

# **Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons**

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## **First session**

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### **Physical protection and illicit trafficking**

**Working paper submitted by Australia, Austria, Canada,  
Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, New  
Zealand, Norway and Sweden (the Vienna Group of Ten)**

#### **Key points**

- The Vienna Group calls for the acceleration of efforts to develop and implement a fully effective global nuclear security framework based on prevention, detection and response. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) plays an essential role in the global efforts to improve the global nuclear security framework and to promote its implementation.
- All States should apply, as appropriate, the recommendations on the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities contained in IAEA document INFCIRC/225, as revised, and in other relevant international instruments at the earliest possible date.
- All States parties to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material should ratify the 2005 amendment to the Convention as soon as possible and we encourage them to act in accordance with the object and purpose of the amendment until such time as it enters into force. All States that have not yet done so should adhere to the Convention and adopt the amendment as soon as possible.
- With regard to curbing illicit trafficking, all States need to reinforce efforts on improving existing control mechanisms and cooperation mechanisms.
- We encourage States concerned, on a voluntary basis, to further minimize highly enriched uranium (HEU) stocks and use and to convert radioisotope production to low-enriched uranium targets, where technically and economically feasible.

#### **Working paper on implementation of the Action Plan**

1. The Vienna Group of Ten notes that article III of the Treaty is designed to detect and prevent the diversion of nuclear material, equipment and technology. This



relates not only to diversion at the State level but also to diversion to individuals or subnational groups. The Group notes in this regard that physical protection and measures to combat illicit trafficking are parts of a national system of nuclear security, the existence of which should be made a precondition for transfers of nuclear material, sensitive equipment or technology.

2. The Vienna Group emphasizes the essential role of the Agency in the global efforts to improve the global nuclear security framework and to promote its implementation. The Group underlines the importance of ensuring that the Agency continues to have the appropriate structure, resources and expertise needed to carry out its mandated nuclear security activities in accordance with its statute, relevant General Conference resolutions and its Nuclear Security Plans, and welcomes the work of the IAEA Office of Nuclear Security to that effect. In continuing and strengthening this function, the Agency should take an active role in facilitating effective cooperation and coordination at the international and regional levels.

3. The Vienna Group welcomes the progress made by the Agency in establishing a comprehensive set of nuclear security guidelines and recommendations and the work currently being undertaken by IAEA in developing the *Nuclear Security Series*, and welcomes the establishment of the Nuclear Security Guidance Committee in March 2012. The Group acknowledges the important contribution of IAEA in assisting States in meeting appropriate security standards and calls on all States to take full advantage of the IAEA advisory services in that regard, including the IAEA International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS), and the establishment of Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plans. In this regard, the Group welcomes the Advisory Service missions being conducted in nuclear-weapon States and welcomes the increasing number of Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plans.

4. The Vienna Group underlines the paramount importance of effective physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities and the need for all States to maintain the highest standards of physical protection. The Group calls on all States to apply, as appropriate, and at the earliest possible date, the recommendations on the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities contained in IAEA document INFCIRC/225, as amended, and in other relevant international instruments. The Group welcomes in particular, the recent revision of INFCIRC/225, contained in the IAEA publication entitled *Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC/225/Revision 5)*.<sup>1</sup>

5. The Vienna Group welcomes new accessions to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, noting that the Security Council, in its resolution 1373 (2001), called on all States to accede to the Convention. The Group strongly supports the early entry into force of the 2005 amendment to the Convention, calls on all States parties to the Convention to ratify the amendment as soon as possible and encourages them to act in accordance with the object and purpose of the amendment until such time as it enters into force. The Group calls on all States that have not yet done so to adhere to the Convention and adopt the amendment as soon as possible. The Group notes that continued and enhanced efforts are needed to provide for the full and effective implementation of the

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<sup>1</sup> IAEA *Nuclear Security Series*, No. 13 (Vienna, 2011).

Convention, including through the IAEA *Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities*.

6. The Vienna Group recognizes the non-proliferation and security benefits of the minimization of the use of highly enriched uranium in civilian applications, including the conversion of civilian research reactors to low-enriched uranium fuel. The Group welcomes the efforts of the Agency to assist countries that, on a voluntary basis, have chosen to take steps to minimize the use of highly enriched uranium in civilian nuclear applications. The Group encourages States concerned, on a voluntary basis, to further minimize highly enriched uranium stocks and use and to convert radioisotope production to low-enriched uranium targets, where technically and economically feasible, and taking into account the need for an assured supply of medical isotopes. The Group encourages international dialogue on the elimination of civilian uses of highly enriched uranium. In this context, the Group welcomes the discussions organized by Norway, Austria and the Nuclear Threat Initiative, in cooperation with IAEA, at the Second International Symposium on HEU Minimization, held in Vienna from 23 to 25 January 2012, roughly five years after the initial symposium, held in Oslo in 2006.

7. The Vienna Group notes with serious concern the illicit trade in highly sensitive nuclear equipment and technology. The Group stresses the importance of full cooperation from all IAEA member States in identifying the supply routes and sources of the technology, related equipment and nuclear and non-nuclear materials. The Group recognizes the increased need for all States to reinforce their efforts to improve existing control mechanisms and cooperation mechanisms, as appropriate, in order to achieve higher degrees of efficiency in the efforts to curb illicit trafficking.

8. The Vienna Group welcomes the work of the Agency in support of efforts of States parties to combat illicit trafficking of nuclear materials and other radioactive substances. The Group welcomes IAEA efforts to assist IAEA member States in strengthening their regulatory control over the applications of radioactive materials, including through the IAEA *Implementing Guide: Security of Radioactive Sources*.<sup>2</sup> The Group also welcomes IAEA activities undertaken to provide for the enhanced exchange of information, including the continued maintenance of its illicit trafficking database. The Group recognizes the need for enhanced coordination among States and among international organizations in preventing, detecting and responding to the illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials.

9. The Vienna Group is convinced of the importance of nuclear forensics in determining the origin of detected nuclear and other radioactive materials. Nuclear forensics can also be an effective tool in providing evidence for the prosecution of acts of illicit trafficking and malicious uses. The Group encourages States and the Agency to develop and enhance nuclear forensics capabilities, and to foster international cooperation in this regard. An appropriate approach could entail combining the skills of both traditional and nuclear forensics by developing a common set of definitions and standards, undertaking research and sharing information and best practices.

10. The Vienna Group notes that continued efforts to enhance the prevention of terrorist acts, as well as the physical protection and accountability of nuclear and

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<sup>2</sup> IAEA *Nuclear Security Series*, No. 11 (Vienna, 2009).

other radioactive materials in nuclear and non-nuclear use, and in storage and transport, throughout their life cycle, in a comprehensive and coherent manner, should be priorities for strengthening nuclear security. Implementation of the IAEA *Nuclear Security Recommendations on Radioactive Material and Associated Facilities*<sup>3</sup> and the IAEA *Nuclear Security Recommendations on Nuclear and Other Radioactive Materials out of Regulatory Control*<sup>4</sup> would constitute an important first step in this regard. The Group calls for the acceleration of efforts to develop and implement a fully effective global nuclear security framework based on prevention, detection and response.

11. The Vienna Group welcomes the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and urges all States that have not yet done so to become party to the Convention as soon as possible.

12. The Vienna Group notes that the decision taken by the Security Council in its resolution 1540 (2004), as reaffirmed in Council resolutions 1673 (2006), 1810 (2008) and 1977 (2011), to require all States to establish appropriate effective controls over materials related to nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, and to this end, to establish appropriate effective physical protection measures, and appropriate effective border controls and law enforcement efforts to detect, deter, prevent and combat illicit trafficking and brokering in nuclear weapon-related materials. The Group further notes that in its resolution 1887 (2009), the Council, inter alia, called on States to share best practices with the aim of securing all vulnerable nuclear material, manage responsibly and minimize the use of highly enriched uranium for civilian purposes, and improve their national capabilities to detect, deter and disrupt illicit trafficking in nuclear materials.

13. The Vienna Group welcomes the continued multilateral and bilateral contributions made by the 24-member Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction to enhancing the physical protection of nuclear facilities and weapons-usable material worldwide. The Group likewise welcomes the contribution of the Global Threat Reduction Initiative and similar programmes to the reduction and protection of vulnerable nuclear and radiologic materials located at civilian sites worldwide.

14. The Vienna Group welcomes the activities of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, which aims at developing partnership capacity to combat nuclear terrorism consistent with the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. The Group welcomes participation of the International Atomic Energy Agency as an observer in the Initiative and encourages the Agency to continue to play a constructive role in this and other international nuclear security-related initiatives.

15. The Vienna Group commends the work of the Proliferation Security Initiative and welcomes the increasing participation of States in such efforts, which further enhance international cooperation in combating illicit trafficking of nuclear material. We recall that the Interdiction Principles endorsed by Proliferation Security Initiative participants are in accordance with Security Council resolution 1540 (2004).

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<sup>3</sup> IAEA *Nuclear Security Series*, No. 14 (Vienna, 2011).

<sup>4</sup> IAEA *Nuclear Security Series*, No. 15 (Vienna, 2011).

16. The Vienna Group supports the effective implementation of the workplan adopted by the 2010 Washington Nuclear Security Summit. The Group also encourages participating States to effectively follow up the outcomes of the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit and welcomes the confirmation of the Netherlands as host of the 2014 Summit.

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