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AGENDA ITEMS 90 AND 91

Question of the representation of China in the United Nations (continued)*

Restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations (continued)*

1. Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom): We are now coming towards the end of what has been a fairly substantial debate on the problem under discussion and I do not propose to delay the Assembly long in the remarks that I have to make on this matter.

2. For several years the United Kingdom Government has taken the view that because the question of Chinese representation in the United Nations was one over which such strongly divergent views were held in this Assembly it would have been unprofitable in our view, and indeed harmful, to discuss it. We, together with the majority of the Members of the General Assembly, therefore at that time supported the moratorium. We make no apology for this. The moratorium procedure certainly did not solve the question of Chinese representation, but in its day it served to avoid undue acrimony and dissension over a subject which no amount of debate would have solved.

3. But my Government does not believe that a procedure useful, and indeed advisable, at the time that it was designed, necessarily remains useful and advisable for ever. In the past year we have therefore given much thought, in common with many other Members of this Assembly, to the manner in which this very vexed question of Chinese representation might now be dealt with.

4. Hitherto, the effect of the moratorium has been to freeze the question. This year the Assembly has decided to inscribe and to debate the two items now on our agenda. This decision represents a considerable change. The five-Power draft resolution [A/L.372] now before us is in keeping with it. It does not preclude discussion of, or any vote upon, the subject at issue. It proposes only that any decision to make a change in Chinese representation should require a two-thirds majority.

5. The basis for such a proposal is that the question of Chinese representation in the United Nations is an important one. No one who has followed the course of this problem through the last decade, in this Assembly as well as elsewhere, can deny that it is an important question. Spokesmen of the Soviet Union have in the past referred to it as "one of the most vital and pressing issues confronting the General Assembly" and, again, one which "profoundly affects the fate of the United Nations itself". Mr. Khrushchev, speaking in this Assembly at the fifteenth session, described it himself as "an important and pressing question". If, this year, the representative of the Soviet Union has studiously—and I use the word advisedly—avoided using the words "important question", he has nevertheless given us decisive arguments in favour of considering it exactly that. In the course of his tendentious speech on 1 December, the representative of the Soviet Union said that the seating of the Chinese People's Republic

"is vital from the point of view of struggling for the consolidation of peace and the normalization of the international situation. This question also vitally affects the situation within the United Nations itself" [1068th meeting, para. 22].**

In listening to the statements of representatives of other delegations also, it has been clear that on all sides this problem is considered to be of the utmost importance. It is therefore reasonable that it should be dealt with in accordance with the procedure for reaching decisions on important questions in the General Assembly.

6. Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom wishes to make it clear that its objective in supporting this draft resolution is not—I repeat, is not—to find some new means of pushing this important problem aside. It is not the policy of Her Majesty's Government to deny a seat in the United Nations to the People's Republic of China. On the contrary, as my Secretary of State, Lord Home, said in the British Parliament last February, we believe that the facts of international life require the presence of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations.

7. Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom believes that the aim of the United Nations must be to reach a solution to the question of Chinese representation acceptable to a wide majority of Member States and as fair to all the interested parties as circumstances permit.

8. Mr. STEVENSON (United States of America): At this session of the General Assembly the United States favoured full and free debate on the question of the representation of China in the United Nations. We have been having just such a debate for the past two weeks, and we have heard no less than fifty speakers.

*Resumed from the 1077th meeting.

**Provisional English version taken from the interpretation.

9. At several points we have heard again some old and tired ideological tirades. History has been turned upside down by such statements as that it was South Korea which attacked North Korea on that infamous Sunday in June 1950. And a few of the speeches have been seasoned with captious, capricious and irrelevant inaccuracies. I shall resist the temptation to contradict them in detail.

10. But I must reply briefly to a suggestion by several speakers—that the real reason for the opposition of the United States to a change in Chinese representation is that we resent the "social system" of the Peking régime. This, of course, is a red herring. It is well known that we maintain normal relations with a number of Communist States. We did not oppose the recent entry into this body of another such country. In recent weeks the President of the United States has said quite clearly that we have no objection to a communist régime if that is what the people of a certain country want for themselves.

11. No, Mr. President, that is not the problem. Nor is the problem that we are confusing 1961 with 1945 or 1949; indeed, we believe in redemption from sin—and letting bygones be bygones.

12. No amount of good will, of tolerance, of generosity, of wishful thinking, can obscure the reality of 1961—and we are asked to offer membership in this body to a régime which believes in the rule of the gun—not the rule of reason, or of negotiation, or of co-operative action—but the rule of the gun.

13. And no amount of sentiment can obscure the fact that the draft resolution [A/L.360] of the Soviet Union would give a licence for the Peking régime to use armed force against a Member which sits in this Assembly. One can hardly accuse the representative of the Soviet Union of equivocation on this point. In his opening statement in this debate he was explicit about the alleged "right" of Peking to "liquidate"—I use his words—"through the use of force" the Republic of China on Taiwan. "That," he said, "is within its exclusive right and nobody else's" [1068th meeting, para. 55].***

14. This body has devoted many anguished hours to its duty and its resolve to prevent the use of force, and now we are faced with this astonishing request to sanction the use of force.

15. And some would have us believe that this really is not an important question—just a routine procedural point for casual decision.

16. Article 18 of the Charter, which deals with the important question at issue, is not a narrow, legalistic concept. In the wisdom of the founders, it is left to the Assembly to determine—on general political grounds—what is and what is not an important question. And this is precisely what the Assembly has done on one occasion after another. There is nothing unusual about the procedure involved. For example, as recently as 27 October 1961 [1043rd meeting] the Assembly decided by a vote that a resolution dealing with the report of the Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation was of sufficient importance to require for passage a two-thirds majority of all Members present and voting. This was fully in accordance with the rules of procedure and Article 18 of the Charter.

17. There has also been an effort to confuse this debate by contending that a precedent was set for the question before us when the Assembly accepted the credentials of the representatives of the Republic of the Congo (Leopoldville) in November 1960. The statement has even been made that the resolution was passed by a simple majority.

18. In point of fact, the resolution was passed by better than a two-thirds majority. But that is not the main point. The main point is that there is no analogy between the presentation of credentials by the unchallenged Head of State of a new nation which has just achieved membership and the present proposal to throw out a founding Member and replace it with representatives of another régime. I hope no further effort will be made to confuse the issue on this score.

19. I submit with all sincerity that the proposal to expel a Member which supports the Charter to make room for a régime which defies the Charter and to arm that régime with a United Nations licence to make war across the Formosa Strait, is wrong from the point of view of this Organization—is morally wrong, is legally wrong—is unrealistic in the light of the relevant realities of 1961. Whatever else may be said, it is indubitably an important question—one of the most important questions ever likely to come before this body.

20. A recurrent theme that runs through the arguments put forth by those who favour the immediate admission of Red China is a plea for realism. Let us face the fact, these speakers say, that the mainland of China has been under the control of the Chinese Communist Party for these twelve years past. Let us, they say, face the fact—repeated from this rostrum scores of times during the past ten days—that there are six and a half or seven hundred million Chinese people under the control of that régime. And, they say finally, let us face the fact that this is 1961, not 1945.

21. The idea behind this theme seems to be that other delegations are guilty of a lack of realism because they are not bowled over by the big reality, which seems to be that Communist control of mainland China is Communist control of mainland China. But no one has disputed this obvious fact. As I heard it repeated over and over again, I thought of the famous American aphorism about the woodpecker: "Thou sayest such undisputed things in such a solemn way."

22. These repeated facts only help to define the problem; they do not help to solve it.

23. To act wisely on the matter before us, we must look at all the relevant and current realities bearing upon the Communist régime in Peking and the Organization it aspires to join. I suggest that there are six such realities of major consequence to the decision that we are soon to make.

24. The first reality is that the régime in Peking does not, in any meaningful way, represent these six and a half or seven hundred million people of whom we have heard so often these past two weeks: the mass executions, the iron controls, the total suppression of all personal freedom and civil liberties, the two million Chinese refugees in Hong Kong—these are proof enough.

25. The second reality is that the Communist Chinese régime has already made a record of aggression and

***Provisional English version taken from the interpretation.

hostility toward its neighbours in Korea, in Tibet, in India and in South-East Asia.

26. The third reality is that the Chinese Communists are dedicated today—and as a matter of high policy—to war and to violent revolution in other countries.

27. The fourth reality is that the Republic of China is a founding Member of the United Nations; that the Government of the Republic of China exists, and so do eleven million people on Taiwan; that its delegation which sits here now has performed honourable service to the United Nations and to its Charter.

28. The fifth reality is the Charter of the United Nations, which sets forth explicitly the requirements for membership and the terms for expulsion.

29. The sixth reality is the proposal which is put to us in the Soviet draft resolution [A/L.360], which is this: that by our own deliberate action we are first to throw out a founding Member who is guilty of nothing, in order to empty a seat in this hall, and then we are to invite another delegation to enter this body, on its own terms, to fill that empty seat; and we are to present that new delegation with a special licence to commit armed aggression against the Member which we have just illegally ejected.

30. This is the reality of the proposal before us: to violate our own Charter to make room for a régime whose creed and actions are diametrically opposed to the letter and the spirit of the United Nations Charter.

31. These, I say, are realities; these are facts. And it is precisely these hard, cold and current realities of 1961 which persuade my delegation that what we are asked to do is not realistic, but unrealistic. And it is these realities which have been overlooked or conveniently ignored by some who have spoken on this subject in recent days.

32. To be tolerant we do not have to be naïve; to be generous we do not have to be foolhardy; and to be realistic, most certainly we do not have to be carried away by wishful thinking.

33. I have in mind especially the suggestion made by several speakers that once the Peking régime has been admitted to this Organization, it would forthwith change its spots and join co-operatively with other nations to help keep the peace and otherwise engage in constructive international enterprise.

34. This is a most tempting thought which all of us would like to share. But I still look for evidence that there is any substance to it. All the evidence points the other way. And it would be exceedingly dangerous to substitute our hopes for the hard evidence about the intentions of the Peking régime which is furnished by that régime itself.

35. This evidence is not of our manufacture. It is not the product of ill-will on our side. It is the official evidence offered by the Peking régime itself, in its own words and by its own actions. We would ignore it at our common peril because it bears directly upon the work and the future of this Organization. And it shows clearly just how harmoniously the Peking régime would fit into the deliberations of this body—just how constructive a contribution we could expect from this new voice in the United Nations.

36. Let me remind the representatives of the basic world view of the Peking régime. It was put quite clearly by Red Flag, the theoretical journal of the

Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, in April of 1960. Red Flag says that:

"Everyone knows that there are principally two types of countries with social systems fundamentally different in nature. One type belongs to the world socialist system, the other to the world capitalist system."

This statement means that in the eyes of Peking, every Member of this Assembly that does not belong to the world communist system belongs, by definition, to what Peking calls the "capitalist-imperialist system"—for there are only two types of countries.

37. And Red Flag goes on to announce:

"The capitalist-imperialist system absolutely will not crumble by itself. It will be pushed over by the proletarian revolution within the imperialist country concerned, and the national revolution in the colonial and semi-colonial countries. Revolution means the use of revolutionary violence by the oppressed class, it means revolutionary war."

38. This concept is further borne out by a statement from a senior official of the Chinese Communist Government, Tung Pi-Wu, who declared on 5 October 1961, just a few weeks ago at a public meeting in Peking: "In the present epoch, only under the leadership of the proletariat, and by obtaining the help of the socialist countries, will it be possible for any country to win complete victory in its national and democratic revolution". In other words, a communist revolution, aided by external support from communist countries, must still be fostered in the newly independent countries of the world.

39. Proof that these are not mere words was heard in this Assembly only the other day when the representative of one new African nation poignantly described Peking's incessant campaign to destroy his Government through subversion and guerrilla warfare.

40. This is the world view of the Peking régime and it should be warning enough to all of us. But what does Peking think more precisely about our most urgent world problems—about the kind of problem we attempt to deal with here in the United Nations? I shall mention two—disarmament and the United Nations operations in the Congo.

41. On disarmament we also find the evidence in the same article to which I have referred. Remember, if you please, the premise that all nations which are not members of the world communist system are considered to be "imperialist". The magazine says:

"It is ... inconceivable that imperialism will accept a proposal for general and complete disarmament ... only when the Socialist revolution is victorious throughout the world can there be a world free from war ...".

42. That takes care of our search for general disarmament: according to Peking it is a hopeless illusion until all Governments have been overthrown by violent communist revolution. In the meantime, Peking's policy on the recent rupture of the moratorium on nuclear testing is the following—in its own words, of course:

"The Soviet Government's decision to conduct experimental explosions of nuclear weapons is in accord with the interests of world peace and those of the people of all countries."

43. As for the United Nations operations in the Congo, Peking's policy is set forth as recently as 6 December 1961 in the People's Daily, the official newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party. Our peace-keeping effort in the Congo, in which troops of a score of Members are involved, is described in the People's Daily as nothing but imperialism under United Nations cover. "As long as the Congo remains occupied by the United Nations force", according to People's Daily, "the Congolese issue will remain unsolvable and the freedom of other African countries insecure." The article then demands an immediate stop to the United Nations operation in the Congo. That, of course, is a prescription for tribal strife, chaos and slaughter in Central Africa—which is, no doubt, what Peking desires.

44. Finally, at the very moment when some Members of the Assembly were pleading the qualifications of the Peking régime for membership in the United Nations, the People's Daily of 10 December 1961—just four days ago—had this to say:

"... All revolutionary people can never abandon the truth that 'all political power grows out of the barrel of a gun ...'

"... The revolutionary theories, strategy and tactics, summed up by the Chinese people in revolutionary practice and expressed in a nutshell in Comrade Mao Tse-Tung's writing, are carrying more and more weight with the people of various countries ...

"... To put it frankly, all oppressed nations and peoples will sooner or later rise in revolution, and this is precisely why revolutionary experiences and theories will naturally gain currency among these nations and peoples. This is why pamphlets introducing guerrilla warfare in China have such wide circulation in Africa, Latin America and Asia ...".

45. Those are not my words. Those are quotations from the People's Daily of only four days ago.

46. Nowhere in this extraordinary document do the Chinese Communists deny that their actions have been as I described them. Indeed, they boastfully announce their intention to continue spreading violence and dissension abroad.

47. Note carefully, also, if you will, that none of these official statements has anything to do with membership or non-membership in the United Nations. Peking does not say that it favours atomic testing now, but would feel differently if admitted to the United Nations. Peking does not say that it wants the United Nations to abandon the Congo now, but would feel differently if admitted to the United Nations. Peking does not say that, although it is now training guerrillas for revolution in other countries, it would act differently if admitted to the United Nations.

48. We have no other choice but to believe that these policies would be pursued and would be advocated in this very Assembly by Chinese Communist representatives who believe that all political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.

49. What else can we assume, and be realistic? What else can we expect, confronted with this evidence?

50. It seems to me that Members will be well advised to think carefully about our obligations and our responsibilities to the people of the world, who want the

United Nations to continue as a going concern—and go on to new strengths and to new triumphs. They would do well to consider the already delicate deliberations of this body—the already difficult operations on which we are embarked. They would do well to think long and hard about these things—and then ask themselves whether the work of this body would be helped or would be hindered by the presence here of a delegation from Peking.

51. One of the Members, in the course of the debate, lamented the sad plight of the people of mainland China. My delegation yields to no one in its concern for the people of China, with which we have had such long and intimate and friendly relations. But the representative in question went on to suggest that if Peking were in the United Nations the Food and Agriculture Organization "could have been of assistance" to the hungry people of China.

52. Perhaps he does not know that Peking rejected an offer of help extended to the Chinese Communist Red Cross Society by the League of Red Cross Societies—of which Communist China is a member. While we know of it from the Press, the people of the Chinese mainland were never told that such an offer of international assistance had been extended to China.

53. Would Peking, which refused help for its own people from one humanitarian international organization to which it belongs, accept help from another international organization?

54. In the meantime, it is not my delegation which presumes to pass judgement on others. We are not, as several have implied, inventing some subtle moral criterion to decide who is good and who is bad, who is correct and who is incorrect, who is respectable and who is not respectable.

55. On the contrary, the principles to which the Members of the United Nations are bound are stated quite explicitly in the Charter in terms which we would be the last to refute or even to want to refine. And the evidence of Peking's disdain for these principles is written with equal clarity. We ask only that each Member compare the official Charter and the official record.

56. The Soviet draft resolution [A/L.360], and the amendment [A/L.375] to it submitted by the delegations of Cambodia, Ceylon and Indonesia not only call for the expulsion of a loyal Member of the United Nations, but implicitly would encourage the Chinese Communists to use force to achieve their objectives.

57. For these reasons, we believe that the Soviet proposal to unseat the Government of the Republic of China and replace it with a delegation from Peking should be emphatically rejected, and we will vote against it.

58. The amendment to that proposal submitted by the three Powers, while set forth with greater sophistication than the Soviet proposal, clearly would have the same effect. We believe it should likewise be rejected and will accordingly vote against it also.

59. For all these reasons I am equally confident that the Members will confirm the plain fact that any proposal to alter the representation of China in the United Nations would be a vitally important question under the Charter.

60. Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): The discussion of the question of the restoration of the legitimate rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations, a discussion in which more than half of the Member States of our Organization have taken part, has been clear proof of the vital necessity for solving this question without further delay.

61. The course followed by the discussion has convincingly confirmed how right the Soviet Union delegation was to raise the question and to formulate it as it did in our draft resolution [A/L.360]. At the same time, the discussion has afforded further strong confirmation of what had already become apparent during the discussion of the question in the General Committee—the endeavour of the United States and the countries that follow in its wake to divert the General Assembly, by means of procedural tricks, from deciding this simple question, to engage in manoeuvring, to avoid taking a substantive decision on the question of restoring the legitimate rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations and to prevent the expulsion from the United Nations of the Chiang Kai-shek clique, the faithful servants of the United States.

62. What arguments could the United States, and the other countries that have supported its attitude, advance to counter the facts and evidence in favour of the speediest possible solution of the question of restoring the rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations adduced in the speeches made by the delegations of the Soviet Union, Cambodia, Ceylon, Burma, Indonesia, Nepal, Ghana, the United Arab Republic, Guinea, Mali and other countries? Strictly speaking, none of any weight. And the statements made today by the representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States confirm this conclusion.

63. What did the United Kingdom representative say today when, along with the United States representative, he put this question on the particular plane to which he today referred?

64. He spoke very briefly of how his delegation had previously been in favour of a moratorium; at that time it had been a necessary measure, but now the idea had collapsed; it was now impossible not to discuss this question and so the procedure of dragging out the discussion of the question had become obsolete, and a new procedure had therefore been invented. That was the idea underlying the remarks of the United Kingdom representative. The rest of his arguments boiled down to this: the basis for a decision on the lines of the resolution tabled by the United States and certain other countries [A/L.372] was the procedural rule that requires, as they see it, a two-thirds majority, since the question is an important one. The Soviet Union had stated even earlier that it was an important question, Mr. Khrushchev had said so at the last session, and so, strictly speaking, this had decided them to propose this new procedure for delaying the solution of the question. When, however, the United Kingdom representative quoted from what I said on the first day this question was discussed, he should have quoted the speech correctly and pointed out that what I said, and what I still say was that this is indeed an important problem, but that from the standpoint of the struggle for peace and the strengthening of the United Nations and from the point of view of the method of solving the question, it is a simple

procedural matter. You could not advance any counter-argument to this in your statements today.

65. Of course, any procedural decision, especially one bearing the representation of one or other country, can have very important consequences, and it has very important consequences. We saw this at the time when we were deciding the procedural question of the representation here of the Republic of the Congo—the consequences of that decision were and still are, important. The significance of a decision on such a question, procedural though it may be, is still more important in the case of the question of the representation of the People's Republic of China. But this is not in the least self-contradictory. The question is important from the standpoint of the interests of preserving peace and strengthening the United Nations and important from the standpoint of its consequences but all the same, it is a procedural question from the point of view of the method of solving it now.

66. What else did the United Kingdom representative say? Well, he said nothing else. His statement was very short. Why? Because there was nothing for the United Kingdom representative to say. What can he say on the substance of the question when the United Kingdom Government recognizes the People's Republic of China as a State, recognizes the Government of the People's Republic of China and has diplomatic relations with that government, what can he say in support of the thesis that the People's Republic of China cannot and should not be represented in the United Nations? There is nothing he can say to defend this absurd attitude. He can say nothing, so he came here and admitted that he could say nothing and went away ten minutes after making a short statement, the gist of which I have just given you.

67. Is that really the position of a Great Power? Is that the attitude to take on an important question from the point of view of United Nations policy? It shows the complete impotence and bankruptcy of the United Kingdom Government's policy on this question. You cannot explain to your people why you maintain diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China and vote against that country being represented in the United Nations. You cannot explain the fact that such a position is intolerable to common sense. No one can understand your policy on this question. But I will tell you why you do this. It is because you are allies of the United States and you vote as your senior ally tells you. That is the situation, but is that really seemly for a great Power?

68. Now, to deal with what the United States representative said here. He repeated much of what he said last time. I have already given some reply to that statement of the United States representative and I do not think that there is any need to go back to the last statement and to repeat it now. There are only a few additional elements which were brought up today by Mr. Stevenson and I think that I might usefully devote a few minutes to them.

69. Mr. Stevenson said today that "we are asked to offer membership in this body to a régime which believes in the rule of the gun". That is how I took down, by ear, the interpretation of the statement made by the United States representative.

70. But this is a completely unsubstantiated assertion and it is one that falls strangely from the lips of the representative of the country which is organizing military bases and maintains its troops everywhere,

in the very places which are, strictly speaking, no concern of the United States. During the discussion which has just taken place in the First Committee on the question of South Korea we had occasion to ask the question why the United States is still keeping its troops there. So, who is it who believes in the force of bayonets? Who? The United States believes in the force of bayonets. It keeps troops in South Korea when there are no foreign troops in North Korea. It is you, the United States, that is keeping troops in South Korea.

71. Who is it believes in the power of the bayonet and the gun in South Viet-Nam? Who? It is the United States which is sending its instructors there and is now beginning to send its military detachments, etc.

72. How can you accuse the People's Republic of China of being, as you say, a régime which believes in the rule of the gun? For the People's Republic of China has not occupied any foreign territory. It does not keep its troops anywhere. It has withdrawn its troops from Korea, troops which were there when it was at one time helping its sister country to oppose United States occupation. But you keep your troops there. How much time has gone by since then? With your assistance and with your troops standing by in South Korea, a military fascist coup d'état occurred and you strengthened and supported this military fascist coup d'état with your troops.

73. How can you say that the People's Republic of China is a régime which believes in the rule of the gun? No; you believe in the rule of the gun and you are keeping troops in a whole series of areas where they are entirely unneeded from the point of view of United States security and even of the security of the countries in which you keep these troops.

74. I shall not go on citing other examples. There are plenty of them, but I shall not digress. The above is quite enough to show the spuriousness of the United States approach to this question.

75. Mr. Stevenson went on to say that, if we give the People's Republic of China the seat, the lawful seat, which belongs to it here in the United Nations, then that would be tantamount to allowing war to be unleashed across the Straits of Taiwan.

76. But, strictly speaking, why should there be a war? There can only be war if the United States goes on keeping its troops there. Taiwan, after all, is not an American island; it is a Chinese island. Why do you keep your troops there? Why do you keep your fleet there? And now you say: war may break out. If it does, it will only be because United States troops are occupying other people's territory.

77. That is how the question stands. Remove your troops from Taiwan. Clear your fleet out of the Straits of Taiwan. There will not be any war because, as soon as you and your troops and fleet leave the Straits of Taiwan, the Chiang Kai-shek régime will collapse and the Chinese people itself will settle the problem of Taiwan without resort to arms.

78. Therefore, the assertion that our solution would virtually unleash war, made to frighten the General Assembly and world public opinion, is completely incorrect and unfounded, and has no real basis. Instead of yourselves drawing the proper inferences from your policy and removing your troops from this area so as not to provoke war—instead of that, you are maintaining this focal point of danger in the Far East

and are deepening the crisis in the relations between the United States and the great Chinese people. And this crisis may lead to war. It did in fact lead to a very dangerous situation when the last United States Government was obliged to take certain measures so as to do something to alleviate the situation created by the presence of United States occupation troops and the United States fleet near the shores of the great nation of China.

79. The conclusion from this then, should be not what you say, by any means; it should be for you to withdraw your troops and your fleet from there as speedily as possible. That is the kind of conclusion which the United States representative should draw, and not the conclusion which he drew.

80. Restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations will only strengthen real co-operation inside the United Nations, and will enable the Chinese people and its representatives to take their proper place here in our world organization. And it will facilitate the solution of all problems, both in the Far East and in the whole world in general.

81. The United States representative then cited in his speech a large number of quotations from various publications issued in the Chinese People's Republic or somewhere else. To be quite candid, I failed to follow all these quotations which were collected by Mr. Stevenson's assistants so as to make a more convincing impression on our General Assembly.

82. Mr. Stevenson quoted from these various Chinese writers and tried to make out that China is aggressive and that its attitude does not altogether fit in with the United Nations Charter and the purposes and principles of that Charter. On that point, however, I would like to give just one piece of advice and one reply.

83. If we, Mr. Stevenson, were to start quoting your—I emphasize your—statements alone, we would see that on the question of China they contradict one another. Yet, you would like to find things fitting together when you quote dozens of different writers. If one single author fails to be consistent in explaining the whole of his policy, how can you expect that there will be complete logic and consistency in all the statements of very different types of writers?

84. That is what I can say with regard to Mr. Stevenson's statement. Facts are stubborn things and you cannot get away from them anywhere. They contradict your artificial arguments.

85. The People's Republic of China is a great peace-loving State, a State that is ruled by a people's Government which enjoys the support of all the 650 million population of People's China. The People's Republic of China is a powerful country whose influence and authority in the international arena is increasing daily; it is a country without which there can be no solution of the most important current problems in international relations that are causing anxiety to the whole of mankind: the problems of war and peace, of disarmament, of the removal of the threat of atomic war and the whole complex of international economic and social problems which are under discussion in the United Nations and outside it.

86. The restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China is in the interest not only of the People's Republic of China but also, and equally so, of all the other countries Members of the United

Nations, regardless of whether they do or do not like the people's régime in China.

87. It is high time to realize that the countries which are preventing a solution of this question are isolating, not the People's Republic of China but themselves. These countries are not less, but more, interested in collaboration with the great People's Republic of China, and their refusal to recognize the lawful rights of China in the United Nations and to normalize relations with that great Power does harm most of all to themselves. The longer the United States and the other Western States indulge in self-deception by regarding their own puppets as representatives of the government of great China, the harder will it be for them to recover from these illusions. That this sobering process will inevitably supervene—on that point, I think, there can be no doubts whatsoever.

88. All suggestions that the restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations would, as the United States and their aggressive bloc allies have been trying to assure the Assembly, undermine the United Nations are quite unfounded. You have to make these allegations in order to divert attention from your subversive activities in this Organization and from your efforts to compel the United Nations to serve your interests but not international interests. That is the only reason why you do not want to throw the remnants of the Chiang Kai-shek clique, who represent no one except themselves and your interests, out of the United Nations.

89. Withdraw your troops from Taiwan, that ancient territory of China and province of the People's Republic of China, and you will see that the régime which you are so solicitously protecting will immediately collapse. However, as the statement of the United States representative showed, the United States Government does not wish to take this step since the United States is deeply interested in preserving the Chiang Kai-shek clique which has offered them Taiwan as a fundamentally important military base in this part of Asia.

90. In these circumstances, how can the United States agree to expel the representatives of the Chiang Kai-shek clique here in the United Nations? Hence its arguments for keeping this clique in the United Nations and its stubborn refusal to restore the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China.

91. In speaking in the discussion in support of the United States attitude on the question of the representation in the United Nations of the People's Republic of China, the representative of Australia asked questions which, according to him, called for profound study. Although replies to these questions were contained both in the statement of the Soviet delegation and in the statements of many other representatives who spoke before and after it, nevertheless, since these questions have been asked and the representative of Australia declared that he himself, as he said, could not reply to them, they should be answered.

92. He asked which Chinese Government should occupy a seat in the United Nations. There is one Government which represents the people of China—the Government of the People's Republic of China. This has been said not only by us but by the enormous majority of representatives who have spoken here. Only that Government has the right to send its representatives to the United Nations. For twelve years now the Government of the People's Republic of China

has been exercising effective control over Chinese territory and its population. It has been given wide international legal recognition. Can anyone still doubt this? What does the Australian representative still need to be told on this point?

93. Obviously, it is not a question of making a study at all. The representative of Australia simply lacks courage to say that he simply does not want the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China to be restored, and is therefore resorting to all kinds of ruses in order to becloud and confuse this clear-cut question.

94. The representative of Australia also asked [1072nd meeting] what would be the consequences for the area of which China is either part or a neighbour, and what would be the consequences for the United Nations, if, as the upshot of the discussion on this question, the rights of the People's Republic of China were restored and it were to occupy the seat lawfully belonging to it in the United Nations.

95. A number of speakers from countries here representing the area in question or countries that are neighbours of the People's Republic of China, in referring to the growth of friendly relations with that country, show convincingly what a great contribution the People's Republic of China has made to the cause of rallying together the countries of that area and have stressed the part played by the People's Republic of China in the peaceful settlement of the Korean and Indo-Chinese questions, the question of Laos, of the relaxation of tension in the region of South-East Asia and the Far East. Those are facts which you cannot refute; they are recorded in the resolutions of a number of international conferences at Bandung, Conakry and Belgrade.

96. There can be no doubt that the restoration of the rights of the People's Republic of China in our Organization will help to strengthen the authority of the United Nations, will substantially assist our Organization in solving many important present-day problems, will promote the lessening of international tension, and, in particular, will help to strengthen peace and security in South-East Asia and the Pacific Ocean area.

97. Surely, that is clear to the representative of Australia. It has already been admitted by most of the countries of Asia, ay, and not only Asia; we have heard these admissions here in the Assembly hall during the discussion of this question.

98. No; all these and other questions which you have been asking here are needed by you in order to evade solving the problem of restoring the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China on its merits. You are now incapable of carrying through your bankrupt policy of postponing the question of representation. You have realized that you cannot now make much headway with it and so you have decided to change tactics; you have decided now to study the question, to set up, perhaps, for this purpose a committee or some other body, but not to settle it now on its merits. Your entire enterprise is much too obvious. You are counting on finding simpletons who might be drawn along with it. This, however, is a hopeless method. Even the new Members of the United Nations, who are taking part for the first time in the discussion of this question, have seen through your schemes.

99. It must, however, be regretfully noted that some people seem to have swallowed the United States bait.

I have in mind, principally, a statement made by Mr. Wachuku, the representative of Nigeria [1071st meeting]. I would like, quite frankly and in a spirit of friendly criticism, to say a few words about his views.

100. Whether the representative of Nigeria so intended or not, he has in reality, supported the policy of the colonial countries, which is aimed at dismembering the territory of the People's Republic of China and separating from it its ancient territory, the province of Taiwan. The attitude of the representative of Nigeria is fraught with far-reaching consequences and serves the cause of those who advocate the creation of "two Chinas". At the same time, it directly prejudices and undermines the struggle of the African countries for their national emancipation and the creation of integral sovereign national States. That is, surely, an attitude which backs up the efforts of the colonizers to dismember the Congo and detach from it one of its provinces, Katanga, and to give Tshombé recognition as the ruler of that part of the Congolese State.

101. The Soviet delegation cannot accept, either, the strange assertion of the representative of Nigeria and some other countries that the People's Republic of China should, as they say, make some kind of an application for admission to the United Nations. What application can there be? The People's Republic of China is a Member of the United Nations, a founder of the United Nations, but its rights have been usurped by impostors who represent neither the People's Republic of China nor the Chinese people.

102. The task of the General Assembly is to restore the rights of a State Member of the United Nations, a Member of the Security Council whose rights, in spite of the requirements of the Charter of our Organization, have been violated and whose seat in the United Nations and its organs is occupied by people in the service of a clique which has been rejected and expelled by the people of China.

103. Certain representatives, following the example of the United States, have adopted the policy of defending the rights of this clique by asking how can we do without such an exemplary Member of the United Nations (this was an additional remark made by Mr. Stevenson today) and claiming that, if the Chiang Kai-shek people were expelled the United Nations would lose its universality, and so on.

104. I leave these hypocritical assertions to the consciences of their authors. But no matter what manoeuvres and tricks they resort to, the just demand for the restoration of the lawful rights in the United Nations of the People's Republic of China will triumph. The discussion of the question of China's representation held at the present session has clearly shown what underlies the proposal about China's representation in the United Nations submitted by New Zealand [A/4873], undoubtedly not on its own initiative only, but at the behest of the United States. And the statement made yesterday [1077th meeting] by the New Zealand representative merely corroborated this.

105. You do not want a cardinal and just solution of the question. You do not want the restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations, but you find it harder now to say so openly. In order to justify your attitude and give it a respectable appearance, you deliberately stress the importance of the question under discussion and, in

violation of the Charter, you demand a decision by a two-thirds majority vote, although it is absolutely obvious that a decision on the question of restoring the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China is a simple procedural decision, that is, one which is adopted by a simple majority.

106. This, incidentally, has been recognized by many prominent authors in the field of international law. For example, in a well-known paper, The representation of China in the United Nations, written by the American international law authority Professor Briggs, a member of the United Nations International Law Commission, it is explained in detail that, when the question of China's representation is discussed by any United Nations body a vote can be taken (I quote his opinion) only on the question of credentials, if the body in question does not want to lay itself open to the charge of interfering in the internal affairs of a Member State.

107. Mr. Stevenson probably knows Mr. Briggs. This is what this authority writes: "A vote on credentials is a procedural decision in all United Nations organs having competence over credentials".^{1/}

108. In an analytical study of this question, Professor Fitzmaurice, a prominent British legal authority and member of the International Court, deals in detail with the question of the voting procedure in the various United Nations organs in connexion with the problem of the representation of China. "The actual issue on which they vote," he declares, "is, and has invariably been, treated as one of procedure, to be decided by an ordinary majority vote—and it is very important that it should continue so to be.

109. "Not only would any other course lead to considerable practical difficulty and inconvenience, but, in bodies where questions of substance have to be decided by a qualified majority vote, for example, two-thirds, it might enable a minority to deny representation to a delegate whose credentials were considered in all respects valid by the majority."

110. I think that Mr. Godber too must be familiar with this expression of opinion by a prominent British jurist.

111. Thus, even the most prominent bourgeois experts in international law have no doubt whatsoever that under international law the only Government of China is the Government of the People's Republic of China, and that only the credentials issued by the Government are the proper credentials to represent China.

112. Nevertheless, the representatives of the United States, Australia, New Zealand and, strange though it may seem, Nigeria also, insist on further study of this question in a Committee or some other organ.

113. It must surely be clear to those who advocate making a study of this question that the only point of such a study is to drag out the decision, that it represents a new form of the so-called moratorium that was referred to today by the representative of the United Kingdom.

114. After all, the idea of setting up a committee is not new. The General Assembly has already had an opportunity of convincing itself of the futility and harm involved in setting up such committee, since in

^{1/} See World Peace Foundation, International Organization, vol. VI, 1952, p. 208.

1950, at the fifth session of the Assembly, a Special Committee was set up to study the question of China's representation.

115. What do you want to do now—to set us back another eleven years and return to the same Committee, the uselessness and harm of whose work were already then exposed? What are you going to study in the proposed Committee?

116. The Soviet delegation categorically objects to setting up any committee at all, and if anyone makes a formal proposal to set it up, the Soviet Union will take no part in the work of such a committee.

117. There is no need to delude ourselves and public opinion with a pretence making sort of a study of a question that is clear to us all. The question of restoring the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China must be solved once and for all, and you cannot evade its solution.

118. As you are aware, the Soviet delegation has submitted its own draft resolution, in which is clearly and precisely expressed our attitude, the one which in our opinion should be adopted by the United Nations on the question under discussion.

119. The resolution submitted by the United States and certain other States is clearly designed as a procedural manoeuvre and seeks simply to postpone the solution of this problem by a new method.

120. The Soviet resolution calls for the restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China. But how can we give a seat in the United Nations to the legitimate representatives of the Republic unless we expel the impostors who are occupying China's seat in our Organization?

121. It is only by immediately expelling from all United Nations organs the representatives of the Chiang Kai-shek clique who are illegally occupying China's seat in the United Nations that we can secure that seat for those who should by right occupy it and for whom it was intended. The sooner this is done, the better it will be for the United Nations.

122. We demand this openly and uncompromisingly. China is a great Power, a Member of the United Nations and permanent member of the Security Council, a Power whose rights have been usurped in breach of the Charter, by people who represent no one. There can be no compromise at all on this question of principle. China's lawful seat in our Organization must be given to the representatives of the People's Republic of China, a Member of the United Nations whose rights have been violated. That is the sense of the Soviet resolution.

123. We invite all delegations to support our simple and just draft resolution, which, quite unambiguously solves, once and for all, the question of the representation of China by expelling those who are unlawfully occupying its seat and restoring the lawful rights of that great State, the People's Republic of China.

124. We shall vote against the resolution of the United States and certain other States which are seeking by a procedural manoeuvre to postpone once again the solution of the question, the fully-matured question, of restoring the legitimate rights of the People's Republic of China.

125. The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I call on the representative of the United Kingdom, who has asked to exercise his right of reply.

126. Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom): I apologize for coming to the rostrum again, but I think it is very important that I should seek to clear up at once what I can only assume must have been a misunderstanding on the part of the representative of the Soviet Union, as in his references to the speech that I made he based a great deal of what he said on what seemed to me to be a complete misreading and misunderstanding of what I said. This seems to me to be all the more extraordinary in view of the fact that he prefaced this by castigating me severely for having made only a short speech. That is a crime of which I am never likely to accuse the representative of the Soviet Union.

127. The important point, however, was that he claimed that I said that Her Majesty's Government was opposed to seating the People's Republic of China in the United Nations. That was not what I said, and in order to be quite clear in this very important matter I will read once more the relevant passage from my speech—it is only a short passage:

"Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom wishes to make it clear that its objective in supporting this draft resolution is not to find some new means of pushing this important problem aside. It is not the policy of Her Majesty's Government to deny a seat in the United Nations to the People's Republic of China. On the contrary, as my Secretary of State, Lord Home, said in Parliament last February, we believe that the facts of international life require the presence of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations."

128. That was what I said, and in the light of that I found quite extraordinary some of the comments which the representative of the Soviet Union made. I thought it important that I should immediately clear up what I believe must have been a genuine misunderstanding on his part, but as I am here I would just make one further small comment, because he referred in the later stages of his speech to the words of a most distinguished English lawyer, and quoted them in support of his own thesis.

129. He quoted Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, and I must say that the quotation which he gave from this important British lawyer was taken right out of its context. It was taken from a passage in which Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice was referring to the moratorium procedure, and it cannot bear the implications which the representative of the Soviet Union has given to it. That is all that I have to say.

130. The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I call on the representative of China, who has asked to exercise his right of reply.

131. Mr. TSIANG (China): The delegate of the Soviet Union, and his comrades in the Soviet bloc, have taken a very prominent part in this debate, as was to be expected. The uniformity of their argumentation is indeed monolithic. They, one and all, have used gutter language to play gutter politics in the United Nations. They are skilful, up to a certain point, in weaving a colourful fabric out of falsehoods. They do not deserve any reply except on two points which, unless corrected, may poison the entire international atmosphere. The delegate of the Soviet Union, in his speech on 1 December, stated:

"The United States has seized the Chinese island of Taiwan, occupied it, and turned it into a spring-

board for aggression against the People's Republic of China;" [1068th meeting, para. 59].****

132. The United States has not seized Taiwan. The United States has not occupied Taiwan. The United States has not turned Taiwan into a spring-board for aggression against anybody.

133. My Government and the Government of the United States have signed a treaty of mutual defence.^{2/} Its terms have been published and are public property. The treaty is similar in language and nature to many such treaties already existing. The United States has not occupied Taiwan, any more than it has occupied Great Britain or any country in Western Europe. The treaty is entirely defensive in purpose. Under this treaty, my Government has retained full sovereignty. The United States has not, either by virtue of this treaty or in the name of anything else, tried to infringe upon the sovereignty of my country. The relations between my country and the United States have been very friendly. The Soviet accusation of United States imperialism in China is propaganda made up of falsehood throughout, whether we consider the recent period or the historical past. The Chinese people know this. No matter how hard the Chinese Communists keep up their "Hate America" campaign, and no matter how often the Soviet representative and his comrades repeat that accusation in the United Nations, the Chinese people, in their heart of hearts, know that the United States is China's friend.

134. The second point in the Soviet propaganda campaign here which I wish to discuss is the idea of the economic exploitation of Taiwan—or the allegation concerning the economic exploitation of Taiwan—by the so-called American monopolies. Let me quote the words of the Soviet representative from the verbatim records:

"Finally, the United States holds so persistently to the Chiang Kai-shek clique because American monopolies have taken into their hands the economy of Taiwan, with its help, and extract considerable profits from it. It is a fact that the American company, Westinghouse Electric, controls the Taiwan electric power system; that the American firm, National Fertilizer Association, controls the production of chemical fertilizers; that the Gulf Oil Corporation of the United States controls the oil-bearing area of Miaosu; that the American firm, Reynolds Metal, is in control of the aluminium industry, while other American companies have seized the rest of the Taiwan economy." [1068th meeting, para. 64.] ****

The Soviet Union has once more picked up points in the "Hate America" campaign of its comrades on the mainland of China. Every one of these points is a falsehood. Let me take them up one by one.

135. The first point is that the Soviet representative told the Assembly that Westinghouse Electric controls the Taiwan electric power system. This is a lie. What we have is the Taiwan Power Corporation, a Chinese Government enterprise with assets equivalent to over 100 million United States dollars. That Corporation has, from time to time during the last twelve years, bought power equipment from Westinghouse. The purchases have been made on a deferred payment basis. The total of such credits granted by Westinghouse to

the Taiwan Power Corporation is seventeen million dollars. Much of this has already been paid. Westinghouse owns and controls nothing on the island of Taiwan. We have found the relationship between the Taiwan Power Corporation and Westinghouse to be very fruitful and, so far as we are concerned, we are ready to continue to deal with Westinghouse.

136. The second point is that the American firm, National Fertilizer Association, controls the production of chemical fertilizers in Taiwan. This again is a lie. Chemical fertilizers are a nationalized industry in my country. Our annual production is about 400,000 tons. Not a single ton of this is produced by any American company or owned by American monopolist capital. It is entirely Chinese. Indeed, negotiations are afoot between the Chinese Petroleum Corporation on the one hand and the Socony Mobil Oil Company and the Allied Chemical Corporation of the United States on the other hand, to form a partnership for the manufacture of 100,000 tons a year of urea and 45,000 tons a year of ammonia. The plan contemplates the use of the newly-discovered natural gas in Taiwan. The agreement has not yet been finalized but this is expected to come about very soon. When established, the enterprise will be a tripartite affair, with the Chinese Petroleum Corporation, the Socony Mobil Oil Company and the Allied Chemical Corporation as the three partners. The concern will contribute one-fifth of the total chemical fertilizers manufactured on the island. This is certainly far from controlling the production of chemical fertilizers on Taiwan.

137. The third point of the Soviet representative's enumeration is that the Gulf Oil Corporation of the United States controls the oil-bearing area of Miaosu. Unfortunately, we have not discovered any oil-bearing area in Miaosu, wherever that may be. For all practical purposes, oil does not exist in Taiwan. The Gulf Oil Company cannot control something in Taiwan which does not exist there.

138. The fourth point of the Soviet enumeration is that Reynolds Metal is in control of the aluminium industry of Taiwan. The aluminium industry in Taiwan is a nationalized industry. It has nothing to do with Reynolds Metal. Let me make it clear and absolute: Reynolds Metal has nothing whatever to do with Taiwan.

139. The last point of the Soviet enumeration is that other American companies have seized the rest of the Taiwan economy. I need only say one thing on this point. This is a lie. While discussing this point, I would like to insert a commercial. My Government welcomes foreign investors in Taiwan whether they come as holders of stocks of Chinese companies, or as partners in joint enterprises, or as lenders of capital for new enterprises. In so far as foreign capitalists conform to Chinese law, they are welcome.

140. What has really mattered in the economic progress of my country in recent years is not American monopoly capital but American economic aid. These Soviet accusations concerning the United States occupation of Taiwan and the United States monopolist capital exploitation of Taiwan have behind them two insinuations. One is an attempt to lead the world to believe that my Government is a willing tool and victim of American imperialism and colonialism. My Government was the first in all the Asian and African countries to fight against imperialism and colonialism. Dr. Sun Yat-sen, who founded the Republic of China in 1911 and who is the father of Chinese nationalism, made it his life work to emancipate China from

****Provisional English version taken from the interpretation.

^{2/} United States of America and China: Mutual Defense Treaty, signed at Washington, on 2 December 1954.

Western colonialism and imperialism. By the end of the Second World War, under the leadership of my Government, all the previous unequal treaties between China and the Western Powers had been revised, so that all the unequal features in them were removed. The new treaties provided for the abolition of all foreign concessions and settlements in China. To insinuate that the National Government of the Republic of China is a willing tool of American imperialism is to falsify the entire modern history of China.

141. Let me add that in its efforts to rid China of inequality and to win back for China full respect for China's sovereignty my Government succeeded completely, except in one single instance—that of the Soviet Union. As a result of the Yalta Agreement, the Soviet Union reimposed on China territorial concessions which had been imposed on it by Tsarist Russia. It is sheer hypocrisy for the representative of the Soviet Union to stand up here and accuse the Western Powers—and particularly the United States—of colonialism and imperialism in China without mentioning the record of his own Government.

142. The other insinuation which the Soviet representative tried to introduce is to the effect that capitalist States are, by their very nature, imperialist and colonialist, whereas the Soviet Union, being a so-called socialist State, is, by its very nature and definition, non-imperialist and non-colonialist. If any proof is needed, the entire post-war period of the world shows that the Western capitalist States have either completely liquidated or are on the point of completely liquidating their colonialist relations with the peoples of Asia and Africa. Today there is only one expanding colonial empire, and that is the empire of the Soviet Union.

143. We Chinese are nationalists. We serve our own national interests. We are determined to guard our national sovereignty and national resources. At the same time we seek economic co-operation with the free world. In that process of co-operation, we are confident that we can win for our country and people fair and sound bargains. Capitalists, we know, naturally wish to make profits. But there is no capitalist, Western or Oriental, no matter how ignorant or selfish, who imagines that he can get rich on the poverty of Asia and Africa. People as people are not good markets. It is only people with purchasing power that form a good market. This is common sense, understood everywhere.

144. One of the most remarkable statements made in the course of this debate was the speech of the representative of Ceylon, delivered on the afternoon of 4 December. It was both eloquent and romantic. He characterized the United Nations as "the school of peace where all nations come to learn the lessons of peace". [1070th meeting, para 65] He went on to say:

"Experiments in peace were made in China centuries ago, culminating in the doctrines of Lao-tze and Confucius. These are hopeful traditions in the great history of China. These traditions will emerge here in this laboratory of peace with a new vigour and a rediscovery." [Ibid., para. 76.]

He left no doubt that the re-emergence of Chinese traditions in "this great laboratory of peace" will come with the seating of the Chinese Communists in the United Nations.

145. I am certainly indebted to the representative of Ceylon for having given eloquent expression to his appreciation of the great history of my country. Chinese cultural traditions are, as he says, pacifist and humanist. Lao-tze and Confucius did exercise enormous influence on the formation of Chinese culture. However, realism compels me to say—and I have spent years in studying Chinese history—that in spite of the pacifist and humanist traditions of my country, we have had some great conqueror-emperors such as Wu-ti of the Han Dynasty, Tai-tsung of the Tang Dynasty, Genghis Khan of the Yuan Dynasty, and Cheng-tsu of the Ming Dynasty. But, and this is important, in the whole history of Chinese literature there is not a single poem or essay in praise of war or empire until very recent years. The present leader of the Chinese Communists, some years ago, wrote a poem in which he assessed the stature of these old conqueror-emperors. After portraying the majesty of China's mountains and rivers, he concluded his poem with the following verse:

*These lands, these rivers, their bewitching charm
Inspired the conqueror-emperors of Ch'in and Han,
Tang and Sung, in splendor striving to expand.*

*Alas! All short of stature! And even Genghis Khan
Knew only how to shoot a hawk for play.*

For the towering figure watch the scene today!

146. In other words, Mao Tse-tung thinks that he will surpass all the great conqueror-emperors of the past. In his eyes, they were but pygmies. Here I find my first difficulty with Mr. Malalasekera's vision of my country. We do have a great tradition of peace and humanism. The trouble is that the Chinese Communists say that this great tradition is feudalistic and reactionary and that it should be destroyed and eradicated from the minds and hearts of the Chinese people. While the representative of Ceylon appreciates Lao-tze and Confucius, Mao Tse-tung does not. That is why I say the Chinese Communists cannot represent China because they are un-Chinese.

147. In another part of his eloquent speech, the representative of Ceylon called our attention to the great yearning for economic development and industrialization in many of the under-developed countries of the world. In this respect, he thinks that the Chinese Communists, if admitted to the United Nations, could make a great contribution. He says:

"Regardless of ideologies, the great experiments and achievements of China in this respect cannot be ignored. They are too valuable a lesson to many new smaller nations desperately hunting for blue-prints for planned economies." [Ibid., para. 84.]

In regard to this matter the representative of Ceylon again fell back on Chinese history, and he waxed even more eloquent. Let me quote him:

"When the West says 'no' to all these, let us recall the great contribution which China made to the early history of Western Civilization. The caravans moving from the Italian cities to China for its textiles, its art, its culture, is one of the most dramatic chapters in the history of modern civilization." [Ibid., para. 87.]

148. In this part of his speech the representative of Ceylon is even more romantic than in his remarks on the traditions of peace in my country. The economic experiments of the Chinese Communists have brought the 600 million people on the mainland of China to the verge of starvation. Whenever and wherever they

have a change the hungry people flee to Hong Kong and Macao, just because they cannot get enough to eat. Before the harvest of 1962 has been reaped the world will have learned more about starvation and undernourishment on the mainland of China. The results of the schemes of economic development of the Chinese Communists are both tragic and cruel.

149. With China's huge population the problem of economic development would be difficult under all circumstances, no matter what political and economic system the Chinese people might adopt. The Chinese Communists, however, have made a bad situation worse for the simple reason that they have tried to imitate the Soviet Union. They forget that China is not Russia and that China cannot imitate the Soviet Union, even if we should grant that the example of the Soviet Union were laudable, which it is not.

150. Let me call attention to only one aspect of this matter. If the farmland of the Soviet Union were to be distributed equally among the farming families in the Soviet Union each family would get an average of twenty-five acres. The same average in China would be 2.94 acres. In other words, Soviet agriculture can yield a surplus much larger than that of Chinese agriculture.

151. The natural accumulation of capital in the Soviet Union would be much greater than in China whether under communism or under capitalism. In the Soviet Union, the monolithic State can force the farmers to tighten their belts so that resources can be squeezed out of agriculture for the purpose of industrialization, as Stalin did. In China, under ordinary conditions, the belts of the farmers are as tight as possible. Even with the highest pressure of the monolithic State there is very little to be squeezed out of Chinese agriculture.

152. The Chinese Communists ignored this elementary fact and they have tried to imitate the Soviet Union by launching their "Leap Forward" programmes of industrialization and by instituting the commune. In other words, the Chinese Communists have even surpassed Stalin in his brutality. And that explains why the Soviet Union is ready for de-Stalinization and Communist China is not. The simple fact is that the Soviet example of economic development cannot and should not be followed by China. The Chinese Communist example of economic development—let me say this with all the earnestness of which I am capable—should not be followed by any of the under-developed countries of the world.

153. Under the difficult conditions prevailing in China much still can be done. The starting point must be the improvement of agriculture. If the farmer is helped to produce more, then we may expect to get more out of agriculture for the purpose of industrialization. With modern science, much can be done in this field.

154. On the island of Taiwan our scientists have produced better species of rice and wheat. They have analysed the soil and taught the farmer what chemical fertilizers to apply. They have worked out effective insecticides. They have gone far in irrigation—in some cases with large projects, in other cases with small improvements. The scientists have improved the breeds of farm animals. Today on the island, the farmers working on the same area of land, are producing twice what they did ten years ago, and with this agricultural progress we have been able to industrialize. Today, of the exports of my country, almost,

but not quite, 50 per cent are manufactured articles. The per caput income on Taiwan is double what it is on the mainland. With our experience on Taiwan, we have come to the conclusion that the Chinese people can raise their standard of living and at the same time preserve their human freedoms. The example of the mainland of China under the Chinese Communists shows that, if human freedom is sacrificed, the economic condition of the people goes from bad to worse.

155. In the course of this debate some speakers have directly or indirectly suggested a solution along the line of "two Chinas". Such a solution is not acceptable to my Government. The people on the mainland of China are our brothers and sisters. We have no quarrel with them. We do not want to conquer them; we do not to fight them. At the same time, we cannot forget their plight. They have been enslaved. They have been starved. We free Chinese while enjoying our freedom, naturally wish to help our people on the mainland to regain their freedom. We cannot write them off. We shall continue to struggle for the freedom of the entire Chinese people.

156. Our struggle for freedom, if properly understood, in fact fulfils the principles and ideals of the United Nations. We think that all peoples who have long enjoyed freedom or who have recently recovered their freedom would wish to come to our aid. Certainly, it would be a gross disappointment to the Chinese people if the United Nations should take the side of the oppressors of the Chinese people or give aid and comfort to these oppressors. In my statement of 1 December (1068th meeting) I pointed out how, by admitting the Chinese Communists into the United Nations, this Organization would be conferring on them political prestige which they will exploit for the continuation of oppression at home and subversion abroad. This Assembly should not seek a solution which is contrary to its own principles and which is not acceptable to the Chinese people.

157. Some speakers have taken advantage of this debate to extol the concept of universality. In past debates in the United Nations on this point, my delegation has stated again and again that we believe that the United Nations should try to approach universality in its membership. At the same time we have affirmed that arithmetical universality, mechanically achieved, is neither possible nor desirable. Article 4 of the Charter defines the qualifications for membership. Articles 5 and 6 provide for the suspension and expulsion of Members which have failed to live up to the obligations of membership. These Articles demand that we should not sacrifice the principles and ideals set forth in the Charter in order to achieve arithmetical universality.

158. Some of the speakers who have emphasized universality have gone so far as to state that we should have all States in the United Nations, whether they are peace-loving or not; that it is difficult to discriminate between sinners and saints; and that it is easier to deal with sinners inside the United Nations than outside. We beg to differ. In matters of this kind we too believe in tolerance, and we think that when there is reason for doubt we should like to give the benefit of the doubt to the other party. But we think that the United Nations should not have in its midst a party which has been solemnly condemned as an aggressor and which openly states that war is inevitable and that some wars are necessary.

159. When, at the end of the Second World War, the peoples of the world established the United Nations, it was not because the world lacked diplomatic machinery. In 1944-1945 all States maintained their usual Ambassadors and Ministers abroad and from time to time sent special missions and organized special conferences. Today, conventional diplomacy—or, we may say, ordinary diplomacy—is in full function. We organized the United Nations; we maintain it, not as the replacement of conventional diplomacy but as something distinct from, and additional to, conventional diplomacy.

160. What is the distinction between conventional diplomacy, as practised now and through the ages, and the United Nations? Let us be honest and realistic about this business. We must admit that the United Nations is not necessarily more efficient than conventional diplomacy. In organizing conferences, in making compromises and adjustments between States, and even in some cases, in preventing war, conventional diplomacy is more efficient than the United Nations. We should not forget that the big Powers, in the latter part of the nineteenth century, through conventional diplomacy, so skilfully compromised and adjusted their conflicts of interests that they managed to partition Africa without a war. Think of that as an achievement!

161. We of this generation certainly do not wish to have such compromises recur. That is why we have organized the United Nations. The founders of the United Nations thought that they could prevent that type of diplomacy by subjecting the deliberations and decisions of the United Nations organs to certain principles and ideals set forth in the Charter. Those who would have the United Nations organs sacrifice their principles in order to achieve arithmetical universality must be aware of the fact that by being unfaithful to the Charter, we would be denying the very soul of the United Nations. When the peoples of the world discover that there is no difference between the United Nations on the one side and ordinary diplomacy on the other, the United Nations will have to close its doors, and indeed it had better close its doors.

162. In discussing the principles of the United Nations, I am glad to note that the representative of Ireland, in his speech [1075th meeting], stressed both peace and human rights. These are twin pillars of this great Organization. I do not need to elaborate on the principles of peace. However, I think I may say a few words on human rights.

163. Article 1 of the Charter states that one of the purposes of the United Nations is the promotion and encouragement of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. These human rights are, of course, values in themselves. They constitute a part of the civilization which we try to cherish. However—and this is a point that I would like to make—it is sometimes overlooked that respect for human rights is the best guarantee for world peace. Before the Second World War, all the dictators who launched aggressive wars found it necessary, in the first place, to deprive their peoples of human rights and fundamental freedoms, for, at bottom, all peoples love peace and are unwilling to go to war. In this respect the Germans of Hitler's time, the Italians of Mussolini's time, and the Japanese of Tojo's time were not different from other people elsewhere. But the peace-loving peoples in the fascist countries had

lost their fundamental freedoms and human rights. Totalitarian and dictatorial régimes had been imposed on them. That was how the Second World War came. Let us not overlook the linkage between peace and human rights. Wherever human rights are violated, we have a condition favouring war.

164. The United Nations, of course, should tolerate different political and social systems. Nevertheless, if the United Nations is to survive, its Membership must have a minimum of like-mindedness. To declare that it is a matter of little importance whether the Chinese Communists are peace-loving or not, and whether they respect human rights or not, amounts to the desecration and degradation of the United Nations.

165. This Organization is going through a long difficult period. Let us remain steadfast in upholding these principles, because this is the only way that we can maintain and develop this Organization so that it may be what the peoples of the world expect it to be.

166. The PRESIDENT (translated from French): We have just completed the general debate on items 90 and 91 of the agenda. The Assembly will now start to discuss the draft resolutions. May I point out that we have before us a draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union [A/L.360], an amendment to that draft resolution submitted by Cambodia, Ceylon and Indonesia [A/L.375], and a draft resolution submitted by Australia, Colombia, Italy, Japan, and the United States of America [A/L.372].

167. I call on the representative of Ceylon, who has asked to exercise his right of reply.

168. Mr. PERERA (Ceylon): Although it was not my intention to do so, may I be permitted to exercise the right of reply, on behalf of Mr. Malalasekera, with regard to some of the remarks that were made by Mr. Tsiang. As parts of the speech made by Mr. Malalasekera on 4 December (1070th meeting) have been quoted in extenso, may I say that his remarks were based on personal visits to the People's Republic of China. His assessment of what he would call the vision for the future of the Chinese people is based not only on Chinese history, but on the social and political forces that are at work in contemporary China. Mr. Malalasekera's understanding of the dialectical process, as he stated in his speech, was not only romantic—I am sure he would be the first to subscribe to the view that it was romantic—but it was also a humanistic approach to the problem.

169. The General Assembly has before it an amendment [A/L.375] dated 12 December 1961 to the draft resolution [A/L.360] moved by the Soviet Union. Representatives have had the opportunity of studying it and it is not my intention to take up the time of the Assembly by going into it in detail. At this late stage of our debate perhaps it may be essential to state the purport of that amendment. In doing that I may at the same time have to go into some of the facts which motivated the amendment, which stands in the name of Cambodia, Ceylon and Indonesia.

170. It will be recalled that the subject under consideration, which comprises items 90 and 91 on the agenda of the General Assembly, arose from the inclusion of an item, at the request of New Zealand [see A/4874], under the title "Question of the representation of China in the United Nations". Item 91 was included, in our view, under a correct title—as "Restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations". Subsequently,

a draft resolution [A/L.372] was tabled by Australia, Colombia, Italy, Japan and the United States of America. The draft resolution of the Soviet Union was submitted on 27 October 1961. I have given the history of these draft resolutions because it is apposite to my task in dealing with the amendment.

171. In the view of my delegation and that of the co-sponsors of the amendment, when the item entitled "Question of the representation of China" was included on the agenda, it was clear that the authors of the five-Power draft resolution had in mind a certain procedure. As against that, the Soviet Union draft resolution was, in our view, a correct approach to the problem. We say "correct", because juridically it stated the facts as they are at present known, and sought a remedy.

172. Our amendment takes into account the two preambular paragraphs of the Soviet draft *in toto*. We do not disagree at all. Nor, may I say with emphasis, do we reject in any way the primary purpose, or the ultimate purpose, of the Soviet draft. I have made that position clear, because in the course of the debate—and we took into account the statements made by various delegations—reference was made to non-existing juridical facts, to political facts which had no bearing on the issue, and, what is more, in our view, an attempt was made to abuse a certain article in the United Nations Charter. Therefore I make the submission that the correct title of the item, the correct way of stating the question, is: "Restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations".

173. The two preambular paragraphs of the Soviet Union draft are not only unimpeachable, but they are also a declaration of principles and a restatement of facts of which we are apprised.

174. Since the establishment of the People's Republic of China in September 1949, as we are aware, there has been a *de facto* Government in Peking, and it is for that reason that our amendment seeks to seat that Government immediately in the United Nations. If I may perhaps use wording which is often used in United Nations matters, the modalities of the question may perhaps be different, in the view of the Soviet Union, but the purpose is the same.

175. If I may sum up the purpose of our amendment, as we see it, it seeks to achieve the following objects. First, it rejects categorically the idea of two Chinas, in the geographical or any other sense. Second, it repudiates firmly the belief held by certain delegations that the People's Republic of China should make an application for membership. This matter was dealt with very brilliantly by the representative of the Soviet Union in reference to one particular representative's statements. Third, it states the legal position in accordance with the accepted canons of international law. Further, without using extravagant language, I might say that the full purpose that the amendment seeks to achieve is the purpose set forth in the Charter. In addition it seeks to fulfil the high hopes which the statesmen at San Francisco entertained at the time the Charter was drafted and the United Nations was established.

176. The substance of the amendment is derived from certain simple propositions. We have sought, not to confuse the issue as has been done by the draft resolution sponsored by Australia, Colombia, Italy, Japan and the United States, but have tried to simplify it so

that the Assembly could appreciate what the issues are. We have sought to state the legal points and the political points in as clear a manner as possible. The substance of the amendment, therefore, in our view, is derived from certain facts which cannot be denied.

177. The first is, that China is a founding Member of the United Nations and a permanent member of the Security Council.

178. The substance of the amendment is also derived from an assessment of what has happened in the past twelve years. It is our view that, contrary to the principles of the Charter, contrary to the accepted practices which govern international relations and contrary to the principles of international law, the seat in this Assembly which should have been the seat of the People's Republic of China has been denied to it. Furthermore, that seat, to which the People's Republic of China was entitled as far back as September 1949, not only in the General Assembly but in the other organs of the United Nations, has been unlawfully occupied by—without using any harsh words—others whom we may call "pretenders". I use a very mild term, because in history we have come across pretenders, and we find them even in contemporary history. There are a few archdukes and princes going about Europe pretending that they are entitled to the thrones of this or that empire.

179. The third proposition from which we derive our amendment is based on a legal proposition; or I should say, "a legal concept". That is, that in seating the lawful Government of China, which is the Peking Government, there is an automatic removal of any pretender now claiming the seat, or attempting to claim the seat which is not lawfully the pretender's.

180. The restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China is, therefore, not a question of representation; it is something which goes beyond that. If it were a question of representation, I submit, we would have to reassess the basis on which Article 4 of the Charter is framed. That is not the case here. As Mr. Malalasekera put it in his speech, it is simply a matter of credentials, no more and no less. Whether looked at juridically or politically, it is a question of credentials.

181. The amendment, I submit, seeks to remove, and perhaps to clean away—if I may put it that way—the patina of confusion which we saw in the minds of some delegations. It seeks to assure not only for the People's Republic of China the restoration of its lawful rights and its recognition by international bodies like the United Nations; it also seeks to assure to all countries in the future the legality of revolutionary changes.

182. That is the purport of the amendment. Today it may be China; tomorrow it may be another country that is denied its lawful seat in this Assembly. We have therefore taken into account these changes that have taken place, and we have based our amendment not only on international practices but also on canons of international law which have been accepted by all Members of this Assembly.

183. May I say in this connexion, with great earnestness, that in 1793 the United States Government recognized the French Revolutionary Government, and on that occasion the then Secretary of State, Jefferson, wrote to the American Minister in Paris:

"We surely cannot deny to any nation that right whereon our own government is founded—that every

one may govern itself according to whatever form it pleases, and change these forms at its own will; and that it may transact its business with foreign nations through whatever organ it thinks proper, whether King, Convention, Assembly, Committee, President, or anything else it may choose. The will of the nation is the only thing essential to be regarded".^{3/}

184. That sums up our position. We were disturbed and we continue to be disturbed, that questions of recognition have been introduced into what is a very simple matter of credentials. I do not wish to develop the legal aspects of this subject, but in this connexion a very important document, ignored by those who wish to ignore it—but nevertheless it is a United Nations document and a very well considered document, the result of a Committee that sat on this subject—was submitted. I am referring to a letter^{4/} addressed to the President of the Security Council by the then Secretary-General, from which I quote:

"From the standpoint of legal theory, the linkage of representation in an international organization and recognition of a government is a confusion of two institutions which have superficial similarities but are essentially different."

185. It is our submission that the seating of the Peiping Government does not involve recognition or non-recognition by States Members of the United Nations. It is not even a question of the representation of China in the United Nations. It is a question of the restoration of lawful rights which the People's Republic of China has been entitled to enjoy since September 1949. Over a period of twelve years, in spite of the prognostication of many a Cassandra, the *de facto* Government at Peiping has survived. In spite of the threats to liberate the mainland of China, the Peiping Government survives. Can we ignore these facts?

186. The sponsors of the amendment have taken into consideration not only the realities of international life but also the realities that prevail in China. And it is here that we are fortified by another statement from the document I already mentioned. I quote from it again:

"The Members have therefore made clear by an unbroken practice that:

"(1) A Member could properly vote to accept a representative of a government which it did not recognize, or with which it had no diplomatic relations, and

"(2) Such a vote did not imply recognition or a readiness to assume diplomatic relations."

187. We do not ask that the seating of the Government of the People's Republic of China should have any consequences other than that it takes its proper place. The question of recognition is an entirely different matter. But what we do object to is, that this question should have been confused with the question of recognition. What is more, the position has been confused by certain delegations which now demand that there should be a separate application

by the People's Republic of China. The letter from the then Secretary-General goes on to say:

"The practice which has been thus followed in the United Nations is not only legally correct but conforms to the basic character of the Organization. The United Nations is not an association limited to like-minded States and governments of similar ideological persuasion (as in the case in certain regional associations). As an Organization which aspires to universality, it must of necessity include States of varying and even conflicting ideologies."

188. I have no desire to quote any further from that document, since its contents are well known and reference has been made to it in many of the statements. All we are concerned with now is to put an end to all these fictions which are being introduced at every point in our debate.

189. In this context, I wish to make our position very clear. Our amendment is in no way derogatory to, nor does it detract from, the Soviet draft resolution. I do not want to use the word "complementary", and I do not wish to refer to the words used by the representative of the United States, that ours is a more sophisticated draft. I can assure members that sophistication was not in our mind. Our only thought was to make the position quite clear, especially in view of the two submissions made, on the one hand that there should be a separate application, and that there was a possibility, on the other hand, of having two Chinas.

190. I should like to conclude on a note which we believe is essential for the future of our Organization. I am referring to the attempt made by some States to cloak the truth under the verbiage of international law. Any analysis of the political situation based on law must take into account the accepted practices. The truth is that international law can no more refuse to recognize that a finally successful conquest does change title to territory, than municipal law can change a régime brought about by a successful revolution. What we have in mind is, that in the future we should not be faced with such issues, issues which could have been solved many years ago. We seek to counter the use of the doctrine of non-recognition in international affairs, for we believe that this doctrine, besides being an attempt to disguise the facts of international politics under a legal mask, is only one example of Governments trying to obtain the benefits of international law whilst absolving themselves from its responsibilities. The doctrine, if accepted, is tantamount in our view to condoning the absence of any idea of duty to the international community. The doctrine is a political idea dressed up in legal language.

191. Perhaps my co-sponsors and I feel strongly on this matter, not because we are living in the shadow of China or because we are living in South-East Asia or in Asia proper, but because we believe that a legal wrong has been done to the Government at Peiping. I hesitate to comment on the policies of Governments, and that applies to Governments that are seated in this Assembly and to those that are not seated in this Assembly. That is why I refrained advisedly from commenting on Dr. Tsiang's remarks. I could have dealt with them, but that would not serve any purpose for the moment. A sense of punctiliousness has caused me to refrain from discussing matters of policy. We are appealing to the Assembly on the basis of purely legal and juridical facts. We are appealing to the Assembly on the basis of our amendment which, as

^{3/} *The Living Thoughts of Thomas Jefferson*, Presented by John Dewey, New York, Longmans, Green and Co. 1943, p. 162.

^{4/} *Official Records of the Security Council, Fifth Year, Supplement for 1 January through 31 May 1950*, document S/1466.

I said earlier, seeks to seat the Government of the People's Republic of China immediately, on the assumption that it is the only Government that represents the Chinese people. Its competence and its fiat have not been denied. What is more, its lawful rights have been denied only by this Assembly. It is not for me to say that it has diplomatic relations with forty countries and trade relations with eighty countries. Those facts are well known.

192. We have submitted this amendment on the basis of those principles, and I trust that the spirit of the amendment will be appreciated by the Soviet Union.

193. With respect to the draft resolution submitted by the five Powers, we shall vote against it for the reasons which I have already stated and also—if I may finally add this—for reasons involving the future of our Organization. It will not only be impolitic but dangerous to support such a draft resolution, whether it is designed to set up a committee to study the question further, or to decide whether to treat it as an important matter. I said earlier that Article 18 could be abused. I do not want to discuss this in detail, since many jurists who spoke before me have dealt with the matter of when the application of the last part of Article 18 comes into operation. It was never meant to create an injustice. It was meant to create something which was acceptable in the interests of international law. I commend the amendment [A/L.375] to the Assembly.

Mr. Kurka (Czechoslovakia), Vice-President, took the Chair.

194. The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): I have on the list of speakers the names of a number of representatives who have expressed a wish to speak in explanation of their vote before the vote is taken. I shall call on them to come to the rostrum.

195. Mr. BELAUNDE (Peru) (translated from Spanish): I propose to explain the vote which the delegation of Peru will cast on the draft resolutions now before us and on the amendment which has just been presented.

196. In this matter the small Powers—all the Powers, for that matter, but even more particularly we small ones—must look at the problem with complete objectivity, standing apart from politics and taking account only of the Charter and the true interests of the United Nations—in other words, listening only to such reasons as are based on legal and moral justice and, where the international situation is concerned, to reasons of prudence.

197. I must regretfully differ from the theory which has been put forward here—a highly dangerous theory, which has no basis in international life—that the admission of a State to membership in the United Nations, whenever a change of Government takes place, is a mechanical and automatic affair that can be settled merely by a comparison of credentials. Such a notion is based on a lamentable confusion. Certainly, most of the recent cases have involved no argument regarding the succession of the Governments. The new Governments established in the territory of a country which was a Member of the United Nations have been recognized by the majority of the other Governments. When there was no revolutionary reaction against those Governments, when the Government concerned clearly had full control of the territory, and when it was recognized by nearly all

Member countries of the Organization, then its admission brought no change in the international atmosphere such as to compromise the general policy which must be followed by the United Nations for the maintenance of peace.

198. Thus, only when those three unquestionably normal conditions were fulfilled was the matter of the representation of a new State a purely automatic affair. Since precedent—except in the case of China—has favoured such cases, there has sprung up what is called in English an "over-generalization", or a simplification of an essentially technical matter which is by nature complex. I know what I am saying, because I have been studying the problem ever since I held the Chair of International Law at Lima in 1913. When a new Government is installed, or when a new revolutionary entity seizes control of the territory, the control is obviously complete. There is no discussion, no possibility of two Governments. There is only one Government. There is no "pretender" (to repeat the polite euphemism which has been used here and which I applaud). When, in addition, most Member countries of the United Nations have recognized or are going to recognize that Government, so that their attitude will not impose upon the Organization a specific policy but, on the contrary, will win the support of world opinion and not force it to take a specific direction; and lastly—and this is the essential point—when that new Government has created no profound and radical change in world policy that will represent a danger to peace, then, in such normal conditions, and only then, is the question of the recognition of a new Government by the United Nations a purely automatic affair of credentials. Why? Because behind the apparently automatic majority is universal consent, what we call in the voting here "no objection" by any Member of the United Nations.

199. An objective study of the matter shows that this is not case with China. In the first place, we are faced with two Governments, although the populations and territories concerned are different. But this duality of Governments also requires a study of other grave problems. Then, too, there is complete disagreement on the question of recognition. According to my information, fifty-four countries have recognized Nationalist China, while thirty at most have recognized the People's Republic of China.

200. Most serious of all, however, has been that which Communist China's arrival on the scene has represented: a change in the juridical status existing at the time; the intervention in China of a foreign Power; the violation of a treaty which obviously existed between Soviet Russia and Communist China—a treaty to which we have frequently referred here—and, lastly, an immediate attempt to establish in Asia an imperialistic trend which was to upset the political balance in Asia that was a basis of world peace.

201. All here have already recalled—and I need not do so again—the problem of Korea, the position of Indo-China, the Viet-Nam guerrillas, the invasion of Tibet and, finally, the threat to India.

202. However, there is something even graver. We are forgetting to apply psychology to politics. One of the great evils of our age is that we have converted sociology and law into completely empirical, materialistic and quantitative sciences, forgetting the essential principles and purposes of human conduct.

We cannot deny the universality of the United Nations—but it is a moral, not a geographical, universality. When the countries which established the United Nations demanded and proclaimed—in the name of the peoples, not of the States—certain principles, like respect for human rights, respect for treaties, the practice of tolerance—the practice of tolerance!—and the decision to live together in peace, they invested all the peoples of the United Nations with something from which those peoples cannot escape. Any people attempting to destroy that investiture exposes itself to the possibility of expulsion from the United Nations. The preamble to the Charter and the Article relating to expulsion create for the United Nations an undeniable moral investiture that must be respected by any Government or any people which wants to belong to the United Nations or to occupy a seat there as a founding Member State.

203. In recent times we have watched with sorrow—for confronted with evil we can feel no anger, only sorrow, compassion and sadness—how the bellicose policy of Communist China has been intensified, how of late that country has set aside the theory of peaceful coexistence and has clearly and publicly adopted, before all mankind, the doctrine that war is inevitable, and the Marxist-Leninist interpretation which completely rejects any policy of peace and prescribes that the revolution must be imposed by any means and in any form, whether through subversive or through open warfare. Are we not witnessing, at this very moment, a debate between the Soviet Union and Communist China on this subject? How does the Soviet Union interpret peaceful coexistence? Does Communist China accept it, proclaim it, interpret it in the same way? If so, the change, because of psychological factors, would involve a moral element which it would be absurd and inconceivable for the United Nations to ignore.

204. The United Nations is based on spiritual values, on a consciousness of spiritual values. It would be absurd to demand, in the name of a stupid, sordid and despicable type of realism, that the United Nations should discard the moral criterion in matters touching its constitution and policies. For that reason therefore—and I say this with all respect—I do not believe that this question can be presented within the framework displayed for it today by the Soviet Union and the delegation of Ceylon. The problem is a different one. They have gone from a situation of blissful and evangelic normality to the gravest situation confronting the world of today in connexion with the problem of peace in the East, which means the peace of the world.

205. All that I have just said means, therefore, that the subject is of great importance and that we need to go much further into it, to study it from the legal standpoint, to study it from the political standpoint, to study it from the sociological standpoint, to study it from standpoint of the spiritual structure of the United Nations and, above all, to study it from the standpoint of the problems of peace. If that is the shape of the problem, who can doubt that it needs to be studied? Who can doubt that it would be a rash solution, violating all the rules of prudence and discretion, for the United Nations to embark upon a political movement, to take up a sentimental position, to be loyal to principles which we respect or to ties which we also respect but which cannot cause us to overlook the spirit of the Charter and the major

interest of the United Nations in not adding to the shadows of today?

206. I have used the word "shadows"; this word reminds me of an admirable work by Huizinga—the great Dutch historian who wrote the Life of Erasmus and the Waning of the Middle Ages—a book entitled In the Shadow of Tomorrow. Gentlemen, they are not tomorrow's shadows, they are today's; and every day they are piling up, every day they are multiplying. Let us not add to them the shadow of a frankly imperialistic State, the shadow of a problem which would end by dividing the United Nations. Let us not introduce yet another source of bitter discussion and problems to break the sublime unity which the United Nations must maintain if it is to discharge its lofty, human mission.

207. For these reasons the delegation of Peru will vote, in full awareness of what it is doing, against the proposal of the Soviet Union, and against the amendment of Ceylon which, as has been said here, in no way changes the Soviet proposal. In equal awareness it will vote for the proposal of the United States of America, which expresses what we all feel to be a reality—namely, that the question is one of the most substantial and most important ever submitted for the consideration of the United Nations.

Mr. Slim (Tunisia) resumed the Chair.

208. Mr. BERARD (France) (translated from French): The Assembly will not be surprised to hear that the explanation of the vote of the French delegation will be brief. In the course of a debate during which approximately sixty speakers have been heard, everything has been said and resaid. To revert to the substance of the matter would not be appropriate at this stage and would oblige us to be unnecessarily repetitious. In any case the comments which I wish to make on the draft resolutions before us are prompted by considerations of simple common sense rather than by speculations in the realm of high politics.

209. It is indeed common sense which compels us to declare ourselves in favour of the draft resolution submitted by Australia, Colombia, Italy, Japan and the United States of America [A/L.372], which has been convincingly commented upon by the spokesmen of these States. How is it possible to maintain that so complex and controversial a question as that of changing the representation of China is not an "important" one within the meaning of Article 18 of the Charter? As our colleague from Cameroon so aptly pointed out the day before yesterday, does not the fact that the question has been raised for twelve years in this Assembly provide the clearest proof of its importance? And Mr. Bindzi added:

"During these twelve years, the sages composing this eminent areopagus have decided every time that the hour for a decision had not yet struck and have deemed it necessary to allow themselves more time for reflection." [1076th meeting, para. 176.]

210. It seems to me that there is a singular contradiction in declaring on the one hand that the problem, by its very nature, is likely to entail the most serious repercussions, and, on the other hand, that it boils down to a mere point of procedure. There are many arguments in support of this opinion to be found in the speeches of the representatives who have preceded me. I shall quote only this particularly significant

passage from the eloquent speech made on 4 December 1961 by the representative of Ceylon:

"For these reasons the issue under discussion here is not a procedural issue, except in so far as it concerns a simple matter of credentials. It is an issue which strikes at the deepest roots of the question of war and peace in Asia and in the whole world." [1070th meeting, para. 92.]

211. It is useful to recall also that the list of important questions given in Article 18 of the Charter is not restrictive, since paragraph 3 of that Article provides for "the determination of additional categories of questions to be decided by a two-thirds majority". The Assembly is fully justified in deciding that the question at issue is important. In our opinion, it is the duty of the Assembly to do so.

212. The French delegation will accordingly vote in favour of the five-Power draft resolution [A/L.372], which seems to it to be well founded from both the legal and the factual point of view. On the other hand, it will be compelled to vote against the draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union [A/L.360] for reasons which are connected both with the form and with the substance of the draft resolution.

213. To consider first the form: the text of the Soviet proposal is worded in a manner which we consider to be inadmissible. This is yet another example of a reprehensible habit, made fashionable by the Eastern delegations, which is becoming increasingly rife in the United Nations and which the President of the Republic of Liberia has castigated in a particularly noteworthy manner in his speech before the Assembly on 23 October 1961, when he said:

"... discussions and debates are conducted and, very often, decisions are made in the heat of passion and excitement where all the niceties of diplomacy and the suavity of expression are totally disregarded by Member States ... Such practices indulged in from day to day, month to month, year to year, session after session, have bred envy, hatred and prejudices which inevitably have become so deep-seated as to render friendly intercourse, understanding, conciliation, reconciliation and compromise at any point difficult if not impossible." [1041st meeting, para. 16.]

Those were the words of Mr. William S. Tubman, the President of the Republic of Liberia.

214. I concur whole-heartedly with the opinion expressed the day before yesterday by Mr. Louis Rakotomalala, the representative of Madagascar, when he said that in the course of this debate:

"... the advocates and opposers of such admission have in turn set forth their arguments with eloquence, but also with considerable passion and, it must be said, sometimes with little respect for the objectivity and moral principles which 103 nations have gathered here to protect" [1076th meeting, para. 153].

Such violent language would in itself be sufficient reason for rejecting the USSR draft resolution. The considerations of substance are, however, even more serious and more important.

215. The USSR proposal claims to provide us with an abrupt and immediate solution—a solution which in no way takes account of all the elements of a problem whose breadth and complexity the present debate has at least had the merit of demonstrating to us. Mr.

Frank Aiken, the eminent Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ireland, has urged the General Assembly [1075th meeting] to seek a formula which would ensure and promote peace in the Far East. The French delegation does not think that the adoption of the Soviet draft resolution would lead to a lessening of tension or help to overcome the present difficulties; quite the contrary. Simply to expel the representatives of a Government which has always shown respect for the provisions of the United Nations Charter and the duties of international co-operation, and to replace them by the representatives of a régime of which the least that can be said is that it pays very little heed to respect for human rights, to the fundamental freedoms or the development of friendly and peaceful relations among nations does not seem to us a solution to be recommended. Once again, the issue is an important one, every aspect of which deserves to be carefully weighed in the light of the views expressed in the course of the discussion that has just taken place. That is why, as I have stated, my delegation will vote against this draft resolution.

216. The explanation that I have just given indicates the attitude that my delegation will adopt in respect to the amendment submitted by Cambodia, Ceylon and Indonesia [A/L.375]. This amendment has the merit of purging the Soviet Union resolution of the violence of language which I have just criticized, and in that respect I must say that its sponsors certainly deserve our gratitude. In reality, however, it does not alter the sense or scope of this draft resolution and does not remove the serious objections of substance to which in our opinion it gives rise. For that reason, this amendment is not acceptable to my delegation.

217. Mr. DELGADO (Philippines): In the consideration of item 90 on the agenda, entitled "Question of the representation of China in the United Nations", and item 91, entitled "Restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations", two draft resolutions have been submitted, one [A/L.360] by the Soviet Union and the other [A/L.372] by Australia, Colombia, Italy, Japan and the United States of America. An amendment [A/L.375] to the Soviet draft resolution has been submitted by the delegations of Cambodia, Ceylon and Indonesia.

218. Before casting its vote on these two draft resolutions, the Philippine delegation wishes to make its stand clear. The position of the Philippine Government on the general question of membership in the United Nations of Communist China was stated by my delegation on 17 October 1961 as follows:

"Our respect for the provisions of the Charter constrains the Philippine delegation to continue, in present circumstances, to oppose the membership in this Organization of Communist China, which has flouted the cause of peace, has challenged and fought against the collective will of the United Nations, and has, through aggression, infiltration and subversion, disregarded the peace and territorial integrity of its neighbours and of many other countries." [1038th meeting, para. 90.]

219. In the policy statement that I have just quoted we made reference to certain provisions of the Charter. Before taking up the Charter provisions we have in mind, may I be permitted to lay before this Assembly what my delegation believes are the purposes behind the draft resolutions—particularly the Soviet Union draft resolution—and the results or

consequences that would follow their adoption by this Assembly.

220. The draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union has two operative paragraphs. It first operative calls for the immediate removal from all United Nations organs of "the representatives of the Chiang Kai-shek clique who are unlawfully occupying the place of China in the United Nations". The second operative paragraph "Invites the Government of the People's Republic of China to send its representatives to participate in the work of the United Nations and of all its organs".

221. The amendment introduced by Cambodia, Ceylon and Indonesia would replace the two operative paragraphs of the Soviet draft resolution with one stating that it was decided "that the representative of the Government of the People's Republic of China be seated in the United Nations and all its organs".

222. Under the draft resolution submitted by Australia and four other Powers, the General Assembly recalls that on 14 December 1950 the Assembly, in resolution 396 (V), recommended that:

"whenever more than one authority claims to be the government entitled to represent a Member State in the United Nations and this question becomes the subject of controversy in the United Nations, the question should be considered in the light of the Purposes and Principles of the Charter and the circumstances of each case",

and decides:

"... in accordance with Article 18 of the Charter that any proposal to change the representation of China is an important question".

223. Since the two draft resolutions are related to each other, we propose to discuss them together.

224. The Philippine delegation agrees with the view expressed in the five-Power draft resolution that "any proposal to change the representation of China" in the United Nations "is an important question" within the meaning of Article 18 of the Charter. We shall, therefore, vote in favour of that draft resolution.

225. We cannot vote in favour of the draft resolution proposed by the Soviet Union because, as intimated in our policy statement on 17 October 1961, we are opposed to the membership of Communist China in the United Nations, taking into account certain provisions of the Charter and the behaviour of Communist China past and present.

226. We cannot vote for the three-Power amendment because it does not change the purpose behind the draft resolution of the Soviet Union nor the results that would follow; if this amendment were adopted, the result would be the same as if the Soviet draft were adopted. The Republic of China would be removed from the United Nations and its place would be taken by the People's Republic of China.

227. In taking this position with respect to the draft resolution tabled by the Soviet Union, we are not unmindful of the views expressed here by several delegations that the question before us does not involve the expulsion of a Member, that we are not concerned here with the admission of a new Member, and that the question before us merely concerns credentials. My delegation has given due consideration, not only to the language of the draft resolution

of the Soviet Union, but has also endeavoured to look behind that language. We have asked ourselves this question: what really is the purpose of this draft resolution? What will be its effect?

228. Let us take up the first operative paragraph. True, this paragraph speaks of removal, not expulsion; but to my delegation there does not seem to be much difference between removal and expulsion. The draft resolution calls for the removal of representatives of the Republic of China from all organs of the United Nations.

229. Now, what are the organs of the United Nations? According to Article 7 of the Charter, there are two kinds—the principal organs and the subsidiary organs. The principal organs are the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, the International Court of Justice and the Secretariat. The subsidiary organs are those established in accordance with Charter provisions. In the latter category are the Peace Observation Commission, UNRWA, ECAFE, UNICEF, and a host of others.

230. The first operative paragraph of the draft resolution of the Soviet Union—the "removal" part—would have us remove from the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Trusteeship Council, ECAFE, UNICEF, and many other subsidiary organs of the United Nations, representatives of Nationalist China. Does this action not amount to expulsion? Call it removal, or ouster, or expulsion—the result is the same. And they do not want to consider this action as serious or important; they want to effect the change through a vote with a simple majority. What sarcasm!

231. We now come to the second operative paragraph of the Soviet draft resolution—the invitation "to the Government of the People's Republic of China to send its representatives to participate in the work of the United Nations and of all its organs". As in the case of the first operative paragraph, my delegation has considered not only the language but also the real purpose or effect of this invitation. It is clear that the purpose of this draft resolution and its effect would be to seat a new Member. To those who say that the matter involved here is merely the restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations, we say that the People's Republic of China never had any rights in the United Nations; that membership of the United Nations is not a matter of right for anybody, but a privilege which can be granted by this Organization after compliance with certain conditions. And what are these conditions?

232. Under Article 4, paragraph 1 of the Charter, an applicant for membership in the United Nations needs four qualifications: first, it should be a State; second, it should be peace-loving; third, it should accept the obligations contained in the Charter; and fourth, it should be able and willing, in the judgement of the United Nations, to carry out these obligations.

233. The Philippine delegation believes that the People's Republic of China, by its past and present behaviour, has shown that it is not a peace-loving State and is not, therefore, qualified to be admitted as a Member of this Organization.

234. The word "peace-loving" in Article 4 did not get into the Charter by accident. It was put there after lengthy deliberations not only in San Francisco in 1945, but even before San Francisco—in Washington in 1942 and in Moscow in 1943. In the history of the

United Nations Charter, one comes across these four important documents: (1) the Atlantic Charter of 1941; (2) the Declaration by United Nations of 1942; (3) the Moscow Declaration of 1943; and (4) the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals of 1944. The word "peace-loving" is not found in the Atlantic Charter nor in the Declaration by the United Nations. It is found in the Moscow Declaration and in the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals. It is from these two documents that the word got into the Charter of the United Nations.

235. On the question of who should be members of the World Organization, the experts who formulated the proposals on which the United Nations Charter was based considered three principles: (1) the principle of universal membership, which envisaged an international organization with a global or world-wide membership; (2) the principle of automatic membership, which envisaged an international organization where all duly recognized independent States should be considered as members; and (3) the principle of selective membership, which envisaged an international organization that selected its members.

236. The concept of automatic membership was discarded on the ground that no State could be compelled to accept membership in an organization when that membership carried with it certain obligations. The concept of universal membership was preserved as an objective, but it was the concept of selective membership that won the unanimous vote of the drafting experts. The principle of selective membership was agreed upon because of the unanimous view of the framers that the aggressor nations, the Axis States, were to be excluded from the Organization in the beginning. In the language of these framers, the enemy countries would have "to work their passage home" before they could be admitted as peace-loving Members. Having rejected the principle of automatic membership and adopted the concept of selective membership, it became necessary to consider the selective conditions or qualifications of applicants for membership. The United States draft, which was used as the basis of the talks in Moscow in the fall of 1943, did not contain the word "peace-loving". This term was inserted at the suggestion of the British representatives and was approved subsequently, by the Soviet, American, and Chinese representatives. The Moscow Declaration of 30 October 1943 included what later came to be known as "Point 4 of the Moscow Declaration", which contains for the first time the "peace-loving" qualification. The paragraph reads as follows:

"4. They [the four Governments] recognize the necessity of establishing at the earliest practicable date a general international organization, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states, and open to membership by all such states, large and small, for the maintenance of international peace and security."

237. After the Moscow Conference came the Dumbarton Oaks conversations in Washington, D.C., between representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the Republic of China. For the second time, these Powers adhered to the principle of selective membership and agreed to have as members of the proposed international organization only "peace-loving" States.

238. Chapter II of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, which emerged from the Washington conversations and which served as the working paper for the framers

of the Charter in San Francisco opened with this statement:

"The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving States".^{5/}

Chapter III, on membership, has only one sentence, which reads: "Membership of the Organization should be open to all peace-loving States."^{6/}

239. It is interesting to note the views expressed during the San Francisco Conference on the membership issue. There were some representatives who wanted to define the requirements of membership beyond the sole "peace-loving" qualification in the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals. For example, the representative of Chile thought that Members should love not only peace but also "the democratic system". The representative of France went further and expressed the view that applicant States should prove their love of peace "by their institutions, their international behaviour, and the effective guarantees which they furnish that they will respect their international obligations". It was the British proposal, however, which won the day. It reads as follows:

"Membership of the Organization is open to all peace-loving States which, in the judgement of the Organization, are able and ready to accept and carry out the obligations contained in the Charter."^{7/}

This British proposal, with slight modification, was written into the Charter of the United Nations as its Article 4, paragraph 1.

240. It is therefore clear that the "peace-loving" qualification got into the Charter after long deliberation. It was conceived in Moscow, in 1943; it was confirmed at Dumbarton Oaks in 1944; and it was formally written into the United Nations Charter in San Francisco in 1945. That "peace-loving" requirement is still in the Charter and deserves our respect.

241. In our policy statement of 17 October, we spoke of aggression, infiltration and subversion in general terms. May we be permitted to give specific instances. Aggression? Our answer is Korea. On 2 November 1950, while the United Nations forces were pushing back the invading North Korean Communists, hordes of Chinese Communists entered Korea, joined in the fight and drove the United Nations forces back, overrunning Seoul, the capital of the Republic of Korea. The General Assembly called upon Communist China to withdraw its troops. Peiping refused, and in February 1951 the Assembly [resolution 498 (V)] found that Peiping had committed aggression.

242. In the meantime, thousands of Chinese Communist soldiers were taken prisoner by the United Nations forces. Fighting ceased when an Armistice Agreement was signed on 27 July 1953. That Armistice is still in force; no peace settlement has as yet been agreed upon. In other words, technically, there is still war in Korea.

243. Even at this moment, thousands of soldiers under the United Nations Command are deployed near the demilitarized zone at the 38th parallel, facing thousands of Communist troops. If we go to Pusan, a city in South Korea, today we shall see a big open area, over which the United Nations flag is flying.

^{5/} See United Nations Conference on International Organization, G/1, p. 2.

^{6/} *Ibid.*, p. 3.

^{7/} See United Nations Conference on International Organization, I/2/17, p. 2.

The area is covered by crosses and other symbols, to mark the graves of the thousands of soldiers who fought and died in Korea in defence of United Nations principles. This is the first cemetery of its kind, the United Nations Cemetery in Pusan. There are tombstones there with Philippine names, because my country did its bit in the United Nations action.

244. Here, in this building, as one emerges from the Meditation Room, one sees a bronze plaque marked, "The United Nations—In grateful remembrance of the men of the Armed Forces of Member States who died in Korea in the service of the United Nations ..." and then one reads the names of the sixteen countries, African, Asian, European and American, which participated in the Korean War against the Chinese Communists. The United Nations Cemetery in Pusan and that bronze plaque in this building are a grim reminder of the fact that the People's Republic of China has waged war not against one nation alone, or an alliance of nations, but against the United Nations itself.

245. And Tibet? We all know about the invasion by the military forces of Communist China and the suppression of human rights there. Thousands and thousands of Tibetans, including the Dalai Lama, have fled from Tibet and are now refugees in India, in Nepal and other neighbouring countries. The Dalai Lama has accused Peiping of genocide.

246. Even at this very hour we have an idea of what the Chinese Communists are doing on Indian territory. According to The New York Times of 29 November 1961, Prime Minister Nehru indicated that he might use force to fight Chinese Communist aggressors. The great Nehru, a genuine lover of peace, a disciple of another great peace-lover, Mahatma Gandhi, is reported to have said:

"My whole soul reacts against the idea of war anywhere. That is the training I have received throughout my life and I cannot easily get rid of it at the age of seventy-two."^{8/}

But when, in spite of his hatred for war, Mr. Nehru says that he might use force to fight the Chinese Communists, we know that the soil of India has been the subject of aggression.

247. We of course know about the bombing of the islands of Quemoy and Matsu from the Chinese mainland; we know about Laos and now it is South Viet-Nam. The Philippines has not escaped the subversive activities of the Chinese Communists in all fields, economic and others. It is unnecessary to enumerate the details here. Suffice it to say that our intelligence service has complete reports of the same.

248. Here is a country whose admission into this Organization is sought, and we have heard it said on this rostrum that the admission of Communist China into the United Nations will promote the cause of peace because Communist China believes in peaceful coexistence. Does Communist China really love peace?

249. We know that Communist China has the conviction that war between the Communist countries and the free world is inevitable. It has raised and is maintaining a huge army. This army is not for self defence. It has actually sent a million soldiers to overrun Korea. It has used this army to invade Tibet. It is actually using that army to invade India.

^{8/} This statement was reported in The New York Times of 6 December 1961.

250. The Chinese Communists hold that Lenin's doctrine of the inevitability of war and of continuing struggle between the proletariat and bourgeoisie is as true today.

251. The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I call on the representative of the Soviet Union to speak on a point of order.

252. Mr. LAPIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Much as I respect the seniority of the speaker to whom we are listening I would ask him to carry his lecture over to a more convenient time. It is now past midnight and time for us all, particularly the older people, to go to bed.

253. Mr. DELGADO (Philippines): I am almost at the last page. I was saying that the Chinese Communists hold that Lenin's doctrine of the inevitability of war and of continuing struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie is as true today as when it was enunciated several decades ago. I quote:

"We believe in the absolute correctness of Lenin's thinking: War is an inevitable outcome of exploiting systems, and the source of modern wars is the imperialist system. Until the imperialist system and the exploiting classes come to an end, wars of one kind or another will always appear."

254. In other words, so long as Communism is not triumphant throughout the world, there will be wars. This being the case:

"Marxism-Leninism must not sink into the mire of bourgeois pacifism, and can only appraise all kinds of wars and thus draw conclusions for proletarian policy by adopting the method of concrete class analysis ..."

Let Communist China do something in the future that may erase our vision of Korea, Tibet, India, Laos, and Viet-Nam; let it stop acts of aggression, infiltration and subversion; let it give up the policy that war is necessary; let it stop defying the United Nations; and we can then talk about the United Nations inviting it to join us here.

255. We shall vote on the basis of the foregoing considerations.

256. The PRESIDENT (translated from French): Before calling on the next speaker, I should like to draw the attention of the Assembly to the fact that we are now hearing statements in explanation of vote. I shall be very grateful if all Members will refrain from taking advantage of such statements, in order to reopen the general debate, which, as I announced during this meeting, has been closed.

257. Mr. CISSE (Senegal) (translated from French): As the Chair has just requested, I shall be very brief and shall confine myself to an explanation of vote.

258. At the fifteenth session of the General Assembly, during the debate on the question of the representation of China in the United Nations, my delegation had an opportunity of making known its position by voting in favour of the inclusion of that item on the agenda [895th meeting].

259. Subsequently, during the first few days of our resumed session, the Government of the Republic of Senegal granted de jure recognition to the People's Republic of China. That position, which we adopted recently, still reflects our policy today. Senegal is

in favour of the admission of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations. My delegation will therefore vote in favour of any draft resolution having that specific purpose. However, the draft resolution submitted by the delegation of the Soviet Union [A/L.360] links the admission of the People's Republic of China to the expulsion of the Republic of China. My Government considers that, just as it is unfair and unrealistic to leave the People's Republic of China outside the United Nations, so it would hardly be wise to try to expel the nationalist Republic of China from the United Nations. In view of these considerations, my delegation will not be able to support the USSR draft resolution.

260. Moreover, Senegal considers that the question of the representation of China is unique in the history of the United Nations. The Organization has had this question before it for nearly ten years and has been unable to solve it. The preservation of international peace and security may depend on its solution. The question must therefore be considered in accordance with the provisions of Article 18, paragraph 2, of the Charter. For this reason, my delegation will vote in favour of the draft resolution submitted by the five great Powers [A/L.372].

*The meeting rose at 12.25 a.m.
on Friday, 15 December*