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**President: Mr. Abdelaziz BOUTEFLIKA**  
**(Algeria).**

*In the absence of the President, Mr. Garcia Robles (Mexico), Vice-President, took the Chair.*

**Tribute to the memory of Mr. Shadhel Taqa,  
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq**

1. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): It is my sad duty to inform the General Assembly of the death, on 20 October 1974, of His Excellency Mr. Shadhel Taqa, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq.

2. As President of the General Assembly, Mr. Bouteflika has sent to the Chairman of the delegation of Iraq a letter conveying our condolences to the Government and people of Iraq and to the bereaved family. I am confident that the members of the General Assembly will wish to associate themselves with that message.

3. I invite representatives to stand and observe a minute of silence in tribute to the memory of Mr. Shadhel Taqa.

*The members of the General Assembly observed a minute of silence.*

**AGENDA ITEM 110**

**Question of Cyprus**

4. Mr. KYPRIANOU (Cyprus): First, I should like to express on behalf of my delegation our deep sorrow and condolences on the passing away of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq and to convey to the Government and people of Iraq and to the bereaved family our deep sympathy in their great loss.

5. In opening the debate on Cyprus today, I cannot but start by saying that the people on the island—who have undergone and are still going through a great tragedy, unsurpassed perhaps in history—are waiting very anxiously to learn what we are going to say and what is going to be done in this Assembly. The victims of the tragedy, the relatives of those who have been killed, and those who live in conditions of untold

suffering and in camps are awaiting the outcome of this debate. They believe that the United Nations, despite its shortcomings, which have been emphasized over and over again in repeated debates, cannot remain silent and cannot remain inactive in the face of this situation. Therefore, what is going to be discussed now does not constitute just another debate on another perennial issue. We are going to discuss a tragedy. Therefore, feeling as we do, we hope we may be excused if, in putting to you the facts and our views, we are not very diplomatic. We shall be frank, we shall be, perhaps, blunt, when necessary.

6. Cyprus—and this is not an exaggeration—is going through its most critical period, the most crucial period in its history. What has happened to Cyprus should not be the concern only of the people of Cyprus; it should be the concern of everybody. Is it possible, really, to tolerate a situation such as this in 1974? There are many questions that will arise in the course of this debate. We are concerned about our very survival. The independence, the integrity, the unity, the sovereignty of a small, independent State, a Member of the United Nations, is at stake. This is not an exaggeration. It is understandable that people who live far away from Cyprus may not feel exactly as we in Cyprus feel, but this is no excuse for not trying to understand what are the real, underlying issues of our problem.

7. Some say that diplomacy is the art of compromise, and from time to time we hear it said, "Let us see whether we can find a compromise" between what are usually termed the extreme positions. But is there room for compromise on basic issues? Is there room for compromise on issues that are reflected in the very Charter of the United Nations and in its declarations and resolutions? Can there be any compromise, can there be any excuse, when a small country has suffered, and still suffers, an aggression of the kind we have suffered? Can there be any excuse or justification or room for compromise when it is obvious to everybody that what some are trying to do in the case of Cyprus is to impose a solution on the people of Cyprus in the most inhuman manner—by removing people from their homes, by uprooting them and making them refugees? Can it be said that this is possible in the case of Cyprus, whereas in other cases it should not be done? Here I refer to another item that will be on our agenda later on. Why should it be inadmissible in that case, while in our case it should be tolerated? That is why we should be frank and clear.

8. The facts are quite well known. They have been discussed in the Security Council over the past few months, and some of the basic facts have been discussed in the General Assembly during the course of the general debate. No great detail, probably, is necessary at this stage, although we are ready to discuss any detail in due course. We are even prepared to

discuss anything relating to the past, anything relating to the background of the whole problem, although in urgent situations such as this, one should seek urgently to deal with the future, because there is ample time to discuss the past.

9. On 15 July 1974, a coup d'état was carried out—was attempted—to overthrow the President, Archbishop Makarios, and the legitimate Government of Cyprus. Within only a few days, Cyprus was the victim of aggression by Turkey. As I had occasion during the general debate to point out [2239th meeting, paras. 276-279], the timing of both these acts raised all sorts of questions, and I am confident that the facts and the truth about them will one day be unfolded. There was a coup, there was the aggression and the invasion; and when Turkey invaded Cyprus in the early hours of 20 July, the argument that was used, officially proclaimed throughout the world by the Prime Minister of Turkey, was that it was going to be a limited police action for the sole purpose of restoring constitutional order. What was the constitutional order that they wanted to restore? Obviously, the 1960 Constitution. However, without going into any great detail, we find ourselves now in a situation in which I would challenge anyone to come to this rostrum and say that what Turkey really did was to restore the 1960 Constitution. For after all, you do not restore a constitution by bombing villages, hospitals and houses with napalm bombs. You do not invade using heavy weapons such as those that were given to Turkey for its own defence but used illegally by Turkey, as has been repeatedly stated in the United States Congress. You do not restore constitutional order by uprooting people from their homes and by implementing a plan that has been in existence for a long time, a plan entitled "Attila"—who would have been really very proud to have his name used as a banner, proud of the actions that were taken by those who used his name in doing what they have done in Cyprus.

10. The legal aspects of the question of intervention were discussed in great detail in the Security Council in 1964, discussed exhaustively, and it was at that time pointed out by many speakers that no one had the right of military intervention in Cyprus under any circumstances.

11. But even if for the sake of argument we suppose the guarantor Powers had the right to intervene in Cyprus for the restoration of constitutional order or for the protection of what the Treaty of Guarantee provided,<sup>1</sup> then, I suppose, Turkey, having invaded Cyprus for the purpose of destroying what the Treaty of Guarantee provided, it was the duty of the other guarantor Powers to come to the assistance of Cyprus; and perhaps in the course of this debate the position of the United Kingdom and of Greece on this issue would be of some importance.

12. The "Attila Plan"—or the idea of the partition of Cyprus—is not new. Even the disguised form of partition, which has now been termed "geographic federation", is not new. In fact, that has been Turkey's purpose all along; I will only cite some quotations in this respect.

13. On 17 May 1964, the Prime Minister of Turkey, Mr. Inonu, the predecessor of Mr. Ecevit, said:

"One day Greece will agree to a peaceful partition of Cyprus with the help of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO]. As long as the Greeks refuse, the battle will go on; Turkey will not recede in any hopeless situation; Turkey will use her right of intervention in the island."

14. When Cyprus was threatened with invasion and attack in 1964, President Johnson of the United States, in a letter addressed to Mr. Inonu, the Prime Minister of Turkey, wrote:

"I just call your attention, however, to our understanding that the proposed intervention by Turkey would be for the purpose of effecting a form of partition of the island—a solution which is specifically excluded by the Treaty of Guarantee."

15. And to explain what I meant earlier by "disguised form of partition", disguised by the expression "geographic federation"—here again is what Mr. Inonu said on 8 September 1964 in the Turkish National Assembly:

"Officially we promoted the 'federation' concept rather than the 'partition' thesis."

There are a lot of other questions that could be cited, but these are enough.

16. When Hitler invaded Czechoslovakia he used as a pretext the safety of the minority there. When again he decided to invade Poland in 1939 he said something else:

"Let us do what we have to do in Poland. After all, who today remembers what the Turks did to the Armenians? Later on nobody will remember what we do to the Poles."

17. Forty per cent of the territory of Cyprus is now under the occupation of Turkey; the indigenous population has been uprooted and Cyprus now has over 200,000 refugees—separated from their homes, living in misery, not knowing what their future is going to be. That is one third of the population of the island. It is all very well for big—or even sometimes, unfortunately, small—countries to try and close ranks to see whether they can find compromises to accommodate both those who are suffering and those who are the so-called victors; but it is really not possible to tolerate a situation in which human beings are going to be used as the pawns in promoting solutions unacceptable to them. If any delegations or representatives here would like to hear in some detail about the situation of the refugees—although much is included in the reports of the Secretary-General—a delegation representing the refugees of Cyprus has just arrived here from Cyprus, and is present here today.

18. Can the United Nations condone this situation? Senator Edward Kennedy, speaking the other day in New York, said that his country could not condone this situation. Can the United Nations then condone this situation, either openly or implicitly, by its inactivity?

19. In the meantime—and for the benefit of those who are not aware of what is going on—the part of Cyprus that has been occupied by Turkey is being described as part of the Mersina district of Turkey; the Turkish pound is being used; one sees stamps with

the Mersina emblem on them; there is a lot of information concerning that, which we shall circulate.

20. That is an effort to annex; but, officially, I shall not be surprised if the representatives of Turkey come here and say, "We do not want partition". It is not in their interest to say that they want partition: the whole world would say, "We cannot accept it". So what is it in their interest to say? "We want a geographic separation, or a geographic federation". But to anyone who knows the realities of Cyprus, "geographic separation" is tantamount to partition in the worst form; partition will be automatic; and if the General Assembly or the United Nations is interested, as I trust it is, in seeing that Cyprus survives as an independent State, then those possibilities should be excluded.

21. It will again be said that one of the reasons for the action by the Turkish forces was to protect the Turkish minority or—and I do not have any difficulty in using the word—community.

22. From what? The first thing that those characters who carried out the coup said was that the Turkish Cypriots had nothing to be afraid of—that the coup was organized against the Government of Cyprus. Where was the danger for the Turkish Cypriots?

23. But, again, let us suppose for argument's sake that Turkey wanted to anticipate a possible danger. Does one do that by bombing—with napalm bombs, I repeat—by havoc, by destruction, by devastation, by invading in the thousands with tanks, by killing, by raping? Does one adopt these methods?

24. We have hundreds of cases like these, and if somebody is going to say again that this is propaganda, I here now again propose, and in the course of the debate will make a specific proposal, that a mission from the General Assembly should go and investigate in Cyprus what we are now accusing Turkey of, investigate the atrocities everywhere throughout the island.

25. And what about the missing persons? Who cares about these missing persons, to whom the Secretary-General, himself, referred in his reports? What about them? What happened to them? Can anyone tell us? Can the Red Cross tell us? Can the Red Cross say that they are free to go wherever they like and do whatever they like in Cyprus? Can UNFICYP say that they do not have any restriction on their activities in the occupied area?

26. The answers are in the reports of the Secretary-General before you. Therefore, it is a situation that requires the attention of the Assembly in an urgent way. We have not come here simply to place on record our views or get something which we might be able to improve on next year. There will probably not be a next year for Cyprus if we do not act quickly, and the responsibility will not be ours.

27. It is all very well to say, "Let us negotiate. Let us try and see what we can do". But who refuses negotiation? Can you imagine negotiation when 40,000 troops and tanks are just outside your door, and whenever you don't agree on something the engines of these tanks start roaring? Is this negotiation? How can the two sides in Cyprus, the Greek and Turkish Cypriots in Cyprus, agree freely on a

constitutional arrangement when, the so-called "liberators" of one side are there, threatening everybody—and I am sure, and mark my words and let them be on record, that when this whole tragedy is over quite a few of the Turkish Cypriots also will have a lot to say as to what happened during these terrible months.

28. We have come to the General Assembly to seek its support. We have not come here for the purpose of finding out how we can satisfy the aggressor. We have not come here for the purpose of hiding the facts. This is not the forum for such tactics, for such an approach. We have come here to put before you bluntly our views. Cyprus, a small, non-aligned country, is suffering and has been the target of aggression and invasion, and its very existence is being endangered. If the General Assembly—and in particular the non-aligned countries—do not come to our support, what is the meaning of non-alignment? If the General Assembly does not come out in support of Cyprus on specific principles and on specific issues, then many will wonder what is the usefulness and effectiveness of the United Nations, and what is our hope for the future?

29. We have not come here to negotiate the constitutional settlement of Cyprus. That is a job for the Cypriots themselves, both Greek and Turkish. But we have come here to seek your support on the following points and principles: there should be unconditional respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus; any kind of aggression or intervention should cease immediately; not only for humanitarian reasons, but also for the other reasons that I have already explained, the General Assembly must take the stand, clearly and categorically, that all refugees—and I underline the words "all refugees"—may return to their homes in safety and without conditions. Otherwise, the implication is that some would be prepared to tolerate this violation of basic human rights and thus enable others to impose a solution on Cyprus. Negotiations, yes—but in free conditions.

30. We do not want negotiations of the type that took place twice at Geneva during the crisis, and which proved to be anything but negotiations. We do not want negotiations at gunpoint such as at Geneva, where not even 36 hours were allowed for the purpose of consulting, because certain proposals were put forward on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, and when these proposals proved unacceptable the second phase of the Attila Plan was proceeded with, even more devastating than the one before, proving beyond any doubt that that was the plan that was meant to be implemented.

31. What happened in Cyprus was not an accident. The coup was not an accident. The invasion was not an accident.

32. Will the General Assembly tolerate this situation? We are concerned with the well-being of the people of Cyprus, whether they be Greeks or Turks. If the Turks do not trust us, let us find other ways to make them trust us, but not through their Attila "liberators". We are ready to consider any suggestion compatible with the Charter and the declarations of the United Nations, that would allay any reasonable anxiety. We are ready to see UNFICYP strengthened for that purpose. We are ready to do everything possible as long as we are assisted in keeping Cyprus an independent, sovereign State with its unity intact, and as long as all those ideas that are being worked on, I know

not where, about finding realistic solutions are abandoned, because we cannot—and I humbly submit that the General Assembly cannot—endorse, condone or legalize faits accomplis. It is all very well to talk about compromise, but there are some situations where there is no room for compromise.

33. Before concluding my remarks, I should like to inform members of the General Assembly that my delegation has submitted a draft resolution which I shall introduce with the least possible comment [A/L.738]. We have not submitted it out of any discourtesy to anyone. On the contrary, we are grateful to all the countries that have been trying to prepare a draft resolution. Somehow we felt that time was running out and we found ourselves at the very last moment in a situation where we believed that we had no alternative but to submit a draft resolution ourselves.

34. Although this text is being submitted by Cyprus it should not, I submit, be looked upon as a draft resolution submitted by one of the parties. First of all, there is only one party—Cyprus, the country that brought the issue before the United Nations. Secondly, I do not think anyone would disagree with me that Cyprus is the only aggrieved party. I do not think that anybody else is suffering from what has gone on in Cyprus. We have not included in this draft resolution any extreme positions for the purpose of bargaining. We have tried to make it accord with the views and even the phraseology expressed to us and which we welcomed.

*The speaker then read out the text of draft resolution A/L.738.<sup>2</sup>*

35. As far as the preambular part of the draft resolution is concerned, which recalls the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council, it is quite clear and there is really nothing to be said. In fact, all of the paragraphs of the preamble are quite clear.

36. With respect to the operative part of the draft resolution, we have taken the position—and I must emphasize this—that the three basic important elements are, first, the independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of Cyprus, which should be unconditionally respected, and that there should be no acts of aggression or intervention directed against Cyprus. That is clear enough. Secondly, we call for the immediate withdrawal of the troops. I do not suppose that anyone would really say that this is unreasonable. The withdrawal of the troops from Cyprus is a basic and essential prerequisite if progress is to be achieved in any way. Then we come to the question of the refugees in connexion with which the draft resolution calls upon all the parties involved to take urgent measures to ensure the speedy return of all refugees to their homes in safety. That is something which cannot be the subject of any bargaining. We must state that very straightforwardly, very clearly and very frankly, because if in any way, either directly or indirectly, the question of the return to their homes of the people who have been uprooted from them is made a point of bargaining, or becomes the subject of the veto of anybody else, then you destroy Cyprus, you destroy the hopes for a peaceful evolution, you create the conditions for partition, and also you destroy the very principles of the United Nations.

37. With respect to the other paragraphs, I believe they are also quite clear. The text commends the negotiations and the talks that are taking place in Cyprus, and we believe that that is the procedure that should be followed in taking up the constitutional aspects of the problem. But at the same time we provide for another framework—not the Geneva type of framework—for free negotiations within the framework of the United Nations to deal with all the other international aspects of the crisis.

38. Having said that, I would repeat once again that we have not submitted this draft resolution out of any discourtesy. We felt that we had no alternative in the circumstances. If any delegations have any other views on some of the items included in the draft resolution, we shall be ready to discuss them. But again I must stress that the essential elements which I have cited cannot be the subject of bargaining or compromise.

39. We expect support. I do not believe we are unrealistic or unreasonable in expecting that support. We expect the support of the non-aligned countries—the group to which we belong. We expect the support of all the States in the United Nations, because, if we do not receive the support we require at this particular juncture in our history, is any one of the States in the United Nations going to receive the support it may require—though I hope it will not—in any similar situation with regard to another country, if this unprecedented situation is allowed to go on and is not checked in time?

40. Shall we allow this precedent to be created? Hitler said, in the case of Poland, “Who remembers the Armenians?” Someone may one day say, “Who remembers the Cypriots?”, but that will be in relation to another such situation. These are my strong convictions. I have not made a prepared speech just for the record. I have tried to give this Assembly our views as we feel them, as we see them. It is not just another debate, as I said at the outset. I say to the Assembly: we need your support; we plead for your support. If we do not receive the support we require, Turkey will have scored a great victory in Cyprus, a military victory, but it will be, as our President has said, the defeat of the United Nations. It is not Cyprus that has been defeated. Cyprus is being destroyed. It has been turned into a shambles, as Edward Kennedy said the other day. People live in the streets and under the trees. It has been devastated. It has not yet perished, but it is for you to see to it that it will not perish.

41. In this particular case of Cyprus, which is a test case for non-alignment, a test case for the principles of the United Nations, if we start here and continue in the corridors to find compromises for the purposes of accommodating the aggressor, then quite honestly I must say that our hopes for the future of the United Nations will not be very high, and those for mankind even less. Should we not have the support, the natural support, that the Palestinians have on their issues—some very similar issues? Are some countries going to give their support in that case but not in this case? That goes for many other issues in the United Nations. This is a test case for morality. It is a test case for the principles of the Charter. It is a test case for Africa, for Latin America, for Europe, for Asia, for the prin-



ciples of non-alignment. Was it a mistake to remain non-aligned? Was it a mistake to place our trust and our hopes in the United Nations? Was it a mistake to be loyal to our friends? Was it a mistake to follow with consistency the policy we have followed in the United Nations on every single issue? Should we be treated differently? But we cannot afford to be treated differently at this time. It is a question of survival, of the very existence of Cyprus.

42. Mr. President, this is all I have to say in opening the debate. I shall be at your disposal and at the disposal of every representative here to answer any single question that any one may wish to put to me, and when the time comes we too shall put forward specific questions to others.

43. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I should like to draw attention to the following facts that are relevant to the item under discussion.

44. As the Assembly will recall, at the plenary meeting held on 21 September [2236th meeting], a difference of opinion arose regarding the forum where the Cyprus question should be considered. It was evident that agreement had to be reached on that procedural aspect of the question and the Assembly therefore requested its President, Mr. Bouteflika, and the Secretary-General, Mr. Waldheim, to consult with the parties and try to reach a solution acceptable to all.

45. It will be recalled also that at the following meeting, also on 21 September, the President informed us of the positive results of that step. He said:

“At the 2236th meeting it was decided that the item entitled ‘Question of Cyprus’ should be allocated to the plenary Assembly. However, an understanding has been reached that the General Assembly, when it considers this item, will invite the Special Political Committee to meet for the purpose of affording representatives of the Cypriot communities an opportunity to take the floor in the Committee in order to express their views. The General Assembly will then resume its consideration of the item, taking into account the report of the Special Political Committee.” [2237th meeting, para. 2.]

46. The time seems to have come for the representatives of the two communities to express their opinions. They are both in New York and have informed the Secretariat that they are ready to make their statements.

47. Consequently, it seemed to me that—following Mr. Bouteflika’s example—I should consult the three parties directly concerned.

48. As a result of the consultations, an understanding was reached that, in accordance with the decision taken at its 2237th meeting, the General Assembly should invite the Special Political Committee to meet in order to hear the points of view of the representatives of the two Cypriot communities. To that end the Committee will be asked to hold a maximum of two meetings on 29 October.

49. It also seemed appropriate to us that, in accordance with the Assembly’s powers under rule 58 of its rules of procedure, verbatim records should be kept of the two meetings of the Special Political Committee.

50. Finally, the understanding was reached that the plenary Assembly should resume its consideration of this item on 30 October.

51. May I take it that the General Assembly agrees to that procedure?

*It was so decided.*

52. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): Before adjourning the meeting, I call on the representative of Iraq, who wishes to make a statement.

53. Mr. ZAHAWIE (Iraq): On behalf of my delegation and the Government of the Republic of Iraq, I wish to thank you, Sir; the President of the General Assembly, Mr. Bouteflika; the representative of Cyprus and the other members of the Assembly for the kind words of sympathy addressed to my delegation in connexion with the sad and untimely death of Mr. Shadhel Taqa, the late Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq. My delegation will not fail to convey the Assembly’s condolences and expressions of sympathy to the Iraqi Government and the family of the deceased.

*The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m.*

#### NOTES

<sup>1</sup> Signed at Nicosia on 16 August 1960. See United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 382, No. 5475.

<sup>2</sup> For the text, see *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-ninth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 110.