



# General Assembly

Sixty-seventh session

## First Committee

**20<sup>th</sup>** meeting

Monday, 5 November 2012, 3 p.m.  
New York

Official Records

*Chair:* Mr. Percaya ..... (Indonesia)

*The meeting was called to order at 3.05 p.m.*

### Agenda items 86 to 102 (continued)

#### Action on all draft resolutions submitted under disarmament and international security agenda items

**The Chair:** I now call on the remaining delegations that did not have the opportunity to explain their votes this morning under cluster 1, “Nuclear weapons”. Let me quickly add that, despite the extra meeting we received, we are unfortunately still very much behind schedule and time remains of the essence. I therefore appeal to all those taking the floor to do so in reasonable time.

**Mr. Magalhães (Brazil):** I take the floor to explain Brazil’s vote on draft resolutions A/C.1/67/L.25, A/C.1/67/L.27, A/C.1/67/L.41 and A/C.1/67/L.49.

The Brazilian delegation voted in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.25, entitled “Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons”, in spite of Brazil’s well-known position on the need to eliminate nuclear weapons and not merely prohibit their use. We understand that a gradual, phased programme towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons can be a realistic approach to the goal of nuclear disarmament. In its Final Document, the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons noted

“the proposals for nuclear disarmament by the Secretary-General to inter alia consider negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention or

agreement on a framework of separate mutually reinforcing instruments, backed by a strong system of verification (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I), para. 81).

The Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons also noted in paragraph 82 of its Final Document that “the final phase of the nuclear disarmament process and other related measures should be pursued within an agreed legal framework”, which a majority of States parties, including Brazil, believe should include specified timelines. We consider that actions 3, 5 and 6 of the plan of action of the Final Document constitute the necessary way forward in promoting nuclear disarmament.

The Brazilian delegation voted in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.27, entitled “Reducing nuclear danger”, because we believe that nuclear doctrines must be reviewed, as called for in paragraph 1, in order to reduce the risk of unintentional and accidental use of nuclear weapons. It is our view, however, that the most serious threat to humankind and the survival of civilization derives primarily not from the use, but rather from the very existence, of nuclear weapons. In that context, measures such as de-alerting and de-targeting nuclear weapons, while relevant, cannot be a substitute for multilateral agreements conducive to the complete elimination of all nuclear weapons.

The 2010 NPT Review Conference, in paragraph 81 of its Final Document, noted the proposals for nuclear disarmament of the Secretary-General to consider negotiations on a nuclear-weapons convention

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or agreement on a framework of separate, mutually reinforcing instruments, backed by a strong system of verification. The NPT Review Conference also noted in paragraph 82 of its Final Document that the final phase of the nuclear disarmament process and other related measures should be pursued within an agreed legal framework, which a majority of State parties, including Brazil, believe should include specified timelines.

My delegation voted in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.41, entitled “Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices”, because Brazil is committed to the objective of nuclear disarmament and understands that such a treaty can bring added value to efforts towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, in fulfilment of article VI of the NPT. Indeed, in that context, we would like to reiterate that the treaty on fissile material can be considered a concrete step towards nuclear disarmament only if it deals with existing stocks of plutonium and enriched uranium. We recall that the present stocks are enough to be used in nuclear weapons for many centuries to come. A treaty on fissile material that does not contain specific commitments related to the pre-existing material would not, therefore, address the international community’s goal of a world free of nuclear weapons.

Brazil’s support for the draft resolution is based on the understanding that negotiating a treaty on fissile material will be a meaningful step in a process that should be part of a larger legal framework — that of a nuclear weapons convention — supported by mutually reinforcing instruments aimed at the complete elimination of nuclear weapons in a clear time frame. As we have stated on other occasions, the process should represent not an alternative to that idea, but rather a path that is convergent and coherent with the mandate of the Conference on Disarmament, the sole legitimate multilateral forum for disarmament negotiations.

With the comprehensive safeguards agreements, we already have a de facto fissile material cut-off treaty in force for the great majority of States in the world. What we need is decisive political will on the part of States possessing nuclear weapons to join with non-nuclear-weapon States and think of their corresponding obligations in freeing the world of weapons that threaten humankind, aggravate tensions and hamper efforts towards peace.

The Brazilian delegation abstained in the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.49, entitled “United

action towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons”. While we share the ultimate goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons, we believe that the draft resolution could benefit from some adjustments in order to promote its objectives in a more effective and balanced manner. Paragraph 9, for instance, fails to state that any fissile material treaty should serve both disarmament and non-proliferation objectives and deal with existing stocks of fissile material. Paragraph 12 of the draft resolution should, in line with action 7 of the Final Document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, express support for the immediate commencement of discussions within the Conference on Disarmament on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threaten of use of nuclear weapons, not excluding an international legally binding agreement.

With regard to paragraph 16, the Brazilian delegation would like to recall that the Model Additional Protocol is an instrument of a voluntary nature signed between a Member State and the International Atomic Energy Agency. The language used in paragraph 16 would benefit from the Final Document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, which noted that it is the sovereign decision of any State to conclude an additional protocol, and that additional protocols should be universally applied once the complete elimination of nuclear weapons has been achieved.

**Mrs. Ledesma Hernández** (Cuba) (*spoke in Spanish*): Our delegation wishes to explain its vote on two draft resolutions.

With regard to draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.43, Cuba has maintained the clear position of objecting to all types of nuclear tests, including those undertaken with supercomputers and other sophisticated explosive methods. For that reason, Cuba has always voted in favour of the draft resolution on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) that is introduced every year in the First Committee. We supported it again on this occasion. However, we also believe it important to point out that with the reiteration of paragraph 5 of draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.43, the draft resolution is alienated from the eminently technical nature it should have. Everyone understands the inherent complexities of this delicate matter and the decisions made in the Security Council in that regard, which do not help in solving the problem.

We firmly believe that diplomacy and peaceful dialogue should continue with a view to finding a

long-term solution to the nuclear question on the Korean peninsula. We confirm our support for the denuclearization of that peninsula and for a negotiated solution between the parties concerned.

We are also very concerned about the slow movement towards nuclear disarmament and the lack of progress made by nuclear-weapon States towards the full elimination of their nuclear arsenals. We hope that the sponsors of the draft resolution will in the future maintain the text's focus on matters that are relevant and related to the CTBT, and avoid including easily manipulated matters of controversy, which would help us to focus instead on finding the needed consensus on the topic.

Regarding draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.41, entitled "Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices", our delegation wishes to make the following explanation of vote. Cuba voted for the draft resolution in its entirety because we favour the launching of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on an effectively verifiable, non-discriminatory multilateral treaty that prohibits the production of fissile material for the building of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, and that also addresses existing weapons. At the same time, we believe that negotiating a treaty on fissile material would be a positive but insufficient measure if we do not define the subsequent steps towards achieving nuclear disarmament.

We regret the fact that the Conference on Disarmament has not been able to undertake its substantive work for more than a decade. We wish to underscore that the Conference on Disarmament has an essential role to play within the disarmament machinery as the sole multilateral forum for negotiating disarmament treaties. We are concerned over ideas being entertained by some parties of removing those topics from the agenda or leaving the Conference altogether and moving towards alternate processes for negotiating disarmament treaties in other venues. Those would be dangerous steps backwards. It remains the shared responsibility of us all to preserve and strengthen the Conference. The Conference on Disarmament should adopt, as soon as possible, a broad and balanced programme of work that takes account of the real priorities in the area of disarmament, focusing on the priority given to nuclear disarmament in the first special session of the General Assembly on

disarmament. That topic should be given priority in the Conference's programme of work.

Our delegation abstained in the voting on paragraph 3, which calls for the establishment of a group of governmental experts to make recommendations on possible elements of a fissile material cut-off treaty, because we believe that it is a non-inclusive option with limited participation on a topic that is of interest to all delegations. We note our concern regarding the proliferation of initiatives aimed at creating groups of experts with limited inclusion to consider disarmament and arms-matters that are highly sensitive and of interest to all Member States. We believe that the creation of groups of experts should be the exception and not the rule. Instead, we should see transparent and inclusive processes in which all Member States participate an equal footing in the context of the disarmament machinery of the United Nations.

Allow me to conclude by expressing Cuba's support for the efforts to optimize the United Nations disarmament machinery. We are convinced, however, that the paralysis affecting a large part of this machinery is the result above all of the lack of political will on the part of some States to achieve true progress, in particular in the area of nuclear disarmament.

**Ms. Adamson** (United Kingdom): I am speaking on behalf of France, the United Kingdom and the United States with regard to draft resolutions A/C.1/67/L.4/Rev.1 and A/C.1/67/L.28.

With respect to A/C.1/67/L.4/Rev.1, entitled "Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia", the Governments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States have been in touch with the five Central Asian States on a number of occasions in an effort to resolve problems that have prevented our ratification of the protocol to the Treaty. We are encouraged by the expression of readiness of the Central Asian States to consult with us on outstanding issues.

We remain convinced that nuclear-weapon-free zones can contribute towards strengthening the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and building regional stability, while also providing meaningful and valuable negative security assurances to the members of the Zone. At this point, several outstanding issues remain, including article XII, whose resolution in a mutually acceptable manner would be necessary to make further progress towards our respective accessions to the Treaty's protocol.

Nevertheless, we support the objective of a nuclear-weapon-free Central Asia and underscore our readiness to consult with the five Central Asian States in the near future in order to arrive at a mutually satisfactory outcome.

With respect to A/C.1/67/L.28, entitled “Decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapon systems”, The Governments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States continue to disagree with the basic premise of the draft resolution that the current level of readiness of nuclear weapons increases the risk of their unintentional or accidental use. We would like to restate that the operational readiness of our respective nuclear weapons systems is maintained at a level consonant with our national security requirements and our obligations to our allies, within the larger context of the current global strategic situation. In reflection thereof, we have decreased the operational readiness and alert levels of our respective forces since the early 1990s. Additionally, our respective nuclear weapons systems are no longer targeted against any State. Collectively, those steps have reduced the value of further de-alerting as a priority for nuclear disarmament, in our view.

Unhelpfully, the present draft resolution proceeds from the presumption that lowered alert levels will automatically and in all cases lead to heightened international security. In reality, while alert levels can be and have been lowered in response to an improved international security climate, the relationship between alert levels and security is complex and not reducible to such simple formulaic responses. We would also like to reiterate that our nuclear-weapon systems are subject to the most rigorous command, control and communication systems to ensure against the possibility of accidental or unintentional use and to guarantee that such weapons can be used only at the sole direction of the proper national command authority and to maximize that authority’s decision time.

I wish to explain in our national capacity the United Kingdom’s negative vote on draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.13, “Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments”. This is not a new draft resolution, and our previous reasons for not supporting this text remain valid. While we agree with many of the elements of the draft resolution, particularly those reflecting language of the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)), we voted against it because many of the changes

take us further away from our common understanding and introduce new concepts that were never part of the NPT plan of action. We feel that the NPT plan of action should guide our work over the next few years, and are therefore disappointed to see this draft resolution and a number of others here in the First Committee focusing almost exclusively on the nuclear disarmament agenda.

We would also like to see a greater emphasis on the need for all States that possess nuclear weapons, not just the NPT-defined nuclear-weapon States, to undertake activities that are consistent with the shared objective of making the world safer and more secure. This in no way confers any particular status on such countries, but rather reflects the fact that a comprehensive and global approach to disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy is required.

**Mr. Bravaco** (United States of America): With regard to draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.13, our delegation shares the views and opposition expressed by the Ambassador of the United Kingdom. The common understanding forged at the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should be preserved and not altered by introducing new concepts, as A/C.1/67/L.13 does.

**Ms. Higgie** (New Zealand): New Zealand has voted in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.2, entitled “The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East”. New Zealand is a strong and long-standing supporter of the universalization of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). We are committed to the realization of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, as mandated by the States parties to the NPT in 1995 and reaffirmed by the 2010 NPT Review Conference. New Zealand commends the efforts of Under-Secretary of State Jaakko Laajava as facilitator for the 2012 conference on a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, and we look forward to the convening of the conference.

We note that the International Atomic Energy Agency will of course have a crucial role to play in verifying such a zone, and we therefore urge all States that have not yet done so, including in the Middle East, to sign, ratify and implement an additional protocol to allow the Agency to undertake its important work. New Zealand wishes, however, to place on record our concern regarding the absence in the draft resolution of any reference to other States in the Middle East that present significant nuclear-proliferation concerns. We

would hope that this lack of balance will be able to be addressed in future years.

**Ms. Anderson** (Canada): Canada takes the floor to explain its vote on draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.2 due to the fact that once again this year the draft resolution unfairly singles out Israel by calling for its accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons while failing to address serious issues of non-compliance by States in the region already party to the Treaty. Canada has taken this position both here and on similar resolutions in other forums, including in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Canada finds the draft resolution to be deficient because it ignores the reality of Iran's and Syria's non-cooperation with the IAEA. We are deeply concerned, for example, that Iran has failed to comply with Security Council resolutions. Iran has chosen to ignore these Security Council obligations and the efforts of the international community to arrive at an equitable and lasting solution that would meet the concerns of the international community with regard to Iran's intentions.

In the case of Syria, it has had ample opportunity to cooperate effectively with the Agency in resolving this issue, but has refused to do so. For these reasons, Canada voted against this year's draft resolution on the risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East.

**Mr. Proaño** (Ecuador) (*spoke in Spanish*): My delegation abstained in the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.41 and its paragraph 3. We believe that the consideration of a matter of such importance as a treaty on fissile material should not be reduced to the exclusive treatment by a few States, particularly in circumstances in which, given the importance of the matter, the international community is calling for a broadening of the membership of the Conference on Disarmament. My delegation believes that the creation of a group of governmental experts on this crucial matter restricts the possibility of the interests and concerns of all Member States being represented equally, given that nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation are of concern to all countries and not to just a few.

In this regard, my delegation would like to stress that the appropriate forum for negotiations on this topic is the Conference on Disarmament, which is the only multilateral negotiating forum for nuclear disarmament, as established at the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

In this respect, and with regard to draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.49, my delegation believes that, as was the case as recently as two years ago, this fact could and should have been reflected in paragraph 9, in which there should have been a mention of the start of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty within the Conference on Disarmament. Furthermore, that paragraph could have stated that such negotiations should cover the matters of future production and stockpiles, thereby addressing the matter as a whole — that is, in terms of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation — which is in the interests of us all. That is the reason for our abstention in the voting on the draft resolution.

Furthermore, and from a broader perspective on the same draft resolution, my delegation believes that a multilateral, legally binding instrument on negative security assurances would be meaningful and relevant. We believe that, while Security Council resolution 984 (1995) was a positive step in that direction, referring to it is not equivalent to referring to a multilateral, legally binding international instrument. My delegation therefore believes that the draft resolution could have placed greater emphasis on the importance of negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States, which are placing their hopes in such assurances until full disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons are achieved through, for example, a convention on nuclear weapons. This is another topic that is not highlighted in the draft resolution.

**Mr. Simon-Michel** (France) (*spoke in French*): I would like to take the floor to explain why my country voted against resolution A/C.1/67/L.13 and in favour of A/C.1/67/L.49.

My country regrets having to had to vote against draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.13, which is entitled "Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments". It does not reflect in a pertinent way the obligations and commitments that we undertook at the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), or the balance between the three main pillars of the NPT: disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Furthermore, we were struck by the absence of any mention in the draft resolution of the negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty in the Conference on Disarmament, which was considered by the NPT Review Conference to be the next phase of nuclear disarmament.

Finally, we regret that the draft resolution does not adequately address the issue of compliance with NPT obligations and in particular that it does not refer at all to the challenge represented to the NPT by the Islamic Republic of Iran, which is not complying with its international obligations in this area. This is a glaring omission. While we support certain aspects of the draft resolution, in particular those referring to the Final Document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)), many of the proposed changes to last year's text are a departure from common sense and introduce new concepts that have never been part of the NPT plan of action. We think that the NPT plan of action should guide our work over the coming years, and we are disappointed that the draft resolution and a number of others introduced in the First Committee are focused almost exclusively on nuclear disarmament.

We also would have wished greater stress to be placed on the need for all States that have a military nuclear capacity — and not only nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT — to undertake activities that would contribute to achieving the common goal of a more secure world. This would reflect the fact that a more comprehensive approach towards disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy is necessary.

Although we could support the draft resolution, we are prepared to continue working with the members of the New Agenda Coalition on the subject of disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

France voted in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.49, entitled “United action towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons”. While we voted for the draft resolution, which reflects in its general structure the commitments that we have undertaken in the area of nuclear disarmament, we would like to make a few comments. We indeed continue to believe that the draft resolutions submitted to the General Assembly must give due recognition to the efforts undertaken by nuclear-weapon States. We are also concerned about the way that this text has evolved over the past two years. I would like to highlight our desire to see the NPT plan of action that was adopted by consensus in 2010 re-examined in a balanced manner.

**Mr. Proppper** (Israel): I would like to take the floor to briefly explain Israel's position on three draft

resolutions. Our full written statements will be sent to the Secretariat.

With regard to draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.2, entitled “The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East”, Israel voted against the draft resolution. Adopting such an unbalanced draft resolution, which aims to single out Israel in a biased manner, will not serve the greater objective of curbing proliferation in the Middle East, or contribute to the role and standing of this body in advancing peace and security in the Middle East. The fact that the sponsors of this anti-Israel draft resolution chose to include language referring to the 2012 conference proves above all the ill intent of the Arab States with regard to the proposed conference.

With regard to resolution A/C.1/67/L.41, the inherent utility of a fissile material cut-off treaty in addressing the current growing proliferation challenges, including the non-compliance of States with their international obligations in the nuclear domain, is far from having been proved. This holds especially true for the Middle East, where several States have an exceptionally poor track record of compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations.

Regarding draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.43, on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), Israel decided to vote in favour because of the importance it attaches to the objectives of the CTBT presented in the text. However, Israel cannot support and has strong reservations regarding some of the language included in the sixth preambular paragraph and paragraph 1. It is the long-standing position of Israel that the CTBT and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) are not linked. An attempt to artificially force such a linkage, especially through a reference to the NPT Review Conference, a forum of which Israel is not a member, would only jeopardize the CTBT and its noble cause, as well as any prospect for better regional security in the Middle East.

**Mrs. González-Román** (Spain) (*spoke in Spanish*): The delegation of Spain would like to explain its vote on resolution A/C.1/67/L. 55, on a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa.

The entry into force of the Treaty of Pelindaba, establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa in 2009, was a great step for all African nations and an important contribution to strengthening international peace and security. For this reason, Spain has always been unequivocally supportive of the objectives of the

Treaty, and would like to once again welcome its entry into force.

However, after having examined in detail the invitation extended to Spain to sign the third protocol of the Treaty, my Government, in consultation with our Parliament and taking into account the guiding principles adopted by consensus in the Conference on Disarmament at its 1999 substantive session with respect to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely reached by the countries of the region in question, has decided not to sign the protocol, as we indicated at the time to the treaty depository. In this regard, I would just like to highlight two points.

First of all, the Treaty of Pelindaba contains no provision, obligation, guarantee or safeguard with respect to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation that Spain has not already adopted for its entire national territory. Indeed, by virtue of its membership in various international organizations, Spain has for many years undertaken and observed a series of obligations and safeguards in the framework of the European Atomic Energy Community and of our Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency, which go considerably beyond the obligations set forth in the Treaty of Pelindaba.

Secondly, the entire Spanish territory has been nuclear-weapon-free since 1976. The ban on the introduction, installation or stockpiling of nuclear weapons on all Spanish territory was confirmed by the Parliament when Spain joined NATO in 1981, and ratified in a referendum held in March 1986. Thus, Spain has already taken all the measures necessary to ensure that the content of the Treaty of Pelindaba is being implemented on all of our national territory.

Spain has joined the consensus in support of this text since it was first introduced to the First Committee in 1997. However, Spain dissociates itself from the consensus on paragraph 5, and we call on the sponsors of the draft resolution to engage in transparent, good-faith negotiations to achieve a more balanced text that is acceptable to all parties. We reiterate that Spain does not want to alter the Treaty of Pelindaba or its protocols, but only paragraph 5 of draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.55.

**Mr. Hashmi** (Pakistan): I take the floor to explain my delegation's position on a number of draft resolutions.

First, with respect to A/C.1/67/L.2, as in previous years, my delegation continues to support the primary purpose and focus of the draft resolution. However, we also believe that a lopsided emphasis remains in the draft text on the recommendations and conclusions emanating from various review conferences of the parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). My delegation is disappointed at the continued but unrealistic call on Pakistan to join the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon State. Our position on the subject is clear and does not warrant reiteration. We therefore voted in favour of the draft text as a whole while abstaining on the fifth and sixth preambular paragraphs.

On A/C.1/67/L.13, we are disappointed by the continued selective and discriminatory language of paragraph 11, which calls upon Pakistan to unconditionally accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon State. We also cannot accept references in the text to NPT review conferences and their recommendations, due to our known position on the Treaty. We therefore abstained in the voting on the draft resolution as a whole and voted against paragraph 11.

On A/C.1/67/L.28, Pakistan voted in favour of the draft resolution. We support most of the elements referred to in the draft text. Moreover, we wish to reiterate that the notion of decreasing the operational status of nuclear weapons must be based on reciprocity. However, the reference to the conclusions and recommendation of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, from our point of view, is unwarranted. As a non-party to the NPT, we cannot subscribe to the Conference's decisions and therefore we have been obliged to abstain from the voting on the the draft resolution's eighth preambular paragraph.

On A/C.1/67/L.41, we recognize the efforts made by the Canadian delegation to conduct a series of informal consultations on that draft resolution. However, we consider the proposal on setting up a group of governmental experts to be ill-advised. That proposal adds no value to the process or the substance of the treaty. It would, on the other hand, undermine the Conference on Disarmament (CD). We are not convinced that what an exclusive group of governmental experts can do or claim to do cannot be achieved through a more representative and recognized forum, such as the CD. We remain convinced that changing the format or forum will not constitute a change in the external political environment, which is the real roadblock to

negotiations of a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT). Therefore, in the light of our consistent position on the issue and in the light of the aforementioned reasons, we voted against the draft resolution as a whole, as well as against its paragraph 3.

On A/C.1/67/L.43, my delegation continues to believe that the objective of the call in the draft resolution for promoting signatures and ratifications leading to the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) will be facilitated when major erstwhile proponents of the CTBT decide to ratify it. The acceptance of CTBT obligations on a regional basis in South Asia will also help expedite its entry into force. Over the years, Pakistan has consistently supported the objectives of the CTBT. We have been voting in favour of this text in the First Committee since it was introduced in 1996. We voted for the draft resolution this year as well.

However, the draft resolution refers to conclusions and recommendations of NPT review conferences. We wish to reiterate that we do not consider ourselves bound by any of the provisions that emanate from the NPT review conferences or from any other forum in which Pakistan is not represented. Therefore, while my delegation, in the spirit of flexibility, voted in favour of the draft resolution as a whole, we were constrained to abstain in the voting on the sixth preambular paragraph.

Finally, on A/C.1/67/L.49, my delegation continues to disagree with several provisions of the draft resolution. In accordance with our clear and consistent position, we reject the unrealistic call to accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon State without conditions. At the same time, we do not consider ourselves bound by any of the Treaty's provisions, including those that are adopted at NPT review conferences. While Pakistan supports the objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons, it cannot agree to some of the proposals in the draft resolution, such as the immediate commencement of FMCT negotiations and universalization of the comprehensive safeguards agreement and the additional protocol. We deem those proposals to be selective, discriminatory, contrary to our legitimate security interests and violative of the statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. In view of the aforementioned reservations, my delegation abstained in the voting on the draft resolution as a whole and on paragraphs 2 and 16, and we voted against paragraph 9.

**Mr. Aljowaily (Egypt):** I take the floor to provide an explanation of vote on draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.41, entitled "Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices", and sponsored by Canada.

The international community has identified nuclear disarmament as the main priority in multilateral disarmament diplomacy. That fact can be seen starting from the first resolution of the General Assembly and from the Final Document (resolution S-10/2) of the tenth special session of the General Assembly, the first special session on disarmament. Within that context, Egypt has always considered a treaty on a fissile material cut-off to be an important and crucial step towards achieving nuclear disarmament. That can be clearly seen in the inclusion of the New Agenda Coalition-sponsored language in the 13 practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts towards nuclear disarmament agreed to at the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Step 3 called upon the Conference on Disarmament (CD) to negotiate a non-discriminatory multilateral and international and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices "taking into consideration both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives" (*NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Parts I and II), p. 14*).

Regarding the draft resolution, Egypt has engaged constructively with Canada and interested delegations, with the objective of meeting the basic requisites to include stockpiles of past production of fissile material for military uses in any potential treaty on fissile materials with a view to achieving general and complete nuclear disarmament. We had suggested operative language towards that end regarding the necessity of an explicit reference to stockpiles, taking into consideration the fact that document CD/1299, the Shannon report, the basis that allows us to proceed further in that direction. While we appreciate the positive response to some of our concerns, given the absence of explicit reference that any work on a possible treaty would take place exclusively within the CD, while including stockpiles of past production of fissile material for military uses, as well as the way in which the current draft resolution reflects the sequencing of the outcomes and the nature of the proposed mechanisms, Egypt abstained in the voting on the operative clauses of the draft resolution as a whole.



Egypt will continue to seek within the CD an early adoption of a comprehensive and balanced programme of work that would deal with not only a fissile material treaty that takes into consideration both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives, but also all core issues on the agenda of the Conference.

Egypt firmly believes that the Conference on Disarmament is the single multilateral negotiating forum on disarmament. We firmly believe that the lack of political will is the obstacle preventing the CD from adopting a comprehensive and balanced programme of work that would address its four core issues equally. We therefore reiterate that the solution to the impasse in the CD is to regain the momentum and to spur the political commitment towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

**Mr. Al-Yafei** (United Arab Emirates): The United Arab Emirates voted in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.41, entitled "Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices". Paragraph 3, as amended before the vote, was significant to my delegation's voting in favour of it, as well as on the draft resolution as whole. We have particularly taken into consideration the fact that the group of experts to be established by the Secretary-General will only make recommendations on possible aspects that could contribute to, but not negotiate a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) on the basis of document CD/1299 and the mandate contained therein, which will operate on the basis of consensus without prejudice to national positions in future negotiations. The establishment of a group of governmental experts pursuant to the draft resolution is not meant to be a replacement of but merely a supportive function to the Conference on Disarmament, not to mention the fact that it has no mandate to take a decision on any FMCT.

Another important issue for the United Arab Emirates with regard to the establishment of a group of governmental experts is the fact that its report, which will be submitted to the Secretary-General, will be for onward transmission by the Secretary-General to the Conference on Disarmament. That is explicit in the adopted resolution. The CD's competent review of the report of the group of governmental experts and the position to be taken on it by the Conference on Disarmament will therefore be crucial in the issue of an FMCT.

I must reiterate that the adoption of the draft resolution does not in any way jeopardize, prejudice or

replace the Conference on Disarmament, which is an international consensus and requirement.

**Mr. Amano** (Japan): I would like to deliver an explanation of vote on the draft resolution contained in A/C.1/67/L.4, entitled "Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia", on behalf of Sweden and Japan.

We voted in favour of the draft resolution and welcome the entry into force of the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia on 21 March 2009. Such a zone is the first nuclear-weapon-free zone in the northern hemisphere and would encompass an area where nuclear weapons previously existed. As stipulated in the principles and guidelines of the 1999 Disarmament Commission report (A/54/42), consultations with nuclear-weapon States regarding the negotiations of a treaty establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone are important.

In that regard, we welcome the readiness expressed by the five Central Asian States to continue consultations on a number of provisions of the Treaty. We encourage those States concerned to accelerate consultations in the hope that progress will be possible in the near future. We would also like to encourage the five Central Asian States to keep countries with an interest in that process informed on the developments of their consultations.

I would also like to explain Japan's voting on the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/67/L.52, entitled "Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons". Japan voted in favour of the draft resolution, as deepening substantive discussions on ways to increase the effectiveness of negative security assurances is essential for the realization of a world free of nuclear weapons.

However, the draft resolution should not prejudice the discussions in the Conference on Disarmament (CD). Japan strongly hopes that each CD member State will show flexibility and that the CD will break the long-standing stalemate and will advance its substantive work on the negotiations of a fissile material cut-off treaty and the discussion of its other important issues.

**Mr. Najafi** (Islamic Republic of Iran): I take the floor to explain the position of my delegation regarding two draft resolutions adopted by the First Committee this morning.

As in previous years, we voted in favour of the draft resolution, entitled "The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East", contained in document A/C.1/67/L.2. It deals with the most important aspect of security in the Middle East, namely, the threat of the nuclear weapons arsenals of the Zionist regime.

That regime, which has officially acknowledged its possession of nuclear weapons and enjoys the full support of the United States and certain Western countries, is the only source of threat to the security of the Middle East and beyond. The nuclear weapons arsenal of that regime is also the only obstacle to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, proposed by Iran in 1974. Since that time, the General Assembly has, without interruption, adopted resolutions endorsing that proposal and has recognized that the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East would greatly enhance international peace and security. Furthermore, the Assembly reaffirms that view in the consensual Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly (resolution S-10/2).

Pending the establishment of such a zone in the region, the States of the region should solemnly declare that they will refrain, on a reciprocal basis, from producing, acquiring or in any other way possessing nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices and from permitting the stationing of nuclear weapons on their territory by any third party. They should also agree to place all their nuclear activities under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.

However, it is a source of grave concern that, despite the repeated calls of the international community over the past decades, the Zionist regime has neither acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) nor placed its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. Consequently, no progress has been made to date in the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

In that connection, we believe that the 2012 conference on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East provides the international community with an opportunity to exert maximum pressure on the Israeli regime to eliminate all its nuclear weapons, to accede to the NPT without further delay and conditions and as a non-nuclear-weapon party, and to place all its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. Such actions would pave the

way for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

It is ironic that countries such as Canada, the United States or members of the European Union, which have kept deadly silent on the clandestine nuclear weapons programme and unsafeguarded nuclear installations of the Zionist regime, have made baseless allegations against the exclusively peaceful and safeguarded nuclear programme of my country. We categorically reject them all. Indeed, the United States and member States of the European Union that either have nuclear weapons or host nuclear warheads, in clear violation of the NPT, and have been in non-compliance with the NPT for years are not entitled to express concern over Iran's exclusively peaceful nuclear programme.

However, the rationale behind these hypocritical statements is clear. By making such baseless and absurd allegations against the exclusively peaceful nuclear programme of my country, they try to solve the inherent problem of the legitimacy of the Zionist regime and divert the attention of Member States from the danger of its nuclear arsenals, its clandestine nuclear programme, its unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, its record of non-adherence to the international instruments on weapons of mass destruction, and its non-compliance with its related obligations under the Charter of the United Nations and international law.

But, all of us recall that through the consensually adopted Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)), 189 NPT States parties, including the United States and other main supporters of the Zionist regime, unanimously called upon the Zionist regime by name to accede to the NPT without condition and to put all its clandestine nuclear activities under international safeguards. This indicates that the international community has not been and will not be deceived by the hue and cry raised by the Zionist regime and its few Western supporters. It also indicates that, in the view of the international community, there is no source of insecurity and instability in the Middle East and beyond other than the Israeli regime, which has crossed all lines during its lifetime and committed every crime, ranging from crimes of aggression to war crimes and crimes against humanity, and continues to threaten other countries.

Some representatives of Western countries have asked why the draft resolution refers only to Israel.

The answer is clear — because the Israeli regime, with its nuclear arsenal, is the only source of the threat to security in the Middle East. It is ironic that the representative of the Zionist regime, as the only non-NPT party in the Middle East, today talked about the non-compliance of the States parties to the Treaty.

I now turn to our position regarding draft resolutions A/C.1/67/L.13 and A/C.1/67/L.28. My delegation joined the consensus adoption of draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.13, entitled “Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments”, and draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.28, entitled “Decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems”. Nevertheless, we would like to put on record that these draft resolutions are acceptable to us inasmuch as their content is in line with the Final Document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference. Moreover, in regard to references made to the meetings of nuclear-weapon States, as well as the implementation of certain bilateral agreements between two nuclear-weapon States, we would like to stress that reductions in deployment and operational status cannot substitute for irreversible cuts in and the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

On draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.41, my delegation abstained in the voting. In our view, by proposing this draft resolution, which is on a subject under discussion within the Conference on Disarmament, some countries intended to misuse the General Assembly as leverage to prioritize the items on the Conference’s agenda.

My delegation is of the firm belief that nuclear disarmament is the highest priority on the disarmament agenda and that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of such weapons. Accordingly, the incipient negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified timeline, including the conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention in order to legally prohibit, once and for all, the possession, development, stockpiling and use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by any country and to provide for the destruction of such inhumane weapons, must be the highest priority among the items on the agenda of the Conference.

With regard to a treaty to ban fissile material for nuclear-weapons purposes, we strongly believe that it should not be developed as a mere non-proliferation

instrument. We will never accept such an approach. We also stress that the scope of such a treaty must cover the past, present and future production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and provide for their complete destruction.

My delegation also voted against paragraph 3 of draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.41 regarding the establishment of a group of governmental experts to make recommendations on possible elements that could contribute to a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. We did so because we did not and do not welcome taking issues on the Conference on Disarmament’s agenda outside of the Conference. My delegation is of the view that this is a premature attempt to prioritize the items on the Conference’s agenda, to take the issues outside the Conference, and to divert attention from nuclear disarmament and the total elimination of nuclear weapons as the highest priority of the international community in the field of disarmament. It is also an attempt to restrict the consideration of disarmament issues only to a select group and limited number of States in order to influence and prejudge the multilateral process. While supporting the position of the Conference on Disarmament as the sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, we believe that, with the new approach taken by its sponsor, the draft resolution will lose its credibility.

The Islamic Republic of Iran voted in favour of A/C.1/67/L.43, entitled “Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty”. However, my delegation would like to dissociate itself from paragraph 5 of the draft resolution because of the language of the text and the way it has been drafted. As explicitly stated in the Charter of the United Nations, the General Assembly is entitled to discuss independently any question within the scope of the Charter and make recommendations. Therefore, in our view, there is no need to refer to the work of other organs of the United Nations, which was done in a completely different context, in a draft resolution of the General Assembly.

**Mr. Hallak** (Syrian Arab Republic) (*spoke in Arabic*): My country voted in favour of the draft resolution entitled “The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East”, contained in document A/C.1/67/L.2, because we believe that the issue is of paramount importance to the peace and security of our region and because we fully believe in the need to create a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

In previous statements, we have reminded those who have short memories that Syria was one of the first States to call for the establishment of a Middle East zone free of all weapons of mass destruction, in particular nuclear weapons. We have done so ever since we acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1968.

It is known near and far that my country has contributed to the many initiatives seeking to achieve that noble objective, the most recent of which was the draft resolution submitted by Syria to the Security Council on 29 December 2003 on behalf of the Arab Group. It proposed removing all weapons of mass destruction, in particular nuclear weapons, from the Middle East region through joint international monitoring and under United Nations supervision, thereby enhancing the role of multilateral international disarmament agreements.

In a comical intervention that recalls the theatre of the absurd, clearly Israel's representative has desperately tried to mislead the First Committee by making false allegations and telling lies in order to divert attention from the threat of Israeli nuclear weapons and from the fact that Israel does not abide by international resolutions on nuclear non-proliferation, is not a party to the NPT and has not placed its nuclear installations under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

It is no secret today that Israel continues to pursue a policy of aggressive nuclear armament, based on a huge nuclear arsenal and means of delivery that are larger than, for example, the British and French nuclear arsenals. Moreover, Israel and its allies cover up the risks resulting from its possession of nuclear weapons and its threat to use them against countries in the region through what is known as a policy of nuclear ambiguity. It is indeed ironic for the Israeli representative to make false allegations, while Israel itself refuses to abide by resolutions of international legitimacy and to place its nuclear installations under IAEA supervision. In that connection, we call on the international community to exert pressure on Israel to join the NPT as a non-nuclear party and to eliminate its nuclear arsenal and means of delivery in order to achieve stability and security in the region.

Most countries in the world were looking forward to the convening of a successful special conference on establishing a zone free of nuclear weapons and all

other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, to be held in Helsinki, Finland, by the end of the year. However, Israel's announcement at the IAEA General Conference in September confirmed its intention to disregard the resolution adopted at the 2010 Review Conference of the States Parties to the NPT (resolution S-10/2) and thus to thwart the Helsinki conference. Everyone knows that Israel is the only party in our region that possesses nuclear weapons and their means of delivery.

With regard to the statement made this morning by our colleague, the representative of the United States, we would like to point out that the United States is the main party to breach and violate all provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and to threaten its credibility. United States nuclear weapons are deployed in more than eight countries beyond its boundaries. That is a clear breach of articles I and III of the Treaty. We should add that the United States, through its military cooperation and nuclear scientific cooperation with Israel, violates the provisions of the NPT. The nuclear non-proliferation policies of the United States completely lack objectivity and are based on double standards and hypocrisy.

We regret the statement made by the representative of Cyprus, on behalf of the States members of the European Union, confirming that undeclared alliance with Israel. Casting doubt on my country's position with regard to cooperation with the IAEA is out of place, completely in vain, provocative and out of context and shields Israel from meeting its nuclear non-proliferation responsibilities in the Middle East.

Our colleague, the representative of Cyprus, is not in a position to give advice or to criticize others. I find myself obliged to remind her that her country and most other States members of the European Union are not in compliance with all the NPT's provisions because nuclear weapons are present on the territories of European Union member States. Also, they cooperate directly, indirectly, overtly and implicitly with Israel by providing it with technologies and nuclear, chemical and biological materials. Many States members of the European Union are the cause of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East because they have provided Israel with reactors, equipment, material and technologies, as well as expertise, not to mention political support. If members of the European Union were really concerned about non-proliferation, they would have put concerted pressure on Israel to compel it to participate in the 2012

conference in Helsinki and to ensure its success, as well as to join the NPT.

Syria joined the NPT in 1968, long before many members of the European Union, and abides by its provisions. Syria continues to comply with the provisions of the NPT as well as those of the comprehensive safeguards agreement that it signed with the IAEA. It receives the Agency's inspectors on a regular basis and all reports issued by the IAEA note that Syria is in full compliance with that agreement.

With regard to the statement by the representative of France, we would remind him of the previous statements that we have made in exercise of the right of reply to the allegations that have been made by his delegation. We also recall that his country is the sole party responsible for the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle East, having provided the Dimona reactor to Israel in 1955. Moreover, France continues to assist Israel in all areas of nuclear proliferation and the proliferation of other weapons of mass destruction. We remind him that in 1960 his country carried out its first nuclear test in the Algerian desert, and we note French reports confirming that those explosions did indeed take place and involved live human test subjects.

In conclusion, the statement by the representative of Canada has also confirmed our serious concerns about the various false witnesses who take turns playing devil's advocate. We would ask the representative of Canada to review the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency on the positive cooperation it has received from Syria. Hopefully, that representative will be set straight and change her statements accordingly. Otherwise, the statement by our Canadian colleague gives the impression that her country supports Israel's violation of the rights of a Member State in a manner that contravenes the provisions of international law and the Charter of the United Nations and would support Israel's continued possession of nuclear weapons.

**The Chair:** The Committee has now heard the last speaker in explanation of vote under cluster 1, "Nuclear weapons".

We will now turn to cluster 2, "Other weapons of mass destruction", contained in informal paper 2.

The Committee will now take action on draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.15.

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

**Mr. Cherniavsky** (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.15, entitled "Measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol", was introduced by the representative of Indonesia, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Non-Aligned Movement, at the Committee's 12th meeting, on 22 October. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in document A/C.1/67/L.15.

**The Chair:** A recorded vote has been requested.

*A recorded vote was taken.*

*In favour:*

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain

and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

*Against:*

South Sudan

*Abstaining:*

Israel, Micronesia (Federated States of), United States of America

*Draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.15 was adopted by 166 votes to 1, with 3 abstentions.*

[Subsequently, the delegation of South Sudan informed the Secretariat that it had intended to abstain.]

**The Chair:** The Committee will now take action on draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.44.

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

**Mr. Cherniavsky** (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.44, entitled “Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction”, was introduced by the representative of Poland at the Committee’s 12th meeting, on 22 October. The sponsor of the draft resolution is listed in document A/C.1/67/L.44.

**The Chair:** The sponsor of the draft resolution has expressed the wish that it be adopted by the Committee without a vote. If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Committee wishes to act accordingly.

*Draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.44 was adopted.*

**The Chair:** I now call on the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran in explanation of position on the draft resolution just adopted.

**Mr. Najafi** (Islamic Republic of Iran): I would like to explain the position of my delegation regarding the draft resolution entitled “Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction”, contained in document A/C.1/67/L.44.

The Islamic Republic of Iran, as the main victim of the use of chemical weapons in contemporary history, attaches great importance to the full implementation of the Convention, and would like to put on record

that the total destruction of all chemical weapons stockpiles remains the key objective of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction. For these reasons, my delegation joined the consensus adoption of the draft resolution.

While the continued existence of chemical weapons threatens international peace and security and undermines the integrity and credibility of the Convention, in our view the non-compliance of the major possessor States parties with the final extended deadline of 29 April 2012 is a source of great concern. They should embark on sustained and accelerated efforts, within the framework of the Chemical Weapons Convention and its verification regimes, to achieve full compliance with their obligations under the Convention. Otherwise, the *raison d’être* of the Convention will be seriously challenged and its credibility significantly tarnished.

Although my delegation joined the consensus adoption of the draft resolution, we express our strong dissatisfaction that it does not accurately reflect the non-compliance of the major possessor States parties with their final extended deadline obligations. While that non-compliance has been acknowledged by the decision-making bodies of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and its Director-General and is reflected in their reports, there is no reason not to include it in a draft resolution of the General Assembly.

**The Chair:** The Committee will now move on to consider actions under cluster 3, “Outer space (disarmament aspects)”. I invite delegations that wish to make general statements on cluster 3 to take the floor.

**Mrs. Ledesma Hernández** (Cuba) (*spoke in Spanish*): My delegation would like to make a general statement on cluster 3, under which Cuba has co-sponsored draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.3, entitled “Prevention of an arms race in outer space”.

An arms race would be a very serious threat to international peace and security, which is why Cuba considers it to be advisable and essential to continue developing international transparency- and confidence-building measures in outer space. Cuba considers the text of the draft resolution to be an important contribution to efforts to prevent an arms race in outer space, which include concrete measures such as prior notification, verification and follow-up to

improve transparency in space activities. At the same time, we think that the Conference on Disarmament should play the leading role in negotiating a multilateral agreement on prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects. We hope that, as it was in previous years, the draft resolution will be adopted with the support of all Member States.

**The Chair:** The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.3.

**Mr. Cherniavsky** (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.3, entitled “Prevention of an arms race in outer space”, was introduced by the representative of Egypt at the 13th meeting, on 22 October. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in document A/C.1/67/L.3 and CRP.3/Rev.3.

**The Chair:** A recorded vote has been requested.

*A recorded vote was taken.*

*In favour:*

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Bhutan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines,

Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, South Sudan, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

*Against:*

None

*Abstaining:*

Israel, United States of America

*Draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.3 was adopted by 169 votes to none, with 2 abstentions.*

**The Chair:** I invite the Committee to take action on cluster 4, entitled “Conventional weapons”.

I call on the representative of Cambodia to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.8.

**Mr. Ngoun** (Cambodia): In the interest of time, our delegation would like to make a very brief statement. On behalf of Albania and Slovenia, the past and future Presidents of the Meetings of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, Cambodia, as the current President, has the honour to introduce the traditional draft resolution, contained this year in document A/C.1/67/L.8 and entitled “Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction” for the Committee's consideration.

The text of the draft resolution is similar to that of last year's, with a technical update. The main purpose of the draft resolution is to emphasize the full universalization of the Convention by urging all States to accede to it without delay and to attach great importance to the strengthening of cooperation on and implementation of the Convention, including mine clearance and the promotion of the care, rehabilitation and socioeconomic reintegration of mine victims. We are of the view that the support of all States Members of the United Nations for the draft is essential, as it would

send a signal of hope to mine victims and those who are now living in affected areas.

Based on the record, the draft resolution has received wide support from State parties and non-State parties to the Convention. We hope that this year the draft resolution will receive even wider support in order to put an end to the suffering and casualties caused by anti-personnel mines and to achieve our ultimate goal of a mine-free world. Together we can make a difference, and together we will succeed in having a mine-free future.

**The Chair:** I call on the representative of Morocco in explanation of vote before the voting.

**Mr. El Oumni** (Morocco) (*spoke in French*): Morocco, which contributed actively to the preparation process of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, has decided to vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.8, as it has done since 2004, in order to reiterate its support for the eminently humanitarian goals of the Convention, in particular the protection of the civilian population from the unacceptable damage caused by anti-personnel mines. Similarly, Morocco's ratification in March 2002 of Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons and its regular submission since 2003 of a national report on the implementation of the Protocol reflect the support of the Kingdom of Morocco for the universal impetus to eliminate anti-personnel mines. In that context, Morocco implements the Ottawa Convention's provisions on mine clearance, the destruction of stockpiles, outreach, training and assistance to victims of anti-personnel mines.

In this regard, I underscore, first, Morocco's outstanding demining efforts, which have allowed us to recover and destroy thousands of anti-personnel mines, anti-tank mines and unexploded ordnance; secondly, the Moroccan authorities' management of the care and medical, social and economic rehabilitation of victims; thirdly, Morocco's support to countries of the region in demining and its ongoing dialogue with non-governmental organizations to implement the goals of the Convention. Since 2006, the Kingdom has submitted on a voluntary basis a report under article VII of the Convention. It is that spirit that Morocco regularly takes part in the Meetings of States Parties or review conferences of the Convention.

Morocco's adherence to the Ottawa Convention is a strategic goal related to security needs related to respect for its territorial integrity.

**The Chair:** I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

**Mr. Cherniavsky** (Secretary of the Committee): Under agenda item 94, draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.8, entitled "Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction", was introduced by the representative of Cambodia at the 15th meeting, on 24 October. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in document A/C.1/67/L.8.

With the permission of the Chair, I will now read out for the record the oral statement by the Secretary-General.

This oral statement is made in accordance with rule 153 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly. Under the terms of paragraph 9 of draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.8, the General Assembly would request the Secretary-General, in accordance with article 11, paragraph 2, of the Convention, to undertake the preparations necessary to convene the Thirteenth Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention and, on behalf of the States parties and in accordance with article 11, paragraph 4, of the Convention, to invite States not parties to the Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations, to attend the Thirteenth Meeting of the States Parties and future meetings as observers.

In accordance with article 14 of the Convention, the cost of the next Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention would be borne by the State parties and States not parties to the Convention participating in that Meeting, in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment, adjusted appropriately. The Secretariat will prepare a preliminary cost estimate for the Thirteenth Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention for the approval of the States Parties at their Twelfth Meeting.

It is recalled that all activities related to international treaties that, under their respective legal arrangements, ought to be financed outside the regular budget of the United Nations may be undertaken by the



Secretariat only when sufficient funding is received in advance from States parties and States not parties to the Convention participating in the meetings. Accordingly, the adoption of draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.8 would not give rise to any financial implications under the programme budget for the biennium 2012-2013.

**The Chair:** The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.8. A recorded vote has been requested.

*A recorded vote was taken.*

*In favour:*

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Bhutan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lesotho, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, South Sudan, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu,

Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

*Against:*

None

*Abstaining:*

Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Egypt, India, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Israel, Lebanon, Libya, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Syrian Arab Republic, United States of America, Uzbekistan, Viet Nam

*Draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.8 was adopted by 152 votes to none, with 19 abstentions.*

**The Chair:** The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.12.

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

**Mr. Cherniavsky** (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.12 was introduced under agenda item 98, entitled "Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects", by the representative of Sweden at the Committee's 16th meeting, on 25 October. The sponsor of the draft resolution is listed in document A/C.1/67/L.12.

With the permission of the Chair, I shall now read an oral statement by the Secretariat in connection with draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.12. This oral statement is made in accordance with rule 153 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly.

Under the terms of paragraphs 14 and 15 of draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.12, the General Assembly would request the Secretary-General to render the necessary assistance and to provide such services, including summary records, as may be required for annual conferences and expert meetings of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, and of the High Contracting Parties to Amended Protocol II and Protocol V, as well as for any continuation of work after the meetings. The Assembly would also request the Secretary-General, in his capacity as depositary of the Convention and the Protocols thereto, to continue to inform the General Assembly periodically, by

electronic means, of ratifications and acceptances of and accessions to the Convention, its amended article 1 and the Protocols thereto.

The Committee's attention is called to the fact that the respective cost estimates for servicing the three conferences of the High Contracting Parties to be held from 12 to 16 November 2012 have been prepared by the Secretariat and approved by the Thirteenth Annual Conference of the High Contracting Parties to Amended Protocol II, held in Geneva on 11 November 2011; by the Fifth Annual Conference of the High Contracting Parties to Protocol V, held in Geneva on 9 and 10 November 2011; and by the Fourth Review Conference of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention, held in Geneva from 14 to 25 November 2011.

In addition, the Committee's attention is also drawn to the fact that the cost of the Fourteenth Annual Conference of the High Contracting Parties to Amended Protocol II, the Sixth Conference of the High Contracting Parties to Protocol V, and the 2012 Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention would be borne by the States parties and States not parties to the Convention participating in the meetings, in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessments, adjusted appropriately.

The request that the Secretary-General render the necessary assistance and provide services to the Fourteenth Annual Conference of the High Contracting Parties to Amended Protocol II, to the Sixth Conference of the High Contracting Parties to Protocol V and the 2012 Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention should thus have no financial implications on the regular budget of the United Nations.

Following established practice, the Secretariat will prepare cost estimates for any continuation of the work after the conferences, for the approval of the High Contracting Parties. It is recalled that all activities related to international conventions or treaties that, under their respective legal arrangements, are to be financed outside the regular budget of the United Nations may be undertaken by the Secretariat only after sufficient funding is received, in advance, from States parties. Accordingly, the adoption of draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.12 would not give rise to any financial implications under the proposed programme budget for 2012 to 2013.

**The Chair:** The sponsor of draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.12 has expressed the wish that the draft resolution be adopted by the Committee without a vote. If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Committee wishes to act accordingly.

*Draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.12 was adopted.*

**The Chair:** I shall now give the floor to representatives who wish to speak in explanation of vote or position following the adoption of the draft resolutions.

**Mr. Aljowaily (Egypt):** I take the floor to explain Egypt's abstention in the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.8. Egypt abstained in the voting on this draft resolution, on the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, due to the particularly imbalanced nature of that instrument, which was developed and concluded outside the framework of the United Nations.

Egypt imposed a moratorium on its own capacity to produce and export landmines in 1980, long before the conclusion of the Ottawa Convention. Egypt views the Convention as lacking in balance between the humanitarian concerns related to the production and use of anti-personnel landmines and their legitimate military use in border protection, particularly in countries with long borders.

The Convention does not impose any legal responsibility on States to remove anti-personnel mines they have placed in the territories of others, making it almost impossible for many States to meet their demining requirements on their own. That is particularly true in the case of Egypt, which still has millions of anti-personnel mines on its territory placed by warring States during the Second World War. This serious concern is further exacerbated by the weak system of international cooperation set by the Convention, which is still limited in its effect and highly dependent on the will of donor States.

The Ottawa Convention's weaknesses, resulting from its lack of universality, reflect the lack of international consensus on its provisions, due in part to its finalization outside the United Nations. That reminds us of the value of concluding arms control and disarmament agreements within the context of the United Nations and not outside that framework.

**Mr. Hallak** (Syrian Arab Republic) (*spoke in Arabic*): As it usually does, my delegation joined the consensus on draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.12, entitled “Convention on the Prohibition or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects”. We note our understanding of the new paragraph 6 that, while the General Assembly would welcome a certain agreement reached by the Fourth Review Conference of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention, that welcome does not represent any present or future commitment by States that are not parties to this agreement.

**Mr. Najafi** (Islamic Republic of Iran): My delegation shares the humanitarian concerns of the States parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction that are sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.8 on the implementation of the Convention.

Landmines have been used irresponsibly by military and armed groups during civil wars in certain regions of the world, and consequently have claimed a great number of innocent lives, particularly among women and children. We welcome every effort to stop this trend. However, the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention focuses mainly on humanitarian concerns and does not adequately take into account the legitimate military requirements of many countries, particularly those with long land borders, for responsible and, of course, limited use of mines to defend their territories.

Due to the difficulties of monitoring sensitive, extensive areas by established and permanent guard posts or effective warning systems, unfortunately landmines continue to be effective means for those countries to ensure the minimum security requirement of their borders. While this defensive device should be used under strict established rules to protect civilians, more national and international efforts also should be made to explore new alternatives to landmines. Likewise, international cooperation should be promoted to speed up the mine clearance activities in order to reduce civilian casualties and establish sustainable indigenous demining programmes.

My delegation, while appreciating the objectives of the draft resolution, due to its particular concerns and considerations, could not support the draft resolution and therefore abstained in the voting.

**Mrs. Ledesma Hernández** (Cuba) (*spoke in Spanish*): Our delegation would like to explain its vote with respect to draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.8, entitled “Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction”.

As in previous sessions, the delegation of Cuba abstained in the voting on the draft text. Cuba fully shares the legitimate humanitarian concerns related to the indiscriminate and irresponsible use of anti-personnel mines. Our country is a State party to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, including its Additional Protocol II, and complies strictly with its prohibitions and restrictions with regard to the use of mines.

As we stated earlier, Cuba has been subject to an ongoing policy of aggression and hostility for five decades by the greatest military super-Power in the world. Consequently, it is not possible for my country to give up the use of mines to protect its sovereignty and territorial integrity, in accordance with its right to self-defence, recognized in the Charter of the United Nations.

Cuba will continue to support all efforts that, in maintaining the necessary balance between humanitarian concerns and national security, seek to eliminate the terrible consequences of the indiscriminate and irresponsible use of anti-personnel mines for the civilian population and the economy of many countries. Similarly, we join the call on all countries that are able to do so to provide the necessary financial, technical and humanitarian assistance for mine clearance and the economic and social rehabilitation of victims.

**Mr. Berbash** (Libya) (*spoke in Arabic*): My country abstained in the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.8, entitled “Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction”. Although Libya has not yet joined the Convention, it is always keen to participate as an observer in meetings that are held within the context of that agreement. In May 2005, Libya hosted a workshop, together with the Government of Canada, in order to participate in the international deliberations on this topic.

Libya is aware of the human suffering and the derailment of development efforts caused by mines. Libya has suffered as a result of the mines planted

during the Second World War and continues to suffer their consequences today. That suffering and tragedy were, unfortunately, renewed during the era of the dictatorship, which ended last year. We thank those States and civil society institutions that have hastened to assist us in our recent demining efforts and in rehabilitating mine victims and the victims of the struggle against the dictatorship. It is our hope that civil society institutions and countries that are able to do so will provide more assistance to our demining efforts.

We now turn to our concerns and reservations with regard to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction. The Convention ignores the damage inflicted on countries by war and occupation or when their lands have been theatres of operation between foreign countries, which was the case of my country. The Convention does not establish a mechanism to help affected countries remove the mines left by colonial Powers by providing them with information and maps indicating the locations of the mines or with technical assistance. Therefore, the affected countries are not able to remove those mines. Similarly, the Convention does not oblige the colonial countries that planted those mines in foreign territories to remove them at their own expense or to repair the damage resulting from those mines.

Allow me, Sir, to explain our vote with regard to draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.12, entitled "Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects". Although we joined in the consensus, we have hitherto had our reasons for not joining the Convention. However, we are determined to review some of the international disarmament instruments to which we have not yet adhered and that the previous regime had reasons for not joining. As I have said, as soon as the permanent constitution of our country is adopted and a parliament and Government are elected, we are determined to reconsider and study all the previous positions of Libya with regard to those instruments. We will then take decisions with regard to those instruments.

**Mr. Hashmi** (Pakistan): Pakistan shares the humanitarian objectives espoused by draft resolution A/C.1/66/L.8, entitled "Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and

on Their Destruction". We are a party to Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, which regulates the use of landmines in both internal and external conflicts in order to prevent civilians from falling victim to landmines. We continue to implement the Protocol with the greatest earnestness.

Landmines continue to play a significant role in the defence needs of many States, especially those in regions of conflict and dispute. Pakistan remains committed to pursuing the objectives of a universal and non-discriminatory ban on anti-personnel mines in a manner that takes into account the legitimate defence requirements of States.

Given our security compulsions and the need to guard our long borders not protected by any natural obstacle, the use of landmines forms an important part of our self-defence strategy. As such, it is not possible for Pakistan to agree to the demands for the complete prohibition of anti-personnel landmines until viable alternatives are available. The objective of the total elimination of anti-personnel mines can best be promoted, inter alia, by making available non-lethal, military and cost-effective alternative technologies.

Pakistan, as one of the largest troop contributors to United Nations-led peacekeeping operations, has actively contributed to demining operations in several affected countries. We are prepared to provide training facilities to the mine-affected countries within our national resources. We enjoy a unique record of clearing all minefields after the wars in South Asia. There has never been a humanitarian situation caused by the use of those mines. We remain committed to ensuring that mines in our military inventory will never become the cause of civilian casualties in Pakistan or elsewhere in the world.

**Mr. Gill** (India): I take the floor to explain India's abstention in the voting on A/C.1/67/L.8, entitled "Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction".

India supports the vision of a world free of the threat of anti-personnel landmines. Since 1997, India has discontinued the production of non-detectable anti-personnel mines and observed a moratorium on their transfer. India is a party to Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, which enshrines the approach of taking into account the legitimate defence requirements of States,

especially those with long borders. The availability of militarily effective alternative technologies that can cost-effectively perform the legitimate defensive role of anti-personnel landmines will considerably facilitate the goal of the complete elimination of anti-personnel mines. India remains committed to increased international cooperation in assistance for mine clearance and the rehabilitation of mine victims, and is willing to continue to contribute technical assistance and expertise to this end.

Since the first Review Conference of the States Parties to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, held in Nairobi in 2004, India has participated in all the Meetings of the States Parties as an observer. We intend to continue our participation in the meetings of the Convention as an observer.

**Mr. Kang Myong Chol** (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): The delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea abstained in the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.8, entitled "Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction" because the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is unable to accede to the Convention at present, owing to the specific security circumstances on the Korean peninsula.

As is well known, the Korean peninsula is still in a state of war, with a fragile and uneasy truce having been in place for six decades. While the Democratic People's Republic of Korea shares the humanitarian concerns associated with the indiscriminate use of landmines, in order to preserve its sovereignty it cannot forgo the use of mines. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea has been subject to a hostile policy by the United States, manifested in the continued threat of aggression and pre-emptive strike. The United States refuses to join the Convention, keeping its options open in terms of the use of mines on the Korean peninsula. There are now currently millions of mines planted in the demilitarized zone, and the United States attempts to rationalize the use of mines on foreign territory under the pretext of its commitment to defending its ally.

Under this imminent security threat, and with nearly 30,000 United States troops deployed in South Korea and ready to commit acts of hostility against my country, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea will be unable to join the Ottawa Convention until the truce gives way to lasting peace and foreign troops

withdraw completely from the Korean peninsula. Although the Democratic People's Republic of Korea cannot renounce the use of landmines due to legitimate defence requirements, there have been no cases of innocent civilians suffering from the landmines in my country to date.

**Ms. Hong** (Singapore): I am taking the floor to explain my delegation's vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.8, entitled "Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction".

Singapore's position on anti-personnel landmines has been clear and open. As in the past years, Singapore supports and will continue to support all initiatives against the indiscriminate use of anti-personnel landmines, especially when they are directed at innocent and defenceless civilians. With this in mind, in May 1996 Singapore declared a two-year moratorium on the export of anti-personnel landmines without self-neutralizing mechanisms. In February 1998, Singapore expanded the moratorium to include all manner of anti-personnel landmines, not just those without self-neutralizing mechanisms, and extended the moratorium indefinitely. We also support the work of the Convention by regularly attending the meetings of the State Parties to the Convention.

At the same time, like several other countries, Singapore firmly states that the legitimate security concerns and the right to self-defence of any State cannot be disregarded. A blanket ban on all types of anti-personnel landmines might therefore be counterproductive. Singapore supports international efforts to resolve the humanitarian concerns over anti-personnel landmines. We will continue to work with members of the international community towards finding a durable and truly global solution.

**Mr. Seruhere** (United Republic of Tanzania): I would like to inform the Committee that the United Republic of Tanzania, in cooperation with a non-governmental organization from Belgium, has developed a very cheap technology for detecting anti-personnel mines. This cheap technology has been in use for over five years. It is called SUA-APOPO. It uses rats, and I want to assure the Committee that the rats are very safe because, in order to detonate an anti-personnel mine, one needs a minimum of 11 kilograms, which is equivalent to 24.2 imperial or United States pounds. The rats only

weigh 3.5 kilograms, which is equivalent to 6.7 imperial or United States pounds.

**The Chair:** We will now move on to consider cluster 5, “Other disarmament measures and international security”.

I give the floor to delegations wishing to make general statements other than explanations of vote or to introduce draft resolutions under cluster 5.

**Mrs. Ledesma Hernández** (Cuba) (*spoke in Spanish*): Our delegation would like to make a general statement on this new cluster. Among the issues under this cluster, we would like to stress that the members of the Non-Aligned Movement have introduced, as in previous years, three draft resolutions concerning various important questions that are highly relevant not only to the members of the NAM, but also to the entire international community. Those draft resolutions are A/C.1/67/L.16, entitled “Effects of the use of armaments and ammunitions containing depleted uranium”; A/C.1/67/L.17, entitled “Observance of environmental norms in the drafting and implementation of agreements on disarmament and arms control”; and A/C.1/67/L.18, entitled “Promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation”.

The legitimate concerns of the international community regarding the effects of the use of armaments and ammunitions containing depleted uranium are addressed in a comprehensive way in draft resolution A/67/C.1/L.16, taking account of the persisting scientific uncertainty regarding the long-term environmental effects of depleted uranium, especially in respect of long-term contamination of the water table. There is therefore a need to adopt precautionary measures with regard to the use of depleted uranium. At the same time, research should continue to determine the long-term effects on health and environment due to the use of such armaments and ammunitions.

Cuba also believes that relevant environmental standards must be taken fully into account when negotiating treaties and agreements on disarmament and arms-control measures in international disarmament forums, as called for in draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.17. In that regard, all States should contribute to compliance with such standards in the application of treaties and conventions to which they are parties.

The complex international situation requires us to work together in tackling the urgent problems

facing humankind and confirms the importance of draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.18 on the promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation. We believe that the text represents an important contribution to the debate on and the search for effective and lasting multilateral solutions in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation.

Cuba urges all delegations to support the draft resolutions submitted under this cluster, and we trust that the vast majority of delegations will vote in favour of them, as they have in previous years.

**The Chair:** I shall now give the floor to delegations that wish to explain their positions or votes on the draft resolutions and decision under cluster 5.

**Mr. Pollard** (United Kingdom): I would like to deliver the following explanation of position on behalf of France and the United Kingdom, which will join consensus on draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.17, entitled “Observance of environmental norms in the drafting and implementation of agreements on disarmament and arms control”.

We wish to make clear that, in joining consensus, the United Kingdom and France operate under stringent domestic environmental impact regulations for many activities, including the implementation of arms-control and disarmament agreements. We see no direct connection, as stated in the draft resolution, between general environmental standards and multilateral arms control.

**Mr. Bravaco** (United States of America): The United States will not participate in the action on draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.17, entitled “Observance of environmental norms in the drafting and implementation of agreements on disarmament and arms control”. As we have previously explained, the United States operates under stringent domestic environmental regulations for many activities, including the implementation of arms-control and disarmament agreements. We see no direct connection, as stated in the draft resolution, between general environmental standards and multilateral arms control and do not consider this a matter germane to the First Committee.

**The Chair:** The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.16.

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

**Mr. Cherniavsky** (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.16, entitled “Effects of the use of armaments and ammunitions containing depleted uranium”, was introduced under agenda item 94 (e) by the representative of Indonesia on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries at the Committee’s 17th meeting, on 1 November. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in document A/C.1/67/L.16.

**The Chair:** A recorded vote has been requested.

*A recorded vote was taken.*

*In favour:*

Afghanistan, Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Singapore, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

*Against:*

France, Israel, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

*Abstaining:*

Albania, Andorra, Australia, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, South Sudan, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Ukraine

*Draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.16 was adopted by 138 votes to 4, with 28 abstentions.*

**The Chair:** The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.17.

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

**Mr. Cherniavsky** (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.17, entitled “Observance of environmental norms in the drafting and implementation of agreements on disarmament and arms control”, was introduced under agenda item 94 (q) by the representative of Indonesia on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries at the Committee’s 17th meeting, on 1 November. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in document A/C.1/67/L.17.

**The Chair:** The sponsor of draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.17 has expressed the wish that the Committee adopt it without a vote. If I hear no objection, I will take it that the Committee wishes to act accordingly.

*Draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.17 was adopted.*

**The Chair:** The Committee will now take action on draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.18.

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

**Mr. Cherniavsky** (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.18, entitled “Promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation”, was introduced under agenda item 94 (r) by the representative of Indonesia on behalf of the State Members of the United Nations that are members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries at the Committee’s 17th meeting, on 1 November. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in document A/C.1/67/L.18.

**The Chair:** A recorded vote has been requested.

*A recorded vote was taken.*

*In favour:*

Afghanistan, Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Russian Federation, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

*Against:*

Israel, Micronesia (Federated States of), United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

*Abstaining:*

Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Samoa, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Sudan, Spain,

Sweden, Switzerland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey

*Draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.18 was adopted by 119 votes to 4, with 49 abstentions.*

[Subsequently, the delegation of Ukraine informed the Secretariat that it had intended to abstain.]

**The Chair:** The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.34.

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

**Mr. Cherniavsky** (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.34, entitled "United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education", was introduced under agenda item 94 (o) by the representative of Mexico. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in documents A/C.1/67/L.34 and A/C.1/67/CRP.3/Rev.3.

**The Chair:** The sponsors of the draft resolution have expressed the wish that the Committee adopt the draft resolution without a vote. If I hear no objection, I will take it that the Committee wishes to act accordingly.

*Draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.34 was adopted.*

**The Chair:** The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft decision A/C.1/67/L.54.

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

**Mr. Cherniavsky** (Secretary of the Committee): Draft decision A/C.1/67/L.54, entitled "Role of science and technology in the context of international security and disarmament", was submitted under agenda item 93 by the representative of India. The sponsor of the draft decision is listed in document A/C.1/67/L.54.

**The Chair:** The sponsor of the draft decision has expressed the wish that the draft decision be adopted by the Committee without a vote. If I hear no objection, I will take it that the Committee wishes to act accordingly.

*Draft decision A/C.1/67/L.54 was adopted.*

**The Chair:** I shall now call on those representatives who wish to explain their vote or position on the draft resolutions and decision just adopted.

**Mr. Amano** (Japan): My delegation has asked for the floor to explain Japan's position on draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.16, entitled "Effects of the use of armaments and ammunition containing depleted uranium", for which Japan voted in favour.



In accordance with paragraphs 2 and 5 of resolution 65/55, adopted by the General Assembly on 8 December 2010, Japan has submitted to the Secretary-General its views on the effects related to the use of depleted uranium armaments and ammunitions (see A/65/129). As we communicated to the Secretary-General, Japan has not used or owned armaments and ammunitions that contain depleted uranium. We recognize that, despite the studies conducted by relevant international organizations on the effects of the use of that type of munition on human health and the environment, at present no internationally definitive conclusion has been drawn. Japan will continue to follow the developments in the studies conducted by the relevant international organizations.

In that connection, Japan would like to call upon all relevant international organizations to conduct successive on-site studies and further information-gathering, including the most recent scientific findings. At the same time, we ask that those organizations pay due attention to the opinions and activities of the interested non-governmental organizations in that field and to provide their views on the effects that the use of depleted uranium munitions may or can cause to the human body and the environment.

**Mr. Winkler** (Germany): Germany voted in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.16, entitled “Effects of the use of armaments and ammunitions containing depleted uranium”. Germany regrets that the relevant United Nations Environment Programme report of 2010 (A/65/129/Add.1) is quoted in a selective and misleading way in the draft resolution. The United Nations Environment Programme, in its report to the Secretary-General on the subject, also stated that the measured overall levels of radioactivity were low and within acceptable international standards, with no immediate dangers from either particle-based or waterborne toxicity. That statement is not adequately reflected in the reference in the seventh preambular paragraph of the resolution.

**Mr. Pollard** (United Kingdom): I am speaking on behalf of France, the United Kingdom and the United States to explain our negative vote on draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.16, entitled “Effects of the use of armaments and ammunitions containing depleted uranium”.

This is not a new issue. Despite some updates, the draft resolution continues to call for further action by

the Secretary-General and States Members of the United Nations on the basis of the alleged harmful effects of the use of depleted uranium munitions on human health and the environment. The environmental and health effects of the use of depleted uranium munitions have been so far thoroughly investigated by the World Health Organization, the United Nations Environment Programme, the International Atomic Energy Agency, NATO, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the European Commission and others. None of those inquiries has documented any cases of long-term environmental or health effects attributable to the use of such munitions. It is therefore regrettable that the conclusions of those studies are ignored in this way.

It is further regrettable that the sponsors of the draft resolution have failed to quote the response from the 2010 United Nations Environment Programme report in its entirety and used the following partial quote to strengthen their alleged claim.

“The main scientific findings were consistent across the three assessments. Measurements taken at the depleted uranium sites showed that, even in areas with widespread depleted uranium contamination, the overall levels of radioactivity were low and within acceptable international standards, with no immediate dangers from either particle-based or waterborne toxicity.” (A/65/129/Add.1, para. 4)

Given the lack of tangible evidence to the contrary, we do not recognize the presupposed potential risks to health and the environment. We therefore do not support United Nations resolutions that presuppose that depleted uranium is harmful.

**Mr. Gillon** (Belgium) (*spoke in French*): Belgium voted in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.16, entitled “Effects of the use of armaments and ammunitions containing depleted uranium”.

On 20 June 2009, a law entered into force in Belgium that prohibits inert munitions and armoured plating containing depleted uranium or any other type of industrial uranium. The adoption of that law was preceded by parliamentary hearings, at which scientific experts made presentations. Different points of view were expressed as to the danger posed to health and the environment by the use of depleted uranium weapons. Belgium pays very close attention to any developments in the scientific analysis of the dangers related to the use of weapons systems containing depleted uranium,

including studies undertaken on the issue at the international level.

In that connection, Belgium takes note of the report submitted by the United Nations Environment Programme to the Secretary-General (A/65/129/Add.1). All its conclusions deserve our attention. Belgium was the first country in the world to have decreed such a prohibition based on the principles of caution and prudence. Belgium is ready to provide any clarification to the United Nations with regard to the definitions, objectives and modalities of its law. It also states its readiness to share, where necessary, its expertise in order to provide information regarding its legislative experience to members and any interested State, in particular those in the process of establishing legislation in that area.

Belgium hopes that the draft resolution that we have just adopted in the First Committee will contribute to a better understanding at the international level of the possible effects of weapons and ammunitions containing depleted uranium, with a view to reaching a joint assessment in due course.

**Ms. Kloeg** (Netherlands): The Netherlands has again voted in favour of the draft resolution entitled “Effects of the use of armaments and ammunitions containing depleted uranium” (A/C.1/67/L.16).

However, we feel that the basis for such research and discussions could have been formulated in a more neutral way by speaking of possible consequences instead of potential hazards or potential harmful effects. The reference in the draft resolution to the potential harmful effect of the use of depleted uranium ammunitions on human health and the environment cannot be supported by conclusive scientific evidence. That view is shared by the World Health Organization and the International Atomic Energy Agency in the report of the Secretary-General (A/65/129 and A/65/129/Add.1).

The research undertaken by the United Nations Environment Programme, among other bodies, indicates that measurements taken at a depleted uranium site showed that even in areas of widespread depleted uranium contamination, the overall levels of radioactivity were low and within international standards, with no immediate dangers from either particle-based or waterborne toxicity. We will closely monitor the outcomes of the ongoing and future research in that field and take any further developments into

consideration when the issue is taken up again during the 2014 session of the First Committee.

**The Chair:** We have heard the last speaker in explanation of vote or position on the draft resolutions and decision adopted under cluster 5.

We will now turn to the draft resolutions under cluster 6, “Regional disarmament and security”. Before the Committee proceeds to take action on them, I shall give the floor to those delegations wishing to make general statements other than explanations of vote or position, or to introduce draft resolutions under cluster 6.

I give the floor to the representative of Pakistan to introduce draft resolutions A/C.1/67/L.47, A/C.1/67/L.51 and A/C.1/67/L.53.

**Mr. Hashmi** (Pakistan): I take the floor to introduce the three resolutions under cluster 6, namely, draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.47, entitled “Regional disarmament”; draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.51, entitled “Confidence-building measures in the regional and subregional context”; and draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.53, entitled “Conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels”.

I turn first to draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.47, which I would like to introduce on behalf of the delegations of Bangladesh, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Indonesia, Kuwait, Peru, Saudi Arabia, the Sudan, Turkey and my own country, Pakistan.

While there is no denying the importance of international disarmament measures, the regional dimension is unquestionably significant. The promotion of security and disarmament at the regional level complements those objectives at the global level. In that regard, the guidelines and recommendations for regional approaches to disarmament within the context of global security adopted by the Disarmament Commission in 1993 show us the way.

The sponsors, including my delegation, hope that, as in the Committee’s previous session, the draft resolution will be adopted unanimously.

I would now like to introduce the draft resolution, entitled “Confidence-building measures in the regional and subregional context”, contained in document A/C.1/67/L.51, on behalf of the delegations of Bangladesh, Egypt, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, the

Philippines, Sierra Leone, the Syrian Arab Republic, Ukraine, Uruguay and my own delegation, Pakistan.

The submission of the draft resolution is driven by the internationally recognized value of regional and subregional confidence-building measures. Pakistan is convinced that such measures have yielded and will continue to yield peace and conflict-resolution dividends, which in turn allow States to concentrate on socioeconomic development. Confidence-building measures can also create an enabling atmosphere for arms control and disarmament.

The draft resolution recalls, *inter alia*, the confidence-building-measure-related ways and means set out in the 1993 report of the Disarmament Commission (see A/48/42, annex II) and urges Member States to pursue them through sustained consultations and dialogue.

My delegation and the other sponsors hope that, as in the past year, the draft resolution will be unanimously adopted by the Committee.

Finally, allow me now to introduce the draft resolution entitled “Conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels”, contained in document A/C.1/67/L.53, on behalf of the delegations of Bangladesh, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Syrian Arab Republic, the United Arab Emirates and my own delegation, Pakistan. The draft resolution aims to promote conventional disarmament at the regional and subregional levels. Despite its significance, this issue has not so far received due attention or support. The international community needs to be sharply focused on conventional balance and arms control.

The sponsors, including my delegation, look forward to the Committee’s continuing strong support for this draft resolution.

**The Chair:** The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.47.

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

**Mr. Cherniavsky** (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.47, entitled “Regional disarmament”, has just been introduced by the representative of Pakistan. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in documents A/C.1/67/L.47 and A/C.1/67/CRP.3/Rev.3.

**The Chair:** The sponsors of the draft resolution have expressed the wish that it be adopted by the Committee without a vote. If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Committee wishes to act accordingly.

*Draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.47 was adopted.*

**The Chair:** The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.51.

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

**Mr. Cherniavsky** (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.51, entitled “Confidence-building measures in the regional and subregional context”, has just been introduced under agenda item 94 (w) by the representative of Pakistan. The sponsors of the draft resolution are contained in documents A/C.1/67/L.51 and A/C.1/67/CRP.3/Rev.3.

**The Chair:** The sponsors of the draft resolution have expressed the wish that the draft resolution be adopted by the Committee without a vote. If I hear no objection, I will take it that the Committee wishes to act accordingly.

*Draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.51 was adopted.*

**The Chair:** The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.53.

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

**Mr. Cherniavsky** (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.53, entitled “Conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels”, was just introduced under agenda item 94 (v) by the representative of Pakistan. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in documents A/C.1/67/L.53 and A/C.1/67/CRP.3/Rev.3.

**The Chair:** A separate, recorded vote has been requested on operative paragraph 2.

*A recorded vote was taken.*

*In favour:*

Afghanistan, Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Cuba, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Djibouti, Dominican Republic,

Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka, the Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

*Against:*

India

*Abstaining:*

Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Bhutan, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Malta, Mexico, Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Samoa, San Marino, Slovakia, South Sudan, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

*Operative paragraph 2 was retained by 132 votes to 1, with 36 abstentions.*

**The Chair:** The Committee will now take action on draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.53 as a whole. A recorded vote has been requested.

*A recorded vote was taken.*

*In favour:*

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina,

Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, South Sudan, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

*Against:*

India

*Abstaining:*

Bhutan, Russian Federation

*Draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.53, as a whole, was adopted by 166 votes to 1, with 2 abstentions.*

**The Chair:** I shall now give the floor to those representatives who wish to speak in explanation of vote or position on the draft resolutions just adopted.

**Mr. Ermakov** (Russian Federation) (*spoke in Russian*): As everyone may have noticed, the Russian Federation abstained in the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.53. We recognize the importance of conventional arms control to ensuring regional security, but we are convinced that the system of such control should correspond to the real military and political situation and contribute to ensuring peace and maintaining stability.

Speaking concretely, every year we point out to the authors and sponsors of the present text that the reference in the preamble to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe as a cornerstone of European security is unacceptable. As everyone knows, the Treaty is a relic of the Cold War — a product of the confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States of America. Even before it was implemented, the Treaty no longer corresponded to the military and political situation that had developed in Europe. Thus, it was not only discriminatory, but in some ways comical because the Treaty explicitly includes in its area of application “that part of the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics comprising the Baltic countries”, which is a reference to Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania, all of which are members of NATO. Accordingly, it is simply unacceptable and not serious to consider the Treaty as a model for building regional security.

**Mr. Gill** (India): India voted against the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/67/L.53, entitled “Conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels”. The draft resolution requests the Conference on Disarmament to consider the formulation of principles that can serve as a framework for regional agreements on conventional arms control. The Conference, as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, has the vocation of negotiating

disarmament instruments of global application. In 1993, the United Nations Disarmament Commission adopted by consensus guidelines and recommendations for regional disarmament. There is no need, therefore, for the Conference on Disarmament to engage in formulating principles on the same subject at a time when it has several other priority issues on its agenda.

Furthermore, we believe that the security concerns of States extend beyond narrowly defined regions. Consequently, the notion of preserving a balance in defence capabilities in the regional or subregional context is unrealistic and unacceptable to our delegation.

**Mr. Pintado** (Mexico) (*spoke in Spanish*): I would like to refer to draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.53, entitled “Conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels”, which was just adopted by the First Committee. As it did at the sixty-sixth session, my delegation decided to abstain in the voting on paragraph 2. As already indicated, our reservations concern two issues.

First, we believe that the development of conventional arms control principles is not in the area of competence of the Conference on Disarmament, not only because of the issues it encompasses, but also because it does not have a place within the negotiating mandate of that body. In any case, it is the First Committee that, given its deliberative nature, should consider this issue.

Secondly, Mexico believes that the deadlock in and working methods of the Conference on Disarmament make it impossible to add another item to the agenda of that body, such as that referred to in the paragraph on which we abstained.

*The meeting rose at 6.05 p.m.*