



General Assembly    Security Council

Distr.  
GENERAL

A/40/139  
S/16969  
20 February 1985

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY  
Fortieth session  
Item 22 of the preliminary list\*  
THE SITUATION IN KAMPUCHEA

SECURITY COUNCIL  
Fortieth year

Letter dated 20 February 1985 from the Permanent Representative  
of Democratic Kampuchea to the United Nations addressed to the  
Secretary-General

Further to my letter of 15 January 1985 (A/40/88-S/16898), I have the honour to send you herewith additional information on the current situation in Kampuchea, consisting of excerpts from the Directives of the High Command of the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea addressed to all military units in all fronts in Kampuchea on 31 January 1985.

I should be most grateful if you would have this text circulated as an official document of the General Assembly, under item 22 of the preliminary list and of the Security Council.

(Signed) THIUINN Prasith  
Ambassador,  
Permanent Representative  
of Democratic Kampuchea

\* A/40/50.

## ANNEX

### THE SITUATION IN KAMPUCHEA

- JANUARY 1985 -

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#### A. PRESENT MILITARY SITUATION OF THE VIETNAMESE ENEMY AND THEIR PLAN DURING THIS SECOND STAGE OF THE 7TH DRY SEASON

##### I. The present military situation of the Vietnamese enemy

In the military field, the Vietnamese enemy are facing more difficulties than during the 6th dry season.

- i. The Vietnamese troops are facing more difficulties because our National Army have carried out their guerrilla activities deeper and deeper inside Kampuchea, especially in the battle zone I (the Tonle Sap lake region), thus tying down several ten thousands of Vietnamese troops.
- ii. In this battle zone I, through their ever active and powerful military operations, our army have been able to penetrate deeper and deeper inside Kampuchea wiping out the Vietnamese enemy from Skoun to Prek Kdam, at Bat Doeung, Tuol Leap, Bek Chan and Kambaul. These activities have crippled the transportation of the enemy supplies to the western zone of Kampuchea to a great extent.

Our army have been carrying out every day activities to cut off the railroads. Especially the Phnom Penh-Battambang railroad has been ceaselessly cut off. The supply line through the Tonle Sap lake has been also ceaselessly cut off. The highways n° 5 and n° 6 have been cut off in many places. All these have rendered the Vietnamese transportation of supplies to the western Kampuchea more difficult than during the 6th dry season.

Since the beginning of the current 7th dry season, the Vietnamese enemy transportations could be done mainly by foot. The Vietnamese fresh supply of troops sent to western Kampuchea have to go by foot in driblets.

Thus, the battle zone I which constitutes the strategic "throat" of the enemy, has been strangled tightly by our National Army so that the enemy have increasingly difficult breathing.

The enemy have mobilized several ten thousands of their troops to prevent our army from carrying out their activities in this battle zone I, but it has been to no avail. In such a situation, they appear to be in a position to ward off our attacks or to defend their strategic "throat" supply lines to western Kampuchea.

If the Vietnamese enemy keep mobilizing their troops to defend their strategic "throat" and fail, they will certainly be strangled to death.

For this reason, their Politbureau in Hanoi has sound the alarm as follows:

- i. If the Vietnamese enemy continue hard to mobilize their forces to oppose the NADK in the battle zone I, they will be defeated.
- ii. If they mobilize their forces and send them from eastern and central Kampuchea and dare to send an important number of troops from the battle zone I (Tonle Sap lake region) in order to oppose and attack the NADK in western Kampuchea, they will face two eventualities :
  - 1 - They would succeed to some extent in opposing our army so that they could have some more time and some favourable occasion to serve their deceptive diplomatic schemes, or
  - 2 - they would remain in the same position of being strangled in Kampuchea especially in the battle zone I (Tonle Sap lake region) and in the battle zone II (western Kampuchea) because they would reach a situation of being at bay.

The Vietnamese enemy cannot extricate themselves from the guerrilla warfare and combat tactics of our army throughout the country and especially in the battle zone I ( Tonle Sap lake region) and in western Kampuchea. Actually as the Vietnamese enemy have withdrawn their forces from the battle zone I in order to rescue their troops or to oppose us in western Kampuchea, their forces have become more sparse in the battle zone I. Our army have taken this opportunity to wipe out their fighting forces, to destroy their administrative apparatus at the level of communes and districts as well as their economic bases and supply lines, and to penetrate deeper inside Kampuchea towards the capital Phnom Penh.

The enemy troops mobilized to oppose or attack us so as to relieve their difficulties in the western Kampuchea front, give us the opportunity to wipe out more of their fighting forces because we are in a better situation in terms of troops strength, military and food supplies. The enemy have to transport their troops, their military and food supplies from afar, so they cannot sustain a long fighting period.

II. Measures taken by the Vietnamese enemy  
during the current 7th dry season

The enemy are well aware that if they only keep trying to mobilize their forces to oppose us at their strategic "throat" and fail, they will be defeated. Consequently, they have to mobilize their forces to oppose and fight us in western Kampuchea. This has been the decision taken by the Politbureau in Hanoi which has ordered its army high command in Kampuchea to implement it at all costs, for as it termed, "it is a matter of life and death".

According to their above-mentioned objectives, the Vietnamese enemy have taken a number of important measures as follows:

- i. They have mobilized the maximum of their forces to oppose and fight our army in western Kampuchea,
- ii. They have done their utmost to transport additional military equipment provided by the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies, especially heavy artillery and tanks, to western Kampuchea,
- iii. They have intensified their fascist policy of forcible enlistment of Kampuchean people into their army as their strategic assistant forces,
- iv. They have intensified their barbarous policy to commandeer the population in the communes, districts and provinces and send them to clear forests and build road in western Kampuchea.

According to the above-mentioned assignment of their forces, the Vietnamese enemy have set their objectives of fighting in western Kampuchea as follows :

- i. To send their intelligence and commando units across the border to fight on Thai territory, one to ten kilometers deep,
- ii. To destroy our military depots and our military equipment such as heavy artillery, trucks, roads, bridges, transmitter-receiver sets,
- iii. To cut our supply lines to the battle zone I,
- iv. To attack our command posts from the regimental level upward.

In order to achieve these four objectives, the enemy have set up and used their special forces called "Special Units A5" which they consider as their vanguard intelligence and commando

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units. However, the Vietnamese themselves have admitted that these "Special Units A5" are running short of troop strength and lacking in combat spirit while their lower cadres are weak and have rather limited knowledge of the combat terrain.

The enemy forces also comprise their infantry divisions stationed in Kampuchea, a number of infantry divisions sent from Laos especially the division 305, an important number of reinforcement specializing in heavy artillery, tanks, commando and intelligence activities and other fields, from North Vietnam. They have also increased their aircrafts and made use of them more often than during the 6th dry season.

## **B. OUR ASSESSMENT AND MEASURES**

I. The Vietnamese enemy have been committing aggression against and occupation of Kampuchea with a view to swallowing her up as they had already done in Kampuchea Krom. However, the people of Kampuchea and the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea have been ever more united in fighting against the Vietnamese aggressors during the past 6 years so as to make them more and more bogged down and to put them in an increasing difficulties. As a result, the Vietnamese enemy are now almost out of breath in the political, military, diplomatic and economic fields in Kampuchea and in Vietnam as well.

In the military field, the Vietnamese aggressors are totally and completely bogged down. They are facing also increasing difficulties because they cannot stop the advances of our national army who have been penetrating and fighting them deeper and deeper inside Kampuchea. They know well that if our forces approach nearer and nearer to the capital Phnom Penh they will represent a vital danger to them.

That is why the Hanoi Politbureau has decided to mobilize its military forces and equipment to attack us at all costs in western Kampuchea. In such a situation, we can see that the Vietnamese enemy are not in an offensive position, they are rather in a defensive one. They try to oppose us in order to relieve their burden and gain time for propaganda and deceptive diplomatic manoeuvres. Indeed, their measures cannot rescue their increasing bogging down situation in the battlefield of Kampuchea.

Although the Vietnamese enemy have mobilized and sent their troops and military equipment from eastern and central Kampuchea to oppose and fight us in western Kampuchea, our national army keep on fighting them in eastern Kampuchea and even more strongly in the battle zone I. And in the western battlefield, our army will also be able to fight the enemy aiming especially at destroying as much as possible their fighting forces and military equipment.

II. Our measures are as follows:

- i. To implement with creativeness the principle "to defend ourselves through launching offensive attacks" or "to launch offensive attacks so as to defend ourselves".
- ii. To continue to launch attacks more actively and deeply in the battle zone I according to the "Five-target combat tactics" by taking the opportunity given by the withdrawal of the Vietnamese troops from this zone to western Kampuchea. To do our utmost to wear down and wipe out all Vietnamese forces stationed there. Especially to launch attacks against their small or important supply lines, the communes and small and medium-size population centers in order to destroy as much as possible their political administrative apparatus and economic bases in this battle zone I, to liberate the population and mobilize them to fight more actively against the enemy so as to expand further our guerrilla bases and liberated zones.

By so doing, we further strangle the strategic "throat" of the enemy till they suffocate. If it is so, the Vietnamese forces in western Kampuchea will also be breathless. In brief, the Vietnamese forces in western Kampuchea depend on their strategic "throat" in the battle zone I.

- iii. We have managed to defend successfully our command-committees at all levels, our depots and military equipment and our supply lines. We must keep on going and even better our defense. To implement well this task means to completely defeat the Vietnamese plan for the current 7th dry season.
- iv. In the western Kampuchea battlefield, it is a fight between two regular armies. In this front, we must fight and destroy as much as possible the Vietnamese fighting forces during this 7th dry season by using with creativeness all forms of our guerrilla combat tactics while displaying initiatives at all times.

We must implement the following principles and tactics of combat :

- to make use of our forces in the fighting so that our forces and those of the enemy are intertwined.

- to assign our forces to keep track of the enemy night and day, to attack them at once or call our artillery when they meet them, to attack and mine the enemy's supply lines, to attack their intelligence units, to storm their forces, to launch attacks from the rear, to use our artillery to destroy the enemy's tanks and artillery.

In brief, we must resort to intertwine combat tactics so as to wear down the enemy forces. Everywhere we meet the enemy we attack them, more particularly from the rear, cutting their forces into pieces. It is of the most importance that each unit fight doggedly against the enemy and keep track of them night and day. We must absolutely avoid the fight and retreat tactic.

The Vietnamese enemy have many weaknesses in western Kampuchea : they depend entirely on the strategic "throat" in the battle zone I. If this strategic " throat " is totally strangled, the Vietnamese forces in western Kampuchea will be also out of breath in all fields. Thus, after a period of fighting, the enemy's troops strength, military equipment and food supplies will be running short so that they cannot fulfill their plan. Besides, in December 1984, we destroyed an important regiment stronghold of the Special Unit A5 stationed at Aur Popoul where we also eliminated an important number of their troops, destroyed a great quantity of military equipment and killed a lieutenant-colonel, deputy chief commander of the Special Unit A5. Moreover, since November last up to now we have eliminated more in fighting forces than during the 6th dry season including those belonging to the Special Unit A5.

The points the Vietnamese enemy consider as strong are as follows:

1. Their commando units
2. Their intelligence units
3. Their heavy artillery and tanks
4. Their deceptive schemes to attack us on the flanks and on the rear.
5. In some places, their troops doggedly held on.

Facing the above mentioned points, we keep on launching attacks against the enemy so that they have ceaselessly more difficulties. We must keep on fighting the enemy according to the following directives :

- i. To keep track of the enemy persistently night and day;
- ii. Not to fail to attack their intelligence units;
- iii. To cut off their supply lines by all means;
- iv. To use our artillery to destroy their artillery and tanks;
- v. To wage a dogged fight against the enemy.

The situation as a whole is developing favourably for us and unfavourably for the enemy. Four months have already elapsed since the beginning of this 7th dry season which will be over in only three months. We have already fought the enemy for more than a half of the current dry season and we have won victories one after another.

We must keep on fighting against the enemy so that we win more victories till the end of this 7th dry seasons and this, by having always in mind the following three guide-lines:

1. To continue to launch attacks against the Vietnamese enemy more actively and deeply in the battle zone I according to the "Five-target combat tactic";
2. To defend our command committees, depots and supply lines;
3. To fight the Vietnamese enemy in western Kampuchea in order to eliminate as much as possible their fighting forces.

(Excerpts from the Directives of the High Command of the NADK addressed to all military units in all fronts in Kampuchea - 31 January 1985)

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