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FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND TWENTY-NINTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Thursday, 24 August 1989, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. El Ghali Benhima (Morocco)

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): The 529th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is called to order.

Today the Conference continues its consideration of the reports of its ad hoc subsidiary bodies, as well as consideration and adoption of its annual report to the United Nations General Assembly. However, in conformity with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any representative who so wishes may raise any matter relevant to the work of the Conference.

On the list of speakers for today I have the representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, India and Bulgaria. I now give the floor to the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Mr. Han.

Mr. HAN (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): Mr. President, I would like to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency for this month. I believe your active role will lead to the successful conclusion of this summer session.

The positive progress in disarmament and relaxation this year encourages those of us who are trying to overcome a lot of difficulties in negotiations. I think it is one of the merits of the Conference that, although no significant progress and breakthrough has been made, discussion on major issues has become substantive, especially on chemical weapons, and many more non-member countries have participated in the Conference.

World peace and the security of mankind are of concern for all countries and for all peoples. World peace and security and disarmament, being issues directly affecting the existence of ourselves and the coming generations irrespective of the size of countries, their military power and their level of scientific and technological development, have become a growing concern of all. Now the international political situation is gradually tending towards disarmament and relaxation. It is worthy of note that the abolition of medium-range and shorter-range missiles has been started and negotiations on 50 per cent cuts in strategic weapons and on chemical weapons are under way in the talks between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States.

The withdrawal of foreign troops and the settlement of the regional conflicts in many parts of the world through dialogue and negotiations are catalysing international détente. It is true, however, that while major attention is being concentrated on negotiations among big countries, the worsening situation in some of the small countries is often unheeded, which should not be overlooked. The history of many small and big wars since the Second World War shows that there has never been a war among big countries, although they have had an arms race. Every war has been launched either by an armed intervention by big countries or by a dispute among small countries.

Since lots of nuclear weapons are deployed even in small non-nuclear-weapon States and regions, any war can easily lead to a thermonuclear war across the world. For this reason many non-nuclear-weapon States want early international legal measures for disarmament to end the nuclear arms race and abolish nuclear weapons from every part of the world.

(Mr. Han, Democratic People's Republic of Korea)

In this regard, the situation prevailing on the Korean peninsula demands attention. Forty-five thousand foreign troops and more than 1,000 nuclear weapons, from ultra-small nuclear shells to operational and tactical nuclear missiles and neutron bombs and various modern carriers of nuclear weapons, are deployed in the southern half of the Korean peninsula, and special nuclear arsenals are now being built. This threatens the very existence of the Korean nation and the peace and security of Asia and the world. Hence the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has designated disarmament on the Korean peninsula and throughout the globe as an important task of foreign policy, trying its best to realize it.

On 23 June 1986 our Government clarified its position on the creation of a nuclear-free peace zone on the Korean peninsula and took measures to stop the testing, production, import, storage and transit of nuclear weapons in the area north of the military demarcation line. Last November our Government initiated multilateral negotiations on disarmament to realize our proposal for phased and reciprocal arms reductions up to 1991 with a view to creating a favourable environment for the withdrawal of nuclear weapons and foreign troops from south Korea. None of our proposals were realized and, once started, the North-South dialogue was stopped; tension is growing day by day.

Should disarmament negotiations have been pursued and positive measures been taken on the Korean peninsula, the situation there would have been further relaxed, giving a feeling of relief to many countries. In fact there is no reason why so many nuclear weapons and foreign troops should remain in the southern parts of the Korean peninsula in the light of the development of today's situation. We have unilaterally reduced armed forces by 100,000 troops and put 150,000 troops on peaceful construction tasks. Time and again we have stated clearly, openly that we have no intention of southward invasion: neither have we the nuclear weapons and modern weapons that south Korea has. Even if the nuclear weapons deployed in the southern part of the peninsula are targeted at socialist countries beyond the Korean peninsula, there is no justification today when nuclear disarmament is going on. It is high time for the foreign troops and nuclear weapons to be withdrawn from that area, and to that end talks should be held. This will help eliminate another cause of world tension, help to bring peace to the Korean peninsula, Asia and the rest of the world. We believe that such realistic issues should be considered in the negotiations for a treaty on nuclear disarmament as well as bilateral disarmament talks.

Chemical weapons aimed at mass destruction pose a great threat to world peace and security together with nuclear weapons. Today the need to abolish chemical weapons completely has become one of the burning issues in international politics amid rising public concern, which constitutes a favourable environment for the Conference on Disarmament. The international conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons held last January in Paris played an important role; on the occasion of the Paris Conference the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea signed the Geneva Protocol of 1925. On 26 January this year, in a statement issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, our Government reaffirmed its ban on the production, storage and import of chemical weapons and its refusal to allow the transit of foreign countries' chemical weapons through our land, airspace or territorial waters.

(Mr. Han, Democratic People's Republic of Korea)

Our Government hopes for the expeditious conclusion of a treaty on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons covering all countries, through the Conference on Disarmament. Although there exist technical difficulties concerning the issues of development of peaceful chemical industry and co-operation, as well as ways and means of ensuring inspection and verification, they can be settled within one or two years unless there is a political intention of opposing or delaying the abolition of chemical weapons. Our delegation will continue to play its role for the fulfilment of the goal of the Conference in the future.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for his statement and for his kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of India, Ambassador Sharma.

Mr. SHARMA (India): Mr. President, my delegation would like to compliment you on the effective guidance you have provided, and especially your contribution to the work relating to the preparation of the annual report for the General Assembly. We are confident that consultations under your guidance during the intervening months will enable a good beginning of the 1990 session.

As this year's session draws to a close, it is natural to take stock of developments and relate them to the anticipation that we voiced in February when our Minister of State for External Affairs addressed the Conference. 1989 has been a significant year in the field of disarmament. The Paris Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons recorded the unequivocal commitment of 149 States to rid the world entirely of chemical weapons and called upon the Conference on Disarmament to redouble its efforts to conclude the negotiations on a CW convention at the earliest date. In Vienna, an accord of historic significance on security and co-operation in Europe was signed, resulting in negotiations in earnest on the reduction of conventional forces in Europe between NATO and Warsaw Pact member States. The initial proposals tabled by the two sides reveal a high degree of convergence of views. Later in the year, we saw the resumption of negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on nuclear and space issues, as well as on issues relating to the chemical weapons negotiations. These developments are a reflection of the improvement in the current international climate for making meaningful progress, described variously as "the end of the cold war" or "a new détente". What is relevant is that there is resumption of engaged dialogue. Conflicts in different parts of the world have been arrested and negotiations are under way for their resolution. The United Nations has played an important role in this process, thereby demonstrating its unique position and singular responsibility in a multipolar world. Against this positive background, however, the assessment of our work in the Conference on Disarmament during the year is sombre.

Let us first look at the nuclear issues on our agenda. It is worth pondering that the very first United Nations General Assembly resolution of January 1946 called for the elimination of nuclear weapons from States' arsenals. Since then nuclear issues have continued to be given the highest priority by the delegations present in this Conference, yet we have not been

(Mr. Sharma, India)

able to move forward in these areas. This lack of progress is a source of grave concern to my delegation. Among these the nuclear test ban is one of the most important items on our agenda. For many years the General Assembly has adopted resolutions regarding the urgent need for a comprehensive test-ban treaty, reaffirming the responsibility of this Conference in the negotiation of such an agreement. The conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty is the single most important measure to bring about a cessation of the nuclear arms race. Therefore, partial or gradual approaches which imply reduced testing or testing at lower yields evade the issue and cannot provide the answer to this universal concern.

In the past, technical arguments were brought up against concluding a comprehensive test-ban treaty by those who perceived it only as a long-term goal. The most important one related to the absence of appropriate verification methods. However, technical developments have now made it possible to meet far-reaching verification requirements. In the Mexico Declaration, circulated here as CD/723 three years ago, the leaders of the Six-nation Initiative offered to monitor a test ban in co-operation with the United States and the USSR. It is no exaggeration to state that verification today is no longer a technical issue but has become a political one.

Ambassador Yamada has undertaken intensive consultations with all delegations during the last six months to try and resolve the procedural issue of the mandate of an ad hoc committee on this item. It is encouraging to note that there is a narrowing down of differences. We would urge delegations that have called for flexibility on the part of others in order to develop a compromise agreement, which has been responded to, also to demonstrate similar flexibility if we are to establish an ad hoc committee at the beginning of the 1990 session.

The twenty-eighth session of the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events concluded on 7 August under the chairmanship of Dr. Dahlman of Sweden. The work on GSETT-2 to develop a global system for seismic data exchange has progressed slowly but steadily. The first phase, consisting of start-up tests, is well under way, and the second phase is expected to begin in January 1990. The third phase, which will be a full-scale test of the entire system for an extended period of time, is the core of the test. While the exact schedule has not been established, this phase is likely to begin during the autumn of 1990. It is very possible that, had the CD been able to set up an ad hoc committee on a nuclear test ban, the pace of work of the GSE would have been faster. But 1990 no longer affords the CD the luxury of inaction. An ad hoc committee must be established to provide the necessary political framework within which to consider the results of GSETT-2.

On the subjects of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war, statements were made by China, by the socialist States, by the Western States and by the Group of 21 reaffirming their priority. Yet progress was not registered this year. Despite the fact that, as far back as 1985, both the United States and the Soviet Union declared that "a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought", and that, in Reykjavik, the concept of a nuclear-weapon-free world was discussed, the nuclear arms race continues

(Mr. Sharma, India)

unabated. The existence of nuclear weapons is anathema as, of all weapon systems, it alone threatens the very survival of mankind and civilization. This threat can be removed only by the total elimination of all nuclear weapons. But on item 2 - "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament" - the CD this year too was unable to establish an ad hoc committee to undertake preliminary work on this subject. The Group of 21's mandate on this item was a compromise mandate reflecting two crucial aspects of this issue - the urgency attached to it and the need to deal with it in the multilateral negotiating framework. It is a mandate that called for consideration of all aspects with a view to identifying agreements to be negotiated at appropriate stages with adequate measures of verification. The draft mandate does not lay down any time frames; it is open-ended and flexible. Yet it was not found acceptable for reasons which seem to be lost in the unconvincing theology of security doctrines based on nuclear deterrence. Though we have welcomed progress achieved in bilateral negotiations, this cannot replace the genuine multilateral search for universally applicable nuclear disarmament measures. All nations have the most vital interest possible in negotiations on nuclear disarmament, though States which possess nuclear weapons clearly bear a special responsibility. In keeping with respect for the security concerns of non-nuclear nations, nuclear-weapon States must accept the obligation to take positive and practical steps towards the adoption and implementation of concrete measures leading to nuclear disarmament.

A similar deadlock has made it impossible for this Conference to move forward on agenda item 3, "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters". Once again the Group of 21 tabled a mandate on this item calling for thorough consideration of all aspects of the subject in an ad hoc committee. This is a compromise proposal intended to take into account the reservations of other delegations; from our point of view, we would favour negotiations on a convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons, a proposal that has enjoyed widespread support in the General Assembly during the years. However, the flexibility demonstrated by the Group of 21 was not reciprocated.

Ever since the use of a nuclear weapon in Hiroshima, sentiment has grown overwhelmingly against any use of nuclear weapons and has today become the accepted moral guideline, almost a part of customary international law. It is accepted that nuclear weapons are not weapons of war but weapons of mass destruction and doomsday weapons. As far back as 1962, General Assembly resolution 1653 (XVI) described the use of nuclear weapons as a violation of the Charter of the United Nations and a crime against humanity. During the 1980s, beginning with the TTAPS report, a number of studies have been carried out on the climatic and global effects of nuclear war, most recently by the Secretary-General's group of experts. Whatever the differences in the theoretical models used, there is clear consensus among all experts that even a limited nuclear exchange would produce catastrophic and irreversible consequences for our biosphere, consequences that would be grave for combatants and non-combatants alike. It is obvious that conventional wars cannot under any circumstances be equated with nuclear war. Invoking the Charter to justify the use of nuclear weapons in the exercise of the right of self-defence is, therefore, neither legitimate or justiciable.

(Mr. Sharma, India)

Last year, the United States and the Soviet Union signed an agreement establishing Nuclear Risk Reduction Centres. It was described by President Reagan as "another practical step in efforts to reduce the risk of nuclear conflict that could result from accident, miscalculation or misunderstanding". Foreign Minister Shevardnadze described it as a "tangible step in the practical implementation of the understanding that nuclear war should never be fought". With such an agreement, the probability of an inadvertent nuclear exchange may have been reduced, but two essential facts still remain - the possibility of a nuclear war still exists, and the stakes are still the same, namely, the decimation of human civilization as we know it. It is now a truism that the surest way to remove the danger of nuclear war lies in the elimination of nuclear weapons. Pending the achievement of nuclear disarmament, the only way to eliminate the threat of a nuclear holocaust is to conclude a convention that would prohibit the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, delegitimizing nuclear weapons as currencies of power.

Let me now turn to another nuclear-related issue, that of "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons" - an item on which we also set up an Ad hoc Committee this year with a negotiating mandate, the report of which has already been adopted by this Conference. Once again, the Ad hoc Committee has, despite all efforts, failed to register any significant progress on this item. If we look back, we find that, at the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, held in 1978, all nuclear-weapon States gave unilateral security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States. Even then, my delegation observed that such unilateral declarations do not constitute credible and binding agreements, as these were not negotiated, were not verifiable and, above all, conflicted in character and were subject to divergent interpretations. They were also at variance with the goal of total nuclear disarmament. Ultimately, the declarations sought to assure the security of nuclear-weapon States.

We remain convinced that the one effective measure to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons can only be complete nuclear disarmament. Until this is achieved, it is imperative, as an interim step, for the international community to develop effective measures to provide non-nuclear-weapon States with clear-cut and unambiguous guarantees against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, or the impression could well be created that nuclear-weapon States are perpetuating their present military superiority and denying other States the right to undiminished security.

The use of the qualifying adjective "negative" to define the security assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States is also puzzling, and needs to be looked at afresh. Is this to distinguish them from the "positive" security assurances that are provided to member States belonging to the two military alliances, security assurances that are based on the possible use and threat of use of nuclear weapons? In present times, when old concepts and principles of security-related doctrines are being reviewed and reformulated, my delegation finds this distinction anachronistic, particularly if we accept the fact that one nation's security cannot be built at the cost of the insecurity of another nation, and that we have to undertake a search for security that will collectively enhance security for all States.

(Mr. Sharma, India)

Turning to the subject of prevention of an arms race in outer space, it is accepted that an extension of the arms race into outer space would have profoundly destabilizing consequences. Deeply conscious of such risks, an overwhelming majority of the Member States of the United Nations have in recent years urged the Conference on Disarmament to take resolute measures aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space. The international community has, for more than three decades, recognized outer space as a common preserve of mankind. To expand international co-operation in the peaceful uses of outer space, it is essential for it to be kept free of all types of weapons and anti-weapon systems.

Since 1985, the Conference on Disarmament, and in particular the Ad hoc Committee, have carried out useful work. The time has now come to take stock of these discussions and a dozen or more proposals that have been put forward by delegations. Our future work needs to be structured and organized so as to enable us to undertake full-fledged negotiations that can strengthen the international legal régime pertaining to outer space. We have been told that the existing international legal régime pertaining to outer space is adequate, as no violation of the Charter, particularly Article II, paragraph 4, has reportedly occurred in outer space. We find such an argument insufficient. To find reassurance in the belief that, because there has not been any violation of the Charter in outer space, there will not be any in the future, would be to shut our eyes to history, the logic of research and scientific and technological developments that are taking place all around us. This Conference, at the present moment, has been charged with the responsibility of negotiating measures for preventing an arms race in outer space so that no violations of the Charter are reported in future decades and we will not have to inscribe a far more complex and troubling subject on the CD's agenda, namely, cessation of an arms race in outer space.

It is universally accepted that it is in mankind's common interest for the exploration of space to be carried out exclusively for peaceful purposes. This gives every country, irrespective of its level of scientific and technological development, a stake in maintaining outer space free of all weapons. Bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union are by their very nature limited. Further, their objective too is restricted compared to the responsibility enjoined upon the Conference on Disarmament. Therefore, bilateral negotiations cannot be considered a substitute for effective multilateral action leading to universal agreements in this field.

The existing international legal régime does place some legal restraints on the placement of certain types of weapons in outer space. However, these restraints are neither comprehensive in scope nor do they apply to all kinds of weapon systems. Under the outer space Treaty, only the placement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Earth's orbit and on celestial bodies is prohibited. Other weapons are left outside the scope of the outer space Treaty. These are precisely the areas where research is currently being undertaken to develop directed-energy weapons as well as kinetic energy weapons. Another debate has concerned the definition of the term "peaceful purposes". The negotiating record of the outer space Treaty indicates that a great majority of delegates addressing this issue consider



(Mr. Sharma, India)

that the term "peaceful" should be interpreted as "non-military" and not merely in the narrow sense of "non-aggressive". The limitations of the existing international legal régime have become strikingly more evident in view of technological developments taking place. New legal instruments need to be developed which will reflect the political reality as well as technological developments.

The existing corpus of international law, in the form of both bilateral and multilateral agreements, indicates clearly the direction in which we have to move. Among the proposals put forward by delegations, some relate to specific aspects such as banning ASAT weapons or providing immunity to satellites, while others adopt a comprehensive approach such as amendment of the 1967 outer space Treaty or addition of a protocol to it. While supporting different proposals for negotiating concrete measures aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space, my delegation has placed particular emphasis on a comprehensive agreement which would prohibit the development of anti-satellite weapons and provide for the dismantling of all existing systems.

Satellite technology has reached a stage where it is an important aid in economic planning and development. Communications, remote sensing, navigation and meteorology are some of the fields where developing countries enjoy great benefits from satellite technology. We therefore view with great concern the development of anti-satellite weapon systems. The existing international legal régime with respect to anti-satellite weapons is also limited. Anti-satellite weapons cannot legally be tested, installed or used on any celestial body and cannot be placed in orbit around the Earth or stationed in outer space if they carry a nuclear weapon or any other weapon of mass destruction. However, testing and use of conventionally armed anti-satellite weapons is permitted. At the same time, the bilateral treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union - the ABM Treaty - places restrictions on testing of weapons in ABM mode but permits weapons to be tested in ASAT mode. This gap has been the justification used in the past for testing of anti-satellite weapons. Nevertheless, since 1985, both the United States and the USSR have observed a moratorium on anti-satellite testing. As an immediate measure, therefore, my delegation would propose that the de facto moratorium on testing of the existing dedicated anti-satellite weapons should be formalized. What is needed now are multilateral negotiations to convert this voluntary restraint into a universally binding commitment. Production as well as deployment of dedicated anti-satellite weapons should be prohibited, and existing anti-satellite systems should be dismantled. Furthermore, the testing of non-dedicated systems in ASAT mode should also be prohibited, thereby closing the gap that exists in the relevant legal régime. Problems of definitions and verification are not insurmountable. This is evident from the fact that, since 1985, no allegations have been traded about the violation of the self-imposed moratorium on ASAT testing by either of the two States concerned, indicating that not only are national technical means of verification adequate to detect and verify testing of space weapons in ASAT mode, but a mutually agreed definition of a dedicated ASAT weapon does exist.

(Mr. Sharma, India)

In addition, other delegations have also put forward complementary proposals to provide immunity to satellites, especially those that generate opportunities for development in economic growth and international security. The immunity provided by the Charter is limited. This was soon realized by both the United States and the USSR, and in both bilateral treaties, SALT and ABM, interference with each other's national technical means of verification, namely satellite systems, was prohibited. Global peace-keeping and universal disarmament agreements need an integrated multilateral verification system, as proposed by the leaders of the Six-nation Initiative. Other proposals for international satellite monitoring have been put forward, particularly by France and Canada. Work on confidence-building measures is useful in the context of negotiations on an ASAT ban, as these would help in providing for greater data exchange possibilities. However, it must be kept in mind that confidence-building measures such as "rules of the road", "keep-out zones", etc. provide only a limited immunity; full immunity can only be provided by a verifiable, comprehensive ASAT ban. My delegation believes that work on such confidence-building measures and negotiations on an ASAT ban are not mutually exclusive, and hopes that next year we will be able to establish an ad hoc committee with a mandate that will enable progress to be registered across a broad spectrum of issues.

Let me now turn to the subject of the chemical weapons negotiations. The Final Declaration of the Paris Conference provided an auspicious beginning to our work this year. The support could not have been more clearly stated than in the commitment voiced by 149 States that urged the Conference on Disarmament to conclude negotiations at the earliest possible date. The necessary framework to deal with the pending issues was also set up through the resourceful and methodical leadership provided by the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Morel, and the five working group chairmen. Yet, as the session draws to a close and we take stock of the situation, our feelings are mixed. Undeniably we have made some progress but, against the background of political will and the sense of urgency expressed in the Paris Declaration, in the negotiating framework and the resources provided to us, it has been modest.

The optimism reflected in Paris was diluted, as was seen by the inability of the Conference to reach consensus on a minor updating of the mandate in February. This cast a shadow, which is evidenced by the fact that although during the last six months a considerable amount of work has been done, we have been unable to come closer to solutions regarding a few crucial outstanding issues. My Minister, addressing the Conference on Disarmament on 14 February this year, sounded a note of caution when he stated:

"At present, we observe that far too much time in the Ad hoc Committee is devoted to technical details which divert attention from the political issues that still remain to be resolved. Such details could be identified and resolved by the preparatory commission. The time has come for us to look forward and move with vigour and decisiveness. A clear approach would in itself provide a positive thrust to negotiations in the CD."

(Mr. Sharma, India)

The volume of work done this year is clear from the fact that the report of the Ad hoc Committee runs to 242 pages. As many as 65 working papers were submitted to the Ad hoc Committee. Yet it is also clear that on the crucial issues of challenge inspection, the composition of and decision-making in the Executive Council, the order of destruction and some of the legal issues pertaining to amendments and the entry into force of the CW convention, we do not have new language included in the draft convention. After an initial discussion on the subject of verification which tackled the issue directly and squarely with regard to additional measures, the Working Group found itself in an impasse. At the same time, we have enlarged the discussions in a number of other areas such as instrumentation, confidentiality, inspection protocols, model facility attachments, etc. A number of national trial inspections have been carried out which confirm that the existing verification system developed in the draft convention is sound and reliable. All these are subjects that would help in the smooth implementation of the CW convention, but, before that, we have to ensure that we have a convention.

I do not think that it is possible to maintain the momentum in the negotiations indefinitely. We cannot let ourselves be bogged down in protracted discussions of certain details at this stage. As Ambassador von Stülpnagel reminded us, we must "make use of the 'window of opportunity' provided by the historic situation we find ourselves in". We must recognize that time is running out and accept the political fact that the only way to free mankind from all chemical weapons for all time is the conclusion of a comprehensive and effectively verifiable convention which ensures that all existing chemical weapon stocks and chemical weapon production facilities are eliminated and that the further development, production, acquisition, transfer and use of these weapons is prohibited. Interim measures designed to prevent the proliferation of chemical weapons, apart from not being effective, also run the risk of opening up a parallel track which could easily derail ongoing negotiations and confuse the objective we are working towards. Political reality dictates that the risk does not come from the possible use of chemical weapons but from the existence of chemical weapons, and the only way to address this political reality is to find a politically viable solution. A comprehensive solution is the only viable political solution. If we want a convention that will enjoy universal adherence, then we must work on a convention that will attract universal adherence. This requires the convention to be non-discriminatory and provide for equal rights and obligations of all States, whether or not they possess chemical weapons and whether or not they have a large chemical industry. It implies that the convention must contain an effective system of verification that reassures all States parties about compliance. It implies that the Convention must ensure the unimpeded right of States parties to develop, produce, use, exchange and transfer chemicals and technology for peaceful purposes, and that the Convention must not hinder or impede international co-operation in peaceful areas of chemical industry development. These are some of the principles which need to be observed and safeguarded if we want to develop a convention which is universal and comprehensive.

(Mr. Sharma, India)

How would these principles translate into approaches to resolve the outstanding issues? The open-ended consultations carried out by Ambassador Morel on the subject of challenge inspection indicate that we are working on the right track. However, it is necessary to bear in mind that once a request for challenge inspection is received by the international organization created, the area of interest is enlarged and becomes a concern of all States parties. All States parties then are legitimately involved in seeking reassurance that the convention is being upheld. The multilateral character of challenge inspection therefore needs to be ensured if these concerns and the universal interest in upholding the convention are to be met. On the subject of the composition of the Executive Council we have also had useful preliminary discussions. It is clear that the Executive Council will be small in size, much smaller in size than the Conference of States Parties. All States parties have a right to be represented in the Executive Council, and furthermore, during the period that they are not present on the Executive Council, they must feel that the Executive Council is representative of the various interests that are reflected in the Conference of States Parties. In our view, all member States represented on the Executive Committee should enjoy equal rights and obligations. However, it is likely that in practice certain States parties will serve more frequently on the Executive Council than other States parties in the implementation of the criteria accepted, which cannot be seen to detract from the basic principle of equitable geographical balance, the principle of non-discrimination and the need for universal adherence.

I am sure we all share the sense of urgency and realize that the CW negotiations are at a critical stage. If we look at other disarmament negotiations, we realize that any slow-down can be a serious set-back to our efforts. At the same time, CW negotiations are but part of the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament. The nuclear issues, which enjoy the highest priority, also need to be addressed, and Conference resources allocated to them. We hope, therefore, that taking this priority into account, the Conference on Disarmament will set itself a time frame within which to conclude its negotiations on a CW convention. Setting a time frame would provide the necessary political thrust for concluding our work during the 1990 session.

I would like to draw attention to document CD/859 tabled last year by my delegation, containing an "Action plan for ushering in a nuclear-weapon-free and non-violent world order". The action plan envisages the total elimination of nuclear weapons in three stages by the year 2010, accompanied by measures to reduce conventional arms and forces to minimum defensive levels and steps to forestall the application of emerging technologies to military purposes. It is a plan that is global and comprehensive in nature and based on the principle of multilateralism and non-discrimination. It expresses the hope that in accordance with a programme for nuclear disarmament, multilateral negotiations could be initiated for a new treaty to replace the discriminatory Non-Proliferation Treaty. We have stressed in the action plan that general and complete disarmament under effective international control is a precursor to a peaceful and non-violent world order. It also provides a seminal role for the United Nations in maintaining peace and security. I hope that during the 1990 session this document will provide a useful input to our negotiations.

(Mr. Sharma, India)

It is true that the work of the Conference cannot be detached from the political reality which conditions and surrounds it. However, on the part of the Conference this need not be an entirely passive relationship, and the Conference can also contribute to the evolution of a new mode of thinking on disarmament negotiations. We are in a very different situation today from that of even some years ago, and it will evolve more rapidly in the years to come. This fact demonstrates one truth, which may have been less apparent in the post-war decade or two, namely, that there are no barriers to human knowledge and capability. What one section of the human community can accomplish today can be achieved by other societies, and attempting to put barriers to this evolution of human capability in general will be as effective as Canute's efforts to stem the waves. In the past, agreements on disarmament have been almost entirely restricted to those between major military Powers and others devised by these Powers which the international community was invited to join. Perhaps this expressed the political reality of a bygone era, but this pattern of exclusivism is already broken, even if recognition of this central political reality is slow in coming. To be durable and to safeguard our future in the common interest, the disarmament dialogue on issues of joint concern will have to be conducted progressively on a universal basis and reflect a globalism in approach. This is the only road to true security, one where partnership in global disarmament issues is indivisible. The significance of the CW convention lies as much in the world community successfully abolishing an abhorrent class of weapons as in the successful example it would create of the universality of approach which should inform the deliberations of the Conference. In this respect it would be a historical watershed convention, and hopefully the precursor in method of other agreements on the elimination of weapons of mass destruction and threatening new areas of warfare. The observations which I have made on individual areas of concern to the Conference have been made in a spirit of seeking shared global objectives in our work here.

I do realize that I have held the floor somewhat longer than I think is customary. I think, however, that I have accumulated considerable speaking time on the credit side over the spring and summer sessions. I have only cashed it in all at once.

Mr. KOSTOV (Bulgaria): The summer session of the Conference on Disarmament is coming to its end. This inevitably brings everyone of us face to face with the question: What did we achieve in the course of nearly six months' efforts in 1989? The assessment of the results is a task for every delegation, and it is undoubtedly made in conformity with the established procedures in every country and against the background of its foreign policy.

But the question also has a purely human dimension. Are we all as human beings satisfied with the work done? Do the results arrived at correspond to the amount of intellectual energy and efforts spent by all of us? Everybody probably has his own answer to that question, which may be different in the details, but in the main boils down, I am sure, to deep disappointment due to the fruitlessness of the Conference's activities as a whole.

(Mr. Kostov, Bulgaria)

The only ray of hope that inspires us with some confidence for the future is the continuing movement forward in the negotiations on a chemical weapons ban. The impulse provided by the Paris Conference, although it lost some force due to the lack of readiness of some delegations to switch immediately to the new reality, in the long run had a favourable influence on the pace of our work.

The new report of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons is an impressive document. Justice requires us to pay tribute to Ambassador Morel (France) for his energetic efforts aimed at accelerating the pace of the negotiations, which have brought some concrete results. It can now be claimed that there are no blanks in the "rolling text" as far as the inclusion of all problems and topics is concerned. We have at our disposal a more solid textual basis.

I think it is generally recognized that there are three main problems which will determine whether we will reach the end of the road leading to the finalizing of a draft convention on a chemical weapons ban. I am speaking about the system of control and verification, the order of destruction of chemical weapon stockpiles, and the Executive Council of the future organization. That is why, I think, the consultations carried out on Ambassador Morel's initiative and dealing with the challenge inspection procedures (article IX, part II) and the composition and decision-making process of the Executive Council are a step in the right direction. The inclusion of the results of those consultations in appendix II of the "rolling text" is to be welcomed. Undoubtedly, the submission to the Conference of an agreed Soviet-American document on challenge inspection procedures would make a considerable contribution in this respect.

A number of useful and important conclusions in the field of verification were drawn from the national trial inspections. The presentation of reports on these inspections by a number of key countries belonging to all groups, and the holding of an open dialogue, contributed to the identification of a number of problems that might arise in that field. We hope that the holding of the second phase of experiments - international trial inspections - will bring us still closer to a model for international verification in the framework of the convention.

Consideration of the question of the Executive Council reveals that the three aspects of the problem - composition, terms of reference and the procedure for decision-taking - are interrelated. It is evident, for example, that the wider the terms of reference of the Council, the bigger will be the interest of the countries participating as members in it, and the greater the importance of the provisions for decision-taking. Although the document entitled "Outcome of the open-ended consultations on article IX, part 2" included in appendix II of the Committee's report outlines the political contours rather than the legal content of a possible agreement, it definitely marks an important step forward.

(Mr. Kostov, Bulgaria)

Notwithstanding, we have to admit that the progress achieved so far is mainly on technical matters. Therefore, we have to be fully aware that if next year we continue at this year's pace and do not succeed in solving the main problems that have a political connotation, the convention will continue to elude us. It is important that all countries, and above all the chemically most developed ones, should show their readiness to translate their political declarations in favour of banning chemical weapons into practical deeds in drafting the convention.

The movement forward in the chemical weapons negotiations cannot dispel disappointment over the lack of progress as to the remaining agenda items. I shall dwell only on some of them - the ones whose topicality is recognized by everyone.

There is an international consensus that the Conference on Disarmament is supposed to play an important role in negotiations on the cessation of the arms race and disarmament. It is to be regretted that over the past decade the Conference has been unable to produce a single multilateral agreement. It is alarming that there is a deadlock on each and every nuclear item on the Conference's agenda.

In my statement delivered last March I dwelt in detail on the nuclear test ban question, and presented the Bulgarian position on that matter. I do not want to repeat what has already been said. I shall only add that my delegation followed with great interest the efforts of Ambassador Yamada of Japan in the search for a consensus on the question of a mandate for an ad hoc committee on a nuclear test ban. My delegation expects to hear more about the results obtained. We are in favour of the continuation of those efforts during the forty-third General Assembly session.

My delegation believes that bilateral and multilateral disarmament negotiations can and should complement each other if there is a political will to find ways and means of harmonizing them. For this reason, while open to any procedural arrangement, we are in favour of setting up an ad hoc subsidiary body on item 2. In our view it is high time for the Conference to commence serious and in-depth discussion on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. The Conference could attempt to devise a comprehensive stage-by-stage programme, with agreed time frames for each individual stage, for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons throughout the world. Another subject for consideration could be the principles on the basis of which the process of nuclear disarmament should be carried out. An important topic of discussion could be the problems of verifying multilateral measures in the field of nuclear disarmament and the order of destruction of nuclear weapons. It is to be expected that meaningful consideration of item 2 would bring to the fore several useful ideas and proposals and thus create some prerequisites for the commencement of concrete multilateral negotiations. The Conference must face its responsibilities on nuclear issues because bilateral negotiations, although of extreme importance, cannot solve all nuclear disarmament questions.

(Mr. Kostov, Bulgaria)

On 8 August, in my capacity as co-ordinator of the Group of Socialist Countries, I spoke on some aspects of item 3, "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters". Now on behalf of my delegation I would like to stress some points. It is generally recognized that the greatest peril facing mankind is the threat to its survival posed by nuclear weapons, and that, consequently, the prevention of nuclear war is a matter of highest priority. It is therefore lamentable that no progress has been made in the Conference on item 3 since its inclusion in the agenda. It is clear that the deadlock on item 3 is not due to procedural or organizational difficulties. The core of the problem is whether one is willing to find a common denominator on it. In a sense it could be argued that there is such a common denominator. The declaration by the leaders of the USSR and the United States that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought has been welcomed by each and every delegation in the Conference on Disarmament. This promoted my delegation to suggest in its document CD/710 that "efforts aimed at the prevention of nuclear war would be spurred on if the Soviet-United States declaration on the senselessness of nuclear war were supported by the remaining nuclear Powers and by all countries in the world, and if it were consolidated in a suitable form on a multilateral basis".

The first report approved by the Conference was the report of the Ad hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons. One more document was added to the long history of negotiations on agenda item 6 of the Conference. No assessment of the report can avoid the conclusion that this year again no progress was made in the negotiations. My delegation deeply regrets this state of affairs. In our view a lot of prerequisites are at hand for the Conference to start moving ahead on item 6. There is a clear understanding of the various positions. The points of divergence are well established. A number of proposals and formulae aimed at bringing the positions closer have been advanced. All delegations have repeatedly reiterated their readiness to search for a "common formula" which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding nature.

We live in times when East-West relations are being improved, a new type of confidence is being built, military openness and transparency is being increased, innovative solutions in the field of disarmament are being found. It seems to us that these are elements of a qualitatively new political environment for the consideration of negative security assurances. We regard the solution to the problem of providing effective and credible guarantees for the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States as part and parcel of the more all-embracing task of strengthening international peace and security, enhancing the political and legal foundations for observance of the principle of non-use of force in international relations.

The fourth review conference of the NPT is approaching. It is high time for the Conference to proceed to meaningful negotiations on item 6 of its agenda. We believe that the task of the Conference might be facilitated if the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly succeeded in adopting one single resolution on negative security assurances.



(Mr. Kostov, Bulgaria)

My delegation, as a sponsor of one of the two resolutions which the First Committee has been adopting for years now, is ready to participate in the search for, and elaboration of, a single compromise solution to be adopted at the forty-fourth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

The deliberations on the subject of the prevention of an arms race in outer space this year in the Ad hoc Committee, under the able chairmanship of Ambassador Bayart, again underlined the many-sided relationship between the utilization of outer space and international security. There is now a commonly shared belief that the implementation of a wide set of confidence-building and co-operative measures in outer space could enhance transparency and predictability in this sphere of human activity, thus contributing to the main objective of ensuring the absence of arms of any kind in outer space. My delegation is convinced that the elaboration of "rules of the road" and a code of conduct in outer space could be instrumental for the cause of the prevention of an arms race there, and we are ready to participate in practical efforts to that end. The set of measures of a political character proposed recently by the delegation of Poland in document CD/941 are also conducive, in my opinion, to future progress on this item and deserve in-depth consideration in the Ad hoc Committee.

We note with satisfaction the participation of experts from various member States in the deliberations of the Ad hoc Committee. This testifies to the increased interest in various aspects of the problem of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The contributions made by the experts provided us with better knowledge of the issues involved and demonstrated the utility of having further recourse to expert advice and opinion.

If the prevailing opinion is that it is still too early to institutionalize a permanent group of experts, a proposal that my delegation has already spoken in favour of, we could probably start by asking an open-ended expert group, on an ad hoc basis, to explore and present to the Ad hoc Committee its opinion on certain problems of a purely technical or legal nature - for example, the assessment of existing verification technologies with respect to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The elaboration of common standards, requirements and procedures for international satellite data exchange for the purpose of verification could also be taken up effectively at the expert level under the auspices of the Ad hoc Committee. In this respect it is worth mentioning the Soviet proposal for the creation of an international space monitoring agency in document CD/OS/WP.39. In our view this is an initiative of great importance not only in the sphere of disarmament, but also in the wider context of strengthening international security and co-operation.

In conclusion I would only like to note that the question of the improved and effective functioning of the Conference, to which little attention was paid this year, is acquiring growing importance. We cannot cope with the tasks we have in front of us unless we have adequate and flexible machinery at our disposal. That is the reason why my delegation considers that problem deserves greater attention and seriousness at next year's session of the Conference.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I have no more speakers on my list. Are there any delegations wishing to take the floor? I see there are none.

I would now like to inform you of the status of work on the Conference's annual report to the United Nations General Assembly. As you know, the informal open-ended consultations on the substantive paragraphs relating to agenda items 1, 2, 3 and 7 have resulted in agreement. Today the secretariat has distributed a revised version of these documents here in the conference room, as well as in the delegations' pigeon-holes, and during the day will distribute the other documents on the agenda items I have just mentioned. The distribution has been carried out in English for the moment to facilitate the work of delegations before the draft annual report is considered at an informal meeting of the Conference immediately prior to the adoption of the report. The text of the draft annual report will be circulated, as usual, in all the official languages. I hope that the Ad hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament will adopt its report to the plenary of the Conference at its 3 p.m. meeting today. I have also been told that the informal consultations on the report of the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space have reached a satisfactory conclusion, and that the Ad hoc Committee will hold a meeting to adopt its report immediately after this plenary meeting in this conference room.

However, there remains one question to be settled, which is the subject of intense consultations with the co-ordinators and other interested delegations. I will pursue my efforts to reach a solution before the end of the day, so that the secretariat can prepare the final text of the annual report.

Since the work of the ad hoc committees has virtually been concluded, we will have no need of a timetable of meetings for the coming week. I would simply remind you that we will hold two plenary meetings, on Tuesday and Thursday, and that, prior to the plenary meeting on Thursday 31 August, there will be an informal meeting for the second reading of the technical parts of the report and the substantive paragraphs. Should we reach agreement on the last points concerning which meetings are to continue today, the secretariat hopes to be able to distribute the text of the draft annual report on Wednesday 30 August in all the official languages from 3 p.m. onwards. The English text may even be distributed a little earlier, on Wednesday morning.

I have no other business for today and therefore intend to close this meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday 29 August at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.25 a.m.