

Assembly that its work might be completed within the limits set for the current session.

23. The President then proposed that the General Assembly should adjourn in order to enable the six Main Committees to elect their Chairmen,

who, together with the seven vice-Presidents and the President of the Assembly, would constitute the General Committee.

The meeting rose at 12.5 p.m.

TWO HUNDRED AND TWENTY-FIRST PLENARY MEETING

Held at Flushing Meadow, New York, on Tuesday, 20 September 1949, at 3.40 p.m.

President: General Carlos P. RÓMULO (Philippines).

Chairmen of Main Committees

The PRESIDENT announced that the six Main Committees had duly elected their Chairmen, the results of the elections being as follows:

First Committee: Mr. L. B. Pearson (Canada);
Second Committee: Mr. H. Santa Cruz (Chile);
Third Committee: Mr. C. E. Stolk (Venezuela);
Fourth Committee: Mr. H. Lannung (Denmark);
Fifth Committee: Mr. A. Kyrrou (Greece);
Sixth Committee: Mr. M. Lachs (Poland).

Election of the Vice-Presidents

2. The PRESIDENT requested the General Assembly to proceed to the election of its seven Vice-Presidents. He recalled that, according to rule 27 of the rules of procedure, the Vice-Presidents of the General Assembly should be chosen "on the basis of ensuring the representative character of the General Committee". The following countries, having already become members of the General Committee, would not be eligible: Canada, Chile, Denmark, Greece, Poland, Venezuela and, of course, the Philippines.

A vote was taken by secret ballot.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Viteri Lafronte (Ecuador) and Rahim Bey (Egypt) acted as tellers.

Number of votes cast, 58.

Abstentions, 1;

Invalid votes, none;

Valid votes; 57;

Simple majority, 29.

Number of votes obtained:

France, 51;

United States of America, 51;
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 50;
China, 49;
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 46;
Brazil, 42;
Pakistan, 42;
Egypt, 10;
Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, 6;
Ethiopia, 4;
Haiti, 4;
India, 4;
Guatemala, 3;
Luxembourg, 3;
Norway, 3;
Thailand, 3;
Burma, 2;
Lebanon, 2;
Liberia, 2;
Mexico, 2;
Yugoslavia, 2;
Argentina, 1;
Australia, 1;
Belgium, 1;
Costa Rica, 1;
Iceland, 1;
Iran, 1;
Iraq, 1;
Israel, 1;
New Zealand, 1;
Turkey, 1;
Uruguay, 1.

The representatives of the following countries, having received the required simple majority of the members present and voting, were elected as Vice-Presidents: France, United States of America, United Kingdom, China, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Brazil, and Pakistan.

The meeting rose at 4.20 p.m.

TWO HUNDRED AND TWENTY-SECOND PLENARY MEETING

Held at Flushing Meadow, New York, on Wednesday, 21 September 1949, at 11 a.m.

President: General Carlos P. RÓMULO (Philippines).

Opening of the general debate: speeches by Mr. de Freitas Valle (Brazil), Mr. Acheson (United States of America), Mr. Hevia (Cuba), Sir Benegal Rau (India), Fayez El-Khoury Bey (Syria)

1. Mr. DE FREITAS VALLE (Brazil) stated that his country's participation in the San Francisco Conference had been marked by a spirit of confident hope, so much so that, despite its earlier opposi-

tion to the institution of the veto, Brazil had been the first of the fifty States represented there to vote for the inclusion of the veto in the Charter, a fact which showed that Brazil had relied on the five great Powers to use the veto wisely. In London, the whole-hearted co-operation of the representatives of Brazil had been directed towards the task of the establishment of the United Nations by the implementation of the Charter. It had given earnest support to the deci-

sion to have the headquarters of the Organization in New York. Its election to the initial membership of the Security Council had been secured by an almost unanimous vote; one of its nationals had twice been President of the General Assembly and it was currently a member of the Economic and Social Council. By a generous decision of the General Assembly, he himself had been appointed one of the Vice-Presidents of the fourth session. Why, then, should Brazil have cause to complain about the United Nations?

2. It was the purity of Brazil's idealism that impelled it to criticize the United Nations. Its total lack of prejudice, however, was undeniable evidence of the faith which it had in the future of the Organization. The time had come to return to the spirit of San Francisco.

3. The League of Nations had been a mere instrument of conciliation. The United Nations constituted a great political league for the preservation of tranquillity and the defence of peace—the peace which God had promised to men endowed with that good will which in current times many appeared to lack. It was just as useless to try to fix the blame for that as it was necessary to recognize the fact.

4. It could be asked whether it was the fault of the United Nations that it had not made greater progress. He, for his part, did not believe so, for in his opinion circumstances had been cruel for the protagonists of peace. He could not deny, however, that, as units of the Organization, few Members of the United Nations had shown the detachment from interests and vanities that was necessary if people were to associate without prejudice. Each State, or, more precisely, each Government, had given more thought to its own subsistence than to the progress of the United Nations. Even if it were the sad truth that certain Members were using the United Nations instead of serving it, it could yet be argued, without entering into too many subtleties, that abuse of the services of an institution was a sign of belief in its worth.

5. Mr. Trygve Lie, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, had on occasions fearlessly explained the dilatory progress of the United Nations, placing the entire blame on the shoulders of those who failed to co-operate. Would it not perhaps be fairer to speak of lack of mutual confidence than to seek to apportion the blame?

6. The United Nations could not have proclaimed that peoples were uniting with the determination "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war" if such determination had not in fact existed. It was that thought that had prompted him to refer to the spirit which had reigned in San Francisco, so much broader than that which had been manifested at the subsequent meetings in London. Every Member should have the courage to admit that fact and to return to that earlier spirit if true progress was to be made.

7. It was evident that in so doing the Organization should not allow itself to be discouraged by those who sought to criticize the United Nations for the delay in fulfilling the aims for which it had been created. What sacrifice of principles would it have meant for some Members, in cases where the veto was invoked, to think in good faith of a system of equilibrium and guarantees?

8. Exactly three years and eight months had passed since the General Assembly of the United Nations had first met in London, still under the impulse of the spirit of San Francisco, for its initial attempt to set up the framework of the structure the outlines of which had been traced in San Francisco. Every one was living in anxious expectation of arriving at the goal that had been set there. Could not the Organization, from the very first, have been fully capable of doing what was expected of it when confronted with the problems resulting from the war, problems which the victors had unfortunately been unable to solve?

9. Furthermore, the formation of the United Nations had taken place at the height of one of the periodical world crises, and it was exactly during such periods that Governments and peoples accelerated their evolution and moulded themselves to circumstances, while idealism declined. One of the causes of the lack of perfect adjustment within the Organization lay in just such an evolution in attitudes and in international conduct since the time of the San Francisco Conference. While it was an accepted fact that international policy should not be made to undergo violent changes, it was no less true that it was extremely difficult to maintain steadiness in a structure the foundations of which had been laid under the auspices of a group of countries which, from the very inception of the work, had lost the power of mutual understanding and had begun to tread antagonistic paths in the field of collective security. The unhappy obligation of enforcing the Treaty of Versailles had been one of the main causes of the downfall of the League of Nations.

10. What was wrong, therefore, was not the United Nations but the world itself. Proof of that could be found in the fact that while the Security Council conducted its ceaseless round of meetings, the International Court of Justice had done little, not through the fault of its members but because no cases were submitted to it, since people apparently no longer believed in the domination of the spirit over force. The nations were, in fact, afraid of force itself, as was evident from the fact that the Security Council had been unable to exercise its high functions for the preservation of peace. The world might well bewail the conflicts within the Security Council and the lack of appeals to the International Court of Justice.

11. One way in which an attempt had been made to cover current deficiencies, not only in the system itself but arising from unfortunate circumstances, had been to lay undue emphasis on activities which could always be explained but not often justified. The aim, apparently, was to solve concrete problems, often of a material nature, while losing sight of fundamental ones; to heal the body, while forgetting the soul. The body of the Organization was growing at an alarming rate, with an uncontrolled development of organs and functions. Practically every international problem which arose was handed outright to the United Nations or to one of its agencies, without any attempt being made to find out beforehand whether the Organization was or was not equipped to face the question and solve it. The result had been the almost automatic creation of agencies and commissions to solve the problems which were daily submitted to the United Nations as new ones. The problem was not solved but an international apparatus was forthwith created for

its detailed study, which tended only to make it more complicated and its solution more difficult.

12. The number of meetings called in consequence of the ever-growing tendency to establish new international machinery was incredible: during 1947, 1948 and 1949, the various organs of the United Nations had held respectively 3,504, 4,092 and 3,683 meetings, and 3,850 were already planned for the following year.

13. Brazil considered that such a procedure was not only misguided but detrimental to the prestige of the United Nations. Mr. de Freitas Valle himself was not there to make charges, still less to denounce that which should be known to all. He realized, however, that some Members might be unaware of the circumstances, since not all had been able to attend the countless meetings, while the Members which had attended had often failed to be adequately represented.

14. The purpose of all Members — for in San Francisco and in London the thoughts of all had been centred on the United Nations of the future — had been to assemble the many international agencies together under what might be called the new Super-State, not to complicate, but to simplify international life. The results in that field could perhaps be said to show that the procedure had been erratic. It would be well to admit that fact and try to remedy the situation.

15. On the other hand, it should be recognized that many of the efforts in question had not been expended in vain. In the economic field, for instance, the organization of a broad programme of technical assistance for economic development — the pattern for which had been based on President Truman's high-minded proposal — constituted an important and constructive task. Only with the organization of the plans for large-scale technical assistance would the Economic and Social Council come of age.

16. In the field of social progress, many important achievements were on record. It was satisfying to recall resolution 217 (III) of the General Assembly, adopted on 10 December 1948, proclaiming the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which would be followed by a covenant on human rights and measures of implementation, and by the codification of international law. The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, approved by the Assembly in its resolution 260 (III) of 9 December 1948, also represented a step towards the maturity of the juridical conscience and the settlement of the question of international penal responsibility.

17. Although it had not yet had any direct part in the activities of the Trusteeship Council, the Brazilian delegation had been observing them with great interest and attention. The emergence of colonial peoples to independent life had undoubtedly given rise to a major political revolution. It was to be hoped that the process would be expedited and facilitated by the activities of the Trusteeship Council, which bore an immense responsibility in its function of representing the international consciousness of peoples who were as yet deprived of autonomous political expression. It was not without some concern that the Brazilian Government viewed a certain tendency on the part of metropolitan Powers governing non-autonomous territories to make use of administrative unions, whether for the purpose of

reducing the area of international supervision or whether — which was far more alarming — as a preparatory stage for political absorption. It was, fortunately, the duty of the Trusteeship Council to be on the alert and to curtail such tendencies.

18. The administrative organization of the United Nations, although handicapped by the lack of a better geographical distribution in the Secretariat, was already marked by the outstanding quality of its services and by the regularity with which its increasingly difficult task was being fulfilled. The completion, in 1950, of construction work on the new headquarters would free the Organization from the inconveniences and loss of time incurred by the holding of meetings outside New York, with the consequent impairment of efficiency and the heavy burden on the budget.

19. In conclusion, Mr. de Freitas Valle expressed the earnest hope that the current session would make speedy progress and that the inspiration of political instinct and greatness of soul would result in the solution of some of the problems which were causing so much distress, in particular, that of the former Italian colonies, the fate of which depended on the wisdom and fairness of the decisions the United Nations would make.

20. Reaffirming the confidence of Brazil in the United Nations, he added that no apologies were necessary for the frankness of the Brazilian delegation in pointing out some of the shortcomings of the Organization, since it was Brazil's desire to see them corrected for the betterment of international life and the welfare of the human race.

21. Mr. ACHESON (United States of America) said that the fourth session of the General Assembly was opening at a time when the initial shocks and adjustments of the post-hostilities period had been generally absorbed into the lives of nations. The real shape of the major problems of the post-war era could at last be seen with greater distinctness. The nations were coming to grips in many practical and prosaic ways with their tasks in a world which was far from ideal.

22. The United States delegation had given much thought to the major problems which had agitated and dominated international life since the end of the recent war, and had done its best to analyze their nature and their significance. It recognized that some of them were of a terrible seriousness, but also that they were deeply rooted in the experience and traditions of great peoples, in the philosophies of major political movements, and in inertia — the inertia of institutions and conditions which intimately affected the lives of hundreds of millions of people across the globe. They were too deeply rooted, in many instances, to be rapidly overcome by persuasion or compromise or by isolated diplomatic gestures.

23. Many people, becoming aware of the depth of those problems, despaired of their solution by peaceful means. The United States had never shared and did not share that feeling. General Marshall had warned against what he called "fighting the problem" instead of applying oneself to its solution. That warning applied to problems in the international field in the past months and years. It was true that the problems were serious, that they were bitter, and that they were not susceptible of any sudden and dramatic solutions. But it had not been proved that they would

not eventually yield to the effects of time and patience and hard work. To the extent that they could not be solved for the time being, they must be endured; but there must be unceasing efforts to overcome them step by step. There were grounds for hoping that persistent effort, geared to the ever-present process of change in human affairs, would eventually produce a more hopeful and a more solid structure of world relationships than the existing one.

24. The major problems of the time could not be solved by national action alone, but required common action in the light of the common public interest. The increasing recognition of the concept of public interest in the field of international relations was a significant — though little heralded — fact of the twentieth century.

25. The sure vision of the leaders of the nations united in the previous war had given birth to the United Nations, a forum in which the international public interest could be fully expressed and applied in the solution of problems.

26. The questions which lay before the fourth session of the General Assembly affected vitally the general complex of world problems. Those questions should be faced soberly and practically. Even if the right answers to them were found, that would not by itself bring about the desired transformation in world affairs. Only out of a long series of such patient and often undramatic efforts could that transformation eventually be achieved.

27. With respect to the Greek question, the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans had concluded that Yugoslavia had decreased, and perhaps even ceased, its aid to the Greek guerrillas, and that guerrilla activities in general were declining, but the danger still existed because of continuing aid, principally from Albania. It was timely for the Assembly to make a renewed effort to restore peace along the northern Greek border and to re-establish normal relations between Greece and all its northern neighbours. Outside aid to the guerrillas must stop and Greece must be permitted to bind up its wounds. The session could provide further opportunity for continued and sincere efforts among interested parties to bring about that result.

28. Mr. Acheson believed that he expressed a desire widely shared in the Assembly when he voiced the hope that the USSR, which in the past had not participated in the Special Committee, would join in renewed consultations aimed at settling that persistent and serious problem. If the northern neighbours of Greece had come to realize that their own self-interest required respect for the recommendations of the United Nations and an adjustment of their relations with Greece, a rapid solution should be attainable.

29. A further matter in which the public interest had been deeply engaged for a long time was Korea. Despite serious obstacles, United Nations agencies had made a successful contribution to the creation of the Republic of Korea and had assisted it in its development. Unfortunately, the authorities of the northern portion of Korea had so far refused to permit the United Nations Commission to visit that region or to arrange for the unification of the country.

30. It was the view of the United States that a United Nations commission should continue to be

stationed in Korea. Among the principal responsibilities of such a body should be to observe and report on any developments which might lead to military conflict in Korea, to use the influence of the United Nations to avert the potential threat of internal strife in that troubled land, and to explore further the possibility of unification. The authority of the commission to observe and report on the actual facts might be sufficient to prevent open hostilities. That was the fervent hope of all patriotic Koreans.

31. In accordance with its established policy, the United States would continue to give full support to the work of the Commission on Korea.

32. Turning to the question of Palestine, Mr. Acheson said that it was a source of considerable satisfaction that the period of active hostilities in that country had been brought to a close by the conclusion of armistice agreements between Israel and the several Arab States. The efforts of the Acting Mediator and his staff in that connexion were worthy of high praise.

33. Since the beginning of 1949 the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine had been carrying on its work. While no agreed settlement between the parties had so far been reached, there was nevertheless hope that progress would be made in moving beyond the armistice stage to a real and permanent peace.

34. Eventual agreement between the parties was essential for the political and economic stability of the area. Later during the session the Conciliation Commission would present a report, including the recommendations of the Economic Survey Mission which was in the Near East. On the basis of that report, the General Assembly should be able to provide such machinery as might be necessary further to facilitate and encourage agreement among the parties. The United States stood ready to give its full support and assistance to that effort.

35. The plight of the Palestinian refugees presented to the world a pressing humanitarian problem. It was of the highest importance that the States immediately concerned should recognize and accept their governmental responsibilities with respect to the problem. As an interim measure, the General Assembly should make the necessary provision for the maintenance of those refugees until the time when they could again become self-sustaining members of the Near Eastern communities.

36. It was the hope of the peoples of all faiths that the General Assembly would be able to act successfully upon the report of the Conciliation Commission in respect to Jerusalem. In the view of the United States Government, it should adopt a practical plan for a permanent international régime in the Jerusalem area and for the protection of, and free access to, the Holy Places.

37. Another problem of great complexity which the General Assembly had not solved at its previous session, but which appeared ready for solution, was the question of the disposal of the former Italian colonies. The exhaustive discussion at the third session had helped to clarify the issues, to bring out new information and to enable many Members to develop their views on the matter. At the fourth session, the General Assembly should work out plans for a united

and independent Libya, to be carried to completion in not more than three or four years.

38. It was the view of the United States Government that the Assembly should agree on provisions enabling the peoples of Eritrea to join in political association with neighbouring Governments, and the peoples of Somaliland to enjoy the benefits of the Trusteeship System.

39. The Assembly should make every effort to reach agreement on the major lines of a workable plan for the solution of that important problem.

40. The General Assembly's responsibility for the disposal of the former Italian colonies arose from the agreement of the four major signatories to the peace treaty with Italy to accept the Assembly's recommendation. Such a grant of a new power of decision to an organ of the United Nations, by express prior agreement to the responsible parties, opened a promising avenue towards enhanced usefulness of the United Nations.

41. The development of that precedent might well assist the settlement of various other political problems by special agreement, in advance, to accept recommendations of the General Assembly or the Security Council, or, in legal questions, the determination of the International Court of Justice. Through such advance agreement additional services would and should be rendered from time to time by the General Assembly and other organs of the United Nations.

42. The United States Government felt a deep interest in the varied activities of the United Nations affecting the peoples of the world who had not yet become fully self-governing. In Indonesia, the United Nations was witnessing an example of the development of a colonial people to freedom and independence and, through co-operative efforts of both parties at the Round Table Conference at The Hague of a voluntary association for mutual advantage.

43. Progress was being made in the realization of the Charter's objectives regarding non-self-governing peoples both in colonial areas and in those under trusteeship. The United States Government would continue to support the aspirations of those people who were working out their destinies in the spirit of the Charter, to the end that they might achieve self-government or independence at the earliest practicable date.

44. There was another field in which the concept of international public interest was becoming increasingly evident. The Charter expressed the determination of the peoples of the United Nations "to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom".

45. The Economic and Social Council had laid before the General Assembly a programme for co-operative action by the United Nations and the specialized agencies for rendering technical assistance in the economic development of under-developed areas (A/983).

46. The United States Government would give full support to such a programme to be launched by the United Nations, in which international action would supplement and support the steps taken by the national Governments to improve economic and social conditions. In every field—health, education, agriculture, industry, and others—particular projects had demonstrated that, with

the support of local authorities, a small number of experts could bring great benefits to large numbers of people. Those efforts were not for the selfish advantage of any one country. They were for the common good.

47. Poverty, malnutrition and disease went hand-in-hand, and their existence was a threat to the prosperity and stability of the rest of the world. National economic development must come primarily from the efforts of the people concerned, working with their own national resources. But their efforts could be leavened and the process speeded-up by international co-operation to assist the less developed areas to acquire the knowledge, skills and techniques by which their efforts could be made more productive.

48. The recommendations of the Economic and Social Council on that subject were on a bolder scale than anything undertaken in the past through international organizations. They offered effective tools in the struggle for increased production and ever-widening opportunities for employment. They deserved careful consideration and approval in the common interest.

49. The Charter recognized that social progress and higher standards of life grew from larger freedom. Man did not live by bread alone. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, one of the greatest achievements of the third session of the Assembly, constituted a long stride towards freeing men from tyranny or arbitrary constraint. The United States attached great importance to that aspect of the work of the United Nations.

50. The Assembly was confronted with a concrete issue in that field namely, the question of observance of human rights in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania. The treaties of peace with those countries set forth the procedures for the settlement of disputes arising under those treaties. Within the preceding few weeks Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania had refused to follow those procedures. Since, however, the three Governments sought to support their position on legal grounds, the United States favoured submission to the International Court of Justice of the question whether they were under an obligation to carry out the treaty procedures. It was to be hoped that Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania would not in advance refuse to accept the opinion of the Court and to act in accordance with it. The United States as an interested party would accept as binding the view of the International Court of Justice.

51. That issue involved more than the violation of terms in a treaty. It affected the rights and freedoms of all the people who lived in those three States.

52. The United States Government deeply regretted that no agreement had been reached in the United Nations on the international control of atomic energy and the prohibition of atomic weapons.

53. The United States was continuing and would continue to strive for an effective system of international control of atomic energy which would make effective the prohibition of atomic weapons. That was why it supported the Atomic Energy Commission's plan of control and prohibition as approved by the General Assembly in its resolution 191 (III) of 4 November 1948. It was clear from the resolutions passed by the

General Assembly on the subject that the overwhelming majority of the Members of the United Nations also supported effective control and effective prohibition.

54. Because the Soviet Union refused either to accept the United Nations plan or to put forth any other effective plan of control and prohibition, the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission had again reported (A/993) that it was in an impasse. The Commission had found that its discussions were not enlarging areas of agreement. On the contrary, they were hardening existing differences. It had concluded, therefore, that it could do nothing practicable or useful until the sponsoring Powers reported that a basis for agreement existed.

55. As one of the six Powers which had sponsored the establishment of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, the United States, in response to the request formulated by the General Assembly in its resolution 191 (III), was endeavouring, through consultation among the sponsoring Powers, to find a basis for agreement. It held that that offered the best prospect of determining whether any hope remained for finding such a basis. It was ready to discuss any proposal advanced in good faith for effective international control of atomic energy and for effective prohibition, but unless and until the Soviet Union demonstrated a willingness to co-operate in the world community and, in the field of atomic energy, gave evidence of such a willingness by agreeing to a truly effective, enforceable system of international control and prohibition, there was no hope that a basis for agreement could be found.

56. On the subject of the regulation and reduction of conventional armaments, all were aware that there was no immediate prospect of universal agreement. The work done by the Commission for Conventional Armaments had helped to provide a useful start towards the regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces when that became practicable. The Commission should continue to formulate such plans in order that they might be available whenever the opportunity to utilize them arose.

57. The United States Government could be depended upon to contribute fully to the creation of the necessary conditions of confidence and, with their attainment, to play its full role in the regulation and reduction, under effective safeguards, of armaments and armed forces. The policy of the United States in that important matter was in full conformity with General Assembly resolution 190 (III) of 3 November 1948, which looked towards the composition of differences among the major Powers and the establishment of lasting peace.

58. In the perspective of history, the first four years of the United Nations had been marked by great advances in international co-operation among nations. Yet the assured and durable peace which mankind had sought in victory in 1945 and still sought in the world had not been attained.

59. In the Charter the nations had pledged themselves to settle their problems by peaceful means, and to build up the conditions essential for peace. Disregarding those obligations, a small group had persisted in policies threatening other members of the international community. As a

result a profound sense of insecurity had enveloped large areas of the world.

60. To meet that threat of insecurity in Europe, the United States had joined with members of the North Atlantic community in a treaty which made clear, in advance, the determination of the parties to resist armed attack on any of them. The American Republics had undertaken similar commitments under the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro. But those treaties were made pursuant to the principles of collective action to resist aggression embodied in the Charter.

61. Methods and procedures to give effect to that principle varied with circumstances. The Members of the United Nations, and the General Assembly itself, should constantly study the means which would lead to the stabilization of peace.

62. In the final analysis, the security problem was a universal problem. It could not be solved except on a universal basis, through the United Nations.

63. The business of the General Assembly was to make its contribution to the solution, in the common interest, of the great problems urgently confronting the nations of the world. On behalf of the United States, Mr. Acheson pledged unreserved support for and devotion to a concerted effort to that end, and appealed to all Members to proceed with appreciation of the limits of what they could be expected to accomplish, with confidence in the long-term values of patience, and with reliance upon the power of common sense in international affairs.

64. Mr. HEVIA (Cuba), after conveying the greetings of Dr. Carlos Prío, President of the Republic of Cuba, and the good wishes of the Cuban Government and people for the success of the General Assembly, said that Cuba also was experiencing the economic recession which was beginning to make itself felt in many countries. Cuban imports and exports had already been curtailed. The Cuban delegation believed that the peace and well-being of the peoples of the world should be the chief preoccupation of the day, and that a wider practice of democracy, greater purchasing power among the nations, and an increase of wealth and opportunities for employment in the under-developed countries would facilitate the achievement of those aims.

65. As early as 1945, at the Inter-American Conference held at Chapultepec, in Mexico, the Cuban delegation had declared that the Charter of the new international Organization would not succeed unless the international rights and duties of the individual were also defined. Democracy had ceased to be a political definition and had become the expression of a complete way of life. The Cuban Government was convinced that that way of life was the only one which would permit the different ideological, economic and moral tendencies in the international community to exist peacefully side by side. To achieve a harmonious development of international relations it was essential that democratic ideas should be spread throughout the world.

66. In its national foreign policy, Cuba had upheld the principle of non-intervention and respect for the sovereignty of States; the memorable occasion of the Seventh International Conference of American States at Montevideo was an eloquent example of its line of conduct.

67. If the Assembly was to be enabled to carry out its task and the United Nations was to fulfil its purpose, economic problems should be gone into deeply. There were maladjustments in the economic field which gave rise to many disturbances and to the domestic and internal difficulties that afflicted so many countries.

68. High purchasing power in all countries was an essential requirement for the development of international trade and world production. It was useless to attempt to reduce trade barriers unless effective demand was encouraged in order to stimulate productive activity and the flow of international trade. In the absence of high purchasing power, foreign trade would dry up, production would be seriously reduced, and unemployment and poverty would injure world economy.

69. An effort for the maintenance of high wages and the guaranteeing of a humane labour system compatible with the assurance of adequate returns for industry was indispensable. The principal purchasers in international markets were precisely the countries which had reached a high level of industrial development.

70. The economic progress of under-developed countries was equally essential. Foreign trade statistics showed that industrialization was the principal source of employment which enabled workers to enjoy an adequate standard of living.

71. Cuba was working for peace along such basic lines. Within the limitations to which a small country was inevitably subject, it had made vast efforts to secure for its people the conditions appropriate for democracy and a high standard of living, and to encourage the development of new industries. Complete freedom of thought was enjoyed in Cuba. Governments succeeded each other by the free choice of the people. The Constitution provided guarantees for a high standard of living for the working class and for the diversification of industry within the national economy. Cuba's foreign trade statistics showed that the Cuban market had, for its size, one of the largest potential purchasing powers in the world.

72. Cuba was disappointed by the interpretation given to some international trade agreements whereby, without its acquiescence, traditional rights which had contributed to the development of its trade since it became an independent Republic had been prejudiced and its efforts to maintain the industries already established had been obstructed. Thus the possibility of establishing new industries and maintaining the principal existing industries at minimum levels of production were limited in the case of Cuba and other countries of similar economic structure.

73. International agreements should not increase the wealth of some countries to the detriment of the economically under-developed nations. It was impossible that some peoples should maintain great prosperity in a community of impoverished nations. It was natural that States should endeavour to raise their populations to maximum levels of production and employment—without however interfering with the possibilities of other nations—in order to ward off the economic recession which threatened all countries, large and small alike, and to rid the world of the spirit of war. The less-developed nations should be encouraged to increase their industries, to create fuller employment and to develop world trade.

74. In speaking thus frankly, the Cuban delegation believed that it was contributing towards making more real the spirit of mutual comprehension and good understanding among nations. It believed that the maintenance of peace and the welfare of nations could best be secured first, by extending the practice of democracy; secondly, by striving to maintain high wages and raising working conditions to a level compatible with industrial prices; thirdly, by promoting the development of new industries in the economically under-developed countries.

75. The delegation of Cuba was desirous of co-operating in the purposes of the General Assembly and contributing with its work and good will to the end that the decisions adopted should have a favourable repercussion in the international sphere and should contribute to the building of that better world to which all aspired, thus ensuring the maintenance of peace.

76. Sir Benegal RAU (India) congratulated the President on his election and pointed out that it was a matter of special gratification to all Asian delegations, since it was the first time their continent had been so honoured.

77. Since the opening of the third session of the Assembly, a number of events of outstanding international importance had occurred, which necessarily affected, directly or indirectly, all the countries of the world: the North Atlantic Treaty, the Council of Europe, the happenings in the Far East, and others. He would confine himself to those of special concern to India. In January 1949, representatives of nearly twenty Asian Governments had gathered in Delhi to consider the Indonesian situation. The occasion was momentous and the resolutions passed at the Conference had materially influenced the subsequent course of events; but more important than the occasion or the resolutions was the fact that such a conference was held. It was the first time Asian Governments had come together for a political purpose; if the cultural Asian Conference of March 1947 had been a symbol of Asia's awakening to a new life, the political Conference of January 1949 might be said to mark the coming of age of Asia and the beginning of a process of active co-operation among the countries in that region of the world. They did not contemplate an exclusive Asian bloc; but as the process of co-operation developed among those countries, they would discover paramount common interests and the conflicts that unhappily divided some of them would assuredly dissolve. India, with its many religions and cultures and its long and chequered history, had an important part to play. It was an ancient country with roots going down thousands of years in time; it had sounded the depths and shoals of fortune; it had had periods of greatness and periods of decline and had learned not to be unduly elated by the one or unduly depressed by the other. India had realized that power and glory did not last for ever and there was no abiding satisfaction, whether for States or for individuals, except in the service of high ideals and great causes. But even to render that service, it must exist and defend itself against all disintegrating forces, whether from within or without; that too India was firmly resolved to do.

78. The other event of special concern to India was the decision taken the previous April that when India became a Republic under its new Constitution—as it would in a few months' time

—it would continue to remain a member of the Commonwealth of Nations. The moment was not opportune to discuss the reasons for that decision, but he would reply to a question that was often put, namely, how that decision would affect India's attitude towards the various problems which came up for consideration in the Assembly. It would not affect it at all; India would continue to judge each question on its merits, as it had always done in the past. The Commonwealth justly prided itself on that tolerance which permitted freedom of judgment and of expression of opinion and there was, therefore, no reason for fearing that that freedom would be lacking in the Assembly. Unless such freedom existed no country could make its full contribution as a Member of the United Nations. A country might make mistakes but, even if it stood alone, it would be reassuring to the world to realize its integrity and its freedom to act as it thought right.

79. The United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan had announced its intention to report upon Kashmir once again to the Security Council¹ and it would therefore be inappropriate to discuss the subject at that time. The Indian delegation would, however, make one general observation. When such a vast country as India, which had developed as a single political and economic entity over a long period, was suddenly split into two, a large number of complex questions were bound to arise requiring both time and patience for their solution. Problems which had previously been of a domestic character were suddenly projected into the international sphere.

80. As far as Kashmir was concerned, India was not opposed in principle to arbitration. Indeed, arbitration was one of the methods of peaceful settlement enjoined by the Charter. But unless the arbitration was upon agreed issues, clearly defined beforehand, and upon well recognized principles, it might merely lead to further complications. Whether the Kashmir problem or any other problem was concerned, India was as anxious as any other loyal Member of the United Nations for a peaceful and stable solution.

81. One of the most important subjects which would come up for discussion during the fourth session was that of the disposal of the former Italian colonies. Under the peace treaty with Italy, the final disposal of those territories was to be determined jointly by the Governments of four Powers, France, the United Kingdom, the United States and the USSR, within one year, "in the light of the wishes and welfare of the inhabitants and the interests of peace and security, taking into consideration the views of other interested Governments". If the four Powers were unable to agree upon the disposal of any of those territories within the period mentioned, the matter was to be referred to the General Assembly of the United Nations for a recommendation, and the four Powers undertook to accept the recommendation and to take appropriate measures to give effect to it. Since the four Powers had not been able to agree, the matter had come before the General Assembly at the previous session. As the General Assembly had then failed to reach any decisive conclusion, the matter would come up again during the fourth session.

82. Sir Benegal Rau repeated that the disposal of those territories was to have been made by the

four Powers in the light of the wishes and welfare of the inhabitants and certain other considerations. It followed, therefore, that the General Assembly would have to be guided by the same factors in making its own recommendations on the subject. In other words, the wishes and welfare of the inhabitants of the territories were to be the paramount consideration.

83. It should be borne in mind that in that matter the Assembly was acting, for the first time, as a world parliament invested with the power of giving final decisions, which those concerned were bound to carry out. In exercising that power, its members should therefore be most careful to see that they dealt with the problem strictly on its merits and that no extraneous considerations deflected their judgment. They must convince the peoples of the world that they were worthy of the confidence placed in them, so that other problems which defied solution outside the Assembly might be turned over to them with the same confidence. Approaching the matter from that point of view, the first question was what the wishes of the inhabitants of those territories were and what their welfare demanded. It might be that some of the territories desired and were fit for immediate independence, and that others would have to be placed under the Trusteeship System or be dealt with in some other way. With reference to the first category, though they might be fit for independence, the organs of self-government were not yet in being; they would have to be created by some process. The main problem was how to create them and how long the process would take. India had had some experience in those matters; in the light of that experience it appeared that the most satisfactory way of creating the necessary organs of self-government was to set up a constituent assembly to draw up a constitution for those territories.

84. The General Assembly might well appoint a commission of experts to examine that question on the spot and, if possible, to set up a constituent assembly, much as the British Cabinet had sent out a mission to India for a similar purpose in 1946. The commission might get to work at once, and once a constituent assembly had been set up, the task of drawing up a constitution might be left to that body. The constitution so framed should be subject to the approval of the General Assembly of the United Nations. How long the process would take would depend on the constituent assembly itself and on the nature of the questions which arose for its decision. It was important that the constitution should reflect the genuine will of the people. As soon as the constitution was ready, steps should be taken to transfer power from the existing régimes to the authorities under the new constitution. Meanwhile the existing régimes might continue, but they would have no part in the working of the constituent assembly.

85. With regard to the territories to be placed under the International Trusteeship System, it should be remembered that one of the basic objectives of that system was to promote the advancement of the inhabitants of the Trust Territories and their progressive development towards self-government or independence. Perhaps the best way of securing that object would be to ask the same commission to draw up a constitution for the Trust Territories. The constitution

¹ See S/1196.

should, of course, be appropriate to the existing stage of development of those Territories, but it should contain an article providing for a periodic review of the administration by the United Nations through its appropriate organs and also reserving power to the United Nations to amend the constitution so as to ensure the realization of full self-government within a period of ten years. The constitution as prepared by the commission should be subject to the approval of the General Assembly, and the Trusteeship Agreement should contain a provision requiring the Administering Authority to administer the Territory in accordance with the provisions of the constitution prescribed for it. If that were done, the question as to who should be the Administering Authority would become relatively unimportant, because it would be bound by a constitution approved and controlled by the United Nations.

86. Those, broadly speaking, were the lines along which the minds of the Indian delegation were moving; when their ideas had fully crystallized they would embody them in a draft resolution to be submitted at the appropriate time.

87. With regards to Indonesia, the Indian delegation had noted that discussions were proceeding at the Round Table Conference at The Hague. At the previous session of the General Assembly, India and Australia had jointly sponsored a draft resolution on the problem, suggesting a postponement of the debate to the fourth session¹, for the reason that statements made in the course of the debate on the one side or the other might introduce embarrassing complications for the participants at the Round Table Conference. It was to be hoped that the negotiations would be concluded satisfactorily before the end of the current session and that the necessity for discussing the question during the session would therefore not arise.

88. On 14 May 1949 the General Assembly had adopted resolution 265 (III) inviting the Governments of India, Pakistan, and the Union of South Africa to enter into discussions regarding the treatment of Indians in the Union at a round-table conference, taking into consideration the purposes and principles of the Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Preliminary discussions were taking place. India had lost no time in acting upon the resolution, but the response so far had been disappointing. Although the outlook at the moment was not bright, Sir Benegal Rau hoped that his delegation would not be compelled to bring up the matter before the Assembly again during the current session.

89. The Indian delegation had always taken a keen and active interest in the all-round development of Non-Self-Governing Territories as provided for in Article 73 of the Charter. It considered the Special Committee on Information transmitted under Article 73 of the Charter to be a most useful and, indeed, an indispensable institution. The establishment of such a Committee constituted an assurance to the millions of people living in those Territories that the General Assembly was conscious of its obligations towards races and regions not directly represented in the United Nations. It was satisfactory that the services of the specialized agencies were being made increasingly available to the Non-

Self-Governing Territories, because nowhere else were economic, social, educational and cultural problems in greater need of expert handling. For the specialized agencies, therefore, the Non-Self-Governing Territories, as part of the underdeveloped regions of the world, offered a unique opportunity for investigation and assistance. But they could labour in their respective fields only to the extent that the Administering Authorities invited their co-operation.

90. During the preceding twelve months there had been a good deal of evidence that Administering Authorities were building up machinery for international collaboration among themselves for the more efficient handling of certain economic problems. The Indian delegation would remind the General Assembly of the two types of international collaboration envisaged in subparagraph d of Article 73: one, outside the United Nations among the Powers themselves, the other with the specialized agencies. The first type did not rule out the second; in fact, it stressed the importance of the second. The specialized agencies, as organs of the United Nations, would bring to bear on the problems entrusted to them the outlook of the introductory paragraph of Article 73, namely, "the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of these Territories are paramount". The future of the Special Committee which focussed the attention of the United Nations on the problems of the Non-Self-Governing Territories in the spirit of Article 73, would be determined at a later stage by the Assembly. The Indian delegation was convinced that a Committee so useful in its achievements and so promising for the future could not be brought to a premature end without creating serious misgivings in the minds of the dependent races of mankind.

91. With regard to the question of South West Africa, Sir Benegal Rau recalled that on 26 November 1948 the General Assembly had adopted resolution 227 (III), recommending that the Mandated Territory of South West Africa should be placed under international trusteeship and urging the Government of the Union of South Africa to propose a Trusteeship Agreement for the Territory. Later in the same resolution, the Trusteeship Council was authorized to examine such information on the administration of South West Africa as the Government of the Union of South Africa might continue to supply.

92. Ignoring both the terms of those recommendations and the strongly-expressed sentiments of a number of delegations which took part in the debates, the Union Government had completed the process of what it called the closer political association of South West Africa with itself; and it had informed the Trusteeship Council that it would no longer supply information on the administration of South West Africa. The question would come up in due course before the current session of the Assembly. For the time being Sir Benegal Rau would only say that the Indian delegation viewed with grave concern the incorporation of the Mandated Territory of South West Africa into the Union, without any authority, moral or legal, for such a step. Rank political injustice, fanned by racial passion expressing itself in a policy of complete segregation, was utterly repugnant to every principle embodied in the Charter and could not but undermine the foundations of peace and security.

¹ That draft resolution was adopted by the General Assembly at its 208th meeting and became resolution 274 (III).

93. The deadlock in the Security Council on the application for membership in the United Nations of fourteen countries was a matter of deep disappointment. The consequences of refusing admission to peace-loving and sovereign States on grounds which had nothing to do with the merits of their applications would be disastrous alike for the prestige and the authority of the Organization. If such a policy should be pursued for any length of time, the United Nations would degenerate into a close corporation, and forfeit humanity's faith in its capacity to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war. It was a matter of general principle valid for all the countries of the world that no irrelevant considerations should bar the admission of a State which satisfied the provisions of the Charter. India particularly deplored the exclusion of Ceylon and Nepal, both neighbours, with long-standing ties in every sphere, and also that of Ireland.

94. In conclusion, Sir Benegal Rau referred to the draft declaration on the rights and duties of States¹, submitted by the International Law Commission as the first fruits of its activities. It was a short and unpretentious document, but it had two provisions of cardinal importance. The first was to be found in the preamble, which contained a tacit recognition of the Charter of the United Nations as part of contemporary international law. The second occurred in the concluding article of the declaration, which laid down the principle "that the sovereignty of each State is subject to the supremacy of international law". Reading the two together, it followed that the Charter was to be looked upon as a kind of fundamental law for every State. That that proposition should have received the authority of such a body as the International Law Commission was a development of immense significance, and it was to be hoped that the General Assembly would endorse the declaration.

95. FAYEZ EL-KHOURI Bey (Syria) explained that although his brother, Faris El-Khoury Bey, who had participated in the activities of the General Assembly as head of the Syrian delegation ever since the birth of the United Nations at San Francisco, was unable to attend the fourth session, the Syrian delegation would do its best to follow in his footsteps and to draw inspiration from his wisdom and his high qualities of justice, honesty, and love for peace.

96. It was difficult to speak about Syria apart from the countries of the Near East or, as it was sometimes called, the Middle East. Syria was not a State in the meaning which the West attached to that word; it was only a part of those vast Arab lands on the eastern and southern shores of the Mediterranean and its inhabitants were the same as those of Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Egypt and North Africa. If that racial unity was not apparent in the distribution of the Arab States, it was nevertheless a living reality in the souls and hearts of the inhabitants of those countries, and a strong faith which made them foresee that sooner or later their unity would be realized.

97. That hope was not new; it was half a century old, and at one point in the lifetime of the current generation it had come very near to realization. Those who were acquainted with modern

Arabic history knew well how legitimate Arab rights had twice been disregarded under the cloak of power politics. The first occasion had been after the First World War, when the Arab world had been divided into many States and subjugated to foreign mandates, against the will of the population, by the Allies, themselves the very promoters of freedom.

98. That destructive policy had been pursued for a quarter of a century, until the Arabs had found themselves grouped into a number of jealous States, all unprepared to assume the responsibilities of independence or to protect the frontiers of their countries. Conquering elements had been brought into Arab countries by the Allies themselves, who had armed them, given them money and munitions, and had let them fight against the Arabs and drive them from their countries, with the result that the lawful owners of Arab lands and homes had become distressed refugees threatened by death and annihilation.

99. The Arabs had subsequently been accused by the mandatory Powers—the very Powers which were responsible for their defence—of being unable to defend themselves: a strange accusation, when the whole world knew that those Powers were the first to blame.

100. Independence was no easy matter for newly-born nations. In the firm conviction that independence could not be taught overnight, but had to be practised before a people could assume its responsibilities and reap its fruits, Syria had opposed the Mandate System while it was yet only an idea, and had fought its application in Syria, despite the fact that the League of Nations had insisted on supporting it. As a result of the League's policy, the general situation had continued to deteriorate in the Near East until it had culminated in the existing state of affairs, which was an abiding proof of the League's failure to apply the principles upon which it was based. The short span of life of the League had proved beyond any doubt that it had been a game of power politics and private interests and that the great Powers had not been as sincere in their actions as they had pretended to be in their words.

101. The failure of the League of Nations had resulted in the Second World War. European politicians and statesmen had again started to preach the principles of freedom and democracy, confessing their past mistakes and making vows to the whole world of the sincerity of their intentions in the time to come.

102. The peoples of the world had been deceived by those new and generous promises. Syria, too, had believed in them. It loved democratic ideals and had anxiously hoped that their realization would bring about its independence and happiness. It had therefore again joined its efforts to those of the Allied nations and had co-operated in the war against nazism and fascism. He himself had received the Allies in Syria in 1941, looking forward to the realization of the independence which they had declared, and he had had the honour and privilege of establishing the foundations of the first Ministry of Foreign Affairs in independent Syria.

103. At that time Syria had placed all its resources, all its lines of communications and all its forces, at the disposal of the Allies, in order to achieve victory. So enthusiastic had his country been for the democratic cause that it had ex-

¹ See *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly, Supplement No. 10.*

pressed its determined will to declare war on the forces of nazism and fascism. The Allies, however, for reasons which Syria had not understood at the time, had prevented it from so doing. Once the war was over, it had become clear that the Allies had been conspiring against Syria and that for Syria to have declared war would have stopped those conspiracies. Had Syria declared war on the Axis, it would have had trained and equipped armies with able commanders to defend the Arab countries in hours of peril, thus preventing homelessness and misery. All indications showed that that would not have served the purpose of the Allies.

104. The United Nations had been formed in April 1945, with Syria among its Members. There had, however, been consistent proof that the League of Nations, which had been a failure, had been reborn in the Organization and that the evils which had led to its death were again at work in the United Nations. Wise and peace-loving individuals felt that the United Nations would suffer the same destiny as its predecessor.

105. No sooner had the war ended than the victorious nations had divided into two enemy camps, each claiming that they represented true democracy and that the other was a deceitful pretender. The United Nations had, in fact, been reduced to a centre of venomous propaganda, where the seeds of aggression and war were being sown. No greater proof was needed of the enmity existing among the great nations than the words heard from the rostrum of the United Nations, no greater proof of the lack of faith among the great States in the Organization than their international groupings outside it.

106. How could those Powers expect the smaller nations to believe their appeals to the principles of justice and democracy, when they were seen to act contrary to those principles, concentrating their forces to spread war in most areas of the world where people were killing each other and being killed by poverty, ignorance and sickness?

107. The two camps were continuing to mobilize their forces and to instigate peoples against each other, calling the whole process the "cold war". It was indeed a "cold war", in that it had not yet burned the great Powers with its fire. It was, however, no "cold war" for the Chinese, the Indonesians, the Arabs or the Greeks, who saw their houses burning, while the flames were fed with fuel rather than extinguished with water.

108. Such were the painful and frightful realities. The representatives of the smaller nations, whom destiny had favoured with rich lands and placed in a strategical position that excited the envy of the greater Powers, could only warn the powerful States to fear God, to sympathize with the weak and to place a limit to their ambitions, for the world had room for everyone.

109. It had been said that the misunderstanding between the USSR and the Western democracies was a matter of conflicting ideologies. It could be questioned whether that was true, or whether it was rather an excuse for spreading their influence over the countries which they described as under-developed.

110. It was no new struggle but, in fact, centuries old. Many conquerors had attempted the same thing: Alexander the Great, Caesar, Napoleon, Kaiser William II and Hitler. The student

of human history would realize, unfortunately, that humanity had not advanced a single step towards moral perfection; material comfort had developed in every possible way, but it was all designed to serve the mortal body, and not the immortal soul.

111. The East had been the first teacher of the world and had laid down the basic principles for its civilization. The teachings of the East were still the core of modern Western civilization, and although the West had materially surpassed all previous centuries in the development of matter and in conquering the difficulties of nature, in the realm of the spirit it had not been able to make one single addition to the high principles formulated by the East. The striking feature of the day was to hear the West priding itself on all its preparations for war to defend Christian civilization, which it had taken from the East and which preached love and peace.

112. The East, which had inherited those principles from its fathers and had practised them consistently, had become convinced that the deeds of the West did not correspond to its words. Oriental civilization would have guaranteed the happiness of its people had it not been for those new Western theories which in the West itself had resulted in dispute, chaos and cold war.

113. The latest system which had appeared in the West and which had gathered around it the poor and persecuted classes was the communist system which had brought about the division of the world into two camps and had become the cause of controversy among great leaders and statesmen. To oriental eyes, however, which had seen the rise and fall of kingdoms and empires and had witnessed the birth and death of social systems, it was obvious that man's inspired ideas were doomed to perish and fail and that only God's inspiration to man could live.

114. As to the various revolts which had broken out in different parts of the world, they were only a reaction to oppression and an expression of dissatisfaction with tyrannical social systems. Calm and the end of revolution would be brought about only with the realization of social justice and equity.

115. Communism, or any other revolutionary system, would not find easy followers in the Orient, the peoples of which would not exchange their high social and humanitarian ideals for those new principles. The oppression of the Orient by the West, however, its exploitation and the denial of its right to justice and the pursuit of happiness, would certainly have a strong reaction.

116. The situation in Asia was undoubtedly an unhappy one. In the midst of such deterioration, caused primarily by the erroneous policies of the West, communism would find in the Orient a fertile ground in which to grow and prosper. Poverty, hunger and sickness would always find an outlet in any revolutionary social system that would upset the prevailing order and relieve people of their sufferings. What, in fact, had the poor, the hungry and the sick to lose in changing the order which had caused their poverty, hunger and sickness for another that promised to save them and to transport them to a paradise of wealth, health and satisfaction?

117. Such dangerous omens were a warning to stubborn imperialists, and equally to those who made generous promises, for they were playing

with a fire that would consume impostors and tyrants.

118. One of the results of the division that existed among the great Powers was the splitting of the Organization into two camps, one led by the USSR and the other by the United States. To speak of the division in the Organization implied that the small States had also been divided, joining one or the other of the two camps. On the other hand, those two camps would not have been able to establish themselves if the small States had not joined either of them. If the United States and the USSR had been left in isolation, and if the small States had taken a neutral attitude, treating each problem separately and judging what was right and what was wrong without condoning the purposes and intentions of the two great States, there was no doubt that their attitudes would have altered and their obstinacy would have given place to a spirit of compromise. The interests of the great States were opposed, and it was difficult to reconcile them. But an examination of the causes of that discord would show that the small nations were among the causes of the disagreement. Their rich, undeveloped resources made the great States envy each other and enter into a race to see which could be the first to exploit those resources. Otherwise, they would find nothing about which to disagree. Why should not the small States, therefore, agree among themselves to form a third camp and hold the balance in their hands? That camp would in fact be the camp of peace, for the small States had no ambitions, they harboured no ill-will toward anyone, nor had they any imperialistic designs. All they wanted was to protect the weak against the ambitions of the strong and to establish justice, right and peace, with malice toward none and with goodwill for all.

119. It was regrettable that the small States took little interest in the disputed cases that came up for study and did not devote to them the interest or attach to them the importance which was usually given by the great Powers. On the contrary, they waited for the great Powers to come to a decision and to submit one plan or another to the vote. Some of them voted for one side and some for the other, without looking into the origins of the case and without remembering that by sacrificing the interests of one small State, they were sacrificing their own interests and that, one after the other, their turn would come. The votes of the smaller nations were the power at the disposal of the great nations in organizing their camps. They should, therefore, attach their real value to their votes, before casting them. For that reason he urged the small nations to make good use of the power in their hands and organize themselves for the sole purpose of guaranteeing world peace. It might be claimed that the right of veto which had been given to the great Powers was the cause of the misfortunes of the Organization, and that without it the whole world would have been in a condition of prosperity and peace.

He believed that that was an exaggerated view. The right of veto undoubtedly contradicted the principle of equality among all nations but in spite of all the damage that had been caused by its abuse, it must be admitted that the cause of the sickness did not lie in that alone. In the Syrian representative's view, the attitude which had been taken by the small nations in the various committees, as well as in the General Assembly, had resulted in damage to the whole structure of the United Nations which was at least equal to the damage caused by the veto.

120. The regrettable fact must frankly be recognized that in spite of all the efforts made and the good will shown, the noble and humanitarian aims of the United Nations would never be attained so long as destructive hands were working secretly, with their power politics and diabolic intrigues, to destroy the honest and useful structure which was being erected. It should be realized and understood that no problem could be considered solved unless it was solved fairly and justly.

121. Fayez El-Khoury Bey appealed to the Members, representing the nations of the world, to help to bring the politicians of the world to reason, in order to achieve the aims of the Organization. He appealed to them, moreover, to bear in mind that economic stability and world prosperity were chimerical and futile fancies if they were not preceded by and founded upon justice, equity and security.

122. In conclusion, he drew attention to a number of points. In the first place, peace among men and the happiness of the peoples of the world could be achieved only through right, justice and freedom, not through military conquests; an aggressor might be able to achieve his aims by means of bayonets, but he could never sit and relax on the points of those bayonets. Secondly, the victorious in the modern world were no happier than the vanquished; the economic situation prevailing after the two world wars was a striking example of that truth. Thirdly, the tragic fate of the League of Nations should never be forgotten; it constituted a warning that everything possible must be done to save the United Nations from the same fate. Fourthly, when voting, each delegation must take into full consideration the consequences of its vote. The damage which might result from a precipitous vote could not be restricted to the nation against whom that vote was cast; sooner or later, it would also damage the people of the delegation which voted without full consideration. Fifthly, bargaining, to the detriment of others, should be avoided in the final voting. Lastly, the small nations should not forget that the Organization could not live without them, and should not, therefore, lose sight of the value of their votes or underestimate their power in bringing about results.

The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m.