

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

APPENDIX I

VOLUME I

List and text of documents issued by the
Conference on Disarmament

REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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VOLUME I

List and text of Documents issued by the Conference
on Disarmament

Document No.	T i t l e
CD/515/Rev.4	Group of 21: Draft Mandate for an <u>Ad Hoc</u> Committee on item 3 of the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament
CD/788	Letter dated 28 August 1987 from the Chargé d'affaires, a.i. of Argentina and the Permanent Representatives of India, Mexico and Sweden addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament, transmitting the text of a Joint Message to the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development addressed by the five Heads of State or Government of Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden and the First President of Tanzania on 24 August 1987
CD/789	Letter dated 16 December 1987 from the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament, transmitting a working paper entitled "Information on the presentation at the Shikany military facility of standard chemical munitions and of technology for the destruction of chemical weapons at a mobile unit"
CD/790	Letter dated 12 January 1988 from the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament, transmitting the text of the statement of 26 December 1987 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
CD/791 CD/CW/WP.183	Federal Republic of Germany: Working paper on verification of non-production. The case for <u>ad hoc</u> checks.
CD/792 CD/CW/WP.184	Federal Republic of Germany: Working paper on super-toxic lethal chemicals (STLCs)
CD/793	Letter dated 21 January 1988 from the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the President of the Conference on Disarmament, transmitting the resolutions and decisions on disarmament adopted by the General Assembly at its forty-second session

Document No.	T i t l e
CD/794	Letter dated 26 January 1988 from the Permanent Representative of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic to the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting the text of the document entitled "Towards Increasing the Effectiveness of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva" adopted at the session of the Committee of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Warsaw Treaty Member States held in Prague on 28 and 29 October 1987
CD/795 and Corr.1 issued in French only	Report of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Committee on Chemical Weapons to the Conference on <u>Disarmament</u> on its work during the period 12-29 January 1988
CD/796	Agenda for the 1988 session and Programme of Work of the Conference on Disarmament
CD/797	Letter dated 1 February 1988 from the Representative of the United States of America, addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament, transmitting the text of a document entitled "Joint U.S.-Soviet Summit Statement" issued by the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 10 December 1987 at the conclusion of the meeting between the President of the United States, Ronald Reagan, and the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev, in Washington, 7-10 December 1987
CD/798	Letter dated 1 February 1988 from the Representative of the United States of America, addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament, transmitting the text of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, together with the Protocol on Procedures Governing the Elimination of the Missile Systems Subject to the Treaty, the Protocol Regarding Inspections Relating to the Treaty and its Annex on Provisions on Privileges and Immunities of Inspectors and Aircrew Members, and the Memorandum of Understanding Regarding the Establishment of the Data Base for this Treaty, signed at Washington on 8 December 1987
CD/799	Letter dated 1 February 1988 from the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament, transmitting the text of a document entitled "Joint Soviet-U.S. Summit Statement" issued on 10 December 1987 at the conclusion of the meeting between the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, M.S. Gorbachev, and the President of the United States, R. Reagan, in Washington, 7-10 December 1987

Document No.	T i t l e
CD/800	Letter dated 1 February 1988 from the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament, transmitting the text of the Treaty between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, the Protocol on Procedures Governing the Elimination of the Missile Systems subject to the Treaty between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, the Protocol Regarding Inspections Relating to the Treaty between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, together with its Annex on Provisions on Privileges and Immunities of Inspectors and Aircrew Members, and the Memorandum of Understanding Regarding the Establishment of the Data Base for the Treaty between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, signed at Washington on 8 December 1987
CD/801	Decision on the re-establishment of an <u>ad hoc</u> committee on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons
CD/802 CD/CW/WP.186	United States of America: Thresholds for monitoring chemical activities not prohibited by a convention
CD/803	Decision on the re-establishment of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament
CD/804	Decision on the re-establishment of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Committee on Radiological Weapons
CD/805	Decision on the re-establishment of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Committee on Chemical Weapons
CD/806	Letter dated 11 February 1988 from the Permanent Representatives of Argentina, India, Mexico and Sweden addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting the text of a Joint Message addressed on 6 December 1987 to President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev by the six leaders authors of the Initiative for Peace and Disarmament
CD/807	Letter dated 15 February 1988 addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament by the Permanent Representatives of Argentina, India, Mexico and Sweden transmitting a document entitled the "Stockholm Declaration" adopted in Stockholm on 21 January 1988 by the Five Heads of State or Government of Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico and Sweden and the First President of Tanzania

Document No.	T i t l e
CD/808 CD/CW/WP.188	Letter dated 18 February 1988 from the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting a document entitled "Memorandum on multilateral data exchange in connection with the elaboration of a convention on the complete and general prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons (proposal by the USSR)"
CD/809 CD/CW/WP.189	Argentina: Assistance in relation to protection against chemical weapons
CD/810	Letter dated 29 February 1988 from the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament, transmitting the text of a message from A.A. Gromyko, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union, to the Heads of the States Members of the South Pacific Forum in connection with the ratification by the Soviet Union of Protocols 2 and 3 to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (the Treaty of Rarotonga)
CD/811	Letter dated 1 March 1988 from the Special Representative of Argentina addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament, transmitting the Declaration signed on 25 February 1988 in Cartagena de Indias (Colombia), during the first session of the third ordinary meeting of the Permanent Mechanism of Political Consultation and Concertation, by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela, and concerning the Zone of Peace and Co-operation of the South Atlantic (Resolutions 41/11 and 42/16 of the General Assembly of the United Nations)
CD/812	German Democratic Republic: Working paper on the Chemical Weapons Convention. The Executive Council: Composition, Size, Decision-making and Other Procedural Matters
CD/813	Letter dated 7 March 1988 addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament from the Permanent Representative of Norway transmitting a publication entitled "Contributions by Norway to the Conference on Disarmament 1982-1987"
CD/814	Letter dated 8 March 1988 from the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting the texts of the Agreement between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centres and of Protocol I and Protocol II to that Agreement, signed at Washington on 15 September 1987

Document No.	T i t l e
CD/815	Letter dated 8 March 1988 addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament from the Representative of the United States of America transmitting the text of the Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, together with its two Protocols, signed at Washington on 15 September 1987
CD/816	Mandate for an <u>Ad Hoc</u> Committee under item 5 of the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament entitled "Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space"
CD/817 CD/OS/WP.19	Letter dated 17 March 1988 from the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament, transmitting the text of a document entitled "Establishment of an international system of verification of the non-deployment of weapons of any kind in outer space"
CD/818	Progress Report to the Conference on Disarmament on the twenty-fifth session of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events
CD/819	Group of 21: Draft mandate for an <u>ad hoc</u> Committee on item 2 of the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament - Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament
CD/820	Special Report of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Committee on Radiological Weapons
CD/821 CD/CW/WP.196	Letter dated 28 March 1988 from the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament, transmitting the text of a statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics dated 16 March 1988
CD/822 CD/CW/WP.197	Federal Republic of Germany and Italy: Working paper on the order of destruction of chemical weapons
CD/823	Canada: Chemical Weapons Convention: Article VIII. Factors involved in determining verification inspectorate personnel and resource requirements
CD/824	Letter dated 5 April 1988 from the Permanent Representative of Bulgaria to the President of the Conference on Disarmament, transmitting the text of the Communiqué on the Session of the Committee of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty member States held in Sofia on 29 and 30 March 1988, and of the Appeal to NATO member States, and to all States participating in the CSCE, issued at that session

Document No.	T i t l e
CD/825	Special Report of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Committee on Effective International Arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons
CD/826	Letter dated 7 April 1988 from the Deputy Head of the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament, transmitting a note from the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany evoked by the recent reports about the use of chemical weapons in the war between Iraq and Iran
CD/827	Letter dated 11 April 1988 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament
CD/828	Federal Republic of Germany: Provision of data relevant to the Chemical Weapons Convention
CD/829	Group of 21: Draft mandate for an <u>Ad Hoc</u> Committee on item 1 of the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament
CD/830 CD/CW/WP.201	Letter dated 18 April 1988 from the Representative of the United States of America addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament, transmitting the text of a document entitled "Information presented to the visiting Soviet Delegation at the Tooele Army Depot, 18-21 November 1987"
CD/831 Corr.1 issued in Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish only and Corr.2 in Spanish only	Special Report of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Committee on Chemical Weapons to the Conference on Disarmament
CD/832	Special Report of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament
CD/833	Special Report of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space
CD/834 Corr.1 issued in Chinese only and Corr.2 in Spanish only	Special Report of the Conference on Disarmament to the third special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations devoted to disarmament
CD/835	Letter dated 5 July 1988 from the Permanent Representative of Sweden addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament, transmitting the text of the Joint Statement by the Nordic Foreign Ministers on the twentieth anniversary of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1 July 1988

Document No.	T i t l e
CD/836	Letter dated 7 July 1988 from the Permanent Representative of Mexico to the Conference on Disarmament addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament, transmitting the text of the statement by the Government of Mexico on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the opening for signature of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
CD/837	Letter dated 7 July 1988 from the Leader of the delegation of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament, transmitting the text of a statement made by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Sir Geoffrey Howe, on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
CD/838	Letter dated 7 July 1988 from the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament enclosing the text of answers given by Mr. N.I. Ryzhkov, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, in reply to questions from the TASS correspondent, published in the newspaper <u>Pravda</u> of 1 July 1988
CD/839	Letter dated 7 July 1988 from the Representative of the United States of America addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting the text of a statement by the President of the United States of America, Ronald Reagan, and the text of a statement by the Assistant to the President for Press Relations, Marlin Fitzwater, on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the opening for signature of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1 July 1988
CD/840	Programme of Work for the Second Part of the 1988 Session of the Conference on Disarmament
CD/841	Letter dated 13 July 1988 from the Permanent Representative of the Hungarian People's Republic addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting the text of the Declaration issued by the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Parliament of the Hungarian People's Republic on the twentieth anniversary of the opening for signature of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
CD/842	Letter dated 22 July 1988 from the Permanent Representative of the Polish People's Republic addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament, transmitting the texts of the Communiqué of the Meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty, the Statement by the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty on Negotiations on Reductions in Armed Forces and Conventional Arms in Europe and the Implications of the Arms Race for the Environment and Other Aspects of Ecological Security, adopted at the Meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, held in Warsaw on 15 and 16 July 1988

Document No.	T i t l e
CD/843	Letter dated 21 July 1988 addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of Finland transmitting a document entitled "Standard Operating Procedures for the Verification of Chemical Disarmament; D.1 A Proposal for Procedures Supporting the Reference Database"
CD/844	Letter dated 25 July 1988 from the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting the text of a document entitled "Joint Statement at the Moscow Summit", dated 1 June 1988, which was issued following the meeting between M.S. Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and R. Reagan, President of the United States of America, held in Moscow from 29 May to 2 June 1988
CD/845	Letter dated 25 July 1988 from the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting the text of the Agreement between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on Notifications of Launches of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles, signed at Moscow on 31 May 1988
CD/846	Letter dated 25 July 1988 from the Representative of the United States of America addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting the text of a document entitled "Joint Statement between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Issued Following Meetings in Moscow, USSR - 29 May - 1 June 1988"
CD/847	Letter dated 25 July 1988 from the Representative of the United States of America addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting the text of the Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Notifications of Launches of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles, signed at Moscow on 31 May 1988
CD/848	Decision on the re-establishment of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament
CD/849 CD/CW/WP.205	United States of America: Destruction of Chemical Weapons Production Facilities
CD/850	Letter dated 28 July 1988 from the Permanent Representative of Egypt addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting the text of a statement issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Egypt on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the opening for signature of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Document No.	T i t l e
CD/851 CD/OS/WP.24	Venezuela: Proposed amendment to the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies
CD/852	Letter dated 5 August 1988 addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament by the Representatives of Indonesia, Mexico, Peru, Sri Lanka and Yugoslavia concerning a proposed amendment to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, on the twenty-fifth anniversary of its signing
CD/853	Progress Report to the Conference on Disarmament on the twenty-six session of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events
CD/854	Letter dated 8 August 1988 from the Permanent Representative of Australia addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting a statement by Mr. Bill Hayden, MP, Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, dated 5 August, on the subject of the use of chemical weapons in the Gulf War
CD/855	Letter dated 8 August 1988 from the Permanent Representative of Australia addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting a statement by The Honourable R.J.L. Hawke, AC, Prime Minister of Australia, marking the Twentieth Anniversary of the opening for signature of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
CD/856	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: Working paper on past production of chemical warfare agents in the United Kingdom
CD/857	Letter dated 12 August 1988 addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of Norway transmitting a research report entitled "Verification of a Chemical Weapons Convention. Development of Procedures for Verification of Alleged Use of Chemical Warfare Agents. Part VII"
CD/858	Letter dated 10 August 1988 from the Permanent Representative of Canada addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting volume 4 of the compendium of verbatim statements on verification made in the Conference on Disarmament during the period 1985-1987
CD/859	India: Action plan for ushering in a nuclear-weapon-free and non-violent world order

Document No.	T i t l e
CD/860	Letter dated 16 August 1988 from the Permanent Representative of Venezuela addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament, transmitting the text of a communication sent by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Venezuela to the Foreign Ministers of the depositary countries of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water, concerning a proposed amendment to the Treaty submitted jointly by the Governments of Indonesia, Mexico, Peru, Sri Lanka, Venezuela and Yugoslavia
CD/861	Norway: Verification of alleged use of chemical weapons
CD/862	Norway: Verification of a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban: Establishing a global seismological network incorporating small-aperture arrays
CD/863	Czechoslovakia: Draft mandate for the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Committee on item 1 "Nuclear Test Ban"
CD/864	Report of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Committee on Radiological Weapons
CD/865	Letter dated 29 August 1988 addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament from the Deputy Representative of Canada to the Conference on Disarmament, transmitting compendia comprising plenary statements and working papers relating to chemical weapons from the 1987 session of the Conference on Disarmament
CD/866	Canada: Statement by the Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Ottawa, 28 July 1988.
CD/867	Report of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament
CD/868	Report of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons
CD/869 CD/CW/WP.210	Federal Republic of Germany: Working paper on the verification of non-production of chemical weapons. <u>Ad hoc</u> checks
CD/870	Report of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space

Document No.	T i t l e
CD/871 CD/CW/WP.212	German Democratic Republic: Chemical Weapons Convention. Provision of data relevant to the Chemical Weapons Convention
CD/872	Letter dated 12 September 1988 from the Permanent Repre- sentative of Australia addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting a statement made in Canberra on 9 September 1988 by the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, Senator Gareth Evans, on the reported use of chemical weapons against Kurdish tribes in Northern Iraq
CD/873	Letter dated 2 September 1988 addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament from the Permanent Representa- tive of Finland transmitting a document entitled "Computer- aided Techniques for the Verification of Chemical Disarmament; E.1 Verification Database"
CD/874 Corr.1 issued in French only and Corr.2 in Spanish only	Report of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Committee on Chemical Weapons to the Conference on Disarmament
CD/875	Report of the Conference on Disarmament to the General Assembly of the United Nations

Group of 21

Draft Mandate for an Ad hoc Committee on item 3
of the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament

1. In the discharge of its responsibility as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, in accordance with paragraph 120 of the Final Document of SSOD-I, the Conference on Disarmament decides to establish an ad hoc Committee under agenda item 3 entitled "Prevention of Nuclear War, including all related matters".
2. The Conference requests the ad hoc Committee, as a first step, to consider all proposals relevant to agenda item 3, including appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war. The ad hoc Committee will take into account all existing proposals and future initiatives and report on its work to the Conference on Disarmament before the end of its 1988 session.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/788

3 September 1987

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 28 AUGUST 1987 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES, a.i. OF ARGENTINA AND THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES OF INDIA, MEXICO AND SWEDEN ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF A JOINT MESSAGE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DISARMAMENT AND DEVELOPMENT ADDRESSED BY THE FIVE HEADS OF STATE OR GOVERNMENT OF ARGENTINA, GREECE, INDIA, MEXICO, SWEDEN AND THE FIRST PRESIDENT OF TANZANIA ON 24 AUGUST 1987

As we are sure you are aware, the five Heads of State or Government of Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico and Sweden and the First President of Tanzania addressed, on 24 August 1987, a Joint Message to the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development, in which, after stressing that disarmament and development are the most important challenges faced by contemporary civilization, they expressed the hope that the International Conference would constitute an important step towards fulfilling the commitment the peoples of the United Nations undertook towards future generations 42 years ago.

We would appreciate that the text of this Joint Message, which is annexed to this letter, be reproduced and distributed as a document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed) Gabriel Parini
Chargé d'Affaires, a.i.
Special Mission of Argentina
for Disarmament Affairs

(Signed) J. Singh Teja
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of
India to the United Nations
Office at Geneva

(Signed) Alfonso García Robles
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of
Mexico to the Conference on
Disarmament

(Signed) Rolf Ekéus
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of
Sweden to the Conference on
Disarmament

ANNEX

MESSAGE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN DISARMAMENT AND DEVELOPMENT

In our Organization's Charter, the peoples of the United Nations undertook a commitment to preserve succeeding generations from the scourge of war and to safeguard fundamental human rights based on the dignity and worth of the human person. They agreed to maintain international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources. They also decided to join efforts in promoting social progress and achieving better standards of life for the inhabitants of our planet.

Unfortunately, the commitments undertaken at that time have not been satisfactorily fulfilled. Today we live in a world of precarious peace menaced by the spectre of a final war which could destroy human civilization. No less important has been our inability to create the conditions for the welfare of all human beings on our planet. Hunger, poverty, illiteracy and disease are the deplorable realities facing a large part of the world's population today. Glaring economic disparities also constitute a distinctive characteristic of contemporary international relations. For these reasons, and as representatives of Member States of the United Nations and peoples with varying histories, we, the leaders of Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden and Tanzania, united in the Initiative of the Six for Peace and Disarmament, have on several occasions since our first Joint Declaration in May 1984 reiterated our deep conviction about the indispensable need to guarantee peace and development in the community of nations. We hold the firm belief that to attain peace, urgent efforts towards disarmament and development are essential.

Peace cannot be achieved through increasing and constantly perfected weaponry. This represents a misconception which, in an interdependent world, fails to take into account the existence of non-military threats to international security, such as misappropriation of natural resources, especially non-renewable ones, lack of food, disease, illiteracy and environmental degradation. Peace must be conceived as an integral objective to be reached jointly by all humanity.

We must not allow ourselves to waste the planet's limited resources on the manufacture of constantly more sophisticated and powerful weapons of destruction conceived by man to destroy his fellow man. We must renew our efforts to free resources for effective disarmament measures, specifically nuclear disarmament measures, so as to channel them to satisfy the economic and social development needs of all peoples, especially those of the least developed countries.

Man's capacity and intelligence must not be used to build and perfect means by which our lives are constantly threatened. On the contrary human creativity should be channelled towards solving problems which lead to

uncertainty and international conflict. Disarmament and development are the most important challenges faced by contemporary civilization. We hope that the International Conference on Disarmament and Development will constitute an important step towards fulfilling the commitment the peoples of the United Nations undertook towards future generations 42 year ago.

24 August 1987,

Raúl Alfonsín
President of Argentina

Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado
President of Mexico

Andreas Papandreu
Prime Minister of Greece

Ingvar Carlsson
Prime Minister of Sweden

Rajiv Gandhi
Prime Minister of India

Julius Nyerere
First President of Tanzania

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/789
16 December 1987

ENGLISH
Original: RUSSIAN

LETTER DATED 16 DECEMBER 1987 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ADDRESSED
TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT
TRANSMITTING A WORKING PAPER ENTITLED "INFORMATION ON
THE PRESENTATION AT THE SHIKHANY MILITARY FACILITY OF
STANDARD CHEMICAL MUNITIONS AND OF TECHNOLOGY FOR THE
DESTRUCTION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AT A MOBILE UNIT"

I have the honour to transmit herewith a USSR working paper entitled
"Information on the presentation at the Shikhany military facility of standard
chemical munitions and of technology for the destruction of chemical weapons
at a mobile unit".

I should be grateful if you would take the necessary steps to circulate
this information as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed) Y. Nazarkin
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to
the Conference on Disarmament

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

INFORMATION ON THE PRESENTATION AT THE SHIKHANY MILITARY FACILITY OF
STANDARD CHEMICAL MUNITIONS AND OF TECHNOLOGY FOR THE DESTRUCTION OF
CHEMICAL WEAPONS AT A MOBILE UNIT

(Working paper)

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Description of the presentation

In the Conference on Disarmament, on 6 August 1987, the Soviet side, in order to build an atmosphere of trust, and with a view to the early conclusion of an international convention on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons and the elimination of stockpiles thereof, invited participants in the chemical weapons negotiations to visit the Soviet military facility at Shikhany to acquaint themselves with standard chemical munitions and with a technology for the destruction of chemical weapons at a mobile unit.

The presentation was scheduled for 3 and 4 October 1987.

Invitations to the presentation were issued to the representatives of 51 States participating in the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament. The programme is attached.

In total, the presentation was attended by more than 130 persons from 45 States, including 15 heads of delegations to the Conference on Disarmament, 2 representatives of the United Nations Secretariat, as well as military specialists, experts and advisers.

The presentation was covered by 56 representatives of the mass media, including 20 from foreign countries.

In inviting participants in the negotiations on a chemical weapons ban to visit the Shikhany military facility, the Soviet side was guided by the interests of a full, effective and verifiable ban on chemical weapons and by its desire to contribute in all possible ways to strengthening an atmosphere of trust in the negotiations. The presentation was a concrete manifestation of the Soviet Union's new approach to the solution of international problems.

Together with the proposals aimed at agreement without delay on a convention banning chemical weapons which the Soviet Union has put forward in the negotiations, and with other acts such as the halting of the manufacture of chemical weapons by the Soviet Union, the presentation at Shikhany pursued the goal of showing readiness to conclude an international convention on such weapons.

Those attending the presentation were flown from Moscow to a military airfield near the Shikhany facility in Aeroflot aircraft.

They were welcomed to the Shikhany facility by Colonel-General V.K. Pikalov, Commander of Chemical Warfare Troops of the USSR Ministry of Defence, in the facility's club (text attached).

The Commander of the Shikhany facility, Major-General R.F. Razuvanov, described to them the layout and the main zones of the facility, and the purposes for which they are used (text and sketch map of the facility attached).

During the presentation of standard chemical munitions, the participants were presented with four reports concerning chemical artillery munitions, chemical warheads for tactical missiles, air-launched chemical munitions, and chemical agents for close combat (texts of the reports and diagrams of the standard munitions, with combat characteristics, attached).

A total of 19 standard chemical munitions were displayed: 10 types of munitions for tube and rocket artillery; 2 warheads for tactical missiles; 6 types of aerial bomb and spray tank; and 1 type of munition, a chemical hand-grenade, for close combat.

For each type of munition the participants were informed of its military purpose, its calibre, the name of the CW agent with which it was filled, the method of dispersion of the agent, the type of fuse and the type of explosive, the weight of the projectile and the weight of the CW agent, the filling coefficient, and the materials from which the projectile was made.

Staff at the facility submitted a report on "The Soviet Army's chemical warfare agents" (text attached).

The report sets out the physical and chemical characteristics of blister agents, nerve agents and lung irritants, including the agents' chemical formula, molecular weight, physical state, boiling and freezing points, density, volatility, viscosity, surface tension, heat capacity, latent heat of evaporation and diffusion co-efficient. It also gives the agents' toxicity characteristics.

Those attending the presentation also heard a report on "Standard methods for determining the toxicity of CW agents" (text attached).

The report proposed a method for the categorization of super-toxic lethal chemicals that could be used in elaborating appropriate methods for inclusion in a convention.

As regards the technology for the destruction of chemical weapons, those attending the presentation were shown a mobile chemical weapon destruction unit and given an opportunity to thoroughly examine each of the machines comprising the unit as well as to acquaint themselves with their technical characteristics. They were informed of the purpose of the unit, its composition, process path, deployment time, staffing and energy supply requirements, weight and power specifications.

These points were dealt with in four reports by specialists on:

The purpose, design specifications and principles for use of the mobile chemical weapon destruction unit;

The technology for the destruction of chemical munitions at the mobile unit;

Safety arrangements during the destruction of chemical munitions at the mobile unit and their application;

Verification of the completeness of the destruction of chemical weapons at the mobile unit, and environmental protection measures.

Copies of these reports are attached.

The actual process of destruction of chemical munitions was demonstrated at the Shikhany facility's proving ground through the destruction of a 250-kilogram aerial bomb filled with the CW agent sarin.

Those present were able to observe the main stages in the destruction of a chemical weapon, such as the opening of the munition casing, the evacuation of the chemical warfare agent into a reactor, the thermochemical reaction of the destruction of the agent, and the thermal decomposition of the products of the decontamination. Work with actual chemical warfare agents was confirmed by biological experiments on animals.

In the course of the demonstration of the chemical weapon destruction technology, methods of verifying the completeness of destruction of CW agents were extensively presented, as were safety measures.

Since the technology for the destruction of chemical weapons at a mobile unit requires the use of personal protective equipment, those members of delegations who wished to acquaint themselves with the destruction process in greater detail were provided with such equipment in accordance with the safety regulations, and the equipment underwent technical testing. The time for which the equipment was worn depended on each individual's wish to observe the process of chemical weapon destruction directly. In this regard, instructions were provided on the rules for the use of protective equipment (text attached).

The members of delegations and reporters attending the presentation were able to film and take photographs as well as to make sound recordings on all the routes covered and throughout the visit.

Following the presentation of the standard chemical munitions, a briefing was held on board the Yuri Andropov, at which a speech was made by Lieutenant-General A.D. Kuntsevich, a leading expert from the USSR Ministry of Defence and the USSR Academy of Sciences. In the course of the briefing, Ambassador Y.K. Nazarkin, the Soviet representative to the Conference on Disarmament, Lieutenant-General Kuntsevich, and Major-General R.F. Razuvanov, Commander of the Shikhany military facility, answered numerous questions relating to the presentation.

On 5 October, a press conference on the results of the foreign representatives' visit to the Shikhany military facility was held in Moscow, at the press centre of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Participating in it were: Colonel-General V.K. Pikalov, Commander of the Chemical Warfare Troops of the USSR Ministry of Defence; Ambassador V.P. Karpov, Head of the Arms Limitation and Disarmament Department of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Ambassador Y.K. Nazarkin, USSR representative to the Conference on Disarmament; Ambassador Rolf Ekéus, Chairman of the Conference on Disarmament's Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons and head of the Swedish delegation; Lieutenant-General A.D. Kuntsevich, a leading expert in the USSR Ministry of Defence and the USSR Academy of Sciences; and Ambassador G.I. Gerasimov, head of the Information Department of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The press conference was attended by over 350 people, including 80 foreign correspondents.

It was addressed by Colonel-General V.K. Pikalov, Commander of the Chemical Warfare Troops of the USSR Ministry of Defence.

Annex 1

Programme for the presentation to participants
of standard chemical munitions and a technology
for the destruction of chemical weapons at a
mobile unit

1-2 October	Arrival in Moscow
3 October	
9 a.m.	Departure by air from Moscow
10-11 a.m.	Arrival at the Bagai-Baranovka military airfield and transfer to the site of the munitions presentation
11 a.m.-1 p.m.	Meeting with commanding officers of the Shikhany facility
1-3 p.m.	Presentation of standard chemical munitions
6-7 p.m.	Briefing
8-11 p.m.	Entertainment, boat trip
4 October	
9 a.m.	Transfer to the site of the demonstration of chemical weapon destruction technology
10 a.m.-1 p.m.	Demonstration of chemical weapon destruction technology
2-3 p.m.	Transfer to Bagai-Baranovka military airfield
3 p.m.	Departure by air for Moscow
5 p.m.	Arrival in Moscow
5 October	
10.30 a.m.	Press conference on the results of the trip at the press centre of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Annex 2

Introductory statement by Colonel-General V.K. Pikalov, Commander,
Chemical Warfare Troops, USSR Ministry of Defence

The Shikhany military facility, which you have accepted an invitation to visit, comes directly under the military administration of the Chemical Warfare Troops.

I have the honour to welcome you to the Volga region on behalf of the authorities of the Ministry of Defence and to wish you well.

I think there is no need to comment on the programme for the presentation, since it is well known. I should like to say just one thing: the programme will be carried out to the full, and is unprecedented for us.

Although the year has been marked by abnormal weather, Nature has tried to provide us with some sunshine, and I hope that these conditions will also extend to our meeting.

As the programme for the presentation is rather a full one, I would earnestly request you to defer all the questions that arise in the course of our work until the briefing that will be held on the boat today, or to put them at the press conference that will take place on 5 October, at 10 a.m., in the press centre of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Moscow.

Annex 3

Statement by Major-General R.F. Razuvanov, Commander,
Shikhany military facility

Permit me to welcome you to the Shikhany military facility on behalf of the officers and all our staff. You are the first foreigners to have entered its territory.

That being so, permit me to describe the facility briefly to you.

On the way here, you were given information about the Saratov region and the Volsk district in which the facility lies, and about the particular features of the area.

You are now in the facility's club, which is situated in the residential zone. Directly adjacent to this are the administrative zone, the laboratory and technical zone, the security and safety sub-unit zone, and the stores and ancillary services zones (figure 1).

The residential zone contains housing for our personnel, together with common services and recreational facilities.

The administrative zone contains the administrative buildings for the control and administration of the facility.

Located within the administrative zone are the main services such as materials and technical supply, finance, transport, engineering, meteorology, communications and other sub-units essential to the operation of the facility.

The laboratory and technical zone contains buildings, structures and laboratory blocks necessary for the fulfilment of the functions assigned to the facility.

Other tasks assigned to our facility include those relating to chemical weapons.

Today, on the way to the point where the standard chemical munitions will be presented, you will have an opportunity to pass through our residential zone, the administration zone and the laboratory and technical zone; commentaries will be provided by facility personnel.

After the presentation you will travel across the proving ground and beyond the perimeter of the Shikhany military facility's buffer zone to the edge of the River Volga, where a cruise ship will be waiting for you near the settlement of Belogorodnya.

Tomorrow you will again go by this route to the presentation site, where a demonstration will be given of a technology for the destruction of chemical weapons. Afterwards, you will go to the Bagai-Baranovka airfield, from where you will fly to Moscow.

I should like to say once again on behalf of our entire team that we fully support the efforts being made by our Party and Government in the sphere of disarmament and the elimination of all types of weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons, by the year 2000.

We are happy to welcome you as the representatives of world public opinion as a whole and its struggle for peace and the reduction of international tension.

We hope that the participants in the negotiations will make every effort to ensure that a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons becomes a reality in the very near future.

We, for our part, are willing to assist in this and trust that the presentation at our facility will further the achievement of early agreement on the banning of chemical weapons and the elimination of stockpiles of such weapons.




Fig. 1. Sketch map of the Shikhany military facility

Annex 4

Chemical artillery munitions

122-mm chemical tube artillery shell

The shell consists of a casing with a filler hole, a burster tube, a bursting charge, a fuse and a CW agent (figure 2).

Combat characteristics of the shell

The shell is designed to disable personnel through the respiratory organs.

The CW agent in the shell is sarin. Combat condition of CW agent when used - vapour and finely dispersed aerosol. Method of CW agent dispersion - explosion of bursting charge. A percussion fuse is used in the shell.

Shell weight - 22.2 kg. Weight of sarin - 1.3 kg.

Filling coefficient - 0.06.

Explosive - TNT

Steel, copper and aluminium are used in shell construction.

152-mm chemical tube artillery shell

The shell consists of a casing with a filler hole, a burster tube, a bursting charge, a fuse and a CW agent (figure 3).

Combat characteristics of the shell

The shell is designed to disable personnel through the respiratory organs.

The CW agent in the shell is sarin. Combat condition of CW agent when used - vapour and finely dispersed aerosol.

Method of CW agent dispersion - explosion of bursting charge. A percussion fuse is used in the shell.

Shell weight - 40.0 kg. Weight of sarin - 2.8 kg.

Filling coefficient - 0.07.

Explosive - TNT

Steel, copper and aluminium are used in shell construction.

130-mm chemical tube artillery shell

The shell consists of a casing with a filler hole, a burster tube, a bursting charge, a fuse and a CW agent (figure 4).

Combat characteristics of the shell

The shell is designed to disable personnel through the respiratory organs.

CW agent in shell - sarin. Combat condition of CW agent when used - vapour and finely dispersed aerosol. Method of CW agent dispersion - explosion of bursting charge. A percussion fuse is used in the shell.

Shell weight - 33.4 kg. Weight of sarin - 1.6 kg.

Filling coefficient - 0.05.

Explosive - TNT.

Steel, copper and aluminium are used in shell construction.

122-mm chemical tube artillery shell

The shell consists of a casing with a filler hole, a burster tube, a bursting charge, a fuse and a CW agent (figure 5).

Combat characteristics of the shell

The shell is designed to disable personnel through the respiratory organs and unprotected parts of the skin, and to contaminate matériel, terrain and engineering structures.

The CW agent in the shell is viscous lewisite. Combat condition of CW agent when used - vapour, aerosol and droplets. Method of CW agent dispersion - explosion of bursting charge. A time fuse is used in the shell.

Shell weight - 23.1 kg. Weight of viscous lewisite - 3.3 kg.

Filling coefficient - 0.14.

Explosive - TNT

Steel, copper and aluminium are used in shell construction.

152-mm chemical tube artillery shell

The shell consists of a casing with a filler hole, a burster tube, a bursting charge, a fuse and a CW agent (figure 6).

Combat characteristics of the shell

The shell is designed to disable personnel through the respiratory organs and unprotected parts of the skin, and to contaminate materiél, terrain and engineering structures.

The CW agent in the shell is viscous lewisite. Combat condition of CW agent when used - vapour, aerosol and droplets. Method of CW agent dispersion - explosion of bursting charge. A time fuse is used in the shell.

Shell weight - 42.5 kg. Weight of viscous lewisite - 5.4 kg.

Filling coefficient - 0.13.

Explosive - TNT.

Steel, copper and aluminium are used in shell construction.

130-mm chemical tube artillery shell

The shell consists of a casing with a filler hole, a burster tube, a bursting charge, a fuse and a CW agent (figure 7).

Combat characteristics of the shell

The shell is designed to disable personnel through unprotected parts of the skin, and to contaminate matériel, terrain and engineering structures.

The CW agent in the shell is VX. Combat condition of CW agent when used - dense aerosol and droplets. Method of CW agent dispersion - explosion of the bursting charge. A proximity fuse is used in the shell.

Shell weight - 33.4 kg. Weight of VX - 1.4 kg.

Filling coefficient - 0.04.

Explosive - TNT.

Steel, copper and aluminium are used in shell construction.

122-mm chemical rocket missile

The missile consists of a body with a filler hole, a primer tube, a bursting charge, a fuse and a CW agent (figure 8).

Combat characteristics of the missile

The missile is designed to disable personnel through unprotected parts of the skin, and to contaminate matériel, terrain and engineering structures.

The CW agent in the missile is VX. Combat condition of CW agent when used - dense aerosol and droplets.

Method of CW agent dispersion - explosion of bursting charge. A proximity fuse is used in the missile.

Weight of missile - 19.3 kg. Weight of VX - 2.9 kg.

Filling coefficient - 0.15.

Explosive - TNT.

Steel, copper and aluminium are used in missile construction.

122-mm chemical rocket missile

The missile consists of a body with a filler hole, a primer tube, a bursting charge, a fuse and a CW agent (figure 9).

Combat characteristics of the missile

The missile is designed to disable personnel through the respiratory organs.

The CW agent in the missile is sarin. Combat condition of CW agent when used - vapour and finely dispersed aerosol. Method of CW agent dispersion - explosion of the bursting charge. A percussion fuse is used in the missile.

Weight of missile - 19.3 kg. Weight of sarin - 3.1 kg.

Filling coefficient - 0.16.

Explosive - TNT.

Steel, copper and aluminium are used in missile construction.

140-mm chemical rocket missile

The missile consists of a body with a filler hole, a primer tube, a bursting charge, a fuse and a CW agent (figure 10).

Combat characteristics of the missile

The missile is designed to disable personnel through the respiratory organs.

The CW agent in the missile is sarin. Combat condition of CW agent when used - vapour and finely dispersed aerosol. Method of CW agent dispersion - explosion of the bursting charge. A percussion fuse is used in the missile.

Weight of the missile - 18.3 kg. Weight of sarin - 2.2 kg.

Filling coefficient - 0.12.

Explosive - TNT.

Steel, copper and aluminium are used in missile construction.

240-mm chemical rocket missile

The missile consists of a body with a filler hole, a primer tube, a bursting charge, a fuse and a CW agent (figure 11).

Combat characteristics of the missile

The missile is designed to disable personnel through the respiratory organs.

The CW agent in the missile is sarin. Combat condition of CW agent when used - vapour and finely dispersed aerosol. Method of CW agent dispersion - explosion of the bursting charge. A percussion fuse is used in the missile.


Weight of the missile - 44.3 kg. Weight of sarin - 8.0 kg.

Filling coefficient - 0.18.

Explosive - TNT.

Steel, copper and aluminium are used in missile construction.

1. Casing
2. Burster tube
3. Bursting charge
4. CW agent
5. Fuse
6. Filler hole




Combat characteristics

- | | |
|----------------------------------|---|
| 1. Purpose | To disable personnel through respiratory organs |
| 2. Calibre | 122 mm |
| 3. CW agent | |
| Name | Sarin |
| Combat condition | Vapour and finely dispersed aerosol |
| 4. Method of CW agent dispersion | Explosion of bursting charge |
| 5. Fuse type | Percussion |
| 6. Weight of shell | 22.2 kg |
| 7. Weight of CW agent | 1.3 kg |
| 8. Filling coefficient | 0.06 |
| 9. Explosive | TNT |
| 10. Construction materials | Steel, copper, aluminium |

Figure 2. 122-mm chemical tube artillery shell

1. Casing
2. Burster tube
3. Bursting charge
4. CW agent
5. Fuse
6. Filler hole




Combat characteristics

- | | |
|----------------------------------|---|
| 1. Purpose | To disable personnel through respiratory organs |
| 2. Calibre | 152 mm |
| 3. CW agent | |
| Name | Sarin |
| Combat condition | Vapour and finely dispersed aerosol |
| 4. Method of CW agent dispersion | Explosion of bursting charge |
| 5. Fuse type | Percussion |
| 6. Weight of shell | 40.0 kg |
| 7. Weight of CW agent | 2.8 kg |
| 8. Filling coefficient | 0.07 |
| 9. Explosive | TNT |
| 10. Construction materials | Steel, copper, aluminium |

Figure 3. 152-mm chemical tube artillery shell

1. Casing
2. Burster tube
3. Bursting charge
4. CW agent
5. Fuse
6. Filler hole




Combat characteristics

- | | |
|----------------------------------|---|
| 1. Purpose | To disable personnel through respiratory organs |
| 2. Calibre | 130 mm |
| 3. CW agent | |
| Name | Sarin |
| Combat condition | Vapour and finely dispersed aerosol |
| 4. Method of CW agent dispersion | Explosion of bursting charge |
| 5. Fuse type | Percussion |
| 6. Weight of shell | 33.4 kg |
| 7. Weight of CW agent | 1.6 kg |
| 8. Filling coefficient | 0.05 |
| 9. Explosive | TNT |
| 10. Construction materials | Steel, copper, aluminium |

Figure 4. 130-mm chemical tube artillery shell

1. Casing
2. Burster tube
3. Bursting charge
4. CW agent
5. Fuse
6. Filler hole




Combat characteristics

1. Purpose	To disable personnel through respiratory organs and unprotected parts of the skin and to contaminate <u>matériel</u> , terrain and engineering structures
2. Calibre	122 mm
3. CW agent	
Name	Viscous lewisite
Combat condition	Vapour, aerosol and droplets
4. Method of CW agent dispersion	Explosion of bursting charge
5. Fuse type	Time
6. Weight of shell	23.1 kg
7. Weight of CW agent	3.3 kg
8. Filling coefficient	0.14
9. Explosive	TNT
10. Construction materials	Steel, copper, aluminium

Figure 5. 122-mm chemical tube artillery shell

1. Casing
2. Burster tube
3. Bursting charge
4. CW agent
5. Fuse
6. Filler hole




Combat characteristics

- | | |
|----------------------------------|---|
| 1. Purpose | To disable personnel through respiratory organs and unprotected parts of the skin and to contaminate <u>matériel</u> , terrain and engineering structures |
| 2. Calibre | 152 mm |
| 3. CW agent | |
| Name | Viscous lewisite |
| Combat condition | Vapour, aerosol and droplets |
| 4. Method of CW agent dispersion | Explosion of bursting charge |
| 5. Fuse type | Time |
| 6. Weight of shell | 42.5 kg |
| 7. Weight of CW agent | 5.4 kg |
| 8. Filling coefficient | 0.13 |
| 9. Explosive | TNT |
| 10. Construction materials | Steel, copper, aluminium |

Figure 6. 152-mm chemical tube artillery shell

1. Casing
2. Burster tube
3. Bursting charge
4. CW agent
5. Fuse
6. Filler hole




Combat characteristics

- | | |
|----------------------------------|---|
| 1. Purpose | To disable personnel through unprotected parts of the skin, and to contaminate <u>matériel</u> , terrain and engineering structures |
| 2. Calibre | 130 mm |
| 3. CW agent | |
| Name | VX |
| Combat condition | Dense aerosol and droplets |
| 4. Method of CW agent dispersion | Explosion of bursting charge |
| 5. Fuse type | Proximity |
| 6. Weight of shell | 33.4 kg |
| 7. Weight of CW agent | 1.4 kg |
| 8. Filling coefficient | 0.04 |
| 9. Explosive | TNT |
| 10. Construction materials | Steel, copper, aluminium |

Figure 7. 130-mm chemical tube artillery shell

- 1. Fuse
- 2. Body
- 3. Primer tube
- 4. Bursting charge
- 5. CW agent
- 6. Filler hole




Combat characteristics

- | | |
|----------------------------|---|
| 1. Purpose | To disable personnel through unprotected parts of the skin, and to contaminate <u>matériel</u> , terrain and engineering structures |
| 2. Calibre | 122 mm |
| 3. CW agent | |
| Name | VX |
| Combat condition | Dense aerosol and droplets |
| 4. Method of dispersion | Explosion of bursting charge |
| 5. Fuse type | Proximity |
| 6. Weight of missile | 19.3 kg |
| 7. Weight of CW agent | 2.9 kg |
| 8. Filling coefficient | 0.15 |
| 9. Explosive | TNT |
| 10. Construction materials | Steel, copper, aluminium |

Figure 8. 122-mm chemical rocket missile

1. Fuse
2. Body
3. Primer tube
4. Bursting charge
5. CW agent
6. Filler hole




Combat characteristics

1. Purpose	To disable personnel through respiratory organs
2. Calibre	122 mm
3. CW agent	
Name	Sarin
Combat condition	Vapour and finely dispersed aerosol
4. Method of dispersion	Explosion of bursting charge
5. Fuse type	Percussion
6. Weight of missile	19.3 kg
7. Weight of CW agent	3.1 kg
8. Filling coefficient	0.16
9. Explosive	TNT
10. Construction materials	Steel, copper, aluminium

Figure 9. 122-mm chemical rocket missile

1. Fuse
2. Body
3. Primer tube
4. Bursting charge
5. CW agent
6. Filler hole




Combat characteristics

- | | |
|----------------------------------|---|
| 1. Purpose | To disable personnel through respiratory organs |
| 2. Calibre | 140 mm |
| 3. CW agent | |
| Name | Sarin |
| Combat condition | Vapour and finely dispersed aerosol |
| 4. Method of CW agent dispersion | Explosion of bursting charge |
| 5. Fuse type | Percussion |
| 6. Weight of missile | 18.3 kg |
| 7. Weight of CW agent | 2.2 kg |
| 8. Filling coefficient | 0.12 |
| 9. Explosive | TNT |
| 10. Construction materials | Steel, copper, aluminium |

Figure 10. 140-mm chemical rocket missile

1. Fuse
2. Body
3. Primer tube
4. Bursting charge
5. CW agent
6. Filler hole



Combat characteristics

1. Purpose	To disable personnel through respiratory organs
2. Calibre	240 mm
3. CW agent	
Name	Sarin
Combat condition	Vapour and finely dispersed aerosol
4. Method of CW agent dispersion	Explosion of bursting charge
5. Fuse type	Percussion
6. Weight of missile	44.3 kg
7. Weight of CW agent	8.0 kg
8. Filling coefficient	0.18
9. Explosive	TNT
10. Construction materials	Steel, copper, aluminium

Figure 11. 240-mm chemical rocket missile

Annex 5

Chemical warheads for tactical missiles

Chemical warhead for 540-mm tactical missile

The warhead consists of a casing with a filler hole, a bursting charge, a VT fuse and a CW agent (figure 12).

Combat characteristics of the warhead

The chemical warhead is designed to disable personnel through unprotected parts of the skin, and to contaminate matériel, terrain and engineering structures.

The warhead is filled with the CW agent VX.

Combat condition when used - dense aerosol and droplets. Method of CW agent dispersion after opening of warhead by means of bursting charge - fragmentation of the VX by an inflow of air.

Weight of warhead - 436 kg. Weight of VX - 216 kg.

Filling coefficient of warhead with CW agent - 0.5.

Steel, aluminium and copper are used in warhead construction.

Chemical warhead for 884-mm tactical missile

The warhead consists of a casing with a filler hole, a bursting charge, a VT fuse and a CW agent (figure 13).

Combat characteristics of the warhead

The chemical warhead is designed to disable personnel through unprotected parts of the skin, and to contaminate matériel, terrain and engineering structures.

The warhead is filled with the CW agent viscous VX.


Combat condition when used - dense aerosol and droplets. Method of CW agent dispersion after opening of warhead by means of bursting charge - fragmentation of the viscous VX by an inflow of air.

Weight of the warhead - 985 kg. Weight of the viscous VX - 555 kg.

Filling coefficient of warhead with CW agent - 0.56.

Steel, aluminium and copper are used in warhead construction.

1. VT fuse
2. Bursting charge
3. Filler hole
4. Casing
5. CW agent




Combat characteristics

- | | | |
|----|-------------------------------|---|
| 1. | Purpose | To disable personnel through unprotected parts of the skin, and to contaminate <u>matériel</u> , terrain and engineering structures |
| 2. | Calibre | 540 mm |
| 3. | CW agent | |
| | Name | VX |
| | Combat condition | Dense aerosol and droplets |
| 4. | Method of CW agent dispersion | Opening of warhead by means of bursting charge, fragmentation of the CW agent by inflow of air |
| 5. | Weight of warhead | 436.0 kg |
| 6. | Weight of CW agent | 216.0 kg |
| 7. | Filling coefficient | 0.5 |
| 8. | Construction materials | Steel, copper, aluminium |

Figure 12. Chemical warhead for 540-mm tactical missile

1. VT fuse
2. Casing
3. CW agent
4. Bursting charge
5. Filler hole



Combat characteristics

- | | |
|----------------------------------|---|
| 1. Purpose | To disable personnel through unprotected parts of the skin, and to contaminate <u>matériel</u> , terrain and engineering structures |
| 2. Calibre | 884 mm |
| 3. CW agent | |
| Name | Viscous VX |
| Combat condition | Dense aerosol and droplets |
| 4. Method of CW agent dispersion | Opening of the warhead by means of bursting charge, fragmentation of the CW agent by inflow of air |
| 5. Weight of warhead | 985.0 kg |
| 6. Weight of CW agent | 555.0 kg |
| 7. Filling coefficient | 0.56 |
| 8. Construction materials | Steel, copper, aluminium |

Figure 13. Chemical warhead for 884-mm tactical missile

Annex 6

Air-launched chemical munitions

100-kg chemical bomb

The bomb consists of a shell with a filler hole, a primer tube, a bursting charge, a propelling charge, an external casing and a CW agent (figure 14).

Combat characteristics of the bomb

The chemical bomb is designed to disable personnel through the respiratory organs and unprotected parts of the skin, and to contaminate matériel, terrain and engineering structures.

The bomb is filled with a mixture of the CW agents mustard gas and lewisite. Combat condition when used - vapour, aerosol and droplets. Method of CW agent dispersion in combat condition - explosion of bursting charge. A percussion fuse is used in the bomb.

Weight of bomb - 100 kg. Weight of CW agent - 39 kg. Filling coefficient - 0.39.

Steel, copper and aluminium are used in bomb construction.

100-kg. chemical bomb

The bomb consists of a shell with a filler hole, a primer tube, a bursting charge and a CW agent (figure 15).

Combat characteristics of the bomb

The chemical bomb is designed to disable personnel through the respiratory organs and unprotected parts of the skin, and to contaminate matériel, terrain and engineering structures.

The bomb is filled with a mixture of the CW agents mustard gas and lewisite. Combat condition of CW agent when used - vapour, aerosol and droplets. Method of CW agent dispersion into combat condition - explosion of the bursting charge. A percussion fuse is used in the bomb.

Weight of the bomb - 80 kg. Weight of the CW agent - 28 kg. Filling coefficient - 0.35.

Steel, copper, and aluminium are used in bomb construction.

250-kg chemical bomb

The bomb consists of a shell with a filler hole, a primer tube, a bursting charge and a CW agent (figure 16).

Combat characteristics of the bomb

The chemical bomb is designed to disable personnel through the respiratory organs.

The bomb is filled with the CW agent sarin. Combat condition of the CW agent when used - vapour and finely dispersed aerosol.

Method of CW agent dispersion into combat condition - explosion of the bursting charge. A percussion fuse is used in the bomb.

Weight of the bomb - 233 kg. Weight of sarin - 49 kg. Filling coefficient - 0.21.

Steel, copper and aluminium are used in bomb construction.

250-kg chemical spray tank

The spray tank consists of a casing with a filler hole, a primer tube, a bursting charge and a CW agent (figure 17).

Combat characteristics of the tank

The chemical spray tank is designed to disable personnel through unprotected parts of the skin, and to contaminate matériel, terrain and engineering structures.

The tank is filled with the CW agent viscous soman. Combat condition of the CW agent when used - dense aerosol and droplets. Method of CW agent dispersion after opening of the casing by means of the bursting charge - fragmentation of the CW agent by an inflow of air. A time fuse is used in the tank.

Weight of the tank - 130 kg. Weight of the CW agent - 45 kg. Filling coefficient - 0.35.

Steel, copper and aluminium are used in tank construction.

500-kg chemical spray tank

The spray tank consists of a casing with a filler hole, a bursting charge and a CW agent (figure 18).

Combat characteristics of the tank

The chemical spray tank is designed to disable personnel through the respiratory organs and unprotected parts of the skin, and to contaminate matériel, terrain and engineering structures.

The tank is filled with a mixture of the CW agents mustard gas and lewisite. Combat condition of the CW agent when used - vapour, aerosol and droplets. Method of CW agent dispersion after opening of the casing by means of the bursting charge - fragmentation of the CW agent by an inflow of air. A time fuse is used in the tank.

Weight of the tank - 280 kg. Weight of the CW agent - 164 kg. Filling coefficient - 0.59.

Steel, copper and aluminium are used in tank construction.

1500-kg chemical spray tank

The spray tank consists of a casing with a filler hole, a burster charge and a CW agent (figure 19).

Combat characteristics of the tank


The chemical spray tank is designed to disable personnel through the respiratory organs and unprotected parts of the skin, and to contaminate terrain, matériel and engineering structures.

The tank is filled with a mixture of the CW agents mustard gas and lewisite. Combat condition of the CW agent when used - vapour, aerosol and droplets. Method of CW agent dispersion after opening of the casing by means of the bursting charge - fragmentation of the CW agent by an inflow of air. A time fuse is used in the tank.

Weight of the tank - 963 kg. Weight of CW agent - 630 kg. Filling coefficient - 0.65.

Steel, copper and aluminium are used in tank construction.

1. External casing
2. Shell
3. Propelling charge
4. Primer tube
5. Bursting charge
6. CW agent
7. Filler hole




Combat characteristics

- | | |
|---------------------------|--|
| 1. Purpose | To disable personnel through respiratory organs and unprotected parts of the skin, and to contaminate <u>matériel</u> , terrain and engineering structures |
| 2. Calibre | 100 kg |
| 3. CW agent | |
| Name | Mixture of mustard gas and lewisite |
| Combat condition | Vapour, aerosol and droplets |
| 4. Method of dispersion | Explosion of bursting charge |
| 5. Fuse type | Percussion |
| 6. Weight of bomb | 100 kg |
| 7. Weight of CW agent | 39 kg |
| 8. Filling coefficient | 0.39 |
| 9. Construction materials | Steel, copper, aluminium |

Figure 14. 100-kg chemical bomb

1. Shell
2. Primer tube
3. Bursting charge
4. CW agent
5. Filler hole




Combat characteristics

- | | |
|---------------------------|--|
| 1. Purpose | To disable personnel through respiratory organs and unprotected parts of the skin, and to contaminate <u>matériel</u> , terrain and engineering structures |
| 2. Calibre | 100 kg |
| 3. CW agent | |
| Name | Mixture of mustard gas and lewisite |
| Combat condition | Vapour, aerosol and droplets |
| 4. Method of dispersion | Explosion of bursting charge |
| 5. Fuse type | Percussion |
| 6. Weight of bomb | 80 kg |
| 7. Weight of CW agent | 28 kg |
| 8. Filling coefficient | 0.35 |
| 9. Construction materials | Steel, copper, aluminium |

Figure 15. 100-kg chemical bomb

1. Shell
2. Primer tube
3. Bursting charge
4. CW agent
5. Filler hole




Combat characteristics

- | | |
|---------------------------|---|
| 1. Purpose | To disable personnel through respiratory organs |
| 2. Calibre | 250 kg |
| 3. CW agent | |
| Name | Sarin |
| Combat condition | Vapour and finely dispersed aerosol |
| 4. Method of dispersion | Explosion of bursting charge |
| 5. Fuse type | Instantaneous percussion |
| 6. Weight of bomb | 233 kg |
| 7. Weight of CW agent | 49 kg |
| 8. Filling coefficient | 0.21 |
| 9. Construction materials | Steel, copper, aluminium |

Figure 16. 250-kg chemical bomb

1. Casing
2. Primer tube
3. Bursting charge
4. CW agent
5. Filler hole




Combat characteristics

- | | |
|----------------------------------|---|
| 1. Purpose | To disable personnel through unprotected parts of the skin, and to contaminate <u>matériel</u> , terrain and engineering structures |
| 2. Calibre | 250 kg |
| 3. CW agent | |
| Name | Viscous soman |
| Combat condition | Dense aerosol and droplets |
| 4. Method of CW agent dispersion | Opening of tank by means of bursting charge, fragmentation of CW agent by an inflow of air |
| 5. Fuse type | Time |
| 6. Weight of tank | 130 kg |
| 7. Weight of CW agent | 45 kg |
| 8. Filling coefficient | 0.35 |
| 9. Construction materials | Steel, copper, aluminium |

Figure 17. 250-kg chemical spray tank

1. Casing
2. Bursting charge
3. Filler hole
4. CW agent




Combat characteristics

- | | |
|----------------------------------|--|
| 1. Purpose | To disable personnel through respiratory organs and unprotected parts of the skin, and to contaminate <u>matériel</u> , terrain and engineering structures |
| 2. Calibre | 500 kg |
| 3. CW agent | |
| Name | Mixture of mustard gas and lewisite |
| Combat condition | Vapour, aerosol and droplets |
| 4. Method of CW agent dispersion | Opening of tank by means of bursting charge, fragmentation of CW agent by an inflow of air |
| 5. Fuse type | Time |
| 6. Weight of tank | 280 kg |
| 7. Weight of CW agent | 164 kg |
| 8. Filling coefficient | 0.59 |
| 9. Construction materials | Steel, copper, aluminium |

Figure 18. 500-kg chemical spray tank

1. Casing
2. Bursting charge
3. Filler hole
4. CW agent



Combat characteristics

1. Purpose
To disable personnel through respiratory organs and unprotected parts of the skin, and to contaminate matériel, terrain and engineering structures
2. Calibre
1500 kg
3. CW agent
Name
Mixture of mustard gas and lewisite
Combat condition
Vapour, aerosol and droplets
4. Method of CW agent dispersion
Opening of tank by means of bursting charge, fragmentation of CW agent by an inflow of air
5. Fuse type
Time
6. Weight of tank
963 kg
7. Weight of CW agent
630 kg
8. Filling coefficient
0.65
9. Construction materials
Steel, copper, aluminium

Figure 19. 1500-kg chemical spray tank

Annex 7

Chemical agents for close combat

Chemical hand-grenade

The hand-grenade consists of a body with an outlet hole, an igniter set and pyrotechnical mixture containing a CW agent (figure 20).

Combat characteristics of the grenade.


The hand-grenade is designed to incapacitate personnel temporarily.

The grenade is filled with a pyrotechnical mixture containing the CW agent CS. Combat condition of the CW agent when used - vapour and finely dispersed aerosol. Method of CW agent dispersion - sublimation from the pyrotechnical mixture.

Weight of the grenade - 0.25 kg. Weight of the pyrotechnical mixture - 0.17 kg.

Polyethylene, steel and aluminium are used in grenade construction.

1. Body
2. Pyrotechnical mixture containing CW agent
3. Igniter set
4. Outlet hole.



Combat characteristics

- | | |
|------------------------------------|--|
| 1. Purpose | To incapacitate personnel temporarily |
| 2. CW agent | |
| Name | CS |
| Combat condition | Vapour and finely dispersed aerosol |
| 3. Method of CW agent dispersion | Sublimation from pyrotechnical mixture |
| 4. Weight of grenade | 0.25 kg |
| 5. Weight of pyrotechnical mixture | 0.17 kg |
| 6. Construction materials | Steel, aluminium, polyethylene |

Figure 20. Chemical hand-grenade

Annex 8

The Soviet Army's chemical warfare agents

The standard chemical munitions placed on display contain the following CW agents: mustard gas/lewisite mixture, viscous lewisite, sarin, viscous soman, VX, viscous VX and CS (table 1).

These agents are used in the following equipment:

Mustard gas/lewisite mixture - aerial bombs and spray tanks;

Viscous lewisite - tube artillery shells;

Sarin - tube and rocket artillery shells and aerial bombs;

Viscous soman - spray tanks;

VX - tube and rocket artillery shells and tactical missile warheads;

Viscous VX - tactical missile warheads;

CS - chemical hand-grenades.

There are no binary chemical weapons in the Soviet Army.

Mustard gas/lewisite mixture.

The mustard gas/lewisite mixture is a dark brown liquid with a sharp, unpleasant odour.

Physico-chemical characteristics:

Boiling point:	Above 200°C
Freezing point:	-48.5 -50°C
Density:	1.428×10^3 kg/m ³
Volatility:	1.53×10^{-3} kg/m ³
Dynamic viscosity:	8.7×10^{-3} Pa.s
Surface tension:	4.4×10^{-2} kg/s ²
Diffusion coefficient:	5.83×10^{-6} m ² /s.

The toxicological characteristics of this preparation are determined by the properties of its constituents, which are nerve and paralysing agents producing marked blister effects:

Ineffective dose on the skin of a rabbit:	0.0005 mg/cm ²
Minimum effective dose on the skin of a rabbit:	0.005 mg/cm ²

Minimum necrogenic dose on the skin of a rabbit: 0.05 - 0.10 mg/cm²

Absolutely lethal dose on the skin of a dog: 60 - 70 mg/kg

Viscous lewisite

Viscous lewisite is a highly viscous dark brown liquid.

Physico-chemical characteristics:

Boiling point: 170-196°C

Freezing point: -40°C

Density: (1.86-1.92).10³ kg/m³

Dynamic viscosity: 30.0x10⁻² Pa.s

Volatility: 2.3x10⁻³ kg/m³

Diffusion coefficient: 5.83x10⁻⁶ m²/s

The effect produced by viscous lewisite is attributable to the toxic properties of its basic component, lewisite. Viscous lewisite produces its effects through the unprotected parts of the skin.

Toxicological characteristics:

Ineffective dose on the skin of a rabbit: 0.0005 - 0.001 mg/cm²

Minimum effective dose on the skin of a rabbit: 0.005 mg/cm²

Minimum necrogenic dose on the skin of a rabbit: 0.05 mg/cm²

Absolutely lethal dose on the skin of a dog: 30 mg/kg

Sarin

Sarin is a light yellow mobile liquid with a fruity smell.

Physico-chemical characteristics:

Boiling point: 147-151.5°C

Freezing point: -56°C

Density 1.098x10³ kg/m³

Volatility: 1.41x10⁻² kg/m³

Dynamic viscosity: 1.92x10⁻³ Pa.s

Heat capacity:	1.911 kJ/kg.°C
Latent heat of evaporation:	4.027×10^2 kJ/kg
Diffusion coefficient:	5.92×10^{-6} m ² /s

Toxicologically, sarin is a nerve agent. It produces its effects after its introduction into the organism by any means.

Toxicological characteristics:

(Median toxic dose)

Intramuscularly, mg per kg of animal weight:

White mouse:	0.23
White rat:	0.074
Rabbit:	0.025
Guinea-pig:	0.037

Intravenously, mg per kg of animal weight:

Rabbit:	0.021
Guinea-pig:	0.019

By inhalation, 100 mg.min/m³ for a rabbit.

Viscous soman

Viscous soman is a yellowish-brown, highly viscous liquid with a slight aromatic odour.

Physico-chemical characteristics:

Boiling poing	190°C
Freezing point	-80°C
Density:	1.035×10^3 kg/m ³
Volatility:	2.65×10^{-3} kg/m ³
Dynamic viscosity:	17.5×10^{-2} Pa.s
Surface tension:	2.65×10^{-2} kg/s ²
Diffusion coefficient:	4.83×10^{-6} m ² /s
Heat capacity:	2.205 kJ/kg.°C

The toxic action of viscous soman is attributable to its basic component, soman, which is a nerve agent. Viscous soman produces its effects through its introduction into the organism by any means.

The median lethal dose for intravenous administration of soman is as follows:

Guinea-pig: 0.014 mg/kg

White mouse: 0.084 mg/kg

VX

VX is a dark brown liquid with a high boiling point.

Physico-chemical characteristics:

Boiling point: Above 300°C

Freezing point: Below -66°C

Density: 1.014×10^3 kg/m³

Volatility: 0.54×10^{-5} kg/m³

Dynamic viscosity: 9.15×10^{-3} Pa.s

Surface tension: 2.96×10^{-2} kg/s²

Diffusion coefficient: 4.0×10^{-6} m²/s

Heat capacity: 1.928 kJ/kg.°C

VX produces its effects when it is introduced into the organism by various means.

The median lethal dose is as follows:

Intravenously:

White mouse: 0.0220 mg/kg

Rabbit: 0.0064 mg/kg

Percutaneously:

White rat: 0.090 mg/kg

Cat: 0.011 mg/kg

Viscous VX

Viscous VX is a yellowish-brown dense liquid, the basic component of which is the CW agent VX.

Physico-chemical characteristics:

Boiling point:	Above 300°C
Freezing point:	Below -70°C
Density:	$1.025 \times 10^3 \text{ kg/m}^3$
Volatility:	$0.45 \times 10^{-5} \text{ kg/m}^3$
Dynamic viscosity:	$15.8 \times 10^{-2} \text{ Pa.s}$
Surface tension:	$3.19 \times 10^{-2} \text{ kg/s}^2$
Diffusion coefficient:	$3.8 \times 10^{-6} \text{ m}^2/\text{s}$
Heat capacity:	1,930 kJ/kg.°C

The effects of viscous VX are similar to those of VX.

The median lethal dose for intravenous administration is as follows:

Cat:	0.0034 mg/kg
White rat:	0.0070 mg/kg

CS

CS is a crystalline substance which ranges from white to brown in colour and darkens when heated.

Physico-chemical characteristics:

Melting point:	93-95°C
Boiling point:	310-315°C
Weight by volume:	$1.6-3.2 \times 10^2 \text{ kg/m}^3$
Content of active agent:	Not less than 97 per cent
Moisture content:	Not more than 0.5 per cent
Decomposition point:	Above 625°C
Volatility:	1.10^{-7} kg/m^3

CS has a low toxicity level whatever the means of absorption. However, it produces a highly irritating effect on the respiratory organs and the eyes.

The median incapacitating dose absorbed by inhalation ranges from 1.0 to 5.0 mg.min/m³.

THE SOVIET ARMY'S CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS

CW agents	Types of chemical munitions
Blister gases	
Mustard gas/lewisite mixture	Aerial bombs Spray tanks
Viscous lewisite	Tube artillery shells
Nerve agents	
Sarin	Tube artillery shells Rocket artillery shells Aerial bombs
Viscous soman	Spray tanks
VX	Tube artillery shells Rocket artillery shells Tactical missile warheads
Viscous VX	Tactical missile warheads
Irritant	Chemical hand-grenades
CS	

Annex 9

Standard methods for determining the toxicity of CW agents

For the purpose of classifying super-toxic lethal chemicals, a methodology is proposed for determining their intravenous toxicity in rabbits.

Median lethal doses (LD₅₀), expressed in mg per kg of animal weight, are used for evaluation purposes.

The trials are conducted in laboratory conditions with an air temperature of 18-22°C. Clinically healthy, fully grown animals weighing 2.0-2.5 kg (females and males in a 1:1 ratio) are selected for the experiment.

Each chemical is introduced into the rabbits in a water-acetone or water-alcohol solution. Acetone or alcohol is used to prepare the original mother liquor, which is then diluted with distilled water to produce solutions containing the dose of the tested chemical in 0.05 ml of the solution. 0.05 ml/kg of diluted solution is introduced into the rabbit's auricular vein.

In the first stage of the experiment, an evaluation is made of the dose range within which the median lethal dose of the chemical being studied falls. For this purpose, the substance is administered intravenously to the rabbit in increasing or decreasing doses according to the effect observed. The effect is recorded as either "died" or "survived". One rabbit is used for each dose.

After the chemical's toxicity range has been determined, the second stage of the experiment is carried out to determine the value of the median lethal dose. For this purpose four groups of six rabbits are required, three for test purposes and one control group. The test animals are given various doses of the chemical, and the control rabbits an equal amount of solvent.

The results of the intoxication are clinically observed for two days. An autopsy is performed on the animals that have died in order to determine the exact cause of death.

The median lethal dose is calculated by the probit method, which can be carried out either manually, by preparing a logarithmic chart, or on various types of computer, using appropriate programs.

The results indicating the intravenous toxicity of the super-toxic lethal chemicals are entered into a record which shows:

The date and time of the experiments;

Weather conditions;

Data concerning the chemical tested (classification number, place, date and order of selection of samples, external appearance, physico-chemical properties);

Dose of substance administered and effects observed;

Clinical description of the effects;

Calculated median lethal dose.

Following intravenous administration of the CW agent, the rabbits present a clinical picture of injury, agitation and tonoclonic spasms.

Death occurs within a few minutes or hours, depending on the amount of the effective dose.

Annex 10

Mobile unit for the destruction of chemical weapons

Purpose, technical characteristics and principles governing
the use of the mobile chemical weapon destruction unit

The unit is intended for the independent destruction in field conditions of chemical air-launched and artillery munitions and tactical missile warheads containing the nerve agents sarin, viscous soman, VX and viscous VX.

Depending on the nature and scale of the operation and the time available, several of these units can be used jointly.

Composition of the unit and its basic technical characteristics

The unit consists of the following components:

1. Chemical monitoring equipment	1
2. Transport vehicle with trailer on which the "Neutral" installation is mounted	1
3. Mobile chemical laboratory	1
4. Chemical tanker	2
5. Tractor	2
6. Burner	1
7. Power plant	1
8. Compressor	1
9. Transport vehicle	1
10. Shower unit	1

Principal technical characteristics of the unit:

Deployment time	10 hours
Manpower requirement	17 persons

Electricity consumption: power - 131 kW
voltage - 380/220 V

Overall weight: 66.3 t

The unit can be moved to the destruction site under its own power, by air or by rail.

Preliminary reconnaissance is carried out in the area where the work is to be done with a view to guaranteeing the safety of the operation; arrangements are made for demarcation of the area and the protection and chemical monitoring of the environment.

The unit consists of the following components:

1. Chemical monitoring equipment checks any contamination of the air in the area of operations during the destruction of chemical weapons.
2. The "Neutral" installation neutralizes the CW agent; the feed level and the automatic maintenance of the required temperature are continuously checked.
3. The chambers in which the CW agents are removed are intended for opening up the casings of the munitions to be destroyed. There are three versions of the chambers, for small-calibre, medium-calibre and large-calibre munitions.
4. The mobile chemical laboratory is intended for carrying out analytical monitoring of the destruction of the CW agents and analysis of soil, vegetation and air samples in the area of operation.
5. The chemical tankers transport the material to be neutralized, transfer it to the "Neutral" installation and transport the neutralization products to the burner.
6. The burner is used for thermal decomposition of the CW agent neutralization products at a temperature of around 1,200°C.
7. The power plant provides the mobile unit with electric power. It has a capacity of 200 kW.
8. The compressor is used to provide the mobile unit with compressed air and also to fill tanks with compressed air for the incinerator.
9. The function of the lift trucks is to carry the munitions from the lorry to the CW agent removal chamber.
10. The shower facility is used for personal cleansing (washing) by the personnel operating the unit. The facility has two shower units each consisting of six cubicles.

The facility includes changing and washing rooms.

Technology for the destruction of chemical munitions
at the mobile unit

A flow chart for the destruction of air-launched and artillery munitions and warheads of tactical missiles filled with the nerve agents sarin, soman and VX at a mobile unit is shown in figure 21.

The calibres of the munitions to be destroyed range from 1 kg to 500.0 kg.

The arrangement comprises a chamber for removing CW agents, a "Neutral" neutralization unit, an ARS-14U chemical tanker, an IIG426 burner, an AL-4 mobile chemical laboratory, a lift truck, a casing neutralization chamber, a vacuum pump and instrumentation to control and monitor the operation of the unit and the state of the environment.

The destruction technology is essentially a thermochemical process involving neutralization of the CW agents and combustion of the neutralization products to form inorganic compounds in concentrations within the specified maximum permissible range.

The munitions to be destroyed are placed, depending on calibre, in one of the removal chambers (RM, RS and RK), which is connected by flexible pipes fitted with seals to the "Neutral" unit and the ARS-14U chemical tanker.

The munitions are opened in a hermetically sealed chamber by drilling a hole in the casing; obturation and evacuation of the CW agent into the "Neutral" reactor is then effected under a vacuum created by the vacuum pump.

The process of neutralization takes place at temperatures of 100-120°C over a period of 30-40 minutes.

The content of toxic substances in the reactive mass of sarin neutralization products is less than LD₅₀, or 1,200 mg/kg, for a rabbit.

Once the reaction is completed, the neutralization products are pumped out of the "Neutral" reactor into the chemical tanker and fed into the burner.

The combustion of the neutralization products takes place at a temperature of around 1,200°C. The combustion products are carbon, sulphur and phosphorus oxides and hydrogen fluoride.


Neutralization of the munitions casing, after removal of the CW agents, is carried out in a separate chamber.

The basic functional components of the unit - the removal chamber, "Neutral" unit and casing neutralization chamber - are hermetically sealed, thus preventing toxic substances from being released into the environment.

The destruction process is monitored by steady-state instruments on control panels.

Analytical monitoring of CW agent content in the reactive mass, on the surface of equipment and in the air is carried out periodically in the AL-4 laboratory, and the ambient air in the working area is continuously monitored by means of gas indicators.

For safety reasons, personnel working on the mobile unit wear individual equipment to protect the respiratory organs and skin.



1. CW agent removal chamber
2. "Neutral" neutralization unit
3. ARS-14U chemical tanker
4. IIG426 burner
5. AL-4 mobile chemical laboratory
6. Lift truck
7. Casing decontamination chamber
8. Vacuum pump

Figure 21. Destruction technology flow chart

Safety arrangements during the destruction of chemical munitions
at the mobile unit and their application

For reasons of safety, the equipment of the unit is stationed at an adequate distance from populated areas, taking into account the nature and scale of operations which the unit has to perform. The site at which the unit is located is declared a prohibited area and appropriate security arrangements are made.

Persons not less than 18 years of age who have suitable training and skills and are physically fit are allowed to work in the unit.

Before commencing a shift, the operating personnel undergo a compulsory medical check and are given instruction in safety precautions. The medical check is carried out by a specialist. Instruction in safety precautions is provided by a safety engineer and a doctor specializing in toxicology.

Immediately before proceeding with the destruction of chemical weapons, the personnel assigned to carry out the process put on individual protective clothing for the skin and respirators, which are then checked for airtightness in a special chamber. A full set of individual protective clothing is required for work with damaged munitions. When destroying technically sound chemical munitions, personnel are permitted to work without individual protective clothing, but must wear respirators. This degree of protection completely precludes the possibility of the personnel being contaminated during the destruction of chemical weapons. When the ambient air temperature is high, work is organized with shortened shifts.

The principal operations required by the technology are mechanized.

The agents and reagents are fed into the "Neutral" reactor and the neutralization products are pumped out of the reactor and into the furnace for combustion by the chemical tankers, using the least possible number of personnel.

The design of the removal chamber equipment, seal fittings, "Neutral" reactor and other assemblies and components prevents the personnel from coming into contact with the droplet gas, and operation of the equipment under vacuum precludes the possibility of the personnel being contaminated by inhalation.

An obligatory and high-priority operation required by the technology is the maintenance of a vacuum in the "Neutral" reactor so that the process of destruction of the CW agents need not be interrupted even if the power supply is temporarily disconnected.

Continuous monitoring of air contamination is obligatory during operation of the unit. If a warning device is activated, the destruction process is halted and the cause of the air contamination is identified and eliminated. If the power supply is disconnected, the air is analysed by means of a rapid detector.

In the event of an emergency involving contamination of the working area, the chemical tanker is used to decontaminate the site and equipment.

Once the work has been completed, the extent of any contamination is checked and individual protective clothing is specially treated. Where such clothing has come into contact with droplet gas, it is packed into hermetically sealed containers and sent to the decontamination centre.

After removing their protective clothing, the personnel are processed in a disinfection and medical checkpoint.

Thus, the equipment design of the unit, the constant medical supervision and the reliable individual protective clothing used during the operations completely preclude the possibility of contamination of the unit's crew and the population of nearby areas and ensure a high degree of environmental safety.

Verification of the completeness of the destruction of chemical weapons at the mobile unit, and environmental protection measures

The main aim of environmental protection measures relating to the operation of the mobile chemical weapon destruction unit is to prevent pollution of the atmosphere, soil, water and vegetation by CW agents and by their neutralization products.

This is achieved in the following way:

First, the airtightness of the unit's equipment completely prevents CW agents from entering the atmosphere;

Second, the destruction process involves the chemical transformation and decomposition of the CW agents and neutralization products to safe concentrations as specified by the health authorities.

The destruction of 1 t of CW agent produces slightly more than 2 m³ of liquid waste, which is rendered environmentally harmless after combustion.

The safety measures include monitoring of the destruction process and environmental monitoring.

Annex 11

Instructions for the use of protective equipment

Ladies and Gentlemen, Comrades,

You have been issued with respirators. Respirators provide reliable protection against the action of chemicals. They must fit properly, so before being issued with a respirator each of you will have the circumference of his or her head measured vertically and horizontally.

The respirators are tested by determining their airtightness in protecting the sense organs in air containing an irritant.

The agent used to test the respirators irritates the mucous membranes of the eyes, the respiratory organs and the exposed, and especially moist, parts of the skin.

The irritation has no lasting effects. If the agent enters the eyes, the result will be strong lachrymation that can be stopped by washing the eyes with water.

If the agent enters the respiratory organs, the result will be a burning sensation in the nasopharynx, combined with sneezing and coughing. To stop this you must rinse your throat with water and take several deep breaths of fresh air.

Should the agent come into contact with the skin, the result will be a burning sensation. If this happens, you are not advised to rub the affected parts with the hands. The burning sensation will pass after 5-10 minutes.

Those persons who are to observe the unit in operation directly must not remove the respirators after they have been checked for airtightness. Those who will be watching the unit in operation on closed-circuit television do not need to wear respirators.

The respirator consists of a mask and a filter canister.

To check the airtightness of the respirator, you must:

1. Remove the respirator from the carrier and put it on, as follows:

Take two side straps in each hand and pull them to the side;

Place the chin in the lower cavity of the facepiece;

Pull the mask over the head by moving your hands up and back;

Straighten the mask and straps and smooth out the material of the facepiece.

2. Put on the tunic.

3. Go to the chamber containing the irritant substance and stand facing the canvas sleeve at a distance of one metre.

4. When directed by the instructor to "Begin test":

Approach the sleeve and open it;

With the respirator fitted, introduce your head into the chamber through the sleeve;

Carefully take a short breath and, if you feel no irritation of the respiratory organs or eyes, continue to inhale, taking deep breaths and turning the head.

5. When directed by the instructor to "End test":

Release the sleeve;

Withdraw your head from the chamber;

Tighten the cord on the sleeve;

Move upwind;

Remove the respirator and place it in the carrier;

Remove the tunic and wash your hands.

6. The position of the respirator straps must not be altered without authorization after the airtightness test.

7. If you feel any irritation of the respiratory organs or eyes when testing the respirator in the chamber:

Immediately move away from the chamber;

Go upwind;

Remove the respirator and ask the instructor for guidance.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/790

13 January 1988

Original: ENGLISH/RUSSIAN

LETTER DATED 12 JANUARY 1988 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ADDRESSED TO THE
PRESIDENT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE
TEXT OF THE STATEMENT OF 26 DECEMBER 1987 BY THE MINISTRY OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of the statement of
26 December 1987 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR.

I should be grateful if you would circulate it as an official document of
the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed): Ambassador Y. Nazarkin
Representative of the USSR
to the Conference on Disarmament

Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR

On 16 December 1987, the United States of America began manufacturing a new generation of chemical weapons - binary weapons. A totally unprovoked step has thus been made towards a further escalation of the chemical arms race.

This militaristic action was taken despite the fact that considerable progress has been achieved at the Geneva negotiations on the complete and general prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons, thereby bringing much closer the goal of ridding mankind of the chemical threat. Moreover, at the summit meeting in Washington a week earlier, the American leadership had expressed its commitment to the elaboration of a verifiable comprehensive and effective international convention on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons and had agreed on the need for more intensive negotiations with a view to concluding it.

The inevitable conclusion is that, having embarked upon a course of rearming with binary chemical weapons, the United States is about to make a choice uncondusive to agreement on chemical disarmament. The binary weapons programme is obviously the reason why the United States has recently been slowing down the negotiations of the prohibition of chemical weapons in Geneva.

The American binary weapons programme is also by no means consistent with the emerging process of confidence-building in the field of chemical weapons, manifestations of which have been the very recent tour by the participants in the negotiations, including the United States, of the Soviet military facility at Shikhany and the visit by Soviet experts to the American chemical weapons facility at Tooele, Utah.

However, these are not the only negative consequences of the fact that the United States has begun to rearm with binary weapons. Although in words the United States loudly declares its concern about the possibility of other States acquiring chemical weapons, through its deeds it is in fact contributing to the proliferation of chemical weapons by setting a bad example to those countries which are not yet manufacturing them.

In their attempts to justify the beginning of the manufacture of binary weapons in the eyes of world public opinion, American representatives usually refer to what they allege is the chemical threat from the Soviet Union. To this end, they cite utterly fantastic "data" regarding stockpiles of chemical weapons in the USSR. They assert that these stockpiles amount to between 250,000 and 700,000 tonnes of chemical warfare agents and that the capability of the USSR in this field is many times superior to that of the United States.

Such deceit must be brought to an end. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR is authorized to state that the Soviet Union's stocks of chemical weapons comprise no more than 50,000 tonnes of chemical warfare agents. That, according to estimates by Soviet experts, roughly corresponds to the stockpiles of chemical weapons held by the United States. In addition, all Soviet chemical weapons are kept within the territory of the USSR.

Those who speculate about the Soviet chemical threat deliberately ignore the fact that it is precisely the Soviet Union which has been consistently endeavouring at the Geneva talks to achieve the earliest possible complete

prohibition of chemical weapons and the destruction of all stockpiles of chemical weapons and of the very infrastructure for manufacturing such weapons, and that it has been calling for the process of chemical disarmament to take place under the most stringent international control, including mandatory on-site inspections upon request without the right of refusal. The USSR is in favour of confidence-building and openness in the field of chemical weapons. Our specific proposals for a reciprocal exchange of data on chemical weapons even before the signing of a convention have been submitted to the American side. The Soviet Union has stopped manufacturing chemical weapons and has never used such weapons, or placed them in others' hands or deployed them outside its own borders. In preparation for the conclusion of a convention, work is actively being undertaken in our country to set up facilities for destroying the entire chemical arsenal.

All these facts show that the start of binary chemical weapons manufacture in the United States is nothing less than an attempt to torpedo the process of chemical disarmament and a sign of contempt for the efforts of the States participating within the Conference on Disarmament in the multilateral negotiations on the prohibition of this type of weapon of mass destruction and for the repeated calls by the United Nations General Assembly to accelerate those negotiations. The United States binary weapons programme runs counter to the aspirations of the world's peoples, who are hoping that, after the conclusion of the Treaty between the USSR and the United States on the elimination of medium- and shorter-range missiles, the cause of real disarmament will be advanced on all fronts.

The Soviet Union condemns this action by the United States and believes that it creates a new situation in the field of chemical weapons which may require the adoption of appropriate measures. At the same time, the USSR will continue to do everything in its power to prevent a breakdown of the negotiations in Geneva, an outcome which the United States is promoting by its deeds.

The Soviet Union counts on the understanding and support of all countries that are in favour of ridding mankind of the barbaric phenomenon of chemical weapons.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/791
CD/CW/WP.183

25 January 1988

Original: ENGLISH

Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Working Paper

Verification of Non-production: The case for Ad Hoc checks

1. According to the system developed by the Conference, verification of non-production should be carried out through exchanges of data and, in the case of Lists 1 and 2, through permanent or random on-site inspections. In this context, we should like to recall our proposals for the development of an effective and practicable system of data exchange, which were aimed at the establishment of an efficient reporting system (CD/CW/WP.159 dated 19 March 1987).

The graded intrusiveness of the verification measures is in line with the respective levels of relevance to a CW ban of the substances contained in Lists 1 to 3 and entails concentration of controls on the main areas. This approach should be adhered to in the interests of effective verification. The envisaged system is a suitable means of creating sufficient transparency regarding the use of the reported substances.

It was clear, however, from the outset that these controls could only bite if the comprehensive reporting obligations provided for in the text of the Convention were complied with. Hence, there could be grounds for concern that non-declared use of substances subject to controls under Article VI might remain undetected. Such violations of the Convention are conceivable in two types of facilities - on the one hand in facilities already covered on the basis of their reported use of other substances from Lists 2 and 3, and on the other hand in plants not reported as production facilities for controllable substances which have thus remained outside the system of verification provided for in Article VI.

2. For facilities of the former category, routine inspections and the politically significant instrument of challenge inspections initiated by States parties are the available means of clarifying suspected violations of the Convention. For facilities of the latter category verification can be carried out by means of challenge inspections alone. On the basis of the groundwork done by other delegations, particularly the Australian observations on spot checks (CD/698), we believe it is worth considering additional provision for a form of Ad hoc check which the international authority could manage easily on a routine basis as follows:

The international authority should be empowered (under a system analogous to the right to query unclear data envisaged in paragraph 5 of our Working Paper CD/CW/WP.159) to carry out on its own initiative Ad hoc checks at short notice in production facilities of the chemical industry. These checks should serve solely to ascertain whether, at the time of the check, substances listed in the Annexes to Article VI and not reported for the facility in question were being produced there.

If the production of such substances is ascertained, their amount should then be investigated. In this way it can be established whether the Convention has been violated through production of an amount in excess of the thresholds for reporting.

We believe that with the aid of this instrument, directed against the major sources of concern regarding potential violation of a CW ban, a maximum degree of additional transparency, and hence of additional confidence in the reliability of all parties' compliance with the Convention, can be achieved.

Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Working Paper

Super-toxic Lethal Chemicals (STLCs)

1. The vigorous efforts made by the Conference to ensure verification of STLCs stem from the idea of registering any future militarily relevant developments in the field of chemical production. This aim is to be achieved through the inclusion in an appropriate verification system of production facilities which are also suited to the production of super-toxic lethal chemicals. The identification of the facilities in question would presuppose a definition to that effect, which does not exist and upon which it would be difficult to reach agreement. It is therefore advisable to envisage actual production, at least of certain types of STLC, as evidence of suitability, i.e. to cover production facilities which already produce STLCs. This is the approach proposed in CD/782.

2. Another issue is the selection of the relevant STLCs. It has not proved possible so far to establish a list in line with the system applied in Annexes 1, 2 and 3 to Article VI. Annex 4 to Article VI is therefore aimed at a definition of STLCs, thereby making this definition a central issue. If the same methods of determination, and hence the same contractual obligations, were to be preserved, the definition contained in Annex 4 would have to be supplemented by standardized operation procedures for acute subcutaneous toxicity determinations, as defined in CD/500 (Annex III, pp.6-7).

However, if those criteria were applied, figures for subcutaneous and inhalatory toxicity measured in rats will be available for only a limited number of substances. The result will be that industry and government in

States parties will not know whether a large number of substances are subject to the convention or not. Parties would need to test innumerable substances under conditions such as those laid down in CD/500 in order to obtain a clear picture of the scope of their contractual obligations. The effort and expenditure involved would be immense, particularly in respect of inhalatory toxicity.

We therefore believe that the Conference should accept the task of drawing up a list of relevant STLCs on the basis of research work, which several delegations have surely undertaken, since it is only in this way that the parties' obligations can be defined with the necessary precision. So that the most comprehensive possible security can be obtained against any future STLC production, this list should focus on toxicity alone. The inclusion of other criteria would be difficult in view of the limited state of knowledge about many relevant substances.

3. As our contribution, we have annexed to this paper the findings of research carried out with a data bank, using the criteria contained in CD/500. This identified a total of 39 compounds which can be termed relevant to the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons (Annex). */ This preselection requires comparative checking under the standardized conditions set forth in CD/500. The number of compounds identified by us could be modified in the course of further discussions among the experts and possibly supplemented with further compounds. The crucial point is that such a list would create clarity regarding the scope of the reporting obligations and of the further controls which should be accepted.

In this group the requisite yardstick of military relevance should be the amount of commercial production alone. Insignificant production levels could be excluded through agreement on appropriate threshold figures.

In this way a coherent system of controls could be created for STLCs, too, as is largely the case for the substances listed in Annexes 1, 2 and 3.

*/ Four of them are already in List 1 of Annex VI - CD/782. (Sarin is eligible for inclusion as a result of both its subcutaneous and inhalatory toxicity ratings.)

STLC Compounds

(LD50 values in rats, subcutaneous, <0,5 mg/kg)

1. Sarin
2. Soman
3. Tabun
4. VX
5. Alcuroniumchlorid
6. Calcitriol
7. Alfalcidol
8. Neostigminbromid
9. Tubocurarin-Hydrochlorid
10. Pipecuriumbromid
11. Pancuroniumdibromid
12. 1,1'-((2-Beta,3-alpha,5-alpha,16-beta,17-beta)-3,17-bis(acetyloxy)androstan-2,16-diyl)bis(1-methylpiperidiniumbromid)
13. Armin
14. Phospholin
15. Acetoxycycloheximid
16. (3-Hydroxyphenyl)diethylmethylammoniumjodid, Methylcarbamate
17. (3-Hydroxy-p-tolyl)trimethylammoniumchlorid, Methylcarbamate
18. (4-Hydroxy-o-cumenyl)trimethylammoniumchlorid, Methylcarbamate
19. Methyl-cyclohexylfluorophosphonat
20. Dimefox
21. Paraoxon
22. Diethyl-S-(2-diethylaminoethyl)thiophosphat
23. Tetraethylpyrophosphat
24. Chlorpeptid
25. Palytoxin

Annex 2

STLC Compounds

(LCt₅₀ values in rats, inhalation, < 2,000 mg/m³/min)

1. Sarin
2. Tris(2-chlorethyl)amin
3. Bis(2-chlorethyl)sulfid
4. Sesquimustard
5. 2-Chlorethyl-fluoracetat
6. 2-Fluorethanol
7. 2-Fluorethyl-fluoracetat
8. Phorat
9. 4-Ethyl-1-phospha-2,6,7-trioxabicyclo(2.2.2)octan-1-oxid
10. Methyl-N-(2-chlorethyl)-N-nitrosocarbamat
11. p-Methylurethanbenzolsulfonhydrazid
12. Dimethyldisulfid
13. Methylvinylketon
14. Nickel-tetracarbonyl
15. Polytetrafluorethylen(Pyrolysat)

Explanatory notes on Annexes 1 and 2

The research on substances with a subcutaneous toxicity of ≤ 0.5 mg/kg in rats or an inhalatory toxicity of $\leq 2,000$ mg/m³/min in rats was carried out in the RTECS (Registry of Toxic Effects of Chemical Substances) data bank. The RTECS is a data bank of the National Institute for Occupational Health (NIOSH) in Cincinnati, United States of America, in which data on the toxicity of chemical substances from the widest range of sources are stored without checks on findings and can be retrieved, with predefined threshold values, by the user.

Account could not be taken during research work of the degree of accuracy with which the toxicity values had been defined. Nor were the parentage, sex and weight of the laboratory animals taken into consideration. Findings of post-experimental observation were also left out of account. Which of the researched substances are actually STLC compounds as defined in the toxicity provisions recommended in Annex III to CD/500 can only be ascertained by means of experimental verification, which may result in divergent findings.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/793
27 January 1988

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 21 JANUARY 1988 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
OF THE UNITED NATIONS TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE CONFERENCE
ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE RESOLUTIONS AND DECISIONS
ON DISARMAMENT ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AT ITS
FORTY-SECOND SESSION

I have the honour to transmit herewith the texts of the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly at its forty-second session, which entrust specific responsibilities to the Conference on Disarmament in 1988. The relevant provisions of those resolutions are reproduced in the annex.

For the information of the Conference, I also have the honour to transmit herewith other resolutions and a decision dealing with or relating to disarmament matters which were adopted by the General Assembly at its forty-second session.

(Signed) Javier Pérez de Cuéllar

ANNEX

I. Resolutions dealing with disarmament matters

(A) Resolutions that entrust specific responsibilities to the Conference on Disarmament

At its forty-second session, the General Assembly adopted the following resolutions entrusting specific responsibilities to the Conference on Disarmament:

- 42/26 A "Cessation of all nuclear-test explosions"
- 42/27 "Urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty"
- 42/31 "Conclusion of effective international arrangements on the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons"
- 42/32 "Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons"
- 42/33 "Prevention of an arms race in outer space"
- 42/35 "Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons"
- 42/37 A "Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons"
- 42/38 B "Prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons"
- 42/38 F "Prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons"
- 42/38 L "Prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes"
- 42/39 C "Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons"
- 42/42 A "Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war"
- 42/42 B "Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session"
- 42/42 C "Cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament"
- 42/42 D "Prevention of nuclear war"
- 42/42 I "Comprehensive programme of disarmament"
- 42/42 K "Report of the Conference on Disarmament"
- 42/42 L "Report of the Conference on Disarmament"

42/42 M "Implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the tenth special session"

The Conference's attention should be drawn, in particular, to the following provisions contained in those resolutions:

(1) In resolution 42/26 A, operative paragraph 5 appeals to all States members of the Conference on Disarmament, in particular to the three depositary Powers of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water and of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to promote the establishment by the Conference at the beginning of its 1988 session of an ad hoc committee with the objective of carrying out the multilateral negotiation of a treaty on the complete cessation of nuclear-test explosions; and operative paragraph 6 recommends to the Conference on Disarmament that such an ad hoc committee should comprise two working groups dealing, respectively, with the following interrelated questions: contents and scope of the treaty, and compliance and verification.

(2) In resolution 42/27, operative paragraph 2 urges that the following actions be taken in order that a comprehensive nuclear-test ban treaty may be concluded at an early date: (a) The Conference on Disarmament should initiate substantive work on all aspects of a nuclear-test ban treaty at the beginning of its 1988 session; (b) States members of the Conference on Disarmament, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, and all other States should co-operate in order to facilitate and promote such work; (c) The nuclear-weapon States, especially those which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, should agree to appropriate verifiable interim measures with a view to realizing a comprehensive nuclear-test ban treaty; (d) Those nuclear-weapon States which have not yet done so should adhere to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water; operative paragraph 3 also urges the Conference on Disarmament: (a) To take immediate steps for the establishment, with the widest possible participation, of an international seismic monitoring network with a view to the further development of its potential to monitor and verify compliance with a comprehensive nuclear-test ban treaty; (b) In this context, to take into account the progress achieved by the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, including the exchange of wave-form data, and other relevant initiatives by individual States and groups of States; (c) To initiate detailed investigation of other measures to monitor and verify compliance with such a treaty, including an international network to monitor atmospheric radioactivity; and operative paragraph 4 calls upon the Conference on Disarmament to report to the General Assembly at its forty-third session on progress made.

(3) In resolution 42/31, operative paragraph 2 considers that the Conference on Disarmament should continue to explore ways and means of overcoming the difficulties encountered in carrying out negotiations on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; and operative paragraph 4 requests the Conference on Disarmament to continue active negotiations on this subject and to establish for this purpose the respective ad hoc committee at the beginning of its 1988 session.

(4) In resolution 42/32, operative paragraph 2 notes with satisfaction that in the Conference on Disarmament there is no objection, in principle, to the idea of an international convention to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, although the difficulties as regards evolving a common approach acceptable to all have also been pointed out; operative paragraph 4 recommends that further intensive efforts should be devoted to the search for such a common approach or common formula and that the various alternative approaches, including in particular those considered in the Conference on Disarmament, should be further explored in order to overcome the difficulties; and operative paragraph 5 recommends that the Conference on Disarmament should actively continue negotiations with a view to reaching early agreement and concluding effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, taking into account the widespread support for the conclusion of an international convention and giving consideration to any other proposals designed to secure the same objective.

(5) In resolution 42/33, operative paragraph 6 reiterates that the Conference on Disarmament, as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, has the primary role in the negotiation of a multilateral agreement or agreements, as appropriate, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects; operative paragraph 7 requests the Conference on Disarmament to consider as a matter of priority the question of preventing an arms race in outer space; operative paragraph 8 also requests the Conference on Disarmament to intensify its consideration of the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects, taking into account all relevant proposals, including those presented in the Ad Hoc Committee on the prevention of an arms race in outer space at the 1987 session of the Conference and at the forty-second session of the General Assembly; operative paragraph 9 further requests the Conference on Disarmament to re-establish an ad hoc committee with an adequate mandate at the beginning of its 1988 session, with a view to undertaking negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in outer space in all its aspects; operative paragraph 10 urges the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America to pursue intensively their bilateral negotiations in a constructive spirit aimed at reaching early agreement for preventing an arms race in outer space, and to advise the Conference on Disarmament periodically of the progress of their bilateral sessions so as to facilitate its work; and operative paragraph 14 requests the Conference on Disarmament to report on its consideration of this subject to the General Assembly at its forty-third session.

(6) In resolution 42/35, operative paragraph 2 requests the Conference on Disarmament, in the light of its existing priorities, to keep constantly under review, with appropriate expert assistance, the question of the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons with a view to making, when necessary, recommendations on undertaking specific negotiations on the identified types of such weapons; and operative paragraph 7 requests the Conference on Disarmament to submit to the General Assembly for consideration at its forty-third session a report on the results achieved.

(7) In resolution 42/37 A, operative paragraph 1 takes note with satisfaction the work of the Conference on Disarmament during its 1987 session regarding the prohibition of chemical weapons, and in particular appreciates the progress in the work of its Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons on that question and the tangible results recorded in its report; operative paragraph 3 urges again the Conference on Disarmament, as a matter of high priority, to intensify, during its 1988 session, the negotiations on a convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and to reinforce further its efforts by, inter alia, increasing the time during the year that it devotes to such negotiations, taking into account all existing proposals and future initiatives, with a view to the final elaboration of a convention at the earliest possible date, and to re-establish its Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons for this purpose with the mandate to be agreed upon by the Conference on Disarmament at the beginning of its 1988 session; and operative paragraph 4 requests the Conference on Disarmament to report to the General Assembly at its forty-third session on the results of its negotiations.

(8) In resolution 42/38 B, operative paragraph 2 recognizes that the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons in 1987 made a further contribution to the clarification and better understanding of different approaches that continue to exist with regard to both of the important subjects under consideration; operative paragraph 3 takes note of the recommendation of the Conference on Disarmament that the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons should be re-established at the beginning of its 1988 session; and operative paragraph 4 requests the Conference on Disarmament to continue its negotiations on the subject with a view to a prompt conclusion of its work, taking into account all proposals presented to the Conference to this end and drawing upon the annexes to its report as a basis of its future work, the result of which should be submitted to the General Assembly at its forty-third session.

(9) In resolution 42/38 F, operative paragraph 2 requests the Conference on Disarmament to intensify further its efforts to reach, as early as possible, an agreement prohibiting armed attacks against nuclear facilities.

(10) In resolution 42/38 L, the operative paragraph requests the Conference on Disarmament, at an appropriate stage of its work on the item entitled "Nuclear weapons in all aspects", to pursue its consideration of the question of adequately verified cessation and prohibition of the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices and to keep the General Assembly informed of the progress of that consideration.

(11) In resolution 42/39 C, operative paragraph 1 reiterates its request to the Conference on Disarmament to commence negotiations, as a matter of priority, in order to reach agreement on an international convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances, taking as a basis the draft Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons annexed to the present resolution; and operative paragraph 2 further requests the Conference on Disarmament to report to the General Assembly at its forty-third session on the results of those negotiations.

(12) In resolution 42/42 A, operative paragraph 3 requests the Conference on Disarmament to commence negotiations on the item "Prevention of nuclear war" of its agenda and to consider, inter alia, the elaboration of an international instrument of a legally binding character laying down the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons.

(13) In resolution 42/42 B, operative paragraph 1 reiterates once more the right of all States not members of the Conference on Disarmament to participate in the work of the plenary sessions of the Conference on substantive questions; and operative paragraph 2 urges States members of the Conference on Disarmament not to misuse the rules of procedure of the Conference so as to prevent States not members from exercising their right to participate in the work of the Conference.

(14) In resolution 42/42 C, operative paragraph 1 reaffirms that the existence of bilateral negotiations on nuclear and space arms in no way diminishes the urgent need to initiate multilateral negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament; operative paragraph 2 believes that efforts should be intensified with a view to initiating, as a matter of the highest priority, multilateral negotiations in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly; operative paragraph 3 again requests the Conference on Disarmament to establish an ad hoc committee at the beginning of its 1988 session to elaborate on paragraph 50 of the Final Document and to submit recommendations to the Conference as to how it could best initiate multilateral negotiations of agreements, with adequate measures of verification, in appropriate stages for: (a) Cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear-weapon systems; (b) Cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, and of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes; (c) Substantial reduction in existing nuclear weapons with a view to their ultimate elimination; and operative paragraph 4 requests the Conference on Disarmament to report to the General Assembly at its forty-third session on its consideration of this subject.

(15) In resolution 42/42 D, operative paragraph 1 notes with regret that, despite the fact that the Conference on Disarmament has discussed the question of the prevention of nuclear war for several years, it has been unable even to establish a subsidiary body to consider appropriate and practical measures to prevent it; and operative paragraph 3 again requests the Conference on Disarmament to undertake, as a matter of the highest priority, negotiations with a view to achieving agreement on appropriate and practical measures that could be negotiated and adopted individually, for the prevention of nuclear war and to establish for that purpose an ad hoc committee on the subject at the beginning of its 1988 session.

(16) In resolution 42/42 I, operative paragraph 1 regrets that the Conference on Disarmament was unable to complete the elaboration of the comprehensive programme of disarmament in 1987 and to submit a draft thereof to the General Assembly at its forty-first session; and operative paragraph 2 urges the Conference on Disarmament to resume the work on the elaboration of

the comprehensive programme of disarmament at the outset of its 1988 session with a view to resolving outstanding issues and concluding negotiations on the programme in time for its submission to the General Assembly at its third special session devoted to disarmament, and, for that purpose, to re-establish its Ad Hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament.

(17) In resolution 42/42 K, operative paragraph 1 takes note of the report of the Conference on Disarmament on its 1987 session; operative paragraph 2 reaffirms the role of the Conference on Disarmament as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum of the international community; operative paragraph 3 requests the Conference on Disarmament to intensify its work in accordance with the relevant provisions set forth in paragraph 120 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session; and operative paragraph 4 also requests the Conference on Disarmament to submit a report on its work to the General Assembly at its forty-third session.

(18) In resolution 42/42 L, operative paragraph 1 notes with satisfaction that further progress has been made in the negotiations on the elaboration of a draft convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction, and urges the Conference on Disarmament to intensify further its work with a view to completing negotiations on such a draft convention; operative paragraph 2 calls upon the Conference on Disarmament to intensify its work, to further its mandate more earnestly through negotiations and to adopt concrete measures on the specific priority issues of disarmament on its agenda, in particular those relating to nuclear disarmament; operative paragraph 3 once again urges the Conference on Disarmament to continue or to undertake, during its 1988 session, substantive negotiations on the priority questions of disarmament on its agenda, in accordance with the provisions of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly and other resolutions of the Assembly on those questions; operative paragraph 4 calls upon the Conference on Disarmament to provide the existing ad hoc committees with appropriate negotiating mandates and to establish, as a matter of urgency, the ad hoc committees under item 1 of its agenda, entitled "Nuclear test ban", on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament and on the prevention of nuclear war; operative paragraph 5 urges the Conference on Disarmament to undertake, without further delay, negotiations with a view to elaborating a draft treaty on a nuclear-test ban; operative paragraph 6 requests the Conference on Disarmament to submit a special report on the status of its negotiations and its work to the General Assembly at its third special session devoted to disarmament; and operative paragraph 7 requests the Conference on Disarmament to submit a report on its work to the General Assembly at its forty-third session.

(19) In resolution 42/42 M, operative paragraph 4 calls upon the Conference on Disarmament to proceed urgently to negotiations on the questions of disarmament on its agenda; and operative paragraph 6 invites all States engaged in disarmament and arms limitation negotiations outside the framework of the United Nations to keep the General Assembly and the Conference on Disarmament informed on the status and/or results of such negotiations, in conformity with the relevant provisions of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session.

In the above-mentioned resolutions 42/33, 42/35 and 42/38 B, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to transmit to the Conference on Disarmament all relevant documents. They are the following:

- 42/33 A/42/27, A/42/59-S/18534, A/12/93-S/18620, A/42/132-S/18701, A/42/231-S/18816, A/42/346-S/18922, A/42/167-S/18741, A/42/319-S/18894, A/42/407, A/42/652-S/19201, A/42/681. A/42/708 and Corr.1, A/42/715-S/19252, A/C.1/42/L.11, A/C.1/42/L.14, A/C.1/42/L.20, A/C.1/42/L.43, A/C.1/42/L.43/Rev.1
- 42/35 A/42/27, A/42/352-S/18930, A/42/652-S/19201, A/42/681, A/C.1/42/L.55
- 42/38 B A/42/27, A/42/517, A/C.1/42/L.5, A/C.1/42/L.17

The relevant records of the consideration of the subjects covered by those resolutions transmitting documentation are contained in documents A/42/PV.4 to 33, A/42/PV.84, A/C.1/42/PV.3 to 31 and A/C.1/42/PV.36, 40 and 44.

All those documents and records were distributed during the forty-second session of the General Assembly to all Members of the United Nations, including all members of the Conference on Disarmament.

(B) Other resolutions and decision dealing with disarmament matters

At the forty-second session, the General Assembly also adopted the following resolutions dealing with disarmament matters;

- 42/25 "Implementation of General Assembly resolution 41/45 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) "
- 42/26 B "Cessation of all nuclear-test explosions"
- 42/28 "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East"
- 42/29 "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia"
- 42/30 "Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects"
- 42/34 A "Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa"
- 42/34 B "Nuclear capability of South Africa"
- 42/36 "Reduction of military budgets"
- 42/37 B "Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction"

- 42/37 C "Measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol and to support the conclusion of a chemical weapons convention"
- 42/38 A "Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations"
- 42/38 C "Notification of nuclear tests"
- 42/38 D "Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations"
- 42/38 E "Conventional disarmament"
- 42/38 G "Conventional disarmament"
- 42/38 H "Nuclear disarmament"
- 42/38 I "Objective information on military matters"
- 42/38 J "Implementation of General Assembly resolutions in the field of disarmament"
- 42/38 K "Naval armaments and disarmament"
- 42/38 M "Compliance with arms limitation and disarmament agreements"
- 42/38 N "Conventional disarmament on a regional scale"
- 42/38 O "Review of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament"
- 42/39 A "Review and implementation of the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly"
- 42/39 B "Freeze on nuclear weapons"
- 42/39 D "United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia"
- 42/39 E "Regional disarmament"
- 42/39 F "Consideration of guidelines for confidence-building measures"
- 42/39 G "World Disarmament Campaign"
- 42/39 H "Implementation of General Assembly resolution 41/60 I on a nuclear-arms-freeze"
- 42/39 I "United Nations programme of fellowships on disarmament"
- 42/39 J "United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa"
- 42/39 K "United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America"
- 42/40 "Convening of the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament"

- 42/41 "World Disarmament Conference"
- 42/42 E "International co-operation for disarmament"
- 42/42 F "Verification in all its aspects"
- 42/42 G "Report of the Disarmament Commission"
- 42/42 H "Disarmament Week"
- 42/42 J "United Nations disarmament studies"
- 42/42 N "Rationalization of the work of the First Committee"
- 42/43 "Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace"
- 42/44 "Israeli nuclear armament"
- 42/45 "Relationship between disarmament and development"

In addition, the General Assembly adopted a decision (42/407) entitled "General and complete disarmament", which contains substantive provisions on disarmament matters.

II. Resolutions relating to disarmament matters

It should be noted that, at its forty-second session, the General Assembly adopted the following resolutions which are relating to disarmament matters:

- 42/6 "Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency"
- 42/13 "Achievements of the International Year of Peace"
- 42/16 "Zone of peace and co-operation of the South Atlantic"
- 42/22 "Declaration on the Enhancement of the Effectiveness of the Principle of Refraining from the Threat or Use of Force in International Relations"
- 42/24 "United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy"
- 42/46 A "Question of Antarctica"
- 42/46 B "Question of Antarctica"
- 42/67 "Effects of atomic radiation"
- 42/68 "International co-operation in the peaceful uses of outer space"
- 42/90 "Strengthening of security and co-operation in the Mediterranean region"

- 42/91 "Implementation of the Declaration on the Preparation of Societies for Life in Peace"
- 42/92 "Review of the implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security"
- 42/93 "Comprehensive system of international peace and security"
- 42/150 "Peaceful settlement of disputes between States"
- 42/151 "Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind"
- 42/157 "Report of the Special Committee on the Charter of the United Nations and on the Strengthening of the Role of the Organization"
- 42/158 "Development and strengthening of good-neighbourliness between States"
- 42/161 "Comprehensive review of the whole question of peace-keeping operations in all their aspects"



General Assembly

Distr.
GENERAL

A/RES/42/25
17 December 1987

Forty-second session
Agenda item 48

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/42/737)]

- 42/25. Implementation of General Assembly resolution 41/45 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 2286 (XXII) of 5 December 1967, 3262 (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3473 (XXX) of 11 December 1975, 32/76 of 12 December 1977, S-10/2 of 30 June 1978, 33/58 of 14 December 1978, 34/71 of 11 December 1979, 35/143 of 12 December 1980, 36/83 of 9 December 1981, 37/71 of 9 December 1982, 38/61 of 15 December 1983, 39/51 of 12 December 1984, 40/79 of 12 December 1985 and 41/45 of 3 December 1986 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco), 1/

Taking into account that within the zone of application of that Treaty, to which twenty-three sovereign States are already parties, there are some territories which, in spite of not being sovereign political entities, are nevertheless in a position to receive the benefits deriving from the Treaty through its Additional Protocol I, to which the four States that de jure or de facto are internationally responsible for those territories may become parties,

Considering that it is not fair that the peoples of some of those territories are deprived of such benefits without being given the opportunity to express their opinion in this connection,

1/ United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 634, No. 9068.

Recalling that three of the States to which Additional Protocol I is open - the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the United States of America - became parties to the Protocol in 1969, 1971 and 1981, respectively,

1. Deplores that the signature of Additional Protocol I by France, which took place on 2 March 1979, has not yet been followed by the corresponding ratification, notwithstanding the time already elapsed and the pressing invitations which the General Assembly has addressed to it;

2. Once more urges France not to delay any further such ratification, which has been requested so many times and which appears all the more advisable, since France is the only one of the four States to which the Protocol is open that is not yet party to it;

3. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-third session an item entitled "Implementation of General Assembly resolution 42/25 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)".

84th plenary meeting
30 November 1987



General Assembly

Distr.
GENERAL

A/RES/42/26
17 December 1987

Forty-second session
Agenda item 49

RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/42/738)]

42/26. Cessation of all nuclear-test explosions

A

The General Assembly,

Bearing in mind that the complete cessation of nuclear-weapon tests, which has been examined for more than thirty years and on which the General Assembly has adopted more than fifty resolutions, is a basic objective of the United Nations in the sphere of disarmament, to the attainment of which it has repeatedly assigned the highest priority,

Stressing that on eight different occasions it has condemned such tests in the strongest terms and that, since 1974, it had stated its conviction that the continuance of nuclear-weapon testing will intensify the arms race, thus increasing the danger of nuclear war,

Recalling that the Secretary-General, addressing a plenary meeting of the General Assembly on 12 December 1984, after appealing for a renewed effort towards a comprehensive test-ban treaty, emphasized that no single multilateral agreement could have a greater effect on limiting the further refinement of nuclear weapons and that a comprehensive test-ban treaty is the litmus test of the real willingness to pursue nuclear disarmament, 1/

1/ See Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-ninth Session, Plenary Meetings, 97th meeting, para. 302.

Taking into account that the three nuclear-weapon States that act as depositaries of the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water 2/ undertook in article I of that Treaty to conclude a treaty resulting in the permanent banning of all nuclear-test explosions, including all those explosions underground, and that such an undertaking was reiterated in 1968 in the preamble to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 3/ article VI of which further embodies their solemn and legally binding commitment to take effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear-arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament,

Bearing in mind that the same three nuclear-weapon States, in the report they submitted on 30 July 1980 to the Committee on Disarmament after four years of trilateral negotiations, 4/ stated, inter alia, that they were "mindful of the great value for all mankind that the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon test explosions in all environments will have" as well as "conscious of the important responsibility placed upon them to find solutions to the remaining problems", adding furthermore that they were "determined to exert their best efforts and necessary will and persistence to bring the negotiations to an early and successful conclusion",

Noting that the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in its Final Declaration 5/ adopted on 21 September 1985, called on the nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty to resume trilateral negotiations in 1985 and on all the nuclear-weapon States to participate in the urgent negotiation and conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, as a matter of the highest priority, in the Conference on Disarmament,

Recalling that the leaders of the six States associated in the five-continent peace and disarmament initiative affirmed in the Mexico Declaration, 6/ adopted on 7 August 1986, that they "remain convinced that no issue is more urgent and crucial today than bringing to an end all nuclear tests", adding that "both the qualitative and the quantitative development of nuclear weapons exacerbate the arms race, and both would be inhibited by the complete abolition of nuclear weapons testing",

2/ United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 480, No. 6964.

3/ Resolution 2373 (XXII), annex.

4/ CD/139/Appendix II/Vol. II, document CD/130.

5/ Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document, Part I (NPT/CONF.III/64/I) (Geneva, 1985), annex I.

6/ A/41/518-S/18277, annex I.

Taking note with satisfaction of the progress made in the Conference on Disarmament by the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events on the seismic verification of a comprehensive test ban, 7/

Bearing in mind that the multilateral negotiation of such a treaty in the Conference on Disarmament must cover all the various interrelated problems that it will be necessary to solve in order that the Conference may transmit a complete draft treaty to the General Assembly,

1. Reiterates once again its grave concern that nuclear-weapon testing continues unabated, against the wishes of the overwhelming majority of Member States;

2. Reaffirms its conviction that a treaty to achieve the prohibition of all nuclear-test explosions by all States for all time is a matter of the highest priority;

3. Reaffirms also its conviction that such a treaty would constitute a contribution of the utmost importance to the cessation of the nuclear-arms race;

4. Urges once more the three depositary Powers of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water and of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in particular the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, to abide strictly by their undertakings to seek to achieve the early discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to expedite negotiations to this end, keeping the Conference on Disarmament regularly informed of their negotiations;

5. Appeals to all States members of the Conference on Disarmament, in particular to the three depositary Powers of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water and of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to promote the establishment by the Conference at the beginning of its 1988 session of an ad hoc committee with the objective of carrying out the multilateral negotiation of a treaty on the complete cessation of nuclear-test explosions;

6. Recommends to the Conference on Disarmament that such an ad hoc committee should comprise two working groups dealing, respectively, with the following interrelated questions: contents and scope of the treaty, and compliance and verification;

7. Calls upon the States depositaries of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, by virtue of their special responsibilities

7/ See Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-second Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/42/27), para. 31.

under those two Treaties and as a provisional measure, to bring to a halt without delay all nuclear-test explosions, either through a trilaterally agreed moratorium or through three unilateral moratoria, which should include appropriate means of verification;

8. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-third session the item entitled "Cessation of all nuclear-test explosions".

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30 November 1987

B

The General Assembly,

Bearing in mind the determination, proclaimed since 1963 in the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water, 2/ to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end,

Bearing in mind also that in 1968 the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 3/ recalled such determination and included in its article VI an undertaking by each of its parties to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear-arms race at an early date,

Recalling that in its resolution 2028 (XX) of 19 November 1965, adopted unanimously, it had stressed that one of the basic principles on which the treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons should be based was that such treaty, which was then to be negotiated, should embody an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers,

Recalling also that the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in its Final Declaration 5/ adopted by consensus on 21 September 1985, expressed its deep regret that a comprehensive multilateral nuclear-test-ban treaty had not been concluded so far and called for the urgent negotiation and conclusion of such a treaty as a matter of the highest priority,

Noting that article II of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water provides a procedure for the consideration and eventual adoption of amendments to the Treaty by a conference of its parties,

1. Recommends that the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water formally submit an amendment proposal to the depositary Governments with a view to convening a conference at the earliest possible date to consider amendments to the Treaty that would convert it into a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty;

/...

2. Requests that the States parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water report to the General Assembly at its forty-third session on the progress of their efforts.

84th plenary meeting
30 November 1987



General Assembly

Distr.
GENERAL

A/RES/42/27
22 December 1987

Forty-second session
Agenda item 50

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/42/739)]

42/27. Urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty

The General Assembly,

Convinced that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought,

Convinced of the consequent urgent need for an end to the nuclear-arms race and the immediate and verifiable reduction and ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons,

Convinced, therefore, that an end to all nuclear testing by all States in all environments for all time is an essential step in order to prevent the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear weapons and further nuclear proliferation and to contribute, along with other concurrent efforts to limit and reduce nuclear arms, to the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons,

Welcoming the joint statement of 17 September 1987 by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America that they have agreed to commence negotiations in 1987 on nuclear-testing issues,

Recalling the proposals by the leaders of the six-nation initiative to promote an end to nuclear testing, and other recent initiatives to this end,

Convinced that the most effective way to achieve the discontinuance of all nuclear tests in all environments for all time is through the conclusion, at an early date, of a verifiable, comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty open to and capable of attracting the adherence of all States,

Reaffirming the particular responsibilities of the Conference on Disarmament in the negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty,

1. Reaffirms its conviction that a treaty to achieve the prohibition of all nuclear-test explosions by all States in all environments for all time is a matter of fundamental importance;

2. Urges, therefore, that the following actions be taken in order that a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty may be concluded at an early date:

(a) The Conference on Disarmament should initiate substantive work on all aspects of a nuclear-test-ban treaty at the beginning of its 1988 session;

(b) States members of the Conference on Disarmament, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, and all other States should co-operate in order to facilitate and promote such work;

(c) The nuclear-weapon States, especially those which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, should agree to appropriate verifiable interim measures with a view to realizing a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty;

(d) Those nuclear-weapon States which have not yet done so should adhere to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water; ^{1/}

3. Also urges the Conference on Disarmament:

(a) To take immediate steps for the establishment, with the widest possible participation, of an international seismic monitoring network with a view to the further development of its potential to monitor and verify compliance with a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty;

(b) In this context, to take into account the progress achieved by the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, including the exchange of wave-form data, and other relevant initiatives by individual States and groups of States;

(c) To initiate detailed investigation of other measures to monitor and verify compliance with such a treaty, including an international network to monitor atmospheric radioactivity;

4. Calls upon the Conference on Disarmament to report to the General Assembly at its forty-third session on progress made;

5. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-third session the item entitled "Urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty".

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^{1/} United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 480, No. 6964.



General Assembly

Distr.
GENERAL

A/RES/42/28
17 December 1987

Forty-second session
Agenda item 51

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/42/740)]

42/28. Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 3263 (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3474 (XXX) of 11 December 1975, 31/71 of 10 December 1976, 32/82 of 12 December 1977, 33/64 of 14 December 1978, 34/77 of 11 December 1979, 35/147 of 12 December 1980, 36/87 of 9 December 1981, 37/75 of 9 December 1982, 38/64 of 15 December 1983, 39/54 of 12 December 1984, 40/82 of 12 December 1985 and 41/48 of 3 December 1986 on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East,

Recalling also the recommendations for the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East consistent with paragraphs 60 to 63, and in particular paragraph 63 (d), of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 1/

Emphasizing the basic provisions of the above-mentioned resolutions, which call upon all parties directly concerned to consider taking the practical and urgent steps required for the implementation of the proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East and, pending and during the establishment of such a zone, to declare solemnly that they will refrain, on a reciprocal basis, from producing, acquiring or in any other way possessing nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices and from permitting the stationing of nuclear weapons on their territory by any third party, to agree to place all their nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards and to declare their support for the establishment of the zone and deposit such declarations with the Security Council for consideration, as appropriate,

1/ Resolution S-10/2.

Reaffirming the inalienable right of all States to acquire and develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes,

Emphasizing further the need for appropriate measures on the question of the prohibition of military attacks on nuclear facilities,

Bearing in mind the consensus reached by the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East would greatly enhance international peace and security,

Desirous to build on that consensus so that substantial progress can be made towards establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East,

Emphasizing the essential role of the United Nations in the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East,

Having examined the report of the Secretary-General, 2/

1. Urges all parties directly concerned to consider seriously taking the practical and urgent steps required for the implementation of the proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and, as a means of promoting this objective, invites the countries concerned to adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; 3/

2. Calls upon all countries of the region that have not done so, pending the establishment of the zone, to agree to place all their nuclear activities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards;

3. Invites those countries, pending the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East, to declare their support for establishing such a zone, consistent with the relevant paragraph of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly and to deposit those declarations with the Security Council;

4. Further invites those countries, pending the establishment of the zone, not to develop, produce, test or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or permit the stationing on their territories, or territories under their control, of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices;

5. Invites the nuclear-weapon States and all other States to render their assistance in the establishment of the zone and at the same time to refrain from any action that runs counter to both the letter and spirit of the present resolution;

2/ A/42/364.

3/ Resolution 2373 (XXII), annex.

6. Extends its thanks to the Secretary-General for his report containing the views of parties concerned regarding the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East;

7. Takes note of the above-mentioned report;

8. Requests those parties that have not yet communicated their views to the Secretary-General to do so;

9. Welcomes any further comments from those parties that have already communicated their views to the Secretary-General;

10. Requests the Secretary-General to submit a report to the General Assembly at its forty-third session on the implementation of the present resolution;

11. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-third session the item entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East".

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30 November 1987



General Assembly

Distr.
GENERAL

A/RES/42/29
17 December 1987

Forty-second session
Agenda item 52

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/42/741)]

42/29. Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 3265 B (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3476 B (XXX) of 11 December 1975, 31/73 of 10 December 1976, 32/83 of 12 December 1977, 33/65 of 14 December 1978, 34/78 of 11 December 1979, 35/148 of 12 December 1980, 36/88 of 9 December 1981, 37/76 of 9 December 1982, 38/65 of 15 December 1983, 39/55 of 12 December 1984, 40/83 of 12 December 1985 and 41/49 of 3 December 1986 concerning the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia,

Reiterating its conviction that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions of the world is one of the measures which can contribute effectively to the objectives of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and general and complete disarmament,

Believing that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia, as in other regions, will assist in the strengthening of the security of the States of the region against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Noting with appreciation the declarations issued at the highest level by Governments of South Asian States that are developing their peaceful nuclear programmes reaffirming their undertaking not to acquire or manufacture nuclear weapons and to devote their nuclear programmes exclusively to the economic and social advancement of their peoples,

Welcoming the recent proposal for the conclusion of a bilateral or regional nuclear-test-ban agreement in South Asia,

Taking note of the proposal to convene, under the auspices of the United Nations, a conference on nuclear non-proliferation in South Asia, as soon as possible, with the participation of the regional and other concerned States,

Bearing in mind the provisions of paragraphs 60 to 63 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 1/ regarding the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone, including in the region of South Asia,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General 2/ and the views of the States of South Asia contained therein,

1. Reaffirms its endorsement, in principle, of the concept of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia;

2. Urges once again the States of South Asia to continue to make all possible efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia and to refrain, in the mean time, from any action contrary to this objective;

3. Calls upon those nuclear-weapon States that have not done so to respond positively to this proposal and to extend the necessary co-operation in the efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to communicate with the States of the region and other concerned States in order to ascertain their views on the issue and to promote consultations among them with a view to exploring the best possibilities of furthering the efforts for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia;

5. Also requests the Secretary-General to report on the subject to the General Assembly at its forty-third session;

6. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-third session the item entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia".

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1/ Resolution S-10/2.

2/ A/42/456 and Add.1.



General Assembly

Distr.
GENERAL

A/RES/42/30
17 December 1987

Forty-second session
Agenda item 53

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/42/742)]

42.30. Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of
Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be
Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 32/152 of 19 December 1977, 35/153 of 12 December 1980, 36/93 of 9 December 1981, 37/79 of 9 December 1982, 38/66 of 15 December 1983, 39/56 of 12 December 1984, 40/84 of 12 December 1985 and 41/50 of 3 December 1986,

Recalling with satisfaction the adoption, on 10 October 1980, of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, together with the Protocol on Non-Detectable Fragments (Protocol I), the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby Traps and Other Devices (Protocol II) and the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons (Protocol III), 1/

Reaffirming its conviction that general agreement on the prohibition or restriction of use of specific conventional weapons would significantly reduce the suffering of civilian populations and of combatants,

1/ A/CONF.95/15 and Corr.2, annex I. For the printed text of the Convention and its Protocols, see The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, vol. 5: 1980 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.81.IX.4), appendix VII.

Taking note with satisfaction of the report of the Secretary-General, 2/

1. Notes with satisfaction that an increasing number of States have either signed, ratified, accepted or acceded to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, which was opened for signature in New York on 10 April 1981;
2. Further notes with satisfaction that, consequent upon the fulfilment of the conditions set out in article 5 of the Convention, the Convention and the three Protocols annexed thereto entered into force on 2 December 1983;
3. Urges all States that have not yet done so to exert their best endeavours to become parties to the Convention and the Protocols annexed thereto as early as possible, so as ultimately to obtain universality of adherence;
4. Notes that, under article 8 of the Convention, conferences may be convened to consider amendments to the Convention or any of the annexed Protocols, to consider additional protocols relating to other categories of conventional weapons not covered by the existing annexed Protocols, or to review the scope and operation of the Convention and the Protocols annexed thereto and to consider any proposal for amendments to the Convention or to the existing Protocols and any proposals for additional protocols relating to other categories of conventional weapons not covered by the existing Protocols;
5. Requests the Secretary-General as depositary of the Convention and its three annexed Protocols to inform the General Assembly from time to time of the state of adherence to the Convention and its Protocols;
6. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-third session the item entitled "Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects".

84th plenary meeting
30 November 1987



General Assembly

Distr.
GENERAL

A/RES/42/31
17 December 1987

Forty-second session
Agenda item 54

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/42/743)]

42/31. Conclusion of effective international arrangements on the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons

The General Assembly,

Convinced of the need to take effective measures for the strengthening of the security of States, and prompted by the desire shared by all nations to eliminate war and prevent nuclear conflagration,

Considering that, until nuclear disarmament is achieved on a universal basis, it is imperative for the international community to develop effective measures to ensure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Recognizing that effective measures to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons can constitute a positive contribution to the prevention of the spread of such weapons,

Noting with satisfaction the determination of non-nuclear-weapon States in various parts of the world to prevent nuclear weapons from being introduced into their territories and to ensure the complete absence of such weapons in their respective regions, including through the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned, and being anxious to encourage and contribute to the attainment of this objective,

Desirous of promoting the implementation of paragraph 59 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 1/ the first special session devoted to disarmament, in which it urged the nuclear-weapon States to pursue efforts to conclude, as appropriate, effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Recalling its numerous resolutions on this subject, as well as the relevant part of the special report of the Committee on Disarmament 2/ submitted to the General Assembly at its twelfth special session, 3/ the second special session devoted to disarmament,

Noting that the Conference on Disarmament considered in 1987 the item entitled "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons", as reflected in its report, 4/ where it is stated that discussions on the conclusions that could be drawn from the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on this item, including consideration of the possibilities for interim measures and alternatives, once again proved inconclusive,

Noting further that during that consideration the importance of making progress on this issue was underlined in the light of the forthcoming third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament,

Recalling the proposals submitted on the subject to the General Assembly and in the Conference on Disarmament, including the drafts of an international convention, and the widespread international support for the conclusion of such a convention,

Aware that additional proposals on the substance of the issue of security assurances with respect to non-nuclear-weapon States were submitted in the Conference on Disarmament in 1987, as reflected in its report,

Aware also that the work on the substance of the effective arrangements and discussion on various aspects and elements of an interim solution revealed that specific difficulties relating to differing perceptions of security interests persisted and that the complex nature of the issues involved continued to prevent agreement on a "common formula",

1/ Resolution S-10/2.

2/ The Committee on Disarmament was redesignated the Conference on Disarmament as from 7 February 1984.

3/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twelfth Special Session, Supplement No. 2 (A/S-12/2), sect. III.C.

4/ Ibid., Forty-second Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/42/27), sect. III.F.

Recognizing the need for fresh approaches to the solution of urgent security issues in the nuclear age, many of which relate to the security of non-nuclear-weapon States as well,

Aware of the wide support in the Conference on Disarmament for continuing the search for a "common formula", which could be included in an international legally binding instrument to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Welcoming once again the solemn declarations made by some nuclear-weapon States concerning non-first use of nuclear weapons, and convinced that if all nuclear-weapon States were to assume obligations not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, that would be tantamount in practice to banning the use of nuclear weapons against all States, including all non-nuclear-weapon States,

Considering that the non-nuclear-weapon States having no nuclear weapons on their territories have every right to receive reliable, uniform and unconditional international legal assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

1. Reaffirms once again the urgent need to reach agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and to find a common approach acceptable to all;
2. Considers that the Conference on Disarmament should continue to explore ways and means of overcoming the difficulties encountered in carrying out negotiations on this question;
3. Appeals to all States, especially the nuclear-weapon States, to demonstrate political will and to exercise the flexibility necessary to reach agreement on a "common formula", which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding nature;
4. Requests the Conference on Disarmament to continue active negotiations on this subject and to establish for this purpose the respective ad hoc committee at the beginning of its 1988 session;
5. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-third session the item entitled "Conclusion of effective international arrangements on the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons".



General Assembly

Distr.
GENERAL

A/RES/42/32
17 December 1987

Forty-second session
Agenda item 55

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/42/744)]

42/32. Conclusion of effective international arrangements to
assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or
threat of use of nuclear weapons

The General Assembly,

Bearing in mind the need to allay the legitimate concern of the States of the world with regard to ensuring lasting security for their peoples,

Convinced that nuclear weapons pose the greatest threat to mankind and to the survival of civilization,

Deeply concerned at the continuing escalation of the arms race, in particular the nuclear-arms race, and the possibility of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Convinced that nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons are essential to remove the danger of nuclear war,

Taking into account the principle of the non-use of force or threat of force enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations,

Deeply concerned about the possibility of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Recognizing that the independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of non-nuclear-weapon States need to be safeguarded against the use or threat of use of force, including the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Considering that, until nuclear disarmament is achieved on a universal basis, it is imperative for the international community to develop effective measures to ensure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons from any quarter,

Recognizing that effective measures to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons can constitute a positive contribution to the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons,

Recalling its resolutions 3261 G (XXIX) of 9 December 1974 and 31/189 C of 21 December 1976,

Bearing in mind paragraph 59 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 1/ in which it urged the nuclear-weapon States to pursue efforts to conclude, as appropriate, effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Desirous of promoting the implementation of the relevant provisions of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session,

Recalling its resolutions 33/72 B of 14 December 1978, 34/85 of 11 December 1979, 35/155 of 12 December 1980, 36/95 of 9 December 1981, 37/81 of 9 December 1982, 38/68 of 15 December 1983, 39/58 of 12 December 1984, 40/86 of 12 December 1985 and 41/52 of 3 December 1986,

Further recalling paragraph 12 of the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade, contained in the annex to its resolution 35/46 of 3 December 1980, which states, inter alia, that all efforts should be exerted by the Committee on Disarmament 2/ urgently to negotiate with a view to reaching agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Noting the in-depth negotiations undertaken in the Conference on Disarmament and its Ad Hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear Weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, 3/ with a view to reaching agreement on this item,

Noting the proposals submitted under that item in the Conference on Disarmament, including the drafts of an international convention,

1/ Resolution S-10/2.

2/ The Committee on Disarmament was redesignated the Conference on Disarmament as from 7 February 1984.

3/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Fortieth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/40/27 and Corr.1), sect. III.F.

Taking note of the decision of the Eighth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Harare from 1 to 6 September 1986, 4/ as well as the relevant recommendations of the Organization of the Islamic Conference reiterated in the Final Communiqué of the Sixteenth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, held at Fez, Morocco, from 6 to 10 January 1986, 5/ calling upon the Conference on Disarmament to reach an urgent agreement on an international convention to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Further noting the support expressed in the Conference on Disarmament and in the General Assembly for the elaboration of an international convention to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, as well as the difficulties pointed out in evolving a common approach acceptable to all,

1. Reaffirms the urgent need to reach agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;
2. Notes with satisfaction that in the Conference on Disarmament there is no objection, in principle, to the idea of an international convention to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, although the difficulties as regards evolving a common approach acceptable to all have also been pointed out;
3. Appeals to all States, especially the nuclear-weapon States, to demonstrate the political will necessary to reach agreement on a common approach and, in particular, on a common formula which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character;
4. Recommends that further intensive efforts should be devoted to the search for such a common approach or common formula and that the various alternative approaches, including in particular those considered in the Conference on Disarmament, should be further explored in order to overcome the difficulties;
5. Recommends that the Conference on Disarmament should actively continue negotiations with a view to reaching early agreement and concluding effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, taking into account the widespread support for the conclusion of an international convention and giving consideration to any other proposals designed to secure the same objective;

4/ See A/41/697-S/18392, annex, sect. I, para. 49.

5/ See A/41/326-S/18049, annex I.

6. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-third session the item entitled "Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons".

84th plenary meeting
30 November 1987



General Assembly

Distr.
GENERAL

A/RES/42/33
22 December 1987

Forty-second session
Agenda item 56

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/42/745)]

42/33. Prevention of an arms race in outer space

The General Assembly,

Inspired by the great prospects opening up before mankind as a result of man's entry into outer space,

Recognizing the common interest of all mankind in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes,

Reaffirming that the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interest of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development, and shall be the province of all mankind,

Reaffirming further the will of all States that the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall be for peaceful purposes,

Recalling that the States parties to the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 1/ have undertaken, in article III, to carry on activities in the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, in accordance with international law and the Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international co-operation and understanding,

1/ Resolution 2222 (XXI), annex.

Reaffirming, in particular, article IV of the above-mentioned Treaty, which stipulates that States parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner,

Reaffirming also paragraph 80 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 2/ the first special session devoted to disarmament, in which it is stated that, in order to prevent an arms race in outer space, further measures should be taken and appropriate international negotiations held in accordance with the spirit of the Treaty,

Recalling its resolutions 36/97 C and 36/99 of 9 December 1981, as well as resolutions 37/83 of 9 December 1982, 37/99 D of 13 December 1982, 38/70 of 15 December 1983, 39/59 of 12 December 1984, 40/87 of 12 December 1985, and 41/53 of 3 December 1986 and the relevant paragraphs of the Political Declaration adopted by the Eighth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Harare from 1 to 6 September 1986, 3/

Gravely concerned at the danger posed to all mankind by an arms race in outer space and, in particular, by the impending threat of the exacerbation of the current state of insecurity by developments that could further undermine international peace and security and retard the pursuit of general and complete disarmament,

Mindful of the widespread interest expressed by Member States in the course of the negotiations on and following the adoption of the above-mentioned Treaty in ensuring that the exploration and use of outer space should be for peaceful purposes, and taking note of proposals submitted to the General Assembly at its tenth special session and at its regular sessions and to the Conference on Disarmament, 5/

Noting the grave concern expressed by the Second United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space at the extension of an arms race into outer space and the recommendations 4/ made to the competent organs of the United Nations, in particular the General Assembly, and also to the Committee on Disarmament, 5/

2/ Resolution S-10/2.

3/ See A/41/697-S/18392, annex, paras. 36-39.

4/ See Report of the Second United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Vienna, 9-21 August 1982 (A/CONF.101/10 and Corr.1 and 2), para. 426.

5/ The Committee on Disarmament was redesignated the Conference on Disarmament as from 7 February 1984.

Convinced that further measures are needed for the prevention of an arms race in outer space,

Recognizing that, in the context of multilateral negotiations for preventing an arms race in outer space, bilateral negotiations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America could make a significant contribution to such an objective, in accordance with paragraph 27 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session,

Noting with satisfaction that bilateral negotiations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America have continued since 1985 on a complex of questions concerning space and nuclear arms, both strategic and intermediate-range, and in their relationship, with the declared objective, endorsed in the joint statement of their leaders on 21 November 1985, 6/ of working out effective agreements aimed, inter alia, at preventing an arms race in outer space,

Anxious that concrete results should emerge from these negotiations as soon as possible,

Taking note of that part of the report of the Conference on Disarmament relating to this question, 7/

Welcoming the re-establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee on the prevention of an arms race in outer space during the 1987 session of the Conference on Disarmament, in the exercise of the negotiating responsibilities of this sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, to continue to examine and to identify through substantive and general consideration issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space,

Noting that the work accomplished in 1987 by the Ad Hoc Committee of the Conference on Disarmament has contributed to a fuller identification of issues and a better understanding of a number of problems and to a clearer perception of the various positions,

1. Recalls the obligation of all States to refrain from the threat or use of force in their space activities;

2. Reaffirms that general and complete disarmament under effective international control warrants that outer space shall be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and that it shall not become an arena for an arms race;

6/ A/40/1070, annex.

7/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-second Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/42/27), sect. III.E.

3. Emphasizes that further measures with appropriate and effective provisions for verification to prevent an arms race in outer space should be adopted by the international community;

4. Calls upon all States, in particular those with major space capabilities, to contribute actively to the objective of the peaceful use of outer space and to take immediate measures to prevent an arms race in outer space in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international co-operation and understanding;

5. Recognizes, as stated in the report of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Conference on Disarmament, that the legal régime applicable to outer space, as such, is not sufficient to guarantee the prevention of an arms race in outer space, the significant role that régime plays in the prevention of an arms race in that environment, the need to consolidate and reinforce that régime and to enhance its effectiveness, and the importance of strict compliance with existing agreements, both bilateral and multilateral;

6. Reiterates that the Conference on Disarmament, as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, has the primary role in the negotiation of a multilateral agreement or agreements, as appropriate, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects;

7. Requests the Conference on Disarmament to consider as a matter of priority the question of preventing an arms race in outer space;

8. Also requests the Conference on Disarmament to intensify its consideration of the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects, taking into account all relevant proposals, including those presented in the Ad Hoc Committee on the prevention of an arms race in outer space at the 1987 session of the Conference and at the forty-second session of the General Assembly;

9. Further requests the Conference on Disarmament to re-establish an ad hoc committee with an adequate mandate at the beginning of its 1988 session, with a view to undertaking negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in outer space in all its aspects;

10. Urges the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America to pursue intensively their bilateral negotiations in a constructive spirit aimed at reaching early agreement for preventing an arms race in outer space, and to advise the Conference on Disarmament periodically of the progress of their bilateral sessions so as to facilitate its work;

11. Calls upon all States, especially those with major space capabilities, to refrain, in their activities relating to outer space, from actions contrary to the observance of the relevant existing treaties or to the objective of preventing an arms race in outer space;

/...

12. Takes note that the study on disarmament problems relating to outer space and the consequence of extending the arms race into outer space, called for in resolution 41/53, has been prepared by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research and that, after a final meeting of the group of experts held in September 1987, the report was finalized and being prepared for publication in autumn 1987;

13. Requests the Secretary-General to invite the views of Member States on all aspects of the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space and to submit a report to the General Assembly at its forty-third session;

14. Requests the Conference on Disarmament to report on its consideration of this subject to the General Assembly at its forty-third session;

15. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit to the Conference on Disarmament all documents relating to the consideration of this subject by the General Assembly at its forty-second session;

16. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-third session the item entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space".

84th plenary meeting
30 November 1987



General Assembly

Distr.
GENERAL

A/RES/42/34
22 December 1987

Forty-second session
Agenda item 58

RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/42/747)]

42/34. Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa

A

Implementation of the Declaration

The General Assembly,

Bearing in mind the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa 1/ adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its first ordinary session, held at Cairo from 17 to 21 July 1964,

Recalling its resolution 1652 (XVI) of 24 November 1961, its earliest on the subject, as well as its resolutions 2033 (XX) of 3 December 1965, 31/69 of 10 December 1976, 32/81 of 12 December 1977, 33/63 of 14 December 1978, 34/76 A of 11 December 1979, 35/146 B of 12 December 1980, 36/86 B of 9 December 1981, 37/74 A of 9 December 1982, 38/181 A of 20 December 1983, 39/61 A of 12 December 1984, 40/89 A of 12 December 1985 and 41/55 A of 3 December 1986, in which it called upon all States to consider and respect the continent of Africa and its surrounding areas as a nuclear-weapon-free zone,

Recalling that in its resolution 33/63 it vigorously condemned any overt or covert attempt by South Africa to introduce nuclear weapons into the continent of Africa and demanded that South Africa refrain forthwith from conducting any nuclear explosion in the continent or elsewhere,

1/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Annexes, agenda item 105, document A/5975.

Bearing in mind the provisions of resolution CM/Res.1101 (XLVI)/Rev.1 2/ on the denuclearization of Africa adopted by the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity at its forty-sixth ordinary session, held at Addis Ababa from 20 to 25 July 1987,

Having taken note of the report of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research entitled "South Africa's nuclear capability", 3/ undertaken in co-operation with the Department for Disarmament Affairs of the Secretariat and in consultation with the Organization of African Unity, as well as the report of the Disarmament Commission, 4/

Noting the actions taken by those Governments which have taken measures to restrict co-operation with South Africa in nuclear and other fields,

Expressing regret that, despite the threat that South Africa's nuclear capability constitutes to international peace and security and, in particular, to the realization of the objective of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa, the Disarmament Commission, although it made some progress during its substantive session in 1987, failed once again to reach a consensus on this important item on its agenda,

1. Strongly renews its call upon all States to consider and respect the continent of Africa and its surrounding areas as a nuclear-weapon-free zone;

2. Reaffirms that the implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity would be an important measure to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to promote international peace and security;

3. Expresses once again its grave alarm at South Africa's possession and continued development of nuclear-weapon capability;

4. Condemns South Africa's continued pursuit of a nuclear capability and all forms of nuclear collaboration by any State, corporation, institution or individual with the racist régime that enable it to frustrate the objective of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa, which seeks to keep Africa free from nuclear weapons;

5. Calls upon all States, corporations, institutions and individuals to desist from further collaboration with the racist régime that may enable it to frustrate the objective of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa;

2/ See A/42/699, annex I.

3/ A/39/470.

4/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-second Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/42/42).

6. Demands once again that the racist régime of South Africa refrain from manufacturing, testing, deploying, transporting, storing, using or threatening to use nuclear weapons;

7. Appeals to all States that have the means to do so to monitor South Africa's research on and development and production of nuclear weapons and to publicize any information in that regard;

8. Demands once again that South Africa submit forthwith all its nuclear installations and facilities to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency;

9. Requests the Secretary-General to provide all necessary assistance that the Organization of African Unity may seek regarding the modalities and elements for the preparation and implementation of the relevant convention or treaty on the denuclearization of Africa;

10. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-third session the item entitled "Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa".

84th plenary meeting
30 November 1987

B

Nuclear capability of South Africa

The General Assembly,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on South Africa's nuclear capability, 5/

Recalling its resolutions 34/76 B of 11 December 1979, 35/146 A of 12 December 1980, 36/86 A of 9 December 1981, 37/74 B of 9 December 1982, 38/181 B of 20 December 1983, 39/61 B of 12 December 1984, 40/89 B of 12 December 1985 and 41/55 B of 3 December 1986,

Bearing in mind the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa 1/ adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its first ordinary session, held at Cairo from 17 to 21 July 1964,

Recalling that, in paragraph 12 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 6/ it noted that the massive accumulation of

5/ A/42/649.

6/ Resolution S-10/2.

armaments and the acquisition of armaments technology by racist régimes, as well as their possible acquisition of nuclear weapons, present a challenging and increasingly dangerous obstacle to a world community faced with the urgent need to disarm,

Recalling also that, in its resolution 33/63 of 14 December 1978, it vigorously condemned any overt or covert attempt by South Africa to introduce nuclear weapons into the continent of Africa and demanded that South Africa refrain forthwith from conducting any nuclear explosion in the continent or elsewhere,

Bearing in mind the provisions of resolution CM/Res.1101 (XLVI)/Rev.1 2/ on the denuclearization of Africa adopted by the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity at its forty-sixth ordinary session, held at Addis Ababa from 20 to 25 July 1987,

Noting with regret the non-implementation by apartheid South Africa of resolution GC(XXX)/RES/468 7/ adopted on 3 October 1986 by the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency during its thirtieth regular session,

Having taken note of the report of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research entitled "South Africa's nuclear capability", 3/ undertaken in co-operation with the Department for Disarmament Affairs of the Secretariat and in consultation with the Organization of African Unity,

Expressing regret that, despite the threat that South Africa's nuclear-weapon capability constitutes to international peace and security and, in particular, to the realization of the objective of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa, the Disarmament Commission, although it made some progress during its substantive session in 1987, failed once again to reach a consensus on this important item on its agenda,

Alarmed that South Africa's nuclear facilities, particularly those that remain unsafeguarded, enable it to develop and acquire the capability of producing fissionable material for nuclear weapons,

Gravely concerned that South Africa, in flagrant violation of the principles of international law and the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, has continued its acts of aggression and subversion against the peoples of the independent States of southern Africa,

Strongly condemning the continued military occupation by South African troops of parts of the territory of Angola in violation of its national sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, and urging the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of South African troops from Angolan soil,

Expressing its grave disappointment that, despite repeated appeals by the international community, certain Western States and Israel have continued to

7/ A/41/490, annex II.

collaborate with the racist régime of South Africa in the military and nuclear fields and that some of these States have, by a ready recourse to the use of veto, consistently frustrated every effort in the Security Council to deal decisively with the question of South Africa,

Recalling its decision taken at the tenth special session that the Security Council should take appropriate effective steps to prevent the frustration of the implementation of the decision of the Organization of African Unity for the denuclearization of Africa, 8/

Stressing the need to preserve peace and security in Africa by ensuring that the continent is a nuclear-weapon-free zone,

1. Takes note of the report of the Secretary-General on South Africa's nuclear capability;
2. Condemns the massive buildup of South Africa's military machine, in particular its frenzied acquisition of nuclear-weapon capability for repressive and aggressive purposes and as an instrument of blackmail;
3. Further condemns all forms of nuclear collaboration by any State, corporation, institution or individual with the racist régime of South Africa, in particular the decision by some Member States to grant licences to several corporations in their territories to provide equipment and technical and maintenance services for nuclear installations in South Africa;
4. Reaffirms that the acquisition of nuclear-weapon capability by the racist régime constitutes a very grave danger to international peace and security and, in particular, jeopardizes the security of African States and increases the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons;
5. Expresses its full support for the African States faced with the danger of South Africa's nuclear capability;
6. Commends the actions taken by those Governments which have taken measures to restrict co-operation with South Africa in nuclear and other fields;
7. Demands that South Africa and all other foreign interests put an immediate end to the exploration for and exploitation of uranium resources in Namibia;
8. Calls upon all States, corporations, institutions and individuals to terminate forthwith all forms of military and nuclear collaboration with the racist régime;
9. Requests the Disarmament Commission to consider once again as a matter of priority during its substantive session in 1988 South Africa's nuclear capability,

8/ See resolution S-10/2, para. 63 (c).

taking into account, inter alia, the findings of the report of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research on South Africa's nuclear capability;

10. Requests the Secretary-General to provide all necessary assistance that the Organization of African Unity may seek regarding the modalities and elements for the preparation and implementation of the relevant convention or treaty on the denuclearization of Africa;

11. Commends the adoption by the Security Council of resolutions 558 (1984) of 13 December 1984 and 591 (1986) of 28 November 1986 on the question of South Africa, with a view to blocking the existing loopholes in the arms embargo so as to render it more effective and prohibiting, in particular, all forms of co-operation and collaboration with the racist régime of South Africa in the nuclear field;

12. Demands once again that South Africa submit forthwith all its nuclear installations and facilities to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency;

13. Requests the Secretary-General to follow very closely South Africa's evolution in the nuclear field and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its forty-third session.

84th plenary meeting
30 November 1987



General Assembly

Distr.
GENERAL

A/RES/42/35
22 December 1987

Forty-second session
Agenda item 59

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/42/748)]

42/35. Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons

The General Assembly,

Recalling its previous resolutions on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons,

Recalling also the decision contained in paragraph 77 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 1/ to the effect that, in order to help prevent a qualitative arms race and so that scientific and technological achievements might ultimately be used solely for peaceful purposes, effective measures should be taken to prevent the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction based on new scientific principles and achievements and that efforts aimed at the prohibition of such new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction should be appropriately pursued,

Noting that in the course of its 1987 session the Conference on Disarmament considered the item entitled "New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons",

1/ Resolution S-10/2.

Taking into consideration the section of the report of the Conference on Disarmament relating to this question, 2/

Convinced that all ways and means should be utilized to prevent the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons,

Determined to prevent modern science and technology from leading to the development of new types of weapons of mass destruction that have characteristics comparable in destructive effect to those of weapons of mass destruction identified in the definition of weapons of mass destruction adopted by the United Nations in 1948, 3/

1. Reaffirms on the basis of the common desire of the international community the necessity of prohibiting the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons;

2. Requests the Conference on Disarmament, in the light of its existing priorities, to keep constantly under review, with appropriate expert assistance, the question of the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons with a view to making, when necessary, recommendations on undertaking specific negotiations on the identified types of such weapons;

3. Calls upon all States, immediately following the identification of any new type of weapon of mass destruction, to renounce practical development of such a weapon and to commence negotiations on its prohibition;

4. Once again urges all States to refrain from any action that could lead to the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons;

5. Calls again upon all States to undertake efforts to ensure that ultimately scientific and technological achievements may be used solely for peaceful purposes;

6. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit to the Conference on Disarmament all documents relating to the consideration of this item by the General Assembly at its forty-second session;

7. Requests the Conference on Disarmament to submit to the General Assembly for consideration at its forty-third session a report on the results achieved;

2/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-second Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/42/27), sect. III.G.

3/ The definition was adopted by the Commission for Conventional Armaments (see S/C.3/32/Rev.1).

8. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-third session the item entitled "Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons: report of the Conference on Disarmament".

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30 November 1987



General Assembly

Distr.
GENERAL

A/RES/42/36
22 December 1987

Forty-second session
Agenda item 60

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/42/749)]

42/36. Reduction of military budgets

The General Assembly,

Deeply concerned about the ever-spiralling arms race and growing military expenditures, which constitute a heavy burden for the economies of all nations and have extremely harmful effects on world peace and security,

Reaffirming once again the provisions of paragraph 89 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 1/ the first special session devoted to disarmament, according to which the gradual reduction of military budgets on a mutually agreed basis, for example, in absolute figures or in terms of percentage, particularly by nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States, would contribute to curbing the arms race and would increase the possibilities for the reallocation of resources now being used for military purposes to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries,

Convinced that the freezing and reduction of military budgets would have favourable consequences on the world economic and financial situation and might facilitate efforts made to increase international assistance for the developing countries,

Recalling that at its twelfth special session, the second special session devoted to disarmament, all Member States unanimously and categorically reaffirmed

1/ Resolution S-10/2.

the validity of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session, as well as their solemn commitment to it, 2/

Recalling also that in the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second United Nations Disarmament Decade, it is provided that during this period renewed efforts should be made to reach agreement on the reduction of military expenditures and the reallocation of resources thus saved to economic and social development, especially for the benefit of developing countries, 3/

Recalling further the provisions of its relevant resolutions, in which it considered that a new impetus should be given to the endeavours to achieve agreements to freeze, reduce or otherwise restrain, in a balanced manner, military expenditures, including adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all parties concerned,

Aware of the various proposals submitted by Member States and of the activities carried out so far within the framework of the United Nations in the field of the reduction of military budgets,

Considering that the identification and elaboration of the principles that should govern further actions of States in freezing and reducing military budgets and the other current activities within the framework of the United Nations related to the question of the reduction of military budgets should be regarded as having the fundamental objective of reaching international agreements on the reduction of military expenditures,

Noting that the Disarmament Commission, at its 1986 substantive session, agreed upon the above-mentioned principles except one, on which various alternatives were proposed by Member States, 4/

1. Declares again its conviction that it is possible to achieve international agreements on the reduction of military budgets without prejudice to the right of all States to undiminished security, self-defence and sovereignty;

2. Appeals to all States, in particular to the most heavily armed States, pending the conclusion of agreements on the reduction of military expenditures, to exercise self-restraint in their military expenditures with a view to reallocating the funds thus saved to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of developing countries;

2/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twelfth Special Session, Annexes, agenda items 9 to 13, document A/S-12/32, para. 62.

3/ See resolution 35/46, annex, para. 15.

4/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-first Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/41/42), para. 28.8.

3. Reaffirms that the human and material resources released through the reduction of military expenditures could be reallocated for economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries;

4. Requests the Disarmament Commission to continue the consideration of the item entitled "Reduction of military budgets" and, in this context, to conclude, at its 1988 substantive session, its work on the last outstanding paragraph of the principles that should govern further actions of States in the field of freezing and reduction of military budgets, and to submit its report and recommendations to the General Assembly not later than at its forty-third session;

5. Draws anew the attention of Member States to the fact that the identification and elaboration of the principles that should govern further actions of States in freezing and reducing military budgets could contribute to harmonizing the views of States and creating confidence among them conducive to achieving international agreements on the reduction of military budgets;

6. Urges all Member States, in particular the most heavily armed States, to reinforce their readiness to co-operate in a constructive manner with a view to reaching agreements to freeze, reduce or otherwise restrain military expenditures;

7. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-third session the item entitled "Reduction of military budgets".

84th plenary meeting
30 November 1987



General Assembly

Distr.
GENERAL

A/RES/42/37
22 December 1987

Forty-second session
Agenda item 61

RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/42/750)]

42/37. Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons

A

Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons

The General Assembly,

Recalling its previous resolutions relating to the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and of their destruction,

Reaffirming the urgent necessity of strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, 1/ and of the adherence by all States to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, signed in London, Moscow and Washington on 10 April 1972, 2/

Taking note of the Final Document of the Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their

1/ League of Nations, Treaty Series, vol. XCIV (1929), No. 2138.

2/ Resolution 2826 (XXVI), annex.

Destruction, adopted by consensus on 26 September 1986, 3/ and in particular of article IX of the Final Declaration of the Conference, 4/

Having considered the report of the Conference on Disarmament, 5/ which incorporates, inter alia, the report of its Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, 6/ and noting that following the precedents set over the past three years, consultations are continuing during the inter-sessional period, thus increasing the time devoted to negotiations,

Convinced of the necessity that all efforts be exerted for the continuation and successful conclusion of negotiations on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons and on their destruction,

Noting the bilateral and other discussions, including the ongoing exchange of views between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America in the framework of the multilateral negotiations, on issues related to the prohibition of chemical weapons,

Noting further with appreciation the efforts made at all levels by States to facilitate the earliest conclusion of a convention and, in particular, the concrete steps designed to promote confidence and to contribute directly to that goal,

Wishing to encourage Member States to take further initiatives to promote confidence and openness in the negotiations and to provide further information to facilitate prompt resolution of outstanding issues, thus contributing to an early agreement on the convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons and on their destruction,

1. Takes note with satisfaction of the work of the Conference on Disarmament during its 1987 session regarding the prohibition of chemical weapons, and in particular appreciates the progress in the work of its Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons on that question and the tangible results recorded in its report;

2. Expresses again none the less its regret and concern that notwithstanding the progress made in 1987, a convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons and on their destruction has not yet been elaborated;

3/ BWC/CONF.II/13.

4/ Ibid., part II.

5/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-second Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/42/27).

6/ Ibid., para. 79.

3. Urges again the Conference on Disarmament, as a matter of high priority, to intensify, during its 1988 session, the negotiations on such a convention and to reinforce further its efforts by, inter alia, increasing the time during the year that it devotes to such negotiations, taking into account all existing proposals and future initiatives, with a view to the final elaboration of a convention at the earliest possible date, and to re-establish its Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons for this purpose with the mandate to be agreed upon by the Conference at the beginning of its 1988 session;

4. Requests the Conference on Disarmament to report to the General Assembly at its forty-third session on the results of its negotiations.

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30 November 1987

B

Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the
Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their
Destruction

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 2826 (XXVI) of 16 December 1971, in which it commended the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction and expressed the hope for the widest possible adherence to the Convention,

Recalling its resolution 39/65 D of 12 December 1984, in which it noted that, at the request of a majority of States parties to the Convention, a second Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention would be held in 1986,

Recalling that the States parties to the Convention met at Geneva from 8 to 26 September 1986 to review the operation of the Convention with a view to assuring that the purposes of the preamble to and the provisions of the Convention, including the provisions concerning negotiations on chemical weapons, were being realized,

Recalling also its resolution 41/58 A of 3 December 1986, in which it, inter alia, noted with appreciation that on 26 September 1986, the Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction adopted by consensus a Final Declaration, 4/

Noting with satisfaction that, at the time of the Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention, there were more than a hundred States parties to the Convention, including all the permanent members of the Security Council,

/...

1. Notes with appreciation that, in accordance with the Final Declaration of the Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, an Ad Hoc Meeting of Scientific and Technical Experts from States parties to the Convention was held at Geneva from 31 March to 15 April 1987, which adopted by consensus a report 7/ finalizing the modalities for the exchange of information and data agreed to in the Final Declaration, thus enabling States parties to follow a standardized procedure;
2. Notes that the Ad Hoc Meeting of Scientific and Technical Experts from States parties to the Convention agreed in its report that the first exchange of information and data should take place not later than 15 October 1987 and that thereafter information to be given on an annual basis should be provided through the Department for Disarmament Affairs of the Secretariat not later than 15 April;
3. Notes with satisfaction that the first such exchange of information and data has commenced;
4. Requests the Secretary-General to render the necessary assistance and to provide such services as may be required for the implementation of the relevant parts of the Final Declaration;
5. Calls upon all signatory States that have not ratified or acceded to the Convention to do so without delay, and also calls upon those States which have not yet signed the Convention to join the States parties thereto at an early date, thus contributing to the achievement of universal adherence to the Convention and to international confidence.

84th plenary meeting
30 November 1987

C

Measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol and
to support the conclusion of a chemical weapons convention

The General Assembly,

Recalling the provisions of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, 1/ and other relevant rules of customary international law,

Recalling also the necessity of the adherence by all States to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, signed in London, Moscow and Washington on 10 April 1972, 2/

7/ BWC/CONF.II/EX/2.

Reiterating its concern over reports that chemical weapons have been used and over indications of their emergence in an increasing number of national arsenals, as well as over the growing risk that they may be used again,

Noting with satisfaction that the Conference on Disarmament is actively engaged in negotiating a convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons and on their destruction, 8/ including detailed provisions for the on-site verification of compliance with the convention, and expressing its support for the early and successful conclusion of those negotiations,

Noting also that prompt and impartial investigation of reports of possible use of chemical and bacteriological weapons would further enhance the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol,

Expressing its appreciation for the work of the Secretary-General, and noting the procedures available to him in support of the principles and objectives of the 1925 Geneva Protocol,

1. Renews its call to all States to observe strictly the principles and objectives of the 1925 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, and condemns all actions that violate this obligation;
2. Urges all States to be guided in their national policies by the need to curb the spread of chemical weapons;
3. Recognizes the need, upon the entry into force of a chemical weapons convention, to review the modalities available to the Secretary-General for the investigation of reports of the possible use of chemical weapons;
4. Requests the Secretary-General to carry out investigations in response to reports that may be brought to his attention by any Member State concerning the possible use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) or toxin weapons that may constitute a violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol or other relevant rules of customary international law in order to ascertain the facts of the matter, and to report promptly the results of any such investigation to all Member States;
5. Requests the Secretary-General, with the assistance of qualified experts provided by interested Member States, to develop further technical guidelines and procedures available to him for the timely and efficient investigation of such reports of the possible use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) or toxin weapons;

8/ See Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-second Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/42/27), sect. III.D.

6. Also requests the Secretary-General, in meeting the objectives set forth in paragraph 4 above, to compile and maintain lists of qualified experts provided by Member States whose services could be made available at short notice to undertake such investigations, and of laboratories with the capability to undertake testing for the presence of agents the use of which is prohibited;

7. Further requests the Secretary-General, in meeting the objectives of paragraph 4 above:

(a) To appoint experts to undertake investigation of the reported activities;

(b) Where appropriate, to make the necessary arrangements for experts to collect and examine evidence and to undertake such testing as may be required;

(c) To seek, in any such investigation, assistance as appropriate from Member States and the relevant international organizations;

8. Requests Member States and the relevant international organizations to co-operate fully with the Secretary-General in the above-mentioned work;

9. Requests the Secretary-General to submit a report to the General Assembly at its forty-third session on the implementation of the present resolution.

84th plenary meeting
30 November 1987



General Assembly

Distr.
GENERAL

A/RES/42/38
7 January 1988

Forty-second session
Agenda item 62

RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/42/669/Add.1)]

42/38. General and complete disarmament

A

Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations

The General Assembly,

Recalling that at their meeting at Geneva in November 1985 the leaders of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America committed themselves to the objective of working out effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on Earth, 1/

Noting that in their joint statement of 8 January 1985 the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the United States of America agreed that the subject of the negotiations was a complex of questions concerning space and nuclear arms, both strategic and intermediate-range, with all these questions considered and resolved in their interrelationship, 2/

Noting with satisfaction that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America have reached an agreement on the total elimination of their intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles,

1/ A/40/1070, annex.

2/ See Official Records of the General Assembly, Fortieth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/40/27 and Corr.1), appendix II (CD/642/Appendix II/Vol. II), documents CD/570 and CD/571.

Noting also with satisfaction the agreement of the two Governments that a similarly intensive effort will be made to achieve a treaty on a 50 per cent reduction in their strategic offensive arms within the framework of the Geneva nuclear and space talks,

Noting further with satisfaction that, at their forthcoming meeting, the leaders of the two countries will consider thoroughly the development of instructions to delegations on a future treaty on a 50 per cent reduction in United States and Soviet strategic offensive arms and on the observance of and non-withdrawal from the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems 3/ for an agreed period,

Believing that, through negotiations pursued in a spirit of flexibility and with full account taken of the security interests of all States, it is possible to achieve far-reaching and effectively verifiable agreements,

Firmly convinced that an early agreement in these negotiations, in accordance with the principle of undiminished security at the lowest possible level of armaments, would be of crucial importance for the strengthening of international peace and security,

Further convinced that the international community should encourage the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the United States of America in their endeavours, taking into account both the importance and complexity of their negotiations,

1. Welcomes the agreement between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America to conclude a treaty eliminating their intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles;

2. Notes with satisfaction that President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev have agreed to meet in the United States beginning on 7 December 1987 and that a further meeting in the Soviet Union is envisioned between them in the first half of 1988;

3. Calls upon the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the United States of America to spare no effort in seeking the attainment of all their agreed objectives in the negotiations, in accordance with the security interests of all States and the universal desire for progress towards disarmament, in particular early achievement of a treaty implementing the agreement to reduce their strategic offensive arms by 50 per cent, which could be signed during President Reagan's visit to Moscow;

3/ United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 944, No. 13446.

4. Invites the two Governments concerned to keep other States Members of the United Nations duly informed of progress in those negotiations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, in accordance with paragraph 114 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly; 4/

5. Expresses its firmest possible encouragement and support for the bilateral negotiations and their successful conclusion.

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30 November 1987

B

Prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling
and use of radiological weapons

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 41/59 A of 3 December 1986,

1. Takes note of the part of the report of the Conference on Disarmament on its 1987 session that deals with the question of radiological weapons, in particular the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons; 5/

2. Recognizes that the Ad Hoc Committee in 1987 made a further contribution to the clarification and better understanding of different approaches that continue to exist with regard to both of the important subjects under consideration;

3. Takes note of the recommendation of the Conference on Disarmament that the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons should be re-established at the beginning of its 1988 session;

4. Requests the Conference on Disarmament to continue its negotiations on the subject with a view to a prompt conclusion of its work, taking into account all proposals presented to the Conference to this end and drawing upon the annexes to its report as a basis of its future work, the result of which should be submitted to the General Assembly at its forty-third session;

5. Also requests that the Secretary-General transmit to the Conference on Disarmament all relevant documents relating to the discussion of all aspects of the issue by the General Assembly at its forty-second session;

4/ Resolution S-10/2.

5/ See Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-second Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/42/27), para. 88.

6. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-third session the item entitled "Prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons".

84th plenary meeting
30 November 1987

C

Notification of nuclear tests

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 41/59 N of 3 December 1986, in which it called upon each of the States conducting nuclear explosions to provide the Secretary-General with specific data on nuclear explosions conducted by them,

Noting that, despite the continuation of nuclear explosions, no such data have been submitted to the Secretary-General,

1. Calls upon all States to comply with resolution 41/59 N;
2. Again urges each of the States conducting nuclear explosions to provide to the Secretary-General within one week of each nuclear explosion such data referred to in paragraph 1 of resolution 41/59 N as they may have available;
3. Invites all other States to provide to the Secretary-General any such data on nuclear explosions they may have available;
4. Requests the Secretary-General to make this information immediately available to all Member States and to submit to the General Assembly annually a register of the information provided on nuclear explosions during the preceding twelve months.

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30 November 1987

D

Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 40/18 of 18 November 1985 and 41/86 N of 4 December 1986,

/...

Recalling also the Harare Appeal on Disarmament, 6/ adopted by the Eighth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries on 6 September 1986, and the final communiqué adopted in New York on 7 October 1987 by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs and heads of delegation of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries to the forty-second session of the General Assembly, 7/

Gravely concerned over the continuing escalation of the arms race, especially in nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, despite the fact that this increases the risk of nuclear war and endangers the survival of humanity,

Convinced that the alternative today in the nuclear age is not between war or peace, but between life and death, which makes the prevention of nuclear war the principal task of our times,

Further convinced that international peace and security can be ensured only through general and complete disarmament under effective international control and that one of the most urgent tasks is to halt and reverse the arms race and to undertake concrete measures of disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament,

Noting that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America reached an agreement in principle, during the meeting held in Washington, D.C., from 15 to 17 September 1987, on the elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles,

Convinced also that in the interest of mankind as a whole, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, in their bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations, should continue their endeavours with the ultimate objective of achieving general and complete disarmament under effective international control,

1. Welcomes the agreement in principle between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America to sign a treaty on intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles in the autumn of 1987, to make intensive efforts to achieve a treaty on a 50 per cent reduction in strategic offensive arms within the framework of the Geneva nuclear and space talks, and to begin nuclear-test-ban negotiations before 1 December 1987;

2. Calls upon the two Governments concerned to intensify their efforts with the objective of achieving agreements in other areas, in particular, the areas of strategic arms and a nuclear-test ban, as a matter of urgency;

6/ See A/41/697-S/18362, annex, sect. I.

7/ A/42/681, annex.

3. Invites the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America to keep the Conference on Disarmament duly informed of progress made in their negotiations.

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30 November 1987

E

Conventional disarmament

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 39/151 C of 17 December 1984, 40/94 C of 12 December 1985 and 41/59 C of 3 December 1986,

Having examined the report of the Disarmament Commission, 8/

1. Takes note with satisfaction of the report on the consideration of the question of conventional disarmament during the 1987 session of the Disarmament Commission; 9/

2. Recommends that the report should provide a basis for further deliberations on the subject by the Disarmament Commission;

3. Requests the Disarmament Commission to include in the agenda of its 1988 session the item entitled "Substantive consideration of issues related to conventional disarmament, including the recommendations and conclusions contained in the Study on Conventional Disarmament"; 10/

4. Also requests the Disarmament Commission to continue at its 1988 session the consideration of the question of conventional disarmament with a view to facilitating the identification of possible measures in the fields of conventional arms reduction and disarmament and to report to the General Assembly at its forty-third session;

5. Requests the Secretary-General to draw the present resolution to the attention of the General Assembly at its third special session devoted to disarmament;

8/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-second Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/42/42).

9/ Ibid., para. 45.

10/ United Nations publication, Sales No. E.85.IX.1.

6. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-third session the item entitled "Conventional disarmament".

84th plenary meeting

30 November 1987

F

Prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling
and use of radiological weapons

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 37/99 C of 13 December 1982, 38/188 D of 20 December 1983, 39/151 J of 17 December 1984, 40/94 D of 12 December 1985 and 41/59 A and I of 3 December 1986 on, inter alia, the conclusion of an agreement prohibiting military attacks against nuclear facilities,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General on this subject submitted pursuant to resolution 41/59 I, 11/

Gravely concerned that armed attacks against nuclear facilities, though carried out with conventional weapons, could be tantamount to the use of radiological weapons,

Recalling also that Additional Protocol I of 1977 12/ to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 13/ prohibits attacks on nuclear electricity-generating stations,

Deeply concerned that the destruction of nuclear facilities by conventional weapons causes the release into the environment of huge amounts of dangerous radioactive material, which results in serious radioactive contamination,

Firmly convinced that the Israeli attack against the safeguarded nuclear facilities in Iraq constitutes an unprecedented danger to international peace and security,

Recalling further resolutions GC(XXVII)/Res/407 and GC(XXVII)/Res/409, adopted in 1983 by the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency, in which the General Conference urged all member States to support actions in international forums to reach an international agreement that prohibits armed attacks against nuclear installations devoted to peaceful purposes,

11/ A/42/517.

12/ A/32/144, annex I.

13/ United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 75, Nos. 970-973.

1. Reaffirms that armed attacks of any kind against nuclear facilities are tantamount to the use of radiological weapons, owing to the dangerous radioactive forces that such attacks cause to be released;
2. Requests the Conference on Disarmament to intensify further its efforts to reach, as early as possible, an agreement prohibiting armed attacks against nuclear facilities;
3. Requests the International Atomic Energy Agency to provide the Conference on Disarmament with the technical studies that would facilitate the conclusion of such an agreement;
4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its forty-third session on the progress made in the implementation of the present resolution.

84th plenary meeting
30 November 1987

G

Conventional disarmament

The General Assembly,

Reaffirming the determination to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war expressed in the Preamble to the Charter of the United Nations,

Recalling the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 4/ and particularly its paragraph 81, which provides that together with negotiations on nuclear disarmament measures, the limitation and gradual reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons should be resolutely pursued within the framework of progress towards general and complete disarmament, and which stresses that States with the largest military arsenals have a special responsibility in pursuing the process of conventional armaments reductions,

Also recalling that the same document declares, inter alia, that priorities in disarmament negotiations shall be: nuclear weapons; other weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons; conventional weapons, including any which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects; and reduction of armed forces, and that it stresses that nothing should preclude States from conducting negotiations on all priority items concurrently,

Further recalling that the same document states that effective measures of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war have the highest priority, and that real progress in the field of nuclear disarmament could create an atmosphere conducive to progress in conventional disarmament on a world-wide basis,

Aware of the dangers to world peace and security originating from wars and conflicts fought with conventional weapons, as well as of their possible escalation

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into a nuclear war in regions with a high concentration of conventional and nuclear weapons,

Also aware that with the advance in science and technology, conventional weapons tend to become increasingly lethal and destructive,

Believing that resources released through disarmament, including conventional disarmament, can be used for the social and economic development of people of all countries, particularly the developing countries,

Bearing in mind its resolution 36/97 A of 9 December 1981 and the Study on Conventional Disarmament 10/ conducted in accordance with that resolution, as well as its resolutions 41/59 C and 41/59 G of 3 December 1986 and the consideration by the Disarmament Commission at its 1987 session of the question of conventional disarmament, 9/

Bearing in mind also the efforts made to promote conventional disarmament and the related proposals and suggestions, as well as the initiatives taken by various countries in this regard,

1. Reaffirms the importance of the efforts aimed at resolutely pursuing the limitation and gradual reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons within the framework of progress towards general and complete disarmament;

2. Believes that the military forces of all countries should not be used other than for the purpose of self-defence;

3. Urges the countries with the largest military arsenals, which bear a special responsibility in pursuing the process of conventional armaments reductions, and the member States of the two major military alliances to continue negotiations through various forums on conventional disarmament in earnest, with a view to reaching early agreement on the limitation and gradual and balanced reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons under effective international control in their respective regions, particularly in Europe, which has the largest concentration of arms and forces in the world;

4. Encourages all States, while taking into account the need to protect security and maintain necessary defensive capabilities, to intensify their efforts and take, either on their own or in a regional context, appropriate steps to promote progress in conventional disarmament and enhance peace and security;

5. Requests the Disarmament Commission to consider further, at its 1988 substantive session, issues related to conventional disarmament;

6. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-third session the item entitled "Conventional disarmament".

84th plenary meeting
30 November 1987

/...

H

Nuclear disarmament

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 41/59 F of 3 December 1986,

Reaffirming the determination to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war as expressed in the Preamble to the Charter of the United Nations,

Convinced that the most acute and urgent task of the present day is to remove the threat of a world war - a nuclear war,

Recalling and reaffirming the statements and provisions on nuclear disarmament set forth in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 4/ and in particular the provisions that "effective measures of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war have the highest priority", contained in paragraph 20, and that "In the task of achieving the goals of nuclear disarmament, all the nuclear-weapon States, in particular those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, bear a special responsibility", contained in paragraph 48,

Bearing in mind that the ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons,

Noting that the leaders of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America agreed in their joint statement issued at Geneva on 21 November 1985 that "a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought" 1/ and the common desire they expressed in the same statement calling for early progress in areas where there is common ground, including the principle of a 50 per cent reduction in the nuclear arms of the Soviet Union and the United States appropriately applied,

Noting also that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America have conducted intensive negotiations on various issues of disarmament,

Noting further that the Conference on Disarmament has not played its due role in the field of nuclear disarmament,

Bearing in mind that the Governments and peoples of various countries expect that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America will reach agreement on halting the nuclear-arms race and reducing nuclear weapons, so as to start the process of nuclear disarmament,

1. Welcomes the agreement in principle between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America to conclude a treaty on the elimination of their intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, and calls upon the two States to make further efforts for eliminating, in accordance with the agreement in

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principle, all their intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles at the earliest possible date;

2. Urges the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, further to discharge their special responsibility for nuclear disarmament, to take the lead in halting the nuclear-arms race and to negotiate in earnest with a view to reaching early agreement on the drastic reduction of their nuclear arsenals;

3. Reiterates its belief that bilateral and multilateral efforts for nuclear disarmament should complement and facilitate each other;

4. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-third session the item entitled "Nuclear disarmament".

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I

Objective information on military matters

The General Assembly,

Recalling paragraph 105 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 4/ which encourages Member States to ensure a better flow of information with regard to the various aspects of disarmament to avoid dissemination of false and tendentious information concerning armaments and to concentrate on the danger of escalation of the arms race and on the need for general and complete disarmament under effective international control,

Recalling its previous resolutions on the subject,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General prepared in conformity with resolution 41/59 B of 3 December 1986, 14/

Recognizing that the adoption of concrete, confidence-building measures on a global, regional or subregional level would greatly contribute to a reduction in international tension,

Believing that the adoption of such measures would contribute to greater openness and transparency, thus helping to prevent misperceptions of military capabilities and intentions, which could induce States to undertake armaments programmes leading to the acceleration of the arms race, in particular the nuclear-arms race, and to heightened international tensions,

14/ A/42/435.

Believing that objective information on military capabilities, in particular of nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States, could contribute to the building of confidence among States and to the conclusion of concrete disarmament agreements and thereby help to halt and reverse the arms race,

Convinced that greater openness on military activities, inter alia, through transmittal of relevant information on these activities, including on the levels of military budgets, would contribute to increased confidence among States,

Taking into account the work undertaken in the Disarmament Commission on the reduction of military budgets, 15/

Noting that an increased number of States have provided annual reports on military expenditures in conformity with the international system for the standardized reporting of military expenditures under the auspices of the United Nations,

1. Reaffirms its firm conviction that a better flow of objective information on military capabilities would help relieve international tension and contribute to the building of confidence among States on a global, regional or subregional level and to the conclusion of concrete disarmament agreements;

2. Recommends that those global, regional and subregional organizations that have already expressed support for the principle of practical and concrete confidence-building measures of a military nature on a global, regional or subregional level should intensify their efforts with a view to adopting such measures;

3. Recommends that all States, in particular nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States, should consider implementing additional measures based on the principles of openness and transparency, such as, for example, the international system for the standardized reporting of military expenditures, with the aim of achieving a realistic comparison of military budgets, facilitating the availability of objective information on, as well as objective assessment of, military capabilities and contributing towards the process of disarmament;

4. Invites all Member States to transmit to the Secretary-General, not later than 15 April 1988, their views concerning ways and means of ensuring confidence and furthering openness and transparency in military matters for submission to the General Assembly at its third special session devoted to disarmament;

5. Requests the General Assembly at its third special session devoted to disarmament to take into account all the provisions of the present resolution in its deliberations;

15/ See Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-second Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/42/42), para. 41.

6. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its third special session devoted to disarmament on the implementation of all the provisions of the resolutions on the subject;

7. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-third session the item entitled "Objective information on military matters".

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J

Implementation of General Assembly resolutions in the field
of disarmament

The General Assembly,

Recalling paragraph 115 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 4/ which states, inter alia, that the General Assembly has been and should remain the main deliberative organ of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and should make every effort to facilitate the implementation of disarmament measures,

Mindful of the fact that the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament could be strengthened substantially through an increased effort by Member States to implement faithfully General Assembly resolutions in the field of disarmament,

Convinced of the importance of treating recommendations of the General Assembly in the field of disarmament with due respect in accordance with the obligations assumed by Member States under the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Deems it important that all Member States make every effort to facilitate the consistent implementation of General Assembly resolutions in the field of disarmament, and thus show their resolve to arrive at mutually acceptable, comprehensively verifiable and effective disarmament measures;

2. Invites all Member States to make available to the Secretary-General their views and suggestions on ways and means to improve the situation with regard to the implementation of General Assembly resolutions in the field of disarmament;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly, on an annual basis, a report regarding the developments in the field of arms limitations and disarmament, which would include all relevant information provided by Member States concerning the implementation of General Assembly resolutions in the field of disarmament, as well as their views on possible avenues to improve the situation in this respect;

4. Calls upon all Member States to render every assistance to the Secretary-General in fulfilling the request contained in paragraph 3 above;

/...

5. Decides to continue its consideration of the issue of the implementation of General Assembly resolutions in the field of disarmament at its forty-third session.

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K

Naval armaments and disarmament

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 38/188 G of 20 December 1983, by which it requested the Secretary-General, with the assistance of qualified governmental experts, to carry out a comprehensive study on the naval arms race,

Recalling its resolution 40/94 F of 12 December 1985, by which it requested the Disarmament Commission to consider the issues contained in the study on the naval arms race, 16/ both its substantive content and its conclusions, taking into account all other relevant present and future proposals, with a view to facilitating the identification of possible measures in the field of naval arms reductions and disarmament, pursued within the framework of progress towards general and complete disarmament, as well as confidence-building measures in this field,

Recalling also its resolution 41/59 K of 3 December 1986, by which it requested the Disarmament Commission to continue, at its forthcoming session in 1987, the substantive consideration of the question and to report on its deliberations and recommendations to the General Assembly at its forty-second session,

Having examined the report of the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission on the substantive consideration of the question of the naval arms race and disarmament during the 1987 session of the Commission, 17/ which met with the approval of all delegations participating in the substantive consultations and which, in their view, could form the basis of further deliberations on the subject,

1. Notes with satisfaction the report on the substantive consideration of the question of the naval arms race and disarmament by the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission;

16/ A/40/535, annex. The study was subsequently issued with the title The Naval Arms Race (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.86.IX.3).

17/ A/CN.10/102.

/...

2. Requests the Disarmament Commission to continue, at its forthcoming session in 1988, the substantive consideration of the question and to report on its deliberations and recommendations to the General Assembly not later than at its forty-third session;

3. Also requests the Disarmament Commission to inscribe on the agenda for its 1988 session the item entitled "Naval armaments and disarmament";

4. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-third session the item entitled "Naval armaments and disarmament".

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L

Prohibition of the production of fissionable material
for weapons purposes

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 33/91 H of 16 December 1978, 34/87 D of 11 December 1979, 35/156 H of 12 December 1980, 36/97 G of 9 December 1981, 37/99 E of 13 December 1982, 38/188 E of 20 December 1983, 39/151 H of 17 December 1984, 40/94 G of 12 December 1985 and 41/59 L of 3 December 1986, in which it requested the Conference on Disarmament, at an appropriate stage of the implementation of the Programme of Action set forth in section III of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly 4/ and of its work on the item entitled "Nuclear weapons in all aspects", to consider urgently the question of adequately verified cessation and prohibition of the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices and to keep the Assembly informed of the progress of that consideration,

Noting that the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament for 1987 included the item entitled "Nuclear weapons in all aspects" and that the programme of work of the Conference for both parts of its 1987 session contained the item entitled "Cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament", 18/

Recalling the proposals and statements made in the Conference on Disarmament on those items, 19/

Considering that the cessation of production of fissionable material for weapons purposes and the progressive conversion and transfer of stocks to peaceful

18/ See Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-second Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/42/27), paras. 7 and 9.

19/ Ibid., paras. 48-68.

uses would be a significant step towards halting and reversing the nuclear-arms race,

Considering also that the prohibition of the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices would be an important measure in facilitating the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and explosive devices,

Requests the Conference on Disarmament, at an appropriate stage of its work on the item entitled "Nuclear weapons in all aspects", to pursue its consideration of the question of adequately verified cessation and prohibition of the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices and to keep the General Assembly informed of the progress of that consideration.

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M

Compliance with arms limitation and disarmament agreements

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 41/59 J of 3 December 1986,

Conscious of the abiding concern of all Member States for preserving respect for rights and obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law,

Convinced that observance of the Charter of the United Nations, relevant treaties and other sources of international law is essential for the strengthening of international security,

Mindful in particular of the fundamental importance of full implementation and strict observance of agreements on arms limitation and disarmament if individual nations and the international community are to derive enhanced security from them,

Stressing that any violation of such agreements not only adversely affects the security of States parties but can also create security risks for other States relying on the constraints and commitments stipulated in those agreements,

Stressing further that any weakening of confidence in such agreements diminishes their contribution to global or regional stability and to further disarmament and arms limitation efforts and undermines the credibility and effectiveness of the international legal system,

Recognizing in this context that, inter alia, full confidence in compliance with existing agreements can enhance the negotiation of arms limitation and disarmament agreements,

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Believing that compliance with arms limitation and disarmament agreements by States parties is, therefore, a matter of interest and concern to the international community, and noting the role that the United Nations could play in that regard,

Convinced that resolution of non-compliance questions that have arisen with regard to agreements on arms limitations and disarmament would contribute to better relations among States and the strengthening of world peace and security,

1. Urges all States parties to arms limitation and disarmament agreements to implement and comply with the entirety of the provisions of such agreements;

2. Calls upon all Member States to give serious consideration to the implications of non-compliance with those obligations for international security and stability, as well as for the prospects for further progress in the field of disarmament;

3. Further calls upon all Member States to support efforts aimed at the resolution of non-compliance questions, with a view to encouraging strict observance by all parties of the provisions of arms limitation and disarmament agreements and maintaining or restoring the integrity of such agreements;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to provide Member States with assistance that may be necessary in this regard;

5. Further requests the Secretary-General to bring the present resolution to the attention of the General Assembly at its third special session devoted to disarmament.

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N

Conventional disarmament on a regional scale

The General Assembly,

Reaffirming its resolution 40/94 A of 12 December 1985,

Taking note of the final communiqué of the Special Ministerial Meeting of the Co-ordinating Bureau of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries on Latin America and the Caribbean, held at Georgetown from 9 to 12 March 1987, 20/

Taking into account its resolution 41/59 M of 3 December 1986,

20/ A/42/357-S/18935, annex I.

/...

1. Reiterates its adherence to resolution 40/94 A relating to conventional disarmament on a regional scale;
2. Expresses its firm support of all regional or subregional endeavours, taking into account the characteristics of each region and when the regional situation so permits, as well as unilateral measures, directed to strengthening mutual confidence and to assuring the security of all States involved, making possible regional agreements on arms limitations in the future;
3. Further reiterates the primary responsibility of the militarily significant States, especially the nuclear-weapon States, for halting and reversing the arms race, and the priority assigned to nuclear disarmament in the context of the advances towards general and complete disarmament.

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0

Review of the role of the United Nations in the
field of disarmament

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 39/151 G of 17 December 1984, 40/94 O of 12 December 1985 and 41/59 O of 3 December 1986,

Bearing in mind that the primary purpose of the United Nations is to maintain international peace and security,

Reaffirming its conviction that genuine and lasting peace can be created only through the effective implementation of the security system provided for in the Charter of the United Nations and the speedy and substantial reduction of arms and armed forces, by international agreement and mutual example, leading ultimately to general and complete disarmament under effective international control,

Reaffirming further that the United Nations, in accordance with its Charter, has a central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament,

Recognizing the need for the United Nations, in discharging its central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament, to play a more active role in the field of disarmament in accordance with its primary purpose under the Charter to maintain international peace and security,

Taking into account the part of the report of the Disarmament Commission relating to this question, 21/

21/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-second Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/42/42), para. 43.

/...

1. Requests the Disarmament Commission to continue its consideration of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament as a matter of priority at its next substantive session, in 1988, with a view to the elaboration of concrete recommendations and proposals, as appropriate, taking into account, inter alia, the views and suggestions of Member States as well as the aforementioned documents on the subject;

2. Requests further the Disarmament Commission to submit its report on the subject, including findings, recommendations and proposals, as appropriate, to the General Assembly at its forty-third session;

3. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-third session the item entitled "Review of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament: report of the Disarmament Commission".

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General Assembly

Distr.
GENERAL

A/RES/42/39
7 January 1988

Forty-second session
Agenda item 63

RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/42/751)]

42/39. Review and implementation of the Concluding Document of
the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly

A

Review and implementation of the Concluding Document of the
Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 34/83 A of 11 December 1979, 35/156 J of
12 December 1980, 36/97 K of 9 December 1981, 37/100 E of 13 December 1982, 38/73 H
of 15 December 1983, 39/63 K of 12 December 1984 and 40/151 A of 16 December 1985,

Expressing the growing alarm of the world community over the dangers of the
arms race, in particular the nuclear-arms race, and its adverse social and economic
consequences,

Noting that the present state of the international situation requires that the
disarmament principles embodied in the Charter of the United Nations become part
and parcel of any collective efforts aimed at ensuring a truly safe world,
including those undertaken by the Security Council,

Reaffirming that the United Nations under its Charter plays a central role and
bears main responsibility in the area of disarmament and the strengthening of
international security,

Recalling paragraph 13 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of

the General Assembly, 1/ in which the Assembly acknowledged that genuine and lasting peace can only be created through the effective implementation of the security system provided for in the Charter and the speedy and substantial reduction of arms and armed forces, by international agreement and mutual example,

Recalling that under Article 26 of the Charter, the Security Council is responsible for formulating, with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee, plans for establishing an arms regulation system,

Noting the fact that the Security Council, which is vested under the Charter with the principal responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, has not yet conducted any examination of the question of the adverse effects of the arms race, especially in the nuclear field, on international peace and security, as provided for in the relevant General Assembly resolutions,

1. Calls upon the Security Council, in particular its permanent members, within the framework of its main task, to contribute to establishing and maintaining international peace and security with the least possible diversion of world human and economic resources to armament, and to take the necessary steps for the effective implementation of Article 26 of the Charter of the United Nations with a view to enhancing the central role of the United Nations in facilitating solutions to the issues of arms limitation, primarily in the nuclear field, and disarmament, as well as the strengthening of international peace and security;

2. Recommends that the nuclear-weapon States, which at the same time are the five permanent members of the Security Council, hold joint meetings and provide regular information to the General Assembly, as well as to the Conference on Disarmament, about the state of affairs as regards the range of issues related to disarmament, especially in the nuclear field, prevention of a nuclear war and the status of the current agreements in the field of arms limitation and disarmament, and about progress at those negotiations which include the participation of the nuclear Powers;

3. Recommends that the Security Council consider the question of establishing, under Article 29 of the Charter, such subsidiary bodies as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions to facilitate a solution to disarmament issues;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its forty-third session a report on the implementation of the present resolution within the framework of the agenda item entitled "Review and implementation of the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly".

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1/ Resolution S-10/2.

B

Freeze on nuclear weapons

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 37/100 A of 13 December 1982, 38/73 B of 15 December 1983, 39/63 G of 12 December 1984, 40/151 E of 16 December 1985 and 41/60 E of 3 December 1986 concerning a freeze on nuclear weapons,

Convinced that in this nuclear age lasting world peace can be based only on the attainment of the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control,

Further convinced that the highest priority objectives in the field of disarmament have to be nuclear disarmament and the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction,

Recognizing the urgent need to halt the arms race, particularly in nuclear weapons,

Recognizing further the urgent need for a negotiated reduction of nuclear-weapon stockpiles leading to their complete elimination,

Noting with deep concern that nuclear-weapon States have not so far taken any action in response to the call made in the above-mentioned resolutions,

1. Once again calls upon all nuclear-weapon States to agree to a freeze on nuclear weapons, which would, inter alia, provide for a simultaneous total stoppage of any further production of nuclear weapons and a complete cut-off in the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes;

2. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-third session the item entitled "Freeze on nuclear weapons".

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C

Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons

The General Assembly,

Alarmed by the threat to the survival of mankind and to the life-sustaining system posed by nuclear weapons and by their use, inherent in concepts of deterrence,

Conscious of an increased danger of nuclear war as a result of the intensification of the nuclear-arms race and the serious deterioration of the international situation,

/...

Convinced that nuclear disarmament is essential for the prevention of nuclear war and for the strengthening of international peace and security,

Further convinced that a prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would be a step towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons leading to general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Recalling that in paragraph 58 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 1/ it is stated that all States should actively participate in efforts to bring about conditions in international relations among States in which a code of peaceful conduct of nations in international affairs could be agreed upon and that would preclude the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Reaffirming that the use of nuclear weapons would be a violation of the Charter of the United Nations and a crime against humanity, as declared in its resolutions 1653 (XVI) of 24 November 1961, 33/71 B of 14 December 1978, 34/83 G of 11 December 1979, 35/152 D of 12 December 1980 and 36/92 I of 9 December 1981,

Noting with regret that the Conference on Disarmament, during its 1987 session, was not able to undertake negotiations with a view to achieving agreement on an international convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances, taking as a basis the text annexed to General Assembly resolution 41/60 F of 3 December 1986,

1. Reiterates its request to the Conference on Disarmament to commence negotiations, as a matter of priority, in order to reach agreement on an international convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances, taking as a basis the draft Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons annexed to the present resolution;

2. Further requests the Conference on Disarmament to report to the General Assembly at its forty-third session on the results of those negotiations.

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ANNEX

Draft Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons

The States Parties to this Convention,

Alarmed by the threat to the very survival of mankind posed by the existence of nuclear weapons,

/...

Convinced that any use of nuclear weapons constitutes a violation of the Charter of the United Nations and a crime against humanity,

Convinced that this Convention would be a step towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons leading to general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Determined to continue negotiations for the achievement of this goal,

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1

The States Parties to this Convention solemnly undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons under any circumstances.

Article 2

This Convention shall be of unlimited duration.

Article 3

1. This Convention shall be open to all States for signature. Any State that does not sign the Convention before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time.
2. This Convention shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification or accession shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
3. This Convention shall enter into force on the deposit of instruments of ratification by twenty-five Governments, including the Governments of the five nuclear-weapon States, in accordance with paragraph 2 of this article.
4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited after the entry into force of this Convention, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.
5. The depositary shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or accession and the date of the entry into force of this Convention, as well as of the receipt of other notices.
6. This Convention shall be registered by the depositary in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

/...

Article 4

This Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall send duly certified copies thereof to the Government of the signatory and acceding States.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorized thereto by their respective Governments, have signed this Convention, opened for signature at _____ on the ____ day of _____ one thousand nine hundred and _____.

D

United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 39/63 J of 12 December 1984, in which it requested the Secretary-General to provide assistance to such Member States in the regions concerned as might request it with a view to establishing regional and institutional arrangements for the implementation of the World Disarmament Campaign, on the basis of existing resources and of voluntary contributions that Member States might make to that end,

Reaffirming its resolutions 37/100 F of 13 December 1982, 38/73 J of 15 December 1983 and 39/63 F of 12 December 1984 on regional disarmament,

Bearing in mind resolutions 40/151 G of 16 December 1985, which established the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, and 41/60 J of 3 December 1986, which established the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America,

1. Decides to establish the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia with headquarters at Kathmandu, on the basis of existing resources and of voluntary contributions that Member States and interested organizations may make to that end;

2. Decides also that the Centre shall provide, on request, substantive support for the initiatives and other activities mutually agreed upon by the Member States of the Asian region for the implementation of measures for peace and disarmament, through appropriate utilization of available resources, and shall co-ordinate the implementation of regional activities in Asia under the World Disarmament Campaign;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to take the necessary administrative measures to ensure the establishment and functioning of the Centre, including, to that end, the possible utilization of the existing United Nations infrastructure at Kathmandu with a view to the full employment of available resources;

/...

4. Invites Member States and interested organizations to make voluntary contributions to the Centre;

5. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its forty-third session on the implementation of the present resolution.

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E

Regional disarmament

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 37/100 F of 13 December 1982, 38/73 J of 15 December 1983, 39/63 F of 12 December 1984, 40/94 A of 12 December 1985 and 41/59 M of 3 December 1986, relating to regional disarmament,

Reaffirming that all States, in particular nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States, have the responsibility of halting and reversing the arms race,

Confirming the importance and potential effectiveness of regional disarmament measures taken at the initiative and with the participation of all the States concerned, in that they can contribute to the realization of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Stressing that any regional disarmament enterprise must take into account the specific conditions characteristic of each region,

Also stressing that it is for the countries themselves of a region to take appropriate initiatives in common and to prepare agreements that will allow the achievement of regional disarmament,

Further stressing that disarmament efforts in a region cannot be isolated either from the disarmament efforts in other regions or from global disarmament efforts both in the nuclear and conventional field,

Taking into account the decisions and recommendations appearing in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 1/ particularly in paragraph 114,

Aware of those studies which have already been carried out and of the views of States which are of interest for regional disarmament,

1. Expresses its thanks to the Secretary-General for his report submitted pursuant to resolution 39/63 F; 2/

2. Notes with satisfaction the importance of the regional measures that have already been adopted and the regional efforts undertaken in the field of nuclear and conventional disarmament;

3. Encourages States to consider and develop as far as possible regional solutions in the matter of arms reduction and disarmament;

4. Invites all States and regional institutions associated with regional disarmament efforts to report thereon to the Secretary-General;

5. Requests the United Nations to lend its assistance to States and regional institutions that may request it, with a view to the institution of measures within the framework of an effort for regional disarmament;

6. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the General Assembly regularly informed of the implementation of resolutions on regional disarmament and of the activities which the Secretariat, in particular the Department for Disarmament Affairs, and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research are conducting in the field of regional disarmament;

7. Also requests the Secretary-General to bring the present resolution to the attention of the General Assembly at its third special session devoted to disarmament;

8. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-fourth session the item entitled "Regional disarmament: report of the Secretary-General".

84th plenary meeting
30 November 1987

F

Consideration of guidelines for confidence-building measures

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 41/60 C of 3 December 1986, as well as the relevant paragraphs of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 1/

Considering that growing positive and concrete experience with confidence-building measures could facilitate reaching final consensus on the draft guidelines for confidence-building measures, as contained in the 1986 report of the Disarmament Commission, 3/

3/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-first Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/41/42), annex II.

Noting with satisfaction that the concept of confidence-building as an important instrument for the strengthening of international peace and security and for promoting and facilitating the attainment of disarmament measures meets with growing acceptance among States,

Requests the Disarmament Commission to consider, at its 1988 session, the "Draft guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures and for the implementation of such measures on a global or regional level", with a view to finalizing them in the most expeditious manner to be determined by that body.

84th plenary meeting
30 November 1987

G

World Disarmament Campaign

The General Assembly,

Recalling that in paragraph 15 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 1/ the first special session devoted to disarmament, it declared that it was essential that not only Governments but also the peoples of the world recognize and understand the dangers in the present situation and stressed the importance of mobilizing world public opinion on behalf of disarmament,

Recalling also its resolutions 35/152 I of 12 December 1980, 36/92 C of 9 December 1981, 37/100 I of 13 December 1982, 38/73 D of 15 December 1983, 39/63 D of 12 December 1984, 40/151 B of 16 December 1985 and 41/60 B of 3 December 1986, as well as the reports of the Secretary-General of 17 September 1981, 4/ 11 June 1982, 5/ 3 November 1982, 6/ 30 August 1983, 7/ 4 October 1985, 8/ 19 September 1986 9/ and 28 September 1987, 10/

Having examined the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the programme of activities of the World Disarmament Campaign by the United Nations

4/ A/36/458.

5/ A/S-12/27.

6/ A/37/548.

7/ A/38/349.

8/ A/40/443.

9/ A/41/554.

10/ A/42/543.

/...

system during 1987 and the activities contemplated for 1988, as well as its main financial aspects, 10/

Having also examined the part of the report of the Secretary-General dealing with the activities of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies relating to the implementation of the World Disarmament Campaign, 11/ as well as the Final Act of the 1987 United Nations Pledging Conference for the Campaign, 12/ held on 26 October 1987,

Believing that the World Disarmament Campaign has an important role to play for a positive outcome of the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament by informing, educating and generating public understanding and support for the objectives of the United Nations in the field of arms limitations and disarmament,

1. Reiterates its commendation of the manner in which, as described in the above-mentioned reports, the World Disarmament Campaign has been geared by the Secretary-General in order to guarantee "the widest possible dissemination of information and unimpeded access for all sectors of the public to a broad range of information and opinions on questions of arms limitation and disarmament and the dangers relating to all aspects of the arms race and war, in particular nuclear war"; 13/

2. Recalls that, as was also agreed by consensus in the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly, the second special session devoted to disarmament, it is likewise an essential requisite for the universality of the Campaign that it receive "the co-operation and participation of all States"; 13/

3. Endorses once more the statement made by the Secretary-General on the occasion of the 1984 United Nations Pledging Conference for the World Disarmament Campaign 14/ to the effect that such co-operation implies that adequate funds be made available and that consequently the criterion of universality also applies to pledges, since a campaign without world-wide participation and funding will have difficulty in reflecting this principle in its implementation;

4. Reiterates its regret that most of the States that have the largest military expenditures have not so far made any financial contribution to the Campaign;

11/ A/42/611, paras. 9-19.

12/ A/CONF.142/1.

13/ See Official Records of the General Assembly, Twelfth Special Session, Annexes, agenda items 9-13, document A/S-12/32, annex V, para. 4.

14/ See A/CONF.127/SR.1.

5. Decides that at its forty-third session there should be a sixth United Nations Pledging Conference for the World Disarmament Campaign, and expresses the hope that on that occasion all those Member States which have not yet announced any voluntary contribution may do so;

6. Reiterates its recommendation that the voluntary contributions made by Member States to the World Disarmament Campaign Voluntary Trust Fund should not be earmarked for specific activities inasmuch as it is most desirable that the Secretary-General enjoy full freedom to take the decisions he deems fit within the framework of the Campaign previously approved by the General Assembly and in exercise of the powers vested in him in connection with the Campaign;

7. Notes with appreciation that the Secretary-General has given permanent character to his instructions to the United Nations information centres and regional commissions to give wide publicity to the Campaign and, whenever necessary, to adapt, as far as possible, United Nations information materials to local languages;

8. Requests the Secretary-General, in carrying out the activities of the Campaign contemplated for 1988, to give particular attention to the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament;

9. Requests the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its forty-third session a report covering both the implementation of the programme of activities of the Campaign by the United Nations system during 1988 and the programme of activities contemplated by the system for 1989;

10. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-third session the item entitled "World Disarmament Campaign".

84th plenary meeting
30 November 1987

H

Implementation of General Assembly resolution 41/60 I
on a nuclear-arms freeze

The General Assembly,

Recalling that in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 1/ the first special session devoted to disarmament, adopted in 1978 and unanimously and categorically reaffirmed in 1982 during the twelfth special session of the General Assembly, 15/ the second special session devoted to disarmament, the Assembly expressed deep concern over the threat to the very survival of mankind posed by the existence of nuclear weapons and the continuing arms race,

15/ See Official Records of the General Assembly, Twelfth Special Session, Annexes, agenda items 9-13, document A/S-12/32.

/...

Recalling also that, on those occasions, it pointed out that existing arsenals of nuclear weapons are more than sufficient to destroy all life on Earth and stressed that mankind is therefore confronted with a choice: halt the arms race and proceed to disarmament, or face annihilation,

Convinced of the urgency further to pursue negotiations for the substantial reduction and qualitative limitation of existing nuclear arms,

Considering that a nuclear-arms freeze, while not an end in itself, would constitute the most effective first step to prevent the continued increase and qualitative improvement of existing nuclear weaponry during the period when the negotiations take place, and that at the same time it would provide a favourable environment for the conduct of negotiations to reduce and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons,

Firmly convinced that at present the conditions are most propitious for such a freeze, since the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America are now equivalent in nuclear military power and it seems evident that there exists between them an overall rough parity,

Conscious that the application of the systems of surveillance, verification and control already agreed upon in some previous cases would be sufficient to provide a reasonable guarantee of faithful compliance with the undertakings derived from the freeze,

Convinced that it would be to the benefit of all other States possessing nuclear weapons to follow the example of the two major nuclear-weapon States,

1. Urges once more the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, as the two major nuclear-weapon States, to proclaim, either through simultaneous unilateral declarations or through a joint declaration, an immediate nuclear-arms freeze, which would be a first step towards a comprehensive programme of disarmament and whose structure and scope would be the following:

(a) It would embrace:

- (i) A comprehensive test ban of nuclear weapons and of their delivery vehicles;
- (ii) The complete cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons and of their delivery vehicles;
- (iii) A ban on all further deployment of nuclear weapons and of their delivery vehicles;
- (iv) The complete cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes;

/...

(b) It would be subject to appropriate measures and procedures of verification, such as those that have already been agreed by the parties in the case of the SALT I 16/ and SALT II 17/ treaties, those agreed upon in principle by them during the preparatory trilateral negotiations on the comprehensive test ban held at Geneva and those contemplated in the document on verification measures issued at the Mexico Summit on 7 August 1986 18/ and drawing upon the results of the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, in the Conference on Disarmament;

(c) It would be of an initial five-year duration, subject to prolongation when other nuclear-weapon States join in such a freeze, as the General Assembly urges them to do;

2. Requests the above-mentioned two major nuclear-weapon States to submit a joint report or two separate reports to the General Assembly, prior to the opening of its forty-third session, on the implementation of the present resolution;

3. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-third session an item entitled "Implementation of General Assembly resolution 42/39 H on a nuclear-arms freeze".

84th plenary meeting
30 November 1987

I

United Nations programme of fellowships on disarmament

The General Assembly,

Recalling its decision, contained in paragraph 108 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 1/ the first special session devoted to disarmament, to establish a programme of fellowships on disarmament, as well as its decisions contained in annex IV to the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly, 15/ the second special session devoted to disarmament, in which it decided, inter alia, to continue the programme and to increase the number of fellowships from twenty to twenty-five as from 1983,

16/ "Interim Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on certain measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms" (United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 944, No. 13445).

17/ "Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms" (see CD/53/Appendix III/Vol. I, document CD/28).

18/ A/41/518-S/18277, annex I, attachment.

/...

Noting with satisfaction that the programme has already trained an appreciable number of public officials selected from geographical regions represented in the United Nations system, most of whom are now in positions of responsibility in the field of disarmament affairs in their respective countries or Governments,

Recalling its resolutions 37/100 G of 13 December 1982, 38/73 C of 15 December 1983, 39/63 B of 12 December 1984, 40/151 H of 16 December 1985 and 41/60 H of 3 December 1986,

Recalling further that, in its resolution 40/151 H, it decided to consolidate the disarmament fellowship programme with the newly established regional disarmament training programme and disarmament advisory services programme under the Department for Disarmament Affairs, in the Office of the Under-Secretary-General of the Secretariat,

Noting with satisfaction that the programme, as designed, has enabled an increased number of public officials, particularly from the developing countries, to acquire more expertise in the sphere of disarmament,

Believing that the forms of assistance available to Member States, particularly to developing countries, under the United Nations programme of fellowships on disarmament will enhance the capabilities of their officials to follow ongoing deliberations and negotiations on disarmament, both bilateral and multilateral,

1. Reaffirms its decisions contained in annex IV to the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly and the report of the Secretary-General 19/ approved by resolution 33/71 E of 14 December 1978;

2. Requests the Secretary-General to implement the United Nations programme of fellowships on disarmament, including the advisory services and training programmes, within existing resources;

3. Expresses its appreciation to the Governments of the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, Sweden, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America for inviting the 1987 fellows to study selected activities in the field of disarmament, thereby contributing to the fulfilment of the overall objectives of the programme;

4. Commends the Secretary-General for the diligence with which the programme has continued to be carried out;

5. Decides to rename the three programmes consolidated pursuant to paragraph 3 of resolution 40/151 H "the United Nations disarmament fellowship, training and advisory services programme";

6. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its forty-third session on his assessment of the operations of the programme.

84th plenary meeting
30 November 1987

J

United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament
in Africa

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 40/151 G of 16 December 1985 and 41/60 D of 3 December 1986,

Taking note of the Political Declaration adopted by the Eighth Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Countries, held at Harare from 1 to 6 September 1986, in which the Heads of State or Government, inter alia, reaffirmed the need to strengthen the role of the regional bodies in mobilizing support for the World Disarmament Campaign and, in this regard, welcomed the establishment of the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa at Lomé, 20/

Bearing in mind resolution AHG/Res.164 (XXIII), 21/ adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its twenty-third ordinary session, held at Addis Ababa from 27 to 29 July 1987, by which it, inter alia, endorsed the Lomé Declaration on Security, Disarmament and Development in Africa and the Programme of Action for Peace, Security and Co-operation in Africa, 22/

Taking into account the report of the Secretary-General, 23/

1. Expresses its satisfaction that the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, inaugurated on 24 October 1986, has become operational;

2. Commends the efforts of the Secretary-General for taking the necessary measures to ensure the effective functioning of the Centre and requests him to continue to lend all the necessary support to the Centre;

20/ See A/41/697-S/18392, annex, sect. I, para. 58.

21/ See A/42/699, annex II.

22/ See A/40/761-S/17573, annex. For the printed text, see Official Records of the Security Council, Fortieth Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1985, document S/17573, annex.

23/ A/42/609.

/...

3. Expresses its gratitude to those Member States and international, governmental and non-governmental organizations which have already made contributions to ensure the functioning of the Centre;
4. Appeals once again to Member States, as well as to international, governmental and non-governmental organizations, to make voluntary contributions in order to strengthen the effective operational activities of the Centre;
5. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its forty-third session on the implementation of the present resolution.

84th plenary meeting
30 November 1987

K

United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and
Development in Latin America

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 41/60 J of 3 December 1986 on the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America,

Bearing in mind the report of the Secretary-General, 24/

1. Welcomes the inauguration at Lima on 9 October 1987 of the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America;
2. Also welcomes the promptness with which the Secretary-General has taken the necessary administrative measures to ensure the functioning of the Centre, and requests him to continue to give the Centre all necessary support;
3. Expresses its thanks to the host Member State for its valuable contribution to the functioning of the Regional Centre;
4. Believes that, in carrying out its activities, the Regional Centre will seek to promote relations of mutual trust and security between the countries of the region in a spirit of harmony, solidarity and co-operation for the implementation of measures for peace and disarmament, and for the promotion of economic and social development in Latin America;
5. Recommends that the Regional Centre hold, in 1988, a conference of experts on the strengthening of political co-operation in Latin America in the areas of peace, disarmament, development and security in the context of the World Disarmament Campaign;

6. Again calls upon Member States and international, governmental and non-governmental organizations to make voluntary contributions to the Centre;

7. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit that appeal to all Member States in order to ensure the normal functioning of the Regional Centre;

8. Also requests the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its forty-third session on the implementation of the present resolution.

84th plenary meeting
30 November 1987



General Assembly

Distr.
GENERAL

A/RES/42/40
22 December 1987

Forty-second session
Agenda item 64

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/42/752)]

42/40. Convening of the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament

The General Assembly,

Bearing in mind the decision, contained in paragraph 66 of the Concluding Document of its Twelfth Special Session, 1/ the second special session devoted to disarmament, concerning the convening of the third special session devoted to disarmament,

Reaffirming its resolution 41/60 G of 3 December 1986, in which it decided to convene its third special session on disarmament in 1988 and to establish an open-ended Preparatory Committee for the Third Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament,

Reaffirming the validity of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 2/ the first special session devoted to disarmament, and its conviction that disarmament remains one of the essential objectives of the United Nations,

1/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twelfth Special Session, Annexes, agenda items 9-13, document A/S-12/32.

2/ Resolution S-10/2.

Expressing its concern at the continuation of the arms race, which aggravates international peace and security and also diverts vast resources urgently needed for economic and social development,

Reiterating its conviction that peace can be secured through the implementation of disarmament measures, particularly for nuclear disarmament, conducive to the realization of the final objective, namely, general and complete disarmament under effective international control,

Having considered the report of the Preparatory Committee for the Third Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament, 3/

1. Decides that the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament shall be held from 31 May to 25 June 1988 at United Nations Headquarters in New York;

2. Endorses the report of the Preparatory Committee for the Third Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament and the recommendations contained therein;

3. Endorses also the recommendation of the Preparatory Committee that it meet in New York from 25 January to 5 February 1988 in order to consider substantive issues related to the session for incorporation in the document or documents to be adopted at the third special session devoted to disarmament, and any remaining organizational and procedural matters, with the understanding that the Preparatory Committee, at that session, would determine the need for a subsequent session;

4. Expresses its appreciation to the members of the Preparatory Committee for their constructive contribution to its work;

5. Requests the Preparatory Committee to submit its final report to the General Assembly at its third special session devoted to disarmament;

6. Requests all Member States engaged in bilateral, regional or multilateral negotiations on disarmament issues outside the framework of the United Nations to submit appropriate information on such negotiations to the General Assembly in accordance with paragraph 27 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly before the third special session devoted to disarmament;

7. Requests the Secretary-General to prepare necessary documentation, including background material, as may be requested by the Preparatory Committee for the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament;

3/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-second Session, Supplement No. 46 (A/42/46).

8. Requests the Secretary-General to render to the Preparatory Committee all necessary assistance for the completion of its work;

9. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-third session an item entitled "Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its third special session devoted to disarmament".

84th plenary meeting
30 November 1987



General Assembly

Distr.
GENERAL

A/RES/42/41
22 December 1987

Forty-second session
Agenda item 65

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/42/753)]

42/41. World Disarmament Conference

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 2833 (XXVI) of 16 December 1971, 2930 (XXVII) of 29 November 1972, 3183 (XXVIII) of 18 December 1973, 3260 (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3469 (XXX) of 11 December 1975, 31/190 of 21 December 1976, 32/89 of 12 December 1977, 33/69 of 14 December 1978, 34/81 of 11 December 1979, 35/151 of 12 December 1980, 36/91 of 9 December 1981, 37/97 of 13 December 1982, 38/186 of 20 December 1983, 39/150 of 17 December 1984, 40/154 of 16 December 1985 and 41/61 of 3 December 1986,

Reiterating its conviction that all the peoples of the world have a vital interest in the success of disarmament negotiations and that all States should be in a position to contribute to the adoption of measures for the achievement of this goal,

Stressing anew its conviction that a world disarmament conference, adequately prepared and convened at an appropriate time, could provide the realization of such an aim and that the co-operation of all nuclear-weapon Powers would considerably facilitate its attainment,

Recalling that, in paragraph 122 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 1/ the first special session devoted to disarmament, it was decided that, at the earliest appropriate time, a world

1/ . Resolution S-10/2.

disarmament conference should be convened, with universal participation and with adequate preparation,

1. Takes note with satisfaction of the report of the Secretary-General on the world disarmament conference, 2/

2. Expresses its gratitude to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference for his consultations with the representatives of the nuclear-weapon States, as well as with all other States, as requested in resolution 41/61;

3. Renews the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee;

4. Requests the Ad Hoc Committee to continue to maintain close contact with the representatives of the nuclear-weapon States, as well as with all other States, in order to remain currently informed of their positions on the question of convening a world disarmament conference, and to consider any relevant comments and observations that might be made, especially having in mind paragraph 122 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session;

5. Also requests the Ad Hoc Committee to report to the General Assembly at its third special session devoted to disarmament;

6. Further requests the Ad Hoc Committee to hold one session in 1988 of two days' duration for the preparation and adoption of its report to the third special session devoted to disarmament.

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30 November 1987

2/ A/42/542 and Add.1.



General Assembly

Distr.
GENERAL

A/RES/42/42
7 January 1988

Forty-second session
Agenda item 66

RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/42/754)]

42/42. Review of the implementation of the recommendations
and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its
tenth special session

A

Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war

The General Assembly,

Recalling that, in accordance with paragraph 20 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 1/ the first special session devoted to disarmament, effective measures of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war have the highest priority and that this commitment was reaffirmed by the Assembly as its twelfth special session, the second special session devoted to disarmament,

Recalling also that, in paragraph 58 of the Final Document, it is stated that all States, in particular nuclear-weapon States, should consider as soon as possible various proposals designed to secure the avoidance of the use of nuclear weapons, the prevention of nuclear war and related objectives, where possible through international agreement, and thereby ensure that the survival of mankind is not endangered,

1/ Resolution S/10-2.

Reaffirming that the nuclear-weapon States have the primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament and for undertaking measures aimed at preventing the outbreak of nuclear war,

Convinced that it is possible and necessary for mankind to block the way to a nuclear catastrophe and that the renunciation of the first use of nuclear weapons is a most urgent measure to this end,

Stressing that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought,

Recalling that in the Political Declaration adopted at the Eighth Conference of Heads of States or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Harare from 1 to 6 September 1986, all nuclear-weapon States were called upon to enter early into an internationally binding commitment not to be the first to use or to threaten to use nuclear weapons, 2/

Emphasizing that for the sake of international peace and security, military concepts and doctrines must be of a strictly defensive character,

1. Considers that the solemn declarations by two nuclear-weapon States made or reiterated at the twelfth special session of the General Assembly, concerning their respective obligations not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, offer an important avenue to decrease the danger of nuclear war;

2. Expresses the hope that those nuclear-weapon States which have not yet done so would consider making similar declarations with respect to not being the first to use nuclear weapons;

3. Requests the Conference on Disarmament to commence negotiations on the item "Prevention of nuclear war" of its agenda and to consider, inter alia, the elaboration of an international instrument of a legally binding character laying down the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons;

4. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-third session the item entitled "Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war".

84th plenary meeting
30 November 1987

2/ See A/41/697-S/18392, annex, sect. I, para. 47.

B

Review of the implementation of the recommendations and
decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth
special session

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 39/148 L of 17 December 1984, 40/152 J of 16 December 1985 and 41/86 J of 4 December 1986,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General on this subject submitted pursuant to resolution 41/86 J, 3/

Noting with concern that the problem identified in the above-mentioned resolutions has not been alleviated,

Firmly convinced that all States have a vital interest in the success of disarmament negotiations,

Bearing in mind paragraph 28 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 1/ in which it affirmed that all States have the duty to contribute to efforts in the field of disarmament and that all States have the right to participate in disarmament negotiations, as well as paragraphs 120 (g) and (h) of the Final Document,

Recalling further its resolution 38/183 F of 20 December 1983, in which it called upon the Governments of all States to contribute substantially, inter alia, to halting and reversing the arms race, particularly in the nuclear field, and thus to reducing the danger of nuclear war,

1. Reiterates once more the right of all States not members of the Conference on Disarmament to participate in the work of the plenary sessions of the Conference on substantive questions;

2. Urges States members of the Conference on Disarmament not to misuse the rules of procedure of the Conference so as to prevent States not members from exercising their right to participate in the work of the Conference;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its forty-third session on the progress made in the implementation of the present resolution.

84th plenary meeting
30 November 1987

C

Cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament

The General Assembly,

Recalling that, in paragraph 11 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 1/ the Assembly stated that the nuclear-arms race, far from contributing to the strengthening of the security of all States, on the contrary weakens it and increases the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear war and that existing arsenals of nuclear weapons are more than sufficient to destroy all life on Earth,

Recalling also that, in paragraph 47 of the Final Document, the Assembly expressed the belief that nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of civilization, that it is essential to halt and reverse the nuclear-arms race in all its aspects in order to avert the danger of war involving nuclear weapons, and that the ultimate goal in this context is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons,

Noting that, in the Political Declaration adopted by the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at New Delhi from 7 to 12 March 1983, it was stated that the renewed escalation in the nuclear-arms race, as well as reliance on doctrines of nuclear deterrence, had heightened the risk of the outbreak of nuclear war and led to greater insecurity and instability in international relations, and that it was also stated that nuclear weapons were more than weapons of war, that such weapons were instruments of mass annihilation, 4/

Noting further that, in the Political Declaration adopted by the Eighth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Harare from 1 to 6 September 1986, it was stated that the idea that world peace could be maintained through nuclear deterrence, a doctrine that lay at the root of the continuing escalation in the quantity and quality of nuclear weapons, was the most dangerous myth in existence, 5/

Believing that all nations have a vital interest in negotiations on nuclear disarmament because the existence of nuclear weapons in the arsenals of a handful of States directly and fundamentally jeopardizes the vital security interests of both nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States alike,

Welcoming proposals on the complete elimination of nuclear weapons throughout the world,

4/ See A/38/132-S/15675 and Corr.1 and 2, annex, sect. I, para. 28.

5/ See A/41/697-S/18392, annex, sect. I, para. 33.

Considering that it is necessary to halt all testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons of all types and versions and their delivery systems as a first step in the process that should lead to the achievement of substantial reductions in nuclear forces, and welcoming in this context the Joint Declaration issued on 22 May 1984 by the heads of State or Government of Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden and the United Republic of Tanzania, 6/ which was reaffirmed in the Delhi Declaration 7/ and the Mexico Declaration 8/ issued by the leaders of those States on 28 January 1985 and 7 August 1986, respectively,

Noting that in the Conference on Disarmament, at its 1987 session, several proposals were presented for the consideration of practical measures,

Regretting, however, that the Conference on Disarmament was unable to reach agreement on the establishment of an ad hoc committee on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament,

Convinced of the imperative need to take constructive action towards halting and reversing the nuclear-arms race,

1. Reaffirms that the existence of bilateral negotiations on nuclear and space arms in no way diminishes the urgent need to initiate multilateral negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament;

2. Believes that efforts should be intensified with a view to initiating, as a matter of the highest priority, multilateral negotiations in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly; 1/

3. Again requests the Conference on Disarmament to establish an ad hoc committee at the beginning of its 1988 session to elaborate on paragraph 50 of the Final Document and to submit recommendations to the Conference as to how it could best initiate multilateral negotiations of agreements, with adequate measures of verification, in appropriate stages for:

(a) Cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear-weapon systems;

6/ A/39/277-S/16587, annex. For the printed text, see Official Records of the Security Council, Thirty-ninth Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1984, document S/16587, annex.

7/ A/40/114-S/16921, annex. For the printed text, see Official Records of the Security Council, Fortieth Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1985, document S/16921, annex.

8/ A/41/518-S/18277, annex I, attachment.

(b) Cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, and of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes;

(c) Substantial reduction in existing nuclear weapons with a view to their ultimate elimination;

4. Requests the Conference on Disarmament to report to the General Assembly at its forty-third session on its consideration of this subject;

5. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-third session the item entitled "Cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament".

84th plenary meeting
30 November 1987

D

Prevention of nuclear war

The General Assembly,

Alarmed by the threat to the survival of mankind posed by the existence of nuclear weapons and the continuing nuclear-arms race,

Deeply concerned by an increased danger of nuclear war as a result of the intensification of the nuclear-arms race and the serious deterioration of the international situation,

Conscious that removal of the threat of nuclear war is the most acute and urgent task of the present day,

Reiterating that it is the shared responsibility of all Member States to save succeeding generations from the scourge of another world war, which would inevitably be a nuclear war,

Recalling the provisions of paragraphs 47 to 50 and 56 to 58 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly 1/ regarding the procedures designed to secure the avoidance of nuclear war,

Recalling also that at the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at New Delhi from 7 to 12 March 1983, it was stated that nuclear weapons were more than weapons of war, they were instruments of mass annihilation, 4/ and that at the Eighth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Harare from 1 to 6 September 1986, it was stated that the accumulation of weapons, in particular nuclear weapons, constituted a threat to the survival of mankind and that, therefore, it had become imperative

/...

that States abandon the dangerous goal of unilateral security through armament and embrace the objective of common security through disarmament, 9/

Recalling further its resolutions 36/81 B of 9 December 1981, 37/78 I of 9 December 1982, 38/183 G of 20 December 1983, 39/148 P of 17 December 1984, 40/152 Q of 16 December 1985 and, in particular, its resolution 41/86 G of 4 December 1986, in which it expressed its conviction that, in view of the urgency of the matter and the inadequacy or insufficiency of existing measures, it was necessary to devise suitable steps to expedite effective action for the prevention of nuclear war, and once more requested the Conference on Disarmament to undertake, as a matter of the highest priority, negotiations with a view to achieving agreement on appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war,

Having considered that part of the report of the Conference on Disarmament on its 1987 session relating to this question, 10/

Noting with grave concern that the Conference on Disarmament was once again unable to start negotiations on the question during its 1987 session,

Taking into account the deliberations on this item at its forty-second session,

Convinced that the prevention of nuclear war and the reduction of the risk of nuclear war are matters of the highest priority and of vital interest to all people of the world,

Also convinced that the prevention of nuclear war is a problem too important to be left to the nuclear-weapon States alone,

1. Notes with regret that, despite the fact that the Conference on Disarmament has discussed the question of the prevention of nuclear war for several years, it has been unable even to establish a subsidiary body to consider appropriate and practical measures to prevent it;
2. Reiterates its conviction that, in view of the urgency of the matter and the inadequacy or insufficiency of existing measures, it is necessary to devise suitable steps to expedite effective action for the prevention of nuclear war;
3. Again requests the Conference on Disarmament to undertake, as a matter of the highest priority, negotiations with a view to achieving agreement on appropriate and practical measures that could be negotiated and adopted individually

9/ See A/41/697-S/18392, annex, sect. I, para. 31.

10/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-second Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/42/27) sect. III.C.

for the prevention of nuclear war and to establish for that purpose an ad hoc committee on the subject at the beginning of its 1988 session;

4. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-third session the item entitled "Prevention of nuclear war".

84th plenary meeting
30 November 1987

E

International co-operation for disarmament

The General Assembly,

Stressing again the urgent need for an active and sustained effort to expedite the implementation of the recommendations and decisions unanimously adopted at its tenth special session, 1/ the first special session devoted to disarmament,

Recalling the Declaration on International Co-operation for Disarmament of 11 December 1979 11/ and its resolutions 36/92 D of 9 December 1981, 37/78 B of 9 December 1982, 38/183 F of 20 December 1983, 39/148 M of 17 December 1984, 40/152 I of 16 December 1985 and 41/86 K of 4 December 1986,

Stressing the vital need to proceed to balanced, mutually acceptable, comprehensively verifiable and effective measures towards halting the arms race and attaining disarmament, particularly in the nuclear field, for the preservation of peace and the strengthening of comprehensive international security,

Bearing in mind the vital interests of all States in the adoption of concrete effective disarmament measures, which would, through conversion, release considerable material, financial and human resources to be used for peaceful purposes and, with the assistance of the respective international machinery, particularly for overcoming economic underdevelopment in the developing countries,

Convinced of the need to strengthen constructive international co-operation based on the political goodwill of States for successful negotiations on disarmament, and on the increased openness in military matters in accordance with the priorities established in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 1/

Stressing that international co-operation for disarmament should, as a matter of priority, be aimed at averting nuclear war through the gradual elimination of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, the discontinuation of

11/ Resolution 34/88.

nuclear-weapon tests, the prevention of an arms race in outer space and conventional disarmament on a global scale, taking into account the characteristics of the different regions, and at confidence-building as an indispensable component of relations among States,

Considering that the progress towards a nuclear-weapon-free world can be executed stage by stage in terms of both participation and armaments to be covered, with the steady strengthening of international security and stability,

Believing that a broader internationalization of all disarmament negotiations would be an important factor contributing to their success,

Noting with satisfaction an increased dynamism of the efforts of the international community to avert the nuclear threat and to make a genuine breakthrough in the field of disarmament,

Emphasizing that the two nuclear-weapon States possessing the most important nuclear arsenals should continue and further expedite their negotiations with a view to curbing the nuclear-arms race while mutually refraining from launching weapons into outer space,

Believing that all nuclear-weapon States should make their national contributions to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free world,

Conscious that in the nuclear space age the reliable security of all countries in all spheres of international relations can be ensured only by political means, through the joint efforts of all States,

1. Invites all States further to increase co-operation and to strive actively for meaningful disarmament negotiations on the basis of reciprocity, equality, undiminished security and the non-use of force in international relations, so that they may prevent the qualitative enhancement and quantitative accumulation of weapons, as well as the development of new types and systems of weaponry, especially weapons of mass destruction, and secure a meaningful and all-embracing disarmament process;
2. Stresses the importance of strengthening the effectiveness of the United Nations in fulfilling its central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament;
3. Emphasizes the necessity of refraining from the dissemination of any doctrines and concepts that may endanger international peace and security by justifying nuclear war;
4. Invites all States to consider, in a spirit of co-operation, ways and means to achieve a broader internationalization of the current disarmament negotiations;

/...

5. Declares that the use of force in international relations as well as in attempts to prevent the full implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples 12/ constitutes a phenomenon incompatible with the idea of international co-operation for disarmament;

6. Reiterates its profound conviction that outer space should be excluded from the sphere of military preparation and used exclusively for peaceful purposes, for the benefit of all mankind;

7. Appeals to States members of military groupings to promote, on the basis of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly and in a spirit of co-operation and openness, the gradual mutual limitation of their military activities as well as the reduction of their armed forces and armaments, thus creating conditions for their dissolution;

8. Calls upon all Member States and the international organizations concerned to continue to cultivate and disseminate, particularly in connection with the World Disarmament Campaign, launched by the General Assembly at its twelfth special session, the second special session devoted to disarmament, the idea of international co-operation for disarmament;

9. Calls upon the Governments of all States to contribute substantially to halting and reversing the arms race, particularly in the nuclear field, and thus to reducing the danger of nuclear war and to strengthening international peace and security.

84th plenary meeting
30 November 1987

F

Verification in all its aspects

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 40/152 O of 16 December 1985 and 41/86 Q of 4 December 1986,

Conscious of the urgent need to reach agreements on arms limitation and disarmament measures capable of contributing to the maintenance of peace and security,

Convinced that, if such measures are to be effective, they must be fair and balanced and acceptable to all parties, their substance must be clear and compliance with them must be evident,

12/ Resolution 1514 (XV).

/...

Noting that the critical importance of verification of and compliance with agreements is universally recognized,

Reaffirming its conviction, as expressed in paragraph 91 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 1/ adopted by consensus at that session, its first special session devoted to disarmament, that in order to facilitate the conclusion and effective implementation of disarmament agreements and to create confidence, States should accept appropriate provisions for verification in such agreements,

Reiterating its view that:

(a) Disarmament and arms limitation agreements should provide for adequate and effective measures of verification satisfactory to all parties concerned in order to create the necessary confidence and to ensure that they are being observed by all parties;

(b) The form and modalities of the verification to be provided for in any specific agreement depend upon and should be determined by the purposes, scope and nature of the agreement;

(c) Agreements should provide for the participation of parties directly or through the United Nations system in the verification process;

(d) Where appropriate, a combination of several methods of verification as well as other compliance procedures should be employed;

Recalling that:

(a) In the context of international disarmament negotiations, the problem of verification should be further examined and adequate methods and procedures in this field should be considered;

(b) Every effort should be made to develop appropriate methods and procedures that are non-discriminatory and that do not unduly interfere with the internal affairs of other States or jeopardize their economic and social development,

Believing that verification techniques should be developed as an objective means of determining compliance with agreements and appropriately taken into account in the course of disarmament negotiations,

Noting with satisfaction that part of the report of the Disarmament Commission relating to this question, 13/

1. Calls upon Member States to increase their efforts towards achieving agreements on balanced, mutually acceptable, comprehensively verifiable and effective arms limitation and disarmament measures;

13/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-second Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/42/42), para. 46.

/...

2. Encourages all States that have not already done so to communicate to the Secretary-General, not later than 31 March 1988, their views and suggestions on verification principles as invited by the General Assembly in its resolution 41/86 Q;

3. Urges individual Member States and groups of Member States possessing verification expertise to consider means by which they can contribute to, and promote the inclusion of, adequate and effective verification measures in arms limitation and disarmament agreements;

4. Requests the Disarmament Commission to conclude its consideration of verification in all its aspects at its 1988 substantive session, in the context of pursuing general and complete disarmament under effective international control, as a matter of critical importance in the negotiation and implementation of arms limitation and disarmament, with a view to the elaboration of concrete recommendations and proposals, as appropriate, regarding verification in all its aspects, including principles, provisions and techniques to promote the inclusion of adequate verification in arms limitation and disarmament agreements and the role of the United Nations and its Member States in the field of verification, and to report on its deliberations, conclusions and recommendations to the General Assembly at its third special session devoted to disarmament and at its forty-third session;

5. Requests the Secretary-General to prepare for the Disarmament Commission at its 1988 substantive session a compilation of the views received from Member States on the issue;

6. Also requests the Secretary-General to bring the present resolution to the attention of the General Assembly at its third special session devoted to disarmament;

7. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-third session the item entitled "Verification in all its aspects".

84th plenary meeting
30 November 1987

G

Report of the Disarmament Commission

The General Assembly,

Having considered the report of the Disarmament Commission, 14/

14/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-second Session,
Supplement No. 42 (A/42/42).

/...

Emphasizing again the importance of an effective follow-up to the relevant recommendations and decisions contained in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 1/ the first special session devoted to disarmament,

Taking into account the relevant sections of the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly, 15/ the second special session devoted to disarmament,

Considering the role that the Disarmament Commission has been called upon to play and the contribution that it should make in examining and submitting recommendations on various problems in the field of disarmament and in the promotion of the implementation of the relevant decisions of the tenth special session,

Recalling its resolutions 33/71 H of 14 December 1978, 34/83 H of 11 December 1979, 35/152 F of 12 December 1980, 36/92 B of 9 December 1981, 37/78 H of 9 December 1982, 38/183 E of 20 December 1983, 39/148 R of 17 December 1984, 40/152 F of 16 December 1985 and 41/86 E of 4 December 1986,

1. Takes note of the report of the Disarmament Commission;
2. Notes that the Disarmament Commission has yet to conclude its consideration of some items on its agenda, but notes also with appreciation the progress achieved on some of these;
3. Recalls the role of the Disarmament Commission as the specialized, deliberative body within the United Nations multilateral disarmament machinery that allows for in-depth deliberations on specific disarmament issues, leading to the submission of concrete recommendations on those issues;
4. Stresses the importance for the Disarmament Commission to work on the basis of a relevant agenda of disarmament topics, thereby enabling the Commission to concentrate its efforts and thus optimize its progress on specific subjects in accordance with resolution 37/78 H;
5. Requests the Disarmament Commission to continue its work in accordance with its mandate, as set forth in paragraph 118 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, and with paragraph 3 of resolution 37/78 H, and to that end to make every effort to achieve specific recommendations, at its 1988 substantive session, on the outstanding items on its agenda, taking into account the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly as well as the results of its 1987 substantive session;

15/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twelfth Special Session, Annexes, agenda items 9-13, document A/S-12/32.

6. Also requests the Disarmament Commission to meet for a period not exceeding four weeks during 1988 and to submit a substantive special report, containing specific recommendations on the items included in its agenda, to the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, as well as a report to the Assembly at its forty-third session;

7. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit to the Disarmament Commission the report of the Conference on Disarmament, 16/ together with all the official records of the forty-second session of the General Assembly relating to disarmament matters, and to render all assistance that the Commission may require for implementing the present resolution;

8. Also requests the Secretary-General to ensure full provision to the Commission and its subsidiary bodies of interpretation and translation facilities in the official languages, and to assign, as a matter of priority, all the necessary resources and services to this end;

9. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-third session the item entitled "Report of the Disarmament Commission".

84th plenary meeting
30 November 1987

H

Disarmament Week

The General Assembly,

Gravely concerned over the continuing arms race,

Stressing the vital importance of eliminating the threat of a nuclear war, ending the nuclear-arms race and bringing about disarmament for the maintenance of world peace and security,

Emphasizing anew the need for and the importance of wide and continued mobilization of world public opinion in support of halting and reversing the arms race, especially the nuclear-arms race, in all its aspects,

Taking into account the aspirations of the world public to prevent an arms race in space and to terminate it on Earth and to eliminate nuclear weapons and other types of weapons of mass destruction,

Urging all Member States not to interfere with the rights of their citizens to organize and participate in the anti-war and anti-nuclear-weapon-threat demonstrations and movement,

16/ Ibid., Forty-second Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/42/27).

/...

Noting with satisfaction the broad and active support by Governments and international and national organizations of the decision taken by the General Assembly at its tenth special session, the first special session devoted to disarmament, regarding the proclamation of the week starting 24 October, the day of the foundation of the United Nations, as a week devoted to fostering the objectives of disarmament, 17/

Recalling the recommendations concerning the World Disarmament Campaign contained in annex V to the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly, the second special session devoted to disarmament, in particular the recommendation that Disarmament Week should continue to be widely observed, 18/

Recalling also its previous resolutions relating to the question of Disarmament Week,

1. Takes note with satisfaction of the report of the Secretary-General 19/ on the follow-up measures undertaken by governmental and non-governmental organizations in holding Disarmament Week;
2. Expresses its appreciation to all States and international and national governmental and non-governmental organizations for their energetic support of and active participation in Disarmament Week;
3. Invites all States that so desire, in carrying out appropriate measures at the local level on the occasion of Disarmament Week, to take into account the elements of the model programme for Disarmament Week prepared by the Secretary-General; 20/
4. Invites Governments to continue, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 33/71 D of 14 December 1978, to inform the Secretary-General of activities undertaken to promote the objectives of Disarmament Week;
5. Invites the relevant specialized and other agencies to intensify activities, within their areas of competence, to disseminate information on the consequences of the arms race, especially the nuclear-arms race, and requests them to inform the Secretary-General accordingly;

17/ Resolution S-10/2, para. 102.

18/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twelfth Special Session, Annexes, agenda items 9-13, document A/S-12/32, annex V, para. 12.

19/ A/42/469.

20/ A/34/436.

6. Also invites international non-governmental organizations to take an active part in Disarmament Week and to inform the Secretary-General of the activities undertaken;

7. Further invites the Secretary-General to use the United Nations information organs as widely as possible to promote better understanding among the world public of disarmament problems and the objectives of Disarmament Week;

8. Requests the Secretary-General, in accordance with paragraph 4 of resolution 33/71 D, to submit to the General Assembly at its forty-third session a report on the implementation of the provisions of the present resolution.

84th plenary meeting
30 November 1987

I

Comprehensive programme of disarmament

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 38/183 K of 20 December 1983, 39/148 I of 17 December 1984 and 40/152 D of 16 December 1985, in which it requested the Conference on Disarmament to submit to the General Assembly at its forty-first session a complete draft of the comprehensive programme of disarmament,

Bearing in mind its decision 41/421 B of 14 September 1987, by which it took note of the report of the Conference on Disarmament, 21/ containing the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament 22/ concerning its work during the 1987 session of the Conference, and decided to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-second session the sub-item entitled "Comprehensive programme of disarmament: report of the Conference on Disarmament",

Noting that, in its report, the Ad Hoc Committee agreed to recommend to the Conference on Disarmament that the Committee be re-established at the outset of the 1988 session, with a view to resolving outstanding issues and concluding negotiations on the programme in time for its submission to the General Assembly at its third special session devoted to disarmament,

Noting further that the Conference on Disarmament agreed to that recommendation,

21/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-first Session, Supplement No. 27A (A/41/27/Add.1).

22/ Ibid., para. 4.

1. Regrets that the Conference on Disarmament was unable to complete the elaboration of the comprehensive programme of disarmament in 1987 and to submit a draft thereof to the General Assembly at its forty-first session;

2. Urges the Conference on Disarmament to resume the work on the elaboration of the comprehensive programme of disarmament at the outset of its 1988 session with a view to resolving outstanding issues and concluding negotiations on the programme in time for its submission to the General Assembly at its third special session devoted to disarmament, and, for that purpose, to re-establish its Ad Hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament.

84th plenary meeting
30 November 1987

J

United Nations disarmament studies

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 40/152 K of 16 December 1985 and 41/86 C of 4 December 1986,

Reaffirming the valuable contribution that United Nations studies can make to the discussion and consideration of disarmament issues,

Noting with appreciation the views of Member States contained in the report of the Secretary-General, 23/

Taking into consideration that the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies also functions as the Board of Trustees of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research,

Noting that the establishment of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research offers new opportunities regarding research in the field of disarmament,

1. Takes note with appreciation of the report of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies; 24/

2. Affirms that the final decision on how United Nations disarmament studies should be prepared rests with the General Assembly;

23/ A/42/363 and Add.1.

24/ A/42/300, annex.

3. Takes note of the conclusion of the Advisory Board that consensus should be the normal practice in study groups, but that the expression of differing opinions where views cannot be reconciled should be permitted;

4. Invites Member States to take note of the conclusions and recommendations of the Advisory Board in presenting proposals for disarmament studies or research.

84th plenary meeting
30 November 1987

K

Report of the Conference on Disarmament

The General Assembly,

Recalling the relevant portions of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 1/ the first special session devoted to disarmament, in particular paragraph 120 of the Final Document,

Bearing in mind that considerable and urgent work remains to be accomplished in the field of disarmament,

Convinced that the Conference on Disarmament, as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, should play a central role in the implementation of the Programme of Action set forth in section III of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session,

Having considered the report of the Conference on Disarmament, 16/ which the Conference adopted by consensus,

1. Takes note of the report of the Conference on Disarmament on its 1987 session;

2. Reaffirms the role of the Conference on Disarmament as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum of the international community;

3. Requests the Conference on Disarmament to intensify its work in accordance with the relevant provisions set forth in paragraph 120 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session;

4. Also requests the Conference on Disarmament to submit a report on its work to the General Assembly at its forty-third session;

5. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-third session the item entitled "Report of the Conference on Disarmament".

84th plenary meeting
30 November 1987

/...

L

Report of the Conference on Disarmament

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 34/83 B of 11 December 1979, 35/152 J of 12 December 1980, 36/92 F of 9 December 1981, 37/78 G of 9 December 1982, 38/183 I of 20 December 1983, 39/148 N of 17 December 1984, 40/152 M of 16 December 1985 and 41/86 M of 4 December 1986,

Having considered the report of the Conference on Disarmament, 16/

Convinced that the Conference on Disarmament, as the single multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, should play the central role in substantive negotiations on priority questions of disarmament and on the implementation of the Programme of Action set forth in section III of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 1/

Reaffirming that the establishment of ad hoc committees offers the best available machinery for the conduct of multilateral negotiations on items on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament and contributes to the strengthening of the negotiating role of the Conference,

Deploring the fact that, despite the repeated requests of the General Assembly and the expressed wish of the great majority of members of the Conference on Disarmament, the establishment of an ad hoc committee on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and on nuclear disarmament, as well as on the prevention of nuclear war, was once again prevented during the 1987 session of the Conference,

Expressing its deep concern and disappointment that the Conference on Disarmament has not been enabled, this year either, to reach concrete agreements on any disarmament issues to which the United Nations has assigned greatest priority and urgency and which have been under consideration for a number of years,

1. Notes with satisfaction that further progress has been made in the negotiations on the elaboration of a draft convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction, and urges the Conference on Disarmament to intensify further its work with a view to completing negotiations on such a draft convention;

2. Calls upon the Conference on Disarmament to intensify its work, to further its mandate more earnestly through negotiations and to adopt concrete measures on the specific priority issues of disarmament on its agenda, in particular those relating to nuclear disarmament;

3. Once again urges the Conference on Disarmament to continue or to undertake, during its 1988 session, substantive negotiations on the priority questions of disarmament on its agenda, in accordance with the provisions of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly and other resolutions of the Assembly on those questions;

/...

4. Calls upon the Conference on Disarmament to provide the existing ad hoc committees with appropriate negotiating mandates and to establish, as a matter of urgency, the ad hoc committees under item 1 of its agenda, entitled "Nuclear-test ban", on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament and on the prevention of nuclear war;

5. Urges the Conference on Disarmament to undertake, without further delay, negotiations with a view to elaborating a draft treaty on a nuclear-test ban;

6. Requests the Conference on Disarmament to submit a special report on the status of its negotiations and its work to the General Assembly at its third special session devoted to disarmament;

7. Requests the Conference on Disarmament to submit a report on its work to the General Assembly at its forty-third session;

8. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-third session the item entitled "Report of the Conference on Disarmament".

84th plenary meeting
30 November 1987

M

Implementation of the recommendations and decisions
of the tenth special session

The General Assembly,

Having reviewed the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session, 1/ the first special session devoted to disarmament, as well as the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly, 15/ the second special session devoted to disarmament,

Recalling its resolutions S-10/2 of 30 June 1978, 34/83 C of 11 December 1979, 35/46 of 3 December 1980, 35/152 E of 12 December 1980, 36/92 M of 9 December 1981, 37/78 F of 9 December 1982, 38/183 H of 20 December 1983, 39/148 O of 17 December 1984, 40/152 N of 16 December 1985 and 41/86 O of 4 December 1986 and its decision S-12/24 of 10 July 1982,

Deeply concerned that no concrete results regarding the implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the tenth special session have been realized in the course of the more than nine years since that session,

Convinced that international peace and security can be ensured only through general and complete disarmament under effective international control and that one of the most urgent tasks is to halt and reverse the arms race and to undertake concrete measures of disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, and that, in this respect, the nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States have the primary responsibility,

/...

Noting with satisfaction that the two leading nuclear-weapon States have reached an agreement in principle on the elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles,

Convinced that the conclusion of a treaty on the elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles would positively affect the overall negotiations on disarmament,

Stressing once again that the active participation of Member States in effective disarmament negotiations is necessary for discharging their responsibility to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, that all States have the right to contribute to efforts in the field of disarmament, that it is more than ever imperative in the present circumstances to give a new impetus to negotiations on disarmament, in particular nuclear disarmament, at all levels and to achieve genuine progress in the immediate future, and that all States should refrain from any actions that have or may have negative effects on the outcome of disarmament negotiations,

Reaffirming that the United Nations has a central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament,

Stressing that the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 1/ which was unanimously and categorically reaffirmed by all Member States at the twelfth special session as the comprehensive basis for efforts towards halting and reversing the arms race, retains all its validity and that the objectives and measures contained therein still represent one of the most important and urgent goals to be achieved,

1. Invites all States, particularly nuclear-weapon States and especially those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, to take urgent measures with a view to implementing the recommendations and decisions contained in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, as well as to fulfilling the priority tasks set forth in the Programme of Action contained in section III of the Final Document;

2. Calls upon all States, in particular nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States, to take urgent measures in order to promote international security on the basis of disarmament, to halt and reverse the arms race and to launch a process of genuine disarmament;

3. Calls upon the two leading nuclear-weapon States to intensify and pursue their negotiations with determination and taking into account the interest of the entire international community, in order to halt the arms race, particularly the nuclear-arms race, to reduce substantially their nuclear arsenals, prevent the arms race in outer space and undertake effective measures of nuclear disarmament;

4. Calls upon the Conference on Disarmament to proceed urgently to negotiations on the questions of disarmament on its agenda;

/...

5. Calls upon the Disarmament Commission to intensify its work in accordance with its mandate with a view to making concrete recommendations on specific items on its agenda;

6. Invites all States engaged in disarmament and arms limitation negotiations outside the framework of the United Nations to keep the General Assembly and the Conference on Disarmament informed on the status and/or results of such negotiations, in conformity with the relevant provisions of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session;

7. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-third session the item entitled "Implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the tenth special session".

84th plenary meeting
30 November 1987

N

Rationalization of the work of the First Committee

The General Assembly,

Reaffirming that, in order for the United Nations to discharge effectively its central role and primary responsibilities in the field of disarmament and related security questions, the necessary political will of States as well as the effective functioning of existing machinery must be demonstrated,

Convinced that the existing machinery for the consideration of disarmament and related international security questions within the framework of the United Nations can and should be reinforced through concrete measures to increase its effectiveness and efficiency,

Emphasizing the need to strengthen the effectiveness and efficiency of the activities of the First Committee as the key organ of the General Assembly for disarmament and related international security questions,

Acknowledging the valuable proposals already introduced with the above-mentioned goal in mind, including those of the group of former and present chairmen and other officers of the First Committee,

Taking into account the report of the Disarmament Commission, 25/

1. Decides to adopt the following recommendations concerning the work of the First Committee:

25/ See Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-second Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/42/42).

/...

(a) The agenda of the First Committee should be rationalized by grouping or merging related items to the extent possible in order to provide greater organizational clarity and without prejudging their substance;

(b) Recommendations on procedural matters should be adopted as decisions, not as resolutions;

(c) In the interest of maximum effectiveness and efficiency, draft resolutions on the same subject or under the same agenda items should be merged, whenever possible;

(d) A period of time for discussion and for organized informal consultations among delegations should be allocated in the programme of work of the First Committee;

(e) The First Committee should have a single general debate on all disarmament questions during which delegations may speak on specific issues, in order to ensure the best use of time and resources available;

(f) The deadline for the submission of draft resolutions on disarmament items should be advanced further to the extent feasible with a view to allowing sufficient time for consultations before proceeding to take action upon them;

2. Requests the First Committee to implement the above-mentioned recommendations at the forty-third session of the General Assembly.

84th plenary meeting
30 November 1987



General Assembly

Distr.
GENERAL

A/RES/42/43
7 January 1988

Forty-second session
Agenda item 67

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/42/755)]

42/43. Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace

The General Assembly,

Recalling the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, contained in its resolution 2832 (XXVI) of 16 December 1971, and recalling also its resolutions 2992 (XXVII) of 15 December 1972, 3080 (XXVIII) of 6 December 1973, 3259 A (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3468 (XXX) of 11 December 1975, 31/88 of 14 December 1976, 32/86 of 12 December 1977, S-10/2 of 30 June 1978, 33/68 of 14 December 1978, 34/80 A and B of 11 December 1979, 35/150 of 12 December 1980, 36/90 of 9 December 1981, 37/96 of 13 December 1982, 38/185 of 20 December 1983, 39/149 of 17 December 1984, 40/153 of 16 December 1985, 41/87 of 4 December 1986 and other relevant resolutions,

Recalling further the report of the Meeting of the Littoral and Hinterland States of the Indian Ocean, 1/

1. Takes note of the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean 2/ and the exchange of views in the Committee;

2. Takes note of the discussions on substantive issues in the Working Group established in accordance with the Ad Hoc Committee's decision of 11 July 1985;

1/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 45 (A/34/45 and Corr.1).

2/ Ibid., Forty-second Session, Supplement No. 29 (A/42/29).

3. Emphasizes its decision to convene the Conference on the Indian Ocean at Colombo, as a necessary step for the implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace adopted in 1971;

4. Renews the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee as defined in the relevant resolutions, and requests the Committee to intensify its work with regard to the implementation of its mandate;

5. Requests the Ad Hoc Committee to hold three preparatory sessions in 1988, each of a duration of one week, one session of which could be held at Colombo in accordance with a decision to be taken by the Ad Hoc Committee at its first session in 1988;

6. Requests the Ad Hoc Committee, should the preparatory work not be completed to enable the convening of the Conference in 1988, to complete the remaining work during its subsequent sessions in order to enable the convening of the Conference at Colombo at an early date, but not later than 1990, in consultation with the host country;

7. Notes that the Ad Hoc Committee will, during its preparatory sessions in 1988, give serious consideration to ways and means of more effectively organizing work in the Ad Hoc Committee to enable it to fulfil its mandate;

8. Requests the Ad Hoc Committee to submit to the Conference a report on its preparatory work;

9. Requests the Ad Hoc Committee to present a report on its work to the General Assembly at its third special session devoted to disarmament;

10. Requests the Ad Hoc Committee to submit to the General Assembly at its forty-third session a full report on the implementation of the present resolution;

11. Requests the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee to continue his consultations on the participation in the work of the Committee by States Members of the United Nations which are not members of the Committee, with the aim of resolving this matter at the earliest possible date;

12. Requests the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee to consult the Secretary-General at the appropriate time on the establishment of a secretariat for the Conference;

13. Requests the Secretary-General to continue to render all necessary assistance to the Ad Hoc Committee, including the provision of summary records, in recognition of its preparatory function, as well as verbatim transcripts for a possible meeting at Colombo.

85th plenary meeting
30 November 1987



General Assembly

Distr.
GENERAL

A/RES/42/44
7 January 1988

Forty-second session
Agenda item 68

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/42/756)]

42/44. Israeli nuclear armament

The General Assembly,

Bearing in mind its previous resolutions on Israeli nuclear armament, the latest of which is 41/93 of 4 December 1986,

Recalling resolution 41/48 of 3 December 1986, in which, inter alia, it called for placing all nuclear facilities in the region under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, pending the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East,

Recalling further Security Council resolution 487 (1981) of 19 June 1981, in which, inter alia, the Council called upon Israel urgently to place all its nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards,

Noting that only Israel has been specifically called upon by the Security Council to place its nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards,

Taking note with appreciation of the report of the Secretary-General on Israeli nuclear armament, 1/

1/ A/42/581.

Noting with grave concern Israel's persistent refusal to commit itself not to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons, despite repeated calls by the General Assembly, the Security Council and the International Atomic Energy Agency,

Taking into consideration resolution GC (XXXI)/RES/470 adopted by the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency, in which it called upon Israel to place all its nuclear facilities under Agency safeguards,

Deeply alarmed by recent information in regard to the continuing production, development and acquisition of nuclear weapons by Israel,

Aware of the grave consequences that endanger international peace and security as a result of Israel's development and acquisition of nuclear weapons and Israel's collaboration with South Africa to develop nuclear weapons and their delivery systems,

Deeply concerned that the declared Israeli policy of attacking and destroying nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes is a part of its nuclear armament policy,

1. Reiterates its condemnation of Israel's refusal to renounce any possession of nuclear weapons;
2. Reiterates also its condemnation of the co-operation between Israel and South Africa;
3. Requests once more the Security Council to take urgent and effective measures to ensure that Israel complies with Council resolution 487 (1981);
4. Calls upon all States and organizations that have not yet done so to discontinue co-operating with and giving assistance to Israel in the nuclear field;
5. Reiterates its request to the International Atomic Energy Agency to suspend any scientific co-operation with Israel which could contribute to its nuclear capabilities;
6. Requests also the International Atomic Energy Agency to inform the Secretary-General of any steps Israel may undertake to place its nuclear facilities under Agency safeguards;
7. Requests the Secretary-General to follow closely Israeli nuclear activities and to report to the General Assembly at its forty-third session;
8. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-third session the item entitled "Israeli nuclear armament".

85th plenary meeting
30 November 1987



General Assembly

Distr.
GENERAL

A/RES/42/45
7 January 1988

Forty-second session
Agenda item 69

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/42/757)]

42/45. Relationship between disarmament and development

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 38/71 B of 15 December 1983, 39/160 of 17 December 1984 and 40/155 of 16 December 1985 and its decisions 40/473 of 20 June 1986 and 41/422 of 4 December 1986,

Recalling also the provisions of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 1/ the first special session devoted to disarmament, related to the relationship between disarmament and development,

Stressing that the holding of the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development in New York from 24 August to 11 September 1987 constituted a significant development in the process of the multilateral review, at a political level, of the relationship between disarmament and development,

1. Welcomes the adoption of the Final Document of the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development; 2/
2. Decides to have the report of the Conference brought to the attention of the Preparatory Committee for the Third Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament;

1/ Resolution S-10/2.

2/ United Nations publication, Sales No. E.87.IX.8.

3. Requests that Committee to include in the agenda of the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament an item entitled "Relationship between disarmament and development, in the light of the action programme adopted at the International Conference"; 3/

4. Requests the Secretary-General to take action through the appropriate organs, within available resources, for the implementation of the action programme adopted at the International Conference.

85th plenary meeting
30 November 1987

3/ Ibid., para. 35.

Decisions adopted on the reports of the First Committee

42/407. General and complete disarmament

At its 46th plenary meeting, on 21 October 1987, the General Assembly, on the recommendation of the First Committee, ^{1/} having noted the joint statement released by the United States of America and the Soviet Socialist Republics at the end of the meeting between the Secretary of State and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, held at Washington, D.C., from 15 to 17 September 1987, urged the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and of the United States of America to spare no effort in concluding, in accordance with the agreement in principle reached at that meeting, at the earliest possible date a treaty on the elimination of their intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles to be signed at a summit meeting to be held in the fall of 1987 between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev, as it was agreed, and to make a similarly intensive effort to achieve a treaty on 50 per cent reductions in their strategic offensive arms within the framework of the Geneva Nuclear and Space Talks.

^{1/} A/42/669, para. 10.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/794
27 January 1988

Original: ENGLISH, FRENCH
and RUSSIAN

LETTER DATED 26 JANUARY 1988 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK SOCIALIST REPUBLIC TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF THE DOCUMENT ENTITLED "TOWARDS INCREASING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT IN GENEVA" ADOPTED AT THE SESSION OF THE COMMITTEE OF THE MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE WARSAW TREATY MEMBER STATES HELD IN PRAGUE ON 28 AND 29 OCTOBER 1987

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of the document entitled "Towards Increasing the Effectiveness of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva" adopted at the Session of the Committee of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Warsaw Treaty Member States, held in Prague on 28 and 29 October 1987.

I should be grateful if you would take the measures necessary to have this text circulated as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed) Miloš Vejvoda
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Towards increasing the effectiveness of the
Conference on Disarmament in Geneva

Being firmly convinced that lasting peace and reliable security for all can be attained solely by political means, the member States of the Warsaw Treaty consider it of fundamental importance to ensure maximum effectiveness of the entire existing system of disarmament negotiations. Both bilateral and multilateral talks on security and disarmament must be centred upon questions relating to the halting of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament. It is necessary to activate the efforts of all States towards building up a nuclear-weapon-free and non-violent world.

The Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, in the work of which States of all continents, with different socio-economic systems, members of politico-military alliances, non-aligned and neutral countries, all the nuclear powers as well as non-nuclear-weapon countries have been participating on a footing of equality, has a special role to play in this endeavour.

That multilateral forum has proved that if political will is displayed on the part of States it is capable of performing the function of an organ negotiating in a concrete and effective manner formulation of measures and agreements in the sphere of disarmament. Thanks to the conference, such significant instruments of international law as the treaties on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the conventions on the prohibition of bacteriological weapons and on the prohibition of military use of environmental modification techniques have been prepared.

Yet, the results of the work of the Geneva forum in recent years have been far from being fully corresponding to the requirements of time.

The States participating in the session propose to concentrate the efforts at the present stage of the work of the Conference on Disarmament on the solution of the following crucial issues:

Completion of the drafting of the convention on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons. The member States of the Warsaw Treaty consider the speediest possible prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons to be one of the primary goals of their foreign policy. In this connection, they recall their statement adopted in Moscow in March 1987 as well as other significant initiatives. The work on the convention is coming close to the final stage. There is every prerequisite for its successful completion in the near future. The States participating in the session are ready for constructive co-operation with their partners in negotiations with the view of overcoming the remaining obstacles so as to make it possible to proceed soon to general and complete elimination of chemical weapons and of the industrial base for their production.

Progress towards complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. The member States of the Warsaw Treaty regard the halting of nuclear-weapon tests and their general and complete prohibition as measures of primary importance on the way to the halting of the arms race, as steps which might provide for a reliable blockage of the paths of sophistication of nuclear weapons. In this connection, they call attention to the document entitled "Basic Provisions of a Treaty on the Complete and General Prohibition of Nuclear-Weapon Tests" put

forward at the Conference on Disarmament in June 1987 and suggest to set up a special group of scientific experts who would prepare without delay practical proposals for a system of verification of refrainment from nuclear testing. The drafting of such an agreement within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament and the comprehensive Soviet-United States talks on limitation and, ultimately, complete prohibition of nuclear tests will be complementary to each other, pursuing one single objective. They are ready to consider in a constructive manner any other proposals and ideas aimed at a speedy solution of this issue.

The member States of the Warsaw Treaty believe that a solid foundation has been built at the Conference on Disarmament for practical and effective work in matters relating to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Socialist countries have put forward concrete proposals to that end.

The States participating in the session underline the need to activate the work of the conference also in other crucial directions, taking into account the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations which reflect the will of the overwhelming majority of States of the world.

They propose that all aspects of the work of the Conference on Disarmament be considered from all angles at the Third Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament with a view to increasing the effectiveness of the conference.

The Warsaw Treaty States stand up for identifying, through joint efforts, in the spirit of constructive, unconflictual dialogue, ways and means of achieving in the deliberations at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva better practical results. They propose to consider and agree upon the following practical measures:

Firstly, putting the work of the conference on a more intensive footing by making it work throughout the year with two or three breaks. Agreeing that the auxiliary organs of the conference, in accordance with its general mandate, should work not on a year-by-year basis but until their work is completed.

Secondly, providing for a more active involvement of experts and scientific centres existing in various countries in the work on the problems facing the conference. Applying on a broader scale, as may be required, the practice of setting up expert groups for individual spheres. Considering the question of engagement of world-renowned scientists and public officials in the efforts to find solutions to the most complex disarmament problems discussed by the conference and to ensure timely identification of the long-term factors which are of crucial importance to the strengthening of security. This might be done in various ways, especially by establishing at the conference a consultative council.

Thirdly, holding, on the basis of agreement among the parties to the conference, sessions at the level of ministers of foreign affairs in times of critical importance, including cases when difficulties of substantial nature will arise in the course of the deliberations. Sessions attended by ministers would give a positive impetus to progress in those significant talks.

The member States of the Warsaw Treaty consider it useful to enable all countries that are not parties to the Conference on Disarmament to contribute to its work. It is their opinion that the conference might become in the future a permanent universal organ of disarmament negotiations.

The States participating in the session point out that the talks on questions of security and disarmament which are conducted on multilateral as well as bilateral basis complement and enrich one another.

The member States of the Warsaw Treaty declare that they are ready to participate in a constructive manner in the consideration and implementation of all concrete proposals aimed at activating the Conference on Disarmament and increasing its effectiveness, regardless of where they come from.

Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons
to the Conference on Disarmament on its work during
the period 12-29 January 1988

I. INTRODUCTION

1. In accordance with the decision taken by the Conference on Disarmament at its 434th plenary meeting held on 27 August 1987, the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons resumed its work on 12 January 1988 under the Chairmanship of Ambassador Rolf Ekéus (Sweden). Mr. Abdelkader Bensmail, Senior Political Affairs Officer of the Department for Disarmament Affairs, continued to serve as Secretary of the Committee.

2. The Ad Hoc Committee held six meetings from 12-29 January 1988. In accordance with the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Committee, as contained in its Report to the Conference on Disarmament (CD/782), private consultations were conducted in Geneva by the Chairman, with delegations present, during the period 23-27 November 1987 and open-ended consultations of the Ad Hoc Committee were held between 30 November and 16 December 1987 in preparation for the resumed session.

3. The representatives of the following States not members of the Conference participated in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee: Austria, Denmark, Finland, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland and Turkey.

II SUBSTANTIVE WORK DURING THE RESUMED SESSION

4. In accordance with its mandate, the Ad Hoc Committee continued its work on the Convention. In particular, it considered the Annex to Article IV; Article VI and its Annexes; Article VIII; Article IX; Article X; and Article XI, utilizing Appendices I and II of the Report on its work in 1987 (CD/782), as well as proposals made by delegations, the Chairman of the Committee; by Mr. Philippe Nieuwenhuys of Belgium, Co-ordinator of Cluster I (issues pertaining to chemical weapons stocks); by Mr. Pablo Macedo of Mexico, Co-ordinator of Cluster III (issues pertaining to non-production of chemical weapons); and by Dr. Walter Krutzsch of the German Democratic Republic, Co-ordinator of Cluster IV (issues pertaining to the organization and functions of the Consultative Committee and its organs, as well as issues pertaining to consultation, co-operation and fact-finding, including challenge inspection).

*/ Re-issued for technical reasons.

III. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5. The results of the work undertaken during the resumed session are reflected in the updated versions of the Appendices to CD/782, attached hereto. Appendix I to this Report reflects the present stage of negotiations on the Convention; however, the draft texts contained therein do not bind any delegations.

6. The Ad Hoc Committee recommends to the Conference on Disarmament:

(a) That Appendix I to this Report be used for further negotiation and drafting of the Convention.

(b) That other documents reflecting the state of work of the Ad Hoc Committee, as contained in Appendix II to this Report, together with Appendix III and other relevant present and future documents of the Conference, also be utilized in the further negotiation and elaboration of the Convention.

APPENDIX I

Preliminary structure of a Convention on chemical weapons 1/

Preamble

- I. General provisions on scope
 - II. Definitions and Criteria
 - III. Declarations
 - IV. Chemical weapons
 - V. Chemical weapons production facilities
 - VI. Activities not prohibited by the Convention
 - VII. National implementation measures
 - VIII. The Organization
 - IX. Consultations, co-operation and fact finding
 - X. Assistance
 - XI. Economic and technological development
 - XII. Relation to other international agreements
 - XIII. Amendments
 - XIV. Duration, withdrawal
 - XV. Signature, ratification, entry into force
 - XVI. Languages
- Annexes and other documents

1/ Discussions are still continuing on where different issues like verification measures are to be placed under this structure.

Preamble 1/

The States Parties to this Convention

Determined to act with a view to achieving effective progress towards general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, including the prohibition and elimination of all types of weapons of mass destruction,

Desiring to contribute to the realization of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

Recalling that the General Assembly of the United Nations Organization has repeatedly condemned all actions contrary to the principles and objectives of the Protocol for Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925,

Recognizing that the Convention reaffirms principles and objectives of and obligations assumed under the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925, and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction signed at London, Moscow and Washington on 10 April 1972,

Bearing in mind the objective contained in Article IX of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction,

Determined for the sake of all mankind, to completely exclude the possibility of the use of chemical weapons, through the implementation of the provisions of this Convention, thereby complementing the obligations assumed under the Geneva Protocol of June 1925,

Considering that the achievements in the field of chemistry should be used exclusively for the benefit of mankind,

Convinced that the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, and their destruction, represents a necessary step towards the achievement of these common objectives.

Have agreed as follows:

1/ Some delegations consider that the texts contained in the Preamble require further consideration.

I. GENERAL PROVISIONS ON SCOPE

1. Each State Party undertakes not to:
 - develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons, or transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical weapons to anyone.
2. Each State Party undertakes not to:
 - assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in activities prohibited to Parties under this Convention.
3. Each State Party undertakes not to use chemical weapons. 1/ 2/
4. [Each State Party undertakes not to [conduct other activities in preparation for use of chemical weapons] [engage in any military preparations for use of chemical weapons].]
5. Each State Party undertakes to destroy chemical weapons which are in its possession or under its [jurisdiction or] control. 3/
6. Each State Party undertakes to [destroy] [destroy or dismantle] chemical weapons production facilities which are in its possession or under its [jurisdiction or] control.

1/ It is understood that this provision is closely linked to the definition of chemical weapons in another part of the Convention, the final formulation of which is yet to be agreed upon. It is also understood that this provision does not apply to the use of toxic chemicals and their precursors for permitted purposes still to be defined and to be provided for in the Convention. This provision is also closely linked to a provision in the Convention to be agreed upon relating to reservations.

2/ The question of herbicides is subject to ongoing consultations. The 1986 Chairman of these open-ended consultations has suggested the following formulation for a provision on herbicides: "Each State Party undertakes not to use herbicides as a method of warfare; such a prohibition should not preclude any other use of herbicides".

3/ The view was expressed that the application of this provision to the destruction of discovered old chemical weapons needs to be further discussed. Another view was expressed that the application of this provision does not allow for any exceptions.

II. DEFINITIONS AND CRITERIA

For the purposes of this Convention:

1.1/ The term "chemical weapons" shall apply to the following, together or separately: 2/

- (i) toxic chemicals, including super-toxic lethal chemicals, other lethal chemicals, other harmful chemicals and their precursors, including key precursors [and key components of binary and/or multicomponent chemical systems for chemical weapons], 3/ except such chemicals intended for purposes not prohibited by the Convention as long as the types and quantities involved are consistent with such purposes;
- (ii) munitions and devices, specifically designed to cause death or other harm through the toxic properties of those toxic chemicals, as referred to above, which would be released as a result of the employment of such munitions and devices;

1/ The definitions of chemical weapons are presented on the understanding that problems related to irritants used for law enforcement and riot control, and also to chemicals intended to enhance the effect of the use of chemical weapons if their inclusion in the Convention is agreed could be handled outside the definitions of chemical weapons if this will result in a more clear and understandable definition. Preliminary suggestions to solve these problems are given below and consultations on them will be continued.

2/ One delegation expressed its reservation on the present formulation of the definition of chemical weapons and on the terminology used in (i) that failed to reflect the general purpose criterion.

3/ Some delegations consider that further deliberation is required in order to clarify at a later stage of the negotiations the implications of this definition for other parts of the Convention. This applies to other relevant parts of the Appendix. Other delegations consider that key component of binary and/or multicomponent chemical system for chemical weapons means: a component which poses a special risk to the objectives of the Convention as it can be an integral part in a chemical weapons munition or device and can form toxic chemicals at the moment of their employment and possesses the following characteristics: (a) reacts (interacts) rapidly with other component(s) of binary and/or multicomponent chemical system during the munition's flight to the target and gives a high yield of final toxic chemical; (b) plays an important role in determining the toxic properties of the final product; (c) may not be used, or be used only in minimal quantities, for permitted purposes; (d) possesses the stability necessary for long-term storage.

- (iii) any equipment specifically designed for use directly in connection with the employment of such munitions or devices;
- [The term "chemical weapons" shall not apply to those chemicals which are not super-toxic lethal, or other lethal chemicals and which are approved by the Consultative Committee for use by a Party for domestic law enforcement and domestic riot control purposes.]
- [States Parties agree not to [develop, produce, stockpile or] utilize for chemical weapons chemicals intended to enhance the effect of the use of such weapons.]

[2. "Toxic chemicals" means:

chemicals [however or wherever they are produced], [whether produced in plants, munitions or elsewhere] [regardless of the method and pattern of production] whose toxic properties can be utilized to cause death or temporary or permanent harm, to man or animals involving:]

[2. "Toxic chemicals" means:

any chemical, regardless of its origin or method of production which through its chemical action on life processes can cause death, temporary incapacitation, or permanent harm to man or animals

Toxic chemicals are divided into the following categories:]

(a) "super-toxic lethal chemicals", which have a median lethal dose which is less than or equal to 0.5 mg/kg (subcutaneous administration) or 2,000 mg-min/m³ (by inhalation) when measured by an agreed method 1/ set forth in ... 2/

(b) "other lethal chemicals", which have a median lethal dose which is greater than 0.5 mg/kg (subcutaneous administration) or 2,000 mg-min/m³ (by inhalation) and less than or equal to 10 mg/kg (subcutaneous administration) or 20,000 mg-min/m³ (by inhalation) when measured by an agreed method set forth in ... 2/

[(c) "other harmful chemicals", being any [toxic] chemicals not covered by (a) or (b) above, [including toxic chemicals which normally cause temporary incapacitation rather than death] [at similar doses to those at which super-toxic lethal chemicals cause death].]

[and "other harmful chemicals" has a median lethal dose which is greater than 10 mg/kg (subcutaneous administration) or 20,000 mg-min/m³ (by inhalation).]

1/ It was noted that after such measurements had actually been performed, the figures mentioned in this and the following section might be subject to slight changes in order to cover sulphur mustard gas under the first category.

2/ Recommended procedures for toxicity determinations are attached in Appendix III.

3. Purposes not prohibited by the Convention means:

(a) industrial, agricultural, research, medical or other peaceful purposes, domestic law enforcement purposes; and military purposes not connected with the use of chemical weapons.

(b) protective purposes, namely those purposes directly related to protection against chemical weapons; 1/

4. "Precursor" means:

a chemical reagent which takes part in the production of a toxic chemical.

(a) "Key Precursor" means:

a precursor which poses a significant risk to the objectives of the Convention by virtue of its importance in the production of a toxic chemical.

It may possess [possesses] the following characteristics:

- (i) It may play [plays] an important role in determining the toxic properties of a [toxic chemicals prohibited by the Convention] [super-toxic lethal chemical].
- (ii) It may be used in one of the chemical reactions at the final stage of formation of the [toxic chemicals prohibited by the Convention] [super-toxic lethal chemical].
- [(iii) it may [is] not be used, or [is] used only in minimal quantities, for permitted purposes.] 2/

Key precursors are listed in ...

For the purpose of the relevant provisions in a Chemical Weapons Convention key precursors should be listed and subject to revisions according to [characteristics] [guidelines].

Chemicals which are not key precursors but are deemed to pose a [threat] [particular risk] with regard to a Chemical Weapons Convention should be included in a list.

1/ The suggestion that such permitted protective purposes should relate only to "an adversary's use of" chemical weapons was removed pending a decision on whether in the Convention the question of prohibiting other military preparations for use of chemical weapons than those mentioned under scope should be dealt with.

2/ The position of this paragraph should be decided in relation to how some chemicals, for instance, isopropylalcohol, are dealt with in the Convention.

[(b) Key component of binary and/or multicomponent chemical systems for chemical weapons means:]

[a key precursor which forms a toxic chemical in the binary or multicomponent weapons munition or device and which has the following additional characteristics (to be elaborated):]

5. "Chemical weapons production facility" means:

- Chemical weapons production facility means [any building or equipment designed, constructed or used [in any degree] for the production of chemical weapons] or for filling chemical weapons.
- Chemical weapons production facility means [any building or any equipment which in any degree was designed, constructed or used since 1 January 1946, for:

(a) the production for chemical weapons of any toxic chemical, except for those listed in Schedule [3], or the production for chemical weapons of any precursors;] or

(b) the filling of chemical weapons.

III. DECLARATIONS 1/

1. Each State Party shall submit to the Consultative Committee, not later than 30 days after the Convention enters into force for it, the following declarations:

(a) Chemical Weapons

- (i) whether it has any chemical weapons under its jurisdiction or control 2/ anywhere;
- (ii) whether it has on its territory any chemical weapons under the jurisdiction or control of others, including a State not Party to the Convention;
- (iii) whether it has transferred or received any chemical weapons and whether it has transferred to or received from anyone the control over such weapons since [1 January 1946] [26 March 1975].

(b) Chemical Weapons Production Facilities

- (i) whether it has [at the time of entry into force of the Convention for it] any chemical weapons production facilities under its jurisdiction or control anywhere or has had such facilities at any time since [1.1.1946];
- (ii) whether it has [at the time of entry into force of the Convention for it] any chemical weapons production facilities on its territory under the jurisdiction or control of others, including a State not Party to this Convention, or has had such facilities at any time since [1.1.1946];
- (iii) whether it has transferred or received any equipment for the production of chemical weapons [and documentation relevant to the production of chemical weapons] since [1.1.1946], and whether it has transferred to, or received from, anyone the control of such equipment [and documentation].

1/ The view was expressed that the Annex to this Article needs to be reviewed.

2/ It is agreed that the concept of "jurisdiction or control" requires additional discussion and elaboration. To facilitate work on the issue an informal discussion-paper dated 20 March 1987 was prepared, on the request of the Chairman of the Committee, by Dr. Bolewski (Federal Republic of Germany), Dr. Szénási (Hungary) and Mr. Effendi (Indonesia).

(c) Other declarations

The precise location, nature and general scope of activities of any facility and establishment 1/ on its territory or under its jurisdiction or under its control anywhere 2/ designed, constructed or used since [1.1.46] for development of chemical weapons, inter alia, laboratories and test and evaluation sites.

2. Each State Party making affirmative statements in regard to any of the provisions under subparagraphs 1a and 1b of this Article shall carry out all relevant measures envisaged in any or all of Articles IV and V.

1/ The scope of the phrase "any facility and establishment" is to be clarified and an appropriate formulation found.

2/ It is agreed that the concept of "on its territory or under its jurisdiction or under its control anywhere" requires additional discussion and elaboration.

IV. CHEMICAL WEAPONS

1. The provisions of this article and its Annex shall apply to any and all chemical weapons under the jurisdiction or control of a State Party, regardless of location, including those on the territory of another State.

2. Each State Party, within 30 days after the Convention enters into force for it, shall submit a declaration which:

(a) specifies the [precise location,] 1/ aggregate quantity and detailed inventory of any chemical weapons under its jurisdiction or control;

(b) reports any chemical weapons on its territory under the jurisdiction or control of others, including a State not Party to this Convention; 2/

(c) specifies any transfer or receipt by the State Party of any chemical weapons since [1 January 1946] [26 March 1975] or any transfer of control by that State Party of such weapons; and

(d) provides its general plan for destruction of its chemical weapons.

3. [Each State Party shall, immediately after the declaration under para. 2 of this Article has been submitted, provide access to its chemical weapons for the purpose of systematic international on-site verification of the declaration through on-site inspection. Thereafter, each State Party shall ensure, through access to its chemical weapons for the purpose of systematic international on-site verification and through on-site inspection and continuous monitoring with on-site instruments, that the chemical weapons are not removed except to a destruction facility.] 1/

4. Each State Party shall submit detailed plans for the destruction of chemical weapons not later than six months before each destruction period begins. The detailed plans shall encompass all stocks to be destroyed during the next coming period, and shall include the precise location and the detailed composition of the chemical weapons which are subject to destruction during that period.

5. Each State Party shall:

(a) destroy all chemical weapons pursuant to the Order specified in the Annex to Article IV, beginning not later than 12 months and finishing not later than 10 years after the Convention enters into force for it;

(b) provide information annually regarding the implementation of its plans for destruction of chemical weapons; and

(c) certify, not later than 30 days after the destruction process has been completed, that all chemical weapons have been destroyed.

1/ One delegation reserved its position on this question.

2/ A question was raised as to the applicability of this subparagraph.

6. Each State Party shall provide access to any chemical weapons destruction facilities and the facilities' storage for the purpose of systematic international on-site verification of destruction through the continuous presence of inspectors and continuous monitoring with on-site instruments, in accordance with the Annex to Article IV.

7. Any chemical weapons discovered by a State Party after the initial declaration of chemical weapons shall be reported, secured and destroyed, as provided in the Annex to Article IV. 1/ 2/

8. All locations where chemical weapons are [stored or] 3/ destroyed shall be subject to systematic international on-site verification, through on-site inspection and monitoring with on-site instruments in accordance with the Annex to Article IV.

9. Any State Party which has on its territory chemical weapons which are under the control of a State that is not a Party to this Convention shall ensure that such weapons are removed from its territory not later than ... months after the date on which the Convention entered into force for it.

10. The declaration, plans and information submitted by each State Party under this article shall be made in accordance with the Annex to Article III and the Annex to Article IV.

1/ Consultations were carried out on this issue. The results are reflected in CD/CW/WP.177/Rev.1. Different views were expressed, inter alia on the question of the responsibility for the destruction of these weapons. Further work is needed.

2/ For some delegations, the question of the applicability of this Annex to obsolete chemical weapons (ordnances) retrieved from the combat zones of World War I will have to be resolved later.

3/ One delegation reserved its position on this question.

V. CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION FACILITIES

1. The provisions of this article shall apply to any and all chemical weapons production facilities under the jurisdiction or control of a State Party, regardless of location. 1/

2. Each State Party with any chemical weapons production facility shall cease immediately all activity at each chemical weapons production facility except that required for closure.

3. No State Party shall construct any new facility or modify any existing facility for the purpose of chemical weapons production or for any other purpose prohibited by the Convention. 2/

4. Each State Party, within 30 days after the Convention enters into force for it, shall submit a declaration which:

(a) specifies any chemical weapons production facilities under its jurisdiction or control, or on its territory under the control of others, 3/ including a State not party to this Convention, at any time since [1 January 1946] [at the time of entry into force of the Convention];

(b) specifies any transfer or any receipt by the State Party of any equipment for the production of chemical weapons [and documentation relevant to the production of chemical weapons] since [1.1.1946] or any transfer of control by that Party of such equipment [and documentation];

(c) specifies actions to be taken for closure of each chemical weapons production facility;

(d) outlines its general plan for destruction [or reconstruction for peaceful purposes] for each chemical weapons production facility, and

(e) outlines its general plan for any temporary conversion of any chemical weapons production facility into a facility for destruction of chemical weapons.

5. Each State Party shall, immediately after the declaration, under para. 4, has been submitted, provide access to each chemical weapons production facility for the purpose of [systematic] international on-site verification of the declaration through on-site inspection.

1/ It is understood that the above provisions also apply to any facility on the territory of another State [regardless of ownership and form of contract, on the basis of which they have been set up and functioned for the purposes of production of chemical weapons].

2/ Some delegations consider this paragraph redundant.

3/ Some delegations expressed doubts as to the applicability of this phrase.

6. Each State Party shall:

(a) close within three months after the Convention enters into force for it, each chemical weapons production facility in a manner that will render each facility inoperable; and

(b) provide access to each chemical weapons production facility, subsequent to closure, for the purpose of systematic international on-site verification through periodic on-site inspection and continuous monitoring with on-site instruments in order to ensure that the facility remains closed and is subsequently [dismantled and] destroyed, or [dismantled] [and reconstructed for peaceful purposes].

7. Each State Party shall submit detailed plans for [destruction] [elimination] of each facility not later than [3 months] before the [destruction] [elimination] [conversion] of the facility begins. 1/

8. Each State Party shall:

(a) [destroy] [eliminate] all chemical weapons production facilities pursuant to [the [order] [schedule] specified in] the Annex to Article V beginning not later than 12 months, and finishing not later than 10 years, after the Convention enters into force for it; 2/

(b) provide information annually regarding the implementation of its plans for the [destruction] [elimination] of its chemical weapons production facilities, and

(c) certify, not later than 30 days after the destruction process has been completed, that its chemical weapons production facilities have been [destroyed] [eliminated].

9. A chemical weapons production facility may be temporarily converted for destruction of chemical weapons. Such a converted facility must be [destroyed] [eliminated] as soon as it is no longer in use for destruction of chemical weapons and, in any case, not later than 10 years after the Convention enters into force for the State Party.

10. [Each State Party shall submit all chemical weapons production facilities] [All chemical weapons production facilities shall be subject] to systematic international on-site verification through on-site inspection and monitoring with on-site instruments in accordance with the Annex to Article V.

11. The declaration, plans and information submitted by each State Party under this article shall be made in accordance with the Annex to Article V.

1/ One delegation held the view that the detailed plans in question should be submitted by each State Party within twelve months of the entry into force of the Convention for it.

2/ Some delegations expressed the desire to see the elimination of chemical weapons production facilities at the earliest opportunity.

VI. ACTIVITIES NOT PROHIBITED BY THE CONVENTION 1/ 2/

1. Each State Party:

(a) has the right, subject to the provisions of this Convention, to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, retain, transfer and use toxic chemicals and their precursors for purposes not prohibited by the Convention.

(b) shall ensure that toxic chemicals and their precursors are not developed, produced, otherwise acquired, retained, transferred, or used within its territory or anywhere under its jurisdiction or control for purposes prohibited by the Convention.

2. Toxic Chemicals and their Precursors:

(a) Toxic chemicals and their precursors considered in the Annexes to Article VI [1], [2], [3] and [4], which could be used for purposes prohibited by the Convention, as well as facilities which produce, process or consume these toxic chemicals or precursors, shall be subject to international monitoring as provided in those annexes:

Annex to Article VI [1] Schedule [1]: Super-Toxic Lethal Chemicals and [especially dangerous key precursors] [key components of chemicals weapons systems].

Annex to Article VI [2] Schedule [2]: Key Precursors.

Annex to Article VI [3] Schedule [3]: Chemicals produced in large commercial quantities and which could be used for chemical weapons purposes.

Annex to Article VI [4]: Commercial production of toxic chemicals not listed in Schedules [1], [2] or [3] that might be relevant to the Convention. 3/

1/ One delegation considers that the terminology used in this article and its annexes should be consistent with the final definition of chemical weapons to be agreed upon.

2/ One delegation expressed the view that the question of collection and forwarding of data and other information to verify non-production requires further consideration. This delegation made reference to the Working Paper CD/CW/WP.159 of 19 March 1987, which includes draft elements for inclusion in the rolling text.

3/ Some delegations consider that these chemicals should be dealt with in the Annex to Article VI [2] Schedule [2]. Other delegations consider that a separate Annex is required.

(b) The schedules of chemicals contained in the annexes may be revised. Modalities for revision are contained in the Annex to Article [VI] [O.]. 1/

3. Within 30 days of the entry into force of it, each State Party shall declare data on relevant chemicals and the facilities which produce them, in accordance with the Annex to Article VI [1], [2], [3] and [4]. 2/

4. Each State Party shall make an annual declaration regarding the relevant chemicals in accordance with the Annex to Article VI [1], [2], [3] and [4]. 2/

5. Each State Party undertakes to subject the chemicals and [facility] [facilities] under the Annex to Article VI [1] to the measures contained in that annex.

6. Each State Party undertakes to subject the chemicals and facilities under the Annex to Article VI [2] and [4] 2/ to monitoring by data reporting and routine systematic international on-site verification, through on-site inspection and use of on-site instruments as long as production and processing are not impaired.

7. Each State Party undertakes to subject the chemicals and facilities under the Annex to Article VI [3] to monitoring by data reporting.

8. The provisions of this article shall be implemented in a manner designed in so far as possible to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of parties to the Convention and international co-operation in the field of peaceful chemical activities including the international exchange of scientific and technical information and chemicals and equipment for the production, processing or use of chemicals for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of the Convention. 3/ 4/

9. In conducting verification activities, the (Consultative Committee) shall:

(a) avoid undue interference in the State Party's peaceful chemical activities;

(b) take every precaution to protect confidential information coming to its knowledge in the implementation of the Convention; 3/ and

1/ Furthermore, work was carried out on guidelines for considering inclusion of chemicals in Schedule [1]. The result of this work is enclosed in Appendix II to serve as a basis for future work.

2/ Some delegations consider that the chemicals in the Annex to Article VI [4] should be dealt with in the Annex to Article VI [2] Schedule[2]. Other delegations consider that a separate Annex is required.

3/ It was agreed that provisions to ensure the confidentiality of the information provided should be elaborated.

4/ The inclusion of this paragraph in this article is to be considered further.

(c) require only the minimum amount of information and data necessary for the carrying out of its responsibilities under the Convention.

10. For the purpose of on-site verification, each State Party shall grant to the (Consultative Committee) access to facilities as required in the Annex to Article VI [1], [2], [3] and [4]. 1/

1/ Some delegations consider that the chemicals in the Annex to Article VI [4] should be dealt with in the Annex to Article VI [2] Schedule [2]. Other delegations consider that a separate Annex is required.

VII. NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION MEASURES

Each State Party to this Convention shall adopt any measures it considers necessary in accordance with its constitutional processes to implement this Convention and, in particular, to prohibit and prevent anywhere under its jurisdiction or control any activity that a State Party to this Convention is prohibited from conducting by this Convention.

In order to implement these obligations, each State Party shall, according to its needs and specific conditions, designate or establish a national authority. 1/

Each State Party undertakes to inform the Consultative Committee concerning the national authority and other legislative and administrative measures taken to implement the Convention.

Each State Party undertakes to co-operate with the Consultative Committee in the exercise of all its functions and in particular to provide assistance to the Consultative Committee including data reporting, assistance for international on-site inspections, provided for in this Convention, and a response to all its requests for the provision of expertise, information and laboratory support.

National Technical Means 2/

1/ It was suggested that guidelines for the functioning of the national authority for the implementation of the Convention be elaborated.

2/ It was suggested that no reference to National Technical Means is needed in a future Convention.

VIII. THE ORGANIZATION 1/, 2/

A. General Provisions

1. The States Parties to the Convention hereby establish the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, to achieve the objectives of the Convention, to ensure the implementation of its provisions, including those for international verification of compliance with it, and to provide a forum for consultation and co-operation among States Parties. 3/
2. All States Parties to the Convention shall be members of the Organization.
3. The seat of the headquarters of the Organization shall be ...
4. There are hereby established as the organs of the Organization the [Consultative Committee] [General Conference], the Executive Council and the Technical Secretariat.

B. [The Consultative Committee] [The General Conference]

(a) Composition, procedure and decision-making

1. The [Consultative Committee] [General Conference] shall be composed of all the States Parties to this Convention. Each State Party to the Convention shall have one representative in the [Consultative Committee] [General Conference], who may be accompanied by alternates and advisers.
2. The first session of the [Consultative Committee] [the General Conference] shall be convened by the Depository at (venue) not later than 30 days after the entry into force of the Convention.
3. The [Consultative Committee] [the General Conference] shall meet in regular sessions which should be held annually unless it decides otherwise. It shall meet in special sessions, as the [Consultative Committee] [General Conference] may decide, at the request of the Executive Council or at the request of any State Party supported by [8-10] 4/ [one third of] the States Parties. When necessary a special session shall be convened at short notice.

1/ This Article is at an early stage of elaboration.

2/ One delegation has expressed reservations with regard to the approach being given to the concept of an Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, or any other similar solution for this purpose, and has expressed the view that before proceeding further in the examination of this question, there is a need to define the principles that will govern the financing of such an Organization.

3/ A view was expressed that the achievement of these objectives should be sought in close co-operation with the United Nations.

4/ A view was expressed that a smaller number of States Parties supporting such a request could also be sufficient.

4. Sessions shall take place at the headquarters of the Organization unless the [Consultative Committee] [General Conference] decides otherwise.
5. The [Consultative Committee] [General Conference] shall adopt its rules of procedure. At the beginning of each regular session, it shall elect its Chairman and such other officers as may be required. They shall hold office until a new Chairman and other officers are elected at the next regular session.
6. A majority of the members of the [Consultative Committee] [General Conference] shall constitute a quorum.
7. Each member of the [Consultative Committee] [General Conference] shall have one vote.
8. Decisions on questions of procedure, including decisions to convene special sessions of the [Consultative Committee] [General Conference], shall be taken by a simple majority of the members present and voting. Decisions on questions of substance shall be taken by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting unless otherwise specifically provided for in the Convention. When the issue arises as to whether a question is one of substance or not, that question shall be treated as one of substance unless otherwise decided by the [Consultative Committee] [General Conference] by the majority required for decisions on questions of substance. 1/ 2/

(b) Powers and functions

1. The [Consultative Committee] [General Conference] shall be the [principal] [supreme] organ of the Organization. [It shall consider any questions or matters within the scope of the Convention, including those relating to the powers and functions of the Executive Council and Technical Secretariat. It may make recommendations to States Parties on any such questions or matters.]
- [2. The [Consultative Committee] [General Conference] shall oversee the implementation of the Convention, promote and [assess] [review] compliance with it, deal with any issues in this respect raised by a State Party or brought to its attention by the Executive Council and make recommendations or take decisions as appropriate.]

1/ It has also been proposed that decisions should be taken by consensus, except as specified elsewhere and, if a consensus were not possible, by a simple majority of the members present and voting. It has also been pointed out that there should be no differentiation between decisions on questions of procedure and those of substance.

2/ A view was expressed that the report of a fact-finding inquiry should not be put to a vote, nor should any decision be taken as to whether a Party is complying with the provisions of the Convention.

[2. The [Consultative Committee] [General Conference], within the authority granted by this Article, shall make recommendations and decisions on issues raised by a State Party or brought to its attention by the Executive Council. The [Consultative Committee] [General Conference] shall also oversee the implementation of the Convention, and promote and [assess] [review] compliance with it.]

3. The [Consultative Committee] [General Conference] shall oversee the activities of the Executive Council and the Technical Secretariat and may issue guidelines in accordance with the Convention to either of them in the exercise of their functions.

4. In addition, the powers and functions of the [Consultative Committee] [General Conference] shall be:

- (i) To consider and adopt at its regular sessions the report of the Organization, consider other reports 1/ and consider and adopt the programme and budget of the Organization, submitted by the Executive Council;
- (ii) to [encourage] [promote] international co-operation for peaceful purposes in the chemical field;
- (iii) to review scientific and technological developments which could affect the operation of the Convention;
- (iv) to decide on the scale of financial contributions to be paid by States Parties; 2/
- (v) to elect the members of the Executive Council;
- (vi) to appoint the Director of the Technical Secretariat; 3/
- (vii) to approve the rules of procedure of the Executive Council submitted by the latter;

1/ It has been proposed that reports should be sent to the United Nations.

2/ The entire problem of the costs of the Organization needs to be considered.

3/ The option of candidates being proposed by the Executive Council and by States Parties for appointment should be discussed.

(viii) to establish such subsidiary organs as it finds necessary for the exercise of its functions in accordance with this Convention. 1/ 2/

(ix) ... 3/

5. The [Consultative Committee] [General Conference] shall, after the expiry of a period of ... years from the date of entry into force of this Convention, undertake a review of the operation of this Convention. 4/

[6. The Chairman of the [Consultative Committee] [General Conference] shall serve as Chairman of the Executive Council.]

C. The Executive Council

(a) Composition, procedure and decision-making

(To be elaborated)

(b) Powers and functions

1. The Executive Council shall be the executive organ of the [Consultative Committee] [General Conference], to which it shall be responsible. It shall carry out the powers and functions entrusted to it under the Convention and its Annexes, as well as such functions delegated to it by the [Consultative Committee] [General Conference]. In so doing, it shall act in conformity with the recommendations, decisions and guidelines of the [Consultative Committee] [General Conference] and assure their continuous and proper implementation.

2. In particular, the Executive Council shall:

[(a) ensure compliance through effective implementation of the verification provisions of the Convention;]

(b) supervise the activities of the Technical Secretariat;

(c) co-operate with the appropriate national authorities of States Parties and facilitate consultations and co-operation among States Parties at their request;

1/ It has been proposed that a Scientific Advisory Council be established as a subsidiary body.

2/ It has been proposed that a Fact-finding Panel be established as a subsidiary body.

3/ The question of functions relating to the implementation of Articles X and XI will be considered at a later stage. Other functions, e.g. the action to be taken in the event of non-compliance by a State Party, could be included as well.

4/ The convening of further review conferences, possibly at certain intervals of years, could also be provided for.

(d) consider any issue or matter within its competence, affecting the Convention and its implementation, [including concerns regarding compliance,] and inform, as appropriate, States Parties and the [Consultative Committee] [General Conference] of the result of its consideration;

[(e) consider and, if necessary, refer to the [Consultative Committee] [General Conference] cases of non-compliance.]

(f) consider and submit to the [Consultative Committee] [General Conference] the draft programme and budget of the Organization;

(g) consider and submit to the [Consultative Committee] [General Conference] the draft report of the Organization on the implementation of the Convention, the report on the performance of its own activities and such special reports as it deems necessary or which the [Consultative Committee] [General Conference] may request;

(h) conclude agreements with States and international organizations on behalf of the Organization, subject to approval by the [Consultative Committee] [General Conference], and approve agreements relating to the implementation of verification activities, concluded by the Director of the Technical Secretariat with States Parties;

(i) (i) meet for regular sessions. Between regular sessions, it shall meet as often as may be required for the fulfilment of its functions;

[(ii) elect its Chairman;]

(iii) elaborate and submit its rules of procedure to the [Consultative Committee] [General Conference] for approval;

(iv) make arrangements for the sessions of the [Consultative Committee] [General Conference] including the preparation of a draft agenda.

3. The Executive Council may request the convening of a special session of the [Consultative Committee] [General Conference]. 1/

1/ It has been proposed that the Executive Council should request the convening of a special session of the [Consultative Committee] [General Conference] whenever obligations set forth in Article I of the Convention are violated.

D. Technical Secretariat 1/

1. A Technical Secretariat shall be established to assist the Consultative Committee and the Executive Council in the performance of their functions, including technical assistance to States Parties. The International Inspectorate shall be part of the Technical Secretariat and carry out activities relating to the execution of international verification measures provided for in this Convention. Guidelines on the International Inspectorate are specified in ... 2/

2. The Technical Secretariat shall comprise a Director, who shall be its head, and inspectors and such scientific, technical and other personnel as may be required.

3. The Director of the Technical Secretariat shall be appointed for ... years by the Consultative Committee [upon the recommendation of the Executive Council] and shall be responsible to the Consultative Committee and the Executive Council for the appointment of the staff and the organization and functioning of the Technical Secretariat. The paramount consideration in the employment of the staff and in the determination of the conditions of service shall be the necessity of securing the highest standards of efficiency, competence and integrity. Only citizens of States Parties shall serve as international inspectors or as other members of the professional and clerical staff. Due regard shall be paid to the importance of recruiting the staff on as wide a geographical basis as possible. Recruitment shall be guided by the principle that the staff shall be kept to a minimum.

4. In the performance of their duties, the Director of the Technical Secretariat, the inspectors and the other members of the staff shall not seek or receive instructions from any Government or from any other source external to the International Authority. They shall refrain from any action which might reflect on their position as international officials responsible only to the Consultative Committee.

5. Each State Party shall undertake to respect the exclusively international character of the responsibilities of the Director of the Technical Secretariat, the inspectors and the other members of the staff and not to seek to influence them in the discharge of their responsibilities.

1/ One delegation noted that the positions, composition and functions of the Technical Secretariat will need further discussion and elaboration.

2/ Because of considerations under way in some capitals, the question of how to approach these guidelines will be decided later. For the convenience of delegations Attachment (A) of the Report of the Co-ordinator for Cluster IV (CD/CW/WP.175) is included as Addendum 1 to this Appendix.

IX. CONSULTATIONS, CO-OPERATION AND FACT-FINDING 1/

1. States Parties shall consult and co-operate, directly among themselves, or through the Consultative Committee or other appropriate international procedures, including procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter, on any matter which may be raised relating to the objectives or the implementation of the provisions of this Convention.

2. States Parties to the Convention shall make every possible effort to clarify and resolve, through exchange of information and consultations among them, any matter which may cause doubt about compliance with this Convention, or which gives rise to concerns about a related matter which may be considered ambiguous. [A Party which receives a request from another Party for clarification of any matter which the requesting Party believes causes such doubts or concerns shall provide the requesting Party, within ... days of the request, with information sufficient to answer the doubts or concerns raised along with an explanation on how the information provided resolves the matter.] Nothing in this Convention affects the right of any two or more States Parties to this Convention to arrange by mutual consent for inspections or any other procedures among themselves to clarify and resolve any matter which may cause doubts about compliance or gives rise to concerns about a related matter which may be considered ambiguous. Such arrangements shall not affect the rights and obligations of any State Party under other provisions of this Convention.

Procedure for requesting clarification

3. A State Party shall have the right to request the Executive Council to assist in clarifying any situation which may be considered ambiguous or which gives rise to doubts about the compliance of another State Party with the Convention. The Executive Council shall provide appropriate information and data in its possession relevant to the situation which can dispel such doubts, whilst [taking every precaution in] protecting commercial and industrial secrets and other confidential information coming to its knowledge in the implementation of the Convention.

4. A State Party shall have the right to request the Executive Council to obtain clarification from another State Party on any situation which may be considered ambiguous or which gives rise to doubts about its compliance with the Convention. In such a case, the following shall apply:

(a) The Executive Council shall forward the request for clarification to the State Party concerned within [24 hours] of its receipt.

(b) The requested State Party shall provide the clarification to the Executive Council within [seven days] of the receipt of the request.

1/ Some delegations expressed the view that the issue of verification of alleged use of chemical weapons and procedures for conducting such inspections had not yet been considered in-depth and should be discussed at a later stage on the basis of the proposed Annex to Article IX (documents CD/766 and CD/CW/WP.173).

(c) The Executive Council shall forward the clarification to the requesting State Party within [24 hours] of its receipt.

(d) In the event that the requesting State Party deems the clarification to be inadequate, it may request the Executive Council to obtain from the requested State Party further clarification.

(e) For the purpose of obtaining further clarification requested under paragraph 2 (d), the Executive Council may set up a group of experts to examine all available information and data relevant to the situation causing the doubt. The group of experts shall submit a factual report to the Executive Council on its findings.

(f) Should the requesting State Party consider the clarification obtained under paragraphs 2 (d) and 2 (e) to be unsatisfactory, it may request a special meeting of the Executive Council in which States Parties involved not members of the Executive Council shall be entitled to take part in accordance with provisions in Article ... In such a special meeting, the Executive Council shall consider the matter and may recommend any measure it deems appropriate to cope with the situation.

5. A State Party shall have the right to request the Executive Council to clarify any situation which has been considered ambiguous or has given rise to doubts about its compliance with the Convention. The Executive Council shall respond by providing such assistance as appropriate.

6. The Executive Council shall inform the States Parties to this Convention about any request for clarification provided in this Article.

7. [If the doubts or concerns of a State Party about compliance have not been resolved within [two months] after the submission of the request for clarification to the Executive Council, or it believes its doubts warrant urgent consideration, without necessarily exercising its right to the challenge procedure, it may request a special session of the Consultative Committee in accordance with Article ... In such a special session, the Consultative Committee shall consider the matter and may recommend any measure it deems appropriate to cope with the situation.]

Procedure for requesting a fact-finding mission

The further contents of Article IX remain to be elaborated. 1/

1/ Consultations on this issue were carried out by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee. The state of affairs, as seen by the Chairman is presented in Appendix II with the aim of facilitating further consideration of the issue.

X. ASSISTANCE 1/

XI. ECONOMIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT 2/

XII. RELATION TO OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS 3/

Nothing in this Convention will be interpreted as in any way impairing the obligations assumed under the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925 and in the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, signed at London, Moscow and Washington on 10 April 1972.

XIII. AMENDMENTS

XIV. DURATION, WITHDRAWAL 3/

...

The withdrawal of a State Party from this Convention shall not in any way affect the duty of States to continue fulfilling the obligations assumed under any relevant rules of international law, particularly the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925.

XV. SIGNATURE, RATIFICATION, ENTRY INTO FORCE

XVI. LANGUAGES

1/ During the resumed session work under this Article was initiated. In the course of the deliberations a number of questions were identified which indicate possible approaches to the issues involved but which warrant further consideration by delegations. With the aim of facilitating further work, the questions raised are summarized in a discussion paper by the Chairman, enclosed in Appendix II.

2/ In order to initiate discussion on the issues involved the Chairman presented a discussion paper with points for consideration. The views expressed by delegations indicated different approaches to the issues involved and no conclusions were reached. Further work is needed and the discussion points are presented by the Chairman in Appendix II with the sole aim of facilitating further preparatory work by delegations.

3/ Some delegations consider that the texts contained above require further consideration.

ANNEX TO ARTICLE III

I. DECLARATIONS OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS

A. Possession or non-possession

1. Possession of chemical weapons on own territory

Yes

No

2. Possession, jurisdiction or control over chemical weapons
elsewhere

Yes

No

B. Existence on the territory of any chemical weapons under the jurisdiction
or control of anyone else

Yes

No

C. Past transfers

Yes

No

II. DECLARATIONS OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION FACILITIES

A. Possession or non-possession

1. Possession of chemical weapons production facilities on own
territory

Yes

No

2. Possession, jurisdiction or control over chemical weapons
production facilities elsewhere

Yes

No

B. Existence on the territory of any chemical weapons production facilities under the jurisdiction or control of anyone else

Yes

No

C. Past transfers of equipment [or technical documentation] ^{1/}

Yes

No

[III. OTHER DECLARATIONS]

-

-

-

^{1/} The view was expressed that technical documentation should not be included.

ANNEX TO ARTICLE IV

I. DECLARATIONS OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS

A. The declaration by a State Party of the aggregate quantity [location], 1/ and detailed composition of chemical weapons under its jurisdiction or control shall include the following:

1. The aggregate quantity of each chemical declared.

[2. The precise location of each declared storage site of chemical weapons, expressed by:

- name;

- geographical co-ordinates.] 1/

3. Detailed inventory 2/ for each storage facility:

(1) Chemicals defined as chemical weapons in accordance with Article II:

(a) Chemicals shall be declared within the schedules specified in the Annex to Article VI. 3/

(b) For a chemical not listed in the Schedules in the Annex to Article VI, 3/ the information required for possible assignment of the chemical to one of the proper schedules shall be provided, including the toxicity of the pure compound. For a precursor chemical, the toxicity and identity of the principal final reaction product(s) shall be provided.

(c) Chemicals shall be identified by chemical name in accordance with current IUPAC (International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry) nomenclature, structural formula and Chemical Abstracts Service registry number, if assigned. For a precursor chemical, the toxicity and identity of the principal final reaction product(s) shall be provided.

(d) In cases involving mixtures of two or more chemicals, all such components shall be identified and the percentage of each component shall be provided, and the mixture shall be declared under the category of the most toxic chemical.

1/ One delegation reserved its position on this question.

2/ At a later stage, when agreement has been reached concerning an Order of Destruction the possibility of grouping the declared weapons according to such an Order could be discussed.

3/ A view was expressed that in the context of Article IV, consideration should be given to the development of schedules applicable to chemical weapons declared under the Article.

(e) In cases involving multi-component munitions, devices, bulk containers, and other containers, the quantity of each chemical component shall be provided, as well as the projected quantity of the final principal reaction product obtained. Such items shall be declared under the category of the [key precursor] [key component].

(f) For each chemical the form of storage, i.e. munitions, sub-munitions, devices, equipment or bulk containers and other containers shall be declared. For each form of storage the following shall be listed:

- type
- size or calibre
- number of items
- weight of chemical fill per item 1/
- purity of chemical fill 2/

(g) For each chemical the total weight present at the storage site shall be declared.

(h) For each intended chemical fill, unfilled munitions and/or sub-munitions and/or devices and/or equipment, defined as chemical weapons. 3/ 4/ For each type the information shall include:

- the number of items
- the fill volume per item 5/
- alternative chemical fill(s), if known.

1/ The question of precisely how to determine this weight remain to be resolved.

2/ Four different approaches have been taken by delegations: (1) initial purity; (2) purity of the compound as stored, with an approximation of some 10 per cent; (3) that declaration of purity was not necessary; (4) that purity is necessary where equivalence has to be calculated.

3/ At a later stage, when agreement has been reached concerning an Order of Destruction, the possibility of grouping the declared weapons according to such an Order could be discussed.

4/ Some delegations do not consider the inclusion of this under 3(1) appropriate and prefer to include it under 3(2).

5/ Some delegations did not consider this information necessary.

(2) Unfilled munitions and/or sub-munitions and/or devices and/or equipment, defined as chemical weapons. 1/ 2/ For each type the information shall include:

- (a) the number of items
- (b) the fill volume per item 3/
- (c) the intended chemical fill, if known.

(3) Equipment specifically designed for use directly in connection with the employment of munitions, sub-munitions, devices or equipment under points (1) and (2). (Example: single purpose rocket launchers).

(4) Chemicals specifically designed for use directly in connection with the employment of munitions, sub-munitions, devices or equipment under points (1) and (2). (Example: thickeners). 4/

B. Detailed information on any chemical weapons on the territory of a State Party which are under the jurisdiction or control of others, including a State not Party to the convention (to be developed).

C. Past transfers and receipts.

A State Party that has transferred or received chemical weapons shall declare this (these) transfer(s) or receipt(s), [provided the amount transferred or received exceeded one metric tonne per chemical 5/ and per year]. This declaration shall be made according to the inventory format in paragraph 3 above. This declaration shall also reflect the supplier and recipient countries, timing and current location, if known, of the transferred items.

1/ At a later stage, when agreement has been reached concerning an Order of Destruction, the possibility of grouping the declared weapons according to such an Order could be discussed.

2/ Some delegations do not consider this as a separate declaration but prefer to include this under 3(1).

3/ Some delegations did not consider this information necessary.

4/ Different views exist concerning if, or to what extent, such chemicals should be declared. Furthermore, it appears that this question will have to be decided in the light of the final definition of chemical weapons.

5/ Nominal chemical fill weight for unfilled munitions.

II. INTERNATIONAL VERIFICATION OF DECLARATIONS OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS,
INTERNATIONAL SYSTEMATIC MONITORING OF STORAGE FACILITIES, INTERNATIONAL
VERIFICATION OF REMOVAL OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS FOR DESTRUCTION 1/

1. Storage facility description

(a) Each site or location where, pending their destruction chemical weapons, declared in accordance with Article IV, are stored on the territory of a State Party or under its jurisdiction or control elsewhere, shall hereafter be designated as "storage facility".

(b) At the time of the submission of its declaration of chemical weapons, in accordance with Article IV, a State Party shall provide the International Authority with the detailed description and location of its storage facility(ies) containing:

- boundary map;
- location of bunkers/storage areas, within the facility;
- the detailed inventory of the contents of each bunker/storage area;
- relevant details of the construction of bunkers/storage areas;
- recommendations for the emplacement by the International Authority of seals and monitoring instruments.

2. Measures to secure the storage facility and storage facility preparation

(a) Not later than when submitting its declaration of chemical weapons, a State Party shall take such measures as it considers appropriate to secure its storage facility(ies) and shall prevent any movement of its chemical weapons, except their removal for destruction.

(b) In order to prepare its storage facility(ies) for international verification, a State Party shall ensure that its chemical weapons at its storage facility(ies) are so configured that seals and monitoring devices may be effectively applied, and that such configuration allows ready access for such verification.

(c) While the storage facility remains closed for any movement of chemical weapons other than their removal for destruction activities necessary for maintenance and safety monitoring by national authorities may continue at the facility.

1/ One delegation expressed reservations on this whole section in view of its position on the issue of declaration of location of chemical weapons stocks in Article IV.

3. Agreements on subsidiary arrangements 1/

(a) Within .. months after entry into force of the convention, States Parties shall conclude with the International Authority agreements on subsidiary arrangements for verification of their storage facilities. Such agreements shall be based on a Model Agreement and shall specify for each storage facility the number, intensity, duration of inspections, detailed inspection procedures and the installation, operation and maintenance of the seals and monitoring devices by the International Authority. The Model Agreement shall include provisions to take into account future technological developments.

(b) States Parties shall ensure that the verification of declarations of chemical weapons and the initiation of the systematic monitoring of storage facilities can be accomplished by the International Authority at all storage facilities within the agreed time frames after the convention enters into force. 2/

4. International verification of declarations of chemical weapons

(a) International verification by on-site inspections

- (i) The purpose of the international verification of declarations of chemical weapons shall be to confirm through on-site inspections the accuracy of the declarations made in accordance with Article IV. 3/
- (ii) The International Inspectors shall conduct this verification promptly after a declaration is submitted. They shall, inter alia verify the quantity and identity of chemicals, types and number of munitions, devices and other equipment.
- (iii) They shall employ, as appropriate, agreed seals, markers or other inventory control procedures to facilitate an accurate inventory of the chemical weapons at each storage facility.
- (iv) As the inventory progresses, International Inspectors shall install such agreed seals as may be necessary to clearly indicate if any stocks are removed, and to ensure the securing of the storage facility.

1/ The coverage of the subsidiary arrangements is to be discussed.

2/ Procedures to ensure the implementation of the verification scheme within designated time frames are to be developed.

3/ The applicability of Article IV, paragraph 2(b) is to be discussed.

(b) Co-ordination for international systematic monitoring of storage facilities

In conjunction with the on-site inspections of verification of declarations of chemical weapons, the International Inspectors shall undertake necessary co-ordination for measures of systematic monitoring of storage facilities.

5. International systematic monitoring of storage facilities

(a) The purpose of the international systematic monitoring of storage facilities shall be to ensure that no undetected removal of chemical weapons takes place.

(b) The international systematic monitoring shall be initiated as soon as possible after the declaration of chemical weapons is submitted and shall continue until all chemical weapons have been removed from the storage facility. It shall be ensured, in accordance with the agreement on subsidiary arrangements, through a combination of continuous monitoring with on-site instruments and systematic verification by international on-site inspections or, where the continuous monitoring with on-site instruments is not feasible, by the presence of International Inspectors.

(c) If the relevant agreement on subsidiary arrangements for the systematic monitoring of a chemical weapons storage facility is concluded, International Inspectors shall install for the purpose of this systematic monitoring a monitoring system as referred to below under (e). If no such agreement has been concluded, the International Inspectors will initiate the systematic monitoring by their continuous presence on-site until the agreement is concluded, and the monitoring system installed and activated.

(d) In the period before the activation of the continuous monitoring with on-site instruments and at other times when this continuous monitoring is not feasible, seals installed by International Inspectors may only be opened in the presence of an International Inspector. If an extraordinary event requires the opening of a seal when an inspector is not present, a State Party shall immediately inform the International Authority and International Inspectors will return as soon as possible to validate the inventory and re-establish the seals.

(e) Monitoring with instruments.

(i) For the purpose of the systematic monitoring of a chemical weapons storage facility, International Inspectors will install, in the presence of host country personnel and in conformity with the relevant agreement on subsidiary arrangements, a monitoring system consisting of, inter alia, sensors, ancillary equipment and transmission systems. The agreed types of these instruments shall be specified in the Model Agreement. They shall incorporate, inter alia, seals and other tamper-indicating and tamper-resistant devices as well as data protection and data authentication features.

- (ii) The monitoring system shall have such abilities and be installed, adjusted or directed in such a way as to correspond strictly and efficiently to the sole purpose of detecting prohibited or unauthorized activities within the chemical weapons storage facility as referred to above under (a). The coverage of the monitoring system shall be limited accordingly. The monitoring system will signal the International Authority if any tampering with its components or interference with its functioning occurs. Redundancy shall be built into the monitoring system to ensure that failure of an individual component will not jeopardise the monitoring capability of the system.
 - (iii) When the monitoring system is activated, International Inspectors will verify the accuracy of the inventory of chemical weapons, as required.
 - (iv) Data will be transmitted from each storage facility to the International Verification Headquarters by means (to be determined). The transmission system will incorporate frequent transmissions from the storage facility and a query and response system between the storage facility and the International Verification Headquarters. International Inspectors shall periodically check the proper functioning of the monitoring system.
 - (v) In the event that the monitoring system indicated any irregularity, the International Inspectors would immediately determine whether this resulted from equipment malfunction or activities at the storage facility. If, after this examination the problem remained unresolved, the International Authority would immediately ascertain the actual situation, including through immediate on-site inspection or visit of the storage facility if necessary. The International Authority shall report any such problem immediately after its detection to the State Party who should assist in its resolution.
 - (vi) The State Party shall immediately notify the International Authority if an event at the storage facility occurs, or may occur, which may have an impact on the monitoring system. The State Party shall co-ordinate subsequent actions with the International Authority with a view to restoring the operation of the monitoring system, and establishing interim measures, if necessary, as soon as possible.
- (f) Systematic on-site inspections and visits.
- (i) Visits to service the monitoring system may be required in addition to systematic on-site inspections to perform any necessary maintenance, replacement of equipment or to adjust the coverage of the monitoring system, if required.

- (ii) (The guidelines for determining the frequency of systematic on-site inspections are to be elaborated.) The particular storage facility to be inspected shall be chosen by the International Authority in such a way as to preclude the prediction of precisely when the facility is to be inspected. During each inspection, the International Inspectors will verify that the monitoring system is functioning correctly and verify the inventory in agreed percentage of bunkers and storage areas.

(g) When all chemical weapons have been removed from the storage facility, the International Authority shall certify the declaration of the National Authority to that effect. After this certification, the International Authority shall terminate the international systematic monitoring of the storage facility and will promptly remove all devices and monitoring equipment installed by the International Inspectors.

6. International verification of the removal of chemical weapons for destruction

(a) The State Party shall notify the International Authority [14] days in advance of the exact timing of removal of chemical weapons from the storage facility and of the planned arrival at the facility where they will be destroyed.

(b) The State Party shall provide the Inspectors with the detailed inventory of the chemical weapons to be moved. The International Inspectors shall be present when chemical weapons are removed from the storage facility and shall verify that the chemical weapons on the inventory are loaded on to the transport vehicles. Upon completion of the loading operations, the International Inspectors shall seal the cargo and/or means of transport, as appropriate.

(c) If only a portion of the chemical weapons is removed, the International Inspectors will verify the accuracy of the inventory of the remaining chemical weapons and make any appropriate adjustments in the monitoring system in accordance with the agreement on subsidiary arrangements.

(d) The International Inspectors shall verify the arrival of the chemical weapons at the destruction facility by checking the seals on the cargo and/or the means of transport and shall verify the accuracy of the inventory of the chemical weapons transported.

7. Inspections and visits

(a) The International Authority shall notify the State Party of its decision to inspect or visit the storage facility 48 hours prior to the planned arrival of the inspection team at the facility for systematic inspections or visits. In the event of inspections or visits to resolve urgent problems, this period may be shortened. The International Authority shall specify the purpose(s) of the inspection or visit.

(b) A State Party shall make any necessary preparations for the arrival of the Inspectors and shall ensure their expeditious transportation from their point of entry on the territory of the State Party to the storage facility. The agreement on subsidiary arrangements will specify administrative arrangements for Inspectors.

(c) International Inspectors shall, in accordance with agreements on subsidiary arrangements:

- have unimpeded access to all parts of the storage facilities including any munitions, devices, bulk containers, or other containers therein. While conducting their activity, Inspectors shall comply with the safety regulations at the facility. The items to be inspected will be chosen by the Inspectors;
- bring with them and use such agreed instruments as may be necessary for the completion of their tasks;
- receive samples taken at their request from any devices and bulk containers and other containers at the facility. Such samples will be taken by representatives of the State Party in the presence of the Inspectors;
- perform on-site analysis of samples;
- transfer, if necessary, samples for analysis off-site at a laboratory designated by the International Authority, in accordance with agreed procedures;
- afford the opportunity to the Host State Party to be present when samples are analysed;
- ensure, in accordance with procedures (to be developed), that samples transported, stored and processed are not tampered with;
- communicate freely with the International Authority.

(d) The State Party receiving the inspection shall, in accordance with agreed procedures:

- have the right to accompany the International Inspectors at all times during the inspection and observe all their verification activities at the storage facility;
- have the right to retain duplicates of all samples taken and be present when samples are analysed;
- have the right to inspect any instrument used or installed by the International Inspectors and to have it tested in the presence of its personnel;

- provide assistance to the International Inspectors, upon their request, for the installation of the monitoring system and the analysis of samples on-site;
- receive copies of the reports on inspections of its storage facility(ies);
- receive copies, at its request, of the information and data gathered about its storage facility(ies) by the International Authority.

(e) The International Inspectors may request clarification of any ambiguities arising from the inspection. In the event that any ambiguities arise which cannot be resolved in the course of the inspection, the Inspectors shall inform the International Authority immediately.

(f) After each inspection or visit to the storage facility, International Inspectors shall submit a report with their findings to the International Authority which will transmit a copy of this report to the State Party having received the inspection or visit. Information (to be designated) received during the inspection shall be treated as confidential (procedures to be developed).

III. PRINCIPLES, METHODS AND ORGANIZATION OF THE DESTRUCTION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS

1. Destruction of chemical weapons means a process by which chemicals are converted in an essentially irreversible way to a form unsuitable for production of chemical weapons, and which in an irreversible manner renders munitions and other devices unusable as such.
2. Each State Party possessing chemical weapons shall determine how it shall destroy them, except that the following processes may not be used: dumping in any body of water, land burial or open-pit burning. It shall destroy chemical weapons only at specifically designated and appropriately designed and equipped facility(ies).
3. The State Party shall ensure that its chemical weapons destruction facility(ies) are constructed and operated in a manner to ensure the destruction of the chemical weapons; and that the destruction process can be verified under the provisions of this convention.

IV. PRINCIPLES AND ORDER OF DESTRUCTION 1/

1. The elaboration of the Order of Destruction shall build on the undiminished security for all States during the entire destruction stage; confidence-building in the early part of the destruction stage; gradual acquisition of experience in the course of destroying chemical weapons stocks and applicability irrespective of the actual composition of the stockpiles and the methods chosen for the destruction of the chemical weapons.

1/ The further development of this entire section has been subject to consultations by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, the result of which is enclosed in Appendix II. The Co-ordinator on Cluster I also held some consultations on this question.

2. The destruction of chemical weapons stocks shall start for all States Parties possessing chemical weapons simultaneously. The whole destruction stage shall be divided into nine annual periods.

3. Each State Party shall destroy not less than one ninth of its stockpile [in measure of stockpile equivalent and/or equivalent mustard weight] during each destruction period. 1/ 2/ However, a State Party is not precluded from destroying its stocks at a faster pace. Each State Party shall determine its detailed plans for each destruction period, as specified in part III of this Annex and shall report annually on the implementation of each destruction period. 3/

4. Order of Destruction (to be elaborated). 4/

V. INTERNATIONAL VERIFICATION OF THE DESTRUCTION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS 5/

1. The purpose of verification of destruction of chemical weapons shall be:

- to confirm the identity and quantity of the chemical weapons stocks to be destroyed, and
- to confirm that these stocks for all practical purposes have been destroyed.

2. General plans for destruction of chemical weapons

The general plan for destruction of chemical weapons, submitted pursuant to Article IV shall specify:

(a) a general schedule for destruction, giving types and quantities of chemical weapons planned to be destroyed in each period;

1/ It is considered necessary to elaborate a method for comparing different categories of chemical weapons stocks. The comparison of lethal and harmful chemicals remains unresolved and is subject to further consideration.

2/ Some delegations expressed the view that the question of the regulation of the destruction of stockpiles needs further and full discussion.

3/ It has been recognized that the destruction of chemical weapons stocks and the elimination of relevant production facilities should be considered together.

4/ Some delegations feel that it would be appropriate to introduce the idea of security stockpile levels to meet the security concerns of countries with small stockpiles of chemical weapons.

5/ This section is at a very early stage of elaboration. Further work is needed on it.

(b) the number of chemical weapons destruction facilities existing or planned, to be operated over the 10 years destruction period;

(c) for each existing or planned chemical weapons destruction facility:

- name and address;
- location;
- chemical weapons intended to be destroyed;
- method of destruction;
- capacity;
- expected period of operation;
- products of the destruction process.

3. Detailed plans for destruction of chemical weapons

The detailed plans submitted pursuant to article IV, six months before each destruction period, shall specify:

(a) the aggregate quantity of each individual type of chemical weapons planned to be destroyed at each facility;

(b) the number of chemical weapons destruction facilities and a detailed schedule for the destruction of chemical weapons at each of these facilities;

(c) data about each destruction facility,

- name, postal address, geographical location;
- method of destruction;
- end-products;
- layout plan of the facility;
- technological scheme;
- operation manuals;
- the system of verification;
- safety measures in force at the facility;
- living and working conditions for the international inspectors.

(d) data about any storage facility at the destruction facility planned to provide chemical weapons directly to it during the destruction period,

- layout plan of the facility;
- method and volume of storage estimated by types and quantities of chemical weapons;
- types and quantities of chemical weapons to be stored at the facility during the destruction period;
- safety measures in force at the facility.

(e) After the submission of the first detailed plans, subsequent annual plans should contain only changes and additions to required data elements submitted in the first detailed plans.

4. Review of detailed plans for the destruction of chemical weapons

(a) On the basis of the detailed plan for destruction and proposed measures for verification submitted by the State Party, and as the case may be, on experience from previous inspections and on the relevant agreement(s) on subsidiary arrangements, the Technical Secretariat shall prepare before each destruction period, a plan for verifying the destruction of chemical weapons, consulting closely with the State Party. Any differences between the Technical Secretariat and the State Party should be resolved through consultations. Any unresolved matters shall be forwarded to the Executive Council 1/ for appropriate action with a view to facilitating the full implementation of the Convention.

(b) The agreed combined detailed plans for destruction and verification plans, with an appropriate recommendation by the Technical Secretariat, will be forwarded to the members of the Executive Council for review. The members of the Executive Council shall review the plans with a view to approving them, consistent with verification objectives. This review is designed to determine that the destruction of chemical weapons, as planned, is consistent with the obligations under the Convention and the objective of destroying the chemical weapons. It should also confirm that verification schemes for destruction are consistent with verification objectives, and are efficient and workable. This review should be completed [60] days before the destruction period.

(c) Each member of the Executive Council may consult with the Technical Secretariat on any issues regarding the adequacy of the combined plan for destruction and verification. If there are no objections by any members of the Executive Council, the plan shall be put into action.

(d) If there are any difficulties, the Executive Council shall enter into consultations with the State Party to reconcile them. If any difficulties remain unresolved they should be referred to the Consultative Committee.

1/ The role of the Executive Council in the review process will need to be reviewed in the light of its composition and decision-making process.

(e) After a review of the detailed plans of destruction of chemical weapons, the Technical Secretariat, if the need arises, will enter into consultation with the State Party concerned in order to ensure its chemical weapons destruction facility(ies) is (are) designed to assure destruction of chemical weapons, to allow advanced planning on how verification measures may be applied and to ensure that the application of verification measures is consistent with proper facility(ies) operation, and that the facility(ies) operation allows appropriate verification.

(f) Destruction and verification should proceed according to the agreed plan as referred to above. Such verification should not interfere with the destruction process.

5. Agreements on subsidiary arrangements

For each destruction facility, States Parties should conclude with the International Authority detailed agreements on subsidiary arrangements for the systematic verification of destruction of chemical weapons. Such agreements shall be based on a Model Agreement and shall specify, for each destruction facility, the detailed on-site inspection procedures and arrangements for the removal of chemical weapons from the storage facility at the destruction facility, transport from this storage facility to their destruction and the monitoring by on-site instruments, taking into account the specific characteristics of the destruction facility and its mode of operation. The Model Agreement shall include provisions to take into account the need for maintenance and modifications.

6. International Inspectors will be granted access to each chemical weapons destruction facility (...) prior to commencement of active destruction phases for the purpose of carrying out an engineering review of the facility, including the facility's construction and layout, the equipment and instruments for measuring and controlling the destruction process, and the checking and testing of the accuracy of the verification equipment.

7. Systematic international on-site verification of destruction of chemical weapons

(a) The Inspectors will be granted access to conduct their activities at the chemical weapons destruction facilities and the chemical weapons storage facilities thereat during the entire active phase of destruction. They will conduct their activities in the presence and with the co-operation of representatives of the facility's management and the National Authority if they wish to be present.

(b) The inspectors may monitor by either physical observation or devices:

- (i) the chemical weapons storage facility at the destruction facility and the chemical weapons present;
- (ii) the movement of chemical weapons from the storage facility to the destruction facility;
- (iii) the process of destruction (assuring that no chemical weapons are diverted);

(iv) the material balance (to be elaborated further); and

(v) the accuracy and calibration of the instruments.

(c) To the extent consistent with verification needs, verification procedures should make use of information from routine facility operations.

(d) After the completion of each period of destruction, the Technical Secretariat shall certify the declaration of the National Authority, reporting the completion of destruction of the designated quantity of chemical weapons.

(e) International Inspectors shall, in accordance with agreements on subsidiary arrangements:

- have unimpeded access to all parts of the destruction facilities, and the storage facilities thereat, any munitions, devices, bulk containers, or other containers, therein. While conducting their activity, Inspectors shall comply with the safety regulations at these facilities. The items to be inspected will be chosen by the Inspectors in accordance with the verification plan that has been agreed to by the State Party and approved by the Executive Council;
- bring with them and use such agreed instruments as may be necessary for the completion of their tasks;
- monitor the systematic on-site analysis of samples during the destruction process;
- receive, if necessary, samples taken at their request from any devices, bulk containers and other containers at the destruction facility or the storage facility thereat. Such samples will be taken and analysed by representatives of the State Party in the presence of the Inspectors;
- communicate freely with the International Authority;
- if necessary, (to be discussed) transfer samples for analysis off-site at a laboratory designated by the International Authority, in accordance with agreed procedures;
- ensure, in accordance with procedures (to be developed), that samples transported, stored and processed are not tampered with;
- afford the opportunity to the host State Party to be present when samples are analysed.

(f) The State Party receiving the inspection shall, in accordance with agreed procedures:

- have the right to accompany the International Inspectors at all times during the inspection and observe all their verification activities at the destruction facility, and the storage facility thereat;

- have the right to retain duplicates of all samples taken at the Inspectors' request and be present when samples are analysed;
- have the right to inspect any agreed standard instrument used or installed by the International Inspectors and to have it tested in the presence of its personnel;
- provide assistance to the International Inspectors, upon their request, for the installation of seals or monitoring devices and the analysis of samples on-site as appropriate to the monitoring of the destruction process;
- receive copies of the reports on inspections of its destruction facility(ies);
- receive copies, at its request, of the information and data gathered about its destruction facility(ies) by the International Authority.

(g) If Inspectors detect irregularities which may give rise to doubts they will report the irregularities to the representatives of the facility and the National Authority and request that the situation be resolved. Uncorrected irregularities will be reported to the Executive Council.

(h) After each inspection to the destruction facility, International Inspectors shall submit a report with their findings to the International Authority which will transmit a copy of this report to the State Party having received the inspection. Information (to be designated) received during the inspection shall be treated as confidential (procedures to be developed).

8. Chemical weapons storage facilities at chemical weapons destruction facilities

(a) International Inspectors shall verify any arrival of chemical weapons at a chemical weapons storage facility at a chemical weapons destruction facility, as referred to in paragraph 6 (d) of section II of this Annex, and the storing of these chemical weapons. They shall employ, as appropriate, agreed seals, markers or other inventory control procedures to facilitate an accurate inventory of the chemical weapons in this storage facility. They shall install such agreed seals as may be necessary to verify that stocks are removed only for destruction.

(b) As soon and as long as chemical weapons are stored at chemical weapons storage facilities at chemical weapons destruction facilities, these storage facilities shall be subject to international systematic monitoring, as referred to in relevant provisions 1/ of paragraph 5 of section II of the

1/ To be specified later.

present annex, in conformity with the relevant agreements on subsidiary arrangements or, if no such agreement has been concluded, with the agreed combined plan for destruction and verification.

(c) The International Inspectors will make any appropriate adjustments in the monitoring system in accordance with the relevant agreement on subsidiary arrangements whenever inventory changes occur.

(d) At the end of an active destruction phase, International Inspectors will make an inventory of the chemical weapons that have been removed from the storage facility to be destroyed. They shall verify the accuracy of the inventory of the chemical weapons remaining employing inventory control procedures as referred to above under (a). They shall install such agreed seals as may be necessary to ensure the securing of the storage facility.

(e) The international systematic monitoring of a chemical weapons storage facility at a chemical weapons destruction facility may be discontinued when the active destruction phase is completed, if no chemical weapons remain. If, in addition, no chemical weapons are planned to be stored at this facility, the international systematic monitoring shall be terminated in accordance with section II, paragraph 5 (g) of this Annex.

ANNEX TO ARTICLE V

I. DECLARATIONS AND REPORTS ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION FACILITIES

A. Declarations of [existing] chemical weapons production facilities

The declaration should contain for each facility:

1. Name and exact location.
 2. Ownership, operation, control, who ordered and procured the facility.
 3. Designation of each facility:
 - (a) Facility for producing chemicals defined as chemical weapons.
 - (b) Facility for filling chemical weapons.
 4. Products of each facility and dates that they were produced:
 - (a) Chemicals produced.
 - (b) Munitions or devices filled, identity of chemical fill.
 5. Capacity of the facility, expressed in terms of:
 - (a) The quantity of end product that the facility can produce in (period), assuming the facility operates (schedule).
 - (b) The quantity of chemical that the facility can fill into each type of munition or device in (period), assuming that the facility operates (schedule).
 6. Detailed facility description:
 - (a) Layout of the facility.
 - (b) Process flow diagram.
 - (c) Detailed inventory of equipment, buildings and any spare or replacement parts on site.
 - (d) Quantities of any chemicals or munitions on site.
- B. Declarations of former chemical weapons production facilities
- The declaration should contain for each facility:
1. All information as in paragraph A, above, that pertains to the operation of the facility as a chemical weapons facility.
 2. Date chemical weapons production ceased.

3. Current status of special equipment that was used for chemical weapons production.
4. Dates of conversion from CW use, date of beginning of non-CW use.
5. Current ownership, operation and control.
6. Current production, stating types and quantities of product(s).
7. Current capacity of the facility, expressed in terms of the quantity of end product that can be produced in (period), assuming the facility operates (schedule).
8. Current detailed facility description:
 - (a) Layout of the facility.
 - (b) Process flow diagram.
 - (c) Location of any CW-specific equipment remaining on-site.
 - (d) Quantities of any chemical weapons remaining on-site.
- C. Declarations of [existing] chemical weapons production facilities under the control of others on the territory of the State Party
 - Responsibility for declarations (to be discussed).
 - All elements contained in part IA of this Annex should be declared.
- D. Declarations of former chemical weapons production facilities under the control of others on the territory of the State Party
 - Responsibility for declarations (to be discussed).
 - All elements contained in part IB of this Annex should be declared.
- E. Declarations of transfers
 1. Chemical weapons production equipment means (to be developed).
 2. The declaration should specify:
 - (a) who received/transferred chemical weapons production equipment [and technical documentation];
 - (b) the identity of the equipment;
 - (c) date of transfer;
 - (d) whether the chemical weapons production equipment [and documentation] were eliminated;
 - (e) current disposition, if known.

F. Declarations of measures to ensure closure of:

1. Facilities under the jurisdiction or control of the State Party (data on national measures and the time-frames).
2. Facilities on the State Party's territory under the control of others (to be developed).

G. Annual Reports

H. Final Certification of Elimination

II. PRINCIPLES AND METHODS OF ELIMINATION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION FACILITIES

A. General

Each State Party shall decide on methods to be applied for the elimination of its chemical weapons production facilities, according to the principles laid down in this Annex. The process of elimination might be carried out through destruction, 1/ dismantling, 2/ [or conversion 3/].

- responsibility for carrying out measures when more than one State is involved (to be discussed).

B. Closure and methods for closing the facility (to be elaborated)

C. Activities related to elimination

1. Facilities producing Schedule [I] chemicals.

1/ One delegation suggests the following formulation: "Destruction means disassembling of technological equipment, its removal from buildings and constructions where it had been installed with its further irreversible transformation into articles unsuitable for the purposes of production of chemical weapons."

2/ One delegation suggests the following formulation: "Dismantling means disassembling of technological equipment, its removal from buildings and constructions where it had been installed with its further use for permitted purposes."

3/ One delegation suggests the following formulation: "Conversion of facilities means use of facilities after their reconstruction for permitted purposes not connected with chemical weapons."

2. Facilities producing other categories of chemicals.

3. Filling facilities.

D. Activities related to temporary conversion to destruction facility

E. Activities related to former chemical weapons production facilities

III. ORDER OF ELIMINATION (to be developed)

IV. PLANS

A. General Plans

1. For each facility the following information should be supplied:

(a) envisaged time-frame for measures to be taken;

(b) methods of elimination.

2. In addition, the following information should be supplied for each facility:

[(a) In relation to dismantling:]

[(b) In relation to conversion for peaceful purposes:

(i) description of the facility after conversion

(ii) designation of the facility after conversion and names of products to be manufactured.]

3. In relation to temporary conversion into chemical weapons destruction facility:

(i) envisaged time-frame for conversion into a destruction facility;

(ii) envisaged time for utilizing the facility as a destruction facility;

(iii) description of the new facility;

(iv) method of elimination of special equipment;

(v) time-frame for elimination of the converted facility after it has been utilized to destroy chemical weapons;

(vi) method of elimination of the converted facility.

4. In relation to former chemical weapons production facilities (to be elaborated).

B. Detailed plans

1. The detailed plans for elimination of each facility should contain:

- (a) detailed time schedule of elimination process;
- (b) layout of the facility;
- (c) process flow diagram;
- (d) detailed inventory of equipment, buildings and other items to be eliminated;
- (e) measures to be applied to each item on the inventory;
- (f) proposed measures for verification;
- (g) security/safety measures to be observed during the destruction of the facility;
- (h) working and living conditions to be provided for international inspectors.

2. In addition, the following information should be included:

- [(a) In relation to dismantling:]
- [(b) In relation to conversion for peaceful purposes:
 - (i) projected use of the facility after conversion and products to be manufactured;
 - (ii) layout of the facility after conversion;
 - (iii) process flow diagram of the facility after conversion];

3. In relation to the temporary conversion into a chemical weapons destruction facility.

In addition to the information contained in part IV.B.1 of this Annex the following information should be provided:

- (i) method of conversion into a destruction facility;
- (ii) data on the destruction facility, in accordance with the Annex to Article IV, part IV.B.1(c).

4. In relation to elimination of a facility that was temporarily converted for destruction of chemical weapons, information should be provided in accordance with part IV.B.1 of this Annex.

5. In relation to former chemical weapons production facilities (to be elaborated).

V. INTERNATIONAL VERIFICATION OF DECLARATIONS OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION FACILITIES AND THEIR CLOSURE, INTERNATIONAL SYSTEMATIC MONITORING, INTERNATIONAL SYSTEMATIC VERIFICATION OF ELIMINATION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION FACILITIES 1/

1. International verification of declarations of chemical weapons production facilities and of cessation of their activities

(a) International verification by initial on-site inspections

- (i) The purpose of the international verification of declarations of chemical weapons production facilities shall be:
 - to confirm that all activity has ceased except that required for closure;
 - to confirm through on-site inspections the accuracy of the declarations made in accordance with Article V.
- (ii) The International Inspectors shall conduct this initial verification promptly, and in any event not later than [60] days after a declaration is submitted.
- (iii) They shall employ, as appropriate, agreed seals, markers or other inventory control procedures to facilitate an accurate inventory of the declared items at each chemical weapons production facility.
- (iv) International Inspectors shall install such agreed devices as may be necessary to indicate if any resumption of production of chemical weapons occurs or if any declared item is removed. They shall take the necessary precaution not to hinder closure activities by the State Party. International Inspectors may return to maintain and verify the integrity of the devices.

(b) Co-ordination for international systematic monitoring of chemical weapons production facilities

In conjunction with the initial on-site inspections to verify declarations of chemical weapons production facilities, the International Inspectors shall undertake necessary co-ordination for measures of systematic monitoring of these facilities as provided for in paragraph 4, below.

1/ This Section of this Annex will require further discussion and elaboration upon resolution of the definitions of chemical weapons, chemical weapons production facilities, and methods of elimination.

2. Agreements on subsidiary arrangements 1/

(a) Within [6] months after entry into force of the Convention, States Parties shall conclude with the International Authority detailed agreements on subsidiary arrangements for the systematic monitoring of their chemical weapons production facilities. Such agreements shall be based on a Model Agreement and shall specify for each production facility the detailed inspection procedures and arrangements for the installation, operation and maintenance of the seals and monitoring devices by the International Authority, taking into account the specific characteristics of each facility. The Model Agreement shall include provisions to take into account future technological developments.

(b) States Parties shall ensure that the verification of declarations of chemical weapons production facilities and the initiation of systematic monitoring can be accomplished by the International Authority at all such facilities within the agreed time frames after the Convention enters into force. 2/

3. Measures for closure of chemical weapons production facilities

(a) The purpose of the closure of a chemical weapons production facility is to render it inoperable as such.

(b) Agreed measures for closure will be taken by the State Party with due regard to the specific characteristics of each facility. Such measures shall include, inter alia: 3/

- prohibition of occupation of buildings except for agreed activities;
- disconnection of equipment directly related to the production of chemical weapons to include, inter alia, process control equipment and utilities;
- disabling of protective installations and equipment used exclusively for the safety of operations of the chemical weapons production facility;
- interruption of rail and other roads to the chemicals weapons production facility except those required for agreed activities.

(c) While the chemical weapons production facility remains closed, the State Party may continue safety activities at the facility.

1/ The coverage of the subsidiary arrangements is to be discussed.

2/ Procedures to ensure the implementation of the verification scheme within designated time frames are to be developed.

3/ The activities and items in these measures will need further elaboration.

4. International verification of closure of chemical weapons production facilities

Subsequent to the on-site verification of declarations as referred to in paragraph 1, the International Inspectors shall conduct on-site inspections at each chemical weapons production facility for the purpose of verifying that measures referred to under 3 (b) have been accomplished.

5. International systematic monitoring of chemical weapons production facilities

(a) The purpose of the international systematic monitoring of a chemical weapons production facility shall be to ensure that no resumption of production of chemical weapons nor removal of declared items would go undetected at this facility.

(b) The international systematic monitoring shall be initiated as soon as possible after the closure of the chemical weapons production facility and shall continue until this facility is eliminated. Systematic monitoring shall be ensured, in accordance with the agreements on subsidiary arrangements, through a combination of continuous monitoring with on-site instruments and systematic verification by international on-site inspections or, where the continuous monitoring with on-site instruments is not feasible, by the presence of International Inspectors.

(c) In conjunction with the on-site verification of the closure of chemical weapons production facilities referred to in paragraph 4 above and, if the relevant agreement on subsidiary arrangements for the systematic monitoring of a chemical weapons production facility has been concluded, International Inspectors shall install for the purpose of this systematic monitoring a monitoring system as referred to under (e) below. If no such agreement has been concluded, the International Inspectors will initiate the systematic monitoring by their continuous presence on-site until the agreement is concluded, and the monitoring system installed and activated.

(d) In the period before the activation of the monitoring system and at other times when the continuous monitoring with on-site instruments is not feasible, devices installed by International Inspectors, in accordance with paragraph 1 above, may only be removed in the presence of an International Inspector. If an extraordinary event results in, or requires, the removal of a device when an inspector is not present, a State Party shall immediately inform the International Authority and International Inspectors will return as soon as possible to validate the inventory and re-establish the devices.

(e) Monitoring with instruments

(i) For the purpose of the systematic monitoring of a chemical weapons production facility, International Inspectors will install, in the presence of host country personnel and in conformity with the relevant agreement on subsidiary arrangements, a monitoring system consisting of, inter alia, sensors, ancillary equipment and transmission systems. The agreed types of these instruments shall be specified in the Model Agreement. They shall incorporate, inter alia, seals

and other tamper-indicating and tamper-resistant devices as well as data protection and data authentication features.

- (ii) The monitoring system shall have such abilities and be installed, adjusted or directed in such a way as to correspond strictly and efficiently to the sole purpose of detecting prohibited or unauthorized activities within the chemical weapons production facility as referred to above under (a). The coverage of the monitoring system shall be limited accordingly. The monitoring system will signal the International Authority if any tampering with its components or interference with its functioning occurs. Redundancy shall be built into the monitoring system to ensure that failure of an individual component will not jeopardize the monitoring capability of the system.
 - (iii) When the monitoring system is activated, International Inspectors will verify the accuracy of the inventory of declared items at each chemical weapons production facility as required.
 - (iv) Data will be transmitted from each production facility to the International Verification Headquarters by (means to be determined). The transmission system will incorporate frequent transmissions from the production facility and a query and response system between the production facility and the International Verification Headquarters. International Inspectors shall periodically check the proper functioning of the monitoring system.
 - (v) In the event that the monitoring system indicates any irregularity, the International Inspectors would immediately determine whether this resulted from equipment malfunction or activities at the production facility. If, after this examination the problem remained unresolved, the International Authority would immediately ascertain the actual situation, including through immediate on-site inspection or visit of the production facility if necessary. The International Authority shall report any such problem immediately after its detection to the State Party who should assist in its resolution.
 - (vi) The State Party shall immediately notify the International Authority if an event at the production facility occurs, or may occur, which may have an impact on the monitoring system. The State Party shall co-ordinate subsequent actions with the International Authority with a view to restoring the operation of the monitoring system and establishing interim measures, if necessary, as soon as possible.
- (f) Systematic on-site inspections and visits
- (i) During each inspection, the International Inspectors will verify that the monitoring system is functioning correctly and

verify the declared inventory as required. In addition, visits to service the monitoring system will be required to perform any necessary maintenance or replacement of equipment, or to adjust the coverage of the monitoring system as required.

- (ii) (The guidelines for determining the frequency of systematic on-site inspections are to be elaborated). The particular production facility to be inspected shall be chosen by the International Authority in such a way as to preclude the prediction of precisely when the facility is to be inspected.

6. International verification of elimination of chemical weapons production facilities

(a) The purpose of international verification of elimination of chemical weapons production facilities will be to confirm that the facility is eliminated as such in accordance with the obligations under the Convention and that each item on the declared inventory is eliminated in accordance with the agreed detailed plan for elimination.

(b) [3-6] months before elimination of a chemical weapons production facility, a State Party shall provide to the Technical Secretariat the detailed plans for elimination to include proposed measures for verification of elimination referred to in Section IV.B.1 (f) of the present Annex, with respect to, e.g.:

- timing of the presence of the inspectors at the facility to be eliminated;
- procedures for verification of measures to be applied to each item on the declared inventory;
- measures for phasing out systematic monitoring or for adjustment of the coverage of the monitoring system.

(c) On the basis of the detailed plan for elimination and proposed measures for verification submitted by the State Party, and on experience from previous inspections, the Technical Secretariat shall prepare a plan for verifying the elimination of the facility, consulting closely with the State Party. Any differences between the Technical Secretariat and the State Party concerning appropriate measures should be resolved through consultations. Any unresolved matters shall be forwarded to the Executive Council 1/ for appropriate action with a view to facilitating the full implementation of the Convention.

(d) The agreed combined plans for elimination and verification, with an appropriate recommendation by the Technical Secretariat, will be forwarded to the members of the Executive Council for review. These plans should allow a State Party to destroy any item agreed to be diverted. The members of the Executive Council shall review the plans with a view to approving them,

1/ The role of the Executive Council in the review process will need to be reviewed in the light of its composition and decision-making process.

consistent with verification objectives. This review is designed to determine that the planned disposition of each item is consistent with the obligations under the Convention and the objective of eliminating the facility. It should also confirm that verification schemes for elimination are consistent with verification objectives, and are efficient and workable. This review should be completed [60] days before the planned initiation of elimination.

(e) Each member of the Executive Council may consult with the Technical Secretariat on any issues regarding the adequacy of the combined plan for elimination and verification. If there are no objections by any members of the Executive Council, the plan shall be put into action.

(f) If there are any difficulties, the Executive Council should enter into consultations with the State Party to reconcile them. If any difficulties remain unresolved they should be referred to the Consultative Committee. The resolution of any differences over methods of elimination should not delay the execution of other parts of the elimination plan that are acceptable.

(g) If agreement is not reached with the Executive Council on aspects of verification, or if the approved verification plan cannot be put into action, verification of elimination will proceed by the continuous on-site monitoring and presence of inspectors.

(h) Elimination and verification should proceed according to the agreed plan. The verification should not unduly interfere with the elimination process.

(i) If required verification or elimination actions are not taken as planned, all States Parties should be so informed. (Procedures to be developed.)

(j) For those items to be eliminated through destruction, verification of elimination should be conducted through the presence on-site of Inspectors to witness the destruction. 1/

(k) For those items that may be diverted for permitted purposes. 2/

(l) When all items on the declared inventory have been eliminated, the International Authority shall certify, in writing, the declaration of the State Party to that effect. After this certification, the International Authority shall terminate the international systematic monitoring of the chemical weapons production facility and will promptly remove all devices and monitoring equipment installed by the International Inspectors.

(m) After this certification, the State Party will make the declaration that the facility has been eliminated.

1/ This verification measure may not necessarily be the only one and others, as appropriate, may need to be further elaborated.

2/ Specification of the items, permitted purposes and methods of verification of disposition will need to be elaborated.

7. International verification of temporary conversion of a chemical weapons production facility into a chemical weapons destruction facility

(to be elaborated)

8. Inspections and visits

(a) The International Authority shall notify the State Party of its decision to inspect or visit a chemical weapons production facility 48 hours prior to the planned arrival of the inspection team at the facility for systematic inspections or visits. In the event of inspections or visits to resolve urgent problems, this period may be shortened. The International Authority shall specify the purpose(s) of the inspection or visit.

(b) A State Party shall make any necessary preparations for the arrival of the Inspectors and shall ensure their expeditious transportation from their point of entry on the territory of the State Party to the chemical weapons production facility. The agreement on subsidiary arrangements will specify administrative arrangements for Inspectors.

(c) International Inspectors shall, in accordance with agreements on subsidiary arrangements:

- have unimpeded access to all parts of the chemical weapons production facilities. While conducting their activity, Inspectors shall comply with the safety regulations at the facility. The items on the declared inventory to be inspected will be chosen by the Inspectors;
- bring with them and use such agreed instruments as may be necessary for the completion of their tasks;
- communicate freely with the International Authority.

(d) The State Party receiving the inspection shall, in accordance with agreed procedures:

- have the right to accompany the International Inspectors at all times during the inspection and observe all their verification activities at the chemical weapons production facility;
- have the right to inspect any instrument used or installed by the International Inspectors and to have it tested in the presence of State Party personnel;
- provide assistance to the International Inspectors upon their request for the installation of the monitoring system;
- receive copies of the reports on inspections of its chemical weapons production facility(ies);
- receive copies, at its request, of the information and data gathered about its chemical weapons production facility(ies) by the International Authority.

(e) The International Inspectors 1/ may request clarification of any ambiguities arising from the inspection. In the event that any ambiguities arise which cannot be resolved in the course of the inspections, the inspectors shall inform the International Authority immediately.

(f) After each inspection or visit to the chemical weapons production facility, International Inspectors shall submit a report with their findings to the International Authority which will transmit a copy of this report to the State Party having received the inspection or visit. Information (to be designated) received during the inspection shall be treated as confidential (procedures to be developed).

1/ The question of whether or not an individual Inspector shall have the rights set out in this and the following paragraph remains open.

ANNEX TO ARTICLE VI [O.]

MODALITIES FOR REVISION OF LISTS

1. The revisions envisaged would consist of additions to, deletions from, or shifts between the lists.
2. A revision could be proposed by a State Party. [If the Technical Secretariat has information which in its opinion may require a revision of the lists of chemicals, it should provide that information to the [Executive Council] which should communicate it to all States Parties.] A State Party may request the assistance of the Technical Secretariat in the substantiation of its proposal.
3. A proposal for revision should be submitted to [the International Authority] [the Executive Council] [the Depositary of the Convention].
4. [The International Authority] [The Executive Council] [The Depositary of the Convention], upon receipt of a proposal for revision, will be responsible for informing States Parties about it.
5. The proponent should substantiate its proposal with the necessary information. Any State Party and, as requested, the Technical Secretariat, could also provide relevant information for the evaluation of the proposal.
6. Technical evaluations of a proposal may be made by the International Authority, [the Executive Council], any State Party [and the Technical Secretariat].
7. The decision on a proposal should be taken by the International Authority [the Consultative Committee] by [a majority vote] [consensus] [tacit approval of all States Parties 60 days after they have been informed of the proposal by the International Authority. If there is no tacit approval, the matter should be reviewed by the [Consultative Committee] at its next meeting.] [If urgent consideration is requested by five or more Parties, a special meeting of the Consultative Committee should be promptly convened.]
8. The revision procedure should be concluded within [60 days] after the receipt of the proposal. Once a decision is taken, it should enter into force after a period of [30 days].
9. The Technical Secretariat should provide assistance to any State Party, when requested, in evaluating an unlisted chemical. This assistance should be confidential [unless it is established in the evaluation that the chemical has chemical weapon properties].

ANNEX TO ARTICLE VI [1]

GENERAL PROVISIONS

1. A State Party shall not produce, acquire, retain, transfer or use chemicals in Schedule [1] unless:

- (i) the chemicals are applied to research, medical or protective purposes, 1/ and
- (ii) the types and quantities of chemicals are strictly limited to those which can be justified for research, medical or protective purpose, and
- (iii) the aggregate amount of such chemicals at any given time for [permitted] [protective] purposes is equal to or less than one metric tonne, and
- (iv) the aggregate amount for [permitted] [protective] purposes acquired by a State Party in any calendar year through production, withdrawal from chemical weapons stocks and transfer is equal to or less than one metric tonne.

TRANSFERS

2. A State Party may transfer chemicals in Schedule [1] outside its territory only to another State Party and only for research, medical or protective purposes in accordance with paragraph 1.

3. Chemicals transferred shall not be retransferred to a third State.

4. Thirty days prior to any transfer to another State Party both States Parties shall notify the Consultative Committee.

5. Each State Party shall make a detailed annual declaration regarding transfers during the previous calendar year. The declaration shall be submitted within ... months after the end of that year and shall for each chemical in Schedule [1] include the following information:

- (i) the chemical name, structural formula and Chemical Abstracts Service Registry Number (if assigned);
- (ii) the quantity acquired from other States or transferred to other States Parties. For each transfer the quantity, recipient and purpose should be included.

1/ A view was expressed that for consistency in this Annex, "permitted purposes" should be used instead of "research, medical or protective purposes". The view was also expressed that use of the term "permitted" would broaden considerably the sphere of use of super-toxic lethal chemicals which could be used as chemical weapons and that this was very undesirable.

SINGLE SMALL-SCALE PRODUCTION FACILITY

Each State Party which produces chemicals in Schedule [1] for [permitted] [protective] purposes shall carry out the production at a single small-scale facility, the capacity of which shall not exceed [one] metric tonne per year, as measured by the method established in []. 1/

I. Declarations

A. Initial declarations

Each State Party which plans to operate such a facility shall provide the Consultative Committee with the location and a detailed technical description of the facility, including an inventory of equipment and detailed diagrams. For existing facilities, this information shall be provided not later than 30 days after the Convention enters into force for the State Party. Information on new facilities shall be provided six months before operations are to begin.

B. Advance notifications

Each State Party shall give advance notification to the [international authority] of planned changes related to the initial declaration. The notification shall be submitted not later than ... months before the changes are to take place.

C. Annual declarations

(a) Each State Party possessing a facility shall make a detailed annual declaration regarding the activities of the facility for the previous calendar year. The declaration shall be submitted within ... months after the end of that year and shall include:

1. Identification of the facility
2. For each chemical in Schedule [1] produced, acquired, consumed or stored at the facility, the following information:
 - (i) the chemical name, structural formula and Chemical Abstracts Service Registry Number (if assigned);
 - (ii) the methods employed and quantity produced;
 - (iii) the name and quantity of precursor chemicals listed in Schedules [1], [2] or [3] used for production of chemicals in Schedule [1];
 - (iv) the quantity consumed at the facility and the purpose(s) of the consumption;

1/ The view was expressed that the single small-scale production facility should be State-owned.

- (v) the quantity received from or shipped to other facilities within the State Party. For each shipment the quantity, recipient and purpose should be included;
 - (vi) the maximum quantity stored at any time during the year;
 - (vii) the quantity stored at the end of the year.
3. Information on any changes at the facility during the year compared to previously submitted detailed technical descriptions of the facility including inventories of equipment and detailed diagrams.

(b) Each State Party possessing a facility shall make a detailed annual declaration regarding the projected activities and the anticipated production at the facility for the coming calendar year. The declaration shall be submitted not later than ... months before the beginning of that year and shall include:

- 1. Identification of the facility
- 2. For each chemical in Schedule [1] produced, consumed or stored at the facility, the following information:
 - (i) the chemical name, structural formula and Chemical Abstracts Service Registry Number (if assigned);
 - (ii) the quantity anticipated to be produced and the purpose of the production.
- 3. Information on any anticipated changes at the facility during the year compared to previously submitted detailed technical descriptions of the facility including inventories of equipment and detailed diagrams.

II. Verification

- 1. The aim of verification activities at the facility shall be to verify that the quantities of Schedule [1] chemicals produced are correctly declared and, in particular, that their aggregate amount does not exceed one metric tonne.
- 2. The single small-scale production facility shall be subject to systematic international on-site verification, through on-site inspection and monitoring with on-site instruments.
- 3. The number, intensity, duration, timing and mode of inspections for a particular facility shall be based on the risk to the objectives of the Convention posed by the relevant chemicals, the characteristics of the facility and the nature of the activities carried out there. The guidelines to be used shall include: (to be developed)
- 4. Each facility shall receive an initial visit from international inspectors promptly after the facility is declared. The purpose of the initial visit shall be to verify information provided concerning the facility, including verification that the capacity will not permit the production, on an

annual basis, of quantities [significantly] above one metric tonne, and to obtain any additional information needed for planning future verification activities at the facility, including inspection visits and use of on-site instruments.

5. Each State Party possessing or planning to possess a facility shall execute an agreement, based on a model agreement, with the [international authority] before the facility begins operation or is used, covering detailed inspection procedures for the facility. Each agreement shall include: (to be developed) 1/

OTHER FACILITIES

[Facilities which synthesize, acquire or use chemicals in Schedule [1] for research or medical purposes shall be approved by the State Party. Synthesis at each such facility for research and medical purposes shall be limited per annum to a total maximum of [..]g and to [..]g of any one chemical on the Schedule.]

[Facilities which acquire or use chemicals in Schedule [1] for permitted purposes shall be approved by the State Party. Each transfer from the single small-scale production facility to such facilities shall be notified to the Consultative Committee by inclusion in the annual data reporting, with an indication of the chemical or chemicals involved, the amount transferred and the purpose of the transfer.]

I. Declarations

A. Initial declarations

The location of the facilities approved by the State Party shall be provided to the Consultative Committee.

B. Advance notifications

C. Annual declarations

II. Verification

Facilities shall be monitored through annual data reporting to the Consultative Committee. The following information shall be included: (to be developed)

1/ The view was expressed that pending conclusion of the agreement between a State Party and the [International Authority] there would be a need for provisional inspection procedures to be formulated.

ANNEX TO ARTICLE VI [1]
SCHEDULE [1]

PROVISIONAL LIST 1/

1. O-Alkyl alkylphosphonofluoridates
e.g. Sarin: O-isopropyl methylphosphonofluoridate (107-44-8)
Soman: O-pinacolyl methylphosphonofluoridate (96-64-0)
2. O-Alkyl N,N-dialkylphosphoramidocyanidates
e.g. Tabun: O-ethyl N,N-dimethylphosphoramidocyanidate (77-81-6)
3. O-Alkyl S-2-dialkylaminoethylalkylphosphonothiolates
e.g. VX: O-ethyl S-2-diisopropylaminoethylmethylphosphonothiolate (50782-69-9)
4. Sulphur mustards:
e.g. Mustard gas (H): bis(2-chloroethyl)sulphide (505-60-2)
Sesquimustard (Q): 1,2-bis(2-chloroethylthio)ethane (3563-36-8)
O-Mustard (T): bis(2-chloroethylthioethyl)ether (63918-89-8)
5. Lewisites
Lewisite 1: 2-chlorovinylldichloroarsine (541-25-3)
Lewisite 2: bis(2-chlorovinyl)chloroarsine (40334-69-8)
Lewisite 3: tris(2-chlorovinyl)arsine (40334-70-1)
6. Nitrogen mustards
HN1: bis(2-chloroethyl)ethylamine (538-07-8)
HN2: bis(2-chloroethyl)methylamine (51-75-2)
HN3: tris(2-chloroethyl)amine (555-77-1)
7. 3-Quinuclidinyl benzilate (BZ) (6581-06-2)
8. Alkylphosphonyldifluorides
e.g. DF (676-99-3)
9. Ethyl O-2-diisopropylaminoethyl alkylphosphonites
e.g. QL (57856-11-8)

1/ Some of the chemicals on the Schedules exist in more than one stereoisomeric form. It is proposed that, where assigned, the Chemical Abstracts Service Registry Numbers be stated for each of them.

To be discussed further

1. Saxitoxin
2. 3,3-Dimethylbutan-2-ol (pinacolyl alcohol)
3. CS
4. CR
5. Chloro Soman and Chloro Sarin
6. Sulphur Mustards: to include compounds listed below.

2-chloroethylchloromethylsulphide

bis(2-chloroethyl) sulphone

bis(2-chloroethylthio)methane

1,3-bis(2-chloroethylthio)-n-propane

1,4-bis(2-chloroethylthio)-n-butane

ANNEX TO ARTICLE VI [2]

KEY PRECURSOR CHEMICALS

DECLARATIONS

The Initial and Annual Declarations to be provided by a State Party under paragraphs [3] and [4] of Article VI shall include:

1. Aggregate national data on the production, processing and consumption of each chemical listed in Schedule [2], and on the export and import of the chemicals in the previous calendar year with an indication of the countries involved.
2. The following information for each facility which, during the previous calendar year, produced, processed or consumed more than [] tonnes per annum of the chemicals listed in Schedule [2]:

Key Precursor Chemical(s)

- (i) The chemical name, common or trade name used by the facility, structural formula, and Chemical Abstracts Service Registry Number (if assigned).
- (ii) The total amount produced, consumed, imported and exported in the previous calendar year. 1/
- (iii) The purpose(s) for which the key precursor chemical(s) are produced, consumed or processed:
 - (a) conversion on-site (specify product type)
 - (b) sale or transfer to other domestic industry (specify final product type)
 - (c) export of a key precursor (specify which country)
 - (d) other.

1/ Whether the total amount is to be expressed as an exact figure or within a range is to be discussed.

Facility 1/ 2/

- (i) The name of the facility and of the owner, company, or enterprise operating the facility.
- (ii) The exact location of the facility (including the address, location of the complex, location of the facility within the complex including the specific building and structure number, if any).
- (iii) Whether the facility is dedicated to producing or processing the listed key precursor or is multi-purpose.
- (iv) The main orientation (purpose) of the facility.
- (v) Whether the facility can readily be used to produce a Schedule [1] chemical or another Schedule [2] chemical. Relevant information should be provided, when applicable.
- (vi) The production capacity 3/ for the declared Schedule [2] chemical(s).
- (vii) Which of the following activities are performed with regard to the key precursor chemicals:
 - (a) production
 - (b) processing with conversion into another chemical
 - (c) processing without chemical conversion
 - (d) other - specify.
- (viii) Whether at any time during the previous calendar year declared key precursors were stored on-site in quantities greater than [] [tonnes].

1/ One delegation suggested that, in the case of a multi-purpose facility currently producing key precursor chemicals, the following should be specified:

- general description of the products;
- detailed technological plan of the facility;
- list of special equipment included in the technological plan;
- type of waste treatment equipment;
- description of each final product (chemical name, chemical structure and register number);
- unit capacity for each product;
- use of each product.

2/ The view was expressed that a definition of a chemical production facility was needed and thus should be elaborated.

3/ How to define production capacity remains to be agreed upon. Some consultations with technical experts have taken place on this issue. A report on these consultations is enclosed in Appendix II to facilitate further work by delegations.

Advance notifications

3. (a) Each State Party shall annually notify the (international authority) of facilities which intend, during the coming calendar year, to produce, process or consume more than ... of any chemical listed in Schedule [2]. The notification shall be submitted not later than ... months before the beginning of that year and shall for each facility include the following information:

- (i) The information specified under paragraph 2 above, except for quantitative information relating to the previous calendar year;
- (ii) For each chemical listed in Schedule [2] intended to be produced or processed, the total quantity intended to be produced or processed during the coming calendar year and the time period(s) when the production or processing is anticipated to take place.

(b) Each State Party shall notify the (international authority) of any production, processing or consumption planned after the submission of the annual notification under paragraph 3 (a), not later than one month before the production or processing is anticipated to begin. The notification shall for each facility include the information specified under paragraph 3 (a).

Verification 1/

Aim

4. The aim of the measures stipulated in Article VI, paragraph 6 shall be to verify that:

- (i) Facilities declared under this Annex are not used to produce any chemical listed in Schedule [1]. 2/
- (ii) The quantities of chemicals listed in Schedule [2] produced, processed or consumed are consistent with needs for purposes not prohibited by the Chemical Weapons Convention. 3/
- (iii) The chemicals listed in Schedule [2] are not diverted or used for purposes prohibited by the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Obligation and Frequency

5. (i) Each facility notified to the [international authority] under this Annex shall be subject to systematic international on-site verification on a routine basis.

1/ Some of the provisions contained in this section have general application throughout the Convention. It is understood that the retention of these will be reviewed at a later stage in the negotiations.

2/ It was suggested that "or for any other purposes prohibited by the Convention" should be added.

3/ Opinions were expressed on the need to consider the question of the existence in a facility of excessive capacity for the production of chemicals in Schedule [2].

- (ii) The number, intensity, duration, timing and mode of inspections and monitoring with on-site instruments 1/ for a particular facility shall be based on the risk to the objectives of the Convention posed by the relevant chemical, the characteristics of the facility and the nature of the activities carried out there. 2/ The guidelines to be used shall include: (to be developed). 3/ 4/

Selection

6. The particular facility to be inspected shall be chosen by the [international authority] in such a way to preclude the prediction of precisely when the facility is to be inspected.

Notification

7. A State Party shall be notified by the [international authority] of the decision to inspect a facility referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3 hours prior to the arrival of the inspection team.

Host State Party

8. The host State Party shall have the right to designate personnel to accompany an international inspection team. The exercise of this right shall not affect the right of inspectors to obtain access to the facility, as provided by the Convention, nor shall it delay or otherwise impede the carrying out of the inspection.

1/ One delegation considered that further discussion was required on monitoring with on-site instruments.

2/ A number of possible factors that could influence the number, intensity, duration, timing and mode of inspections have been identified and discussed. The result of this work is enclosed in Appendix II to serve as a basis for future work.

3/ It was noted that a "weighted approach" might be taken in determining the inspection régime for specific chemicals. The importance of establishing a threshold(s) in this context was also noted. It was mentioned that a threshold(s) should relate to "military significant quantities" of the relevant chemical(s).

4/ There was general agreement that the guidelines should stipulate the main elements relevant to the basic features of the facility. A view was expressed that one of the guidelines might provide that inspections will usually be carried out at a time when the facility inspected is operating in the normal way. The view was also expressed that this approach would be inconsistent with the language of paragraph 6.

Initial Visit

9. Each facility notified to the [international authority] under this Annex shall be liable to receive an initial visit from international inspectors, promptly after the State becomes a Party to the Convention.

10. The purpose of the initial visit shall be to verify information provided concerning the facility to be inspected and to obtain any additional information needed for planning future verification activities at the facility, including inspection visits and use of on-site instruments.

Agreement on Inspection Procedures

11. Each State Party shall execute an agreement, based on a model agreement, with the [international authority], within [6] months after the Convention enters into force for the State, governing the conduct of the inspections of the facilities declared by the State Party. The agreement shall provide for the detailed subsidiary arrangements which shall govern inspections at each facility. 1/

12. Such agreements shall be based on a Model Agreement and shall specify for each facility the number, intensity, duration of inspections, detailed inspection procedures and the installation, operation and maintenance of on-site instruments by the International Authority. The Model Agreement shall include provisions to take into account future technological developments.

States Parties shall ensure that the systematic international on-site verification can be accomplished by the International Authority at all facilities within the agreed time frames after the convention enters into force. 2/

Monitoring with on-site instruments: 3/

Verification Inspections

13. The areas of a facility to be inspected under subsidiary arrangements may, inter alia, include: 4/

1/ Several delegations considered that the model agreement should be elaborated as part of the negotiations on the Convention. A draft for such a model agreement is contained in Appendix II.

2/ Procedures to ensure the implementation of the verification scheme within designated time frames are to be developed.

3/ It was agreed that provisions on monitoring with on-site instruments should be elaborated taking into account the relevant parts of the Annexes to Articles IV and V.

4/ Opinions were expressed on the need to consider the question of the existence in a facility of excessive capacity for the production of chemicals on Schedule [2].

- (i) areas where feed chemicals (reactants) are delivered and/or stored;
- (ii) areas where manipulative processes are performed upon the reactants prior to addition to the reaction vessel;
- (iii) feed lines as appropriate from subparagraph (i) and/or subparagraph (ii) to the reaction vessel, together with any associated valves, flow meters, etc.;
- (iv) the external aspect of the reaction vessel and its ancillary equipment;
- (v) lines from the reaction vessel leading to long- or short-term storage or for further processing of the designated chemical;
- (vi) control equipment associated with any of the items under subparagraphs (i) to (v);
- (vii) equipment and areas for waste and effluent handling;
- (viii) equipment and areas for disposition of off-specification chemicals.

14. (a) The International Authority shall notify the State Party of its decision to inspect or visit the facility [48] [12] hours prior to the planned arrival of the inspection team at the facility for systematic inspections or visits. In the event of inspections or visits to resolve urgent problems, this period may be shortened. The International Authority shall specify the purpose(s) of the inspection or visit.

(b) A State Party shall make any necessary preparations for the arrival of the Inspectors and shall ensure their expeditious transportation from their point of entry on the territory of the State Party to the facility. The agreement on subsidiary arrangements will specify administrative arrangements for Inspectors.

(c) International Inspectors shall, in accordance with agreements on subsidiary arrangements:

- have unimpeded access to all areas that have been agreed for inspection. While conducting their activity, Inspectors shall comply with the safety regulations at the facility. The items to be inspected will be chosen by the Inspectors;
- bring with them and use such agreed instruments as may be necessary for the completion of their tasks;
- receive samples taken at their request at the facility. Such samples will be taken by representatives of the State Party in the presence of the Inspectors;
- perform on-site analysis of samples;

- transfer, if necessary, samples for analysis off-site at a laboratory designated by the International Authority, in accordance with agreed procedures; 1/
- afford the opportunity to the Host State Party to be present when samples are analysed; 1/
- ensure, in accordance with procedures (to be developed), that samples transported, stored and processed are not tampered with; 1/
- communicate freely with the International Authority.

(d) The State Party receiving the inspection shall, in accordance with agreed procedures:

- have the right to accompany the International Inspectors at all times during the inspection and observe all their verification activities at the facility;
- have the right to retain duplicates of all samples taken and be present when samples are analysed;
- have the right to inspect any instrument used or installed by the International Inspectors and to have it tested in the presence of its personnel;
- provide assistance to the International Inspectors, upon their request, for the installation of the monitoring system and the analysis of samples on-site;
- receive copies of the reports on inspections of its facility(ies);
- receive copies, at its request, of the information and data gathered about its facility(ies) by the International Authority.

15. The Technical Secretariat may retain at each site a sealed container for photographs, plans and other information that it may wish to refer to in the course of subsequent inspection.

Submission of Inspectors' Report

16. After each inspection or visit to the facility, International Inspectors shall submit a report with their findings to the International Authority which will transmit a copy of this report to the State Party having received the inspection or visit. Information received during the inspection shall be treated as confidential (procedures to be developed).

17. The International Inspectors may request clarification of any ambiguities arising from the inspection. In the event that any ambiguities arise which cannot be resolved in the course of the inspection, the Inspectors shall inform the International Authority immediately.

1/ The view was expressed that all questions related to analysis off-site required further discussion.

ANNEX TO ARTICLE VI [2]
SCHEDULE [2]

PROVISIONAL LIST

1. Chemicals containing one P-methyl, P-ethyl, or P-propyl (normal or iso) bond.
 2. N,N-Dialkylphosphoramidic dihalides.
 3. Dialkyl N,N-dialkylphosphoramidates.
 4. Arsenic trichloride. (7784-34-1)
 5. 2,2-Diphenyl-2-hydroxyacetic acid. (76-93-7)
 6. Quinuclidin-3-ol (1619-34-7)
 7. N,N-Diisopropylaminoethyl-2-chloride. (96-79-7)
 8. N,N-Diisopropylaminoethan-2-ol. (96-80-0)
 9. N,N-Diisopropylaminoethane-2-thiol. (5842-07-9)
-

TO BE DISCUSSED FURTHER

- (1) The following compounds:

Bis(2-hydroxyethyl)sulphide (thiodiglycol)

3,3-Dimethylbutan-2-ol (pinacolyl alcohol)

- (2) Expanded groups for compounds 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9, as follows:

(No. 5): 2-phenyl-2-(phenyl, cyclohexyl, cyclopentyl or cyclobutyl)-2-hydroxyacetic acids and their methyl, ethyl, n-propyl and iso-propyl esters.

(No. 6): 3- or 4-hydroxypiperidine and their [derivatives] and [analogs].

(Nos. 7,8,9): N,N-Disubstituted aminoethyl-2-halides
N,N-Disubstituted aminoethan-2-ols
N,N-Disubstituted aminoethane-2-thiols

ANNEX TO ARTICLE VI [3]

Chemicals which are produced in large commercial quantities and which could be used for chemical weapons purposes

DECLARATIONS

1. The Initial and Annual Declarations to be provided by a State Party under paragraph [4] of Article VI shall include the following information for each of the chemicals listed in Schedule [3]:

- (i) The chemicals name, common or trade name used by the facility, structural formula and Chemical Abstracts Service Registry Number.
- (ii) The total amount produced, consumed, imported and exported in the previous calendar year.
- (iii) The final product or end use of the chemical in accordance with the following categories (to be developed),
- (iv) for each facility which produces, processes, consumes or transfers one of the chemicals listed in Schedule [3] (on an industrial scale - to be defined). 1/
 - (a) The name of the facility and of the owner, company, or enterprise operating the facility.
 - (b) The location of the facility.
 - (c) The capacity (to be defined) 2/ of the facility.
 - (d) The approximate amount of production and consumption of the chemical in the previous year (ranges to be specified).

1/ It was proposed that a threshold for the dual purpose agents (Phosgene, Cyanogen chloride, Hydrogen cyanide, Chloropicrin) could be established at [50 tonnes/year] [500 tonnes/year] and for precursors at [5 tonnes/year] [50 tonnes/year]. The proposal was presented in an informal discussion paper dated 30 March 1987, prepared on the request of the Chairman of the Committee, by Dr. Peroni (Brazil), Lt. Col. Bretfeld (German Democratic Republic) and Dr. Ooms (Netherlands).

2/ Some consultations with technical experts have taken place on this issue. A report on these consultations is enclosed in Appendix II to facilitate further work by delegations.

2. A State Party shall notify the (International Authority) of the name and location of any facility which intends, in the year following submission of the Annual Declaration, to produce, process or consume any of the chemicals listed in Schedule [3] (on an industrial scale - to be defined).

VERIFICATION

The verification régime for chemicals listed in Schedule [3] will comprise both the provision of data by a State Party to the [International Authority] and the monitoring of that data by the [International Authority]. 1/

1/ Some delegations consider that provision should be made for resort to an on-site "spot-check" inspection, if required, to verify information supplied by a State Party. Other delegations believe that the provisions of Articles VII, VIII and IX of the Convention are sufficient in this respect.

ANNEX TO ARTICLE VI [3]
SCHEDULE [3]

Phosgene	(75-44-5)
Cyanogen chloride	(506-77-4)
Hydrogen cyanide	(74-90-8)
Trichloronitromethane (chloropicrin)	(76-06-2)
Phosphorus oxychloride	(10025-87-3)
Phosphorus trichloride	(7719-12-2)
Di- and Trimethyl/Ethyl Esters of Phosphorus [P III] Acid:	
Trimethyl phosphite	(121-45-9)
Triethyl phosphite	(122-52-1)
Dimethyl phosphite	(868-85-9)
Diethyl phosphite	(762-04-9)
Sulphur monochloride	(19925-67-9)
Sulphur dichloride	(19545-99-0)

ANNEX TO ARTICLE VI [4] 1/

Commercial production of toxic chemicals, not listed in Schedules [1], [2] or [3] that might be relevant to the Convention

DECLARATIONS

1. The Initial and Annual Declarations to be provided to the [international authority] by a State Party under Article VI shall

for each facility which produces or processes [more than [10 kg] [100 kg] [1,000 kg] 2/ per annum 3/ of] any chemical 4/ 5/ with an LD₅₀ equal to or less than 0.5 mg per kg bodyweight 6/ or an LCt₅₀ equal to or less than 2,000 mg-min/m³ and has a production capacity 7/ for any such chemical exceeding 1,000 kg 2/ 8/ per annum 9/,

include the following information:

1/ Some delegations consider that the chemicals in this Annex should be dealt with in the Annex to Article VI [2] Schedule [2]. Other delegations consider that a separate Annex is required.

2/ Some delegations felt that the thresholds for production and production capacity should correspond to militarily significant quantities.

3/ The question of production or processing not occurring annually requires further discussion.

4/ Some delegations expressed the view that additional criteria of suitability for chemical weapons purposes should be added.

5/ Some delegations expressed the view that whether or not a list of these chemicals would be needed, should be discussed.

6/ It is understood that further discussion is needed with regard to chemicals with a somewhat lower toxicity. In this context various ideas were put forward, i.e.:

- that chemicals falling within a deviation-range of 10-20 per cent could be considered;
- that chemicals with an LD₅₀ close to 0.5 mg/kg bodyweight could be included as exceptions;
- that the modalities for revisions of lists could be made use of to take care of possible concerns in this regard.

7/ How to define production capacity remains to be agreed upon. In this context reference was made to the proposal contained in CD/CW/WP.171.

8/ It is understood that the quantitative value of the threshold for production capacity remains to be discussed.

9/ One delegation expressed the view that the question of production capacities should be considered in accordance with the relevant provisions in the Annex to Article VI, Schedules [2] and [3] (cf. CD/CW/WP.167 pp. 62, 68).

Chemical(s)

- (i) The chemical name, common or trade name used by the facility, structural formula, and Chemical Abstracts Service Registry Number (if assigned);
- (ii) For each chemical the total amount produced and/or processed [, imported and exported, with an indication of the countries involved,] in the previous calendar year; 1/ 2/
- (iii) The purpose(s) for which the chemical(s) are produced or processed:
 - (a) conversion on-site (specify product type);
 - (b) sale or transfer to other domestic industry (specify final product type or end use);
 - (c) export (specify which country);
 - (d) other.

Facility

- (i) The name of the facility and of the owner, company, or enterprise operating the facility;
- (ii) The exact location of the facility (including the address, location of the complex, location of the facility within the complex including the specific building and structure number, if any);
- (iii) Whether the facility is dedicated to producing or processing the declared chemical(s) or is multipurpose;
- (iv) The production capacity of the facility for the declared chemical(s); 3/
- (v) Which of the following activities are performed with regard to the declared chemical(s) and for which purpose(s):
 - (a) production;
 - (b) processing with conversion into another chemical;
 - (c) processing without chemical conversion (e.g. purification);
 - (d) other - specify.

1/ Whether the total amount is to be expressed as an exact figure or within a range is to be discussed.

2/ One delegation expressed the view that aggregate national data on the production of any such chemical should also be provided.

3/ How to define production capacity remains to be agreed upon.

(vi) Whether declared chemicals are stored on-site in quantities greater than []. 1/

2. A State Party shall notify the [international authority] of the name and location of any facility which intends, in the year following submission of the Annual Declaration, to produce or process

[more than [10 kg] [100 kg] [1,000 kg] 2/ per annum of] any chemical 3/ 4/ with an LD₅₀ equal to or less than 0.5 mg per kg bodyweight 5/ or an LCt₅₀ equal to or less than 2,000 mg-min/m³ and which has or intends to acquire a production capacity 6/ for any such chemical exceeding 1,000 kg 2/ 7/ per annum. 8/ 9/

1/ The question of a threshold required further consideration.

2/ Some delegations felt that the thresholds for production and production capacity should correspond to militarily significant quantities.

3/ Some delegations expressed the view that additional criteria of suitability for chemical weapons purposes should be added.

4/ Some delegations expressed the view that whether or not a list of these chemicals would be needed, should be discussed.

5/ It is understood that further discussion is needed with regard to chemicals with a somewhat lower toxicity in the light of what might be agreed as regards footnote 6/ to paragraph 1.

6/ How to define production capacity remains to be agreed upon. In this context reference was made to the proposal contained in CD/CW/WP.171.

7/ It is understood that the quantitative value of the threshold for production capacity remains to be discussed.

8/ One delegation expressed the view that the question of production capacities should be considered in accordance with the relevant provisions in the Annex to Article VI, Schedules [2] and [3] (cf. CD/CW/WP.167 pp. 62, 68).

9/ It was pointed out that production plans might be changed at short notice and that the Convention therefore should provide for declarations of such revisions of production plans.

VERIFICATION 1/

Aim

3. The aim of the measures stipulated in Article VI, paragraph 6 shall be to verify that:

- (i) facilities declared under this Annex are not used to produce any chemical listed in Schedule [1];
- (ii) the quantities of declared chemicals produced or processed are consistent with needs for purposes not prohibited by the Chemical Weapons Convention;
- (iii) the declared chemicals are not diverted or used for purposes prohibited by the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Obligation and Frequency

- 4.(i) Each facility notified to the [international authority] under this Annex shall be subject to systematic international on-site inspection on a routine basis if the production of any declared chemical exceeds ... per annum and the production capacity for any of the declared chemical(s) exceeds ... per annum.
- (ii) The number, intensity, duration, timing and mode of inspections for a particular facility shall be based on the risk to the objectives of the Convention posed by the relevant chemical, the characteristics of the facility and the nature of the activities carried out there. (Guidelines to be used as well as a system for "weighting" need to be developed. In this context, threshold(s) might need to be established). 2/

Selection

5. The particular facility to be inspected shall be chosen by the [international authority] in such a way to preclude the prediction of precisely when the facility is to be inspected.

Notification

6. A State Party shall be notified by the [international authority] of the decision to inspect a facility referred to in paragraph [4] [48] [12] hours prior to the arrival of the inspection team.

1/ Some of the provisions contained in this section have general application throughout the Convention. It is understood that the retention of these will be reviewed at a later stage in the negotiations.

2/ Some delegations expressed the view that possible criteria of "suitability for chemical weapons purposes" might be considered in this context rather than in the context of declarations.

Host State Party

7. The host State Party shall have the right to designate personnel to accompany an international inspection team. The exercise of this right shall not affect the right of inspectors to obtain access to the facility, as provided by the Convention, nor shall it delay or otherwise impede the carrying out of the inspection.

Initial Visit

8. Each facility notified to the [international authority] under this Annex shall be liable to receive an initial visit from international inspectors, promptly after the State becomes a party to the Convention. 1/

9. The purpose of the initial visit shall be to verify information provided concerning the facility to be inspected and to obtain any additional information needed for planning future verification activities at the facility, including inspection visits and use of on-site instruments.

Agreement on Inspection Procedures

10. Each State Party shall execute an agreement, based on a model agreement, with the international authority, within ... months after the Convention enters into force for the State, governing the conduct of the inspections of the facilities declared by the State Party. The agreement shall provide for the detailed subsidiary arrangements which shall govern inspections at each facility.

11. The detailed subsidiary arrangements shall include, inter alia, the size of the team required for the inspection; the duration of the inspection; the relevant parts of the site to be inspected; and the need for permanent on-site instrumentation.

Verification Inspections

12. The areas of a facility to be inspected under subsidiary arrangements may, inter alia, include:

- (i) areas where feed chemicals (reactants) are delivered and/or stored;
- (ii) areas where manipulative processes are performed upon the reactants prior to addition to the reaction vessel;

1/ One delegation pointed out that new facilities would have to be notified to the [international authority] at a later stage.

- (iii) feed lines as appropriate from subparagraph (i) and/or subparagraph (ii) to the reaction vessel, together with any associated valves, flow meters, etc.;
 - (iv) the external aspect of the reaction vessel and its ancillary equipment;
 - (v) lines from the reaction vessel leading to long- or short-term storage or for further processing of the designated chemical;
 - (vi) control equipment associated with any of the items under subparagraphs (i) to (v);
 - (vii) equipment and areas for waste and effluent handling;
 - (viii) equipment and areas for disposition of off-specification chemicals.
13. The inspectors have the right at any stage during the inspection to obtain samples from any of the areas inspected. They also have the right to request that appropriate analyses be performed in their presence, either in-house or in a mobile field laboratory, or if necessary to have samples analysed at a laboratory designated by the [international authority]. They may request clarification of any ambiguities arising from the inspection.
14. The Technical Secretariat may retain at each site a sealed container for photographs, plans and other information that it may wish to refer to in the course of subsequent inspection.

Submission of Inspectors' Report

15. The inspectors shall submit a report to the [international authority] on the activities conducted by them and on their findings. 1/
16. In the event that any ambiguities arise which cannot be resolved in the course of the inspection, the inspectors may in their report recommend appropriate steps for clarification.

1/ It was suggested that the report of the inspectors should be made available to the State Party subject to the inspection.

OTHER DOCUMENT(S)

Preparatory Commission 1/

1. For the purpose of carrying out the necessary preparations for the effective operation of the provisions of the Convention and for preparing for the first meeting of the Consultative Committee, the Depository of the Convention shall convene a Preparatory Commission not later than [30] days after the Convention has been signed by (to be determined) States.
2. The Commission shall consist of the representatives designated by the States which have signed the Convention.
3. The Commission shall be convened at [...] and remain in existence until the Convention comes into force and thereafter until the Consultative Committee has convened.
4. The expenses of the Commission shall be met by the States signatories to the Convention, participating in the Commission, [in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment, adjusted to take into account differences between the United Nations membership and the participation of States signatories in the Commission].
5. All decisions of the Commission shall be made by [consensus] [a two-thirds majority].
6. The Commission shall
 - (a) elect its own officers, adopt its own rules of procedures, meet as often as necessary and establish such committees as it deems useful;
 - (b) appoint an executive secretary and establish a provisional technical secretariat with units in charge of preparatory work concerning the main activities to be carried out by the Technical Secretariat created under the Convention: declarations and data; inspectorate; evaluation of accounts and reports; agreements and negotiations; personnel, qualifications and training; development of procedures and instruments; technical support; finance and administration;
 - (c) make arrangements for the first session of the Consultative Committee, including the preparation of an agenda and draft rules of procedure;

1/ Provisions on the Commission could be contained in a resolution of the United Nations General Assembly commending the convention or in an appropriate document associated with the Convention.

(d) make studies, reports and recommendations for the first session of the Consultative Committee and the first meeting of the Executive Council on subjects requiring immediate attention after the entry into force of the Convention, including the programme of work and the budget for the first year of activities of the Consultative Committee, the location of the permanent offices of the International Authority, technical problems relevant to activities connected with the implementation of the Convention, establishment of the Technical Secretariat and of its staff and financial regulations.

7. The Commission shall report on its activities to the first meeting of the Consultative Committee.

ADDENDUM TO APPENDIX I

GUIDELINES ON THE INTERNATIONAL INSPECTORATE 1/

Attachment (A) to CD/CW/WP.175 - Cluster IV

I. Designation

1. Verification activities in a State Party to the Convention shall only be performed by inspectors designated to this State in advance.

2. The Technical Secretariat shall communicate, in writing, to the State concerned the names, nationality and ranks of the inspectors proposed for designation. Furthermore, it shall furnish a certificate of their qualifications and enter into such consultations as the State concerned may request. The latter shall inform the Secretariat, within (30) days after receipt of such a proposal, whether or not it will accept the designation of each inspector proposed. The inspectors accepted by the State Party shall be designated to that State. The Technical Secretariat shall notify the State concerned of such a designation.

3. Should any State Party object to the designation of inspectors, be it at the time they are proposed or at any time thereafter, it shall inform the Technical Secretariat of its objection. If a State Party raises objections to an inspector already designated, this objection shall come into effect 30 days after receipt by the Technical Secretariat. The Technical Secretariat shall immediately inform the State concerned of the withdrawal of the designation of the inspector. In cases of objections to designation of inspectors the Technical Secretariat shall propose to the State Party in question one or more alternative designations. The Technical Secretariat shall refer to the Executive Council any repeated refusal by a State Party to accept the designation of inspectors if the Secretariat is of the opinion that such refusal impedes inspections to be conducted in the State concerned.

II. Privileges and immunities of inspectors

1. To the extent necessary for the effective exercise of their functions, inspectors shall be accorded the following privileges and immunities, which shall also apply to the time spent travelling in connection with their missions:

(a) immunity from personal arrest or detention and from seizure of their personal baggage;

(b) immunity from legal process of every kind in regard to what they do, say or write in the performance of their official functions;

1/ These guidelines relate to the activities international inspectors carry out in connection with routine verification in States Parties.

(c) inviolability of all the papers, documents, equipment and samples they carry with them;

(d) the right to use codes for their communication with the Secretariat and to receive papers or correspondence by courier or in sealed bags from the Secretariat;

(e) multiple entry/exit and/or transit visas and the same treatment in entry and transit formalities as is given to members of comparable rank of diplomatic missions;

(f) the same currency and exchange facilities as are accorded to representatives of foreign Governments on temporary official missions;

(g) the same immunities and facilities in respect to their personal baggage as are accorded to members of comparable rank of diplomatic missions.

2. Privileges and immunities shall be granted to inspectors for the sake of the Convention and not for the personal benefit of the individuals themselves. The Secretariat shall have the right and the duty to waive the immunity of any inspector whenever it is of the opinion that the immunity would impede the course of justice and can be waived without prejudice to the Convention.

3. If any State Party to the Convention considers that there has been an abuse of an above-mentioned privilege or immunity, consultations shall be held between that State and the Secretariat to determine whether such an abuse has occurred and, if so, to ensure that it does not repeat itself.

III. General rules governing inspections and the conduct of inspectors

1. Inspectors shall carry out their functions under the Convention on the basis of the inspection mandate issued by the Technical Secretariat. They shall refrain from activities going beyond this mandate.

2. The activities of inspectors shall be so arranged as to ensure on the one hand the effective discharge of the inspectors' functions and, on the other, the least possible inconvenience to the State concerned and disturbance to the facility or other location inspected. Inspectors shall only request the information and data which are necessary to fulfil their mandate. States Parties shall furnish such information. Inspectors shall not communicate to any State, Organization or person outside the Technical Secretariat any information to which they have access in connection with their activities in a State Party. They shall abide by relevant regulations established within the Technical Secretariat for the protection of confidential information. They shall remain bound by these relevant regulations after they have left their functions as international inspectors.

3. In the performance of their duties on the territory of a State Party, inspectors shall, if the State Party so requests, be accompanied by representatives of this State, provided inspectors are not thereby delayed or otherwise hindered in the exercise of their functions. If a State Party designates the inspectors' point of entry into, and departure from, the State

concerned and their routes and modes of travel within the State, it shall be guided by the principle of minimizing the time of travel and any other inconvenience.

4. In exercising their functions, inspectors shall avoid unnecessarily hampering or delaying the operation of a facility or affecting its safety. In particular, inspectors shall not operate any facility or direct the staff of the facility to perform any operation. If inspectors consider that, to fulfil their mandate, particular operations should be carried out in a facility, they shall request the designated representative of the management of the facility to perform them.

5. After the inspection visit, inspectors shall submit to the Technical Secretariat a report on the activities conducted by them and on their findings. The report shall be factual in nature. It shall only contain facts relevant to compliance with the Convention, as provided for under the inspection mandate. Relevant regulations, governing the protection of confidential information, shall be observed. The report shall also provide information as to the manner in which the State Party inspected co-operated with the inspection team. Different views held by inspectors may be attached to the report.

6. The report shall be kept confidential. The National Authority of the State Party shall be informed of the findings of the report. Any written comments, which the State Party may immediately make on these findings shall be annexed to it. Immediately after receiving the report, the Technical Secretariat shall transmit a copy of it to the State Party concerned.

7. Should the report contain uncertainties, or should co-operation between the National Authority and the inspectors not measure up to the standard required, the Technical Secretariat shall approach the State Party for clarification.

8. If the uncertainties cannot be removed or the facts established are of a nature to suggest that obligations undertaken under the Convention have not been met, the Technical Secretariat shall inform the Executive Council without delay.

APPENDIX II

This appendix contains papers reflecting results of work undertaken on issues under the Convention. They are enclosed to serve as a basis for future work.

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PRINCIPLES AND ORDER OF DESTRUCTION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS

During the resumed session the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee conducted consultations on the Principles and Order of Destruction of Chemical Weapons. As a starting point was taken Annex IV, Section III, of the rolling text (CD/782). During the consultations the following elements and ideas emerged, which, in the view of the Chairman, could constitute building blocks in the further search for solutions to the problems involved.

1. The elaboration of the Order of Destruction shall build on the undiminished security for all States during the entire destruction stage, confidence-building in the early part of the destruction stage, gradual acquisition of experience in the course of destroying chemical weapons stocks and applicability irrespective of the actual composition of the stockpiles and the methods chosen for the destruction of the chemical weapons.

2. Each State Party possessing chemical weapons shall begin destruction not later than one year after it becomes a Party to the Convention, and all stockpiles must have been destroyed by the end of the tenth year after the entry into force of the Convention. 1/

3. The entire destruction period is divided into annual periods.

4. For the purpose of destruction, chemical weapons declared by each State Party are divided into three categories.

(Discussions have taken place along the lines of the following three categories:

Category 1: Chemical weapons on the basis of Schedule [1] chemicals;

Category 2: Chemicals weapons on the basis of all other chemicals;

Category 3: Unfilled munitions and devices, and equipment specifically designed for use directly in connection with employment of chemical weapons.)

5. For each category a comparison factor shall be established.

- The comparison factor for categories containing chemicals shall be agent tons, i.e. the aggregate weight of the chemicals within each such category.
- The comparison factor(s) for unfilled munitions and devices shall be expressed in fill volume (m³) and for equipment in number of items.

1/ Possible additional provisions applicable to States possessing chemical weapons but which ratify the Convention at a later stage would need to be discussed.

6. The Order of Destruction shall be based on the principle of levelling out the stockpiles of chemical weapons of State Parties, while observing the principle of [equal] [undiminished] security. (The level of such stockpiles shall be agreed upon.)

7. Each State Party possessing chemical weapons

- shall start the destruction of Category 1 chemical weapons not later than one year, and shall complete it not later than 10 years after the entry into force of the Convention,
- shall start the destruction of Category 2 chemical weapons not later than one year, and shall complete it not later than five years after the entry into force of the Convention,
- shall start the destruction of Category 3 chemical weapons not later than one year, and shall complete it not later than ... years after the entry into force of the Convention.

8. Within each category a State Party shall carry out the destruction in such a way that not more than what is specified in the table below remains at the end of each annual period.

Table

	<u>Category 1</u>	<u>Category 2</u>	<u>Category 3</u>
<u>Year</u>			
2			
3			
4			
5			
6		(to be developed)	
7			
8			
9			
10			

9. Within each category a State Party shall determine its detailed plans for each annual period in such a way that not more than what is specified in the Convention will remain by the end of each such period.

These plans shall be submitted to and approved by the Executive Council, in accordance with the provisions in Section V of the Annex to Article IV as regards the plans for elimination of chemical weapons.

10. A State Party is not precluded from destroying its stocks at a faster pace.

11. Each State Party shall report annually on the implementation of the destruction in each annual period.

GUIDELINES FOR SCHEDULE [1] 1/

The following guidelines, singly or in combination, should be taken into account in considering whether a chemical should be included in Schedule [1]:

1. Super-toxic lethal chemicals which have been stockpiled as chemical weapons.
2. Super-toxic lethal chemicals which pose a particular risk of potential use as chemical weapons.
3. Super-toxic lethal chemicals which have little or no use except as chemical weapons.
4. Super-toxic lethal chemicals which possess physical and chemical properties enabling them to be used as chemical weapons. 2/
5. Super-toxic lethal chemicals with chemical structure related/similar to those super-toxic lethal chemicals already listed in Schedule 1. 3/
6. Chemicals whose principal effect is to cause temporary incapacitation and which possess physical and chemical properties enabling them to be used as chemical weapons.
7. Any toxic chemical with a chemical structure related/similar to those chemicals already listed in Schedule 1. 3/
8. Other chemicals which have been stockpiled as chemical weapons.
9. Other chemicals which have little or no use except as chemical weapons.
10. Key precursors which participate in a one-stage process of producing toxic chemicals in munitions and devices. 4/
11. Key precursors which pose a high risk to the objectives of the Convention by virtue of their high potential for use to produce chemical weapons.

1/ The basis and modalities for the application and revision of the guidelines are to be developed.

2/ A view was expressed that compounds listed in Schedule [1] should possess the properties of chemical warfare agents.

3/ The view was expressed that this by itself would not be sufficient to include a chemical in Schedule [1].

4/ One delegation believes that this provision is not necessary and that it is already covered under point 12.

12. Key precursors which may possess the following characteristics:

- (i) it may react with other chemicals to give, within a short time, a high yield of a toxic chemical defined as a chemical weapon;
- (ii) the reaction may be carried out in such a manner that the toxic product is readily available for military use; and
- (iii) key precursors which have little or no use except for chemical weapons purposes.

POSSIBLE FACTORS IDENTIFIED TO DETERMINE THE NUMBER, INTENSITY,
DURATION, TIMING AND MODE OF INSPECTIONS OF FACILITIES HANDLING
SCHEDULE [2] CHEMICALS 1/

1. Factors related to the listed chemical
 - (a) Toxicity of the end product.
2. Factors related to the facility
 - (a) Multipurpose or dedicated facility.
 - (b) Capability and convertibility for initiating production of highly toxic chemicals.
 - (c) Production capacity.
 - (d) On-site storage of listed key precursors in quantities exceeding ... tonnes.
 - (e) Location of the facility and infrastructure for transportation.
3. Factors related to the activities carried out at the facility
 - (a) Production e.g. continuous, batch, types of equipment.
 - (b) Processing with conversion into another chemical.
 - (c) Processing without chemical conversion.
 - (d) Other types of activities, e.g., consumption, import, export, transfer.
 - (e) Volume produced, processed, consumed, transferred.
 - (f) Relationship between maximum and utilized capacity for a scheduled chemical.
 - multipurpose facility
 - dedicated facility
4. Other factors
 - (a) International monitoring by on-site instruments.
 - (b) Remote monitoring.

1/ The order in which these factors are listed does not indicate any priority.

REPORT ON HOW TO DEFINE "PRODUCTION CAPACITY"

Report to the Co-ordinator of Cluster III from Dr. Santesson (Sweden)
on the subject of consultations with technical experts on the question
of how to define "production capacity"

Consultations were held with Lt. Col. Bretfeld (German Democratic Republic), Dr. Cooper (United Kingdom), Prof. Kuzmin (USSR), Dr. Mikulak (United States), Dr. Ooms (Netherlands) and Prof. Pfirschke (Federal Republic of Germany), as well as with Col. Koutepov (USSR) and Col. Lovelace (United States). This report summarizes the results of the consultations, as seen by the rapporteur.

Although it was generally felt that it would be desirable to have one definition of "production capacity" applicable all through the Convention, it was also concluded that this might not be possible.

A definition could consist of a verbal part and a mathematical formula to be used for the calculation of the numerical value of the production capacity. Such a single definition, as exemplified below, could be utilized in the Annex to Article V, paras. I.A.5 (a) and I.B.7 (cf. in this context CD/CW/WP.148), in the Annex to Article VI [2], para. 2, in the Annex to Article VI [3], para. 1 (iv), and in the case of "Possible factors identified to determine ... Schedule [2] chemicals", contained in CD/782 App. II, p. 12.

On the basis of CD/CW/WP.171 and proposals presented during the consultations, the following suggestion was worked out.

Verbal part:

- Alt. 1 The production capacity is the annual quantitative potential for manufacturing a specific substance on the basis of the technological process used at a facility where the substance in question is actually produced.
- Alt. 2 The production capacity is the annual quantitative potential for manufacturing a specific substance on the basis of the technological process actually used or planned to be used at a facility.

Mathematical formulae:

Production capacity per year =

$$= \frac{\text{quantity produced}}{\text{hours of production}} \times \text{constant} \times \text{no. of units}$$

or in the case of dedicated units not yet in operation

$$= \frac{\text{nameplate or design capacity}}{\text{hours of planned operation}} \times \text{constant} \times \text{no. of units}$$

The constant is the number of hours of availability per year. In both formulae, the constant will have different values for continuous and batch operations. Furthermore, different values may have to be assigned for "dedicated batch processes" and "multipurpose batch processes". The values of the constant remains to be determined.

It was noted that the formulae relate to the production step in which the product is actually formed. They might not necessarily be applicable e.g. to subsequent purification steps in the process.

It was also noted that in the case of multipurpose facilities producing more than one declared chemical, the production capacity of the facility for each of the chemicals should be calculated independently of the other chemicals being produced.

In the case of the Annex to Article VI [4], it appears that for limited production, the above mathematical formulae might possibly give rise to an overestimate of the actual production capacity. It was suggested that the formulae could be used if the annual production was more than 5 tonnes.

In the case of the Annex to Article VI [1], it was felt that the above type of definition would be unsuitable and that other ways of delimiting the "production capacity" of the single small-scale production facility should be explored.

Further refinement of the definition of production capacity is required. Also, methods for verification of the declared production capacity will have to be discussed. In this context opinions were expressed on the use of production log books and to which extent inspectors would need access to technical information on the production process.

MODELS FOR AGREEMENTS

A. MODEL FOR AN AGREEMENT RELATING TO FACILITIES PRODUCING,
PROCESSING OR CONSUMING CHEMICALS LISTED IN SCHEDULE [2] 1/

1. Identification of the facility

- (a) Facility identification code
- (b) Name of the facility
- (c) Owner(s) of the facility
- (d) Name of the company or enterprise operating the facility
- (e) Exact location of the facility
 - . Location of the complex
 - . Location of the facility within the complex, including the specific building and structure number, if any
 - . Location of relevant support facilities within the complex: e.g., research and technical services, laboratories, medical centres, waste treatment plants
- (f) Determination of the area(s) and place(s)/site(s) to which inspectors shall have access

2. Information on the facility

This agreement is based on the design information obtained during the initial visit on [date of visit]. Design information should include:

- (a) Data on the production process (type of process: e.g., continuous or batch; type of equipment; the technology employed; process engineering particulars)
- (b) Data on processing with conversion into another chemical (description of the conversion process, process engineering particulars and end-product)
- (c) Data on processing without chemical conversion (process engineering particulars, description of the process and the end-product, concentration in the end-product)
- (d) Data on waste treatment (disposal and/or storage, waste treatment technology, recycling)

1/ This paper relates to agreements which have commonly been named "facility attachments". Further work is needed on this issue.

(e) Data on safety and health measures at the facility

(f) Data on clean-up procedures and general overhauls

(g) Data on feedstocks used in the production or processing of declared chemicals (type and capacity of storage)

(h) Maps and plans of the facility, including data on infrastructure for transportation (site maps showing, for example, all buildings and functions, pipework, roads, fences, mains electricity, water and gas points, and diagrams indicating the relevant material flow at the designated facility)

2.1. Storage of information

Designation of information, provided about the facility under paragraph 2, which shall be kept by the International Authority under lock and key at the facility. (In the event of unresolved ambiguities, the International Authority shall have the right to study such information.)

3. Number and modalities of inspections.

After the initial visit, the number and modalities of inspections shall be decided by the Technical Secretariat on the basis of guidelines (compare CD/CW/WP.167, page 63, subparagraph 5.ii. and CD/CW/WP.167, Appendix II, page 3).

4. Verification measures and identification of the specific area(s) and place(s) of a facility to be inspected

(a) Identification of the relationship between feedstocks and the quantity of end-products

(b) Identification of key points for measurement (KMP) and sample-taking (STP)

(c) Identification of methods for continuous monitoring and surveillance, e.g.

- . key points for the application of monitoring and surveillance measures
- . installed instruments and devices, seals and markers, methods to check the proper functioning of those instruments, servicing of installed instruments
- . activities to be undertaken by the State Party concerned with a view to providing the conditions necessary for the installation and proper functioning of the devices

(d) Certification of relevant losses within the production process and their implications for key measurement points (KMP)

5. Inspection activities

5.1. Mode of routine inspection

To be developed on the basis of the initial visit

5.2. Indication of the scope of the inspection effort in agreed areas under ordinary circumstances

Access to the area to be inspected, including all key points. Activities may comprise:

(a) Examination of relevant records

(b) Identification of relevant plant equipment

(c) Identification and validation of measuring equipment (examination and calibration of measuring equipment; verification of measuring systems using, as appropriate, independent standards)

(d) Taking of analytical samples

(e) Verification of chemical inventory records

. verification of the operator's inventory-taking for completeness and accuracy

. verification of the quantities of feedstocks

(f) Observation of operations relating to movement of chemical substances in the plant

(g) Installation, servicing and review of surveillance and monitoring instruments

(h) .

.

.

5.3. Specific arrangements for the use of special equipment

As the need arises, specific arrangements for the use of special equipment, as requested by inspectors.

6. Provisions governing sample-taking, on-site analyses of samples and on-site analysis equipment

(a) Sample-taking (e.g., standardized procedures)

(b) On-site analyses (e.g., provisions concerning on-site/in-house analyses, analytical methods, equipment, precision and accuracy of analyses)

(c) Duplicates and additional samples

7. Records

7.1. Type of records

The records to be examined shall be determined after the initial visit and shall include the following:

(a) Accounting records (for example, discards, retained wastes, shipments of end-products, receipts/shipments)

(b) Operating records

Operating records used to establish the quantity, quality and composition of the end-product. These may include:

- . Information on any accident that resulted in a loss/gain of material
- . Information on dissolution, evaporation, etc.

(c) Calibration records

Information on the functioning of analytical/monitoring equipment

7.2. Location and language of records

To be determined during the initial visit

7.3. Access to records

To be determined after the initial visit

7.4. Retention period of records

To be determined on the basis of the initial visit

8. Services to be provided by the facility

Point of contact for each type of service, e.g.

- . operator assistance
- . medical and health services

9. Specific facility health and safety rules and regulations to be observed by inspectors

10. Changes, revision and updating of advance information to be provided on the facility

(To be announced in reference to the paragraph on the design information obtained during the initial visit)

11. Interpretation services

B. MODEL FOR AN AGREEMENT RELATING TO SINGLE
SMALL-SCALE PRODUCTION FACILITIES 1/

Proposal by the Co-ordinator of Cluster IV

1. Information on the single small-scale production facility

(a) Identification

- (i) Facility identification code
- (ii) Name of the facility
- (iii) Exact location of the facility

If the facility is located within a complex, then also

- . Location of the complex
- . Location of the facility within the complex, including the specific building and structure number, if any
- . Location of relevant support facilities within the complex, e.g. research and technical services, laboratories, medical centres, waste treatment plants
- . Determination of the area(s) and place(s)/site(s) to which inspectors shall have access

(b) Detailed technical information

- (i) Maps and plans of the facility, including site maps showing, with functions indicated, for example, all buildings, pipework, roads, fences, mains electricity, water and gas points, diagrams indicating the relevant material flow at the designated facility and data on infrastructure for transportation
- (ii) Data on each production process (type of process, type of equipment, technology employed, production capacity, process engineering particulars)
- (iii) Data on the feedstocks used (type of feedstock, storage capacity)
- (iv) Data on the storage of the chemicals produced (type and capacity of storage)
- (v) Data on waste treatment (disposal and/or storage, waste treatment technology, recycling)

1/ Prepared by Lt. Col. Bretfeld, German Democratic Republic;
Dr. Cooper, United Kingdom; Dr. Lau, Sweden; and Dr. Santesson, Sweden.

(c) Specific facility health and safety procedures to be observed by inspectors

(d) Dates

(i) Date when the initial visit took place

(ii) Date(s) when additional information was provided

(e) Storage of information

Identification of which information, provided about the facility under paragraph 1, shall be kept by the International Organization under lock and key at the facility.

2. Number and modalities of inspections

The number and modalities of inspections shall be decided by the Technical Secretariat on the basis of guidelines.

3. Inspections

On-site inspection activities may include, but shall not necessarily be restricted to, the following:

(i) Observation of any and all activities at the facility

(ii) Examination of any and all equipment at the facility

(iii) Identification of technological changes in the production process

(iv) Comparison of process parameters with those ascertained during the initial visit

(v) Verification of chemical inventory records

(vi) Verification of equipment inventory records

(vii) Review, servicing and maintenance of monitoring equipment

(viii) Identification and validation of measuring equipment (examination and calibration of measuring equipment, verification of measuring systems using, as appropriate, independent standards)

(ix) Application, examination, removal and renewal of seals

(x) Investigation of indicated irregularities

4. Monitoring system

(a) Description of items and their location

(i) Sensors and other instruments

(ii) Data transmission system

- (iii) Ancillary equipment
- (iv) ...
- (b) Installation of the system
 - (i) Time schedule
 - (ii) Advance preparations
 - (iii) Assistance to be provided by the State Party during installation
- (c) Activation, initial testing and certification
- (d) Operation
 - (i) Regular operation
 - (ii) Routine tests
 - (iii) Service and maintenance
 - (iv) Measures in case of malfunctions
 - (v) Responsibilities of the State Party
- (e) Replacement, modernization

5. Temporary closure

- (a) Notification procedure
- (b) Description of the types of seals to be used
- (c) Description of how and where seals shall be fixed
- (d) Provisions for surveillance and monitoring

6. Instruments and other equipment to be used during inspections

- (a) Instruments and other equipment installed or brought in by inspectors
 - (i) Description
 - (ii) Testing, calibration and examination by the State Party
 - (iii) Use
- (b) Instruments and other equipment to be provided by the State Party
 - (i) Description
 - (ii) Testing, calibration and examination by inspectors
 - (iii) Use and maintenance

7. Sample-taking, on-site analyses of samples and on-site analysis equipment

- (a) Sample-taking from production
- (b) Sample-taking from stocks
- (c) Other sample-taking
- (d) Duplicates and additional samples
- (e) On-site analyses (e.g., provisions concerning on-site/in-house analyses, analytical methods, equipment, precision and accuracy of analyses)

8. Records The records to be examined shall be determined after the initial visit and shall include the following:

- (a) Accounting records
- (b) Operating records
- (c) Calibration records

The following shall be determined on the basis of the initial visit:

- (a) Location and language of records
- (b) Access to records
- (c) Retention period of records

9. Administrative arrangements

- (a) Preparations for the arrival and departure of inspectors
- (b) Transport of inspectors
- (c) Accommodation for inspectors
- (d) ...

10. Services to be provided ^{1/}

Such services may include, but shall not necessarily be restricted to, the following:

- (a) Medical and health services
- (b) Office space for inspectors
- (c) Laboratory space for inspectors

^{1/} The question of charges for the services needs to be discussed.

- (d) Technical assistance
- (e) Telephone and telex
- (f) Power and cooling water supplies for instruments
- (g) Interpretation services

For each type of service, the following information shall be included:

- (a) The extent to which that service shall be provided
- (b) Points of contact at the facility for the service

11. Other matters

12. Revisions of the agreement

C. MODEL FOR AN AGREEMENT RELATING TO CHEMICAL
WEAPONS STORAGE FACILITIES 1/

Proposal by the Co-ordinator of Cluster IV

1. Information on the storage facility

(a) Identification:

- (i) Storage facility identification code;
- (ii) Name of the storage facility;
- (iii) Exact location of the storage facility.

(b) Dates:

- (i) Date of the initial verification of the Declaration of the facility;
- (ii) Date(s) additional information provided

(c) Layout:

(i) Maps and plans of the facility, including

- boundary map to show entrances, exits, nature of boundary (e.g. fence);
- site maps to include locations of all buildings and other structures, bunkers/storage areas, fences with access points indicated, mains electricity and water points, and infrastructure for transports including loading areas;

(ii) Details of the construction of bunkers/storage areas which might be of relevance for verification measures;

(iii) ...

(d) Detailed inventory of the contents of each bunker/storage area;

(e) Specific facility health and safety procedures to be observed by inspectors.

2. Information relating to the transport of chemical weapons from the facility

(a) Detailed description of loading area(s);

(b) Detailed description of loading procedures;

1/ Prepared by Lt. Col. Bretfeld, German Democratic Republic;
Dr. Cooper, United Kingdom; Dr. Lau, Sweden; and Dr. Santesson, Sweden.

- (c) Type of transport to be used, including construction details relevant to verification activities, e.g. where to place seals;
- (d) ...

3. Number and modalities of systematic inspections, etc.

The number and modalities of systematic inspections will be decided by the Technical Secretariat on the basis of guidelines.

4. Inspections

(a) Systematic on-site inspections

Systematic on-site inspection activities may include, but are not necessarily restricted to, the following:

- (i) Application, examination, removal and renewal of seals;
- (ii) Review, servicing and maintenance of monitoring equipment;
- (iii) Verification of the inventory of randomly selected sealed bunkers/storage areas.
 - Percentage of bunkers/storage areas to be verified during each systematic on-site inspection.

(b) On-site inspections of transports from the facility

On-site inspections of transports of chemical weapons from the storage facility may include, but are not necessarily restricted to, the following:

- (i) Application, examination, removal and renewal of any seals relevant to the transportation of chemical weapons;
- (ii) Verification of the inventory of bunkers/storage areas from which chemical weapons are to be transported;
- (iii) Observation of the loading procedure and verification of items loaded;
- (iv) Adjustment/realignment of the coverage of the monitoring system.

(c) Inspections to resolve indicated irregularities (ad hoc inspections)

Ad hoc inspection activities may include, but are not necessarily restricted to, the following:

- (i) Investigation of indicated irregularities;
- (ii) Examination, removal and renewal of seals;
- (iii) Verification as required of the inventory of bunkers/storage areas.

(d) Continuous presence of inspectors

The activities of continuously present inspectors may include, but are not necessarily restricted to, the following:

- (i) Application, examination, removal and renewal of seals;
- (ii) Verification of the inventory of any selected sealed bunkers/storage areas;
- (iii) Observation of any and all activities at the storage facility, including any handling of stored chemical weapons for the purpose of transport from the storage facility.

5. Seals and markers

- (a) Description of types of seals and markers
- (b) How and where seals are to be fixed

6. Monitoring system

- (a) Description of items and their locations:
 - (i) Sensors and other instruments;
 - (ii) Data transmission system;
 - (iii) Ancillary equipment;
 - (iv) ...
- (b) Installation:
 - (i) Time schedule;
 - (ii) Advance preparations at the storage facility;
 - (iii) Assistance to be provided by the State Party during installation.
- (c) Activation, initial testing and certification
- (d) Operation:
 - (i) Regular operation;
 - (ii) Routine tests;
 - (iii) Service and maintenance;
 - (iv) Measures in case of malfunctions;
 - (v) Responsibilities of the State Party.

- (e) Replacements, modernizations
 - (f) Dismantling and removal
7. Provisions governing instruments and other equipment to be used during inspections
- (a) Instruments and other equipment brought in by inspectors:
 - (i) Description;
 - (ii) Testing, calibration and examination by the State Party;
 - (iii) Routine use.
 - (b) Instruments and other equipment to be provided by the State Party:
 - (i) Description;
 - (ii) Testing, calibration and examination by inspectors;
 - (iii) Routine use and maintenance.
8. Provisions governing sample-taking, on-site analyses of samples and on-site analysis equipment
- (a) Sample-taking from munitions, notably the standardization of methods for each different type of munition present at the facility
 - (b) Sample-taking from bulk stocks
 - (c) Other sample-taking
 - (d) Duplicates and additional samples
 - (e) On-site analyses (e.g., provisions concerning on-site/in-house analyses, analytical methods, equipment, precision and accuracy of analyses)
9. Administrative arrangements
- (a) Preparations for arrival of inspectors
 - (b) Transport for inspectors
 - (c) Accommodation for inspectors
 - (d) ...

10. Services to be provided ^{1/}

Such services should include, but are not necessarily restricted to, the following:

- medical and health services;
- office space for inspectors;
- laboratory space for inspectors;
- technical assistance;
- telephone and telex;
- power and cooling water supplies for instruments;
- interpretation services.

For each type of service, the following information should be included:

- the extent to which that service is to be provided;
- point of contact at the facility for the service.

11. Amendments and revisions of the agreement

(e.g. changes in loading procedures, types of transport, analytical methods)

12. Other matters

^{1/} The question of charges for the services needs to be discussed.

ON-SITE INSPECTION ON CHALLENGE

This paper represents the state of affairs of work done on the issue of On-Site Inspection on Challenge, as seen by the Chairman. Nothing contained therein constitutes any agreement and therefore does not bind any delegation. The paper is presented with the aim of facilitating for delegations to analyse the situation and to arrive at common positions in the future work of the Committee.

Under Part I, (paragraphs 1-13) material is found on the initial process for an on-site inspection on challenge, up until the submission of the report by the inspectors. The Material under Part II refers to the process after the submission of the report and has been subject to less thorough consultations by the Chairman. However a number of points and questions have been raised. They are summarized in Part II, as seen by the Chairman.

PART I

1. Each State Party has the right at any time to request an on-site inspection of any site under the jurisdiction or control 1/ of a State Party, anywhere, in order to clarify doubts about compliance with the provisions of the Convention. A requesting State is under the obligation to keep the request within the objectives of the Convention.
2. Throughout the inspection the requested State has the right and is under the obligation to demonstrate its compliance with the Convention.
3. The on-site inspection on challenge shall be carried out in accordance with the request.

(The initiation of a challenge inspection)

4. The request shall be submitted to the Head of the Technical Secretariat. 2/ It shall as precisely as possible specify the site to be inspected and the matters on which reassurance is required, including the circumstances and nature of the suspected non-compliance, as well as indicate the relevant provision(s) of the Convention, about which doubts of compliance have arisen.
5. The Head of the Technical Secretariat shall immediately notify the State Party to be inspected, and inform the members of the Executive Council about the request.

1/ The question of "jurisdiction or control" spans over many parts of the Convention. It is under continuous discussion and the exact formulations remain to be agreed upon.

2/ It has been pointed out that there is a need to discuss ways and means to prevent misuse of such requests. One suggested approach is to transmit the request through a Fact Finding Panel.

6. A team of inspectors shall be dispatched as soon as possible and arrive at the site to be inspected not later than ... hours 1/ after the request.
7. The requested State is obliged to admit the team of inspectors and representative(s) of the requesting State into the country and assist them so that they can arrive at the site on time. 2/
8. The inspectors shall at the arrival be permitted to secure the site in a way they deem necessary to ensure that no material of relevance for the inspection is removed from the site.
9. Access to the site for the inspection team shall be provided not later than ... hours after the request.

(The conduct of challenge inspection)

10. The team of inspectors shall conduct the requested on-site inspection with the purpose of establishing relevant facts.
11. The inspectors shall have the access to the site they deem necessary for the conduct of their mission, within the limits of the request. They shall conduct the inspection in the least intrusive manner possible to accomplish their task. The requested State shall facilitate the task of the inspectors.

The inspectors shall consult with the requested State which in keeping with its right and obligation may propose ways and means for the actual conduct of the inspection. The requested State may also make proposals for the protection of sensitive equipment or information, not related to chemical weapons. The inspectors shall consider the proposals made to the extent they deem them adequate for the conduct of their mission.

The inspectors shall conclude the inspection as soon as possible and not later than ... after the commencement of the inspection, and return to the Headquarter.

12. In the exceptional case the requested State proposes arrangements to demonstrate compliance, alternative to a full and comprehensive access, it shall make every effort through consultations with the requesting State to reach agreement on the modalities for establishing the facts and thereby clarifying the doubts.

If agreement is reached within ... hours after the request, the inspection team shall carry out its task in accordance with the agreement. If no agreement is reached within ... hours after the request [the inspection shall be carried out in accordance with points 10 and 11 above.] [the inspection team shall report on the matter to the Executive Council which, within ... hours, shall ...].

1/ A time span of 24-48 hours from the request to the arrival has been discussed.

2/ Situations could be envisaged, i.a. when the site to be inspected is not on the territory of the requested State Party. Such cases could however be considered in the context of questions related to jurisdiction.

(The report)

13. The team of inspectors shall submit a report to the Head of the Technical Secretariat as soon as possible and not later than ... days after the conclusion of the inspection.

The report shall be strictly factual and only contain relevant information, and may within these parameters, include information as to the manner in which the State Party inspected co-operated with the inspection team. Different views held by inspectors shall be attached to the report.

The Head of the Technical Secretariat shall promptly transmit the report to the requesting State, the requested State and to the Executive Council.

(The process after the submission of the report)

(To be elaborated)

PART II

Consideration of the Report

- Whether the Executive Council should meet as soon as possible to consider the Report?

1. The character of the evaluation

(a) The role of the requesting State and the significance of whether that State Party, is satisfied or not,

(b) Should the Executive Council establish formally (i) whether it considers a violation of the Convention has taken place?, (ii) whether an abuse of the rights under Article IX has taken place?

(c) If a violation has been established as a consequence of the evaluation of the report, what further steps?

(i) measures with a bearing on the violating State Party, such as suspension of rights and privileges, export control arrangements etc.,

(ii) a request that the violator remedy the situation,

(iii) assistance to States Parties threatened as a consequence of violations (Art. X),

(iv) convening of a special meeting of the Consultative Committee/ General Conference,

(v) other measures,

(d) If no formal establishment of violation is called for, could the steps mentioned under (c) above anyhow be undertaken?

(e) Measures of two types:

- (i) directives to the Secretariat to undertake certain actions,
- (ii) recommendations to the States Parties to undertake certain action.

2. The process of the evaluation

(a) How should the Executive Council arrive at its positions

- (i) unanimously
- (ii) qualified majority
- (iii) simple majority
- (iv) other.

(b) In which form should the Executive Council express itself

- (i) decisions
- (ii) opinions
- (iii) other.

(c) The role of the requesting and the requested State in the process of evaluation of the Executive Council

- (i) participation in the deliberation of the Council
- (ii) non-participation.

3. The role of Consultative Committee/General Conference in the evaluation

- (a) establish a violation,
- (b) make decision,
- (c) make recommendations,
- (d) endorse positions taken by the EC.

Concerning the process of evaluation of the Consultative Committee/General Conference, compare alternatives under Executive Council above.

4. In the event of an abuse of the rights under Article IX, what measures to be considered,

- (a) notification of States Parties
- (b) compensation to the requested party
- (c) other.

ARTICLE X, ASSISTANCE

During the resumed session work under this Article was initiated. In the course of the deliberations a number of questions were identified which indicate possible approaches to the issues involved but which warrant further consideration by delegations. With the aim of facilitating further work the Chairman has summarized below the questions raised.

I. Assistance in relation to protection against chemical weapons

Various needs for assistance in relation to protection against chemical weapons have been mentioned. They fall broadly into the following categories:

1. Assistance in the case of actual use of chemical weapons against a State Party

A number of questions need to be further discussed.

(a) The character of such assistance

(Some examples given of what such assistance could possibly consist of were: protective equipment and advice on protective measures, medical antidotes and treatments, detection equipment and alarm systems, decontamination equipment and decontaminants).

(b) Who should provide the assistance

- State Parties between themselves on a voluntary basis? (Questions were raised as to the need to include provisions in the convention on voluntary assistance).
- State Parties directly between themselves on a mandatory basis?
- The Technical Secretariat?

If this is to be the case provisions would be needed for the Technical Secretariat to have access to material and services required. How could that be arranged? (In this context it was suggested that State Parties, in a position to do so, on a voluntary basis could provide the Technical Secretariat with lists of material and services which they could make available, if need be).

(c) What kind of procedures would be required to trigger assistance in the two latter cases above?

- A decision by the Executive Council, possibly following a fact-finding procedure?
- A recommendation by the Executive Council, possibly following a fact-finding procedure?
- Automaticity upon request?

It was pointed out that the procedures would have to be such that speedy action was ensured. (Suggestions were made that procedures similar to those applicable for an on-site inspection on challenge could be discussed).

Some discussions also took place on the need to ensure that assistance provided was compatible with the Charter of the United Nations.

2. Assistance in the case of threat of use of chemical weapons by a non-State Party

The same questions arose as under point 1 above. In addition it appears that some kind of evaluation of the threat would be needed.

(Furthermore, there were differing views as to whether it was useful to differentiate between assistance in cases of actual use and cases of threat of use of chemical weapons).

3. Assistance to develop and improve protective capacity

II. Assistance in relation to obligations deriving from the Convention

Various situations could be envisaged when States Parties might want to request assistance to carry out its obligations under the Convention.

During the deliberations the question arose whether this kind of assistance should be dealt with in the context of Article X. Suggestions were made that it would be more appropriately included in the context of the respective other Articles in the Convention or in a new separate Article.

III. Measures against a State using or threatening to use Chemical Weapons were also discussed, in a limited fashion.

It was suggested that this issue could be dealt with in the same manner and context as other possible measures to be considered against States acting in violation of the Convention.

(One example of a possible measure which was mentioned was the halting of export of certain chemicals to such a State. Also restrictions with regard to transfer of technology in the field of chemistry was considered a possibility. Another could be that the Security Council may be called upon to take measures in accordance with Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. In this context the usefulness of, or the need for, including wording corresponding to the Article VII of the BW-Convention could be discussed).

ARTICLE XI, ECONOMIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT

No text presently exists under this Article. In order to initiate discussion on the issues involved the Chairman presented a discussion paper with points for consideration, largely modelled on Article X of the BW-Convention and the Final Declaration of the second review conference of the BW-Convention. The views expressed by delegations indicated different approaches to the issues involved and no conclusions were reached. Further work is needed and the discussion points below are presented by the Chairman with the sole aim of facilitating further preparatory work by delegations.

1. That the States Parties to the Convention should facilitate and promote as well as have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange between them of chemicals and equipment and information relating to development and application of chemistry for peaceful purposes with the aim of promoting equitable economic and technological co-operation.
2. That the States Parties between themselves should, to the fullest possible extent, provide access to and share their scientific and technological knowledge in the field of chemistry, on an equal and non-discriminatory basis for peaceful purposes, with due consideration for the needs of the developing countries.
3. That nothing in the Convention should be interpreted as establishing any discrimination between States Parties as regards their duties, obligations and responsibilities under the Convention, as well as their right to the development of chemical technology and industry for peaceful purposes.
4. That the Convention should be implemented in a manner designed in so far as possible to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of parties to the Convention and international co-operation in the field of peaceful chemical activities including the international exchange of scientific and technical information and chemicals and equipment for the production, processing or use of chemicals for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of the Convention.
(This paragraph is taken from Article VI:8. Its placement could be discussed).

APPENDIX III

PROCEDURES FOR TOXICITY DETERMINATIONS

In March 1982 consultations were held, involving 32 experts from 25 countries, i.a. on toxicity determination.

As a result of the discussions, the participants in the consultations unanimously agreed to recommend standardized operating procedures for acute subcutaneous toxicity determinations and for acute inhalation toxicity determinations. These unanimously agreed recommendations were submitted as Annexes III and IV to document CD/CW/WP.30.

It is understood that further work may be needed to take into account technical developments since 1982. In order to facilitate this work Annexes III and IV to CD/CW/WP.30 are reproduced as Appendix III.

ANNEX III

RECOMMENDED STANDARDIZED OPERATING PROCEDURES FOR ACUTE SUBCUTANEOUS TOXICITY DETERMINATIONS

1. Introduction

Three categories of agents were defined on the basis of their toxicity:

- (i) super-toxic lethal chemicals;
- (ii) other lethal chemicals;
- (iii) other harmful chemicals.

Lethality limits in terms of LD₅₀ for subcutaneous administration were established to separate three toxic categories at 0.5 mg/kg and 10 mg/kg.

2. Principles of the test method

The test substance is administered to a group of animals in doses corresponding exactly to the category limits (0.5 or 10 mg/kg respectively). If in an actual test the death rate was greater than 50 per cent, then the material would fall into the higher toxicity category; if it was lower than 50 per cent the material would fall into the lower toxicity category.

3. Description of the test procedure

3.1 Experimental animal Healthy young adult male albino rats of Wistar strain weighing 200 ± 20 g should be used. The animals should be acclimatized to the laboratory conditions for at least five days prior to the test. The temperature of the animal room before and during the test should be $22 \pm 3^\circ\text{C}$ and the relative humidity should be 50-70 per cent. With artificial lighting, the sequence should be 12 hours light, 12 hours dark. Conventional laboratory diets may be used for feeding with an unlimited supply of drinking water. The animals should be group-caged but the number of

animals per cage should not interfere with proper observation of each animal. Prior to the test, the animals are randomized and divided into groups; 20 animals in each group.

3.2 Test substance Each test substance should be appropriately identified (chemical composition, origin, batch number, purity, solubility, stability etc.) and stored under conditions ensuring its stability. The stability of the substance under the test conditions should also be known. A solution of the test substance should be prepared just before the test. Solutions with concentrations of 0.5 mg/ml and 10 mg/ml should be prepared. The preferable solvent is 0.85 per cent saline. Where the solubility of the test substance is a problem, a minimum amount of an organic solvent such as ethanol, propylene glycol or polyethylene glycol may be used to achieve solution.

3.3 Test method Twenty animals receive in the back region 1 ml/kg of the solution containing 0.5 mg/ml of the test substance. The number of dead animals is determined within 48 hours and again after 7 days. If the death rate is lower than 10 animals, another group of 20 animals should be injected by the same way with 1 ml/kg of the solution containing 10 mg/ml of the test substance. The number of dead animals should be determined within 48 hours and again after 7 days. If the result is doubtful (e.g. death rate = 10), the test should be repeated.

3.4 Evaluation of the results If the death rate in the first group of animals (receiving a solution containing 0.5 mg/ml) is equal to or higher than 50 per cent, the test substance will fall into the "super-toxic lethal chemical" category. If the death rate in the second group (receiving a solution containing 10 mg/ml) is equal to or higher than 50 per cent, the test substance will fall into the "other lethal chemical" category; if lower than 50 per cent, the test substance will fall into the "other harmful chemical".

4. Data reporting

A test report should include the following information:

- (i) test conditions: date and hour of the test, air temperature and humidity;
- (ii) animal data: strain, weight and origin of the animals;
- (iii) test substance characterization: chemical composition, origin, batch number and purity (or impurities) of the substance; date of receipt, quantities received and used in the test; conditions of storage, solvent used in the test;
- (iv) results: the number of dead animals in each group, evaluation of results.

ANNEX IV

RECOMMENDED STANDARDIZED OPERATING PROCEDURES FOR ACUTE
INHALATION TOXICITY CRITERIA

1. In the assessment and evaluation of the toxic characteristics of chemicals in a vapour or aerosol state determination of acute inhalation toxicity is necessary. In every case, when it is possible, this test should be preceded by subcutaneous toxicity determination. Data from these studies constitute the initial steps in the establishing of a dosage regimen in subchronic and other studies and may provide additional information on the mode of toxic action of a substance.

Three categories of agents were defined on the basis of their toxicity:

- (i) super-toxic lethal chemicals
- (ii) other lethal chemicals;
- (iii) other harmful chemicals.

Lethality limits in terms of LCt_{50} for inhalatory application were established to separate three toxic categories at $2,000 \text{ mg min/m}^3$ and $20,000 \text{ mg min/m}^3$.

2. Principles of the test method

A group of animals is exposed for a defined period to the test substance in concentration corresponding exactly to the category limits ($2,000 \text{ mg min/m}^3$ or $20,000 \text{ mg min/m}^3$) respectively. If in an actual test the death rate was greater than 50 per cent, then the material would fall into the higher toxicity category; if it was lower than 50 per cent, the material would fall into the lower toxicity category.

3. Description of the test procedure

3.1 Experimental animal Healthy young adult male albino rats of Wistar strain weighing $200 \pm 20 \text{ g}$ should be used. The animals should be acclimatized to the laboratory conditions for at least five days prior to the test. The temperature of the animal room before and during the test should be $22 \pm 3^\circ\text{C}$ and the relative humidity should be 50-70 per cent. With artificial lighting, the sequence should be 12 hours light, 12 hours dark. Conventional laboratory diets may be used for feeding with an unlimited supply of drinking water. The animals should be group-caged but the number of animals per cage should not interfere with proper observation of each animal. Prior to the test the animals are randomized and divided into two groups; 20 animals in each group.

3.2 Test substance Each test substance should be appropriately identified (chemical composition, origin, batch number, purity, solubility, stability, boiling point, flash point, vapour pressure etc.) and stored under conditions ensuring its stability. The stability of the substance under the test conditions should also be known.

3.3 Equipment A constant vapour concentration may be produced by one of several methods:

- (i) by means of an automatic syringe which drops the material on to a suitable heating system (e.g. hot plate);
- (ii) by sending airsteam through a solution containing the material (e.g. bubbling chamber);
- (iii) by diffusion of the agent through a suitable material (e.g. diffusion chamber).

A dynamic inhalation system with a suitable analytical concentration control system should be used. The rate of air flow should be adjusted to ensure that conditions throughout the equipment are essentially the same. Both a whole body individual chamber exposure or head only exposure may be used.

3.4 Physical measurements Measurements or monitoring should be conducted of the following parameters:

- (i) the rate of air flow (preferably continuously);
- (ii) the actual concentration of the test substance during the exposed period;
- (iii) temperature and humidity.

3.5 Test method Twenty animals are exposed for 10 minutes to the concentration of 200 mg/m^3 and then removed from the chamber. The number of dead animals is determined within 48 hours and again after 7 days. If the death rate is lower than 10 animals, another group of 20 animals should be exposed for 10 minutes to the concentration of $2,000 \text{ mg/m}^3$. The number of dead animals should be determined within 48 hours and again after 7 days. If the result is doubtful (e.g. death rate = 10), the test should be repeated.

3.6 Evaluation of results If the death rate in the first group of animals (exposed to the concentration of 200 mg/m^3) is equal to or higher than 50 per cent, the test substance will fall into the "super-toxic lethal chemical" category. If the death rate in the second group (exposed to the concentration of $2,000 \text{ mg/m}^3$) is equal to or higher than 50 per cent, the test substance will fall into the "other lethal chemical" category; if it is lower than 50 per cent, the test substance will fall into the "other harmful chemical".

4. Data reporting

A test report should include the following information:

- (i) Test conditions: date and hour of the test, description of exposure chamber (type, dimensions, source of air, system for generating the test substance, method of conditioning air, treatment of exhaust air etc.) and equipment for measuring temperature, humidity, air flow and concentration of the test substance;

- (ii) Exposure data: air flow rate, temperature and humidity of air, nominal concentration (total amount of test substance fed into the equipment divided by volume of air), actual concentration in test breathing zone;
- (iii) Animal data: strain, weight and origin of animals;
- (iv) Test substance characterization: chemical composition, origin, batch number and purity (or impurities) of the substance; boiling point, flash point, vapour pressure; date of receipt, quantities received and used in the test; condition of storage, solvent used in the test;
- (v) Results: number of dead animals in each group, evaluation of results.

Agenda for the 1988 session and Programme of Work
of the Conference on Disarmament

(Adopted at the 436th plenary meeting on 2 February 1988)

The Conference on Disarmament, as the multilateral negotiating forum, shall promote the attainment of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

The Conference, taking into account, inter alia, the relevant provisions of the documents of the first and second special sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, will deal with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant measures in the following areas:

- I. Nuclear weapons in all aspects;
- II. Chemical weapons;
- III. Other weapons of mass destruction;
- IV. Conventional weapons;
- V. Reduction of military budgets;
- VI. Reduction of armed forces;
- VII. Disarmament and development;
- VIII. Disarmament and international security;
- IX. Collateral measures, confidence-building measures; effective verification methods in relation to appropriate disarmament measures, acceptable to all parties concerned;
- X. Comprehensive programme of disarmament leading to general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

Within the above framework, the Conference on Disarmament adopts the following agenda for 1988 which includes items that, in conformity with the provisions of Section VIII of its Rules of Procedure, would be considered by it:

1. Nuclear test ban
2. Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament
3. Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters
4. Chemical weapons
5. Prevention of an arms race in outer space
6. Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapons States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons
7. New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons
8. Comprehensive programme of disarmament
9. Consideration and adoption of: (a) the special report to the third special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations devoted to disarmament; and (b) the annual report to the forty-third session of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

Programme of Work

In compliance with rule 28 of its Rules of Procedure, the Conference on Disarmament also adopts the following programme of work for the first part of its 1988 session:

- | | |
|---------------------|---|
| 2-12 February | Statements in plenary meetings. Consideration of the agenda and programme of work, as well as of the establishment of subsidiary bodies on items of the agenda and other organizational questions. |
| 15-26 February | Nuclear test ban.
Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. |
| 29 February-4 March | Prevention of an arms race in outer space. |
| 7-11 March | Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters. |
| 14-25 March | Chemical weapons. |
| 28 March-1 April | Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapons States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.
New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons. |
| 4-8 April | Comprehensive programme of disarmament. |
| 11-... April | Reports of <u>Ad Hoc</u> subsidiary bodies; consideration and adoption of the special report to the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. |

The Conference will continue consideration of its improved and effective functioning and will report to the third special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations devoted to disarmament on that subject.

The Conference will further intensify its consultations in pursuance of paragraphs 16 and 17 of its report (CD/787) with a view to taking a positive decision at its 1988 annual session with regard to expansion of its membership by not more than four States and the need to maintain balance in the membership of the Conference and will inform accordingly the third special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations devoted to disarmament.

Meetings of subsidiary bodies will be convened after consultations between the President of the Conference and the Chairmen of the subsidiary bodies, according to the circumstances and needs of those bodies.

The Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events will meet from 7 to 18 March 1988.

In adopting its programme of work, the Conference has kept in mind the provisions of rules 30 and 31 of its Rules of Procedure.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/797

5 February 1988

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 1 FEBRUARY 1988 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT, TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF A DOCUMENT ENTITLED "JOINT U.S.-SOVIET SUMMIT STATEMENT" ISSUED BY THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON 10 DECEMBER 1987 AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE MEETING BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, RONALD REAGAN, AND THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION, MIKHAIL GORBACHEV, IN WASHINGTON, 7-10 DECEMBER 1987

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of a document entitled "Joint U.S.-Soviet Summit Statement" issued by the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 10 December 1987 at the conclusion of the meeting between the President of the United States, Ronald Reagan and the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev, in Washington, 7-10 December 1987.

I would request that you make arrangements for the Statement to be issued as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed)

Max L. Friedersdorf
United States Representative
to the Conference on Disarmament

10 December 1987

JOINT U.S.-SOVIET SUMMIT STATEMENT

Ronald W. Reagan, President of the United States of America, and Mikhail S. Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, met in Washington on 7-10 December 1987.

Attending the meeting on the United States side were Vice President George Bush; Secretary of State George P. Shultz; Secretary of Defense Frank C. Carlucci; Chief of Staff Howard H. Baker, Jr; Acting Assistant to the President Lieutenant General Colin L. Powell; Counselor of the Department of State Ambassador Max M. Kampelman; Ambassador-at-Large and Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters Paul H. Nitze; Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters Ambassador Edward L. Rowny; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr.; Ambassador of the United States to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Jack P. Matlock; and Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs Rozanne L. Ridgway.

Attending on the Soviet side were Member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR Eduard A. Shevardnadze; Member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Alexander N. Yakovlev; Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Anatoly F. Dobrynin; Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers Vladimir M. Kamentsev; Chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces and First Deputy Minister of Defence of the USSR, Marshal of the Soviet Union Sergei F. Akhromeev; Assistant to the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Anatoly S. Chernyaev; Head of the General Department of the CPSU Central Committee Valeriy I. Boldin; Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR Aleksandr A. Bessmertnykh; Ambassador of the USSR to the United States of America Yuri V. Dubinin; Member of the Collegium of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs Victor P. Karpov; and Ambassador-at-Large Aleksey A. Obukhov.

During the course of the official visit, which had been agreed during the two leaders' November 1985 meeting in Geneva, the President and the General Secretary held comprehensive and detailed discussions on the full range of issues between the two countries, including arms reductions, human rights and humanitarian issues, settlement of regional conflicts, and bilateral relations. The talks were candid and constructive, reflecting both the continuing differences between the two sides, and their understanding that these differences are not insurmountable obstacles to progress in areas of mutual interest.

They reaffirmed their strong commitment to a vigorous dialogue encompassing the whole of the relationship.

The leaders reviewed progress to date in fulfilling the broad agenda they agreed at Geneva and advanced at Reykjavik. They took particular satisfaction in the conclusion over the last two years of important agreements in some areas of this agenda.

The President and the General Secretary affirmed the fundamental importance of their meetings in Geneva and Reykjavik, which laid the basis for concrete steps in a process intended to improve strategic stability and reduce the risk of conflict. They will continue to be guided by their solemn conviction that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. They are determined to prevent any war between the United States and the Soviet Union, whether nuclear or conventional. They will not seek to achieve military superiority.

The two leaders recognized the special responsibility of the United States and the Soviet Union to search for realistic ways to prevent confrontation and to promote a more sustainable and stable relationship between their countries. To this end, they agreed to intensify dialogue and to encourage emerging trends toward constructive co-operation in all areas of their relations. They are convinced that in so doing they will also contribute, with other nations, to the building of a safer world as humanity enters the third millennium.

I. ARMS CONTROL

The INF Treaty

The two leaders signed the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles. This Treaty is historic both for its objective - the complete elimination of an entire class of United States and Soviet nuclear arms - and for the innovative character and scope of its verification provisions. This mutual accomplishment makes a vital contribution to greater stability.

Nuclear and space talks

The President and the General Secretary discussed the negotiations on reductions in strategic offensive arms. They noted the considerable progress which has been made toward conclusion of a treaty implementing the principle of 50 per cent reductions. They agreed to instruct their negotiators in Geneva to work toward the completion of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and all integral documents at the earliest possible date, preferably in time for signature of the treaty during the next meeting of leaders of State in the first half of 1988. Recognizing that areas of agreement and disagreement are recorded in detail in the Joint Draft Treaty Text, they agreed to instruct their negotiators to accelerate resolution of issues within the Joint Draft Treaty Text including early agreement on provisions for effective verification.

In so doing, the negotiators should build upon the agreements on 50 per cent reductions achieved at Reykjavik as subsequently developed and now reflected in the agreed portions of the Joint Draft START Treaty Text being developed in Geneva, including agreement on ceilings of no more than 1,600 strategic offensive delivery systems, 6,000 warheads, 1,540 warheads on 154 heavy missiles; the agreed rule of account for heavy bombers and their nuclear armament; and an agreement that as a result of the reductions the aggregate throw-weight of the Soviet Union's ICBMs and SLBMs will be reduced to a level approximately 50 per cent below the existing level, and this level will not be exceeded by either side. Such an agreement will be recorded in a mutually satisfactory manner.

As priority tasks, they should focus on the following issues:

(a) The additional steps necessary to ensure that the reductions enhance strategic stability. This will include a ceiling of 4,900 on the aggregate number of ICBM plus SLBM warheads within the 6,000 total;

(b) The counting rules governing the number of long-range, nuclear-armed air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) to be attributed to each type of heavy bomber. The delegations shall define concrete rules in this area;

(c) The counting rules with respect to existing ballistic missiles. The sides proceed from the assumption that existing types of ballistic missiles are deployed with the following number of warheads. In the United States: PEACEKEEPER (MX):10, MINUTEMAN III:3, MINUTEMAN II:1, TRIDENT I:8, TRIDENT II:8, POSEIDON:10. In the Soviet Union: SS-17:4, SS-19:6, SS-18:10, SS-24:10, SS-25:1, SS-11:1, SS-13:1, SS-N-6:1, SS-N-8:1, SS-N-17:1, SS-N-18:7, SS-N-20:10 and SS-N-23:4. Procedures will be developed that enable verification of the number of warheads on deployed ballistic missiles of each specific type. In the event either side changes the number of warheads declared for a type of deployed ballistic missile, the sides shall notify each other in advance. There shall also be agreement on how to account for warheads on future types of ballistic missiles covered by the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms;

(d) The sides shall find a mutually acceptable solution to the question of limiting the deployment of long-range, nuclear-armed SLCMs. Such limitations will not involve counting long-range, nuclear-armed SLCMs within the 6,000 warhead and 1,600 strategic offensive delivery systems limits. The sides committed themselves to establish ceilings on such missiles, and to seek mutually acceptable and effective methods of verification of such limitations, which could include the employment of National Technical Means, co-operative measures and on-site inspection;

(e) Building upon the provisions of the Treaty on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, the measures by which the provisions of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms can be verified will, at a minimum, include:

1. Data exchanges, to include declarations by each side of the number and location of weapon systems limited by the Treaty and of facilities at which such systems are located and appropriate notifications. These facilities will include locations and facilities for production and final assembly, storage, testing, and deployment of systems covered by this Treaty. Such declarations will be exchanged between the sides before the Treaty is signed and updated periodically after entry into force;
2. Baseline inspection to verify the accuracy of these declarations promptly after entry into force of the Treaty;
3. On-site observation of the elimination of strategic systems necessary to achieve the agreed limits;

4. Continuous on-site monitoring of the perimeter and portals of critical production and support facilities to confirm the output of these facilities;
5. Short-notice on-site inspection of:
 - (i) declared locations during the process of reducing to agreed limits;
 - (ii) locations where systems covered by this Treaty remain after achieving the agreed limits; and
 - (iii) locations where such systems have been located (formerly declared facilities);
6. The right to implement, in accordance with agreed-upon procedures, short-notice inspections at locations where either side considers covert deployment, production, storage or repair of strategic offensive arms could be occurring;
7. Provisions prohibiting the use of concealment or other activities which impede verification by National Technical Means. Such provisions would include a ban on telemetry encryption and would allow for full access to all telemetric information broadcast during missile flight;
8. Measures designed to enhance observation of activities related to reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms by National Technical Means. These would include open displays of treaty-limited items at missile bases, bomber bases, and submarine ports at locations and times chosen by the inspecting party.

Taking into account the preparation of the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Arms, the leaders of the two countries also instructed their delegations in Geneva to work out an agreement that would commit the sides to observe the ABM Treaty, as signed in 1972, while conducting their research, development, and testing as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty, and not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, for a specified period of time. Intensive discussions of strategic stability shall begin not later than three years before the end of the specified period, after which, in the event the sides have not agreed otherwise, each side will be free to decide its course of action. Such an agreement must have the same legal status as the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Arms, the ABM Treaty, and other similar legally binding agreements. This agreement will be recorded in a mutually satisfactory manner. Therefore, they direct their delegations to address these issues on a priority basis.

The sides shall discuss ways to ensure predictability in the development of the United States-Soviet strategic relationship under conditions of strategic stability, to reduce the risk of nuclear war.

Other arms control issues

The President and the General Secretary reviewed a broad range of other issues concerning arms limitation and reduction. The sides emphasized the importance of productive negotiations on security matters and advancing in the main areas of arms limitation and reduction through equitable, verifiable agreements that enhance security and stability.

Nuclear testing

The two leaders welcomed the opening on 9 November 1987, of full-scale, step-by-step negotiations, in accordance with the joint statement adopted in Washington on 17 September 1987, by the Secretary of State of the United States and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

The United States and Soviet sides have agreed to begin before 1 December 1987, full-scale stage-by-stage negotiations which will be conducted in a single forum. In these negotiations the sides as the first step will agree upon effective verification measures which will make it possible to ratify the United States-USSR Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974 and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty of 1976, and proceed to negotiating further intermediate limitations on nuclear testing leading to the ultimate objective of the complete cessation of nuclear testing as part of an effective disarmament process. This process, among other things, would pursue, as the first priority, the goal of the reduction of nuclear weapons and, ultimately, their elimination. For the purpose of the elaboration of improved verification measures for the United States-Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Treaties of 1974 and 1976 the sides intend to design and conduct joint verification experiments at each other's test sites. These verification measures will, to the extent appropriate, be used in further nuclear test limitation agreements which may subsequently be reached.

The leaders also welcomed the prompt agreement by the sides to exchange experts' visits to each other's nuclear testing sites in January 1988 and to design and subsequently to conduct a Joint Verification Experiment at each other's test site. The terms of reference for the Experiment are set forth in the statement issued on 9 December 1987, by the Foreign Ministers of the United States and the Soviet Union. The leaders noted the value of these agreements for developing more effective measures to verify compliance with the provisions of the 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the 1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty.

Nuclear non-proliferation

The President and the General Secretary reaffirmed the continued commitment of the United States and the Soviet Union to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and in particular to strengthening the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The two leaders expressed satisfaction at the adherence since their last meeting of additional parties to the Treaty, and confirmed their intent to make, together with other States, additional efforts to achieve universal adherence to the Treaty.

The President and the General Secretary expressed support for international co-operation in nuclear safety and for efforts to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, under further strengthened IAEA safeguards and appropriate export controls for nuclear materials, equipment and technology. The leaders agreed that bilateral consultations on non-proliferation were constructive and useful, and should continue.

Nuclear risk reduction centres

The leaders welcomed the signing on 15 September 1987, in Washington, of the agreement to establish Nuclear Risk Reduction Centres in their capitals. The agreement will be implemented promptly.

Chemical weapons

The leaders expressed their commitment to negotiation of a verifiable, comprehensive and effective international convention on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons. They welcomed progress to date and reaffirmed the need for intensified negotiations toward conclusion of a truly global and verifiable convention encompassing all chemical weapons-capable States. The United States and Soviet Union are in favour of greater openness and intensified confidence-building with respect to chemical weapons both on a bilateral and a multilateral basis. They agreed to continue periodic discussions by experts on the growing problem of chemical weapons proliferation and use.

Conventional forces

The President and the General Secretary discussed the importance of the task of reducing the level of military confrontation in Europe in the area of armed forces and conventional armaments. The two leaders spoke in favour of early completion of the work in Vienna on the mandate for negotiations on this issue, so that substantive negotiations may be started at the earliest time with a view to elaborating concrete measures. They also noted that the implementation of the provisions of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe is an important factor in strengthening mutual understanding and enhancing stability, and spoke in favour of continuing and consolidating this process. The President and the General Secretary agreed to instruct their appropriate representatives to intensify efforts to achieve solutions to outstanding issues.

They also discussed the Vienna (Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction) negotiations.

Follow-up Meeting of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe

They expressed their determination, together with the other 33 participants in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, to bring the Vienna CSCE Follow-Up Conference to a successful conclusion, based on balanced progress in all principal areas of the Helsinki Final Act and Madrid Concluding Document.

II. HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN CONCERNS

The leaders held a thorough and candid discussion of human rights and humanitarian questions and their place in the United States-Soviet dialogue.

III. REGIONAL ISSUES

The President and the General Secretary engaged in a wide-ranging, frank and businesslike discussion of regional questions, including Afghanistan, the Iran-Iraq War, the Middle East, Cambodia, southern Africa, Central America and other issues. They acknowledged serious differences but agreed on the importance of their regular exchange of views. The two leaders noted the increasing importance of settling regional conflicts to reduce international tensions and to improve East-West relations. They agreed that the goal of the dialogue between the United States and the Soviet Union on these issues should be to help the parties to regional conflicts find peaceful solutions that advance their independence, freedom and security. Both leaders emphasized the importance of enhancing the capacity of the United Nations and other international institutions to contribute to the resolution of regional conflicts.

IV. BILATERAL AFFAIRS

The President and the General Secretary reviewed in detail the state of United States-Soviet bilateral relations. They recognized the utility of further expanding and strengthening bilateral contacts, exchanges and co-operation.

Bilateral negotiations

Having reviewed the state of ongoing United States-Soviet negotiations on a number of specific bilateral issues, the two leaders called for intensified efforts by their representatives, aimed at reaching mutually advantageous agreements on: commercial maritime issues; fishing; marine search and rescue; radio navigational systems; the United States-USSR maritime boundary; and co-operation in the field of transportation and other areas.

They noted with satisfaction agreement on the expansion, within the framework of the United States-Soviet Air Transport Agreement, of direct air passenger service, including joint operation of the New York-Moscow route by Pan American Airways and Aeroflot, and on the renewal of the United States-Soviet World Ocean Agreement.

People-to-people contacts and exchanges

The two leaders took note of progress in implementing the United States-Soviet General Exchanges Agreement in the areas of education, science, culture and sports, signed at their November 1985 Geneva meeting, and agreed to continue efforts to eliminate obstacles to further progress in these areas. They expressed satisfaction with plans to celebrate jointly the thirtieth anniversary of the first Exchanges Agreement in January 1988.

The two leaders reaffirmed the importance of contacts and exchanges in broadening understanding between their peoples. They noted with particular satisfaction the progress made in the development of people-to-people contacts under the initiative they launched at their 1985 meeting in Geneva - a process which has involved tens of thousands of United States and Soviet citizens over the past two years. The leaders reaffirmed their strong commitment further to expand such contacts, including among the young.

Global climate and environmental change initiative

With reference to their November 1985 agreement in Geneva to co-operate in the preservation of the environment, the two leaders approved a bilateral initiative to pursue joint studies in global climate and environmental change through co-operation in areas of mutual concern, such as protection and conservation of stratospheric ozone, and through increased data exchanges pursuant to the United States-Soviet Environmental Protection Agreement and the Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Concerning Co-operation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for Peaceful Purposes. In this context, there will be a detailed study on the climate of the future. The two sides will continue to promote broad international and bilateral co-operation in the increasingly important area of global climate and environmental change.

Co-operative activities

The President and the General Secretary supported further co-operation among scientists of the United States, the Soviet Union and other countries in utilizing controlled thermonuclear fusion for peaceful purposes. They affirmed the intention of the United States and the USSR to co-operate with the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and Japan, under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency, in the quadripartite conceptual design of a fusion test reactor.

The two leaders noted with satisfaction progress under the bilateral Agreement on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy towards establishing a permanent working group in the field of nuclear reactor safety, and expressed their readiness to develop further co-operation in this area.

The President and the General Secretary agreed to develop bilateral co-operation in combating international narcotics trafficking. They agreed that appropriate initial consultations would be held for these purposes in early 1988.

They also agreed to build on recent contacts to develop more effective co-operation in ensuring the security of air and maritime transportation.

The two leaders exchanged views on means of encouraging expanded contacts and co-operation on issues relating to the Arctic. They expressed support for the development of bilateral and regional co-operation among the Arctic countries on these matters, including co-ordination of scientific research and protection of the region's environment.

The two leaders welcomed the conclusion of negotiations to institutionalize the COSPAS/SARSAT space-based global search and rescue system, operated jointly by the United States, the Soviet Union, France and Canada.

Trade

The two sides stated their strong support for the expansion of mutually beneficial trade and economic relations. They instructed their trade ministers to convene the United States-USSR Joint Commercial Commission in order to develop concrete proposals to achieve that objective, including within the framework of the Long-Term Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to Facilitate Economic, Industrial, and Technical Co-operation. They agreed that commercially viable joint ventures complying with the laws and regulations of both countries could play a role in the further development of commercial relations.

Diplomatic missions

Both sides agreed on the importance of adequate, secure facilities for their respective diplomatic and consular establishments, and emphasized the need to approach problems relating to the functioning of embassies and consulates general constructively and on the basis of reciprocity.

V. FURTHER MEETINGS

The President and the General Secretary agreed that official contacts at all levels should be further expanded and intensified, with the goal of achieving practical and concrete results in all areas of the United States-Soviet relationship.

General Secretary Gorbachev renewed the invitation he extended during the Geneva summit for President Reagan to visit the Soviet Union. The President accepted with pleasure. The visit will take place in the first half of 1988.
