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Report on the activities of the Office of Internal Oversight Services

Administrative and budgetary aspects of the financing
of the United Nations peacekeeping operations

Peacekeeping operations

Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services

Summary

The present report is submitted in conformity with General Assembly resolutions 48/218 B (para. 5 (e)), 54/244 (paras. 4 and 5), 59/272 (paras. 1-3) and 64/263 (para. 1). It covers oversight activities of the Office of Internal Oversight Services related to peace operations during the 12-month period from 1 January to 31 December 2011.

The Office of Internal Oversight Services issued 194 oversight reports related to peace operations in 2011. The report of the Office on its non-peacekeeping oversight activities for the period from 1 July 2010 to 30 June 2011 is contained in document A/66/286 (Part I) and Add.1.

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Preface

I am pleased to submit the present report on the activities of the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) in peacekeeping operations during the 12-month period ending 31 December 2011 to the General Assembly.

The report reflects the results of improvements to the process within OIOS to respond to feedback received from management. In particular, the volume of internal audit recommendations has been reduced in order to help the Organization focus on critical and important issues requiring attention. Critical issues are being followed up quarterly until implemented, while important recommendations will be followed up annually. Less important (low risk) opportunities for improvement continue to be identified, but they are provided to management for discretionary implementation, and will be followed up only during the next relevant audit engagement. This change, which is consistent with professional standards, has significantly reduced the administrative burden previously required for monitoring outstanding recommendations.

In addition, the report begins to identify trends in the categories and the volume of issues identified in OIOS recommendations. This analysis will help contribute to identifying potential systemic issues that may need to be addressed in future oversight activities and/or management initiatives.

OIOS has recently initiated independent reviews of the activities of both the Investigations Division and the Inspection and Evaluation Division. Combined with the external quality assessment of the Internal Audit Division completed in 2011, these reviews will provide the basis for considering additional improvements to the process of the Office to increase the efficiency and value of its work to the Secretariat.

I am very grateful for the cooperation and support provided by senior management and the Secretary-General to the activities of OIOS during the reporting period. Their willingness to engage constructively in internal oversight activities and to involve OIOS in critical managerial discussions is particularly helpful in ensuring that our efforts contribute to identifying sustainable solutions to the pressing issues and challenges facing the Organization.

I also appreciate the dedication, professionalism and commitment of OIOS staff in delivering results in often very challenging circumstances, results in which they justifiably take pride.

(Signed) Carman L. **Lapointe**
Under-Secretary-General for Internal Oversight Services

I. Introduction

1. During the reporting period, from 1 January to 31 December 2011, the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) issued 194 oversight reports related to peace operations.

2. The present part of the report of OIOS pertains exclusively to the oversight of United Nations peace operations, which includes the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Department of Field Support, the peacekeeping missions that fall under the authority of those Departments and the special political and peacebuilding missions led by the Department of Political Affairs and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, supported by the Department of Field Support and the Department of Management.

II. Overview

A. Internal Audit Division

3. The Peacekeeping Audit Service of the Internal Audit Division operates out of New York and through resident audit offices based in 10 missions and one office (see figure I), including the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI), the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT), the Middle East Office, which consists of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process (UNSCO), the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) and the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), and the United Nations Support Office for the African Union Mission in Somalia (UNSOA).

Figure I
OIOS Resident Audit Offices



4. In New York, the Peacekeeping Audit Service covers audits of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Department of Field Support and the Department of Political Affairs, as well as smaller peacekeeping and special political missions without resident auditors. The Service is assisted by specialists from the Special Assignments Section and the Information and Communication Technology Audit Section. The specific expertise of these staff members complements the work of the resident auditors and ensures consistency and depth in auditing cross-cutting areas in information and communications technology (ICT), construction, procurement and trust funds.

Internal improvements in the Internal Audit Division

5. In a continuous effort to improve work processes and procedures, the Internal Audit Division undertook the following initiatives:

(a) **Risk-based audit planning:** Following the recommendations of the Independent Audit Advisory Committee and the related request of the General Assembly in its resolution 64/243 (para. 128), and in accordance with the relevant Institute of Internal Auditors practice advisory, the Division refined its risk-based planning methodology on the basis of residual risks. The updated risk assessments, which consider the adequacy and effectiveness of existing key controls in addition to inherent risks, resulted in the identification of major risks that may hinder the achievement of objectives;

(b) **New toolkits:** In order to strengthen its audit capacity and coverage, the Division rolled out a new toolkit for auditing programme performance management. The toolkit was piloted with the Civil Affairs Section of MONUSCO. This initiative supports the efforts of the Secretariat to increase its focus on results (outcomes);

(c) **Horizontal audits:** The Division is making greater use of horizontal audit methodology to identify systemic strengths and weaknesses across peacekeeping missions, to assess whether adequate policies and instructions have been developed and implemented and to determine whether appropriate monitoring and oversight occurs. Horizontal audits are expected to highlight the need for policy reviews and procedural changes, as well as facilitate knowledge sharing (see paras. 18-20 below);


(d) **Electronic work papers:** The Division customized its electronic documentation and management software (AutoAudit) to align it with improvements in audit methodology and management processes;

(e) **Advisory services:** The Division partners with its clients to achieve better results and enhance the value of its contribution to the goals of the United Nations. In 2011, the Division continued to provide advisory services to UNSOA to help strengthen the controls for various activities supporting the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). In addition, in response to a request from the Department of Field Support, OIOS assisted in facilitating a risk and control self-assessment of the implementation of the global field support strategy.

B. Investigations Division

6. The Investigations Division, with its headquarters in New York, also operates through two regional centres (in Nairobi and Vienna) and resident investigation offices in seven peacekeeping missions: MONUSCO/MONUC, UNMIL, MINUSTAH, UNAMID, UNOCI, UNMISS and UNIFIL (see figure II). Investigations at other missions are conducted by investigators based at Headquarters or in the regional centres.

Figure II
OIOS Investigations Division offices



Strengthening operational effectiveness


7. In response to increasingly sophisticated demands for collecting evidence through the use of ICT, the Digital Forensics Unit, based in New York, with staff in Nairobi and Vienna, was fully integrated into the operations of the Division. The Unit provides technical services for forensic recovery and analysis of digital information, and conducts training for all staff of the Division as part of a comprehensive capacity-building exercise. Utilizing existing resources, a Research and Analysis Unit was established at Headquarters. The Unit uses a variety of analytical tools and techniques; provides in-depth examination of information to identify evidentiary and investigative lines of inquiry; and undertakes trend and statistical analysis in support of OIOS risk assessment initiatives. In addition, the decentralization of the Professional Practices Section functions to Vienna and Nairobi is enabling knowledge sharing, enhanced support and responsiveness to investigators in the regional offices and missions and improved quality assurance for investigation processes and reports.

8. Fraud and corruption, including vendor conduct, continued to be a focus of the work of the Division, as it continues to liaise closely with the Procurement Division and the Ethics Office to develop an appropriate framework to address improper conduct by vendors. The Division also participated in the annual meeting of the High-level Committee on Management of the United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination (CEB) and the Procurement Network of the Department of Management, where it emphasized the need for fraud risk awareness and a focus on red flags in procurement fraud. The Division also participated in the Conference of International Investigators, hosted by the World Bank, and introduced its training module on investigating procurement matters.

Case management

9. The intake of new investigations compared to output was favourable, with 114 matters related to peacekeeping predicated for investigation and 119 investigations completed in 2011. Throughout 2010 and 2011, the Investigations Division substantially reduced the case backlog that had accrued over several years.¹ The number of peacekeeping cases pending for 12 months or more was 58 as at 31 December 2011 compared to 71 as at 31 December 2010. Figure III presents a breakdown of pending cases as at 31 December 2010 and 2011.

Figure III
Length of pending peacekeeping investigations as of 31 December 2010 and 2011



C. Inspection and Evaluation Division

Internal initiatives

10. The Inspection and Evaluation Division held its annual retreat and identified three strategic priorities in alignment with the overall OIOS priorities: (a) refining the Division's vision and mission statements; (b) identifying ways to increase rigour throughout the evaluation process; and (c) developing a comprehensive strategy for work planning, including a review of the Division's risk assessment approach and its structure. The Division intends to follow through on these three priorities in 2012.

¹ Backlog is defined as an investigation pending for more than 12 months. The backlog decreased by 10 per cent in 2010, and by 17 per cent in 2011.

11. In the context of the development of the overall OIOS communications strategy, the first quarterly newsletter was developed in the first quarter of 2012. The newsletter is aimed at raising awareness of the Division's results and at providing information on the use of evaluations to improve programme management.

12. In addition, a comprehensive review of the Division's manual, aimed at ensuring user-friendly and practical guidance on the conduct of evaluation, was initiated and will be completed in the first quarter of 2012.

D. Staffing

13. Efforts to address vacancy rates throughout OIOS are continuing. The OIOS vacancy rate for peacekeeping investigations, as at 31 December 2011, was 25 per cent.²

Table 1
OIOS vacancy rates: 2009-2011

	<i>As of 31/12/2009</i>		<i>As of 31/12/2010</i>		<i>As of 31/12/2011</i>	
	<i>Posts</i>	<i>Per cent</i>	<i>Posts</i>	<i>Per cent</i>	<i>Posts</i>	<i>Per cent</i>
Investigations Division	25	46	18	33	16	28
Internal Audit Division	16	18	19	20	21	24
Inspection and Evaluation Division	0	0	1	50	1	33
Executive Office	1	25	1	25	0	0
Total	42	28	39	25	38	25

E. Impediments to the work of the Office of Internal Oversight Services

14. During 2011, there was no inappropriate scope limitation that impeded the Office's work or independence.


III. Oversight results

A. Classification of oversight results

15. Audit results are classified into seven risk categories: strategy; governance; compliance; finance; operations; human resources; and information.

² OIOS would like to highlight that the OIOS vacancy rate for peacekeeping investigations, as at 31 January 2012, which stood at 22 per cent with 34 posts vacant, has shown improvement.

Figure IV
Peacekeeping-related audit recommendations (2010 and 2011), by risk category^a




^a See A/66/286 (Part I), para. 23: In 2011, OIOS reclassified all open recommendations into three categories: critical recommendations, important recommendations, and opportunities for improvement. The first two categories are subject to regular monitoring, follow-up and reporting; the third category will be followed up, as appropriate.

16. The results of investigations are classified into six main investigation categories: procurement; management; inventory/assets; personnel; financial; and sexual exploitation and abuse. While matters for direct investigation by OIOS most commonly belong in the categories of procurement, financial and sexual exploitation and abuse, peacekeeping-related matters may arise in all categories. Minor management, assets/inventory and personnel matters are referred to a more appropriate office for action unless serious financial or operational impacts are indicated. Matters involving procurement irregularities continue to be a priority, given the potential financial risks and impact on the integrity of organizational systems. OIOS treats cases of sexual exploitation and abuse involving rape or minors on a priority basis.

17. Sexual exploitation and abuse remain a significant area of concern, with the greatest number of such offences being committed by uniformed personnel. Over 34 per cent of completed investigations are related to sexual exploitation and abuse, and over 60 per cent of such cases were from MONUSCO (with a total of 19 out of 20 contingent reports and all investigation reports related to sexual exploitation and abuse. In the case of UNMIL, four out of six contingent reports are related to sexual exploitation and abuse (see also paras. 47, 52, 83, 92 and 96 below).

Figure V
Peacekeeping-related investigations completed during 2010 and 2011, by category



B. Oversight results by Department/Mission

Cross-cutting issues

Safety and security

18. During the period under review, OIOS conducted audits of aviation safety at 11 field missions: UNAMA (AP2011/630/06); UNIFIL (AP2011/672/09); UNMIT (AP2011/682/05); UNFICYP (AP2011/654/03); UNSOA (AP2011/638/07); UNMIL (AP2011/626/03); UNAMI (AP2011/812/06); UNAMID (AP2011/634/19); the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) (AP2011/632/15); MINUSTAH (AP2011/683/09); and UNOCI (AP2011/640/07). Key results are set out below.

Operational risk

19. In 6 of 11 missions (see table 2), the Aviation Safety Councils were not fully effective in performing their functions, as meetings were not held on a quarterly basis; meeting discussions were not developed into action points; permanent members did not always attend meetings; and target dates for implementation of aviation safety recommendations were not always established. As a result, recommendations made by the Aviation Safety Assistance Teams of the Department of Field Support were outstanding for periods ranging from 6 months to 2 years. These related to critical safety controls such as: (a) adequacy of staffing of Aviation Sections and Aviation Safety Units; (b) testing of aviation emergency response plans; (c) development and implementation of standard operating procedures; and (d) adequacy of X-ray machines and maintenance of airfields at air terminals. Furthermore, 4 of 11 missions did not have an up-to-date emergency response plan and nine missions had not conducted all the required exercises and drills to test the validity of their plans and to ensure preparedness in the event of an aviation emergency. This was mainly due to inadequate staffing, security concerns and restrictions imposed by host countries. The weaknesses identified are being addressed by the missions.

Table 2
Deficiencies noted in the functioning of Aviation Safety Councils

<i>Mission</i>	<i>Meetings were not held on a quarterly basis</i>	<i>Meeting discussions were not developed into action points</i>	<i>Permanent members did not always attend meetings</i>	<i>Implementation target dates were not always established</i>
UNAMA	X			
UNIFIL				X
UNMIT	X		X	X
UNMIL				X
UNAMI	X	X		
UNAMID			X	

X indicates actions pending in the respective missions.

20. Only 1 of the 10 missions (excluding UNSOA which had no aviation assets) had fully developed and integrated the aviation operational risk management framework into its aviation operations. The implementation of the aviation operational risk management policy, which is an integral part of the aviation risk management framework, entails a decision-making process to address associated risks. The following were noted in at least 1 of the 9 audited missions (see table 3) that had not fully implemented the policy: (a) lack of finalized standard operating procedures; (b) operational risk management methodology not applied to all aviation operations; or (c) an implementation task group on the policy had not formally been established or had not been active; (d) lack of comprehensive training on operational risk management and aviation safety management. Delays in implementing operational risk management were mainly attributed to the lack of: capacity within the missions to implement the policy; commitment of missions management; and awareness among staff about aviation safety matters. The weaknesses are being addressed by the missions in collaboration with the Department of Field Support.

Table 3
Missions with pending operational risk management actions as at 30 June 2011

<i>Mission</i>	<i>Lack of finalized standard operating procedures</i>	<i>Operational risk management methodology not applied to all aviation operations</i>	<i>Implementation task group not formally established or not active</i>	<i>Comprehensive training on operational risk management and aviation safety management</i>
UNAMA		X		X
UNIFIL	X		X	X
UNMIT				X
UNFICYP		X		
UNMIL	X	X		

<i>Mission</i>	<i>Lack of finalized standard operating procedures</i>	<i>Operational risk management methodology not applied to all aviation operations</i>	<i>Implementation task group not formally established or not active</i>	<i>Comprehensive training on operational risk management and aviation safety management</i>
UNAMI		X		
UNAMID		X		
MINUSTAH			X	
UNOCI		X		

X indicates actions pending in the respective missions.

Cooperation and coordination

21. The Inspection and Evaluation Division conducted an evaluation of cooperation and coordination between the Department of Peacekeeping Operations/Department of Field Support and regional organizations. While the two Departments and regional partners showed an unequivocal level of commitment to working together to maintain peace and security, there is a need for clear points of entry and streamlined communications. Cooperation is seen as a mechanism that can allow peacekeeping initiatives to broaden and/or deepen the scope of what the Departments can accomplish without partners. For cooperation with regional organizations to be coherent, the respective responsibilities and roles of the Departments and regional organizations must be defined. Such delineation would increase predictability and minimize friction in exchanges between the entities.

22. The structures of the Departments do not easily lend themselves to cooperation with regional organizations. Since departmental resources for cooperation were spread out among several divisions and offices within the two Departments, regional organizations found it difficult to communicate with appropriate staff or to find help to mitigate challenges encountered. OIOS recommended that the Departments establish and streamline clear points of entry for inter-organizational communications and coordination and keep shared information current and easily accessible to authorized partners.

Department of Management

23. In 2011, OIOS issued six audit recommendations to the Department of Management in one audit report:

- *Selected United Nations human resources management reform initiatives in field missions (AP2010/615/04)*

Human resources risk

24. *Selected United Nations human resources management reform initiatives in field missions (AP2010/615/04)*. United Nations human resources reform met its short-term objectives of streamlining contractual arrangements and harmonizing conditions of service of staff in field missions. Change management controls were effective in disseminating guidance and information materials on key elements of the reform to staff. However, there were no benchmarks or performance indicators

to measure and monitor the effectiveness of the reform in meeting the longer-term objectives of enhanced productivity, improved work environment and effective mandate delivery. In addition, there was no mechanism for monitoring human resources management reform costs, including the financial impact of the contractual reform on the Organization's end-of-service and post-retirement liabilities. The Department of Management, in coordination with the Department of Field Support, initiated corrective action to address OIOS recommendations with respect to reform initiatives.

Department of Political Affairs: internal audit activities

25. In 2011, OIOS issued one audit recommendation to the Department of Political Affairs in two audit reports:

- *United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB) (AP2010/600/04)*
- *Audit of DPA's substantive and administrative support to special envoys (AP2011/560/01)*

Department of Peacekeeping Operations


Investigation activities

26. In 2011, OIOS issued two closure reports to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations related to unsubstantiated misconduct in that Department (0046/11 and 0544/09).

Department of Field Support: internal audit activities

Figure VI

Audit recommendations issued to the Department of Field Support in 2010 and 2011, by risk category



27. In 2011, OIOS issued 23 audit recommendations to the Department of Field Support in six audit reports:

- *United Nations Logistics Base at Brindisi, Italy (UNLB) (AP2011/615/01)*
- *Planning and budget formulation procedures and processes of the support account in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support (AP2010/615/05)*
- *Aviation safety oversight of field missions by the Department of Field Support (AP2011/615/07)*
- *Staffing table and post management (AP2011/615/02)*
- *Strategic planning and budgeting for ICT requirements in the Information and Communications Technology Division of the Department of Field Support (AT2010/615/01)*
- *Audit of ICT governance and security management in peacekeeping missions (AT2011/615/01)*

OIOS also provided one advisory service:

- *Assistance to the Department of Field Support with a self-assessment of the implementation of the global field support strategy (AP2010/615/01)*

Operational risk

28. *Aviation safety oversight of field missions by the Department of Field Support (AP2011/615/07)*. The regional aviation safety offices established by the Department of Field Support were carrying out incompatible functions of implementing aviation safety programmes for missions and also providing oversight of the same programmes on behalf of the Department. There was thus an unmitigated risk of inadequate and ineffective oversight of aviation safety programmes in missions covered by regional offices. In addition, the Department did not have a system for identifying and following up on recommendations intended to mitigate unacceptable risks. The Department accepted the OIOS recommendation that it streamline the functions of the regional aviation offices and implement a system for identifying and following up on recommendations.

29. *Staffing table and post management (AP2011/615/02)*. The audit, conducted at the request of the Department of Field Support, noted that the parties responsible for the management of staffing tables and posts of the various types of field missions were not formally defined. In addition, roles and responsibilities for staffing table and post management were not sufficiently detailed in the related policies and procedures. Furthermore, the Nucleus database and the Integrated Management Information System (IMIS) used for the staffing table and post management were not interfaced, increasing the risk of inappropriate processing of human resources actions. The Department agreed to revise the staffing table and post management policy to reflect detailed procedures, but noted that its development may be lengthy as it requires coordination and feedback from stakeholders at Headquarters and the field missions.

30. *ICT governance and security management in peacekeeping missions (AT2011/615/01)*. ICT governance structures in the peacekeeping missions were not operating as expected and appropriate mechanisms for ensuring oversight and

coordination of ICT strategic planning in the field were not fully developed. Missions lacked adequate ICT risk and security management processes. The Department of Field Support stated that ICT governance and security management in the operational environments of peacekeeping missions is an ongoing process that requires a phased approach in its implementation. The Department has, over the years, been performing the ICT-related aspects of risk management and control with limited resources. Furthermore, risk assessment, risk management, monitoring and reporting requirements span business units and the findings identified in the audit should be measured against United Nations standards. The Department was in the process of implementing the OIOS recommendations.

31. *Strategic planning and budgeting for ICT requirements in the Information and Communications Technology Division of the Department of Field Support (AT2010/615/01).* Effective definition, planning and monitoring of ICT resource requirements in terms of costs, benefits and risks should include the identification of cost-effective, integrated and standard application systems, resources and information technology capabilities to meet current and future peace operations requirements. The following related risks needed to be addressed as a matter of priority: (a) inadequate coordination mechanisms between the Information and Communications Technology Division and the Office of Information and Communications Technology to ensure the alignment of their respective ICT strategic plans in implementing the knowledge management programme; (b) unclear roles and responsibilities for supporting the implementation of the information management strategy of the Department of Field Support and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations; (c) duplication with the scope of the enterprise resource planning (Umoja) project; and (d) absence of a comprehensive information architecture model defining the flow of information and the basic structure, content and relationships of the applications and systems employed to process the data needed in support of the two Departments. The Department of Field Support stated that it had been working closely with the Office of Information and Communications Technology on a Secretariat-wide information architecture model. The information architecture will be formulated as an integrated component of the enterprise architecture of the Secretariat, covering business, information, solutions and technology alignment. The Department also reported that it has been engaged with the Office of Information and Communications Technology and has expressed its commitment to work together when the Secretariat's enterprise architecture activity commences. The Department was in the process of implementing the OIOS recommendations.

Investigations activities

32. In 2011, OIOS issued one investigation report to the Department of Field Support:

- *Investigation report on misuse of office and misuse of ICT resources by a staff member at the United Nations Logistics Base in Entebbe, Uganda (0188/08)*

United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB): investigation activities

33. In 2011, OIOS issued one closure report, related to unsubstantiated misconduct by a staff member at the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB) (0103/10), and had no new or pending cases.

United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in the Central African Republic (BONUCA): investigation activities

34. In 2011, OIOS issued two investigation reports to BONUCA:


- *Investigation reports on fraud, misappropriation of funds and other irregularities by staff members (0246/10 and 0247/10)*

OIOS also issued one closure report, related to unsubstantiated misconduct by a staff member at BONUCA (0158/09), had three pending cases and predicated three new cases for investigation.

United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT): internal audit activities

Figure VII

Audit recommendations issued to MINURCAT in 2010 and 2011, by risk category



35. In 2011, OIOS issued four audit recommendations to MINURCAT in three audit reports:

- *Disposal of assets during MINURCAT's liquidation (AP2010/636/09)*
- *Financial aspects of MINURCAT's liquidation (AP2010/636/10)*
- *Trust fund for the support of the activities of MINURCAT (AP2010/636/11)*

Key results included:

Strategy risk

36. *Disposal of assets during MINURCAT's liquidation (AP2010/636/09).* MINURCAT faced significant challenges, in part due to inadequate planning of the

liquidation. As at 28 February 2011, the backlog for United Nations-owned equipment stood at 990 twenty-foot equivalent units, 420 light vehicles and 53 heavy vehicle/transport assets with over 90 per cent of such assets in Abeche, which were due to be handed over to the Government of Chad by 31 March 2011. Moreover, equipment in some camps was not properly accounted for or physically verified prior to request for write-off, as it was deemed not cost effective when taking into account the residual value of the equipment. Given the limited time frame to move a significant amount of such equipment, MINURCAT had to enter into local transportation arrangements to expedite movement.

Compliance risk

37. *Trust fund for the support of the activities of MINURCAT (AP2010/636/11)* (see also para. 39). The audit noted that MINURCAT did not comply with the provisions of a donor's agreement to utilize contributed funds solely to support course/skills harmonization training for the Détachement Intégré de Sécurité and that only \$30,000 of a \$2,528,000 contribution was spent on skills training, while the remainder was used for other expenditures, including payment of monthly stipends to personnel of the Détachement. Upon identification of the error by management, a request was submitted to the donor to consider granting authorization for the contributed funds to be utilized for expenditures other than skills training. The Department of Field Support reported that all issues concerning the trust fund were resolved with the donor.

Financial risk

38. *Financial aspects of MINURCAT's liquidation (AP2010/636/10)*. The Finance Section had not developed an implementation plan detailing key liquidation activities and procedures to be performed. As a result, more than one month into the liquidation period, important tasks such as closing of local bank accounts and reviewing receivables and payables were not completed. For example, only \$67,600 of \$3.9 million in recorded receivables had been reviewed and followed up, and no review had been done of payables totalling \$4.2 million. As part of the liquidation activities, and following guidance from the Department of Field Support, MINURCAT had taken action to clear some long outstanding receivables, including submitting write-off requests to the Controller. The Mission confirmed that it was unlikely to complete this work prior to the end of the liquidation phase, citing resource constraints. As a result, the Mission developed a list of activities to be handed over to the Liquidation Team of the Department of Field Support. MINURCAT, however, took immediate action to develop an implementation plan for the Finance Section. Upon further enquiry, OIOS was informed that follow-up action is being carried out by the Department of Field Support.

39. *Trust fund for the support of the activities of MINURCAT (AP2010/636/11)* (see also para. 37). MINURCAT used \$4.13 million from its assessed peacekeeping budget to pay for activities that should have been funded from the trust fund. The Mission explained that the funds were used to meet shortfalls due to delays in issuance of allotments by the Department of Management. However, the approval of the Controller was not sought. Although an amount of \$1.96 million was later charged back to the trust fund and returned to the peacekeeping account, the remaining amount of \$2.17 million was yet to be adjusted, resulting in an understatement of the expenditures of the trust fund as of 31 December 2009. The

Field Budget and Finance Division and the Peacekeeping Financing Division were taking action to verify all transactions prior to making any prior period adjustments to reconcile the accounts. The Department of Field Support reported that the trust fund has been reconciled and corrective action taken. In October 2011, the Department requested closure of the trust fund and the return of funds to donors, as appropriate.


Investigation activities

40. In 2011, OIOS issued one closure report, related to unsubstantiated misconduct by a staff member at MINURCAT (0292/09) and had one pending case for investigation but no new cases.

United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH): internal audit activities

Figure VIII

Audit recommendations issued to MINUSTAH in 2010 and 2011, by risk category



41. In 2011, OIOS issued 23 audit recommendations to MINUSTAH in five audit reports:

- *Management of engineering projects (AP2011/683/03)*
- *Public information function (AP2010/683/07)*
- *Property management (AP2010/683/08)*
- *Contracts management (AP2011/683/01)*
- *Aviation safety (AP2011/683/09)* (see paras. 18-20)

Key results included:

Operational risk

42. *Management of engineering projects (AP2011/683/03)*. There was inappropriate segregation of duties and inadequate training on the use of the Galileo inventory management system. Furthermore, due to unreliable project cost data, project managers were unable to accurately assess and monitor costs or take timely action to avoid cost overruns. As there was no mechanism for assigning materials to projects or activities, materials valued at \$3.7 million were issued to 140 projects described as “minor work”, equivalent to 53 per cent of all materials allocated to new projects from 1 January 2010 to 31 March 2011. MINUSTAH acknowledged the need for strengthened internal controls to ensure the reliability of project data in Galileo.

43. In addition, MINUSTAH needed to develop specific guidelines and procedures to assist project managers in: (a) planning, executing and closing-out engineering projects; (b) monitoring and reporting on the status of projects; and (c) managing outsourced projects. A database to maintain adequate and reliable project records was also needed. Standard operating procedures for the management of outsourced engineering projects have since been developed and approved and those for monitoring and reporting on the status of internal projects have been drafted. A database of engineering projects has been developed and is being maintained and continuously updated.

44. *Public information function (AP2010/683/07)*. Since monitoring mechanisms were needed to measure the effectiveness and impact of MINUSTAH’s public information services, the Communications and Public Information Office was unable to take corrective action and modify its strategies, when necessary. Activities held at multimedia centres were evaluated by requesting immediate feedback from participants and analysing participants’ demographics. MINUSTAH acknowledged the need to measure the effectiveness of public information activities on an ongoing basis.

Human resources risks

45. *Public information function (AP2010/683/07)*. The Communications and Public Information Office had an overall vacancy rate of 26 per cent, with critical posts remaining vacant as at 31 December 2010. These vacant posts had an adverse impact on the effective delivery of public information services, such as photographic documentation of the Mission’s success stories. In addition, public information assistants were working in some regions without close supervision. Recruitment was ongoing to fill vacant posts.

46. *Contracts management (AP2011/683/01)*. The Contracts Management Unit lacked adequate resources to carry out its functions, with 6 of 11 approved posts vacant, resulting in inadequate monitoring of contracts. MINUSTAH continued to receive goods and services pursuant to expired contracts for armed guard security services; spare parts; and hospital and medical services. Ex post facto approval was sought and recruitment was ongoing to fill vacant posts. MINUSTAH informed that the Contracts Management Unit was fully staffed as at 31 December 2011.

Investigation activities

47. In 2011, OIOS issued one contingent report and 11 investigation reports related to MINUSTAH:


- *Investigation report on an assault by a member of a formed police unit (0121/11)*
- *Investigation reports on dental insurance fraud by staff members (0094/11, 0095/11, 0096/11, 0097/11, 0098/11, 0099/11 and 0100/11)*
- *Investigation report on sexual exploitation and abuse of minors by a United Nations police officer (0038/11)*
- *Contingent report on sexual exploitation and fuel fraud by peacekeepers (0014/11)*
- *Investigation report on illegal outside activity, child neglect and non-honouring of private legal obligations by a staff member (0013/11)*
- *Investigation report on sexual exploitation and abuse by a United Nations police officer (0550/09)*

In 2011, OIOS also issued one closure report related to unsubstantiated misconduct in MINUSTAH (0224/10), had 15 pending cases and predicated 23 new cases for investigation.

United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO): internal audit activities

Figure IX

Audit recommendations issued to MONUSCO in 2010 and 2011, by risk category



48. In 2011, OIOS issued 35 audit recommendations to MONUSCO in nine audit reports:

- *Non-expendable property (AP2010/620/07)*
- *Vendor payment process (AP2010/620/09)*
- *Within-mission travel (AP2010/620/08)*
- *Conduct and discipline (AP2010/620/02)*
- *Electoral support (AP2011/620/03)*
- *Civil affairs programme (AP2011/620/01)*
- *Contingent-owned equipment (AP2011/620/02)*
- *Rations management (AP2011/620/04)*
- *Quick-impact projects (AP2011/620/08)*

Key results included:

Strategy risk

49. *Electoral support (AP2011/620/03)*. The MONUSCO Electoral Assistance Division had developed terms of reference for each of its units and a detailed schedule for all activities, however, key performance indicators to monitor implementation had not been developed. Moreover, a security planning document had been drafted in collaboration with the National Independent Electoral Commission, but had not been shared with the MONUSCO Safety and Security Section and/or approved by senior management. The Division developed a comprehensive workplan with key performance indicators to monitor the implementation of its electoral mandate.

50. *Civil affairs programme (AP2011/620/01)*. There was a good process in place to develop the 2010/11 annual workplan for the Civil Affairs Section, involving staff and representatives of substantive offices, international non-governmental organizations and United Nations agencies, funds and programmes. However, the local population and the Government, both key stakeholders, were not consulted during the planning process. There was also the need for improved participation of MONUSCO staff in the provinces in workplanning and a need to develop outcome indicators to assess the achievement of key mission goals. MONUSCO accepted the OIOS recommendation to enhance the planning process.

Operational risk

51. *Contingent-owned equipment (AP2011/620/02)*. Of the Mission's 26 infantry battalions, 11 (42 per cent) had contingent-owned equipment serviceability percentages below the required 90 per cent for two consecutive years. In addition, 19 of the 41 enabling units (including hospitals, engineering companies and formed police units) had serviceability percentages below the required 90 per cent. This was due to lack of oversight of contingent-owned equipment and memorandums of understanding by the Management Review Board with regard to the enforcement of timely maintenance or replacement of equipment. Safety surveys were not conducted by the Transport Section to ascertain the roadworthiness of such equipment, even though reports on equipment indicated that vehicles had faulty

engines, gear boxes, brakes and clutches. In addition, according to the mission electronic fuel accounting system, 60 of the 73 vehicles classified as unserviceable were being provided with fuel, indicating that they were being driven. MONUSCO acknowledged the need to conduct periodic safety inspections of contingent-owned equipment and to ensure that unserviceable equipment is repaired or replaced in a timely manner.

Investigation activities

52. In 2011, OIOS issued 20 contingent reports and 4 investigation reports related to possible misconduct in MONUSCO/MONUC:


- *Contingent reports on sexual exploitation and/or abuse, including cases involving minors, by peacekeepers (0329/07, 0358/07, 0186/08, 0228/08, 0439/08, 0043/09, 0195/09, 0223/09, 0345/09, 0372/09, 0110/10, 0112/10, 0113/10, 0114/10, 0115/10, 0158/10, 0337/10, 0270/10)*
- *Contingent report on sexual exploitation by a military observer (0269/10)*
- *Contingent report on fraud implicating peacekeepers (0459/10)*
- *Investigation report on sexual exploitation and abuse by an officer of a formed police unit (0404/09)*
- *Investigation report on sexual exploitation by a military observer (0032/09)*
- *Investigation report on reported sexual exploitation and abuse implicating a peacekeeper (0597/08)*
- *Investigation report on sexual exploitation and abuse implicating a military observer (0135/08)*

In 2011, OIOS also issued 10 closure reports related to unsubstantiated misconduct by staff members in MONUSCO/MONUC (0055/09, 0088/09, 0185/08, 0290/07, 0325/09, 0332/10, 0345/08, 0414/07, 0503/10 and 0519/10), had 54 pending cases and predicated 28 new cases for investigation.

United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA): internal audit activities

Figure X

Audit recommendations issued to UNAMA in 2010 and 2011, by risk category



53. In 2011, OIOS issued 13 audit recommendations to UNAMA in three audit reports:

- *Common facilities (AP2010/630/07)*
- *Aviation safety (AP2011/630/06)* (see paras. 18-20)
- *Public information programme (AP2011/630/04)*

Key results included:

54. *Aviation safety (AP2011/630/06)*. Critical issues identified have been reflected under cross-cutting issues on aviation safety (see paras. 18-20).


Investigation activities

55. In 2011, OIOS issued one closure report related to possible misconduct at UNAMA (0506/10), had one pending case and predicated one new case for investigation.

United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI): internal audit activities

Figure XI

Audit recommendations issued to UNAMI in 2010 and 2011, by risk category



56. In 2011, OIOS issued 16 audit recommendations to UNAMI in four audit reports:

- *Procurement of major contracts (AP2010/812/03)*
- *Business continuity management (AP2010/812/04)*
- *Ground transport services (AP2011/812/01)*
- *Aviation safety (AP2011/812/06)* (see paras. 18-20)

Key results included:

Governance risk

57. *Business continuity management (AP2010/812/04)*. UNAMI had not developed an integrated business continuity and disaster recovery plan identifying critical activities and business processes for the Mission and the steps to be taken for continuing operation after a disruptive event. The Information Communications and Technology Section had such a plan but it had not been tested regularly. There were other safety and security plans such as the country security plan and the aviation emergency response plan, however, several functions, including logistics, engineering and transport, either had no plan or the plans developed did not consider all locations. This was mainly due to the fact that the Department of Peacekeeping Operations/Department of Field Support had failed to issue a clear policy directive and operating procedures on the development of such plans at field missions. UNAMI acknowledged the need to develop a mission-specific policy and standard

operating procedures and completed a draft comprehensive business continuity and disaster recovery plan, to be tested and implemented in 2012.


Investigation activities

58. In 2011, OIOS issued one closure report related to unsubstantiated misconduct in UNAMI (0389/08), had two pending cases and predicated two new cases for investigation.

African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID): internal audit activities

Figure XII

Audit recommendations issued to UNAMID in 2010 and 2011, by risk category



59. In 2011, OIOS issued 42 audit recommendations to UNAMID in five audit reports:

- *HIV/AIDS Unit operations (AP2010/634/10)*
- *Water and environmental protection operations (AP2010/634/11)*
- *Aviation safety (AP2010/634/19)* (see paras. 18-20)
- *Administration of Mission-provided staff accommodation (AP2011/634/18)*
- *Recruitment of national staff (AP2011/634/01)*

Key results included:

Strategy risk

60. *HIV/AIDS Unit operations (AP2010/634/10)*. HIV/AIDS concerns had not been integrated as required into the programmes of substantive sections, because the

UNAMID HIV/AIDS Unit had not provided adequate technical input and planning support. This impeded effective mainstreaming of HIV/AIDS concerns. The Mission acknowledged the need to ensure effective integration and the HIV/AIDS Unit agreed to follow up. As a result, the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Unit has incorporated HIV/AIDS activities into its workplan, while the other substantive sections are in the process of doing so.

Operational risk

61. *HIV/AIDS Unit operations (AP2010/634/10)*. The provision of voluntary confidential counselling testing services was inadequate: the rooms for testing were too close in proximity to other offices; HIV/AIDS test kits were not available in Sector South; and medical supplies in Zaleingi were stored in temperatures exceeding norms. There were no Unit staff located in remote sites such as Um Barru and Tine, and some remote sites had never been visited. The situation has since improved with space allocated in the large-scale Camp in El Geneina. In addition, mobile testing services have been established for all remote sites, including Um Barru and Tine. Nevertheless, staffing challenges remain a major constraint. One new staff member arrived in January 2012, but six others have been awaiting visas since 2011.

62. *Water and environmental protection operations (AP2010/634/11)*. The UNAMID Water and Environmental Protection Section was unable to fully implement the steps to achieve water self-sufficiency at all locations in the Mission area primarily due to delays in drilling boreholes. As at January 2011, only 26 of 95 (27 per cent) planned boreholes had been drilled, due to delays in the procurement of drilling rigs, delays in acquiring suitable land and security concerns which prevented outsourcing and/or access to drilling sites. Moreover, newly drilled boreholes were not always commissioned in a timely manner. UNAMID was addressing the delays, which have resulted in additional annual costs for purchased water amounting to some \$1.2 million, as well as delayed deployment of military, police and civilian staff.

63. Furthermore, inadequate wastewater treatment capacity in some locations resulted in improper disposal of wastewater. For example, wastewater in Nyala was disposed of along the roadside where it flowed downstream, increasing potential health risks to the local population, and at one location in El Fasher, wastewater from inadequate septic systems often overflowed, causing foul odours and unsanitary conditions. Inadequate monitoring of wastewater disposal methods, a lack of environmental awareness among staff and contractors and delays in the deployment of treatment plants due to unavailability of construction materials were the primary factors affecting conditions. UNAMID was taking measures to improve the disposal of wastewater.

64. *Administration of Mission-provided staff accommodation (AP2011/634/18)*. Primarily due to lack of policies and procedures, and the inconsistent allocation of accommodation to Mission personnel, staff members were disgruntled about the fairness of the process. In some cases, accommodation units were handed over to staff in an unfinished condition, or inadequately furnished, and, owing to poor construction, some units were infested by rodents. UNAMID needed to develop, communicate and consistently administer appropriate accommodation standards. The Mission has since developed an accommodation guide for this purpose,

providing details on standards of accommodation. In addition, the Mission is considering undertaking a safe fumigation exercise.

Safety and security risk

65. *Administration of Mission-provided staff accommodation (AP2011/634/18).* Living conditions were generally poor for Mission personnel. Common areas were not landscaped, drainage systems were ineffective, there was inadequate garbage disposal, insufficient water taps, emergency water reserves and fire extinguishers and a lack of proper perimeter fencing and lighting to prevent unauthorized access of personnel and stray dogs. UNAMID has begun addressing accommodation deficiencies, and staff accommodations in the large-scale Camp at El Geneina are compliant with minimum operating security standards. Safety and security enhancements in other locations are also being addressed, and living conditions are being improved through the provision of laundry services and gym and recreational facilities. The landscaping project in the residences for staff receiving mission subsistence allowance at El Fasher will resume once the recycled water plant is connected.

Human resources risk

66. *Recruitment of national staff (AP2011/634/01).* The lack of guidance provided to staff responsible for the national recruitment process resulted in non-compliance with recruitment policies and procedures, including:

- (a) Inadequate development and dissemination of vacancy announcements;
- (b) Inadequate assurance that all applicants were considered against agreed criteria (in 32 of 192 recruitment cases);
- (c) Candidates not meeting minimum requirements were interviewed and selected;
- (d) There was insufficient evidence that all qualified applicants were interviewed;
- (e) Reference checks were not being carried out.

UNAMID has since developed procedures for the recruitment of national staff to clarify roles and responsibilities of staff involved in the process, as well as the procedures to be followed, including monitoring compliance with United Nations regulations and rules.

Investigation activities

67. In 2011, OIOS issued three contingent reports and two investigation reports related to UNAMID:

- *Contingent report on the fatal shooting of two peacekeepers (0230/11)*
- *Contingent report on the fatal shooting of a Sudanese national by a peacekeeper (0154/11)*
- *Investigation report on attempted entitlement fraud by a staff member (0421/10)*

- *Contingent report on the fatal shooting of a peacekeeper (0565/09)*
- *Investigation report of fraud by a staff member (0491/09)*


In 2011, OIOS also issued three closure reports related to unsubstantiated misconduct in UNAMID (0182/11, 0507/10 and 0562/09), had five pending cases and predicated three new cases for investigation.

68. All contingent reports for UNAMID related to violent activity, with no sexual exploitation and abuse reported. There were no investigation reports related to sexual exploitation and abuse. The reports issued covered property theft and fraud. The absence of reported sexual exploitation and abuse suggests an operational context that may discourage or otherwise prevent its occurrence.

United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF): internal audit activities

Figure XIII

Audit recommendations issued to UNDOF in 2010 and 2011, by risk category




69. In 2011, OIOS issued nine audit recommendations (none were classified as critical) to UNDOF in two audit reports:

- *Management of human resources (AP2011/670/01)*
- *Management of fuel and food rations (AP2011/670/02)*

United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP): internal audit activities

Figure XIV

Audit recommendations issued to UNFICYP in 2010 and 2011, by risk category



70. In 2011, OIOS issued four audit recommendations to UNFICYP in two audit reports:

- *Aviation safety (AP2011/654/03)* (see paras. 18-20)
- *Security (AP2011/654/02)*


Investigation activities

71. In 2011, OIOS issued one closure report related to unsubstantiated misconduct at UNFICYP (0246/09), had one pending case and predicated one new case for investigation.

United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL): internal audit activities

Figure XV

Audit recommendations issued to UNIFIL in 2010 and 2011, by risk category



72. In 2011, OIOS issued 31 audit recommendations to UNIFIL in five audit reports:

- *Public information (AP2010/672/04)*
- *Conduct and Discipline Team and its regional responsibilities (AP2010/672/05)*
- *Management of contingent-owned equipment (AP2011/672/01)*
- *Aviation safety (AP2011/672/08)* (see paras. 18-20)
- *ICT governance and security management (AT2010/672/01)*

Key results included:

Governance risk

73. *Conduct and Discipline Team and its regional responsibilities (AP2010/672/05).* Since its inception in 2007, the Conduct and Discipline Team in UNIFIL had been functioning as a de facto regional office covering UNLB and five missions in the region namely UNIFIL, UNDOF, UNFICYP, UNTSO and UNSCO. However, the Conduct and Discipline Team did not have region-specific terms of reference and, prior to January 2011, there was no written communication from Headquarters to promulgate the Team's regional responsibilities. As a result, the Team used the generic terms of reference developed by the Department of Field Support as its main guidance, but faced frequent challenges to convince the missions of its responsibilities. Also, without region-specific terms of reference, the Chief of the Conduct and Discipline Team did not have the authority to access reports of alleged misconduct and of investigations, and to request information on conduct and discipline curricula and training activities in the other missions.

Investigation activities


74. In 2011, OIOS issued two contingent reports related to possible misconduct in UNIFIL, had one pending case and predicated one new case for investigation:

- *Contingent report on the suspicious death of a peacekeeper (0176/11)*
- *Contingent report on the accidental discharge of a rocket by a peacekeeper (0385/10)*

United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK): internal audit activities

Figure XVI

Audit recommendations issued to UNMIK in 2010 and 2011, by risk category



75. In 2011, OIOS issued 10 audit recommendations to UNMIK in three audit reports:

- *Reconfiguration structures for mandate implementation and accountability (AP2010/650/02)*
- *Management of UNMIK administration of Mitrovica and role of municipal representatives in northern Kosovo (AP2010/650/03)*
- *Management of confidential documents (AP2011/650/02)*

Key results included:

Strategy risk

76. *Reconfiguration structures for mandate implementation and accountability (AP2010/650/02)*. UNMIK had not conducted a comprehensive risk assessment to identify risks to fulfilling its new roles as laid out in the reports of the Secretary-

General that provided strategic direction within the framework of Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) (S/2008/354 and S/2008/692). The risk assessment could have guided the formulation of strategic decisions, a mandate implementation plan and operational plans to strengthen controls over their implementation. UNMIK has subsequently finalized a mandate implementation plan.

Operational risk

77. *Management of UNMIK administration of Mitrovica and role of municipal representatives in northern Kosovo (AP2010/650/03)*. The Cadastre Department of the UNMIK administration of Mitrovica lacked adequate storage facilities for records, which were kept in box files in the office. A loss of such records would cause problems in verifying ownership and authenticity of changes made to land parcels, particularly for communities that did not have access to the cadastre database. Provision of archive and storage facilities would mitigate the risks of theft, loss or damage of records. UNMIK acknowledged the need for a records-archiving system and a secure storage facility.


Investigation activities

78. In 2011, OIOS issued one closure report related to unsubstantiated misconduct in UNMIK (0374/09), had one pending case and predicated one new case for investigation.

United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL): internal audit activities

Figure XVII

Audit recommendations issued to UNMIL in 2010 and 2011, by risk category



79. In 2011, OIOS issued 25 audit recommendations to UNMIL in six audit reports:

- *Safety and security (AP2010/626/02)*
- *Warehouse operations (AP2010/626/04)*
- *Electoral support (AP2011/626/02)*
- *Aviation safety and air operations (AP2011/626/03)* (see paras. 18-20)
- *Fuel management (AP2011/626/04)*
- *Procurement management (AG2011/626/01)*

Key results included:

Strategy risk

80. *Electoral support (AP2011/626/02)*. The Mission established an election team in January 2011 and proposed a budget for the establishment of electoral support capacity to complement the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) election team co-located with the National Election Commission. As of April 2011, there was no clear UNMIL strategy or plan of action for electoral assistance. There was also a lack of appropriate electoral support structure and capacity in UNMIL, which could diminish its ability to identify the electoral support needs of the Government of Liberia and take appropriate remedial actions in a timely manner. UNMIL indicated that since October 2010 support to the elections had been coordinated through the meetings of the joint UNMIL/UNDP Electoral Task Force and that a detailed plan had to be premised on gaps in national capacities, as Security Council resolution 1938 (2010) indicated that support was “upon request”.

Operational risk

81. *Fuel management (AP2011/626/04)*. Fuel data recorded in the mission electronic fuel accounting system and the CarLog system to monitor and account for fuel were unreliable. Data in the fuel accounting and CarLog systems were not consistently updated and reconciled to show actual fuel usage, resulting in unexplained differences between the volumes of fuel reported as issued and received by Fuel, Aviation and Receiving and Inspection Units and contingents. Fuel attendants were performing incompatible functions by both dispensing fuel for vehicles and recording related transactions in the relevant system. Furthermore, strategic fuel reserves maintained by the fuel supply contractor were below the contracted level. UNMIL agreed to strengthen internal controls over the issuance, receipt and use of fuel and to ensure contractor compliance with the provisions of the fuel contract.

82. *Procurement management (AG2011/626/01)*. There were several control weaknesses in the procurement of vehicle maintenance services resulting in exorbitant rates by vendors in subcontractual relationships. UNMIL was overcharged by approximately \$442,000 for these services. UNMIL subsequently strengthened internal controls over procurement activities.

Investigation activities

83. In 2011, OIOS issued six contingent reports related to possible misconduct in UNMIL:

- *Contingent report on sexual exploitation and/or abuse by peacekeepers, including of a minor (0160/11, 0102/11, 0370/10, 0470/09)*
- *Contingent report on fuel fraud by peacekeepers (0571/10)*
- *Contingent report on the death of a peacekeeper (0936/06)*

In 2011, OIOS also issued eight closure reports related to unsubstantiated misconduct by staff members in UNMIL (0025/11, 0169/09, 0198/07, 0254/09, 0294/10, 0364/07, 0533/10 and 0606/05), had 19 pending cases and predicated 17 new cases for investigation.

84. As part of OIOS efforts to clear backlog investigations and manage new investigations in a more timely manner, a special West Africa initiative was established at Headquarters with responsibility for all new cases, allowing the office at Nairobi to finalize backlogged investigations. The initiative has been effective in demonstrating the benefits of a flexible approach to assigning investigations based on fluctuations in demand and capacity.


United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL): investigation activities

85. In 2011, OIOS issued one closure report related to unsubstantiated misconduct by a staff member in UNIPSIL (0553/10), had one pending case and predicated one new case for investigation.

United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS): internal audit activities

Figure XVIII

Audit recommendations issued to UNMIS in 2010 and 2011, by risk category



86. In 2011, OIOS issued 34 audit recommendations to UNMIS in 10 audit reports:

- *Security (AP2010/632/06)*
- *Inventory management (AP2010/632/11)*
- *Business continuity and crisis management (AP2010/632/12)*
- *HIV/AIDS awareness and prevention programme (AP2010/632/14)*
- *Fuel management (AP2011/632/01)*
- *Contract management (AP2011/632/02)*
- *Public information programme (AP2010/632/03)*
- *Aviation safety (AP2011/632/15)* (see paras. 18-20)
- *Liquidation planning process (AP2011/632/16)*
- *Archiving and records management (AP2011/632/19)*

Key results included:

Operational risk

87. *Inventory management (AP2010/632/11)*. There was no documented relocation plan for the transfer of inventories from the El Obeid logistics base to Juba. Although the Mission indicated that meetings had been held and a relocation plan of action had been developed, the results of the meetings were not documented. As a result, the transfer of over 293 sea containers of non-expendable and expendable properties to Juba was not properly planned, nor were adequate procedures in place to account for the contents of the shipments. On arrival in Juba, the containers were haphazardly stored in a busy area, inhibiting easy access to them, and 10 containers belonging to the Engineering Section were left open in a flooded and overgrown area, exposing their contents to adverse weather conditions and theft. UNMIS agreed to ensure that there is adequate planning and storage facilities for all future transfers of assets.

88. *Business continuity and crisis management (AP2010/632/12)*. As part of its crisis management activities, UNMIS had developed an evacuation and relocation plan to ensure the preservation of life and property in the event of a crisis. The plan had not been tested, however, nor had staff been briefed to ensure its adequacy and effectiveness nor updated with contact information of key personnel. The Mission agreed to update and test its evacuation and relocation plan.

Evaluation activities

89. The Inspection and Evaluation Division conducted an evaluation of the performance and achievement of results by UNMIS. While the Mission has made progress towards fulfilling its mandate to support the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, serious challenges hampered its success. The weak level of cooperation with the United Nations country team presented one such critical challenge. The Secretary-General requested UNMIS to develop an effective strategic partnership with the country team, including cooperative arrangements that were mutually supportive with different structural forms. However, the Mission

lacked both an integrated strategic planning and an integrated programme implementation structure with the country team. UNMIS was established in 2005, but it did not develop its first integrated implementation plan until 2008. Disagreements about leadership in integrated programme activities had occurred, and structural issues had further complicated coordination and integration between UNMIS and the country team.

90. The above-mentioned issues prevented the formation of a mutually supportive strategic partnership. National elections highlighted the fact that the United Nations had not acted as “One United Nations” in the Sudan. Components of the Integrated United Nations Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Unit had worked in a parallel rather than in an integrated manner, which negatively impacted the Unit’s effectiveness and efficiency. Integration has since increased, as evidenced by the holding of expanded meetings of the country team and the establishment of the United Nations Integrated Referendum and Electoral Division. The integrated action plan adopted by the Mission and the country team was developed in July 2010 and joint preparations for referendums began in late 2010.

91. OIOS recommended that the Department of Peacekeeping Operations ensure a more effective partnership between the peacekeeping mission and the country team in order to enable a “One United Nations” approach in the country. Furthermore, the Department should recognize the lead role of the country team in such cooperation, when appropriate.

Investigation activities

92. In 2011, OIOS issued five contingent reports, five investigation reports and one assessment report related to possible misconduct in UNMIS:

- *Investigation report on possible misappropriation of funds by a United Nations police officer (0239/11)*
- *Contingent report on the attempted sale of military uniforms by a peacekeeper (0184/11)*
- *Contingent report on a breach of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora by peacekeepers (0012/11 and 0011/11)*
- *Contingent report on sexual assault implicating a peacekeeper (0007/11)*
- *Investigation report on the fraudulent procurement of an entry visa and misuse of information and communications resources by a staff member (0567/10)*
- *Contingent report on the physical assault and detention of a United Nations staff member by peacekeepers (0383/10)*
- *Assessment of the Special Investigations Unit report on fraud and misappropriation of funds by a staff member (0373/10)*
- *Investigation report on possible sexual exploitation by a military observer (0298/10)*
- *Investigation report on possible misconduct by a United Nations police officer (0296/10)*
- *Investigation report on possible misconduct by a staff member (0290/10)*


In 2011, OIOS issued 10 closure reports related to unsubstantiated misconduct in UNMIS (0010/09, 0022/09, 0107/07, 0229/11, 0297/10, 0353/09, 0448/10, 0458/07, 0461/06 and 0732/06), had 24 pending cases and predicated 16 new cases for investigation.

93. The range of investigations in UNMIS was varied without particular trends or clusters in possible misconduct.

United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT): internal audit activities

Figure XIX

Audit recommendations issued to UNMIT in 2010 and 2011, by risk category




94. In 2011, OIOS issued 14 audit recommendations to UNMIT in two audit reports:

- *Transitional police support programme (AP2010/682/03)*
- *Aviation safety (AP2011/682/05)* (see paras. 18-20)

United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI): internal audit activities

Figure XX

Audit recommendations issued to UNOCI in 2010 and 2011, by risk category



95. In 2011, OIOS issued 16 audit recommendations to UNOCI in two audit reports:

- *Aviation safety (AP2011/640/07)* (see paras. 18-20)
- *ICT governance and security management in UNOCI (AT2020/640/01)*

Investigation activities

96. In 2011, OIOS issued 11 contingent reports and 1 investigation report related to possible misconduct in UNOCI:

- *Contingent report on possible fraud by peacekeepers (0524/10 and 0323/10)*
- *Contingent report on misconduct by peacekeepers (0505/10)*
- *Contingent report on attempted fraud by peacekeepers (0317/10, 0315/10 and 0313/10)*
- *Contingent report on claims of fraud by peacekeepers (0316/10, 0314/10)*
- *Contingent report on fraud by peacekeepers (0216/10)*
- *Contingent report on sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers (0145/10 and 0588/09)*
- *Investigation report on conflict of interest and irregular recruitment process by a staff member (0596/07)*


In 2011, OIOS also issued one closure report related to unsubstantiated misconduct by a staff member in UNOCI (0509/10), had 10 pending cases and predicated 9 new cases for investigation.

97. Contingent reports 0216/10, 0313-317/10, 0505/10, 0524/10 and 0323/10 relate to possible fraud by peacekeepers from different contingents and represent the occurrence of a cluster of similar false claims for reimbursement, indicating potential control weaknesses.

United Nations Support Office for the African Union Mission in Somalia (UNSOA): internal audit activities

Figure XXI

Audit recommendations issued to UNSOA in 2010 and 2011, by risk category



98. In 2011, OIOS issued nine audit recommendations to UNSOA in five audit reports:

- *UNSOA's logistical support to AMISOM on the provision of food rations (AP2010/638/03)*
- *Recruitment of international and national staff (AP2010/638/05)*
- *UNSOA's training programme in support of AMISOM (AP2011/638/01)*
- *Operations at Mombasa Support Base (AP2011/638/02)*
- *Aviation safety (AP2011/638/07) (see paras. 18-20)*


Investigation activities

99. In 2011, OIOS issued one closure report related to unsubstantiated misconduct in UNSOA (0354/10), had four pending cases and predicated two new cases for investigation.

United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO): internal audit activities

Figure XXII

Audit recommendations issued to UNTSO in 2010 and 2011, by risk category



100. In 2011, OIOS issued two audit recommendations to UNTSO in one audit report:

- *Recruitment and official travel (AP2010/674/01)*