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SUB-COMMISSION ON PREVENTION OF DISCRIMINATION AND PROTECTION OF MINORITIES

Sixteenth Session

SUMMARY RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND TWENTY-FIRST MEETING

Held at Headquarters, New York,  
on Thursday, 23 January 1964, at 10.5 a.m.

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all forms of religious intolerance (E/CN.4/Sub.2/235 and  
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34, 35) (continued)

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PRESENT:

<u>Chairman:</u>	Mr. SANTA CRUZ	(Chile)
<u>Rapporteur:</u>	Mr. CAPOTORTI	(Italy)
<u>Members:</u>	Mr. ABRAM	(United States of America)
	Mr. AWAD	(United Arab Republic)
	Mr. BOUQUIN	(France)
	Mr. CALVOCORESSI	(United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland)
	Mr. CUEVAS CANCINO	(Mexico)
	Mr. INGLES	(Philippines)
	Mr. KETRZYNSKI	(Poland)
	Mr. KRISHNASWAMI	(India)
	Mr. MATSCH	(Austria)
	Mr. MUDAWI	(Sudan)
	Mr. SAARIO	(Finland)
	Mr. TITOV	(Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)
<u>Also present:</u>	Mrs. LEFAUCHEUX	Commission on the Status of Women

Observers from Member States:

Miss KRACHT	Chile
Mr. SAJJAD	India
Mr. BARROMI	Israel
Mr. SCHAAPVELD	Netherlands
Mr. MATSEIKO	Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic
Mrs. NASON	United States of America
Mr. MELOVSKI	Yugoslavia

Representatives of specialized agencies:

Mr. FARMAN-FARMAIAN	International Labour Organisation
Miss BARRETT	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

<u>Secretariat:</u>	Mr. HUMPHREY	Director, Division of Human Rights
	Mr. LAWSON	Secretary of the Sub-Commission

DRAFT DECLARATION AND DRAFT CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF RELIGIOUS INTOLERANCE (E/CN.4/Sub.2/235 and Add.1; E/CN.4/Sub.2/L.312, L.315, L.316; E/CN.4/Sub.2/NGO/32, 34, 35) (continued)

Mr. BOUQUIN pointed out that the word "intolerance", used in the title of the agenda item, was inappropriate. The problem was not whether religions and beliefs were tolerated, but whether there was discrimination on the ground of religion or belief. He urged Mr. Krishnaswami and others who might draft texts on that item to use the latter term.

Because of the close connexion between the two phenomena of racial discrimination and religious discrimination in the past, especially at the time of the pogroms and the nazi persecutions, the United Nations had first considered producing one text to cover both subjects. The General Assembly had eventually adopted the idea of parallel declarations. However, the work which had been done on racial discrimination would certainly help the Sub-Commission to prepare a draft declaration on religious discrimination. The problem of religious discrimination was the more complex, however, because it concerned the very sensitive area of freedom of conscience and also because some religions had a transcendental character which affected the whole life of their followers. The term "belief" also included philosophic beliefs which were non-religious. The draft declaration ought to guarantee not only the freedom to adopt and profess a religion but also the freedom not to profess a religion, or to adhere to a philosophic belief. Nevertheless, he agreed with Mr. Krishnaswami that it was unnecessary to put the word "belief" next to the word "religion" in all the articles of the draft declaration, as in some cases it would be pointless.

The draft declaration should distinguish between discrimination which was an act of the State and discrimination which was the act of an individual or group. It should also distinguish between discrimination practised against individuals and discrimination practised against communities or groups and whether it was directed against faith or beliefs or against the manifestations of faith or beliefs. The denial of the right to adhere to a religion or belief was a violation of the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion proclaimed in article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Yet article IV of Mr. Krishnaswami's draft declaration (E/CN.4/Sub.2/L.315), while declaring that everyone had a right to adhere to a religion or belief, did not expressly include, as did article 18 of the Universal Declaration, the idea that everyone was free to change his religion or belief. In his view, the draft declaration

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(Mr. Bouquin)

should not lag behind article 18 and should follow it as closely as possible. Imposition of beliefs by force and reprisals against the followers of religions or the holders of beliefs, of course, could not be allowed. The draft declaration must also take into account the fact that freedom of religion included the freedom of adherents of a religion to assemble not only to perform rites and practices or to receive religious instruction, but also to share in spiritual life. Reference had been made, in that connexion, to the supra-nationality of religion, but the meaning of that expansion was not very clear. A draft declaration on freedom of religion must guarantee freedom at the international level for the adherents of a religion to have contacts with co-religionists in other countries, for example, through international religious associations, international congresses, and attendance at religious schools in other countries by those who did not have facilities for religious instruction in their own countries. That problem came under the head not only of freedom of religion but also of freedom of information in the broad sense of the term, including freedom to spread knowledge across frontiers. Not only article 18 of the Universal Declaration but also articles 19, 20 and 26, which dealt respectively with freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and association and the right of parents to choose the kind of education that should be given to their children, must be safeguarded. A limitations clause was, of course, necessary, but it should permit as much freedom as possible and should not jeopardize the application of those provisions.

He did not think it wise for the Sub-Commission to prepare a text as detailed as Mr. Krishnaswami's (E/CN.4/Sub.2/L.315), since it was drawing up a declaration not a convention. He was not in agreement on some of the specific provisions in that draft, but would reserve his comments on them for a later occasion. As in the matter of racial discrimination, what was needed was a clear, precise text avoiding controversial matters. As the Netherlands Government had pointed out (E/CN.4/Sub.2/235/Add.1), "the declaration should state in the clearest way and without any ambiguity that everybody has the right to freedom of religion in the full sense of the word and moreover that nobody shall be subject to any discrimination on the ground of his religion". To that statement he would add only the words "or belief".

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Mr. TITOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that the Sub-Commission must agree on basic principles regulating the relations between those who held religious beliefs and those who did not. It must base its discussion on the real facts of the present-day world. The study prepared by Mr. Krishnaswami (E/CN.4/Sub.2/200/Rev.1) would be very useful to it in that endeavour.

The Sub-Commission's work would be doomed to failure, however, if it did not deal with the whole problem. It must encompass discrimination not only against followers of religions but also against persons who did not adhere to religious beliefs. All the provisions of the draft declaration must apply equally to both. Atheism had a long and distinguished history. Many great men from many countries had adhered to it - Democritus, Epicurus, Copernicus and Galileo, to name but a few. Today hundreds of millions of persons were atheists, constituting progressive elements of mankind, and the Sub-Commission must take that fact into account.

All modern nations must recognize freedom of holding religious or non-religious beliefs. Atheists respected the freedom of persons to hold religious beliefs, but in return expected a similar freedom to adhere to their own beliefs. Atheism had no need for formal recognition, for it had already won the hearts and minds of men; its adherents in many parts of the world were still subjected to discrimination and persecution. The draft declaration must oppose any attempt to place religious beliefs above other beliefs.

The draft declaration should also proclaim freedom of conscience - the right of any person to adhere or not to adhere to a religious or a non-religious belief. It must state that all persons should have equality of rights without regard to their religious affiliation, and that reference to such affiliation should be excluded from all official documents.

Article 124 of the USSR Constitution established full freedom of conscience. No Soviet citizen was obliged either to profess a religion or to espouse atheism. The laws of the USSR protected adherents of religions from infringements on their right to worship; all adherents of religions now enjoyed equal rights. Soviet citizens were not held accountable for their beliefs, and no information concerning them was required in official documents. The church had been completely

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(Mr. Titov)

separated from the State. On the basis of the USSR's experience, he urged that the draft declaration should declare the separation of church and State to be an indispensable condition for freedom of conscience. Another guarantee of that freedom was the separation of the school from the church. Religious or non-religious belief was a private matter, and the State should not assume the functions of a religious instructor of children. The draft declaration should also mention sects whose practices offended human dignity and did moral and physical injury. Similarly, it should indicate clearly that any groups that sought to disrupt public order, whatever their religious affiliation, should be banned. The use of religious beliefs for political purposes was clearly unlawful. Differences in religion or belief should not be exploited to create enmity among peoples, and the draft declaration should include an article stating that the activities of all religions should be directed towards international peace and friendship.

The points he had outlined were not adequately expressed in the drafts before the Sub-Commission. The preamble of Mr. Krishnaswami's draft declaration (E/CN.4/Sub.2/L.315) was in line with the spirit of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, but the specific articles, with the exception of article IV, were designed principally to secure protection for freedom of religious belief. Even in article IV the expression "religion or belief" should be changed to "religious or non-religious belief". Those articles which did not protect the rights of persons to hold non-religious beliefs disregarded the views of a large part of mankind. Article VI, which was designed to cover all types of worship, weakened the basic statement and made the draft declaration too long. It was not feasible, nor was there sufficient time, to cover all the specific aspects of the manifestation of the various religions.

Mr. Calvocoressi's draft articles (E/CN.4/Sub.2/L.316), while free of unnecessary detail, were also one-sided, since they referred only to the protection of freedom of religious belief. He agreed with Mr. Ketrzynski that paragraph 1 of that draft was an inaccurate statement.

The draft declaration should make the following points: (1) as each person had the right to adhere to any belief or to none, attempts to curtail or take away that right should be condemned as violations of the human rights and

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(Mr. Titov)

fundamental freedoms proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; (2) any preference, limitation or exclusion (on the ground of adherence to a religious or non-religious belief) was a violation of human rights; (3) religious or non-religious belief was a private matter; freedom of conscience could exist only when the church was separated from the State and the school was separated from the church; all citizens should be free to engage in religious worship or anti-religious propaganda; (4) all churches, religious beliefs and movements, without regard to the number of their adherents, were equal before the law, and no church or religion should have any privileges; formal or de facto domination of one church by another should be eliminated; (5) the full equality of all persons irrespective of their religious or non-religious beliefs in all aspects of the economic, cultural, social, governmental and political life of the country must be established and protected; freedom of religious and non-religious beliefs should not be used for political purposes or to foment hatred; adherents of all beliefs should seek to strengthen international co-operation and peace; persons and groups should not be permitted to infringe the rights of others or to endanger public order or morality under the slogan of freedom of religious belief.

Mr. BARROMI (Israel), speaking at the invitation of the Chairman, stated that it was of vital importance to the Jews and to the people of Israel that the United Nations should take vigorous action, based on clear legal guarantees, to protect religious minorities by eliminating all forms of religious discrimination without impairing universal human rights and democratic freedoms. He recalled that the Sub-Commission's work towards that end had been given fresh impetus by the recurrence of a wave of neo-nazism in 1960 and by more recent evidence that irresponsible groups were still inciting to hatred against religious minorities. Religious discrimination was an urgent problem affecting millions of persons and the efforts to eradicate it should go hand in hand with the endeavour to eliminate racial discrimination. Those efforts should be directed towards providing protection for non-believers as well as believers, although he saw no need for a formal definition of the former.

(Mr. Barromi, Israel)

He had been most favourably impressed by Mr. Krishnaswami's draft (E/CN.4/Sub.2/L.315) and saw special merit in paragraph 6 of Mr. Calvocoressi's draft (E/CN.4/Sub.2/L.316). A draft declaration on religious intolerance should contain provisions which effectively protected freedom of worship and places of worship; freedom to use the language of a religion and to establish and operate religious institutions; freedom to produce religious articles, including the right to manufacture such articles in countries where production was State-controlled; freedom of religious association within a country and with co-religionists outside it, including the opportunity to secure the economic resources necessary to maintain religious institutions; freedom of religious education, including the training of religious teachers and the education of the youth with a view to perpetuating a religious faith; and, finally, freedom to propagate religious ideas. Freedom of movement for religious reasons should also be guaranteed and should apply within a country as well as between different countries; it should be part of the right of anyone to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country. The draft declaration should further prohibit (article XIV of Mr. Krishnaswami's text was relevant) publications and films or other public spectacles which had the effect of inciting to hatred against religious groups and were issued or shown repeatedly and systematically. He recognized that an isolated publication or film of that nature might not be subject to such a prohibition. The recurrence of such publications could constitute a dangerous pattern and he quoted as an example an article in which Jewish religion and ethics were described as mere worship of money.

Any declaration on religious intolerance must contain provisions such as those he had suggested, because there were still instances in developed areas where freedom of religion and belief was not respected. Surprisingly enough, it was in certain areas which enjoyed a high level of technical and scientific development and in which that freedom had been recognized in the Constitution and in legislation that limitations had been placed on the right of the Jewish minority to freedom of religious education and religious association. He was confident that at a time when marked progress was being made in easing political tensions and in promoting observance of human rights generally, it would be possible to bring the de facto treatment of religious minorities into line with their de jure status.

Finally, he would wish to see in Mr. Krishnaswami's text a provision similar to that contained in article IX of Mr. Abram's draft (E/CN.4/Sub.2/L.312),

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(Mr. Barromi, Israel)

which would elaborate and adapt the principle stated in article 8 of the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. Legislation alone could not eradicate religious intolerance from the minds of men; that object could be achieved only by sustained efforts by responsible leaders to educate the people.

Mr. CAPOTORTI emphasized that the draft declaration on religious intolerance should enjoy equal priority with the draft convention on racial discrimination and that the Sub-Commission at its current session should make every effort to produce a text of such a declaration for consideration by the Commission on Human Rights. While it was true that politically the draft convention met the urgent needs of the newly-independent States, religious intolerance was equally detrimental to the full exercise of individual rights and to human dignity.

Bearing in mind that a declaration was a first step towards a convention, the Sub-Commission would be well advised to pattern the structure of the document on the Declaration on racial discrimination, while shaping its content so as to reflect the various ideas contained in article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Since that article guaranteed the freedom of conscience of non-believers as well as persons professing a belief or religion, the same freedom should be safeguarded in the draft declaration. Moreover, the declaration should call upon States to apply the prohibition of religious intolerance to themselves and their organs and officials in the first instance, and to individuals and groups, in the second. Article II of Mr. Krishnaswami's text effectively dealt with that question. The declaration should moreover deal with religious intolerance from two distinct points of view: on the one hand, it should establish non-discrimination in matters of religion by safeguarding all forms of religion and religious practice; on the other, it should prevent discrimination based on religion by ensuring that no one could be deprived of his individual rights (i.e., all the rights proclaimed in the Universal Declaration) because of his religion or belief.

In regard to the debate which had taken place on the problem of relations between church and State, the essential question was not the legal status of a given faith in a country, but whether the granting of such status to a particular religion prevented the exercise of the rights proclaimed in article 18 of the Universal Declaration and in the other provisions of that basic document.

(Mr. Capotorti)

In the event that it should have such detrimental consequences, the Sub-Commission's task was to prevent them; however, in the absence of those consequences, the Sub-Commission would be exceeding its mandate if it sought to establish a uniform rule governing the legal position of a given religion in a State. In that connexion, it would be noted that in the United Kingdom, where one religion was recognized as the State religion, all religious groups enjoyed equal rights.

Mr. Krishnaswami's text (E/CN.4/Sub.2/L.315) represented an excellent basis for the Sub-Commission's work. However, it would gain by certain changes in specific articles. For example, in article I, reference need only be made to discrimination on grounds of religion or belief; the other grounds of discrimination might be mentioned in the preamble. Article II was felicitously worded, but article III should be drafted along the same lines since it dealt with another facet of the same problem. The reference to ancestral heritage or historical tradition in article V might well be deleted because people had no choice in those matters. Paragraph 6 of article VI should be expressed in more general terms; the law could hardly be expected to recognize the holy days of every religion or religious sect. More thought should also be given to the wording of article VII: it would be unreasonable to demand that the State should recognize the celebration or dissolution of marriage according to a particular religion. Article XI would also gain by greater precision; it should make clear from whom funds were to be solicited. Article XII should not leave a loophole which would enable certain religious institutions to claim exemption from taxation. Finally, article XIII was an essential element of any declaration because it reproduced the limitation specified in article 29 of the Universal Declaration.

Mr. Krishnaswami's draft, although detailed regarding the ritual requirements for the freedom of religion, was somewhat sketchy regarding religious practices and religious education. The relevant articles should be expanded. Moreover, the Sub-Commission should retain in the draft declaration all the ideas contained in Mr. Calvocoressi's text.

While the choice of a religion or belief was a private matter, the manifestations and practices of religion were not private; they had considerable impact on society. Consequently, the aim of the Sub-Commission should be to interpret article 18 of the Universal Declaration in such a way as to provide an equal opportunity to all to profess their beliefs and practice their particular forms of religious worship.

Commenting on the organization of the Sub-Commission's work, he suggested that the authors of the various drafts should consult together with a view to reaching agreement on a consolidated text, which would go forward to the Commission on Human Rights. Should they fail to reach agreement, the three drafts should be transmitted, accompanied by the summary records of the current debate.

Mr. AWAD, referring to Mr. Titov's remarks, observed that anthropological research had shown that throughout history every human society in the world, no matter how remote, had had some religion. Religion was a natural human need and that aspect of the matter should be taken into consideration. The fact that its manifestations were sometimes objectionable - for example, human sacrifice - could easily be provided for. Most intelligent people considered that atheism, despite its name, was in reality a form of religion and its adherents were therefore entitled to the same protection as the members of any other religion.

As far as he was aware there had been no serious persecution of atheists. In most countries, for instance, they were not obliged to take an oath which was against their conscience, and religious instruction was not compulsory. In his opinion, however, religious instruction should be provided in all schools for children whose parents wished them to receive such instruction.

In any event, the Sub-Commission's task was not to hold philosophical discussions but to preach the gospel of tolerance in order to ensure that people should not be persecuted or oppressed anywhere in the world on account of their convictions. He had been sorry to hear one member of the Sub-Commission say that there would not be time to complete work on the declaration. He felt that the least the Sub-Commission could do would be to consider Mr. Krishnaswami's draft, perhaps adding a paragraph extending protection to those who did not hold any religious faith. The draft was an admirable piece of work and the Sub-Commission need have no hesitation in submitting it to the Commission on Human Rights.

Mr. MUDAWI observed that racial discrimination and discrimination on religious grounds sprang from the same roots - bigotry, ignorance and

(Mr. Mudawi)

narrow-mindedness. It was true that there had been a decline in religious intolerance, but there were still sporadic outbreaks of it in various parts of the world. Although most religions preached tolerance, mutual love, freedom of speech and association and respect for others' rights to practice their religion, there was a great difference between theory and practice. There should therefore be no relaxation of effort.

In trying to formulate principles the members of the Sub-Commission should bear in mind that religion was not always the victim of discrimination; members of religions had often shown intolerance towards members of other religions or people who professed no religious faith. The Sub-Commission should not only ensure that people should be free to practise their religion; it should also ensure that if there were a conflict between fundamental human rights and religious beliefs the former should prevail.

The draft declaration submitted by Mr. Krishnaswami (E/CN.4/Sub.2/L.315) provided a useful basis for discussion. At the same time he would like to see the ideas expressed in the second sentence of paragraph 4 and in paragraph 5 of Mr. Calvocoressi's draft (E/CN.4/Sub.2/L.316) incorporated in any declaration which might be adopted. He would also like the declaration to contain a provision that all the freedoms and rights it enunciated were subject to the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in order to allay the apprehensions of those who feared that some religions might use the declaration as an excuse for infringing the Universal Declaration. There should also be a provision for some limitation on the freedom to practise religion, i.e. the practise of religion should not infringe the rules of public health, security, morality and public order. He welcomed the statement in the fifth preambular paragraph of Mr. Krishnaswami's draft that discrimination ultimately destroyed those who were responsible for it, and he hoped that a sentence to that effect would be included in the declaration.

Mr. CUEVAS CANCINO recalled the role that had been played by the church during the three hundred years of Spanish colonial domination in Latin America. Although the colonies had been governed by the Spanish Crown, many matters of public administration and current policy had been left in the hands of the church. Following Mexico's achievement of independence there had been a strong reaction against the intrusion of the church in temporal affairs.

Religion had also frequently led to intervention in international life, sometimes in the form of relief for the victims of what was taken to be a tyranny incompatible with the existence of international law, and at other times flagrant intervention in less developed countries. For those reasons he considered that the separation of church and State was usually the best solution. His approach to the problem was based on the principle of non-intervention. Freedom should always be subordinated to the interests of the community, but discrimination against individuals should be prohibited. Any society had the right to impose limitations on the freedom of its citizens for the purpose of protecting morality and public order.

In his view there should be complete separation between secular education, which should be exclusively in the hands of the State, and religious instruction.

Public order implied some limitation of worship. Religious practices should not be allowed to trespass on the freedom of others or the natural order of society. The State should be able, for instance, to insist that religious rites should be confined to churches, temples and other places of worship and that participants should wear the clothing commonly worn by the members of the community.

Priests and ministers of religion should be nationals of the State in which they resided and officiated. Secondly, a minister of religion should not exercise his influence in the political field. To prevent such activities could not be regarded as an infringement of religious freedom.

The laws of the State should prevail in such matters as marriage, burial and the administration of oaths. In those respects Mr. Krishnaswami's draft was not entirely satisfactory. It should be made clear that civil ceremonies should have precedence over religious ceremonies and that there should be no duplication or inconsistency between them.

(Mr. Cuevas Cancino)

He did not consider that limitation of property ownership by religious bodies, or the imposition of taxes, were incompatible with religious freedom.

Either Mr. Krishnaswami's draft or Mr. Calvocoressi's could serve as a basis of discussion. In view of the short time available the Sub-Commission would do well to concentrate on a single text.

Mr. CALVOCORESSI associated himself with Mr. Bouquin's remarks at the previous meeting to the effect that if the Sub-Commission failed to deal with the question of religious intolerance at the present session a very bad impression would be created. Furthermore, the matter was one of urgent practical importance, since there were complaints in many parts of the world of ill-treatment of individuals or groups on account of their religion.

Undoubtedly all members agreed on the principle, emphasized by Mr. Titov, that people who held no religious beliefs should enjoy the same human rights as everyone else. That point was covered by articles II and IV of Mr. Krishnaswami's draft and he would not labour it.

He disagreed with Mr. Titov on the question of separation of church and State. References had already been made to the position in the United Kingdom. It was a curious fact that in that country the establishment of the church was criticized rather on the grounds that it constituted interference by the State in the affairs of the church than on the grounds that it entailed discrimination in favour of the established church. While there were certainly arguments in favour of separation, they did not go to the essence of the matters now before the Sub-Commission and he considered that the Sub-Commission should be wary of introducing sweeping requirements which went further than its current pre-occupations required.

A third point raised by Mr. Titov was that of the separation of church and school. He had little to add to what Mr. Capotorti had said on that subject. In his view the correct formulation of the problem would be that any group should be entitled to teach the children what the members of the group believed, provided only that no one should be forced to go to such schools and that no special privileges or preferences should be given to them.

With regard to the question of how the Sub-Commission was to proceed, he felt that by struggling for unanimity it might end by achieving nothing. The only possible course would be to take the previous work as a basis and to confine observations and objections to departures from the principles that had already,

been adopted. He would suggest that Mr. Krishnaswami might take into account the criticisms that had been made during the debate, and any others that might be made to him privately, and prepare a revised draft, which would probably command a considerable measure of agreement. Only in that way would the Sub-Commission be able to produce a text which it could submit to the Commission on Human Rights.

Mr. ABRAM, referring to the question of the separation of church and school, observed that the State should be concerned not about whether religious schools taught religious as well as academic subjects, but that in such schools the academic subjects should be well taught and that the pupils should not be at a disadvantage in comparison with pupils of secular schools.

With regard to Mr. Titov's remarks on the subject of interference in politics by religious bodies, he wondered whether some of the provisions in Mr. Krishnaswami's draft and in his own would be regarded by Mr. Titov as political rather than religious. He referred, for example to article VI of Mr. Krishnaswami's text, which provided inter alia for the right to teach and to learn sacred languages, to hold meetings, to communicate with members of the same religion abroad and to observe dietary practices prescribed by religion.

He hoped the Sub-Commission would accept Mr. Calvocoressi's suggestions with regard to its future work. He would like unanimity to be achieved, but if that was not possible the best way would be to study a set of principles to which the majority could subscribe and submit them to the Commission on Human Rights.

If Mr. Krishnaswami were to prepare a fresh draft, as suggested by Mr. Calvocoressi, he hoped that it would incorporate paragraph 4 of Mr. Calvocoressi's text. If States were to follow the line of action laid down in that paragraph he believed that prejudice would soon disappear.

Mr. KEIRZYNSKI, replying to Mr. Awad, stressed that atheists must have the same rights as people who professed a religion. There were certain prejudices which must be overcome and to achieve that end the Sub-Commission must express itself clearly.

He agreed with Mr. Cuevas Cancino that there must be separation between public schooling and religious teaching. In the modern world secular education must be the responsibility of the State and that fact should be reflected in the draft declaration.

(Mr. Ketrzynski)

With regard to the connexion between religion and politics, it was his impression that when the holders of religious beliefs advocated social progress they were accused of meddling in politics, but that no such accusation was made when they defended reactionary policies.

He had some apprehensions with regard to article VI, paragraph 9, of Mr. Krishnaswami's draft, which laid down that no religious group or community should be prevented from bringing teachers from abroad and that no limitations should be placed on travel abroad for the purpose of maintaining contacts with communities and institutions belonging to the same religion. The laws in those respects should be the same for members of religious groups and for persons who did not belong to any religion. Moreover, the rights in question were not absolute. For instance, in case of strained relations between two countries no such provisions could be put into effect.

The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.