安全理事会敦促中非稳定团与专家小组合作，推动执行第 2149(2014)号决议第 31 段(d)和(e)段，并监测第 2127(2013)号决议第 54 段所规定措施的执行情况；

自然资源

(k) 安全理事会要求中非稳定团与专家小组合作，查明中非共和国自然资源生产地区、资源开发主要方面及供应和出口路线，以防止武装团伙或犯罪网络利用中非共和国的自然资源；

(l) 委员会要求中非稳定团协同和支持有关国家当局定期检查和视察矿区、贸易路线、简易跑道和贸易商行，作为其促进和支持国家权力迅速扩展任务的一个环节；

(m) 委员会要求与中非共和国接壤的6个会员国每年以保密方式汇报自然资源进出口，包括钻石和黄金的完整统计数据；

(n) 委员会敦促中非共和国黄金出口商、进口商、加工商和消费者为减少中非共和国冲突进一步加剧的风险，遵守目前正通过大湖区问题国际会议区域证书机制执行的尽责指导原则；

(o) 委员会敦促中非共和国钻石出口商、进口商、加工商和消费者减少中非共和国冲突进一步加剧的风险，并鼓励大型钻石业和有关国际机构制定适用于钻石供应链的尽责指导原则；

人道主义

(p) 委员会敦促中非共和国过渡当局与国际伙伴合作，在中非稳定团的支持下，制订流动法庭，以便将肇事者绳之以法，并在各省消除有罪不罚现象；

(q) 委员会敦促联合国人权事务高级专员办事处、儿基会和参与中非共和国监测和报告机制的其他国际组织与专家小组合作，改进和加强问责措施，更好地确认侵犯人权和违反国际人道法的肇事者，包括在武装冲突中使用儿童兵和犯有基于性别的暴力的肇事者。

Annex 1: Table of correspondences sent and received by the Panel from 15 February to 17 September 2014

Country/ Other Entity	Number of letters sent	Requested information fully supplied	Information partially supplied	No answer/ Information not supplied	Pending*
African Union	1			1	
AHS	1	1			
ASECNA	2	2			
Angola	1			1	
Belgium	2	1		1	
BINUCA/MINUSCA	2	2			
BSIC	1	1			
Cameroon	5		1	4	
Central African Republic	3	2		1	
Chad	3		1	1	1
China	2	1			1
Côte d'Ivoire	1			1	
Republic of the Congo	3	1		2	
Democratic Republic of the Congo	1		1		
Ecobank	4	2			2
France	3	2			1
France (Sangaris)	2	2			
Gabon	1	1			
Groupe Bancaire Commercial	1			1	
ICC	1	1			
IWI	3	3			
Kardiam/Badica	2	2			
Kenya	1			1	
KP Chair	1	1			
Maxam	1	1			
MoneyGram	1				1
Morocco	1	1			
Nepal	1			1	
Niger	1			1	
Nigeria	1			1	
Qatar	1	1			
Russian Federation	1	1			
SAMT	2	2			
Senegal	1			1	
South Africa	1			1	
South Sudan	1			1	
Steyr AUG	1	1			
ST Kinetics	1	1			
Sudan	3			3	

Switzerland	1	1			
Togo	1				1
Toyota	1	1			
Tula	1				1
UAE	6	5		1	
Uganda	2	1		1	
Ukraine	2	2			
UNFPA Bangui	1	1			
UNOHCHR Bangui/Geneva	1		1		
UNHCR Bangui/Geneva	1		1		
USA	1				1
Western Union	1	1			
TOTAL	84	45	5	25	9

* A request pending indicates that the Member State or the entity indicated in a communication to the Secretariat of the Committee that a response to the Panel's request of information is forthcoming.

Annex 2: Agreement between former Séléka and anti-balaka facilitated by Pareto (archived at the United Nations)

ACCORD DE RECONNAISSANCE ET D'ENGAGEMENT A LA MEDIATION
DE L'ONG-PARETO DANS LA CRISE CENTRAFRICAINE PAR
LES EX-SELEKA ET LE MOUVEMENT DES ANTIBALAKA

Considérant les objectifs de création de L'ONG Nationale de médiation et de sensibilisation **PARETO** (Paix-Réconciliation- Tolérance), au lendemain du début de la crise Centrafricaine, créée en date du 05 Janvier 2014.

Considérant la reconnaissance et l'autorisation de l'**ONG-PARETO** par les autorités de la transition comme entité légale, et pouvant exercer sur l'étendue du territoire national, ces activités de médiation et de sensibilisation de la population Centrafricaine sur la paix, le pardon, la tolérance, le vivre ensemble et la réconciliation nationale, par le Ministère de l'Administration du territoire, de la Décentralisation et de la Régionalisation, avec la décision numéro : 028/14, numéro d'enregistrement 14.48/ MATDR. DIRCAB.DGATD.DAPA.SASE du 03.04.201, en date du 07 Avril 2014.

Considérant l'initiative prise par L'ONG-PARETO, pour le déclenchement effectif d'une médiation dans la crise Centrafricaine, entre les parties en conflits, en date du 15 Mars 2014 à Bangui et à l'intérieur du pays.

Considérant les résultats remarquables et salutaires de L'ONG-PARETO dans sa médiation sur le terrain, et appréciés par les parties en conflit.

Considérant les toutes dernières démarches de négociation dans sa médiation (PARETO), pouvant mettre à table et échanger fructueusement pour une sortie de crise des belligérants de la crise Centrafricaine en date du 14 juin 2014 à Bangui, démarche saluée par toutes les parties.

Considérant l'engagement naturel d'impartialité et d'abnégation dans cette médiation pris par L'ONG-PARETO représentée par son médiateur en personne, puis sa reconnaissance et respect des démarches de médiation et de pacification de la crise Centrafricaine, entreprises par le médiateur de la CE.E.A.C, son Excellence monsieur **Denis SASSOU NGUESSO**, Président de la République sœur du Congo.

Considérant la volonté affichée pour la recherche de solutions de sortie de crise, par toutes les parties prenantes, de ladite médiation (EX-SELEKA et ANTIBALAKA).

Nous, Responsables ou Représentants des entités, **EX-SELEKA** et **ANTIBALAKA**, reconnaissons et acceptons la médiation de l'**ONG-PARETO**, déclenchée depuis le 15 Mars dernier, et nous engageons par le présent à respecter tous les principes et clauses consensuels de ladite médiation.

Le présent accord de reconnaissance et d'engagement à la médiation de l'ONG-PARETO, est signé et délivré par les parties, pour servir et valoir partout ou besoin sera.



Fait à Bangui, le 16 Juin 2014

Représentant EX-SELEKA



Mr ERIC VERIS MASSI
Médiateur Ex-Seleka

Représentant ANTIBALAKA



Mr Patrice Edward NGAISSONA
Coordinateur National Politique

Pour l'ONG-PARETO




Mr Beni-Diogo Iadji Kouyaté

Médiateur


Tel +236-72 05 99 79/77 22 82 69/beni.kouyate@yahoo.fr

Annex 3: International mediation institutions in the Central African Republic


The international mediation architecture




The international mediation team



International Contact Group/ Group of 8-CAR



Technical Follow-up Committee on the Libreville Agreement



Annex 4: Cessation of Hostilities Agreement signed in Brazzaville on 23 July 2014

ACCORD DE CESSATION DES HOSTILITES EN REPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE

PREAMBULE

Considérant les dispositions pertinentes de la Charte des Nations Unies, les Résolutions du Conseil de Sécurité des Nations Unies, notamment les résolutions: 2121 (2013) ; 2127 (2014); 2134 (2014) et 2149 (2014) l'Acte constitutif de l'Union Africaine et les décisions pertinentes du Conseil de Paix et de Sécurité de l'Afrique Centrale (COPAX) ;

Considérant la Convention de l'Union Africaine sur la protection et l'assistance des personnes déplacées en Afrique, signée à Kampala le 23 octobre 2009 ;

Considérant les résolutions régionales relatives au règlement du conflit en République Centrafricaine : notamment l'Accord de Paix Global de Libreville de 2008 et de 2013, ainsi que les Déclarations de Ndjamena de 2013 et 2014 ;

Considérant les initiatives nationales relatives au règlement des conflits, notamment, les Recommandations du Dialogue Politique Inclusif du 20 décembre 2008, la Charte constitutionnelle de Transition de 2013 et la Feuille de Route de la Transition qui en découlait ;

Conscients de la nécessité du dialogue pour l'instauration d'une paix durable et de sécurité sur l'ensemble du territoire national, condition essentielle à la reconstruction du pays et à l'édification de la démocratie ;

Considérant la volonté constante de Son Excellence Madame Catherine SAMBA-PANZA, Chef de l'Etat de Transition, réitérée dans ses différentes déclarations (Bruxelles, Paris, Oslo, Malabo) et la dernière adresse à la Nation du 04 juillet 2014, de promouvoir le dialogue politique et la réconciliation nationale de tous les fils et de toutes filles de Centrafrique ;

Considérant la dynamique nationale, notamment celle des institutions de la Transition, des Forces vives de la Nation y compris la plateforme des autorités religieuses, la société civile et les parties politiques, à construire une société de paix et de concorde nationale, en apportant leur soutien au cadre de l'actuelle Transition ;

Réaffirmant leur volonté de contribuer au retour définitif de la paix, de prendre part au Forum de Brazzaville et de signer un Accord de cessation des hostilités ;

Réaffirmant leur détermination inébranlable à mettre un terme aux causes profondes de l'état continu de violence, d'insécurité, d'instabilité politique et d'exclusion qui a plongé le peuple centrafricain dans la détresse et la souffrance et qui compromet gravement les perspectives de développement économique, ainsi que la réalisation de l'égalité et de la justice sociale dans leur pays ;



Répondant à la Médiation Internationale dirigée par Son Excellence Denis SASSOU NGUESSO, Président de la République du Congo, Médiateur de la crise centrafricaine, appuyée par Monsieur BOUBEYE MAÏGA, Représentant de la Présidente de la Commission de l'Union Africaine et Monsieur Abdoulaye BATHILY, Représentant Spécial du Secrétaire Général des Nations Unies pour l'Afrique Centrale, mise en place lors de la Concertation des Chefs d'Etat et de Gouvernement de la Communauté Economique des Etats de l'Afrique Centrale (CEEAC), en marge du 23^{ème} Sommet Ordinaire de l'Union Africaine, tenu à Malabo en Guinée Equatoriale le 27 juin 2014, sur la situation en République Centrafricaine ;

Les ex-combattants et éléments armés centrafricains conviennent de ce qui suit :

Article 1^{er} :

- Le présent Accord de Cessation des Hostilités est établi entre les belligérants pour prendre effet sur l'ensemble du territoire de la République Centrafricaine ;
- Les belligérants acceptent d'observer la cessation des hostilités dès la signature de l'Accord ;

Article 2 :

La cessation des hostilités implique :

- L'arrêt immédiat des hostilités et l'abstention de tout acte militaire ou toute autre forme de violence ;
- La cessation de tous les actes de violences contre les populations civiles et militaires, le respect et la protection des droits humains. Ces actes de violences incluent les exécutions sommaires, la torture, le harcèlement, les incendies volontaires de villages, des biens publics et privés, les destructions des édifices religieux, le pillage, la détention et l'exécution arbitraires des civils et militaires ainsi que le recrutement et l'utilisation d'enfants soldats, la violence sexuelle et l'armement des civils ;
- La dénonciation de tous les actes de violences et des violations des droits de l'homme et droit humanitaire international ;
- L'arrêt et l'abstention de toutes actions et incitations de nature à nuire aux efforts visant à faire valoir l'esprit de fraternité et de concorde nationale ;
- L'engagement des parties à communiquer publiquement et dans un délai de 24 heures à compter de la date de signature du présent Accord, la cessation des hostilités par leurs chaines de commandement respectives ainsi qu'à la population civile.
- La cessation par les parties de toute propagande, discours de haine et de division fondées sur l'appartenance religieuse, tribale ou partisane. Les parties mettent fin aux actes d'intolérance et aux campagnes médiatiques susceptibles de provoquer la confrontation politique ou religieuse.

3 

- L'organisation d'une campagne d'information sur le contenu du présent Accord auprès de leurs adhérents et, en ce qui concerne le gouvernement, la campagne d'information visera toute la population centrafricaine.


Article 3 : Dès l'entrée en vigueur du présent Accord :

- a. Les Parties s'obligent à cesser toute entrave à l'exercice de l'autorité de l'Etat dans les zones où elles se trouvent notamment : les barrières illégales et les administrations parallèles.
- b. Les Parties s'engagent à s'impliquer dans le processus global de réconciliation nationale qui se poursuivra en RCA, à s'abstenir immédiatement d'entraver la libre circulation des personnes et des biens sur l'ensemble du territoire, ainsi que le travail des Forces nationales et internationales dans l'exécution de leurs mandats donnés par les différentes Résolutions des Nations Unies.
- c. Les Parties s'engagent à extirper de leurs rangs et à rapatrier tous les mercenaires afin qu'ils regagnent leur pays respectifs avec l'appui de la communauté internationale.
- d. Les parties s'engagent à renoncer à tout projet de partition de la RCA.

Article 4 : Tous les ex-combattants et éléments armés signataires du présent Accord doivent être regroupés dans un délai raisonnable, sous réserve de mobilisation des ressources nécessaires sur les sites à convenir d'un commun accord avec le Gouvernement de la Transition et la Communauté Internationale.

Article 5 : Les parties s'engagent également à :

- a. Respecter et faire respecter les droits humains ;
- b. Interdire et condamner toute violence contre les populations civiles et militaires, y compris les violences sexuelles ;
- c. Mettre en place au sein de leurs mouvements respectifs, un mécanisme de suivi des ces engagements, en portant connaissance de ces violations aux autorités compétentes, afin de lutter contre l'impunité ;
- d. Mettre fin et prévenir toutes violations commises à l'égard des enfants notamment, les actes de meurtre, de mutilations, d'exploitation des enfants, ainsi que les viols et autres violences ;
- e. Ne pas recruter des enfants comme combattants, en conformité avec la Charte Africaine des Droits et du Bien-être des enfants, la Convention sur les droits de l'enfant et le Protocole Facultatif à la Convention relative aux droits d'enfants concernant l'implication d'Enfants dans les conflits Armés.

4 

Article 6 : Les parties s'engagent à :

- a- Respecter la libre circulation en général, des convois humanitaires en particulier, les enclaves humanitaires, et à créer des conditions favorables pour l'assistance aux réfugiés et aux déplacés ;
- b- Promouvoir un environnement socio-sécuritaire favorable en vue de permettre le retour des réfugiés et des déplacés dans leurs communautés.

Article 7 : Un programme prioritaire doit être mis en place en urgence dans le but de :

- a. Créer les conditions de retour, de réinstallation et de réinsertion des personnes déplacées en raison du conflit ;
- b. Lutter contre la criminalité particulièrement celle prévue à l'article 2 ;
- c. Réhabiliter les zones affectées par le conflit.

Article 8 : Les parties signataires mettent en place une commission de suivi de l'application du présent Accord composée comme suit :

- 1. 01 représentant par groupe politico-militaire ;
- 2. G8 – RCA ;
- 3. 06 représentants des Institutions de la Transition (Présidence, CNT, Gouvernement).

Cette commission devra établir des sous – commissions régionales et locales, chaque fois que de besoin. En cas de nécessité, la commission de suivi de l'application du présent Accord peut faire appel à toute personne qualifiée.

Article 9 : En cas de différend ou de difficulté sur l'application du présent Accord, l'une ou l'autre des Parties peut avoir recours à la commission de suivi. En cas de non satisfaction, elle pourra faire recours à la Médiation Internationale.

Article 10 : Le présent Accord entre en vigueur dès sa signature.

Fait à Brazzaville, le 23 Juillet 2014



Ont signé

-Les ex-Combattants et Eléments armés

Pour le Front Populaire pour la Renaissance de la Centrafrique (F.P.R.C),
Général Mohamed MOUSSA DHAFANE Ex Coalition SEVEKA

Pour les anti-Balaka,
Monsieur Patrice Edouard NGAISSONA

Pour le Front Démocratique du Peuple Centrafricain (FDPC),
Monsieur André Le-Gaillard RINGUI

Pour Révolution et Justice (RJ),
Monsieur Armel SAYO

Pour le Mouvement de Libération Centrafricaine pour la Justice (MLCJ),
Monsieur ABAKAR SABONE

Pour l'Union des Forces Républicaines (UFR),
Monsieur Florian N'DJADDER BEDAY

Pour l'Union des Forces Républiques Fondamentales (UFRF),
Monsieur Dieu-bénit GBEYAKIKOBET

-En présence de :


Gouvernement de Transition :

Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, de l'Intégration Africaine et de la Francophonie,
Son Excellence Toussaint KONGO-DOUDOU


Conseil National de Transition
Honorable Alexandre Ferdinand N'GUENDET




Alternative Citoyenne pour la Démocratie et la Paix (ACDP),
Monsieur Enoch DERANT LAKOUE



Ancienne Majorité Présidentielle,
Monsieur Laurent NGON-BABA



Groupement des Partis Politiques / Républicains Travailleurs Légalistes (GPP/RTL),
Monsieur Bertin BEA



Union des Partis Politiques pour la Reconstruction Nationale (UPPRN),
Pierre Abraham MBOKANI



Rassemblement des autres Partis Politiques,
Monsieur Auguste BOUKANGA




A. BOUKANGA
Président de l'URD/Assemblée RAS
Partis Politiques sans Plateforme,
Monsieur Henri GOUANDIA

Personnalités Indépendantes :

- Madame Alphonsine BOGANDA-YANGONGO



- Monsieur Stève Koba




Conseil National de la Jeunesse (CNJ),

- Monsieur Jean Félix Wulfrand RIVA



- Monsieur Abdel-Aziz AROUFAÏ



Organisation des Femmes Centrafricaines (OFCA),
Madame Marie-Annick SERVICE



Comité Consultatif des Femmes Leaders,
Dr. SOKAMBI DIBERT BEKOY




Haut Conseil de la Communication,
Monsieur José Richard POUAMBI



Syndicats des Travailleurs,
Monsieur Michel LOUDEGUE



Confédération Nationale des Agriculteurs et éleveurs,
Madame Brigitte ANDARA



Confessions Religieuses

- Monseigneur Dieudonné NZAPALAINGA



- IMAM KOBINE LAYAMA



Conseil Inter-ONG en Centrafrique (CIONGCA),
Monsieur Célestin NGAKOLA




Groupement Interprofessionnel en Centrafrique (GICA),
Monsieur Giles POTOLO INGBANGANDIMBO



La Diaspora,
Monsieur Maurice OUAMBO




Déplacés Internes,
Monsieur Jean Claude MALABI



Communautés à Risques :

- Monsieur ATAHIROU BALLA DODO
- Madame ADJA ASTA MOUSSA



La Médiation Internationale

Pour les Nations-Unies

Le Représentant Spécial du Secrétaire Général de l'ONU en Afrique Centrale,
Monsieur Abdoulaye BATHILY




Pour l'Union Africaine

Le Vice-Médiateur,
Monsieur SOUMAILOU BOUBEY MAIGA




Pour la CEEAC

Le Rapporteur
Le Secrétaire Général de la CEEAC,
Ambassadeur Ahmad ALLAM-MI,



Le Médiateur international

Le Président de la République du Congo,
Son Excellence Monsieur Denis SASSOU N'GUESSO



Annex 5: FPRC press communiqué calling for the creation of the independent state of Dar El Kouti and its government (archived at the United Nations)

FRONT POPULAIRE POUR LA RENAISSANCE DE CENTRAFRIQUE

Présidence du Bureau Politique

Secrétariat Général

DECISION N°002-14 portant création d'un nouvel Etat au Nord-est Centrafrique en scission en République Centrafricaine

La Présidence du Bureau politique du Front Populaire pour la Renaissance de Centrafrique (FPRC) ;

Vu le génocide planifié, orchestré et exécuté et la prise en otage des musulmans par les milices chrétiennes en Centrafrique après la démission négociée du Président Michel DJOTODIA lors du sommet extraordinaire de la CEEAC du 10 janvier 2014 à Ndjamena en violation des articles 13,14 alinéa 1 et 15 de la déclaration des droits de l'homme du 10 janvier 1948 ;

Vu la destruction des mosquées, des biens et habitations, les tueries, le cannibalisme, la profanation des cimetières, des corans perpétrés par les milices Anti-balaka ;

Vu l'incapacité avérée des autorités de la Transition avec l'inexistence des forces de défense capables d'assurer un minimum de sécurité et à rétablir la paix et la concorde sur la moindre partie du territoire national en violation grave de la Charte Constitutionnelle de Transition ;

Vu les capacités des nouvelles forces républicaines (Ex-Séléka) hiérarchisées et responsables de rétablir l'ordre et la paix dans sa zone de juridiction ;

Vu l'attitude du gouvernement poussant une partie de la population vers la partition de fait de la Centrafrique ;

Vu que les chrétiens et les musulmans vivent en parfaite symbiose dans les zones sous contrôle des Forces Républicaines ;

Vu la Charte des Nations-Unies et de la déclaration universelle des droits de l'homme pour le Droit de peuple à l'autodétermination de 1948;

Vu la Charte Africaine des droits de l'homme et des peuples de 1986;

Vu le communiqué final des assises de NDELE du 09 au 10 Mai 2014 sur la mise place de l'Etat Major des Forces Républicaines ;

Vu le communiqué final des assises de BIRAO du 06 au 10 juillet 2014 portant la mise en place du bureau politique de Front Populaire pour la Renaissance de Centrafrique (FPRC) ;

DECIDE

Article 1er : Il est créé un Etat laïc, libre et souverain situé au Nord-est de la République Centrafrique dénommé « ETAT DE DAR EL KOUTI » en scission avec la République Centrafricaine.

Article 2 : L'Etat de DAR EL KOUTI est dirigé par un Chef d'Etat assisté d'un Gouvernement provisoire.

Article 3 : Le Gouvernement provisoire sous la Haute impulsion du Chef d'Etat a pour mission de préparer un Référendum Constitutionnel d'Autodétermination en vue de la proclamation de la République indépendante et démocratique et la mise en place des institutions.

Article 4 : La présente Décision qui prend effet à compter de la date de sa signature sera enregistrée, notifiée à la communauté internationale et publiée partout au besoin.

Fait à Birao le, 14 Août 2014

Pour le bureau politique, le Vice Président

Général NOUREDINE ADAM

“ETAT DE DAR EL KOUTI

FRONT POPULAIRE POUR LA RENAISSANCE DE CENTRAFRIQUE

Présidence du Bureau Politique

DECISION N°003-14 PORTANT NOMINATION DES
MEMBRES DU GOUVERNEMENT PROVISOIRE DE L'ETAT DE DAR EL KOUTI.
Vu la Décision n°002-14 de 15 Août 2014 portant création de l'Etat de DAR EL KOUTI ;
Vu le communiqué final des assises de BIRAO du 06 au 10 juillet 2014 portant la mise en place du bureau
politique de Front Populaire pour la Renaissance de Centrafrique (FPRC) ;
Vu le communiqué final des assises de NDELE sur la mise place de l'Etat Major des Forces Républicaines
;
DECIDE

Article 1er : Les personnalités dont les noms suivent sont nommés membres du Gouvernement Provisoire
de l'Etat de DAR EL KOUTI.

Il s'agit de :

Chef d'Etat et du Gouvernement Provisoire : **Monsieur Michel DJOTODIA AM-NONDROKO**

Ministres d'Etat

1. Ministre d'Etat à la Défense Nationale et à la Sécurité Publique :

Gl. NOUREDINE ADAM

2. Ministre d'Etat à la Promotion Féminine et la Jeunesse : **Madame Elodie Mahamat TABANE**

Secrétaires d'Etat :

3. Secrétaire d'Etat aux Affaires Etrangères et au partenariat au Développement : **Monsieur Mamadou
Moussa DANGABO**

4. Secrétaire d'Etat au Développement Rural: **Dr HAMAT MAL-MAL Essène**

5. Secrétaire d'Etat aux Finances et au Commerce: **Monsieur Fotor ABDEL-DJOUBAR**

6. Secrétaire d'Etat à la Santé Publique et aux Actions Humanitaires: **Monsieur Haroun AMALAS
AMLAS**

7. Secrétaire d'Etat à l'Administration du Territoire et à la Justice : **Monsieur Marcel NGAO-LOEMBE**

8. Secrétaire d'Etat à l'Education Nationale : **Monsieur Abakar SABONE**

9. Secrétaire d'Etat aux Transports et aux Infrastructures: **Monsieur Abdoulaye ISSENE RAMADANE**

10. Secrétaire d'Etat aux Ressources Naturelles : **Gl. Ousmane Mahamat OUSMANE**

11. Secrétaire d'Etat à la Communication et aux Nouvelles Technologies: **Monsieur Awal HABILA.**

Article 2 : La présente Décision qui prend effet à compter de la date de sa signature sera enregistrée,
notifiée à la communauté internationale et publiée partout au besoin sera.

Fait à Birao le, 17 Août 2014

Le Président du Bureau Politique

Michel DJOTODIA AM-NONDROKO “

Annex 6: Photographs of former Séléka military leadership in Batangafo (photographs taken by the Panel on 13 July 2014)

Zone Commander (appointed by General Alkhatim) Colonel Mohamed Assil (right)



Zone Commander (appointed by General Zoundeko) Colonel Moussa Maouloud (right)





















Annex 7: Photograph of non-local anti-balaka groups in Bambari (Ouaka province) (photograph taken by the Panel on 4 July 2014)



Annex 9: Photograph of “Ben Laden” (centre) taken during a meeting with the Panel in Bambari (Ouaka province) on 3 July 2014



Annex 10: Names, positions and signatures of the political and military leadership of the CLPC in a document dated 18 May 2014 (archived at the United Nations)


Les membres de la Coordination du Mouvement Antibalaka			
N°	NOM ET PRENOMS	FONCTION	EMARGEMENT
01	NGAÏSSONA Patrice Edouard	Coordonnateur Général	
02	NGAYA Alfred Legrand	Conseiller Politique	
03	Commandant MOKOM GAWAKA Maxime	Coordonnateur national des opérations militaires, Chef d'Etat- Major Général	
04	Commandant NAMSIO Emotion Brice	Porte-Parole Général	
05	YAGOUSSOU Sylvestre	Porte-Parole Adjoint	
Tél. : (+236), 72.64.80.98 - 72.56.72.80. - 72.50.83.16. - 72.77.56.87. 72.28.46.45.			
06	Lieutenant GANAZOUI Hervé	Chef de Bataillon	
07	Commandant ANDILO NGAÏBONA	Chef de Bataillon	
08	Capitaine LEBENE Thierry (12 Puissances)	Chef de Bataillon	
09	Capitaine EMTENOU Eusèbe	Chef de Bataillon	
10	Commandant ZONI Alain	Chef de Bataillon	
11	Commandant ANGA Charles	Commandant de Compagnie	
12	Commandant OUAPOUTOU Benjamin	Chef de Bataillon	
13	Capitaine DEHOLO Marcellin	Chef de Bataillon	
14	Commandant YADJOUNGOU Gustave	Chef de Bataillon	
15	Lieutenant DENAMGANAI Aimé Abel	Chef de Bataillon	
16	Lieutenant YAKOUZOU Bernard	Chef de Bataillon	
17	Sergent BAKAFE Aristide	Chef de Bataillon	
18	Commandant MAHANI Constant	Chef de Bataillon	
19	Sergent YAORE Ange Anicet	Chef de Bataillon	


20	Commandant MAZIMBELET Guy	Chef de Bataillon	<i>[Signature]</i>
21	Commandant YADJOUNGOU Gustave	Chef de Bataillon	<i>[Signature]</i>
22	Lieutenant KONATE Yvon	Chef de Bataillon	<i>[Signature]</i>
23	Commandant BEJOUANE Richard	Chef de Bataillon	<i>[Signature]</i>
24	Commandant BOZANDO Richard	Chef de Bataillon	<i>[Signature]</i>
25	Sergent KEANSSEM Séraphin	Chef de Section	<i>[Signature]</i>
26	Sergent MOKPEM Guy Gervais	Chef de Bataillon	<i>[Signature]</i>
27	Lieutenant DONOH Yvon	Chef de bataillon	<i>[Signature]</i>
28	BEOROFEI Sylvain	Chef de bataillon	<i>[Signature]</i>
29	Gend. BERKAI HOURONTI Dieudonné	Chef de bataillon	<i>[Signature]</i>
30	Caporal Chef OROFEI Patrick	Commandant de Compagnie	<i>[Signature]</i>

Tél : (+236).72.64.80.98 - 72.56.72.80. - 72.50.83.16. - 72.77.56.87. 72.28.46.45.

31	Commandant YANOUE Gabin	Chef de Bataillon OCRB Damala	<i>[Signature]</i>
32	Lieutenant ANDILOGOA Giscard	Chef de Bataillon	<i>[Signature]</i>
33	Commandant INGA Gabin	Chef de Bataillon	<i>[Signature]</i>
34	Capitaine YADOUNGOU Rodrigue	Chef de Bataillon	<i>[Signature]</i>
35	Capitaine SAMI Urbain	Chef de Bataillon	<i>[Signature]</i>
36	Capitaine GOLOKETE Guy	Chef de Bataillon	<i>[Signature]</i>

Annex 11: Appointment letters signed by Patrice Edouard Ngaïssona of Soussou Abib (a.k.a. Soussou Habib) as acting regional coordinator and Rodrigue Karamokonzi as acting zone commander in Boda on 28 June 2014 (Lobaye province), and confirmation letter of their appointment on 8 July 2014 (archived at the United Nations)





Monsieur SENDE - Régis - Maurice et Monsieur BOKOTO - Maxime
sont nos portés parole.

Et voici comment le Bureau Sous-préfectoral des Anti
BALAKA de Boda est formé. Le Bureau général prend vingt
personnes qui vont être tout de suite cités.

<u>Coordonateur Sous-Préfectoral</u>	SOUSSOU - Hôlé
<u>Coordonateur S/P adjoint</u>	DOBO - Aimé
<u>Commandant de Zone</u>	KARAMOKONDJI - Vian - Rodu
<u>Commandant de Zone adjoint</u>	KOTTE - Aimé - Jérôme
<u>Chef d'état Major</u>	BALE - Kossi - Japhet
<u>Chef d'état Major adjoint</u>	NGOUMBARA - Marc
<u>Secrétaire Général</u>	NGOUASSOUM - Félix
<u>Secrétaire Général Adjoint</u>	KALOUA - Margot - Edo
<u>Treasorier Général</u>	KEBE - Ibrahim
<u>Treasorier Général Adjoint</u>	YAMINI - Hippolyte
<u>Commissaire aux Comptes</u>	GOUNMOURDU - Perpetue
<u>Porte Parole</u>	SENDE - Régis - Maurice
<u>Porte Parole Adjoint</u>	BOKOTO - Maxime
<u>Protocoles</u>	LOSSE - Eric ; BEKAI - Christ SANGHE - Patrice
<u>Conseillers</u>	VENETOUGBOU - Patrice ; NGOU - Théodore GRANGALE - Alpha et BEKET - Paul


Après la présentation faite, certaines remarques ont été faites.
Chaque chef pour la mauvaise conduite soulignée dans leurs comptes.

Et en fin la parole est donnée au pasteur ancien parois
pour la prière de clôture de la dite réunion.

Fait à Boda le 08-07-2014

Bureau Sous-Préfectoral des Anti-
BALAKA de Boda -

le Commandant de Zone


M. KARAMOKONDJI

Annex 12: CLPC decision number 1 expelling L'épold Narcisse Bara (archived at the United Nations)



Annex 13: Press communiqué announcing the appointment of Sébastien Wénézoui as deputy general coordinator of the CLPC (archived at the United Nations)



Annex 14: Composition of the steering committee appointed by the transitional Prime Minister on 28 August 2014, as per the cessation of hostilities agreement signed in Brazzaville on 23 July 2014

Article 3 : La Commission est composée comme suit :

I/INSTITUTIONS DE LA TRANSITION

- **Présidence de la République :**
 - Madame Léonie BANGA- BOTHY, Ministre Conseiller Diplomatique ;
 - Monsieur Léon DIBERET, Ministre Conseiller en matière d'administration du Territoire
- **Conseil National de Transition :**
 - Madame Léa KOYASSOUM DOUMTA, Vice-présidente ;
 - Monsieur Gaëtan Rock MOLOTO KENGUEMBA, Conseiller National ;
- **Gouvernement :**
 - Madame Marie Noëlle KOYARA, Ministre d'Etat en charge des Travaux Publics, de l'Equipeement et de l'Aménagement du Territoire ;
 - Général de Brigade MINTEKOE Thierry Marie, Ministre de la Sécurité Publique et de l'Emigration-Immigration;

II/ GROUPES POLITICO-MILITAIRES :

- Ex-Coalition Seleka : Moustapha SABONE
- Anti-Balaka : Salomon FEIGANAZOUI
- Front Démocratique du Peuple Centrafricain (FDPC) : ADAM Ousmane
- Révolution et Justice (RJ): Colonel Laurent DIM-WOEI ;
- Mouvement de Libération Centrafricaine pour la Justice (MLCJ): Eloge KOI ;
- Union des Forces Républicaines (UFR) : Florian François N'DJADDER BEDAYA ;
- Union des Forces Républicaines Fondamentales (UFRF) : Askin NZENGUE- LANZA

III/ COMMUNAUTE INTERNATIONALE : Tous les membres du G8-RCA

Article 4 : La Commission de suivi se réunit une fois par semaine et chaque fois que de besoin sur convocation de sa Présidence.

Article 6 : Le présent arrêté, qui prend effet pour compter de la date de sa Signature, sera publié partout où besoin sera.



Annex 15: Unsigned press communiqué from the *Coordination politique provisoire* of the former Séléka announcing the Birao conference

RÉPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE
UNITÉ-DIGNITÉ-TRAVAIL



Séléka

COMMUNIQUE 001/CS/CP/AG. 14

La Coordination Politique Provisoire de la Coalition Séléka tient à informer l'opinion nationale et internationale que la Coalition tient son Assemblée Générale du 07 au 08 juillet 2014 à Birao.

C'est dans l'esprit de solidarité et d'unité, qui caractérise la coalition, que se tiendra ladite assemblée afin de mettre en place un Bureau Politique National, interlocuteur valable et légitime sur les plans national et international.

Ce dernier sera investi de la mission de préparation des différentes mutations internes en vue de participer à la construction de la paix, la sécurité, la bonne gouvernance, la démocratie et la justice sociale, condition sine qua none du développement durable de notre pays, la République Centrafricaine.

Les délégués de Bangui, Bambari, Bria, kagabandoro, Ndélé et ceux de la diaspora sont attendus à Birao dans la journée du lundi 07 juillet 2014.

La Coordination prie tous les destinataires du présent communiqué d'en faire large diffusion.

Fait à Bangui, le 06 juillet 2014
Pour la Coordination Politique Provisoire



Annex 16: Final communiqué of the first general assembly of the political leadership of the *Front Populaire pour la Renaissance de Centrafrique* (FPRC – Popular front for the rebirth of the Central African Republic) (archived at the United Nations)

COMMUNIQUE FINAL

**DE LA PREMIÈRE ASSEMBLÉE GÉNÉRALE DES CADRES POLITIQUES DU FRONT
POPULAIRE POUR LA RENAISSANCE DE CENTRAFRIQUE (FPRC) TENUE À BIRAO**

Du 06 au 10 juillet 2014, s'est tenue à Birao la première Assemblée Générale du Front Populaire pour la Renaissance de Centrafrique (FPRC) sous la Présidence du Général Mahamat Nouradine ADAM, Premier vice Président de l'ex-coalition séléka.

Ont pris part à ces assises les personnalités politiques ci-après :

Le Général Mohammed Moussa DHAFFANE; le Ministre d'Etat DJONO AHABA Herbert Gontran; le Général DAMANE Zakaria; le Général ISSA ISSAKA Aubin; le Général ABDELKARIM Moussa; le Général BABA Issène, Chef de mission de l'Etat Major des Forces Républicaines ; le Général ACHAFI DAOUD; le Général YAYA Bourma; le Général MAHAMATKER; le Général Nama Hamat DAGACHE; Messieurs les Ministres; les Conseillers Nationaux de Transition; les Sultans de la Vakaga et du Bamingui Bangoran; les leaders communautaires; les Cadres musulmans ; les Conseillers Municipaux.

L'objectif est d'évaluer la crise actuelle et redéfinir une nouvelle orientation politique du mouvement.

Les points suivants ont fait l'objet d'examen :

- 1- Le compte rendu des activités de la coordination politique provisoire ;
- 2- L'adoption des textes de base ;
- 3- La mise en place du bureau politique ;
- 4- Le forum de Brazzaville.

A l'issue de cette Assemblée Générale, il a été arrêté ce qui suit :

1. Du compte rendu des activités de la coordination provisoire

Les participants ont pris acte de ce compte rendu et ont félicité la coordination politique provisoire de leurs efforts.

2. De l'adoption des textes de base

L'assemblée générale a entériné la dissolution de la coalition Séléka et a donné le nom du nouveau mouvement qui s'appelle **Front Populaire pour la Renaissance de Centrafrique (FPRC)**. En examinant les textes, les participants ont apporté des amendements tant qu'à la forme qu'au fond. C'est ainsi que la validation des textes a été reportée à une assemblée générale extraordinaire qui sera convoquée par le bureau politique.

3. De la mise en place du Bureau politique

Les participants ont passé en revue les maux qui sont à l'origine de la divergence entre les Cadres politiques de FPRC et se sont accordés pour désigner les différentes personnalités aux postes suivants :

- Président : **Michel DJOTODIA AM NONDROKO**
- 1^{er} vice-président chargé des questions de défense et de sécurité : **GI. Mahamat Nouradine ADAM**
- 2^{ème} vice-président chargé de logistique et de l'administration : **GI. Mohamed Moussa DHAFFANE**
- 3^{ème} vice-président chargé des questions économiques et financières : **Mahamat TAÏB YACOB**
- Conseiller chargé Désarmement, Démobilisation Réinsertion (DDR) : **Abdoulaye Issène RAMADANE**
- Conseiller chargé de Défense globale : **GI. Damane ZAKARIA**
- Conseiller chargé de la culture civique et de la formation : **Ousmane Mahamat OUSMANE**
- Secrétaire Général : **Moustapha SABOUNE**
- Secrétaire Général Adjoint : **Hamat MAL-MAL ESSENE**
- Trésorier Général : **Sélémane Oumar GARBA**
- Trésorier Général Adjoint : **Djouma NDJAHA**
- 1^{er} Commissaire aux comptes : **Gilbert TOUMOU DEYA**

- 2^{ème} Commissaire aux comptes : **Assane BOUBA ALI**
- Délégué chargé des relations extérieures : **Eric Neris MASSI**
- Délégué chargé des affaires juridiques : **Mamadou Moussa DANGABOU**
- Délégué chargé des affaires politiques : **Mahamat ABRASS**
- Délégué chargé de la mobilisation des ressources financières : **Haroun Amalas AMLAS**
- Délégué chargé des projets de développement : **Rizigala RAMADANE**
- Délégué chargé de la promotion féminine : **Elodie TABANE MAHAMAT**
- Délégué chargé des affaires sociales et culturelles : **Abakar MOUSTAPHA**
- Délégué chargé de la jeunesse : **Ibrahim Sallet HAMIT**
- Délégué chargé des médias et des nouvelles technologies : **Mahamat Ahamat SEID**
- Délégué Adjoint chargé des médias et nouvelles technologies : **Ousmane ABAKAR**
- Délégué Europe : **Sabi MANDJO :**
- Délégué Amérique : **Abidine ABDOU**
- Délégué Asie : **Ibrahim OUSMANE**
- Délégué Afrique et monde Arabe : **Salehou NDIAYE**
- Porte-parole : **Awal HABILA**

A l'issue de la mise en place de ce nouveau bureau, les participants ont donné des orientations claires aux nouveaux membres afin de prendre leur responsabilité face aux défis qui les attendent.

4. De la participation de Front Populaire pour la Renaissance de Centrafrique (FPRC) au prochain forum de Brazzaville

Les Cadres politiques de FPRC s'adhèrent et se félicitent de l'initiative des Chefs d'Etat au 23^{ème} Sommet de l'Union Africaine tenue à Malabo pour la tenue d'un forum à Brazzaville relative à la crise Centrafricaine.

Cependant, le Rapport des Nations Unies soutenu par l'Union Africaine précise en substance : «les milices chrétiennes anti-balaka sont des voyous et des bandits de grand chemin et méritent d'être traitées par les organisations Internationales comme tel..... ».

A

Cette question nécessite une large consultation car les véritables victimes sont les populations civiles musulmane et chrétienne assimilées.

Toutes fois, le bureau politique est mandaté pour apprécier l'opportunité de participer à ce forum.

Les participants ont constaté avec amertume la partialité des Nations-Unies à travers le BINUCA et les forces françaises de l'opération SANGARIS qui n'ont pas réagi devant les actes de destruction des habitations, des mosquées et Corans, l'anthropophagie et la profanation des corps des musulmans.

Les participants ont également noté l'incapacité des forces étrangères à protéger les musulmans après la démission du Président Michel DJOTODIA. Cela rejoint la déclaration solennelle de la Présidente de Transition fait au cours de sa visite officielle pendant le mois de février 2014 à Ndjamena qui affirmait « qu'elle n'avait pas les moyens de protéger les musulmans », les persécutions du gouvernement contre les fonctionnaires musulmans et le non-respect des Accords de NDJAMENA.

Après avoir épuisé les points inscrits à l'ordre du jour, l'assemblée générale a adressé ses vifs remerciements à la MISACA, au Président de la Délégation spéciale auprès de la commune de Ridina, à sa Majesté, le Sultan de la Vakaga et aux populations de Birao pour son accueil fraternel et son aimable hospitalité.

Enfin, à l'unanimité les participants ont adopté le présent communiqué final et les recommandations des travaux de la première Assemblée Générale des cadres politiques de Front Populaire pour la Renaissance de Centrafrique (FPRC) jointes en annexe.

Fait à Birao le, 10 juillet 2014

Le Rapporteur Général



Amit IDRIS

Le Président du comité d'organisation



Fotor ABDEL-DJOUBAR

Annex 17: Photographs of Brigadier General Alkhatim and his forces posted on the Facebook profile of a prominent former S d dka General on 14 August 2014



In the photograph below, two fighters, just behind General Alkhatim, are covering up their faces with a traditional headscarf of the nomadic tribes of Chad and Sudan; the green vehicle Nissan Patrol in the back bears registration plates of Bangui



Annex 18: Screenshots of a video presenting *Révolution et Justice* during which “General” François Toussaint (wearing black clothes and with white hair) takes over the command of the group from Armel Sayo



Annex 19: Photograph of LRA district commander (COMDR) Captain Okollo Palutaka and former Séléka COMDR Colonel Ahmed Sherif allegedly taken on 20 February 2014 in the region of Nzako (Mbomou province)



Annex 20: Press release by the Belgian Federal Public Service concerning the seizure of diamonds in Antwerp in May 2014



FPS Economy discovers shipment of potential conflict diamonds from the Central African Republic

Brussels, 6 June 2014 – In the Antwerp Diamond Office, the FPS Economy discovered a suspicious shipment of rough diamonds that could potentially originate from the Central African Republic (CAR), where a civil war is raging. Already in June 2013, the Kimberley Process (KP), the global control mechanism on rough diamond production, issued a ban on diamonds originating from CAR.

Two weeks ago, during the physical inspection of imports and exports by the experts of the FPS Economy, a suspicious shipment of rough diamonds was discovered. Upon request of the Belgian KP authority, the FPS Economy, the KP Working Group of Diamond Experts was immediately asked to advise, comparing digital images of the shipment and images of the CAR footprint, concluding there is a high probability that the shipment of rough diamonds originates from CAR. The FPS Economy immediately notified the judicial authorities.

The European Commission appointed the FPS Economy as the official authority charged with controlling the international Kimberley Process Certification Scheme requirements on rough diamonds. The KP is a unique cooperation between governments, industry and civil society controlling the worldwide rough diamond production. One of those requirements states that each shipment of rough diamonds that is exported or imported worldwide needs to be accompanied by a valid Kimberley Certificate, issued by an officially authorized body in one of the KP participating countries.

Apart from physical controls, the Diamond Office also applies increased vigilance towards suspicious shipments of rough diamonds that show resemblance to the so-called footprint of CAR, which is a typology (describing characteristics such as color, assortment and type) compiled by a KP team of diamond experts. Due to this increased vigilance, the FPS Economy was able to detect this suspicious shipment of rough diamonds.

Press release issued by the Belgian Federal Public Service Economy

<http://economie.fgov.be/en/>

Annex 21: Email dated 23 May 2014 from the KP Working Group of Diamond Experts to Belgian Federal Authorities

Dear [REDACTED]
Dear [REDACTED]

Thank you very much for the enhanced vigilance your services apply to checking parcels of incoming rough diamonds with the CAR footprint that the WGDE has provided. I welcome this request for technical assistance to the WGDE in comparing digital pictures of the diamonds in these parcels with the production footprint of CAR, and we are happy to provide you with our expert opinion on this.

After careful examination and consultation, based on morphological and quality features and size distribution of the diamonds pictured, we come to following observations:

1. The rough diamonds pictured display characteristics typical of alluvial (non-kimberlitic) sources.
2. The rough diamonds pictured are close to an artisanal, alluvial (unsorted) run-of-mine and seem to be arriving from the same or from very similar (proximate) production zones.
3. The rough diamonds pictured coincide with the listed characteristics of the rough diamond production from CAR as represented in the footprint provided by the WGDE and archived digital pictures of parcels of CAR diamonds available from previous legitimate imports (before May 2013).
4. Some of the rough diamonds in the pictures of the apprehended parcels display characteristics typical of Nola in the Western diamond production zone in CAR, whereas other models are characteristic of Sam Ouandja and Bria in the Eastern production zones of CAR.
5. The rough diamonds pictured do not show characteristics typical of a Kisangani-origin (DRC) that could sometimes be mistaken with the CAR footprint.

In conclusion, we believe that the presented digital pictures display rough diamonds that coincide with the characteristics of rough diamonds from CAR as detailed in the CAR production footprint made available by the WGDE. Based on objective scientific scrutiny, it is therefore possible to attribute with a high level of probability, a CAR origin to these pictured rough diamonds.

Hoping that this information proves valuable in your endeavours to stop conflict diamonds from being mixed with diamonds from legitimate sources.

Kind regards,

[REDACTED]

Annex 22: Letter dated 4 September 2014 from Kardiam in response to information request of the Panel concerning the seizure of diamonds in Antwerp in May 2014



Hoveniersstraat 30, bus 145
2018 Antwerpen
BELGIQUE
☎ : 32-3-231.05.21
☎ : 32-3-233.18.39
E-MAIL : kardiam.bvba@skynet.be

Antwerp, the 4th of September 2014

Through the Secretary of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) concerning the Central African Republic
Mr David Biggs
United Nations Plaza
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

UN Panel of Experts on the CAR
Attn. Mr Aurélie Llorca
Coordinator

Kardiam bvba herewith provides the Panel with the required information:

1.
Diamonds seized in Antwerp by Belgian authorities in May / June 2014 being initially sent to Kardiam:

Ditrex Diamonds DMCC (Dubai – U.A.E.)

Shipment rough diamonds	2.703,46 carat	KPC AE 41061	22-05-2014
-------------------------	----------------	--------------	------------

Reya Diam DMCC (Dubai – U.A.E.)

Shipment rough diamonds	3.397,40 carat	KPC AE 41066	22-05-2014
-------------------------	----------------	--------------	------------

Shipment rough diamonds	533,69 carat	KPC AE 41205	01-06-2014
-------------------------	--------------	--------------	------------

2.
Kardiam bvba, the company's directors and the company's personnel have had no knowledge and/or have not been in any way involved in (a) and/or (b).

Kardiam bvba and the company's directors are not in a position to give any further comment or explanation on the ongoing judicial investigation.


Abdoul Karim Dan – Azoumi
Gérant – Director

Kardiam B.V.B.A.
Hoveniersstraat 30 - bus 145
2018 ANTWERPEN
Tel. (03) 231 05 21

Annex 23: JCK article including statement on the provenance of diamonds seized in Antwerp¹



Dubai Under Fire

By Rob Bates, News Director

Posted on July 2, 2014

In the past decade, the growth of Dubai as a diamond center has been phenomenal—more than \$40 billion in diamonds are now traded in the most populated city in the United Arab Emirates, up from \$5 billion less than a decade ago. The reasons are obvious: It offers traders a free-trade zone with no taxes on imports and exports, backed by a government that tries not to interfere with business. By contrast, rival Antwerp has had to cope with now-lifted sanctions on Marange diamonds, [and faces](#) a possible E.U. prohibition on Russian gems. Dubai has none of those concerns.

But in the last month, the desert city known for its 90-degree temperatures has faced a different kind of heat over just how laissez-faire its oversight is. Last month, Antwerp World Diamond Centre, the Belgian industry group, [announced](#) it had seized a parcel of diamonds from the Central African Republic—gems that are banned by the Kimberley Process. That parcel came from Dubai. And while the AWDC did not name its rival in its statement, it pointedly referenced CAR diamonds receiving “forged KP certificates that are insufficiently controlled via other diamond hubs.”

Peter Meeus, chairman of the Dubai Diamond Exchange (and former CEO of the AWDC), tells *JCK* that Dubai received the parcel from the Democratic Republic of Congo with a valid KP certificate. He says local experts perform physical inspections on every parcel but this certificate did not raise questions. And while Antwerp authorities told him the shipment came from a trader known to deal in CAR goods and matched a “digital footprint” of goods from that country (and apparently contained the same volume of goods as previous legal CAR exports by that trader), he is not convinced of its provenance.

“It is not such a clear-cut case,” he says. “We showed the pictures to many people, and it could be Guinea, it could be South Africa, it could be many places.”


He notes his center does not have access to the same digital images that Belgium has, but Dubai is willing to take the lead on developing a digital database to identify problem goods...

¹ Accessed on 28 August 2014 at <http://www.jckonline.com/blogs/cutting-remarks/2014/07/02/dubai-under-fire>

Annex 24: Kimberley certificate for a direct shipment from Afrogem to Ditrex Diamonds that entered into the shipment to Kardiam seized in Antwerp in May 2014, and Expertise document showing the name of the trader, Louay Charara, on behalf of whom diamonds were exported

The rough diamonds in this shipment have been handled in accordance with the provisions of the Kimberley Process International certification scheme for rough diamonds

REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO



CD 013720

MINISTRE DES MINES

CENTRE D'EVALUATION, D'EXPERTISE ET DE CERTIFICATION

Produit : DIAMANT BRUT

CERTIFICAT DU PROCESSUS DE KIMBERLEY

KIMBERLEY PROCESS CERTIFICATE

Nom et adresse du destinataire **DITREX DIAMONDS.DMCC**

Name and address of consignee **ALMAS TOWER 34 F. DUBAI / U.a.e**

Nous certifions que le chargement n° **APG/039/14** originaire de **R.D. CONGO**

This is to certify that shipment n° originating from
 exporté par **AFROGEM** détenteur(trice) de la licence
 exported by holder of exporters licence
 d'exportation n° contenant **24** lots de diamant brut a été
 n° parcels of rough (uncut) diamonds was
 évalué par le CEEC à la date du **25 avril 2014** Date d'expiration: le **09 mai 2014**


valued by the CEEC on: The date of expiry:

SOUS L'AUTORITE DE LA REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO
 Under the Authority of the Democratic Republic of Congo

Code S.H.	TOTAL CARATS	TOTAL DOLLARS US
7102.21	65.586,31	62.455,47
7102.31	2.264,18	102.803,65

Délivré à Kinshasa, République Démocratique du Congo
 Issued in Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of Congo

DIRECTION GENERALE CEEC **MINISTRE DES MINES**



CD 013720

IMPORT CONFIRMATION
CERTIFICATE
CERTIFICAT DE CONFIRMATION
D'IMPORTATION

This is to certify that the hereby certified product was imported into

UAE

and that the import has been checked and verified in compliance with all rules and regulations concerning the certificate of origin

DRC

For the Importing Authorities,

Other Authority (specify)

to be returned to
 Centre d'Evaluation,
 d'Expertise et de Certification,
 17th floor, BCDC Tower,
 Boulevard du 30 Juin, Kinshasa,
 Democratic Republic of Congo

Les diamants bruts contenus dans ce chargement ont été traités conformément aux dispositions du système international de certification du processus de Kimberley

CLEAR DIAMOND SPRL
 NRC : KG/9989/M, Id. Nat : 01-118-N61214P, n° Impôt : A1107059L
 Siège social : Avenue Mongala n° 3, Kinshasa / Gombe

DATE : 18-avr-14

AFROGEM

LOUAY CHARARA
 COLIS N° 272/04/2014

FACTURE N° 1301189 CODE CLIENT : 4100050

Lot	Qualité	Carats	PRIX FC	%	TOTAL FC
1301189	T1 MB -15+11MB	187,35	604	0	113.253
1301189	T1Zs (4/4) (0,90 - 1,19)	17,21	604	0	10.403
1301189	T1 Zs (5/4) (1,20 - 1,39)	40,20	604	0	24.301
1301189	T1 ZS (6/4) (1,40 - 1,79)	21,76	604	0	13.154
1301189	T1 MBS (3/4) (0,70 - 0,89)	37,74	604	0	22.814
1301189	T1 MB -21+15 MB	114,17	604	0	69.016
1301189	T1 MBS (8/4) (1,80 - 2,79)	8,05	604	0	4.866
1301189	T1 Z -11+6	73,45	604	0	44.401
1301189	T1 Z -15+11	29,97	604	0	18.117
1301189	T1 Z -21+15	25,08	604	0	15.161
1301189	T1 -6 GEM	1.177,80	604	0	711.980
1301189	T1 MBS -11+6	534,70	604	0	323.226
1301189	T2 REJECT -6	600,40	260	0	156.344
1301189	T2 REJECT +6-11	700,35	260	0	182.371
1301189	T2 REJECT +11-15	317,48	260	0	82.672
1301189	T2 CLIVAGE (3/4)	51,02	512	0	26.097
1301189	T2 INDUSTRIALS -6	899,80	260	0	234.308
1301189	T2 INDUSTRIALS -6	173,90	260	0	45.284
1301189	T2 INDUSTRIALS +6-11	576,15	260	0	150.029
1301189	T2 MIXTE (4/4)	30,79	260	0	8.018
1301189	T3 BOART -6	23.661,20	56	0	1.320.295
1301189	T3 BOART +6-11	226,60	56	0	12.644
1301189	T3 BOART +11-15	23.659,40	56	0	1.320.194
1301189	T3 BOART +15-21	14.732,45	56	0	822.071
Poids total :		67.897,02			

TOTAL FC: 5.731.018
 TVA FC: 0
 TOTAL A PAYER FC: 5.731.018

VA : Exemption aux exportateurs de diamant
 Arrêté Ministériel 533/CAB.MIN.MINES/01/2008 et 275/CAB.MIN/FINANCES du 2 décembre 2008

Réf : 6.162,39

Compte : [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

02-55

Annex 25: Sample of Badica's purchasing records (BECDOR)² for Bria and Sam-Ouandja

BADICA RELEVÉ DES BORDEREAUX D'ACHAT DIAMANT								
			BUREAU D'ACHAT :		BRIA			
			NOM DE L'ACHETEUR :		JOSE FERREIRA			
			PERIODE D'ACHAT :		DU 10-02 au 07-03-2014			
			NUMERO ET DATE EXPORT :		08/03/2014			
Date	N° Bord	Nom(s) & Prénom(s)	Titre	N° Carnet	Prov	Poids	Valeur en CFA	TAXE 3%
10/02/2014	12366	BASSAM	COL	HK026/13	HK	14,06	400 000	12 000
11/02/2014	12367	MOULAY	COL	HK010/13	HK	10,85	350 000	10 500
16/02/2014	12368	SOULEYMANE	COL	HK050/13	HK	30,47	600 000	18 000
17/02/2014	12369	GOMEZ	ART		HK	0,75	40 000	1 200
18/02/2014	12370	HAMED MOHAMED	COL	HK024/13	HK	52,10	5 500 000	165 000
	12371	JEAN	ART		HK	2,55	500 000	15 000
22/02/2014	12372	ALI MALAM	ART		HK	1,56	50 000	1 500
	12373	KASSIM	ART		HK	5,00	700 000	21 000
26/02/2014	12374	HASSAN AL SABBAGH	COL	MK015/13	HK	5,94	3 000 000	90 000
	12375	MORDUMA RIGOBERT	COL	BB001/13	HK	16,77	1 000 000	30 000
27/02/2014	12376	MAHAMAT	ART		HK	3,57	250 000	7 500
	12377	HAMED MOHAMED	COL	HK024/13	HK	81,00	4 700 000	141 000
01/03/2014	12378	YAYA	ART		HK	1,10	100 000	3 000
	12379	JEAN	ART		HK	3,60	80 000	2 400
	12380	HASSAN AL SABBAGH	COL	MK015/13	HK	194,24	11 000 000	330 000
03/03/2014	12381	JEAN PIERRE KOLIKO	ART		HK	16,00	800 000	24 000
04/03/2014	12382	MAHAMAT ABDEL	COL	MB07/13	HK	6,57	700 000	21 000
05/03/2014	12383	MORDUMA RIGOBERT	COL	BB001/13	HK	3,16	1 500 000	45 000
	12384	HISSEN ABDELKARIM	ART		HK	4,14	125 000	3 750
07/03/2014	12385	HASSAN AL SABBAGH	COL	MK015/13	HK	19,56	3 300 000	99 000
	12386	NOUR	ART		HK	87,42	5 900 000	150 000
	12387	ABASS	ART		HK	75,57	4 750 000	142 500
TOTAL						633,98	44 445 000	1 333 350

BADICA RELEVÉ DES BORDEREAUX D'ACHAT DIAMANT								
			BUREAU D'ACHAT :		SAM			
			NOM DE L'ACHETEUR :		EPAYE SHERIF			
			PERIODE D'ACHAT :		DU 14-04 au 18-04-2014			
			NUMERO ET DATE EXPORT :		20/04/2014			
Date	N° Bord	Nom(s) & Prénom(s)	Titre	N° Carnet	Prov	Poids	Valeur en CFA	TAXE 3%
14/04/2014	15864	DANDARA	ART		HK	8,29	600 000	18 000
15/04/2014	15865	ALI MOUSSA	ART		HK	3,37	1 340 000	40 200
18/04/2014	15866	MAHAMAT	ART		HK	28,75	1 500 000	45 000
	15867	ABEDL	ART		HK	27,93	15 000 000	450 000
TOTAL						68,34	18 440 000	553 200


BADICA RELEVÉ DES BORDEREAUX D'ACHAT DIAMANT								
			BUREAU D'ACHAT :		SAM			
			NOM DE L'ACHETEUR :		SHERIF EPAYE			
			PERIODE D'ACHAT :		22 - 04 - 2014 au 20 - 06 - 2014			
			NUMERO ET DATE EXPORT :					
Date	N° Bord	Nom(s) & Prénom(s)	Titre	N° Carnet	Prov	Poids	Valeur en CFA	TAXE 3%
22/04/2014	15868	IBRAHIM ABDERAMANE	ART		HK	4,38	600 000	18 000
02/05/2014	15869	ABOUBAKAR SIDIKI	COL	BG003/14	HK	25,67	2 000 000	60 000
29/05/2014	15870	ALI	ART		HK	2,98	325 000	9 750
29/05/2014	15871	PAPA SYLLA	ART		HK	2,15	400 000	12 000
08/06/2014	15872	ALI	ART		HK	0,62	22 000	660
17/06/2014	15873	IZADINE TAHIR	ART		HK	18,45	1 550 000	46 500
20/06/2014	15874	MAHAMAT	ART		HK	36,06	3 000 000	90 000
TOTAL						90,31	7 897 000	236 910

² Bureau d'évaluation et de contrôle du diamant et de l'or.

Annex 26: Flight record from Berb érat airport of Minair flying for Sangaris

ZCZC (06) FF
 FEFTZTZK le 24/0709
 FEFFZPZX
 (Dép UN0575H FF 0702 FP) Reg = 0804
 (01) FF
 FEFTZTZK le 27/0811
 FEFFZPZX
 (FPL TLAE i/M
 L40/L S/C
 FF0900
 N0160 F100 DCT FEFO/ N0160 F070 DCT FM
 N0160 F080 DCT
 FF0800 FI/FF
 OPR/ MINAIR FOR SANGARIS RHC FO 1045/1045
 FM 1235/1335 FF 1355)
 Reg = 0905

Annex 27: Satellite imagery showing increased mining activity near Sam-Ouandja³



³ Satellite imagery provided by the Kimberley Process participant country, archived at the United Nations.

Annex 28: Purchasing records (BECDOR) ⁴ for Sodiam showing diamond purchases from Hassan Fawaz, Bassem Bahim and Moussa (Jacob)⁵

Relevé de Bordereaux d'achats D'OR
Bureau d'Achat: Sodiam Exportation 00/00/2014
Centre: BANGUI-BERBERATI

21/05/2014	14001	Serge	Art	4,13	100 000
21/05/2014	14002	Simon	Art	4,83	200 000
21/05/2014	14003	Alire	Art	4,06	200 000
23/05/2014	14004	Bergé	Art	3,16	1 000 000
24/05/2014	14005	Makata	Mk/004	9,30	1 300 000
26/05/2014	14006	Morez	Art	3,70	300 000
27/05/2014	14007	Makata	Mk/004	4,31	1 000 000
28/05/2014	14008	wani Gaston	Art	2,16	20 000
28/05/2014	14009	Benjamin	Art	1,02	100 000
30/05/2014	14010	Nakoge	Art	1,40	160 000
01/06/2014	14011	René	Art	2,00	73 000
02/06/2014	14012	Hassan Fawaz	Mk/001	130,20	2 000 000
04/06/2014	14013	Betta Jonas	Art	2,04	140 000
05/06/2014	14014	Moundi	Art	1,04	175 000
06/06/2014	14015	Moundi	Art	6,01	240 000
06/06/2014	14016	Herman	Art	1,04	82 000
07/06/2014	14017	Antoine	Art	1,41	70 000
07/06/2014	14018	Hassan Fawaz	Mk/001	30,14	2 000 000
07/06/2014	14019	Hassan Fawaz	Mk/001	30,25	1 000 000
08/06/2014	14020	Hassan Fawaz	Mk/001	14,34	1 000 000
08/06/2014	14021	Charles	Art	5,82	118 000
08/06/2014	14022	Serge	Art	2,78	90 000
08/06/2014	14023	Moundi	Art	4,10	190 000
09/06/2014	14025	Moundi	Art	5,42	270 000
10/06/2014	14026	Hassan Fawaz	Mk/001	8,46	920 000

Relevé de Bordereaux d'achats D'OR
Bureau d'Achat: Sodiam Exportation 00/00/2014
Centre: BANGUI-BERBERATI

13/06/2014	14027	Basem Bahim	Mk/007	25,00	3 000 000
14/06/2014	14028	Jean Claude	Art	0,81	55 000
15/06/2014	14029	Christian	Art	3,30	90 000
15/06/2014	14030	Asivy	Art	1,23	100 000
15/06/2014	14031	Chawa	Art	0,43	20 000
17/06/2014	14032	Bonaventure	Art	2,08	60 000
18/06/2014	14033	Jean Claude	Art	1,27	30 000
24/06/2014	14034	Daco Clivie	Art	4,38	215 000
24/06/2014	14035	GOKARI Hamed	Mk/005	4,04	3 150 000
24/06/2014	14036	Guy	Art	0,92	40 000
24/06/2014	14037	Makata Bienvenu	Mk/004	4,30	1 200 000
24/06/2014	14038	Christian	Art	1,26	120 000
25/06/2014	14039	Pierre	Art	1,44	270 000
29/06/2014	14040	Bakari Ahmet	Mk/005	98,13	8 500 000
30/06/2014	14041	Basem Bahim	Mk/007	24,00	1 000 000

⁴ Bureau d'évaluation et de contrôle de *diamant* et d'or.

⁵ Note that purchasing records concern diamonds not gold, as wrongly stated in the documents.

Relevé de Bordereaux d'achats
Bureau d'Achat: Sodiam Exportation 00/00/2014
Centre: BANGUI

18/05/2014	11238	Zaouro Pa	Art	2,13	45 000
19/05/2014	11239	Erica donne	Art	14,80	885 000
25/05/2014	11240	Nana	MB 009	81,00	4 000 000
26/05/2014	11241	Jacob	LB002/2014	172,00	4 000 000
31/05/2014	11242	Boris	Art	2,15	220 000
31/05/2014	11243	Boris	Art	13,97	410 000
03/06/2014	11244	Jacob	Lb 002	15,00	1 350 000
13/06/2014	11245	Maurice	Art	2,86	100 000
21/06/2014	11246	Moulat	Mk 006	143,24	20 000 000
23/06/2014	11247	Vincent	Art	3,46	1 500 000
23/06/2014	11248	Nanza	BG 007	41,70	860 000
30/06/2014	11249	Moulat	Mk006	189,74	25 000 000
02/07/2014	11250	Abdoulat	Art	302,51	200 000

Annex 29: Patrick Ayandho (left) photographed in Bangui with Socrate Bozizé (right) on 24 December 2012⁶



⁶ Accessed on 4 September 2014 at <http://centrafrique-presse.over-blog.com/article- invraisemblable-arbre- de-noel-en-bozizie-113747024.html>

Annex 30: Cameroon's diamond export statistics from 20 January to 15 August 2014

Aug 15 Août

EXPORTATIONS DU PREMIER TRIMESTRE 2014								
Pays Participant du PK	État	Date	Exportateur	Localité d'origine du lot	Poids-Carats	Nombre de lots	Nombre de certificats	Valeur
CHINA	CHINA	8-Jul-14	ETS NEW HORIZON	WOUNDJIKI, BEKE, ROMA	13,88	1	1	\$ 5 626,00
Sous-Total					13,88	1	1	\$ 5 626,00
EU	BELGIUM	20-Jan-14	LA GÉNÉRALE DE SERVICE SARL	BATOURI	69,65	1	1	\$ 72 651,00
	Sous-Total				69,65	1	1	\$ 72 651,00
	GERMANY	28-Jan-14	EUROPE ABSOLUTE SERVICE CAMEROUN	BATOURI	11,04	1	1	\$ 2 992,00
	Sous-Total				11,04	1	1	\$ 2 992,00
	SWITZERLAND	4-Apr-14	MPOMBO COLETTE (FLM MINING)	MOBILONG	19,26	1	1	\$ 9 209,46
	SWITZERLAND	4-Jun-14	MPOMBO COLETTE (FLM MINING)	MOBILONG	19,28	1	1	\$ 3 972,00
	Sous-Total				38,54	2	2	\$ 13 181,46
	SPAIN	12-Mar-14	A.A.BOSS GLOBAL CONCEPTS CAMEROON LTD	MOBILONG	23,96	1	1	\$ 3 422,32
Sous-Total					23,96	1	1	\$ 3 422,32
TURKEY	TURKEY	3-Feb-14	ETS NEW HORIZON	GAROUA-BOULAI	33,42	1	1	\$ 5 996,00
Sous-Total					33,42	1	1	\$ 5 996,00
UAE	UAE	4-Feb-14	NICE HOME SARL	GAROUA-BOULAI, BATOURI	70,46	2	1	\$ 25 561,00
	UAE	4-Feb-14	ETS TBM	BEKE	21,06	1	1	\$ 1 763,00
	UAE	24-Mar-14	GEMS AFRIKA	BATOURI (BEKE, BGALOE, BGITI, OUNDJIKI, ROMA, TAMOUNA)	815,53	2	2	\$ 109 980,85
Sous-Total					907,05	5	4	\$ 137 304,85
USA	USA	20-Mar-14	ETS NEW HORIZON	GAROUA-BOULAI	24,93	1	1	\$ 4 150,43
Sous-Total					24,93	1	1	\$ 4 150,43
Grand Total					1122,47	13	12	\$ 245 324,06


Annex 31: Communication of Cameroonian Kimberley Process authorities to the Chair of the Kimberly Process



Please, be advised that on June 3rd 2014, a Cameroon national acting on behalf of an Egyptian business man attempted to have a 23.78 cts parcel certified for export. The purchase documents did not include tracking documents used to control our national output and trade for certification purposes. Therefore, this parcel of unknown origin has been seized and will remain in our custody until an investigation and proceedings decide otherwise. A picture of the seized parcel is attached.

Best regards

National Permanent Secretariat for the Kimberley Process
Cameroon Republic



Annex 32: Example of Dera d'or purchasing records showing suppliers in Yaloké

REPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE
SECTION GENERALE
DES MINES
SECTION DE LA COMMERCIALISATION
L'INDUSTRIE ET DU FICHIER MINIER
BUREAU D'EVALUATION ET DE CONTRÔLE
DE DIAMANT ET OR (BECDOR)

**BORDEREAU D'ACHAT
D'OR ou DIAMANTS**

N° 00331/20

Nom et Prénom de l'Acheteur DERA-NOR
BIJOUTERIE S/Préf. de
Date d'Achat 20 Lieu d'Achat S/Préf. de
Provenance du Vendeur YALOKÉ S/Préf. de
6.24/05/2014

Nom et Prénom du Vendeur	QUALITE		OR Brut	VALEUR en Francs CFA
	Artisan	N° Carnet d'identité de Collecteur	Poids en grs	
APOLINAIRE	X		205	2870000
TOTAL				2870000

Signature de l'Acheteur

Annex 33: Export authorization for gold issued to Badica in Bangui to export to *Etablissement Djibrilla* in Douala, Cameroon

**DIRECTION GENERALE
DES RESSOURCES
MINERALES**

République Centrafricaine
Pour exportation d'Or Diamant brut
d'origine artisanale ou industrielle


LAISSEZ PASSER N° 000417


Société (1) BADICA BP 333 BANGUI R.A.
Autorisée à exporter le lot de diamants bruts suivant:
Provenance du lot: BADICA RD 002/19016
Poids du lot (2): 827,09 grammes
Poids brute d'achat du lot (3): 42 406,350 FFA
Lieu d'achat: YALAKE
Date d'achat: du 05/05/2014
Destination du lot (4): Etablissement DJIBRILLA A.P.D.
Douala (CAMEROUN)


Montant à l'exportation perçue par l'Etat Centrafricain (5)
226 066 FFA

Certifié exact et sincère
A Bangui, le 05/05/2014
Le Représentant de la Société (5)

Reçu n° 05/05/19016

Le Chef de Service de Contrôle
de l'Évaluation de diamant

Philippe TOIZONE

Visa de sortie
N° _____ du _____
L'Agent des Douanes


Délivré à Bangui, le 05/05/2014
Le Directeur de la Commerce, de l'Industrie et de l'Industrie

Philippe TOIZONE

Société
CFA
Adresse du destinataire
Signature expéditeur

Imprim. ST Paul BP 798

Annex 34: Cameroon's gold export statistics for 2014 showing *Etablissement* (ETS) Djibrilla

REPUBLIQUE DU CAMEROUN
Paix Travail Patrie

MINISTRE DES MINES, DE L'INDUSTRIE
ET DU DEVELOPPEMENT TECHNOLOGIQUE

SECRETARIAT GENERAL

DIRECTION DES MINES

SOUS DIRECTION DES ACTIVITES MINIERES

REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON
Peace-Work-Fatherland

MINISTRY OF MINES, INDUSTRY AND
TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT

SECRETARY GENERAL'S OFFICE

DEPARTMENT OF MINES

SUB-DEPARTMENT OF MINING ACTIVITY

N° _____/MINMIDT/SG/DM/SDAM/SAMPM

Yaoundé, le _____

FICHE - EXPORTATIONS 2014				
	Nom de l'exportateur	Substance exportée	Quantité (g)	Date d'exportation
1	ETS DJIBO	or	1365	07/01/2014
2	ETS DJIBRILLA ABBO	or	1289.7948	24/01/2014
3	ETS DJIBO	or	958	12/02/2014
	ZENITH	or	675.16	07/03/2014
4	ETS DJIBRILLA ABBO	or	1701.44	23/03/2014
5	ETS DJIBRILLA ABBO	or	862.01	24/04/2014
6	ETS DJIBRILLA ABBO	or	1106.02	26/05/2014
7	ETS DJIBRILLA ABBO	or	1196.6	26/06/2014
8	ETS DJIBRILLA ABBO	or	1090.82	02/07/08/2014
9	KISSLING EXPLO	or	2432.18	08/08/2014
10	ETS DJIBO	or	1443	11/08/2014
	Total		14 120.0248	

D'après les documents disponibles au service de l'artisanat minier et de la petite mine, L'établissement **DJIBRILLA ABBO** a effectué **trois (03) exportations d'or** au cours de l'année 2013 soit une quantité correspondant à **6 620.311 grammes**.

Depuis le début de l'année 2014, il en a réalisé **six (06)** équivalant à une quantité de **7 246.6848 grammes**.

Annex 35: Ismaila Sylla appearing on France 24 on 1 April 2013 (screenshot)




Annex 36: Dera d'or purchasing record for Ismaila Sylla

REPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE
DIRECTION GENERALE
DES MINES
DIRECTION DE LA COMMERCIALISATION
DE L'INDUSTRIE ET DU FICHIER MINIER
BUREAU D'EVALUATION ET DE CONTRÔLE
DE DIAMANT ET OR (BECDOR)

BORDEREAU D'ACHAT
D'OR ou DIAMANTS N° 00306 /20

Nom et Prénom de l'Acheteur: DERA-DOR
Bijouterie: S/Préf. de
Date d'Achat: 20 S/Préf. de
Provenance du Vendeur: S/Préf. de
05/07/1013

Nom et Prénom du Vendeur	QUALITE		OR Brut	VALEUR en Francs CFA
	Artisan	N° Carnet d'identité de Collecteur	Poids en grs	
ISMAILA SYLLA	NON PAYE		731 GR	

Annex 37: Purchasing records (BECDOR)⁷ for Sodiam showing purchase from Ismaila Sylla


28/01/2014	12958	Abdoulaye Dodo	BG016	9,00	6 750 000
28/01/2014	12959	Djibula Noh	Ln 002	13,68	1 500 000
10/02/2014	12960	Tidian	Bq 005	1,96	11 000
	12961				
16/02/2014	12962	Ismail Sylla	Bq018	29,29	150 000
17/02/2014	12963	Sylvanus	Art	5,7	180 000
17/02/2014	12964	Nidbaka	Art	0,76	8 000
18/02/2014	12965	Fiak	Art	39,40	200 000
18/02/2014	12966	Bangui Jean	Art	11,80	1 800 000
19/02/2014	12967	Sakho	Art	6,88	1 000 000
20/02/2014	12968	Dawilly Cherubin	Art	1,57	133 000

⁷ Bureau d'évaluation et de contrôle de *diamant* et d'or.

Annex 40: Receipt for security taxes levied by former Séléka's 5th military region on possession of cattle

DELEGUE CHARGE DE LA DEFENSE NATIONALE REPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE
DE LA RESTRICTION DE L'ARMEE UNITE- DIGNITE- TRAVAIL
DES ANCIENS COMBATTANTS
ET DE VICTIMES DE GUERRES
ETAT MAJOR GENERALE D'ARMEEES

Taxe de sécurité

Reçu N°.....

Mr, Mme.....

Somme.....

Destination de :.....

NB : la somme versée s'élève à 5000f /bovin

Annex 41: Abandoned office for the regulation, control and processing of agricultural produce in Bambari

Photograph taken by the Panel on 3 July 2014



Annex 43: *Laissez-passer* issued by former Séléka's 5th military region commander General Ali Darrassa Mahamat to truck driver after payment of taxes

Commandant de la 5^{ème} région militaire

Général ALI DARRASSA MAHAMAT

MINISTRE DE LA DEFENSE NATIONAL
DE LA RESTRUCTURATION DE L'ARMEE
DES ANCIENS COMBATTANTS
ET DES VICTIMES DE GUERRES

ETAT MAJOR GENERAL
DE L'ARMEE

5^{ème} REGION MILITAIRE

SECRETIARIAT GENERAL
N°..... /MDNRAACVG/EMGA/RMS/SG/2014

REGION MILITAIRE DE LA OUAKA

REPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE
UNITE - DIGNITE - TRAVAIL

LAISSER PASSER

Nom du chauffeur et numéros de permis :
Nom du propriétaire du véhicule et
Numéros d'immatriculation :
Somme versée à la douane :
En foi de quoi, la présente note lui est délivrée pour servir et valoir ce que droit.

Fait a Bambari le

5^{ème} REGION MILITAIRE

QUAKA

S.G. P.O.

GENERAL
ali DARRASSA mahamat

Général ALI DARRASSA MAHAMAT

Commandant de la 5^{ème} région militaire

Annex 44: Ouaka Café depot and trucks

Photographs taken by the Panel on 4 July 2014



Annex 45: Third party transfers

1. Origin of Chinese rifles type 56-2 seized by international forces in the CAR

Serial number	Supplied by China to CAR	Serial number	Supplied by China to CAR	Serial number	Supplied by China to CAR
1415134	No	3714906	No	5073674	Yes
1416134	No	3715272	No	12000227	No
2077511	No	3715570	No	12001848	No
2623706	Yes	3717153	No	12003305	No
2801719	Yes	3717514	No	12005065	No
2802252	Yes	3718426	No	12005471	No
2802317	Yes	3720804	No	12005612	No
2802711	Yes	3721718	No	12007070	No
2802785	Yes	3723201	No	12007479	No
2803047	Yes	3724756	No	12007732	No
2803496	Yes	3725636	No	12009106	No
2803977	Yes	3732127	No	12009259	No
2804494	Yes	4038028	No	12009272	No
2804769	Yes	4057235	Yes	12010138	No
2804913	Yes	5020855	Yes	12010345	No
2805133	Yes	5031435	Yes	12010522	No
2805167	Yes	5034615	Yes	12010692	No
2805218	Yes	5036411	Yes	12010930	No
2805229	Yes	5041705	Yes	12011547	No
2805646	Yes	5045242	Yes	12011695	No
2806828	Yes	5049645	Yes	12012154	No
2806942	Yes	5051601	Yes	12013024	No
2806974	Yes	5051955	Yes	12013094	No
3083578	Yes	5055396	Yes	12014008	No
3148150	Yes	5058551	Yes	12014050	No
3700410	No	5063050	Yes	12014921	No
3700984	No	5064596	Yes	12015080	No
3701119	No	5064665	Yes	12017806	No
3702027	No	5065023	No	12017977	No
3702269	No	5065486	Yes	12019524	No
3704048	No	5066651	No	12019986	No
3705690	No	5066812	No	12020018	No
3707151	No	5066854	No	12020304	No
3708037	No	5067164	No	12911586	No
3708339	No	5067327	Yes	23708582	No
3712546	No	5070557	Yes	28044044	No
3712939	No	5070815	No	35072021	No
3714547	No	5071063	Yes	37311347	No
3714547	No	5071513	No	48018358	No
3714698	No	5071810	Yes	89030970	No

2. Origin of Chinese small arms cartridges seized by international forces in the CAR

Head stamp marking	Supplied to CAR by China (Yes/ No)
41	Yes
61	Yes
71	Yes
81	No
270	No
351	No
539	No
811	Yes
911	No
945	Yes
9121	No
9611	No
9631	No

3. Origin of grenades similar to Chinese models

Grenades 82-2S not consistent with those of Chinese manufacturers

Lots of grenades 82-2 S in circulation in the CAR (photograph taken by the Panel in April 2014)



Grenades 82-2 of Chinese origin supplied to Nepal and found in the CAR

Label on a wooden box indicating the origin of grenades (photograph taken by the Panel in April 2014)



4- Other rifles transferred to the Central African Republic by a third party

SAR 80 manufactured by Singapore Technologies Kinetics and delivered to Yugoslavia in December 1990 (photograph taken by the Panel)



AUG 222 Rem semi-automatic rifle sold to a French company in June 1991 (photograph taken by the Panel)



















Annex 46: Erased serial numbers on AKM rifles

The Panel is gathering information about a batch of AKM rifles with external markings and serial numbers intentionally removed by grinding to hide traceability of the weapons. The models with slant muzzle devices, present wear and tear signs of recent introduction in service. The Panel has identified three serial numbers on internal compounds уи2958, мн5814, тн1633. The chain of custody of these rifles should give indications about the possible networks which introduced these weapons into the Central African Republic. The Panel is awaiting a reply from the company that has manufactured one of the weapons.

Serial Number: уи2958**Serial Number: мн5814****Serial Number: тн1633**

Annex 47: Update to the Panel's profile of arms cartridges found in the CAR

Country	Bulgaria	China	China	Russian Fed
Calibre	7.62x39	7.62x25	12.7x108	7.62x39
1				
Markings	10 99	11 95	11 10	17 74
Area of discovery	Bouar	Not known	Boguila	Boguila
First reported	July 2014	June 2014	May 2014	May 2014
Country	Russian Fed	China	China	S. Africa
Calibre	7.62x39	7.62x54R	9x25	7.62x51
2				
Marking	60 96	71 08	71 11	92 23
Area of discovery	Bouar	Boguila	Not known	Bouar
First reported	June 2014	June 2014	June 2014	July 2014
Country	Russian Fed	China	China	Iran
Calibre	12.7x108	9x19	7.62x39	5.56x45
3				
Marking	188 79	311 09	352	7.62x39 02
Area of discovery	Boguila	Not known	Boguila	Bouar
First reported	May 2014	June 2014	May 2014	July 2014
Country	Iran (prob)	Italy	USA	Belgium
Calibre	9x19	9x19	357	9x19
4				
Marking	9x19 05	CT 95	FEDERAL	FN 76
Area of discovery	Not known	Not known	Not known	Not known
First reported	June 2014	June 2014	June 2014	June 2014

Country	Portugal	Israel	UK	France
Calibre	5.56x45	5.56x45	7.92/8x57	5.56x45
5				
Marking	FNM	IMI 07	KYNOCH	LM 80
Area of discovery	Not known	Not known	Bouar	Boguila
First reported	June 2014	June 2014	July 2014	June 2014
Country	France	France	France	France
Calibre	7.62x51	5.56x45	5.56x45	9x19
6				
Marking	LM 86	LM 1.86	LM. 4.85	LM
Area of discovery	Bouar	Unknown	Unknown	Not known
First reported	July 2014	July 2014	July 2014	June 2014
Country	France	Germany	Sweden	Sweden
Calibre	5.56x45	5.56x45	9.3x62	.44
7				
Markings	LM 06	MEN 06	norma	norma
Area of discovery	Not known	Bouar	Bouar	Not known
First reported	June 2014	July 2014	July 2014	June 2014
Country	UK	UK	UK	France
Calibre	5.56x45	5.56x45	5.56x45	9x19
8				
Marking	RG 02	RG 07	RG 09	SF 72
Area of discovery	Not known	Not known	Not known	Not known
First reported	June 2014	June 2014	June 2014	June 2014

Country	France	France	France	France
Calibre	9x19	5.56x45	9x19	9x19
9				
Marking	SF	SF 1.78	SF 79	SF 82
Area of discovery	Not known	Unknown	Not known	Not known
First reported	June 2014	July 2014	June 2014	June 2014
Country	France	France	France	France
Calibre	9mm	5.56x45	5.56x45	.357
10				
Marking	SF 87	SF 1.89	SF 1-89	SFM
Area of discovery	Not known	Not known	Boguila	Not known
First reported	June 2014	July 2014	June 2014	July 2014
Country	Czech Rep.	France	Israel	USA
Calibre	9x19	9mm	5.56x45	9x19
11				
Markings	S&B	TE F	TZ 24 92	WIN
Area of discovery	Not known	Not known	Boguila	Not known
First reported	June 2014	June 2014	June 2014	June 2014
Country		Russian Fed	Egypt	
Calibre	.45	7.63x39	7.62x39	
12				
Marking	45 AUTO	БПЗ	37 83 ع م ج	
Area of discovery	Not known	Boda	Bouar	
First reported	June 2014	July 2014	July 2014	

Lists of Markings

Marking	Manufacturer	Head stamp picture
10	Bulgaria	1
11	China	1
17	Russian Federation	1
60	Russian Federation	2
71	China	2
92	South Africa	2
188	Russian Federation	3
311	China probably	3
352	China probably	3
7.62x39	Not known	3
9x19	Not known	4
CT	Italy probably	4
FEDERAL	USA	4
FN	Belgium	4
FNM	Portugal	5
IMI	Israel	5
KYNOCH	UK	5
LM	France	5, 6, 7
MEN	Germany	7
Norma	Sweden	7
RG	UK	8
SF	France	8, 9, 10
SFM	France	10
S&B	Czech Republic	11
TE	France	11
TZ	Israel	11
WIN	USA	11
Star logo		12
БПЗ	Russian Federation	12
ع م ج	Egypt	12

Annex 48: Chadian Galil assault rifles discovered in the Central African Republic

Three Galil rifles with serial number 2066204, 2063423 and 2065145 were seized on different occasions by International forces. The rifles with serial numbers 2066204 and 2063423 were part of lots of weapons sold in 2008 and 2009 to the Ministry of Defence of Chad with an end-user certificate certifying that the weapons would not be transferred to another country (see End User Certificate below).

*Galil serial number 2063423 and 2065145 seized by international forces
(photographs taken by the Panel)*

	
2063423	
	
2065145	

End user Certificate by the Ministry of Chad stating that the Galil Assault rifles acquired from Israel Weapon Industries (IWI) would be used solely by Defence and Security Forces of Chad and would not be sold or transferred to a third party
(archived at the United Nations)

REPUBLIQUE DU TCHAD

UNITE - TRAVAIL - PROGRES

PRESIDENCE DE LA REPUBLIQUE

MINISTERE DE LA DEFENSE NATIONALE

N° 2562 /PR/MDN/EMP/2007**CERTIFICAT D'UTILISATEUR FINAL**

Le Ministère de la Défense Nationale de la République du Tchad a acquis de Israël Weapon Industries (IWI) LTD les matériels ci-dessous :

N°	Désignation	Quantités
1	GALIL Assault Rifle	2 000

Le Ministère de la Défense Nationale de la République du Tchad certifie par la présente que les matériels ci-dessus énumérés serviront exclusivement aux Forces de Défense et de Sécurité du Tchad et ne seront ni vendus, ni transmis à une tierce partie étrangère à la République du Tchad.

N'Djaména, le 18 JAN. 2007

Le Ministre de la Défense Nationale a.i.
Le Ministre d'Etat, Ministre des Infrastructures



Annex 49: Vehicle used by armed group neutralized by French forces in Boguila

*Photograph taken by the Panel at a location two kilometres
northwest of Boguila on 24 June 2014*



Detail of the vehicle frame number (photograph taken by the Panel on 24 June 2014)



The vehicle was a TOYOTA 60-25 SAE H83 DOT frame serial number JTELB71J507021369. The vehicle was previously acquired in 2002 by the office of UNHCR in Bangui (see below).

TOYOTA
 N.V. Toyota Motor Europe Marketing and Engineering B.V.
 Represented by Toyota Office Benelux (Agent of Toyota)

Our Ref 35261-1
 07 Mar 2002

Po 20621

Dear [REDACTED]

These vehicles will be ready to leave Gls on the 13th.


Consignee: Office of the UNHCR Charge de Mission/ d.
 Boite Postale 950 b. e.
 Rue de L'Universit
 Bangui, Central African Rep
 Attn: Mr. Fall Tel: 00 [REDACTED] Fax: 00 [REDACTED]

Shipping Marks 02/AB/CAR/LS402
 P.O.: 20621
 DESTINATION: BANGUI, CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

Payment Terms Freight Pre-Paid

Chassis #	Engine #	Vehicle Ref and Type	Kgs	m3	Spares
JTECB01J-401005543	1HZ-0361856	226006 Land Cruiser STD Station Wagon	2250	18.3	N
JTECB01J-201005544	1HZ-0361856	226007 Land Cruiser STD Station Wagon	2250	18.3	N
JTECB01J-001005543	1HZ-0361861	226008 Land Cruiser STD Station Wagon	2250	18.3	N
JTELB71J-507021369	1HZ-0379465	225747 Land Cruiser Pick Up	2040	17.8	N

Location of the wrecked vehicle



Source: Google Earth; wreckage coordinates: N 07.08.47.898; E 016.53.49.024

Annex 50: Cartridges found in the location of the vehicle neutralized by French forces in Boguila

Eight types of cartridges found in the spot with markings (SF 1-89 5,56; T 92 Z 24; LM 08; 17 74; SU 1 09 51; 71 08; 188 79; 11 10) are not part of the profile of cartridges found in the Central African Republic, and therefore might have been introduced in violation of the arms embargo. The Panel will continue to investigate the case and update its ammunition profile in the CAR accordingly. The head stamps are the following:

			
5.56x45	5.56x45	5.56x45	7.62x39
			
7.62x39	7.62x54R	12.7x108	12.7x108

Six type of cartridges found in the spot with markings (9121 86; 351 78; 90 12; 188 74; 188 83; SF 1-82 12.7 S) are part of the profile of cartridge of the baseline established by the Panel in its interim report. They are more likely coming from local armed group arsenals existing before 5 December 2014:

			
5.56x45	7.62x39	7.62x54R	12.7x99
			
12.7x108	12.7x108		

Annex 51: Smuggling of hunting ammunition from Cameroon

Box containing 250 cartridges seized by Central African customs in Beloko




Modification of hunting ammunition by anti-balaka combatants



Head stamp of 12 gauge hunting ammunition seized by international forces



Smuggling corridors of ammunition along CAR-Cameroon border



Annex 52: Documents showing an attempt by Ousmane Roger to procure ammunition in Cameroon

Letter from a retailer in Yaoundé dated 27 February 2014, asking the “Ministère de l’administration territoriale et de la décentralization” whether it would be possible to sell arms and hunting ammunitions to Ousmane Roger

Armes - Munitions - Pêche - Musique et Accessoires divers

Yaoundé le 27 Février 2014

Monsieur le Ministre d'Etat
Ministre de l'Administration
Territoriale et de la Décentralisation
Yaoundé - Cameroun

Objet : Demande d'une information
auprès de votre Ministère avant tout
service d'armes et Munitions en
faveur de Monsieur Ousmane Roger,
ressortissant Centrafricain

Excellence,

Je viens très respectueusement auprès de votre haute autorité solliciter
des informations auprès de votre ministère.

Excellence, j'aimerais savoir si la décision de Monsieur Ousmane Roger
signée en date du 19 Septembre 2011 par les autorités de la République
Centrafricaine qui lui autorise le transfert des munitions et armes de la
république du Cameroun pour la Centrafrique est-il possible ? Je me réfère à
votre ministère pour avoir la bonne information.

Dans l'attente d'une réponse, veuillez agréer Excellence Monsieur le
Ministre, l'expression de mes sentiments dévoués.

Ci-joint :

- Photocopie de la décision de Monsieur Ousmane Roger

La Gérant

Decision dated 9 September 2011 of Pastor Josué Binoua, former Minister of territorial administration of the Central African Republic, authorizing Ousmane Roger to import 200,000 cartridges from Cameroon for his ammunition shops in Berbérati, Bouar and Nola.

MINISTÈRE DE L'ADMINISTRATION
DU TERRITOIRE ET DE LA DÉCENTRALISATION

DIRECTION DE CABINET

DIRECTION GÉNÉRALE DE L'ADMINISTRATION
DU TERRITOIRE ET DE LA DÉCENTRALISATION

DIRECTION DES AFFAIRES POLITIQUES
ET ADMINISTRATIVES

SERVICE DES AFFAIRES POLITIQUES

DECISION N° 000/MATD.DIR.CABLOGAT/11

LE MINISTRE DE L'ADMINISTRATION DU
TERRITOIRE ET DE LA DÉCENTRALISATION

Vu La constitution du 27 Décembre 2004 ;
Vu La loi n°10.005 du 11 Mai 2010, modifiant et complétant Certaines dispositions de la constitution du 27 Décembre 2004 ;
Vu La loi n°61.213 du 04 Mai 1961, réglementant l'introduction et l'usage des armes à feu en République Centrafricaine ;
Vu L'ordonnance n° 34.021 du 27 mars 1964, modifiant et complétant la loi n° 61.213 du 04 Mai 1961, réglementant l'introduction et l'usage des armes à feu en République Centrafricaine ;
Vu Le décret n°11.032 du 18 avril 2011, portant nomination du 1^{er} ministre chef du gouvernement ;
Vu Le décret n°11.034 du 22 Avril 2011, portant nomination des membres du gouvernement et ses modifications subséquentes ;
Vu Le décret n° 10.268 du 17 Septembre 2010, portant l'organisation et le fonctionnement du Ministère de l'Administration du Territoire et de la Décentralisation et accord les attributions du Ministre ;
Vu La demande formulée par Monsieur OUSMAN Roger en date du 28 Juillet 2009.

DECIDE

Art 1^{er} : Est autorisé le transfert de la République du Cameroun en Centrafrique en faveur de Monsieur OUSMAN Roger dans ses dépôts situés à Berbérati, Bouar et Nola.

200.000 (DEUX CENT MILLE) CARTOUCHES DE CHASSE CALIBRE 12 SOIT 400 CARTON DE 500 CARTOUCHES.

Art 2 : L'introduction, le transfert, l'emmagasinement et la vente de ces munitions s'effectueront Conformément aux conditions fixées par la réglementation en vigueur.

Art 3 : La présente décision qui prend effet à compter de la date de sa signature sera enregistrée et Communiquée par tout où besoin sera.

MATÉRIEL DE LA SIGNATURE

ASPLATIONS
RECPIAL, DOD, CH
MATD, DIR, CAB
FONCEP
INTRES
ARCH, OAPA

LE MINISTRE
L'OFFICIER
D'ETAT CIVIL

13 SEPT 2011

Ministère de l'Administration du Territoire et de la Décentralisation - Sis Avenue des Martyrs - Immeuble Ex-Pétroca - 3^{ème} Etage - Tel : 21611984

Letter from the Ministère de l'administration territoriale et de la décentralisation of Cameroon to the Cameroonian retailer, dated 29 April 2014, informing that sales of arms and ammunition to Ousmane Roger are not authorized.



Réf: Votre lettre en date du 27 février 2014.

Objet: vente d'armes et de munitions à un ressortissant centrafricain.

[Redacted]

Comme suite à votre lettre citée en référence, relative à l'objet susvisé,

J'ai l'honneur de vous faire connaître que la décision en cause, signée des autorités centrafricaines, ne saurait être interprétée comme applicable au Cameroun.

Aussi, je vous demande de ne procéder à aucune vente d'armes et de munitions en faveur de Monsieur OUSMAN Roger, de nationalité centrafricaine.

Veuillez agréer, Madame, l'expression de ma considération distinguée./-

29 APR 2014

[Signature]

[Redacted]

Annex 53: Statistics of sales of 12-gauge hunting cartridges in Cameroon



On 27 April 2014, the Central African Republic customs, supported by a unit of MISCA, seized a box of ammunition smuggled into the Central African Republic at the Garoua Boulai-Beloko border crossing. The Panel photographed the seized materials *in situ* (see below).

After the discovery of 27 April, the Panel wrote an official letter to the manufacturing company in Europe. The company informed the Panel that the lot of ammunition seized had been shipped in January 2014 to an import-export company in Cameroon. On 9 May 2014, the Panel wrote a letter to this Cameroonian company, copying the Permanent Mission of Cameroon to the United Nations, requesting information on the clients that bought ammunition from the company in 2014. On 16 May 2014, the company communicated sales statistics of 12-gauge hunting cartridges from January to April 2014. Upon the request of the Panel, it later communicated the statistics of 2013.

The company DOLLAH YANKAM from Bafoussam, western Cameroon, with a commerce branch in Batouri, purchased 170,100 cartridges in the first quarter of 2014, compared to 30,650 in the first quarter of 2013. Pierre Ndibi Ze from Eboloa purchased 174,395 units in 2014 and 104,395 units in 2013 (see graph below). Neither of the retailers could provide the Panel with an explanation of the increase in their purchases. The Cameroonian ministry of territorial administration and decentralization that oversees ammunition imports and circulation could not provide any explanation either.

Sales of hunting cartridges by SAMT to five retailers from February to April of 2013 and 2014

	Retailer AT		Retailer DO		Retailer MB		Retailer ND		Retailer ON	
week	AT13	AT14	DO13	DO14	MB13	MB14	ND13	ND14	ON13	ON14
1	8060	6000	475	0	4625	0	3450	2000	3675	2250
2	11340	9350	3390	0	11230	2325	4480	1500	2875	3400
3	19465	3000	1000	5425	2100	12075	8000	15775	2325	1000
4	11085	5425	575	0	10900	1650	6000	10625	15100	8750
5	11705	12050	5150	250	5850	7400	8305	8400	3975	4375
6	8145	9135	4050	7125	10250	10225	5925	20500	3600	7455
7	6545	10375	575	31150	18160	7900	3000	14875	19000	9900
8	4985	9080	5475	18875	11200	17375	19495	18300	7850	5350
9	4825	14400	2250	31300	2000	10925	3775	11725	18750	15750
10	6750	14900	2775	38450	11250	20900	1000	41500	200	23250
11	4450	7250	1910	1775	5550	19625	1700	16020	14000	4500
12	3535	3500	1125	11625	2750	2750	2950	0	125	8750
13	5110	7625	1900	24125	7875	11550	36300	13175	4750	5750
Total	106000	112090	30650	170100	103740	124700	104380	174395	96225	100480



Annex 54: Seizure of arms by AU/RTF from former Séléka in Nzako

The Panel sent a letter on 9 July 2014 to the Permanent Mission of Uganda to the United Nations requesting information on weapons, ammunition and military equipment that were seized by the UPDF component of the AU/RTF in the Central African Republic. Uganda replied to the Panel on 24 July 2014, sharing information and inviting the Panel to visit its unit in Obo, Central African Republic. Unfortunately, the Panel has been unable to precede to Obo due to logistics constraints.

Uganda reported that indeed UPDF has collected weapons from former Séléka elements during the two clashes of 29 and 30 June 2014 near a village called Kano and near Nzako, but denied that its soldiers had conducted a disarmament exercise. However, Uganda informed the Panel that following the incidents, other former Séléka elements surrendered their weapons and equipment to UPDF. The Ugandan authorities also denied having collected the amount of weapon declared by former Séléka to the Panel.

Uganda provide a list of arms and equipment seized by UPDF from 29 June to 6 July 2014 which comprised one civilian vehicle, 17 rifles, one propelled grenade launcher, one 60 mm mortar, five propelled grenades, eleven 60mm mortar shells and 1,557 small arms cartridges of different calibres (details in a table below).

Analysis of the items seized gives indications of the arsenal of equipment and arms used by former Séléka in that region. The vehicle seized, registered in Haute Kotto, was commandeered probably by a local in Bria. All rifles seized are AK/AKM, Type 56, Galil, Uzi or ASR models and of the category of small arms, observed by the Panel either in the stocks collected by International Forces or carried by former Séléka combatants in Bambari, Batangafo and Bria. Only two assault rifles Type 56 out of seven have serial numbers 56-22806086 and 56-35044386 which are close to the ones that China confirmed to have supplied to the CAR (see annex 44 Third party transfer of arms).


Arm and ammunition seized by UPDF component of the AU/RTF



Vehicle seized by UPDF component of the AU/RTF near Nzako



Location of the incident



List of items seized by UPDF component of the AU/RTF

NO.	DESCRIPTION	SERIAL NO.	AMMOS RECOVERED	DATE OF RECOVERY
	Weapons captured in exchange of fire with Seleka			
01	SMG	An 7757		29.06.2014
02	SMG	56- 35044386	39 Rds	29.06.2014
03	ASR RIFLE	35004		29.06.2014
04	MICRO GARIL	G-287859	30 Rds	29.06.2014
05	SMG	EB 3691		30.06.2014
06	SMG	56- 212009401		30.06.2014
07	SMG	56- 23725797		30.06.2014
09	SMG	OT 9919		30.06.2014
10	SMG	HT 19508		30.06.2014
11	G3	EN 2468	72 Rds	30.06.2014
12	G3 MAGS (01)			30.06.2014
13	MICRO GARLIC	G-556-223	35 Rds	30.06.2014
14	ZERO – ZERO (01)		01Rd	30.06.2014
15	60 mm mtor(01)	160022	11 BOMBS	30.06.2014
16	RED BERET (02)			30.06.2014
17	BASE PLATE (01)			30.06.2014
	Weapons surrendered by Seleka			
18	SMG	56- 22806086	204	05.07.2014
19	UZI GUN	E29545	50 Rds	05.07.2014
20	UZI GUN	E69135		05.07.2014
21	ASR RIFLE	31665		05.07.2014
22	RPG PIPE	101173	05 SHELLS	05.07.2014
23	RPG CHARGERS (04)			05.07.2014
24	PKM LOSE AMMO		01 Tin & 925 Rds	05.07.2014
25	SMG	56- 23730842	201 Rds	06.07.2014
26	SMG	56- 212011395		06.07.2014
27	SMG	56- 23711122		06.07.2014
28	SMG EMPTY MAGAZINE (20)			06.07.2014
29	HF RADIO (01)	038TL0308		06.07.2014
30	BUSH NELL HD CAMERA (01)	01		06.07.2014
31	LEOPOLD (sight vision)	01		06.07.2014
31	GRENADES	02		06.07.2014
33	A PAIR OF UNIFORM	01		06.07.2014

Annex 55: Potential arsenal of former Séléka in Birao (Vakaga province)

The photograph below was retrieved from Facebook profile of a former Séléka leader; it shows some equipment owned by the armed group, including a recoilless gun type SPG-9 73 mm which is mounted on the pick-up truck vehicle. A similar weapon has been seized by International forces in Bangui.

*Photograph from Facebook profile of a former Séléka General
posted on 10 June 2014*



Photograph taken by the Panel on 10 August 2014 at MISCA compound in Bangui



Annex 56: Mesures de confiance (confidence-building measures)

Rationale

The confidence-building measures were approved by FOMAC and Sangaris Force Commanders and transmitted on 4 December 2013 to the Central African ministers of defence, of internal security and to the Chief of staff of the CAR armed forces (FACA). The measures aimed at guaranteeing the freedom of movement of French Forces and FOMAC and the cantonment of armed groups in Bangui and in the regions.

The measures outline that while awaiting implementation of DDR and SSR programmes, “transition forces” were created including FACA and former Séléka. The measures also stipulate that not all transition forces elements should be integrated or reintegrated in a reformed FACA, and that President Djotodia should ensure the departure of mercenaries. The document specified procedures for identification, disarmament, cantonment and guidelines for behaviour.

The measures have been implemented in Bangui and culminated by the cantonment of former Séléka in the three camps of Béal, BSS and RDOT. Attempts by Sangaris to canton and disarm former Séléka in Bambari on 21 June 2014 and in Batangafo on 4 August 2014 were unsuccessful, following strong resistance and mobilization of the local youth in popular uprisings against international forces. The Panel visited the two localities and noted that former Séléka combatants were carrying their weapons openly. Similar forced disarmament in PK5 neighbourhood in Bangui led to armed confrontation by self-defence groups undermining the efforts of Sangaris and EUFOR-RCA.

Implementation

Confidence-building measures, although initially intended for FACA and former Séléka, were actually also implemented in the western part of the country where anti-balaka groups and *Révolution et Justice* are active. In those areas, international forces have systematically dismantled illegal checkpoints and seized weapons from combatants. The Panel witnessed the implementation by international forces on 15 August 2014 of the implementation of the *mesures de confiance* in Bouca for anti-balaka (see below and also paragraph 57 of the main report).

Local authorities, MISCA and Sangaris officers explaining the mesures de confiance to the population in Bouca (photograph taken by the Panel on 15 August 2014)



Confidence-building measures document distributed by Sangaris in Bouca on 15 August 2014

A document entitled “Mesures de confiance approuvées par les autorités centrafricaines de transition” for the implementation of the confidence-building measures was approved on 19 January 2014 by Sangaris and MISCA Force Commanders, and MISCA Police commander. The document specifies procedures for securing cantonment sites, official buildings and for static and mobile protection of authorities and dignitaries. The *mesures de confiance* aim at dismantling armed checkpoints and restricting movements of heavy weapon and armed combatants.

MESURES DE CONFIANCE APPROUVÉES PAR LES AUTORITÉS CENTRAFRICAINES DE TRANSITION

1. IDENTIFICATION

- TOUT MILITAIRE DES FORCES DE TRANSITION DOIT ÊTRE EN TENUE, PORTER UN SIGNE DISTINCTIF CONNU DE TOUS ET DÉTENIR UN DOCUMENT L'IDENTIFIANT CLAIREMENT.

2. DESARMEMENT

- SAUF POUR LES ÉLÉMENTS DE PROTECTION DE CERTAINS SITES ET DE CERTAINES PERSONNALITÉS, TOUT ARMEMENT EST PROSCRIT HORS DES CANTONNEMENTS MILITAIRES OFFICIELS OÙ SERONT STOCKÉES MUNITIONS ET ARMES LOURDES.
- LES ARMES PORTÉES ILLEGALEMENT SERONT CONFISQUÉES PAR MISCA OU SANGARIS.

3. CANTONNEMENT

- APPUYÉES PAR MISCA, SANGARIS OU LA FORCE DE GARDE DE L'ONU ; SEULES LA POLICE ET LA GENDARMERIE SONT AUTORISÉES À ASSURER LA SÉCURITÉ EN RCA.
- TOUT PERSONNEL MILITAIRE DE TRANSITION EST RATTACHÉ À UN LIEU DE CANTONNEMENT ET DOIT Y RESTER SAUF S'IL EST OFFICIELLEMENT EN MISSION.

4. COMPORTEMENT

- LES AUTORITÉS CIVILES ET MILITAIRES LOCALES DONT LES FORCES DE TRANSITION DONNE TOUTE FACILITÉ À LA MISCA ET À LA FORCE SANGARIS POUR L'EXÉCUTION DE LEURS MISSIONS.
- TOTALE LIBERTÉ DE CIRCULATION DES FORCES MISCA ET SANGARIS EN TOUT TEMPS ET SUR L'ENSEMBLE DU TERRITOIRE DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE.
- LES ONG DEVRONT POUVOIR ACCÉDER AUX POPULATIONS SANS RESTRICTION POUR APPORTER L'AIDE HUMANITAIRE SUR L'ENSEMBLE DU TERRITOIRE CENTRAFRICAIN.
- PAS D'ENTRAVE À LA CIRCULATION À BANGUI OU EN PROVINCE
- SEULES LA POLICE, LA GENDARMERIE OU LES FORCES MISCA ET SANGARIS PEUVENT INTERROMPRE LA CIRCULATION (BARRAGE, FILTRAGE).
- TOUT ACTE HOSTILE ENVERS L'UNE DES FORCES MISCA OU SANGARIS SERA CONSIDÉRÉ COMME UNE AGRESSION CONTRE LES FORCES.

Cantonment

In June 2014, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) in coordination with national authorities, MINUSCA and international forces identified a total of 2,114 individuals including 444 women and 103 children in three cantonment sites in Bangui. Their total was articulated as follows:

Category /Sites	RDOT	BSS	BEAL	Total
Former Séléka	1,041	257	539	1,837
Former FACA	27	1	5	33
FACA	2	6	0	8
Trained by FACA	24	6	0	30
Civilians	116	9	81	206
Total	1,210	279	625	2,114


The cantonment has not been implemented for the anti-balaka groups nor for *Révolution et Justice*.

Relocation


MINUSCA, in coordination with national authorities and International Forces, and with the support of IOM, from 1 to 5 September 2014, has conducted the first voluntary relocation from cantonment sites in Bangui of 238 cantoned elements including 21 civilians mostly to the towns of Damara, Dékoa, Kaga-Bandoro and Sibut, but also to other localities in the north-eastern part of the Central African Republic.

	Civilians	Combatants	Total
Damara	1	16	17
Dékoa		12	12
Fere		2	2
Guiffa		1	1
Kabo	1	43	44
Kaga-Bandoro	14	92	106
Liby		1	1
Malo		3	3
Patcho		3	3
Sibut	5	44	49
Total	21	217	238

Annex 57: Tendencies of the displacement of population in the Central African Republic from 14 August to 1 September 2014



Annex 58: UNHCR map of refugee movements as of 22 August 2014



Annex 59: Table of incidents of obstruction of humanitarian aid, Central African Republic, from 1 May 2014 to 14 August 2014

	Date	Prefecture	ATT	K	W	D	LT	T	Summary	Source
1	May	Bangui	anti-balaka	1,0	0,0	0	0	0	On 1 May 2014, anti-balaka murdered a national staff member of the United Nations and left his dismembered body behind a house that serves as the anti-balaka checkpoint in the area of PK16, on the route between Bangui and Damara.	UN Reports
2	May	Nana-Gribizi	former Séléka	0,0	0,0	0	1	1	In May 2014, the compound of an INGO was looted by former Séléka fighters. They took computers and other things. The INGO decided to suspend its activities in Kaga-Bandoro and relocate its staff to Bangui.	INGO
3	May	Bamingui-Bangoran	Unknown	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	In May 2014, an INGO base in N'Délé was looted by armed men. The guards were hit but were not seriously hurt. They took five telephones, three chargers, two torches, and one guard's bag with 26,000 CFA (51 USD) and other small things. They wanted to continue to loot the place but two former Séléka elements fired into the air and the looters ran away.	INGO
4	May	Nana-Gribizi	anti-balaka	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	In May 2014, the anti-balaka stopped two INGO vehicles and took the opportunity to accuse other INGOs of transporting Muslims with their convoys. All valuables from staff members were taken.	INGO
5	May	Nana-Gribizi	former Séléka	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	Former Séléka operatives broke in to an INGO office in Kaga-Bandoro. The INGO guards escaped the scene. During the incident, there was no INGO staff present in the office. No missing items were reported. The INGO decided to relocate their staff from Kaga-Bandoro to Bangui. During the relocation on 8 May 2014, at around 13:00 hours, an INGO convoy to Bangui was stopped by the anti-balaka operatives in Guifa village. The anti-balaka elements took mobile phones and other small items from the INGO staff. No injuries or casualties were reported.	INGO

6	May	Kemo Gribingui	Various	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	From 6 to 8 May 2014, one contracted transporter was hired to bring medicine from Bangui to Alindao. He was constantly harassed at checks points. At Libi (close to Sibut) its cargo was searched by the anti-balaka who suspected him to transport weapons. At Grimari he met 25 armed former Séléka who forced him to transport them to Bambari (contracted lorry without visibilities). The transporter was also obliged to pay 50,000 CFA (98 USD) for "formalities". Upon arrival in Alindao, two local former Séléka forced him to follow to an unknown direction and sub field manager was obliged to call the sous-préfet to get the vehicle back. Then, when unloading the lorry, four other former Séléka showed up and began to open the boxes "to check if an INGO was not transporting weaponry." They stopped when the local former Séléka leader went to the scene and ordered them to stop.	INGO
7	May	Kemo Gribingui	anti-balaka	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	In May 2014, an INGO convoy was stopped and looted by armed anti-balaka a few km. before arriving to Sibut. Mobile phones, money and personal valuables were stolen from the INGO staff present at the moment. No injuries or casualties were reported.	INGO
8	May	Kemo Gribingui	anti-balaka	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	An INGO vehicle had a flat tire right after passing the anti-balaka checkpoint in the route Sibut – Dekoa. Eight INGO staff members were in the vehicle. While they were changing the tire, a group of armed men approached them and looted all their valuables at gun point. No injuries or casualties were reported.	INGO
9	May	Kemo Gribingui	anti-balaka	0,0	0,0	0	0	0	The anti-balaka accused the United Nations of transporting Muslims with their convoys. Threats had been transmitted several times.	UN reports
10	May	Mambéré-Kadéï	former Séléka	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	An INGO was threatened by a group of six armed former Séléka, asking for four tires for pickup trucks. The INGO was forced to give them.	INGO
11	May	Nana-Gribizi	former Séléka	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	The compound of an INGO was looted by former Séléka fighters. They took computers and other things. The INGO has decided to suspend its activities in Kaga-Bandoro and relocate its staff to Bangui.	INGO

12	May	Bangui	anti-balaka	0,0	0,0	0	0	0	On 12 May 2014, two children who were accused of witchcraft by the anti-balaka, were welcomed at the INGO Child Protection workshop at M'Poko IDP Camp. However, anti-balaka wanted to take them away and put them on trial through "traditional justice" One of the girls was transferred by an INGO staff to the nearest police station for protection. The other one was wounded but managed to escape, most likely to Saint Joseph Mukasa IDP Camp where her mother lives. The anti-balaka was furious with the INGO staff since they did not permit them to take the girls and proceeded to threaten the INGO staff. The INGO Security Officer intervened and safeguarded the staff and the educational material.	INGO
13	May	Haut-Mbomou	Others	0,0	0,0	0	0	0	On 13 May 2014, a CNR (National agency for the refugees) while ensuring security at a non-food items distribution site, threatened the Head of Field Office of the United Nations with a loaded weapon. United Nations staff members and police officers intervened and disarmed the perpetrator who was escorted to the Gendarmerie. The reason and motives of intimidation are unknown.	UN Report
14	May	Kemo Gribingui	anti-balaka	0,0	0,0	0	0	0	An INGO convoy of two vehicles was heading towards Sibut. When the convoy arrived at Kangamote (11km. from Sibut), it was stopped by the anti-balaka group shooting in the air. The anti-balaka has demanded to be picked up to go to Sibut. A violent dispute occurred between the driver and anti-balaka. One anti-balaka member broke the windscreen. Then, one of their leaders decided to let vehicles go to Sibut. When vehicles proceeded again towards Sibut, six anti-balaka jumped into the back of one pickup vehicle. The vehicle stopped after few hundred metres and anti-balaka jumped off the vehicle.	INGO
15	May	Bangui	anti-balaka	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	On a mission from Bangui to Sibut, a rental car, carrying four INGO national staff members, broke down due to a flat tire at Damara. A second vehicle was deployed from Bangui to tow back the broken down vehicle and the staff to Bangui. However, at around 00:00 hours, at	INGOs

									PK12, the mission was blocked by a patrol of anti-balaka. The anti-balaka threatened the staff, took their cell phones and kept them imprisoned during the night. The next morning the team was released and their cell phones were returned. No violence or torture was exerted on the team at any point. Another vehicle had to be sent to repair the first vehicle.	
16	May	Bamingui-Baingoran	former Séléka	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	Two INGO vehicles, transporting products from the water distribution foundation Sodeca, were intercepted by armed men at the village of Yambala, on the road between Mbres and N'Délé. The armed men forced the drivers of the vehicles to drive them to the city of N'Délé. At N'Délé the armed men descended from the vehicles and disappeared in to the bush. As a result of this attack, a INGO has decided to suspend all its activities outside the urban centres of central and north-eastern part of the CAR.	INGO
17	May	Ouham	anti-balaka	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	The anti-balaka fighters, located at the corridor of the northern exit to Paoua, intercepted the United Nations vehicle and threatened to take five bags of rice from it. Subsequently, the United Nations security officer and the local chief of the anti-balaka fighters went to the scene and convinced the anti-balaka fighters to return the bags of rice to the United Nations crew. Upon persuasion from the security officer and the chief of the anti-balaka ordered his men not to interfere or attack vehicles bearing the United Nations logo.	UN Reports
18	May	Haut-Mbomou	Various	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	A truck rented by an INGO, traveling from Bangui to Zemio, was subject to harassment and attacks by armed men along its route. At PK 26 in Bangui, four motorcycles and Income Generating Kits were stolen by the anti-balaka elements. Further, at Sibut, more of the income generating kit disappeared. Finally, in Alindao, the truck was held for two days by former Séléka who half-emptied the entire truck of its contents before releasing it.	UN Reports

19	May	Bangui	anti-balaka	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	Attempted robbery by three armed anti-balaka men on the residence of one of the national staff members of the United Nations. The staff member informed the Radio Room that her house was under attack. Security team (Moroccan guard force) was deployed to her house. Upon arrival of the security team, the attackers fled over the back wall of the house. The gatekeeper of the house had been tied up by the perpetrators.	UN reports
20	May	Ouaka	Various	0,0	0,0	0	0	0	In the morning of 22 May 2014, Sangaris forces received the order to disarm the new former Séléka headquarters located in Bambari. Former Séléka refused to be disarmed and began to fight. All expats went into hibernation and stopped operations for weeks.	INGOs
21	May	Bangui	Unknown	0,0	0,0	0	0	0	A young man, armed with grenade, approached INGO base/premises in Bangui and threatened to throw the grenade stating that the INGO was “hiding Muslims in the base.” The individual finally left with no explanation. The INGO staff was non-operational during the day.	INGO
22	June	Ouaka	Unknown	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	In June 2014, in Bambari, an INGO motorbike was stolen by unidentified armed men while intense combats were taking place in the village.	INGO
23	June	Ouaka	Unknown	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	In June 2014, at night, an INGO office was robbed by unknown armed men. The perpetrators entered the building by breaking a window. All valuables were taken including the safe.	INGO
24	June	Haut-Mbomou	Others	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	An INGO base in Mboki has been completely looted. A crowd made up of the inhabitants of Mboki, pillaged a truck that was loading equipment at the INGO base. After completely emptying the truck, they moved onwards into the base and emptied the entire compound. Amongst the things that were looted were computers, printers, documents, cash money, satellite phones and many other items. The INGO has declared that it has now been forced to suspend its activities in Mboki.	INGO, RJDHRCA0 60614; France24060 614

25	June	Bamingui-Bangoran	Unknown	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	In June 2014, in N'Délé approximately four armed men entered the INGO base. No report on items stolen/looted. No injuries were inflicted. The INGO relocated its staff. Operations suspended.	INGO
26	June	Nana-Gribizi	Unknown	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	An INGO base in Kaga-Bandoro was attacked and robbed by a group of armed men in turbans. They took six mobile and satellite phones and money from the safe. No physical violence reported.	INGO; RNL040614
27	June	Ombella M'Poko	Not attributable	0,0	1,0	0	0	0	An INGO vehicle ran over a four-year-old child by accident in a village close to Yaloké. One vehicle was taken to the anti-balaka headquarters in town, while another vehicle took the injured child to the hospital. Staff members who were in the first vehicle were searched by the anti-balaka. All their valuables were taken. After extensive discussion and violence the vehicle was released with two anti-balaka and the family of the injured child. The vehicle met the rest of the team in Yaloké and took the child to Bangui. The anti-balaka charged approximately 100,000 CFA (197 USD) to help the vehicle exit the village. Few km. after Yaloké anti-balaka left the vehicle. The child was taken to Bangui and released the next day.	INGO
28	June	Bangui	Others	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	On 3 June 2014, at around 23:00 hours, the United Nations national staff member was the victim of an armed robbery, conducted by six perpetrators who were posing as anti-balaka. The alleged perpetrators were in possession of two AK-47 assault rifles and four machete knives. They demanded the sum of 400,000 CFA (790 USD). Once a staff member declared he did not have that amount of money in his possession, they took his work phone and some of his clothes. The incident lasted for about an hour. No physical violence was exerted.	UN Reports
29	June	Ouham-Pende	Others	1,0	0,0	0	0	0	One INGO staff member was shot and killed in Kambakota near Batangafo. Reports indicate that the murder was committed as a settlement of personal account (the agent was FACA military officer before joining the INGO). Fulani knew he was from the village and waited for his return to kill him.	INGO

30	June	Bamingui-Bangoran	Unknown	0,0	2,0	1	1	0	Four armed men in military attire (each carrying AK-47 assault rifle) forcibly entered an INGO warehouse in N'Délé (located around 50 miles from the INGO base). After finding nothing to steal, they proceeded towards the INGO base. They climbed the outside wall and using their weapons hit two guards on duty (the guards were not injured). They took five mobile phones, three chargers, two flashlights, an INGO T-shirts, 26,000 CFA (50 USD) and other things. Then the assailants requested to see the expats house. The guards complied. While the armed men tried to break in by force, the former Séléka patrol was passing by and heard the noise. The patrol fired a shot to the air and called the guards of the base. The armed men ran away before the former Séléka patrol entered the base.	INGO
31	June	Kemo Gribingui	anti-balaka	1,0	0,0	0	1	0	On 3 June 2014, a convoy, composed of 27 trucks carrying humanitarian material (some privately rented, others belonging to the INGOs), was going to Kaga-Bandoro (17 trucks) and to Bambari (10 trucks). The convoy left Bangui early in the morning, escorted by the Rwandan MISCA soldiers, and arrived to Damara at around 18:00 hrs. In Damara the convoy was met by the Gabonese MISCA soldiers who continued the escort. Gabonese MISCA soldiers said that Damara was too dangerous to spend the night there, the truck drivers followed instructions. The convoy left Damara at 19:00 hours. At around 21:00 hours the convoy was stopped by a group of armed anti-balaka, next to the village of Mabo (40 km. south of Sibut). Some armed men started shooting at the last four trucks of the convoy and threw a grenade towards the same direction. MISCA responded by shooting at the assailants who retreated to the forest a short while after. Many of the trucks were affected by the clash. Some of them were either repaired fairly quickly, or continued while damaged, except for one INGO truck which could not continue. The passengers in the truck requested MISCA to wait for them; MISCA refused and left the truck alone in the road. After the reparations the truck continued its way. While passing by the town of Mabo, same armed men attacked again.	UN Reports

									The driver did not stop but the assailants were able to jump into the back of the truck. They killed the apprentice with a machete and threw his corpse from the truck. They have also looted several bags of food and material that were in the back of the truck.	
32	June	Ouham-Pende	Others	1,0	0,0	0	0	0	In June 2014, the Fulani killed an INGO national staff member, in Dokaba village located 35 km. north of Batangafo.	INGO
33	June	Bangui	anti-balaka	0,0	0,0	0	0	0	The driver of INGO vehicle was abducted by the anti-balaka element. The vehicle and driver were released few weeks after.	INGO
34	June	Nana-Gribizi	Unknown	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	Roughly ten armed people went to the project site of an INGO and threatened the guard. They opened about 20 boxes full of toys and equipment, took plastic sheeting and empty drums. Some toys were destroyed.	INGO
35	June	Kemo Gribingui	anti-balaka	0,0	0,0	1	0	0	On 3 June 2014, an INGO convoy was being escorted by MISCA (firstly by Rwandese and then by Gabonese soldiers). At PK 40 the convoy was attacked by the anti-balaka. Fire exchange between the attackers and MISCA followed. Several vehicles were hit by the bullets, including the truck rented by another INGO.	INGO
36	June	Ouham-Pende	anti-balaka	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	On 5 June 2014, anti-balaka elements from Bocaranga have allegedly intercepted a truck that was carrying merchandise from N'Gaoundere (Cameroon) to an INGO in Paoua. The anti-balaka elements insisted that they had received instructions from their commanding officer to intercept the truck and drive it to Bocaranga, if they had not succeeded, to set the truck on fire. The inhabitants of Ndim persuaded the anti-balaka elements to take 50,000 CFA (100 USD) and let the vehicle proceed. The anti-balaka eventually agreed.	UN Reports
37	June	Ouaka	Unknown	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	On 5 June 2014, armed men with a machete entered the new INGO compound and stole communications equipment. No physical violence reported.	INGO
38	June	Ouham-Pende	anti-balaka	0,0	1,0	0	1	1	On 5 June 2014, in the road from Bocaranga to Ndim, a private truck carrying material for the INGO's projects, was stopped at the checkpoint by the anti-balaka from Bocaranga. The driver had to pay 85,000 CFA (167	INGO

									USD) to release the truck. Meanwhile, the owner of the truck was informed about the incident and took the road to recuperate the truck. When the truck arrived to Paoua, the driver found that the owner of the truck, who is a Muslim, had been kidnapped and tortured by the same anti-balaka. The family of the owner had to pay 450,000 CFA (888 USD) for the release of the individual.	
39	June	Ouaka	Unknown	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	On 6 June 2014, at around 12:40 hours, a group of four armed men with hunting rifles and one AK-47 assault rifle stopped and searched an INGO vehicle that was on the way to the town of Goussiema. They took all personal belongings from four staff members (three nationals and one international), including three mobile phones.	INGO
40	June	Lobaye	anti-balaka	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	On 6 June 2014, the food distribution in Boda was stopped by the anti-balaka elements who threatened the INGO staff, stole rice, peanut seeds, corn and hoes. The distribution was being undertaken by an INGO.	INGO
41	June	Ombella M'Poko	anti-balaka	0,0	2,0	1	0	0	In the early afternoon of 8 June 2014, 60 km. north of Damara, a humanitarian convoy coming from Bangui was attacked by the anti-balaka. The convoy (17 trucks) departed from outside the United Nations offices going to two locations: one to Kaga-Bandoro and another one to Bangassou. The convoy, heading to Kaga-Bandoro, was escorted by Gabonese MISCA soldiers on the Bangui-Sibut axis, when it was attacked by the anti-balaka. The escort responded to the attack. Young girls aged nine or ten-year-old were wounded by a gunshot (two fingers were cut off). The nurse from Gabonese MISCA took care of the girls, Sangaris doctor performed the surgery. The girls were being observed at the Sibut hospital. One damaged truck was picked up by Gabon Batallion.	UN reports, Panel of Experts
42	June	Nana-Gribizi	Unknown	0,0	0,0	0	0	0	On 8 June 2014, several threats were addressed to the United Nations national staff member using telephone communications. Neither the person who is threatening nor the reasons of threats are known. The United Nations security officers are closely following the situation.	UN Reports

43	June	Ouham-Pende	anti-balaka	0,0	0,0	0	0	0	On 10 June 2014, an INGO driver was threatened by a group of about 20 armed anti-balaka members.	INGO
44	June	Ouham-Pende	anti-balaka	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	On 11 June 2014, in Danga, the distribution of food supplies by an INGO was disrupted by the anti-balaka. Three tons of bags of rice were pillaged. The distribution of supplies was suspended.	UN reports
45	June	Bangui	anti-balaka	0,0	0,0	0	0	0	On 11 June 2014, at around 11:00 hours, a medical team that departed from the Ndjojo IDP site was intercepted by two anti-balaka elements, who accused the driver of the vehicle (a non-UN member) to be a Muslim. They asked his identity card for verification. The driver was Christian. The anti-balaka elements told him that he was lucky, because they would have killed him if he had been a Muslim. There were three passengers present in the vehicle, including two UN staff members.	UN reports
46	June	Ouham	RJ	0,0	1,0	0	0	0	On 12 June 2014, an INGO convoy was stopped by Revolution et Justice elements 2 km. from Benamkouna asking for part of the goods that were being carried in the trucks. During the incident MISCA from Paoua arrived. The INGO convoy left the area as soon as the clashes started. Two wounded (one RJ element and one civilian young man) were taken to the INGO hospital.	INGO
47	June	Ouaka	Unknown	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	On 13 June 2014, at around 01:00 hours, one armed man in turban, who only spoke Arabic, entered an INGO warehouse. During the robbery, he made the guards take their clothes off and lie on the floor while he stole what he could.	INGO
48	June	Bangui	Unknown	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	On the night of 13 to 14 June 2014, the Child Friendly Spaces (CFS) ran by an INGO in the IDP camp of M'Poko was attacked by armed anti-balaka men who stole some buckets, recreational items and plastics. They were looking for food but did not find any. After the incident, the INGO team met with the anti-balaka leader in M'Poko to sensitize. They agreed not to attack the site anymore.	INGO

49	June	Bangui	anti-balaka	0,0	1,0	0	0	0	On 15 June 2014, in Bangui, an INGO vehicle was brought to the Malmaka neighbourhood (5 th <i>arrondissement</i>) for cleaning. The vehicle was left there. The person in charge of cleaning the vehicle was kidnapped and taken to the Combatant neighbourhood by young anti-balaka members. The vehicle is now in the Senegalese neighbourhood of Baidi, where Rwandese MISCA soldiers are stationed.	UN Reports
50	June	Ouham-Pende	anti-balaka	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	On 16 June 2014, in Balone village, around 3 km. from Batangafo, the anti-balaka seized a vehicle belonging to an INGO for unknown reasons. Upon arrival in Batangafo, the vehicle was seized by the former Séléka. On 17 June, Congolese MISCA soldiers intervened by seizing the vehicle and returning it to the INGO.	UN Reports
51	June	Nana-Gribizi	former Séléka	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	On the night of 17 to 18 June 2014, there were further attempts of thefts at the INGO compound in Kaga-Bandoro. This action was allegedly led by armed men identified as former Séléka. The absence of punitive action against former Séléka favours the current insecure situation, and is worrying both the population and the INGOs.	UN Reports
52	June	Bangui	anti-balaka	0,0	0,0	0	0	0	On 18 July 2014, in the 8 th neighbourhood (Martir's Avenue) the INGO vehicle was stopped at the anti-balaka checkpoint and was threatened to be hit with a grenade if passengers did not hand over their valuables. The vehicle was held for around 40 minutes. The passengers explained to the armed men that they were humanitarian workers and they were let go without further harm.	INGO
53	June	Nana-Gribizi	former Séléka	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	On the night of 18 to 19 June 2014, in Kaga-Bandoro, there was an attempted robbery by the former Séléka in the concession belonging to an INGO. The absence of punitive action against former Séléka favours such incidents.	UN Reports
54	June	Nana-Gribizi	Unknown	0,0	3,0	1	1	1	On 18 June 2014, at around 21:00 hours, five armed men wearing uniforms forcefully entered the house of an INGO staff member. Men were armed with an AK-47 assault rifles, some had machetes as well. Upon hearing	INGO

									people outside the door, the house residents tried to stop the entry, but the door was kicked open. Upon entering, the house residents tried to fight the men off, but each received blows from the armed men. One received a hit at the back from a machete and also received a hit on the right side of the chest (lower rib cage) from the butt of an AK-47 assault rifle. The other two also received blows at the back from machetes. The INGO Security Manager was informed about the incident at 23:00 hours. By that time, three injured men were brought to an INGO hospital, where they spent the night and received care. Items stolen: three phones, three suitcases, clothes, one mattress, 178,000 CFA (350 USD). An INGO staff lost: two phones, one suitcase, clothes, one mattress, 90,000 CFA (177 USD). During the fighting, one armed man lost his AK-47 bayonet, which the INGO recovered and handed over to the United Nations.	
55	June	Nana-Gribizi	Unknown	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	On 19 June 2014, at around 22:00 hours, two armed men entered the residence of an INGO national staff. Two staff members were beaten, ordered to take off their clothes and robbed. Money, mobile phones and other valuable were taken. Only males were present at the moment of the incident.	INGO
56	June	Bangui	anti-balaka	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	On 19 June 2014, at INGO projects' site at the 4 th <i>arrondissement</i> , there were clashes between MISCA and the anti-balaka. Once the clashes began, an INGO staff members took one of their motorbikes to the chef de Quartier where it had to be guarded. However, the armed group of the anti-balaka intercepted and took the motorbike.	INGO
57	June	Ouaka	anti-balaka	0,0	0,0	1	0	0	On 23 June 2014, at around 11:00 hours, 15 km. south of Grimari, an INGO four-truck convoy, transporting 100 tonnes of seeds, were stopped by the anti-balaka and demanded to be transported to Bambari. The drivers refused, the anti-balaka shot at one of the trucks damaging the wheel. Tthe trucks continued their way without further damage.	INGO

58	June	Ouaka	Unknown	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	On 23 June 2014, in Bambari at 19:30 hours, three INGO national staff members, who live in the Sica neighbourhood, were victims of hold-ups in their residences. A group of four armed men stole from one of the victims all his personal belongings, including a bag containing 50,000 CFA (50 USD). The other two INGO staff members had all their personal effects stolen as well.	UN Reports
59	June	Nana-Mambere	Unknown	0,0	0,0	0	0	0	On the night of 23 to 24 June 2014, in Bouar, a group of armed men went to the residence of an INGO national staff member, planning a hold-up. However, they were unable to go through with the operation because of the noise of saucepans that woke up the entire neighbourhood.	UN Reports
60	June	Ouaka	Unknown	0,0	0,0	0	0	0	On 23 June 2014, the anti-Balaka attacked a village 10 km. south-east from Bambari. Security situation was very tense. Some INGOs in Bambari went to the United Nations for shelter and other INGOs went into hibernation until security situation was clear. This situation lasted until 27 June. On 27 June, one INGO evacuated/re-located four staff members from Bambari to Bangui. Eight remain there with one vehicle and one ambulance. Programs and operation were minimized to only some parts of Bambari and now they are re-thinking of re-opening the programs.	INGO
61	June	Ouham-Pende	Unknown	0,0	1,0	0	1	0	On 26 June 2014, in Batangafo, approximately 10 armed men wearing military clothes arrived to an INGO staff member's house. They were threatening, beating and looting him.	INGO
62	June	Lobaye	MISCA	0,0	1,0	0	0	0	In June 2014, at around 16:00 hours, MISCA opened fire towards the population for unknown reasons close to the health centre ran by an INGO in Boda. One guard of the health centre was wounded and received treatment. The operations of the INGO had to be stopped for few days due to the tensions in town.	INGO

63	June	Bangui	Unknown	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	On 28 June 2014, at around 20:00 hours, close to PK0, an INGO vehicle was stopped by another vehicle from which three armed men descended, approached the INGO vehicle, shot to the air (clearly to create some panic) and asked the driver to get down from the vehicle. The driver accepted without resistance. The INGO contacted the United Nations asking for help. However, the vehicle was not retrieved.	INGO
64	June	Bangui	Unknown	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	On 28 June 2014, at around 19:55 hours, on the road between the stadium and Bangui University (1 st <i>arrondissement</i>), an unidentified group of armed men fired shots into the air and hijacked an INGO vehicle. The robbers forced the INGO staff out of the vehicle and left towards unknown destination.	UN Reports
65	June	Nana-Gribizi	anti-balaka	0,0	1,0	0	0	1	On 28 June 2014, the mayor of Kaga-Bandoro was with an INGO team. The team stopped to talk to the anti-balaka ComZone and his men. The ComZone and others got angry and aggressive and claimed that the mayor was in fact a traitor working for the former Séléka and that he could not leave with the team. Tensions increased and other members of anti-balaka started verbally and physically abusing the mayor, throwing him to the ground and beating him. While this unfolded the anti-balaka ordered the INGO team to turn off the vehicles, get out of their cars, and stop all communications. After an hour of discussion and pleading the anti-balaka agreed to let the team and the mayor depart, but not without again beating and threatening him.	INGO
66	June	Bangui	Unknown	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	On 28 June 2014, six armed men came to the INGO compound taking one vehicle, two handsets and two mobile phones.	INGO
67	June	Nana-Gribizi	anti-balaka	0,0	0,0	0	0	0	On 28 June 2014, in Botto (Kaga-Bandoro prefecture), an assessment team of an INGO had a confrontation with the anti-balaka elements who contested the presence of the Deputy Mayor of Kaga-Bandoro as part of the assessment team. The Deputy Mayor was kidnapped by the anti-balaka elements and released later on following the intervention of the INGO's Head of the Mission.	UN Reports

68	June	Ouham-Pende	Unknown	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	On 30 June 2014, in Bambara, an INGO team was threatened by three heavily armed men after a food distribution for civilian population had finished. The INGO team decided to give them some goods that were meant for other vulnerable populations.	INGO
69	June	Haute Sangha	Unknown	0,0	1,0	1	1	0	On 30 June 2014, in Berbérati, an INGO team chose the Barthelemy Boganda Stadium to undertake the food distribution for the beneficiaries in the 4 th and 5 th <i>arrondissements</i> . The distribution had been delayed since additional security measures had to be put in place. Eighty people, including the INGO staff, drivers, security guards and daily workers participated in the distribution. The distribution started at 10:00 hours and was stopped at 12:00 hours to collect more goods from the warehouse. At 15:00 hours it was re-initiated. During the break a group of young armed men entered the stadium unnoticed. When the group of beneficiaries arrived (mainly composed of young men) they forcibly threw down the gates of the stadium and occupied the place creating panic. The group of armed young men approached the staff present and forced them to give away the keys of the trucks. The staff complied. Meanwhile, drivers of the bigger trucks moved to block the entrance that prevented armed men from leaving. During the confusion, the armed men left the stadium after severely injuring one of the daily workers and taking with them 20 bags of rice and 50 kg. of other goods (NFIs). They have also left the gates of the stadium damaged.	INGO
70	June	Ouham	former Séléka	0,0	0,0	0	0	0	On 29 June 2014, after mid-day, an INGO national staff member with his personal motorbike went to the market in Koki (north-east of Bossangoa). According to the information gathered, he was taken to the north by a group of the former Séléka when he was leaving Koki. The Panel facilitated the release of the victim.	INGO
71	July	Ouham-Pende	Unknown	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	On July 2014, armed men arrived to the residence of the INGO national staff member, threatened the residents with a grenade and looted the house. All valuables were taken, including 30,000 CFA (59 USD).	INGO

72	July	Ouham-Pende	Unknown	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	In July 2014, the residence of the INGO national staff member was visited by a group of armed men. During the incident, the staff member was absent but his family was present. Reports of looting.	INGO
73	July	Bangui	Unknown	0,0	0,0	0	0	0	On 1 July 2014, at around 13:00 hours, there was a shooting around the area of the medical centre (a tent, established by the INGO) at the M'poko IDP site. The medical centre had to be closed all afternoon due to the fragile security situation.	INGO
74	July	Ouham	former Séléka	0,0	0,0	0	0	0	On 1 July 2014, an INGO convoy found a non-detonated grenade on its way that allegedly belongs to former Séléka elements patrolling the Kabo – Moyen-Sido axis.	INGO
75	July	Ouham	Unknown	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	On 2 July 2014, around 12:00 hours, at 20 km. from Kabo, five INGO vehicles which were returning to Sido, were ambushed by unidentified gunmen who shot at and immobilized the vehicles. They robbed the passengers taking their mobile phones and an undetermined amount of money. No physical damage was exerted during the attack.	UN Reports
76	July	Bangui	Various	0,0	0,0	0	0	0	On 2 July 2014, at around 12:45 hours, an INGO vehicle was attacked by a group of young men protesting in the street. No major damage was caused. The vehicle was clearly marked as belonging to the INGO.	INGO
77	July	Bangui	Unknown	0,0	1,0	0	0	0	On 2 July 2014, in front of the university in Bangui, an INGO vehicle was attacked by a group of armed young men. At around 12:30 hours, three INGO staff and one the United Nations staff member on board of the vehicle were attacked with sticks and stones by the group of young men. The vehicle was completely surrounded at some point. The assailants were able to break two windows; one INGO staff member was injured. No further consequences reported.	INGO
78	July	Ouham	Others	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	On 3 July 2014, at around 15:00 hours, an INGO convoy of four vehicles carrying around 20 staff members were attacked by two armed men (carrying two AK-47 assault rifles) in civilian attire. The assailants were speaking a combination of Arabic and local language. The convoy was returning from	INGO

									<p>Moyen-Sido to Sido, incident took place about 19 km. south of Moyen-Sido. The two armed men suddenly went out of the bush to the road and obliged the first vehicle to stop, one armed man approached the driver and demanded two million CFA (3,900 USD) and all the valuables. After a few seconds the second assailant shot at the first vehicle, the bullet went through the vehicle without harming any of the passengers. Later other three bullets were shot to the ground. Due to the clear threat the passengers started to hand over all their valuables and money. After no more than 10 minutes the assailants had taken all they could. They also intended to take vehicles, but for the unknown reason, they have changed their mind and disappeared into the bush carrying all stolen valuables. The convoy continued to drive. After 20 minutes of driving, the convoy stopped to check if anyone had been injured and if vehicles were damaged. Everything was ok. Upon arrival to Sido, the team reported the incident to the local former Séléka authorities, MISCA and the rest of the humanitarian community. The former Séléka authorities said they had tried to catch the assailants without success. Since then all humanitarian operations to Moyen-Sido have been stopped due to the security reasons. Humanitarian operations have not yet been renewed until the writing of the final report on 8 August 2014.</p>	
79	July	Bangui	Unknown	0,0	0,0	0	0	0	<p>The driver in a rented vehicle (pickup truck) wanted to drop-off an expat at the airport. The airport road was blocked by demonstrators. MISCA African peacekeepers told the driver to wait as they were about to clear the road. After clearing the road block (which included MISCA firing in the air) and as soon as the vehicle passed, demonstrators jumped into the road and pelted the vehicle with half-bricks and other large projectiles. The driver kept driving and did not stop. Three windows were shattered and both the driver and expat passenger were hit by flying glass and rocks. None sustained serious injuries.</p>	INGO

80	July	Bangui	anti-balaka	0,0	0,0	0	0	0	On 5 July 2014, the INGO team that works in the Boy-Rabe area had to relocate due to repeated verbal threats from the anti-balaka in the area.	INGO
81	July	Ouaka	Various	1,0	0,0	0	0	0	On 7 July 2014, at St Joseph's IDP site in Bambari, 62-year-old INGO national staff member was killed during the attack at the IDP site. According to the information collected, at around 16:00 hours, a group of young Muslim armed men forced their entry to the church and started shooting indiscriminately to the civilians who sought shelter at the church after the shooting was heard. Allegedly staff member's body had been chopped in pieces with a machete. His body was recuperated by his family the day after and properly buried. Information from different sources indicates that the armed young men were supported by the former Séléka elements. However, this has to be further investigated.	INGO
82	July	Ouaka	Various	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	On 7 July 2014, at St Joseph's IDP site in Bambari, the same armed men, who have attacked the church, attempted to hijack INGO vehicle. The vehicle was not stolen due to the intervention of the former Séléka men who arrived at the site after some hours of clashes. During the attack, all the construction material that the INGO had in stock in the site was looted and the latrines and all WATSAN work done destroyed. Information from different sources indicates that the armed young men were supported by the former Séléka elements.	INGO
83	July	Ouaka	Unknown	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	On 7 July 2014, in Bambari, the residences of two United Nations staff members, who were staying at the Bishop IDP site, and one staff member staying at the Centre Pastoral Abbé Lazare, were completely looted after the attacks earlier that day.	UN Reports
84	July	Bangui	Unknown	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	On 9 July 2014, at around 13:00 hours, an INGO vehicle was approached by two young men who tried to force their way into the vehicle. They did not succeed because the staff locked the vehicle from the inside. two men then took a mobile phone through the window of the	INGO

									driver's seat, but later threw it back into the vehicle. After they shouted at the driver to leave the location as soon as possible if not they were going to harm them. No further damage was reported.	
85	July	Ombella M'Poko	anti-balaka	0,0	0,0	0	0	0	On 9 July 2014, at around 08:00 hours, a convoy of humanitarian were temporarily held up by the anti-balaka elements in Boali. There were five vehicles, carrying approximately 21 staff members from the United Nations agencies and an INGO, who were going on a mission in the interior of the country. The anti-balaka was holding them up to demonstrate against the fact that one of their comrades was killed by MISCA soldier. They temporarily kidnapped three western women and took them to the river where they sat them down and gave them food, and returned with the women shortly after. However, there was a very clearly stated threat to execute the three western women in revenge if any more of the anti-balaka group were killed by MISCA. Back at the main site, it was announced that there was MISCA convoy approaching from the north and the anti-balaka group anticipated a firefight. However, a negotiation between the United Nations field officer, MISCA troops and the anti-balaka avoided a firefight. All persons were released unharmed. The incident was concluded by 13:15 hours.	UN Reports, INGO
86	July	Bangui	Unknown	0,0	0,0	0	0	0	Reports of several staff members receiving threatening phone calls.	INGO
87	July	Bangui	Unknown	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	On 11 July 2014, at around 14:00 hours, an INGO vehicle was a victim of an attempted car hijacking in Bangui. The INGO security officer was attacked by a group of four armed men who stopped the car by threatening to shoot at the vehicle. The vehicle was going out of the United Nations office and heading back to the INGO compound. The INGO staff stopped the vehicle and negotiated with criminals. After 30 min. of negotiation, the INGO staff was released unharmed. According to the information gathered, the perpetrators were the anti-balaka.	Panel of Experts

88	July	Kemo Gribingui	former Séléka	0,0	0,0	0	0	0	Two expats were returning by road from Bangassou to Alindao. At the Kongbo checkpoint 60 km. south of Alindao, drunk former Séléka soldiers harassed them about transferring a pregnant woman to Alindao. The soldiers got angry and threatened the staff. Long discussion ensued and the ComZone (local former Séléka commander) eventually let them go, but not until asking for money and drugs, which were not given.	INGO
89	July	Ouham	former Séléka	0,0	0,0	0	0	0	An attempted forced entry into an INGO base by five heavily armed former Séléka elements.	INGO
90	July	Ouham	Unknown	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	On the night of 15 July 2014, unidentified armed men broke into an INGO compound in Batangafo. Following this attack, on 17 July 2014, the INGO decided to suspend its activities and send the international staff back to Bangui.	UN Reports
91	July	Ouham	Unknown	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	On 18 July 2014, in Bossangoa, a convoy of trucks (hired by the United Nations and an INGO) transporting humanitarian supplies was attacked and looted on the road from Bangui to Bossangoa.	UN Reports
92	July	Ouham-Pende	Unknown	0,0	0,0	0	0	0	In the afternoon of 18 July 2014, a doctor of the INGO hospital in Paoua was walking back to his house when he was stopped by a man armed with a rifle and two grenades. Two passers-by saved the doctor and the armed man fled into the bush.	UN Reports
93	July	Ombella M'Poko	anti-balaka	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	On 17 July 2014, the Yaloké bridge broke and several INGOs were stuck with their vehicles in the northern side of Yaloké on the road to Bangui. On 18 July, some vehicles tried an alternative route not suitable for trucks to pass. An INGO vehicle, with three staff members on board, decided to take that route to reach Bangui. After passing through a small village called Zaoua, an armed individual came out of the bush and made the vehicle stop. Few seconds after, 15 more men went out of the bush (most of them were armed with artisanal weapons but two of them had AK-47 assault rifles). Armed men took all the valuables from the staff. They have also threatened to take the vehicle, but after negotiation, the INGO team was released.	INGO; UN Reports

94	July	Bamingui-Bangoran	Governm ent Forces	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	<p>On 19 July 2014, 20 trucks of food and goods arrived from Sudan to Birao for an INGO to undertake the humanitarian distribution in N'Délé. The trucks were carrying one INGO's goods but marked as a different INGO. The trucks were escorted by a group of armed men who were commissioned by the Sultan of Birao to provide security to the convoy. Upon arrival to N'Délé the trucks were taken to the INGO base as planned, unloaded and stocked in the INGO warehouse. However, the keys of the warehouse were kept by the Sultan and no access was given to the INGO staff.</p> <p>On 20 July, the INGO delegations arrived to N'Délé to talk to the Sultan (he is 23-years-old) and he agreed to give the keys of the place where the goods were being kept. The distribution was planned to start right after but there was some tension in the village caused by the list of beneficiaries. The INGO and implementing partners have a list of households in need but some of the authorities in the village were advocating for a general distribution in the entire <i>sous-préfecture</i>. Another delegation from the INGO returned to N'Délé to explain that this was not possible and that the INGO was already assisting returnees and there could not be duplication. The Sultan agreed. At this point some of the goods that had arrived from Sudan and which were being kept under the control of the Sultan could be seen in the local market for sale.</p> <p>The INGO staff had received several threats by then, some because of the delay in the distribution, some because of the situation that was taking place. The INGO head of delegation travelled to N'Délé to sort out the issue. He was called by one of the three COMZONE in the village, who spoke to him and to the Sultan, but they could not arrive to an agreement. The INGO Head of Delegation was threatened that he would not be able to leave N'Délé unless he accepted the conditions required by the authorities. Due to the tense situation he went back and slept and the Sangaris base (this was the second night in N'Délé the first night he slept in the INGO base). One of the national staff members was</p>	INGOs
----	------	-------------------	--------------------------	-----	-----	---	---	---	--	-------

									<p>attacked in the streets of the village, with no mayor consequences. The humanitarian proceeded to tell the authorities that they were prepared to stop all operations. The Sultan then sent a letter to the INGOs explaining that he would cooperate.</p> <p>Finally, INGOs delegation went to N'Délé to talk with all relevant stakeholders and the Sultan finally accepted to give back the keys and permit the distribution to take place as agreed. The distribution had not started at the time of writing of this incident on 7 August 2014.</p>	
95	July	Bangui	anti-balaka	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	<p>On 20 July 2014, at around 14:00 hours, an INGO vehicle, that had departed from Bozoum with five INGO staff members, was stopped at the anti-balaka check point 45 km. north of Bangui. Three armed men requested for all the valuables, including some empty Jerry Cans (JC) in the back of the vehicle. The driver explained that the Jerry Cans were empty and one of the three men shot at the ground in a threatening way. Finally, the armed men took all the JC from the vehicle, took all personal valuables from the staff and let them leave the location. The staff present reported that they had seen Sangaris and MISCA patrols in the road several times.</p>	INGO; UN Reports
96	July	Haute-Kotto	former Séléka	0,0	0,0	0	0	0	<p>On 20 July 2014, an INGO team arrived to Bria to undertake an assessment. Few hours after they arrived they were called by the former Séléka authority in town (to be determined) who forced them to leave the town. The team was given two hours to depart back to Bangui. They had to leave without having undertaken the task. No further harm was reported.</p>	INGO
97	July	Bangui	Unknown	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	<p>On 22 July 2014, at around 14:00 hours, an INGO truck was stuck in the mud in Boy-Rabe – Bangui axis when armed men attacked and looted the truck.</p>	UN Reports

98	July	Kemo	anti-balaka	0,0	0,0	0	0	0	On 23 July 2014, at around 15:00 hours, in the outskirts of the village of Gafondo, a convoy of nine INGO private contracted trucks and one INGO truck carrying humanitarian aid to Bambari were stopped at the anti-balaka checkpoint, where each driver was asked to pay 50,000 CFA (100 USD) for passage. Two experts from the Panel happened to be on the spot at the time of event and were able to talk to the anti-balaka and explain the "criminal" nature of such act. The trucks were permitted to pass without further consequences.	Panel of Experts
99	July	Bangui	Unknown	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	An INGO vehicle was close to the office when another vehicle came up from behind, suddenly overtook the car, and cut off the vehicle. Three armed men jumped out of the vehicle, two ensured a perimeter and one threatened the INGO driver. The driver got out of the vehicle holding his hands up. The attacker took the INGO's vehicle while the other two returned to their vehicle and left without injuring anybody. Two shots were fired into the air to dissuade the driver and bystanders from interfering.	INGO
100	July	Bangui	Unknown	0,0	0,0	0	0	0	On 28 July 2014, at around 20:00 hours, the residence of the United Nations staff member was intruded by five armed men. The owner of the residence arrived before any harm was done and the men escaped. The Moroccan Unit and the United Nations security responded to the incident in less than an hour. A homemade weapon was recuperated by the United Nations.	UN Reports
101	July	Bangui	Unknown	0,0	0,0	0	0	0	On 31 July 2014, at around 00:45 hours, unidentified individuals attempted to enter the residence of the United Nations staff member. Warned by the noise, the United Nations staff alerted the neighbours and the robbers fled. No injuries or stolen property was reported. The Security Officer of the United Nations gave support to the staff member.	UN Reports
102	August	Ouham-Pende	Unknown	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	In August 2014, in Bouar, an INGO national staff member was robbed by unknown armed men, who took all valuables from the residence. All residents were present at the time of the incident.	INGO

103	August	Ouham	Various	0,0	0,0	0	0	0	In the morning of 1 August 2014, an INGO received information that Bouca village might be attacked in the afternoon. No more information was available. Therefore, from 1 to 3 August, the INGO has moved six staff members (out of 16) to the hospital. The other 10 were supporting vaccination programme in Bossangoa and returned back to Bouca on 3 August.	INGO
104	August	Nana-Gribizi	Unknown	0,0	0,0	0	0	0	On 1 August 2014, an INGO reported the detention of a staff member, the Ouandago post chief, who was being accused of spying and not paying at the checkpoints, even though INGO staff is exempted from paying at check points.	INGO
105	August	Ouaka	Unknown	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	On the night of 2 August 2014, a group of unknown armed men entered an INGO warehouse in Bambari. They were not able to enter through the front door, so they went to the back and climbed the walls. According to the first assessment, some bags of corn, some "house" and documents were stolen. The INGO is expected to provide more information.	INGO and UN Reports
106	August	Ouaka	Unknown	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	On 3 August 2014, in Bambari, an INGO warehouse was vandalized by unidentified individuals who stole hoes, seeds and other agricultural products.	UN Reports
107	August	Bangui	Unknown	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	On 3 August 2014, in front of the bank in Bangui, an unidentified individual stole an ID-card and an unknown amount of money from the United Nations staff member. The staff member sustained no injuries during the incident.	UN Reports
108	August	Bangui	anti-balaka	0,0	0,0	0	0	0	On 3 August 2014, in Bangui, the son of the United Nations staff member was arrested by the anti-balaka in the Damala area. He was released four hours later following the intervention of the United Nations Security officers.	UN Reports
109	August	Haute Sangha	Unknown	0,0	0,0	0	0	0	On 4 August 2014, an INGO received threats (written and verbal) from a group of young men who said they would attack any INGO that entered the distribution centre. The operations have been stopped in the region until further notice.	INGO

110	August	Vakaga	former Séléka	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	On 5 August 2014, at around noon, in Birao, two INGO national staff members were riding a motorcycle to the hospital when they were stopped by two former Séléka armed men (armed with AK-47 assault rifles) They were forced to descend. Their motorcycle was taken towards Sam-Ouandja. The COMZONE and Prefect were informed and said they would look for the assailants. The situation will be monitored further.	INGO
111	August	Ouaka	Unknown	0,0	1,0	0	0	1	On 6 August 2014, at around 23:00 hours, unknown armed men kidnapped an INGO national staff member and took him to a location close to the river. The international forces patrol passed by the location and made the assailants leave. The individual was released. According to the reports received, he was tortured and was badly wounded.	INGO; UN Reports
112	August	Ouaka	Unknown	0,0	1,0	0	0	1	On 7 August 2014, an INGO national staff member was abducted in the street by a group of armed men. They took him to the river and started to cut his throat. At that time Sangaris patrol arrived. The staff member is ok.	INGO
113	August	Bamingui-Bangoran	Unknown	0,0	0,0	0	0	0	On the night of 11 August 2014, unidentified armed men attempted to rob an INGO compound. They tried getting in through the gate. The staff called ComZone. By the time he arrived, armed men were gone. Later they came back and tried to climb the wall, but the guards' presence persuaded them to leave.	INGO
114	August	Ouaka	former Séléka	0,0	0,0	0	0	0	On 12 August, in Bambari, an INGO driver, travelling from Bangui to Bria, was intercepted by the former Séléka elements on the Bria- Bambari axis. They threatened him and forced him to return to Bangui with his truck.	INGO
115	August	Bamingui-Bangoran	former Séléka	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	On 14 August, at around 14:00 hours, a humanitarian truck, bringing fuel to N'Délé was ambushed by armed former Séléka. Staff members had no choice but to give away all their valuables. The truck remained in Kaga-Bandoro.	INGO


116	August	Ouham	Others	1,0	0,0	0	0	0	In August 2014, in Batangafo, an INGO staff member had a fight with armed men who allegedly wanted to attack the hospital. The staff member was killed by stabbing.	INGO
-----	--------	-------	--------	-----	-----	---	---	---	---	------

Source: Panel of Experts — Database of Incidents.


TERMS OF REFERENCE

Abbreviation	Definition
ATT	Alleged Perpetrator
K	Number of Civilian Killings
W	Number of Civilian Wounded
D	Destruction of Property. 1 - Positive. 0 - Negative
LT	Looting. 1 - Positive. 0 - Negative
T	Torture. 1 - Positive. 0 - Negative
Summary	Summary of Events
Source	Source of the information


Annex 60: Reported incidents of obstruction of humanitarian aid by perpetrator from 5 December 2013 to 14 August 2014




Source: Panel of Experts — Database of Incidents.

Annex 61: Incidents of obstruction of humanitarian aid from 5 December 2013 to 14 August 2014

Source: Panel of Experts — Database of Incidents.



Source: Panel of Experts — Database of Incidents.

Annex 62: Killings of aid workers per month from 5 December 2013 to 10 August 2014

Source: Panel of Experts — Database of Incidents.

Annex 63: Case study concerning violations of international humanitarian law in Boda as of August 2014

1. The Panel has been closely following the situation in Boda throughout its mandate since it is one of the examples of Muslims enclaves in the western part of the country. This case study is a combination of the follow-up that the Panel has been undertaking together with information from secondary sources consulted on a regular basis to monitor the situation.
2. Boda is located approximately 160 kilometres southwest of Bangui in the Lobaye province. The town and small surrounding villages have approximately 45,000 inhabitants. The centre of Boda originally counted approximately 6,000 Muslims and 30,000 non-Muslims. Since the end of January 2014, most of the Muslim population left Boda. Those who remained are “locked” in the centre of town, while the non-Muslim population resides in five IDP sites and in the forest or non-urbanized areas surrounding the town. Some of the Muslim population might still be living outside the town, but the Panel could not verify this information.
3. In its interim report ([S/2014/452](#), annex 23: Case Study II: Boda – Obstructing the delivery of humanitarian assistance and attacks against humanitarian organization), the Panel reported that the commander of the anti-balaka in Boda was an individual called “8-8” or “Général 8-8”. Since then, the Panel has learned that this individual has been killed under unknown circumstances. A few weeks after his death, the head of the anti-balaka movement, Patrice Edouard Nga ĩsona, decided to address the situation of Boda. On 28 June 2014, a document was distributed appointing new leadership for the province and town (see **annex 11**). The document refers to Soussou Abib and Aimé Dogo, being appointed as provincial coordinator and deputy provincial coordinator respectively. Rodrigue Karamokonzi and Aimé Kotté were appointed respectively as zone commander and deputy zone commander. As indicated in **annex 11**, they are under Nga ĩsona’s structure, command and control, and their appointment was confirmed locally on 8 July 2014.
4. The situation in Boda has not improved since the Panel’s interim report, apart from increased presence of humanitarian organizations. Muslim population remains locked in the centre of town, not able to leave their neighbourhood. Targeted killings and attacks continue on a weekly basis.
5. The Panel documented the following incidents since 28 June 2014 (when the anti-balaka appointment letter was signed by Nga ĩsona):⁸
 - During the night of 5 July 2014, a 15-year-old arrived to the health centre in the Muslim enclave of Boda. He had two gunshot wounds in one of his legs. He was allegedly close to the red line⁹ when he was shot, he could not see where the shots were coming from. He was transferred and treated by Sangaris due to the seriousness of the wounds and recovered.

⁸ Panel of Experts Database of incidents

⁹ The red line marks the division of the village of Boda between Muslims and Christians.

- On 5 July 2014, at around 17:30 hours, a 25-year-old man arrived to the health centre at the Muslim enclave of Boda injured by two bullets in the chest by the anti-balaka sniper who had shot him when trying to cross the red line. He died from the injuries several hours later.
 - On 11 July 2014, in Boda, one Muslim herder passing by the zone was killed by anti-balaka elements.
 - On 13 July 2014, near the red line of the town of Boda, a young Muslim was shot with an AK-47 assault rifle and wounded in his shoulder by an anti-balaka sniper at around 10:00 hours. He was in the eastern side of the red line trying to tell his children to return to the inside of the enclave after collecting wood. Sangaris received notice of the incident, picked him up and took him to the health centre in the inside of the enclave. He was released after two days of medical treatment.
 - On 15 July 2014, in Boda, a Muslim who was going to visit a relative in a non-Muslim neighbourhood was killed. The local authorities had announced the cancellation of the red line the day before.
 - On 20 July 2014, near the anti-balaka headquarters, a young Muslim was killed.
 - On 21 July 2014, a Muslim man of around 25-years-old was killed by an anti-balaka when approaching the red line at around 18:00 hours.
 - On 21 July 2014, at around 10:00 hours, a middle aged Muslim man was killed by an anti-balaka sniper while inside the enclave. He was apparently targeted because he had been cultivating his land the day before outside the enclave.
 - In the afternoon of 26 July 2014, an anti-balaka youth tried to throw a grenade into the Muslim neighbourhood. The grenade exploded on the red line that divides the Muslim enclave from the rest of the village. Some destruction was reported but there were no injuries. The perpetrator escaped.
 - On 26 July 2014, at around 13:00 hours, a Muslim civilian was injured by an anti-balaka shooter while INGO food distribution was taking place inside the Muslim enclave. He received medical treatment and left the health centre same day.
6. The above-mentioned July incidents amount to six unlawful killings of civilians, three severe injuries and one case of destruction of property, all allegedly committed by anti-balaka elements.
7. During the month of August 2014, the Panel focused on monitoring the escalation of violence, starting 21 August 2014:

- In the morning of 21 August 2014, a young man was killed by a group of anti-balaka while trying to exit the Muslim enclave. In retaliation, a group of armed Muslims left the Muslim enclave and attacked the IDP site located at the Saint Michele church. The figures available at the time of writing were 13 individuals killed (12 Christians and one Muslim, it is not yet clear if the victims were civilians or combatants) and six Christians wounded.
- On the same day at around 20:00 hours, a group of anti-balaka attacked the base of one INGO present in Boda with machetes and threatened to kill all staff, since they were providing humanitarian aid to the Muslim population. Since the incident, almost all INGOs present in Boda requested staff to be relocated to Bangui with MISCA escort. Only two INGOs remained in Boda.
- Later on the night of the 21 August 2014, a small group of anti-balaka youths once again approached the Muslim enclave and started shooting. The response from the Muslim enclave was robust, killing one of the anti-balaka that started the attack.
- On 22 August 2014, at around 06:00 hours, the anti-balaka re-started the attack on the Muslim enclave but stopped after a few hours due to the intensity of the Muslim response. After this, the situation in the village was relatively calm. At around 17:00 hours, the tension increased once again, when a Muslim self-defence group occupied the primary school located next to the Saint Michele IDP site, and the neutral zone dividing the town that had been set in place months ago by Sangaris. An exchange of fire followed, killing one anti-balaka.
- On 23 August 2014, at around 17:00 hours, the anti-balaka took the ambulance of the hospital, telling an INGO staff who run the hospital that the ambulance was being taken “on loan” to bring more troops to the village. Until the time of writing of the report, the ambulance had not been returned.
- On 24 August 2014, the exchange of fire restarted and was initiated by the anti-balaka with light weapons towards the Muslim enclave in an attempt to take over the area. The Muslim armed groups retaliated and drove away the anti-balaka, killing two.
- On 25 August 2014, the situation was relatively calm. The two anti-balaka killed the day before were buried. Reinforcements from international forces arrived. At night, unknown armed individuals looted and robbed the warehouse of one INGO that supplies the hospital and health centres in town. The warehouse is located on the Christian side of the town. Since the INGO that owns the warehouse had no staff there at the moment, no information is available about what was looted and destroyed.


- On 27 August 2014, international forces started initiating dialogue with different parties. Market activities re-started in the Muslim part of the town, while the Christian part of the town remained largely empty, its population having fled to the bush.
 - On 28 August 2014, at around 14:00 hours, tensions rose again in Boda. Shootings were heard from 06:00 hours onwards as the anti-balaka attempted to take over the enclave for the second time. The confrontations involved weaponry on both sides, killing two anti-balaka and wounding one woman in the Muslim enclave.
 - After few days of relative calm, international forces on 1 September 2014 negotiated with all parties, which agreed to start a pacification programme.
8. At the time of drafting, the situation remains calm. However, two more killings of Muslims were reported on 6 and 7 September 2014, details of the incidents are not yet available.

Annex 64: Methodology

1. Throughout the mandate, the Panel compiled a database of security and criminal incidents that could be classified as violations of international humanitarian law (IHL), international human rights law (IHRL) and other sanctionable acts listed in paragraph 37 of Security Council resolution 2134 (2014). Other security-related incidents have been included as well to gain an overview of the security situation in the country and, if relevant, pursue further investigations.
2. Documented incidents include: killings, kidnappings and rapes of aid workers; attacks or threats against humanitarian organizations, staff members and criminal incidents.
3. The database does not contain all of the incidents that took place in the country during the reporting period (from 5 December 2013 to date) due to limited staff resources and underreporting, particularly of incidents of violence against women, killings of civilians, hindering/hampering of humanitarian aid and attacks against humanitarian actors. Underreporting is largely due to the lack of presence of humanitarian and human rights organizations in large parts of the country, particularly in rural areas.
4. The database relies on primary and secondary sources of information. Primary sources convey direct and immediate knowledge of the relevant facts, e.g. direct witnesses, victims, pictures, video or audio records of the criminal fact, original documents, direct media records of instigation or other incriminating actions or objects of forensic significance. Secondary sources convey indirect knowledge of the relevant acts, such as indirect witnesses (hearsay, witnesses by reference) or indirect media reports.
5. Incidents that are reported by a primary sources are immediately included in the database, while incidents reported by secondary sources go through a source evaluation and corroboration process before being included. The source evaluation process takes in consideration the reliability of the source, the credibility of the information, the completeness of the report and the corroboration of the information.
6. For the collection of primary source material, the Panel met with Heads of UN Agencies, Programmes and Funds, Heads of Delegations of INGOs and Directors of NGOs to the largest extent possible. The Panel requested a compilation and a detailed description of every incident where staff had been victim of attacks, threats or other incident that could fall under the pre-determined violations mentioned above. Meetings with victims and witnesses also resulted in the inclusion of certain incidents.
7. There is a gap of information from local NGOs, mainly due to time constraints as well as the fact that local NGOs do not systematically register the incidents that they have been victims of.
8. The Panel also profited from cooperation with the United Nations agencies that already document different types of incidents in their own databases.
9. A few methodological clarifications that apply to Sections IV and V of the interim report of the Panel (S/2014/452) are important to highlight:


10. Killings of aid workers have been counted without consideration whether targeted individuals were on duty or not. In one of the incidents documented in this report, three non-staff victims (one driver and two assistants) who were carrying humanitarian aid goods have been considered as humanitarian victims since they were part of a humanitarian operation.
11. It is important to note that sexual violence is highly under-reported in the Panel's security incident database and more research and investigation will be undertaken on this subject during the second half of the Panel's mandate. The Panel has already established relations with various humanitarian actors that document acts of sexual violence in the Central African Republic.

Annex 65: Reported killings of civilians per prefecture from 5 December 2013 to 14 August 2014



Source: Panel of Experts — Database of Incidents.


Annex 66: Reported killings of civilians per month



Source: Panel of Experts — Database of Incidents.


Annex 67: Reported killings of civilians per prefecture and per perpetrator from 5 December 2013 to 10 August 2014

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC : Reported Killings of Civilians per Prefecture per Prepetrator (05 december 2013 to 10 august 2014)








ANALYSIS OF REPORTED KILLINGS OF CIVILIANS IN CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC PER PREFECTURE



Reported average killings	Various	Anti-Balaka	Ex-Seleka	Unknown	Others	MISCA	FFR	ANT	Not attributable	RJ	Sangaris	LRA	EACA	Endtotal
Bangui	862	251	72	138	44	20				6			1	1 392
Ouham-Pende	5	136	132	28	33			25	20	15	5			399
Nana-Mambere		107	111	66	8							1		293
Ombella M'Poko		128	50	9	2	3								192
Ouaka	19	31	89	1	21	0						3	0	163
Lobaye	61	83		2	2	0								148
Ouham		0	90	4	44	4		5						146
Mambéré-Kadéï			96	19	4	16								135
Kemo	23	23	12	1										58
Nana-Gribizi	4	5	15	1	11			0						36
Mbomou		0	10									1		11
Haute-Kotto			6	4	0	0						0		10
Bamingui-Bangoran			8											8
Haut-Mbomou			3	2								1	0	6
Sangha Mbaré			2	0		1								3
Basse Kotto			0									0		0
Haut-Mbomou			0									0		0
Endtotal	974	861	615	259	180	28	25	25		21	5	4	2	3003



Annex 68: MISCA incidents

The list of incidents below corresponds to a number of investigations, queries and meetings that the Panel held with various numbers of interlocutors, including first and second hand sources. The list was compiled and shared with MISCA human rights section, who gave their points of view and also shared with the Panel the incidents that they had investigated. Many other incidents were reported to the Panel but due to lack of complete information they are not reflected in the table.

NUMBER	DATE	SUMMARY	REPLY OF MISCA OR OTHER SOURCES
1	22 December 2013	On 22 December 2013, four anti-balaka detainees in Bossangoa were allegedly tortured to death by Congolese (Brazzaville) MISCA soldiers.	At the time of the event, the human rights section of MISCA had not been deployed in the country.
2	28 January 2014	On 28 January 2014, in Bangui, the younger brother of Nourredine Adam was allegedly killed by MISCA during a disarmament operation to which he tried to resist.	At the time of the event, the human rights section of MISCA had not been deployed in the country.
3	4 February 2014	On 4 February 2014, in Yaloké and Bossembélé, Chadian elements of MISCA, who had come to pick up their nationals, spread terror by shooting at the Christian population. A few hours later, at the end of the day, they arrived in Boali. At least three civilians died.	According to the human rights section of MISCA, Chadian MISCA contingent at Yaloké and Bossembélé killed three civilians in Boali.
4	16 February 2014	On 16 February 2014, a Chadian MISCA soldier in Bossangoa, visibly under the influence of drugs and alcohol, opened fire on his comrades who were sleeping. The incident ended with the death of a Chadian soldier and four wounded civilians. The perpetrator was arrested and sent to Bangui.	The human rights section of MISCA received information about the case, but due to logistical and security constraints the case was not fully investigated.
5	23 February 2014	On 23 February 2014, a member of the Chadian MISCA contingent was chasing his girlfriend through the <i>Combattant</i> neighbourhood of Bangui because he suspected her of stealing his laptop and phone. This led to clashes between anti-balaka and Chadian MISCA soldiers. The confrontations resulted in three civilians shot dead and one Chadian MISCA soldier in question dead as well.	The human rights section of MISCA received information about the case, but due to logistical and security constraints the case was not fully investigated.
6	27 February 2014	On 27 February 2014, in Nola, during a patrol by Congolese MISCA, soldiers arrested several people carrying small arms and white arms. One boy aged 17 was killed for having pointed his gun at elements of MISCA.	The human rights section of MISCA had no knowledge of the case.

7	5 March 2014	On 5 March 2014, in the 5 th <i>arrondissement</i> of Bangui, two civilians and one Lieutenant from the CAR national police were killed in clashes opposing Chadian MISCA soldiers and civilians.	The human rights section of MISCA heard about the incident. According to Con Ops, no Chadian troops were present. However, the case was not duly investigated due to security constraints. The families of victims were displaced and not reachable by the human rights section.
8	17 March 2014	On 17 March 2014, six anti-balaka elements were killed by Burundian MISCA soldiers while attempting to enter the Central Mosque at IDP site in Bangui.	The human rights section of MISCA had no knowledge of the case.
9	23 March 2014	On 23 March 2014, three Chadian MISCA soldiers allegedly raped a woman in Bouca. The victim underwent a medical exam which showed many lesions on her body. The exam also indicated a psychological trauma. The panel was provided with an identification number of one of the alleged perpetrators: 4CTS6S.	The human rights section of MISCA had no knowledge of the case.
10	20 March 2014	On 20 March 2014, in Fode, Bangui, Burundian MISCA soldiers from their post on a building in PK5 killed a man. Anti-balaka opened fire towards the building in reciprocation.	The human rights section of MISCA had no knowledge of the case.
11	24 March 2014	On 24 March 2014, in Boali, according to testimonies collected by HRW, a group of MISCA soldiers from the Republic of the Congo encircled a mission belonging to a Christian anti-balaka leader, and captured at least 11 persons, including four women. The peacekeepers detained men and women after the anti-balaka attacked a Congolese vehicle the same day, killing one Congolese MISCA soldier and wounding four others. According to HRW, those detained have disappeared. Their families have inquired about their whereabouts at MISCA base and local police stations. "The African Union needs to divulge what happened to this group of people who were arrested and taken away by Congolese army-men supposed to maintain peace," declared Peter Bouckaert, director of the Emergencies division at HRW. "Soldiers of peace are here to protect the civilian population, not to make it suffer from further abuses."	The human rights section of MISCA took action and investigated the case. According to the information provided, MISCA has taken disciplinary measures.

12	29 March 2014	<p>On 29 March 2014, a convoy of Chadian MISCA soldiers was returning to the Force Headquarters at Mpoko. They were transporting weapons seized from militia groups in and around the city of Kaga-Bandoro, in the northern part of the CAR. At around 15:00 hours, they fell into an ambush by armed elements at PK12. They sustained a grenade attack and were caught under heavy fire from the attackers. Attackers operated from civilian residential areas, Chadian MISCA soldiers had to fire back and shoot into the air in order to escape. Initial assessments reported four dead and 21 injured. Two Chadian soldiers were wounded. Vehicles of the contingent sustained heavy damages as a result of machine gun fire. Thereafter, MISCA team of human rights observers conducted an investigation which revealed the following: the Chadian contingent of MISCA fell into an ambush by members of anti-balaka groups who had taken position in the area before the arrival of the military convoy. The anti-balaka elements deliberately fired on the Chadian elements, who responded in self-defence to protect themselves. As information from various sources indicates, there were from 6 to 13 civilian deaths.</p> <p>The Panel had a telephone interview with Colonel Souleiman who joined MISCA in mid-March 2014 as a battalion Commander. He was on convoy that opened fire in PK12 on 29 March 2014. He declared that on 29 March anti-balaka using civilian people as human shield ambushed his convoy in PK12. His convoy came under fire and was obliged to return fire for self-defence purposes. He was returning to Mpoko after a reconnaissance visit to his various detachments and to survey newer locations for his deployment. He declared that he had a movement order signed by MISCA FC and was coming back to debrief his mission and coordinate his redeployment. He declared that his convoy joined another administrative and logistic convoy coming to Bangui to get monthly supplies. He also indicated that the two convoys joined because MISCA FC had informed him that the situation in Bangui was tense and that the</p>	Case investigated by MISCA and report submitted to hierarchy.
----	---------------	--	---

		risk of being ambushed by anti-balaka around PK12 was high. General Tumenta was later interviewed by the Panel and confirmed the information provided by the battalion Commander and also that the convoy was part of MISCA, and that the response was coherent with the mission's rules of engagement.	
13	21 May 2014	On 21 May 2014, a convoy of commercial trucks escorted by MISCA from Bangui to Cameroon stopped for an overnight in Yaloké. While <i>in situ</i> , some of the truck drivers negotiated with a group of Fulani who wanted to be driven to the border. However, MISCA escort complied with orders from Bangui and did not permit Fulani to board the trucks. This was done mainly due to the security situation because no special protection measures were taken to secure the Fulani. It was reported by open sources that MISCA had hindered movement of civilians.	The human rights section of MISCA investigated the case thoroughly and shared the information with the Panel.
14	27 May 2014	On 27 May 2014, a 37-year-old married woman in Bria was sexually assaulted by Congolese (DRC) MISCA Sergeant. The time of the attack was not mentioned in the report. The perpetrator was identified but his name is held confidential until further investigation by relevant authorities.	The human rights section of MISCA had seen reports of the case but due to the lack of access they have not fully investigated.
15	27 June 2014	On 27 June 2014, at around 20:00 hours, shooting was heard in the centre of Boda. After a day of festivities Congolese MISCA soldiers went to the only bar in the village, where they were drinking beer. The terrace of the bar faces the market. Six civilians (three women and three men) were approaching one of the shops close to the bar and passed in front of the bar. One MISCA soldier opened fire towards civilians alleging that they were carrying a grenade. Two injuries reported.	MISCA informed the Panel that the soldiers shot after seeing a grenade in the hands of individuals suspected to be anti-balaka.
16	27 June 2014	On 27 June 2014, at around 16:00 hours, MISCA soldiers opened fire towards the population for unknown reasons, close to the health centre in Boda. One guard of the health centre was wounded and received treatment.	The victim has reported the incident by writing a letter to MISCA. No response yet received.
17	12 – 18 July 2014	On 24 July 2014, the Panel interviewed four civilians, who were part of a group of individuals victims of illegal detention, torture, sexual violence and extra judicial killing, committed by the Cameroonian and Congolese MISCA in Bossemptélé and Yaloké from 12 to 18 July	The human rights section of MISCA was not aware of the case. The Panel spoke to victims and transmitted the information to MISCA for further investigations.

		2014 (see annex 69 for further details).	
18	15 August 2014	On 5 August 2014, open source indicates that women in IDP camps in Bambari area are often subject to sexual abuse from Gabonese MISCA soldiers. They enter their huts at night demanding sexual favours. Sometimes forced, sometimes for as little as 500 CFA (1 USD) or a biscuit.	The human rights section of MISCA has been informed of the case and is in process of conducting investigations.
19	20 April 2014	On 20 April 2014, the Panel was informed by MISCA that “Zaparo”, former anti-balaka chief of the area of Batalimo, had been killed by MISCA forces based in Batalimo due to his relation with criminal activities in the region and constant misbehavior against civilians. MISCA captain declared that they had been some protests from the population in the town but the Mayor of the town had diffused. The Panel was later informed by local sources that “Zaparo” had been tortured by Congolese (Brazzaville) MISCA soldiers before being killed.	The case is to be submitted to MISCA
20	9 May 2014	On 9 May 2014, in the village of Bozoum, Cameroonian MISCA soldiers killed the anti-balaka commander Richard B éjouane and his son. B éjouane arrived the same day to the village, started shooting in the air and causing problems. When MISCA arrived, they tried to arrest them both, they refused and they were shot. A group of 30 civilians from the village went to MISCA base to protest against killing. MISCA threatened to kill them if they continued to protest.	The case is to be submitted to MISCA
21	14 August 2014	On 14 August 2014, the <i>Révolution et Justice</i> commander “Waluba” was killed in the church of the village of Gadoulou (nine kilometres west of Paoua) by MISCA contingent in Paoua. His deputy and another two of his men were badly wounded. All three were taken to the hospital in Paoua. One died of his wounds on 15 August.	The case is to be submitted to MISCA

Source: Panel of Experts — Database of Incidents, MISCA Human Rights Section and secondary sources.

Annex 69: Case file of illegal detention, torture, extra-judicial killing and sexual violence in Bossemptélé and Yaloké (Ombella-Mpoko province).

1. For the investigation of this case, the Panel interviewed half of the individuals who were present during the incident, including civilians, members of the anti-balaka movement, the Deputy Public Prosecutor of Bangui, individuals from MISCA who were involved in the incident, and individuals of INGOs who work in both locations and who were informed about the incident.
2. On 24 July 2014, the Panel interviewed four civilians who were witnesses and/or victims of illegal detention, torture, sexual violence and extra judicial killing allegedly committed by the Cameroonian MISCA contingent based in Bossemptélé and the Congolese (Republic of Congo) MISCA contingent in Yaloké during the period between 12 and 13 July 2014. Other interviews took place in the months of July and August to complete the investigation.
3. According to the testimony of these four individuals, on Saturday 12 July 2014, two vehicles (one brown pickup truck and one Grey Toyota Prado) left Garoua Boulai at around 16:00 hours towards Bangui after purchasing merchandise to bring back to Bangui and sell. The vehicles belonged to an anti-balaka commander known as “Américain”, who charged each person per seat and per kilo of merchandise. The day of the incident, there were a total of 16 persons in the two vehicles: eight men, six women and two children.
4. At around 20:00 hours, the two vehicles approached the village of Baoro and stopped in front of a truck. The driver of the pickup, “Américain”, descended from the vehicle with his weapon (a 9 mm automatic pistol), alongside “Faustin”, one of his personal guards, and both approached the truck driver to ask for fuel. The driver said that he had none to spare and so he gave them money in exchange. Those who did not descend from the vehicle had no knowledge of how much money was taken from the truck driver but said that it had been clearly a robbery. The witnesses interviewed reported that they believe the truck driver called MISCA and alerted them of the incident which MISCA sources confirmed.
5. At the same time, MISCA and Sangaris were searching for a man called John Mulabe, who was allegedly very dangerous, had a pending arrest warrant and was moving from the Cameroonian border to Bangui in two vehicles.
6. Around 22:00 hours the Prado arrived at the MISCA Cameroonian check point at the entrance of Bossemptélé. The vehicle was briefly checked by MISCA, which requested the documents of the vehicle, and allowed to continue. The pickup arrived around 15 minutes after; eight passengers were ordered to descend from the vehicle and lay down on the floor. The driver, “Américain” was likewise ordered to descend from the vehicle, and then to walk away from the passengers towards another group of MISCA soldiers. While he was walking, MISCA soldiers shot him twice in his back. Two of the witnesses laying on the floor, eye-witnessed the events. As soon as the shooting took place, another anti-balaka called “Frederic”, who was in the group, took the chance and ran away to the forest. The MISCA soldiers shot to the air but did not pursue him. “Frédéric”’s whereabouts are unknown at the time of writing of this report.

7. Seven individuals left lying on the ground were ordered to stand up and walk to MISCA base in Bossemptélé, approximately 150 meters from the checkpoint. Once at MISCA base, they were all ordered to take off all their clothes at gunpoint, including women. MISCA soldiers proceeded to tie their hands and feet, some of them in pairs, some individually. During this time, MISCA soldiers kept shouting at them, accusing them of being anti-balaka and responsible for the recent killing of MISCA soldier in Bozoum. Witnesses report that from 23:00 hours to 07:00 hours the next day, they were constantly beaten, subjected to cold water being poured on them, insulted, not permitted to sit down, nor given water or food (see exhibits 1 to 3 below with photographs of marks on one of the victims). During the night, the individuals detained saw MISCA soldiers taking goods from the pickup truck, drinking beer and eating food.
8. Upon arrival to the base, women were taken to a separate room (men stayed in the base but outside the building). Women were ordered to take off their clothes, their hands tied, and they were verbally abused and according to the testimonies there was constant shouting coming from the room where women were being held. The Panel interviewed two of the women concerned. One of them, girlfriend of "Américain" said that she had not been raped but that she had been harassed and sexually assaulted. She was touched, searched in unnecessary intimate places, while her companion was equally abused but not searched.
9. In the meantime, the Prado continued its route towards Bangui, its passengers unaware of the pickup truck having been stopped at Bossemptélé. Upon arrival at Yaloké, the Prado was stopped at a Gendarmerie checkpoint. The passengers were held there for some time without explanation. After around 30 minutes, Congolese (Republic of the Congo) MISCA soldiers arrived at the checkpoint and notified them that their companions in the pickup truck had been arrested in Bossemptélé. They were also informed that they were now arrested in connection to the robbery of the truck driver in Baoro. Seven adults (two men and five women) and two children were in Prado. All the passengers in Prado were ordered to descend from the vehicle, and lay on the floor. They were checked, beaten and then taken to the Gendarmerie in Yaloké. The two children in the vehicle were taken away to an unknown location.
10. Upon arrival to the Gendarmerie at Yaloké, two men were taken to a room, hands and feet tied with ropes in pairs. Five women were taken to a separate room. They all spent the night in Yaloké.
11. On 13 July 2014, at around 14:00 hours, seven individuals, who had been detained in Bossemptélé, arrived in Yaloké with MISCA vehicles. The pickup truck and goods purchased in Cameroon were left in Bossemptélé. Seven adults and two children, who spent the night in Yaloké, were forced to board MISCA truck and were taken to Bangui.
12. Around 19:00 hours, they arrived at MISCA base at Mpoko, Bangui. Still handcuffed with ropes, women and children were taken to one room, and men to another. Later during the night, one Cameroonian MISCA soldier arrived to the room where the men were being held and offered them food. Since they were handcuffed they explained to soldiers that they could not eat without their hands and requested their hands be untightened. The MISCA soldiers laughed and said that they were animals and that they were expected to eat as such. The detainees reported during the interview that they could not eat until they were handed over

to MISCA Police. Women and children were held in a room next to the men. They all slept on the floor without a cover, and were not given access to bathrooms.

13. In the morning of 14 July 2014, Colonel of Congolese (Republic of the Congo) MISCA Police arrived at the location where the individuals were being held and ordered Cameroonian soldiers to transfer the detainees to Congolese camp. The Colonel mentioned that the conditions in which they were being held were inhumane and complained to Cameroonian soldiers. Cameroonian soldiers followed the order and 16 individuals were taken to Congolese camp at Mpoko. According to their testimonies, once at Congolese camp they were given food, permitted to clean up and asked what had happened.
14. Later on the same day, at around 16:00 hours they were transferred to the SRI unit of the Gendarmerie in Bangui, where they spent the night.
15. On 15 July 2014, they were all interrogated by the Gendarmerie and informed that an investigation of the events had been opened. In the afternoon, a Prosecutor started to take statements from each of the individuals. By next day all testimonies had been taken and in the morning of 18 July, all the individuals except three were released without charges.
16. The last three individuals (two men and one woman) were held and transferred to the prison by a decision of the Prosecutor. They were presented to the Judge on 30 July 2014. The judge ruled that the woman should be in domiciliary detention for 12 months, reporting to the police once a week. The other two men were sentenced to three years in prison for carrying illegal weapons. The Panel has withheld the names of the majority of witnesses and victims to protect their identity. The ones (partially) disclosed gave their approval.
17. The Panel met with Cameroonian battalion commander and another Cameroonian Colonel. The Panel reached the Captain, who was still in Bossemptélé at the time of the incident, by phone. The Captain was requested to give his version of events. He denied that they had tortured the individuals in question, raped or harassed women or stole any goods. However, when questioned about the individual who was killed, he explained: "We had been warned that the man inside the vehicle, whose name was John Mulabe, was dangerous. When he descended from the vehicle we sensed danger and then shot him." The weapon of "Américain" was collected after the shooting but it remains unknown whether it was found inside the vehicle or not. Cameroonian contingent interlocutors dismissed the question and did not provide a clear answer. According to the two commanding officers in Bangui, MISCA soldiers did not realize that they had not killed John Mulabe but someone else only until several days after the incident.
18. The individuals that were released presented a complaint to the Prosecutor's Office in Bangui who requested goods confiscated by MISCA to be returned. On 30 July 2014, MISCA returned the two vehicles, but they were both empty. A follow-up claim is to be submitted to the Prosecutor and to the human rights section of MISCA in order for the victims to be compensated for their damages.

Exhibit 1 – Eye wound of one of the victims.



Exhibit 2 – Leg wound of one of the victims.



Exhibit 3 – Wrist wounds of one of the victims



Annex 70: Locations of schools affected by the **conflict** from 5 December 2013 to 31 July 2014¹⁰

1. 23 in Bangui – private and public
2. 8 in Bamingui-Bangoran – all public
3. 26 in Basse-Kotto – private and public
4. 12 in Haute-Kotto – all public
5. 10 in Haut-Mbomou – private and public
6. 18 in Kéno – all public
7. 27 in Mambéré-Kadéï – private and public
8. 20 in Mbomou – private and public
9. 12 in Nana-Gribizi – all public
10. 28 in Nana-Mambere – private and public
11. 37 in Ombella M'Poko – private and public
12. 31 in Ouaka – private and public
13. 49 in Ouham – public and private
14. 78 in Ouham-Pendé – private and public
15. 11 in Sangha Mbaere – private and public
16. 8 in Vakaga – all public

¹⁰ Information provided by the IASC Education Cluster for the Central African Republic.

Annex 71: Case study of killing, rape, displacement of a family in Bambari

1. On 25 June 2014, at around 22:00 hours, in the town of Bambari, Toumbazou I neighbourhood, four armed anti-balaka youths entered the house of Oumar Ousman, a 84-year-old FAO consultant in Bambari. Mr. Ousman was not present at the moment of the incident; in the morning he had been evacuated by Sangaris to the UNICEF compound in town, together with all other United Nations staff in the village due to the volatile security situation.
2. According to his testimony and other interviews conducted by the Panel,¹¹ the anti-balaka men were looking for him. Nine family members of Ousman were in the house at the time of the incident, including sons, daughters and granddaughters of Ousman.
3. Four men entered the house, demanding the whereabouts of Ousman. One of his daughters responded that he was not in the house. Four men proceeded to ask for men in the house. At that moment, Oumar Boukar Ousman (35-year-old son of FAO consultant) ran away through the back of the house suspecting that his life was in danger. Three men proceeded to chase the young man towards the river and once they caught him, killed him with machetes and knives. Neighbors found the body later that night by the riverside.
4. Then three men returned to the house and raped three of five women present in the house. The youngest was 13-years-old and the eldest was 32.
5. Due to the shouting and the noise caused during the incident, neighbours went to the house. Three of the assailants ran away without being caught. However, one was caught and interrogated by neighbours and the neighbourhood chief.
6. According to the testimony of the neighbours and the information gathered from the caught assailant, an individual named Bada Yade had hired four anti-balaka members to kill Ousman. They were hired from Grimari and not from Bambari. His father Gustave Yade, is a former colleague of Ousman, with whom he had worked in 2011. Back then, they had had a work-related misunderstanding. The neighbours released the anti-balaka member after they had obtained his confession. He was not handed over to the police, supposedly because it was too late and the neighbours could not reach anyone on the phone.
7. Valuables stolen from the residence included 180,000 CFA (355 USD), a sewing machine, a manioc mill, a generator and all doors inside the house. The anti-balaka commander in the neighbourhood called "Risqueur", who supposedly was very upset with the perpetrators, recuperated most of the valuables.

¹¹ Interviews conducted in Bambari on 3 July 2014 and in Bangui on 26 June, 17 and 18 July 2014.

8. The incident was reported to MINUSCA Security and to the competent NGO for women and girls to receive medical treatment. On 26 June 2014, all Ousman's family members were evacuated to Bangui. Ousman is submitting an official complaint to the Judicial Authorities in Bangui. The Panel is following the matter. No judiciary measures have been taken.


*House of FAO consultant occupied by anti-balaka elements
(photograph taken by the Panel on 3 July 2014)*



*Inside the house of FAO consultant looted and occupied by anti-balaka
(photograph taken by the Panel on 3 July 2014)*



Location of the house where incident occurred



Annex 72: Gender-based violence sub cluster data on rape cases in the Central African Republic from December 2013 to July 2014

**PERIODE DES INCIDENTS DU 5 DECEMBRE 2013 A JUILLET 2014
DONNEES ONG - RCA**

VIOLENCES SEXUELLES PERPETREES PAR DES HOMMES EN ARMES /ACTEURS ARMES NON ETATQUES + PREFECTURE D'INCIDENT ONG (Pr éfectures : Nana Gribizi, Ouham Pende, Ombella MPoko)				
FEMMES	HOMMES	FILLES	GARCONS	TOTAL
518	02	83	00	603 CAS
REPARTITION PAR PREFECTURE				
				Nana-Gribizi : 223 cas
				Ouham-Pend é: 62 cas
				Ombella-Mpoko : 318 cas
VIOLENCES SEXUELLES PERPETREES PAR DES HOMMES EN ARMES /ACTEURS ARMES NON ETATQUES + PREFECTURE D'INCIDENT ONG (Pr éfectures : Ombella MPoko, Lobaye, Ouham Pende)				
FEMMES	HOMMES	FILLES	GARCONS	TOTAL
34	00	05	00	39 CAS
REPARTITION PAR PREFECTURE				
				Ombella-Mpoko : 32 cas
				Lobaye : 03 cas
				Ouham-Pend é: 02 cas
VIOLENCES SEXUELLES PERPETREES PAR DES HOMMES EN ARMES /ACTEURS ARMES NON ETATQUES + PREFECTURE D'INCIDENT ONG (Pr éfectures : Haut Mbomou, Ouahm, Bangui)				
FEMMES	HOMMES	FILLES	GARCONS	TOTAL PAR PREFECTURE
00	00	01	00	Haut-Mbomou : 01 cas
08	01	01	00	Ouham : 09 cas
91	20	17	04	Bangui : 132 cas
				142 CAS

Source: GVB CLUSTER – Central African Republic