

**REPORT**  
**OF THE *AD HOC* COMMITTEE**  
**ON THE INDIAN OCEAN**

**GENERAL ASSEMBLY**

OFFICIAL RECORDS: TWENTY-NINTH SESSION

SUPPLEMENT No. 29 (A/9629)



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New York, 1974

#### **NOTE**

**Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.**

/Original: English/

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## I. INTRODUCTION

1. The General Assembly adopted on 16 December 1971 resolution 2832 (XXVI), by which it declared that the Indian Ocean was designated for all time as a zone of peace. In doing so, the Assembly inter alia called upon the great Powers to enter into immediate consultations with the littoral States of the Indian Ocean with a view to: (a) halting the further escalation and expansion of their military presence in the Indian Ocean; and (b) eliminating from the Indian Ocean all bases, military installations and logistical supply facilities, the disposition of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction and any manifestation of great Power military presence in the Indian Ocean conceived in the context of great Power rivalry.
2. By resolution 2992 (XXVII) of 15 December 1972, the General Assembly: (a) decided to establish an Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean, consisting of no more than 15 members, to study the implications of the Indian Ocean peace zone proposal, with special reference to the practical measures that might be taken in furtherance of the objectives of the Declaration contained in General Assembly resolution 2832 (XXVI), and having due regard to the security interests of the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean and the interests of any other State consistent with the Charter of the United Nations; and (b) requested the Committee to report to the General Assembly at its twenty-eighth session. The General Assembly further decided that the Committee should consist of the following States: Australia, China, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mauritius, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, United Republic of Tanzania, Yemen and Zambia.
3. In paragraph 14 of its report to the General Assembly at its twenty-eighth session, 1/ the Committee suggested, inter alia, that a study by the Secretary-General be prepared in 1974 with the assistance of consultant experts, providing authoritative information about the military presence of the great Powers in the Indian Ocean, so that the Committee would be in a better position to assess the implications of that presence.
4. By resolution 3080 (XXVIII) of 6 December 1973, the General Assembly requested the Ad Hoc Committee to continue its work, to carry out consultations in accordance with its mandate and to report with recommendations to the General Assembly at its twenty-ninth session. The Assembly further requested the Secretary-General to prepare, with the assistance of qualified experts and competent bodies selected by him, "a factual statement of the great Powers' military presence in all its aspects, in the Indian Ocean, with special reference to their naval deployments, conceived in the context of great Power rivalry". Such a statement was to be transmitted to the Ad Hoc Committee for its consideration. By the same resolution the General Assembly decided to include in the provisional agenda of its twenty-ninth session an item entitled "Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace".

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1/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 29 (A/9029).

## II. WORK OF THE COMMITTEE

5. The Committee held 12 meetings (A/AC.159/SR.12-23) between 7 June and 15 October 1974.

6. The officers elected by the Committee in 1973, namely:

Chairman: Mr. Hamilton S. Amerasinghe (Sri Lanka),  
Vice-Chairman: Mr. Raden Kusumasmoro (Indonesia),  
Rapporteur: Mr. Moise A. Rakotosihanaka (Madagascar),

continued to serve in their respective capacities.

7. The factual statement prepared with the assistance of qualified experts appointed by the Secretary-General pursuant to resolution 3080 (XXVIII), referred to in paragraph 4 above, was submitted to the Committee on 3 May 1974 (A/AC.159/1). Subsequently, on representations made to him, the Secretary-General, after careful consideration of the need to clarify the basis of certain parts of the statement, made arrangements for the statement to be reviewed by the experts. They were joined in their review by a special consultant appointed by the Secretary-General.

8. Concerning document A/AC.159/1, communications were received by the Secretary-General from the following Member States, which were circulated as Committee documents, as follows: United Republic of Tanzania (A/AC.159/2); United States of America (A/AC.159/3); Somalia (A/AC.159/4); United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (A/AC.159/5); Yemen (A/AC.159/6); Madagascar (A/AC.159/7); France (A/AC.159/8); Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (A/AC.159/9); and Ethiopia (A/AC.159/11). These communications were transmitted to the experts to be taken into account in the preparation of the revised factual statement.

9. On 11 July 1974, the revised factual statement (A/AC.159/1/Rev.1) was submitted to the Ad Hoc Committee by the Secretary-General. In doing so he indicated that the new document replaced the previous text in its entirety. For their part the experts indicated that they had taken into account the communications mentioned above.

10. After the circulation of document A/AC.159/1/Rev.1, a letter dated 23 July 1974 was addressed to the Secretary-General by the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and was circulated as a Committee document (A/AC.159/10).

11. The Committee considered the revised factual statement (A/AC.159/1/Rev.1) at meetings between 16 September and 15 October 1974 and decided to annex it to the present report. In the course of the consideration of the document by the Committee, the following views, inter alia, were expressed.

12. The representative of Madagascar stated that, in paragraph 11 of the revised factual statement, the sentence referring to naval vessels being based by France at Diego Suarez was ambiguous in the context of that paragraph. The reason was that the revised factual statement did not explain that, as envisaged in the French-Malagasy agreement of 4 June 1973 concerning the withdrawal of French forces from Madagascar (referred to in paragraph 13 of the factual statement), the French

vessels and staff which remained at Diego Suarez were there, on a temporary basis, for the sole purpose of training Malagasy personnel. The representative of Madagascar also stressed that the base at Diego Suarez, which was now under Malagasy sovereignty, would be transformed into a naval dockyard.

13. The representative of Madagascar also referred to the United States-United Kingdom project to expand military facilities on the island of Diego Garcia and recalled that the Government of Madagascar had issued a communiqué denouncing the project as being prejudicial to peace and security in the Indian Ocean (A/9585) and had also issued a statement on the same subject, which had been circulated as a Committee document (A/AC.159/L.6).

14. The representative of Australia stated that the revised factual statement was generally acceptable to his delegation, and the factual material it contained was useful. With regard to paragraph 47 of the factual statement, Australia would have preferred the last sentence to read: "On 9 January 1974 the United States and Australia entered into a new agreement under which the North West Cape station will be operated as a joint facility, and Australian servicemen will participate in the management and operation of the station". That was the wording which had been used in the statement issued by the United States and Australia Ministers.

15. The representative of Iraq held that, although the General Assembly had requested in resolution 3080 (XXVIII) that the factual statement should be based on available material, the statement drew only on certain limited sources of information. For example, most of the information given in the section concerning the USSR was attributed to United States sources. The representative of Iraq also noted that, as acknowledged in paragraph 7 of document A/AC.159/L.1/Rev.1, the factual statement did not deal with the question of foreign military alliances. In the view of his delegation, no study such as the one in question could be entirely satisfactory unless it covered the major question of foreign military alliances in the area, and not just the most visible elements of military and naval presence. In this connexion, the representative of Iran considered that if such a suggestion had been adopted, the Committee would have found itself involved in a long discussion, in an effort to define what actually constituted a foreign military alliance.

16. The representative of Pakistan considered that the factual statement would have been more useful if it had not been limited to the great Powers' military presence "conceived in the context of great Power rivalry", and hoped that in due course the Committee would be provided with a complete and unqualified picture of the great Powers' military presence in the Indian Ocean region. He also expressed the view that the increase in the great Powers' military presence in the Indian Ocean was attributable not only to the global strategy of the Powers concerned, but also to the political climate and military imbalance within the region. On the other hand, the representative of India considered that the question of the political climate and military imbalance in the region did not fall within the purview of the Ad Hoc Committee's terms of reference.

17. The representative of Indonesia expressed appreciation to the Secretary-General and the experts for the revised factual statement. At the same time, he took note of the reservations made by some delegations on certain aspects of that statement. Indonesia held that, since the Committee's main task was to prepare a report with

recommendations to the General Assembly, the report should be based on the result of consultations between the Committee Chairman and the great Powers, the revised factual statement and the Committee's own evaluation of the general situation.

18. The representative of Zambia said that the revised factual statement was a useful document, which fully justified the concern of the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean about great Power rivalry in that area. He expressed the view that such rivalry did not serve the cause of détente, and he urged the great Powers to co-operate fully with the Committee in its efforts to ensure that the Indian Ocean remained a zone of peace. In that connexion, Zambia thought that the Chairman should pursue informal consultations with representatives of the great Powers that were not members of the Committee.

19. The representative of Malaysia said that the revised version was an improvement and his delegation had no serious reservations about its contents. However, Malaysia was rather perturbed over the inclusion of the phrase "in the Malaysia area" in paragraph 29 of the revised statement. The inclusion of that phrase, it felt, was not only totally incorrect but also injected an ambiguity which it considered very unfortunate. The representative of Malaysia, therefore, considered further clarification of that phrase to be necessary. At the same time, he categorically stated that there were no British forces stationed in Malaysia or in any part of the Malaysian territory.

20. Malaysia further held that, in preparing their factual statement, the panel of experts had been greatly handicapped by the lack of common terminology and definitions: it was vital for the Committee to agree upon a common terminology before proceeding to other matters. The Committee had as yet reached no understanding on the limits of the zone of peace, the States which were deemed to be the littoral and hinterland States, a definition of "foreign military bases" and a series of other related questions. When the Committee had agreed on terms and definitions, it could proceed to draw up the broad principles for the zone of peace and establish an annual action programme to promote conditions in which the proposal might be achieved. There were, broadly speaking, three groups of States interested in the Indian Ocean zone of peace: they were, in order of importance, the littoral States, the hinterland States and the other users of the Indian Ocean. Malaysia favoured consultations among the littoral States either informally or through a conference of littoral States with a view to establishing objectives and, if possible, drafting definitions. The consultations could subsequently be expanded to include the hinterland States and, at a later stage, other users of the Indian Ocean.

21. Malaysia also held that, until the Committee had clearly decided how to proceed further with its task, the sole aim of informal contacts with the great Powers should be to find out whether and in what form they were prepared to co-operate with the Committee.

22. Iran said that the revised factual statement, which fulfilled the mandate contained in General Assembly resolution 3080 (XXVIII), provided visible elements of the military and naval presence of the great Powers in the Indian Ocean, within the context of rivalry among them. If some dissatisfaction still remained with regard to the revised factual statement, part of the misgivings might be attributed to ambiguities in the mandate and, in particular, to divergent interpretations of the word "factual".



23. As to the question of consultations with the great Powers, Iran agreed with the suggestion that the immediate aim should be to see whether and in what way the great Powers proposed to co-operate with the Committee in accordance with resolution 3080 (XXVIII). If the presence of the representatives of those Powers in the Committee could be secured, a welcome development would ensue, as the development might gradually change the Committee from an interest group into a negotiating body. He also said that the revised statement was factual in the sense that it was devoid of any value-judgement and of analytical, conjectural and speculative material and elements.

24. The representative of China stated that, while the revised factual statement did not give a full picture of the military presence of the Soviet Union and the United States in the region, it did on the whole reflect the situation and could be taken as a basis for further examination of the matter by the Committee. It could be seen from the statement, China said, that the root cause of the absence of tranquillity in the Indian Ocean area lay in the military expansion of the Soviet Union and the United States, and the contention between them. In order to bring about the establishment of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace, it was necessary to put an end to the two super-Powers' military expansion and contention for hegemony in the region, withdraw all foreign naval fleets from the area and dismantle all foreign military bases and installations there. The Committee should take effective measures to stop the super-Powers' activities and expansion in the Indian Ocean, and concrete proposals conducive to this goal should be put forward.

25. The representative of China also observed that the establishment of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace depended further on the countries in the region basing their relations on the principles of respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence, as well as on their closer unity against the big Powers' policies of hegemonism, expansionism and aggression. It ran counter to the objective of declaring the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace for any country in the region to pursue a policy of nuclear blackmail and threat and to annex a small neighbour. Such a country, China observed, would eat the bitter fruit of its own making.

26. The representative of India expressed the appreciation of his delegation to the Secretary-General and the experts for the revised factual statement, which was based on published material available to the experts and could serve as a useful basis for the Committee's discussions.

27. The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania said that the revised factual statement contained the necessary corrections as far as his country was concerned. In requesting those corrections, his delegation had in no way underestimated the difficulty of producing a factual statement on such a sensitive question. The revised statement, however, did confirm the fact that the military presence of the great Powers in the Indian Ocean - a presence which those Powers were attempting to rationalize - was increasing. The plan to enlarge the Diego Garcia base was an example of the increasing activities of the great Powers in the region. The efforts of the great Powers to impose a military hegemony in the Indian Ocean was a threat to the littoral and hinterland States and to peace in the area. The Ad Hoc Committee should recommend to the General Assembly that it call upon the great Powers concerned to withdraw their forces immediately and enable peace to prevail. His delegation continued to feel that a meeting of the

littoral and hinterland States should be convened to prepare a common approach to the great Powers on the issue.

28. At the 14th meeting, on 17 September 1974, at the request of Somalia, a statement of its representative was heard by the Committee. The representative of Somalia said that the revised factual statement still contained some inaccuracies and misrepresentations. The Committee's attention was drawn to paragraph 22, which stated that the USSR deployed naval warships in the Aden-Somalia area, and to paragraph 26, which referred to the construction of a Soviet communications station near the port of Berbera, the increased use and expansion of that port's naval facilities by the USSR, and the construction of a new Soviet military airfield near Mogadiscio. The Somali Government considered those statements to be unsubstantiated and totally unfounded. It was unfortunate, the representative of Somalia stated, that the only sources of information used or quoted by the authors were official statements by a great Power, the United States of America, whose own military interests and presence in the area constituted a serious threat to peace and a source of tension and anxiety for the countries and peoples of the Indian Ocean. At a recent meeting of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity, held at Mogadiscio, the President of the Supreme Revolutionary Council of Somalia, commenting on the question at a press conference, had stated that foreign military bases had never existed in Somalia and would never be allowed to exist there. As the Permanent Representative of Somalia stated in a letter of 22 May 1974 to the Secretary-General (A/AC.159/4), the port of Berbera offered refueling and bunkering facilities to all ships without discrimination. Somalia, therefore, rejected the suggestion that a restricted area of Somali national territory was under the control of a foreign Power. Furthermore, it considered that the sentence which referred to the building of a new military airfield near Mogadiscio was irrelevant, since its subject-matter was not covered by the mandate contained in General Assembly resolution 3080 (XXVIII) or by the interpretation of that resolution contained in paragraph 5 of the revised factual statement.

29. Some delegations expressed concern about the Indian nuclear explosion of 18 May 1974. The representatives of Pakistan and China felt that this affected the peace and security of the whole region of the Indian Ocean. The representative of Pakistan stated that the Indian nuclear explosion had adversely affected the prospects of establishing a peace zone since it increased the risk of enhancing the great Powers' military presence and rivalry in the region. Referring to India's assertion that it had no intention to produce nuclear weapons, he asked India to give concrete and credible shape to these assurances by placing all its nuclear facilities and future nuclear explosions under international supervision and safeguards. The representative of India emphatically rejected Pakistan's view that the Indian nuclear explosion in any way affected the peace and security of the Indian Ocean region. He reaffirmed that the Indian nuclear explosion was for exclusively peaceful purposes and there was no question of placing all of India's peaceful nuclear activities under international supervision and safeguards. He pointed out that the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean was not the appropriate forum for a discussion on this subject. He regretted Pakistan's attitude of introducing, for its own purposes, issues beyond the mandate of the Committee in its work.

30. One delegation expressed the view that the Indian explosion raised important questions about the use of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes and that any action which might encourage or facilitate the further proliferation of nuclear weapons was a matter of serious concern. In the view of that delegation, it was regrettable that a number of countries had not become parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In this connexion, the delegation of China reaffirmed its strong opposition to the non-proliferation treaty. In its view, the treaty served solely the interests of the two super-Powers in maintaining their nuclear monopoly and blackmail.

31. The Chairman was requested by the Committee to establish contact with the four permanent members of the Security Council which are not members of the Committee, in order to secure their co-operation with the Committee, in accordance with paragraphs 2 and 3 of General Assembly resolution 3080 (XXVIII). This co-operation was to take the form of consultations between the Committee and those four permanent members of the Security Council, with a view to ascertaining their precise policy and position regarding the implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. The consultations, however, did not materialize.

32. The representative of Australia said that Australia did not wish to see great Power rivalry in the form of military and naval escalation developing in the area. That objective could be realized only through concerted and co-operative action by the great Powers themselves, and Australia had accordingly made representations in Moscow and Washington urging that, in a spirit of mutual restraint, there should be a low level of military deployment in the Indian Ocean. In March 1974 approaches had been made at the ambassadorial level to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs and to the State Department, which had been followed up in April during a visit to the United States by the Secretary of the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs. The Secretary had raised the matter with the Soviet Ambassador to the United Nations and with senior State Department officials; he had also called on the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee. The response of both countries to these representations had not been discouraging.

33. There was a consensus in the Committee on the importance of considering the convening, as early as possible, of a conference of the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean. In this connexion it was noted that the Committee had not yet reached an agreed understanding on which countries were deemed to be littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean. The view was also expressed that the participation, in such a conference, of (a) the permanent members of the Security Council and (b) other major maritime users of the Indian Ocean, would be desirable.

34. The Committee considers it desirable, for the purpose of continuing its work, to give priority attention in 1975 to the definition of the following terms: (a) "limits of the Indian Ocean, in the context of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean, as a zone of peace"; (b) "littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean"; and (c) "foreign military bases". One member expressed the view that if specific reference was to be made to these terms, the term "foreign military alliances" should also be defined as it was relevant to the Committee's mandate. Another delegation differed from this view. Some other members held that, without indicating at this stage the terms to be defined, the Committee should undertake in 1975 the definition of all the basic concepts and terms relevant to the implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace.

### III. RECOMMENDATIONS

35. The Ad Hoc Committee submits the following recommendations:

(1) The Ad Hoc Committee should continue and intensify its efforts in accordance with its mandate, as stated in paragraph 2 of General Assembly resolution 2992 (XXVII).

(2) The Ad Hoc Committee should proceed with its consultations with the four permanent members of the Security Council which are not members of the Ad Hoc Committee, as envisaged in paragraph 31 of this report.

(3) The Ad Hoc Committee should give priority attention in 1975 to the definition of terms, as indicated in paragraph 34 of this report.

(4) Consideration should be given for the convening, as early as possible, of a conference of the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean, as envisaged in paragraph 33 of this report.

## ANNEX

### Statement submitted pursuant to paragraphs 6 and 7 of General Assembly resolution 3080 (XXVIII)\*

#### INTRODUCTORY NOTE

By General Assembly resolution 3080 (XXVIII) of 6 December 1973, the Secretary-General was requested to prepare, with the assistance of qualified consultant experts, a factual statement of the great Powers' military presence in the Indian Ocean.

The experts appointed were: Dr. Frank Barnaby, Director, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI); Admiral Shams Safavi (Ret.), Imperial Iranian Navy; and Mr. K. Subrahmanyam, Director, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.

The experts met at United Nations Headquarters from 23 to 25 January and from 8 to 12 April 1974 and, at the conclusion of their work, they submitted their agreed statement on 12 April 1974, which appeared as document A/AC.159/1 dated 3 May 1974.

After careful consideration of the need to clarify the basis of certain parts of the statement, the Secretary-General made arrangements for the statement to be reviewed by the experts. The Secretary-General requested Mr. William Epstein to participate, as Special Consultant, in the review. The review took place in London during the week of 27 to 31 May 1974 and in Geneva during the week of 1 to 5 July 1974.

The experts unanimously agreed upon the revised statement, contained in the present document (A/AC.159/1/Rev.1), which replaces the previous text (A/AC.159/1) in its entirety.

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\* Previously issued under the symbol A/AC.159/1/Rev.1.

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

5 July 1974

Dear Mr. Secretary-General,

At your request we have completed a review of the factual statement submitted to you on 12 April 1974. In preparing the earlier version it was our understanding from the proceedings of the twenty-eighth session of the General Assembly, that a comprehensive statement was required, based on our best assessment of the available data in open sources, and that we would take sole responsibility for this assessment. However, subsequent developments and the nature of your request have now clarified that a factual statement by the Secretary-General, in which all our references are specified, is required. The revised statement reflects these criteria. We have also taken into account the official statements made after the circulation of our earlier text.

The structure of our first version was based on our interpretation that the term "great Power rivalry" referred, in the first place, to the Soviet Union and the United States. In this statement, we have followed the traditional United Nations practice of dealing, alphabetically, with the five permanent members of the Security Council.

In conducting the review we were joined by William Epstein as Special Consultant. Our meetings took place in London during the week of 27-31 May 1974, and in Geneva during the week of 1-5 July 1974.

We have the honour to submit herewith, for your consideration, the text of our unanimously agreed revised statement, which replaces the previous text.

Respectfully yours,

(Signed) Frank BARNABY

Shams SAFAVI

K. SUBRAHMANYAM

His Excellency  
Mr. Kurt Waldheim  
Secretary-General of the  
United Nations  
New York

## INTRODUCTION

1. The General Assembly of the United Nations adopted on 16 December 1971 resolution 2832 (XXVI), by which it declared that the Indian Ocean was designated for all time as a zone of peace. In doing so, the Assembly inter alia called upon the great Powers to enter into immediate consultations with the littoral States of the Indian Ocean with a view to: (a) halting the further escalation and expansion of their military presence in the Indian Ocean; and (b) eliminating from the Indian Ocean all bases, military installations and logistical supply facilities, the disposition of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction and any manifestation of great Power military presence in the Indian Ocean conceived in the context of great Power rivalry.
2. By resolution 2992 (XXVII) of 15 December 1972, the General Assembly established an Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean to study the implications of the Declaration.
3. By resolution 3080 (XXVIII) of 6 December 1973, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to prepare a "factual statement of the great Powers' military presence in all its aspects, in the Indian Ocean, with special reference to their naval deployments, conceived in the context of great Power rivalry".
4. In the absence of any guidance as to the meaning of the expression "great Powers" we have, for the purposes of this statement, taken it to refer to the permanent members of the Security Council, which are dealt with in alphabetical order.
5. For the purposes of this statement, in addition to the geographical area of the Indian Ocean, we have taken into account those portions of the territory of littoral States which, because of the facilities they provide, are relevant to the mandate contained in the General Assembly resolution.
6. Resolution 3080 (XXVIII) also recommended that the statement "should be based on available material". We have accordingly used information contained in official reports and documents that were available, or in reputable publications and press.
7. It should also be noted that resolution 3080 (XXVIII) does not deal with the question of military alliances. In this statement, therefore, we deal primarily with those factors, such as the deployment of warships, the existence of military installations and naval bases etc., which constitute the most visible elements of a military and naval presence.
8. The visible elements of a military and naval presence in the Indian Ocean, for the purposes of this statement, are:
  - (a) The deployment of naval ships - both surface and submarine;
  - (b) The maintenance of naval and military establishments in the area;
  - (c) The military use of communications facilities; the use of military staging facilities; and the military use of air fields.
  - (d) The naval use of mooring buoys in the Ocean;

(e) The use of harbours and ports of littoral States for naval purposes, the use of naval fuelling facilities, the general use of bases and other military facilities etc.

#### CHINA

9. China has no bases in the Indian Ocean nor does it deploy any of its naval units there.

#### FRANCE

##### French naval deployments

10. According to information furnished by the Chairman of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Senate Armed Services Committee on 12 March 1974, the deployment of French combatant naval vessels, excluding auxiliary and service ships, in the Indian Ocean area for the years 1968 to 1973 was as follows:

1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973
3	4	5	6	8	7

11. According to Le Monde of 7 June 1973, following the agreement of 4 June 1973 whereby France agreed to withdraw its forces from Madagascar (see paragraph 13 below), the French Navy created a new naval command for the Indian Ocean operating from a fleet tanker converted into a command ship (La Charente). According to the Canberra Times of 20 March 1974, this ship has a flight deck for helicopters and short take-off and landing aircraft, sophisticated armaments and a high-powered communications system. According to Le Monde of 11 February, 7 March and 26 April 1974, in addition to La Charente the French Navy has three frigates as part of the naval command, and three coastal patrol vessels and some assault landing craft are based at Djibouti in the Territory of the Afars and the Issas which, together with a squadron of aircraft for long-range anti-submarine warfare, patrol the adjoining areas of the Indian Ocean; a coastal patrol vessel and a number of assault landing craft are also based at Diego Suarez. The naval units, landing craft and aircraft of the naval command are linked by radio relay station on Reunion.

##### French naval and military facilities

12. France has base and other military facilities at Djibouti in the Territory of the Afars and the Issas. According to The Military Balance 1973-1974 published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, the strength of the French garrison in 1973 was two battalions. According to The Statesman's Yearbook 1973-1974, there are in addition elements of the Navy and Air Force.

13. Under a 1960 defence agreement, France had the right to maintain base and other military facilities in Madagascar. A French-Malagasy agreement of 4 June 1973 provided for the withdrawal of French ground and air forces from Madagascar by 1 September 1973. As regards Diego Suarez, the agreement stipulated



that the base would pass under the control of Madagascar on 1 September 1973, but French military and civilian personnel would remain for a period of two years, during which time Malagasy units would be trained to run the installations. It was also specified that France was to have landing and harbouring rights for refuelling and repairing aircraft and ships, renewable every year by tacit agreement.

14. According to information provided by the Permanent Mission of Madagascar to the United Nations, on 1 September 1973 the following operations for the evacuation of French armed forces from Madagascar were completed:

- (a) The General Staffs and the military and ancillary services formerly based at Tananarive;
- (b) The third regiment of infantry parachutists at Diego Suarez;
- (c) The second regiment of marine infantry parachutists;
- (d) Air base 181 at Ivato (near Tananarive).

15. The Permanent Mission of Madagascar also indicated that the base at Diego Suarez, which is now under Malagasy sovereignty, will be transformed into a naval dockyard.

16. According to Keesing's Contemporary Archives (26011A), following the agreement to withdraw its forces from the Malagasy Republic, the French Government decided to establish the island of Réunion as the headquarters of French forces in the southern Indian Ocean, and also to reduce these forces from 4,000 to 3,000 men.

#### UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

##### Soviet naval deployments

17. In a letter dated 18 June 1974 from the Permanent Representative of the USSR to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/AC.159/9) it is stated:

"The Soviet Union has never had, has not established and is not now establishing any military or naval bases in the Indian Ocean region. Soviet ships and vessels have never posed a threat to anyone in that region. In accordance with the existing rules of international law and with universally recognized international practice, they are engaged in training cruises and in the search for and recovery of Soviet space craft that splash down in the Indian Ocean. It must also be borne in mind that transit routes from the European part of the USSR to the Soviet Far East pass through the Indian Ocean and that accordingly, in order to ensure the safe passage of ships and vessels, the Soviet Union is conducting scientific investigations in the region."

The letter added that "normal duty calls by naval ships at various ports for the purpose of replenishing their supplies" should not be "tendentiously depicted ... as the establishment of Soviet bases in the Indian Ocean region". This is the only official information from Soviet sources. The information in the following part of this section is based on official United States and other sources.

18. There is no official evidence of the deployment of Soviet nuclear ballistic missile-firing submarines in the Indian Ocean.

19. According to the report from the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs on the Indian Ocean Region of the Parliament of Australia, 1972, a Soviet nuclear-powered submarine (E-II class) was present in the Indian Ocean in April-May 1970.

20. According to the Chairman of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, in a statement on 12 March 1974 to the Senate Committee on Armed Services, Soviet naval forces in the Indian Ocean at present operate from Vladivostok.

21. According to the same source (in statements to the House Committee on Appropriations on 28 February 1974 and to the Senate Committee on Armed Services on 12 March 1974), before 1968 there was no regular Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean, but in recent years the Soviet Union has enhanced its presence there. The Soviet Union at present operates about nine combatants/submarines and a number of auxiliaries. Usually, it maintains a cruiser type, two or three destroyer types, four minesweepers and one or two submarines, and usually brings tenders for repair and bunkering in the area.

22. Ships are relieved at about six-monthly intervals. The deployment in the winter months (November to April) is higher (i.e. it includes a cruiser) than that of the rest of the year and the ships are usually deployed in the western part of the Ocean, in the Aden-Somalia area. (Geoffrey Jukes, Australian, 26 February 1974.)

23. This deployment pattern was changed twice. When the Bangladesh war started in 1971 there were four Soviet warships in the Indian Ocean (a destroyer, a submarine, a minesweeper and a tank landing ship). (McConnell, J. and Kelly, A. M. Super-Power Naval Diplomacy in the Indo-Pakistani Crisis, Center of Naval Analysis, Washington, February 1973.) According to a bulletin of the United States Information Service (Canberra, March 1974), this force was strengthened, and for a brief period in early 1972 there were 20 combatants (13 surface vessels and 7 submarines) present in the Ocean. According to the statement of the Chairman of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff to a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations on 28 February 1974, extra Soviet ships were sent into the Ocean after the United States Navy had dispatched a task force there, headed by the aircraft carrier Enterprise. After the American ships had left the Indian Ocean the extra Soviet warships also left. (McConnell, J. and Kelly, A. M., op. cit.)

24. The second occasion when a larger number of Soviet ships was sent into the Ocean was in October 1973 during the Middle East crisis. The Soviet Navy then dispatched additional warships to increase its squadron in the Indian Ocean to 10 surface combatants and 4 submarines (Geoffrey Jukes, Australian, 26 February 1974).

25. A method for comparing the naval presence of the external Powers in the Indian Ocean is by calculating the number of ship-days a/ spent there by the naval vessels

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a/ Ship-days comparison must, however, be treated with caution since they ignore the actual nature of the ships present and their combat capabilities. Another method for comparing naval presence is by calculating the number of port calls by naval vessels. However, official information in this regard is either not available or conflicting.

of the Towers. Considering only combatant ships and excluding auxiliary and support ships and mine-clearing operations in Bangladesh, the number of ship-days accumulated by the Soviet Navy was stated by the Chairman of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff on 12 March 1974 to the Senate Armed Services Committee to be as follows:

1960 through 1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973
Nil	529	1,138	1,670	1,480	2,387	2,487

#### Soviet naval and military facilities

26. On 20 March 1974, the United States Chief of Naval Operations stated to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives:

"They (the USSR) have built a communications station near the Somali port of Berbera to provide support for their fleet. At the same time they have increased their use of, and are expanding naval facilities at Berbera, which currently include a restricted area under Soviet control, a combined barracks and repair ship and housing for Soviet military dependents. In addition, they engaged in building a new military airfield near Mogadiscio, which could be used for a variety of missions."

The Government of Somalia stated on 22 May 1974 that "there are no foreign military bases on the territory of the Somali Democratic Republic and that the statements alleging the establishment of a foreign communications centre or naval and air bases are totally unfounded" (A/AC.159/4).

27. The following facilities have also been reported by the United States Chief of Naval Operations, in the same statement, to be available to the Soviet Union in the Indian Ocean area:

(a) Fleet anchorages in several locations near the island of Socotra, and near the Chagos Archipelago;

(b) Permanent mooring buoys at several sites in the Ocean; b/

(c) Access by Soviet naval vessels to the naval port of Umm Qasr, Iraq, "where facilities are being built with the assistance of Soviet technicians";

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b/ These buoys are off Mauritius, the Seychelles, the Chagos Archipelago and the east coast of Africa (Study prepared by the Congressional Research Service of the United States Library of Congress for a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 12 May 1974).

(d) The "use of port facilities at the former British base at Aden, and air facilities at the former Royal Air Force field nearby. They /the Soviet Union/ maintain personnel ashore in both locations". According to The Statesman (New Delhi) of 14 March 1974, Democratic Yemen has denied offering military facilities to the Soviet Union.

## UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND

### British naval deployments

28. According to the United Kingdom Statement on Defence Estimates, 1972 (Cmnd. 4891), the British Navy has a force of six frigates or destroyers stationed east of Suez, including Hong Kong, as part of its contribution to the ANZUK force, visiting the Persian Gulf area and providing a presence in the Indian Ocean. Other naval vessels also visit the area occasionally.

29. According to the report from the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs on the Indian Ocean Region of the Parliament of Australia, 1972, the British contribution to ANZUK, stationed in the Malaysia area, includes a battalion group with an air platoon and an artillery battery, long-range maritime reconnaissance aircraft, a number of helicopters and visits by combat units of all three services.

30. According to information by the Chairman of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Senate Armed Services Committee on 12 March 1974, the deployment of British combatant naval vessels, excluding auxiliary and service ships, in the Indian Ocean and Far East areas (area breakdown not available) for the years 1968 to 1973, was as follows:

1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973
43	33	19	18	12	10

### British naval and military facilities

31. The United Kingdom has retained a number of staging posts in the Indian Ocean for the maintenance of communications between Britain and the Far East, as indicated below.

32. The British island of Diego Garcia (see paragraphs 49 and 50 below) is an uninhabited coral atoll 13 miles long and up to 4 miles wide situated almost at the centre of the Indian Ocean. As documented in many reference publications, the island of Diego Garcia, in the Chagos Archipelago, was originally administered as part of Mauritius. When Mauritius was granted independence, Diego Garcia and two other atolls in the Archipelago were bought by the British Government from Mauritius. They are part of "the British Indian Ocean Territory" (BIOT), which includes the islands of Aldabra, Farquhar, Desroches (detached from the Seychelles Group) and the Chagos Archipelago. A 1966 agreement between the United Kingdom and the United States made the islands comprising the BIOT available to both countries for military purposes for a period of 50 years (Cmnd. 3231, April 1967). Agreements between the United States and the United Kingdom, signed

in 1966 and 1970, permitted the United States to build a naval communications station on Diego Garcia for joint use. (United States State Department Press Release, 15 December 1970.)

33. Under an agreement signed on 26 July 1965 (Cmnd. 2749, August 1965), the Government of the Maldives agreed to provide certain defence facilities to the United Kingdom up to 15 December 1986. The United Kingdom has an airfield on Gan Island and a radio communications station on Hithadoo Island, and has "unrestricted access by sea and air to the Agreed Areas" and adjacent territorial waters. The military facilities on the Maldives also include a lagoon in the Addu Atoll with a natural harbour, and the right to maintain armed forces within the Agreed Areas.

34. Under an agreement signed with the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman on 25 July 1958 (United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 312, p. 347), the United Kingdom's existing arrangements were extended for the use by the Royal Air Force of the airfields at Salalah and the island of Masirah.

35. A six-year mutual defence pact signed in March 1968 (Cmnd. 3629, May 1968), and terminable on one year's notice by either party after that time, between the United Kingdom and Mauritius provides for the continuation of existing British facilities on the island, including the use of the airfields for military aircraft, ports and harbours and the naval communications facility. (Statement on the Defence Estimates 1971, Cmnd. 4592.)

36. The United Kingdom has established a military communications system, called Skynet, between the United Kingdom and the Far East. Skynet, which operates in conjunction with the United States satellite network, consists of nine earth stations and two relay space craft. The Royal Air Force is in operational control of the project from its master control centre in England. In addition to the control base there are eight earth stations - four fixed stations at Singapore, Gan, Bahrain and Cyprus; two on board British naval ships; and two smaller air transportable stations operated by the British Navy and the headquarters station in southern England. The relay space craft, placed in stationary orbit 23,000 miles above the equator over the Indian Ocean, provides long-distance defence communications. (Statement on the Defence Estimates 1969, Cmnd. 3927, 1971, Cmnd. 4592; Burman, R. "Rivalry in the Indian Ocean", Vikrant, February 1974.)

#### UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

##### United States naval deployments

37. According to several statements by United States officials to Congressional Committees, apart from MIDEASTFOR (see paragraph 39 below), United States naval forces in the Indian Ocean, which are part of the Seventh (Pacific) Fleet, operate from the Subic Bay base in the Philippines.

38. There is no official information concerning the deployment of United States nuclear ballistic missile firing submarines in the Indian Ocean. According to a joint statement issued by the Australian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for

Defence and the United States Secretary of Defense on 10 January 1974 regarding the United States naval communications station at North West Cape: "... the Ministers noted that one important function of the station was to serve as a key element in a complex system of communications supporting the global balance. They noted the importance of effective and reliable deterrence for the promotion of stable relations among the major Powers ..." (see also paragraph 47 below).

39. According to several statements by United States officials to Congressional Committees, the United States Navy has since 1950 stationed its Mid-east Force (MIDEASTFOR) under the command of a United States Admiral at Bahrain in the Persian Gulf (see paragraph 52 below). This force consists of:

(a) 2 destroyers or destroyer escorts;

(b) 1 amphibious ship (La Salle), converted to the flagship of the United States Middle East Force.

The flagship is stationed in Bahrain and the destroyer or destroyer escorts are on rotational assignments from other naval units of the Atlantic fleet.

40. According to the statement of the Chairman of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Senate Armed Services Committee on 12 March 1974, apart from Bahrain the United States Navy has no free access to any port in the Indian Ocean and must make arrangements on a case-by-case basis.

41. According to a study prepared by the Library of Congress for a Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the United States House of Representatives, dated 12 May 1974, United States naval warships have been conducting periodic patrols in the Eastern Indian Ocean. For example, a brief ASW exercise was conducted in April 1971 by the aircraft carrier Ticonderoga with five escorts, from the Seventh (Pacific) Fleet. In September 1971, the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier Enterprise, accompanied by the nuclear-powered frigate Bainbridge, conducted a short visit.

42. According to the same source, in December 1971, at the time of the Indo-Pakistani war, the aircraft carrier Enterprise headed a task force including an amphibious assault ship, Tripoli, with a battalion landing team, seven destroyers and an oiler, which entered the Bay of Bengal and was deployed in the Indian Ocean until January 1972.

43. On 1 January 1972 the operational area of the United States Seventh (Pacific) Fleet was extended into the Indian Ocean (The New York Times, 22 March 1972). According to various reports in the United States press, in March 1973 the United States aircraft carrier America was in that Ocean. Between October 1973 and December 1973, an Essex-class aircraft carrier, the Hancock, accompanied by four destroyers and an oiler, was deployed and between December 1973 and January 1974 the United States Navy deployed another aircraft carrier, the Oriskany, with four destroyers and an oiler, in the Indian Ocean. Simultaneously, the United States nuclear-powered frigate Bainbridge was also sent into the Ocean. In March 1974 the more modern and larger aircraft carrier, Kitty Hawk, was sent in along with four destroyers and some supply ships; the Bainbridge was then withdrawn.

44. United States Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger stated the following at a press conference on 22 April 1974:

"The Kitty Hawk is just moving out of the Indian Ocean, and it will not immediately be replaced. So for a period of time at least, there will be no American naval forces in the Indian Ocean (other than the Middle East Task Force), but we reiterate that the present plans call for occasional movement of such forces into the Indian Ocean on an intermittent basis."

45. According to the International Herald Tribune of 3 July 1974, the United States guided missile cruiser, Chicago, two destroyers and an oiler entered the Indian Ocean through the Straits of Malacca on 30 June 1974.

46. According to a statement of the Chairman of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff on 12 March 1974 to the Senate Armed Services Committee, the number of ship-days (see paragraph 25 above) accumulated annually by United States naval surface combat ships, excluding auxiliary and support ships, was as follows:

1960-1969	1970	1971	1972	1973
800 (approximately per year)	872	858	990	1,410

#### United States naval and military facilities

47. According to the Washington Post of 11 January 1974, the United States communication station at North West Cape, which was commissioned in April 1967 pursuant to an agreement signed between the United States and Australia in 1963, is capable of very low-frequency communication with submerged submarines. It is part of the United States world-wide communications system which includes stations at Honolulu, Guam, the Philippines, Diego Garcia and Asmara. On 9 January 1974 the United States and Australia entered into a new agreement for sharing control of the North West Cape station (see paragraph 38 above).

48. There has been a United States military communication station (the Kagnew Station) close to Asmara, Ethiopia, in use since 1942, when it was operated jointly with the United Kingdom. The base, now a relay and satellite tracking station, is also used for monitoring purposes (hearings before the Subcommittee on Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad of the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 1970).

49. The United States, pursuant to agreements with the United Kingdom (see paragraph 32 above), has built a naval communications station on the Island of Diego Garcia. A recent new agreement, announced in the British House of Commons on 5 February 1974, provided that the United States would establish support installations on the island for warships and aircraft. The United States Government has requested a supplemental appropriation of \$29 million for the planned facilities on the island.

50. According to numerous statements by United States officials to Congressional Committees, Diego Garcia has a good harbour and a site for a major airfield. The United States Navy is undertaking dredging of the harbour to create a turning

basin that will be 2,000 by 6,000 feet and able to accommodate submarines and aircraft carriers. The United States has constructed an 8,000-foot long coral runway on the island and United States C-130 and C-141 transport aircraft have been using the airstrip. At present there is a contingent of between 200 and 300 American servicemen at the base. The United States has announced plans to increase this contingent to between 500 and 600 men; to lengthen the airfield runway from 8,000 to 12,000 feet, which will make it available for use by KC-135 refuelling aircraft, but not B-52 bombers (statement of Chairman of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff to Senate Armed Services Committee on 12 March 1974); to build more fuel storage tanks; to expand the airfield parking area; to improve existing quarters (to accommodate 609 persons) and to deepen the lagoon so that it will be able to handle more ships than the current two or three. The United Kingdom will have equal access to the facilities of the base for its own ships and aircraft.

51. On 1 May 1974 the Minister for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs stated in the British House of Commons: "The United States proposal to expand its facilities at Diego Garcia is still being considered. The question is relevant to the general background of the review of defence commitments and capabilities which has already been announced. This review will take full account of the needs for security and stability in the area. The views of Commonwealth and other interested countries will also be carefully considered".

52. According to statements made in hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the United States House of Representatives on 12 March 1974, the United States, on 23 December 1971, signed an agreement with Bahrain to use the former British naval base there as a base for the American Middle East Force following the evacuation of the British forces from the Persian Gulf. Prior to this, the United States shared British facilities available at Bahrain (see paragraph 39 above). The American contingent at the base was increased in 1972 from about 200 to 260. The base is also used as a communications centre. In October 1973 Bahrain proposed to the United States the termination of the base rights in one year. The future status of the base is unclear.

53. The United States has tracking facilities at Mahe in the Seychelles (press conference of Prime Minister James Mancham of the Seychelles on his visit to the United Nations in May 1974).



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