
**Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review
Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons**

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**Steps to promote the achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free
zone in the Middle East and the realization of the goals and
objectives of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East**

Report submitted by Canada

1. At the sixty-sixth session of the General Assembly, Canada supported resolution 66/25, in which the Assembly called for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East. In addition, Canada voted in favour of resolution 66/40, entitled “Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments”, in which the Assembly, among other things, called upon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to work towards the full implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and recognized the endorsement by the 2010 Review Conference of practical steps in a process leading to the full implementation of the 1995 resolution, including the convening of a conference in 2012, to be attended by all States of the region, on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. Canada voted against resolution 66/61, on the risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, because, as stated in Canada’s explanation of vote, the resolution unfairly singled out Israel by calling for its accession to the Treaty while failing to address serious non-compliance issues by States in the region, in particular the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Syrian Arab Republic.

2. Canada is working with its partners, including through the Group of Eight and the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, to provide support for the process leading to a conference on a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction. Canada welcomes the appointment of Finland as host of the conference and of Jaakko Laajava as facilitator of the conference process. Canada has participated in events to support this process, including a July 2011 seminar hosted by the European Union and a November 2011 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) forum to discuss how the experience gained by other regions through existing nuclear-weapon-free zones could be relevant to the Middle East. Canada consistently advocates an inclusive process for the conference that involves all



States in the region and represents their interests. Any zone free of weapons of mass destruction should be negotiated by States in the region for States in the region, with support from other actors as requested.

3. Canada has called for universal and full adherence to and compliance with the Treaty by States in the Middle East. At IAEA, Canada actively supported the adoption of a resolution on the application of safeguards in the Middle East by the General Conference at its forty-ninth and fiftieth regular sessions, in 2005 and 2006. Canada regrets that it was unable to support that annual resolution from 2007 to 2011, given that changes presented by the drafters were not the result of a consensual approach. Canada welcomes the fact that States parties to the Treaty in the region have ratified a comprehensive safeguards agreement with IAEA. Canada has appealed to all States in the region to contribute further to regional stability and security by concluding additional protocols to their respective safeguards agreements, which Canada considers the verification standard pursuant to article III of the Treaty. With regard to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, Canada co-sponsored General Assembly resolution 66/64, and has also encouraged the three Annex 2 signatories in the region to ratify the Treaty as a measure to build confidence and security.

4. Canada shares the serious international concerns about the scope and nature of the past and present Iranian nuclear programme and the State party's continuing failure to meet its international obligations. Although Canada recognizes that the Islamic Republic of Iran has a right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, the right to a civilian nuclear programme also comes with international obligations with which all States, including the Islamic Republic of Iran, must comply. Canada is deeply disturbed by the State party's decision to further enrich its nuclear material and continue its activities related to heavy water in defiance of Security Council resolutions. Canada also notes with concern that the State party continues to take actions inconsistent with its safeguards obligations. Notably, it continues to be the only State with significant nuclear activities and a comprehensive safeguards agreement in force that refuses to implement the modified Code 3.1 of the subsidiary arrangements to that agreement. It continues to refuse to provide sufficient information about the original purpose and chronology of the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant and has not provided information regarding its announced plans to construct new enrichment facilities and reactors.

5. Most troubling of all is the recent IAEA assessment that the Islamic Republic of Iran has not provided the necessary cooperation to permit the Agency to confirm that all nuclear material in the Islamic Republic of Iran is in peaceful activities (see GOV/2010/62). The IAEA report of November 2011 (see GOV/2011/65) particularly reinforced long-standing and serious concerns about the military dimensions of the State party's nuclear programme. The range of information and evidence detailed in that report and its annex supports an assessment that the State party's nuclear activities are part of efforts to develop nuclear weapons. Canada stresses that the Islamic Republic of Iran must immediately and fully cooperate with IAEA to address these serious allegations. Repeated changes in the function of the Fordow facility and the State party's decision to triple its production of 20 per cent enriched uranium have heightened Canada's concern. Canada does not see a plausible peaceful use for this volume of enriched uranium, which only brings the Islamic Republic of Iran closer to having a stockpile of weapons-grade material. This provocative activity further damages international confidence in the purported exclusively peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear programme.

6. Canada notes that the Islamic Republic of Iran has lost the confidence of the IAEA Board of Governors and the Security Council through its two-decade history of concealing nuclear activities. In the light of this history, in addition to the failure of the Islamic Republic of Iran to provide any plausible justification for its efforts to acquire the full nuclear fuel cycle, Canada fully supports Security Council resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008) and 1929 (2010), in addition to IAEA Board of Governors resolutions GOV/2009/82 and GOV/2011/65. Those resolutions clearly state the international community's desire for a negotiated diplomatic solution that respects the right of the Islamic Republic of Iran to peaceful uses of nuclear energy while ensuring the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear programme. The State party must cooperate fully with IAEA and provide all necessary transparency and access without delay to enable the Agency to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in the Islamic Republic of Iran and to conclude that all nuclear material in the Islamic Republic of Iran is devoted to peaceful ends. Canada also calls upon the State party to engage seriously and without preconditions in talks aimed at restoring international confidence. Canada welcomes efforts by the five permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany (the "P5+1") in this regard and encourages the Islamic Republic of Iran to engage constructively. Canada also urges the State party to cooperate fully and comply with the international obligations set out by the Security Council, provide all requested information, clarifications and access identified by IAEA without delay and fully implement its additional protocol.

7. Canada remains deeply concerned about findings that point to possible undeclared nuclear material, facilities and activities in the Syrian Arab Republic, and also about possible nuclear cooperation between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Syrian Arab Republic. Canada fully supported resolution GOV/2011/41, in which the IAEA Board of Governors requested the IAEA Director General to report to the Security Council the assessment that an undeclared nuclear reactor existed at Dair Alzour, in breach of Syrian safeguards obligations. While Canada recognizes the difficulties that IAEA has faced in conducting its investigations in view of the physical circumstances that it found at the Dair Alzour site, Canada also notes the very serious potential proliferation threat posed by an undeclared nuclear reactor of the kind that appears to have existed at the site. Canada continues to call upon the Syrian Arab Republic to urgently remedy its non-compliance and to meet its own commitment to fully cooperate with IAEA to resolve related outstanding issues, so that the Agency can provide the necessary assurances as to the exclusively peaceful nature of the Syrian nuclear programme. Canada also continues to urge the Syrian Arab Republic to bring into force an additional protocol as soon as possible. It is only through full, transparent and proactive cooperation with IAEA that the State party can restore confidence with regard to the scope and nature of its nuclear programme.

8. Canada has called upon all remaining States not parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to join as non-nuclear-weapon States. As a confidence-building measure in advance of this ultimate goal, Canada has also called upon these same States to separate civilian and military fuel cycles and to place all civilian nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards. These statements are in conformity with both the policies and actions of Canada, which include its above-mentioned voting record on resolutions at the sixty-sixth session of the General Assembly.

9. Canada recognizes the growing interest in nuclear energy among States parties in the Middle East and welcomes the announcements made by a number of such States concerning new initiatives in this field. In welcoming these initiatives, Canada notes that all nuclear power programmes should be accompanied by the strongest commitments to nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear safety and nuclear security.
