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**Chairman:** Mr. Leopoldo BENITES (Ecuador).

*In the absence of the Chairman, Mr. Fahmy (United  
Arab Republic), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.*

**AGENDA ITEM 26**

Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons: report of the  
Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on  
Disarmament (continued) (A/6390-DC/228, A/C.1/  
L.371 and Corr.1 and Add.1-6, A/C.1/L.372 and  
Add.1-3, A/C.1/L.373)

**GENERAL DEBATE (continued)**

1. Mr. ESCHAUZIER (Netherlands) said that the Indian representative had given (1436th meeting) a penetrating analysis of the "balanced provisions" by which the proposed treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons would impose mutual obligations on both the nuclear and the non-nuclear Powers. His delegation would be the first to rejoice if it should prove possible to achieve a balance of obligations in the treaty. However, as it had said previously, the problem was twofold: first of all, how to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons among non-nuclear Powers and, secondly, how to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race among the existing nuclear Powers. His delegation remained convinced that the signing of a treaty on non-proliferation deserved priority and was a prerequisite for achieving the second objective. The differences between India's position and that of the Netherlands were not so much a matter of what was desirable as a matter of what was attainable. His delegation felt that it would be very difficult to include provisions in the treaty dealing with measures to halt the nuclear arms race among the nuclear States themselves. Such provisions could be regarded as part of principle (b) of resolution 2028 (XX), but it was far more likely that they would be implemented within the framework of principle (c), for what was involved was possible cut-off in the production of fissionable materials, a shut-down of nuclear plants for military purposes and a complete nuclear weapon test ban.

2. The Indian representative had also referred to the International Atomic Energy Agency's safeguards system. The general acceptance of Agency safeguards by the non-nuclear States, with the nuclear

Powers gradually following suit, would progressively have the effect not only of safeguarding peaceful activities but of inhibiting and eventually preventing the manufacture of nuclear weapons. Thus, the requirements of principle (d) of resolution 2028 (XX) would be met by establishing effective controls.

3. Various views had been expressed regarding the use of nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes. His delegation had taken the position that nuclear explosions carried out for peaceful purposes were indistinguishable from nuclear weapon tests. The question was whether, after the signing of a treaty on non-proliferation, a non-nuclear country carrying out a nuclear test, even under international supervision, might not arouse suspicion among the other signatories that it had become a new member of the "nuclear club". That was why his delegation regarded the United States proposal as timely and dictated by common sense. It in no way deprived the developing countries or the other non-nuclear countries of the benefits of nuclear technology, and all non-nuclear countries would be well advised to accept the services of the nuclear Powers pending the establishment of acceptable international machinery. In that connexion, article XI of the statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, which set forth the conditions for "Agency projects", might provide a basis for working out the required international procedures.

4. His delegation concluded from the discussions in the First Committee that the question of guarantees against nuclear threats and blackmail should receive further study by the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. The present wording of operative paragraph 3 of draft resolution A/C.1/L.371 and Corr.1 and Add.1-6 was not satisfactory, and his delegation hoped that it would be amended before the resolution was put to the vote. The mandate embodied in resolution 2028 (XX) was a set of principles which could be given substance only in the course of negotiations in which both the nuclear and the non-nuclear States took part. The fact that it was not possible to take related measures immediately must not be permitted to jeopardize the conclusion of a treaty on non-proliferation in its strict sense.

5. His delegation shared the misgivings expressed by the representatives of Canada, New Zealand and the United Kingdom with regard to draft resolution A/C.1/L.372 and Add.1-3 and agreed with them that a process of consultation could follow the discussions in the First Committee without assuming a formal character which might create unnecessary difficulties. His delegation would therefore be grateful to the representative of Pakistan if he could respond

to the Canadian representative's appeal and not press for a vote on the draft resolution.

6. Miss FAROUK (Tunisia) said that it should be possible to conclude an agreement on non-proliferation at an early date, which should on no account be delayed. The resolution just adopted by the General Assembly on agenda item 97 (resolution 2149 (XXI)) which Tunisia had joined in sponsoring, should help to facilitate the negotiations now under way. The fact that a large number of non-nuclear countries had wished to sponsor both that resolution and draft resolution A/C.1/L.371 and Corr.1 and Add.1-6 was just as encouraging as the fact that the two major nuclear Powers had drawn closer together, for it represented an act of goodwill and of faith in peace on the part of countries whose armaments were relatively limited. However, at a time when the non-nuclear countries were renouncing a right, she wished to recall the very important principle that, in return for the sacrifice being made by the non-nuclear States, the nuclear Powers must provide a corresponding guarantee—that of collective security—to protect the non-nuclear States against nuclear threats from any source. In that way an agreement on non-proliferation, which was a preliminary step, could be followed by the establishment of a permanent, indivisible system for safeguarding peace through a set of realistic, equitable measures which would have to be strictly observed by all States. A comprehensive test ban treaty was thus the logical corollary of an agreement on non-proliferation. Now that there was a climate of greater goodwill, the time seemed ripe for extending the scope of the Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, signed at Moscow in 1963, to cover underground tests, while at the same time limiting the conventional arms race. In the view of her delegation, a "treaty on non-proliferation" would be one whose purpose was to prevent any quantitative increase or qualitative improvement in the nuclear stockpiles of the nuclear Powers and to prevent the acquisition of such weapons by non-nuclear Powers in any manner whatever.

7. Tunisia had joined in sponsoring draft resolution A/C.1/L.371 and Corr.1 and Add.1-6 because it represented a step towards general and complete disarmament on the basis of the principles set forth in resolution 2028 (XX). Operative paragraph 3 of the draft resolution called upon the nuclear-weapon Powers in a straightforward manner to give the assurance that they would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. Her delegation would therefore be unable to support the amendments proposed by Cameroon (A/C.1/L.373); the one relating to operative paragraph 3 was, in particular, unacceptable.

8. The arguments put forward by the representative of Pakistan (1442nd meeting) in support of draft resolution A/C.1/L.372 and Add.1-3 were in keeping with Tunisia's belief that the non-nuclear countries must be afforded safeguards and given an opportunity to assist actively in checking proliferation and the arms race. She wondered, however, whether a conference of non-nuclear countries would be timely, practical or realistic and whether there

would be any value in discussing disarmament in the absence of the nuclear Powers, which bore ultimate responsibility for implementing the decisions taken. It would unquestionably be wiser to avoid a division of that kind between nuclear and non-nuclear countries. That would not prevent consultations from being held in conjunction with the discussions in the First Committee, although not in the form of an actual conference, nor would it prevent the convening of a truly world-wide disarmament conference, for which Tunisia had already indicated its support.

9. Mr. OKOBOI (Uganda) said that since most countries were agreed on the desirability of a treaty on non-proliferation, the main problem was to find ways and means of translating that desire into reality. In his statement in the Committee (1431st meeting), the United States representative had said that he was troubled by the demands of the non-nuclear States for guarantees from the nuclear States prior to the conclusion of a treaty on non-proliferation. But those demands were justified, for experience had shown that the nuclear-weapon Powers could not be taken at their word, since even while they spoke about disarmament, some of them continued their nuclear tests. At the same time, individuals in some nuclear-weapon States did not hesitate to threaten to use nuclear weapons against small States whose ideology they did not share. How could those States which had sought to have their regions declared denuclearized zones have the assurance that the inviolability of such zones would be respected? The representative of the Soviet Union had stated (1445th meeting) that his country was prepared to recognize nuclear-free zones if the other nuclear Powers did likewise. Supposing the others did not, what then became of the desire of the African and Latin American peoples to banish nuclear arms from their areas?

10. The alarm of the non-nuclear States was justified. It had to be recognized that the Viet-Nameese conflict had poisoned the atmosphere of the disarmament negotiations, and that a de-escalation in Viet-Nam would augur well for those negotiations. The African States viewed with apprehension South Africa's preparations for the production of atomic weapons, and found it hard to believe that those preparations, as was assured, were for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. It would readily be understood, therefore, why the non-nuclear States demanded guarantees. Another consideration to be borne in mind was the legitimate desire of those States to utilize nuclear energy for peaceful purposes; such use would not constitute proliferation.

11. At the same time, it was encouraging to hear the assurances of the representatives of the two main nuclear Powers that they were engaged in a continuing and joint search for mutually acceptable ways of overcoming their remaining differences, and his delegation prayed that their discussions would be fruitful. But mere declarations of intent were not enough; they must be translated into a generally acceptable agreement. Any treaty on non-proliferation would have to embody definite pledges in regard to collateral measures of disarmament

such as had many times been referred to. He hoped that the nuclear States would understand the genuine hopes and the legitimate fears of the non-nuclear countries. It was with such consideration in mind that the delegation of Uganda supported draft resolution A/C.1/L.371 and Corr.1 and Add.1-6. It further hoped that the demands of the non-nuclear States would not be a barrier to the conclusion of a treaty on non-proliferation. He hoped that draft resolution A/C.1/L.372 Add.1-3, submitted by Pakistan and other sponsors, would receive unanimous or at least majority support, for, contrary to what had somewhat cynically been stated, the purpose of the proposed conference would be to speed up the process of concluding a treaty on non-proliferation by providing a forum in which the non-nuclear States would be able to produce definite proposals embodying their aspirations, instead of presenting scattered demands.

12. Although it was not satisfied with the piecemeal approach which had characterized the disarmament negotiations, his delegation would vote in favour of the two draft resolutions, for all men of goodwill desired one goal: general and complete disarmament.

13. Mr. COLERIDGE-TAYLOR (Sierra Leone) said that he turned to the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons with full awareness of the catastrophic consequences of a nuclear war. In an issue in which the survival of humanity was in the balance, the possibility of over-emphasizing some aspects of the problem was a trivial consideration, and repetition was pardonable.

14. The main emphasis so far had been on the conclusion of a treaty on non-proliferation. In that regard, the Eighteen-Nation Committee deserved commendation for the work it had done. In the first place, it had kept the lines of communication open for negotiating a treaty; and secondly, it had clarified the issues. It was obvious that a fundamental difference persisted between the two major nuclear Powers on the question how a treaty on non-proliferation could accommodate alliances. Until that difference had been resolved, such a treaty would continue to be no more than a fond hope.

15. The memorandum of 19 August 1966 submitted by the eight non-aligned members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee<sup>1/</sup> set out in detail the considerations which should be predominant in the preparation of an acceptable treaty. His delegation wished to endorse the points raised in that memorandum, and to emphasize the urgency of the need to negotiate and conclude a treaty on non-proliferation. Such a treaty would have to be sufficiently precise to prevent circumvention; it would have to be effective and workable; and it would have to reflect the joint efforts of nuclear and non-nuclear Powers alike to share and accept the obligations and responsibilities which would prevent proliferation. However, those conditions could not be regarded as sufficient, for non-proliferation was but one aspect of general and complete disarmament. The treaty should

therefore be designed to lead in that direction; and that would inevitably involve the limitation, reduction and final elimination of nuclear weapons and the vehicles for their delivery. Of course, a major step towards limiting the manufacture of those weapons was to ensure that they could not be tested. That in turn could only be ensured by the conclusion of a treaty banning nuclear tests in all environments. Unfortunately, since even the partial test ban treaty concluded did not enjoy universal acceptance, it seemed over-optimistic to hope for the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty which would be universally and strictly observed. An interim measure in that regard would be the establishment of more denuclearized zones. Latin America and Africa were taking the lead in that direction, and Asia and the Pacific area might well discover that they were following the right road. If such measures were taken and were accompanied by the systematic destruction of all nuclear weapon stockpiles, the nuclear threat might prove to have been only a nightmare.

16. Before that ideal stage was reached, however, it would be necessary to work out international arrangements to allay the fears of non-nuclear States whose security might be threatened by their willingness to forgo nuclear weapons. It was not enough to give such States assurances of nuclear protection against nuclear attack, for the "nuclear umbrella" was ineffective against nuclear fall-out. Such protection was unsatisfactory when it was possible for countries to thrive in mutual confidence and trust.

17. The Indian representative had rightly argued at the previous meeting that non-proliferation should not deny to non-nuclear Powers the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Nuclear energy properly applied could help to meet the needs of the developing countries. If, moreover, the resources at present consumed in nuclear arms production were released, the result would be a proliferation not of misery and weapons of mass destruction but of prosperity and happiness.

18. His delegation supported draft resolution A/C.1/L.371 and Corr.1 and Add.1-6, but would prefer, for purely textual reasons, the replacement of operative paragraphs 2 and 4 by the new paragraph 2 proposed by Cameroon (A/C.1/L.373). The second Cameroonian amendment improved the draft. On the other hand, the original operative paragraph 3 had been intended to emphasize, and rightly so, the vulnerability of non-nuclear Powers. That idea might be reintroduced into the Cameroonian amendment by means of a minor change; thus at the end of paragraph 3 the words "especially non-nuclear-weapon States" could be added. The Cameroonian delegation might wish to consider that suggestion, though his delegation did not feel strongly enough about the point to make a formal proposal.

19. Turning to the second draft resolution before the Committee (A/C.1/L.372 and Add.1-3), he said that the delegation of Sierra Leone had submitted some amendments (A/C.1/L.375). It had proposed the insertion of two additional preambular paragraphs in order to emphasize strongly the reasons justifying the convening of the proposed conference.

<sup>1/</sup> See Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1966, document DC/228, annex 1, sect. P.

It appeared to have been the intention of Pakistan and the other sponsors to underline on the one hand the special responsibility of non-nuclear Powers for the conclusion of a treaty on non-proliferation, and on the other the need to ensure the security of States which did not possess nuclear weapons. Though those two ideas were included in operative paragraph 1, his delegation had felt that they were not brought out forcefully enough in the original text.

20. The second amendment proposed by his delegation called for the addition at the end of the final preambular paragraph of the phrase "and to facilitate the preparation of a treaty on non-proliferation". The adoption of that amendment would in no way imply the establishment of a time-table for the conclusion of a treaty. If a treaty was concluded before the conference, the matter would be dropped from the conference's agenda; if not, then it would be the responsibility of the participants to facilitate its preparation.

21. His delegation's third amendment was purely textual.

22. Fears had been expressed about the advisability or desirability of a conference of non-nuclear countries. Some had put forward the argument that such a conference would crystallize the division between the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers. Obviously, however, the goal of all members of the international community was to eliminate the distinction between the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers by eliminating nuclear weapons themselves. Others had expressed the fear that the expense involved in such a conference would be prohibitive; but no financial sacrifice was too great if it led to the early solution of the problem of proliferation and to general and complete disarmament. In any case, no judgement could be passed on that point until the Committee had heard the Secretary-General's statement on the financial implications of the draft resolution.

23. If its amendments were adopted, the delegation of Sierra Leone would join the sponsors of the draft resolution.

24. Mr. Orhan ERALP (Turkey) shared the view that nothing should be done to detract from the provisions of General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX). In particular, it was of great importance that a treaty on non-proliferation should be free of loop-holes. It had been heartening to learn that the representatives of the Soviet Union and the United States were hopeful of reaching agreement on the type of defensive arrangement that would preclude the possibility of proliferation. In view of the fact that the techniques of production of nuclear energy for peaceful and for warlike purposes followed parallel lines, a treaty without loop-holes would certainly entail acceptance by non-nuclear States of an effective international control over their nuclear activities. That control could be entrusted to the International Atomic Energy Agency. However, although there was general agreement among the non-nuclear Powers about the need for control, their interpretations differed and their views did not appear to be properly co-ordinated. Nor was there general agreement on such matters as the mutual obligations of nuclear and

non-nuclear Powers and the guarantees the nuclear Powers should provide to the latter.

25. As pointed out in the joint memorandum of 19 August 1966 of the eight non-aligned countries, the main obstacle to the conclusion of a treaty had probably so far been constituted by differences concerning nuclear armaments within alliances. Furthermore, the fact that certain Powers appeared determined to acquire nuclear status outside the mainstream of such alliances had been a more immediate factor and had considerably increased the danger of further proliferation in different parts of the world. That development in itself presented a danger no less significant than the augmentation of nuclear arsenals within the alliances. For, if proliferation were to take place in an environment relatively free from the restraining influence of "nuclear deterrence", it was to be feared that the new nuclear States might feel more at liberty to resort to the use of nuclear weapons or nuclear threats in order to settle their political differences.

26. For those reasons, his delegation would support draft resolution A/C.1/L.372 and Add.1-3, which deserved careful consideration by the Committee and specifically by the non-nuclear Powers.

27. It was satisfactory to note that the urgency of concluding a treaty on non-proliferation, which should be the first and immediate step leading to general and complete disarmament, was generally appreciated. His government would not fail to take whatever steps were open to it towards the early attainment of the treaty, and it was in that spirit that Turkey had joined the sponsors of the draft resolution which had been adopted on agenda item 97 (resolution 2149 (XXI)).

28. His delegation was not opposed in principle to the appeal in operative paragraph 3 of draft resolution A/C.1/L.371 and Corr.1 and Add.1-6. Nevertheless, it had misgivings about its practical value. The principal nuclear Powers had indeed made certain unilateral offers, but there was as yet no indication of agreement between them on the extent and form of the assurances to be granted to non-nuclear States in return for their forgoing the right to manufacture nuclear weapons. The committee would recall, for example, that it was only after the conclusion of the 1963 treaty imposing a partial ban on nuclear weapon tests that it had been possible to give substance to the appeals previously adopted. That was why operative paragraph 3 should be regarded as an interim measure pending the conclusion of a treaty on non-proliferation. Furthermore, the wording of the amendment submitted by Cameroon (A/C.1/L.373), though different in nature from the appeal contained in operative paragraph 3, appeared to be more in line with the language and spirit of resolution 2149 (XXI) which appealed to all States to refrain from any actions which might hamper the conclusion of an agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The main problem was to bring about an early agreement on the treaty and to ensure that the necessary steps were taken to facilitate its conclusion as soon as possible.

*The meeting rose at 4.25 p.m.*