

# Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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## **Memorandum of the Russian Federation for the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit**

### **Working paper submitted by the Russian Federation**

The Russian Federation attaches great importance to the development of nuclear energy and the use of nuclear technologies for non-energy purposes. We believe that peaceful use of nuclear energy ensures reliable energy supply for human needs in the interests of sustainable development.

The International Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Power in the 21st Century, held in June 2013 in Saint Petersburg under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) confirmed that there was a broad consensus about a wider use of nuclear energy in the world given the strict compliance with the requirements of the international non-proliferation regime and nuclear safety and security. We intend to continue rendering assistance to all interested States regarding the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

The Russian Federation fully complies with its international obligations on nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear safety and security.

We appreciate the decisions of the Washington and Seoul Nuclear Security Summits and reaffirm our commitment to those decisions.

### **Global architecture of nuclear security**

We proceed from the fundamental principle stating that the responsibility for establishing and maintaining a nuclear security regime within a State rests entirely with that State.

The Russian Federation is a party to all major international legal instruments in the field of nuclear security, including the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its 2005 Amendment. We believe that the universalization of these legal instruments is an integral part of strengthening nuclear security in the world. We call upon all States to accede to them.



We note that the non-participation of certain States with large inventories of nuclear materials in these fundamental international legal instruments inhibits further steps on the elaboration and adoption of new international legal documents and political commitments in the field of international cooperation on nuclear security and safety.

### **Role of the International Atomic Energy Agency**

The Russian Federation supports IAEA activities in the field of international cooperation aimed at strengthening nuclear security in the world. We take note of the assistance that the Agency provides to its Member States in strengthening their national systems of accounting for and control of nuclear and other radioactive materials, the systems of nuclear safety and security.

Starting from 2010, the Russian Federation has been paying voluntary contributions to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund.

We believe that IAEA continues to play a leading role in establishing an interaction among States and exchanging experience on nuclear security and prevention of the threat of nuclear and radiological terrorism.

We suppose that the IAEA International Conference on Nuclear Security: Enhancing Global Efforts held in 2013 allowed its participants to analyse the experience and achievements of the international community in the area of strengthening nuclear security, to acquire a better understanding of the approaches used in the world to ensure such security and to identify future priorities in this area.

The Russian Federation welcomes the IAEA Nuclear Security Plan 2014-2017 approved by the Board of Governors of the Agency, focused on strengthening the coordinating role of IAEA in ensuring nuclear security, the wide use of information technology and modern developments and rendering relevant assistance to countries at their request.

### **Accounting, control and physical protection of nuclear materials**

We believe that the strengthening of the physical protection of nuclear materials and nuclear facilities, as well as nuclear material accounting and control are among the most essential components for ensuring nuclear security.

In the Russian Federation, all nuclear materials, their storage sites and associated facilities, as well as transportation of nuclear material, are protected by the relevant security measures, including physical protection, at least at the levels recommended by IAEA in INFCIRC/225/Rev.5. Our nuclear security regulations are being continuously perfected.

There are no nuclear materials or facilities in the Russian Federation the level of physical protection of which gives ground to concerns. An effective nuclear safety and security system has been built and is maintained in the Russian Federation. The accounting for nuclear material, control of its physical inventory and effectiveness of its physical protection are inspected regularly by the competent security authorities and by the nuclear energy regulatory bodies.

The Russian Federation constantly works on developing and updating regulatory acts in the field of physical protection, nuclear and other radioactive materials accounting and control, taking into account the accumulated national

experience and the experience of other States and international organizations, including IAEA. In particular, in 2012, a new version of the federal norms and regulations “The basic rules of accounting for and control of nuclear material” was approved, imposing more specified and detailed requirements for the accounting for and control of nuclear material with due account for its category.

We call upon the countries participating in the Summit to develop a national system of accounting for and control of nuclear materials and to ensure their effective physical protection.

### **Security in transport**

For more than 15 years, the Russian Federation has applied the methods for verifying the declared contents during cross-border movement of nuclear and other radioactive materials. We are ready to provide our support to other States concerned in mastering this technology.

Stationary systems have been established at our border checkpoints to exercise such control. Currently, we are introducing the national automated information system to control the cross-border movement of nuclear and other radioactive materials. In 2013, the Federal Customs Service of the Russian Federation together with IAEA twice organized international training courses on radiation detection techniques for customs service instructors and other law enforcement bodies from 15 IAEA Member States.

The Russian Federation is establishing an automated system of safe transport of nuclear and other radioactive materials, making it possible to locate vehicles carrying nuclear materials and assess their physical protection in real time. The system has significantly reduced the risk of nuclear material theft during transportation.

### **Countermeasures against the threat of nuclear terrorism**

The Russian Federation attaches great importance to the coordination of international efforts to reduce the risk of nuclear terrorism.

Given that the terrorist threat is a cross-border problem, we consider it necessary to strengthen the mechanisms of multilateral and bilateral interaction in this area taking into account the need to keep nuclear security-related information confidential.

In 2006, the Russian Federation and the United States of America launched the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, which has become an effective cooperation instrument for sharing best practices in countering the threat of nuclear terrorism and strengthening nuclear security around the world. By now, 85 States have joined the Initiative.

In September 2012, the demonstration exercises on countering nuclear terrorism the Strazh-2012 (Guardian 2012) under the auspices of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, involving national means for detecting nuclear materials, were conducted in the Moscow region. Experts from more than 50 countries attended the event.

**Prevention of illicit trafficking**

We advocate that all States consistently implement United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) co-sponsored by the Russian Federation in 2004. The resolution provides the international legal basis for countering the threat of materials which can be used to develop weapons of mass destruction, related materials, technologies and means of delivery falling into the hands of non-State actors, first of all terrorist organizations.

In addition to other measures to prevent illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive materials, the Russian Federation is developing the state system to prevent illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive materials on Russian territory. Its technical implementation is under way in the Murmansk, Kaliningrad and Sverdlovsk regions.

We support the IAEA programme on creating and maintaining the IAEA database on illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials. We actively participate in working group meetings aimed at enhancing the performance of the database and in the information exchange; we also provide relevant information on a regular basis. The Russian Federation is developing a system of forensic laboratories to identify nuclear and other radioactive materials and radioactive waste removed from illicit trafficking.

Upon the initiative of the Russian Federation, the eighteenth Meeting of the Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group was held in Saint Petersburg in 2013 with the participation of leading experts from laboratories, institutions and national research centres of Europe, America, Asia, Australia and Africa. This event turned out to be a most significant one since the establishment of the Group.

**Radioactive sources**

Being fully aware of the dangers posed by uncontrolled radioactive sources, the Russian Federation undertakes measures aimed at improving their accountability, control and physical protection system. The Russian Federation strictly follows the IAEA recommendations contained in the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and the Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources.

Laws and regulations on accountability, control and physical protection of radioactive sources and materials are being constantly improved taking into account both national experience in this area and the experience of foreign States and international organizations, including IAEA. Thus, in 2012, revised federal norms and rules entitled “Principal Rules for Accounting and Control of Radioactive Materials and Radioactive Wastes in Organizations” were approved, setting requirements on accountability and control, taking into account, inter alia, the ranking of radioactive materials based on their potential to cause harm; in 2014, revised federal norms and rules entitled “Rules Regarding Physical Protection of Radioactive Materials, Sources and Storage Facilities” were adopted.

The radioactive source register is being kept and improved.

### **International programmes**

We believe that the work on the repatriation of highly enriched uranium fresh and spent fuel from Russian- and American-built research reactors in third countries to the country of origin is an important area of cooperation aimed at increasing the level of nuclear security. The Russian Federation and the United States carry out this work with the participation of IAEA, which is reflected in the joint statement by the Russian and United States Presidents on nuclear cooperation of 6 July 2009.

Starting from 2002, we have implemented the programme on the repatriation to the Russian Federation of highly enriched uranium (both fresh and spent) from Russian-built nuclear research reactors alongside with the conversion of these reactors' cores from highly enriched uranium to low-enriched uranium or their shutdown (decommissioning).

So far, the Russian Federation has removed all highly enriched uranium fuel from nine countries, namely, Bulgaria, Latvia, Libya, Romania, Serbia, Ukraine, Czech Republic, Viet Nam and Hungary.

Partly highly enriched uranium fuel has been returned from five countries — Germany, Poland, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Belarus.

Overall, since the start of the programme 790 kg of fresh (hereinafter regarding uranium) and 1,269 kg of spent highly enriched uranium fuel have been returned from 14 countries.

Fuel from Uzbekistan, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Poland is planned to be repatriated.

We have conducted an assessment of six research nuclear reactors and confirmed the technical possibility of their conversion from highly enriched uranium to low-enriched uranium. At present, our efforts are focused on developing and certifying new high-density low-enriched uranium fuel needed for the conversion of relevant reactors in Tomsk and the Kurchatov National Research Centre. The decision about conversion would be made after an additional assessment of its economic impact.

### **Information security**

Since the terrorist threat persists, we attach great importance to maintaining vigilance and improving the security of the information related to the protection of nuclear material and associated facilities and to enhancing the protection of automated management systems which influence the level of security at nuclear energy facilities. We are convinced that excessive transparency in this area may lead to dangerous consequences.

The Russian Federation supports the international efforts to ensure the protection of sensitive information, including the cybersecurity measures at nuclear facilities. In particular, the Russian Federation conducts annual training workshops on "Information Security in Automated Physical Protection Systems".

### **Nuclear security culture**

The Russian Federation constantly works on fostering the nuclear security culture. In 2012, the guidelines for organizing and carrying out the work in the field of nuclear security culture were developed.

In November 2012 and December 2013, on the occasion of the Summits, the Russian Federation, jointly with IAEA, conducted workshops on nuclear security culture organized primarily for experts in the countries operating, building or planning to construct nuclear power reactors designed in the Russian Federation.

### **International cooperation**

The Russian Federation continues to be interested in cooperation aimed at supporting and strengthening the capacities of third countries in the field of nuclear security. We help the countries that start using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in improving their nuclear security. We continue to conduct courses and workshops on physical protection at the Global Nuclear Safety and Security Institute of the National Research Nuclear University, MEPHI, in the city of Obninsk and at the Tomsk Polytechnic University. International workshops and conferences and training courses on nuclear materials control and accounting are regularly held at the Russian Methodological and Training Centre on Nuclear Materials Control and Accounting in Obninsk. Russian experts are actively engaged in developing and improving the IAEA international instruments on nuclear safety and security and holding the IAEA training courses in this field.

We recognize the importance of international cooperation in the sphere of nuclear security in compliance with national legislation, provided that the information is kept confidential and is prevented from falling into the wrong hands. In this context, we consider it desirable to develop cooperation in this area among industrial organizations of different countries working in the field of peaceful use of nuclear energy, since they play an important role in ensuring nuclear security.

**The Russian Federation remains committed to maintaining and strengthening nuclear security and confirms its willingness to take an active part in international efforts to achieve these goals, as well as to work actively and substantively with all interested States that are also committed to these goals.**