

Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Distr.: General
16 May 2014

Original: English

Third session

New York, 28 April-9 May 2014

Summary record (partial)* of the 6th meeting

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Wednesday, 30 April 2014, at 3 p.m.

Chair: Mr. Román-Morey (Peru)

Contents

General debate on issues related to all aspects of the work of the Preparatory
Committee (*continued*)

* No summary record was prepared for the rest of the meeting.

This record is subject to correction.

Corrections should be submitted in one of the working languages. They should be set forth in a memorandum and also incorporated in a copy of the record. They should be sent as soon as possible to the Chief of the Documents Control Unit (srcorrections@un.org)

Corrected records will be reissued electronically on the Official Document System of the United Nations (<http://documents.un.org>).



The meeting was called to order at 3 p.m.

1. **Mr. O'Reilly** (Ireland) said that the main challenge faced by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was the declared nuclear weapons programme of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, a State that purported to have withdrawn from the Treaty and now sought to justify its pursuit of nuclear weapons using the same deterrence arguments advanced by the nuclear-weapon States. Nuclear deterrence could not justify the retention or acquisition of those inhumane weapons, which were exacerbating tensions on the Korean peninsula and gave rise to intractable problems in other regions. His delegation welcomed recent progress in efforts to resolve issues regarding the nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran and supported the efforts of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to address proliferation concerns regarding the Syrian Arab Republic

2. In the absence of any progress in elaborating effective disarmament measures, the Treaty's third pillar concerning nuclear energy for peaceful purposes was the only benefit available to non-nuclear-weapon States. The Peaceful Uses Initiative of IAEA had a key role to play in combating cancer and in other health-related fields. Ireland had made an extrabudgetary voluntary contribution to that Initiative in 2013, specifically for the Programme of Action for Cancer Therapy. The Treaty was not inherently discriminatory but its fitness for purpose as a driver of non-proliferation efforts and a guarantor of peaceful uses of nuclear energy had been compromised by decades of failure to honour the bargain at its heart. Non-nuclear-weapon States had launched such initiatives as the High-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament and the open-ended working group on nuclear disarmament. The two international conferences on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons had revealed the profound lack of capacity at any national or international level to respond to the suffering and death that would result for innocent civilian populations. Moreover, despite repeated assurances of no first use, the peacetime risks associated with the possession and retention of nuclear weapons were arguably growing. Responsible governments were obliged to protect the health and welfare of their citizens.

3. States faced stark policy choices which could no longer be avoided. Article VI of the Treaty required States that had signed and ratified it to take effective measures for disarmament. It was surprising that after half a century there was still a need to call upon States to engage in discussions on such measures. The options set out in the working paper of the New Agenda Coalition were entirely consistent with article VI and with action 1 of the 2010 action plan. States should commence discussions to make good on their commitment to a world without nuclear weapons.

4. **Mr. Sarki** (Nigeria) said that there was a moral imperative to avert the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons, which would doom the entire planet. In that regard, his delegation stressed that nuclear disarmament remained the only effective path to non-proliferation. As a member of the de-alerting group and of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI), Nigeria supported all nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation initiatives, including increased transparency and the de-alerting of the operational readiness of nuclear weapons, the entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and attempts to negotiate a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT). Nigeria had also participated in the High-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament and in the two international conferences on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons.

5. The implementation of the action plan adopted at the 2010 Review Conference remained a good basis for deliberations. As a confidence-building measure, expectations should not be lowered and agreed terms should not be altered ahead of the 2015 Review Conference. Although nuclear-weapon States had made attempts to reduce their stockpiles, they needed to undertake the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals and comply with their obligations under article VI of the Treaty. In the meantime, the minimum expectation was that they should provide legally binding negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States.

6. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones helped prevent vertical and horizontal proliferation and ensured transparency. Nigeria supported the entry into force of the 2009 Treaty of Pelindaba. It called for the conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction to be held as planned in 2014.

7. Nigeria supported the protection of the inalienable right of all States parties to the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. While continuing its efforts to meet basic human needs in many areas, IAEA should work with all member States to implement its Action Plan on Nuclear Safety. Nigeria operated research facilities and had benefited from the Agency's Technical Cooperation Programme.

8. Continued incidences of trafficking in nuclear materials were a reminder that no nation would be safe in the event of an act of nuclear terrorism. Nigeria had taken steps towards ratifying the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. It called upon States which had not yet done so to become parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and place all existing nuclear facilities under IAEA full-scope safeguards.

9. **Mr. Sadykov** (Kazakhstan) said that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons had yet to fulfil its potential. It was vital to ensure the balanced implementation by all States parties of their obligations under all the three pillars of the Treaty. Unfortunately, despite commitments to nuclear disarmament, there were still enough nuclear weapons to destroy life on earth several times over. Four States which had possessed nuclear weapons in the past, namely, Belarus, Kazakhstan, South Africa and Ukraine, had already renounced their nuclear weapons. Only rapid and full nuclear disarmament would guarantee non-proliferation and global security. Kazakhstan supported the adoption of a universal declaration on the achievement of a nuclear weapon-free world, which would promote the advancement of a convention on the total prohibition of nuclear weapons.

10. The year 2014 marked the twenty-fifth anniversary of the establishment of the Nevada-Semipalatinsk anti-nuclear movement that sought to eliminate the nuclear threat not only in Kazakhstan but also worldwide. On 29 August 1991, the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site had been closed by presidential decree. To commemorate the event, an international anti-nuclear conference would be organized in Semipalatinsk. 2014 also marked the fifth anniversary of the adoption of General Assembly resolution [64/35](#), introduced by Kazakhstan, which had designated 29 August as the International Day against Nuclear Tests. All countries should take steps to implement the resolution, including by organizing conferences and

seminars with the participation of young people, the media and non-governmental organizations, and by promoting the international "ATOM" project that called upon Governments to renounce nuclear testing and ensure the early entry into forces of CTBT.

11. The recent Nuclear Security Summits had strengthened the non-proliferation regime, boosted international security and reduced the risk of nuclear materials falling into the hands of terrorists. A fissile material cut-off treaty, combined with CTBT, would become one of the main pillars of the non-proliferation regime. Kazakhstan was participating in the Group of governmental experts to prepare recommendations on the fissile material cut-off treaty.

12. His Government strongly believed that nuclear-weapon-free zones contributed to non-proliferation and global security. Member States in such zones were entitled to receive legally binding negative security assurances from the nuclear-weapon States. In March 2009, the whole of Central Asia had become a nuclear-weapon-free zone, and it was hoped that the five nuclear-weapon States would sign the protocol on negative security assurances to the Semipalatinsk Treaty. It was regrettable that, despite the decisions of the 2010 Review Conference, no conference had yet been convened to establish a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction; his delegation hoped that with political will, and trust among countries of the region, the situation would be resolved.

13. Measures intended to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons should not curtail the inalienable right of States parties to the Treaty to develop peaceful nuclear programmes, in strict compliance with IAEA requirements, and to participate in the exchange of technology and experience in a non-discriminatory and transparent manner. Kazakhstan planned to develop its own nuclear fuel cycle and build new nuclear power plants. It intended to work closely with IAEA on the Peaceful Uses Initiative and the Nuclear Security Fund, and make voluntary contributions to IAEA activities. It was also engaged in negotiations for locating an international low-enriched uranium bank in Kazakhstan. There had been welcome progress in the negotiations between the 5+1 countries and the Islamic Republic of Iran on the subject of that country's nuclear programme. Kazakhstan had hosted two rounds of the negotiations in 2013 and was ready to assist future deliberations.

14. **Mr. Charles** (Trinidad and Tobago) said that Trinidad and Tobago firmly believed that the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons constituted a crime against humanity and a violation of international law, including international humanitarian law, and of the Charter of the United Nations. Four decades after the entry into force of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, it was time to make key decisions about the place of nuclear power in the world and to draw a clear line between nuclear activities that were permitted and those that were prohibited. Trinidad and Tobago engaged in multilateral cooperation in the areas of non-proliferation, disarmament and the peaceful use of nuclear energy and called upon all the nuclear-weapon States to comply with resolution [1540 \(2004\)](#) and honour their obligations under the Treaty. It was proud to be a member of the nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America and the Caribbean, established under the Treaty of Tlateloco.

15. Trinidad and Tobago was one of the oldest hydrocarbon producers in the world; domestic demand for radioactive sources had grown as the use of radiation in medical and industrial applications had increased. As a result, Trinidad and Tobago had become a member of IAEA in 2012 and had launched a programme to ensure that its laws and regulations were in line with the Agency's safety standards, including the emergency preparedness requirements. His Government was nevertheless gravely concerned about the use of the Caribbean sea as a route for the transportation of nuclear and hazardous waste, which could have cataclysmic consequences in the event of an accident, and called upon the States involved to enhance their dialogue with member States of the Caribbean Community.

16. His delegation encouraged all States that had not yet done so to become parties to the Treaty and urged nuclear-weapon States to honour their disarmament obligations under Article VI. Trinidad and Tobago had participated in the international conferences on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons and supported the initiation of a diplomatic process for negotiating a legally binding instrument banning nuclear weapons.

17. **Mr. Mwinyi** (United Republic of Tanzania) said that nuclear disarmament should have been achieved long ago but instead the proliferation of nuclear weapons had continued. That course had to be reversed. The catastrophic humanitarian consequences of a nuclear detonation would spread across borders

and would have dire effects on human survival and on an increasingly fragile ecosystem, and could potentially destroy the world. The only solution was the total elimination of nuclear weapons, which should never again be used, under any circumstances. A legal instrument was therefore needed to strengthen the Treaty by prohibiting the possession and use of nuclear weapons while also creating the conditions for general and complete disarmament as a longer-term goal. For nuclear-weapon States, reducing their arsenals and eventually completely destroying their stockpiles were a moral imperative. The basic principle was the sanctity of human life.

18. The United Republic of Tanzania and other countries in the subregion had no desire to possess nuclear weapons. Like most countries of Africa, they were recurrent victims of small arms and light weapons. His Government was a party to several regional and international instruments relating to disarmament and arms control aimed at the reduction and eradication of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and control of the illicit proliferation of small arms and light weapons.

19. The slow pace of nuclear disarmament weakened the non-proliferation regime; both objectives should be pursued simultaneously as they were closely related and mutually reinforcing. One factor hindering complete disarmament was the delayed entry into force of CTBT. All nuclear-weapon States must end their programmes and make it possible to achieve a nuclear free world.

20. It was important for the Treaty to be implemented in an effective and balanced manner. IAEA had a key role to play in the creation of a favourable environment for nuclear energy production and cooperation and should provide developing countries such as his own country with education on nuclear technology and other assistance, on an equal basis, without any discrimination. Countries which possessed nuclear arsenals must comply with the Treaty without any preconditions.

21. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones was a valuable contribution to international peace and security; all nuclear-weapon States should ratify treaties and related protocols without reservations. His country was a party to the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty. It supported the call for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the

Middle East, which would not only contribute to peace and stability in that region but also benefit the entire international community.

22. **Ms. Richards** (Jamaica) said that, on the eve of the 2015 Review Conference, the international community was faced with the sobering reality of very limited progress made in the implementation of the 2010 action plan. Her delegation fully shared the concerns expressed regarding the continued failure to accord equal attention to all three pillars of the Treaty. The attitude of the nuclear-weapon States towards their legal obligations, and the continued significance of nuclear weapons in their national security and alliance doctrines, were equally troubling. At the same time, nuclear-weapon States and States remaining outside the Treaty continued to develop and modernize their nuclear arsenals, further threatening international peace and security, all of which jeopardized the delicate balance of the disarmament and non-proliferation objectives envisaged by the Treaty.

23. It was essential for the “grand bargain” which had made possible the adoption of the Treaty to be implemented in both letter and spirit. Nuclear-weapon States must comply fully with their obligations and commitments under article VI of the Treaty, and take prompt and effective measures to pursue the goal of full and verifiable disarmament in a time-bound framework. They must enhance transparency, as an essential confidence-building measure. Jamaica strongly supported the call for the early conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear weapons convention and for a follow-up conference by 2018, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 68/32.

24. Her Government was deeply concerned about the catastrophic humanitarian consequences that would result from a nuclear detonation, whether accidental or deliberate. It looked forward to the next international conference on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, to be convened at the end of 2014.

25. As one of the earliest signatories to the Treaty of Tlateloloco, her country had long recognized the vital role that nuclear-weapon-free-zones could play in strengthening regional and international security through confidence-building. In that connection, it regretted the postponement of the conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, which must be convened without further delay.

26. While Jamaica recognized and underscored the right of all States to peaceful uses of nuclear technology, in accordance with article IV of the Treaty, it insisted that that right must be exercised in full compliance with the IAEA verification and safeguards provisions. The Agency’s role in providing the necessary monitoring and verification should be respected. In view of the importance of the universality of the Treaty, States which had not yet done so must accede to the Treaty and place their facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards.

27. The international community must also recognize the urgency of eliminating the testing of all nuclear weapons and urge ratification by the remaining Annex 2 countries to enable the entry into force of CTBT. Jamaica attached great importance to nuclear security and safety. The Fukushima Daiichi incident had underlined the necessity of ensuring the highest standards of nuclear safety, particularly with regard to transportation of nuclear material. She reiterated her country’s strong opposition to the shipment of nuclear waste through the Caribbean sea, notwithstanding the assurances given in that regard. The dialogue, within the context of IAEA, on strengthening international cooperation in nuclear, radiation, transport and waste safety, was timely and important.

28. **Ms. Pucarinho** (Portugal) said that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons remained the basis of the non-proliferation regime; its three pillars must be equally promoted. Some of the benchmarks of the 2010 action plan were yet to be achieved; renewed commitment and the engagement of all States were required in order to succeed. She called on States that were still not party to the Treaty to accede to it as non-nuclear-weapon States, thereby reinforcing the non-proliferation regime. The start of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty would be an important step forward and would bring an end to the nineteen-year stalemate in the Conference on Disarmament. CTBT was a benchmark that all must aim to attain.

29. With regard to nuclear proliferation, Portugal remained very concerned about the nuclear programmes of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the Syrian Arab Republic. It welcomed the progress made through the Joint Plan of Action and the IAEA negotiation framework with regard to the Islamic Republic of Iran. The IAEA comprehensive safeguards regime, including its additional protocol, was a

fundamental instrument in non-proliferation efforts and verification standards. Moreover, the logic of progression established by the Treaty must be retained, as any breach of the safeguards meant a breach of article III and therefore the withdrawal of the rights guaranteed by article IV.

30. The negative assurances created by nuclear-weapon-free zones had added value in the non-proliferation regime; Portugal therefore advocated the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East. Her country supported the inalienable right of all States parties to develop research, production and the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, without discrimination and in conformity with the Treaty. It was vital to keep nuclear energy issues, notably those regarding safety and security, in an inclusive multilateral framework. Portugal was actively engaged in a number of nuclear security initiatives and was convinced that IAEA should have the leading role in that regard. The IAEA Peaceful Uses Initiative, to which her country contributed through the European Union, deserved enhanced attention by all States parties as it supported activities that could otherwise be problematic to pursue.

31. On the eve of the 2015 review conference, a number of remaining global challenges should also be addressed, including cybersecurity, the reliability of early warning systems, the possibility of miscalculation or of a decision based on incorrect information by national command authorities, and the implementation of measures to reduce proliferation risks.

32. **Mr. Nyazaliev** (Kyrgyz Republic) said that although the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons faced extraordinary challenges, there were also a number of new opportunities to advance nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation goals, including the 64 specific benchmarks set forth in the 2010 action plan. His delegation looked forward to the reports by States parties, especially the nuclear-weapon States, with respect to concrete actions they had taken or planned to take to reduce all categories of nuclear weapons in a transparent and irreversible fashion. His country attached particular importance to the expeditious ratification and entry into force of CTBT.

33. One of the most promising approaches to disarmament and non-proliferation was the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones. The Kyrgyz Republic remained hopeful that the nuclear-weapon States would

soon provide negative security assurances to parties to the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the form of legally-binding protocols to the Treaty. His delegation shared the concerns about the delay in convening a conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, and hoped that the conference would take place by the end of 2014.

34. The world had changed significantly in recent years, and new proliferation challenges had emerged. In order to remain viable, the Treaty and the broader regime must adapt to changing circumstances, which included the growing risk of nuclear terrorism. International safeguards and physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities were the first line of defence. In that regard, his country strongly supported the IAEA efforts to strengthen the international safeguards system, including the adoption of the additional protocol as the safeguards standard, as well as efforts to strengthen the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and to implement Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) in order to address the proliferation challenges posed by non-State actors. It welcomed the practical measures identified in the communiqués of the 2010, 2012, and 2014 Nuclear Security Summits. With support from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the United Nations, his Government had adopted a national plan of action for implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004).

35. His delegation attached great importance to the issue of mitigating the environmental consequences of uranium mining and associated nuclear fuel cycle activities in the production of nuclear weapons and, in that regard, drew attention to General Assembly resolution 68/218, on the role of the international community in averting the radiation threat in Central Asia. The environmental consequences of activities related to the production of nuclear weapons were an important, but often neglected, dimension of the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons; the role of education and training as tools to promote disarmament and non-proliferation was another vital but often neglected issue.

36. **Mr. Pašić** (Bosnia and Herzegovina) said that nuclear weapons remained a major challenge to global peace and stability. As long as nuclear arsenals existed, they would be a threat to security. Despite progress made in the past, new, concrete steps needed to be

taken on disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The international community should be more united in efforts to build a safer and more secure world. Notwithstanding obstacles and delays over the past decade, the 2015 Review Conference should provide a good opportunity to make real progress. Bosnia and Herzegovina supported negotiations on nuclear non-proliferation that were transparent, open and in good faith. Furthermore, greater trust was essential between the parties involved; when conflicts threatened regional and global stability, diplomacy and negotiations were the best solution and would enhance mutual trust. The role of nuclear weapons in military doctrines must be reduced.

37. His country stood ready to contribute to international efforts to ensure the universality of the Treaty, to which it had acceded in 1994 as a successor of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina had adopted a decision on ratification of CTBT in October 2005. His delegation called upon all States parties to work in a spirit of compromise and flexibility to reach a constructive outcome regarding three main pillars of the Treaty, which were mutually reinforcing and must be given equal consideration.

38. Bosnia and Herzegovina welcomed stronger engagement of civil society, including non-governmental organizations, in nuclear non-proliferation efforts, for only a comprehensive approach and international cooperation could help to bring about stability and security in the world.

39. **Mr. Luque Márquez** (Ecuador) said that the 2008 Constitution of Ecuador established the country's commitment to disarmament, and prohibited the use of weapons of mass destruction or of chemical, biological or nuclear weapons, and the import of nuclear and toxic waste into the national territory. For more than half a century, Ecuador had demonstrated its commitment to a world free of nuclear weapons and had participated from the outset in the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America and the Caribbean. His delegation reiterated the call by the region's Heads of State and Government for nuclear-weapon States to withdraw their reservations and unilateral interpretative declarations to the Treaty of Tlatelolco and respect the nature of that nuclear-weapon-free zone. The expansion of nuclear-weapon-free zones would raise international awareness as to the illegality of nuclear weapons and lay the foundations

for a more secure world. His delegation therefore lamented the fact that the conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction had not been held and called for the conference to be convened soon, if possible in 2014, with the participation of all countries of the region.

40. There must be a balance between the three pillars of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Given the threat to human survival posed by nuclear weapons, the complete prohibition and elimination of such weapons was the only option. Ecuador deplored the lack of progress on the 22 points of the 2010 action plan and the very limited reduction of arsenals by the nuclear-weapon States. It was very disturbing that nuclear-weapon States were continuing to modernize their weapons and delivery systems and had done nothing to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in their military and national security policies or downgrade levels of alert. Moreover, no progress had been made in transparency and confidence-building measures. It was imperative to initiate negotiations on the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, including a convention on the prohibition and destruction of such weapons. As long as nuclear weapons existed, there was a danger of their use or the threat of their use. A universal, legally-binding instrument must be concluded, without further delay, that would provide security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances.

41. Ecuador defended the right of all States to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in accordance with the Treaty and to develop their scientific and technological research programmes in a responsible manner. The use of nuclear weapons would have catastrophic humanitarian effects. All States were bound by applicable international law, including international humanitarian and human rights law. His delegation hoped that the nuclear-weapon States would attend the third international conference on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, thereby making amends for their conspicuous absence at previous conferences.

42. **Mr. de Macedo Soares** (Secretary-General, Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL)) said that all 33 member States of OPANAL were parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

OPANAL was a full-fledged international organization, established under the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which was responsible for ensuring that States parties fulfilled their obligations, the most important of which was to keep the zone of application of that Treaty free of nuclear weapons. It was also expected to work to advance the goal of nuclear disarmament in every forum and in all other regions.

43. The most recent OPANAL General Conference, held in 2013, had adopted an agenda for action that sought to work with the international community towards the negotiation of a universal legally-binding instrument banning nuclear weapons; urge States to modify or withdraw interpretative declarations made when signing and ratifying protocols to the Treaty of Tlatelolco; and promote concrete actions with other nuclear-weapon-free zones, States, international organizations and non-governmental organizations in order to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons. In that regard, the linkage established with the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) was of special relevance; at its II summit meeting held in January 2014, CELAC had made particular mention of OPANAL in its special declaration on nuclear disarmament.

44. OPANAL also coordinated with the four other nuclear-weapon-free zones and Mongolia, though there was room to exploit further the potential of that cooperation. It was looking forward to working with Indonesia in the preparation of the upcoming third Conference of States parties and signatories of treaties that establish nuclear-weapon-free zones and Mongolia, to be held in 2015. That conference was likely to focus on a number of issues, including the strengthening of nuclear-weapon-free zones, negative security assurances, and the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. Some 50 years earlier, Latin American and Caribbean countries had embarked on the negotiation of what had become the Treaty of Tlatelolco despite the highly adverse political and strategic conditions in the region that were not conducive to reaching strategic understanding. Despite those odds, a territory larger than 20 million square kilometres with a population of 600 million was now protected from nuclear weapons.

45. **Mr. Mahjoub** (Arab Atomic Energy Agency) said that the Agency aimed to develop Arab cooperation and build capacity in the peaceful use of nuclear energy

among its member States. The Agency was therefore developing a programme for researchers and specialists that included regional conferences. It also paid particular attention to the safety and security of nuclear installations and radioactive sources and monitored all practices with radioactive risks in order to prevent accidents, trafficking and sabotage. The Agency had established a network of monitors to exchange information and experiences, promote coordination and assistance between Arab control bodies, thereby preventing a duplication of efforts, and to address all aspects of nuclear control through training and the promotion of safeguards in line with the specific needs of Arab States. It had also drafted plans for specialized groups to develop a number of areas, including infrastructure, capacity-building, nuclear regulations, depleted waste management and information technology. The Agency had taken positive steps to improve security and safety and had a number of cooperation agreements with China, the Republic of Korea, the European Union, the United States and IAEA. It hoped for further cooperation with all States, which would enable it to promote development in the Arab world.

46. The Arab States sought greater cooperation in order to expand the peaceful use of nuclear energy in health care and for economic and social development. All States had the legitimate right to develop research in nuclear energy and in the production and use thereof, as well as to obtain equipment and technology for peaceful means, pursuant to the Treaty. Some Arab States were developing national programmes to build nuclear power stations and desalination plants. The Agency hoped that the Review Conference would address nuclear safety and security, depleted fuel and radioactive waste and would encourage the safe export of such substances, which would benefit international security in the long term.

47. It was well known that nuclear-weapon-free zones improved security, shored up the non-proliferation regime and promoted disarmament. Yet, while the Arab States had sought since 1995 to establish such a zone in the Middle East, the Resolution on the Middle East had not yet been implemented. States parties should therefore take all necessary measures for its implementation. He expressed concern that the conference on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East had not yet taken place and called for it to

be convened in 2014, which would enhance the chances for success of the 2015 Review Conference. He also called on Israel to comply with international agreements and place all of its nuclear installations under the safeguards regime in order to promote peace and security in the Middle East. Arab States were striving for stability, understanding and development and nuclear energy played a key role in ensuring prosperity. Any exception to the right of all States to enjoy peaceful uses of nuclear energy would weaken the nuclear security regime.

The discussion covered in the summary record ended at 4.45 p.m.