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**Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review  
Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the  
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons**

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**Third session**

New York, 28 April-9 May 2014

**Summary record of the 3rd meeting**

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Tuesday, 29 April 2014, at 10 a.m.

*Chair:* Mr. Román-Morey ..... (Peru)

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*The meeting was called to order at 10.15 a.m.*

**General debate on issues related to all aspects of the work of the Preparatory Committee** (*continued*)

1. **Ms. Gottemoeller** (United States of America) said that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons had stood the test of time. It had stemmed the tide of proliferation and its three mutually reinforcing pillars brought important benefits to all parties; it was an essential legal barrier to the further spread of nuclear weapons, the foundation for efforts to further reduce existing nuclear arsenals, and a vehicle for promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and technology under appropriate safeguards. Her Government was more committed than ever to pursuing full implementation of the Treaty, as well as finding comprehensive solutions to the challenges it faced, so that subsequent generations could enjoy the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons. That would require hard work, with no short-cuts or easy ways out. It was imperative to ensure that people were aware of the human impact of nuclear weapons, including the devastating health effects; those considerations had guided and motivated her Government's efforts to reduce and ultimately eliminate those weapons.

2. Her Government had a strong record of accomplishment towards strengthening the Treaty. It had made significant progress on disarmament since the end of the cold war, having reduced its nuclear stockpile from 31,225 nuclear weapons in 1967 to an active arsenal of 4,804 weapons in 2013. It was continuing its successful implementation of the Treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START) for the fourth consecutive year and was pursuing further nuclear reductions with the Russian Federation of up to one third in the deployed strategic warhead level established in the context of that treaty. It remained open to negotiating even further reductions with the Russian Federation in all categories of nuclear weapons, including strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons, both deployed and non-deployed. Recent actions had significantly undermined mutual trust and that trust would take time to rebuild. Yet, even in the darkest days of the cold war, the United States and the Soviet Union had found it in their mutual interest to work together on reducing the nuclear threat.

3. She recalled that, at their recently concluded fifth conference, the five permanent members of the Security Council had achieved consensus on a reporting framework which would guide national reporting to the Committee at its current session. Her own country's report would be released shortly.

4. The entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) remained a top priority for her Government, which was striving to educate its public on the security benefits of that treaty, as well as on the dangerous health effects of nuclear testing. There was no reason for the other annex 2 States to wait for the United States before completing their own ratification processes. She urged all States to provide adequate financial and political support for the provisional operation of the CTBT verification regime until the treaty entered into force.

5. Her Government was working to support nuclear-weapon-free zones, which advanced regional security and bolstered the global non-proliferation regime. It looked forward to signing the protocol to the Central Asian nuclear-weapon-free zone treaty, and to working with Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) towards the signature of the protocol to the Treaty on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Southeast Asia. It also remained committed to the goal of a Middle East zone free of all weapons of mass destruction and to convening a regional conference to discuss such a zone. The recent direct engagement among States in that region was an important step forward; her delegation urged them to reach consensus on arrangements for an early convening of the conference.

6. In spite of those successes, however, non-compliance by a few States presented a direct challenge both to regional security and to the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. Countries that cheated on their commitments increased the risk of conflict and further proliferation, thus endangering people everywhere. It was in the interest of all parties to insist that violators returned to compliance; every effort needed to be made to resolve such challenges through peaceful, diplomatic means. To protect against additional proliferation and respond to cases of non-compliance, the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) needed the full support and cooperation of all States parties, including through the adoption of additional protocols, which bolstered regional and global security by

providing a higher degree of assurance that countries were engaged solely in peaceful nuclear cooperation.

7. Her Government lauded the example set by Ukraine as it celebrated, alongside Belarus and Kazakhstan, its historic decision 20 years earlier to accede to the Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon State. That country's reaffirmation of its non-proliferation obligations was a reminder of its critical contribution towards a world without nuclear weapons.

8. Her Government would continue to promote the safe and secure uses of peaceful nuclear technologies, and, as the largest contributor by far to IAEA nuclear assistance programmes, it would try to increase such support where possible. She encouraged all States in a position to do so to help support the IAEA Peaceful Uses Initiative. Since 2010, 11 States and the European Union had joined her Government in providing approximately \$66 million to the Initiative, assisting more than 120 IAEA member States worldwide.

9. **Mr. Sergeyev** (Ukraine) said that Ukraine had demonstrated its commitment to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament and consistently supported multilateral efforts to prevent and combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In December 2013, during the Ukrainian Chairmanship of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in 2013, the first update of the OSCE Principles Governing Non-proliferation since 1994 had been adopted at the ministerial level in Kyiv, demonstrating the desire of OSCE to strengthen the existing non-proliferation regime.

10. He recalled that, in January 1994, the Presidents of Ukraine, the United States of America and the Russian Federation had signed a trilateral statement setting forth arrangements to implement Ukraine's decision to renounce nuclear weapons and become a non-nuclear-weapon State. The twentieth anniversary of that event had taken place against the backdrop of aggression by the Russian Federation against Ukraine, including occupation and annexation of territory in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and destabilization of the situation in the south-eastern regions of Ukraine, in grave violation of the norms of international law, the Charter of the United Nations, the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and various bilateral and multilateral agreements, and also of its obligations as guarantor of the territorial integrity and political independence of Ukraine under the

Memorandum on Security Assurances in Connection with Ukraine's Accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (the Budapest Memorandum), signed in Budapest on 5 December 1994. That Memorandum had been signed in connection with Ukraine's accession to the Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon State and in pursuance of its commitment, which it had duly carried out, to eliminate all nuclear weapons from its territory within a specified period of time. His Government urged the Conference on Disarmament to develop and conclude a multilateral, legally binding instrument to provide security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

11. Ukraine was also concerned about unilateral actions by the Russian Federation to denounce the Agreement between Ukraine and the Russian Federation on the status and conditions of deployment of the Black Sea fleet of the Russian Federation in the territory of Ukraine, of 28 May 1997. Under article 5 of that Agreement, no nuclear weapons could be carried by the Black Sea fleet stationed in the territory of Ukraine. Given the recent unprecedented events and the strategic location of Crimea, the deployment of Russian nuclear forces in the territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea could not be ruled out, and would represent a serious challenge to the existing non-proliferation regime.

12. All nuclear facilities and materials located in the territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea were the property of Ukraine, and were subject to safeguards in accordance with Ukraine's safeguards agreement with IAEA. Attempts by the Russian Federation to take control of nuclear material and facilities in the territory of Ukraine in Crimea contravened the norms of international law and the Statute of IAEA. Under the agreement between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and IAEA of 1985 and the additional protocol thereto of 2000, the Russian Federation was required to exercise control only over its own nuclear facilities. Bearing in mind the provisions of General Assembly resolution [68/262](#) on the territorial integrity of Ukraine, IAEA was urged to strengthen the application of the safeguards agreement with Ukraine.

13. **Mr. Uliyanov** (Russian Federation) said that without the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the world would be far less secure and stable. While the non-proliferation regime had some shortcomings, it met the fundamental interests of all

States parties. The Treaty should be treated with care, and any challenges to it should be addressed collectively. Those considerations applied equally to the delegation of Ukraine. There was no reason to consider the issues currently facing the authorities in Kyiv in the context of the Treaty.

14. The Russian Federation took very seriously its obligations under the Treaty, including under article VI. While it was common to hear that article VI was not being implemented or was implemented unsatisfactorily, in reality that was far from the case. Of the three obligations under article VI, the obligation related to cessation of the nuclear arms race had been fulfilled three decades earlier. Negotiations on the second obligation, nuclear disarmament, had taken place repeatedly between the two main nuclear Powers. As the result of a whole series of agreements that had been achieved, the strategic nuclear arsenals of the Russian Federation had been reduced by over 80 per cent over the past quarter of a century, and its non-strategic arsenals had been reduced by 75 per cent. The current Russian nuclear potential was far lower than it had been at the time when the Treaty had entered into force. Further progress was being made through the implementation of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (the New START Treaty). It was only in relation to the third obligation, on drawing up a treaty on general and complete disarmament, that the States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons had made no progress at all. The universal and indivisible nature of all parties' obligations under the Treaty must be reaffirmed as part of the review process. Attempts to create links between Treaty obligations or trade-offs among them or to pit non-nuclear-weapon and nuclear-weapon States against each other undermined the stability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and threatened its viability.

15. The highly unsatisfactory situation related to the convening of a conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction was one of the main challenges to the non-proliferation regime. Despite the decisions of the 2010 Review Conference, the conference had not taken place in 2012, and no new date had been set. As one of the conveners, the Russian Federation would continue to do everything possible to implement the relevant section of the 2010 action plan,

and would work in close cooperation with all countries of the Middle East region, whose support was essential for success. At the three unofficial meetings with the countries of the Middle East region in Glion, Switzerland, at which the countries had engaged in direct dialogue for the first time, all participants without exception had demonstrated their willingness to seek acceptable compromises; it should therefore be possible to schedule a conference in November or December of 2014.

16. His Government welcomed the efforts of the countries of Central Asia and the five nuclear-weapon States to reach agreement on signing a protocol to the Treaty on a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia and, along with the other nuclear-weapon States, hoped that it would be signed without delay.

17. The implementation of the Joint Plan of Action with the Islamic Republic of Iran was proceeding smoothly and cooperation between that country and IAEA was ongoing in resolving all remaining issues about the Iranian nuclear programmes. The unprecedentedly positive engagement between the Islamic Republic of Iran, IAEA and the 3+3 countries made it possible to envisage a successful conclusion to the negotiations by 20 July 2014.

18. The Russian Federation had prepared a report on the efforts it had made in relation to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the 2010 plan of action, using the agreed standard reporting format.

19. **Mr. Jones** (United Kingdom) said that while the adoption of the 2010 action plan had been a significant achievement, that plan was not a time-limited five-year exercise, and agreement would have to be reached on the most appropriate way to make further progress on all its issues. His country would be circulating a report on its progress under that plan, including on action 5, under the standard format agreed to by the nuclear-weapon States; the agreement on that format demonstrated the value of the P5 process and the incremental increases in trust and transparency that helped create the conditions for disarmament; yet, there was much more work to be done, particularly at a time when the Russian Federation's actions in Ukraine risked undermining trust.

20. Along with the other nuclear-weapon States, his country would again demonstrate its commitment to legally binding negative security assurances by signing a protocol to the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free

Zone in Central Asia during the current session, and hoped soon to be able to do the same for the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone. His delegation welcomed the informal consultations that had taken place on arrangements for a conference to establish a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. It noted the tentative progress that had been made with the Islamic Republic of Iran and hoped that significantly more progress would be made so that the international community could be fully reassured about that country's nuclear programme. It was regrettable that less progress had been made on other issues, including the ongoing nuclear activities of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Syrian Arab Republic's failure to remedy its noncompliance with the Treaty. His Government also believed that States parties must consider the ramifications for individual and collective security of withdrawal from the Treaty, although it continued to support the right of every State party to withdraw.

21. The Treaty had made a crucial contribution to international security over the past 45 years and should remain at the heart of global dialogue on non-proliferation, disarmament, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy; it was important for the debate to strengthen rather than weaken collective commitment to common aims. While the Treaty continued to face pressures and challenges, none of them were insuperable. The United Kingdom was fully cognizant of the humanitarian consequences that could result from the use of nuclear weapons and would endeavour to prevent their use; it remained steadfastly committed to the goal of a world without nuclear weapons. It believed that frustration with the pace of disarmament needed to be tempered with realism and pragmatism. His country, therefore, did not support the negotiation of a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons, but continued to believe that steps towards a world without nuclear weapons must be taken in the context of the political conditions that existed and the three pillars of the Treaty. Disarmament could not be achieved in isolation. The Treaty needed to be upheld and strengthened, not despite complex security challenges, but because of them.

22. **Mr. Al-Hakim** (Iraq) said that, in the fourth decade of the Treaty's existence, implementation of its mutual and binding commitments continued to be unbalanced. In particular, the nuclear-weapon States

had not fulfilled their disarmament obligations under article VI. Although the nuclear-weapon States had recommitted themselves to those obligations at the review conferences, they continued to develop new generations of nuclear weapons and incorporate nuclear weapons into their security doctrines. Top priority should be given to efforts for the conclusion of an unconditional and binding international instrument on security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States. Universalization of CTBT and progress on a fissile material cut-off treaty were also of vital importance to the success of the Review Conference and implementation of the Treaty.

23. His country honoured all international agreements relating to disarmament and non-proliferation and had enacted legislative measures to carry out its obligations. Iraq had been among the first to accede to the Treaty in 1969, had signed a comprehensive safeguards agreement with IAEA in 1972, and had recently ratified the model additional protocol. It had acceded to CTBT in 2013, and was in the process of completing the constitutional steps required for accession to Convention for the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.

24. The indefinite extension of the Treaty in 1995 had been based on a deal that included making the Middle East a zone free of weapons of mass destruction. States parties needed to be prepared for the repercussions of failure to implement that part of the package. In particular, the postponement of the convening of the conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction undermined the credibility of the Treaty and would have a negative impact on the review process and on disarmament in general. The 2015 Review Conference should not be just one more meeting to discuss the successes and failures of the Treaty, but should take practical steps to address non-compliance.

25. **Mr. Al-Mouallimi** (Saudi Arabia) said that increased global awareness of the dangers of nuclear weapons gave cause for optimism. However, the nuclear-weapon States needed to display the political will necessary to put an end to dependence on nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction as national security tools.

26. In contrast to other regions, the Middle East had not seen any success in efforts to create a nuclear-

weapon free zone. That situation was attributable to resistance by a single State, Israel, to decades of successive international efforts, the most recent of which had been the endorsement by the 2010 Review Conference of the convening of a conference in 2012, to be attended by all States of the Middle East, on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. His country expressed deep regret at the postponement of that conference despite the international consensus on the need for it. It was the responsibility of the international community to ensure that such a conference was convened by the end of 2014.

27. Negotiations between the Islamic Republic of Iran, the 5+1 group and IAEA should continue with clear timetables, and the Iranian Government should reassure the international community of its peaceful intentions by allowing IAEA inspectors to carry out their tasks. At the same time, his country stressed the fundamental right of all States to acquire nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, and had announced its intention to develop an ambitious nuclear energy programme for sustainable development and conservation of precious hydrocarbon resources for future generations.

28. **Mr. Barros Melet** (Chile) said that while substantial success had been achieved in curbing the creation of new nuclear arsenals under the Treaty, the same was not true for reductions in existing stockpiles. Progress towards the Treaty's three pillars — nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy — had been uneven. Non-nuclear-weapon States, such as Chile, remained fully committed to their undertaking not to acquire nuclear weapons. As a party to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco), his Government had made an unequivocal commitment to nuclear disarmament, without reservations. It was therefore disappointed that no progress had been made towards implementing article VI of the Treaty, as it believed that the adoption of a binding, verifiable and universal instrument prohibiting nuclear weapons was the right way to go to achieve disarmament. That goal was within reach as the majority of States had already renounced nuclear weapons and were increasingly advocating their prohibition.

29. He welcomed the various approaches taken to achieve general and complete nuclear disarmament,

including the application of international humanitarian law in order to show the irreconcilable contradiction between the use of nuclear weapons and the concept of humanity. Both the international conferences on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons had shown that it was impossible to prepare for a nuclear explosion in a densely populated area: a nuclear attack or accident would have immediate and long-term consequences, including for economic and social development, the climate, social systems and all human activity in general. In the light of the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons, there was an urgent need for global, preventive action — by States, international organizations and civil society alike — in tackling the possible use or possession of such weapons. His delegation urged the broad participation of nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear weapon-States alike at the third conference on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons. It also welcomed China's call for the five permanent members of the Security Council to lead a global nuclear governance process, as the process of nuclear disarmament must be carried forward with and not against those States. The most appropriate way forward was through an inclusive, pragmatic, and realistic approach.

30. Continued efforts must be made to systematically and continuously promote the reduction of all nuclear weapons, including non-strategic weapons. While the international community clearly supported the bilateral measures taken by the United States and the Russian Federation in that respect, conflict situations which undermined the trust built between them gave cause for concern. Current international political instability made it all the more urgent to start the nuclear disarmament process.

31. Confidence-building was vital to the disarmament and non-proliferation regime. His Government would continue to encourage nuclear-weapon States to adopt practical measures in order to ensure transparency with regard to their nuclear arsenals, notwithstanding issues of national security. His delegation welcomed the efforts of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, including in relation to article X, and of the De-alerting group, which had called for a reduction in the operational readiness of nuclear weapons.

32. With respect to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, which represented a commitment on the part of States to remain free of nuclear weapons,

the nuclear-weapon States must show a commensurate level of political commitment vis-à-vis those zones, and provide irrevocable legal guarantees of non-aggression.

33. The peaceful use of nuclear energy was an inalienable right that must be protected, through verification by the competent body, in order to maintain a sustainable, non-discriminatory security regime and promote national development. IAEA safeguards and additional protocols must be a priority for those States which engaged in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In the light of recent events, transparency in nuclear energy development plans was the best way to protect that right.

34. **Mr. Ja'afari** (Syrian Arab Republic) said that his country had been among the first States in the Middle East region to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and also among the first to call for the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, although the draft resolution it had introduced to the Security Council in that regard in 2003 had met with opposition from a certain influential member of the Security Council that was trying to protect Israel. The international community should bring pressure to bear on Israel to accede to the Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon State and submit its nuclear facilities to IAEA comprehensive safeguards, in accordance with Security Council resolution 487 (1981) and IAEA resolution No. 17 of 2009. Israel, with the support of France and then of the United States, had been pursuing its policy of "nuclear ambiguity" for decades. According to estimates, Israel's nuclear facility at Dimona had produced enough weapons-grade uranium for 200 warheads. One of Israel's own former prime ministers had admitted publicly in 2006 that Israel possessed nuclear weapons. It was Israel's refusal to participate that had prevented the convening of the planned conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. That conference needed to be held before the end of the current year. At the same time, the right of States parties to peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be treated as inalienable in accordance with article IV.

35. At the Committee's 2nd meeting, the representative of IAEA had stated that the building destroyed at the Dayr al-Zawr site in 2007 was very likely to have been a nuclear reactor that should have

been declared to the Agency. He wished to point out that neither the Security Council nor IAEA had condemned the Israeli aggression against that site, perhaps because they had become so accustomed to Israel violating their resolutions. Israel had refused to cooperate with IAEA in the investigation into the source of contamination at the site, which might well have come from the very missiles that Israel used to destroy it. He would have expected the representative of IAEA to make mention of Israel's continued development of its nuclear capabilities outside of international supervision and its disregard of calls to make the Middle East a zone free of nuclear weapons, instead of using language that appeared to justify the Israeli attack. It would behoove the representative to read the memoirs of his former chief, Mr. Mohamed ElBaradei, if he really wanted to know what the Israelis had done at Dayr al-Zawr.

36. **Mr. Dabbashi** (Libya) said that the reduction by certain nuclear-weapon States of their arsenals was a positive step, but did not reflect a commitment to complete disarmament sufficient to encourage other nuclear-weapon States to take similar measures. His country welcomed the High-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament and General Assembly resolution 68/32. Implementation of the three pillars of the Treaty was essential for international security, and a legally binding international instrument should be concluded to guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. The spectre of nuclear terrorism needed to be eradicated and new concepts of national security needed to be instilled that relied on mutual trust and benefit. The role of IAEA should be enhanced, and universalization of the Treaty should be achieved by calling on all States that had not yet acceded to the Treaty, including Israel, to accede to it as non-nuclear-weapon States and submit their nuclear programmes and facilities to IAEA safeguards.

37. All States had the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and nuclear-weapon States should be encouraged to fulfil their disarmament obligations under article VI of the Treaty. Outstanding issues should be settled by negotiation and dialogue rather than by the threat of force or sanctions. International efforts to strengthen the infrastructure and effectiveness of supervisory agencies in all States should be redoubled in order to ensure the safety of

nuclear materials. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones was one of the most effective means of achieving the goals of the Treaty. In that regard, his country was working with the States members of the League of Arab States to convene the postponed conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction; it was regrettable that that spirit was not being reciprocated on the part of one particular regional party that enjoyed the support of one of the organizers of the conference.

38. **Mr. Bylica** (Observer for the European Union), speaking on behalf of the European Union and Ukraine, said that in the view of current proliferation risks, the Treaty was more important than ever. It was imperative to strengthen the authority and integrity of the Treaty, which remained the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament in accordance with Article VI, and an important element in the further development of nuclear energy applications for peaceful purposes. The European Union reaffirmed its full support for the Treaty's three pillars and the implementation of commitments undertaken during the past review conferences.

39. The European Union would continue to promote comprehensive, balanced and substantive implementation of the action plan adopted at the 2010 Review Conference, as the roadmap to the 2015 Review Conference. The Treaty must be universalized; all States that had not yet done so were urged to join the Treaty as non-nuclear weapon States and, pending their accession to the Treaty, to adhere to its terms and pledge commitments to non-proliferation and disarmament.

40. The European Union remained firmly committed to the rule of law in international relations, including in disarmament and non-proliferation matters. It therefore strongly condemned the clear violation of Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity by the Russian armed forces through their acts of aggression in the territory of Ukraine and the Russian Federation's illegal annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol. Those actions were in clear breach of the Charter of the United Nations and the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe as well as of the Russian Federation's specific commitments to respect Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity under the Budapest Memorandum. The European Union

welcomed the meeting held in Geneva on 17 April 2014 on the situation of Ukraine at which initial tangible steps had been agreed upon to de-escalate tensions and restore security for all citizens, and reemphasized the importance of the immediate and full implementation of those steps.

41. He drew attention to a range of topics of particular interest to the European Union, including, on nuclear disarmament, its commitment to the pursuit of nuclear disarmament in accordance with article VI of the Treaty, the importance of the universalization of CTBT and of revitalization of the Conference on Disarmament, and the need to start negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty; on non-proliferation, issues relating to the nuclear activities of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Syrian Arab Republic, and reaffirmation of the European Union's support for the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all weapons of mass destruction; and on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the European Union's support for the inalienable right of all States parties to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and affirmation of the key role of IAEA comprehensive safeguards.

42. There was a continued need to strengthen the non-proliferation regime through a common understanding on how to respond effectively to a State party's withdrawal from the Treaty, including by drawing attention to the potential implications that any such withdrawal would have for international peace and security. The Security Council must act promptly and address without delay any notice by a State party of withdrawal from the Treaty, and promote the adoption of measures in that regard.

43. Lastly, consistent with its engagement with civil society, the European Union supported the establishment and strengthening of its non-proliferation consortium network in order to encourage political and security-related dialogue. It also underscored the importance of disarmament and non-proliferation education in order to foster broader public understanding of those issues.

44. **Mr. Sinhaseni** (Thailand) said that while there were diverging views on non-proliferation, consensus on action to be taken must come from the recognition that both nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear weapon States shared a common goal and responsibility



towards achieving a world free of nuclear weapons. It was also important to continue efforts on all three interrelated and mutually reinforcing pillars of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Despite delays or obstacles faced in any of the three pillars, political will must be fostered and the necessary momentum created in order to achieve the common goals.

45. Events such as the High-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament in September 2013 and the second international Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons were reminders to the international community of the critical need to move the disarmament agenda forward. His Government looked forward to exploring further the proposals made at those meetings, and to the convening of a high-level international conference to review the progress made in nuclear disarmament.

46. As a depository and active proponent of the Bangkok Treaty, which had established the Southeast Asia nuclear-weapon-free zone, his Government strongly supported the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all other regions. In that respect, he hoped that progress could be made without delay on discussions towards establishing such a zone in the Middle East, ahead of the 2015 Review Conference.

47. Efforts should also be redoubled to commence negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty and the early conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear weapons convention. It would also be useful to explore further engagement in public outreach. In that respect, his delegation looked forward to global activities marking the first International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons in September 2014.

48. His delegation was heartened by continuing efforts to enhance capacity in the area of non-proliferation. In addition to participating actively in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, Thailand had also hosted, together with the United States, an initiative held in Bangkok in August 2013 which had focused on improving national capabilities and bilateral cooperation on maritime and air interdiction within the framework of the Proliferation Security Initiative. His Government also looked forward to participating in a regional conference of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization

(CTBTO) for States in Southeast Asia and the Pacific in Indonesia later in May 2014.

49. The inalienable right of States parties to develop and use nuclear energy in a safe, secure and peaceful manner, in accordance with their obligations under article IV and other provisions of the Treaty, was a right that came with responsibilities, and in that respect, his Government had established a network of nuclear regulatory bodies within the Southeast Asian region (ASEANTOM) to serve as a forum to enhance issues of safety, security and safeguards, in accordance with IAEA standards and practices. ASEANTOM had met formally for the first time in Phuket in September 2013, and in early 2014, it had engaged in informal consultations with the European Commission on a project to develop an integrated security system for nuclear and radioactive materials. His Government had participated in the Nuclear Security Summit in The Hague, in the context of which it had hosted a meeting in Pattaya which had helped pave the way for the adoption of the Hague Communiqué.

50. **Mr. Kolga** (Estonia) said that the aggressive actions by the Russian armed forces against Ukraine had jeopardized peace, security and trust in the Euro-Atlantic region, undermining the Treaty's three pillars. In its use of force against the territorial integrity and political independence of Ukraine, the Russian Federation had clearly violated the Budapest Memorandum, along with other international agreements and norms. In that respect, the strategic decision by the Ukrainian Government 20 years earlier to join the Treaty as a non-nuclear State in return for security assurances had clearly been correct. His delegation hoped that the violation of the Budapest Memorandum would not discourage States which had yet to accede to the Treaty. His Government called upon the Russian Federation to honour international legal norms and its international commitments, and take immediate and tangible steps to implement the agreements reached in Geneva on 17 April 2014.

51. In the context of the conferences on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons that had taken place in Norway and in Mexico, his delegation endorsed the views expressed in the working paper "Building blocks for a world without nuclear weapons" (NPT/CONF.2015/PC.III/WP.23), as a building-block approach was needed to achieve the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons, while implementing the action plan adopted at the 2010 Review Conference. His

Government believed that the strategic context of nuclear disarmament should also be taken into account, and remained sceptical about initiating parallel processes that did not involve nuclear-weapon States. Nevertheless, it sympathized with the international community's frustration at the lack of progress in taking forward the multilateral disarmament agenda, and the inability of the Conference on Disarmament to start negotiations or even agree on a programme of work. In that respect, he called upon members of that Conference to appoint a special coordinator on enlargement, in order to review its membership with a view to making it a more universally represented body.

52. The successful conclusion of the high-level event "The Arms Trade Treaty: Towards Entry into Force" in September 2013 demonstrated that success in multilateral arms control was possible. Universalization of the treaties remained a priority, and he urged all States, especially those whose adherence was required for CTBT to enter into force, to sign and ratify that treaty without further delay.

53. His delegation highlighted the importance of export controls, as international treaties and agreements achieved their aims only when they were fully and effectively implemented and transfers of sensitive materials or technology which could be used for weapons of mass destruction were controlled. He welcomed the work done by the Nuclear Suppliers Group and encouraged all States to follow multilaterally agreed guidelines and principles in developing their own controls.

54. On the peaceful uses of nuclear technology, Estonia highly valued the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme. Over the years, his Government had contributed to the Technical Cooperation Fund and had benefitted from cooperation projects. Estonia had gained valuable knowledge through such cooperation, especially in improving regulatory infrastructure, medical applications and radioactive waste management, and stood ready to share that knowledge with other IAEA member States.

55. **Mr. Kmentt** (Austria) said that his Government was deeply concerned about the possible implications of the crisis in Ukraine for the global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. Recent comments that had attempted to present the crisis as justification for possession of nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence were entirely misplaced and

irresponsible and only risked fuelling the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Ukraine's decision in 1994 to transfer the former Soviet nuclear weapon stockpile to the Russian Federation and to become a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a non-nuclear-weapon State had been a very important contribution to international security, as well as to its own security. Ukraine and all other States that had abandoned existing nuclear weapon stockpiles and programmes had reduced the risks of nuclear annihilation.

56. Austria was strongly committed to the Treaty, which remained a legal framework of key importance for international peace, security and nuclear cooperation. However, while the Treaty had served the international community well in the past, its credibility was being seriously challenged on several key aspects and there were growing doubts regarding the extent to which it could still be seen as an effective and credible framework for preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and achieving nuclear disarmament. The universality of the Treaty was becoming an ever more remote possibility, and was not helped when nuclear cooperation was extended to States which were not party to the Treaty. All those challenges must be addressed as a matter of urgency.

57. His Government was gravely concerned about the continued build-up of a nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programme in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The negotiations to achieve a comprehensive resolution to the concerns about the Islamic Republic of Iran's nuclear programme were encouraging. The case of the Syrian Arab Republic needed to be resolved.

58. As long as some States regarded nuclear weapons as a legitimate security hedge for themselves, efforts to counter nuclear proliferation would suffer from a fundamental contradiction and credibility deficit. Disarmament and non-proliferation must be pursued together, with the same degree of urgency. His delegation was concerned about the very limited progress in implementing the 2010 action plan, in particular with respect to article VI of the Treaty. There was a continuing lack of readiness by the nuclear-weapon States to take the required robust steps away from their reliance on nuclear weapons. In order to maintain global support for the Treaty and the entire nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime and halt the spread of nuclear weapons, nuclear-weapon

States needed to add a great deal more credibility and urgency to their nuclear disarmament efforts.

59. Implementation of all provisions of the Treaty, including article VI, was a collective responsibility of all States parties. Several initiatives had been launched as a direct consequence of non-nuclear-weapon States' commitment to article VI, in line with action 1 of the 2010 action plan, including the establishment of an open-ended working group and the convening of the High-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament. The most important development under action 1 was the increased focus of the international community on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, which represented a welcome shift from a narrow focus on national security to a greater understanding of the unacceptable immediate and long-term humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons. The vulnerability of nuclear command and control networks to cyberattacks and human error and the possibility of access to nuclear weapons by non-State actors had been highlighted. Austria would be hosting the third International Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons on 8 and 9 December 2014 in Vienna.

60. **Mr. Rosenthal** (Guatemala) said that in the current context of threats of accidental or intentional nuclear detonation by nuclear-weapon States or non-State actors, it was more urgent than ever to find a way out of the impasse with regard to disarmament. That was especially true in the light of the lack of progress in implementing the 2010 action plan, despite progress made by certain nuclear-weapon States, and the ongoing failure of the Conference on Disarmament to adopt recommendations and advance the goal of nuclear disarmament. It was unclear why millions of dollars were continuing to be invested in the modernization and maintenance of nuclear weapons, or why nuclear programmes were poised to continue in decades to come, in spite of the commitment made by the majority of States to non-proliferation and disarmament.

61. As a State party to the Treaty, his Government advocated its universality and full observance of all its obligations. He underscored the importance of the Treaty's three interlinked and mutually reinforcing pillars; nevertheless, an imbalance in implementation of those pillars had persisted and even sharpened: while significant progress had been made towards non-proliferation and the peaceful use of nuclear

energy, efforts towards fulfilling obligations under article VI had been lacking. He reminded States parties of their legal obligation to implement the Treaty, and urged them to adhere to the Treaty's letter and spirit.

62. His Government was a State party to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco), the world's first nuclear-weapon-free zone. He called on all interested parties to step up efforts to convene the conference to establish such a zone in the Middle East as soon as possible.

63. His Government did not possess any nuclear weapons and would never do so, as the very existence of such weapons posed an unacceptable risk to humanity. It valued all initiatives aimed at the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, or measures which, in the interim, sought to protect humanity from the risks related to the existence of such weapons. In that regard, the maintenance of the moratorium on nuclear testing until CTBT could be fully implemented was of crucial importance. In the light of growing impatience within the international community with regard to the lack of tangible progress towards complete and verifiable nuclear disarmament, States parties would need to do more during the Treaty review process than merely reiterate old commitments and delay its implementation indefinitely.

64. **Mr. Logar** (Slovenia) said that his country believed in a balanced consideration of all three pillars of the Treaty and shared the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons presented by the United States President in 2009. It was convinced that the Treaty should continue to play a central role in efforts to make that vision a reality.

65. His Government hoped that the conference on establishing a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction would be convened before the 2015 Review Conference. The ongoing war in the Syrian Arab Republic and the crisis in Ukraine were sources of great concern. His Government that the de-escalation of tensions in Ukraine was still attainable without serious implications for regional and international peace and security. The agreement reached on the Islamic Republic of Iran's nuclear programme was encouraging and should lead to further steps towards a comprehensive solution.

66. On the tenth anniversary of the adoption of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), which had addressed prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to non-state actors, particularly terrorists, his delegation was pleased that more than 170 States had reported on their activities, and that the Committee's mandate had been extended until 2021.

67. **Mr. Momen** (Bangladesh) said that his country maintained its unequivocal commitment to the full implementation of the Treaty in all its aspects, on the basis of its constitutional obligation to general and complete disarmament. It was also fully committed to implementation of the 2010 action plan, in particular to those actions relevant to the non-nuclear-weapon States.

68. The existence of nuclear weapons was the greatest threat to humanity; Bangladesh therefore reaffirmed the need for those weapons to be completely eliminated, in order to provide an absolute guarantee against their use or threat of use, either by design or by accident, or their acquisition by terrorists. While the nuclear-weapon States claimed to be in compliance with their obligations under article VI of the Treaty, they all maintained large, modernized nuclear forces as a central component of their security postures. Those States must completely eliminate their nuclear arsenals and exclude nuclear weapons from their security doctrines and must cease all plans to further modernize, upgrade, refurbish or extend the lives of their nuclear weapons and related arsenals.

69. The Conference on Disarmament must start the long-overdue negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty and on a nuclear weapons convention, as provided for in General Assembly resolution 68/32, as well as negotiations for legally binding security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States against nuclear threats, and the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

70. While significant progress had been achieved in limiting the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons, no real nuclear disarmament had taken place, as tens of thousands of nuclear weapons continued to threaten humanity, and billions of dollars were being spent to modernize them, despite pressing social needs and growing global expectations for progress in disarmament. Bangladesh therefore favoured a balanced approach to nuclear non-proliferation pursued in tandem with nuclear disarmament.

71. Negative security assurances were vital to strengthening the Treaty and discouraging non-nuclear States from acquiring nuclear weapons. It was a source of concern that nuclear-weapon States were adding more precision capability to existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons and also developing new types of weaponry, in contravention of assurances those States had provided when CTBT had been concluded. The Committee should undertake renewed and vigorous efforts to develop a legally binding framework for providing such assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States.

72. Bangladesh supported the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and accession to their protocols as useful interim steps towards securing negative security assurances and achieving global nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives. It also considered CTBT, which it had signed in 1996 and ratified in 2000, the first country in South Asia to do so, an essential step to ensure nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. His Government called on all States which had not yet done so to ratify that Treaty, especially the eight States whose signature and ratification were needed to enable the Treaty to enter into force.

73. The peaceful uses of nuclear technology under IAEA safeguards and verification would effectively contribute to the achievement of sustainable development and overcome challenges including hunger, disease, natural resource management, environmental pollution and climate change. It was therefore disconcerting that undue restrictions on exports of material, equipment and technology to developing non-nuclear-weapon States persisted. Those barriers must be removed. IAEA must continue to pursue the goals of technical cooperation in the peaceful applications of nuclear energy as one of the three pillars of its activities. Extraneous reasons must not be used to deny the rights of non-nuclear-weapon States to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and technology, and the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme must not be used as a tool for political purposes. Bangladesh called for constructive dialogue to implement the provisions of articles I, II and IV in an environment of trust and confidence.

74. **Ms. Mejía Vélez** (Colombia) said that it was unfortunate that the fundamental risk posed by the mere existence of nuclear weapons remained, 35 years after the establishment of the Conference on

Disarmament, over 40 years since the entry into force of the Treaty, and well after the end of the cold war. Her Government was committed to the complete elimination of weapons of mass destruction. It was a State party to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which had made Latin America and the Caribbean the world's first nuclear-weapon-free zone in a densely populated area and had tangibly contributed to peace and security in that hemisphere and the world at large. Colombia would continue to support the establishment of new nuclear-weapon-free zones in other regions of the world. In particular, it supported the convening of a conference as soon as possible to establish a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction.

75. In view of the numerous nuclear tests that had taken place in the world, her delegation believed that the entry into force of CTBT was the best way to avoid the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. As an annex 2 State, Colombia was committed to the early entry into force of that treaty. Her Government supported multilateral initiatives to rid the world of the nuclear threat arising from the spread of weapons of mass destruction, possible use of nuclear energy for terrorist purposes and the very existence of nuclear weapons.

76. **Mr. Zerbo** (Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization) said that while many statements had been made in support of CTBT and the urgency of its entry into force, the unfortunate reality was that that treaty would not enter into force without the ratification of the remaining annex 2 States. There were clear linkages between the CTBT and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Efforts to achieve a comprehensive nuclear test ban played a critical role in the review process and served as a gauge of the determination of the nuclear-weapon States to fulfil their disarmament obligations under article VI of the Treaty. CTBT was also instrumental in limiting the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons by would-be proliferators, as well as the vertical proliferation of more deadly and sophisticated nuclear weapons.

77. Opportunities for progress towards the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty must be identified and acted upon within the context of the review process of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In the search for compromises on many of the current challenges faced, it was of critical importance that no damage be

done to the objectives of CTBT. The two treaties were mutually reinforcing, and an erosion of support for either treaty would inevitably result in the detriment of both.

78. Regarding CTBT as simply as one of many initiatives that were part of the review process did not do justice to the high priority accorded to CTBT at the 1995, 2000 and 2010 review conferences, or to the over \$1 billion invested in the CTBT verification system. The early entry into force and universalization of CTBT was the responsibility of all States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. All States, especially the remaining annex 2 States, must consider the consequences of inaction and complacency on CTBT and the failure to bring into force a legally binding prohibition on nuclear testing.

79. Over the past 15 years, great strides had been made in building up the CTBT verification regime. There were nearly 300 stations around the globe sending data to the International Data Centre in Vienna. The detection threshold of the monitoring system was far lower than originally envisaged by the drafters of CTBT. The Preparatory Commission was successfully establishing confidence and trust in the verification regime, which was essential to achieving the entry into force of CTBT and deterring further nuclear testing.. The CTBTO verification system was the only multilateral instrument available to the international community to monitor nuclear tests. Although not yet fully completed, it could reliably and accurately detect even small-scale nuclear tests, as shown by its detection of the three nuclear tests announced by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. In that regard, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was urged to refrain from any future testing and to impose a test moratorium pending signature of CTBT.

80. A Group of Eminent Persons had been established that would seek to identify opportunities to advance the entry into force of CTBT, complementing the article XIV process. He urged States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to actively support those and other initiatives and thereby contribute to efforts aimed at strengthening the non-proliferation regime and enhancing international peace and security.

*The meeting rose at 1.05 pm.*