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# **Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons**

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### **The need to foster commitment to nuclear disarmament and strengthen the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons**

#### **Working paper submitted by Libya**

1. International peace and security cannot be achieved while certain States possess or threaten to use nuclear weapons. Instead, practical and tangible steps should be taken towards full and comprehensive disarmament in order to ensure non-proliferation. The nuclear arms race should be halted, and fruitful cooperation between States consolidated. The best safeguard against the use of nuclear weapons is to ensure that they are not produced or developed, and to destroy stockpiles in a verifiable manner, according to a defined timetable and under international control.
2. In its advisory opinion of 8 July 1996 concerning the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, the International Court of Justice stated, inter alia, that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would in particular be contrary to the rules of international humanitarian law applicable in cases of armed conflict, and that there existed an obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to a favourable conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament under strict international control.
3. It is a cause for concern that, over four decades after the conclusion of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the dangers posed by nuclear weapons continue to exist because a limited number of States have retained their nuclear arsenals, hence the failure to achieve the objectives of the Treaty. They will remain a distant prospect so long as the sole point of emphasis is the commitment of non-nuclear States to refrain from acquiring nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, nuclear States fail to take any practical, tangible steps towards full nuclear disarmament. Nuclear States might argue that the acquisition and development of nuclear weapons are a part of their security and defence strategy, and are necessary in order to preserve world peace. Such justifications are unacceptable.
4. Libya affirms that the non-proliferation regime can remain in place only if nuclear States provide sufficient evidence of their commitment to implement the provisions of the Treaty, and in particular article VI. They should take effective action to implement immediately the 13 practical steps agreed to at the 2000 Review



Conference as a benchmark for progress. Such action should be transparent, verifiable and irreversible, as the 2010 Review Conference stressed. It should include a tangible decrease in current nuclear arsenals, an end to production, and the destruction of stockpiles in a verifiable manner and under international control.

5. Libya calls upon all States to refrain from conducting a nuclear test explosion and to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, in particular those States that must ratify the Treaty in order to bring it into force.

6. Achieving the universality of the Treaty is a fundamental condition for its effectiveness and credibility. That universal adherence to the Treaty has yet to be achieved affirms the importance of the full implementation of the outcomes of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and of the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences, in particular the resolution on the Middle East.

7. Libya affirms the importance of nuclear States' commitment to the measures set out in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference. Nuclear States are to implement their unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals by committing to undertake further efforts to reduce and ultimately eliminate strategic offensive nuclear weapons. The nuclear-weapon States also commit to accelerate concrete progress on the steps leading to nuclear disarmament, agreed to and contained in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference.

8. Urgent action should be taken to adopt an unconditional and legally binding international instrument in order to provide security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States regarding the use or the threat of the use of nuclear weapons against them. Such assurances would undoubtedly serve to reinforce the objectives of the Treaty, and to contribute to hastening the elimination of nuclear weapons.

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