



REPORT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

16 June 1972—15 June 1973

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
OFFICIAL RECORDS : TWENTY-EIGHTH SESSION
SUPPLEMENT No. 2 (A/9002)

UNITED NATIONS

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UNITED NATIONS
New York, 1973

NOTE

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INTRODUCTION

1. The present report¹ is submitted to the General Assembly by the Security Council in accordance with Article 24, paragraph 3, and Article 15, paragraph 1, of the Charter.

2. Essentially a summary and guide, reflecting the broad lines of the debates, the report is not intended as a substitute for the records of the Security Council, which constitute the only comprehensive and authoritative account of its deliberations.

3. With respect to the membership of the Security Council during the period covered, it will be recalled that the General Assembly, at its 2070th plenary meeting on 20 October 1972, elected Australia, Austria, Indonesia, Kenya and Peru as non-permanent members of the Security Council to fill the vacancies resulting from the expiration, on 31 December 1972, of the terms of office of Argentina, Belgium, Italy, Japan and Somalia.

4. The period covered in the present report is from 16 June 1972 to 15 June 1973. The Council held 81 meetings during that period.

¹ This is the twenty-eighth annual report of the Security Council to the General Assembly. The previous reports were circulated under the symbols A/93, A/366, A/620, A/945, A/1361, A/1873, A/2167, A/2437, A/2712, A/2935, A/3157, A/3648, A/3901, A/4190, A/4494, A/4867, A/5202, A/5502, A/5802, A/6002, A/6302, A/6702, A/7202, A/7602, A/8002, A/8402 and A/8702.

Part One

QUESTIONS CONSIDERED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL UNDER ITS RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY

Chapter 1

THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

A. Communications, reports of the Secretary-General and discussion by the Council concerning the status of the cease-fire

1. COMPLAINTS BY ISRAEL AND JORDAN

5. During the period covered by this report, no complaints were received from Israel or Jordan concerning violations of the cease-fire in the Israel-Jordan sector, and no meetings of the Security Council were held in that connexion.

2. REPORTS OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL CONCERNING THE SUEZ CANAL SECTOR

6. With regard to the situation in the Suez Canal sector, no complaints were submitted directly to the Security Council by Egypt or Israel regarding cease-fire violations. The Secretary-General continued to circulate supplemental information on the basis of reports received regularly from the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) that occasionally included complaints of cease-fire violations (S/7930/Add.1657, 1673, 1677, 1738, 1743, 1758, 1762, 1770, 1772, 1773, 1826 and 1830).

7. In a report dated 20 July 1972 (S/7930/Add.1673), the Chief of Staff indicated that Israeli jet aircraft had been seen crossing the Suez Canal from east to west and then recrossing soon thereafter. In reports dated 24 July and 10 October (S/7930/Add.1677 and 1762), he indicated that Egyptian surface-to-air missiles had been fired at Israeli aircraft. Israel complained, and United Nations military observers confirmed, that on those occasions Egyptian missiles had been fired at its aircraft while on routine flight over the east bank of the Suez Canal.

8. In other reports dated 16 and 17 September, 5, 15, 16 and 17 October, and 3 and 11 December (S/7930/Add.1738, 1743, 1758, 1762, 1770, 1772, 1773, 1826 and 1830), it was indicated that Israel had complained of rifle and machine-gun fire by Egyptian forces against Israeli positions on the east bank of the Canal but that the incidents referred to in Israel's complaints had not been confirmed by the United Nations observers.

3. COMPLAINTS BY ISRAEL AND THE SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC

9. In a letter dated 22 June 1972 (S/10710), the Syrian Arab Republic complained that Israeli forces had ambushed and abducted from inside Lebanese territory five Syrian officers who had been on a visit

to the Lebanese Army and requested that the Security Council initiate steps for their immediate release (see section 4 (a) below).

10. Between 16 June and early September, the Secretary-General continued to circulate supplemental information based on reports received from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO on the situation in the Israel-Syria sector. The reports related to firing incidents, crossing of the cease-fire line and overflights by the Israeli and Syrian aircraft (S/7930/Add.1635-1640, 1643, 1644, 1647, 1649-1652, 1654-1672, 1674-1687, 1689, 1691-1708, 1710-1722 and 1724-1728).

11. In a letter dated 14 September (S/10790), the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic recalled his statement in the Security Council on 10 September (see section 4 (f) below) that, by its failure to condemn Israel and compel it to put an end to its military operations against Syria the Council had condoned more bloodshed, thus threatening peace and security. He added that statements subsequently made by Israeli officials, including the Prime Minister, had revealed Israel's aggressive intentions, which endangered world peace and security. Therefore, he said, the Council must compel Israel to end its aggression and refrain from launching any new attacks against the Syrian Arab Republic.

12. In letters dated 8 September, 17 and 30 October (S/10781, S/10809 and S/10820), the Syrian Arab Republic complained that Israeli aircraft had bombarded a number of villages in its territory, causing death and injuries to many civilian citizens. With regard to the attack on 17 October, Syria added that official Israeli statements indicated that the attack was not in retaliation for any specific act but the first move in carrying out a sterner policy towards the enemy. The Israeli attack against populated areas near Damascus was also in pursuance of a campaign of terror against the Palestinian people.

13. In its reply dated 1 November (S/10823), Israel stated that its action in Syria was part of its war on Arab terror warfare, which was protected by Syria, and noted that in its letter Syria had omitted any reference to principles of international law and the United Nations Charter which obliged Syria to reach a peaceful agreement with Israel and to refrain from protecting terror organizations.

14. Between mid-September and December the Chief of Staff of UNTSO continued to report (S/7930/Add.1731-1736, 1738-1744, 1746-1761, 1763-1766, 1768-1822, 1826, 1829, 1831-1834, 1836, 1841-1843, 1845, 1847-1850, 1852) almost daily firing incidents

in the Israel-Syria sector involving artillery, mortar and automatic-weapons fire, as well as air activity in that sector involving overflights by either Syrian or Israeli jet aircraft. His reports during the month of November indicated that the incidents had intensified. On 9 November, the Chief of Staff stated that he had followed with deep concern the increasing frequency of serious incidents both in the Israel-Syria and Israel-Lebanon sectors and noted that the incidents of 9 November had resulted in a further worsening of the situation in the area (S/7930/Add.1797). In that report, the Secretary-General stated that he fully shared the concern of the Chief of Staff. Again, on 22 November after reporting a series of incidents that had occurred the previous day in both the Israel-Syria and Israel-Lebanon sectors, the Secretary-General stated that he was gravely concerned at the scale of the incidents of 21 November, which had been even more serious than those of 9 November and constituted a further aggravation of the situation in the area (S/7930/Add.1811).

15. In a letter dated 9 January (S/10860), the Syrian Arab Republic complained that Israeli jet aircraft had attacked a number of villages, in addition to military positions, killing many children, women and other civilians. Syria drew the attention of the President of the Council to the gravity of the situation and said that the Council's failure to act had encouraged Israel to pursue its aggression against a State Member of the United Nations.

16. Israel replied on 16 January (S/10861) that its air action had been directed against bases of terrorist organizations and Syrian military installations and that communiqués issued by those organizations, as well as by Syrian officials, had confirmed that fact. The situation along the Israel-Syria cease-fire line, the letter added, depended on Syria's willingness to abide by its international obligations. During 1972, 122 armed attacks had been perpetrated from Syrian territory along the cease-fire line, resulting in 5 Israelis killed and 11 wounded. When Syria put an end to such assaults, the letter concluded, there would be no need for Israeli action.

17. Between January and June 1973, the reports of the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, like those submitted previously, continued to indicate a variety of incidents on the cease-fire line of the Israel-Syria sector involving firing incidents and aircraft overflight (S/7930/Add. 1853-1856, 1858, 1860-1862, 1864-1867, 1870, 1872-1874, 1876, 1877, 1882, 1883, 1887, 1890-1893, 1895-1897, 1899, 1901-1903, 1905, 1909-1917, 1919-1921, 1923, 1924, 1926, 1928, 1929, 1931, 1934, 1935, 1937, 1940-1945, 1947, 1949, 1950, 1953-1956, 1958, 1959, 1961, 1962, 1964-1990, 1992-1993, 1996-2001, 2009-2011, 2014-2015, 2018-2022).

4. COMPLAINTS BY ISRAEL AND LEBANON

(a) *Communications to the Council, reports of the Secretary-General and requests for a meeting*

18. In a letter dated 20 June 1972 (S/10706), Israel submitted a complaint to the President of the Council concerning attacks carried out by terrorists operating from Lebanese territory and stated that terror organizations were in full control of the southern part of Lebanon, where the attacks had originated. Israel demanded that Lebanon take effective measures to prevent those attacks and to put an end to terror operations conducted against Israel from Lebanese territory.

19. Between 16 and 30 June the Secretary-General continued to circulate supplemental information (S/7930/Add.1635-1637, 1640, 1648, 1650-1653) on the basis of reports received from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO concerning the Israel-Lebanon sector. The reports indicated that there had been flights by Israeli jet aircraft over localities in southern Lebanon and contained complaints by Lebanon that Israeli forces had, on many occasions, crossed the border and directed their artillery or mortar fire into Lebanese territory, causing casualties and damage. The complaints were not always confirmed by the observers because, as explained in the reports, the location of the alleged incidents was outside the observation range of the observation posts.

20. In a report dated 21 June (S/7930/Add.1643), the Chief of Staff reported that Israel jet aircraft had been observed attacking with bombs general target areas in the southern region of Lebanon. The report contained complaints by Lebanon charging that, on the same day, Israeli armoured forces had penetrated Lebanese territory and attacked a vehicular column, killing 5 military personnel and capturing 5 Syrian officers, 1 Lebanese officer and 3 gendarmes. The complaint also charged that Israeli aircraft had bombed two Lebanese towns and a village, killing 9 civilians and wounding 24, and also destroying or damaging 40 houses and 16 civilian vehicles.

21. In a letter dated 23 June (S/10715), the representative of Lebanon stated that Israel's persistent aggression against Lebanon had culminated in a large-scale air and ground attack against his country on 21, 22 and 23 June. In view of the extreme gravity of the situation, Lebanon requested the convening of an urgent meeting of the Security Council.

22. In a letter (S/10716) also dated 23 June, the representative of Israel requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the continued armed attacks, shelling, sabotage, incursions, acts of air piracy and other acts of terror and violence perpetrated from Lebanese territory against Israel.

(b) *Consideration at the 1648th to 1650th meetings (23-26 June 1972)*

23. At the 1648th meeting on 23 June 1972, the provisional agenda listing the letters of Lebanon and Israel (S/10715 and S/10716) under separate headings was adopted. The representatives of Lebanon and Israel, and, subsequently, the representatives of the Syrian Arab Republic, Egypt, Kuwait and Jordan were invited, at their request, to participate in the debate without the right to vote.

24. At the same meeting, the representative of Lebanon said that, on 21 June, an Israeli patrol, consisting of two jeeps supported by an armoured patrol, had entered Lebanese territory in the central region of southern Lebanon and destroyed Lebanese vehicles. At the same time, a Syrian military delegation of seven officers had been visiting the same region during a traditional exchange of visits between army officers of the Syrian Arab Republic and those of Lebanon. The delegation, escorted by one Lebanese officer and five military policemen, had been travelling in a convoy of civilian cars about 400 metres inside Lebanese territory. The convoy had been ambushed by an Israeli military armoured unit composed of five tanks and three half-tracks, which had opened fire on the party. Four Lebanese military policemen had been killed, and a fifth, who had been injured, had been

abducted by the Israeli forces and later died of his wounds in Israel. Five Syrian officers and the Lebanese officer had been kidnapped. One Syrian officer had been wounded and another had managed to escape.

25. He rejected Israel's allegation that the Syrian officers had been captured while engaged in hostile acts against Israel and denied that any infiltration or shelling of Israel had taken place from Lebanese territory or that any element had crossed the Lebanese border to lay mines in the occupied Golan Heights.

26. He then recalled that, in September 1970 and in February 1972, the Council, in response to Lebanon's complaints, had stopped short of taking decisive action against the aggressor. Lebanon had shown its good faith in doing everything to promote conditions of peace in the area and had asked for the strengthening of United Nations machinery under the Armistice Agreement, but Israel had refused to co-operate with the Council or to allow United Nations observers to operate on its territory. The reports of the United Nations observers had not once come up with any facts showing that hostile action had been undertaken from Lebanese territory. On the contrary, some of them contained ample evidence of consistent Israeli violations of Lebanese sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Council, on the basis of many Lebanese complaints, had strongly condemned Israel for its aggression against Lebanon and warned it against the repetition of such acts. Lebanon put its trust and faith in the Council and had come before it for justice against the aggressor that had been disturbing the peace in the area and the world for years in defiance of many United Nations resolutions. Lebanon had two immediate requests of the Council, namely, a very strong condemnation of Israel for its repeated acts of aggression and the immediate return to Lebanon of the Syrian and Lebanese officers who had been abducted by Israeli forces on 21 June.

27. The representative of Israel said that on 20 June, Arab terror organizations based in Lebanon had opened bazooka fire on an Israeli civilian bus and wounded two elderly passengers. Hours later, two Israeli soldiers had been injured by the explosion of a mine planted in the same region by a terror squad from Lebanon. The following day, the Israeli air force and artillery had reacted in self-defence against concentrations of terrorists in the south-eastern region of Lebanon. Approximately 100 metres from the border an Israeli patrol had encountered a military convoy, which had opened fire. In the ensuing clash, five Syrian officers, one Lebanese officer, a soldier and four gendarmes had been taken prisoner. Early on 23 June, terror squads had opened bazooka fire from Lebanon on the town of Kiryat Shmona. Israeli forces had returned fire. Israel continued to hope that Lebanon would abide by its international obligations and put an end to the criminal activities of the terror organizations. However, to claim, as Lebanon sometimes did, that terror operations from Lebanon were a function of the presence in that country of Palestinian refugees was to play on gullibility or ignorance. Lebanon had allowed the terror groups to turn that country into base of operations and to establish headquarters in Beirut. As an example, he cited the Lod airport massacre on 30 May and said that the Arab reaction had been one of callousness and frivolity and that Lebanon had disclaimed responsibility for the attack, which had been initiated, planned and perpetrated from its territory. The Lebanese Government had the obligation under

international law and the Charter to ensure that its territory was not used as a springboard for aggression against a neighbouring State. When Lebanon repudiated that obligation, it left Israel no alternative but to act in self-defence.

28. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that the new aggressive action of Israel was an act of brigandage incompatible with international law. Israel's policy of continued aggression in the Middle East, which had been repeatedly condemned by the Security Council and the General Assembly, had kept that area in a state of dangerous military tension fraught with extremely serious consequences for international peace. Israel was committing new acts of aggression precisely at a time when certain important international problems were being solved on a realistic basis and the international climate was improving, and when prospects were being opened for a renewal of the Jarring mission and for the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967). Israel, however, opposed such international efforts to bring about a peaceful political settlement in the Middle East and was attempting to play for time in the hope that by a policy of fait accompli it might be able to convert the occupied territories into Israeli colonies. The Security Council must categorically condemn Israel's new acts of aggression and demand the immediate release of the members of the Syrian delegation taken prisoner by Israeli forces.

29. The representative of the Sudan said that the aggression of 21 June could be justified neither as a reprisal for the Lod incident nor by the allegations in the letter of the representative of Israel or his statement to the Council. Israeli forces had illegally entered Lebanon, massacring innocent people and destroying houses. Israeli aircraft had joined in that action on two occasions, killing 11 innocent people. The Sudanese delegation strongly condemned Israel's repeated aggression against Lebanon and its abduction of Syrian and Lebanese citizens. The Council must take urgent action to ensure the immediate and unconditional release of the kidnapped Syrian and Lebanese officers.

30. The representative of China said that his Government and people strongly condemned the aggressive crimes of Israel and expressed firm support for the Lebanese Government and people in their struggle to resist aggression, protect their territory and safeguard their sovereignty. The Security Council must severely condemn Israeli Zionism for its crime of armed aggression against Lebanon and firmly demand that the Israeli authorities immediately stop their aggression, return the abducted Syrian and Lebanese personnel, compensate for all the losses caused by Israeli aggression and guarantee against the recurrence of similar incidents.

31. The representative of Somalia said that the Security Council should take prompt and resolute measures against Israel's aggression in order to bring about the immediate release of the kidnapped Syrian and Lebanese officers and should condemn the Israeli aggressors, who had become a constant menace to peace, security and stability in the Middle East and who continued to defy the authority of the Security Council.

32. At the 1649th meeting on 24 June, the representative of Egypt said that the Israelis were conducting themselves in the occupied Arab territories as colonizers. They had destroyed entire villages, expelled populations *en masse* and committed infamous crimes against in-

nocent people. In the background of the problem there were three occupied Arab countries, structural changes carried out in the occupied territories, a Palestinian population under the yoke of Israeli occupation and Israeli forces powerfully armed by the United States. Calm would return to the area when the United Nations resolutions were implemented, when the Jarring mission was resumed, when the Israeli forces withdrew totally from all the occupied Arab territories and when the rights of the Palestinians were safeguarded. The Security Council should condemn Israel for premeditated aggression against Lebanon and calling upon Israel to liberate the Syrian and Lebanese officers unlawfully abducted from Lebanese territory.

33. The representative of Kuwait stated that what Israel called terrorism resulted from the indignation of the Palestinian people, which was being denied its rights and had demonstrated the will not to perish in the abysmal misery of sordid camps. The tranquillity of the Middle East and the achievement of a long-sought-after peace were contingent upon Israel's withdrawal from all Arab territories and the implementation of the United Nations resolutions on the rights of the Palestinians in their homeland.

34. The representative of Jordan said that even though the current Israeli violence against Lebanon was an expression of the Israeli violence that had created the Arab-Israeli problem, it was only the immediate violence against Lebanon that the Council must judge, punish and control. The latest victims must be guaranteed against future repetition of the crime. Israel must be brought under the law of nations and made to comply with the international will.

35. The representative of the Syrian Arab Republic said that his Government fully associated itself with the complaint submitted by Lebanon. The first aspect of the item related directly to Syria. The ambush of five high-ranking Syrian officers on a peaceful visit in southern Lebanon was a flagrant violation of international law, and Israel should be condemned for it. The problem was not really the existence of Israel but the existence of 3 million Arabs. The Golan Heights had been emptied of its population to make room for settlers from all over the world. The tragic thing was that the international community had not been able to grasp the real meaning of the conquest taking place as a colonial conquest in the Near East and to understand that whenever Israel spoke of peace it was hypocrisy, a sham.

36. The representative of the United States of America said that his Government fully supported the territorial integrity and the political independence of Lebanon and was aware that the Government of that country had made efforts to control terrorist elements on its territory. It hoped that all authorities in the area, including particularly the Government of Israel, would facilitate and not impede those efforts by Lebanon. It was the belief of his Government that the way to solve the problem was through direct liaison and co-operation between the parties. Both Israel and Lebanon should have more frequent recourse to the international facilities for the exchange of information and consultation on border matters, and there should be an end to attacks and terrorism across the border. To obtain United States concurrence any draft resolution before the Council would have to be balanced and be concerned about terrorist acts as well as Israeli attacks.

37. The representative of India said that there might be more understanding for the Israeli position if, indeed,

its existence as a State were threatened. But since 1967 it had been clear to the most uninitiated that Israel could have no such fears, for it was many times more powerful than Lebanon, and Lebanon was helpless when faced with Israel's military strength. There could be no justice unless Israel withdrew from the Arab territories it occupied and the dispossessed people of Palestine regained their rights.

38. The representative of Belgium said that his country had never ceased to repudiate the military reprisal actions by Israel against Lebanon, but at the same time had asked Lebanon to contain and effectively control the activities of the Palestinian fighters and prevent acts of sabotage and ambush against civilian targets from being organized from its territory. The request of Syria and Lebanon for the release of officers and policemen captured by Israel forces was legitimate.

39. The representative of Japan deplored all actions that resulted in the loss of innocent lives and added that violations of the cease-fire should be stopped, regardless of origin or motive. He urged the Security Council to call upon Israel to desist and refrain from any ground and air actions against Lebanon and to take prompt measures conducive to the return to normalcy, including the release of the Syrian and Lebanese officers.

40. The representative of Panama said that his country was against terrorism and in favour of a lasting peace between Israel and the Arab countries. He added that his country had asked the Government of Lebanon to prevent the Palestinian fighters who enjoyed the hospitality of that country from using its territory to launch attacks against Israel.

41. The representative of Guinea deplored the repeated acts of aggression against Lebanon by Israel, which was an expansionist State. The Council should condemn Israel for its criminal acts against Lebanon and should call for the immediate release of the five officers kidnapped by the Israeli army, the cessation of Israeli hostilities against Lebanon and withdrawal of Israel from all occupied Arab territories.

42. The representative of Italy said that most of the violence in the Middle East sprang from the lack of progress towards the peaceful settlement of the general situation, which was deteriorating. To eradicate the source of violence the parties involved must give full implementation to resolution 242 (1967). Conditions must be created for the reactivation of the Jarring mission. Italy would support a draft resolution calling on Israel to end the large-scale military operations against Lebanon and on the parties concerned to act in the spirit of the relevant Geneva Convention and proceed to an exchange of prisoners.

43. The representative of Argentina said that punitive expeditions and preventive war were totally incompatible with the purposes, principles and prescriptions of the Charter. There should be an immediate cease-fire, and the officers captured by Israel on 21 June should be returned without delay.

44. The representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland said that senseless escalation of violence and reprisals could best be ended through a just and durable settlement in accordance with resolution 242 (1967). The United Kingdom deplored all acts of violence and condemned the appalling incident at Lod airport to which particular reference had been made. Israel had stated that

it was the responsibility of Lebanon to curb terrorist actions against Israel, but the large-scale military reprisals by Israel were hardly the way to achieve that end and went far beyond the legitimate exercise of the right of self-defence. His delegation hoped that Lebanon would step up its efforts and take all possible measures to prevent terrorist activities from being launched against Israel from Lebanese territory. It further hoped that the officers forcibly removed from Lebanese territory would be released.

45. Speaking as the representative of Yugoslavia, the President said that the Council was again confronted with a policy of aggression, force and utter disregard of the Charter and of United Nations resolutions that were being pursued on a greater scale and more frequently. It was the root-cause of all the tensions afflicting the Middle East. Though not condoning every act of individual terrorism, the world must never deny to people the right to fight for their liberation against the large-scale terrorism of occupation and aggression. The Council must condemn the latest Israeli attacks, ask for the immediate cessation of Israeli aggression against Lebanon and other neighbouring countries, warn Israel not to repeat such acts, take measures to prevent further aggression and request the immediate release of all prisoners taken as a result of Israel's latest aggression.

46. At the 1650th meeting on 26 June, the Security Council decided to add, as subitem (b) of the first item on its agenda, "Letter dated 26 June 1972 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/10720)". In that letter, the representative had requested that the Syrian Arab Republic be considered an integral party to the Lebanese complaint.

47. The representative of France introduced the following draft resolution (S/10722), sponsored by Belgium, France and the United Kingdom:

"The Security Council,

"Having considered the agenda contained in document S/Agenda/1650/Rev.1,

"Having noted the contents of the letters of the Permanent Representative of Lebanon, the Permanent Representative of Israel and the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic,

"Recalling the consensus of the members of the Security Council of 19 April 1972,

"Having noted the supplementary information provided by the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization contained in documents S/7930/Add.1584 to Add.1640, of 26 April to 21 June 1972, and particularly documents S/7930/Add.1641 to Add.1648, of 21 to 24 June 1972,

"Having heard the statements of the representatives of Lebanon and of Israel,

"Deploing the tragic loss of life resulting from all acts of violence and retaliation,

"Gravely concerned at Israel's failure to comply with Security Council resolutions 262 (1968) of 31 December 1968, 270 (1969) of 26 August 1969, 280 (1970) of 19 May 1970, 285 (1970) of 5 September 1970 and 313 (1972) of 28 February 1972 calling on Israel to desist forthwith from any violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon,

"1. Calls upon Israel to strictly abide by the aforementioned resolutions and to refrain from all military acts against Lebanon;

"2. Condemns, while profoundly deploring all acts of violence, the repeated attacks of Israeli forces on Lebanese territory and population in violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and Israel's obligations thereunder;

"3. Expresses the strong desire that appropriate steps will lead, as an immediate consequence, to the release in the shortest possible time of all Syrian and Lebanese military and security personnel abducted by Israeli armed forces on 21 June 1972 on Lebanese territory;

"4. Declares that if the above-mentioned steps do not result in the release of the abducted personnel or if Israel fails to comply with the present resolution, the Council will reconvene at the earliest to consider further action."

The representative of France said that although it was up to Lebanon to control the activities of the *fedayeen* on its territory, everyone knew perfectly well that the situation was the direct result of the occupation by Israel of territories conquered by force. One condition for lasting peace in the region, he added, was to respect the independence and integrity of Lebanon. His delegation agreed with the representative of the United Kingdom that the Israeli operations were out of all proportion with the right of self-defence.

48. The representative of Argentina said that he would vote for the three-Power draft resolution.

49. The representative of the United States introduced a draft resolution (S/10723), which read as follows:

"The Security Council,

"Having noted the contents of the letter of the Permanent Representative of Lebanon [S/10715] and the letter of the Permanent Representative of Israel [S/10716],

"Having heard the statements of the representatives of Lebanon and Israel,

"Gravely concerned at recent terrorist and military acts of violence in the area which have brought about a deterioration in the situation,

"Deploing the tragic and unjustifiable loss of life and property resulting therefrom,

"Convinced that the cause of peace requires the exercise of the utmost restraint by all parties concerned,

"1. Condemns acts of violence in the area;

"2. Calls for an immediate cessation of all such acts;

"3. Calls on all Governments concerned to repatriate all armed forces prisoners they hold in custody."

50. The representative of Panama said that his delegation would abstain in the vote because the three-Power draft resolution gave greater weight to the condemnation of one aspect of violence than to another.

51. The representative of the Sudan objected to the paragraph in the preamble of the three-Power resolution that deplored the tragic loss of life resulting from all acts of violence and retaliation. The paragraph should refer specifically to the acts of aggression committed between 21 and 23 June by Israel against Lebanon. Otherwise it might be misinterpreted.

52. The representative of Somalia said that he would have preferred a draft resolution that clearly condemned Israel and, at the same time, called upon it to release forthwith the Syrian officers abducted in Lebanese territory. However, Somalia would vote for the three-Power draft resolution.

53. The representative of China said that the three-Power draft resolution failed to reflect fully the actual state of affairs and failed to call on Israel to abandon fundamentally its policies of aggression and war, to compensate for the losses suffered by the victims of aggression and to refrain from future acts of aggression. The phrase "deploring all acts of violence" in the sixth preambular paragraph and operative paragraph 2 might be interpreted as making no distinction between the aggressors and the victims of aggression. China had serious reservations on such wordings; nevertheless, it was prepared to vote in favour of the three-Power draft resolution.

Decision: *At the 1650th meeting on 26 June 1972, the three-Power draft resolution (S/10722) was adopted by 13 votes to none, with 2 abstentions (Panama and United States of America) as resolution 316 (1972).*

54. The draft resolution submitted by the United States of America was not put to the vote in view of the adoption by the Council of the three-Power draft resolution.

55. Speaking after the vote, the representative of the United States said that a resolution to have been fair should have been balanced and should have been concerned with terrorist attacks as well as with Israeli attacks, and should have shown concern for the casualties on both sides of the border. It should have asked for the repatriation of all armed forces prisoners. Most importantly, it should have at least carried the hope of making that area closer to peace. The three-Power draft resolution had not met those requirements, and the United States had been forced to abstain.

56. The representative of the United Kingdom said that resolution 316 (1972) fairly reflected the situation that had precipitated the current meetings and struck an appropriate balance. As for the question of prisoners, the resolution rightly concentrated on the personnel referred to in paragraph 3. But it was clearly high time, both on humanitarian grounds and as a contribution towards the lessening of tension in the area, that there was a general release of other captured persons.

57. The representative of Belgium said that paragraph 2 implied that the Government of Lebanon should take all necessary steps to contain and effectively control the activities of the Palestinian fighters and thus avoid acts of sabotage against Israel being organized from its territory. Paragraph 3 implied that, although the release of the military personnel captured on 21 June on Lebanese territory should be immediate, there should also be a general exchange of prisoners between the countries involved in the Middle East conflict.

58. The representative of Italy said that the text of the resolution did not fully reflect Italy's views, even though Italy had voted for it. Italy would have preferred a resolution more in the spirit of accommodation and reconciliation.

59. The representative of India said that, although his country shared the common concern for the human

misery and suffering that had occurred at Lod airport, that incident did not in any manner diminish in India's eyes the condemnation of Israel that the Council had expressed in its resolution.

60. The President, speaking as the representative of Yugoslavia, said that while regretting the loss of innocent lives one had to keep in mind the basic facts and causes responsible for the developments in the Middle East and never deny the right of a people to fight for its liberation and freedom.

61. The representative of Israel said that the text adopted by the Council was inequitable and immoral. By failing to address itself to the armed attacks against a Member State, the resolution was contrary to basic principles of the Charter.

62. The representative of the Syrian Arab Republic said that the Council, by asking Israel to release the five Syrian officers, as well as the Lebanese officers and security personnel, had done the minimum that could be done under the circumstances.

63. The representative of Lebanon expressed his gratitude to the sponsors of the resolution and to those who had voted for it, but said that the resolution adopted did not fully satisfy Lebanon, because Israel had ignored previous resolutions by the Council warning Israel against repetition of its attacks on Lebanon.

(c) Subsequent communications to the Council and requests for a meeting

64. In two separate letters dated 5 July (S/10730 and S/10731), the representatives of the Syrian Arab Republic and Lebanon requested a meeting of the Security Council in view of Israel's refusal to abide by Security Council resolution 316 (1972), which had expressed the strong desire that appropriate steps would lead to the release in the shortest possible time of all Syrian and Lebanese military and security personnel abducted from Lebanese territory by Israeli forces on 21 June 1972.

65. In a letter dated 10 July (S/10735), the representative of Mauritania, expressed his Government's indignation in connexion with the kidnapping of Syrian and Lebanese officers by Israeli armed forces on Lebanese territory. He urged the Council to take all appropriate steps to ensure the immediate implementation of resolution 316 (1972).

66. By a letter dated 18 July, the representative of Israel requested an urgent meeting of the Council to consider the mutual release of all prisoners of war, in accordance with the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949.

(d) Consideration at the 1651st to 1653rd meetings (18-21 July 1972)

67. At the 1651st meeting on 18 July, and after a procedural debate regarding the provisional agenda, the Council, at the recommendation of the President, decided to consider the requests of Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic first, and then to schedule a later Council meeting to consider the request made by Israel. The adopted agenda read as follows:

"The situation in the Middle East

"(a) Letter dated 5 July 1972 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/10730)

"(b) Letter dated 5 July 1972 from the Chargé d'affaires *ad interim* of the Permanent Mission of

Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/10731)".

With the consent of the Council, the President invited the representatives of Afghanistan, Lebanon, Mauritania, Morocco and the Syrian Arab Republic to participate in the discussion without the right to vote.

68. At the same meeting, the President read a message from the Secretary-General in which he stated that he felt he should report on the implementation of resolution 316 (1972) to the current meeting of the Council. The Permanent Representatives of Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic had expressed to him their Government's concern regarding the implementation of resolution 316 (1972) and had requested the good offices of the Secretary-General for the return of the Lebanese and Syrian officers abducted by Israeli forces on 21 June 1972. However, it appeared that in the prevailing circumstances a generally acceptable solution was not yet in sight; but he would pursue his efforts with all the parties concerned by any means available and hoped that those efforts, together with those of the President of the Council, might yet result in arrangements acceptable to all the parties concerned.

69. The President then said that, like the Secretary-General, he was bound to report to the Council on his efforts in that regard but that it had not been possible to find a solution to the problem.

70. The representative of Lebanon said that, when resolution 316 (1972) was adopted, his delegation had not entertained any false hope that Israel would abide by it. Since the incident of 21 June 1972, the Syrian and Lebanese military personnel had remained hostages in Israel, in defiance of the Security Council resolution and in violation of international law and the Lebanon-Israel Armistice Agreement. Furthermore, the Israeli authorities had stated that they would release the abducted military personnel only within the context of a general exchange of prisoners of war. But the question of the abductees could not and should not be confused or connected with any other question relating to prisoners of war captured in other areas, which was not before the Council. Recalling how the military personnel had been abducted by Israeli forces on 21 June in Lebanese territory, he said that Israel sought to extort a ransom, justifying its action on the basis of the provisions of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949. Referring to resolution 316 (1972), he said that paragraph 4 of that resolution had stated that, if Israel failed to release the military personnel abducted on Lebanese territory, the Council would "reconvene at the earliest to consider further action". Lebanon was requesting the Council to take that further action and was of the opinion that the Council should consider the application of effective measures, even sanctions, against Israel.

71. The representative of the Syrian Arab Republic said that the abduction on Lebanese territory of Syrian and Lebanese military personnel by Israeli forces was in flagrant violation of the sovereignty of a Member State of the United Nations, and Israel's claim that those military personnel were prisoners of war and, consequently subject to exchange of prisoners of war on the basis of the Geneva Convention was a bankrupt claim that had been already rejected by the Council. Israel, in fact, had taken hostages, and its demands so far had amounted to blackmail; therefore, it should be condemned for its non-compliance with a decision

of the Security Council and should be called upon immediately to release the abducted Syrian and Lebanese personnel without any conditions whatsoever. Failing that, sanctions should be applied to Israel.

72. The representative of Afghanistan said that, although the issue before the Council was of great importance, the real issue was the question of the Middle East, and as long as a state of war existed, such incidents as the one currently being considered were bound to happen again and again. After stating that some of the big Powers demurred from implementing the decisions they had voted for, including resolution 242 (1967), he called for an effective effort to strengthen the authority of the Jarring mission and urged the Council to put all its weight and authority behind the efforts of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to get the peace negotiations off the ground. With regard to the items on the current agenda, he said that his country supported the demands of the representatives of Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic.

73. The representative of Morocco said that Israel had never wanted to facilitate the task of the Organization to bring about a just and humane solution to the Middle East conflict. Now, through the abduction of hostages, it wished to attain certain results linked to the final solution of the crisis. The Security Council must condemn that attempt and demand the return of the hostages without prior conditions.

74. The representative of Mauritania said that Africa, in its attempts to mediate in the Middle East, had collided with the intransigent attitude of Israel and its refusal to subscribe to the principle of non-annexation of territories by force. The heads of African States had condemned Israel for that attitude, which hindered the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967). If the Council did not take forceful measures against Israel, the confidence placed in that body would be seriously shaken. However, Mauritania was convinced that the Security Council would be equal to its immense responsibilities.

75. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that the Council should take effective steps in order to force Israel to respect international law and the desires of the international community of States expressed in the decisions of the Council and to bring about the establishment of a just and durable peace in the Middle East on the basis of the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from all occupied Arab territories and the implementation of the other provisions of resolution 242 (1967). With regard to the issue before the Council, the Council should condemn Israel's refusal to implement resolution 316 (1972) and, in accordance with that resolution consider further action that would ensure Israel's compliance with the Council's decisions and the immediate release of the abducted Syrian and Lebanese military personnel.

76. The representative of Yugoslavia said that his delegation was prepared to support any proposal that would reconfirm the requirements and demands of resolution 316 (1972) and envisage firmly and precisely the means for its implementation, as well as necessary further action in case that objective was not immediately achieved.

77. At the 1652nd meeting on 20 July, the representative of Somalia introduced a draft resolution

(S/10742) sponsored by Guinea, Somalia, the Sudan and Yugoslavia and said that, since quiet diplomacy had failed to bring about the release of the Syrian and Lebanese personnel referred to in paragraph 3 of resolution 316 (1972), the Council had been forced to reconvene in accordance with paragraph 4 of that resolution. The four-Power draft resolution he was introducing was simply a reaffirmation of the earlier resolution. The text of that draft resolution was as follows:

"The Security Council,

"Having considered the agenda adopted by the Security Council at its 1651st meeting held on 18 July 1972,

"Having noted the contents of the letters of the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic and the Chargé d'affaires ad interim of Lebanon,

"Having heard the statements of the representatives of Lebanon and of the Syrian Arab Republic,

"Having noted with appreciation the efforts made by the President of the Security Council and by the Secretary-General following the adoption of resolution 316 (1972) of 26 June 1972,

"1. Reaffirms resolution 316 (1972) adopted by the Security Council on 26 June 1972;

"2. Deplores the fact that despite these efforts, effect has not yet been given to the Security Council's strong desire that all Syrian and Lebanese military and security personnel abducted by Israeli armed forces from Lebanese territory on 21 June 1972 should be released in the shortest possible time;

"3. Calls upon Israel for the return of the above-mentioned personnel without delay;

"4. Requests the President of the Security Council and the Secretary-General to make renewed efforts to secure the implementation of the present resolution."

78. The representative of India said that the Council's responsibility under paragraph 4 of resolution 316 (1972) should be discharged without further delay. No attempts should be permitted to confuse the issue under discussion with any other issue concerning the return of combatants captured by the different sides in the course of war. With regard to the four-Power draft resolution, he said that there were elements in the draft that he would have liked to have strengthened, but he realized that the actual wording had been arrived at as a result of negotiations; therefore his delegation would support the draft resolution.

79. The representative of China said that the Council should condemn Israel for its refusal to implement the Council's resolution and firmly reject its using abduction as a means of blackmail. The Council must ask the Israeli authorities to return immediately and unconditionally the abducted Syrian and Lebanese personnel. If Israel continued to refuse to implement the resolution, the Council then must consider further and more effective action in accordance with the provisions of the Charter. He concluded that his delegation would vote in favour of the four-Power draft resolution.

80. The representative of the Sudan said that the implementation of many Council resolutions was long overdue, and resolution 316 (1972) was the latest of a long series. It was up to the Council to restore its credibility and self-respect and act resolutely before it was too late.

81. At the 1653rd meeting on 21 July, the representative of Panama said that his delegation would vote in favour of the four-Power draft resolution.

82. The representative of India announced that his delegation would become a sponsor of the four-Power draft resolution, thus making it a five-Power draft resolution.

Decision: *At its 1653rd meeting on 21 July 1972, the Council adopted the five-Power draft resolution (S/10742) by 14 votes to none, with 1 abstention (United States of America), as resolution 317 (1972).*

83. The representative of Japan said that the case before the Council was how to implement Security Council resolution 316 (1972) and to effect the earliest possible release of the captured Syrian and Lebanese personnel. That was why Japan had voted in favour of the five-Power draft resolution. However, the release should be carried out without prejudice to the problem of the general release of prisoners of war. Japan, as a matter of principle, favoured the release of all prisoners of war as soon as actual hostilities had ceased.

84. The representative of the United Kingdom said that his delegation had voted in favour of the draft resolution, even though it had serious doubts about the wisdom of having further recourse to the Council at a time when certain efforts were still being made to obtain the release of the personnel in question. He regretted that it had not been possible to reach agreement on a text that incorporated some language covering the possibility of progress towards a general release of prisoners of war. Such language would have had to be non-prejudicial and have made clear that the Council did not consider agreement on a general release as a necessary prerequisite for the return of the military personnel referred to in the resolution.

85. The representative of the Syrian Arab Republic thanked all the members who had voted in favour of the five-Power draft resolution. In urging implementation of resolutions 316 (1972) and 317 (1972), Syria was not pleading for Arab rights alone but for the life and integrity of the Security Council itself.

86. The representative of Italy said that, in the spirit of the resolution just adopted, Italy renewed its appeal to Israel for the release of the Syrian and Lebanese officers. But his delegation wished also to plead with all parties concerned for a general exchange of all prisoners of war, in line with their declared policy of finding a peaceful solution to the Middle East crisis.

87. The representative of France hoped that the new appeal of the Council would be heeded by Israel. He also would like to see another problem taken up by the Council in the near future, namely, the problem of a general exchange of prisoners of war by mutually agreed procedures.

88. The representative of Yugoslavia said that his delegation had sponsored and voted for resolution 317 (1972) because it considered that the Council had to act again in the absence of Israel's further refusal to implement the provisions of resolution 316 (1972).

89. The representative of Belgium said that he had voted in favour of the resolution because, in reaffirming resolution 316 (1972), the Council confirmed its wish that appropriate steps would immediately lead to the release of the abducted military and security personnel. The text of the new resolution therefore clearly stipulated that there should be far-reaching

consequences that would flow from that release, namely, the mutual exchange of all war prisoners.

90. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that his delegation had voted in favour of the draft resolution, although it considered that the condemnation of Israel for failure to implement resolution 316 (1972) should have been couched in stronger language.

91. Speaking as the representative of Argentina, the President said that he trusted that Israel would now proceed to release all the abducted military personnel.

92. The representative of Lebanon said that his delegation agreed with the principles expressed in the Council regarding prisoners of war. Yet there was also the matter of the 2,500 to 3,000 combatants from the Gaza Strip, Sinai, the west bank of Jordan and the Golan Heights who were languishing in the prisons of Israel. They, too, were prisoners of war.

(e) *Communications to the Council and reports of the Secretary-General from July to September 1972 and request for a meeting*

93. Between July and early September, the Chief of Staff of UNTSO continued to report flights by Israeli aircraft over southern Lebanon, as well as border crossings by Israeli forces. On many occasions, Lebanon complained, and United Nations military observers confirmed, that Israeli forces had penetrated Lebanese territory and remained there in dug-in positions (S/7930/Add.1654, 1656-1659, 1661, 1663, 1664, 1665, 1667, 1670-1688, 1690-1728).

94. In supplemental information dated 9 September (S/7930/Add.1726), the Chief of Staff of UNTSO reported a complaint by Lebanon that Israeli jet aircraft had launched bomb attacks against the towns of Rachaiya el Ouadi and Rafid in the southern region and the refugee camp of Naher El Bared, north of the city of Tripoli, killing 17 persons and wounding 35 in the latter locality, and that Israeli forces had previously penetrated Lebanese territory several times and blown up a house. The observers' reports indicated that on 7 and 8 September Israeli jet aircraft had overflown several villages in the Syrian Arab Republic and in the southern region of Lebanon. In supplemental information dated 10 September (S/7930/Add.1729), the Chief of Staff reported that observers had undertaken, at the request of Lebanon, an inquiry into casualties and damage allegedly caused by Israeli air attacks on Rachaiya el Ouadi and Rafid on 8 September and had been shown damage done to three buildings in Rachaiya. In Rafid, they noted that two houses had been demolished and that many others, including one described as a school, had been damaged. The Lebanese authorities had stated that 10 persons had been killed and two wounded in Rafid. In the inquiry made on 9 September (S/7930/Add.1730) at the Palestinian refugee camp of Nahr El Bared, the observers had been shown damaged houses, railway tracks and a destroyed plantation. Casualties were said to be 3 Lebanese and 7 Palestinians killed, 2 Lebanese and 22 Palestinians wounded.

95. In a letter dated 8 September (S/10780) Lebanon complained that, on that date, Israeli aircraft had raided several villages in southern Lebanon, killing 12 civilians and wounding 34, according to preliminary information on the incidents.

96. In a letter dated 8 September (S/10781), the Syrian Arab Republic complained that on that date Israeli military aircraft had bombarded four villages in the coastal region of Syria, killing one woman and wounding several other civilians.

97. By a letter dated 9 September (S/10782), the Syrian Arab Republic requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider Israel's attacks on Syrian territories, of which it had informed the Council in its letter of 8 September (S/10781).

98. By a letter dated 10 September (S/10783), Lebanon, further to its letter of 8 September (S/10780) and in view of the gravity of the situation endangering the peace and security of the country, requested an urgent meeting of the Council.

(f) *Consideration at the 1661st and 1662nd meetings (10 September 1972)*

99. At the 1661st meeting on 10 September, the President stated that the meeting had been convened at the request of the Syrian Arab Republic, but that a few minutes before the meeting, a request for a meeting had also been received from the representative of Lebanon. Accordingly he suggested that the provisional agenda be revised as follows:

"The situation in the Middle East

"(a) Letter dated 9 September 1972 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/10782),

"(b) Letter dated 10 September 1972 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/10783)".

Decision: *The agenda, as amended, was adopted.*

100. With the consent of the Council, the President invited the representatives of Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic, pursuant to their requests, to participate in the discussion without the right to vote. He also informed the Council that, on 9 September, the Secretariat had informed the Permanent Representative of Israel of the decision to convene a meeting of the Security Council on 10 September. He had later been informed by the representative of Israel that, because 10 September was the Jewish New Year, according to Jewish religious law, the Israeli delegation would not be able to attend the meeting.

101. The representative of the Syrian Arab Republic stated that, on 8 September, at 5 p.m., Israel's air force had launched rockets against several places populated by civilians, killing and wounding many civilians, including women and children. Israel had resumed its attacks on 9 September. He added that those aerial operations had been described by the Vice-Premier of the Israeli Council of Ministers as a first stage in a total offensive. The Council, he said, had before it the facts of culpable, clear-cut aggression, carried out by Israel against a peaceful Syrian population, without any motive or justification apart from Israel's persistent and obstinate determination to hold on to territory that it had acquired illegally during its aggression of 5 June 1967. He requested the Council to compel Israel to halt immediately all military operations, to condemn it for its attacks and to take all appropriate measures to prevent a renewal of aggression.

102. The representative of Lebanon said that, between 5 and 5.30 p.m. on 8 September, 24 Israeli

military aircraft had carried out an indiscriminate raid against several communities in northern Lebanon. As a result of those attacks, 15 Lebanese civilians had been killed. Israel had claimed that it was aiming at commando camps, yet in one area civilians had been hit and in another, there were neither refugees nor commando camps. The refugee camp attacked near Tripoli was run by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). Lebanon had long suffered from Israeli acts of aggression and had previously come to the Security Council seeking measures to stop attacks against its civilian population. Each time the Council had warned Israel against repetition of these acts. Once again Lebanon requested the Council to condemn Israel for its premeditated and unprovoked attacks and to take all appropriate measures to prevent any recurrence of such aggression.

103. The representative of the United States stated the Council was once again seized of a problem with which it had repeatedly failed in the past to come to grips in an equitable way. It was meeting on a complaint by Syria, which made no reference to the tragic events of Munich, although there was an obvious connexion. Syria, which failed to condemn the murder of innocent Israeli athletes, continued to harbour and encourage terrorist organizations that had openly championed such acts. The root of the problem was the absence of peace in the Middle East, which must not be exploited as a pretext for violence on any side. His Government, he added, was engaged in a major effort along with other members of the international community, to put an end to terrorism and violence. His Government urged that the issue of terrorism in all its aspects should receive the highest priority from the General Assembly. The commendable initiative of the Secretary-General in placing the question on the Assembly's agenda should ensure that the world could no longer close its eyes to that pressing matter. Though the United States would continue to work for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, it considered that one-sided resolutions of the type that the Council had so frequently adopted in recent times would not contribute to the goal of peace but would encourage perpetrators of acts of terrorism. The kind of resolution that could be helpful was one that expressed concern about the renewal of terrorist attacks on innocent people, by deploring the loss of innocent lives on both sides and the outbreak of renewed violence in the Middle East. It would state that any encouragement or support for those kinds of acts of terrorism was unacceptable in a civilized society and was, indeed, inimical to the maintenance of the cease-fire and to peace in the Middle East. It would condemn the unprovoked terrorist attack that had shattered the world—the one at Munich on 5 September by terrorists of the so-called Black September organization. And it would call upon States that were harbouring and supporting such terrorists to cease such encouragement and support and take all necessary measures to bring about an end to those acts.

104. The representative of Somalia said that there would have been an opportunity for a meaningful debate if the representative of Israel had been present. However, in matters of international peace and security involving the loss of life, the Council could not afford to suspend its deliberations because of religious or political susceptibilities. The least the Council could do was to call for an immediate cessation of hostilities.

To that effect the representative of Somalia introduced a draft resolution (S/10784), which later was sponsored additionally by Guinea and Yugoslavia and read as follows:

"The Security Council,

"Deeply concerned by the deteriorating situation in the Middle East,

"Calls on the parties concerned to cease immediately all military operations and to exercise the greatest restraint in the interest of international peace and security."

105. Another draft resolution was submitted by the representative of the United States (S/10785), which read as follows:

"The Security Council,

"Gravely concerned at the renewal of terrorist attacks on innocent persons,

"Deploing the loss of innocent lives on both sides and the outbreak of renewed violence in the Middle East,

"Convinced that acts of terrorism, and any encouragement and support for such acts, are totally unacceptable in a civilized society and are inimical to the maintenance of the cease-fire in the Middle East,

"1. Condemns the senseless and unprovoked terrorist attack in Munich on 5 September by terrorists of the so-called Black September Organization which resulted in the loss of life of numerous innocent victims;

"2. Calls upon those States harbouring and supporting such terrorists and their activities to cease their encouragement and support of terrorists and to take all necessary measures to bring about the immediate end of such senseless acts."

106. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics expressed surprise at the pretext under which the representative of Israel had refused to take part in the Council's discussion. The holiday he had invoked had not prevented Israel and its armed forces from beginning and continuing further acts of aggression against the Syrian Arab Republic and Lebanon. In view of the new acts of unprovoked aggression by Israel, his delegation considered it advisable that the draft resolution submitted by Somalia and two other States be voted upon immediately. Commenting on the United States' statement, he said that the essence of realism in the Middle East was the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the occupied territories and the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967). There was no basis for linking the new acts of aggression with the distressing incidents that had occurred in Munich. What was at issue was a deliberate act of provocation planned by Israel, and no artificial motivations could be used to justify it.

107. The representative of Guinea stated that she could not understand why one would wish to make the Syrian Arab Republic and Lebanon responsible for acts committed by commandos. The death of the Israeli athletes in Munich had been deplored, but hundreds of lives must not be sacrificed as a result. The international community could not allow a State to attack others merely because of its strength and the support it received. She concluded by expressing the hope that the Security Council would be able to adopt at once a resolution calling for an immediate cessation of Israeli aggression against the peaceful population of the Syrian Arab Republic.

108. The representative of Belgium proposed suspension of the meeting for a few hours to enable delegations to study the two draft resolutions carefully, and hold consultations to obtain the necessary instructions from their Governments.

109. The representative of Somalia said that the primary duty of the Council was to ensure the cessation of military operations. The draft resolution he had introduced would need no instructions from Governments, since it was purely an act of humanity that should be voted on the same day.

110. Following a procedural discussion in which statements were made by the representatives of Argentina, France, Guinea, India, Italy, the Sudan, the USSR, Yugoslavia, the United Kingdom and the United States, the President adjourned the meeting until later that afternoon.

111. At the 1662nd meeting on 10 September, the representative of the United Kingdom introduced three amendments (S/10786) to the three-Power draft resolution. The amendments, sponsored by Belgium, France, Italy and the United Kingdom, would have provided for:

(1) The insertion of a second preambular paragraph reading:

"Deploing deeply all acts of terrorism and violence and all breaches of the cease-fire in the Middle East";

(2) In the operative paragraph, the replacement of the words "the parties" by "all parties";

(3) In the operative paragraph, the replacement of the words "cease immediately all military operations" by "take all measures for the immediate cessation and prevention of all military operations and terrorist activities".

112. The representative of the United Kingdom said that the aim of the amendments was clear. Violence had again erupted within the Middle East context and the horrors of terrorism and reprisal had again fallen upon innocent victims. Whatever the relationship of cause and effect between the killings at Munich and the incidents described by the representatives of Syria and Lebanon, whatever the justification or lack of justification, the resort to force against national or international law was to be condemned. The Council could not condemn the one kind of violence and condone the other.

113. The representative of Somalia stated that the sponsors of the draft resolution held that, if the amendments were accepted, it would alter the whole purpose of the original three-Power draft, which did not condemn or condone acts of violence but simply addressed itself to the necessity of an immediate cessation of all military operations in the area.

114. The representative of Yugoslavia said that the three-Power draft resolution was an interim text that called for the immediate cessation of all military operations in the area. Accordingly, it should be voted on without delay and, then, if the Council wished, the roots of the crisis could be discussed.

115. The representative of the Sudan said that his delegation would support the three-Power draft resolution. He added that inasmuch as the Council was faced with a situation of naked aggression in which civilians had lost their lives, it must prevent any further deterioration of the situation. He regretted that certain

delegations were trying to inject the question of terrorism into what he described as a straightforward question of security.

116. The representative of India said that the two complaints before the Council were not a new matter. The Council had dealt with two similar complaints earlier in the year. The pattern of Israel's activities had been clear for some time, and his delegation had drawn repeated attention to it. There was no justification for Israel's recent actions by which it had violated international law and the cease-fire. However, certain speakers before him had indicated that those actions had been taken in reprisal for the tragic events at Munich. India had condemned the Munich events. But the situation in the Middle East had involved similar events from the days before the establishment of Israel. It was not possible to select only one or two links in a long chain and ignore the others. To consider the entire chain of events would take time and would not eliminate the immediate threat that confronted Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic. The tragedy of Munich had happened six days earlier and, since then, no attempt had been made to bring it before the Council. He was not even certain that the tragedy was an appropriate subject for the Security Council, inasmuch as it consisted of terrorism by private groups and not by States. A distinction must be drawn between the acts of terrorism by private groups and the acts of military vendetta by organized Governments. His delegation would reject the four-Power amendments. As to the United States draft resolution, he considered that it was unbalanced and entirely silent on the recent Israeli attacks.

117. The representative of Panama stated that his Government had categorically condemned the massacre of Israeli athletes at Munich. The world was also moved at seeing that reprisals for those crimes had left a sad balance of desolation and death in Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic. His delegation believed that the acts were closely linked and therefore would support any draft resolution that would condemn with equal emphasis acts of terrorism and reprisal. His delegation, however, had been instructed to abstain on the two draft resolutions before the Council, for neither of them was likely to achieve useful results. Panama sought respect for the territorial integrity of the Arab States and wanted the Israelis to live free from fear. The proposed amendments were a step in the right direction, and his delegation would vote for them.

118. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that everyone deeply deplored the events at Munich and that the Committee on Sports under the Council of Ministers of the USSR had issued a statement expressing its deepest regret. However, to put the events at Munich on the same footing as the new acts of aggression by Israel would be to condone the aggressive policy of the Israeli Government. The Council must reject as entirely unfounded any reference whatsoever by Israel and its supporters to certain events at the Olympic Games to justify Israeli provocation. To draw a parallel between acts of terror committed by persons in a desperate situation and those of a State that had become an aggressor was to remove from that State the responsibility for the murder of hundreds of innocent people. That was why his delegation would support the three-Power draft resolution. The Security Council's task was to call a halt to military operations immediately; then it could proceed to a discussion of other questions that were of particular

interest to individual delegations or groups of delegations.

119. The representative of Japan said that his delegation strongly held that military operations should be stopped and violations of the cease-fire should be halted. His delegation, therefore, supported the draft resolution submitted by Somalia, Guinea and Yugoslavia. Japan had consistently and repeatedly expressed its regret and abhorrence of all acts of violence, particularly indiscriminate attacks that resulted in the loss of innocent lives. His Government censured, in the strongest terms, all acts of violence and terrorism, regardless of their origin or motive. His delegation, therefore, could also accept the amendments proposed by the four European countries. The recurrence of violence in the Middle East demonstrated once again the urgent need to eliminate the source of tension in that area. In that connexion, the Japanese delegation emphasized the importance of implementing Security Council resolution 242 (1967), in order to bring about a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

120. The representative of the United States said that his delegation would vote in favour of the four-Power amendments; they were the very least that was required on the part of the Council, if it was to address itself to the problem as it existed.

121. The Council then proceeded to vote, first, on the four-Power amendment (S/10786) and, then, on the three-Power draft resolution (S/10783). In putting the four-Power amendment to the vote, the President stated that a separate vote on each paragraph of the amendment had been requested by India.

Decision: At the 1662nd meeting, on 10 September 1972, the first paragraph of the amendment received 8 votes in favour, 4 against (China, Guinea, Sudan and Yugoslavia) and 3 abstentions (India, Somalia and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) and was not adopted, having failed to obtain the required majority.

The second paragraph of the amendment received 9 votes in favour, and 6 against (China, Guinea, Somalia, Sudan, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Yugoslavia) and was not adopted owing to the negative vote of two permanent members of the Council.

The third paragraph of the amendment received 8 votes in favour, 7 against (China, Guinea, India, Somalia, Sudan, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Yugoslavia) and was not adopted, having failed to obtain the required majority.

The three-Power draft resolution (S/10784) received 13 votes in favour, 1 against (United States of America) and 1 abstention (Panama) and was not adopted owing to the negative vote of a permanent member of the Council.

122. Following the vote, the representative of the United States said that the Council would have done neither the parties nor itself any good by adopting a draft resolution that ignored realities by addressing itself to only one form of violence. He added that it was a double standard to suggest that States must control their own forces but need not control irregular forces in their territory.

123. The representative of Belgium said that he had voted in favour of the draft resolution to demonstrate his country's concern following the tragic events that had occurred in the Middle East and continued dangerously to increase tension in that part of the world. It was the Council's duty to end any military activity likely to jeopardize international peace and

security. He regretted the rejection of the four-Power amendments, which had the merit of balancing the text of the draft resolution by not ignoring the problem of blind terrorism.

124. The representative of India stated that, even though the Council was dealing with the immediate problem of the Lebanese and Syrian complaints, his delegation was not against establishing a cause-and-effect chain of events. It had abstained on the first paragraph of the amendments because it would have balanced the two actions, even though one had been taken by private groups and the other by a Government. It had voted for the second amendment because it would have made the resolution more comprehensive. It had opposed the third amendment because it implied that Governments were in a position to prevent all terrorist activities.

125. The representative of Yugoslavia said that the events of Munich could not have any direct connexion with what had been happening in the Middle East for years. All attempts to solve the problems of that region had failed because of Israel's constant refusal to respond positively to United Nations resolutions. The Council must reject the Israeli concept of a self-arrogated right to conduct major aggressive military operations against the territories of its Arab neighbours.

126. The representative of France stated that his country condemned all acts of violence. With regard to the two complaints before the Council, the most urgent task was to put an end to military activities and prevent their recurrence. That was the objective of the appeal contained in the three-Power draft resolution; therefore, his delegation had supported it.

127. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics stressed the inadmissibility of putting on equal footing individual acts of terror committed by people who had been placed in an extremely desperate situation, and acts of aggression committed by States. Israel, he said, was committing an international crime by ordering its armed forces to intrude into the air space and territories of Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic. Though the events of Munich merited the deepest possible regret, they were just one more episode, one more consequence of the war of aggression still being waged by Israel against Arab countries. In a way, Israel had contributed to the tragic events of Munich by approving the actions of the Munich police in firing on the helicopter containing the Israelis and Arabs. Had it not been for the position taken by Israel, the athletes and the Arabs who were involved might be in another country and would, without any doubt, be alive. To prevent a recurrence of events like the one in Munich Israel had to comply with United Nations resolutions by halting its aggression against Arab countries, withdrawing from the occupied territories and respecting the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. Further disregard by Israel of the positions of the absolute majority of the Members of the United Nations and the decisions and demands of the Security Council would make it necessary to apply sanctions against Israel as an aggressor. In conclusion, he stated that, by its veto, the United States had rejected a just proposal and bore a very heavy responsibility for the further development of events in the Middle East.

128. The representative of Argentina said that his delegation had voted for the three-Power draft resolution because it had called for an immediate cessation of all warlike acts, and had supported the European

amendments because they had been designed to emphasize the Council's condemnation of all acts of terrorism. Argentina condemned both acts of terrorism and acts of reprisal and called on all parties concerned to redouble their efforts to achieve that just and lasting peace called for in resolution 242 (1967), which the majority of the Members of the United Nations supported.

129. The representative of Italy said that he had voted for the three-Power draft resolution in response to the appeals from the representatives of the Syrian Arab Republic and Lebanon. Italy consistently condemned all acts of warfare and reprisals that were carried out in violation of international law and the principles of the Charter. Noting that some representatives had maintained that there was no connexion between the Munich incident and the military operations in Syria and Lebanon, he said that perhaps there were sufficient legal grounds for that contention, but to proceed with that approach would be to move in a moral and political vacuum. Therefore, his delegation deeply regretted that the proposed amendments had not been adopted.

130. The representative of the Sudan stated that he had voted for the three-Power draft resolution because his delegation believed that the killing should stop. It was most regrettable that other incidents, like the Munich incident, had been injected into the debate to make it more complex. The Munich incident and similar questions were irrelevant to the situation before the Council. His delegation believed that the amendments had been designed to delay the adoption of the draft resolution, and it regretted that a permanent member of the Council had used the veto to stop a call for ending aggression and sparing human life.

131. The representative of Guinea regretted the rejection of the three-Power draft resolution and hoped that rejection would not be exploited by Israel as a victory that allowed it freedom to embark on new escalations and new acts of aggression against the peaceful territories of Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic.

132. The representative of the United Kingdom said that he would have greatly preferred to see the proposed amendments incorporated in the draft resolution, for they would have made it a more realistic reflection of the circumstances and atmosphere in which the meeting was taking place. However, the United Kingdom could not fail to support a call for an end to military operations and for restraint in the future. His delegation would like to see a greater exercise of restraint by all parties so that the basic problem of the Middle East could be approached by the path of conciliation rather than by that of force.

133. The representative of Somalia said that by its veto the United States had given the green light to Israel and any other Member in the area to continue military operations. He noted that there had been considerable talk about terror and terrorism but that it would be difficult to say what each delegation meant by those terms. The term violence, he suggested, was preferable. Somalia was against all acts of violence for the sake of violence, but situations arose where violence, however regrettable it might be, perhaps became justifiable in pursuit of a legitimate cause or in pursuit of legitimate defence. The Council had met to stop the killing taking place as a result of aerial bombardments. If the Council could not muster a unanimous

vote to call for an immediate cessation of such killing, he doubted its right to exist.

134. The President, speaking as the representative of China, said that Israel's armed aggression against the Syrian Arab Republic and Lebanon was utterly intolerable to all countries that defended the principles of the Charter and to all the peoples who upheld justice. The history of the Middle East since the Second World War had been one of incessant aggression and expansion by Israeli zionism and of the continuous fight of the Palestinian and other Arab peoples against that aggression and expansion. Israel had tried to use the Olympic event as a pretext to expand its war of aggression against Arab countries. The incident was unfortunate, but the root-cause lay in the frenzied aggression committed by Israeli zionism over a long period against the Palestinian and other Arab peoples. The Security Council must severely condemn Israeli zionism for its aggression against Syria and Lebanon and demand that Israel immediately stop all its aggression. It must ask Israel earnestly to implement the relevant Security Council resolutions. His delegation had voted for the three-Power draft resolution, even though it failed to condemn Israeli zionism. His delegation had reservations in that respect, but it deeply regretted that even so minimum a draft resolution had failed of adoption because of the veto of a permanent member.

135. The representative of the Syrian Arab Republic said that his country was showing restraint and respected the cease-fire but that it could not allow the enemy to continue its aggression and permit the massacre of hundreds of peaceful citizens. That was why his Government had asked for the convening of the Council, in order to safeguard peace and security in the Middle East. The proposed three-Power draft resolution could not have prevented Israel from continuing its aggression, because it had not condemned Israel and had not confronted Israel with its responsibilities in accordance with the Charter. Israel would continue to push the Middle East towards war and threaten international peace and security.

136. The representative of Lebanon stated that the three-Power draft resolution had been weak, yet even so it had been defeated because of a certain psychosis that had been created in the Council to link what had happened in Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic to what had happened in Munich. Why was it, he asked, that Lebanon always had to pay the price for what happened somewhere else in the world? He hoped that the negative vote of the United States would not be used as encouragement and as a green light for Israel to continue its attacks against Lebanon.

137. Before adjourning the meeting, the President announced that he had been informed that the United States would not insist on a vote on its draft resolution (S/10785) at that meeting.

(g) *Subsequent communications and reports received between 11 September and 30 December 1972*

138. Between 10 and 16 September the reports of the Chief of Staff of UNTSO (S/7930/Add.1731-1736) referred to continued overflights of Lebanese territory by Israeli jets and penetration by Israeli forces into Lebanon.

139. By a letter dated 11 September (S/10787), the representative of Egypt transmitted to the Secretary-General the text of a statement made by the official spokesman of his Government concerning Israel's

acts of aggression against the Syrian Arab Republic and Lebanon. The statement pointed out that Israel had chosen the most populous refugee camps against which to conduct its aerial raids, and had used American Phantom planes in those raids. By refusing to restore their legitimate rights to the Palestinian people and by refusing to relinquish territories it had occupied, Israel was challenging the Charter and resolutions of the United Nations with the encouragement of the United States of America, which could not be absolved from its responsibility in that respect.

140. In a letter dated 16 September (S/10794), Israel drew the attention of the President of the Council to further attacks against its territories by terrorists based in Lebanon and stated that attacks carried out on 6, 14 and 15 September against Israeli military patrols had resulted in the death of three Israeli soldiers. Israel warned of more attacks by terrorists who, it reported, were concentrating along the borders of Lebanon.

141. In a letter addressed on the same day (S/10795) to the President of the Council, Lebanon complained that Israeli forces had launched a massive land and air attack against southern Lebanon, penetrating 25 kilometres inside Lebanese territory. Those forces had bombed and shelled 15 towns and villages and three military positions. Furthermore, Palestinian refugee camps in the vicinity of Al Nabatieh had been attacked with napalm bombs. The Lebanese armed forces had engaged the invading Israeli forces, and the Lebanese Government had declared a state of emergency.

142. That unprovoked aggression, the letter added, endangered not only the peace and security of Lebanon but that of the Middle East. It constituted a violation of the Charter, the Security Council resolutions, the Armistice Agreement and international law and should therefore be condemned by the international community.

143. In a letter dated 17 September (S/10796), Israel informed the President of the Council that, on the previous day, Israeli forces had struck against bases and concentrations of terror organizations in southern Lebanon and that, as a result of those measures, 130 structures serving as bases of terror groups had been demolished and 40 of their members had been killed. The fact that the target of Israel's action had been bases of murder squads had been corroborated in communiqués issued by terror organizations and in Syrian and Egyptian radio broadcasts. The action undertaken by Israeli forces, the letter added, was part of Israel's defence effort against terror organizations operating from Lebanese territory while Lebanon shirked its international obligations harbouring terror squads in the midst of its population.

144. By a letter dated 21 September (S/10799), Lebanon informed the President of the Council that Israel's attacks on Lebanon on 16 September had resulted in 18 Lebanese military personnel killed, 49 wounded and 5 missing, as well as 25 civilians killed and 40 wounded. One hundred and nine houses in 16 towns and villages had been totally destroyed, 324 homes damaged and 2 bridges destroyed. Water, electricity and irrigation installations had been bombed, and hundreds of civilians' automobiles destroyed. The Israeli forces had later embarked on a campaign of terrorization and looting of the civilian population. The Council, the letter went on, had repeatedly warned that measures would be taken against Israel if the latter continued its aggression against Lebanon. However, in

the absence of effective measures by the Security Council, Israel had persisted in its terror campaign, and the Council therefore assumed a grave responsibility for its failure to protect one of the peaceful Members of the Organization. Photographs showing the victims of Israel's action were annexed to the letter.

145. In a reply dated 27 September (S/10801), Israel referred to its letter on 17 September (S/10796) and stated that in its letter of 21 September Lebanon had tried to cover up its responsibility for permitting the use of its territory as a base for terrorist attacks against civilians in Israel and other countries. As long as Lebanon did not fulfil its international obligation and put an end to the killings initiated from its territory, it would remain an accomplice in such crimes. The letter stressed that Israel's action had been directed against terrorist bases. It denied Lebanon's charges that there had been looting of the civilian population by Israeli forces and maintained that the only structures destroyed had been those used as terrorist centres. Israel could not acquiesce in the continuation of terrorist activities from Lebanese territory and, the letter concluded, the Lebanese Government must bear responsibility for continuing to refuse to halt those activities.

146. In a letter dated 16 October (S/10808), Lebanon charged that, on the preceding day, Israeli aircraft had bombed four locations in south and south-eastern Lebanon, killing and wounding several persons in the process and inflicting severe damage to houses and public utilities. In the past Israel had offered pretexts for its previous attacks, but the attack of 15 October showed, as Mrs. Meir had stated, that Israel intended to feel free to attack wherever there were Palestinians. That policy of systematic and unprovoked aggression endangered the independence, security and integrity of Lebanon and constituted a flagrant defiance of United Nations principles. Under the circumstances, the Security Council could not remain indifferent to those facts and must find appropriate means to deal with the situation.

147. In a letter dated 17 October (S/10809), the Syrian Arab Republic charged that on 15 October an Israeli air squadron had attacked civilians in an area near the town of Missiaf. The letter stated that Israeli military authorities had made it clear that such attacks were intended as harassment rather than retaliation.

148. In a letter dated 18 October (S/10811), Israel, in reply to the letters from Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic (S/10808 and S/10809), stated that air action in Lebanon had been taken against two terrorist bases from which attacks on Israeli civilians had been initiated and against a terrorist sea base and a motor pool on the Mediterranean coast of Lebanon. With regard to action taken in the Syrian Arab Republic, the letter stated that it had been directed against a Fatah training camp. In its war against terror organizations Israel had every right and was duty-bound to take measures to bring their activities to an end. The Arab Governments that provided the terrorist organizations with shelters and financial and political support could not be absolved of responsibility for the terror warfare. As an avowed objective of the terror organizations was the destruction of the State of Israel, Israel had no choice but to strike at those organizations wherever they could be reached.

149. In supplemental information dated 16 September (S/7930/Add.1737), the Chief of Staff of UNTSO reported heavy ground and air activity by Israeli forces

in the vicinity of observation posts (OP) Ras and Khiam in the Israel-Lebanon sector. He also reported that Israeli jet aircraft had made four strikes with bombs and rockets in the vicinity of OP Khiam on the same day. The same report recorded a complaint by Lebanon that four Israeli armoured brigades supported by aircraft had attacked along two axes in the southern region. The complaint was partially confirmed by United Nations military observers, who also confirmed that Israeli forces were still in Lebanese territory as of 1200 hours GMT. On 18 September, the Chief of Staff reported (S/7930/Add.1739 and 1740) a Lebanese complaint that Israeli forces were continuing their action inside Lebanese territory. That complaint was not confirmed by United Nations military observers.

150. From late September to the end of December, the reports of the Chief of Staff (S/7930/Add.1741-1761, 1763, 1766, 1768-1787, 1789-1795, 1797, 1798-1808, 1811, 1814, 1816-1847, 1849-1852) indicated that overflights of Lebanese territory by Israeli jet aircraft, as well as penetration by Israeli forces into Lebanese territory, had continued. The reports contained complaints by Lebanon, not confirmed by United Nations observers, to the effect that Israeli ships had entered Lebanon's territorial waters. On 15 October, there was a report (S/7930/Add.1767) of intensified air activity in southern Lebanon. On that occasion, Lebanon complained, and the observers confirmed, that 20 Israeli jet aircraft overflew the area of southern Lebanon and the Bekaa region, bombing several localities and causing injuries to three civilians.

151. In supplemental information dated 2 November (S/7930/Add.1788), the Chief of Staff issued updated lists of the observation posts, outstations and control centres set up by UNTSO in the Suez Canal, Israel-Syria and Israel-Lebanon sectors.

(h) The question of increasing United Nations observation posts in the Israel-Lebanon sector

152. By a letter dated 30 October (S/10818), the President of the Security Council informed the Secretary-General that, following consultations with the Council members on the subject of the Secretary-General's memoranda of 25 and 27 October, and after referring to the Security Council consensus of 19 April 1972, there had been no objection to acceding to Lebanon's request for an increase in the number of observation posts in the Israel-Lebanon sector.

153. In his memorandum of 25 October, published as annex I to the letter, the Secretary-General stated that, as a result of the Security Council consensus of 19 April on the subject of additional observers in the Israel-Lebanon sector, three United Nations observation posts had been set up in southern Lebanon and the number of observers increased from 7 to 21. On 23 October, he added, Lebanon had requested an increase in the number of United Nations observation posts and observers in that sector. Subsequently, he had requested the Chief of Staff of UNTSO to submit recommendations to him on the arrangements to be made, in particular the number of additional observation posts to be established and the number of additional observers, supporting staff and equipment required for that purpose.

154. Appended to the above memorandum was the letter dated 23 October from the representative of Lebanon stating that, in view of the situation in southern Lebanon, his Government was requesting an increase in the number of United Nations observation

posts and observers, as extension of the scale of the observation system would provide UNTSO with wider observation coverage of the armistice demarcation line.

155. In his second memorandum dated 27 October and published as annex II to document S/10818, the Secretary-General stated that the Chief of Staff in pursuance of his request, had informed him that, after consultations with the Lebanese authorities and a joint reconnaissance of the possible areas for additional posts, he recommended that two additional observation posts be set up, one at Marouahine and the other south-east of Markaba. He also recommended that existing OP Naq be relocated to Labboune. The new arrangement would require an increase of the number of observers from 21 to 34, in addition to 4 field service officers, who could be provided from other UNTSO sectors for a limited period. The eventual need for additional observers would have to be assessed in the light of the later experience. The Secretary-General felt that the new observation posts, together with the relocation of OP Naq, would increase the coverage of the armistice demarcation line and thus make the cease-fire observation more effective. If there was no objection, he would proceed with the arrangements recommended by the Chief of Staff.

156. During the consultations among the Council members on 30 October, the representative of China made a statement, which was circulated at his request in a note issued on that day by the President of the Council (S/10819). In that statement China expressed its firm support of the Arab peoples in their struggle to resist aggression and safeguard their sovereignty and territorial integrity, and of the Palestinian people in their struggle to restore their national rights and said that it had always held different views in principle on the question of sending United Nations observers. However, in view of the request made by the country concerned and the prevailing circumstances China would not oppose the proposal for an increase in the number of observers.

157. In a letter dated 3 November (S/10825), the representative of India stated, with reference to the letter of 30 October from the President of the Council to the Secretary-General (S/10818), that, although his delegation had readily concurred with the decision reflected therein, it had expressed its reservations during the consultations with regard to the procedure followed for coming to that decision.

158. In a report dated 2 November (S/10824), the Secretary-General stated that following receipt of the letter from the President of the Council of 30 October (S/10818), he had instructed the Chief of Staff of UNTSO to proceed immediately with the implementation of the arrangements set forth in his memorandum of 27 October. Subsequently, the two proposed additional observation posts had been set up and become operational on 2 November 1972. In addition, OP Naq had been relocated and renamed OP Lab. The former OP Naq had been converted to an outstation called Naqoura outstation and would have administrative functions. Each of the new posts would cover up to 10 kilometres of the armistice demarcation line, and the observers would move as the situation required and at the request of the Lebanese authorities. He reported that Israel had been informed by the Chief of Staff of the new arrangements, and the UNTSO logistics convoy dispatched from UNTSO headquarters in Jerusalem had crossed both the Israeli and Lebanese checkpoints without delay.

159. In a further report dated 22 February 1973 (S/10824/Add.1), the Secretary-General, after recalling his statement that the future need to recruit additional observers would have to be assessed in the light of experience, noted that the Chief of Staff had carefully assessed the personnel requirements of UNTSO to determine whether he could avoid new recruitments while maintaining the operations of UNTSO at the current level and had reported to him that, by giving more flexibility to the deployment of observers and assigning functions of a non-operational nature to field service staff, he would be able to manage without the 13 additional observers originally requested. The Secretary-General endorsed the recommendations of the Chief of Staff, and pointed out that the Government of Finland was willing to provide four additional observers to replace four Finnish vehicle drivers/mechanics who had observer status and who had been repatriated without replacement. In conclusion, the Secretary-General stated that it was his intention to implement the recommendations of the Chief of Staff not later than 15 March 1973.

160. In a letter dated 30 March (S/10907), the President of the Council informed the Secretary-General that, with regard to his report of 22 February, he had consulted with the members of the Council, who had expressed no objection to implementing the recommendations of the Chief of Staff as set forth in the above report.

161. In an additional report dated 2 April (S/10824/Add.2), the Secretary-General, recalling that he had informed the Security Council of his intention to implement the recommendations of the Chief of Staff not later than 15 March, stated that, at the request of the President of the Council, he had agreed to postpone the proposed action until the end of March. After referring to the letter of the President of the Council, he said that on 30 March he had taken the necessary action to provide UNTSO with four additional Finnish observers and four field service officers.

(i) Communications and reports received between 1 January and 12 April 1973 and request for meeting

162. From 1 January to early April the Chief of Staff continued to report regularly on various incidents in the Israel-Lebanon sector (S/7930/Add.1853-1860, 1862-1863, 1865-1898, 1900-1959) involving crossing and recrossing of the border by Israeli forces and temporary occupation of positions inside Lebanese territory by those forces. The reports indicated frequent flights by Israeli jet aircraft over the southern part of Lebanon and recorded complaints by the Lebanese authorities about those flights and other incidents.

163. In a letter dated 21 February 1973 (S/10885), Lebanon complained that armed Israeli terrorist bands had landed north of Tripoli and had attacked two Palestinian refugee camps. At the refugee camp of El Bedaoui 13 persons had been killed and 10 injured, and at the refugee camp of Naher El Bared 17 had been killed and 10 injured. Those acts of aggression were in violation of the Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Israel-Lebanon Armistice Agreement and fitted well into Israel's policy of striking at the Palestinian people wherever they might be.

164. Israel, in a letter dated 21 February (S/10887), replied that its action had been directed

against terrorist centres where foreign terrorists were being trained for action against Israel. Those camps, the letter added, were used as headquarters for Al Fatah and the Popular Front, which operated one of the camps, and Black September. The letter listed various acts of terrorism carried out by members of those organizations and stated that it was Israel's duty to protect its people from attacks by terror organizations that were permitted to remain in Lebanon and enjoyed its support.

165. With regard to the above incidents, the Chief of Staff reported, on 21 February (S/7930/Add.1906), that a complaint had been received from Lebanon alleging that an airborne Israeli force had attacked the Palestinian camps of El Bedaoui and Naher El Bared, north of Tripoli, and that there had been several killed and injured. However, the complaint had not been confirmed by the United Nations observers, as the location of the incident was outside their observation range.

166. In a report dated 10 April (S/7930/Add.1957), the Chief of Staff stated that a complaint had been received from Lebanon alleging that, during the night of 9/10 April, Israeli forces had attacked and destroyed several civilian houses in Beirut and a gasoline station in Saida and that several persons had been killed and wounded and property had been damaged. He added that Lebanon's complaint had been confirmed by United Nations military observers for the portion of the complaint pertaining to damage in Beirut and Saida.

167. In a letter dated 11 April (S/10911), Lebanon charged that, on the preceding night, Israeli naval units had landed south of Beirut and debarked a squad of Israeli terrorists who had driven away in civilian cars to predetermined objectives, where they had killed three prominent Palestinian leaders. Two of the policemen who had clashed with the attackers had been killed and nine wounded. Another group of Israeli terrorists had blown up a building and a garage in other parts of the city. The attack had killed 12 persons and wounded 29. The letter referred to Israel's attack of 21 February on Palestinian refugee camps and reiterated Lebanon's protest and condemnation of Israel's repetitious aggression which had been condemned by the Security Council. In pursuance of a policy of attacking the Palestinian people without provocation, the letter continued, Israel had engaged in acts of warfare, aggression and terrorism against Lebanon in violation of the Armistice Agreement of 1949, international law and all norms of international morality. Lebanon hoped that the Security Council would take the necessary measures to put an end to Israel's aggression.

168. Israel replied on the same day (S/10912) that its action of 9/10 April had been against terrorist bases, headquarters and hideouts in the Beirut area. Official statements issued in Beirut had confirmed that those killed had been leaders of the Palestine Liberation Organization. Reiterating that Lebanon was a centre for the planning and execution of terrorist attacks against civilians in Israel and elsewhere, the letter added that, by allowing its territory to be exploited and abused by terrorists, Lebanon had forfeited the right to claim respect for its territory and that the only way for Lebanon to extricate itself from that situation was by fully observing its international obligations and eliminating completely the presence of the terrorist groups and their activities on and from Lebanese soil.

169. By a letter dated 12 April (S/10915), the representative of Algeria transmitted to the President of the Council a message from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Algeria regarding the act of aggression by Israel against the capital of Lebanon. The Foreign Minister stated that Israel's policy of escalation was designed to stir up conflict in the Middle East so that Israel could impose its will on the Arab countries and the people of Palestine. He urged that the Council act to ensure respect for its decisions, adding that lasting peace in the region depended on the restoration of the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people and the withdrawal of Israel's aggressive forces.

170. By a letter dated 12 April (S/10913) the representative of Lebanon drew the attention of the President of the Council to Israel's aggression against Lebanon on 10 April, and in view of the gravity of that act and the threat it posed to the peace and security in the Middle East, he requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council to deal with the question.

(j) *Consideration at the 1705th to 1711th meetings (12-20 April 1973)*

171. At its 1705th meeting on 12 April, the Council included the complaint of Lebanon (S/10913) in its agenda. The representatives of Lebanon and Israel, and subsequently those of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, the Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, and Jordan were invited, at their request, to participate in the discussion without the right to vote.

172. The representative of Lebanon stated that on 10 April, a squad of 35 Israeli terrorists in civilian clothes had landed in the southern outskirts of Beirut and driven in civilian Lebanese cars towards predetermined objectives in the city. They had attacked buildings in several areas, killing three members of the Palestine Liberation Organization and blowing up buildings. A total of 12 people had been killed, including two Lebanese policemen, two Lebanese civilians, three Syrian workers, four Palestinians and an Italian woman. Twenty-nine persons, all Lebanese, had been wounded. Lebanon, which depended on the Charter of the United Nations and the Security Council for its protection, considered that the Council had an obligation not only to find solutions to problems but to offer protection to States that were victims of aggression. The Council had repeatedly passed resolutions regarding Israel's aggression against Lebanon and other Arab States, but those resolutions had been met with Israel's contempt and defiance. He noted that Lebanon was a peaceful country that relied not on military power but on international order and legality for its protection. It was the responsibility of the Security Council under the Charter to protect small, peaceful and defenceless States. Israel alleged that it was conducting warfare against terrorism in order to prevent future terrorist acts, and that terrorist organizations were harboured in Lebanon with the connivance of its Government. In fact, however, it was Israel that was maintaining itself by means of State-organized terrorism. The history of Israeli terrorism in the Middle East was well known. Zionist terrorism had driven 1.5 million Palestinians out of their homeland, and most of them were living in refugee camps as a result of a continuing process of terror and terrorism. Of those refugees, 300,000 lived in Lebanon, which could not be held responsible for their desire to return to their homes and for their spirit of resistance against

the aggressor. Lebanon, which had deployed every effort to promote peaceful conditions in the area, could not bear the responsibility that should be borne by the international community to solve the problem of the Palestinians. Israel's repeated acts of aggression, he concluded, could not go unpunished, and the Council should take a more meaningful action than condemnation so as to put an end to Israeli aggression against Lebanon.

173. The representative of the United States stated that the events in Lebanon had been followed by an attempt to spread a big lie, namely, a charge that the United States Government had connived or colluded in those events and that the American Embassy in Beirut was harbouring persons who had been involved. That accusation which, he added, had originated with those who opposed a peaceful settlement and practised terrorism, was totally without foundation. He hoped that reasonable people would recognize how defamatory and irresponsible such a charge was. His Government deplored violence and regretted the mounting toll in innocent lives, and had not had any part in, or knowledge of, the Israeli raid on Lebanon on 10 April.

174. The representative of Israel charged that Lebanon had convened the Council to seek a licence for the continuation of terrorism. While the world had been reacting with indignation to the actions of Arab terror groups, the Arab States had continued to give them support and still harboured terrorist bases within their borders. His Government, he stressed, was duty-bound to protect the lives of its citizens and to put an end to the assaults directed against men, women and children. That was the objective of its action on the night of 9/10 April against terrorist bases, headquarters and hideouts in the Beirut area, in particular, the Al Fatah headquarters there. Casualties had been inflicted on the terrorists, including some leaders of the Palestine Liberation Organization. Under the leadership of those men, terrorist actions in the last two years had totalled 105 attacks resulting in 228 casualties, including 116 deaths. It was common knowledge that Lebanon was a centre for the planning and execution of terrorist attacks against civilians in Israel and elsewhere. Terrorists maintained their headquarters, workshops for the manufacture of weapons and recruitment and information offices in Lebanon's capital with the consent of the Lebanese authorities. Nothing could justify Lebanon's agreement to the maintenance of terror centres and bases on its territory. As long as the Lebanese Government chose to do so it must be considered an accomplice in the terrorists' campaign. Israel's action against the terrorist centres in Beirut had saved the lives of many in the Middle East and other regions, and if that action had been taken earlier, many innocent lives would have been spared.

175. The representative of Saudi Arabia said that Lebanon had never been an aggressor and had never encroached on its neighbours. It was one of the freest countries in the world; otherwise it would not have been possible for spies to prepare the recent terrorist act by Israel in Lebanon. There were about 300,000 Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, and such a country, which had many sects living in peace together, could not engage in internal strife or civil war in order to discover and punish those conniving to perpetrate any action against Israel. The responsibility for that situation fell on the United Nations, where the major Powers had voted to create Israel. As long as there

were Palestinian refugees dispersed all over Arab lands and the world at large, there would be no peace in the area or anywhere in the whole world and terrorism would prevail. It was the responsibility of the major Powers to put an end to that situation. The frustrated Palestinians were not accountable to Lebanon, to Egypt or to Jordan, and because of their frustration they had developed psychoses which generated violence and endangered the life of everyone.

176. At the 1706th meeting on 13 April, the representative of Algeria said that, with the help received from the United States, Israel was practising the same terrorism for which it had condemned the Palestinians. The Palestinian people were waging a struggle for survival as an Arab people. It was true that terrorism was inhumane, but the Palestinians had no regular army to fight the Israeli forces, and they had resorted to the only form of struggle open to them. In face of the struggle of an entire people, it was an illusion to think that Israeli terrorism could break the determination of the Palestinians. The Middle East problem, he continued, would not be solved so long as Israel maintained its Zionist doctrine, which opposed the rightful claims of the Palestinians to live in their own country and claimed to represent all Jewish colonies in the world.

177. The representative of the Syrian Arab Republic said that the real question before the Council was the terrorism practised by Israel as a doctrine, a faith and a cult. It was Israeli terrorism that should be considered by the Council, particularly in its flagrant violation of the sovereignty of Member States. Under the pretext of security, Israel was striking deep into Arab territories, and sooner or later, with one aggression after another, would achieve the "great Israel". Its terrorism was escalating, and it was preparing international public opinion for a new war against the Arab countries to eliminate forever what remained of the Palestinian people. Israel, he said, would not have attained those dimensions of arrogance had it not been for the unconditional support of the United States, and he questioned whether that support was not an invitation to Israel to do whatever it chose to do against the Arab countries. Affirming that his country's attitude concerning the question of Palestine and Israel's aggression against the Arab countries was based on the principles of the Charter and international law, he said that peace in the Middle East depended on the recognition of the right of the people of Palestine to their land and to the free exercise of their right to self-determination and on the complete, immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Israel forces from all occupied Arab territories.

178. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that in the last four years the Council had 10 times taken up questions involving Israel's aggressive acts against Lebanon and that it was no accident that Israel should have refused to support General Assembly resolution 2936 (XXVII) on the non-use of force in international relations and the permanent prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. In the light of the latest events, he went on to say, it had become even more obvious that that resolution, which protected the lawful interests of the victims of imperialist and colonial aggression through its provision regarding the non-use of force in international relations, also reaffirmed the principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force. Consequently any further act of aggression by Israel should be considered

not only a breach of the Charter but a breach of that new rule of international law. In upholding that resolution the Security Council was duty-bound to take appropriate measures to secure the full implementation of that provision. He then recalled that the Council had, in recent years, warned Israel that if it continued its aggressive acts against Lebanon, the Council would consider further actions under the Charter. Israel, he added, had continued to ignore and violate the decisions of the Security Council and the resolutions of the General Assembly. Turning to the events under consideration, he said that Israel's actions in Lebanon were part of Israel's policy of intimidation and State terror. The latest operation had been praised by the Israeli Government and pictured as a kind of retaliatory measure. The USSR, he affirmed, was against all international terrorism that upset the diplomatic activity of States and their representatives. It was also opposed to attempts to influence the policy of States by acts of terrorism, as well as terrorist acts by individuals. The USSR was just as firmly opposed to terrorist acts by irresponsible individuals being used by the aggressor as justification for its own aggressive action against other countries. Accordingly, his delegation condemned Israeli terrorist methods and Israel's raising terrorism to the rank of national State policy. The Soviet Union felt that there was urgent need for a just settlement in the Near East on the basis of Council resolution 242 (1967), which provided for the withdrawal of Israel troops from all the Arab territories occupied in 1967, and recognized the need to ensure the exercise of the lawful rights of the Arab people of Palestine. In that respect, the permanent members of the Security Council ought to make every effort to curb Israeli aggressions. The Soviet Union was prepared to make every necessary effort to bring about a political settlement and was prepared immediately to resume consultations among the five permanent members of the Council to help the Secretary-General's Special Representative. His Government was concerned at the tension in the area, which had been further exacerbated by the recent Israeli raids against Lebanon. The Security Council had not only condemned Israel but warned it of more effective measures under the Charter, should it continue its aggressive acts. The time had come for the Security Council to take those effective measures and halt Israel's acts of aggression.

179. The representative of the Sudan said that from the moment of its creation by the United Nations, Israel had based its existence on military settlements and a huge military institution built on the old organs of terrorism, such as Haganah, the Irgun and the Stern gangs that had been responsible for murders before and after the creation of Israel. All the incidents of violence cited by the representative of Israel and for which he held Lebanon responsible were the ultimate results of Israel's own aggression and terrorism. From the statements of the representative of Israel before the Council and his repeated rationalizations of the crimes against Lebanon, it appeared that aggression against that country would continue to be repeated in the name of the security of Israel. Israel's ultimate aim was to exterminate the 2.5 million Palestine Arabs who claimed their right to self-determination. However, a people determined to struggle for its inherent rights could not be frightened by force of arms or dissuaded by a bribe of 1 per cent of Arabian oil revenues as had been naïvely suggested by the representative of Israel. The Palestinians should no longer be called refugees and

forced to live on charity, as it was the duty of the United Nations to uphold their rights. The Council should condemn Israel's acts of aggression against Lebanon in the strongest terms and if Israel continued to take the law into its own hand and extend its terrorism, the Council should seriously consider applying effective measures against it under the Charter.

180. The representative of Yugoslavia said that the latest Israeli raid was the latest example of an escalated war-like policy based on the use of military force. The previous acts of aggression by Israel against two refugee camps and the downing of a civilian aircraft were also tragic events to be seen in the context of the policy of ready use of naked force. His Government, as well as the United Nations, had condemned the policy of intimidation by force and of territorial expansion. However, what was particularly onerous was that a stronger, larger and better equipped force had been used against a small, weak and peaceful country whose only protection was the United Nations. It was in that context that the Council had to react and meet time after time. The most recent attack constituted a most blatant example of international terrorism—terrorism by States. It was quite inadmissible to link it or equate it with individual terrorist activity. The principal reason for the crisis in the Middle East was Israel's refusal to comply with Council resolution 242 (1967) and other relevant United Nations resolutions that covered Israel's hold on the occupied Arab territories and its expansionist policy and constant denial of the basic rights of the Palestinians. Therefore, the Council must stress that it was not prepared to tolerate Israel's total disrespect for the international community, for the United Nations and for its decisions. It must condemn the Israeli attack on Lebanon and the assassination of the Palestinian Liberation Movement members there.

181. At the 1707th meeting on 16 April, the representative of Egypt said that the aggression against Lebanon on the night of 10 April had not been committed by common criminals but by Israeli soldiers trained and ordered by their Government; the Israeli authorities who lauded those acts of murder had served notice that they would be repeated in Lebanon and elsewhere, which suggested that Israel had assigned to itself an imperial role in the area. All the condemnations and warning of the Council concerning Israeli aggression against Lebanon had had no effect on the authorities of Tel Aviv; consequently, those authorities espoused murder and assassination as a formal State policy and practice. It was unbelievable that Israel should continue to receive ever increasing massive military and economic assistance from a Member State, after all the Council resolutions relating to attacks against Lebanon alone. It was inconceivable that such massive aid should be provided to Israel while it occupied the territories of Egypt, Jordan and the Syrian Arab Republic, made a mockery of the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence and boycotted the peace mission of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. A ban on provision of military supplies and financial aid to Israel was essential for the attainment of peace in the Middle East. The Council should call upon all Member States, especially the permanent members, to interrupt their economic assistance and military supplies to Israel. He announced that he intended to ask for a full review of the entire Middle East situation by the Council, including specific steps for a thorough examination of United Nations efforts to implement all its resolutions

and to apply the basic principles of the Charter. Egypt would soon request a full report by the Secretary-General's Special Representative. The Council and the world had the right and the duty to know whether peace efforts in the Middle East had reached a dead end.

182. The representative of China said that his delegation wished to express its utmost indignation and strong condemnation of the aggression committed by Israeli Zionists. The incident of 10 April was the continuation of a series of atrocities committed by the Israeli Zionists over a long period and another proof that they resorted to aggression as their State policy. Statements by Israeli officials had extolled that incident, and the Israeli representative in the Council had openly declared that Israel would assume the right to attack Palestinians. It was just that the Palestinian people who had been driven from their homeland should fight for their rights to national existence and against the Israeli aggressors. The Palestinian and other Arab peoples would unite closely and push to the end their struggle against the aggressors. The connivance and encouragement of the two super Powers were the basic reasons for Israel's refusal to withdraw from large tracts of Arab territories. The two super Powers were deliberately maintaining a situation of "no war, no peace" in the Middle East and making deals at the expense of the Palestinian and other Arab people's national rights, territory and sovereignty so as to facilitate their contention for important strategic points and oil resources in that area. One super Power had been supporting the Israeli aggressors with arms and economic aid. The other was pouring a steady flow of manpower into Israel to supply the aggressors with sources for troop recruitment and technical specialists. His delegation reaffirmed that the Chinese Government and people firmly supported the Palestinian, Lebanese and other Arab peoples in their just struggle against the Israeli aggressors and considered that the Council must condemn and stop Israel's aggression.

183. Charging that the representative of the Soviet Union, in a statement on 13 April, had made attacks and threats against the Chinese and other delegations that opposed the Soviet proposal regarding the non-use of force in international relations, he recalled that the Chinese delegation, at the twenty-seventh session of the General Assembly, had made a full analysis and refutation of the Soviet delegation's argument, which distorted the spirit of the Charter. In again playing up the theory of the absolute non-use of force in international relations, which made no distinction between the aggressor and the victim of aggression, and at a time when the Israeli Zionists had just committed serious aggression against the Palestinian and Lebanese peoples, the Soviet position amounted to whitewashing the aggressors' crime.

184. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that the statement by the representative of China was slanderous and a distortion of the position of the USSR and of the substance of General Assembly resolution 2936 (XXVII) on the non-use of force in international relations and the permanent prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. That resolution, the Soviet representative emphasized, despite the slanderous assertions of the representative of China, helped the victims of aggression and untied their hands in the struggle against the aggressor. In that resolution the United Nations expressed its support for the

fighters for national liberation. It was for that very reason that the South African racists and the Portuguese colonists — who were stifling the freedom of the African peoples — had voted against that resolution. And now China found itself in the same company. The statement just made by China confirmed, moreover, that China sided with the Israeli aggressors because it was going along with them in the fight against General Assembly resolution 2936 (XXVII) on the non-use of force in international relations and the permanent prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. He called upon the Chinese representative to desist from trying to lead the Security Council in the direction of anti-Sovietism and slander against the Soviet Union and, instead, to put forward concrete proposals designed to stop Israeli aggression against the Arab States.

185. The representative of China said that the Soviet representative's proposal on the "non-use of force" was purely hypocritical and reactionary. He pointed out that in 1968 the Soviet Union had sent large numbers of troops to invade the capital of one of its allies, that in 1971 it had supported by force the dismemberment of a State Member of the United Nations, that it now maintained a large number of troops and military bases beyond its borders and that it stationed a million troops along the frontiers of China to threaten China. Was all this in conformity with the principle of the "non-use of force in international relations"? One should not only listen to someone's words but also look at his deeds, and by so doing it would not be difficult to see his true features.

186. At the 1708th meeting on 17 April, the representative of the United Kingdom said that he took part in the debate in a spirit of profound depression. Far from moving forward, the search for peace in the Middle East went backwards. Far from peace and counsels of moderation prevailing, there was ever-increasing violence, with the scene dominated by extremists. His Government consistently deplored all acts of violence and terrorism in the Middle East and sympathized with the cause and fate of the Palestine refugees, who had been the subject of endless United Nations debates and resolutions. It was not surprising that bitterness and hatred should grow in their hearts and that, in despair, some should turn to violence. However, the international community could not tolerate the killing of innocent people, the murder of diplomats and the disruption of communications. Not only must the Palestinians exercise restraint, but all Governments concerned must exert themselves to control violence. To deplore the acts of violence of the terrorist organizations, however, was not to condone Israel's attacks on Lebanon. Those, too, must be condemned. They constituted an act of official violence which could under no circumstances be justified under the Charter. To accept such action would be to revert to a state of international anarchy. While his Government could not agree that terrorism could be justified, it was not blind to the need to eradicate its root-causes and to deal with its underlying problems. The United Nations must show the refugees that the world had not forgotten them, and their legitimate aspirations must not be overlooked in any final settlement. The debate had ranged beyond the subject on the agenda but the wider issues of the Middle East situation could not be overlooked since until those issues were grappled with, such incidents would continue. His delegation would be glad to see the Council call upon the Secretary-General and his Special Representative to renew their efforts to

promote agreement on the basis of resolution 242 (1967).

187. The representative of Indonesia said that the problem of terrorism and counter-terrorism could not be considered apart from its root-causes, which were two-fold: the injustice inflicted upon the Palestinians, which had continued for 25 years, and the continued occupation by Israel of territories belonging to three Arab countries. He noted that efforts to implement resolution 242 (1967) had not succeeded in eliminating the second root-cause and added that as long as the Palestinians were deprived of their land and as long as Israel insisted on occupying lands belonging to others it would be illusory to imagine that violence born of political despair would cease. His country could not condone senseless acts of violence and wanton terrorism, but it did not view violence committed by desperate and frustrated people in the same light as the acts of terrorism committed by a Government in order to continue its unlawful occupation of other people's land. In resolution 280 (1970) the Security Council had already warned Israel that such flagrant violation of the peace could no longer be tolerated. His delegation was of the opinion that the time had come to take adequate and effective steps as referred to in resolution 280 (1970) and to implement fully the decisions which the Council had taken in the past. Indonesia, he said, would continue to support the struggle of the Arab peoples and was aware that any action by the Council, to be effective, could only be taken with the concurrence and co-operation of the permanent members of the Council.

188. The representative of Guinea said that fundamental to the problem in the Middle East was the inalienable right of the Palestinian people to a home, so that they could put an end to their wanderings, which had lasted almost a quarter of a century. She felt that it was imperative to seek an equitable solution to that situation and that the time had come for the international community to undo its error. The hope, once again, lay with the Powers which more than other Members of the Organization held the key to the solution of the Palestinian tragedy because it was they who created the problem. In particular, she called upon the Government of the United States, which provided Israel with financial and military assistance, to make Israel comply unconditionally with the provisions of resolution 242 (1967) and General Assembly resolution 2949 (XXVII).

189. The representative of Austria said that his Government condemned all acts of violence not only out of dedication to the principle of the peaceful solution of conflicts but out of deep respect for human life. Confronted with the recent violence, his Government shared with all delegations on the Council an extreme sense of urgency in seeking appropriate action. Council actions should be directed against the continuation of violence, but condemnation of violence by the Council could only achieve its aim, if it was directed against all forms and all sources of violence. Declaring that the absence of a solution and the passage of time explained the growing sense of frustration that had bred unrest and tension, he said that there existed a widely recognized basis for a solution. It lay in resolution 242 (1967), which contained all the elements required to bring about peace, justice and security for all nations in the area, including a just settlement of the refugee problem. That resolution demonstrated that

the United Nations was not incapable of devising the platform for a solution.

190. The representative of the United States asked if the recent acts of terror and counter-terror were to be accepted as the new rules of engagement in a tragic unresolved war and said that his country opposed violence and terror from whatever source and of whatever kind. Violence by conventional forces and violence by terrorists were to be condemned equally. One was as ugly as the other. Violations of the sovereignty of one State by another State should not be condoned, nor should murders, by individuals or groups, in violation of basic human rights. No Member State should attack another. Any such action only bred further violence. Neither should any State allow its territory to be used for the launching of terrorist attacks outside its territory. No State should harbour elements which attacked other States, or nationals of that State, wherever they might be. Such individuals, he said, depended on the support or acquiescence of Governments, contrary to General Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV) on friendly relations; therefore, it was the duty of each State not to condone or abet those acts of terrorism, whether they were directed against its own citizens or against the citizens of other countries. The real problem in the Middle East was how to break the vicious circle of violence. The overriding task of the Council was to move from recrimination to even-handed condemnation of all forms of violence, or there would be no progress towards peace. There must be an end to both cross-border attacks and individual acts of violence. The United Nations must leave no doubt as to the international community's disapproval of unwarranted and unnecessary loss of innocent lives from acts of terrorism and military responses to it. The time had come when there must be a halt to all acts of terror by all sides, and the Council should facilitate the turn from violence to peace, using the framework for an overall settlement that existed in resolution 242 (1967). That resolution, which called for a just settlement of the refugee problem, pointed the way to the goal of a lasting peace through which all the peoples of the Middle East could achieve security and justice. His Government recognized that peace in the Middle East could be achieved only by taking into full account the legitimate aspirations of the Palestinians.

191. The representative of Tunisia said that Israel would not succeed in silencing the Palestinians by attacks and incursions into Lebanon or elsewhere. He urged that the problem was no longer of concern solely to the Arabs and Jews of Palestine but to the entire international community, which should work towards an equitable solution. In 1947, he added, when the partition of Palestine was decided, the international community had been concerned only to satisfy the Zionists, who took advantage of sympathies aroused by Hitler's holocaust. At that time the Arab world was mostly under foreign domination, and instead of accepting the portion of Palestine that had been allocated to it under the United Nations partition resolution, the Arabs of Palestine had chose to reject partition and suddenly had found themselves chased from their homes to neighbouring Arab countries and to date they had been denied the right to exist in their own country or elsewhere. Even resolution 242 (1967) referred to the Palestinians only as refugees, whereas the question of their national rights was paramount in any settlement. It was obvious that the problem of Palestine remained before the Council and that it called

for two conclusions : first that the international community should take action to ensure that international law was applied in respect to the Palestinian people; second that the Security Council should hear the representatives of the Palestinian people. His Government held that the responsibility of the great Powers and the super-Powers was decisive in the Middle East but believed that a concerted effort by small and medium-sized countries, including the Arab countries, could design an intelligent and bold strategy that would lead to a more just assessment of the situation by the major Powers.

192. The representative of Australia said that his delegation found the continuing spectacle of violence and violent reprisal saddening and disturbing and felt that it must be deplored. The complete polarization of attitudes that had become frozen over the years helped to aggravate the already difficult task of the United Nations, particularly that of the Council. In his delegation's view, the first and most positive step would be to break the cycle of aggression and reprisal and turn back the wave of murderous violence and terror that had spread outwards from the area across the world. For his delegation, there could be no doubt that the incident at Beirut amounted to murder planned, directed and acknowledged by the Government of Israel and a deplorable intrusion upon the sovereignty of another Member State. As such, it must be censured. However, whether it was to be regarded as an act of aggression, retaliation, precaution or self-defence, it was only one of a succession of acts of violence and some of the neighbouring countries of Israel could scarcely escape charges of complicity in some of them. In conclusion, he warned that, if the United Nations failed to put an end to the further escalation of international terrorism, it was liable to have matters taken out of its hands.

193. At the 1709th meeting on 18 April, the representative of Kenya said his delegation regretted the human suffering that had ensued as a result of the spiralling cycle of violence in the Middle East, and in the name of human dignity and peace, it condemned all acts of terrorism and counter-terrorism. In his view, Lebanon's complaint could not be treated outside the context of the situation in the Middle East or in isolation from the questions of the future of the Palestinians and the occupied territories. He called on the members of the Council, as well as all other Members of the United Nations, to use the Charter of the United Nations as their guide in the conduct of their relations with other States, as it constituted the bedrock on which a just, fair and lasting peace could be built. The Council could not sit idly by while the Charter was daily violated; rather it should reactivate the machinery already set up in resolution 242 (1967). The Council, finally, must call upon the major Powers to ensure that the Secretary-General's Special Representative was given a chance to bring the parties together.

194. The representative of India said that Israel had the right, as did all other sovereign States, to defend its own territory and its own citizens within its own State. But he denied that it had the right to protect its citizens by using the force of arms against citizens in another country. Such a right would contradict the United Nations Charter and the rule of international law. If a citizen of Israel was put in jeopardy in a foreign country, Israel had every right to seek redress through the usual process of bilateral arrangements. India condemned and deplored terrorism

wherever it occurred and by whomever it was perpetrated, but it realized that if just solutions to problems were greatly delayed, people suffering from injustice and frustration would fall back on desperate measures, which often resulted in death and injury to innocent victims. The solution, he believed, must surely lay in an equitable and just end to the problems, as had been attempted in resolution 242 (1967), which unfortunately had not yet been implemented. He agreed with the Foreign Minister of Egypt that the time had come to ask for a full report from the Secretary-General and his Special Representative. It would also be welcome if the permanent members renewed their discussions. His delegation had some doubts as to whether New York was the right place for an objective debate on the Middle East problem and was, therefore, all the more grateful that the Foreign Minister of Egypt had travelled a long distance in his search for a just solution to the problem.

195. The representative of Panama said that his Government was greatly concerned at the recurrence of acts of violence and condemned them emphatically. International terrorism was a scourge that afflicted all the world and should in the opinion of his delegation, be studied as a separate problem. With regard to the complaint of Lebanon, Panama felt that Israel's attack against Lebanon was in open violation of international law and the sovereignty and territorial integrity of a State Member of the United Nations. Panama, which could not condone such acts, pronounced itself in favour of Lebanon and insisted that its territorial integrity be respected. His delegation would like to see a lasting peace established on the basis of resolution 242 (1967) but wished to express its fear that, if violence continued, there might be another conflict in the area, with unforeseeable consequences for all mankind.

196. The representative of France said his country attached particular importance to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Lebanon, a small country that was devoted to peace. Under the pretext of ensuring the security of its nationals Israel had declared that it must combat Palestinian terrorism the most recent manifestations of which had been the incidents in Khartoum and Cyprus. His delegation condemned all acts of violence and felt that the Palestinian cause had gained nothing from the infringement of the most elementary human rights, but it was obliged to draw a distinction between Palestinian terrorism, which was the result of uncontrollable elements, and the Israeli counter-terrorism organized and controlled by a State Member of the United Nations. In the view of his delegation, it was asking the impossible to expect that Lebanon should be able to control the legitimate aspirations of some 300,000 refugees living on its territory. The Beirut incident, and other similar ones could only jeopardize the efforts of those seeking a just and lasting peace in the area. He felt that the supply of arms to any of the parties could only serve to delay the restoration of peace. True peace required of the parties to the conflict a firm determination to negotiate and demanded that the Arab countries recognize the existence of Israel and that Israel concede that it could not indefinitely remain in possession of territories that did not belong to it. Therefore, his delegation continued to believe that the principles contained in resolution 242 (1967) must finally be applied and that the Secretary-General and his Special Representative should continue their efforts. A resumption of the meetings of the

permanent members of the Security Council could be useful, but, in the meantime, the request of Lebanon should be answered, and the Israeli attack must be condemned.

197. The President of the Council, speaking as the representative of Peru, said that this country condemned acts of violence against innocent victims, as well as arbitrary and unilateral reprisals, because both damaged the legal order. For his delegation, an international agreement was needed that would take into account the frustrated aspirations of a whole people. He added the world could not ignore the painful conditions of the people of Palestine, which remained removed from its ancestral home in a situation that could only lead to despair and violence. The Council has justly perceived that complex problem when, in resolution 242 (1967), it had laid down an integral approach to the Middle East question, including the Palestine tragedy, and provided the only possible framework for a just and lasting peace. What was needed, it appeared, was a new type of cease-fire, and the Council must therefore urge Israel to refrain from actions such as those currently being considered by the Council. That would pave the way for more long-range measures that could be taken in the future.

198. The representative of Egypt said that he had come to the Council to show his country's concern about the assault on Lebanon and to ask the Council to deal with the main problems of aggression, occupation, expansion and colonization. With regard to the question under consideration, he said that, when violence was discussed in the future, the accused should be brought before the Council. The representative of Tunisia has suggested that the Palestinians be heard in the Council. The United Nations had divided Palestine into two parts and therefore considered that Palestinians had a country. The Council should realize that it was not simply 33 months of cease-fire that had passed, but 33 months of occupation, which could only be described as simply intolerable.

199. On 19 April a draft resolution was submitted by France and the United Kingdom (S/10916) which read as follows:

"The Security Council,

"Having considered the agenda contained in document S/Agenda/1705,

"Having noted the contents of the letter of the Permanent Representative of Lebanon (S/10913),

"Having heard the statements of the representatives of Lebanon and Israel,

"Grieved at the tragic loss of civilian life,

"Gravely concerned about the deteriorating situation resulting from the violation of Security Council resolutions,

"Deeply deploring all acts of violence resulting in the loss of life of innocent individuals and the endangering of international civil aviation,

"Recalling the General Armistice Agreement between Israel and Lebanon of 23 March 1949 and the cease-fire established pursuant to resolutions 233 (1967) and 234 (1967),

"Recalling its resolutions 262 (1968) of 31 December 1968, 270 (1969) of 26 August 1969, 280 (1970) of 19 May 1970 and 316 (1972) of 26 June 1972,

"1. *Expresses deep concern* over and deplores all acts of violence which endanger or take innocent human lives;

"2. *Condemns* the repeated military attacks conducted by Israel against Lebanon and Israel's violation of Lebanon's territorial integrity and sovereignty in contravention of the Charter of the United Nations, of the Israel-Lebanon Armistice Agreement and of the Security Council's cease-fire;

"3. *Calls upon* Israel to desist forthwith from all military attacks on Lebanon;

"4. *Warns* Israel that, if such attacks were to be repeated, the Council would meet to consider what further and more effective steps or measures could be taken to ensure against their repetition."

200. On the same date an amendment to the two-Power draft resolution was submitted by Guinea, India, Indonesia and Yugoslavia (S/10917) which provided for the addition of the following paragraph at the end of the draft resolution:

"5. *Calls upon* all States to refrain from providing any assistance which encourages such military attacks or impedes the search for a peaceful settlement."

201. At the 1710th meeting on 20 April, the representative of Egypt said that the Middle East situation defied any solution because of the support lent by the United States to Israel in underwriting its occupation by military and financial assistance. The Declaration on friendly relations contained in General Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV) had been invoked. That Declaration affirmed the inviolability of international boundaries, the prohibition of military occupation, the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force and the non-recognition of such acquisition, as well as the prohibition of armed reprisal. It also supported the right of all peoples to self-determination which certainly included the people of Palestine. He expressed the hope that the Council, having heard all the statements, would respond favourably to his request to reconvene in the near future in order to review and examine in depth the situation in the Middle East. The Council, he added, should be assisted by a comprehensive report prepared by the Secretary-General on the efforts undertaken by the United Nations pertaining to the situation in the Middle East since June 1967. He inquired how much time the Secretary-General anticipated that the preparation of such a report would take and submitted a draft resolution (S/10918) with that end in view. He expressed the hope that a member of the Council would request that his proposal be put to the vote and that it be accorded priority in the voting. The draft resolution read as follows:

"The Security Council,

"Having heard the statement of the Foreign Minister of the Arab Republic of Egypt.

"1. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit to the Security Council as early as possible a comprehensive report giving full account of the efforts undertaken by the United Nations pertaining to the situation in the Middle East since June 1967;

"2. *Decides* to meet following the submission of the Secretary-General's report to examine the situation in the Middle East;

"3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to invite Mr. Gunnar Jarring, the Special Representative of

the Secretary-General, to be available during the Council's meetings in order to render assistance to the Council in the course of its deliberations."

202. The Secretary-General stated that it should be possible to prepare a report such as that proposed by the representative of Egypt in three to four weeks. He recalled that on 4 January 1971 he had issued a comprehensive report (S/10070) covering the activities of the Special Representative from 1967 to the end of 1970, and that, since then, there had been other reports concerning the activities of the Special Representative.

203. The representative of Jordan, said that his country, which had had more than one-third of its population under occupation since 1967, had a direct interest in a serious review of the situation and early action to roll back Israeli occupation, liberate the people in its bondage, restore the rights of the masses of people in exile and establish a just and lasting peace in the area. For six years the Arab countries involved had sought every avenue for a peaceful settlement. The occupying Power, however, was consolidating its occupation and absorbing the occupied areas. Settlements had been established, large-scale expropriation of land was taking place with the forcible removal of the owners and Arab Jerusalem had been annexed and its unique and universal religious character had been suppressed by blind religious chauvinism. Such a process of continuing aggression must be halted, and that was the primary responsibility of the Security Council.

204. The representative of the Sudan said that his delegation was formally making a motion, in accordance with rule 38 of the rules of procedure, that the Council should vote on the draft resolution submitted by Egypt, which he hoped it would adopt unanimously.

205. The representative of the United States said that his delegation was far from certain about the usefulness of the review proposed by the Foreign Minister of Egypt. In the emotional circumstances of the moment his delegation was concerned lest new discussion produce contention, lest contention produce new difficulties for those who must seek to construct the framework of a lasting peace in the Middle East.

206. Following statements in explanation of vote before the vote, the President inquired whether there was any objection to proceeding to a vote on the Egyptian draft resolution (S/10918) in accordance with the request of its sponsor that it should be given priority in the voting and the request of the representative of the Sudan that it should be put to the vote in accordance with rule 38 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure. There being no objection, he further inquired whether the Council agreed to approve the draft resolution without a vote.

Decision: *At the 1710th meeting on 20 April 1973, the Egyptian draft resolution (S/10918) was adopted unanimously as resolution 331 (1973).*

207. At the same meeting the representative of France introduced a revision (S/10916/Rev.1) of the draft resolution sponsored by France and the United Kingdom. He stated that its text had been the subject of long negotiations and seemed to meet the essential points of concern which had emerged in the Council in connexion with the complaint by Lebanon. In the revised text, operative paragraph 1 was amended by the substitution of the word "condemns" for the word "deplores" and operative paragraph 4 was deleted.

208. The representative of Guinea, on behalf of the sponsors of the four-Power amendment (S/10917) to the two-Power draft resolution, withdrew that amendment because, she explained, it had referred to the original text of that draft resolution and not to the revised text.

209. At the 1711th meeting on 21 April, the representative of India stated that the changes made in the two-Power draft resolution had modified the principle that there could be no equation or balance between individual acts of violence and State-controlled raids into other States, as well as the principle that the Council had to draw a sharp distinction between those who took the law into their own hands and those who came to the Council for redress. The revised draft blurred the perspective of the total picture of the situation in the Middle East. His delegation would have preferred the first text together with the four-Power amendment. The Indian delegation's logical attitude would therefore, have been to abstain in the vote. However, Lebanon found the present text acceptable and it would not be right not to support the draft and so offer any possible comfort to Lebanon. Consequently India would vote for the two-Power draft resolution.

210. The representative of Guinea said that her country had always affirmed the right of the people of Palestine to fight for the reconquest of their national territory. She felt that the Palestinian people could not be denied that right and that the general problem of the Middle East could not be separated from the specific case presented by Lebanon. Because the revised two-Power draft condemned the liberation movements and Israel on equal footing, her delegation, in order to be consistent, would abstain in the vote on it.

211. The representative of China said that his delegation found much of the contents of the two-Power draft acceptable. However, there were expressions that lent themselves to ambiguity, as they failed to distinguish between the aggressor and the victim of aggression, and therefore might be used by the Zionists to oppose the Palestinian and other Arab peoples. His delegation had made active but unsuccessful efforts to rectify those erroneous expressions. In the circumstances, his delegation would have to abstain in the voting on the revised two-Power draft resolution.

212. The representative of Indonesia said that his delegation would have been happier if the draft resolution had remained in its original form. Indonesia, however, would vote for the revised draft, because Lebanon considered that it met a large portion of its requirements and was prepared to live with it, and because his delegation considered its adoption as an interim measure since the Council had already adopted resolution 331 (1973) and would accordingly examine the situation in the Middle East following the submission of the Secretary-General's report on the situation.

213. The representative of the Sudan said that the draft resolution should have contained a precise reference to the acts of violence and terrorism committed directly by Israel on 10 April instead of referring in a general way to acts of violence for which Israel had ultimate responsibility because of its policy of aggression, occupation and terrorism. His delegation opposed any effort to interpret paragraph 1 as appli-

cable to the Palestinian national liberation movement. In compliance with the wishes of Lebanon, his delegation would vote in favour of the two-Power draft resolution.

214. The representative of Kenya said that his delegation would vote for the two-Power draft resolution, because it considered that it introduced the basic equity into the situation.

215. The representative of Panama said that, because Lebanon considered the text acceptable and because it reaffirmed the right of Lebanon to have its territorial integrity and sovereignty respected, his delegation would vote in favour of the two-Power draft resolution.

Decision: *At the 1711th meeting on 21 April 1972, the revised two-Power draft resolution (S/10916/Rev.1) was adopted by 11 votes to none, with 4 abstentions (China, Guinea, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and United States of America) as resolution 332 (1973).*

216. Resolution 332 (1973) read as follows:

"The Security Council,

"Having considered the agenda contained in document S/Agenda/1705,

"Having noted the contents of the letter of the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations (S/10913),

"Having heard the statements of the representatives of Lebanon and Israel,

"Grieved at the tragic loss of civilian life,

"Gravely concerned at the deteriorating situation resulting from the violation of Security Council resolutions,

"Deeply deploring all recent acts of violence resulting in the loss of life of innocent individuals and the endangering of international civil aviation,

"Recalling the General Armistice Agreement between Israel and Lebanon of 23 March 1949 and the cease-fire established pursuant to resolutions 233 (1967) of 6 June 1967 and 234 (1967) of 7 June 1967,

"Recalling its resolutions 262 (1968) of 31 December 1968, 270 (1969) of 26 August 1969, 280 (1970) of 19 May 1970 and 316 (1972) of 26 June 1972,

"1. Expresses deep concern over and condemns all acts of violence which endanger or take innocent human lives;

"2. Condemns the repeated military attacks conducted by Israel against Lebanon and Israel's violation of Lebanon's territorial integrity and sovereignty in contravention of the Charter of the United Nations, of the Armistice Agreement between Israel and Lebanon and of the Council's cease-fire resolutions;

"3. Calls upon Israel to desist forthwith from all military attacks on Lebanon."

217. Following the vote, the representative of Yugoslavia said that, although his delegation regarded the resolution as unbalanced and might appear to equate official terrorism by a Member State with other acts of violence, it had voted in favour of the revised text because the representative of Lebanon indicated that since it condemned Israel's repeated attacks against Lebanon it met some of Lebanon's basic requirements.

218. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics expressed satisfaction that the Council had adopted on the previous day an important de-

cision to consider within a short time the over-all situation in the Middle East in all its aspects. In his view, that resolution could constitute a turning point in the quest for a peaceful solution to the Middle East conflict on the basis of resolution 242 (1967). With regard to the two-Power draft resolution, he said that it was not sufficiently decisive or strong. His delegation would have voted for the initial text but could not support the revised draft because it did not provide effective measures to stop the aggression of Israel.

219. The representative of the United States said that his Government opposed international violence and terrorism from whatever source and of whatever kind, and had called for a move away from recrimination to even-handed condemnation of all forms of violence. Although his delegation was pleased that the resolution condemned both violence and terrorism, it had withheld its positive vote because the resolution focused too much on the meaningless exercise of trying to parcel out blame and fell short of meeting the full dimensions of the challenge facing the Security Council. His Government had no intention of taking steps that would alter the arms balance in the Middle East or otherwise contribute to instability, but he emphasized that the United States did not propose to sit idly by while others poured arms into the Middle East for one side, thus inevitably tempting some Governments to believe that with those new arms they could risk another round in the Middle East war. His Government had in the past six years sought insistently an agreement among the major arms suppliers to limit weapons shipments to that part of the world. The United States stood ready to participate at any time in such an arrangement if others were willing to put aside their special political objectives and work with the United States toward the goal of a reduced military confrontation.

220. The representative of Australia said that his delegation had voted for the revised draft resolution because the changes in the text had gone some distance towards injecting a measure of balance into the resolution.

221. The representative of Austria said that his delegation had voted for the two-power draft resolution because, in many respects, it condemned all acts of violence and addressed itself in no uncertain terms to a particular case. The resolution, moreover, was an urgent appeal to all parties involved to halt the use of violence and to exert all their influence in order to eliminate all acts of violence. It was also an important reaffirmation of Lebanon's sovereignty and territorial integrity.

222. The representative of the United Kingdom said that his delegation had been prepared to accept a draft with additional paragraphs. However, the resolution just adopted preserved the essential features of the original submitted by the sponsors and met the needs of the situation in responding to the complaint of Lebanon at the same time that it made clear the Council's abhorrence of all acts of violence. He regretted that the resolution had not been supported by all members of the Council.

223. The President, speaking as the representative of Peru, said that he had voted in favour of the draft resolution because, in its revised form, it contained the basic principles that had to be reflected in the Council's decision.

224. The representative of Israel said that the Security Council, by adopting resolution 332 (1973) had demonstrated that, because of its structure and composition it could not deal equitably with questions pertaining to the Middle East situation. The adoption of that resolution confirmed that, there was international law on the one hand, and words produced in the Council on the other, and that the twain rarely met. The resolution also confirmed that, in the absence of United Nations action against international terrorism, it was incumbent upon Governments to combat that scourge by their own means, and his Government would continue to protect its people from Arab murder attacks.

225. The representative of Lebanon said that, like most of his colleagues in the Council, he was not satisfied with the resolution. Lebanon would have wished more and had requested the Council to take further steps. In the past, the Council had adopted resolutions condemning the acts of Israel against Lebanon and had warned Israel against further attacks, pledging to take new steps and new measures, should there be a repetition of such attacks. The Council had just acted on a complaint by Lebanon, following a specific act of aggression against Lebanon admitted by the guilty party. In a sense, the new resolution met certain of Lebanon's requirements; but his delegation was unhappier with it than with the earlier text.

(k) *Reports to the Council received from 12 April to 15 June 1973*

226. From 12 April through 15 June, the Secretary-General continued to circulate reports received almost daily from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO (S/7930/Add.1959-1967, 1969-2023) concerning incidents in the Israel-Lebanon sector.

B. Questions concerning the treatment of civilian populations in Israel-occupied territories and related matters

227. In letters dated 15 and 23 June 1972, Israel (S/10700) and Egypt (S/10717) exchanged charges and counter-charges regarding the condition of the local inhabitants in the Gaza and Sinai areas. Israel stated that, contrary to Egypt's claim, life in those areas was marked by tranquillity and development and added that Egypt's claim was made in order to divert attention from its hostile and destructive policy of active support of Arab terror organizations. Egypt replied that Israel's claims were refuted by its official statements and by the International Committee of the Red Cross, which during April and May had reported acts of mass deportation, mass destruction, deportation of civilians and expropriation of property in the occupied territories of Sinai and Gaza.

228. In a letter dated 28 June (S/10724) Israel charged that the Jews of Syria were living in constant fear for their lives and that they were frequently the victims of violence by the authorities as attested by statements made all over the world in information media and at international conferences and assemblies where protests were voiced against the persecution of Jews in Syria.

229. In a letter dated 29 June (S/10726), Jordan informed the Secretary-General that during the second half of May and the month of June Israel had deported to the east bank 14 persons who had lived in the

occupied west bank and in Gaza. Therefore, measures should be taken to put an end to Israel actions that violated United Nations resolutions and the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949.

230. In a letter dated 28 June (S/10725), Egypt charged that Israel was pursuing a policy of terror aimed at compelling the civilian Arab population in the occupied areas to leave in order to make room for alien immigrant settlers in the land rightfully owned by the Arab people. Israel's terror warfare against innocent civilians had involved many measures which the Zionist propaganda machinery claimed had been made in the name of Israel's peace and security. However, no such propaganda effort to deny its deliberate aggression could disguise Israel's criminal intention for neither hypocrisy nor criminality would succeed in silencing the voices of resistance.

231. In a reply dated 3 July (S/10727), Israel stated that Egypt had distorted Israel's statements regarding Israeli policies with respect to terror warfare and terrorism in the Gaza Strip. Egypt's ire at those policies was due to the frustration of its schemes to keep those regions in constant terror and turmoil.

232. In a letter dated 4 January 1973 (S/10857), Egypt complained about the displacement of inhabitants and the destruction of towns, villages and homes, including refugee camps, undertaken by Israel in the Gaza Strip and the Rafah area in order to consolidate the illegal Israeli military occupation in defiance of numerous United Nations resolutions.

233. In a reply dated 17 January (S/10862), Israel stated that Egypt's letter was an expression of unhappiness with the fact that Israel had not kept the Gaza region in the state of misery and stagnation in which it had been found after 19 years of Egyptian occupation. Since 1967, there had been full employment and a rise in the standard of living. Egypt and other Arab States had tried to prevent that development by fomenting terror and violence, but had failed owing to the measures adopted by the Israeli authorities there.

234. In a letter dated 4 April (S/10908), Egypt complained that Israel was pursuing a systematic policy of coercing the civilian population of the occupied territory in order to compel them to leave. Invoking security measures its authorities had killed three persons and arrested 20 in the Gaza Strip during March, in violation of the Geneva Convention. Therefore, Egypt asserted measures should be taken to end Israel's breaches of law and morality and to protect the human rights of the inhabitants of the occupied territories.

235. Israel replied on 9 April (S/10910) that the three persons killed in the Gaza Strip had been terrorists responsible for attacks in the area.

236. In a letter dated 7 April (S/10909) Egypt, Jordan and the Syrian Arab Republic complained that according to recent reports Israel was considering a proposed legislation to authorize Israeli individuals to purchase land and property in the occupied territories. Israel, it was pointed out, had already taken other prejudicial measures in the occupied territories, such as expropriation of land and property, establishment of Israeli settlements, annexation of Arab Jerusalem, transfer of refugees and integration of the economy of the occupied areas with that of Israel. Such measures were in violation of the Charter, the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in

Time of War and United Nations resolutions and were the cause of deep concern. Therefore, they contended, action should be taken to oblige Israel to desist from any further such actions in the occupied territories.

C. The situation in and around Jerusalem and its Holy Places

237. During the period covered by this report, the President of the Security Council and the Secretary-General received several communications pertaining to the situation in Jerusalem and its Holy Places.

238. In a letter to the Secretary-General dated 10 August 1972 (S/10760), Jordan drew attention to new measures taken by Israel in violation of United Nations resolutions pertaining to Jerusalem and aimed at completing the Judaization of the Old City. In the preceding month, 3,500 Arab inhabitants of the Old City had received evacuation notices from "the Company for the Development of the Jewish Quarter in the Old City of Jerusalem", an Israeli company entrusted by the Israeli Government with the task of evacuating Arab inhabitants from the expropriated areas, the demolition of Arab buildings and the planning and construction of new buildings for new Jewish inhabitants. In view of those illegal actions, Jordan maintained that it was urgent that effective steps be taken to stop such Israeli measures that violated the United Nations resolutions and the fourth Geneva Convention of 1949.

239. In a reply dated 18 August (S/10765) Israel stated that the Jewish quarter of eastern Jerusalem, the subject of Jordan's complaint of 10 August, had been occupied by Jordan in 1948, its buildings destroyed and its entire Jewish population exiled. During 19 years of Jordanian occupation, Israel added, no Jews had been permitted to set foot in that quarter.

240. In a further letter dated 23 October (S/10814), Jordan again protested continued Israeli measures designed to change the character of occupied Jerusalem and to obliterate its Arab character. Israel, the letter said, was building 13 Jewish quarters on the ruins of Arab villages and quarters that had been or were being demolished in the area. Construction had also been continuing on confiscated Arab land inside and outside the walls of the Holy City in order to encircle the remaining Arabs of Jerusalem with residential, industrial and military buildings inhabited by Israelis. Once completed, those 13 quarters would contain 35,000 housing units, capable of accommodating 122,000 new Israeli Jewish residents, thus forming an Israeli Jewish population, many times larger than the Arab population and constituting a radical and a very serious change in the demographic and cultural composition of the City, as well as a physical mutilation of its historic character. Jordan held that the international community was duty bound to take speedy action to stop that development and to enforce the resolutions adopted by the Security Council and the General Assembly in regard to Jerusalem.

241. In a letter dated 25 November (S/10845), Egypt transmitted the text of a resolution adopted by the General Conference of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in Paris in 1972, urgently calling upon Israel to take the necessary measures for the scrupulous preservation of all sites, buildings and other cultural properties, especially in the Old City of Jerusalem, and to desist

from any alteration of the features of the City, as well as from any archaeological excavations.

242. In a letter dated 14 December (S/10848), Jordan complained that measures recently taken by the Israeli Military Governor of Hebron, on the west bank, which would increase the area allocated to Jews inside the Ibrahimi Mosque, were designed to obliterate the Islamic character of that prominent shrine and turn it into a synagogue.

243. In a reply dated 20 December (S/10851), Israel stated that the Jordanian complaint on the question of freedom of worship and the protection of holy sites was a distortion that ignored Jordan's record during its 19 years' occupation of west bank areas, including part of Jerusalem.

244. In a letter dated 14 February 1973 (S/10882) Jordan drew the attention of the Secretary-General to recent serious damage in the Al Aqsa Mosque, for which, he charged, Israel was responsible. One major wall of the Mosque had collapsed on 11 February in the same spot where a fire had broken out in August 1969 and threatened the entire structure. According to engineering experts the damage had been caused by cracks in the wall resulting from the 1969 fire and the drilling and demolition activities being carried out under the Mosque by the Israelis ostensibly as "archaeological excavations" which, should they continue, would cause the collapse of the other walls and, ultimately, the destruction of one of the holiest places of Islam. Israel, Jordan said, must halt all destructive activities in and around the Holy Places of Jerusalem. The international community could not stand and watch Israel defy the United Nations resolutions on Jerusalem and thus destroy the possibility of peace in the area.

245. In a reply dated 16 February (S/10883), Israel stated that Jordan had failed to report that a partial collapse of an interior wall had occurred during work carried out by Arab labourers digging for new marble pillars and that the work was being done under the direction of the Moslem Council in charge of the Mosque. According to a statement by that Council, the collapse of the wall had been anticipated and precautionary measures taken, and the continuation of the work in the Mosque would not be affected by the collapse of the wall. Moreover, Israel stated, that work was in no way connected with, or affected by, any archaeological activity, which was being conducted outside the area of the Mosque.

246. A number of communications were addressed to the Security Council on the question of holding a military parade in Jerusalem.

247. In a letter dated 23 April (S/10919), Jordan informed the Secretary-General of a reported Israeli plan to hold a military parade in Jerusalem on 7 May 1973 to celebrate Israel's twenty-fifth anniversary and stated that the parade would extend to occupied Jerusalem. Jordan recalled that, on a similar occasion in April 1968, the Security Council had, in its resolution 250 (1968), called upon Israel to refrain from holding a military parade in Jerusalem, and that after Israel had proceeded with the parade on 2 May 1968, the Council, in its resolution 251 (1968) had deeply deplored the holding of that parade in disregard of its resolution of 27 April. Jordan also recalled the many other resolutions pertaining to the status of Jerusalem and the rights of its inhabitants and calling upon Israel to take no further steps in the occupied section of

Jerusalem that might purport to change the status of the city or prejudice the rights of the inhabitants, the interests of the international community or a just and lasting peace. Israel, however, had persistently taken measures and implemented policies designed to change the physical, demographic and religious character of Arab Jerusalem and incorporate it into Israel. Israel's contemplated parade on 7 May, Jordan concluded, would not only defy the United Nations but affront the universal spiritual values embodied in Jerusalem.

248. In a note dated 30 April (S/10922), the President of the Security Council said that, in a statement he had made orally to the Permanent Representative of Israel on 27 April, he had pointed out that he had been informed by Jordan of Israel's intention to hold a military parade in Jerusalem on 7 May that would extend to Arab Jerusalem. As a result of consultations with all members of the Council, he then drew the attention of Israel to resolution 250 (1968) of 27 April 1968, in which the Council had called upon Israel to refrain from holding a similar parade, as well as to resolution 251 (1968), in which the Council had deeply deplored the holding by Israel of the military parade, in disregard of the Council's unanimous decision on 27 April 1968.

249. In a further letter dated 8 May (S/10924), Jordan complained that, despite the statement of the President of the Council to Israel on 27 April 1973, Israel had held a large military parade in Jerusalem on 7 May, partly in the sector occupied since June 1967, in violation of successive General Assembly and Security Council resolutions on Jerusalem and other aspects of the Middle East conflict. Its ugly exhibition of militarism in the Holy City should be a sharp reminder to the international community of the plight and agony of Jerusalem in Israeli captivity. Nothing, Jordan stated, could save the city and its inhabitants but the effective implementation of the United Nations resolutions and a speedy termination of Israeli occupation.

D. General statements and other matters brought to the attention of the Security Council in connexion with the situation in the Middle East

250. During the period under review, the Security Council and the Secretary-General received several communications relating to the Lod Airport incident of May 1972, the question of terrorism in the Middle East, the hijacking of aircraft and the incident in which a Libyan airliner was shot down over Sinai by Israeli air force planes.

251. The incident at Lod Airport in May 1972 continued to be the subject of communications containing charges and counter-charges by Israeli and some Arab countries. In letters dated 16 and 23 June 1972 (S/10701, S/10712 and S/10713), Israel continued to hold the Arab Governments responsible for the activities of Arab terror organizations which had culminated in the massacre at Lod Airport on 30 May 1972. In letters dated 16 and 20 June (S/10702 and S/10707) Lebanon and the Libyan Arab Republic rejected that responsibility. Lebanon stated that it could not be responsible for the actions of "non-Lebanese" travelling to Israel from a foreign country on a foreign airliner. Furthermore, the three Japanese who had perpetrated the outrage at Lod Airport had never set foot on Lebanese soil. The Libyan Arab Republic expressed

the view that the incident was not an isolated one but part of the conflict in the Middle East caused by Zionist aggression against the Palestinian people.

252. In a letter dated 20 June 1972 (S/10704), the Syrian Arab Republic, after referring to previous letters to the Secretary-General concerning the annexation by Israel of the occupied Golan Heights, stated that unequivocal statements had been issued by Israeli leaders following the 1967 war, affirming Israel's annexation of occupied Arab territories. The letter contained quoted statements and excerpts of articles from newspapers and magazines, all confirming Israel's intention to retain the occupied territories and to settle it with new emigrants, in violation of the inalienable right of the Arabs of Palestine and the newly displaced persons from occupied Arab territories to return to their homes, as well as in disregard of United Nations resolutions and the Geneva Conventions.

253. In communications dated 28 June and 3 July (S/10725 and S/10727), Egypt and Israel exchanged charges and counter-charges regarding terrorism in the Middle East. Egypt charged that Israel had followed a policy designed to attain its expansionist aims and that it practised terrorism in the name of peace and security. Israel replied that Egypt was denying a neighbouring people its right to life and seeking to destroy Israel and its people. Egypt had initiated and given full support to Arab terror organizations and had identified itself with their operations.

254. In a letter dated 6 July (S/10732), Israel drew attention to the problem of prisoners of war. According to the letter, Egypt at that time held 10 Israeli prisoners of war and the Syrian Arab Republic 3, while Israel was holding 61 prisoners of war from Egypt, 45 from the Syrian Arab Republic and 5 from Lebanon, all of whom were covered by the provisions of the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. The letter added that, despite Israel's repeated offer to arrange, through the International Committee of the Red Cross, the United Nations or diplomatic channels, for a general release and repatriation of all prisoners of war held by the parties, those efforts had been rejected by Egypt and the Syrian Arab Republic, contrary to their obligations under article 118 of the Convention.

255. In a further letter dated 8 September (S/10779), Israel complained of a campaign of atrocities and bloodshed pursued by Arab terror organizations against Israel, culminating in the murder of 11 Israeli sportsmen carried out on 5 September at the Olympic Games in Munich.

256. Stating that Arab States had initiated the establishment of the terror organizations, Israel added that the Arab policy of terror and murder was a grave threat to the general desire throughout the world to seek solutions of problems through negotiations and coexistence, and it was incumbent on the family of nations to take fundamental action to eliminate terrorism by exerting influence on the Arab Governments that backed and assisted terror organizations. In conclusion, Israel insisted that the Arab States put an end to the activities of the terror organizations by terminating the support given them and taking effective measures to prevent operation of terror organizations in and from their territory.

257. In a letter dated 11 September (S/10788), in reply to the above letter, Egypt stated that the general desire in the world to seek solutions of problems

through negotiation had been threatened by Israel and its denial of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. Israel's policy of retaining Arab territories, it added, and its bombing of Arab villages in Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic could hardly be considered means of coexistence. It was Israel that had introduced terror and terrorism into the Middle East. Peace would be achieved in the area only when Israel shed its policy of non-compliance with United Nations resolutions, its persistent denial of the Palestinians' rights, and its policy of official terrorism and naked aggression.

258. Replying in a letter dated 14 September (S/10791), Israel stated that the Egyptian letter of 11 September highlighted that Government's identification with, and responsibility for, terrorist activities and added that it was Egypt that had initiated terror warfare by establishing in the early 1950s the so-called *fedayeen* squads and extending to them political, ideological and material support. Despite significant developments in the world, Egypt had rejected all Israeli peace initiatives and refused to participate in any meaningful negotiations.

259. In letters dated 8 and 10 November (S/10827 and S/10829), Egypt and Israel again accused one another of introducing terrorism into the Middle East. Egypt reiterated that, since its establishment, Israel had practised terrorism against the Arab population and continued to do so by bombing civilian centres. Israel again stated that it was common knowledge who had carried out and continued to carry out acts of terrorism against the people of Israel throughout the world. Egypt's letter had the obvious aim of diverting attention from its responsibility for the spread of terrorism.

260. In a letter dated 26 October (S/10816), Israel stated that on 23 October the Netherlands authorities at Amsterdam Airport had detained a man en route to Brazil, carrying an Algerian diplomatic passport, when it was discovered that his luggage contained booby-trapped letters, grenades, fuses and explosives. The man, Israel added, was known to be a member of Al Fatah, representing that terror organization in Latin America and pursuing his activities under the cover of his Algerian diplomatic passport, which constituted evidence of the close co-operation between Arab Governments and the Arab terror organizations.

261. In a letter dated 30 October (S/10817), Israel reported the hijacking on 29 October of a Lufthansa aircraft by members of Arab murder squads, which, it said, underscored the Arab Government's responsibility for terror warfare. The aircraft had been hijacked after taking off from Beirut Airport and had carried to Tripoli, the Libyan Arab Republic, the three Arab murderers responsible for the killing of 11 Israeli olympic sportsmen in Munich. Libyan authorities, it stated, had received the hijackers and the Munich murderers with jubilation.

262. In a letter dated 26 February 1973 (S/10891), Egypt transmitted the text of a resolution on the Middle East adopted by the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity at its twentieth ordinary session, held in Addis Ababa from 5 to 12 February 1973, condemning Israel for its refusal to withdraw from all occupied Arab territory and calling for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Israel from those territories occupied since 5 June 1967. The reso-

lution also declared that Security Council resolution 242 (1967) remained a valid basis for a fair and just solution to the Middle East situation and reaffirmed its support of General Assembly resolution 2949 (XXVII), which reaffirmed that the acquisition of territories by force was inadmissible.

263. During the month of March 1973, the Security Council received a number of communications with regard to an incident that had taken place on 21 February involving a Libyan civilian airliner which had resulted in the death of 106 civilians.

264. In a letter dated 2 March (S/10893), Egypt charged that on 21 February, a Libyan airliner proceeding from Benghazi to Cairo had deviated from its original course owing to navigational difficulties and bad weather conditions and had accidentally overflowed the occupied Egyptian territory of Sinai, where it had been intercepted by four Israeli fighters. Despite the fact that the aircraft was civilian, the Israeli fighters, without warning, had attacked the airliner with cannon fire and missiles, resulting in the crash of the aircraft and the death of 106 civilians. Israel's action in shooting down a civilian aircraft, the letter continued, was a flagrant and serious threat to the safety of international civil aviation and a violation of the fundamental legal norms and standards of international and civil aviation, that had been condemned by world public opinion. With its letter Egypt transmitted the text of a resolution adopted on 28 February by the Assembly of the International Civil Aviation Organization at its nineteenth extraordinary session condemning the Israeli action and directing that an investigation be made.

265. In a reply dated 5 March (S/10895), Israel transmitted excerpts of a statement made on 28 February by Israel's representative at the Assembly of the International Civil Aviation Organization. In that statement the Israeli representative had said that his Prime Minister had expressed her deep sorrow at the loss of human life resulting from the Libyan airliner incident and also her regret that the pilot had not heeded the warning given to him in accordance with international procedure. The representative had added that his Government had declared its readiness to make *ex gratia* payments to the families of the victims and to the survivors. Referring to the circumstances surrounding the incident, the representative had stated that the incident of the aircraft had arisen from a series of errors and omissions on the part of the Libyan airliner and the Egyptian control system, which had led the Israeli air defence system to assume that the plane had penetrated Sinai air space on a hostile mission. It had penetrated a closed military zone in Sinai and had not responded to the signals of the Israeli jet aircraft and their instructions to land. On the basis of the above assumption, which had later proved to be erroneous, the operational decision had been taken to compel the aircraft to land and, consequently, the airliner had been hit. It had attempted to land, but at the moment it touched the ground, it had crashed. The representative had expressed the hope that the neighbouring Arab countries would respond to Israel's appeal and that channels of swift communications for cases of emergency would be jointly set up so that it would be possible to overcome errors without ignoring security requirements.

266. In a letter dated 12 March (S/10902), Egypt commented on Israel's letter, and quoted the pilot of the Israeli aircraft, who had stated that he had shot

at the airliner's wings to force it to land before it could reach the coast. In Egypt's view, that statement showed that the shooting had been carried out with the intention of blowing up the plane in mid-air, for a fighter pilot could not be unaware that the fuel tanks of a Boeing were situated in the wings. Therefore, the burden of responsibility for the incident lay with Israel.

267. In a reply dated 14 March (S/10904), Israel charged that Egypt's only interest in the matter was to distort and exploit the incident for purposes of propaganda warfare against Israel. Egypt had no intention of co-operating in arrangements and procedures that would avert such disasters in the future, and had already rejected Israel's proposal to establish means of communications for emergency situations.

268. In a letter dated 22 February (S/10889), the Permanent Representative of Guyana transmitted to the Secretary-General a statement dated 21 February by the representatives of non-aligned countries at the United Nations expressing shock at the shooting down of a Libyan civilian aircraft by Israeli forces and sympathy for the loss of innocent civilian lives and property. The statement also strongly condemned the unwarranted acts of aggression and international terrorism that aggravated tension in the Middle East and threatened peace and security.

E. Activities of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Middle East and related developments

1. REPORTS OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

269. In a report dated 15 September 1972 (S/10792), which was also submitted to the General Assembly, the Secretary-General recalled that, in accordance with his mandate under Security Council resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, he had continued to report on the activities of Ambassador Gunnar Jarring, his Special Representative to the Middle East, and also recalled that General Assembly resolution 2799 (XXVI) had requested him to reactivate the mission of his Special Representative and to report thereon as appropriate to the Security Council and to the General Assembly.

270. Following the adoption of resolution 2799 (XXVI), Ambassador Jarring had held meetings in New York with the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt and Israel and with the Permanent Representative of Jordan to the United Nations to discuss arrangements for the reactivation of his mission. From 10 to 27 January 1972, he had had further inconclusive talks in New York and had also visited West Africa and met with President Senghor of Senegal and President Ould Daddah of Mauritania in connexion with the initiative of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1972 concerning the Middle East situation.

271. After further meetings with the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt in Cairo on 19 and 20 February, he had held discussions with the Jordanian authorities and with the Israeli authorities, respectively, on 23 and 25 February. He had then returned to New York, where he had continued to see representatives of the parties until 24 March. He had subsequently returned to Headquarters from 1 to 4 May and from 1 to 12 August for a review of the positions of the parties.

272. In spite of those continued efforts, the Secretary-General concluded that it had not been possible to make any substantial progress but that efforts would continue.

273. During its 1710th meeting on 20 April 1973, the Security Council adopted resolution 331 (1973). (See above, section A, Subsection 4 (j).)

274. In pursuance of Security Council resolution 331 (1973), in which he was requested to submit to the Security Council as early as possible a comprehensive report giving full account of the efforts undertaken by the United Nations pertaining to the situation in the Middle East since June 1967, the Secretary-General, on 21 May, submitted a comprehensive report (S/10929) that covered the different aspects of the Middle East conflict, including the status of the ceasefire, the situation in the occupied territories, the question of Jerusalem and the Palestine refugee problem. In the part concerning the search for a settlement, the Secretary-General recalled the adoption by the Security Council of resolution 242 (1967) and described the activities of the Special Representative from December 1967 to November 1971. He also referred to the discussions in the General Assembly at its twenty-fifth, twenty-sixth and twenty-seventh sessions of the situation in the Middle East that had resulted in the adoption of resolution 2949 (XXVII) by which he had again been requested to report to the Security Council and the General Assembly on the progress made by him and his Special Representative in the implementation of resolution 242 (1967) and of resolution 2949 (XXVII).

275. Referring to Assembly resolution 2949 (XXVII), the Secretary-General stated that the basic deadlock remained, the parties having continued to maintain their respective positions, and there had appeared to be no opportunity for useful action by him or his Special Representative. However, the Secretary-General added, he had engaged in continuous discussions with the parties concerned, as well as with numerous other Governments.

276. In his observations, the Secretary-General noted that for more than 25 years the United Nations, in particular the Security Council, had had a major and universally recognized responsibility in relation to the Middle East question and, although the United Nations had not proved able to bring about a just and lasting settlement, various instrumentalities of the United Nations set up by the Security Council and the General Assembly had played an important role in limiting conflict and in preserving the tenuous truce that had prevailed in the area for most of that time.

277. The problem before the Council, he went on to say, was an extremely complex and difficult one which no Government had been able to solve outside the framework of the United Nations. The procedures of the Council still offered valuable possibilities for limiting conflict and assisting the countries of the region to find the way to a solution of their problems if they so wished. The Council, he pointed out, was the only forum where all the parties to the conflict had been able to meet together in the same room.

278. Noting that the Council was currently resuming the search for peace in the Middle East, he said that he, his Special Representative, the Secretariat and the various instrumentalities of the United Nations were at the disposal of the Governments concerned and of

the Council itself to assist the Council's efforts in any way possible. Those efforts could only be useful if the parties concerned wished to avail themselves of them. A new effort to find a way to a settlement should include a new appraisal of the possibilities and procedures of the Council itself for conciliation and an exploration of all the means that could be used to assist the parties in reaching a just and lasting settlement. In conclusion, the Secretary-General hoped that those concerned would find it possible to look to the future and to take advantage of the international instrumentalities at their disposal.

2. CONSIDERATION AT THE 1717TH TO 1726TH MEETINGS (6-14 JUNE 1973)

279. In accordance with resolution 331 (1973), in which the Council decided to meet following the submission of the Secretary-General's report and requested the Secretary-General to invite his Special Representative to be available during the Council's meeting in order to render assistance to the Council in the course of its deliberations, the Council held 10 meetings from 6 to 14 June to consider the question of the situation in the Middle East.

280. At the 1717th meeting on 6 June, the Council included in its agenda the following item:

"Examination of the situation in the Middle East:

"(a) Security Council resolution 331 (1973)

"(b) Report of the Secretary-General under Security Council resolution 331 (1973) of 20 April 1973 (S/10929)".

281. In the course of the discussion, the President invited, at their request, the representatives of Egypt, Israel and Jordan, as well as the representatives of Algeria, Bahrain, Chad, Guyana, Iran, Kuwait, Lebanon, Mauritania, Morocco, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, the Syrian Arab Republic, the United Arab Emirates, and the United Republic of Tanzania to participate in the debate without the right to vote.

282. Introducing the report prepared in response to resolution 331 (1973) of 20 April 1973 (S/10929), the Secretary-General said that his report described great efforts but little progress. It remained clear that a settlement must primarily depend on the Governments concerned, which had not been able so far to devise an effective means of reaching such a settlement. Consequently, he said, the Middle East problem had been brought again and again to the United Nations during the past 25 years. During that period, however, the Council and the various instrumentalities set up by it and by the General Assembly had played a vital role in limiting conflict and in preserving the truce. Declaring that in there were a series of seemingly insurmountable obstacles to the process of conciliation and settlement in the Middle East and that there were, in the Council, representatives and groupings with fundamentally different attitudes toward certain problems, including the problem of the Middle East, he noted that it was difficult for the Council to act unanimously in promoting a settlement. Nevertheless, he recalled the Council, more than five years earlier, had been unanimous in adopting resolution 242 (1967), thus demonstrating its ability to agree on a basic approach to the complex problem of the Middle East. Although the Council's search for a peaceful settlement had raised hopes of the possibility of progress,

it could not succeed if the parties concerned did not wish to avail themselves of its efforts and its advantages as a forum for discussion and an instrument for peace.

283. The representative of Egypt said that his delegation had requested the Council to re-examine the Middle East situation after six years of effort and endurance had failed to put an end to the Israeli military occupation of Egyptian territories. The hope of millions of his country's people had remained turned to the United Nations awaiting tangible results of various efforts and deliberations. Their hopes, unfulfilled, were giving way to disillusion and scepticism, and they questioned what the Council could do, while the aggressor was digging more fortifications and changing the physical character of the occupied Arab territories in order to create more of its so-called new facts with which to confront the world. In resolution 181 (II) of 29 November 1947, he recalled, the General Assembly had recommended the partition of Palestine, as it had existed under the British Mandate, into an Arab State and a Jewish State, and Member States had given the Jewish State their recognition within the frontiers allotted to it by that resolution. In the past quarter of a century, the world had witnessed the Palestinian people being systematically turned into a nation of refugees huddled in the Gaza sector and on the west bank of the Jordan River, while the Jewish authorities systematically imported hundreds of thousands of aliens to replace the people of Palestine in their homeland. In June 1967, the military forces of Israel had invaded and occupied the rest of what had been left to the people of Palestine, including Arab Jerusalem. Those forces had violated international boundaries and had crossed into the west bank of Jordan and the Palestinian sector of Gaza and seized parts of Egypt and the Syrian Arab Republic, where they still remained. In November 1967 his country had requested an urgent meeting of the Council to consider Israel's refusal to withdraw its armed forces from the territories that it had occupied in June 1967. On 22 November of that year, the Council had chosen to deal simultaneously with the problem of Israel's aggression against Jordan, Syria and Egypt and the problem resulting from the 1947 partition of Palestine. Contrary to Israel's declaration in 1967 that it had no territorial designs against the Arab States, Israel insisted now and had officially communicated to the Secretary-General and his Special Representative, that it would never return all the occupied territories. All the United Nations resolutions adopted on various aspects of the conflict had remained mere documents, and the heavy hand of military occupation was still stifling the national life of the afflicted countries. In contrast Egypt had accepted the package deal embodied in resolution 242 (1967) and had given the Special Representative of the Secretary-General its active support. In response to Mr. Jarring's identical aide-memoires addressed to Egypt and Israel on 8 February 1971², Egypt had given him the serious commitments that he had asked for, including readiness to enter into a peace agreement with Israel, if Israel also carried out all its obligations under the Charter. Israel had blocked the Jarring mission, and when it was suggested in February 1972 that the parties should exchange clarifications of their position with a view to formulating provisions for inclusion in a peace treaty, Israel had also scuttled that effort, insisting that the so-called

Jarring initiative of 8 February 1971 had been outside his terms of reference. The four permanent members of the Security Council who had supported Jarring's aide-memoire of 8 February had expressed satisfaction with Egypt's response and had asked that Israel give a similar reply. Israeli leaders, he continued, kept insisting on direct negotiations with the Arab States "with no prior conditions". Egypt accepted talks without prior conditions. But Israel, though claiming that everything was negotiable, had declared officially that it would not withdraw to the boundaries existing prior to 5 June 1967, which in itself constituted a pre-condition. Occupation was another pre-condition, though basic norms of international law contained a rule on the non-validity of treaties imposed under occupation.

284. Israel's policies showed that it was looking not for a peaceful settlement for at least a decade but for any pretext to justify further expansion. While the military occupation remained, Israel continued its active war and its changes in the physical character and demographic composition of the occupied Arab territories. It was destroying towns and villages and deporting inhabitants, while establishing military and paramilitary settlements in the Arab territories. It was the responsibility of the Council to declare that all changes carried out by Israel in the occupied territories were null and void. Member States should refrain from giving Israel aid that might help it in its continued occupation. Help, on the contrary, should be given to the victims of the military occupation. In its resolution 242 (1967), the Security Council had called for the withdrawal of Israeli military forces from the lands that they had occupied and stressed the right of all nations of the area to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries. The contention that omission of the word "the" in resolution 242 (1967) meant that acquisition of the entire territory of a Member State was not permissible but that acquisition of some amounts of its territory was permissible did not really warrant any comment. Obviously, the Council had not resolved and could not resolve that secure boundaries for Israel should be established inside Egypt or inside the Syrian Arab Republic. The Israeli borders that the Council had wished to be fixed and recognized could exist only within the geographical area of Palestine dealt with in General Assembly resolution 181 (1947). Egypt, he said, had come to the Security Council to secure the immediate Israeli withdrawal from the Arab territories occupied in 1967. A solution was needed that would satisfy the aspirations of the Palestinian people and restore justice and peace to the area. He asked whether Israel accepted the principle of non-acquisition of territory by force and whether the Israeli representative would reply in the negative or not at all. He emphasized that a so-called partial or interim settlement was completely and definitely unacceptable to Egypt.

285. In connexion with the Council's discussion of the item, the representative of Egypt, by a letter dated 1 June (S/10941), had transmitted to the President of the Security Council the text of an article on Israel's "Occupied territories" published in the *Daily Telegraph* (London), 1 June 1973.

286. The representative of Israel said that his country had sought peace with Egypt for 25 years and had attempted repeatedly in the last six years to reach a peaceful agreement with Egypt and other Arab States. It had repeatedly declared that it sought not to freeze the existing situation or to perpetuate the cease-fire lines but to replace them in peace with secure

² See *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-sixth Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1971*, document S/10403, annex I.

and agreed boundaries established through negotiation with each of its Arab neighbours. That position was clear and could not be distorted by misrepresentation of Israeli actions and misquotations from Israeli statements. He gave the following account of developments in the search for peace since 1967. To the call for peace in the area Egypt and other Arab States had reacted with the Khartoum resolution of 1 September 1967 calling for "no recognition, no negotiation, no peace with Israel". When the Secretary-General's Special Representative commenced his mission, Israel had presented to him a detailed agenda for direct peace talks that had been rejected by Egypt. Egypt had refused, and Israel had accepted Mr. Jarring's proposals in March 1968 that the parties send delegations to Cyprus for conferences under his auspices. Subsequently, Egypt had intensified its violations of the cease-fire along the Suez Canal, until it had, in 1969, declared the so-called war of attrition against Israel, which had failed. In August 1970, the cease-fire had been restored on the initiative of the United States and an understanding had been reached to resume the Jarring talks. However, no sooner had that arrangement entered into force than Egypt had violated it by moving missiles into the standstill zone. Nevertheless, in December 1970, Israel had decided to try again to help advance the peace mission and had invited Mr. Jarring to Jerusalem for conversations with the Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs and presented him with Israel's views on "essentials of peace" for transmission to the Governments of Egypt and Jordan. But the effort to initiate a meaningful exchange had collapsed and Egypt had threatened that it would not prolong the cease-fire. In his memorandum of 8 February 1971 Mr. Jarring had suggested that Israel accept the Egyptian position on the question of withdrawal. Israel had been asked not only to agree to withdraw to the old line but to give a prior commitment to do so and Egypt had been requested to give a commitment to enter into a peace agreement with Israel. Israel had expressed its readiness to pursue the talks without pre-conditions. However, Egypt had insisted that Israel should accept the Egyptian *diktat*. Accordingly, Mr. Jarring's memorandum and the General Assembly resolutions supporting it continued to remain obstacles preventing progress by the Jarring mission. Moreover, Egypt had not agreed to the United States proposal that Israel and Egypt enter into proximity talks for a special arrangement to reopen the Suez Canal. Despite that record of the past six years, he said, Israel had not given up hope for peace and understanding with its neighbours and would strive for peace with determination to safeguard its rights but also with understanding and respect for the rights of other States. However, Israel was determined to resist all forms of coercion, including various attempts by the Arab States to impose their will. The experience of the past few years had demonstrated that there could be no imposition of solution from the outside, which would only render the situation even more complex than it was. Under no circumstances would Israel relinquish its right under international law to have peaceful boundaries established at last through negotiation and agreement; nor would Israel acquiesce in any other change in the substance, balance or interpretation of resolution 242 (1967). The one method that had not been applied throughout the years was that of dialogue between the parties. The one way in which the United Nations could contribute to the solution of the problem would be by encouraging the parties to

enter into negotiations. After noting the statement that Egypt accepted direct negotiations with Israel without prior conditions, he added that what Minister El-Zayyat had said subsequently had destroyed the significance of that declaration. Nevertheless, the Council should call on the parties to enter into direct negotiations without any pre-conditions and in Israel's view, the most practical way would be to begin with the proximity talks for the reopening of the Suez Canal. Israel sought an honourable dialogue in which the parties would engage in a joint effort to find mutual accommodation. If Egypt recognized Israel's right to independence and sovereignty and sought genuine peace, there could be no reason to hesitate about entering into a serious dialogue with Israel for the good of all nations in the area.

287. The representative of Jordan said that his country, a major party in the conflict, was torn by occupation and suffered daily in economic, human and emotional terms. Therefore, it had a direct and urgent interest in serious action by the Council to end the occupation and was united in that goal with its Arab partners. Though the Arab parties concerned had accepted the Security Council's resolution, Israel had reversed its position and spoke of retaining the occupied Arab territories in part or in totality under any circumstances. In that respect, the Security Council was governed by the Charter and by its resolution 242 (1967), which emphasized in its preamble the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war, thus establishing a decisive criterion on how its provision for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the occupied territories was to be understood. However, for the past six years Israel had been actively doing and saying the very opposite of what the United Nations had decided. It was consolidating its occupation and absorbing and transforming the areas under its occupation. Over a half million Arabs from the occupied territories had had to flee the area of hostilities in 1967. East Jordan had received some 400,000 displaced persons, who had not been allowed to return to their former places of residence despite several Security Council and General Assembly resolutions to that effect. The Council had refrained from taking action on that shocking spectacle because the cease-fire system had not collapsed and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General was still technically engaged in his peace-making operation. Those appearances were deceptive, however, and it was imperative for the Council to work against the freezing of the present situation, which was contrary to the very basis of the Charter.

288. Every time the Arab parties had responded positively to the initiatives of the Special Representative, the Security Council or the General Assembly, Israel had met those initiatives negatively. The Arab parties had made clear commitments to accept and implement resolution 242 (1967) but Israel had neither accepted the principle of withdrawal nor even given the Special Representative its definition of the extent of its so-called secure boundaries. When four permanent members had held consultations to offer support to the Special Representative, Israel had raised sharp, protesting noises to frustrate that initiative. Israel had virtually boycotted the Special Representative's mission since February 1971, when he had made ordinary and logical suggestions involving the principle of withdrawal. Israel had also rejected any peaceful redress for the Palestinians, including the appeals and demands of the United Nations that they be allowed repatriation or compensation. Instead, it was inviting Jews from

all over the world to emigrate and settle in the homes of the Palestinian Arabs. Force and militarism governed Israel's approach to the problem that it had created with its neighbours. That was why the Council could not accept the role of an observer. The conditions of peace and justice were achievable, and the position of his country was simple and reasonable. Jordan wanted the occupying forces to evacuate its national soil and continued to believe that the legitimate and inalienable rights of the Palestinian Arabs must be respected. That was the foundation of a just and lasting peace in the area.

289. At the 1718th meeting on 7 June, the representative of the United Republic of Tanzania stated that he had come to convey to the Council the feelings of Africa regarding the situation in the Middle East, which was a threat to international peace and security. The Council must take concrete action to dislodge the aggressor and to put right the situation brought about by Israel's aggression. Africa's concern stemmed from the fact that Israel had developed an immunity to international public opinion comparable to that of the minority racist régimes in southern Africa. Israel had defied the calls of the United Nations, OAU, the Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, institutions and individuals to withdraw from Arab territories and had continued to flout world public opinion and to pursue its aggression and expansionism. He had come to the Council to warn Israel that unless it heeded those international calls, OAU would be compelled to take all political and economic measures against it. The African people, who were already concerned at the erosion of the authority of the United Nations in dealing with the problem of *apartheid*, had every reason to be apprehensive at the spectacle of a régime playing havoc with the security and independence of a North African State. Africa expected from the Council firm and positive action designed to bring an end to the situation in the Middle East. His delegation wished to appeal to the Council to take decisive measures calculated to eliminate the consequences of the 1967 war, to restore the legitimate rights of the Palestinians and to establish conditions of a just and lasting peace in the area.

290. The representative of Nigeria expressed the hope that every effort would be made by all the parties concerned to secure the successful implementation of resolution 242 (1967), which had been accepted by them. His country, and, indeed, Africa were very concerned with the situation in the Middle East in general and with the continued occupation of part of the territory of Egypt in particular. As a result, OAU had, on several occasions, passed resolutions reaffirming its support of resolution 242 (1967) and other relevant United Nations resolutions. More recently, the Heads of State and Government of 41 independent African countries meeting in Addis Ababa had unanimously adopted a resolution (circulated at his request in document S/10943) noting with deep concern that Israel had not only refused to implement the numerous resolutions calling upon it to withdraw from all occupied African and Arab territories but had continued to practise a policy of intimidation with a view to creating in those territories a state of fait accompli aimed at serving its expansionist designs and deploring the systematic obstruction by Israel of all efforts to reach a peaceful settlement. He said that with his colleagues from Chad, the United Republic of Tanzania, Guinea, Algeria, Kenya and the Sudan, he had come to the

Council as spokesman of Africa on the matter to demonstrate their solidarity with the United Nations and their faith in its resolutions, and to plead that every effort should be made to implement resolution 242 (1967).

291. The representative of the Syrian Arab Republic wondered whether the Council was ready to exercise its power to put an end to the situation in the Middle East or if it would, through inertia, continue to tolerate faits accomplis. It was his delegation's view that the conflict could not be solved until the problem of Palestine had been settled on the basis of the restoration of the national rights of the Palestinian people. Under the pretext of security and encouraged by the military, economic, political and diplomatic support of the United States, Israel had been guilty of armed aggression against the neighbouring Arab States. It had defied all the resolutions of the United Nations and consolidated its occupation in the Golan Heights by building colonies, one after the other, as it had done in all other occupied Arab territories. If the acquisition of territories by force was admissible, the United Nations had lost its *raison d'être*. If not, the Council must adopt the necessary measures to redress the situation.

292. Israel, having achieved most of its territorial objectives, stated that it was now ready for peace. However, such a peace would be based on annexation and denial of the legitimate national rights of the people of Palestine. His country wanted peace in order to safeguard civilization and to continue to progress on the basis of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the rules of international law and the tenets of justice and equity. The consequences of Israeli aggression must be liquidated by the unconditional withdrawal of all Israel forces from all the occupied territories and by the recognition of the right of the Palestinian people to their land and to self-determination. Only that could create a climate conducive to progress towards a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

293. At the 1719th meeting on 8 June, the representative of the United Arab Emirates said that violence in the Middle East was continuing to disturb the peace not only in that region but throughout the world. However, the final solution to the problem of violence was to be found in the elimination of its deep-rooted causes. It was his Government's belief that peace and stability could not be restored to the area so long as the occupation continued and so long as the Palestinian people continued to be deprived of their fundamental rights in their homeland.

294. The representative of Guyana said that the Council could not contemplate a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict without dealing with the central issue of the plight of the dispossessed Palestinian Arabs; nor could it condone the acquisition of territory by the threat or use of force in violation of international law or the maintenance of the *status quo*, which would lead to the legitimization of acts of aggression and the institutionalization of illegality. The Council should take resolute action in the discharge of its responsibilities under the Charter. He drew attention to the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the Conference of Foreign Ministers of Non-Aligned Countries, held in Georgetown in August 1972 (circulated at his request in document S/10944), which had expressed solidarity with Egypt, Jordan and the Syrian Arab Republic in their legitimate struggle to recover their territorial integrity, called for the full restoration of the rights of

the Arab people of Palestine, acknowledged unequivocally that the acquisition of territory through force was wholly impermissible and recorded the intention of non-aligned countries to follow closely the evolution of the situation in the Middle East.

295. At the 1720th meeting on 11 June, the representative of Kuwait said that the root of the problem lay in the tragic denial of the rights of the Palestinians. Years of dispersion had not stifled their yearning to return to their homeland. Peace and the rights of the Palestinians were so intertwined and indivisible that the denial of the latter obliterated the former. Respect of the rights of the Palestinians, he said, constituted one of the two pillars of a durable peace, strict adherence to the principle of non-acquisition of territory by force being the second pillar. Israel's insistence on direct negotiations was not an honest statement of a genuine desire for peace but a decoy for Arab surrender. Israel wanted to use its superior military power and bargaining position to impose its own harsh peace terms on the Arabs. Its primary concern was how much territory it could annex and how few Arab refugees it would be required to repatriate. The Arabs had a genuine and growing fear of Israel's expansionist nature. The United Nations must embark on a serious and unrelenting effort to attain peace in the region. It had special responsibility towards the Palestinians who had been dispossessed because of its decision to partition their homeland. The international community was also duty bound to take measures designed to bring about Israeli withdrawal from Arab territories and the achievement of peace based on justice.

296. The representative of Algeria said that the crisis of the Middle East involved above all, the dispossession of the Palestine people from its homeland and the denial of its inalienable rights. The injustice towards the Palestinians, approved by the United Nations despite the fundamental principles of its Charter, could never be considered an irreversible fact. The Zionist State had been established through repeated aggression, terrorist actions, provocations and, above all, the systematic application of a vast plan for the annexation of territory. The 1967 aggression, however, had only served to emphasize the existence of a Palestine nation, which had been affirmed with more force and vigour as a fundamental element in any lasting solution. Palestinian resistance could be extended over years, even over generations, but sooner or later it would finally make its purpose a reality. In its recent resolutions, OAU had noted that, despite the many United Nations resolutions enjoining Israel to withdraw from all occupied African and Arab territories Israel had only persisted in refusing to implement those resolutions, and had even done its utmost to create in those territories a fait accompli to serve its expansionist goals. The African heads of State had recognized the tragedy of the Palestinian people and the fact that respect for their inalienable rights was an essential element in any just and equitable solution. They, too, had underlined the danger to the security and unity of the continent posed by the continuation of Israeli aggression that could impel the member States of OAU to take individual or collective political and economic measures against Israel. They were convinced that Israel was encouraged by the support of the United States. The role of that country could not be brought into play in the problem of the Middle East if it continued to practise a partisan policy in the area.

297. At the 1721st meeting on 11 June, the representative of the Sudan said that the Palestinian people's fight for regaining its land was one with that of the people of Guinea (Bissau), Angola, Mozambique, South Africa and Zimbabwe. The Middle East conflict, which had brought economic stresses to many parts of the world, had also caused suffering in some parts of Africa because of the closure of their traditional route of communication. He added that Africa would like to see the Secretary-General's Special Representative resume his mission. Africa stood by resolution 242 (1967), which was not ambiguous and should be implemented as it was; a time-limit should be set for the total withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from all occupied Arab territories. It was time that the United States came out clearly on that issue for its own sake and for the sake of world peace.

298. The representative of Egypt said that in connexion with the Special Representative's aide-mémoire of 8 February 1971, he wished to put three questions to the Secretary-General. First, as the aide-mémoire dealt obviously with the Egyptian sector only, had the Special Representative intended to follow that aide-mémoire with others for Jordan, on the subject of the Palestine refugees and for the Syrian Arab Republic, if that Government should express its willingness to receive such an aide-mémoire? Second, the aide-mémoire had not mentioned the Palestinian territory of Gaza but he sought confirmation of Mr. Jarring's explanation that the absence of a reference to the Gaza Strip, which had been entrusted to Egyptian administration under the Egyptian-Israeli Armistice Agreement of 1949, was without prejudice to the status of the strip as Arab territory occupied by Israel which should be de-occupied. Third, he sought confirmation that the representative of the United States in his capacity as the Chairman of the meeting on 24 June 1971 of the four-Power talks had informed the Secretary-General officially, if orally, that the representatives of the four permanent members of the Security Council welcomed and supported the initiative of the Special Representative in his aide-mémoire of 8 February and believed that, in taking that initiative, he was acting fully in accordance with the terms of his mandate under Council resolution 242 (1967). The Egyptian representative then recalled the three questions that he had put earlier regarding the principle of non-acquisition of territories by force, the principle of territorial integrity and the principle of self-determination and asked if the Council could have adopted or could adopt decisions or resolutions that could be interpreted as allowing the breach of three principles.

299. The representative of the United Kingdom said that his Government could not regard with equanimity the current situation of "no war, no peace". He must note however that some advances had been made since June 1967 towards the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. Those steps included resolution 242 (1967) itself, the declared willingness of Egypt to enter into a peace agreement with Israel if the latter State would give certain commitments covering the implementation on its part of the resolution, and the analogous undertaking given by Jordan. Recently, the United States had made efforts to open negotiations on an interim arrangement designed to bring about some measure of withdrawal by Israeli armed forces and the re-opening of the Suez Canal. His Government would be glad to see such an interim arrangement come into effect, provided it was a step

towards an over-all settlement under resolution 242 (1967) and acceptable to the parties. There had also been efforts by the African heads of State in 1971, as well as useful exchanges between the United States and the USSR and consultations among four permanent members of the Council, where progress had been made particularly on international guarantees. British views on a settlement had been made clear in a statement by the Foreign Minister at Harrogate on 31 October 1970. Those views had not changed. On the two specific points raised by the Foreign Minister of Egypt, the United Kingdom believed that any just and lasting settlement must take into account the views of all the peoples of the area, including the Palestinians, and that the old international boundary between Egypt and the former Mandated Territory of Palestine should be confirmed in a settlement as the international frontier between Egypt and Israel, subject to whatever arrangement was agreed upon regarding the special problem of Gaza. The primary objective of the Council should be to provide renewed impetus to the mission of Mr. Jarring. That mission remained in his view the best hope for progress.

300. At the 1722nd meeting on 12 June, the representative of Guinea said that Israel had systematically opposed solutions likely to restore peace in the area and violated the Security Council's cease-fire resolutions. The General Assembly year after year had adopted resolutions recognizing that the Palestinian refugee problem derived from the fact that the inalienable rights of the refugees had been denied them and that integral respect for the inalienable rights of the Palestinians was indispensable to the restoration of a just and lasting Middle East peace. Guinea reaffirmed its unqualified support for the just cause of the Palestinians. In his view, the Council should take the efficacious measures provided by the Charter to give effect to its decisions.

301. The representative of Morocco said that Israel, in a challenge to the Charter, interpreted resolution 242 (1967) as not implying the restitution of all territories occupied by force. It wanted secure and recognized boundaries, but it wished to impose a solution whereby those frontiers would pass somewhere through Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian national territory. He insisted that there could be no hope for peace in the Middle East unless justice and dignity were restored to the Palestinians. The United Nations should take definite and energetic action to compel Israel to abide by the relevant United Nations resolutions and withdraw its armed forces from all the occupied territories and to respect and guarantee the inalienable rights of the Palestinians in their national territory. In connexion with his statement, the representative of Morocco, in a letter dated 6 June to the Secretary-General (S/10942), transmitted the text of a message from the King of Morocco concerning the Security Council debate on the Middle East crisis.

302. The representative of Yugoslavia said that his country's stand proceeded from basic principles and positions: rejection of any policy based on force; non-recognition of gains through conquest and inadmissibility of Israel's acquisition of any territories by force as a result of the aggressive war against its neighbours; the restoration of territories taken by force; non-recognition of changes effected in the occupied territories; total and unconditional withdrawal of Israel's armed forces to the lines existing prior to 5 June 1967; respect for all internationally recognized boundaries in

the region; the right of all States of the Middle East, including Israel, to independence, national sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference and their right to live in peace and develop freely within secure and recognized borders; respect for the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, because peace in the Middle East could be lasting only if it respected the legitimate interests of all peoples of the region; and solution of the Middle East conflict by peaceful political means. In particular, if Israel accepted what was the core of the problem—the non-acquisition of territory by force and respect for international boundaries—it would be possible to find mutually acceptable solutions for the remaining problems.

303. At the 1723rd meeting on 12 June, the President, speaking as the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, said that his delegation favoured the implementation of all provisions of resolution 242 (1967) and supported Mr. Jarring's mission and his aide-mémoire. The USSR constantly adhered to its course of principle in its Middle East policy, the substance of which lay in the granting of comprehensive support and assistance to the Arab States that had been the victims of Israeli aggression. It firmly opposed attempts to bypass the Security Council and the United Nations in settling the problem. During the four-Power talks, the USSR had issued a warning on the inevitable failure of such attempts; the facts had confirmed that the USSR was right. New attempts to supplant United Nations machinery could not fail to alert everyone genuinely interested in a true, just and lasting settlement in the Middle East. There was no basis for disregarding and bypassing United Nations machinery in a Middle East settlement. The Council must vigorously demand from Israel respect for, and compliance with, its decisions and, finally, must find ways to exert an active and effective influence on those who sabotaged or blocked a settlement and who pursued the bankrupt policy of proceeding from a position of strength. The USSR was ready to give all possible support to United Nations efforts designed to bring about a settlement of the Middle East problem on the basis of the implementation of all the provisions of resolution 242 (1967) and other United Nations decisions.

304. The representative of Iran said that resolution 242 (1967), which had been accepted by Egypt, Israel and Jordan, through its emphasis on the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war, had set forth the requirements for peace in the Middle East: withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from the occupied territories; termination of all claims or states of belligerency and the right of all parties to live in peace and within agreed and recognized boundaries, guaranteeing freedom of navigation through waterways in the area; achievement of a just settlement of the Palestinian refugee problem; and establishment of demilitarized zones. A sincere application of the resolution would lead to an equitable settlement. The refusal of Israel to commit itself to withdraw from the territories of Egypt, Jordan and the Syrian Arab Republic was an obstacle to a meaningful dialogue. The negative attitude of Israel seemed most unjustified inasmuch as Egypt had shown courage and goodwill in responding positively to Mr. Jarring's questionnaire.

305. Pursuant to a request made by the representative of Egypt in the course of the meeting, document S/10948 was issued, containing excerpts of statements made by Council representatives in explanation of their

vote before or after the vote on resolution 242 (1967) on 20 and 22 November 1967.

306. At the 1724th meeting on 13 June, the representative of Saudi Arabia said that his country insisted on the complete and unconditional withdrawal of Israeli forces from all Arab territories occupied since June 1967 and on the right of the Palestinian people to return to their homeland. It stood strongly behind Egypt in declaring that, if the Zionists refused to withdraw, there would be no other choice than to resort to action compelling them to do so. It was the duty of Saudi Arabia to raise its voice, not so much to protest past Council inaction as to warn Council members that evading a prompt solution might lead to a situation that even the super Powers would not be able to contain.

307. The representative of Kenya said that he was speaking on behalf of his country and the OAU, which had taken a series of decisions on the Middle East question since 1967. Member States had a responsibility to fulfil, in good faith, obligations assumed by them under the Charter of the United Nations and had solemnly undertaken to refrain from the threat or use of force against the integrity and political independence of any State. Resolution 242 (1967) offered the only basis for an equitable and just resolution of the Middle East crisis. There could not be a derogation, for any reason whatsoever, from the principle of the territorial integrity of States and the concomitant duty not to violate existing international boundaries and international lines of demarcation.

308. The representative of France said that the continued occupation by Israel of sizable areas of territory belonging to three neighbouring countries obviously constituted a standing violation of the principles recognized by the community of nations, especially the principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force. That situation should be ended in accordance with United Nations resolutions, in particular, resolution 242 (1967), which provided all of the parties concerned with the guarantees indispensable for a lasting peace. France understood Israel's concern to safeguard its security, but the occupation of territories that obviously belonged to neighbouring countries would not ensure that security. From the text of resolution 242 (1967), it was clear that Israel's commitment to withdraw from the territories occupied in June 1967 should be balanced by an end to belligerency and by recognition of the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the States concerned, including Israel. The two essential elements in resolution 242 (1967) were inseparable: no withdrawal without commitments for peace, but no commitments for peace without withdrawal. Accordingly, the Israeli response to Mr. Jarring's memorandum of 8 February 1971 constituted a prior condition that nothing could justify. In stating that it would not withdraw to the lines existing prior to 5 June 1967, Israel was undermining the balance in resolution 242 (1967). The dialogue should begin on a footing of relations of equality and not on a footing of relations of force. The concept of secure and recognized boundaries was in no way contradictory to the principle of withdrawal from the occupied territories, nor did it preclude the introduction of minor changes by mutual agreement. An internationally recognized frontier, taking into account the case of Gaza, already existed between Egypt and Israel, while the necessary international guarantees were set out in paragraph 2 of resolution 242 (1967). No

settlement could or should overlook the problems of the Palestinians. The Council should clearly reaffirm the validity of resolution 242 (1967) in its totality, bearing in mind the fact that any change would threaten the balance of the resolution. The Council's role could not be confined to recalling the past, however, and it should call for a resumption of the action carried out heretofore by the Secretary-General and his Special Representative "to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement".

309. The representative of the United Arab Emirates said that his Government was disturbed by the apparent failure of the United Nations to deal effectively with the dangerous situation arising out of Israel's continued occupation of the lands it had seized in June 1967. Although the meaning of resolution 242 (1967) was clear, and had been explained to Arab delegations at the time of its adoption as relating to the possibility of minor and mutually agreed frontier rectifications, Israel continued to demand substantial changes and insisted on direct negotiations, which in the circumstances could mean only negotiations on the extent of territorial concessions the Arabs would have to make. The Arab representatives had come to the Council in quest of peace with Israel, which must recognize, unless it wished to remain forever an outcast, that a grievous injustice had been inflicted on the Arabs of Palestine and that enduring conditions of peace and harmony could be attained only through respect for their rights as human beings entitled to freedom and security in their own homeland.

310. The representative of Lebanon noted that his country was not directly concerned with resolution 242 (1967), as it had not participated in the 1967 hostilities. Nevertheless it had been the victim of several aggressive attacks for which Israel had been condemned on several occasions by the Council. His Government had consistently maintained that the Lebanese-Israeli Armistice Agreement of 1949 remained valid, a position which had been upheld by the United Nations. On the wider problem of peace in the Middle East, Lebanon stressed the principle that to be lasting, peace must be based on justice for the Palestinian people and the withdrawal of Israeli forces from all the territories occupied as a result of the 1967 hostilities. Lebanon had assumed a leading role in defence of the legitimate and inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, and as a country of Christians, Moslems and Jews had a paramount interest in the problem of Jerusalem.

311. At the 1725th meeting on 14 June, the Secretary-General replied to the three questions addressed to him by the representative of Egypt at the 1720th meeting. He said that Mr. Jarring had informed the representatives of the parties at the time of his intention to submit an aide-mémoire relating to Israel and Jordan; and in connexion with the Syrian Arab Republic he had noted that the Syrian Arab Republic had not accepted resolution 242 (1967) and had not agreed to enter into contact with him. If it were to do so, an aide-mémoire relating to Syria might have been submitted. In reply to the second question, the Secretary-General said that, under the Egyptian-Israeli Armistice Agreement of 1949, Gaza was not Egyptian territory, but had been put under Egyptian administration pending the conclusion of a peace settlement. For that reason, Gaza had not been covered in the aide-mémoire, as had been explained at the time by Mr. Jarring to the United Arab Republic representative. As to the

third question, the Council would recall that the Secretary-General had not been present at or associated with the four-Power meeting, but that the representative of the permanent member of the Council who had presided over a particular meeting provided the Secretary-General with information about matters discussed during the meeting. A note on the oral report to the preceding Secretary-General on the meeting of four of the permanent Council members on 24 June 1971 covered the general sense of that meeting as stated on 11 June by the Foreign Minister of Egypt.

312. The President referred to the three questions posed to the Council by the representative of Egypt on 11 June. The basis for an answer was provided by the Charter of the United Nations and the decisions of its major organs. He stressed that the Charter contained clear and precise provisions concerning the principle of the non-acquisition of territory by force or war and the closely allied principle of the territorial integrity of States. Those principles had a direct relation to fundamental documents of a general nature adopted by the United Nations, including the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (General Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV)), the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security (General Assembly resolution 2734 (XXV)), and numerous other resolutions on the Middle East question adopted by the Security Council and the General Assembly. In connexion with the question whether the principle of self-determination was applicable to the Palestinian Arabs, it was clear from Articles 1 and 55 of the Charter that the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples was one of the fundamental principles of the Charter. That principle was also emphasized in the Declaration of Friendly Relations and in other United Nations resolutions, in particular General Assembly resolution 194 (III), which were applicable to the Palestinian Arabs.

313. The representative of the United States, referring to the President's statement, said that there had been no consultations on the three questions addressed to the Council.

314. The representative of Israel stated that the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter were crucial to the situation in the Middle East, as Israel had been subjected to armed aggression by the Arab States since 1948.

315. The President stated that he had confined himself to mentioning the provisions of the Charter and the decisions of organs of the United Nations directly related to the problem touched upon in the questions of the representative of Egypt.

316. The representative of Australia said that the Council should seize the opportunity to help the Arab States and Israel in the direction of the kind of settlement that they must ultimately reach between themselves. Australia would work to secure support for negotiations towards such an agreement, both in the United Nations and in all its diplomatic endeavours. Both Egypt and Israel had expressed readiness to enter into talks without pre-conditions, and they must be helped to rid themselves of the siege mentality. One aim of talks between Egypt and Israel would be to bring about a territorial settlement or series of settlements to replace, on a permanent basis, the temporary arrangements arrived at in 1949 under the Armistice Agreements. Another aim would be to devise a solu-

tion to the plight of the Palestine refugees under which those unfortunate people could be assured of permanent homes and given hope in place of despair for the future and, perhaps, even some kind of national identity.

317. The representative of Indonesia said that his country supported the struggle of the Palestinians to secure their just and lawful rights, which had been recognized many times by the Assembly and the Council, as well as the demands of the Arab States for Israeli withdrawal from all the occupied Arab territories. The Council should go beyond the ritual of making statements and take concrete steps to overcome the impasse in the Middle East on the basis of its resolution 242 (1967). Moreover, to arrive at a definitive solution, the voice of the Palestinians should be heard. New guide-lines could be formulated so that continued efforts by the Secretary-General and his Special Representative to implement the resolution might have a better chance of achieving concrete results. If the United Nations was not capable of restoring to the Palestinians their just rights, if it could not prevail upon Israel to vacate all Arab territories occupied as a result of aggression, it must be expected that the Arabs would endeavour to redress the situation by the only means left to them, and that was by force.

318. The representative of Peru said that the Special Representative had been right in trying to end the impasse through his initiative of 8 February 1971. The positive Egyptian answer to the aide-mémoire was a step forward and constituted a substantial concession. Unfortunately, the key phrase in Israel's reply—"Israel will not withdraw to the pre-5 June 1967 lines"—was an obstacle to the continuation of the Jarring mission and a step backward in the application of resolution 242 (1967). The key to true security lay in the observance of the principles of coexistence, which implied recognition by the neighbouring Arab countries of the State of Israel, as well as the withdrawal of forces by Israel from the occupied territories and a solution to the problem of the Palestine people. The task that devolved upon the Council, after having laid down the guide-lines for a just and lasting peace in the region, was to ensure compliance with its decision taken six years ago.

319. The representative of Austria said that resolution 242 (1967) represented principles on which the orderly conduct of international relations must rest: the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war, the emphasis on the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, Israel as well as its Arab neighbours, and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries. If such basic relevance were attributed to the provisions of the resolution, it followed that all of them must be fulfilled to permit it to achieve its objectives, including the just settlement of the problem of the Palestinian refugees. The Council's main concern should be to develop the full potential of the parties' acceptance of that resolution and their declared willingness to seek a resolution by peaceful means. No avenue should be left untried. At the same time, it would hardly be conducive to success if one and only one approach were to be declared acceptable by one or the other party. The principal objective should be set in motion a process which built upon agreed elements, advanced step by step and combined political realism with strict respect for principles; this process would create confidence as it continued and would ultimately result in an overall settlement. In contacts with members and the parties his

Government had probed the possibilities of a common effort to that effect.

320. At the 1726th meeting on 14 June, the representative of the United States said that resolution 242 (1967) had been the result of compromise and did not define the terms of settlement but contained a set of provisions and principles which constituted a framework for the terms of a final settlement. The terms to be negotiated must therefore be consistent with those provisions and principles, not just with some of them, but with all taken together. If the terms of a settlement did not meet that test, they could not form part of a just and lasting peace. Resolution 242 (1967) called for agreement, which clearly meant agreement between the parties concerned. Mr. Jarring had been selected to assist the parties to that end. The United States had never seen how such agreement would be possible without an ongoing, serious negotiating process, direct or indirect, that engaged the parties themselves. The Council should do everything possible to encourage the parties to engage in such a dialogue. The overriding interest of the United States in the Middle East was in a peace that would end fear and uncertainty and allow Arab and Israeli alike to reside within secure and recognized boundaries. The United States urgently desired friendly and enduring relations with all countries of the Middle East. Resolution 242 (1967) was silent on the specific question of where the final border between Israel and its neighbours should be located. It neither endorsed nor precluded the armistice lines existing between Israel, Egypt, Jordan and the Syrian Arab Republic on 4 June 1967 as the final secure and recognized boundaries. The question of boundaries must be viewed in the context of the total thrust and intent of that resolution. The United States was prepared to support a fresh attempt by Mr. Jarring based on his mandate in resolution 242 (1967). It agreed with those who had held that the Council had a responsibility to help bring about implementation of the resolution. Implementation required agreement, and agreement required negotiations. The process might begin with an agreement on some Israeli withdrawal in the Sinai and a reopening of the Suez Canal within the context of an extended cease-fire as the first stage on the road to a final settlement. Such a first step would be firmly linked to a final agreed settlement. Whether a beginning was made in that or another way was less important than that such a process be started without delay.

321. The representative of Panama said that resolution 242 (1967) possessed the elements that would enable the parties, through negotiations and agreements, to reach an acceptable solution in the search for peace. The Jews in Panama had contributed significantly to the economic, social and cultural development of the country and the Arabs were hard-working and had earned the affection of the Panamanians. The nationalist policy of Gamal Abdel Nasser with regard to the Suez Canal and his ideas on the permanent sovereignty which peoples had a right to exercise over their natural resources had captured the imagination of the majority of Panamanians. Panama supported the principle of the inadmissibility of the annexation of territories by force or military conquest. It believed that the Arab States, simultaneously with the troop withdrawal, should reach agreement with Israel on guaranteeing to Israel not only recognition as a free and sovereign State but its right to live in peace behind secure and recognized boundaries. The refugee problem should be approached by Israel with its Arab neighbours with all the special

interest owed to a situation in which more than 2 million human beings were clamouring for an equitable and permanent solution. Panama also was concerned over the fate of the Holy Places of Jerusalem. It appealed for the necessary guarantees of freedom of access to the Holy Places, not for devout Catholics alone, but for the believers of all three religions.

322. The representative of Qatar said that there would be no Middle East peace so long as Israel was arrogantly occupying Arab territories and denying the Arab people their fundamental right to freedom and self-determination. In considering a just and equitable formula, due regard must be given to the right of the Palestinians to return to their homeland.

323. The representative of India said that Israel's argument that no boundary for it had ever been worked out was not valid. Its boundaries had been defined by the United Nations with precision when Palestine was partitioned and had been accepted by Israel. The international frontiers between the old Mandated Territory of Palestine and the neighbouring territories of Syria, Lebanon, Transjordan, Saudi Arabia and Egypt had never been in question. Israel had told the Special Representative that it would no longer respect the international boundaries in Egypt, in the Syrian Arab Republic, or anywhere else in territories it had occupied beyond the old Mandated Territory. That attitude, together with Israel's refusal to confirm the principle of the inadmissibility of acquisition of territory by war, was inconsistent with the Israeli claim that it had accepted resolution 242 (1967) and with the Israeli assertion that all claims of either side were open to negotiations. The word "negotiations" did not occur in resolution 242 (1967), which simply requested the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with its provisions. Mr. Jarring had set about that task assiduously and delicately, but had failed because of the Israeli attitude. Nevertheless, in spite of Israel's reservations about, if not rejection of, resolution 242 (1967), it could still serve as a basis for progress. Israel should make a declaration, in formal and unequivocal terms, accepting the principle of inadmissibility of acquisition of territory by force, and commit itself to withdraw from all Arab lands occupied as a result of the June 1967 conflict. The Arab countries concerned should make a declaration, again in formal and unequivocal terms, committing themselves to respect and acknowledge the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and its right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force. All countries concerned should, simultaneously but separately, declare that they would respect the rights of the Palestinian people in every field. Inevitably, Israel, if it intended to be a democratic State, would have to accommodate the Palestinians by guaranteeing them basic civil liberties and political rights. The Secretary-General or his Special Representative should publish a document containing the points on which both sides had agreed in response to Mr. Jarring's aide-memoire of 8 February 1971, covering specifically the solution of the refugee problem as decided by the United Nations resolutions, the reopening of the Suez Canal, transit facilities and demilitarized zones. The principle of secure and recognized boundaries was mainly a political concept and only secondarily a military affair. In the geographical position of Israel and in the context

of modern arms, a secure boundary was only feasible for all the States of the Middle East, not merely Israel, if it was founded upon mutual respect, friendship, co-operation and understanding.

324. The representative of China said that the essence of the Middle East question was aggression versus anti-aggression and of the Palestinian and other Arab peoples fighting for national liberation. The restoration of the Palestinians' right to national existence and the Arab countries' struggle to recover their lost territories constituted an integral whole. So long as the lost territories were not recovered and the Palestinians' national right was not restored, there could be no true settlement of the so-called Middle East question. In recent years, the two super-Powers had been both contending and colluding, taking advantage of the temporary difficulties facing the Palestinian and other Arab peoples to make dirty political deals at the expense of their right to national existence and to their territories and sovereignty. The two super-Powers were deliberately creating and maintaining a situation of "no war, no peace" in the Middle East to facilitate their contention for important strategic points and oil resources and the division of spheres of influence. China firmly opposed and strongly condemned Israeli Zionist aggression and expansion against the Palestinian and other Arab peoples. China did not oppose the Jewish people and the people of Israel; but it was firmly opposed to the Israeli Zionist policies of aggression and expansion. The Chinese delegation firmly held that the Israeli Zionists must be strongly condemned for their prolonged aggression, that the Israeli authorities must be asked to withdraw immediately from the Egyptian, Syrian and all other Arab territories that they had occupied, and that the right of the Palestinians to national existence must be restored.

325. The representative of Bahrain said that the situation in the Middle East was a single problem based on the eviction of the Palestinian people from its homeland. The war of June 1967, through the occupation of the territories of Egypt, Jordan and the Syrian Arab Republic, was only an aggravation of the situation. Bahrain hoped that the Council members would lead the Israeli authorities to declare unequivocally

their support of the principle of the non-acquisition of territory by force stipulated in the Charter, to withdraw their troops from all the Arab territories occupied and to recognize the right of the people of Palestine to self-determination.

326. At the conclusion of the debate the President said that an exchange of views on the matter with the members of the Security Council had revealed a common view that suspension of the Council meeting for a short period would be useful for further pondering on the results of the discussion of the question in the Security Council and further unofficial consultations among its members. There was a general understanding that the Security Council would resume its examination of the situation in the Middle East, for which purpose a meeting of the Council would be convened in the middle of July on a date to be determined following consultations among the members of the Council.

327. At the 1728th meeting on 15 June the Council heard a statement by the representative of Chad on the question of the Middle East, in accordance with an arrangement made at the 1725th meeting. The representative of Chad said that the Council was duty bound to call on Israel to rescind all action and to abandon all policies and practices affecting the population of the occupied territories and to reaffirm that all action taken to create settlements in those territories, including Jerusalem, was null and void. It was high time that the Palestinians should be allowed to participate in negotiations on the questions of foremost concern to them. The Assembly and the Council should explore what they could do to give the Palestine Liberation Organization observer status. The Security Council should reach a constructive settlement rather than abdicate its authority and refer the matter to the General Assembly. The problems of security and war fell within its purview; the Assembly had only powers of recommendation. The Council should be prepared to do its utmost to end the impasse in the Middle East. It should require that Israel withdraw from the occupied territories, and it should associate the people of Palestine in the negotiations with the parties to the conflict rather than just mention them in the course of its debates.

Chapter 2

QUESTION CONCERNING THE SITUATION IN SOUTHERN RHODESIA

A. Communications and reports to the Security Council

328. In a telegram dated 21 June 1972 (S/10718) addressed to the President of the Security Council and circulated at his direction, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the German Democratic Republic, referring to the second interim report (S/10580) of the Committee established in pursuance of Security Council resolution 253 (1968), reiterated his Government's full agreement with the measures adopted by the United Nations concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia and reaffirmed its decision never to give any political, economic or financial assistance to the racist régime of Southern Rhodesia.

329. In an addendum dated 29 June (S/10580/Add.1) to its second interim report of 29 May, the Committee established in pursuance of Security Council resolution 253 (1968) cited a statement made that day

by the representative of Argentina on the final measures taken by his Government, in accordance with its domestic legislation, following the shipment of chrome ore of Southern Rhodesian origin aboard the Argentine vessel *S.S. Santos Vega*.

B. Consideration at the 1654th and 1655th meetings (28 July 1972)

330. The special report dated 9 May (S/10632) of the Committee established in pursuance of Security Council resolution 253 (1968) was included in the Security Council's agenda at the 1654th meeting on 28 July and was considered by the Council at two meetings on that date.

331. Introducing the special report, the representative of the Sudan, in his capacity as Chairman of the Committee, explained that the Committee had prepared the report in response to the Council's request in reso-

lution 314 (1972) that it consider ways and means of ensuring the implementation of sanctions. Section III of the report contained recommendations and suggestions agreed upon by all delegations, except the United Kingdom, which had entered a blanket reservation on the report as a whole. Section IV contained proposals submitted by the delegations of Guinea, Somalia and the Sudan that had not been agreed to, together with a section showing the positions thereon of individual delegations. The agreed recommendations and suggestions reflected the general desire of the Committee to find ways and means by which implementation of the sanctions against Southern Rhodesia might be ensured and measures by means of which the Committee might increase the effectiveness of its work. In the course of the performance of its work, the Committee had constantly been frustrated by the lengthy and often futile process of trying to establish the culpability or innocence of Governments during its investigations of cases of suspected violation of the sanctions; the Committee lacked reliable statistics and an inspection system of the suspect goods and had difficulty in enlisting the co-operation of international non-governmental organizations. In the circumstances, the agreed recommendations and suggestions were only an attempt to alleviate some of the handicaps suffered by the Committee.

332. In the view of the African delegations and of those who supported them, it was the proposals in section IV of the special report that were pertinent to the effective implementation of the economic and other sanctions covered by Security Council resolutions 253 (1968), 277 (1970) and 314 (1972). Nevertheless, in conformity with the agreement reached among members of the Committee during consultations, the draft resolution to be submitted to the Council in due course would, for the time being, incorporate only the agreed recommendations and suggestions set forth in section III, and, as such, he hoped that the draft resolution would be accepted in its entirety.

333. The representative of India said that his delegation had supported in the Committee both the recommendations and suggestions in section III and the proposals in section IV of the report as a means of increasing the relevance and effectiveness of the Committee's work. He regretted that some delegations had been unable to support the proposals in section IV, particularly in view of the repeated violations of the sanctions by some countries, the lack of co-operation by others and the open defiance by South Africa and Portugal, a matter that required urgent action. He therefore expressed the hope that the sanctions would be strengthened, extended and universally and compulsorily applied with sincerity and scrupulousness, as his country had always done. To that end he suggested that the United Kingdom should make the sanctions permanent rather than renew them periodically and that the United Nations Secretariat might compile an up-to-date list of existing legislation passed by various countries for implementing them.

334. The representative of Belgium said that his delegation welcomed the report and associated itself with its recommendations and suggestions contained in section III. His delegation had entered reservations on the proposals in section IV partly because of the substance of some of them and partly for reasons of principle on others. Referring to the debate about the mandate given to the Committee, he pointed out that it could only play an auxiliary role, inasmuch as it was

the Council itself which, under the Charter, bore the full responsibility for such questions as the situation in Southern Rhodesia. The Council could not therefore shirk its responsibilities by delegating them to a subordinate body. Accordingly, he urged that the Committee should not be diverted from its essential task by controversial procedural questions and appealed to all countries to implement fully the sanctions against Southern Rhodesia. His country had complied with its obligations and would continue to do so as long as the sanctions remained in force.

335. The representative of Yugoslavia said that the Security Council had a clear task, namely, to adopt a resolution by which it would approve the recommendations and suggestions contained in section III of the Committee's report, which his delegation considered very important in improving the Committee's effectiveness and attaining the Council's objectives. He added that his delegation, which also strongly supported the African proposals, would support any proposal to endorse the special report and its main recommendations and measures.

336. The representative of Somalia said that, in view of the necessity of keeping the sanctions in force, even though in themselves they would not bring the rebellion to an end, his delegation felt that the Committee's report stressed three important points. First, it was necessary for Member States and intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations to supply the Committee with much more information on suspected violations of the sanctions, a task that had hitherto been borne mainly by the United Kingdom; in that connexion, his delegation was gratified that the Committee had opened channels of communications with such organizations as OAU, the Commonwealth Sanctions Committee, the African Bureau and the American Committee on Africa and that it had already received valuable reports from some of them. Second, in view of the adamant attitude of Portugal and South Africa towards the United Nations, any documentation attesting to the origin of the commodities exported from southern Africa, particularly from the Portuguese Territories of Mozambique and Angola and from South Africa, must be regarded as suspect; therefore, the Council should decide what action to take against those two countries. Third, the report pointed to the need to consult experts in various fields to examine the documentation covering commodities of southern African origin and the role of insurance companies regarding commodities from Southern Rhodesia.

337. At the 1655th meeting on 28 July, the Council had before it a draft resolution (S/10747) sponsored by the delegations of Guinea, Somalia and the Sudan. The draft resolution read as follows:

"The Security Council,

"Recalling its resolution 314 (1972) of 28 February 1972, in which it requested the Committee established in pursuance of Security Council resolution 253 (1968) of 29 May 1968 to consider ways and means by which the implementation of sanctions might be ensured and to submit a report containing recommendations in this respect, including any suggestions that the Committee might wish to make concerning its terms or reference and any other measures designed to ensure the effectiveness of its work,

"Having considered the special report of the Committee established in pursuance of Security Council resolution 253 (1968),

"Mindful of the need to strengthen the machinery established by the Security Council in order to ensure proper implementation of the relevant resolutions of the Council,

"Recalling further that, as stated in previous resolutions of the Security Council, the present sanctions against Southern Rhodesia shall remain fully in force until the aims and objectives set out in resolution 253 (1968) are completely achieved,

"Gravely concerned that certain States have not complied with the provisions of resolution 253 (1968), contrary to their obligations under Article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations,

"1. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of Southern Rhodesia to self-determination and independence;

"2. Recognizes the legitimacy of the struggle of the people of Southern Rhodesia to secure the enjoyment of their rights, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and in conformity with the objectives of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960;

"3. Takes note with appreciation of the special report of the Committee established in pursuance of Security Council resolution 253 (1968);

"4. Approves the recommendations and suggestions contained in section III of the special report;

"5. Calls upon all States continuing to have economic and other relations with Southern Rhodesia to end such relations immediately;

"6. Demands that all Member States scrupulously carry out their obligations to implement fully Security Council resolutions 253 (1968), 277 (1970) of 18 March 1970 and 314 (1972);

"7. Condemns all acts violating the provisions of Security Council resolutions 253 (1968), 277 (1970) and 314 (1972);

"8. Calls upon all States to co-operate fully with the Security Council in the effective implementation of sanctions and to give the Council all the necessary assistance that may be required of them towards the fulfilment of this task;

"9. Again draws the attention of all States to the need for increasing vigilance in all matters relating to sanctions and, accordingly, urges them to review the adequacy of the legislation and the practices followed so far and, if necessary, to take more effective measures to ensure full implementation of all provisions of Security Council resolutions 253 (1968), 277 (1970) and 314 (1972);

"10. Requests the Secretary-General to provide all appropriate assistance to the Security Council Committee established in pursuance of resolution 253 (1968) concerning the question of Southern Rhodesia in the discharge of its responsibilities."

338. Introducing the draft resolution on behalf of the sponsors, the representative of the Sudan said that it was based on the recommendations and suggestions contained in section III of the report and was mainly aimed at broadening the Committee's sources of information on suspected violations of the sanctions and its operations in that field, a purpose that was so clear and straightforward that he appealed to the Council to adopt the draft resolution unanimously. In view of reports that the rebel régime was escalating the system of

apartheid in Southern Rhodesia, that trade agreements were being signed between the illegal régime and foreign firms and that substantial undetected evasion of sanctions was going on, the situation merited a much stronger resolution. In order to obtain unanimity, the sponsors had settled on a mild draft resolution that neither condemned those countries in breach of the sanctions nor even mentioned South Africa and Portugal for their defiance of international opinion on that question.

339. The representative of the United Kingdom said that, because of the timing and, to some extent, the manner in which various parts of the special report had been presented, his delegation had been obliged to enter a blanket reservation on the whole of it in the Committee, without thereby altering its high regard for the objective of making the Committee an effective instrument for the application of sanctions. Now, however, his delegation was pleased to join with other members of the Council in endorsing the proposals in section III, for which purpose the draft resolution had been submitted. What counted was not the mere adoption of resolutions but their effective implementation; his delegation hoped that the sanctions Committee would apply itself to the cases and material already before it. On the question of the widespread evasion of sanctions, he referred to his Foreign Secretary's statement on 9 June drawing attention to the four main types of evidence of evasion. First, calculations by the sanctions Committee, based on trade statistics, indicated that up to half of Southern Rhodesia's exports were reaching Member countries which claimed to be observing sanctions; second, even Southern Rhodesia's figures showed a steady increase in its exports; third, the United Kingdom alone had reported to the Committee 170 cases of suspected violations, all of which could not have conceivably involved innocent transactions, and yet he knew of no single case of prosecution resulting; lastly, there was Southern Rhodesia's apparent ability to import ample supplies of goods of types formerly obtained from the United Kingdom. Those factors seemed to demonstrate a lack of will on the part of a number of Governments to implement sanctions rigorously. Yet it was essential to maintain pressure on the Rhodesian régime. The draft resolution before the Council set out again the responsibilities of Governments and the United Nations to that end and also made practical suggestions; for that reason his delegation would vote in favour of it.

340. The representative of the United States said that his delegation had hoped that the draft resolution before the Council would be merely procedural, but that, regrettably, it appeared to his delegation more substantive than procedural in view of the inclusion of paragraphs 5, 6 and 7.

341. The representative of China, addressing himself to the question of strengthening the sanctions, made the following points. First, the problem of Southern Rhodesia was a direct outcome of British colonial policy. His Government had consistently supported the aspirations of the people of Zimbabwe. It firmly supported and had scrupulously implemented the various resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council on the question. Second, as recommended in the resolution on Zambia adopted by the Assembly of the Heads of State and Government of OAU at its ninth session, the Security Council should, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United

Nations Charter, support the Zimbabwe people's just struggle for national independence and sternly condemn the United States for its breach of the Council's decisions on sanctions. Third, his delegation supported the African delegations' proposals contained in section IV of the report and considered that, in order to give more effective support to the struggle of the people of Zimbabwe, the Council should widen the sanctions to cover South Africa and Portugal. Having made those points, his delegation considered that the draft resolution before the Council reflected the wishes of the great majority of Member States for strengthening the sanctions and would vote in its favour.

342. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that underlying the Council's consideration of the special report submitted by the Committee was the much broader question of ensuring and promoting the inalienable right of the people of Zimbabwe to freedom and independence. That goal had been emphasized by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of OAU at its meeting in Rabat in June 1972 and confirmed by the Council itself on various occasions. One means of realizing that goal had been the institution of mandatory sanctions against the racist régime in Southern Rhodesia. The special report of the Committee aimed at increasing the effectiveness of those sanctions and was also another step towards improving the functioning of the Committee itself. It was a matter of regret that, during the preparation of the report, a number of firm measures recommended by his delegation, together with the African and other delegations, had been resisted by certain colonial Powers. His delegation felt, for instance, that States that openly violated the sanctions, particularly the United States, should be condemned; it also believed that the Council should expand the sanctions immediately to cover South Africa and Portugal. Nevertheless, even though the draft resolution before the Council fell short of those measures, his delegation would vote in its favour, fully aware that the resolution would be only preliminary to hard work by the Committee and consideration of the substantive aspects of the whole question by the Council.

343. The representative of France said that his country had supported the sanctions instituted in 1968 under Chapter VII of the Charter and had scrupulously implemented them. In spite of some positive results, however, the system of sanctions continued to be imperfect. For that reason, the report and draft resolution before the Council contained recommendations and measures aimed at increasing the effectiveness of the Committee. Although his delegation had supported the agreed recommendations contained in section III of the report, it had raised objections to the proposals reproduced in operative paragraphs 1 and 2 of the draft resolution on the ground that they lay beyond the Committee's competence; but inasmuch as those two proposals had not been opposed by the administering Power itself, his delegation would vote in favour of the draft resolution.

344. The representative of Panama said that for historical and other reasons his country opposed any form of oppression or negation of human rights, as was the case in Southern Rhodesia. His delegation supported the sanctions against the racist régime there, as well as any measures aimed at bringing down that régime, whose continued existence flouted the principles of the Charter and constituted a threat to world peace.

345. The representative of Somalia said that, as one of the sponsors of the draft resolution, his delegation was disappointed by the exception taken by the United States regarding operative paragraphs 5, 6 and 7; for, if the decisions of the Security Council were to achieve their purpose, no exceptions should be made to any Member State as to their application.

Decision: *At the 1655th meeting on 28 July 1972, the Council adopted the three-Power draft resolution (S/10747) by 14 votes to none, with 1 abstention (United States of America), as resolution 318 (1972).*

346. After the vote, the representative of Guinea said that the sanctions programme was currently the only effective means of putting an end to racist practices in southern Africa; the great Powers, therefore, had a special responsibility to implement them, because failure to do so would betray the interests of the African people in a crisis fraught with grave consequences for the whole world. His delegation had sponsored the draft resolution in the hope that all Member States, including the trading partners of Southern Rhodesia and South Africa, would support its measures.

347. The representative of Japan said that his delegation had voted in favour of the draft resolution on the understanding that it was based upon the Committee's special report and aimed at approving the recommendations and suggestions contained in section III of that report. He reiterated Japan's pledge to continue implementing faithfully the Security Council decisions against Southern Rhodesia.

348. The representative of Italy said that his delegation's affirmative vote was in keeping with its consistent policy of implementing faithfully the provisions of the Security Council resolution 253 (1968) and subsequent resolutions on the matter. The implementation of the sanctions established by resolutions 253 (1968) and 277 (1970) constituted, in his delegation's view, a clear obligation under the Charter for all Members. Those sanctions should be continued, because, in spite of opinions to the contrary, there was evidence that they were adversely affecting the economy of the rebel régime. He also expressed the hope that in the light of the newly adopted resolution, the Committee would be able to deal more rapidly and effectively with the work before it.

349. The representative of the Sudan highlighted the major aspects of his country's policy on the question of Southern Rhodesia. He said that his country fully supported the programme of sanctions, even though it was only one aspect of the whole question, and called for the co-operation of all States to stop any overt or covert attempts at evasion. The Sudan also fully supported the inalienable right of the people of Zimbabwe to freedom and independence, and in that connexion it strongly condemned the repressive, illegal, minority régime representing only 5 per cent of that Territory's population. It also felt that South Africa and Portugal should be condemned and that the application of sanctions should be extended to those two countries because of their defiance of the decisions of the Council. In conclusion, he expressed his delegation's gratitude to the United Kingdom for providing the Committee with much information on suspected violations and for recommending that the sanctions be continued. He then mentioned his visit to the Commonwealth Sanctions Committee in London, which had formulated proposals for the Security Council to follow, including the compilation of trade statistics for Southern Rhodesia and

the establishment of machinery for inspection of suspected goods.

350. The President, speaking as the representative of Argentina, said that his delegation had voted for the new resolution in the hope that it would increase the effectiveness of the sanctions; all that remained was its implementation. He reaffirmed that Argentina would continue to implement the decisions of the Council until the objectives laid down in resolution 253 (1968) had been achieved.

C. Further communications and request for a meeting

351. In a letter dated 15 August (S/10764) addressed to the Secretary-General, the representative of Botswana, pursuant to paragraph 19 of Security Council resolution 277 (1970) and under the terms of Article 50 of the Charter, drew attention to the economic difficulties being encountered by Botswana in its efforts to implement resolutions 232 (1968), 253 (1968) and 277 (1970), especially in the field of transportation. Of particular importance to Botswana was the construction of the proposed 300-kilometre Botswana-Zambia road at a cost of approximately \$US 12 million. The construction of the road at optimum cost, the letter said, would necessitate transportation of some equipment through Southern Rhodesia and the use of that Territory's transport services. Without such facilities, the cost of the project would rise by at least \$US 3 million, which would seriously undermine the viability of the project. For that reason, Botswana was reporting the matter so as to consult with the Security Council on the situation.

352. By a letter dated 20 September (S/10798), the representatives of Guinea, Somalia and the Sudan requested the President to convene a meeting of the Security Council as soon as possible to resume consideration of the problem of Southern Rhodesia.

353. By a letter dated 27 September (S/10800) addressed to the President of the Security Council, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Guyana transmitted the text of the resolution on Zimbabwe adopted by the Conference of Foreign Ministers of Non-Aligned Countries, held in Georgetown, Guyana, in August 1972. In paragraph 3 of that resolution, the Conference called upon the United Nations to ensure that the evasion of sanctions by international profiteers and speculators was halted and, for that purpose, urged Member States to keep under surveillance all vessels carrying goods prohibited from, or destined for, Southern Rhodesia entering or departing from both Beira and Lourenço Marques.

D. Consideration at the 1663rd to 1666th meetings (27-29 September 1972)

354. At the 1663rd meeting on 27 September, the letter from Guinea, Somalia and the Sudan was included in the Council's agenda and was considered at four meetings between 27 and 29 September, during the course of which the President, with the consent of the Council, invited the representatives of Algeria, Cuba, Guyana, Kenya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Tunisia and Zambia to participate in the discussion without the right to vote. At the 1663rd meeting the Security Council agreed to

a request made by the representatives of Guinea, Somalia and the Sudan in a letter dated 27 September (S/10802) that it extend an invitation under rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure to Mr. Eshael Mlambo of Zimbabwe.

355. Opening the debate on the question, the representative of Morocco said that the situation in Southern Rhodesia was perplexing because the sanctions had failed to work and the Home-Smith agreement³ had collapsed. The continued colonial occupation of Southern Rhodesia would make possible survival of the colonialist forces in the Portuguese Territories and the racist régime in South Africa; therefore, the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia must not be given a chance to survive. The solution to the problem resided with the United Kingdom, which carried primary responsibility for the situation; but it also resided in action to be determined by the Security Council, provided that such action was applied firmly, if necessary under effective and vigilant supervision of an international body. He expressed the hope that the Council would decide unanimously to come to the assistance of the people of Zimbabwe in their quest for the right to life and dignity.

356. The representative of Zambia stated that the basic ethical values and legal norms of humanity in civilized society were enshrined in the United Nations Charter and in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It was clearly understandable, therefore, that the people of Zimbabwe had returned a categorical and final negative verdict against the Home-Smith settlement proposals. But it was also important to note that, whereas the United Kingdom had done nothing positive since the publication of the Pearce Commission's report,⁴ the rebel régime had intensified the iniquitous racial practices of *apartheid* in the Territory, including systematic suppression of African political activity, forced removal of peace-loving people from their ancestral homes, establishment of provincial assemblies for Africans and provision of racially separate social facilities and amenities. He cautioned that it was in Southern Rhodesia's interest to institute changes in the right direction peacefully. Unfortunately, such an offer contained in the Lusaka Manifesto had been rejected by the minority racist régime in Southern Rhodesia, thereby making it imperative for the African people to intensify their armed struggle. He recalled the possible courses of action that he had suggested to the Council during its meetings in Addis Ababa in January 1972, and, in view of the current situation in the Territory, he further urged the Council to take the following additional steps: to reaffirm the principle of the inalienable right of the people of Zimbabwe to self-determination and independence in conformity with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and the Charter; to affirm the principle of no independence before majority rule; to appeal to the United Kingdom for creation of favourable political conditions in the Territory, including the release of all political prisoners, detainees and restrictees and the repeal of racist and repressive discriminatory legislation; and to call upon all States to offer, through OAU, additional material assistance to the people of Zimbabwe in their just struggle for freedom and independence.

³ *Ibid.*, document S/10405.

⁴ *Rhodesia: report of the Commission on Rhodesian Opinion under the Chairmanship of the Right Honourable the Lord Pearce* (London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1972) Cmnd. 4964.

357. The representative of Mauritania said that, despite Security Council resolution 288 (1970), which called upon the United Kingdom to discharge its responsibilities in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), that country had merely displayed a curious lack of interest in the barbarous acts being perpetrated against the people of Zimbabwe. His delegation maintained that no independence for Zimbabwe was acceptable unless it was based on majority rule. He proposed that the Council should draw up a list of all States maintaining economic and other relations with Southern Rhodesia and call upon them to sever those relations. Those States that persisted in violating the provisions of resolutions 253 (1968) and 277 (1970) should be condemned. He also suggested that special measures should be taken against South Africa and Portugal because of their geographical position with regard to Southern Rhodesia and their stubborn refusal to comply with the sanctions against that Territory. Furthermore, it was highly important for the Security Council to establish an appropriate means of controlling effectively the application of sanctions against Southern Rhodesia, and to that end the Council should call upon all States to reaffirm their commitment to the provisions of its resolutions 253 (1968) and 277 (1970).

358. The representative of Guyana said that, in his Government's view, the United Kingdom had a clear duty to reinstate the rule of law in Southern Rhodesia and thereafter ensure a transfer of power to the people of that Territory, in accordance with the principles of the Charter and the directives of the United Nations. He drew the attention of the Council to the resolution on Zimbabwe (S/10800) adopted by the Conference of Foreign Ministers of Non-Aligned Countries, particularly the appeal to all member States to keep under surveillance all vessels carrying goods prohibited from, or destined for, Southern Rhodesia entering or departing from Beira and Lourenço Marques. He also proposed that the Council should be prepared to extend the sanctions to include South Africa and Portugal and to provide the means for their strict enforcement.

359. The representative of Algeria said that the condemnation by African countries of the Southern Rhodesian régime for its usurpation of power stemmed from their justified fears that another State was emerging in southern Africa that would only reinforce that part of the continent as a bastion of *apartheid*. That condemnation, which had been supported by the United Kingdom, might have inspired optimism for an early dislodgement of the rebel régime, but now, seven years later, the situation in the Territory was even worse, as that régime had not only consolidated itself but cut off its last binding links with the United Kingdom by proclaiming itself a republic. Such a situation was unacceptable to his delegation. Given that the sanctions had failed through the non-compliant attitude of South Africa and Portugal, through deliberate violation by the United States and through the failure of direct negotiations between the United Kingdom and the rebel régime, other methods were needed to resolve the situation in Southern Rhodesia. He therefore proposed the convocation by the United Kingdom of a constitutional conference, bringing together representatives of all sectors of the population of the Territory, with the task of preparing an acceptable settlement as the only method of breaking the present deadlock. Meanwhile, sanctions should be continued and the African liberation forces in the Territory given all possible assistance by interna-

tional organizations that recognized the legitimacy of their struggle.

360. The representative of Senegal, after reviewing the main events leading to the current situation in Southern Rhodesia, said that the United Kingdom bore the blame for the bolstered position of the illegal régime, because, as the administering Power, it had merely proposed the imposition of sanctions, which had failed to work, instead of using force to put down the rebellion. But as long as the United Kingdom persisted in that attitude, African countries would continue to give material and financial support to the liberation movements against the illegal régime. He, too, called upon the United Kingdom to convene a constitutional conference of all parties for the purpose of drawing up a constitution that would create democratic institutions based on universal suffrage. In no other way could the independence of Southern Rhodesia be agreed upon.

361. At the 1664th meeting on 28 September, the representative of Kenya said that as the Home-Smith settlement proposals had been rejected by the people of Southern Rhodesia, it was imperative that a new solution be found, particularly in view of the repressive legislation that had since been enacted by the rebel régime and applied ruthlessly against the African National Council and the other freedom movements, in collaboration with the South African racists and Portuguese colonialists. Moreover, the rebel régime had vastly increased its military expenditure, and its economy seemed to be making a remarkable recovery, owing to direct trade with South Africa and Portugal and indirect trade with some of the Western countries. It was incomprehensible that the United States had decided to permit resumption of importation of Rhodesian chrome in contravention of the sanctions; his Government strongly appealed to the United States to reinstate the embargo on chrome and to implement the sanctions strictly. As for promoting the objective of majority rule in Southern Rhodesia, he said, the Council must ensure that international peace and security in the area, as well as political independence and territorial integrity of the free African States, particularly Zambia and Tanzania, were preserved, that the *apartheid* front of South Africa, Portugal and Southern Rhodesia was dismantled, that military supplies to minority régimes in southern Africa were terminated and that assistance to African liberation movements was increased. The Council should undertake measures to ensure the convocation of a constitutional conference of all interested parties in Southern Rhodesia under the aegis of the United Nations, the strengthening and more effective application of the sanctions, the confiscation of Rhodesian exports at their place of entry, refusal by States of landing rights to airlines that landed at Salisbury or whose Governments permitted landing rights to Rhodesian aircraft, the rupture of all postal, telegraphic and other communications with Southern Rhodesia, guarantees of protection to all States in fear of aggression from Southern Rhodesia, South Africa and Portugal and the release of all political prisoners and detainees in Southern Rhodesia.

362. The representative of Yugoslavia recalled a number of events of importance that had occurred in connexion with Southern Rhodesia since the Council's consideration of the question in Addis Ababa, in the light of which his delegation considered that any attempt at resolving the Southern Rhodesian situation must strictly be based on four principles, namely, that there

must not be independence before majority rule, that the administering Power should not, under any circumstances, transfer power or accord any sovereignty to the illegal régime, that the future of Zimbabwe must be decided on the principle of one-man, one-vote and that there must be no further attempt to work out a political programme for the Territory without the full consultation or participation of the people's political representatives. In view of those considerations, his delegation maintained that sanctions, in spite of their violations and their detractors, should not only be continued but tightened and extended to cover South Africa and Portugal; that all exports originating from, or imports destined for, the Portuguese-occupied territories should be officially suspected by all States as *a priori* contraband commodities; and, lastly, that after having received three interim reports, the Council should not weaken its efforts to persuade those concerned to change their fundamentally wrong and unacceptable policy.

363. The representative of Guinea said that the economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia should be strengthened and more strictly enforced, for, although the first victims of such a policy would be the Africans, the people of Zimbabwe were willing and prepared to make that sacrifice. His delegation considered that it was the primary responsibility of the United Kingdom, as the administering Power, to take all the necessary measures, including the use of force, to end the rebellion and to ensure the self-determination of the people of Zimbabwe, in accordance with the principles of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). He added that the ports of Beira and Lourenço Marques, so important to the Rhodesian economy, should be closed.

364. The representative of Argentina said that mandatory economic sanctions adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter were an important instrument in demonstrating the effectiveness of the Council. Member States therefore had a duty to work in solidarity to ensure their enforcement. His country had always complied fully with the economic sanctions recommended by the Security Council and would continue to do so, but it also believed that the Council, after its adoption of resolution 318 (1972), had an opportunity to refine the mechanism of sanctions and to control their implementation more effectively.

365. The representative of the Sudan quoted from various United Kingdom sources and said that the failure of the United Kingdom Government to do anything in the aftermath of the Pearce Commission's report demonstrated that country's complacency and apparent abandonment of its responsibility over Southern Rhodesia. On the evidence of the repressive measures subsequently adopted by the rebel régime, the United Kingdom should know that the régime had no intention of changing the course of its policy on its own. Moreover, judging from the fourth report of the Committee established in pursuance of Security Council resolution 253 (1968), the economic sanctions, admittedly a strong instrument at the disposal of the international community, had not achieved the desired objective, owing to the fact that certain Governments paid only lip-serve to their application. It was a matter of great concern that the United States, a permanent member of the Council, had decided openly and deliberately to flout them by permitting a resumption of importation of chrome ore from Southern Rhodesia. In view of the stalemated situation in that Territory, he suggested that the United Kingdom should not relax

its surveillance of Beira and should start a blockade of Lourenço Marques; that the Council should increase the United Nations role in policing sanctions, which might involve the posting of United Nations observers at the ports of major importers of Southern Rhodesian goods; that there should be a campaign by the United Nations to publicize, as a means of stimulating world concern, the methods and names of countries that flouted sanctions; and that the Council should agree that any cargo from Southern Rhodesia should be impounded by the Government of the port of unloading.

366. The representative of Panama said that, as a country that was itself suffering discrimination at the hands of foreigners occupying the Canal Zone, Panama fully appreciated the injustices perpetrated against the people of Southern Rhodesia. He recalled the case of the *Iona V*, a vessel whose Panamanian registration had immediately been revoked by his Government, owing to suspicion that it had contravened the sanctions by carrying petroleum for Southern Rhodesia. He reaffirmed the view of his Government that the sanctions were presenting the rebel régime with difficulties and listed the ways in which his Government was co-operating to ensure their effective implementation. He urged the Council to undertake measures that would ensure Rhodesia's achievement of independence on the basis of majority government, in accordance with the purposes of the Charter, and reiterated the solidarity of his country with the people of Zimbabwe in their quest for emancipation from the arbitrary excesses of the minority, racist régime.

367. The representative of Tunisia quoted from a statement made by the President of his country in 1965 to the effect that the future of Western civilization in Africa depended upon the Western Powers' conduct vis-à-vis the problem of racism on the continent and that Southern Rhodesia provided them the last opportunity to put their weight behind the effort to destroy the remaining enclaves of racism. After recalling the historical events in Southern Rhodesia that had culminated in the Pearce Commission's report, he observed that the United Kingdom had done nothing since publication of that report. What was needed was not a Council resolution but a decision that would be applied, and it was necessary to know how far the United Kingdom was prepared to go. In his delegation's opinion, a constitutional conference on Southern Rhodesia, as Bishop Muzorewa had so eloquently urged, must be convened immediately so that the African people of Southern Rhodesia would have an opportunity to be heard, and the United Kingdom must fully assume its responsibility and respond to the Council's appeal.

368. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics reiterated that his Government's position of principle was full support for the total, unqualified and final liquidation of colonialism and racism and opposition to the unlawful régime in Southern Rhodesia. In that connexion, his delegation called for an end to any violations of the sanctions, particularly by the United States, and it supported entirely the demand of the African States for extension of the sanctions to cover South Africa and Portugal through application of the measures provided in Article 41 of the Charter. It also supported the Security Council's proposal that all Member States intensify their moral and material support of the people of Zimbabwe in their lawful struggle for freedom and national independence, in accordance with the United Nations Charter and

General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). The latest attempt by the United Kingdom to collaborate in a settlement with the illegal régime had ended in failure when the people of Zimbabwe decisively rejected those settlement terms, and there should be no further compromise or dialogue, with that régime. It was necessary that the illegal régime be replaced immediately by the democratic rule of the people of Zimbabwe through their lawful and fully authorized representatives.

369. Mr. Mlambo, who said he was speaking on behalf of 5.5 million people of Zimbabwe, began by reviewing the situation in the Territory since publication of the Pearce Commission report. He said that after rejection of the Home-Smith proposals restrictions had been placed upon free movement of Bishop Muzorewa, President of the African National Council, and the political activities of the Council itself had been curtailed. The purpose of those measures was to minimize the support enjoyed by the Council and to discredit it before the United Kingdom. Similar measures of oppression and intimidation were also being perpetrated against the chiefs and rural people that had publicly opposed the proposals before the Commission. Nevertheless, he emphasized, the peoples of Zimbabwe were determined to regain their freedom and would vigorously oppose any settlement with the régime not based on the principle of one-man one-vote. He rejected the claim by the United Kingdom that failure by the Africans to accept the settlement would encourage introduction of *apartheid* laws in the Territory, for, he observed, such laws were already operating there. He also pointed out that the sanctions had failed because they had not been applied strictly by many countries. It was regrettable that the United States, a permanent member of the Council and once a strict observer of the sanctions, had decided to break them. Apart from South Africa and Portugal, and Switzerland, which he alleged to be the channel for the régime's supply of capital funds, he named the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Belgium, Luxembourg and Italy, as well as Japan, Dahomey and Gabon, as some of the countries that indulged in clandestine trade with the régime. Nevertheless, the sanctions were gradually grinding the régime's economy to a halt. He appealed to the Council to impose genuine sanctions and to see to it that they were strictly enforced, despite the mistaken contention, often voiced, that such sanctions would hurt the Africans instead of helping them.

370. At the 1665th meeting on 29 September 1972, the representative of Nigeria said that, following the massive rejection of the proposals for a settlement by the African people of Southern Rhodesia, it was urgent to find an alternative solution, because, contrary to the assurances by the United Kingdom, the *status quo* was not being maintained in the Territory, where repressive measures were being introduced and personal freedom curtailed. Even though the United Kingdom continued to bear primary responsibility for the events in Zimbabwe, the Security Council must also fully assume its Charter responsibilities. The programme of sanctions had failed partly because of the non-compliance of Portugal and South Africa and partly because it was being breached by Member States, including, regrettably, permanent members of the Council, such as the United States. It was evident, therefore, that the sanctions must not only be maintained but strengthened and expanded. He urged that the Council should require the United Kingdom to give assurance that it would not grant inde-

pendence to Southern Rhodesia before majority rule and that all the people of Zimbabwe would be permitted to participate freely and equally in determining the future constitution of their country.

371. The President, in his capacity as the representative of China, noted the strong support expressed for the people of Zimbabwe in their struggle for national independence. He said that the only solution to the question of Southern Rhodesia, for which the United Kingdom bore primary responsibility, lay in the achievement of complete national independence by the people of Zimbabwe free from outside interference. In that respect, it was a matter of great satisfaction to all those who upheld justice that the so-called proposals for a settlement had been rejected completely by the people of Zimbabwe. He mentioned some of the demands contained in the resolution on Zimbabwe adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of OAU at its ninth summit conference at Rabat and stated that his delegation supported them. He said that failure to grant true independence to the people of southern Africa, including Zimbabwe, would leave those people no alternative but to engage in armed struggle. His delegation recommended that the Council should reaffirm the right of the people of Zimbabwe to national independence, condemn the illegal régime for its repressive measures against the people of Zimbabwe, strengthen and expand the sanctions to include South Africa and Portugal, condemn violations of the sanctions, including that committed by the United States and call upon all countries and peoples of the world to render stronger assistance and material support to the people of Zimbabwe.

372. The representative of France pointed out that, although Rhodesia's economy was not flourishing in the way claimed by the rebel régime, it was nevertheless standing up against the sanctions being applied by the international community. But the establishment of the Pearce Commission and acceptance of its report by the United Kingdom had indicated that that country, as the administering Power, was determined not to evade its responsibilities and that the exercise itself had afforded an opportunity of contacts between the United Kingdom and the indigenous population. He said that France had supported the institution and expansion of sanctions against the rebel régime, but he urged delegations to be wary of unverified newspaper and radio reports and to leave the process of overseeing implementation of the sanctions to the Council's Committee established in pursuance of resolution 253 (1968). He also urged Governments to tighten their application of the sanctions, if necessary through adoption of new measures, so that the actions of the administering Power might bear fruit.

373. The representative of Belgium said that, in view of the conclusions of the Pearce Commission's report, which had been endorsed by the United Kingdom, the Council was faced with the question of how to promote the independence of Southern Rhodesia in conformity with the five United Kingdom principles. He doubted that the Council was in a position to determine the measures to be taken to that end. Instead, he thought it might be more profitable to call for dialogue and to support the United Kingdom's line of action in the Territory, since, after all, the question of Southern Rhodesia could be solved only by the people of that Territory themselves.

374. The representative of Italy expressed his delegation's satisfaction at the Pearce Commission's report, particularly with regard to its objectivity and thoroughness, and termed it not only the first accurate survey of the situation in Southern Rhodesia but a political fact of great importance.

375. He highlighted some of the pertinent findings of the report and pointed out how clearly they showed the complexity of the situation in the Territory. But in the aftermath of the Commission's report, he noted, a strong momentum had been created on the part of the African population to expedite changes in the desired direction, and the United Nations should address itself to the question of how to help that process. His delegation felt that the sanctions had not been effective, partly owing to their application to the wrong sectors of Rhodesia's economy and partly owing to less than full unreserved co-operation by all Members of the Organization in implementing them, although his country was scrupulously doing so and would continue to do so. The United Nations could act to consolidate and reinforce political unity and self-determination of the Rhodesian African population; but that was a direct and primary responsibility of the United Kingdom, and the Organization could play no more than a supporting role in the process. In view of those considerations, his delegation did not consider it useful for the Council to adopt another lengthy resolution on the question; the situation required patient and persistent action that would foster and accelerate the efforts being made by the people of the Territory themselves.

376. The representative of Saudi Arabia said that even though the majority of the Members of the United Nations regarded the United Kingdom as primarily responsible for the administration of Southern Rhodesia, that Government had often frustrated adoption of drastic measures by the United Nations to dislodge the rebel régime. He wondered what alternative could be adopted in the circumstances. Hopes for concerted action by the big Powers had not materialized, and therefore sanctions could not succeed in their purpose. In his delegation's opinion there were two positive actions open to the Council: first, as he had suggested at an earlier meeting of the Council, a general strike supported by the United Nations could be fomented in the Territory, with the strikers being sustained from a United Nations fund, which could be provided from the £5 million that the United Kingdom in its settlement proposals, had promised to contribute annually for African development; second, the United Nations could exert moral pressure to convince the rebel leader and his supporters that, for their own benefit in the future, they should, as an interim measure, grant municipal or canton-type self-government to the Africans, whose population was increasing far more rapidly than that of the whites.

377. The representative of Somalia, on behalf of Guinea, Somalia and the Sudan, introduced two draft resolutions sponsored by the three delegations. The text of the first draft resolution (S/10804) read as follows:

"The Security Council,

"Recalling its resolution 253 (1968) of 29 May 1968 and subsequent resolutions in which all States are required to take all necessary steps to implement and make effective the economic, political and other sanctions against Southern Rhodesia decided upon

by the Council in furtherance of the objective of ending the rebellion in that territory,

"Taking into account its resolutions 314 (1972) of 28 February 1972 and 318 (1972) of 28 July 1972 concerning the co-operation and obligations of States and the measures necessary to ensure the scrupulous observance and strict implementation of sanctions,

"Deeply concerned that, despite their obligations under Article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations, several States continue to violate sanctions covertly and overtly in contravention of the provisions of resolution 253 (1968),

"Gravely concerned about the detrimental consequences which violations could cause to the effectiveness of sanctions and, in the wider sense, to the authority of the Council,

"Deeply concerned by the report of the United States of America that it has authorized the importation of chrome ore and other minerals from Southern Rhodesia,

"Condemning South Africa and Portugal for their refusal to co-operate with the United Nations in the observance and implementation of sanctions against Southern Rhodesia,

"1. Reaffirms its decision that sanctions against Southern Rhodesia shall remain fully in force until the aims and objectives set out in resolution 253 (1968) are completely achieved;

"2. Calls upon all States to implement fully all Security Council resolutions establishing sanctions against Southern Rhodesia in accordance with Article 25 and Article 2 (6) of the Charter;

"3. Calls upon the United States of America to co-operate fully with the United Nations in the effective implementation of sanctions;

"4. Requests the Security Council Committee established in pursuance of resolution 253 (1968) concerning the question of Southern Rhodesia to undertake, as a matter of urgency, consideration of the type of action including action under Chapter VII of the Charter which could be taken in view of the open and persistent refusal of South Africa and Portugal to implement sanctions against the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia;

"5. Further requests the Committee to examine and submit a report to the Security Council not later than 1 December 1972 on all proposals and suggestions made at the 1663rd and . . . meetings of the Council for extending the scope and improving the effectiveness of sanctions against Southern Rhodesia."

378. The text of the second draft resolution (S/10805) read as follows:

"The Security Council,

"Having considered the question of Southern Rhodesia,

"Recalling its resolutions 216 (1965) of 12 November 1965, 217 (1965) of 20 November 1965, 221 (1966) of 9 April 1966, 232 (1966) of 16 December 1966, 253 (1968) of 29 May 1968 and 288 (1970) of 17 November 1970,

"Reaffirming the inalienable right of the people of Southern Rhodesia to self-determination and independence in conformity with General Assembly reso-

lution 1514 (XV) and the legitimacy of their struggle to secure the enjoyment of their rights as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations,

"*Deeply concerned* by the fact that measures approved by the Council have failed so far to terminate the illegal régime,

"*Having noted* the rejection by the African population of Zimbabwe of the 'settlement proposals' agreed upon between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the illegal régime,

"*Mindful* that those 'settlement proposals' had been negotiated without consulting the genuine political leaders of the African population of Zimbabwe,

"*Reaffirming* that any attempt to negotiate the future of Zimbabwe with the illegal régime on the basis of independence before majority rule would be in contravention of the inalienable rights of the people of that Territory and contrary to the provisions of the United Nations Charter and of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV),

"*Mindful* of the conditions necessary to permit the free and full expression of the right to self-determination,

"*Recalling* Security Council resolution 202 (1965) of 6 May 1965 which endorsed the request of the General Assembly addressed to the United Kingdom to obtain:

"(a) The release of all political prisoners, detainees and restrictees,

"(b) The repeal of all repressive and discriminatory legislation, and in particular the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act and the Land Apportionment Act,

"(c) The removal of all restrictions on political activity and the establishment of full democratic freedom and equality of political rights,

"1. *Reaffirms* the principle that there should be no independence before majority rule in Zimbabwe;

"2. *Calls upon* the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland not to transfer or accord, under any circumstance, to the illegal régime any of the powers or attributes of sovereignty, and urges it to promote the country's attainment of independence by a democratic system of government in accordance with the aspirations of the majority of the population;

"3. *Urges* the United Kingdom, as administering Power, to convene as soon as possible a national constitutional conference in which the genuine political representatives of the people of Zimbabwe would be able to work out a settlement relating to the future of the Territory for subsequent endorsement by the people through free and democratic processes;

"4. *Calls upon* the United Kingdom Government to create the conditions necessary to permit the free expression of the right to self-determination, including:

"(a) The release of all political prisoners, detainees and restrictees;

"(b) The repeal of all repressive discriminatory legislation;

"(c) The removal of all restrictions on political activity and the establishment of full democratic freedom and equality of political rights;

"5. *Further calls on* the United Kingdom Government to ensure that in any exercise to ascertain the wishes of the people of Zimbabwe as to their political future, the procedure to be followed should be in accordance with the principle of universal adult suffrage and by secret ballot on the basis of one-man one-vote without regard to race, colour or to considerations of education, property or income;

"6. *Condemns* the United Kingdom Government for its failure to take effective measures to bring an end to the illegal régime in Zimbabwe;

"7. *Calls upon* all States to give full support and co-operation to the United Nations in all measures designed to enforce strictly the mandatory sanctions imposed by the Security Council in accordance with the obligations assumed by Member States under Article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations."

379. The representative of Somalia then proceeded to explain the two draft resolutions, which, he said, were reasonable and contained proposals that the United Nations could not fail to undertake, if it wished to remain true to its obligations. The second draft resolution (S/10805) was based on the Charter of the United Nations and expressed the consensus contained in the resolution on Zimbabwe adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of OAU at Rabat. Regarding the first draft resolution (S/10804), he said that the sponsors had in mind the operation of the sanctions already in force against Southern Rhodesia. It had always been held by African countries that sanctions alone would never bring down the illegal régime, but that their continuation in force was a necessary means of expressing the authority of the Council. However, if international sanctions were to reflect meaningfully the decisions of the Council, they must be efficiently and strictly applied. For that reason the African countries urged that the Council should soon consider what appropriate action to take against South Africa and Portugal, two States that openly and persistently defied its decisions, and what measures might be taken in respect of other States, like the United States, that were violating the sanctions or otherwise not fully co-operating with the Committee on sanctions in tracking down violations. Consequently, the sponsors recommended in the second draft resolution that the Committee should study immediately all the proposals made by the various States or by governmental and non-governmental organizations concerning ways and means of improving the effectiveness of the sanctions and report back to the Council within a reasonable period of time.

380. At the 1666th meeting on the same day, the representative of India said that the debate had established five distinct facts, namely, that, despite presumed anxieties to the contrary, the African people of Zimbabwe were prepared to suffer the consequences of sanctions as a price for majority rule; that the rebel régime was being sustained primarily through the co-operation and connivance of South Africa and Portugal; that the system of *apartheid* was already being practised in Zimbabwe and it was therefore invalid to argue that implementation of the Home-Smith agreed proposals would prevent its introduction there; that violation of the sanctions was being committed on a large scale by countries, including some big Powers; and that other economic interests outside South Africa and Portugal were also giving support and sustenance to the illegal régime. Unfortunately, he said, the Council could not

do much about the situation, owing to lack of agreement among the big Powers as to the effective measures to be taken. India had always scrupulously applied the sanctions; it had already extended them to cover Portugal and South Africa and was prepared to undertake any recommendations aimed at further tightening them. His delegation recommended, as it had during the Council's meetings in Addis Ababa, that utmost publicity should be given to violations of sanctions. He believed, moreover, that the United Kingdom, short of using force, still had many measures it could take to end the rebellion and institute majority rule in Southern Rhodesia. Commenting on the two draft resolutions before the Council, the representative of India said that the first one was acceptable to his delegation; but he proposed a number of amendments to the second one and stated that the paragraph which sought to condemn the United Kingdom was not acceptable to his delegation, inasmuch as the United Kingdom had consistently stated its inability to use force to oust the rebel régime. The Council as a whole shared the blame for the failure of its objectives in Southern Rhodesia; therefore, it was unjustified that the United Kingdom alone should be condemned for that failure.

381. The representative of Mali said that no one any longer had faith that economic sanctions alone could crush the rebellion in Southern Rhodesia in view of their violation by certain big Powers and the intransigence of South Africa and Portugal. He repeated that the United Nations, in trying to resolve the problem in accordance with the principles of the Charter and the provisions of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), should be guided by the latest proposal by the African National Council of Zimbabwe, namely, the convening of a constitutional conference on the political future of Southern Rhodesia. He considered that the United Kingdom had a special duty to bring about such a conference.

382. The representative of Cuba charged that retrogressive forces, led by North American imperialism, were impeding the progress of liberation movements in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Proof of that could be obtained easily, he said, by answering the questions who supplied arms to the racist oppressors, who owned the monopolies that exploited the wealth of the colonial territories, who violated the sanctions against the racist régimes, and which countries in the Council and the General Assembly always tried to soften otherwise strong anti-colonialist resolutions. The answers to those questions were quite clear. Recalling the communiqué issued at the Conference of Foreign Ministers of Non-Aligned Countries, he repeated that, in view of the outright rejection by colonialist and racist Powers of any possibility of peaceful change, there was an urgent need to assist the legitimate armed struggle of the liberation movements in southern Africa. Moreover, the Council itself had a duty to assist the people of Zimbabwe in their struggle against their racist oppressors.

383. The representative of the United States noted that several speakers had placed great emphasis on United States imports of strategic materials from Southern Rhodesia and explained that the United States Congress, against the advice from the executive branch, had adopted legislation permitting imports of certain strategic materials into the country after 1 January 1972, and his Government had made importation of

such materials a matter of public record. In order to understand why the sanctions programme had not succeeded, it was necessary to consider the whole matter in its proper perspective. He estimated that United States imports from Southern Rhodesia in 1972 would amount to only from 2 to 3 per cent of the Territory's total exports; it was also estimated that during the first six months of 1972, Southern Rhodesia's exports might amount to between \$200 million and \$220 million, of which United States imports would account only for \$3 million. In view of those figures, his delegation was quite perturbed that the Council had centred its discussion solely on the meagre imports of the United States from Southern Rhodesia instead of extending its inquiries to determine where the other 98.5 per cent of Rhodesia's exports went. With regard to chrome ore, he said that, since 1966, according to estimates by the Committee on sanctions, Southern Rhodesia had produced about 400,000 tons per year, most of which had been sold abroad; yet recent imports of that commodity by the United States had amounted only to about 56,000 tons. He wished to know who was buying the rest of the chrome ore from Southern Rhodesia. He noted that the Committee, in its fourth report, had reported 34 cases of suspected violations of sanctions involving chrome ore, the largest number of cases for a single commodity, involving nationals of 23 countries, of which the United States was not one. He also mentioned other important export products for Southern Rhodesia, namely, copper, tobacco, sugar and maize, which were also produced in Rhodesia's neighbouring countries. In its report, the Committee had noted that a number of countries, of which the United States was not one, had reported far larger quantities of imports from Rhodesia's neighbours than the total amount those neighbouring countries had reported to have exported. Such discrepancies, he insisted, should have aroused greater curiosity in the Committee. In conclusion, he said that, apart from the strategic imports, his country had strictly observed the sanctions and would continue to do so; but he emphasized that, if the Council seriously wanted the sanctions to work, it had to abandon its one-sided approach of singling out the United States Government or any other individual Government for reproach and, instead, concentrate on the problem in its broader perspective. He said that the United States would continue to support practical means to achieve the realization of full political rights for all of the people of Southern Rhodesia, but recognized that the way would not be an easy one. He believed that the Council should not turn a deaf ear to any practical efforts to seek a solution, that it should not hasten to condemn the attempt made recently by the British to seek a settlement. The United States did not believe it appropriate for the Council to call upon the United Kingdom to take measures that could become effective only with the use of force. He added that there had been overly great emphasis placed on imports by the United States of strategic materials from Southern Rhodesia. His Government had gone to great lengths to maintain and support the sanctions programme (with the excepted area of strategic imports), although some Governments had not even done that.

384. The representative of the United Kingdom said that, since the Council had last debated the Rhodesian question, the Pearce Commission had reported. His Government had accepted its conclusion, thereby demonstrating its good faith. It considered that the settle-

ment proposals of November 1971, for all their imperfections, offered a reasonable solution. What was now required was a period of calm consideration, in the hope that the people of Southern Rhodesia, African and European alike, would decide to choose the way of compromise. For its part, the United Kingdom would continue to look out for a settlement on the basis of its five principles. While the people of Southern Rhodesia were given time for reflection and it waited to see what came out of Southern Rhodesia itself, his Government maintained its existing position, including sanctions. On the subject of sanctions, he said that the role of the sanctions Committee was to assist Governments in the application of sanctions, and he drew attention to the strict observance of sanctions in the United Kingdom. Concerning the proposal for a constitutional conference, he drew attention to the fluid political situation in Southern Rhodesia and the need for the Rhodesians themselves to solve their own problems; while the British Government had responsibilities, it did not have the power to impose its will; all could endorse the thought behind the proposal, which was that there must be consultation and compromise among all the parties concerned in Southern Rhodesia, but it was just not practicable for his Government to call a conference in Rhodesia without the acquiescence of the Smith régime. To summon a conference outside Rhodesia would be fruitless. Turning to the two draft resolutions before the Council, he said that his delegation was sceptical of any measures that sought to impose a solution from outside. Moreover, the draft resolution in document S/10805 contained directives to his Government, as well as measures designed to bind his Government to impracticable courses of action; as such, that draft resolution was unacceptable to his delegation. The proposal for a further study by the Committee on sanctions contained in the other draft resolution (S/10804) also appeared likely to impede rather than improve the work of the Committee; his delegation had always considered that, if the Committee concentrated sufficiently on determining the origin and destination of suspected goods, the loopholes admittedly existing through South Africa and the Portuguese Territories would be effectively stopped. He reaffirmed that his delegation would not accept any further interpretations of the objectives of the sanctions other than those contained in Security Council resolution 253 (1968).

385. Referring to the statement of the representative of the United States, the representative of Somalia said that, with due respect to the impressive and convincing figures on Southern Rhodesia's trade quoted by the representative of the United States, the sponsors of the two draft resolutions were quite concerned at the fact that the United States had officially decided to re-establish trade relations with Southern Rhodesia. The United States had the power to prohibit the importation of chrome, and such a measure would greatly inspire the international community. He asked whether States had no legal obligations under international law to devise means of upholding that law under their domestic law. He also noted the exceptions taken by the United Kingdom and expressed the hope that that delegation would reconsider its position regarding the two draft resolutions. He then requested a short suspension of the Council's meeting so that the sponsors might seek further views from delegations on the draft resolutions.

386. When the Council resumed the meeting, the representative of Somalia, on behalf of Guinea, Somalia

and the Sudan, stated that the sponsors had accepted some of the amendments proposed and had agreed to make some changes of form to the two draft resolutions. He then read out the agreed amendments and revisions. The final form of the first draft resolution was circulated in document S/10804/Rev.1. The sponsors also agreed to the following modifications in the second draft resolution, the final form of which was circulated in document S/10805/Rev.1:

(1) The words "with satisfaction" were inserted in the fifth preambular paragraph following the words "Having noted".

(2) The first part of operative paragraph 4 was reworded as follows:

"Calls upon the United Kingdom Government to try its utmost to bring about conditions necessary to permit the free expression of the right to self-determination".

(3) Operative paragraph 6 was deleted and the following paragraph renumbered.

(4) In the last operative paragraph, the words "all measures" were replaced by the words "effective measures".

(5) Throughout the text the name of the Territory was revised to read "Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe)".

Decisions: *At the 1666th meeting on 29 September, the draft resolution contained in document S/10804/Rev.1 was adopted by 13 votes to none, with 2 abstentions (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America), as Security Council resolution 320 (1972).*

387. Resolution 320 (1972) read as follows:

"The Security Council,

"Recalling its resolution 253 (1968) of 29 May 1968 and subsequent resolutions in which all States are required to implement and make effective the economic, political and other sanctions against Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) decided upon by the Council in furtherance of the objective of ending the rebellion in that territory,

"Taking into account its resolution 314 (1972) of 28 February 1972 and 318 (1972) of 28 July 1972 concerning the co-operation and obligations of States and the measures necessary to ensure the scrupulous observance and strict implementation of sanctions,

"Deeply concerned that, despite their obligations under Article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations, several States continue to violate sanctions covertly and overtly in contravention of the provisions of resolution 253 (1968).

"Gravely concerned about the detrimental consequences which violations could cause to the effectiveness of sanctions and, in the wider sense, to the authority of the Council,

"Deeply concerned by the report of the United States of America that it has authorized the importation of chrome ore and other minerals from Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe),

"Condemning the refusal of South Africa and Portugal to co-operate with the United Nations in the observance and implementation of sanctions against Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe),

"1. Reaffirms its decision that sanctions against Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) shall remain fully

in force until the aims and objectives set out in resolution 253 (1968) are completely achieved;

"2. *Calls upon* all States to implement fully all Security Council resolutions establishing sanctions against Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), in accordance with Article 25 and Article 2, paragraph 6, of the Charter of the United Nations;

"3. *Urges* the United States of America to co-operate fully with the United Nations in the effective implementation of sanctions;

"4. *Requests* the Security Council Committee established in pursuance of resolution 253 (1968) concerning the question of Southern Rhodesia to undertake, as a matter of urgency, consideration of the type of action which could be taken in view of the open and persistent refusal of South Africa and Portugal to implement sanctions against the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and to report to the Council not later than 31 January 1973;

"5. *Further requests* the Committee to examine and submit a report to the Security Council not later than 31 January 1973 on all proposals and suggestions made at the 1663rd to 1666th meetings of the Council for extending the scope and improving the effectiveness of sanctions against Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe)."

The Council then voted on the revised draft resolution contained in document S/10805/Rev.1. A separate vote was taken first on operative paragraph 1, then on operative paragraph 5 and, finally, on the revised draft resolution as a whole. In each case, the result of the voting was 10 votes in favour to 1 against (the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland), with 4 abstentions (Belgium, France, Italy and the United States of America); therefore, the draft resolution was not adopted, owing to the negative votes of a permanent member of the Council.

388. The representative of Japan, speaking in explanation of vote, reiterated his Government's firm belief that the United Kingdom had the primary responsibility for restoring constitutional government in Southern Rhodesia. Japan had consistently supported majority rule based on universal suffrage there, but it also recognized the need for a patient and practical approach to the question. In view of those considerations, his delegation had voted in favour of the two draft resolutions as revised.

389. The representative of the United States explained that his delegation had abstained on the first draft resolution (S/10804/Rev.1) because of its conflict with United States law, as well as the undue attention it focused on the United States. His delegation had also abstained on the second draft resolution because, although the anxieties of the sponsors about the stale-mated position in Southern Rhodesia and their well-intentioned efforts in that regard were understandable, some of the proposals in that draft resolution were impracticable under current conditions. He said that his Government did not believe force to be an appropriate or effective means of resolving the Rhodesian problem or the other fundamental difficulties in southern Africa. He hoped that circumstances could be brought about in which a constitutional conference including those representing all Rhodesians, African and European, could be called.

390. The representative of France said that his delegation had voted for the first draft resolution because its primary purpose was to ensure the strictest and most complete application of the sanctions. Although in agreement with the general purpose of the sponsors, it had abstained on the second draft resolution because it considered, in view of the realities of the situation, that the Council should first afford an opportunity to the United Kingdom to pursue the political process recently awakened in Southern Rhodesia and should not attempt to usurp the role of the administering Power there.

391. The representative of Belgium said that his delegation had been satisfied to vote in favour of the first draft resolution, as amended, but had abstained on the second draft resolution because, though some of its provisions were not unreasonable, others, particularly operative paragraph 5, sought to impose unrealistic conditions. His delegation would have preferred simply a unanimous reaffirmation of the commitment to end the rebellion, to apply the principle of self-determination and to maintain effective and obligatory sanctions, to which his delegation took the opportunity to reaffirm its loyalty.

392. The representative of Italy said that his country believed that there should be no independence for Southern Rhodesia before majority rule but that that was a question which the people of Southern Rhodesia had to decide for themselves.

393. The representative of the Sudan said that the sponsors had submitted mild draft resolutions containing the minimum of the demands of OAU, in the hope that they would be accepted by the Council. They were grateful to those delegations that had voted for the draft resolutions, but they were disappointed by the veto cast by the United Kingdom and by the abstentions entered by other delegations. The sponsors could not understand why the United Kingdom found it difficult, for example, merely to accept the principle of a secret ballot based on one-man, one-vote. He said that, since the Council's meetings in Addis Ababa and the activities of the Pearce Commission, the situation in Southern Rhodesia had been deteriorating, moving closer to the system of *apartheid*; that was a dangerous development. The United Kingdom had a direct responsibility to open fresh contacts with the rebel leader and ask him to consult the Africans. The Council could not allow any attempt by the United Kingdom, as the administering Power, to pull away gradually from its responsibility.

394. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that the voting just completed, disappointing as it was to the people of Zimbabwe and Africa and their friends, had shown clearly who were friends and who enemies of those fighting for their freedom and independence. His delegation had voted for operative paragraphs 1 and 5 of the second draft resolution, but the United Kingdom had voted against them, which showed clearly the distinction in the concept of freedom possessed by each country and led to the conclusion that the United Kingdom had learned nothing and forgotten nothing.

395. The representative of Somalia said that, despite abstentions by the minority of five delegations on the draft resolution expressing matters of principle, the African group of States intended to submit the substance of the vetoed draft resolution to a vote in the General Assembly, so that the United Nations body as a whole might express itself firmly on it.

396. The representative of Yugoslavia said that the two draft resolutions were moderate in tone, especially after incorporation of the amendments suggested by various delegations. The rejection of the second draft resolution through a veto, therefore, was not only regrettable; it created a new grave concern because it demonstrated that the United Kingdom, as the administering Power, was not prepared to make any positive move towards a final solution of the question.

397. The President, as the representative of China, said that although his delegation had voted for both draft resolutions, it had reservations about operative paragraph 3 of the second one (S/10805/Rev.1), because China had consistently maintained that the people of Zimbabwe should be given energetic support to achieve the immediate independence of Zimbabwe. He also expressed his delegation's utmost regret for the veto exercised by the United Kingdom against the people of Zimbabwe and Africa and concluded that the people of Zimbabwe and the people of Africa had no alternative but to further unite and carry out the struggle for their liberation and put an end with their own hands to the brutal rule of the racist Smith régime.

E. Further reports and communications received between 30 September 1972 and 15 June 1973

398. In a letter dated 30 September (S/10806), the representative of Gabon, referring to a statement by a speaker at the Council's meeting on 28 September naming Gabon in connexion with violation of the sanctions against Southern Rhodesia, reaffirmed his country's intention of complying with the resolutions adopted by the Security Council and by OAU in that regard.

399. On 22 December, the Security Council Committee established in pursuance of resolution 253 (1968) submitted its fifth report (S/10852) covering its work since issuance of its fourth report on 16 June 1971. In that period the Committee had held 57 meetings, during which it had considered the question of imports of chrome, nickel and other materials from Southern Rhodesia by the United States; other cases carried over from previous reports and new cases of suspected violations of sanctions; action taken by various States with regard to sanctions; the state of consular and other representation in Southern Rhodesia and of the illegal régime abroad; the problem of airlines operating to and from Southern Rhodesia; and immigration and tourism in the Territory. Concerning representation of the illegal régime abroad, the Committee reported on the series of actions it had taken regarding the possible participation of Southern Rhodesian athletes in the 1972 Olympic Games, a matter already mentioned in its fourth report. The Committee stated that on 22 August the International Olympic Committee had decided to withdraw its invitation to Southern Rhodesia to participate in the Games. The Committee had also considered procedural issues concerning its work and had decided, with the consent of the Security Council, to replace the system of monthly rotation of its chairmanship to one whereby the chairman and two elected vice-chairmen would hold office for one year. The report also indicated the action taken by the Committee in implementation of Security Council resolutions 314 (1972) and 318 (1972).

400. In a letter dated 20 December (S/10854), the Secretary-General transmitted to the Security Council

the text of General Assembly resolution 2946 (XXVII), in paragraph 6 of which the Assembly drew the attention of the Council to the need to widen the scope of the sanctions against the illegal régime to include all the measures envisaged under Article 41 of the Charter and to consider extending the sanctions against South Africa and Portugal.

401. On 31 December, the Security Council Committee established in pursuance of resolution 253 (1968) issued an addendum to its fifth report (S/10852/Add.1) containing four annexes. Annexes I to III contained the text of correspondence that it had conducted with Governments concerning cases of suspected or admitted violations of sanctions, and annex IV consisted of a note on tobacco, listing replies from Governments on matters relating to that commodity.

402. On 2 February 1973, the Committee issued a second addendum to its fifth report (S/10852/Add.2) giving information and statistical data relative to Southern Rhodesia's trade for 1971. The figures showed that the Territory's merchandise exports for 1971 had amounted to \$388 million (compared with \$354 million in 1970) and that its imports had amounted to \$395 million (compared with \$329 million in 1970). There was no official information as to the direction and nature of the Territory's exports or the origin and nature of the bulk of its imports.

403. In two notes issued on 31 January and 28 February (S/10873 and S/10890), the President announced that he had received letters from the Acting Chairman and from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established in pursuance of resolution 253 (1968) requesting that, in view of the amount of work before the Committee, the time-limit for submitting the reports requested in resolution 320 (1972) be extended, first, until 28 February and, later, until 15 April 1973. The President stated that, following consultations with members of the Council, it had been agreed to grant the Committee's request in each case.

404. On 15 April, the Committee submitted its second special report (S/10920) pursuant to paragraphs 4 and 5 of Security Council resolution 320 (1972). The Committee reported that, during 26 meetings, it had considered, with the help of a working group drawn from its membership, a set of 24 proposals submitted by Guinea, Kenya and the Sudan, as well as a number of proposals submitted by other delegations. A series of recommendations and suggestions on which agreement had been reached was contained in section III of the report, and the African proposals not agreed upon were listed in section IV, together with some alternative proposals presented by other delegations. Section V contained the positions and comments of various delegations on the African proposals as a whole. Among the agreed recommendations and suggestions were preparation by the Committee of a manual setting forth the necessary documentation and clearing procedures for determining the true origin of goods known to be produced in Southern Rhodesia and establishing guidelines for confiscation of such goods as appropriate; publication by the Committee of a list of names of experts who would be available to Governments, at the Government's request, to make appropriate investigations; seizure by Member States of cargoes found to be of Southern Rhodesian origin; establishment of a special fund, financed by voluntary contributions, espe-

cially the equivalent of the proceeds from the sales of confiscated goods, to be used towards defraying the experts' costs; issuance by the Committee of quarterly lists of companies found guilty of sanctions violations and of Governments that fail to reply within two months to the Committee's inquiries regarding cases of possible sanctions violations; and appointment within the Secretariat of an expert on international trade to serve the Committee as required.

405. By a letter dated 27 April (S/10923), the Chairman of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples transmitted the text of a resolution adopted by the Special Committee on that day, in which the Special Committee drew the Council's attention to the urgent need to call upon all States to confiscate shipments to and from Zimbabwe, to nullify all insurance policies covering such shipments, to invalidate passports and other documents for travel to Zimbabwe and, as a matter of priority, to consider imposing sanctions against Portugal and South Africa.

406. In a letter dated 8 May (S/10925) addressed to the President of the Security Council, the representatives of Guinea and Kenya requested a meeting of the Council as soon as possible to consider the second special report of the Security Council Committee established in pursuance of resolution 253 (1968).

F. Consideration at the 1712th to 1716th meetings (14-22 May 1973)

407. At its 1712th meeting on 14 May, the Council included in its agenda the letter from Guinea and Kenya, as well as the second special report of the Committee, and considered the question at five meetings held between 14 and 22 May.

408. Opening the discussion, the Chairman of the Committee established in pursuance of resolution 253 (1968) introduced the Committee's special report and said that it was a matter of profound bitterness and disappointment that five years after the Council had instituted sanctions against Southern Rhodesia justice had not yet come to the African people of that Territory. Against that background, the African members of the Committee had submitted a set of 24 proposals that they considered reasonable and pertinent, aimed at effectively plugging the loop-holes through which the purposes of the sanctions were being frustrated. Regrettably, many of those proposals had not won unanimous support in the Committee and had been relegated to section IV of the report. Among those proposals, she said, the African delegations had recommended that all States refuse landing rights to national carriers of countries still granting such rights to aircraft operating services to and from Southern Rhodesia; that all States prohibit insurance coverage for flights to or from Southern Rhodesia, prohibit shipping companies from carrying goods to or from Southern Rhodesia and prohibit insurance coverage for such goods; that the blockade of Beira be extended to Lourenço Marques and be mounted by the United Kingdom with the help of other Member States; and that the Council call upon the United States to rescind its law permitting violation of the sanctions. Turning to section III of the report, she said that the agreed recommendations and suggestions in that section envisaged measures to be taken by

Governments, by the Committee and by the Secretary-General. She then proceeded to enumerate and explain those she considered most important. She appealed to the Council for unanimous adoption and to Governments for scrupulous implementation of the agreed recommendations and suggestions as a means towards obtaining freedom and justice for the oppressed people of Southern Rhodesia.

409. The representative of Yugoslavia said that, in view of the grave and serious situation in Southern Rhodesia, which constituted a threat to international peace and security and provoked a legitimate struggle by the people of Zimbabwe, his delegation attached great importance to the latest report of the Committee. As the fifth report of the Committee had shown there was flagrant and widespread violation of sanctions committed or facilitated by countries other than South Africa and Portugal. Furthermore, an analysis of all the cases of suspected sanctions violations before the Committee had indicated that, in most instances, no conclusive proof of violation had been found, primarily because some Governments had failed to reply to the Committee's inquiries, others had submitted elusive, incomplete or otherwise unsatisfactory replies and accommodation documents issued by the Portuguese colonial authorities in Mozambique had often been relied upon as evidence of the non-Rhodesian origin of the goods in question. The proposals in the Committee's special report were aimed at further strengthening application of the sanctions by eliminating such practices. His delegation, together with those of India, Indonesia, Panama and Peru, had supported and would continue to support all the African proposals in the report, including those contained in section IV, which he hoped the Council would seriously consider approving in addition to those in section III. In conclusion, he reiterated certain principles fundamental to the solution of the problem in Southern Rhodesia, namely, the inalienable right of the people of Zimbabwe to self-determination, freedom and independence; that there should be no independence in Zimbabwe before majority rule; that any settlement relating to the future of the Territory must be worked out with the full participation of the genuine representatives of the people; and that the administering Power should in no way transfer power or accord any sovereignty to the illegal régime.

410. At the 1713th meeting on 16 May, the President, with the consent of the Council, invited the representative of Somalia, at his request, to participate in the discussion without the right to vote, in accordance with the terms of Article 31 of the Charter.

411. The representative of Somalia noted that the pattern of events in Southern Rhodesia was frighteningly similar to that of South Africa. It was also evident that many countries were violating the sanctions. In the context of the shameful gap between the principles established by the United Nations and the practices of certain Member States, his delegation wished to express its strong support for the proposals put forward by the African members in the Committee. It also supported the Chinese and USSR proposals to extend the sanctions to cover South Africa and the Portuguese Territories and to close all means of communication with Southern Rhodesia. The African proposals presented the absolute minimum expected of the Council. Apart from those relating to the Committee's work, there was virtually nothing new in the agreed

proposals in section III that could not be obtained through strict enforcement by Governments of the Council's previous decisions. It was only the proposals in section IV that provided any scope for extending the sanctions and truly sharpening the application of the existing measures. He strongly urged the Council not to feel defeated over the issue of Southern Rhodesia and not to abandon its commitment to the effort of establishing a just society in that Territory.

412. The representative of Indonesia said that the African proposals, as originally submitted, had been designed to exert more effective pressures upon those countries that had demonstrated varying degrees of laxity in implementing the sanctions. His delegation was disappointed that those proposals in their entirety had not received unanimity of agreement in the Committee. In their final form, the agreed proposals in section III did not provide for any expansion of sanctions; nor did they set out any other concrete actions that could be taken against the open and persistent refusal of South Africa and Portugal to implement sanctions against Southern Rhodesia. It was regrettable that the special report had not included a recommendation for censure of Member States that violated sanctions. One of the agreed proposals called for the appointment within the Secretariat of an individual with expert knowledge of international trade, especially trade conducted with third parties. His delegation particularly endorsed that recommendation for reinforcement of the Committee's secretariat. Turning to the agreed recommendation and suggestions as a whole, he concluded by saying that, although they still were inadequate and did not fully meet the wishes of his delegation, they were a step in the right direction and, as such, he commended the report for unanimous approval by the Council.

413. The representative of the United States reaffirmed his Government's full support for majority rule in Southern Rhodesia as soon as possible. That was the objective fixed by the Council and the reason for its having instituted sanctions against the illegal régime there. What was required was to make the existing sanctions more effective rather than to expand their scope. The recommendations agreed upon by the Committee could be effective in that regard if all Member States, without exception, responded to them quickly and positively. His delegation particularly welcomed the recommendation drawing attention to the discrepancies in the trade figures relating to exports and imports between South Africa, Angola and Mozambique and their trading partners, giving rise to the inference that trans-shipment of Rhodesian commodities might be occurring through those three countries. In that connexion, his delegation would also have welcomed an appeal to those countries' trading partners to take the necessary action to ensure that such discrepancies did not mask the importation of disguised Rhodesian goods. He commended the Committee for its efforts, which he felt represented a concrete and realistic step towards the objective of achieving self-determination and majority rule in Southern Rhodesia.

414. The representative of India said that the recommendations and suggestions in section III of the report, though inadequate, were nevertheless a small step forward. However, his delegation also found nothing in them to encourage belief that sanctions would in the future be more effective in bringing down the

Smith régime than they had been in the past. As evidence of the ineffectiveness of the current sanctions, he cited the example of three tourists, two Canadian and one American, reported that day to have been killed at the Rhodesia-Zambia border. The loss of life was regrettable, but the incident raised the question of who had authorized their passports and endorsed them for a visit to Southern Rhodesia. It was time that the Council, as part of its programme of sanctions, took steps to discourage such tourism. Turning to the proposals in section IV, he considered that it would be worth while for the Council to make a serious attempt to find a common ground of agreement on some of them. His delegation had supported all of them in the Committee, and analysis showed that only a very few delegations were opposed to them. Although it had reservations concerning the efficacy of the measures agreed upon, his delegation was encouraged that there was some progress. The growing strength of the freedom movement was reflected in the increasingly repressive and discriminatory measures being instituted by the illegal régime. The Council should continue to make the sanctions as effective as possible, even though their application could be only a contributory factor in shortening the struggle for freedom that was being waged by the people of Zimbabwe themselves, who were bound to succeed.

415. The representative of France said that, although his delegation had always doubted the efficacy of sanctions in finding a solution to the Rhodesian problem, it had voted for their establishment in 1968 and their extension in 1970 and for measures to increase the effectiveness of the Committee's work in 1972. Similarly, his delegation supported the recommendations and suggestions in section III of the Committee's report, as it had always favoured measures intended to strengthen the sanctions against Southern Rhodesia, provided that the practical modalities of their application met the criterion of effectiveness; but it was imperative that all Governments comply scrupulously with the provisions adopted and thus further isolate the Smith régime. His delegation could not support some of the proposals contained in section IV, particularly those aimed at declaring an economic war on southern Africa as a whole. As no political solution for the Territory would be possible without the support of the administering Power, his delegation hoped that the United Kingdom would continue, in the aftermath of the Pearce Commission, to seek a settlement that would lead Southern Rhodesia as soon as possible to self-determination in accordance with the freely expressed wishes of the population.

416. At the 1714th meeting on 17 May, the representative of Kenya said that the situation in Southern Rhodesia continued to be serious. Opposition to the illegal racist régime had increased, resulting in further repressive measures by that régime and regrettable loss of life and threatening peace and security in that part of Africa. The sanctions programme had failed in its objective of bringing down the illegal régime obviously because many countries were secretly trading with Southern Rhodesia, one permanent member of the Council, the United States, was openly doing so and both South Africa and Portugal continued to defy the Council's decisions. The Committee's agreed recommendations and suggestions were not going to counter those three ways by which sanctions were being flouted; they were only palliatives aimed at boosting African morale and exerting a little more

pressure on the illegal régime. Meaningful African proposals, though supported in the Committee by many delegations, for which the African delegations were very grateful, had been obstructed by prominent Western Powers. Citing some of those proposals, he expressed surprise that, mild and realistic as they were, they could have been opposed by the administering Power itself. With regard to the Committee's conduct of its work, his delegation considered that it should assume an activist role in forestalling violations of sanctions through direct contacts with the companies concerned or through working in close collaboration with non-governmental organizations that could supply it with information and comments. The over-all problem, however, remained to find a solution to the Southern Rhodesian situation. His delegation wished to hear a commitment from the United Kingdom that there would be no independence for Southern Rhodesia before majority rule, that the 1971 Home-Smith proposals for a settlement were no longer under consideration and that the United Kingdom was willing and ready to convene a constitutional conference attended by all concerned, including the African political parties and their leaders, to work out the attainment of majority rule in the Territory.

417. The representative of Kenya then introduced, on behalf of Guinea, Kenya and the Sudan, two draft resolutions (S/10927 and S/10928), which he urged the Council to consider sympathetically.

418. The first draft resolution (S/10927) read as follows:

"The Security Council,

"Recalling its resolutions 320 (1972) of 29 September 1972 and 328 (1973) of 10 March 1973,

"Noting that measures so far instituted by the Security Council and the General Assembly have not brought to an end the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia,

"Reiterating its grave concern that some States contrary to Security Council resolutions 232 (1966) of 16 December 1966, 253 (1968) of 29 May 1968 and 277 (1970) of 18 March 1970 and to their obligations under Article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations, have failed to prevent trade with the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia,

"Condemning the persistent refusal of South Africa and Portugal to co-operate with the United Nations in the effective observance and implementation of sanctions against Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) in clear violation of the Charter of the United Nations,

"Having considered the second special report of the Committee established in pursuance of resolution 253 (1968) (S/10920),

"Taking note of the letter dated 27 April from the Chairman of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (S/10923),

"1. Approves the recommendations and suggestions contained in paragraphs 10 to 22 of the second special report of the Committee established in pursuance of resolution 253 (1968);

"2. Requests the Committee, as well as all Governments, and the Secretary-General as appropriate,

to take urgent action to implement the recommendations and suggestions referred to above,

"3. Requests States with legislation permitting importation of minerals and other products from Southern Rhodesia to repeal it immediately;

"4. Calls upon States to enact and enforce immediately legislation providing for the imposition of severe penalties on persons natural or juridical that evade or commit breach of sanctions by:

"(a) Importing any goods from Southern Rhodesia;

"(b) Exporting any goods to Southern Rhodesia;

"(c) Providing any facilities for transport of goods to and from Southern Rhodesia;

"(d) Conducting or facilitating any transaction or trade that may enable Southern Rhodesia to obtain from or send to any country any goods or services;

"(e) Continuing to deal with clients in South Africa, Angola, Mozambique, Guinea (Bissau) and Namibia after it has become known that the clients are re-exporting the goods or components thereof to Southern Rhodesia, or that goods received from such clients are of Southern Rhodesian origin;

"5. Requests States, in the event of their trading with South Africa and Portugal, to provide that purchase contracts with those countries should clearly stipulate, in a manner legally enforceable, the prohibition of dealing in goods of Southern Rhodesian origin; likewise, sales contracts with these countries should include a prohibition of resale or re-export of goods to Southern Rhodesia;

"6. Calls upon States to pass legislation forbidding insurance companies under their jurisdiction from covering air flights into and out of Southern Rhodesia and individuals or air cargo carried on them;

"7. Calls upon States to undertake appropriate legislative measures to ensure that all valid marine insurance contracts contain specific provisions that no goods of Southern Rhodesian origin or destined to Southern Rhodesia shall be covered by such contracts;

"8. Calls upon States to inform the Security Council Committee established in pursuance of resolution 253 (1968) on their present sources of supply and quantities of chrome, asbestos, nickel, pig iron, tobacco, meat and sugar, together with the quantities of these goods they obtained from Southern Rhodesia before the application of sanctions."

419. The second draft resolution (S/10928) read as follows:

"The Security Council,

"Recalling its resolutions on the situation in Southern Rhodesia, in particular, resolutions 320 (1972) and 328 (1973),

"Noting the measures called for in resolution . . .,

"Considering the urgent and simultaneous need for more stringent measures in order to meet the requirements of paragraph 4 of resolution 320 (1972),

"Deeply disturbed at the deteriorating situation in Southern Rhodesia, which constitutes a serious threat to international peace and security,

"Reiterating its deep concern that measures adopted by the Council have failed to bring to an

end the illegal régime and its conviction that sanctions cannot terminate the illegal régime unless they are comprehensive, mandatory and effectively supervised and unless measures are taken against States which violate them,

"Reaffirming that effective action must be taken to end open and persistent refusal of South Africa and Portugal to implement sanctions against the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia which has undermined the effectiveness of the measures adopted by the Security Council and which constitutes a violation of the obligations of South Africa and Portugal under Article 25 of the Charter,

"1. Decides that all States should limit, with immediate effect, any purchase of chromium ores, asbestos, tobacco, pig iron, copper, sugar, maize and any products from South Africa, Mozambique and Angola to the quantitative levels prevailing in 1965;

"2. Requests States to take the necessary measures, including enacting legislation denying or revoking landing rights to national carriers of countries that continue to grant such rights to aircraft from Southern Rhodesia or operate air services to Southern Rhodesia;

"3. Decides to extend the Beira blockade to cover all commodities and products from or destined to Southern Rhodesia to the port of Lourenço Marques;

"4. Urges the Government of the United Kingdom, as the administering Power, to take all effective measures to implement fully paragraph 3 above and to seek such co-operation of other States in this task as they may require;

"5. Condemns all those Governments, in particular South Africa and Portugal, that encourage, assist or connive at any violation of sanctions against Southern Rhodesia."

420. The representative of Australia said that it would be a mistake to regard the sanctions as a failure; they had placed the illegal régime under considerable pressure, and, judging from the régime's recent actions, particularly in its relations with Zambia, its racist legislation, its attack on the freedom of the press and its imposition of punishment on whole communities, it could not be said that the régime was fully confident of its mastery of the situation. After commenting on some of the agreed recommendations, he said that what was most needed was the necessary zeal on the part of Governments to make the sanctions work. His Government was determined to do all that it could to make them fully effective and was taking additional legislative and administrative measures to that end.

421. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that the report before the Council must be considered in the light of the situation prevailing in Southern Rhodesia, where the South African type of repressive and racially discriminatory action was being perpetrated against the African people, and where, judging from its recent attack against Zambia, the illegal racist régime was carrying out aggressions against its neighbours. Furthermore, the illegal régime was being supported and aided by South Africa and Portugal; in fact, South African armed forces were still operating in the Territory to suppress the national liberation movement, despite numerous demands by the Council for their withdrawal. In

view of that situation, he urged the Council to consider seriously the appeal made by the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, in its resolution adopted on 27 April 1972, calling upon the Council to expand the sanctions to cover South Africa and Portugal. Concerning operation of the sanctions programme, he cited press reports that a number of Western countries were violating the sanctions and reminded the Council that some of those countries had been named from 20 to 40 times in connexion with the cases of suspected violation before the Committee on Sanctions. That Committee had established that the Federal Republic of Germany, Switzerland, Australia and the United States were in direct violation of the sanctions. In those circumstances, the Council had requested the Committee in resolution 320 (1972) to prepare its current report. During the preparation of that report his delegation had insisted on the need to adopt decisive measures. It had proposed that all States cease their purchases from South Africa, Mozambique and Angola of goods that were the main items of Southern Rhodesia's export trade, that the Council introduce a compulsory embargo on the sale of petroleum products and all types of arms to South Africa and Portugal and that all means of communication be applied to expand the sanctions against Southern Rhodesia in conformity with Article 41 of the Charter. Owing to opposition by some Western members of the Committee, none of those proposals had been included in the agreed recommendations for extending the scope of sanctions against Southern Rhodesia; consequently, the Committee's terms of reference under resolution 320 (1972) had not been fulfilled. In his delegation's opinion, only adoption by the Council of decisive measures would put an end to the illegal régime. He declared that the Soviet Union, in pursuit of Leninist principles and of the decisions of the Twenty-fourth Congress of the Communist Party of the USSR, would continue to support efforts for the speediest liquidation of the racist régime in Southern Rhodesia in order to enable the people of Zimbabwe to be free and independent.

422. The representative of Austria said that it was a serious matter that five years after the Council had unanimously imposed comprehensive mandatory sanctions against Southern Rhodesia, the desired result had not yet been achieved. It was all the more serious because the illegal régime had continued to pursue policies unacceptable to the vast majority of Member States. In assessing the operation of sanctions, it was necessary to examine, first, how effectively they were being implemented and, secondly, how much closer they had moved the situation to the goal of majority rule in Southern Rhodesia. His delegation was convinced that, despite difficulties in their practical application the mandatory sanctions still constituted one of the principal means of pursuing that goal. The Committee's report before the Council addressed itself precisely to the problem of finding the means of counteracting their circumvention or eliminating their ineffective operation. For that reason, his delegation welcomed the recommendations and suggestions in section III of the report and recommended their adoption by the Council. His delegation thought the Committee could usefully continue to seek agreement on the recommendations and suggestions contained in section IV of the report. It was convinced

that renewed efforts by the United Kingdom and continued action by the Council would be necessary to achieve a political solution corresponding to the aspirations of the people of Zimbabwe.

423. The representative of Panama said that, although his delegation considered the agreed recommendations and suggestions in section III of the report to be consonant with the Committee's terms of reference it would have wished inclusion in that section of more severe measures to counter the refusal of South Africa and Portugal to comply with the sanctions against Southern Rhodesia. In keeping with its anti-colonialist position, his Government condemned all types of discrimination and was in solidarity with the aspirations of the people of Zimbabwe. Accordingly, his delegation welcomed and strongly supported the two draft resolutions sponsored by Guinea, Kenya and the Sudan.

424. Referring to the statement made by the representative of the USSR, the representative of Australia said that his Government's shipments of wheat to Southern Rhodesia had been authorized on the basis of the fact that they could be regarded as justified within the terms of Security Council resolution 253 (1968) on humanitarian grounds but that as of the end of 1972, his Government had announced that no more Australian wheat would be sold to Southern Rhodesia.

425. In reply, the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that he had merely quoted a statement of fact from the Committee's fourth report, in which the validity of the humanitarian considerations referred to had been questioned by the Committee. However, his delegation welcomed the confirmation that the Government of Australia had now stopped such shipments.

426. At the 1715th meeting on 18 May, the President drew the Council's attention to the two draft resolutions before it and announced that both had additional sponsors: Australia, India, Indonesia, Panama, Peru and Yugoslavia for the first draft resolution (S/10927), and Indonesia, Panama, Peru and Yugoslavia for the second (S/10928).

427. The representative of Peru said that his delegation had supported the original African proposals in the Committee because of their relevance and effectiveness and considered that the agreed recommendations and suggestions, though inadequate, presented the very minimum that the Council could adopt within the mandate of resolution 320 (1972). In view of the need to increase the effectiveness of the sanctions so that they might achieve the desired objective, his delegation had decided to sponsor the two draft resolutions before the Council.

428. The representative of China said that his Government had consistently advocated strict sanctions against Southern Rhodesia, but that, unfortunately, even the previous Security Council resolutions on sanctions had not been earnestly implemented. As evidence of that, he noted that, according to statistical data published by the United Nations Secretariat, Southern Rhodesia's foreign trade in 1971 was 15 per cent higher than in 1970 and that, in addition to the connivance of South Africa and Portugal, certain big Powers were either abetting Southern Rhodesia or blatantly violating the sanctions. He also mentioned the recently reported sale of three Boeing

aircraft to the illegal régime. In response to such a situation, the African delegations had put forward concrete proposals in the Committee, some of which had been rejected by certain big Powers. His delegation maintained that, in addition to the agreed recommendations, the Council should also accept some of the African proposals; that, in view of the adamant attitude of South Africa and Portugal, the Council should condemn those two countries and extend the sanctions to cover them; and that the Council should also condemn those big Powers that continued to violate the sanctions and enjoin them to desist from doing so. He stated that his Government maintained no relations of any kind with the illegal régime and would continue to support the people of Zimbabwe in their struggle. Consequently, his delegation would vote in favour of the two draft resolutions before the Council.

429. The representative of the United Kingdom said that the existing sanctions were comprehensive in scope. If they had been fully and conscientiously applied by all States professing to support them, illegal trade would have been greatly reduced and the willingness of the régime to come to a just settlement would have been greater. In considering what should now be done, the criterion must be effectiveness in stopping illegal trade and therefore promoting the chances of a just settlement. Paper sanctions were useless. His Government could not countenance a paper extension which would amount to a declaration of economic warfare against the whole of southern Africa. What was required was the proper application of existing sanctions. In particular, trade with Southern Rhodesia's neighbours must be confined to legitimate trade. But international trade was complex, much of it conducted indirectly. Those violating sanctions exploited that situation to disguise trade with Southern Rhodesia: it was by no means only direct trade with Southern Africa which was involved. The sanctions Committee could not ignore the technicalities involved if it was to succeed in its main task. The place where an evasion of sanctions could be firmly established was at the port of final destination; for exports to Southern Rhodesia, investigations must be concentrated on the country of origin. The crucial problem was the investigation and identification of sanctions violations. The proposals in section IV of the Committee's report overlooked that problem; they would not prevent violations and could inhibit legitimate trade; his delegation could not endorse them. His delegation did, however, believe that the proposals in section III of the report provided an effective programme of action insofar as they sought to publicise the problem, called upon Governments to institute proper checking procedures at the time of arrival of goods and called for improvement of the Committee's own working methods. However, the draft resolution in document S/10927 went beyond those agreed proposals. To the extent that it incorporated agreed proposals, his delegation warmly supported it; to the extent that it went beyond the agreed proposals, his delegation could not support it. The United Kingdom would not think it right to vote for inappropriate proposals which it was not prepared to put into effect and his delegation would, with regret, have to abstain.

430. The representative of Guinea commented on the draft resolution in document S/10928 and said that, in view of the behaviour of a number of countries, including the United States, in deliberately violating the sanctions, it was necessary to strengthen those

sanctions and to extend them to cover South Africa and Portugal, Southern Rhodesia's *de facto* allies. Turning to the role of the United Kingdom, he said that the administering Power had pursued a hypocritical policy in Southern Rhodesia, exemplified by its refusal to use force there, as well as by the appointment of the Pearce Commission, which had been conceived to give legitimacy to the illegal régime. But the United Kingdom, as well as the rebel, racist régime, would have to contend with the new surge of the liberation movements, under unified military command and supported by OAU, which were determined to triumph and liberate the whole of southern Africa from racism and imperialism.

431. The President, speaking as the representative of the Sudan, considered that the Committee, by precluding any suggestion in the agreed proposals as to what should be done about South Africa and Portugal, had failed to comply with its key terms of reference in paragraph 4 of resolution 320 (1972). He mentioned the pertinent regrettably unagreed, African and other complementary proposals in sections IV and V, which, he believed, would have satisfied that requirement and also met other flagrant irregularities being practised to the benefit of the illegal régime. He emphasized that the African proposals on the question of insurance in particular were realistic and necessary and would constitute an important contribution to the effectiveness of sanctions. His delegation would therefore support the two draft resolutions before the Council because they would provide practical steps in the right direction, and he appealed to all members of the Council to adopt them unanimously. With regard to the existing situation in Southern Rhodesia, he maintained that the United Kingdom still bore a moral and political responsibility to end the rebellion in the Territory, but as that Government was reluctant to take any steps towards that end, the rebel régime was increasing its discriminatory laws and repressive measures against the people of Zimbabwe, thereby leaving them no alternative but to face force with force. It was also the duty of the Security Council to assist in establishing peace in southern Africa as a whole.

432. The representative of Kenya requested, and the Council agreed without objection, to a short suspension of the meeting so as to allow for consultations on the two draft resolutions prior to voting. On resumption, the Council again agreed without objection to another request by the representative of Kenya for adjournment of the meeting until 22 May in order to allow for further consultations and to prepare for further debate on the question.

433. At the 1716th meeting on 22 May, the representative of Kenya further explained the two draft resolutions before the Council. He was encouraged that the first draft resolution (S/10927) has as many as nine sponsors but regretted that the second one (S/10928) was opposed by those who aided, abetted and facilitated the breach of sanctions. The United Kingdom, in particular, which should have welcomed the practical measures contained therein, had failed even to mention it. It was very well known that South Africa and Portugal were the most substantial violators of the sanctions; yet the United Kingdom had proposed no measures to rectify that situation and was not willing that any action should be taken against those two countries. He appealed to the conscience and

integrity of certain major Powers on the Council whose claims to support United Nations action against the illegal régime appeared to be doubtful and whose actions in protecting the illegalities relating to the questions of Southern Rhodesia and South Africa through application of the veto appeared to be aimed at frustrating the goals set by the Council. Such key members of the Council did not want to disturb the *status quo* in southern Africa whence they reaped enormous short-term economic benefits in trade and investments, with cheap labour amounting to a new form of slavery under twentieth-century capitalism. He expressed the hope that such anxieties would be dispelled by an affirmative vote on the second draft resolution. However, in the event that that draft resolution was vetoed, he declared Africa would never give up the struggle for the freedom of the people of Zimbabwe and of southern Africa as a whole or compromise with the evil forces there. That struggle, contrary to the patronizing counsel of certain Western press media, was not a misplaced priority by Africans; to Africa it was a matter of life and death.

Decision: At the 1716th meeting, on 22 May 1973, the Security Council adopted the nine-Power draft resolution (S/10927) by 12 votes in favour to none against, with 3 abstentions (France, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America), as resolution 333 (1973).

434. Speaking in explanation of vote, the representative of Austria said that his delegation had voted for the draft resolution on the understanding that the proposals drawn from section IV of the second special report, on which there had been no unanimity in the Committee, and with some of which Austria had difficulties in agreeing because of their incompatibility with Austrian law, were an invitation to seek, within the Austrian legal order, adequate legislative solutions to achieve the aims of the resolution as a whole.

435. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that his delegation had voted for the draft resolution, even though the Committee's recommendations upon which it was based were not fully satisfactory, because its sponsors had asked support for it. The Soviet delegation considered as most deleterious the role played by South Africa and Portugal in support of the racist régime in Southern Rhodesia, and it urged the Council to take that fact, as well as the worsening situation in the Territory, into account when deciding on the draft resolution pertaining to the Committee's recommendations in that respect.

Decision: At the 1716th meeting on 22 May, the draft resolution contained in document S/10928 received 11 votes in favour, 2 against (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America) and 2 abstentions (Austria and France) and was not adopted, owing to the negative vote of two permanent members of the Council.

436. The representative of France said that his delegation had abstained on the first draft resolution (S/10927) because it incorporated procedures for strengthening the sanctions which, as it had already indicated, had been the subject of a consensus in the Committee, and because the sponsors had not accepted changes that his delegation had suggested. He had indicated previously why his delegation could not support the second draft resolution (S/10928).

437. The representative of China said that, inasmuch as the two draft resolutions were only mild preliminary measures for strengthening and expanding the sanctions against Southern Rhodesia, it was a matter of regret that the second draft resolution had been vetoed by two permanent members of the Council which had admitted that South Africa and Portugal were undermining the sanctions against Southern Rhodesia. As a consequence, the African people would draw the inevitable conclusion that those members were obstinately working to obstruct the adoption of effective measures against the racist régime and its collaborators and would unite to carry on their struggle.

438. The representative of India said that the negative votes cast against the second draft resolution indicated clearly that those who had always advocated effective implementation of the sanctions did not really wish to take the appropriate steps to that end. Consequently, the people of Zimbabwe had no alternative but to redouble their efforts to wrest power through forceful means, for the decision just taken by the Council showed clearly that all that had been done so far to impose sanctions was not really meant seriously.

439. The representative of Yugoslavia said that as a sponsor of both draft resolutions his delegation was gratified by the adoption of the first one but regretted the rejection of the second, which would have met the Council's directives in resolution 320 (1972) for extending the scope of the sanctions. In view of the large majority of members that had supported that draft resolution, he urged the Council to return later to the proposals contained in it.

440. The representative of the United Kingdom expressed regret that the sponsors had pressed the two draft resolutions to the vote, despite the fact that they went beyond the agreed conclusions in the Committee's report, and had introduced them without prior consultation. It could have been no surprise that his delegation had had to abstain on one of them and to cast a negative vote on the other. His delegation's views on the extension of sanctions to South Africa and Portugal had always been made clear. He rejected the argument that the wording of resolution 320 (1972) obliged the sanctions Committee to propose the extension of sanctions to South Africa and Portugal. He firmly rejected the charges of collusion and ill faith made against his Government, whose purpose remained the attainment of a just and acceptable settlement of the problem of Southern Rhodesia.

441. The representative of Australia said that his delegation regretted the rejection of the second draft resolution through the negative vote of two members and declared that, if it had been adopted and its provisions generally applied, his Government would have been prepared to co-operate in enforcing the application of its provisions.

442. The representative of the United States said that his delegation fully supported the agreed proposals in the Committee's report and assured the Council that, despite the difficulties it had on certain paragraphs in the first draft resolution, his Government would adhere strictly to their basic intents and purposes.

Referring to the importation of certain strategic materials from Southern Rhodesia by the United States, he repeated that such imports were a very small part of Southern Rhodesia's total exports; if the Committee knew where the bulk of those exports went, a clear idea would be obtained of how the Territory was surviving the sanctions. Concerning the sale of three Boeing aircraft to Southern Rhodesia, he reaffirmed that the United States had neither authorized the sale nor the re-export of the aircraft and would not authorize their servicing or the sale of spare parts for them. As for the second draft resolution, he said, it contained several proposals on which his delegation had already indicated strong reservations; moreover, his delegation considered that adoption of such a resolution, which was clearly unenforceable, would seriously damage the reputation and credibility of the United Nations. For that reason, his delegation had decided to vote against it.

443. The representative of Indonesia said that his delegation regretted the rejection of the second draft resolution, because adoption of both draft resolutions would have helped a great deal towards plugging the loop-holes through which sanctions were being evaded.

444. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics expressed his delegation's indignation at the rejection of the second draft resolution, containing such modest and pertinent proposals, through the negative votes of the United Kingdom and the United States, which indicated clearly that the United Kingdom in particular blatantly and cynically ignored the national interests of the people of Zimbabwe. Nevertheless, he declared, in spite of such obstacles, the people of Zimbabwe, with the support of peace-loving peoples of the world, would inevitably be victorious in their struggle against racism and colonialism and would enjoy their right to freedom, independence and sovereignty.

445. The representative of Guinea observed that the debate had revealed two things: first, that sanctions were an illusion designed to maintain the rebel régime in power while new settlement proposals based on selected suffrage were being worked out; second, that those who were against economic warfare were only encouraging a racial war already raging in southern Africa and in other colonial Territories—a situation that provoked and threatened the national sovereignty of the independent States neighbouring those Territories.

446. The representative of Kenya said that the action of the two permanent members of the Council in vetoing the second draft resolution, which was most regrettable, indicated that they had rejected the position of negotiation. They had thereby left the people of Zimbabwe no alternative but to resort to the use of arms in order to win their independence and sovereignty, a situation which the United Nations Security Council had been created to prevent.

447. The President, speaking as the representative of the Sudan, also expressed his delegation's disappointment at the rejection of a draft resolution that had been genuinely intended to strengthen the sanctions but added that the negative votes cast would stimulate the freedom fighters in Zimbabwe to escalate their struggle for liberation.

THE SITUATION IN NAMIBIA

A. Communications to the Security Council and reports by the Secretary-General

448. On 21 June 1972, the Secretary-General submitted a report (S/10708) containing 18 replies that he had received from States Members of the United Nations or members of the specialized agencies to his communications requesting information on implementation of Security Council resolution 301 (1971) of 20 October 1971 concerning the situation in Namibia. Addenda to that report (S/10708/Add.1 and 2), containing two additional replies, were issued on 6 July and 13 October.

449. By a letter dated 13 July 1972 (S/10736), the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia transmitted the text of a statement issued by that Council expressing grave concern at political developments in Namibia, in particular, the recent announcement that the South African Government had decided to grant self-rule to Ovamboland in Namibia and proposed to impose self-government on the Damara people, actions which would accelerate the fragmentation of the territorial integrity of Namibia.

450. On 17 July, the Secretary-General submitted a report (S/10738) on the implementation of Security Council resolution 309 (1972) of 4 February 1972, concerning the contacts initiated by him under that resolution with all parties concerned "with a view to establishing the necessary conditions so as to enable the people of Namibia, freely and with strict regard to the principles of human equality, to exercise their right to self-determination and independence, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations". Following an exchange of communications with the Government of South Africa, the Secretary-General, accompanied by members of the Secretariat, had visited South Africa and Namibia between 6 and 10 March and had held discussions with the Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of South Africa. The Secretary-General had also communicated with other parties concerned, including individuals and groups in Namibia calling for a united independent Namibia; groups in Namibia supporting self-government for the "homelands" and opposing a unitary State; and the European Executive Committee of South West Africa. He further reported that prior to and following his visit, he had been in communication with Namibian leaders outside the Territory who presented the views of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) and the South West Africa National United Front (SWANUF), and that, in addition to the group of three designated by the Security Council to consult with him, he had met with the presiding officers of the following United Nations bodies: the Chairman of the *Ad Hoc* Sub-Committee on Namibia, the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia and the Chairman of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. He had also met with the Chairman of OAU and a number of the heads of State and ministers for foreign affairs who attended the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of OAU in Rabat, Morocco, during June 1972. After his return to New York, the Secretary-General had pursued his contacts with the

Minister for Foreign Affairs of South Africa, in the course of which the following three points emerged dealing with the terms of reference of a representative of the Secretary-General: (a) the task of the representative of the Secretary-General would be to assist in achieving the aim of self-determination and independence and to study all questions relevant thereto; (b) in carrying out his task, the representative might make recommendations to the Secretary-General and, in consultation with the latter, to the South African Government, and in so doing, he should assist in overcoming any points of difference; (c) the South African Government would co-operate in the discharge of the representative's task by providing him the requisite facilities to go to South Africa and to Namibia as necessary and to meet all sections of the population of Namibia. It was understood that the representative of the Secretary-General, assisted by necessary staff, would have his headquarters in New York and would travel to Namibia and South Africa as necessary. It was also understood that the Secretary-General would report to the Security Council on developments. The Secretary-General indicated that other parties concerned with whom he had been in communication had expressed doubts about South Africa's readiness to co-operate in the implementation of resolution 309 (1972) and therefore about the possibility of any positive outcome as a result of his efforts to pursue his mandate. Nevertheless, they did not wish to oppose those efforts, if for no other reason than to show their readiness to explore all possible avenues for a peaceful solution of the question of Namibia. In that context, the Secretary-General had conveyed to the Government of South Africa his concern regarding its announced plans with respect to the eastern Caprivi and Ovamboland in further application of its homelands policy. He had expressed the hope that the Government of South Africa would not proceed with any measures that would adversely affect the outcome of the contacts initiated by him pursuant to resolution 309 (1972). The Secretary-General concluded that, on the basis of his discussions to date with the Government of South Africa, and especially in view of its expressed willingness to co-operate in the discharge of the representative's task, he believed that it would be worth while to continue efforts to implement the mandate of the Security Council with the assistance of a representative. Inasmuch as that involved the continuation of his responsibilities under the mandate entrusted to him under resolution 309 (1972), the Secretary-General proposed to proceed with the appointment of a representative after necessary consultations, unless the Security Council indicated otherwise. Accordingly, it was his intention to continue to discharge his mandate in close co-operation with the group of three designated by the Security Council and to keep the Security Council informed as appropriate. He would in any case report to the Council not later than 30 November 1972.

451. Annexed to the report were (a) an aide-mémoire presented to the Secretary-General by the group of three; (b) a list of individuals and groups contacted by the Secretary-General during his visit to Namibia; and (c) a list of written communications addressed to the Secretary-General by Namibians and others relating to his visit to Namibia.

452. In a letter dated 19 July (S/10741), the Executive Secretary of OAU in New York transmitted to the President of the Security Council the text of resolutions adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of OAU at its ninth session in Rabat, including a resolution in which, among other things, OAU condemned all actions by South Africa designed to destroy the unity and territorial integrity of Namibia and decided to increase material assistance to SWAPO.

453. On 31 July, the Secretary-General submitted a report (S/10752) containing 30 replies that he had received from States Members of the United Nations or members of the specialized agencies to his communications requesting information on implementation of Security Council resolution 310 (1972) of 4 February 1972. Addenda to that report (S/10752/Add.1 and 2), containing three additional replies, were issued on 31 August and 13 October.

B. Consideration at the 1656th and 1657th meetings (31 July-1 August 1972)

454. The Security Council considered the situation in Namibia at its 1656th and 1657th meetings held on 31 July and 1 August and included in its agenda the report by the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 309 (1972) concerning the question of Namibia (S/10738). In view of the request of the President of the Council for Namibia that the representatives of Guyana and Nigeria be invited to address the Security Council on behalf of the Council for Namibia, the Security Council decided to extend the appropriate invitations to them.

455. Introducing his report, the Secretary-General stated his belief, on the basis of his discussions with the Government of South Africa, that it would be worth while to continue to implement the Council's mandate and that further efforts should be made with the assistance of a representative of the Secretary-General. He drew particular attention to the fact that at all stages of his contact with South Africa he had kept all interested parties informed. The Government of South Africa had expressed its willingness to co-operate with the representative, who would assist the Secretary-General on a full-time basis and receive instructions from and report to him. Should the Security Council agree, the Secretary-General would continue to discharge his mandate in close co-operation with the Council's group of three, composed of the representatives of Argentina, Somalia and Yugoslavia.

456. The representative of France said that it was still too early to assess the results of the new approach to the question of Namibia. Difficulties remained. None the less, his delegation wished to express confidence in the Secretary-General and supported the proposal to appoint a special representative to assist him in achieving self-determination and independence for Namibia. The Council would be in a better position to evaluate the results achieved at the time of the submission of the Secretary-General's next report in November.

457. The representative of Belgium, stating that the initial results justified continuation of the Secretary-General's mission, welcomed in particular the agreement in principle concerning the appointment of a representative of the Secretary-General. His delegation

shared the Secretary-General's concern about South Africa's decision to give autonomy to Ovamboland and its announced intention to act similarly in respect of the eastern Caprivi, as no steps must be allowed to deprive the Namibian people of their rights or prejudice the political structure of their future State.

458. The representative of Yugoslavia said that his Government's attitude was based on the fundamental demands of the United Nations with respect to Namibia and that several of those requirements and demands had so far not been achieved in the contacts with South Africa. Doubts had been expressed regarding South Africa's true intentions and had been reinforced not only by the deficiencies shown by the South African Government in its contacts with the Secretary-General but by its subsequent actions, such as the continued application of its homelands policy in Namibia, its intensification of oppressive measures immediately after the Secretary-General's visit to Namibia, even against some of those persons who had met or had endeavoured to meet him, and certain of its recent statements. It was too early, however, to reach definite decisions, and, in view of the fact that some of the main interested parties—namely the representatives of the people of Namibia and of OAU—had not openly opposed the extension of the Secretary-General's mandate, his delegation could support the continuation of that mandate until 15 or 30 November and, after the necessary consultations, the appointment of a representative. The fulfilment by the Government of South Africa of a number of requirements would create the conditions necessary for the continuation of the Secretary-General's mission and that of his representative after November.

459. The representative of Somalia expressed satisfaction that the Secretary-General, in the execution of his mandate, had taken fully into account the points made in the aide-mémoire of the group of three. In connexion with the establishment by the Government of South Africa of a so-called homeland in the eastern Caprivi, the creation of a legislative council for the area and its proposed creation of a Bantustan in Ovamboland, it would have been a hopeful sign if, in the period of its supposed co-operation with the United Nations, South Africa had at least refrained from taking any administrative or political actions in the Territory that would aggravate the situation and make the Secretary-General's task more complicated. On the other hand, the new initiative in adopting resolution 309 (1972) in Addis Ababa was an exercise in quiet diplomacy, and the Secretary-General's report should be considered a preliminary one and exploratory in character. His delegation favoured the Secretary-General's proposal that he be authorized to appoint a representative to assist him and shared the views expressed by the representative of Yugoslavia concerning the framework within which the Secretary-General's representative would operate. He drew attention to the fact that the group of African States at the United Nations had expressed the view that the report left many fundamental questions unanswered and had suggested that the next report should be issued by 15 November 1972, so that both the Security Council and the General Assembly would be in a position to consider the question. He emphasized that the Security Council should continue to work on all fronts and should proceed simultaneously to carry out other programmes of action designed to attain the effective implementation of its other resolutions on the question.

460. The representative of Nigeria, speaking as the representative of the United Nations Council for Namibia, said that it was the position of the Council for Namibia that Security Council resolution 309 (1972) was merely one in a series of United Nations efforts aimed at the withdrawal of South Africa's illegal presence from Namibia and should not be misconstrued as a retreat from the legal status of Namibia. Since the visit of the Secretary-General to South Africa and Namibia, the Government of South Africa had not, by its public pronouncements, given the United Nations Council for Namibia much hope that it was ready to accept the United Nations concept of self-determination for Namibia. Instead, it had proceeded to apply its policy of granting self-government to "homelands" and expelling people who assisted the Namibians to attain the aims set for them by the United Nations. He stressed that the United Nations Council for Namibia regretted the failure to involve it actively in connexion with the implementation of Security Council resolution 309 (1972), an omission which it hoped would be avoided in any future course of action in pursuance of that resolution.

461. The representative of China said that prolongation of the United Nations dialogue with the South African authorities on the question of Namibia and the appointment of a personal representative of the Secretary-General were not simple matters and that some fundamental questions required clarification. The South African authorities and their supporters, in their attempt to perpetuate their forcible occupation of Namibia and to annex it completely, had stubbornly resisted the efforts and the various decisions of the United Nations. Having regard to the United Nations resolutions, and having studied the Secretary-General's report on the implementation of Security Council resolution 309 (1972), his delegation felt that some fundamental questions were far from clear; for example, the point of departure and purpose of the dialogue; which United Nations principles regarding Namibia had been accepted or rejected by South Africa as a result of the dialogue; and what actions by South Africa would be sufficient to encourage the Security Council to further prolong the dialogue. In order that the facts might be made clear, he inquired what indications had emerged in the contacts with the South African authorities that they had changed their persistent opposition to the United Nations resolutions concerning Namibia or had expressed willingness to stop their colonialist policy of undermining Namibia's territorial integrity. The Council should also seek to discover whether South Africa's interpretation of self-determination and independence coincided with the meaning of those words in the United Nations Charter and resolutions; what concrete steps South Africa was prepared to take to end its reactionary racial policies; and if it was not, how self-determination and independence for Namibia could be attained. It was also necessary to determine the role of the United Nations Council for Namibia should the South African authorities reject its representative while accepting a personal representative of the Secretary-General. Finally, in connexion with the proposed appointment of a representative of the Secretary-General, he wondered what his tasks, his specific terms of reference and his relationship to the Security Council would be and on what considerations his candidacy would be based.

462. The representative of India emphasized that Security Council resolution 309 (1972) and the processes of contacts with South Africa initiated under it

did not prejudice other United Nations resolutions on the question of Namibia and that self-determination and independence for Namibia must be viewed in absolute terms and only in the context of the whole of Namibia. Any so-called self-rule, home rule or self-determination for Namibia based along the lines of Bantustans was unacceptable. He hoped that in November, when a further report was forthcoming, the Security Council would have sufficient information and clarification of other considerations to allow proper assessment of the progress, if any, achieved under the new initiative.

463. The representative of the Sudan noted that on no occasion had the Secretary-General's comments in his report with respect to his contacts with South Africa given any indication that the South African authorities had tacitly or implicitly acknowledged Security Council resolution 309 (1972), which was not surprising in view of past United Nations experience in dealing with South Africa. His delegation would advocate and welcome a clear and positive declaration by South Africa of its acceptance of the principles of the United Nations Charter and the relevant decisions of the General Assembly and the Security Council with respect to Namibia. As proof of the sincerity of such a declaration, positive measures by the Government of South Africa were required, such as refraining from the establishment of new Bantustans, ending repressive laws, guaranteeing full freedom of speech, movement and political association, and granting amnesty to all political prisoners. He added that in the event that the Secretary-General's mandate were extended, South Africa should, as a token of its co-operation, allow his representative to establish his office and staff in Windhoek. Finally, he emphasized that his delegation would reserve its position until submission of the second report of the Secretary-General not later than 15 November 1972.

464. At the 1657th meeting on 1 August, the representative of Argentina said that the Secretary-General had acted in strict accordance with the spirit and letter of resolution 309 (1972) as regards the concept of consulting all parties concerned. In spite of the fact that those consultations had been brief and limited, for the first time the people of Namibia had been given a chance to express their views and aspirations to the Secretary-General in accordance with a mission assigned by the Security Council, and for the first time the political organizations of the Territory had been given a chance to set forth their views about how best to settle the problem on an equal footing with the South African Government. The will of the various political groups and representatives of the people of Namibia expressed to the Secretary-General was that independence continued to be the desire of the overwhelming majority of the Territory. The Secretary-General and his representative should seek clarification with respect to the construction that South Africa placed on the terms "self-determination" and "independence", especially in view of South Africa's continuation and intensification of its homelands policy in Namibia. He therefore supported the Secretary-General's proposal to appoint a special representative for Namibia, who should have full freedom of movement and be allowed to remain in the Territory for as long as necessary and to confer with all segments of the population without any interference or obstacles. The Security Council, in approving that proposal, would be exercising its prerogative to state its views on any proposal sub-

mitted to it on matters of substance and procedure on the subject of Namibia; hence the final decision would always rest with the Council. Moreover, the mandate of the representative certainly could not exceed that assigned to the Secretary-General.

465. The representative of Argentina then introduced a draft resolution (S/10750) sponsored by his delegation which read as follows:

"The Security Council,

"Recalling its resolution 309 (1972) of 4 February 1972, and without prejudice to other resolutions adopted on the question of Namibia,

"Having considered the report submitted by the Secretary-General in accordance with resolution 309 (1972),

"Reaffirming the inalienable and imprescriptible right of the people of Namibia to self-determination and independence,

"Reaffirming also the national unity and the territorial integrity of Namibia,

"1. Notes with appreciation the efforts made by the Secretary-General in the implementation of resolution 309 (1972);

"2. Invites the Secretary-General, in consultation and close co-operation with the group of the Security Council established in accordance with resolution 309 (1972), to continue his contacts with all parties concerned, with a view to establishing the necessary conditions so as to enable the people of Namibia, freely and with strict regard to the principles of human equality, to exercise their right to self-determination and independence, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;

"3. Approves the proposal of the Secretary-General to proceed, after necessary consultations, with the appointment of a representative to assist him in the discharge of his mandate as set out in paragraph 2 above;

"4. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Security Council informed as appropriate and in any case to report to it on the implementation of resolution 309 (1972) and of this resolution not later than 15 November 1972."

466. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that since the adoption of resolution 309 (1972) there had been no changes either in the political situation in Namibia or in the actions of the South African Government, which continued to challenge the United Nations and carry out its policy of setting up Bantustans. Recent announcements regarding the grant of so-called self-rule to Ovamboland and so-called independent administration to the Damara people had clearly shown the validity of the doubts expressed by his delegation in previous Security Council meetings concerning Namibia. South Africa, in continuing its policy of fragmenting the Territory of Namibia, was endeavouring to ensure the subsequent annexation of the richest areas of Namibia and the maintenance of domination over its people. It was quite possible that the appointment of a special representative of the Secretary-General for Namibia might be utilized by the South African racists as a cover for further delays in implementing the resolutions providing for the maintenance of the territorial integrity of Namibia and the granting of independence to its people. However, since the representatives of the African countries had not raised any objections to having the Secretary-General continue to implement his mandate,

appoint a representative for Namibia and submit a report to the Security Council by 15 November 1972, his delegation would not object to the draft resolution sponsored by Argentina, within the framework of resolution 309 (1972) and other resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly.

467. The representative of the United States said that his delegation was encouraged that progress had been made, as indicated in the Secretary-General's report. The Secretary-General deserved the fullest measure of understanding and support, and his Government pledged such support to the Secretary-General and to the group of three in implementing those tasks already entrusted to him and those about to be assigned to him. He hoped that the Secretary-General would be able to report to the Council by 15 November 1972 appreciable progress towards the ultimate achievement of the goals of Security Council resolution 309 (1972).

468. The representative of Japan welcomed the progress made in initiating contacts with South Africa concerning Namibia and said that the task of implementing Security Council resolution 309 (1972) was still at an initial stage and that many difficulties remained. Regarding the next steps to be taken, he declared that his delegation was fully prepared to approve the proposal of the Secretary-General contained in the report and would vote in favour of the draft resolution submitted by Argentina.

469. The representative of Guinea said that his delegation was concerned over fundamental matters about which the Secretary-General's report did not seem to be very explicit and hoped to receive some explanation as to whether the South African Government was ready to change its colonial policy and to grant independence unconditionally to Namibia. Further, it was interested to know whether the Secretary-General believed that he could rapidly achieve self-determination and independence for Namibia, and whether he could do so without the assistance of the various United Nations bodies on Namibia and without the assistance of the United Kingdom. He called for the liberation of all political detainees and the return of exiled leaders; the withdrawal of all South African forces from the Territory of Namibia; the rapid transfer of the administration to the representatives of Namibia; and the dissolution of Bantustans in Namibia. Finally, he expressed support for the draft resolution sponsored by Argentina.

470. The representative of the United Kingdom said that his delegation, encouraged by the progress made so far, endorsed the suggestion that the Secretary-General continue his efforts as proposed and would support the draft resolution to that effect submitted by Argentina.

471. The representative of Italy recalled his delegation's position that the United Nations should not ignore the possibility, however remote, of achieving progress towards its goal of full independence for Namibia through contacts and discussions with the Government of South Africa. The Secretary-General, he emphasized, should be congratulated for the skilful and tenacious manner in which he had fulfilled the difficult task assigned to him under Security Council resolution 309 (1972). His delegation would support the draft resolution before the Council.

472. The representative of Panama commended the Secretary-General for his comprehensive and encouraging report and also the group of three for their assist-

ance to him. He said that his delegation would support the draft resolution.

473. The Secretary-General stated that he fully understood and appreciated the concern of the members and their reasons for raising the various issues in connexion with his report. He was also aware of the need to see to it that the efforts undertaken pursuant to Security Council resolution 309 (1972) did not in any way prejudice the fundamental position of the United Nations concerning Namibia. He was sure that the members of the Council would understand that it was not possible at that stage to attempt to provide clarifications on matters which would have to be clarified in the course of further efforts, should the Council decide in favour of continuing the mandate. He would, however, like to assure the members of the Council, particularly the representative of China, that he would keep the points raised by them very much in mind in the course of subsequent contacts with the parties concerned with the assistance of his proposed representative. He was also confident that the group of three, which had so far given him such valuable assistance and support and would continue to assist him in the discharge of his mandate, had also taken due note of the concern expressed and the points raised in the debate.

474. In connexion with the draft resolution, the representative of Somalia suggested that, in view of the prominence and concern expressed in the debate about two fundamental aspects of the question, the last two preambular paragraphs should be transferred to the operative section as paragraphs 2 and 3 and the other operative paragraphs renumbered accordingly.

475. The representative of China again emphasized the position of his Government that the correct stand of the previous resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council on Namibia ought to be upheld, the South African authorities ought to end immediately their illegal occupation of Namibia and withdraw their military and police forces, as well as their administration from Namibia, so as to let the Namibian people achieve their independence free from any foreign interference. In view of the South African authorities' refusal to comply with the relevant resolutions of the United Nations calling for an end to their illegal occupation and administration of Namibia, the Security Council should consider the adoption of more effective measures to give strong support to the Namibian people's just struggle for independence and freedom. It should not take any measures that might possibly help the South African authorities extricate themselves from their isolation or alleviate them from the pressure of the international community. The Security Council should take measures corresponding to the resolution on Namibia adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of OAU at its ninth session. Accordingly, he concluded, the Chinese delegation had serious reservations about the prolongation of the Secretary-General's mandate and the continuation of the so-called dialogue with the South African authorities because facts had already proved that continued dialogue with South Africa would be of no help to the struggle of the Namibian people and the complete settlement of the Namibian question. The Chinese delegation therefore would not participate in the voting on the draft resolution before the Council.

476. The representative of Argentina said that his delegation accepted for the most part the modifications of the draft resolution suggested by the representative of Somalia, and he also read out further changes.

Decision: *At the 1657th meeting, on 1 August 1972, the draft resolution sponsored by Argentina (S/10750), as orally modified, was adopted by 14 votes to none, with China not participating in the vote, as resolution 319 (1972).*

477. Resolution 319 (1972) read as follows:

"The Security Council,

"Recalling its resolution 309 (1972) of 4 February 1972, and without prejudice to other resolutions adopted on the question of Namibia,

"Having considered the report submitted by the Secretary-General in accordance with resolution 309 (1972),

"1. Notes with appreciation the efforts made by the Secretary-General in the implementation of resolution 309 (1972);

"2. Reaffirms the inalienable and imprescriptible right of the people of Namibia to self-determination and independence;

"3. Reaffirms also the national unity and territorial integrity of Namibia;

"4. Invites the Secretary-General, in consultation and close co-operation with the group of the Security Council established in accordance with resolution 309 (1972), to continue his contacts with all parties concerned, with a view to establishing the necessary conditions so as to enable the people of Namibia, freely and with strict regard to the principle of human equality, to exercise their right to self-determination and independence, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;

"5. Approves the proposal of the Secretary-General to proceed, after necessary consultations, with the appointment of a representative to assist him in the discharge of his mandate as set out in paragraph 4 above;

"6. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Security Council informed as appropriate and in any case to report to it on the implementation of resolution 309 (1972) and of the present resolution not later than 15 November 1972."

C. Report by the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 319 (1972)

478. On 15 November, the Secretary-General submitted his report to the Security Council (S/10832) on the implementation of resolution 319 (1972). He stated that, on 24 September, in accordance with paragraph 5 of the resolution, he had appointed Mr. Martin Escher of Switzerland as his representative to assist him in the discharge of his mandate as set out in paragraph 4 of the resolution and that, following consultations in New York, Mr. Escher, accompanied by members of the Secretariat, had visited South Africa and Namibia from 8 October to 3 November. On 6 November, Mr. Escher had reported orally to the Secretary-General on the results of his contacts, and, on 14 November, he had submitted a written report, which was annexed. The Secretary-General, Mr. Escher and other members of the mission had met with the following parties and informed them of the results of the mission: (a) the group of three established by the Security Council pursuant to resolution 309 (1972); (b) the President of the Security Council; (c) representatives and officials of OAU; (d) the Chairman of

the Group of African States for the month of November; (e) the Chairman of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples; (f) the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia; (g) the Chairman of the *Ad Hoc* Sub-Committee on Namibia. The Secretary-General noted that the mission, while in Namibia, had had the opportunity to meet privately with, and obtain the views of, a wide cross-section of the population concerning the future of the country.

479. In an aide-mémoire presented to the Secretary-General on 26 September, which he had made available to Mr. Escher and was annexed to his report, the Council's group of three had set forth certain points that it considered should be taken into account in the process of implementing Security Council resolution 319 (1972) as follows: (a) all United Nations resolutions adopted on the question of Namibia remained in effect and should be actively pursued; (b) in all contacts to be carried out with the Government of South Africa and all the parties concerned it should be made clear at the outset that they would be conducted in accordance with the mandate of resolutions 309 (1972) and 319 (1972); (c) the main task of the representative should be to obtain a complete and unequivocal clarification from the Government of South Africa with regard to its policy of self-determination and independence for Namibia, so as to enable the Security Council to decide whether it coincided with the United Nations position on the matter and whether the efforts made under resolutions 309 (1972) and 319 (1972) should be continued; (d) the need to maintain the national unity and territorial integrity of Namibia must always be borne in mind; (e) as an indication of its readiness to co-operate with the United Nations, the Government of South Africa should discontinue the application of so-called homelands policies and abolish all repressive measures in Namibia.

480. In his annexed report to the Secretary-General, Mr. Escher outlined the views expressed to him on the question of Namibia by groups and individuals who met with him in the course of his mission, among them: (a) groups calling for an end to the South African rule over Namibia and for a united, independent Namibia, including representatives of various political organizations in Namibia, church leaders, students, youth and workers; (b) groups and individuals supporting self-government for the "homelands" and opposing a unitary State; (c) representatives of the United Party and the Voice of the People Party; (d) other segments of the population and individuals selected at random. The Secretary-General's representative had also met with a number of presiding officers and members of various United Nations bodies prior to his departure for South Africa and Namibia. Mr. Escher reported that his mission had visited Namibia for 17 days, travelled extensively and held 74 private meetings at which no South African officials were present. His general impression was that the majority of the non-white population supported the establishment of a united, independent Namibia and expected the assistance of the United Nations in bringing it about. With respect to his discussions with the Prime Minister of South Africa, the Secretary-General's representative stated that, although many issues still remained to be clarified, what had been agreed to by the Prime Minister represented some progress in the direction of achieving the objective laid down in paragraph 4 of Security

Council resolution 319 (1972). The Prime Minister felt that it was not the appropriate stage to go into a detailed interpretation of the South African Government's policy of self-determination and independence with regard to Namibia, which could be done with better results once the necessary conditions were established and the inhabitants had had more administrative and political experience. However, the Prime Minister's acceptance of the need to establish necessary conditions appeared to be in line with the objective of the Security Council. The Prime Minister moreover had said that experience in self-government was an essential element for eventual self-determination and that such experience could best be achieved on a regional basis. During the discussions, he had indicated that he would be prepared to establish an advisory council drawn from representatives of the various regions, regional governments or authorities and that he would assume over-all responsibility for the Territory as a whole—i.e., distinct from the Ministers currently responsible for different sectors. In Mr. Escher's view, the Prime Minister's willingness to adopt such measures appeared to be in line with the aim of maintaining the unity of Namibia. Positive elements in the direction of creating conditions for the exercise of self-determination were to be found in the Prime Minister's promise to examine the possibility of removing restrictions on the freedom of movement without impairing influx control and his agreement that there should be legitimate political activity, including freedom of speech and the holding of meetings. Taking into account the readiness of the South African Government to continue the contacts initiated by the Secretary-General pursuant to resolution 309 (1972), and in view of the positive elements that emerged from his discussions with the Prime Minister as noted above, Mr. Escher felt that the contacts between the Secretary-General and the South African Government, as well as the other parties concerned, should be continued.

D. Consideration at the 1678th to 1682nd meetings (28 November-3 December 1972)

481. The Security Council resumed its consideration of the question at its 1678th to 1682nd meetings, held between 28 November and 3 December, in the course of which the representatives of Burundi, Chad, Ethiopia, Liberia, Mauritius, Morocco, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Zambia were invited, at their request, to participate in the discussion without the right to vote. Also at its 1678th meeting, in response to his request, the Security Council agreed to extend an invitation to the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure.

482. At the 1678th meeting, the Secretary-General noted that the report of his representative left unanswered or unresolved a number of important issues, the most pressing of which was that of clarification by South Africa of its policy of self-determination and independence for Namibia and bringing that policy into conformity with the United Nations objectives of self-determination, national unity and independence for the Territory. However, the report had removed any doubts about the political aspirations of the people of Namibia, the majority of whom supported the establishment of a united independent Namibia. Though some of the proposals made by the Prime Minister, if implemented, might represent a partial shift in attitude on the part of his Government, they did not

measure up to the expectations of the Security Council. Other proposals put forward by the Prime Minister seemed to be in conflict with the principles of the United Nations with respect to Namibia and would require further clarification before they could be assessed. Having regard to all the circumstances, it still appeared desirable that in the months ahead the United Nations should remain in touch with developments in Namibia; hence the door should not be closed to further contacts.

483. The representative of Morocco said that the South African Government's policy of establishing so-called regional governments in Namibia respected neither the unity of the Territory nor its territorial integrity. The future of the Territory must be so conceived that the territorial integrity of Namibia, as defined in the Mandate granted to South Africa by the League of Nations was respected. Only within the framework of strict adherence to United Nations principles concerning decolonization could any dialogue with South Africa be possible. That was the basis on which the United Nations mission had been launched, and it must continue with absolute clarity of purpose. The Security Council should set a reasonable period of time in order to ascertain the intentions of South Africa.

484. The representative of Liberia said that South Africa's policy on self-determination was clear: it did not intend to grant sovereignty to Namibia and Namibians either as a territorial entity or even in individual "homelands" but merely to grant some vague form of home rule to Namibia by the terms of which Namibia would remain perpetually under South Africa's control. Judging from the Secretary-General's report, there had apparently been no discussion concerning freedom of the press and the abolition of racially discriminatory laws. In the light of its past record, the readiness of the South African Government to continue the contacts initiated by the Secretary-General might be simply a means of preventing the United Nations from taking effective action to expel South Africa from Namibia while continuing to entrench itself against attack. The time had now come, he declared, to start the process of implementing the substantive resolutions on Namibia and of applying the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice. He proposed that, in the first instance, the Security Council should renew the mandate of the Secretary-General to proceed, through his representative, with contacts with the Government of South Africa, guided by certain specific terms of reference and dates for the achievement of the stated objectives, which he then proceeded to outline. Such measures as those he proposed, he stated, would not in themselves automatically bring about an end to South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia, but they would signal to South Africa's collaborators and her trading partners the determination of the United Nations to begin a new era of effective action by the international community and would, above all, accelerate the movement towards independence for Namibia.

485. The representative of Turkey, in his capacity as President of the Council for Namibia, described the Council's activities since December 1970. The Council, he said, had carefully followed the mission of the representative of the Secretary-General. It regretted that its observations to the representative before and after his visit to South Africa and Namibia had not been included in his report. Moreover, the Secretary-General's report on Mr. Escher's mission was far from

satisfying the concerns of the United Nations Council for Namibia. It would seem that South Africa wished to have the United Nations endorse its policy of dismembering the Territory and its practice of *apartheid*, and there was nothing to indicate that South Africa considered the United Nations resolutions valid or that the contacts had been carried out in accordance with the mandate of the Security Council resolutions: everything led to the belief that South Africa continued to claim that the discussions had been based on its invitation addressed to the Secretary-General personally. Those discussions, which were to have referred to the modalities of the transfer of power to the Council for Namibia, seemed to have deviated from their main objective, and the Council for Namibia hoped that, in taking a decision on the Secretary-General's report, the Security Council would take into account the fact that the situation in Namibia had not altered since the adoption of Security Council resolution 309 (1972). By its attitude, particularly by its refusal to accept formally the United Nations resolutions, he emphasized, South Africa had indicated that no dialogue seemed to be possible.

486. The representative of Ethiopia said that he was speaking as current Chairman of the group of African States in the United Nations and as a representative of one of the countries that had been given a mandate by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of OAU to represent them in the Security Council discussion on the question of Namibia. There was nothing new in the report with regard to the situation in Namibia, the wishes of the Namibian people or the South African Government's attitude. In the circumstances, his delegation believed that the response already elicited from South Africa by the Secretary-General's representative was adequate to enable the Security Council to appreciate South Africa's well-known intentions regarding the future of Namibia. Following consultations among themselves, the representatives of the African States were of the opinion that the continuation of the Secretary-General's contacts in the present circumstances, as long as the South African Government had not given some basic clarifications on a number of important issues, might lend credence to South Africa's claim that it was negotiating in earnest and make it possible for it to implement a policy of Balkanization of Namibia. He urged the Security Council to request clarification from South Africa on such issues as whether it accepted the exercise of self-determination by the people of Namibia as a whole and the unity of the people of Namibia and the integrity of its territory, and whether it accepted that whatever rights it might have had under the Mandate of the League had been terminated. Those were some of the questions on which South Africa should give unequivocal clarification, and only within the framework of such clarification could it be hoped that further contacts might establish the necessary conditions to enable the people of Namibia to exercise their right to self-determination and independence. Thus, until such time as unequivocal clarifications were forthcoming, the contact which the Secretary-General had initiated through his representative with the Government of South Africa should be suspended. The United Nations should direct all its efforts towards ending South Africa's continued illegal presence in Namibia with the aim of establishing an effective United Nations presence in the Territory.

487. The representative of Mauritius drew attention to the conclusion in Mr. Escher's report that the

majority of the non-white population of Namibia supported the principle of a united, independent Namibia. His delegation failed to see how the establishment of an advisory council, as envisaged by the Prime Minister of South Africa, could be interpreted as being "in line with the aim of maintaining the unity of Namibia", as the representative had reported. Only the creation of machinery leading to the establishment of a democratically elected government for the Territory as a whole could be acceptable, and the fact that the Prime Minister would assume over-all responsibility for any organ created for the Territory as a whole did not appear to be a step leading to a truly independent Namibia. He expressed doubts that the contacts with South Africa were making any progress. None the less, the Secretary-General's representative should be congratulated for having accomplished so much in such a short period of time. His delegation was in favour of extending the mandate of the Secretary-General in order to allow him to secure specific answers to the questions that remained to be discussed thoroughly with the South African Government and to clarify several points that were still obscure.

488. At its 1679th meeting, the Security Council agreed to a request made by the representatives of Somalia and the Sudan in a letter dated 28 November (S/10841) that it extend an invitation, under rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure, to Mr. Peter Mueshihange, Secretary for Foreign Relations of SWAPO.

489. At that meeting, the representative of Sierra Leone said that in the meetings between the Secretary-General's representative and the Prime Minister of South Africa, the latter appeared to have ignored the main issues; for though he had reaffirmed the willingness and desire of his Government to continue the contacts with a view to exploring all avenues to an agreed solution acceptable to the people of Namibia, he had also stated that it would be most unrealistic to expect agreement on the issues involved in a matter of days or weeks. The report of the representative fell far short of expectations and clarified the Prime Minister's unacceptable attitude. Under such circumstances, his delegation, though not opposing the idea of reviewing contacts with South Africa, was doubtful whether the new initiative would not prove to be another fruitless effort. None the less, his delegation was not opposed to the holding of talks between the Secretary-General and the leaders of the racist régime, or between those leaders and the super-Powers or States having economic interests in Namibia; nor would it oppose a dialogue between the South African Government and the Namibian people, provided that it was directed towards the full implementation of the relevant resolutions of the United Nations, bearing in mind the direct responsibility for Namibia that the United Nations had assumed and the need for the immediate elimination of South Africa's presence in Namibia.

490. The representative of Somalia expressed the view that the main purpose of Security Council resolutions 309 (1972) and 319 (1972) had been to offer to South Africa the means of transferring, in a reasonable way, the reins of its administration of Namibia and to give the United Nations a legitimate basis, in the likely event of South Africa's continued intransigence, for taking positive action, including the application of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, in support of the aspirations of the Namibian people. The report before the Council was not only

disappointing; in some respects it constituted a retrograde step. It would appear that some fundamental principles had been compromised, with the unfortunate result that unacceptable policies had become associated with a United Nations initiative in Namibia. For example, there was no mention in the report of even such basic initial steps as arrangements for a permanent United Nations presence or a time-table for the handing over of the administration of Namibia; nor did it contain any evidence of South Africa's willingness to reconcile the different views concerning the important principle of self-determination. There would have to be dramatic and immediate new evidence of willingness on the part of the South African Government to change its policies if his delegation were to feel that the line of approach undertaken as a result of resolutions 309 (1972) and 319 (1972) held any validity or usefulness.

491. The representative of Chad stressed the urgency of taking fully into account the deep aspirations of the overwhelming majority of the Namibian people for self-determination and independence, which had been indicated in the report of the Secretary-General. Within that context, therefore, he proposed that the Security Council reaffirm the inalienable right of the Namibian people to self-determination and independence and its non-recognition of the authority of the South African Government over Namibia; create a united, independent Namibia, pursuant to the decision of the General Assembly and to the wishes of the Namibian population; and demand that the South African Government take concrete measures to ensure that fundamental freedoms were exercised and that political prisoners were freed. He proposed further that the Council should invite all Member States and specialized agencies to grant, through OAU, material assistance to the liberation movements of Namibia; set up in Namibian territory the United Nations Council for Namibia; set the date for the proclamation of the independence of Namibia; and ensure implementation by the South African Government of all resolutions adopted by the various bodies of the United Nations pertaining to the Namibian question.

492. The representative of Zambia stated that the main role of the Secretary-General's representative had been to obtain from the South African authorities a "complete and unequivocal clarification" with respect to their Government's position on a number of fundamental issues, particularly the inalienable and imprescriptible right of the people of Namibia to self-determination and independence, the unity and territorial integrity of Namibia and the international status of Namibia in the light of the relevant United Nations resolutions and the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice. The report made it quite evident, however, that the South African authorities had deviously evaded giving explicit answers to those issues. It left the disturbing impression that perhaps the United Nations had inadvertently been led into negotiating with South Africa on the legal status and the very future of the international Territory. In the view of his delegation, all that the representative's mission to South Africa and Namibia had accomplished was to confirm the known fact of the deep aspirations of the Namibian people for self-determination and independence. He urged that rather than relying solely upon the current contacts, which South Africa hoped to use for its own ends and about the usefulness of which his delegation had serious misgivings, the Security Council should consider taking effective meas-

ures, including the use of force, if necessary, under the provisions of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.

493. At its 1680th meeting on 1 December, the Security Council, heard a statement by Mr. Mueshihange in accordance with its previous decision to extend an invitation to him under rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council. Mr. Mueshihange stated that, from the very beginning of the current consultations between the Government of South Africa and the Secretary-General, SWAPO had been doubtful of any positive outcome, although it recognized that such contacts afforded South Africa an opportunity to transfer political power peacefully to the Namibian people.

494. Time and again SWAPO had told the United Nations that the Namibian people wanted an end to the South African Government's illegal administration and demanded nothing short of immediate and total independence for their country as a single and unified entity. On the other hand, the South African Government's definition of self-determination and independence was a matter of public record and was easily discernible in the series of laws that South Africa had enacted over the years. Regarding the proposals put forward by the Prime Minister of South Africa and mentioned in the report of the Secretary-General's representative, SWAPO took the view that the so-called regional government would be nothing other than a new name for the same old idea of division along ethnic lines to facilitate white minority racist domination and exploitation. It was equally obvious that the proposed advisory council would be nothing more than a conglomeration of government-paid puppet chiefs, rather than democratically elected representatives of the people. He called attention to the fact that SWAPO had recently re-emphasized its position, that if by 15 November 1972 the South African racist régime had not concretely committed itself to withdraw its illegal administration from Namibia, indicated the modalities facilitating such withdrawal and clearly stated its agreement to recognize the legitimate rights of the Namibian people to self-determination and independence, then SWAPO would categorically reject any further contact between the United Nations Secretary-General and the illegal occupying Power with respect to Namibia. He maintained that the current talks initiated under resolution 309 (1972) and 319 (1972) were not being focused on the central question of the freedom and independence of the Namibian people and had in fact failed to produce any positive results. Hence they should be terminated, and the United Nations should undertake other, more effective and direct measures to oblige the Government of South Africa to comply with the various decisions taken by the United Nations with respect to the question of Namibia.

495. At the 1681st meeting on 4 December, the representative of Nigeria said that it was clear that South Africa had bluntly refused to clarify its position on a number of very important issues, and where responses by South Africa were forthcoming—for example, its proposals to establish an advisory council and to institute self-government on a regional basis—they were so shrouded in generalities and vagueness that the only conclusion that could be drawn was that the Government, though wishing to give the appearance of co-operation and dialogue, was only playing for time. He suggested that before proceeding further with such contacts, the Security Council should seek a pre-

cise, unequivocal presentation of South Africa's position to ensure that the basis for such contacts did in fact exist. Specifically, the Security Council should direct the Secretary-General to seek clear answers from the South African Government to the following questions: Inasmuch as the people of Namibia had opted for self-determination and independence, would the South African Government indicate precisely when it would remove its administration from the Territory? Would it desist forthwith from pursuing its homelands policy? Would it immediately lift all restrictions on the freedom of movement of Namibians within the Territory and restore freedom of speech and political activity? Would it permit the immediate presence of the United Nations in Namibia, as clearly demanded by the Namibian people? Pending the receipt through the normal diplomatic channels of the response of the Government of South Africa, the mission of the Secretary-General's representative should be suspended, and the Security Council should seek alternative means to enable the Namibian people to enjoy their inalienable right to self-determination and independence.

496. The representative of Burundi emphasized that Namibia was juridically free and that the presence there of South Africa constituted occupation by force of arms and therefore aggression against the United Nations itself. He also stressed that the terms of references of the mission to Namibia, which had been restated by the group of three as a precaution against deviation, had been limited to development of the modalities by which South Africa would cease its present aggression. He suggested that a peaceful and just solution to the question of Namibia could be the easiest and most promising first step in constructing a Euro-African *détente*, inasmuch as Namibia was juridically no longer a colony but under the custodianship to the United Nations both territorially and demographically. By a trial-and-error procedure, begun at Addis Ababa, the Security Council found itself involved in what was essentially a procedural problem about the comparatively trivial modalities of dialogue. Though it had no objection to dialogue with well-intentioned partners as such, his delegation was interested in the modalities of *détente* rather than the modalities of dialogue and wanted to talk about a free Namibia, not about South Africa's usurped freedom to dispose of it.

497. The representative of the Sudan stated that the following conclusions could be drawn from the report of the Secretary-General concerning the results of the mission of his representative: (a) South Africa was playing for time, during which it was consolidating its illegal presence in Namibia, and was on the verge of presenting the international community with a fait accompli, extending its *apartheid* policy to Namibia; and (b) under the guise of regional government, South Africa would actually retain its forces, its administration, its special police and, above all, its oppressive laws in Namibia and would eventually annex the Territory. Two attempts at dialogue with South Africa had failed, and the conclusions drawn from them were concrete evidence that the Council should seriously consider effective ways and means of implementing its decisions concerning Namibia. South Africa's main interest in Namibia was economic exploitation of its people as cheap labour and of its mineral resources, fisheries and ranches. A prolonged, futile dialogue would give South Africa another chance to fragment Namibia further and to suppress the liberation movement. He

stressed the importance of South Africa's immediate removal from the Territory and the establishment of proper conditions in which the United Nations could discharge its responsibilities towards Namibia, if necessary to the extent of deciding on measures under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. The Security Council should make it absolutely clear to the Prime Minister that nothing short of the complete withdrawal of the South African administration from Namibia and the complete independence of the Territory as one nation and one people would be acceptable.

498. The representative of Belgium expressed regret that South Africa had not yet subscribed to the principle of national unity and territorial integrity for Namibia, without which self-determination and independence was inconceivable, as the Security Council had repeatedly proclaimed. Support of that principle by the South African Government would have shed new light on the measures it intended to take in regard to the future of the Territory, which would have constituted a series of stages towards the emancipation of the Namibian people. Nevertheless, the South African Government and its Prime Minister had expressed willingness to take certain measures, such as establishment of an advisory council, assumption by the Prime Minister of over-all responsibility for the Territory and his agreement regarding the existence of legitimate political activity. Those measures represented concessions by South Africa, the scope of which was, unfortunately, questionable, precisely because of the lack of commitment concerning national unity and territorial integrity that the Security Council had expected. However, nothing would justify halting or even suspending negotiations, since their continuation would avoid a return to the old and futile policy of confrontation and would reconcile the rights of Namibia, of which the Security Council was a guarantor, with realism, which consisted in recognizing that the self-determination and independence of the Territory depended on South Africa.

499. At the 1682nd meeting on 6 December, the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that the report of the Secretary-General provided clear evidence that the South African authorities were continuing to apply in Namibia a policy of colonial oppression, *apartheid* and dismemberment of the Territory through the establishment of Bantustans or homelands and were attempting to utilize the Secretary-General's mission and that of his representative to camouflage their racist, colonialist policies and to get United Nations approval for those policies. In his view, the report amply confirmed the validity of the doubts frequently expressed by his delegation before, during and subsequent to the Council's meetings in Addis Ababa concerning the advisability of the measures envisaged in Security Council resolution 309 (1972). The verbal assurances given by the South African Government to the Secretary-General's representative were simply camouflage aimed at misleading the United Nations and world public opinion and creating the impression that something was being done, though, in fact, the situation in Namibia had changed in no way whatsoever, and the Security Council was still faced with an open attempt by the South African racists to delay the granting of independence to Namibia. The attempts at a dialogue with the South African racists were fruitless and even harmful, as they had provided no clear answers to a large number of important questions and would not achieve the

goals of Security Council resolution 309 (1972) and 319 (1972). The representative should not have given promises that went beyond his terms of reference, but the main reason for the failure of his mission was the stubborn refusal of the Government of South Africa and its Prime Minister to put an end to their annexationist policies with regard to Namibia, to cease their unlawful occupation of the Territory and to withdraw their troops, police and administrative machinery, and thereby to grant the people of Namibia the possibility of freely deciding their own destiny. In view of the importance the African and Asian Member States attached to the Council for Namibia, his delegation had decided to become a member of that Council in order to seek, in conjunction with members of the Security Council and of the Council for Namibia, the full implementation of United Nations decisions aimed at the immediate implementation of the inalienable right of the Namibian people to freedom and independence. The time had come for the Security Council to consider such effective measures as would promote the immediate liberation of Namibia from the racists who had unlawfully occupied that Territory, the more so in view of the fact that it no longer seemed advisable to continue the mandate to carry on negotiations, the so-called dialogue, with the racists of South Africa.

500. The representative of Italy stated that it was the task of the Security Council at that stage to give the Secretary-General clear directives for further action to help the Council achieve its goal of self-determination and independence for Namibia. Emphasizing that the question of Namibia was not a problem of exclusive African interest but was the concern of the entire United Nations membership, he noted that the report of the Secretary-General's representative had provided the most thorough and complete analysis to date concerning the opinions and wishes of the people of Namibia. The nine points of discussion referred to in the report were not to be regarded as constituting an agreement between the representative and the South African Prime Minister, whose proposals were, in his view, too cautious and ambiguous and hence needed to be discussed and clarified in depth. His delegation fully shared the view of the Secretary-General that the door should not be closed to further contacts with South Africa. Accordingly, in his view, the talks should be pursued in order to maintain direct contact with the Territory as unanimously advocated by its people, to ensure that the political activity, including freedom of speech and the holding of meetings, became a reality and to obtain from the Government of South Africa a commitment to allow the people of Namibia to exercise freely their inalienable right to self-determination and independence in accordance with the United Nations Charter. Finally, should the Council decide on the continuation of the contacts, the new terms of reference should not modify the mandate of the Secretary-General or allow interference by other bodies in action that had been initiated by the Security Council and was its exclusive responsibility.

501. The representative of Argentina expressed appreciation to the Secretary-General and his representative for their valuable endeavours to fulfil in the best possible manner the difficult mandate that had been entrusted to them under Security Council resolutions 309 (1972) and 319 (1972). Concerning the substantive issues discussed in the contacts, several doubts persisted, and many promises and proposals

required clarification from the Government of South Africa. These included whether the regional basis mentioned for acquiring experience in self-government represented a new application of the rejected homelands policy, the establishment and functions of the advisory council proposed by the Prime Minister and the definition to be given the term "influx control". The political activity in Namibia occasioned by the visit of the Secretary-General's representative was an event whose significance deserved to be emphasized, inasmuch as, whether it was admitted or not, it had been regarded by the people of Namibia as the beginning of a United Nations presence in Namibia and several groups had requested that such a United Nations presence be more effective and permanent. It would be worth while to explore that point if contacts were continued.

502. The representative of Argentina then introduced a draft resolution (S/10846) sponsored by his delegation, as well as certain modifications to its text. He stressed that if the draft resolution were adopted the South African Government would, in its talks with the Secretary-General, be required to take into account the firm position of the United Nations, which was based on the many resolutions adopted by the General Assembly and the Security Council. With regard to the request to "the other parties concerned" to continue to extend their valuable co-operation to the Secretary-General, he said that those parties, in particular, the President of the Council for Namibia, should be consulted more thoroughly to ascertain their valuable views and to obtain guidance in the quest for solutions.

503. The representative of Yugoslavia said that South Africa had failed to respond adequately to the major points stressed in the two aide-mémoires presented by the group of three, of which his delegation was a member, thereby leaving doubts as to whether or not it had ever engaged in contacts with the Secretary-General in good faith at all. None the less, though it condemned South Africa's refusal to comply with the relevant United Nations resolutions, his delegation was in favour of the proposal that the Secretary-General should be authorized to continue his efforts for a specified time. With respect to the draft resolution, he said that it could have been more explicit in making a direct request for a United Nations presence in Namibia, and for the immediate cessation of South Africa's homelands policies, the abolition of all repressive measures and the establishment of all necessary freedoms in Namibia, but that those points had been met by its demand for strict respect for past United Nations resolutions. Adoption of the draft resolution would compel South Africa to appraise the situation more realistically and to realize that, unless by 30 April 1973 it accepted Security Council resolution 309 (1972), clarified its position regarding self-determination, independence and territorial unity, and ceased its exportation of *apartheid* to Namibia, it would not be possible to continue the contacts. He referred to suggestions of many direct or indirect measures by the United Nations that might be brought to bear on the situation, such as appointment of a High Commissioner for Namibia, intensification of the work and expansion of the activities and powers of the United Nations Council for Namibia; proclamation by the United Nations of the independence of Namibia; increased pressure for implementing the arms embargo on South Africa; further efforts towards the application of sanctions; and direct assistance to the leaders and movements among the Namibian people.

504. The representative of France stated that in adopting resolution 309 (1972) in Addis Ababa the Council had, in effect, provisionally put aside certain doctrinal controversies in order to approach the problem from a strictly pragmatic standpoint. He considered that the report provided a cause for both concern and encouragement and was convinced that the endeavour should be continued. If the Council abandoned the effort, the people of Namibia would lose faith in the Organization and the Secretary-General would no longer be in a position to keep the Council informed as to how promised reforms had been carried out. Such an approach did not imply in any way a renunciation by the Security Council of its own approach to the situation in Namibia or any abandonment of its position on the matter.

505. The representative of the United States stated that the progress or climate for change that the Security Council had achieved since its adoption of resolution 309 (1972) seemed greater than that achieved during any other period in the history of the United Nations in its dealings with South Africa regarding Namibia. Such a knotty problem could not be resolved quickly, nor would it respond to unrealistic declarations; but the constructive possibilities of quiet diplomacy should not be underestimated. Therefore his delegation strongly supported continuation of the contacts and hoped that in view of the close deadline for submission of the Secretary-General's next report, the re-establishment of contact with the parties concerned would be prompt, thereby allowing time not only for trips to South Africa and Namibia but for periodic and concurrent consultations with the group of three and others at Headquarters in the light of developments.

506. The representative of China expressed the view that far from yielding any positive result, the so-called dialogue was being exploited by the South African authorities, who were now stepping up their reactionary Bantustan policy and reinforcing their repressive measures and policies of *apartheid* in Namibia. The dialogue had created confusion within and outside the United Nations, and it had been used by South Africa to extricate itself from its political isolation. It had thus adversely affected the struggle of the people of Namibia for liberation. His delegation shared the view that the report of the Secretary-General's representative and the proposal for continued dialogue were unacceptable and, therefore, consistent with its well-known position on the matter, had decided not to participate in the voting on the draft resolution. He considered that both reports submitted to the Security Council were oversimplified in their accounts concerning the talks with the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister of South Africa and that it would not be unreasonable to request that the verbatim record of those talks be submitted to the Council.

507. The representative of Japan commended the Secretary-General and his representative for the manner in which they had conducted their difficult tasks. He expressed regret that no tangible results had been obtained so far with respect to a complete and unequivocal clarification by the Government of South Africa of its interpretation of self-determination, independence and national unity for Namibia. However, as he considered that the contacts initiated under Security Council resolutions 309 (1972) and 319 (1972) were practically the only possible means of breaking the long-standing impasse over the question

of Namibia, his delegation would vote in favour of the draft resolution sponsored by Argentina.

508. The representative of the United Kingdom recalled that the idea of asking the Secretary-General to undertake contacts with all the parties concerned had been put forward many years before it was finally adopted by the Council and that during that period several other courses of action had been attempted, some of which his delegation regarded as not sufficiently founded on the realities of the situation or its legal aspects. Those other means had not produced the desired results, but in the current situation there was no need to be pessimistic about the prospects, though sympathetic to the hesitations and doubts expressed in the debate concerning the results of the contacts so far, his delegation would support the draft resolution, since there was no doubt that the Secretary-General's contacts ought to be continued on the same basis as previously. The draft resolution invited the Secretary-General to continue his valuable efforts without prejudice to the other aspects of the situation, and it clearly did not seek to pre-empt the free choice of the people of Namibia in exercising their right to self-determination. He suggested that it might have been better to have given the Secretary-General a little more time before having to submit his next report.

509. The President, speaking as the representative of India, said that inasmuch as resolution 309 (1972) and 319 (1972) had not made it clear what aspects of the problem of Namibia were to be negotiated with the Government of South Africa, the contacts had been used for working towards a number of arrangements whereby the people of Namibia could exercise their inherent right to self-determination and independence. Thus it was possible to say that some progress had been made as a result of the contacts. However, there had been no acceptance by South Africa of the totality of the United Nations approach to the problem, and the Security Council was confronted with the dilemma of having to decide whether further pursuit of the contacts might not be more beneficial to South Africa than to the United Nations or whether to allow South Africa to pretend that the United Nations had refused it an opportunity to move in the right direction. In his view, that dilemma had been overcome by the text of the draft resolution sponsored by Argentina, which made it quite clear to South Africa that unless the United Nations approach to the problem was accepted the scope for negotiations would indeed be limited, if not completely eliminated. It also established a time-limit for the South African Government to make its position known categorically and unequivocally or face the risks of having the Security Council consider alternative means of action. Accordingly, his delegation would support the draft resolution sponsored by Argentina. Furthermore, he suggested that a more satisfactory means of co-ordination should be established between the various organizations and arrangements currently involved with the problem of Namibia.

510. The representative of Guinea emphasized that in view of the disappointing results of the contacts thus far, her delegation would have preferred the text of the draft resolution to condemn South Africa more forcefully. None the less, her delegation remained flexible in regard to the quest for new approaches to the question of Namibia and, accordingly, would support the draft resolution.

511. The representative of Somalia said that his delegation was not satisfied with some of the provisions

but would accept the draft resolution, inasmuch as it took into account the constructive criticisms put forward and reaffirmed certain basic principles that had seemed compromised by unfortunate developments in the course of the recent talks with the South African Government. He stressed that the special responsibility and obligation of the United Nations towards the people and territory of Namibia should never be questioned or even temporarily put aside. Though the results thus far attained had not been at all promising, the Secretary-General should continue his valuable efforts to ensure that the people of Namibia could exercise their inalienable right to self-determination and independence. The draft resolution provided clear and unequivocal guidelines for the continuation of the Security Council's initiative.

512. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics proposed that operative paragraph 8 of the draft resolution should be amended to provide that the Security Council itself would appoint representatives to fill the vacancies in the group of three. This suggestion was accepted by the representative of Argentina.

Decision: *At the 1682nd meeting, on 6 December 1972 the draft resolution sponsored by Argentina (S/10846), as modified orally at the meeting, was adopted by 13 votes in favour to none against, with 1 abstention (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), and China not participating, as resolution 323 (1972).*

513. Resolution 323 (1972) read as follows:

"The Security Council,

"Recalling its resolutions 309 (1972) of 4 February 1972 and 319 (1972) of 1 August 1972, and without prejudice to other resolutions adopted on the question of Namibia,

"Reaffirming the special responsibility and obligation of the United Nations towards the people and Territory of Namibia,

"Recalling the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 21 June 1971,

"Reaffirming the inalienable and imprescriptible right of the people of Namibia to self-determination and independence,

"Affirming that the principle of the national unity and territorial integrity of Namibia cannot be subject to any conditions,

"Having considered the report submitted by the Secretary-General in accordance with resolution 319 (1972),

"1. Observes with satisfaction that the people of Namibia have again had an opportunity of expressing their aspirations clearly and unequivocally, in their own Territory, to representatives of the United Nations;

"2. Notes with interest that the overwhelming majority of the opinions consulted by the representative of the Secretary-General categorically stated, inter alia, that they were in favour of the immediate abolition of the 'homelands' policy, withdrawal of the South African administration from the Territory, Namibia's accession to national independence and the preservation of its territorial integrity, thus further confirming the consistently held position of the United Nations on this question;

"3. Deeply regrets that there has been no complete and unequivocal clarification of the policy of

the Government of South Africa regarding self-determination and independence for Namibia;

"4. *Solemnly reaffirms* the inalienable and imprescriptible rights of the people of Namibia to self-determination, national independence and the preservation of their territorial integrity, on which any solution for Namibia must be based, and rejects any interpretation, measure or policy to the contrary;

"5. *Invites* the Secretary-General, on the basis of paragraph 4 above, to continue his valuable efforts, in consultation and close co-operation with the group of the Security Council established in accordance with resolution 309 (1972) and, as appropriate, with the assistance of representatives, to ensure that the people of Namibia, freely and with strict regard to the principles of human equality, exercise their right to self-determination and independence, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;

"6. *Again calls* on the Government of South Africa to co-operate fully with the Secretary-General in the implementation of the present resolution in order to bring about a peaceful transfer of power in Namibia;

"7. *Requests* the other parties concerned to continue to extend their valuable co-operation to the Secretary-General with a view to assisting him in the implementation of the present resolution;

"8. *Decides* that, immediately following the partial renewal of the membership of the Security Council on 1 January 1973, the Council shall appoint representatives to fill the vacancies that will occur in the group established in accordance with resolution 309 (1972);

"9. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the implementation of the present resolution as soon as possible and not later than 30 April 1973."

514. Following the vote, the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics reiterated the view that the method of persuasion and solicitation with the South African authorities would not lead to any success and that only the combined efforts of all countries holding an anti-colonialist position could force the South African racists to implement the decisions of the Security Council. The Council, he said, should resort to the means available to it under the Charter.

515. At the 1684th meeting on 16 January 1973, in connexion with paragraph 8 of resolution 323 (1972), the President announced that, following consultations among members of the Council, a consensus had been reached to appoint the representatives of Peru and the Sudan to fill the vacancies that had occurred in the group established in accordance with resolution 309 (1972) as a result of the expiration of the terms of office of the delegations of Argentina and Somalia.

E. Subsequent reports and communications

516. By a letter dated 30 January 1973 (S/10874), the Secretary-General transmitted to the President of the Security Council the text of resolution 3031 (XXVII) concerning the question of Namibia adopted by the General Assembly on 18 December 1972 and drew attention to paragraph 11, which invited the Security Council to take effective measures to secure the withdrawal by South Africa of its illegal administra-

tion from Namibia and the implementation of the resolutions designed to enable the people of Namibia to exercise their right to self-determination.

517. On 30 April, the Secretary-General submitted a report (S/1092) on the implementation of Security Council resolution 323 (1972) of 6 December 1972. The Secretary-General stated that, in close co-operation with the group of three, he had sought to obtain from the South African Government a more complete and unequivocal statement of its policy regarding self-determination and independence for Namibia, as well as clarification of its position on other questions arising from the report of his representative and from the debate in the Security Council.

518. After consultation with the group of three, it had been decided that contacts with the Government of South Africa should be carried out in successive phases. In accordance with that procedure, the Secretary-General had transmitted to the South African Government on 20 December 1972 a series of questions on South Africa's policy regarding self-determination and independence for Namibia; the composition and functions of the proposed advisory council; the removal of restrictions on movement and measures to ensure freedom of political activity, including freedom of speech and the holding of meetings; and the discontinuance of measures in furtherance of South Africa's homelands policy. Subsequently, a detailed discussion of the preliminary replies of the South African Government took place at Headquarters between the Permanent Representative of South Africa and the Secretary-General and his representatives. The latter had again emphasized the firm stand of the United Nations with regard to the international status of Namibia, its national unity and territorial integrity and sought clarification regarding measures that might be interpreted as further application of South Africa's homelands policy and the proposal to establish an advisory council. Following direct contacts in Geneva in mid-April between the Secretary-General and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of South Africa, the Minister had submitted a statement on 30 April in clarification of his Government's position which contained the following points: the Government of South Africa would fully respect the wishes of the whole population of the Territory with regard to its future constitutional organization, and any exercise to ascertain their wishes would not be compromised by any existing political and administrative arrangements; all political parties of the Territory would have full and free participation in the process leading to self-determination and independence, and the Government, in co-operation with the Secretary-General and in consultation with the people, would determine such measures as would ensure the achievement of that goal without delay. The Foreign Minister had previously indicated that his Government did not envisage that individual population groups might suddenly become independent as separate entities, and it recognized and accepted, subject to the requirements of public safety, the need for freedom of speech and political activity for all parties in the process leading to self-determination. It reiterated that South West Africa had a separate international status and reaffirmed that it did not claim any part of the Territory. On the basis of present developments, it anticipated that it might not take longer than 10 years for the people of the Territory to reach the stage where they would be ready to exercise their right to self-determination.

519. The Secretary-General concluded that the position of the Government of South Africa did not coincide with the United Nations resolutions; nor did the statement provide the complete and unequivocal clarification of South Africa's policy in regard to self-determination and independence for Namibia envisaged in resolution 323 (1972). He said that, in the light of the results achieved so far, the question arose as to whether the contacts and efforts initiated pursuant to resolutions 309 (1972), 319 (1972) and 323 (1972) should be continued.

520. Annexed to the report were a communication transmitted to the Secretary-General by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of South Africa containing information concerning the establishment of the Advisory Council and a letter from Chief Kapuue on behalf of the National Convention of Non-Whites rejecting any council nominated by the South African régime. Also annexed was the text of a consensus adopted on

27 March by the United Nations Council for Namibia protesting the establishment of the so-called Advisory Council, requesting that the Secretary-General call on South Africa to forthwith disband the Advisory Council, opposing continuation of the dialogue and calling for the initiation of a programme of action by the United Nations and the Council for Namibia to give full effect to the mandate which the Council had received in 1967.

521. By a letter dated 30 May (S/10938), the Acting President of the United Nations Council for Namibia transmitted the text of a statement adopted by the Council on 25 May clarifying the situation prevailing in Namibia and the so-called concessions that the Government of South Africa was purported to have made in its dispute with the United Nations over the Territory. In that statement, the Council for Namibia reiterated its opposition to continuation of the contacts between the Secretary-General and the Government of South Africa.

Chapter 4

COMPLAINT BY SENEGAL

A. Communications to the Security Council and request for a meeting

522. In a letter dated 16 October 1972 addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/10807), the representative of Senegal charged that a unit of the Portuguese regular army had attacked a Senegalese post on 12 October, with the result that two persons had been killed and one wounded. The attack had been repulsed by the Senegalese army. In view of those facts, and on instructions from his Government, he requested that a meeting of the Security Council be convened as a matter of urgency.

523. In a letter dated 18 October (S/10810), the representative of Portugal referred to the complaint by Senegal of 16 October and transmitted the text of a communiqué published on 13 October, in which the Commander headquarters of the Portuguese forces in Portuguese Guinea acknowledged the violation of the Senegalese frontier by a Portuguese army unit and stated that criminal proceedings were being instituted against the commander of the unit in question, who had been operating outside the zone to which he was assigned. The Government of Portugal expressed its readiness to pay compensation and give all necessary guarantees to the Government of Senegal. Those facts had been communicated through diplomatic channels to the Senegalese Government. Accordingly, the Portuguese Government was unable to understand the purpose of the Council's meeting, unless it was to be regarded as one more step in the campaign being waged against Portugal by certain hostile interests.

B. Consideration at the 1667th to 1669th meetings (19-23 October 1972)

524. At the 1667th meeting, on 19 October, the Security Council included the complaint of Senegal in its agenda without objection. The President, with the consent of the Council, invited the representatives of Algeria, Mali, Mauritania and Senegal, at their request, to participate in the discussion without the right to vote.

525. The representative of Senegal stated that on 12 October Portuguese military forces, including five armoured cars, had attacked the Senegalese post of Nianao. Senegalese soldiers stationed 5 kilometres from the border had compelled the Portuguese forces to withdraw to their base. He pointed out that it was not the first time that the Council had met to deal with provocations by Portugal. As early as April 1963 Senegal had requested the Council to put an end to hostile actions by Portugal, but Lisbon had continued its armed incursions into Senegal in defiance of the decisions of the United Nations. He cited nine acts of Portuguese aggression against Senegal since July 1971 that had caused a number of deaths and inflicted heavy material damage. Senegal protested as an immoral manoeuvre Portugal's attempt to attribute its most recent aggression to the mental incapacitation of its army unit commander. On that ground Senegal rejected Portugal's apologies and offer of compensation. It was clear that Portugal was able to violate international law because of the assistance and approval it received from certain NATO countries in keeping with their strategy of fostering limited local conflicts. Those countries regularly supplied Portugal with weapons and thus were the agents really responsible for the distresses of Africa. Portugal, however, must realize that it could not contain the liberation movements and that its only sound course was to create conditions of peace in Guinea (Bissau) by opening negotiations with the PAIGC⁵ on the basis of the plan submitted by his country in March 1969. The first phase of that plan called for a cease-fire, followed by negotiations; the second phase would inaugurate a period of internal autonomy for Guinea (Bissau); and the third and final stage would witness the granting of independence within the framework of a Portuguese-African community. In view of the gravity of the charges against Portugal, the representative of Senegal was sure that the Council at the same time that it condemned Por-

⁵ Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde.

tugal for its aggression, would order that Government to start negotiations on the basis of a plan presented by Senegal.

526. The representative of Mauritania said that the recent attack was not the first that Portugal had made against Senegal and other African countries. As far back as 1963 Senegal had brought a complaint against Portugal before the Council; for 10 years Senegalese villages had been subject to destruction and their inhabitants massacred. Senegal's attitude in the face of those continuous acts of aggression had been marked by restraint. It could have taken measures of retaliation, but, instead, it had reported those matters to the Council, thus acting in the spirit of the Charter. Portugal was determined to perpetuate its domination over the peoples of Guinea (Bissau), Angola and Mozambique, despite the resolutions of the Council and the General Assembly. The Council should condemn Portugal for its attacks against Senegal and its defiance of the decisions of the United Nations and should take energetic measures to prevent their repetition.

527. The representative of Guinea said that Portuguese aggression against African States was no surprise. As long as Portugal continued to have the support of its allies and as long as it had its colonies, the Council would have to discuss its acts of aggression. Portugal's offer to pay compensation had aroused only scorn in Africa. The African States wanted to put an end to the hostile acts by Portugal; but, most of all, they wanted the liberation of the territories under Portuguese domination.

528. The representative of Guinea then introduced a draft resolution (S/10813) sponsored by Guinea, Somalia and the Sudan which read as follows:

"The Security Council,

"Considering the complaint of the Republic of Senegal against Portugal contained in document S/10807,

"Having heard the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Senegal,

"Considering its resolutions 178 (1963) of 24 April 1963, 204 (1965) of 19 May 1965, 273 (1969) of 9 December 1969, 302 (1971) of 24 November 1971 and the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group of Experts of the Commission on Human Rights, of 2 February 1971, concerning Portuguese acts of violence in Senegalese territory,

"Deeply disturbed by the attitude of Portugal, which persistently refuses to comply with the relevant Security Council resolutions,

"Deeply concerned about the multiplication of incidents which entail the risk of a threat to international peace and security,

"Reaffirming that only complete respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Senegal and all the African States bordering the territories of Guinea (Bissau), Angola and Mozambique, and for the principle of self-determination and independence defined in particular in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 will make it possible to eliminate the causes of tension in those regions of the African continent and create a climate of confidence, peace and security,

"1. Severely condemns the acts of violence and destruction committed by the Portuguese authorities against the people and territory of Senegal since 1963;

"2. Condemns in particular the frontier violation and attack on the Senegalese post at Nianao committed by regular forces of the Portuguese army on 12 October 1972;

"3. Demands that the Government of Portugal should stop immediately and definitively any acts of violence and destruction directed against Senegalese territory and scrupulously respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity and security of that State and all other independent African States;

"4. Requests the Government of Portugal to respect the principle of self-determination and independence, defined in particular in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), and to take immediately all necessary steps to apply that principle;

"5. Declares that if Portugal does not comply with the provisions of the present resolution the Security Council will meet to consider other measures;

"6. Decides to remain seized of the question."

529. The representative of Algeria said that, contrary to its usual position, Portugal had admitted the facts of its military attack on Senegal and offered compensation to the victims. However, one should not forget that the attack had been deliberately carried out against Senegal and followed a long series of similar provocations. The conclusions of the Council's Special Mission to Senegal in 1971 had left no doubt that Portugal was waging a colonial war in Guinea (Bissau) that created an atmosphere of tension in the area and exposed the neighbouring African countries to violations of their sovereignty. The independent African countries wished to devote their efforts to consolidating that sovereignty and overcoming their problems of underdevelopment. Understandably, they could not agree that those efforts should be jeopardized by colonialist meddling. Africa needed peace and security; it had already suffered too much foreign intervention, exploitation and oppression. Algeria expressed its complete support for Senegal and expected the Council to take the measures required by gravity of the situation.

530. The representative of the Sudan said that Senegal might have been able to forgive Portugal's attack of 12 October, if the aggression had been the first of its kind or a mistaken crossing of the border. But it was not the first attack; nor would it be the last. Contrary to Portuguese allegations, the penetration into the Senegalese territory had been planned. Thus Senegal had acted rightly in presenting the case to the Council. He noted that between April 1963 and November 1971 Senegal had submitted nine complaints to the Council and that Portugal's relations with other African States continued to deteriorate because of its attacks on Guinea, Zaire and Zambia. It was inconceivable that a small country like Portugal should be able to maintain 125,000 troops in three frontier wars and retain control over Angola and Mozambique, which were roughly 20 times its size. Portugal was able to continue its colonial role only because of the help it received from its NATO allies and international mining concerns interested in maintaining the Portuguese presence in Africa. The 1971 aid agreement between the United States and Portugal should be examined in that context. Beyond that, Portugal was getting important economic and military support from South Africa that enabled it to maintain its control over the African Territories and continue its aggressions against African States. His

delegation felt that the Council should censure Portugal in the strongest possible terms and take steps to prevent any repetition of its aggression.

531. The representative of Yugoslavia said that since 1963 the Council had adopted six resolutions condemning Portugal for a broad range of military actions against Senegal. One had only to scan the long list of incidents annexed to the report of the Council's Special Mission to Senegal to understand the true dimensions of Portugal's campaign against that country and what provocation, human losses and material damage Senegal had suffered over the years. The Council had already expressed its concern about the wider ramifications of Portugal's policy when it stated at its meeting in Addis Ababa that Portugal, by threatening Senegal, might endanger regional and international peace and security. Inasmuch as Portugal, despite the Council's decisions, continued its aggressions, the Council should reject its explanation on the causes of the latest incident. He said that the root of the matter was Portugal's insistence on keeping its colonial possessions and attacking other independent African States. An equally important factor was the assistance received by Portugal from its allies and the racist régimes of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia that enabled it to continue its policy of subjugation. His delegation had supported previous resolutions on the question, and it insisted on the strictest observance of those resolutions by everyone. It was ready to accord the same support to any new measures that would deal effectively with the problem.

532. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that the attack by Portugal against Senegal was a serious act of aggression, inasmuch as it had involved a clash between the armed forces of the two States, an event that transcended the dimensions of usual border incidents. The new attack was one in the long series of provocations committed by Portugal over the years against Senegal and other independent African States. The explanation of the latest incident offered by Portugal could only be viewed with scepticism and should be rejected by the Council. He pointed out that since 1961 the Council had censured Portugal several times for its aggressions against Senegal, but Lisbon, in defiance of those decisions, had stepped up its military actions and extended them to other African nations. Those actions by Portugal showed that colonialism did not intend to give up its positions in Africa but was ready to commit further crimes in order to preserve its domination in the key strategic points on the continent through joint action with the racists in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. He noted that for the past years, the Council had dealt mostly with questions of colonial imperialist aggression against African States. Of 106 Council meetings in 1971 and 1972, 60 had been devoted to complaints of aggression by imperialists in Africa. The time had come for the United Nations to halt the hostile policy of Portugal in Africa. On the basis of its previous decisions the Council should condemn Portugal for its aggression against Senegal and take positive measures to prevent the perpetration of new aggression.

533. At the 1668th meeting, on 20 October, the representative of Somalia said that, although Portugal had admitted its act of war, the purpose of its communication was to mislead the Council into believing that the recent attack against Senegal had been an isolated case of a frontier incident. One should not forget, however, that the provocative act was a part

of a policy of intimidation against African States designed to hold under enslavement the peoples of Guinea (Bissau), Angola and Mozambique. He noted that there was an alliance of racist colonialists whose purpose was to deny to Africans the exercise of their inalienable human rights. It was not difficult to foresee the danger that such an alliance could cause to peace in Africa. His delegation felt that it was opportune for the Council to consider the entire colonial system in Africa as a whole and to adopt measures leading to its elimination. His delegation was aware that Portugal had been able to continue its aggressive policy through its membership in NATO, and his Government strongly denounced that organization's involvement in the colonial situation in Africa. He hoped that the three-Power draft resolution would be adopted unanimously.

534. The representative of Mali said that the latest attack should be viewed in the context of the systematic assaults since 1963 against Senegalese villages by Portuguese army units using napalm and artillery. The Council had dealt on many occasions with those acts and thus no further arguments were needed to make clear the need for action that would put an end to the situation. Such action should come mainly from the allies of Portugal, especially those that continued to supply Lisbon with weapons. Senegal, whose sons had fought during the last two world wars for justice, had elected to bring the matter of Portugal's aggression to the Council rather than resort to armed retaliation. The Council, therefore, must base its decision on Chapter VII of the Charter and not on recommendations whose weakness and non-application would only erode the authority of the United Nations.

535. The representative of China expressed his Government's indignation and condemnation of Portugal's naked aggression and congratulated the Senegalese people on the victory achieved in repulsing the aggressors. For centuries, Portuguese colonialists had occupied African Territories more than 20 times larger than their own homeland, exploiting the peoples there and declaring those Territories to be their "overseas provinces". With the support of imperialism, Portugal had formed a white racist alliance to suppress the liberation struggle of the peoples of Guinea (Bissau), Angola, Mozambique, Azania, Zimbabwe and Namibia. It was evident that its reckless attitude was possible because of that support. However, the aggressive activities of colonialists had awakened the African people, who realized that by unremitting struggle they could drive the intruders out of their continent. The Chinese people would support the just struggle of Africans until they won victory. His delegation maintained that the Council should condemn Portugal for its aggression and repression of the liberation movement. In view of Portugal's violation of the relevant resolutions, the Council should consider the application of sanctions, ask Portugal to end its rule over the Territories and call upon all States to give assistance to the struggle of the peoples under Portuguese domination.

536. The representative of Argentina said that in normal circumstances the events of 12 October could have been considered a border incident, and Portugal's acknowledgement, explanation and offer of compensation would have been sufficient to close the episode. However, circumstances were not normal. The episode was not an isolated one but a repetition of the type of incidents committed since 1963 against Senegal and other African States. It was another link in an excessively long chain of events that were the con-

sequence of a colonial situation repeatedly condemned by the United Nations. His delegation was convinced that peace could prevail in Africa only when all the remnants of the colonial era had disappeared. Until such time, there was always the danger that hostilities would become greater and lead to open war. His delegation therefore supported the three-Power draft resolution.

537. The representative of Italy said that his delegation deplored the military action by Portugal and was distressed by the loss of human life. Italy had taken note of Portugal's communication, in particular that portion stating that the Portuguese Government was prepared to offer guarantees to Senegal. This was the first sign of any change of attitude that could serve to reduce tensions. Regarding references to deliveries of Fiat aircraft to Portugal, he said that the material had not been sold by his Government, was unrelated to any alliance and had been delivered on the condition that it should not be used outside Europe. In that respect, he recalled that Italy had often proposed the establishment of an international and regional system to control the traffic of heavy or sophisticated arms to zones of tension. Reaffirming his Government's position, he said that his delegation was convinced that the population of the Territories administered by Portugal should be given the opportunity to exercise the right to self-determination. He felt that the draft resolution before the Council had merit but would be more balanced if it took account of the position that Portugal had adopted concerning the recent incident.

538. The representative of India said that the continued denial by Portugal of the rights of the people of Guinea (Bissau) had created circumstances in which the territorial integrity of Senegal was constantly being violated. All attempts by the Council to remedy the situation had failed, owing to the negative attitude of Portugal. The plan for bringing peace to the area initiated by the President of Senegal had also been rejected by Portugal. Thus, it was clear that so long as Portuguese colonialism continued in Africa, the Council would repeatedly face threats to peace in the area. No value could be attached to Portugal's willingness to give guarantees to Senegal, as those guarantees had not been explained and were evidently not related to furthering the independence of Guinea (Bissau). His delegation was ready to support any action to bring to an end the Portuguese colonialism in Africa.

539. The representative of Panama stated his delegation's view that Portugal should end its violations of the sovereignty of Senegal and other African States and said that Portugal's attacks against the peoples of Angola, Mozambique, Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde would never halt their aspiration to independence. His delegation would give unreserved support to the three-Power draft resolution.

540. At the outset of the 1669th meeting on 23 October, the President announced that, as a result of consultations, the Council had before it a revised draft resolution (S/10813/Rev.1) sponsored by Guinea, Somalia and the Sudan.

541. The representative of Belgium, commenting on the revised draft resolution, said that the text contained nothing that his delegation had not already accepted but that it seemed out of proportion to its object. Though regrettable, the incident did not seem comparable to other acts of violence that had been going on since 1963. Accordingly, his delegation would have preferred the Council to deplore rather than condemn the incident and resulting loss of human lives. It also

regretted that the draft did not give the Council the opportunity presented to lessen tension by noting Portugal's readiness to pay compensation and to give guarantees. For those reasons, his delegation would abstain from voting on the draft resolution. However, it was always prepared to condemn Portugal when its guilt was obvious.

542. The representative of Japan said that his delegation greatly regretted the incident on Senegal's border and hoped that it would never happen again. The basic cause of such incidents was the continued colonial domination of Portugal over Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau). His delegation hoped that Portugal would realize the necessity of according the right of self-determination to the peoples of those Territories. He felt, however, that proper attention should be paid to the new elements contained in the communication from Portugal and welcomed the revised text of the draft resolution, which his delegation would support.

543. The President, speaking as the representative of France, said that it was not the first time the Council had had to deal with a complaint by Senegal, but it was the first time that the facts were so clearly revealed. The incident had been a deliberate incursion, committed by a regular unit. In other times, such an incident would have constituted a *casus belli*. Apparently Portugal had understood the gravity of the incident, because its representative in Guinea (Bissau) had deplored it and instituted criminal proceedings against the culprits. Portugal had stated also its intention to pay compensation and to give the necessary guarantees, although their nature had not been defined. His delegation felt that those elements should have been mentioned in the draft resolution. He noted that Senegal, instead of retaliating, had turned to the international community for support. Therefore, the Council should assure the Government of Senegal that peace would be restored to the area. Accordingly, his delegation would support the revised draft resolution.

Decision: At the 1669th meeting, on 23 October 1973, the revised draft resolution (S/10813/Rev.1) was adopted by 12 votes in favour to none against, with 3 abstentions (Belgium, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America) as resolution 321 (1972).

544. Resolution 321 (1972) read as follows:

"The Security Council,

"Considering the complaint of the Republic of Senegal against Portugal contained in document S/10807,

"Having heard the statement of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Senegal,

"Taking note of the letter of the representative of Portugal contained in document S/10810,

"Considering its resolutions 178 (1963) of 24 April 1963, 204 (1965) of 19 May 1965, 273 (1969) of 9 December 1969, 302 (1971) of 24 November 1971 and the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group of Experts of the Commission on Human Rights, of 2 February 1971, concerning Portuguese acts of violence in Senegalese territory,

"Deeply disturbed by the attitude of Portugal, which persistently refuses to comply with the various resolutions adopted by the Security Council on this question,

"Deeply concerned about the multiplication of incidents which entail the risk of a threat to international peace and security,

"Reaffirming that only complete respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Senegal and all the African States bordering the Territories of Guinea (Bissau), Angola and Mozambique, and for the principle of self-determination and independence defined in particular in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, will make it possible to eliminate the causes of tension in those regions of the African continent and create a climate of confidence, peace and security,

"1. Condemns the frontier violation and attack on the Senegalese post at Nianao committed by regular forces of the Portuguese army on 12 October 1972;

"2. Recalls its resolution 294 (1971) of 15 July 1971 condemning the acts of violence and destruction committed by the Portuguese forces against the people and villages of Senegal since 1963;

"3. Demands that the Government of Portugal stop immediately and definitively any acts of violence and destruction directed against Senegalese territory and scrupulously respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity and security of that State and all other independent African States;

"4. Calls upon the Government of Portugal to respect the principle of self-determination and independence, defined in particular in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), and to take immediately all necessary steps to apply that principle;

"5. Declares that if Portugal does not comply with the provisions of the present resolution the Security Council will meet to consider other steps;

"6. Decides to remain seized of the question."

545. In a statement following the voting, the representative of the United Kingdom said that his Government regretted the incident of 12 October and expressed its sympathy with Senegal in the loss of lives and damage to property. The attack was shocking and senseless, but it differed from other incidents in that it had been admitted and denounced by Portugal. In those circumstances, condemnation was not appropriate,

inasmuch as they might provide an opportunity to explore ways of averting new outbreaks of violence.

546. The representative of the United States said that his delegation remained convinced that the people of Portuguese Guinea had a right to self-determination, as his Government had repeatedly made clear to Portugal. The United States deplored the loss of lives that had resulted from the recent incident; nevertheless, it had abstained from voting because the draft resolution did not reflect the contents of Portugal's note, especially the fact that the Portuguese authorities had apologized for their action and had offered to give guarantees to Senegal. He recalled that the previous year his delegation had expressed interest in establishing a commission in order to investigate border incidents and to report to the Council on the progress towards self-determination in the region. His delegation continued to believe in the correctness of that procedure.

547. The representative of Yugoslavia said that his delegation would have preferred the original draft resolution, which had more strongly condemned Portugal. However, it had voted for the revised version because it answered the needs of the moment.

548. The representative of Italy said that his delegation was gratified that the sponsors had included in the revised draft resolution a reference to the letter from Portugal. He hoped that Portugal's offer of guarantees might be taken as the sign of a new development and that peace would return to the area.

549. The representative of Senegal said that, by its decision, the Council had given further confidence to his people and had also proved that, contrary to certain conceptions, it was able to act in the interests of peace and security. He hoped that Portugal would be prompted to reconsider its general attitude.

C. Subsequent communications

550. In a letter dated 9 November addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/10831), the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the German Democratic Republic stated that his country supported the Council's resolution 321 (1972) of 23 October condemning Portugal for its aggression against Senegal. It added that his country would, in the future, support the efforts of the United Nations for the liberation of the colonially dependent Territories in Africa.

Chapter 5

QUESTION CONCERNING THE SITUATION IN TERRITORIES UNDER PORTUGUESE ADMINISTRATION

A. Communications to the Security Council and request for a meeting

551. In a letter dated 7 November 1972 addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/10828), a meeting of the Security Council on 15 November was requested by the representatives of Algeria, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Dahomey, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Republic, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Zaire and

Zambia to examine the situation in the Territories under Portuguese domination. The letter stated that the Security Council had indirectly discussed those Territories while examining several complaints made by African States against the flagrant aggression perpetrated by Portugal against their sovereignty and territorial integrity. The situation in the Territories, the letter stated, had evolved since 1963 in favour of national liberation movements. As a result of that progressive trend, the Security Council was asked to take the necessary measures to bring the Government of Portugal to recognize the right of self-determination and independence of the African peoples under its domination.

552. In a letter dated 15 November (S/10833), the representative of Portugal expressed regret that the Security Council should have been convened on a request that was misconceived. He stated that the question at issue was beyond the competence of the Security Council, there being no dispute prevailing between Portugal and any of the States whose representatives had requested a Council meeting. Further, the situation in the Portuguese Territories was a matter within the domestic jurisdiction of a Member State and, as such, under Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter, expressly excluded from consideration by the United Nations.

553. In a letter dated 15 November (S/10836), the Secretary-General conveyed to the President of the Security Council the text of resolution 2918 (XXVII) relating to the question of Territories under Portuguese administration adopted by the General Assembly at its 2084th meeting on 14 November 1972 and drew attention to paragraph 7 of the resolution, in which the General Assembly recommended that the Security Council should urgently consider taking all effective steps with a view to securing the full and speedy implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and of the related decisions of the Council.

554. The Council also had been informed of the report of the Special Mission to visit the liberated areas of Guinea (Bissau), which had been established by the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. The report had been brought to the attention of the Security Council by the Chairman of the Special Committee in a letter dated 1 August addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/10754).

555. Finally, the Security Council had received the report of the Secretary-General (S/10734) dated 11 July on the implementation of Security Council resolution 312 (1972), containing the replies of Governments to his inquiry concerning action taken or envisaged by them in implementation of paragraph 6 of that resolution.

B. Consideration at the 1672nd to 1677th meetings (15-22 November 1972)

556. At the 1672nd meeting, on 15 November, the Council included the letter from 37 Member States (S/10828) in its agenda without objection and considered the question at six meetings between 15 and 22 November, during which the President, with the consent of the Council, invited the representatives of Burundi, Cuba, Ethiopia, Liberia, Madagascar, Morocco, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Tunisia, Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania to participate in the discussion without the right to vote. At the 1672nd meeting, the Security Council agreed to a request made by the representatives of Somalia and the Sudan in a letter dated 13 November (S/10830) that it extend invitations under rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure to Mr. Marcelino dos Santos, Vice-President of the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO), Mr. Gil Fernandes, member of the Superior Council of PAIGC, and Mr. Manuel Jorge of the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA).

557. Opening the discussion, the representative of Liberia recalled the history of Portugal in Africa and

United Nations efforts to deal with Portuguese colonialism on that continent. He urged the Security Council to reaffirm the inalienable rights of the peoples of Angola, Mozambique, Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde to self-determination and independence and to affirm that the national liberation movements of those Territories were the legitimate representatives of the peoples. He also urged the Government of Portugal to enter into negotiations immediately with the national liberation movements with a view to arriving at a solution to the armed conflict that prevailed in those Territories. Finally, he called upon all States, particularly the military allies of Portugal, to put an end to the sale or supply of weapons to Portugal.

558. The representative of Sierra Leone said that Portugal continued to maintain the legal fiction that the so-called overseas provinces in Africa constituted integral parts of Portugal and that, to all intents and purposes, the peoples of those Territories were Portuguese. However, in 1961, in Angola, less than 1 per cent of 4 million Africans had been recognized as assimilated Portuguese. The fact was that to become a citizen of Portugal an African was obliged to fulfil stringent qualifications, though for whites, citizenship was a matter of course. Portugal, he maintained, was primarily interested in Africa as a field for exploitation and refused to accept the reality of the situation there. The Portuguese Government should be made to understand that it must put an end to the myth that the African Territories were an integral part of metropolitan Portugal. His delegation was willing to give Portugal an opportunity to come to terms with the owners of the Territories it occupied. If it failed to accept that offer, then it would have only itself to blame for the grave consequences that would result.

559. The representative of Ethiopia described the recent history of Portuguese policies in its African colonies and said that in the last 10 years Portuguese oppression had intensified. The policy statements by the spokesmen of the Government in Lisbon showed that Portugal had no intention of voluntarily relinquishing its African colonies. Nevertheless, the liberation movements, though confident and determined to carry on the struggle, had not closed the door to a peaceful alternative to the armed conflict that was raging and were ready to negotiate with Portugal, if it was prepared to accept the principle of self-determination and independence. He called on the international community to give effective moral and material assistance to those national liberation movements. Portugal had repeatedly questioned the authority, efficacy and credibility of the United Nations. The time for action by the Council was long overdue. His delegation therefore appealed to the Council to take up Portugal's challenge and discharge its responsibilities under the Charter.

560. The representative of Saudi Arabia said it was not the Portuguese people who were waging a struggle to suppress the African peoples, but a small circle of vested interests, which, unfortunately, happened to be behind the Government of Portugal and forced it to maintain its domination over its overseas Territories. If a formula could be found within the framework of the United Nations envisaging a community of interests between the liberated Africans of those Territories and the Portuguese, then a glimmer of hope might appear. He suggested that the Secretary-General might appoint an emissary to deal with the question, as he had done with the question of Na-

mbia. Further, the Trusteeship Council might be reactivated, or a representative of the Secretary-General might make a fact-finding tour. Something had to be done to enable the Africans and the Portuguese to communicate and to negotiate. In the long run, there was no alternative to giving freedom to the Africans living in Portuguese Territories.

561. At the 1673rd meeting, on 16 November, the representative of the United Republic of Tanzania recalled the long series of United Nations resolutions concerning Portugal and condemnations of that country for its African policies. He said that, had the United Nations been established for the purpose of adopting resolutions or expounding new philosophies and principles, it would have to be admitted that the Organization had done the maximum possible on questions of decolonization. But the Organization had been established to create and maintain conditions of peace throughout the world. Peace was incompatible with colonialism, for when people were denied their fundamental and basic human rights, it was only natural that they should fight to destroy that peace under which they suffered. The fascist régime in Lisbon, however, was primarily responsible for the destruction of peace in its African Territories. The intensification of Portuguese military operations and the growing influx of economic and other vested interests in the Territories were designed to strengthen the economic base of the minority régimes and white supremacy in that part of Africa. It was in the long-term interests of the Governments and peoples of Western Europe and the United States to cease providing assistance to Portugal and to encourage it to stop the futile war it was fighting in Africa.

562. Mr. dos Santos, addressing the Council on behalf of FRELIMO, said that the decision of the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly to grant observer status to the national liberation movements of the Portuguese Territories was a decision of profound historical and political importance. For his country, it meant that the United Nations recognized the fact that FRELIMO represented the people of Mozambique and Mozambique itself. It also meant that FRELIMO exercised *de facto* political authority over the people of Mozambique, extending to the liberated areas and to the areas still under colonial domination. FRELIMO had already extended its struggle to the province of Monica and Sofala — a province rich in agriculture, mining and industry and one that was very important strategically. The liberated areas currently comprised more than one fourth of Mozambique — more than 200,000 square kilometres. Under the direction of FRELIMO, the people of those areas, totalling more than one million, had embarked upon the economic and social development of the country, and in the areas still under colonial domination, such work was being carried out clandestinely in rural and urban centres. The people lived under Portuguese domination, but followed the political leadership given by FRELIMO. The extent of political mobilization could be measured by the scope of the repression. In the previous July, the international press had announced the arrest of some 1,800 nationalists in the southern regions of the country. The struggle of FRELIMO, however, was not directed at the people of Portugal but against the fascist régime in Lisbon. While waging its genocidal and ecological war, Portugal was strengthening its alliance with the South African and Southern Rhodesian régimes. Furthermore, the direct

participation of those two régimes in the colonial war in Mozambique was increasing, and their soldiers, planes and helicopters were participating more actively in military operations. The people of Mozambique should be supplied with the necessary means to carry out its liberation, and it was necessary to prevent the flow of arms to Portugal. Portugal was receiving military, economic and financial assistance from certain States, particularly its NATO allies, including weapons supplied by the United States, France, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom. In return for that support, Portugal had opened up its colonies to Western investments. If such States did not put an end to aiding Portugal, all of southern Africa would become a vast hot-bed of war. FRELIMO, however, was ready to negotiate with the Government of Portugal on behalf of the entire people of Mozambique as soon as Portugal recognized their right to self-determination and national independence.

563. The representative of Somalia said that the resort to means of revolutionary struggle by the liberation movements had the same importance and significance for the African States represented in the United Nations as all liberation revolutions had had in the past for many States, including some of the big Powers. The time had come for positive measures in regard to the situation in the Portuguese colonies, measures that went beyond the affirmation of principles and the moderate calls for action that had been made in Addis Ababa in February 1972. The Security Council must act more positively in a situation in which at least 150,000 Portuguese troops were engaged in a war to crush the struggle for liberation from colonial oppression, a war that included the use of napalm, chemical warfare and other means of mass destruction. The Security Council now had sufficient cause to invoke Chapter VII of the Charter and impose an arms embargo on Portugal. It was most disappointing to note that France, the United Kingdom and the United States, because of their political, economic and military relationships with Portugal, South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, had deliberately ignored the many measures that the United Nations had proposed with regard to the Portuguese Territories.

564. On behalf of Guinea, Somalia and the Sudan, the representative of Somalia then introduced a draft resolution (S/10834) which he said was designed to redress the situation in the Territories and to update previous resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly. It reflected not only the consensus of the majority of the United Nations membership but the consensus of the heads of State and Government of OAU, as shown in their resolution on decolonization adopted in 1972 in Rabat. The draft resolution read as follows:

"The Security Council,

"Having examined the situation in Angola, Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde, and Mozambique,

"Recalling its resolution 312 (1972) of 4 February 1972,

"Recalling General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, containing the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and resolution 2918 (XXVII) of 14 November 1972 on the question of Territories under Portuguese administration,

"Deeply deploring the continued and intensified armed repression by Portugal of the peoples of Angola, Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde, and Mozambique, in order to suppress the legitimate aspirations of those peoples for self-determination and independence, as well as the continued violations of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of independent African States neighbouring those Territories,

"Recalling its requests to States to refrain from offering the Government of Portugal any assistance that would enable it to continue its repression of the peoples of the Territories under its administration, and to take all the necessary measures to prevent the sale and shipment of arms and military equipment to the Government of Portugal for this purpose, including the sale and shipment of equipment and materials for the manufacture and maintenance of arms and ammunition to be used in the Territories under Portuguese administration,

"Deeply deploring the policy of those States, particularly some of the military allies of Portugal within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, that, in disregard of repeated appeals addressed to them by the United Nations, continue to provide Portugal with military and other assistance, without which Portugal could not pursue its policy of colonial domination and oppression of the peoples of Angola, Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde, and Mozambique,

"Deeply shocked by the continuous use of napalm and chemical substances by Portugal in its colonial wars against the peoples of Angola, Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde, and Mozambique,

"Taking note of the report of the Special Mission to Guinea (Bissau) dispatched in April 1972 by the Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

"Having heard statements of the representatives of Member States and the national liberation movements invited to participate in the consideration of the question,

"Deeply deploring the persistent refusal of the Government of Portugal to implement the relevant provisions of the resolutions adopted by the Security Council and the General Assembly on the question of Territories under Portuguese administration in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

"Conscious of the urgent need to avert further human suffering and material losses by the peoples of Angola, Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde, and Mozambique and to support a negotiated solution to the armed conflict which prevails in those Territories,

"Reaffirms the inalienable right of the peoples of Angola, Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde, and Mozambique to self-determination and independence as recognized by the General Assembly in resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 and the legitimacy of the struggle by those peoples under the direction of their national liberation movements to achieve that right by all available means;

"2. Reaffirms that the situation resulting both from the colonialist policy of Portugal in those

Territories and from the constant aggressions by Portuguese military forces against independent African States adjacent to those Territories seriously disturbs international peace and security in the African continent;

"3. Condemns the persistent refusal of the Government of Portugal to implement General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and all other relevant resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly;

"4. Calls upon the Government of Portugal to cease forthwith its colonial wars and all acts of repression against the peoples of Angola, Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde, and Mozambique;

"5. Affirms that the national liberation movements of Angola, Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde, and Mozambique recognized by the Organization of African Unity are the legitimate representatives of the peoples of those Territories;

"6. Calls upon the Government of Portugal, in conformity with the recommendation contained in General Assembly resolution 2918 (XXVII), and in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), to enter into negotiations with the national liberation movements of Angola, Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde, and Mozambique recognized by the Organization of African Unity with a view to arriving at a solution to the armed conflict that prevails in those Territories and permitting them to accede to independence;

"7. Affirms that the military and other forms of assistance that certain military allies of Portugal within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization supply to the Government of Portugal permit it to pursue its policy of colonial domination and repression against the peoples of Angola, Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde, and Mozambique, thus endangering the peace and international security on the African continent;

"8. Requests all States, particularly certain military allies of Portugal within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to withhold assistance of any kind from the Government of Portugal until it renounces its policy of colonial domination;

"9. Appeals to all Governments, the specialized agencies and other organizations within the United Nations system and non-governmental organizations to render to the national liberation movements of Angola, Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde, and Mozambique recognized by the Organization of African Unity all the moral and material assistance in their struggle for self-determination and independence;

"10. Decides that all States, particularly certain military allies of Portugal, put an end to the sale or supply of weapons, military equipment and material to the Government of Portugal, as well as all supplies, equipment and material for the manufacture or maintenance of weapons and ammunition, as long as Portugal refuses to renounce its policy of colonial domination;

"11. Decides to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of its provisional rules of procedure, a sub-committee of . . . members of the Security Council, to be formed after consultation between the President of the Security Council and the Secretary-

General, which will be in charge of implementation of the provisions of paragraph 10 above and report periodically to the Security Council;

"12. *Requests* all States to co-operate with the sub-committee established under paragraph 11 above;

"13. *Requests* the Secretary-General to assist the sub-committee in the discharge of its tasks."

565. The representative of Madagascar said that the Portuguese Government denied that a state of war existed in its African colonies, over which it claimed to exercise political, administrative, economic and military control. To refute this, it was only necessary to read the report of the Special Mission of the Special Committee on decolonization. However, according to the Portuguese authorities, their war of reconquest or recolonization might well last 100 years if need be. It was difficult to understand how the Portuguese authorities could flout the dispositions of the Charter with impunity and calmly continue their colonialist and imperialist aggression. It had to be recognized, therefore, that Portugal enjoyed complicity and assistance from other nations. The Council had the authority to put an end to the situation by decreeing a total embargo on the sale of arms to Portugal. Furthermore, it would be just for the Council to request the international community, by means of aid to the liberation movements, to provide for a programme of national assistance and reconstruction in Angola, Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde, and Mozambique.

566. Mr. Fernandes, speaking on behalf of PAIGC, said that trying to persuade Portugal to decolonize was like asking the Portuguese ruling class to commit suicide. The economy of Portugal, he said, had been so oriented after 50 years of fascism that only a few powerful families benefited from it. It was that ruling class that was interested in keeping its colonies. The people of Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde had tried non-violent means of protest at first, but petitions, boycotts and strikes had had absolutely no effect on Portugal. A strike of dock workers in 1959 had resulted in the massacre of Piquiti, in which the police had machine-gunned the strikers, leaving more than 50 workers dead and more than 100 injured. Thereafter, the people had no alternative but to resort to armed force. During the 10 years of armed struggle, the people of Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde, under the leadership of PAIGC, had made enormous progress. Almost three-quarters of their national territory had been liberated from colonial domination and two thirds of Guinea (Bissau) was under their effective control. PAIGC had developed an administrative structure and given new life and hope to the people. A variety of cultural and social services had been promoted, such as health, hygiene and education. Many hundreds of Africans were now finding access to educational facilities — some in friendly countries abroad. In Addis Ababa, the Council had been asked by PAIGC to set a time-limit for the departure of Portuguese troops and to send a delegation of the Security Council to see the Portuguese Prime Minister and make concrete proposals for the beginning of negotiations. Personally, he would like to see the United Kingdom as part of the delegation because of its special ties with Portugal. In conclusion, he said that his people had just completed elections for their first national assembly, which was due to meet in the near future and proclaim a State. All of the components

of a sovereign State would be used accordingly. It was not the intention of PAIGC to bring Portugal to its knees. Nevertheless, an end would be put to Portuguese colonial rule in Bissau and Cape Verde.

567. At its 1674th meeting, on 17 November, the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that Portugal was stepping up its political, military and economic relations with South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. Regular troops of the Republic of South Africa were participating in the colonial wars against the African patriots of the Portuguese colonies. In addition, there were many cases of Portuguese aggression against African countries. Despite the condemnations of the Security Council, Portugal continued its policies of aggression, colonial oppression and plunder of the African peoples. It was no secret that that was happening because Portugal had the support of certain influential States members of NATO. In southern Africa the world was seeing a new and special kind of neo-colonialism: collective colonialism. On ancestral African soil occupied by Portugal it was not only the Portuguese colonialists who held sway but the international monopolies, whose headquarters were situated in various capitals and large cities of Western countries. In those circumstances, the Council should set definite deadlines for the transfer of power to the true representatives of the African peoples of Guinea (Bissau), Angola and Mozambique. If Portugal violated the Security Council's decision that power be handed over to the peoples of those countries, then the Council should consider declaring sanctions against Portugal. The Soviet Union supported the peoples of Africa in their struggle against imperialism and was giving full moral support and realistic material assistance to the national liberation movements. With regard to the draft resolution sponsored by Guinea, Somalia and the Sudan (S/10834), his delegation saw three important elements in that text. The first was the appeal to Portugal to begin negotiations with the national liberation movement. The second element was the recognition of the national liberation movements as the legal representatives of their people. The third element was the appeal to all States who were helping Portugal to put an end to such assistance. The Soviet Union supported the draft resolution and felt that the Security Council should immediately decide to put a stop to the delivery of arms and war materials to the Portuguese colonialists.

568. The representative of Morocco said that Portugal was waging, at one and the same time, three typically colonial wars that were clearly beyond its means, yet it had been unable to come up with any better explanation than that its colonies were an integral part of Portugal. Addressing himself to Portugal's NATO allies, he asked how those Powers could fail to be embarrassed by an ally that caused them nothing but disappointment, an ally that waged an outdated and costly colonial war while keeping its own people in an anachronistic state of underdevelopment. He could not understand why the alliance with Portugal was so precious to them, to the point of forgetting their own international obligations and tarnishing their reputations. At the very least, and as a first step, he asked that Portugal's allies place an embargo on all weapons to Portugal. Surely Portugal would awaken to present-day reality and abandon its colonial policy once its sources of weapons was cut off. If Portugal decided to convene a conference similar

to the Evian Conference in order to conclude its colonial wars, Morocco would immediately offer, as the site of that conference, the city of Tangier, whose position was ideal both geographically and politically.

569. The representative of the Sudan said that Portugal should realize that neither in NATO nor in the European community had it any future to rely on. It had no qualifications whatsoever for membership in NATO, except by a sheer accident of history and geography reflecting a period of cold war between East and West. The prevailing *détente* would one day evolve into an *entente*, and Portugal would have outlived its usefulness as a strategic base. And because it lacked certain economic and political qualifications, Portugal could not aspire to be a member of the European Economic Community. In the future, therefore, Portugal would have to rely on its own power and resources, which in no way could enable it to maintain its position in Africa. That being the case, Portugal should not need to be reminded that, sooner or later, mutual co-operation with independent Angola, Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde, and Mozambique would be more beneficial to it than its old military alliances. Should the Council succeed in persuading the NATO Powers to withdraw their military and financial assistance to Portugal, Portugal itself would be greatly helped to consider the situation in its naked reality. If it failed to do so, the Council could invoke Chapter VII of the Charter and apply total sanctions to the whole of southern Africa for a start. Finally, if those efforts failed, the Council might have to consider, as a final attempt, a new innovation such as a declaration of independence for those Territories under Portuguese domination. The Sudan stood firmly by the pledge that it had made with all African States at the Rabat Assembly to give all moral and material support to the legitimate struggle of all African peoples under colonial domination until total liberation was achieved.

570. The representative of Belgium said that his country had long recognized that the peoples of the Portuguese Territories had an inalienable right to self-determination and independence. The time had come to tell Portugal, kindly but firmly, that it must recognize that right without delay and renounce a policy that had run its course. Thus Portugal would follow in the footsteps of various European countries, including Belgium, and would replace the current bonds of dependence that united them to the African Territories by new egalitarian relations indicated by an irreversible historic change. His delegation wished to remind Portugal that the end of their colonial empires had not led to a break in relations between the African countries that became independent and the former metropolitan countries. Quite the contrary, on both sides there had emerged a political will to institute, in equality and mutual non-interference, relations of co-operation whose objective was to aid the young States of Africa in their own economic, social and cultural development efforts. His country had a clear conscience when it came to charges concerning military assistance to Portugal by its NATO allies. The use of weapons sold by Belgian firms to Portugal was confined to the defence needs of the European continent. The defence pact concluded among the 15 member countries of NATO applied only to their territory, and that was why the overseas provinces of Portugal were excluded from the scope of the North

Atlantic Treaty. If Portugal was not honouring its commitments, Belgium would review its position. He reaffirmed Belgium's dedication to the right of the peoples of Portuguese Territories to self-determination and independence and to negotiations without pre-conditions directed to that objective.

571. Mr. Jorge, speaking on behalf of MPLA, told the Council that his presence reflected the expression of his organization's dedication to the standards and principles of the Charter, principles which Portugal had trampled under foot while the international community looked on with indifference. He said that MPLA controlled more than one third of the territory of Angola, corresponding to an area of approximately 500,000 square kilometres. In those liberated areas, the new Angolan State was rising. The Portuguese Government pursued its colonial war by concentrating most of its troops in Angola — more than 130,000 men, of which 60,000 were members of the army, the navy and the air force. The remainder was made up of Katangan mercenaries who had formerly served Tshombé, other mercenaries, soldiers and pilots of the regular South African Army, the Portuguese political police, customs officers and the militia of the armed settlers called the Provincial Organization of Volunteers for Civil Defence. He maintained that Portugal was strengthening its ties with the South African and Rhodesian racists and officially requesting members of NATO to establish military bases in Angola. Furthermore, Portugal had set up a system of "strategic hamlets", resettling the population away from contact with the guerrillas. That policy had failed because it generated hatred among the people who, behind barbed wire, were unable to cultivate their fields. After describing the health, social and educational reforms being instituted in the liberated areas, he went on to say that Portugal could never carry on its colonial war without the active support of NATO, of the racist complex of Rhodesia and South Africa and of Brazil. The Security Council, he said, should invite Portugal once again to halt its war of aggression, thus making it possible for Portugal to negotiate with MPLA, the sole and legitimate representative of the Angolan people.

572. The representative of Uganda said that the Council was not meeting to discuss whether Portuguese Territories should be granted independence, because, by several resolutions of the Council and the General Assembly, that had been established as a clearly defined objective. Portugal had said that it did not reject the principle of self-determination. By self-determination, however, Portugal did not, in fact, mean independence. Portugal had been described at the Institute of Higher Military Studies in Lisbon as a nation "with 4.2 per cent of its area and 41 per cent of its population in Europe and 95 per cent of its area and 55 per cent of its population in Africa". Thus, according to the Portuguese Government, Portugal extended to both the European and the African continents as a single constitutional whole. The words "self-determination" and "State" had been used by Portugal in a unique and fraudulent sense. His delegation supported the proposal before the General Assembly that Portugal should immediately begin negotiations with the national liberation movements. Uganda was willing to abide by whatever decisions the Council took in hastening the self-determination and independence of all Portuguese colonies and fully associated itself with the draft resolution before the Council.

573. At the 1675th meeting, on 21 November, the representative of Tunisia said that the day would come when Portugal would support the admission of its former colonies to the United Nations. What was of concern was the length of the struggle, the magnitude of human suffering that would be wrought before that came about. Despite all the decisions of the United Nations, the situation was deteriorating. Portugal was waging an absurd and useless war that overflowed into the territories of neighbouring independent States. It imposed on the Portuguese people a gigantic financial effort to maintain its colonial war, a war in which young Portuguese were dying every day. Only the generous economic and military assistance of its allies enabled Portugal to continue the fighting. Portugal must establish relations with the peoples of its African Territories based on mutual respect and mutual interest and must understand that military victory was impossible. It must accept a compromise situation based on the principle of self-determination and freedom. All States must co-operate to persuade Portugal to follow the historical example set by other States of the European community.

574. The representative of Burundi, tracing the history of Portugal's colonial wars in Africa, said that Portugal had been able to continue those wars only through the lavish aid extended by its misguided allies. Portugal's talk of racial assimilation in its colonies was a fraud. Equally absurd was Portugal's theory of "Portuguese overseas provinces". Furthermore, the system of *indigenato* was a Portuguese replica of *apartheid*. Racial integration in the Portuguese Territories was a sham, an alibi for indefinitely postponing independence. The truth was that Africans, in order to become assimilated, were asked to renounce their own culture and civilization. He added that although the world was outraged by many acts of terrorism, certain distinctions had to be made. There were several kinds of terrorism, and Portugal was guilty of the worst kind of terrorism against the population of its colonies. Any tendency to isolate colonialism from the world terrorist network would be tantamount to an ostrich-like policy, and the hoped-for effects would be hypothetical.

575. The representative of Nigeria said that Portugal, instead of complying with the principles of the Charter and resolutions adopted by the United Nations clung to the myth of "overseas provinces in Africa". The Portuguese policy in Angola, Mozambique, Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde was calculated to deculturate the indigenous populations so that they might acquiesce in the barefaced rape of their political, social and economic freedom. The so-called constitutional reform relating to the overseas Territories had not in any way lessened the authoritarian control from Lisbon; nor had it made provision for the participation of the vast majority of the population in the political life of the Territories. Portugal had continued its colonial wars only with the help of its NATO allies, which had done nothing to ensure that their aid did not indirectly foot the bill for those wars. An offer of a peaceful settlement of the problem posed by Portuguese colonialism had been made by OAU in 1969 in the Lusaka Manifesto. Portugal had responded negatively, but the offer had been repeated recently by the General Assembly. The Security Council must ensure that Portugal stopped all measures that disturbed the peace and security of

the African continent and, instead, enabled the people to determine the political future of their countries.

576. At its 1676th meeting, on 21 November, the representative of Yugoslavia stated that, in regard to the Portuguese Territories, new developments necessitated new decisions by the Security Council. The liberation of large areas of the Territories and the establishment of local authorities and services, the Special Mission to Guinea (Bissau) which had been the first in the history of the United Nations to visit a liberated Territory in that area, the decisions of OAU and the increased international recognition afforded the national liberation movements all tended to mark a new phase in the struggle to liberate the Portuguese colonies. Accordingly, there was nothing routine or automatic in the Council once again addressing itself to the situation. One should not underestimate the role of the moral, political and material support that the United Nations had been able to extend, though whoever had fought a liberation war knew well that nothing could bring freedom if the people on the spot did not fight. Yugoslavia had declared its full support for the struggle of the peoples of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau) from the outset and had noted with interest the suggestion that the Security Council should consider declaring the independence of the Territories if its other actions proved fruitless. His delegation would have had no difficulty with the draft resolution as initially submitted by three African members of the Security Council. Yugoslavia supported the inalienable right of the peoples of the Territories to self-determination and independence and urged Portugal to enter into negotiations immediately. Yugoslavia also supported the call to put an end to the supply of weapons to Portugal and any measures to ensure such an embargo. It was Yugoslavia's position of principle to support the initiatives of the African States, and he considered that the setting up of a subsidiary *ad hoc* body of the Security Council to deal exclusively with the decolonization process in the Portuguese-held Territories was indicated. It was essential to assist in establishing contacts leading to negotiations between Portugal and its legitimate partners—the national liberation movements—on the basis of the right to self-determination and independence.

577. The representative of Italy said that Italy had always been convinced that the peoples of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau) should be allowed to exercise their right to self-determination and independence. Whatever interpretation might be given to votes cast on various resolutions, he stated, the fact was that on the essential point, the process of self-determination and independence, there was unanimity. The question was how the United Nations could help to achieve that objective. Italy had welcomed the Lusaka Manifesto and appealed to the interested parties to negotiate peacefully, as called for by the African States. However, to ask the United Nations to legitimize violence was to use the United Nations for a purpose other than that for which it had been conceived and transform it into an arena for confrontation. Such a use would jeopardize the rules of international law and weaken the Organization. His delegation was prepared to support any action of the Council intended, first to reaffirm resolution 1514 (XV) and the need to apply it to Angola, Guinea (Bissau) and Mozambique; second, to invite the Portuguese authorities to put an end to

the colonial wars; and third, to appeal to Portugal to initiate negotiations with the parties concerned and with the assistance of the United Nations with a view to arriving at a solution of the armed confrontation and allowing the populations concerned to accede to independence.

578. The representative of Cuba said that the United Nations should act with receptiveness concerning the struggle of the peoples under colonial domination. It should co-operate with the liberation movements because the persistence of colonialism in Africa was a continuing threat to international peace and security and, in particular, to the independent African States. Portugal, he stated, was receiving substantial aid from its NATO allies and had strengthened its diplomatic and political ties with the United States. Against the alliance of international imperialism, colonialism and racism, it was necessary to set up, as a solid block, the unity of all socialist, progressive and non-aligned countries in order to give the liberation movements of Africa the political, moral and material support that they required. Cuba reaffirmed its support for the African liberation movements.

579. The representative of Somalia said that, following consultations, the sponsors of the draft resolution submitted on 16 November (S/10834) had decided to withdraw that draft resolution and to submit instead, two separate draft resolutions (S/10838 and S/10839). The first of the new draft resolutions would call upon Portugal to negotiate with the true representatives of the peoples of the Territories. The sponsors believed that that draft resolution would meet with the unanimous approval of the Security Council, which could not ignore an appeal for negotiations. The second draft resolution dealt with measures to be taken against Portugal, including an arms embargo and the setting up of an *ad hoc* committee to investigate the flow of arms to Portugal.

580. The first draft resolution, to which he made certain textual modifications orally, was circulated as document S/10838/Rev.1 and read as follows:

"The Security Council,

"Having examined the situation in Angola, Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde, and Mozambique,

"Recalling its resolution 312 (1972) of 4 February 1972,

"Also recalling General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, containing the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, and resolution 2918 (XXVII) of 14 November 1972 on the question of Territories under Portuguese administration,

"Taking note of the reports of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

"Considering that the Organization of African Unity recognizes the liberation movements of Angola, Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde, and Mozambique as the legitimate representatives of the peoples of those Territories,

"Having heard statements of the representatives of Member States and of Mr. Marcelino dos Santos, Mr. Gil Fernandes and Mr. Manuel Jorge, who were invited under rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure to participate in the consideration of the question,

"Conscious of the urgent need to avert further human suffering and material losses by the peoples of Angola, Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde, and Mozambique and to achieve a negotiated solution to the armed conflict that prevails in those Territories,

"1. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the peoples of Angola, Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde, and Mozambique to self-determination and independence as recognized by the General Assembly in resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 and the legitimacy of the struggle by those peoples to achieve that right;

"2. Calls upon the Government of Portugal to cease forthwith its colonial wars and all acts of repression against the peoples of Angola, Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde, and Mozambique;

"3. Calls upon the Government of Portugal, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), to enter into negotiations with the representatives of the peoples of Angola, Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde, and Mozambique, with a view to achieving a solution to the armed conflict that prevails in those Territories and permitting them to achieve self-determination and independence;

"4. Requests the Secretary-General to follow developments in the situation and to report periodically to the Security Council."

581. The second draft resolution (S/10839) read as follows:

"The Security Council,

"Recalling its resolution 312 (1972) of 4 February 1972,

"Deeply deploring the continued and intensified armed repression by Portugal of the peoples of Angola, Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde, and Mozambique, in order to suppress the legitimate aspirations of those peoples for self-determination and independence, as well as the continued violations of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of independent African States neighbouring those Territories,

"Recalling its requests to States to refrain from offering the Government of Portugal any assistance that would enable it to continue its repression of the peoples of the Territories under its administration and to take all the necessary measures to prevent the sale and shipment of arms and military equipment to the Government of Portugal for this purpose, including the sale and shipment of equipment and materials for the manufacture and maintenance of arms and ammunition to be used in the Territories under Portuguese administration,

"Deeply deploring the policy of those States, particularly some of the military allies of Portugal within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, that, in disregard to repeated appeals addressed to them by the United Nations, continue to provide Portugal with military and other assistance, without which Portugal could not pursue its policy of colonial domination and oppression of the peoples of Angola, Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde, and Mozambique,

"*Deeply shocked* by the continuous use of napalm and chemical substances by Portugal in its colonial wars against the peoples of Angola, Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde, and Mozambique,

"*Deeply deploring* the persistent refusal of the Government of Portugal to implement the relevant provisions of the resolutions adopted by the Security Council and the General Assembly on the question of Territories under Portuguese administration in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

"1. *Reaffirms* that the situation resulting both from the colonialist policy of Portugal in those Territories and from the Constant aggressions by Portuguese military forces against independent African States adjacent to those Territories seriously disturbs international peace and security in the African continent;

"2. *Condemns* the persistent refusal of the Government of Portugal to implement General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and all other relevant resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly;

"3. *Affirms* that the military and other forms of assistance that certain military allies of Portugal within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization supply to the Government of Portugal permits it to pursue its policy of colonial domination and repression against the peoples of Angola, Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde, and Mozambique, thus endangering the peace and international security on the African continent;

"4. *Requests* all States, particularly certain military allies of Portugal within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, to withhold assistance of any kind from the Government of Portugal until it renounces its policy of colonial domination;

"5. *Appeals* to all Governments, the specialized agencies and other organizations within the United Nations system and non-governmental organizations to render to the national liberation movements of Angola, Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde, and Mozambique recognized by the Organization of African Unity all moral and material assistance in their struggle for self-determination and independence.

"6. *Decides* that all States, particularly certain military allies of Portugal, should put an end to the sale or supply of weapons, military equipment and material to the Government of Portugal, as well as all supplies, equipment and material for the manufacture or maintenance of weapons and ammunition that are used by Portugal in its repression of the African peoples in the Territories under its domination;

"7. *Decides* to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of its provisional rules of procedure, an *ad hoc* committee of five members of the Security Council, to be formed after consultation between the President of the Security Council and the Secretary-General, to undertake investigation of the flow of arms used by Portugal in the African territories under its domination and to report periodically to the Security Council;

"8. *Requests* all States to co-operate with the *ad hoc* committee established under paragraph 7 above;

"9. *Requests* the Secretary-General to assist the *ad hoc* committee in the discharge of its tasks."

582. The representative of China said that Portugal had stationed more than 100,000 troops in the occupied regions, which it had the audacity to call "overseas provinces". Operating from those bases, Portugal had repeatedly launched armed attacks against Guinea, Senegal, Tanzania, Zambia and other independent African countries and had formed a reactionary military alliance with South Africa and Southern Rhodesia to suppress the liberation movements. He said that the Security Council should severely condemn Portugal for its colonial wars and its armed aggression against neighbouring African countries. A strict arms embargo and sanctions should be applied against Portugal, and all countries should be called upon to give greater assistance and support to the national liberation movements in the Portuguese colonies. The Chinese people and the African people had shared the same experience in past history. The Chinese Government and people had always regarded the African people's struggle as a great support to them. Furthermore, the Chinese people would unswervingly stand by the African people and the peoples of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau). The Chinese delegation would vote for the two draft resolutions submitted by Guinea, Somalia and the Sudan.

583. The representative of Argentina said that no one called into question or failed to recognize the very important contributions made by Portugal throughout its history in the discovery of new lands, opening up routes for shipping and trade, exploring the unknown and contributing to progress through the efforts of its distinguished mariners, cartographers, scientists and jurists. What was questioned, however, was that those facts of history should still be invoked to maintain an empire. The world did not remain static. If it did, the United Nations would be made up entirely of a few countries that shared among themselves the domination of the five continents. Portugal still had time to react positively by granting to the peoples of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau) their right to self-determination. To do so would mean that Portugal had moved once and for all into the twentieth century. It would confirm by deeds the political and diplomatic realism displayed by so many Portuguese statesmen in the past. It would mean the dawn of a constructive era in which war and confrontation would be supplanted by friendship and a promising future for all parties.

584. The President of the Security Council, speaking as the representative of Guinea, said that following the first general elections held under universal suffrage by secret ballot, establishing in Guinea (Bissau), under the control of PAIGC, the first national assembly, composed of 120 representatives, it could sincerely be asked whether the Portuguese Government could and should go on representing that people in international forums. Referring to the Agreement of Association that had been signed between Portugal and the European Common Market, the representative said that the exclusion of the so-called overseas provinces of Portugal from that Agreement was significant, as it constituted a resounding defeat for the colonialist thesis of Portugal. She hoped that the Council would give careful consideration to the draft resolutions submitted by the African members of the Council. Stress should be placed on the exceptional importance of the new ideas contained in the drafts.

Her delegation believed that the time had come for Portugal and its friends to show the political realism necessary for leading the peoples of Angola, Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde, and Mozambique to the exercise of their inalienable and imprescriptible right to self-determination and independence without further delay. Should such an initiative fail, then Africa would be duty-bound to draw all the necessary conclusions by implementing the recommendations of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of OAU at its ninth session at Rabat, namely, to call upon all its peoples to mobilize all their material means for the systematic liquidation of Portuguese colonialism and all other bastions of foreign domination on their continent.

585. At the 1677th meeting, on 22 November, the representative of Panama declared that his country's firm anti-colonialist position placed it invariably on the side of peoples struggling for their liberation. Colonialism was an anachronism which it was the duty of the United Nations to eradicate. His delegation felt that the resolution contained in document S/10838/Rev.1, calling upon Portugal to enter into negotiations, was well conceived. However, in the second draft resolution (S/10839), operative paragraph 7 suggested that a special committee of the Security Council should be set up to investigate whether NATO supplies were being directed to the colonial war, which in his delegation's view would be tantamount to setting up a watch-dog committee of very relative effectiveness. It would be more realistic for that committee to be entrusted with the task of promoting contacts and negotiations with Portugal. His delegation would vote in favour of draft resolution S/10838/Rev.1, but would prefer to see S/10839 withdrawn or its submission postponed, since its direct references to members of NATO might well deprive it of support. Nevertheless, if that draft was pressed to the vote, his delegation would vote in favour of it.

586. The representative of India said that the United Nations should declare the Portuguese colonies independent countries and that Portugal had no legal authority over them. The Portuguese presence in those Territories was a form of aggression, and whatever means were adopted for removing that presence were both legitimate and moral. In its willingness to help the liberation movements India would be guided primarily by the wishes of the African countries and, particularly, of OAU. He said that inasmuch as the supply of arms to Portugal helped that Government to deny independence to its Territories, all forms of assistance to Portugal should be suspended. The supply of arms should be controlled and licensed, and investigation should take place in Portugal itself to ensure that arms supplied to it were not exported. Because South Africa and Zimbabwe continued to help Portugal, India had repeatedly suggested that complete and comprehensive sanctions be imposed against South Africa, Zimbabwe and Portugal. Conceding that methods of negotiation and conciliation should be pursued to the utmost, India, nevertheless, could not ignore its own experience with the Portuguese. For 12 or more years India had waited patiently for negotiations with Portugal and had had no response whatsoever. Given that background, his delegation did not see much prospect of a negotiated settlement with Portugal. Moreover, independence should not be the subject of negotiation—only its timing and method of achievement. India would support the draft resolutions in

the hope that the steps the Council was urged to take would bring about some change in Portugal's attitude. Should those measures fail—and the objective indications were that they would—then India would be prepared for much more determined action by the Council.

587. The representative of Japan said that his country entertained profound sympathy for the aspirations of the peoples of the Portuguese Territories. Japan would continue to support the principles of self-determination for those Territories. Furthermore, his delegation welcomed the willingness of the liberation movements to negotiate. It was the position of his Government that all peaceful means of bringing about a settlement should be fully explored. The Foreign Minister of Portugal had stated in the General Assembly that Portugal did not reject the principle of self-determination. That was an encouraging development, and his delegation hoped that a dialogue would soon be started between the Government of Portugal and the African peoples concerned. Japan would therefore vote in favour of the draft resolution contained in document S/10838/Rev.1. However, it had serious doubts whether the draft resolution contained in document S/10839 would help create an atmosphere conducive to the opening of such a dialogue and would therefore abstain from voting on that draft resolution.

588. The representative of Somalia, on behalf of the sponsors, introduced a number of textual changes in the first draft resolution contained in document S/10838/Rev.1 that had been accepted by the sponsors in the course of informal consultations. That acceptance, he explained, did not necessarily signify satisfaction with the changes; rather, it meant that, realizing the political realities and differences of opinion among the members of the Council, the sponsors had no alternative but to agree to the more flexible but unsatisfactory text. He added that they would not press the draft resolution contained in document S/10839 to a vote.

589. The representative of France said that repeated debates concerning the Portuguese Territories testified to the deterioration of the situation and showed also that the General Assembly and the Security Council had not taken the right course. However, it seemed that there was agreement in the Council to set a double objective: to put an end to armed confrontation, on the one hand, and, on the other, to make possible the peaceful and rapid accession of the peoples concerned to self-determination. In the process leading to self-determination, the administering Power had to play the main role, and any proposal that ignored this commonsense finding would be doomed to failure, as the history of decolonization amply confirmed. The Council would be incorrect if it sought to deny Portugal the place and the responsibility to which it was entitled in the process in which the Council was inviting it to participate. Portugal had done civilizing work in those Territories where its flag had flown for several centuries; but times had changed, and the peoples of the Territories had the right to determine their own destiny. That could best be done in friendly co-operation with the peoples currently under its administration. The sponsors of draft resolution contained in document S/10838/Rev.1 had wisely focused their attention on two points: reaffirmation of the inalienable right of the peoples to self-determination and the necessity to put an end to military or repres-

sive operations as soon as possible, so that peaceful methods of negotiation might begin. Acceptance of several changes by the sponsors of that draft resolution would hopefully secure its approbation on a scale that would give it exceptional authority, and he hoped that the appeal for negotiation, which was its essential point, would be heeded. Certain recent statements and letters of the Portuguese authorities seemed to be signs of movement toward constructive discussions. The Secretary-General was requested in the draft to "follow developments in the situation and to report periodically to the Security Council" and might be able to make a positive contribution to the quest for a solution. The French delegation would support draft resolution S/10838/Rev.1 as a whole, though it had serious reservations about certain of its provisions, in particular references to resolutions that France had not voted for or bodies whose establishment it did not approve. He did not consider, moreover, that the current situation was among those referred to in Chapter VII of the Charter and would not be able to support the draft resolution in document S/10839.

590. The representative of the United Kingdom said that throughout the informal consultations his delegation had been at pains to ask continually whether the objective of the Security Council was negotiation or confrontation. Having been assured that the primary purpose was indeed negotiation, he was glad to see that approach reflected in draft resolution S/10838/Rev.1. However, his delegation would have preferred it to be made explicit that the struggle for self-determination should be pursued only by peaceful means and in accordance with the provisions of the Charter, and it considered that the appeal to abandon force in favour of negotiation should have been addressed to all parties concerned, including the liberation movements. It was the view of the United Kingdom that it was for the administering Power, and not the Security Council or the General Assembly, to determine the modalities through which self-determination was to be brought about. His delegation was in full agreement with the principle of steady advance by negotiation that underlay the draft and hoped it would make a positive contribution towards resolving the situation in the Portuguese Territories in Africa. Accordingly, he would vote in favour of the draft resolution in document S/10838/Rev.1, as orally revised. Concerning the accusations that NATO was supporting the Portuguese war effort in Africa, he reiterated that NATO had no responsibility for the defence of Portuguese overseas Territories and that the United Kingdom did not supply arms to Portugal for use in those Territories. As for the draft resolution contained in document S/10839, it could only have led to the prolongation of deadlock and confrontation, and therefore his delegation was pleased that it was not being pressed.

591. The representative of the United States requested that a separate vote be taken on operative paragraph 2 of draft resolution S/10838/Rev.1 in order to enable the United States to express its reservations regarding that paragraph.

592. As the sponsors, under rule 32 of the provisional rules of procedure, objected to a separate vote on operative paragraph 2, the President put the draft resolution as a whole to the vote.

Decision: At the 1677th meeting, on 22 November 1972, the three-Power draft resolution (S/10838/

Rev.1), as orally revised, was adopted unanimously as resolution 322 (1972).

593. Resolution 322 (1972) read as follows:

"The Security Council,

"Having examined the situation in Angola, Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde, and Mozambique,

"Recalling its resolution 312 (1972) of 4 February 1972,

"Also recalling General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, containing the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, and 2918 (XXVII) of 14 November 1972, on the question of Territories under Portuguese administration,

"Taking note of the reports of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

"Considering that the Organization of African Unity recognizes the liberation movements of Angola, Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde and Mozambique as the legitimate representatives of the peoples of those Territories,

"Having heard the statements of the representatives of Member States and of Mr. Marcelino dos Santos, Mr. Gil Fernandes, and Mr. Manuel Jorge, who were invited under rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure to participate in the consideration of the question,

"Conscious of the urgent need to avert further human suffering and material losses by the peoples of Angola, Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde, and Mozambique and to achieve a negotiated solution to the armed confrontation that exists in those Territories,

"1. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the peoples of Angola, Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde, and Mozambique to self-determination and independence, as recognized by the General Assembly in its resolution 1514 (XV), and the legitimacy of the struggle by those peoples to achieve that right;

"2. Calls upon the Government of Portugal to cease forthwith its military operations and all acts of repression against the peoples of Angola, Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde, and Mozambique;

"3. Calls upon the Government of Portugal, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), to enter into negotiations with the parties concerned, with a view to achieving a solution to the armed confrontation that exists in the Territories of Angola, Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde, and Mozambique and permitting the peoples of those Territories to exercise their right to self-determination and independence;

"4. Requests the Secretary-General to follow developments in the situation and to report periodically to the Security Council;

"5. Decides to remain actively seized of this matter."

594. The representative of the United States said that his delegation would have abstained in a separate vote on operative paragraph 2 of the resolution. Sovereignty over Portuguese Territories was vested in the State of Portugal. The United States recognized that Portuguese sovereignty, even while it continually

urged Portugal to permit the exercise of self-determination in those Territories. Furthermore the term "acts of repression" should not be interpreted as referring to specific acts or allegations which had yet to be proved. The United States was opposed to any language that would appear to limit or circumscribe the possibility of negotiation and was pleased to have been able to vote for the resolution, which it hoped would be a constructive step towards the solution of the very difficult problem of the Portuguese Territories. He said that in the exercise of self-determination, independence was one of the options open to the peoples of the area concerned, but it was not the only one. According to the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (General Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV)): "The establishment of a sovereign and independent State... or the emergence into any other political status freely determined by a people constitute modes of implementing the right of self-determination by that people." He said that the United States strongly supported that definition, and in voting for any draft resolution containing the phrase "self-determination and independence" the United States interpretation was that independence was one—but only one—valid option in the total exercise of self-determination.

595. The representative of Italy said that his delegation had voted in favour of the resolution and hoped that it would open the way to the peaceful process of negotiation and ultimately enable the peoples of Angola, Guinea (Bissau) and Mozambique to exercise their inalienable right of self-determination.

596. The representative of the Sudan said that his delegation would be interested to see how far the adopted resolution would be implemented and how far the members of the Council could really move Portugal from its basic position. The wars in the Portuguese Territories were colonial wars, and Portugal should eventually negotiate with the leaders of the liberation movements. With regard to the position of the NATO Powers, his delegation wished to be assured that the financial and economic assistance being given to Portugal was not being exploited to extend those wars in Africa and would like the Council

to call on those Powers to ensure that the weapons and assistance given to Portugal were not finding their way to Africa. Although it was very gratified that the Council had unanimously adopted the resolution, his delegation was not sure that Portugal was going to co-operate. Finally, he said, the resolution should not dissuade or in any way discourage the liberation movements from continuing their struggle for independence. They would be misled if at any time they thought that a resolution would be the end of the problem, and he called upon those movements to accept whatever sacrifice was necessary for the liberation of their countries as the usual price of freedom and liberty.

C. Subsequent communications

597. On 20 November, the representative of Portugal addressed a letter (S/10837) to the President of the Security Council referring to the discussions taking place in the Security Council. The letter said that references to "liberated areas" of the Portuguese Territories were without any basis in truth. Portugal had previously invited the United Nations to verify that fact *in loco* by sending a mission to the Territories, and, once again, it extended an invitation to the Security Council to send a mission to the Territories concerned. The letter also stated that Portugal was always prepared to discuss the pertinent issues concerning its overseas provinces in a constructive spirit with representatives of sovereign African States, and the Prime Minister of Portugal had recently renewed the desire of the Portuguese Government for a constructive dialogue.

598. In a letter dated 24 November (S/10840), the representative of Brazil, referring to remarks made in the Security Council by the representative of Cuba, stated that those remarks were prompted solely by interests of political and ideological propaganda. Concerning the visit made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Brazil to Africa, the letter stated that the Foreign Minister had been welcomed in nine African countries and that his visit had produced various communiqués, joint ministerial declarations and cultural, commercial and technical agreements that belied the Cuban allegations.

Chapter 6

THE CYPRUS QUESTION

A. Communications and reports to the Security Council received between 16 June and 12 December 1972

599. By a letter dated 30 June 1972 (S/10728) addressed to the Secretary-General the representative of Turkey transmitted the text of a message from the Vice-President of Cyprus, Mr. Fazıl Küçük, protesting that recently reported appointments to the Cyprus Council of Ministers by Archbishop Makarios had been made in violation of the Constitution.

600. On 9 August, the Secretary-General issued a further appeal (S/10763) to States Members of the United Nations and members of the specialized agencies for voluntary contributions for the financing of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus

(UNFICYP) for the period from 16 June to 15 December 1972.

601. By a letter dated 20 October (S/10815), the representative of Turkey transmitted to the Secretary-General the text of a letter from the Vice-President of Cyprus, in which Mr. Küçük protested the unilateral appointment of a Greek Cypriot as Minister of Health, an action he declared to be in violation of the Constitution.

602. On 1 December, the Secretary-General submitted his twenty-second report (S/10842) on the United Nations operation in Cyprus covering developments from 27 May to 1 December 1972. Reporting on the state of the intercommunal talks and his good offices, the Secretary-General said that the enlarged

communal talks had continued in Nicosia since 8 June on the basis set forth in his aide-mémoire of 18 October 1971 (S/10401, para. 79). Since resumption of the talks, his Special Representative had been taking part in the exercise of the Secretary-General's good offices. So far, the interlocutors had analysed the problems of constitutional structure and had discussed the question of local government. A certain measure of agreement had been reached, and a new round of talks would be resumed in January 1973. Evaluating the general situation, the Secretary-General said that the reactivation of the talks had been the most important development during the period under review. Although important issues remained unresolved, the impasse that had paralysed the talks had been overcome, and both sides had shown a genuine desire to settle their differences through peaceful negotiations. However, many long-standing problems remained, not all of which were of an intercommunal nature, and until the interlocutors had completed their consideration of all the elements of the Cyprus question, it would be premature to say anything concerning a successful outcome.

603. It had become clear that any prolongation of the existing situation would damage the socio-economic development of Cyprus. Furthermore, the countries contributing contingents or financial support to the peace-keeping operation were increasingly concerned at the delay in finding a solution.

604. During the preceding six months, the situation on the island had remained quiet, although the combat efficiency of both sides had continued to increase, large numbers of young men were still under arms and there had been no progress in the normalization of conditions. Any new development had a bearing on the atmosphere needed for the progress of the local talks, and, therefore, recent reports of imports of weapons were particularly disturbing. UNFICYP had continued to exert its efforts to promote deconfrontation, but its ability to fulfil those functions depended on the co-operation of all concerned and on their acceptance of its advice. The Secretary-General stated his conviction that the intercommunal talks were the best instrument for achieving a satisfactory, lasting and agreed solution based on the concept of an independent, sovereign and unitary State with adequate participation by the two communities. To make such a solution possible, however, two conditions would have to be met. First, both sides would have to be ready to make mutual concessions, and, second, the situation must remain quiet, with intercommunal tension kept to a minimum while the talks were pursued. In view of those considerations, the Secretary-General recommended that the mandate of UNFICYP be extended until 15 June 1973. He added that, if there were a change in the situation during that period, he would make suitable recommendations to the Council. The Secretary-General said that the financial problem facing the Force had not yet been settled but that he would continue his efforts, working with all Members in order to put the financing of UNFICYP on a sound basis. He urged Governments to provide the support necessary to resolve the problem.

B. Consideration at the 1683rd meeting (12 December 1972)

605. At the 1683rd meeting, on 12 December, the report of the Secretary-General (S/10842) was included in the agenda. The representatives of Cyprus,

Turkey and Greece were invited, at their request, to participate in the discussion without the right to vote.

606. The President of the Council announced that as a result of prior consultations, agreement had been reached on the text of the following draft resolution (S/10847):

"The Security Council,

"Noting from the report of the Secretary-General of 1 December 1972 that in the present circumstances the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus is still needed if peace is to be maintained in the island,

"Noting that the Government of Cyprus has agreed that in view of the prevailing conditions in the island it is necessary to continue the Force beyond 15 December 1972,

"Noting also from the report the conditions prevailing in the island,

"1. Reaffirms its resolutions 186 (1964) of 4 March, 187 (1964) of 13 March, 192 (1964) of 20 June, 193 (1964) of 9 August, 194 (1964) of 25 September and 198 (1964) of 18 December, 1964, 201 (1965) of 19 March, 206 (1965) of 15 June, 207 (1965) of 10 August and 219 (1965) of 17 December 1965, 220 (1966) of 16 March, 222 (1966) of 16 June and 231 (1966) of 15 December 1966, 238 (1967) of 19 June and 244 (1967) of 22 December 1967, 247 (1968) of 18 March, 254 (1968) of 18 June and 261 (1968) of 10 December 1968, 266 (1969) of 10 June and 274 (1969) of 11 December 1969, 281 (1970) of 9 June and 291 (1970) of 10 December 1970, 293 (1971) of 26 May and 305 (1971) of 13 December 1971 and 315 (1972) of 15 June 1972, and the consensus expressed by the President at the 1143rd meeting on 11 August 1964 and at the 1383rd meeting on 25 November 1967;

"2. Urges the parties concerned to act with the utmost restraint and to continue and accelerate determined co-operative efforts to achieve the objectives of the Security Council, by availing themselves in a constructive manner of the present auspicious climate and opportunities;

"3. Extends once more the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force, established under Security Council resolution 186 (1964) for a further period ending 15 June 1973, in the expectation that by then sufficient progress towards a final solution will make possible a withdrawal or substantial reduction of the Force."

Decision: *At the 1683rd meeting, on 12 December 1972, the Security Council adopted the draft resolution (S/10847) by 14 votes to none, with 1 abstention (China), as resolution 324 (1972).*

607. In a statement after the voting, the representative of Cyprus said that the Council was meeting at the time when the intercommunal talks had shown signs of limited progress. It was hoped that through mutual understanding and accommodation, an agreement would be reached on a just and workable constitutional structure that could lead to a viable State on the agreed basis of an independent, sovereign and unitary Cyprus. His Government would do all in its power to promote further co-operation in order to achieve a successful conclusion of the talks. The problems arising from the lack of deconfrontation and

normalization, however, had tended to maintain a climate of mistrust and hostility. For its part, his Government had complied with the appeals of the Secretary-General by withdrawing military posts and checkpoints, thus allowing freedom of movement for all Turkish Cypriots in areas under its control. The current climate, he felt, was appropriate for a measure of positive response to the call of the Secretary-General for deconfrontation and normalization. He considered that the essential element for normalization existed in the will of people who wanted conciliation and a solution of their problems. Therefore, a move by both sides at the current juncture would represent a constructive step towards enhancing the prospects of talks.

608. The representative of Turkey said that his delegation was encouraged by the current climate of the talks in their new form and the quiet prevailing on the island. Referring to the statement in the report of the Secretary-General that there had been little progress towards the return of normal conditions, he stressed that the Turkish community continued to live under conditions of hardship and deprivation. So long as the current circumstances persisted, it was hard to visualize the realization of deconfrontation before a climate of mutual confidence had been created. The Turkish Cypriot leadership, therefore, held the view that a general deconfrontation under existing conditions would endanger the community's security. He concurred with the observations by the Secretary-General on the usefulness of the reactivation of the intercommunal talks, which he pointed out were exploratory in their nature and limited to the internal and constitutional problems of Cyprus. That understanding had been reflected in the Secretary-General's aide-mémoire of 18 May 1972. For that reason, his delegation was not able to agree with the statement in the Secretary-General's report that the interlocutors in the reactivated talks would discuss all the elements of the Cyprus problem, although it hoped the talks would bring about an agreed formula on constitutional matters, thus paving the way for a permanent solution. Noting that the question of Cyprus had become a highly sensitive and complex problem, he expressed regret that the report appeared to present a kind of "prescription" for a final settlement. He felt that a prudent approach on the basis of previous reports would have been more in accordance with the current situation.

609. The representative of Greece said that UNFICYP had been a successful United Nations enterprise, inasmuch as it had been able to prevent the recurrence of fighting. However, Greece shared the view that the Force should not become a permanent element of the Cyprus scene. Regarding the current situation, he said that both sides had approached their difficulties in a reasonable manner and showed a genuine desire to settle their differences by negotiations. He said that as the setting up of a workable state machinery was being explored in the talks, his delegation hoped the Council would not dwell on constitutional matters but would give further encouragement to the parties in order to assist them in concluding their task. Greece favoured steps leading to an increase in co-operation and confidence between the two communities. Because it supported the Secretary-General's view that an increase in military capability would augment the trend to escalation, Greece was opposed to any illegal importation of arms into the island.

610. The representative of the United Kingdom said that his delegation had, in view of the reactivation

of the intercommunal talks, voted for the resolution with cautious optimism. He expressed appreciation of the efforts of the Secretary-General that had led to the resumption of those talks. It was up to the two direct participants to reach agreement and compromises where necessary. His delegation appealed to the parties to show willingness to make concessions. It was seriously concerned at the continuing financial deficit of the UNFICYP operations. Despite the rise in costs, his Government had decided, in addition to its previous contribution, to absorb the increased costs of the British contingent and of British logistic support to other contingents.

611. The representative of Belgium said that UNFICYP was a decisive factor in stability and the maintenance of public order. Nevertheless, the situation remained precarious. He paid tribute to the Secretary-General and his Special Representative, as well as the constitutional experts participating in the talks, pointing out that progress had been achieved on questions of principle and expressing the hope that solution would be reached on other important problems. He expressed regret that the two communities appeared to be getting further apart instead of narrowing their differences and, in that respect, shared the view of the Secretary-General that talks should lead to a solution based on the concept of an independent State where both communities would participate properly. His delegation had confidence in the political realism and the spirit of conciliation of the Turkish and Greek Governments. Inasmuch as the acquisition of new arms by parties tended to increase the instability, he appealed to all States to refrain from sending weapons to Cyprus. His Government regretted that only two permanent members of the Council had been making contributions, in view of the fact that the Charter conferred particular responsibility on the permanent members in the field of the maintenance of peace and security.

612. The representative of Argentina said that the alternative to the extension of the mandate of the Force would have been an armed confrontation, which justified the decision to continue the negotiations in order to achieve peace. His delegation was pleased that the two communities had co-operated in regard to the development projects sponsored by the United Nations and felt that the Organization should carry out further actions that could lay the basis for understanding. He hoped that the talks would continue as scheduled.

613. The representative of Somalia said that the slow progress was due to the lack of a spirit of accommodation and mutual acceptance of each other's legitimate claims by the parties. That attitude could be seen in every area of life in Cyprus and, with passing of time, fear and suspicion grew deeper. He paid tribute to the Secretary-General for his role in the resumption of the talks and said that their usefulness had been recognized by the parties. Regarding the financial situation, he said that his Government, though limited in financial resources, had made a modest contribution, and he expressed the hope that the Secretary-General's efforts to resolve the difficulties would be successful.

614. The representative of Japan said that his delegation had supported the seemingly indefinite perpetuation of UNFICYP with some reservation. In spite of some positive signs, the intercommunal tension still persisted, and there had been no progress in the matter of deconfrontation. The situation necessitated the continued presence of United Nations forces in Cyprus.

On the other hand, the most significant development had been the resumption of the intercommunal talks. Although it was too early to forecast any results, he hoped, nevertheless, that the talks would prove fruitful, thus allowing a substantial reduction of UNFICYP. For its part, Japan would continue to support UNFICYP by further voluntary contributions and other means.

615. The representative of Yugoslavia said that since the last report there had been two developments that might lead to a final settlement. One was the absence of any major new crisis; the other was the resumption of the talks, which, since 8 June, had continued without interruption in a businesslike atmosphere. However, in spite of the gains, there had been no progress in normalization and deconfrontation. It was dangerous to let the situation stagnate further, and therefore it was necessary to support measures aimed at promoting normalization and to avoid actions that might jeopardize the situation. He reaffirmed Yugoslavia's support for a sovereign, independent Cyprus and for its unity and territorial integrity. He stressed also its right to non-interference in its internal affairs. He felt that it would be anachronistic to allow the situation to remain unchanged in Cyprus when more thorny problems had been tackled with success.

616. The representative of the United States said that his delegation approached the issue with guarded optimism, as serious problems were yet to be resolved; none the less, the possibilities for progress seemed better, inasmuch as the negotiations presented the means for settling the issues. The United States was encouraged that the situation had remained calm during the past period but regretted that there had been little progress in the matter of normalization, particularly the fact that the trend towards separate development had continued. Although progress had been made in the intercommunal talks, serious issues remained which the United States hoped would be settled with the same sense of co-operation and goodwill that had been displayed so far. Turning to the financial situation, he said that sufficient support had not been forthcoming from the Members of the Organization. The deficit amounted to \$13,600,000 and would be likely to increase by about \$3 million yearly. The Secretary-General had tried to put UNFICYP on a sound financial basis, but unless Member States co-operated with those efforts, his delegation did not see how the Force could be maintained at the current level. The United States was also concerned about the further arms flow to Cyprus, which tended to increase instability on the island. It hoped, therefore, that all States would prevent future arms supplies and encourage the parties to reach a just settlement. The United States had recently tendered a special contribution of \$8 million, and urged others to come forward generously in an effort to erase what was an exorbitant deficit.

617. The representative of the Sudan said that, although the talks had not led to concrete results, his delegation was satisfied that the impasse had been broken. However, it was concerned over continuing instability, which could produce a new deterioration in the situation. It hoped, therefore, that the parties would exert more efforts in order to achieve a peaceful settlement, so that Cyprus would finally emerge as a sovereign, non-aligned State playing an important role in the area.

618. The representative of France noted that the situation had remained just as disquieting as in the past. There had been no relaxation of tension. Moreover, the combat efficiency of both sides had been reinforced, and the trend towards separatism had also continued. Nevertheless, UNFICYP had succeeded in preserving the *status quo* between the two communities. The talks had continued in their new form, which had proved to be positive, and the solution of problems of local administration seemed to be on the right course. He pointed out that the role of UNFICYP was to prevent anything that might engender suspicion and intransigence: its role justified extending its mandate. It was up to the parties, however, to seek a compromise, and they must accordingly work together for a settlement.

619. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics stressed that the Cyprus question should be settled by peaceful means without outside interference by the Cypriots themselves. The USSR opposed any attempts to infringe the sovereignty of Cyprus and felt that foreign troops and military bases should be withdrawn from its territory. Inasmuch as Cyprus was situated near Europe, it was natural that the situation there should have impact on Cyprus. He hoped that the relaxation of tension in Europe would make its benign effect felt on the island. Noting that the resumption of the talks was a positive step, he expressed hope that the negotiations would soon be brought to a successful conclusion. In that respect, he expressed satisfaction about the role of the Secretary-General, whose efforts had contributed to the reopening of the talks. Regarding status of the Force, he said that, in current international conditions, the eight-year stay of UNFICYP could not be described as normal. If such operations were going to last so long, then doubts would arise as to the advisability of carrying them out. Therefore, the USSR was of the opinion that UNFICYP could not be continued endlessly. His delegation had voted in favour of the extension of the stationing of United Nations troops in Cyprus on the assumption that its renewal was effected in full accord with the provisions of the Council's resolution of 4 March 1964 and subsequent decisions of the Council on the Cyprus question, and, in particular, that the present functions of those troops and the voluntary arrangements for financing them would be maintained.

620. The representative of Italy said that his delegation agreed with the assessment of the situation by the Secretary-General. He felt that the reactivated talks represented the first step forward, inasmuch as they could clarify the atmosphere and create a better climate in which it would be easier to reach a final solution. His delegation was therefore encouraged that both sides had shown a genuine desire to settle their differences through negotiations. Regarding the role of UNFICYP, he said that it was still essential to keep the Force on the island. However, the Force was already in its ninth year of existence, and its indefinite prolongation would, in reality, amount to a recognition of its inability to achieve its purposes. His Government felt that peace-keeping operations must discharge two tasks: prevent a situation from deteriorating and bring about a peaceful solution. The United Nations provided the parties with a good basis for agreement, but it could not take their place and fulfil their responsibilities. He said that Italy would continue to make a voluntary contribution to the financing of the United Nations peace-keeping operation.

621. The representative of Panama said that the resumption of the intercommunal talks had been a positive element in the stabilization of the situation. His delegation considered that Cyprus should be a united nation, where the rights of minorities were guaranteed. Panama was grateful for the efforts of the Secretary-General and considered that UNFICYP had played a positive role.

622. The representative of Guinea was pleased that the military situation had remained calm, which indicated the decisive role of the United Nations. She said that the resumption of the intercommunal talks had been an important event, but she found it regrettable that UNFICYP had not succeeded in promoting a return to normal conditions and the freedom of movement of civilians. She hoped that Cyprus would soon be able to achieve a settlement.

623. The President, speaking as the representative of India, said that, although a number of important issues remained to be solved, progress had already been achieved in the reactivated communal talks, and existing difficulties were being approached by the parties in a resolute manner. He hoped that the spirit of co-operation by the parties would grow more quickly. In the atmosphere of renewed hope, it was essential for the parties to concentrate their efforts on the removal of tensions and to ensure that nothing was done that might exacerbate the atmosphere both in and around the island. In that context, he noted that the Government of Cyprus had expressed its readiness to implement reciprocal deconfrontation.

624. The representative of Cyprus, speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that he did not believe that the representative of Turkey could have objected to the concept of a unitary State, inasmuch as during the talks that had progressed the parties had had their goal clearly in mind. He added that Cyprus could solve its problem only in unity, not in division and strife. Regarding the question of displaced persons, he said that his Government had encouraged the return of Turkish Cypriots by building and repairing houses for them.

625. The representative of Turkey, also exercising his right of reply, said that it was better to avoid discussion of constitutional problems, inasmuch as such points were being debated in the intercommunal talks. Turning to the problems of displaced Turkish Cypriots, he said that, so long as the lack of confidence in the other side remained, the community would prefer to remain together and feel safer in its present misery.

C. Communications and reports to the Security Council received between 12 December 1972 and 15 June 1973

626. On 29 January, the Secretary-General submitted an addendum to his report (S/5634/Add.1) on the organization and operation of UNFICYP, in which he informed the Security Council about the ratification by the Government of Cyprus on 14 December 1972 of amendments to the agreement of 31 March 1964 concerning the status of UNFICYP.

627. On 30 January 1973, the Secretary-General issued an appeal (S/10879) to States Members of the United Nations and members of the specialized agencies for voluntary contributions for the financing of UNFICYP for a further period ending 15 June 1973. In his appeal, the Secretary-General said that his re-

sponsibility in regard to UNFICYP could be discharged only if Governments were ready to provide the necessary support for the Force.

628. By a letter dated 2 March (S/10894) addressed to the Secretary-General, the representative of Turkey transmitted a letter from the Vice-President of Cyprus, in which Mr. Küçük communicated the news of the election of Mr. Rauf R. Denktash as Vice-President of the Republic of Cyprus, effective 28 February 1973.

629. On 31 May, the Secretary-General submitted to the Security Council his twenty-third report (S/10940) on the United Nations operation in Cyprus for the period from 2 December 1972 to 31 May 1973. In his report, the Secretary-General said that the parties concerned were making a serious effort to agree through the intercommunal talks on a constitutional framework that would provide for adequate participation in government of the two communities. However, it had so far not been possible to establish a basis for such an accord. He added that the atmosphere of calm that was necessary for the promotion of such an agreement had not been maintained, especially with the Greek Cypriot community. Understandably, such developments had had an adverse impact on the talks.

630. Commenting on other aspects of the situation, the Secretary-General said that little progress had been achieved in the area of military deconfrontation, despite the fact that the Government was ready to accept partial deconfrontation, provided that it would not give advantages to the other side. UNFICYP would take up that approach with the Turkish Cypriot leadership, and it was also ready to negotiate limited agreements to that end to provide a military presence to ensure the security of both sides.

631. In the field of return to normal conditions, progress had also been noticeably slow. The public services rendered to the Turkish community remained inadequate. Apparently, the Government's attitude regarding that matter was linked to the attitude of the Turkish Cypriot leadership concerning such matters as the maintenance of the military *status quo* and freedom of movement.

632. Regarding the economic situation, the Secretary-General said that rapid economic development was among the more encouraging features of the current situation in Cyprus. Both communities were benefiting from the trend, which was an important element pointing the way towards progress rather than a resumption of intercommunal strife.

633. Summing up the situation, the Secretary-General stressed anew the urgency of achieving the settlement of the problem through the reactivated intercommunal talks. In view of the prevailing circumstances, he recommended that the mandate of the Force be extended until 15 December 1973.

634. Turning to the financial situation of UNFICYP, he said that it continued to be precarious, pointing out that the Governments providing contingents, as well as those that made voluntary contributions, were becoming increasingly uneasy at the delay in reaching a settlement. In that respect, the Secretary-General noted that for some time his office had been studying ways and means of reducing the United Nations commitment in terms of both finance and manpower. He intended to make recommendations in that regard in his next report to the Council, but the feasibility of any such move would depend on the progress of the talks.

D. Consideration at the 1727th and 1728th meetings (15 June 1973)

635. At the 1727th meeting, on 15 June, the report of the Secretary-General (S/10940) was included in the agenda. The representatives of Cyprus, Turkey and Greece were invited, at their request, to participate in the debate without the right to vote.

636. The President of the Council announced that, as a result of consultations, an agreement had been reached on the text of the following draft resolution (S/10946):

"The Security Council,

"Noting from the report of the Secretary-General of 31 May 1973 (S/10940) that in the present circumstances the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus is still needed if peace is to be maintained in the island,

"Noting that the Government of Cyprus has agreed that in view of the prevailing conditions in the island it is necessary to continue the Force beyond 15 June 1973,

"Noting also from the report the conditions prevailing in the island,

"1. Reaffirms its resolutions 186 (1964) of 4 March, 187 (1964) of 13 March, 192 (1964) of 20 June, 193 (1964) of 9 August, 194 (1964) of 25 September and 198 (1964) of 18 December 1964, 201 (1965) of 19 March, 206 (1965) of 15 June, 207 (1965) of 10 August and 219 (1965) of 17 December 1965, 220 (1966) of 16 March, 222 (1966) of 16 June and 231 (1966) of 15 December 1966, 238 (1967) of 19 June and 244 (1967) of 22 December 1967, 247 (1968) of 18 March, 254 (1968) of 18 June and 261 (1968) of 10 December 1968, 266 (1969) of 10 June and 274 (1969) of 11 December 1969, 281 (1970) of 9 June and 291 (1970) of 10 December 1970, 293 (1971) of 26 May and 305 (1971) of 13 December 1971 and 315 (1972) of 15 June and 324 (1972) of 12 December 1972, and the consensus expressed by the President at the 1143rd meeting on 11 August 1964 and at the 1383rd meeting on 25 November 1967;

"2. Urges the parties concerned to act with the utmost restraint and to continue and accelerate determined co-operative efforts to achieve the objectives of the Security Council by availing themselves in a constructive manner of the present auspicious climate and opportunities;

"3. Extends once more the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force, established under Security Council resolution 186 (1964), for a further period ending 15 December 1973, in the expectation that by then sufficient progress towards a final solution will make possible a withdrawal or substantial reduction of the Force."

Decision: *At the 1727th meeting, on 15 June 1973, the Security Council adopted the draft resolution (S/10946) by 14 votes to none, with 1 abstention (China), as resolution 334 (1973).*

637. In a statement after the voting, the representative of Cyprus said that the participation of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the two constitutional experts in the intercommunal talks had made a constructive contribution to the atmosphere of talks. Cyprus would do all in its means to promote

that spirit. Regarding the issues involved in the talks, he said that the negotiations were conducted within the constitutional framework of a unitary State. The main characteristic of that premise was that the institutions of local government functioned under the control of the State. As the form of the constitutional structure was being discussed in the local talks, it could not be fully discussed in the Council. However, what was of importance in the intercommunal talks was that the resulting constitutional structure was workable. Turning to the matter of deconfrontation and normalization, he stressed that his Government was co-operating in that regard with UNFICYP and was willing to accept general, as well as partial, deconfrontation, for such a step would help generate confidence between the two sides. His delegation considered the restoration of full freedom of movement as the fundamental premise from which other aspects of normalization would eventually flow. Therefore, it would seem that at least a phased restoration of freedom of movement might be started in the same way as had been suggested by UNFICYP regarding deconfrontation. In spite of the common desire of the people for increased co-operation in economic matters, there had been no effective advance in that field because of a policy of separatism of the other side. However, he hoped that normalization would be achieved through conciliation of the interests of both sides, which, in its turn, would bring about a new spirit in the talks aimed at overcoming differences and difficulties.

638. The representative of Turkey said that his delegation was happy to note that the intercommunal relations had remained calm, for it felt that the prevalence of such an atmosphere was an essential requisite for the process of building confidence. Though most of the recent incidents had occurred in the Greek Cypriot community, he was concerned by the possible negative consequences of those incidents, particularly when they were coupled with statements by high Greek Cypriots professing an objective for the future of the island other than its permanent independence. Such developments were bound to have a negative impact on intercommunal trust and thus on the enlarged talks. Regarding the process of normalization, he said that after almost a decade the Turkish Cypriot community continued to live in conditions of deprivation and discrimination. Furthermore, it was denied its share in the benefits of the current economic development, as well as in the international assistance extended to Cyprus. Turning to the matter of the intercommunal talks, he said that Turkey had given them its full support. His Government was determined to promote a permanent peaceful solution that would safeguard the rights of both communities and the other parties concerned. Turkey would continue to work for changing Cyprus from an island of intercommunal strife into a model of a bicomunal State where both communities would live as equal partners.

639. The representative of Greece said that his delegation shared the Secretary-General's conclusion that no substantial progress had been made towards the return to normal conditions. It was encouraging, however, to note that the parties concerned had accepted the enlarged talks as the best means for promoting a settlement of the Cyprus problem, which was unique in its complexity and therefore required patience and faith to reach a viable solution. His Government deplored all acts of violence and felt that it was in everybody's interest to refrain from any action that could stir up

passions and thus endanger the prospects for a settlement. Regarding the situation of UNFICYP, he hoped that more Members of the United Nations would volunteer their support, since the Force represented a strong deterrent against the recurrence of intercommunal violence. In that respect, he noted that the original Security Council resolutions had not linked the duration of the stationing of the Force in Cyprus to the length or even existence of the intercommunal talks. Greece therefore hoped that UNFICYP would stay on the island as long as needed and that its ability would not be impaired by premature reduction of its size.

640. The representative of the United States said that his delegation, in the light of events in Cyprus since the Council's last meeting, continued to be cautiously optimistic, as the outlook for substantive progress might be brighter than ever before. He urged all sides to take advantage of the promising atmosphere. He noted that the current situation was also characterized by a closer identity of views among the neighbouring Powers, stressing that the constructive attitudes of Greece, Turkey and Cyprus deserved the support of the Council. Regarding the financial situation and the possible reorganization of UNFICYP, he said that his Government had sought, in consultation with the Secretary-General and other contributors, to eliminate the rising deficit. However, the results had been disappointing. In the absence of a positive response to appeals by the Secretary-General, his delegation did not see how the present size and operations of UNFICYP could be maintained much longer. The United States therefore supported the intention of the Secretary-General to make a study of ways and means to reduce the United Nations commitment in terms of finances and manpower without jeopardizing its effectiveness. His delegation felt that a study should analyse what kind of adjustments in forces or operating procedures could be made to eliminate the annual deficit. It also hoped that the Secretary-General would examine the creation of alternative force models. The United States believed that it was time for a detailed review of the structure, operations and financing of UNFICYP, which the Secretary-General intended to undertake prior to the December meeting. It also hoped that concurrently the Secretary-General and his staff would examine the creation of alternative force models—a thorough review, for example, of models based on hypothetical reductions in the neighborhood of 25 per cent, 50 per cent and 75 per cent of UNFICYP's current strength. The study might address alternative restructurings of such a Force to make it more mobile, to redefine its operating procedures and to assure adequate logistic support of each of those hypothetical levels within the terms of its current mandate.

641. The representative of the United Kingdom said that his delegation had voted for the extension of the mandate of the Force in a spirit of guarded optimism. Hopes were pinned on substantial agreement in the intercommunal talks. The role of UNFICYP continued to be important in maintaining calm. It was for that reason that his Government had supported the extension of the mandate and pledged to maintain its troop contingent and logistic support. In view of the serious financial situation, the United Kingdom was willing to absorb the increase in the cost of the British contingent and the logistic support provided by Britain. It hoped that other contributors would adopt the same course and that there would be a more generous response to the appeal of the Secretary-General. His delegation

welcomed the Secretary-General's intention to achieve economies without jeopardizing the effectiveness of UNFICYP. It also supported the proposals by the Secretary-General for reducing tension and generating confidence on the island: confrontation hindered progress in the talks and constituted a heavy commitment on UNFICYP resources.

642. The representative of Austria said that his delegation was convinced that the talks were the most promising way to settle the problem. However, in spite of their encouraging pace, the situation remained unstable, and it was unlikely that it would change before the fundamental problems were solved. Austria was interested in a settlement, for it had contributed a considerable military and police contingent to UNFICYP, as well as a field hospital. He was disappointed over the growing deficit and the fact that the appeals by the Secretary-General for contributions had not been heeded by Member States. In that respect, his delegation was pleased to learn that studies were under way to reduce the financial commitment.

643. The representative of Yugoslavia said that a firm commitment to an independent and non-aligned Cyprus and its territorial integrity had remained the *sine qua non* of any progress on the island. Though the recent period had passed without the outbreak of any major hostilities, little progress had been achieved towards military deconfrontation and a return to normal conditions. Yugoslavia supported a partial deconfrontation as a step leading to a more general one and urged both sides to create a right atmosphere for the conduct of such negotiations. Regarding the role of UNFICYP, he said that it was essential in maintaining peace in Cyprus, and it was because of that function of the Force that Yugoslavia, in accordance with the appeals by the Secretary-General, had decided to make a contribution of \$20,000. However, his delegation trusted that the Secretary-General would be able to reduce the commitment of the Organization in terms of both finance and manpower, since it hoped that the two communities would soon be in a position to reach a final agreement.

644. The representative of France said that the roles of the Secretary-General and his Special Representative and the assistance of the constitutional experts had all been conducive to the continuance of the talks between the two communities; in the final analysis, however, it was up to the parties to come to an agreement and to decide on its provisions. Because the success of the talks was dependent on the mutual confidence of the parties, external conditions must be met, including calm and the absence of confrontation. The purpose of the presence of UNFICYP had been to secure those conditions; it had carried out that mission with success, which might have contributed to making the need for a settlement less obvious over the years. The fragile equilibrium between the parties continued none the less to remain unchanged. However, the talks were currently under way, and the quest for stable institutions was in progress. His delegation looked forward to a study by the Secretary-General on ways of reducing the Force, for the time had come for the parties to take into consideration the prospect for its progressive and inevitable withdrawal.

645. The representative of Australia said that his Government had been somewhat uneasy at the duration of the United Nations commitment in Cyprus and at the delay in reaching the settlement, and it would not

want the continued presence of UNFICYP to come to be taken for granted. Accordingly, Australia noted with satisfaction the Secretary-General's intention to make appropriate recommendations in the direction of economy in his next report. In the meantime, his delegation accepted the Secretary-General's judgement that the presence of the Force was essential, and Australia, accordingly, would continue to provide its contingent and financial contribution to UNFICYP. His delegation was disappointed, however, by the continuing instability in Cyprus and by the lack of progress in the matter of deconfrontation. In the light of the continuing lack of confidence, the hope for progress lay in the intercommunal talks. Australia therefore urged the parties to increase their efforts to reach agreement on a constitutional settlement that would take account of the needs of all Cypriots.

646. The representative of Kenya said that his delegation felt that it was important for both communities to restore mutual confidence in order to resolve their differences. It believed that a common national identity could be built within the framework of an independent, unitary State. With mutual trust, the fears voiced by the Turkish Cypriots regarding the concept of a unitary State need not arise. However, before that was possible, both communities must do all within their power to end the artificial separation prevailing on the island. The restoration of freedom of movement and the realization of gradual island-wide military deconfrontation would be desirable steps leading to the creation of a suitable atmosphere for the solution of main issues.

647. At the 1728th meeting, on the same day, the representative of Indonesia said that his delegation was satisfied that a major confrontation had been avoided during the past period and that the parties had showed self-control and a desire for increased co-operation. Despite those encouraging features, Indonesia realized that the current situation was not prone to produce an instant solution and that more co-operation would be needed to achieve a settlement. Indonesia was also concerned that the parties had not been able to agree on a constitutional framework, but it hoped that through continuation of the talks both sides would find a permanent solution enabling the people of Cyprus to live in peace, unity and harmony.

648. The representative of India said that, although the Force had maintained calm in Cyprus, there had been a growing feeling that the United Nations presence for so many years might not have contributed to the speed with which the Council wanted the talks between the parties to proceed. In connexion with the basic conditions of a settlement, his delegation considered that Cyprus should remain a sovereign independent and unitary State, where the fundamental rights of all citizens were guaranteed, and that it continue to be a non-aligned and separate entity. Turning to the immediate problems, he said that, in order to proceed with normalization, the parties should reduce, if not altogether eliminate, the military confrontation and restore freedom of movement for the civilian population. His delegation was ready to support the removal of all obstacles that stood in the way of normalization.

649. The representative of the Sudan said that his delegation had no doubt that, with the constructive approach on the part of both that had been evidenced so far, the two parties would undertake the patient

work needed to bring the talks to a satisfactory conclusion. Although the Sudan was aware that the search for a solution was not an easy task and that despite some signs of progress, the situation was still unstable, He hoped that through peaceful means Cyprus would emerge into a united independent and non-aligned State.

650. The representative of Guinea said that, although the situation had remained calm during the period under review, several important problems were still outstanding, especially in the field of normalization, and one was inclined to believe that the two communities, despite the resumption of the talks, were diverging and, in fact, moving further apart. Guinea deplored the gulf that divided the two populations and hoped the talks would go forward in a spirit of conciliation and mutual compromise with a will to achieve a final settlement.

651. The representative of Panama said that his delegation considered that the solution of the problem should be sought with a view to Cyprus becoming a united, indivisible land where the rights of minorities were recognized and guaranteed. Panama hoped that the threat of a military confrontation would be removed and that freedom of movement would be guaranteed for the whole population, so that Cypriots could be reconciled and live in peace.

652. The representative of Peru said that, although there was a more propitious atmosphere, the situation was far from being satisfactory. It was also evident that the maintenance of the *status quo* was not a sufficient guarantee for peace and security. Suspicion and fear continued between both communities, and there were economic differences aggravating tension. The tendency towards separate economic development was persistent. It was obvious that, unless that situation was corrected, any effort at political stability would be in vain. Noting that there had been a constructive turn in the intercommunal talks, he expressed hope that they would lead to a satisfactory conclusion.

653. The President, speaking as the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, said that the problem must be settled by peaceful means in the interest of easing tension in the region. He reaffirmed the position of the USSR that a settlement must be based on respect for the freedom, independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus. His delegation was convinced that an early return to normality in Cyprus would lead to a further enhancement of the authority of the Republic and enable it to play an important role in stabilizing the situation in the eastern Mediterranean. Moreover, it continued to hold that, in order to ensure the independence of Cyprus, all foreign troops must be withdrawn and foreign bases situated in its territory removed. The USSR took a positive view of the Secretary-General's report, in particular, the information concerning the intercommunal talks, and it agreed that the resumption of the talks was the best way of reaching an agreed solution. It hoped that as a result of those talks it might be possible to overcome the existing difficulties and to bring those negotiations to a positive end. Regarding the extension of the mandate of the Force and the voluntary procedure for its financing, he said that the USSR had not objected to the draft resolution on the assumption that the extension of the stationing of United Nations troops in Cyprus was effected in full accord with the provisions of the

Council's resolution of 4 March 1964 and subsequent decisions of the Council on the Cyprus question, the present functions of those troops and the voluntary arrangements for financing them being maintained.

654. The representative of Cyprus, speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that Cyprus wanted to have a solution that was compatible with the constitutional norms and territorial realities of the situation, so that it could be workable. He reaffirmed that Cyprus wanted equality of rights of citizenship and expressed

hope that the talks would succeed in a spirit of co-operation and understanding.

655. The representative of Turkey, speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that Turkey's main objective regarding Cyprus was to secure its permanent independence. He was pleased to note that that position coincided with that of the highest authorities in Cyprus. He hoped that the people of Cyprus, whose duty was to end the unfortunate situation, would soon achieve success.

Chapter 7

COMPLAINT BY ZAMBIA

A. Communications to the Security Council and request for a meeting

656. In a letter dated 24 January 1973 addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/10865), the representative of Zambia requested an urgent meeting of the Council to consider acts of aggression against his country committed by the illegal régime of Southern Rhodesia, which had closed their common border and imposed an economic blockade against Zambia on 9 January. Since that date the illegal régime had committed numerous acts of subversion and sabotage against Zambia and deployed its troops, together with 4,000 from South Africa, along the border.

657. Zambia's request for a meeting was supported by Guinea, Kenya, the Sudan and Yugoslavia, which addressed letters dated 23 and 26 January to the President of the Council (S/10866 and S/10869) calling for the examination of the explosive situation on the Zambian border.

658. In a letter dated 26 January addressed to the President of the Council (S/10870), the representative of South Africa transmitted a message from the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs drawing attention to a statement by his Prime Minister regarding the complaint by Zambia. The statement emphasized South Africa's non-interference in the domestic affairs of other countries and its rejection of boycotts and again rejected the charge that South African troops had been deployed along the border between Zambia and Southern Rhodesia.

659. In a letter dated 29 January addressed to the Secretary-General (S/10877), the representative of Zambia transmitted a message from the President of Zambia stating that tension had continued to rise as more people were killed by land mines on Zambian soil by forces of the Smith régime and South Africa. The Zambian President urged the Council to put an end to the critical situation and to ensure the withdrawal of South African troops.

B. Consideration at the 1687th to 1691st meetings (29 January-2 February 1973)

660. At its 1687th meeting, on 29 January, the Security Council decided to include the item in its agenda and considered it in five meetings held between 29 January and 2 February. In the course of the discussion, the representatives of Algeria, Cameroon, Chile, Cuba, Egypt, Ghana, Guyana, Morocco, Senegal,

Somalia, the United Republic of Tanzania, Zaire and Zambia were invited, at their request, to participate in the discussion without the right to vote.

661. Opening the discussion, the representative of Zambia said that the closure by the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia of its border with Zambia on 9 January was an act of aggression aimed at inflicting serious damage to Zambia's economy in order to stop Zambia's support of the liberation movement of the people of Zimbabwe. The current crisis had been exacerbated by the collusion of the Salisbury and Pretoria régimes. South African troops had moved into Southern Rhodesia in 1967 and remained there as an occupation force. Both régimes had repeatedly carried out military incursions into Zambia. He described a series of nine incidents perpetrated in January 1973, that had involved border crossings, firing against villagers and the laying of mines inside Zambia, all of which had caused a number of deaths and injuries. He stated that the real purpose of the moves taken by South Africa and the Smith régime was to stem the nationalist feeling that was sweeping through the oppressed countries of southern Africa. Freedom fighters had achieved important victories in Rhodesia, and even the Smith régime had had to admit that the liberation movement was receiving support from the masses. He did not doubt that, if the current trend continued, Southern Rhodesia would undoubtedly contemplate the bombing of Zambia. The acts of aggression by Southern Rhodesia and its threat to increase its use of force represented a major escalation of the conflict in southern Africa. Although the United Kingdom was the sole legal authority in Southern Rhodesia, it had refused to assume its responsibility. Referring to the mandatory sanctions imposed by the Council against Southern Rhodesia, he said that his Government had decided to establish permanent alternative routes for its trade and to abandon the southern route altogether. His delegation had a number of recommendations to make to the Council, including a request that the Secretary-General immediately dispatch a team of experts to assess Zambia's needs in maintaining an alternative system of road, rail, air and sea communications for sustaining its economy.

662. The representative of Ghana, speaking on behalf of the group of African States, said that the group was convinced that nothing could deter Zambia from its determination to maintain its sovereignty and economic integrity in the face of provocations from the Smith régime. Zambia was being made to suffer for its support of the African liberation struggle, which was

getting the active backing of the indigenous people. The Smith régime had tried to disrupt the struggle of the people of Zimbabwe, but the liberation movement would continue to have the support of Zambia and all of Africa, because it was a just struggle for peace and human dignity. By erecting a border blockade against Zambia, the Smith régime had sought to frustrate Zambia's economic efforts. Moreover, the blockade was a provocative act, and the United Kingdom, as the administering Power, had an obligation to ensure that it was rolled back. In the meantime, Zambia was entitled to international assistance under Articles 49 and 50 of the Charter. In its efforts to find a solution to the problem, the United Kingdom must secure the release of the imprisoned nationalist leaders and encourage a dialogue between them and the Smith régime. The ban on political activity should be lifted and all discriminatory legislation repealed to ensure the establishment of freedom and equality of political rights. When those conditions were met, the stage would be set for the holding of a constitutional conference with the participation of the genuine representatives of the entire population of Southern Rhodesia with a view to the adoption of a new constitution guaranteeing universal adult suffrage. A call for the early convening of such a conference had been vetoed by the United Kingdom in 1972, an action which led him to suspect that the United Kingdom was not interested in solving the problem. There was also abundant evidence that the sanctions imposed by the Council were being breached in many devious ways. His delegation condemned the continued importation by the United States of chrome and nickel from Zimbabwe in contravention of the Security Council's resolutions. The permanent members of the Council and the whole international community should assist the process leading to the formation of a Government based on majority rule in Zimbabwe. Only then would the acts of aggression against Zambia cease.

663. The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania said that, because of its increasing domestic difficulties, the Smith régime, in co-operation with South Africa, had increased its oppression and blockaded Zambia. Although Zambia was the immediate target, the final aim was to weaken the liberation struggle and to perpetuate colonialism in Zimbabwe and the rest of Africa. The issue was whether the international community would deal decisively with the Smith régime or let the situation continue to deteriorate. Tanzania deplored the manner in which the United Kingdom had handled the question of Southern Rhodesia. It was also indignant about those Governments that under flimsy pretexts were providing military and other support to the racist régimes. It was particularly regrettable that some of them were members of the Council. In order to counterbalance the effect of the economic blockade against Zambia, the Council should examine the best ways of assisting Zambia, in particular, the possibility of establishing a special economic assistance fund. It should also ask the Government of the United Kingdom to compensate Zambia for the losses it was incurring because of that Government's failure to bring down the rebellion. Tanzania expected the Council to broaden its current mandatory sanctions against the Smith régime by incorporating the measures envisaged under Article 41 of the Charter. Failure to do so could have serious consequences for peace in southern Africa.

664. The representative of Morocco said that Zambia had become a victim of economic and military

aggression by the Smith régime and its racist neighbours, especially the Pretoria régime, who were interested in the oppression of the liberation movements in Africa. Zambia was ready to face the challenge and had the solid support of the States members of OAU. The Council must decree the most rigorous sanctions against the régime of Ian Smith, and the United Kingdom should co-operate with the United Nations and use effective means to enable the African majority to enjoy all its rights in its own territory. His delegation felt that the United Nations should heed Zambia's appeal and furnish it with the necessary economic assistance.

665. The representative of the United Kingdom said that his Government deplored the closure by the Rhodesian régime of the border with Zambia and extended its sympathy to the Zambian Government on the loss of life resulting from the explosion of land mines in the border area. During consultations with both sides, his Government had made it clear that it would like to see an end to the confrontation and the reopening of the border. His Government had consistently condemned the use of violence and intimidation of any kind for political ends, and he hoped that the Council would not have any difficulty in urging all concerned to do all in their power to prevent further acts of violence across the border. There had been reports of 4,000 South African troops having entered Rhodesia—reports that had been denied by South Africa. The United Kingdom had no evidence to contradict that denial, but his Government had long been aware of the presence of South African police in Rhodesia, and the South African Government knew of the United Kingdom's disapproval and desire that they should be withdrawn. He drew a distinction between extending the sanctions and making them more effective. The trouble with the sanctions was that they were not rigorously applied, not even by those States that professed to comply fully with them. In theory, they could be made more comprehensive through relatively minor measures, such as a ban on communications, but such measures might have a contrary effect. The whole question had been sent to the Committee on sanctions for study, and it was for that body to produce any necessary recommendation. The current situation was not conducive to a solution of the political problem of Southern Rhodesia, which was at a crucial point. If a peaceful political settlement could be reached for Southern Rhodesia, all the other related problems would solve themselves. Therefore, the Council must make certain that nothing said or done by it hindered the chances of peaceful solution.

666. The representative of Yugoslavia said that his Government had issued an official statement condemning Southern Rhodesia's action and offering Zambia all possible support. Commenting on the original and contributory causes of the current crisis, he remarked that the accumulation of the explosive potential in southern Africa because of attempts of colonial régimes to suppress the march of freedom for all African nations could not be treated as a local phenomenon endangering only regional security. Recent international events had shown that local tensions could become major international crises directly involving the entire international community. The Smith régime had the temerity to justify its acts of aggression against Zambia on the grounds that the Zimbabwe freedom fighters were receiving assistance, though the legitimacy of their struggle had been recognized by the United Nations. It was not accidental that the blockade against

Zambia had been imposed when that country was going through a process of basic consolidation of its political structure. The Council must condemn all acts of aggression by Southern Rhodesia, request the removal of any foreign military personnel sent to Salisbury to help the Smith régime and make the implementation of the sanctions more effective. Zambia was entitled to economic assistance; therefore, it would be helpful for the Council to send a mission to review Zambia's needs on the spot.

667. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that the Smith régime had long followed a policy of hostile provocations against Zambia, which had culminated in the closing of the border and the imposition of an economic blockade. Using false pretexts, that régime was trying to make Zambia responsible for the deep crisis generated by its own racist policy and to hide from the world the well-known fact that it was the Zimbabwe people themselves who were waging a national liberation struggle against the Southern Rhodesian racists. The United Nations had confirmed and supported the right of the Zimbabwe people to self-determination, freedom and independence. Nevertheless, the Salisbury régime had intensified its oppression and its acts of aggression against other independent African States. That state of affairs threatened international peace and security and remained possible only because the régime had the support of Portugal and South Africa and their Western allies, which sought to maintain a colonial stronghold in southern Africa. No matter what acts of provocation the colonialists or their protectors committed, however, they would not be able to stop the process of the final and complete liquidation of colonialism and *apartheid*. The Soviet Union condemned the aggressive acts of Southern Rhodesia and South Africa against Zambia and demanded that an end be put to the illegal Smith régime in order to eliminate the threat to peace in Africa. To that end the Security Council should extend and strengthen the sanctions against Southern Rhodesia and decide to decree corresponding sanctions against Portugal and South Africa.

668. At the 1688th meeting, on 30 January, the representative of Chile affirmed the solidarity of his country with Zambia, which was suffering from the aggressive acts of Rhodesia and its racist ally South Africa. Because of their racist doctrines, the mere existence of the two régimes constituted a threat to international peace and security. As sanctions imposed against the Salisbury régime had not been effective, the Council must resort to more effective means to alleviate the situation. Zambia had been accused by Southern Rhodesia of helping the freedom fighters of Zimbabwe; yet Members of the United Nations were not only obliged to recognize the legitimacy of the African liberation movements but were duty-bound to give them support. The Council should condemn the actions of Rhodesia and South Africa and ponder the need to grant status to the people of Zimbabwe by creating for them a council similar to the United Nations Council for Namibia.

669. The representative of Algeria said that the serious situation on the border of Zambia was likely to worsen. The Rhodesian racists had not hesitated to warn Zambia that their air force was able to devastate many capitals of neighbouring African countries. The crisis thus developing in southern Africa contained the risk of unleashing a conflict whose scope could not be foretold. The countries of Africa had tried to relieve

the situation by proposing to the United Kingdom that it convene a constitutional conference to determine the future of Southern Rhodesia; but Britain had vetoed that proposal without presenting any new solution, thus closing the door to any possibility of a settlement. The international community considered unacceptable any transfer of power to the Salisbury Government before the majority had been able to exercise its rights. It was high time for London, after rejecting the African suggestions, to state its intentions regarding the settlement of the problem. Zambia had accepted the sacrifices entailed in carrying out the sanctions of the Council, and therefore it should have the support of the international community.

670. The representative of China expressed his Government's condemnation of the acts of blackmail and provocation committed by the Rhodesian régime. China admired Zambia for its just stand in resolutely resisting Rhodesian attacks and gave it their firm support. His delegation was glad that OAU and many African countries had initiated practical measures to support the struggle of the Zambian Government, thereby demonstrating their solidarity and determination to fight unitedly against the common enemy. He noted that the relevant General Assembly and Security Council resolutions had called upon all countries to support the just struggle of the Zimbabwe people. Yet that support was being used as a pretext to carry out aggression against Zambia. The Council, therefore, must condemn the Rhodesian régime for its provocations against Zambia and the collusion of the racist régimes of Rhodesia, South Africa and Portugal in suppressing the liberation movement in Zimbabwe and demand the withdrawal of South African troops from Rhodesia. It must further strengthen its sanctions and extend them to South Africa and Portugal and call for active support for Zambia and the people of Zimbabwe.

671. The representative of Egypt, speaking on behalf of the Arab countries, expressed solidarity with Zambia in its struggle against the racist régime in Rhodesia. Analysing the situation in southern Africa, he said that, in order to eliminate the tension, there must be a transfer of power to the people of Zimbabwe on the basis of majority rule. Any settlement should be negotiated with the true representatives of the people in Southern Rhodesia. To achieve that goal the Council had to put an end to the aggressive acts of Rhodesia and restore the rule of law there. The programme of action for the full implementation of the Declaration on decolonization reaffirmed the right of colonial peoples to fight by all means against colonialism, and Member States had committed themselves to give them all moral and material support; therefore, the Security Council must assist the peoples of Rhodesia to liberate themselves and must take suitable measures to preserve the rights of Zambia.

672. The representative of Senegal noted that the United Nations had recognized the legitimacy of the national liberation struggle, as had OAU, which supported the Zimbabwe fighters. Thus, Zambia's only sin was having remained faithful to its international obligations and to the Charter of the United Nations. The Council had the means to stop further bloodshed. As the United Kingdom was still responsible for the Rhodesian problem, the Council must remind it of its duty. If the United Kingdom admitted its impotence in assuming its responsibilities, it would be up to the Council to assume its own, making use, as had been

done in other cases, of all the means provided for in the Charter in circumstances of that kind.

673. The representative of Zaire said that his country considered Zambia's struggle as its own and was ready to give it its total support. As for the responsibility of the United Kingdom, he said that Britain had not only the moral commitment but the legal obligation to put down the rebellion and to establish a democratic system in Southern Rhodesia. The United Kingdom had the means to ensure freedom of movement of goods and persons between Zambia and Rhodesia. He noted that the Convention on Transit Trade of Land-locked States rested on the principle of equality of treatment for coastal and land-locked States. Zaire promised Zambia its economic, political and military assistance and hoped that the Council would continue to discuss Zambia's complaint until a suitable solution had been found.

674. The representative of Kenya said that his Government's commitment to give Zambia economic, political, trade and other support was total. After the closure of the border by Southern Rhodesia, Kenya and Zambia had held consultations to explore ways and means of organizing assistance. Southern Africa had been described in some Western circles as "the southern frontier of Western Christian civilization"; yet no honest leader of any Christian sect believed that *apartheid* was in accord with Christian philosophy. Zambia was a victim of the southern African situation because it refused to be blackmailed into denying support to the people of Zimbabwe and elsewhere in their struggle for independence. The Council must act to defuse the situation in southern Africa, to curb South Africa's practice of intervening in the affairs of dependent territories and to ensure that South African military forces were removed from Southern Rhodesia. The Council must help Zambia to salvage its economy and protect its political and economic sovereignty. Kenya supported all the recommendations contained in the statement of the representative of Zambia and urged the Council to invoke Articles 49 and 50 of the Charter and to send a mission to ascertain the needs of Zambia.

675. The representative of India said that the acts of aggression against Zambia should be condemned and stopped, and the South African forces in whatever form they existed in Southern Rhodesia should be removed. The Council must extend full support and sympathy to Zambia in its struggle to protect its independence. He favoured the intensification of sanctions and suggested that the Committee on sanctions should undertake appropriate action to that end. The inalienable rights of the Zimbabwe people should be reaffirmed, and the Council should support Zambia in the face of the economic pressures against it. His delegation was ready to co-operate in relieving those pressures, in accordance with the request already made by the Council in resolution 253 (1968).

676. At the 1689th meeting, on 31 January, the representative of Somalia said that the Council's involvement with the problem of Southern Rhodesia had begun impressively but seemed to be weakening steadily. For the first time, economic sanctions had been imposed under Chapter VII of the Charter, but clandestine trade continued on a large scale, and a super Power with special responsibilities for world leadership had openly flouted the sanctions without any compelling reasons, setting an example of indifference to the authority of the United Nations. By contrast, Zambia's example in fulfilling its international obligations must be taken to

heart by other States, which, with much less hardship to themselves, could take steps to observe sanctions strictly. To defuse the situation the Council should set up appropriate machinery to ascertain the best ways of assisting Zambia to develop alternative routes for its exports formerly sent through Southern Rhodesia and enlist the support of States willing to help Zambia in that task. Above all, the Council must condemn the aggression against Zambia by the Smith régime, which had the strong support of South Africa. Regarding the role of the United Kingdom, he said that it should fulfil its responsibility as the administering Power by developing further initiatives that would enable the African majority to exercise its rights. Moreover, it was the responsibility of the Council to ensure that Zambia was not subjected to further aggression from Southern Rhodesia.

677. The representative of Guinea said that a number of African States had suffered aggression at the hands of colonialist forces. Africa needed peace in order to progress, but that would only be possible if Africans could enjoy general stability. His delegation condemned the aggression and the economic blockade against Zambia and insisted upon the withdrawal of all South African forces from Southern Rhodesia. It was important to develop ways and means to ensure respect for the sanctions, which were being systematically violated by certain Members of the United Nations.

678. The representative of France said that his delegation deplored the closing of the border by the Smith régime and disapproved of the system of collective fines set up by the Rhodesian authorities. Because of its geographic location, Zambia was in a most vulnerable position, and a previous resolution of the Council had shown awareness of the damage that could be inflicted on Zambia by the imposition of sanctions. He joined in paying tribute to Zambia for its courage in deciding to implement the sanctions fully. The international community should, therefore, endeavour to limit the damages that Zambia would suffer as a result of the blockade. The dispatch of experts to assess Zambia's needs might constitute a good approach to the problem. His delegation was also concerned over the consequences, for the future, of the present crisis. It feared that the crisis would hardly favour the solution of the Rhodesian political problem. However, it noted that the United Kingdom had reaffirmed that the objective remained a search for a just political settlement in Southern Rhodesia. It had always believed that the fundamental responsibility for the solution of the problem belonged to the administering Power, and it hoped that those entrusted with seeking a solution to the problem would know how to discharge their duty in conformity with their traditions and the wishes expressed by the General Assembly and the Security Council.

679. The representative of Australia said that his delegation deplored Southern Rhodesia's closure of the border, inasmuch as it threatened to impose severe economic and psychological strain on Zambia and created a new area of tension on the troubled scene in Southern Africa. For those reasons Australia shared in condemnation of the aggressive and provocative action of the Rhodesian régime and the presence of any foreign forces in the Territory. Regarding the suggestions for increasing the effectiveness of the sanctions against Rhodesia, his delegation was awaiting the report of the Committee on sanctions but considered that the main objective must be to make the existing

range of sanctions more fully effective. He stated that his Government had taken a number of recent steps to close any loop-holes that might remain in respect of its own domestic measures to apply the sanctions resolutions. Regarding the economic difficulties forced on Zambia by the closure of the border, he said that a survey of Zambia's needs by a team of experts might offer the best means for establishing a further course of action.

680. The representative of Austria deplored the acts of violence that had caused an alarming aggravation of the situation in the area and resulted in the death of innocent people. Austria had never recognized the illegal régime and had immediately stopped importation of Rhodesian tobacco after the unilateral declaration of independence. There had been no Austrian imports at all since 1970. Regarding Zambia's efforts to comply with the sanctions, he noted that, as a consequence of severing its last economic ties with Southern Rhodesia, Zambia was faced with a grave situation. His delegation was therefore convinced that the request by Zambia for economic assistance by United Nations organizations and Member States under resolutions 253 (1968) and 277 (1970) deserved serious consideration. Such assistance would help to reinforce Zambia's economic independence and to diminish the danger of confrontation along the common border. The strictest universal compliance with the Council decisions on sanctions was necessary. The Committee on sanctions was studying the matter, and he hoped that its report would contain the necessary technical information on possible means of enforcing the sanctions. The success of any further action by the Council depended on the continued co-operation of all parties concerned, and careful examination was required to determine whether such action could contribute effectively to eliminating the threat to peace in the area.

681. The representative of the United States said that since 1965 Zambia had done its best to comply with the sanctions against Southern Rhodesia, although it had been clear from the outset that Zambia would require assistance in reducing its dependence on Southern Rhodesia. Many Member States, including the United States, had responded to Zambia's request for help. In 1966, the United States had provided an airlift at a cost of \$4.5 million for the transport of petroleum products, and it had also contributed some \$38 million for the construction of the road that had enabled Zambia to transport its copper to Tanzania by truck. The border closing had forced Zambia to seek alternate routes for its goods. Its current plight underscored the need to examine carefully ways in which it might be assisted. His Government had long considered that the problem of Southern Rhodesia should be resolved by peaceful means, one of them being the imposition of sanctions, which it felt should be maintained and tightened. It also believed that further attempts should be made to achieve a peaceful settlement. His delegation was in favour of sending a team of the United Nations experts to determine Zambia's needs or of asking the resident representative of the United Nations Development Programme to undertake that task.

682. The representative of Cuba said that the Council had before it a question that concerned the whole international community. Zambia was being victimized by policies that had been repudiated by the General Assembly and the Council on many occasions. The Council, therefore, was duty-bound not merely to

express its support for Zambia but to defend the agreements it had previously approved and take measures to validate decisions about the right of the Zimbabwe people to freedom and independence. Zambia was a victim of aggression carried out by the illegal régime in Rhodesia because it had adopted and adhered to the principles of the third world through its consistent support of the African liberation movements. He appealed to the Council to act in accordance with the proposals of the Zambian representative.

683. The representative of Peru said that the closing of the border constituted a typical act of economic aggression designed to intimidate Zambia. The aggression of the Salisbury régime was not limited to blockade, however; there had also been frequent incidents and a build-up of military forces with the effective support of South Africa. His Government had followed with admiration the decision of Zambia to comply fully with the sanctions and believed that the Security Council should adopt the measures necessary to help that country. It should take steps to secure the withdrawal of South African forces stationed in Rhodesia and the adoption by the administering Power of means at its disposal to put an end to aggression by the illegal régime. Peru also considered that it was indispensable to assess the sanctions and, if necessary, increase them.

684. The representative of Panama said that the Council was confronted with a situation that was an undoubted threat to peace in the area. The economic blockade and the military deployment by the Smith régime along the border with Zambia called for prompt action on the part of the Council. The current problem was made more complex by the presence of South African troops in Rhodesia. Panama condemned the aggression by the racist Rhodesian authorities and was ready to give all its support to measures to ensure Zambia's sovereignty. The Council should act to end the blockade and stop the incursion of mercenaries.

685. The representative of the Sudan said that the assassination of Amílcar Cabral, the bombardment of Tanzanian villages by Portuguese planes, the reinforcement of South African troops in Rhodesia and the subsequent aggression by the Smith régime against Zambia were not isolated events. His Government would support any measures the Council considered appropriate to alleviate the burden imposed on Zambia. However, the situation in southern Africa would continue to threaten international peace so long as the dangerous conditions were not treated with decisiveness. The Council had already determined in 1965 that the Smith régime constituted a threat to peace. Therefore it was deplorable that the United Kingdom had declined since then to fulfil its duty as administering Power. Because of that failure, Rhodesia had begun to spread its atrocities beyond the border of Zimbabwe. With the verdict of the Pearce Commission and the rejection of the minority régime by the people of Zimbabwe and the growing support of international public opinion, the United Kingdom had all the support necessary for leading Rhodesia to self-determination through universal suffrage. Meanwhile the Council had to strengthen its sanctions against Southern Rhodesia and extend them to the racist régimes of Portugal and South Africa.

686. The President, speaking as the representative of Indonesia, said that the Salisbury régime had felt for some years the heat of the independence struggle. In order to divert attention from its domestic difficul-

ties, it had started to put military and economic pressures on Zambia. It was well known that since 1965 the Smith régime had denied the people of Zimbabwe the right to self-determination and that recently its oppression against the indigenous Africans had increased. Indonesia felt that it was the responsibility of the United Kingdom to ensure that the unacceptable state of affairs in Rhodesia was brought to an end. It believed that General Assembly resolution 2945 (XXVII) and other related resolutions adopted by the Security Council should serve as a clear mandate to the British Government to take the necessary steps to settle the problem. The aggressive acts against Zambia by the colonial Powers, if not arrested forthwith, might lead to full-scale war. The Council, therefore, should act promptly in full co-operation with the United Kingdom to prevent the situation from deteriorating. Indonesia was ready to support any measure to alleviate Zambia's burden and hoped that the Council, together with other bodies concerned with the problem of decolonization, like the Special Committee on decolonization, would be able to eradicate the root causes of the problem.

687. At the 1690th meeting, on 1 February, the representative of Cameroon said that his Government associated itself with Zambia in its fight against economic and military blackmail. International law recognized the legitimate right of peoples of self-defence against the use of force that deprived them of the exercise of the right to self-determination; therefore, no guilt should attach to any African nation for supporting the Zimbabwe people. The racist régimes were undermining the right to self-determination of the Zimbabwe people and the territorial integrity and independence of Zambia. As a result of the situation, the indignation of African peoples was mounting, and, if repression was not stopped, Africa would explode in a few years. Thus, it was time for rethinking, particularly for the United Kingdom, known for its diplomacy and experienced government at home. His delegation considered that the United Kingdom should take new initiatives to resolve the problem.

688. The representative of Guyana said that his delegation condemned the aggression of the racist régimes and demanded appropriate action by the Council. Pending that action, the international community should support Zambia to ease its economic burden. It was the failure of the administering Power to take action to end the rebellion in Southern Rhodesia that had led to the current problems. It was incumbent on the United Kingdom to take new initiatives, such as withdrawing its commitment not to use force and convening a constitutional conference, measures which could restore the rule of law in Zimbabwe.

689. The representative of the Sudan introduced two draft resolutions (S/10875 and S/10876) sponsored by Guinea, Kenya, the Sudan and Yugoslavia. He noted that the first draft resolution (S/10875) contained proposals regarding the political aspects of the complaint by Zambia, and that the second draft resolution (S/10876) concerned economic assistance to Zambia.

690. At the 1691st meeting, on 2 February, the representative of the Sudan introduced revised versions of the two draft resolutions (S/10875/Rev.1 and S/10876/Rev.1), sponsored by Guinea, India, Indonesia, Kenya, the Sudan and Yugoslavia.

691. In the first draft resolution (S/10875/Rev.1), the word "régimes" in operative paragraph 3 had been replaced by the word "régime", and the words "that of" had been inserted between "and" and "South Africa". The original operative paragraph 7, which read "*Deplores* the failure of the United Kingdom Government to take effective measures to bring to an end the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia", had been deleted and replaced by a new operative paragraph 4 reading "*Regrets* that the measures so far taken have failed to bring the rebellion in Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) to an end". The remaining operative paragraphs had been renumbered.

Decision: *At the 1691st meeting, on 2 February 1973, the revised draft resolution (S/10875/Rev.1) was adopted by 13 votes to none, with 2 abstentions (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America), as resolution 326 (1973).*

692. Resolution 326 (1973) read as follows:

"The Security Council,

"Taking note of the letter dated 24 January 1973 from the Permanent Representative of Zambia to the United Nations (S/10865), and having heard the statement made by the Permanent Representative of Zambia concerning recent acts of provocation against Zambia by the illegal régime in Salisbury,

"Gravely concerned at the situation created by the provocative and aggressive acts committed by the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia against the security and economy of Zambia,

"Reaffirming the inalienable right of the people of Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) to self-determination and independence in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, and the legitimacy of their struggle to secure the enjoyment of such rights, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations,

"Recalling its resolution 232 (1966) of 16 December 1966, in which it determined that the situation in Southern Rhodesia constituted a threat to international peace and security,

"Convinced that the recent provocative and aggressive acts perpetrated by the illegal régime against Zambia aggravate the situation,

"Deeply concerned that measures approved by the Council have failed to terminate the illegal régime and convinced that sanctions cannot put an end to the illegal régime unless they are comprehensive, mandatory and effectively supervised and unless measures are taken against States which violate them,

"Deeply disturbed by the continued illegal presence and by the intensified military intervention of South Africa in Southern Rhodesia, contrary to Security Council resolution 277 (1970) of 18 March 1970, and also by the deployment of South African armed forces on the border with Zambia, which seriously threatens the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Zambia and other neighbouring African States,

"Deeply shocked and grieved at the loss of human life and damage to property caused by the aggressive acts of the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia and its collaborators against Zambia,

"Reaffirming the primary responsibility of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland over its colony of Southern

Rhodesia, in accordance with the relevant United Nations resolutions,

"1. *Condemns* all the acts of provocation and harassment, including economic blockade, blackmail and military threats, against Zambia by the illegal régime in collusion with the racist régime of South Africa;

"2. *Condemns* all measures of political repression that violate fundamental freedoms and rights of the people of Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), in particular, the recent measures of collective punishment.

"3. *Calls upon* the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to take all effective measures to put an end to such actions by the illegal and racist régime of Southern Rhodesia and that of South Africa;

"4. *Regrets* that measures so far taken have failed to bring the rebellion in Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) to an end;

"5. *Condemns* the continued presence of South African military and armed forces in Southern Rhodesia, contrary to Security Council resolution 277 (1970);

"6. *Demands* the immediate and total withdrawal of South African military and armed forces from Southern Rhodesia and from the border of that Territory with Zambia;

"7. *Calls upon* the Government of the United Kingdom, as the administering Power, to ensure the effective implementation of paragraph 6 of the present resolution;

"8. *Requests* the Security Council Committee established in pursuance of resolution 253 (1968) concerning the question of Southern Rhodesia to expedite the preparation of its report undertaken under Security Council resolution 320 (1972) of 29 September 1972, taking into account the recent developments in Southern Rhodesia;

"9. *Decides* to dispatch immediately a Special Mission, consisting of four members of the Security Council, to be appointed by the President of the Security Council after consultations with the members, to assess the situation in the area, and requests the mission so constituted to report to the Council not later than 1 March 1973;

"10. *Calls upon* the Government of Zambia, the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of South Africa to provide the Special Mission with the necessary co-operation and assistance in the discharge of its task;

"11. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter."

693. In the second draft resolution (S/10876/Rev.1), the ellipsis in operative paragraph 3 had been filled by the words "in paragraph 9 of resolution 326 (1973)".

Decision: *At the 1691st meeting, on 2 February 1973, the revised draft resolution (S/10876/Rev.1) was adopted by 14 votes to none, with 1 abstention (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), as resolution 327 (1973).*

694. Resolution 327 (1973) read as follows:

"The Security Council,

"Having heard the statement of the Permanent Representative of Zambia to the United Nations,

"Recalling its resolutions on the question of Southern Rhodesia, in particular resolution 232 (1966) of 16 December 1966, in which it determined that the situation in Southern Rhodesia constituted a threat to international peace and security,

"Recalling further resolutions 253 (1968) of 29 May 1968 and 277 (1970) of 18 March 1970 imposing mandatory sanctions against Southern Rhodesia, particularly the respective provisions therein requesting the international community to extend assistance to Zambia in view of such special economic problems as it may be confronted with arising from the carrying out of the decisions of the Security Council,

"Taking into account the decision of the Government of Zambia to sever immediately all remaining trade and communication links with Southern Rhodesia in compliance with the decisions of the Security Council and in strict observance of economic sanctions,

"Recognizing that such a decision by the Government of Zambia will entail considerable special economic hardships,

"1. Commends the Government of Zambia for its decision to sever all remaining economic and trade relations with Southern Rhodesia in compliance with the decisions of the Security Council;

"2. Takes cognizance of the special economic hardships confronting Zambia as a result of its decision to carry out the decisions of the Security Council;

"3. Decides to entrust the Special Mission, consisting of four members of the Security Council, referred to in paragraph 9 of resolution 326 (1973), assisted by a team of six United Nations experts, to assess the needs of Zambia, in maintaining alternative systems of road, rail, air and sea communications for the normal flow of traffic;

"4. Further requests the neighbouring States to accord the Special Mission every co-operation in the discharge of its task;

"5. Requests the Special Mission to report to the Security Council not later than 1 March 1973."

695. Following the voting, the representative of the United Kingdom stated that the situation, the real solution of which lay in the achievement of a just political settlement within Rhodesia, should be viewed in the perspective of all the events since the illegal declaration of independence in Rhodesia. The immediate task of all concerned was to relieve the tension in the border area, inasmuch as the continued closure of the border carried a constant threat of conflict and endangered the prospects for a peaceful political settlement within Rhodesia. Regarding the economic effects of the closure, he noted that, should the border be reopened, it was for Zambia to decide its policy concerning resumption of the movements that had been interrupted. It was understandable that Zambia could not allow itself to remain at risk in a matter so vital to its economy. It was right that the proposed examination of the economic consequences of maintaining alternative trade routes should be carried out. However, resolution 326 (1973) concerning political aspects of the situation seemed unlikely to achieve any positive results, as it did not meet the needs of the situation or help towards a peaceful political settlement. Such

resolutions tended to harden positions rather than to allow freer play to the more positive elements.

696. The representative of the United States agreed that resolution 326 (1973) was not likely to achieve the desired results and might have the effect of increasing confrontations. For that reason, his delegation had abstained from voting. Because the United States appreciated the economic burdens imposed on Zambia as a result of the blockade it had voted in favour of resolution 327 (1973). His delegation regretted that its proposals on matters of principle, especially on the appropriate role of the Secretary-General, had been ignored by the sponsors. The United States was sure that an objective non-political analysis of the needs would have done a great deal to encourage Governments and to provide them with a sense of objective understanding of the needs, which would, in the final analysis, be very much in the interest of Zambia.

697. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that the Council must place the responsibility on the States directly involved in the emergence of the racist régime in Southern Rhodesia, demand the immediate withdrawal of South African forces from there and decide on expansion of the sanctions and their extension to South Africa and Portugal, which were violating the relevant Council resolutions. The Council should ensure that compensation for the damages caused to Zambia was borne by the States responsible. Any other approach could be interpreted as meaning that the Council condoned the situation. The USSR had abstained from voting on the second resolution because it had no provision placing responsibility, political or other, including redress for damages, on States directly liable for the coming to power of the racist régime.

698. The representative of Indonesia said that the United Kingdom had the responsibility to take the action required to guarantee to the people of Zimbabwe the full enjoyment of their rights. He stressed that as long as those rights were denied the situation in southern Africa would remain explosive.

699. The representative of France said that his delegation's positive vote had been the result of the improvements introduced in the text of resolution 326 (1973). The revised text placed a better balance on the responsibilities of situation and stress on the acts of the régime in Southern Rhodesia. However, France did not think that it was for the Council to dictate to the administering Power its conduct in the area. Regarding resolution 327 (1973) on economic assistance, France would have preferred the Council to send a team of experts, instead of a mission, which seemed rather large.

700. The representative of India said that his delegation had voted in favour of both resolutions in the hope that by their adoption the Security Council would be able to take action for effective assistance to Zambia and towards de-escalating the situation.

701. The representative of Austria said that his delegation had voted for both resolutions because of its deep concern for the difficult situation in which Zambia found itself after the hostile act of its neighbour.

702. The representative of Yugoslavia said that his delegation was gratified by the support the Council had given to Zambia. The resolutions just adopted met several essential requirements, including a reaffirmation of the rights of the people of Zimbabwe and the establishment of machinery that would enable the Organiza-

tion to assist Zambia. For those reasons, Yugoslavia had voted in favour of both resolutions.

703. The representative of Zambia said that his delegation regarded the first resolution as falling far short of what the international community was entitled to expect from the Council. He compared the abstention of the United Kingdom on the resolution to an abstention on the aggression of the Smith régime. Zambia was not surprised by that action, however; it had long been suspicious of the real motives of the United Kingdom, not only with regard to Southern Rhodesia but with regard to the entire region of southern Africa.

704. The representative of the Sudan hoped that the resolutions would be implemented effectively in order to alleviate the critical situation Zambia was facing and that all would conscientiously implement both resolutions and thus reinforce their meaning.

705. The President, speaking as the representative of Kenya, said that the African countries were not going to sit idly by and see aggression committed against Zambia. There was still time to avoid confrontation in southern Africa, if the countries giving aid to South Africa and the Smith régime would end their co-operation.

C. Communications and reports to the Security Council received between 2 February and 8 March 1973

706. On 5 February 1973, the President of the Security Council issued a note (S/10880) in which he reported that, after consultations with the members of the Council, agreement had been reached on the following composition of the Special Mission provided for in resolution 326 (1973): Austria, Indonesia, Peru and the Sudan.

707. On 21 February, the President of the Security Council issued a further note (S/10886) reporting that, following receipt of a telegram from the Chairman of the Security Council Special Mission to Zambia, it had been agreed, as a result of consultations with the members of the Council, that the date for submission of the Mission's report would be extended to 8 March.

708. On 5 March, the Security Council Special Mission established under resolution 326 (1973) submitted its report to the Security Council (S/10896 and Add.1). In carrying out its mandate, the Special Mission, between 8 and 21 February, had visited the United Kingdom, Zambia, Kenya and the United Republic of Tanzania, where it had held consultations with cabinet members of the respective Governments and with a number of experts and had inspected the border areas of Zambia. On 15 February, the Special Mission had been received by the President of the Republic of Zambia. The report gave a detailed account of the meetings held by the Mission with government authorities in each of the countries it had visited, as well as of its inspection visits in various areas in Zambia.

709. In its assessment of the situation under resolution 326 (1973), the Special Mission stated in its report that the state of tension in the area had been greatly increased following the aggressive acts committed against Zambia by the illegal régime of Southern Rhodesia. The effect of those actions had been felt in the political, military and economic sectors. The Zambian Government had maintained a policy of

restraint towards its hostile neighbour and had no influence on the activities of liberation movements inside the Territories subjected to racism and minority rule. Therefore, it could not be held responsible for developments occurring there. The Mission had been able to observe the military preparations confronting Zambia's frontier along the Zambezi River and considered that the deployment of South African forces near the Zambian border was an important factor in the continuation of the current tension. In the opinion of the Special Mission, the key to the solution of the problem lay in the application of majority rule in Southern Rhodesia, the strict implementation of sanctions against Southern Rhodesia and implementation of relevant Council resolutions regarding the whole area.

710. In its assessment of the needs of Zambia in maintaining alternative systems of communications under resolution 327 (1973), the Mission reported that, of 120,000 tons of monthly imports previously brought into Zambia through Southern Rhodesia, 105,000 tons could be transported by alternative routes through Zaire, Malawi and Tanzania, but the remaining shortfall of some 15,000 tons would have to be brought in by air. It noted that the overland routes could carry the increased tonnage, if facilities and manpower were provided. The cost of those requirements was estimated at \$124 million. The cost of air freight of 15,000 tons would be about \$6.5 million per month. The Mission concluded that, in the coming four to six months, the economy of Zambia would be affected by shortages of imports, depletion of stocks and higher costs. Accordingly, only adequate and timely assistance would make it possible for Zambia to continue to develop its economy in a normal fashion. The Special Mission stated that its assessment of the needs of Zambia in maintaining alternative systems of road, rail, air and sea communications for the normal flow of traffic was made in the light of the report of the team of United Nations experts designated in accordance with resolution 327 (1973). The team's report was reproduced as annex I to the report of the Special Mission.

D. Consideration at the 1692nd to 1694th meetings (8-10 March 1973)

711. At its 1692nd meeting, on 8 March, the Security Council resumed its consideration of the question in the light of the report of the Special Mission established under resolution 326 (1973) and held three meetings between 8 and 10 March, with the participation of the representatives who had taken part in the previous discussion.

712. The representative of Indonesia, the Chairman of the Special Mission established under resolution 326 (1973), introduced its report (S/10896 and Add.1). He stated that the Mission had ascertained that a considerable measure of tension existed in the area, the root-cause of which lay in the existence of colonialism, racism and illegal minority régimes in southern Africa. The provocative and aggressive acts and the continued military preparations by the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia had only increased the tension in the border area. A recurrence of those events could lead to a dangerous escalation and adversely affect Zambia's attitude of restraint. His delegation took particular note of the considerable sums required to meet the specific needs of Zambia to maintain alternative systems of road, rail and sea communications. A tremendous amount of technical assistance would also be

needed to assist Zambia in handling the major task of rerouting its imports and exports.

713. The representative of Zambia said that his Government was pleased that the Mission had been able to confirm its convictions on the causes of the current crisis. He added that, since the visit of the Special Mission, additional incidents had occurred in the border area which again had resulted in civilian casualties. Enumerating the underlying causes of the tension in the area, he pointed out that the crisis did not stem only from current events but was the result of the situation that had been developing over the years in the entire area of southern Africa. Zambia was certainly not responsible for the current tension. The Security Council had already determined that the situation resulting from the unilateral declaration of independence constituted a threat to international peace. Nevertheless, the illegal régime continued in power. Moreover, by its latest action in closing the border, it had demonstrated its intention to extend the war against the African majority beyond its own borders. The strength of the Smith régime lay outside the borders of Rhodesia; internally it was weak, because the masses were against it. Unfortunately, since 1965 the United Kingdom policy regarding the treatment of the Smith régime had changed from one of quelling the rebellion to one of maintaining the *status quo*. Thus, the measures taken against Smith were neutralized by those who wanted him to remain in power. He noted that the presence of South African military forces in Southern Rhodesia contributed to the escalation of tension and that South Africa intended to maintain them there as long as the struggle for majority rule continued. Pressure must be brought to bear on South Africa to remove those forces immediately. Zambia was not responsible for the situation in Southern Rhodesia. In order to alleviate that situation, the Council must press for the release of all political detainees and for the elimination of discriminatory legislation, reaffirm the principle of no independence before majority rule and make the sanctions more comprehensive and effective. The rebellion must be ended and a representative constitutional conference convened by the United Kingdom. Zambia reaffirmed its decision not to use the southern route while the Smith régime remained in power. However, as a result of that decision, Zambia was faced with the need to find alternative routes that could handle the increased volume of traffic arising from the closure of the border with Southern Rhodesia. Zambia appealed to the international community for assistance in carrying out its share of obligations to bring about the necessary political change in Southern Rhodesia and the elimination of tension throughout southern Africa.

714. At the 1693rd meeting, on 9 March, the representative of the Sudan said that, during the tour of the Zambian frontier, members of the Special Mission had been left in no doubt that the colonial and racist régimes had committed, and planned to commit, acts of aggression against Zambia that could lead to a conflagration. Regarding the economic consequences of the situation, he hoped that Zambia's sacrifices would be appreciated and that Zambia would receive prompt assistance from Member States. In that connexion, he expressed satisfaction at the help offered to Zambia by the African countries. Commenting on the political aspects of the situation, he said that the rebel régime, through the growing military presence of South Africans, was becoming extremely dangerous to

Zambia's security. His delegation was concerned that the administering Power, although reaffirming its responsibility, nevertheless declined to discharge its responsibility to take measures for the self-determination of the people of Zimbabwe. The Sudan therefore insisted that the United Kingdom be constantly prompted to fulfil its responsibility and to effect the withdrawal of South African forces from Southern Rhodesia. The Council, for its part, should take preventive action at once rather than be faced with conflagration later on.

715. The representative of Guinea said that the Special Mission's report had proved the facts of the incursion and the laying of mines in Zambia by Rhodesian forces. Guinea regretted the deterioration of the already explosive situation brought on by Rhodesian military preparations. Currently, Zambia had to face not only economic difficulties but preparations for aggression against it. Zambia, like some other African countries, was a standing target for imperialism. In that connexion, she mentioned that Portugal was preparing to dispatch a new group of mercenaries against Guinea aboard the vessel *Albatross*, which had already left the port of Fuerteventura. Inasmuch as Zambia had carried out the Council's resolutions imposing sanctions against Southern Rhodesia and its economy was gravely affected, the Council should make available to Zambia all possible moral and material support. Guinea felt it was up to the United Kingdom to induce Southern Rhodesia to respect the right to self-determination and hoped that the spirit of responsibility that guided the United Kingdom would assist the African countries and the United Nations to overcome the problem of Southern Rhodesia.

716. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics stated that the report of the Special Mission confirmed that the situation in southern Africa had further deteriorated. It also established that South Africa and Portugal were helping Southern Rhodesia in its aggressive acts against Zambia. Those developments underscored the need for the United Nations to take steps to curb the aggressor. He noted that in his message the President of Zambia had asked the Council to put an end to the current situation and to ensure the withdrawal of South African troops from Southern Rhodesia. The USSR supported those demands and felt that the Council was duty-bound to take the necessary steps in that regard. A large part of the responsibility for the continued existence of the Salisbury régime, the report indicated, rested with the ruling circles of the United Kingdom. Instead of taking measures against that régime, London recommended a cautious approach, which constituted an encouragement to the illegal régime. Regarding implementation of the sanctions, he said that, despite the Council's relevant resolutions, some States, including members of the Council, had had no intention of giving effect to those sanctions. Moreover, the activities of the Special Committee on Southern Rhodesia, which was to promote effective implementation of the sanctions, have met with resistance by certain Western representatives. The Council, should put an end to the situation by taking measures under Article 41 to strengthen the sanctions and extend them to South Africa and Portugal, which were directly violating the Council's decisions. In that respect, the USSR supported the proposal by the President of the United Republic of Tanzania for the institution of a boycott against companies violating the sanctions. Regarding the matter of assistance to Zambia, he said that the material liability for the consequences of the

aggression against it should be placed on those States and monopolies responsible for the coming to power of the racist régime which were continuing to maintain contact and carry on trade with it.

717. The representative of Kenya congratulated the Special Mission for its report. He then introduced two draft resolutions (S/10898 and S/10899) sponsored by Guinea, India, Kenya, the Sudan and Yugoslavia and explained that the first draft resolution (S/10898) dealt with political and military aspects of the situation in southern Africa, focused on Zambia, and with the continuing rebellion in Southern Rhodesia, the responsibility of the United Kingdom in that regard, the interference by South Africa in the affairs of Rhodesia and the right of the people of Zimbabwe to self-determination. He noted that there had been hope that the minority régimes would enter into negotiations with the African peoples but that, instead, they had rejected the opportunity presented by African States in the Lusaka Manifesto and entrusted their future to military might. Africans still wanted peace in their continent, so they were appealing to the international community to mobilize the opinion of the peoples of the world against the oppression of the people of Southern Rhodesia. With regard to the second draft resolution (S/10899), dealing with assistance to Zambia, he said that Zambia was a loyal Member of the United Nations threatened by economic dislocation arising from the current situation; hence the sponsors were making an appeal to the international community, through the Organization and its specialized agencies, for special aid to Zambia.

718. The representative of Yugoslavia said that the Special Mission had confirmed the previous assessments of the Council concerning the rebellion in Southern Rhodesia. Accordingly, any resolution on the political aspects of the situation had to reaffirm the basic elements of the United Nations position on the matter and indicate the political ways of dealing with the current problem. In that connexion, he noted that Yugoslavia would be reassured to learn from the administering Power what it was prepared to do about the situation. He paid tribute to Zambia for its decision to apply the sanctions against the illegal régime in order to contribute to the goals of the United Nations and expressed the hope that the industrialized States would follow that example. Yugoslavia was disturbed that some advocated going back to the *status quo ante* and resuming trade with Southern Rhodesia, contrary to the various decisions of the Council.

719. The representative of France said that the political findings reached by the Special Mission did not surprise his delegation, which had repeatedly stated that the cause of the tension was related to the refusal of the Smith régime to comply with decisions of the Council concerning the political future of the Territory. His delegation had constantly affirmed that the problem was a political one and that the basic responsibility lay with the administering Power. France was for the effective implementation of sanctions since, although their effectiveness should not be overestimated, they contributed to placing the illegal régime in an embarrassing position and helped in the search for a solution. Regarding the economic impact of the situation, he assured the representative of Zambia that the concern felt by the French Government over the difficulties of his Government would lead it to study the report of the visiting mission with understanding and to examine how it could respond to the appeal made by the

Zambian Government to the international community. It was in that spirit that his delegation was prepared to take note of the report which had been submitted to it.

720. The representative of the United Kingdom said that his delegation had deplored the closure of the border by the Rhodesian régime. Not only had it been a blow to Zambia's economy; it also represented a heightening of tension. His Government had therefore welcomed the reversal of the Rhodesian régime's action as a measure leading towards a less tense situation. However, that step had not eliminated the difficulties faced by Zambia. With regard to the longer-term effects of those developments, his Government did not regard the *status quo* in Southern Rhodesia as satisfactory; nor was it trying to protect the Smith régime. It desired to achieve a settlement acceptable to all the people of Rhodesia, but only the Rhodesians themselves could bring about a peaceful settlement, and everyone should try to give them every opportunity to do so.

721. At the 1694th meeting, on 10 March, the President, with the consent of the Council, invited the representative of Spain, in addition to those representatives who had been invited earlier, to participate in the discussion without the right to vote.

722. The representative of Spain drew attention to the statement of his Government regarding the case of the ship *Albatross*, reference to which had been made by the representative of Guinea at the 1693rd meeting. The statement indicated that the Spanish authorities, after having received information concerning the ship's mission and in accordance with the declared policy of the Spanish Government to eliminate any attempt against the territorial integrity of Equatorial Guinea, had intercepted the *Albatross*, detained its captain and some of its officers and then escorted the ship out of Spanish territorial waters in the direction of Casablanca, its given port of destination. Spain had reported the event to the Secretary-General and the Governments concerned.

723. The representative of India stated that the report of the Special Mission confirmed the correctness of the Zambian complaint. It also showed that the problem was connected to the situation in Southern Rhodesia and throughout southern Africa. The findings of the Special Mission confirmed the presence of South African troops in the border area as a major factor in continuing the current state of tensions. One of the principal objectives of the Council should be to ensure the withdrawal of those troops. Regarding the long-term solution, he noted that the Council had repeatedly affirmed the primary responsibility of the United Kingdom as the administering Power, to bring the rebellion in Southern Rhodesia to an end. Thus, specific responsibilities for the United Kingdom were set forth in the draft resolution dealing with the political and military aspects of the situation (S/10898). Regarding the economic problems facing Zambia, he said that they were directly related to the desire of the United Nations to impose effective sanctions on Southern Rhodesia. He noted that in its appeal for aid, Zambia was asking not for profits but simply for help in reducing the difficulties that it faced because of its special geographical position.

724. The representative of Kenya introduced two revised draft resolutions (S/10898/Rev.1 and S/10899/Rev.1) that were the result of informal consultations among the members of the Council and were sponsored

additionally by Indonesia, Panama and Peru. The first draft resolution (S/10898/Rev.1) included the following amendments:

(1) Operative paragraph 2, which had read "*Reaffirms* that the situation in Southern Rhodesia constitutes a threat to international peace and security and that the state of tension has been heightened following the recent provocative and aggressive acts committed by the illegal régime of Southern Rhodesia against the Republic of Zambia", had been divided into a fourth preambular paragraph reading "*Reaffirming* that the situation in Southern Rhodesia constitutes a threat to international peace and security" and a new operative paragraph 2 reading "*Affirms* that the state of tension has been heightened following the recent provocative and aggressive acts committed by the illegal régime of Southern Rhodesia against the Republic of Zambia";

(2) In operative paragraph 6, the phrase "taking into consideration the need to widen the scope of sanctions against the illegal régime, and the desirability of the application of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter" had been replaced by the phrase "taking into account all proposals and suggestions for extending the scope and improving the effectiveness of sanctions against Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe)";

(3) In operative paragraph 8, the words "as a whole" had been inserted following the words "people of Zimbabwe", and the final phrase reading "for subsequent endorsement by the people through free and universal adult suffrage" had been deleted.

725. The second draft resolution (S/10899/Rev.1) had been modified by the following changes in operative paragraph 5: the words "and the Economic and Social Council" had been deleted from the first line; the words "including the possible establishment of a special fund for Zambia" had been deleted from the fourth and fifth lines; and the words "for carrying out" had been replaced by the words "to enable it to carry out".

726. The representative of China said that his Government supported Zambia in its stand of defending its independence and resisting the aggression of the Rhodesian racist régime. His delegation endorsed the assessment of the Special Mission and considered that the United Kingdom should put an end to the colonialist rule in Southern Rhodesia so that the people of Zimbabwe might achieve national independence free from outside interference. On those grounds, his delegation would support the two draft resolutions.

727. The representative of Indonesia said that the root cause of the tension in the area lay in the continued existence of colonialism, racism and illegal minority régimes in southern Africa. During the stay of the Special Mission in Zambia, he had personally observed civilian casualties caused by land-mine explosions that had occurred only 20 minutes before the Mission's arrival. He had been highly impressed by the restraint showed by Zambia in the face of those provocations. However, if those senseless acts of the minority régime of Southern Rhodesia were not halted soon, Zambia's patience would be exhausted, and then conflagration could erupt. His delegation believed that it was not yet too late to reverse the ominous trend. It was for the United Kingdom to take action to end the rebellion in Southern Rhodesia and to establish majority rule there. He noted that as a result of the situation Zambia needed considerable financial and technical assistance, and he urged the United Nations and Member States to provide that assistance rapidly.

728. The representative of Australia said that the report contained a great deal of information that his Government would study before it could decide on the best way to contribute to helping Zambia. Australia understood Zambia's decision not to allow its trade to be dependent any longer on the unpredictable whims of its hostile neighbour. His Government shared the view that a key to the solution of the problem lay in implementation of the sanctions against the régime of Southern Rhodesia. In view of the changes that had been presented, his delegation would be able to support both draft resolutions.

729. The representative of Guinea thanked the representative of Spain for the information he had given the Council and commented that some African States were being victimized by imperialism because of their policies.

730. The President, speaking as the representative of Panama, said that Salisbury had not measured the consequences of its hostile action against Zambia and had underrated the spirit of solidarity of the African peoples who were united with Zambia. As for the report of the Special Mission, he said that Panama fully supported its recommendations and, accordingly, had joined the sponsors of the two draft resolutions.

731. The representative of Austria said that his delegation would support the two draft resolutions. His Government was ready to give its favourable attention to the recommendations made in the economic report and its annexes. He added that the draft resolution on assistance to Zambia would enable the Organization to reinforce the sanctions against Southern Rhodesia and would provide guidelines for the vast international effort to come. That action would be a response to the hopes placed by the peoples of the African countries in the role of the United Nations.

732. The representative of Peru, commenting on the draft resolutions before the Council, said that his delegation believed that the Council should proceed to adopt measures designed to reach a political settlement and alleviate Zambia's economic plight. However, the first draft resolution (S/10898/Rev.1) barely hinted at such a solution. The Council's decision would therefore be somewhat interim in nature. He hoped that the Council would be given a further opportunity to discuss the problem when it had received the report of its Committee on sanctions.

733. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that the Soviet Union was co-operating with many African countries by providing assistance towards expanding their economies and specifically with Zambia under the Soviet-Zambia agreement of 1967 on economic and technical co-operation. He stressed that the assistance provided by some Western Powers and multinational monopolies to the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia encouraged it to take action against Zambia and other African States. It would be fair for the Council to adopt a resolution providing that the indemnity for the loss inflicted upon Zambia should be charged to those States and monopolies. Commenting on the second draft resolution (S/10899/Rev.1), he noted that the Charter did not provide for the Security Council to assess the economic losses of a given country, even if those losses were a consequence of the Council's decisions, since to do so might divert its attention from the political tasks entrusted to it.

Decision: At the 1694th meeting, on 10 March 1973, the first revised eight Power draft resolution (S/10898/Rev.1) was adopted by 13 votes to none, with 2 abstentions (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America) as resolution 328 (1973).

734. Resolution 328 (1973) read as follows:

"The Security Council,

"Having considered with appreciation the report of the Security Council Special Mission established under resolution 326 (1973) of 2 February 1973 (S/10896 and Add.1),

"Having heard further the statement of the Permanent Representative of Zambia to the United Nations,

"Recalling its resolutions 277 (1970) of 18 March 1970 and 326 (1973),

"Reaffirming that the situation in Southern Rhodesia constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

"Gravely concerned at the persistent refusal of the régime of South Africa to respond to the demands contained in resolutions 277 (1970) and 326 (1973) for the immediate withdrawal of its military and armed forces from Southern Rhodesia and convinced that this constitutes a serious challenge to the authority of the Security Council,

"Bearing in mind that the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, as the administering Power, has the primary responsibility for putting an end to the illegal racist minority régime and for transferring effective power to the people of Zimbabwe on the basis of the principle of majority rule,

"Reaffirming the inalienable right of the people of Zimbabwe to self-determination and independence in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 and the legitimacy of their struggle to secure the enjoyment of their right as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations,

"1. Endorses the assessment and conclusions of the Special Mission established under resolution 326 (1973);

"2. Affirms that the state of tension has been heightened following the recent provocative and aggressive acts committed by the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia against Zambia;

"3. Declares that the only effective solution to this grave situation lies in the exercise by the people of Zimbabwe of their right to self-determination and independence in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV);

"4. Strongly condemns the racist régime of South Africa for its persistent refusal to withdraw its military and armed forces from Southern Rhodesia;

"5. Reiterates its demand for the immediate withdrawal of South African military and armed forces from Southern Rhodesia and from the border of that Territory with Zambia;

"6. Urges the Security Council Committee established in pursuance of resolution 253 (1968) concerning the question of Southern Rhodesia to expedite the preparation of its report undertaken under Security Council resolution 320 (1972) of 29 September 1972, taking into account all proposals and

suggestions for extending the scope and improving the effectiveness of sanctions against Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe);

"7. *Requests* all Governments to take stringent measures to enforce and ensure full compliance by all individuals and organizations under their jurisdiction with the sanctions policy against Southern Rhodesia and calls upon all Governments to continue to treat the racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia as wholly illegal;

"8. *Urges* the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, as the administering Power, to convene as soon as possible a national constitutional conference where genuine representatives of the people of Zimbabwe as a whole would be able to work out a settlement relating to the future of the Territory;

"9. *Calls upon* the Government of the United Kingdom to take all effective measures to bring about the conditions necessary to enable the people of Zimbabwe to exercise freely and fully their right to self-determination and independence including:

"(a) The unconditional release of all political prisoners, detainees and restrictees;

"(b) The repeal of all repressive and discriminatory legislation;

"(c) The removal of all restrictions on political activity and the establishment of full democratic freedom and equality of political rights;

"10. *Decides* to meet again and consider further actions in the light of future developments."

Decision: *The second revised draft resolution (S/10899/Rev.1) was adopted unanimously as resolution 329 (1973).*

735. Resolution 329 (1973) read as follows:

"The Security Council,

"Recalling its resolution 253 (1968) of 29 May 1968 requesting assistance to Zambia as a matter of priority,

"Recalling further its resolution 277 (1970) of 18 March 1970, as well as resolutions 326 (1973) and 327 (1973) of 2 February 1973 by which it decided to dispatch a Special Mission to assess the situation in the area and the needs of Zambia,

"Having considered the report of the Special Mission (S/10896 and Add.1),

"Having heard the statement of the Permanent Representative of Zambia,

"Affirming that Zambia's action to divert its trade from the southern route reinforces Security Council decisions on sanctions against the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia,

"1. *Commends* the Government of Zambia for deciding to abandon the use of the southern route for its trade until the rebellion is quelled and majority rule is established in Southern Rhodesia;

"2. *Further takes note* of the urgent economic needs of Zambia as indicated in the report of the Special Mission and the annexes thereto;

"3. *Appeals* to all States for immediate technical, financial and material assistance to Zambia in accordance with resolutions 253 (1968) and 277 (1970) and the recommendations of the Special Mission, so that Zambia can maintain its normal flow of traffic

and enhance its capacity to implement fully the mandatory sanctions policy;

"4. *Requests* the United Nations and the organizations and programmes concerned, in particular the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, the United Nations Industrial Development Organization and the United Nations Development Programme, as well as the specialized agencies, in particular the International Labour Organisation, the Food and Agriculture Organization, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the World Health Organization, the International Civil Aviation Organization, the Universal Postal Union, the International Telecommunication Union, the World Meteorological Organization and the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization, to assist Zambia in the fields identified in the report of the Special Mission and the annexes thereto;

"5. *Requests* the Secretary-General in collaboration with the appropriate organizations of the United Nations system, to organize with immediate effect all forms of financial, technical and material assistance to Zambia to enable it to carry out its policy of economic independence from the racist régime of Southern Rhodesia;

"6. *Requests* the Economic and Social Council to consider periodically the question of economic assistance to Zambia as envisaged in the present resolution."

736. Speaking in explanation of vote, the representative of the United States said that his delegation had supported the sending of a team of experts to Zambia to assess the economic situation and was pleased with the voluminous material provided to the Council. However, it had not yet time to study all that material. Although it had voted in favour of the economic resolution, it had done so with some reservations. In view of the fact that his Government had not had adequate time to study the implications of the report, it was not in a position to undertake any commitments regarding the extension of assistance to Zambia. It was also seriously concerned about the possible implications for the role of the specialized agencies. As for the political resolution on which his delegation had abstained, it contained elements that the United States had been unable to accept, especially the idea of extending the scope of sanctions. However, it did agree with the main political assessment by the Special Mission.

737. The representative of France said that the amendments of the text of both draft resolutions had made it possible for France to vote in favour of them. However, because of the short time allowed for study of the report, France was not able to take a position on the matter but would give the conclusions an understanding analysis.

738. The representative of the United Kingdom said that his delegation supported the general sense of the resolution that ways and means of providing Zambia with assistance should be examined urgently, both within the United Nations system and outside. However, with regard to the resolution on the political aspects of the matter, his delegation was doubtful whether it was likely to produce positive results, inasmuch as it did not tackle the problem in a constructive and realistic manner.

739. The representative of Kenya said that his delegation had voted for the political resolution because

it desired to contribute to the solution of the problem in southern Africa. In the same spirit of conciliation, Kenya had voted for the resolution on economic assistance because it hoped to see an end to economic aggression against Zambia and because the resolution supported the purpose of the United Nations. His delegation felt that the Council was entitled, in accordance with Article 55 of the Charter, to enter the field of economic relations. It was also of the opinion that the Council had the right to certain assistance from specialized agencies.

740. The representative of Zambia said that the refusal of the United Kingdom to take measures against Southern Rhodesia had confirmed Britain's interest in the *status quo*. He added that the presence of South African troops and the heavy foreign investments in Southern Rhodesia could not be conducive to a settlement. It was clear that, if foreign troops had been removed and foreign investments had been curtailed,

and if the sanctions had been implemented, the Smith régime would not have lasted a month.

741. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that, after having heard the statement by the representative of Zambia, his delegation had been convinced of the correctness of the position regarding the material responsibility of the aggressor for its actions causing economic losses to a victim.

E. Subsequent communications

742. By a letter dated 8 June addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/10951), the President of the Economic and Social Council transmitted the text of a resolution adopted by that Council at its 1858th meeting on 18 May entitled "Implementation of Security Council resolution 329 (1973) concerning the question of economic assistance to Zambia".

Chapter 8

CONSIDERATION OF MEASURES FOR THE MAINTENANCE AND STRENGTHENING OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY IN LATIN AMERICA IN CONFORMITY WITH THE PROVISIONS AND PRINCIPLES OF THE CHARTER

A. Request of Panama concerning the holding of meetings of the Security Council in Panama City

1. COMMUNICATIONS TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND REQUEST FOR A MEETING

743. By a letter dated 9 January 1973 (S/10858), the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Panama informed the President of the Security Council that the Government of the Republic of Panama had decided, on the basis of Article 28, paragraph 3, of the Charter of the United Nations, to propose that the Security Council should meet at Panama City from 15 to 21 March 1973, to consider an agenda that would have as its general theme the "consideration of measures for the strengthening of international peace and security and the promotion of international co-operation in Latin America, in accordance with the provisions and principles of the Charter and the resolutions relating to the right of self-determination of peoples and strict respect for the sovereignty and independence of States". Panama would place at the disposal of the Security Council whatever technical facilities and services might be necessary to ensure the success of the meeting and offered to contribute appropriately to the costs arising therefrom.

744. In a letter dated 8 January (S/10859), the representative of Colombia, in his capacity as Chairman of the Latin American group, informed the President of the Security Council that the delegations comprising the group had expressed their sympathy and solidarity with the decision of the Government of Panama to propose that the Security Council should meet at Panama City from 15 to 21 March 1973 and had unanimously agreed to support that proposal.

745. By letters dated 23 January (S/10867) and 28 January (S/10872), the representatives of Ghana and Egypt, Chairmen, respectively, of the African and Arab groups, sent to the President of the Security Council copies of their notes to the Chairman of the Latin

American group expressing their groups' solidarity with the Latin American group with regard to the holding of Security Council meetings at Panama City. Similarly, the Chairman of the Latin American group sent to the Secretary-General, for circulation as a Security Council document, copies of his replies to the Chairmen of the African and Arab groups dated, respectively, 1 February (S/10878) and 15 February (S/10884).

2. CONSIDERATION AT THE 1684TH AND 1685TH MEETINGS (16 JANUARY 1973)

746. At its 1684th meeting, on 16 January 1973, the Security Council included in its agenda an item entitled "Request of Panama concerning the holding of meetings of the Security Council in Panama City".

747. The President stated that he had held consultations on the question with the members of the Council, during the course of which the majority of members had expressed themselves in favour of the proposal made by the Government of Panama. It had also been the view of many members of the Council that the procedures followed the preceding year in connexion with the invitation to meet in an African capital should be applied in the case at hand, that is, that the Council should accede in principle to the request of Panama and ask the Security Council Committee on Council Meetings away from Headquarters to study all aspects of the invitation—technical, administrative, financial, legal, political and other, including the formulation of an agreed agenda for its discussions—and to submit to the Council a report with its recommendations.

748. The representative of Panama stated that, after the Security Council meetings in Africa the previous year, his country had taken preliminary soundings among the Latin American countries and those countries represented on the Security Council as to the possibility of meeting in Panama. The response had been positive, and the Secretary-General had, at all times,

been kept informed. In Latin America, he said, there were problems related to colonialism, to the permanent sovereignty over natural resources, to disarmament, and to the denuclearized zones provided for in the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)—matters concerning which the Security Council must intensify its efforts in order to discharge its primary function of maintaining international peace and security. Security was not only a military concept; it was also, and very specially in the modern world, an economic concept. The depletion of the natural resources of one State by another and forcible pressure to obtain material advantages were latent elements of conflict that must be avoided. The existence of colonial dominions was in contradiction to the principle of self-determination and had an immediate impact on other parts of the world. The defence of natural resources was in a similar category and more urgent and pressing in Latin America, whose wealth had, for centuries, been handed over to semi-colonial exploitation by the industrially more developed States, which used all possible means to maintain a situation of colonial under-development. To ensure peace Latin American countries had to develop their wealth with their own means, manage their affairs without external intervention and reaffirm their sovereignty without the odious imposition of military or economic power, which had constituted the old imperialism and which currently sought new forms to organize the world. When the Security Council met for the first time on Latin American soil, it might well make recommendations to ensure the broadest possible implementation of the provisions of the Treaty of Tlatelolco by the States to which the treaty or its Additional Protocol I applied and to ensure the greatest effectiveness of the Treaty through the co-operation of the nuclear Powers, as provided for in its Additional Protocol II. Because Panama keenly desired the Panama Canal to be free from any warlike acts or any nuclear conflict, it was party to the Treaty, and its fundamental aspiration was that the régime for the Panama Canal should be adjusted to the principles enshrined in the United Nations Charter. Accordingly, the causes of conflicts that had arisen from the management of the operation of the interoceanic route by a foreign Power in the territory of Panama should be eliminated. Panama hoped that the Security Council, following the new policy of preventive diplomacy, would be able, during its stay in Panama, to realize that in the so-called Panama Canal Zone there was a colonialist situation, because that Zone was a real enclave that was foreign to the national jurisdiction, dividing Panama's territory into two parts, preventing the political, economic and social integration of the Republic and thus running counter to clear provisions of the United Nations Charter. The Panama Canal Zone was a hotbed of international tension, where a dangerous and potentially explosive situation existed. Panama claimed effective sovereignty and complete jurisdiction over its entire territory as basic points of a new treaty for the Panama Canal that would be genuinely just and equitable. As Panama wished its invitation to the Council to benefit not only the people of Panama but the people of Latin America and of the world, it would make available to the Security Council the necessary technical means and services to ensure the success of the meetings and would contribute adequately to defraying the expenses. It was particularly significant that all the countries of the Latin American group in the United Nations had given Panama's invitation their

support as expressed in document S/10859. Panama would be very pleased to have the high officials of the Latin American States and of the Organization of American States (OAS) attend the meetings. Panama was firmly convinced that the meetings of the Security Council in Africa had been a success, and it promised to contribute, within its means, to ensure that the meetings in Panama would be held in a serious and constructive atmosphere. That would be the best means for increasing enthusiasm for future meetings of the Security Council in Asia and in other parts of the world.

749. The representative of Peru said that his delegation warmly supported the proposal of the Government of Panama that the Council should meet in its capital during March. Panama had many reasons, geographical and historical, for aspiring to have the honour of being the site of so important a Council session. A series of meetings, as proposed by Panama, was fully in accord with the invitation to Member States contained in the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security to enhance, by all possible means, the authority of the Security Council and of its decisions. The countries that constituted the Latin American group at the United Nations wished the Council to know of, and be directly interested in their problems. It was certainly not a matter of disturbing the action of the regional Latin American organ. That had not been the case when the meetings were held in Addis Ababa, which was the headquarters of OAU. It was, rather, a matter of observing, through a universal approach, the extent to which critical situations latent in the continent might become acute and affect international peace and security. In offering its firm support for the proposal of Panama, his delegation expressed its confidence that the members of the Council would also support it.

750. The representative of France stated that his delegation readily accepted the principle of a series of Security Council meetings in Panama. Indeed, it was convinced that such meetings could afford an opportunity for a useful study of Latin American problems linked to the maintenance of international peace and security and thus coming under the primary responsibility of the Council. There was a useful precedent in the meetings held by the Security Council in Addis Ababa. The Council could therefore follow the course taken the preceding year and request the Committee on Council Meetings away from Headquarters to consider the questions raised by Panama's invitation. A distinction seemed necessary between problems linked to the organization of the meetings and preparation of the agenda and those having to do with the preparation of the work of the Council itself. Careful preparation of that work was indispensable to ensure the success of the meetings, whose duration would be rather limited in view of the number of Latin American representatives who would probably wish to address the Council. Such preparation, he suggested, could be made by the Committee at a second, later stage.

751. The representative of the United Kingdom stated that his delegation recognized the spirit in which the proposal had been put forward. If it was the wish of the majority of the members of the Council to accept, in principle, the invitation of the Government of Panama to meet in Panama City, his delegation was prepared to join in doing so. At the same time, he recalled the reservations that he had expressed previously in the Council when it had considered the invitation of OAU

to hold a series of Council meetings in Africa. The views of his delegation on the principle of the matter had not changed. While it naturally accepted that the Security Council might hold meetings at places other than the seat of the Organization, as the Charter provided, it was concerned that nothing should affect its capability to function continuously, as the Charter also stipulated. The fact that the Council had met in Addis Ababa a year ago had been in the nature of a special case, and he did not think there was any general disposition among the membership to regard it as a precedent. In the case at hand, no items relating directly to the particular problems of Latin America were under active consideration by the Council, which might reasonably be held to weaken the case for holding a series of Council meetings in that continent. Even if the Council were actively seized of Latin American questions, his delegation would still be concerned as to whether the holding of a series of meetings away from New York and closer to the scene of particular controversies might not affect the Council's ability to conduct a properly objective debate. To the extent that tension existed in the area, one could not be confident that it would be lessened by the Security Council's holding meetings there—rather the contrary. He thought that it would be right for the Committee on Meetings away from Headquarters to meet before the Council itself reached any decision on the issue. The fact that the Committee had not produced the guidelines that it had been asked to draw up for any future meetings away from New York seemed to support that view. Though there were a number of points to be clarified, for example, the cost to the United Nations of a series of meetings in Panama and the question of the agenda, his delegation would nevertheless join in a positive response to the generous invitation of the Government of Panama.

752. The representative of Guinea said that her delegation welcomed with sympathy the invitation of the Government of Panama. The success of the historic meetings at Addis Ababa had proved how important and timely it was for the Security Council to hold meetings away from Headquarters. The agenda item proposed by Panama was flexible and would provide an opportunity to consider more specifically international co-operation in Latin America in relation to the consideration of measures to strengthen international peace and security. Her delegation supported the proposal made by Ambassador Boyd to follow the same procedures as those used for the Addis Ababa meetings.

753. The representative of China stated that his delegation supported the proposal for holding Security Council meetings in the capital of Panama and appreciated the Panama Government's invitation. The forthcoming meetings would make a useful contribution towards supporting the Latin American countries in their struggle to safeguard their State sovereignty, national independence and economic resources and to oppose super-Power aggression, interference, subversion and control. His delegation was ready to work together with the countries that upheld justice and make its efforts to that end. As time was pressing, he urged that the Security Council, after taking the decision, should immediately proceed with the political preparations for the meetings.

754. The representative of Australia said that Australia would support the proposal in principle but with some reservations. Article 28, paragraph 3, of the Charter should be interpreted to mean that the Council

should normally meet at Headquarters but should also be able to meet elsewhere when there were very special reasons for doing so. There had been special and cogent reasons for holding a series of Council meetings in Africa, but that decision should not be regarded as a precedent. It was also particularly important that, if it decided to meet in Panama City, the Council should, at the same time, ensure that it could meet at short notice in New York if it should be called upon to deal with a sudden emergency elsewhere in the world. The proposed draft agenda seemed to his delegation somewhat broad and general in scope and in need of further study by the Committee on Security Council Meetings away from Headquarters. Notwithstanding its reservations, his delegation would support the Panamanian proposal in principle.

755. The representative of Austria stated that his Government fully supported the proposal of Panama. Its position was consonant with the reply given by Austria (A/8847/Add.1) when the Secretary-General requested suggestions by Member States on ways and means of strengthening the effectiveness of the Security Council in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter. In view of the reference made in that document to the meetings of the Council in Addis Ababa, he could only repeat that his delegation saw in them a happy precedent for similar experiments that should be carried out in future and considered that a series of meetings in a Latin American country would follow that line. Moreover, Austria had always held the view that every country should have the right and the possibility of requesting the inscription of items on the agenda of any United Nations body. The fact that the Latin American group had unanimously supported the invitation had exerted a decisive influence on the position taken by Austria in favour of the Panamanian proposal. His delegation was prepared to adopt a procedure similar to the one used in reaching a decision about meetings of the Council in an African capital.

756. At its 1685th meeting, also on 16 January, the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics stated that the Soviet Union considered that on-the-spot meetings would contribute to the successful solution of problems in various parts of the world that were likely to complicate relations among States. The series of meetings of the Council in Africa had convincingly shown the usefulness of such meetings away from Headquarters. The usefulness and need for convening the Security Council in Latin America were generally recognized and supported by all the countries of that continent. Furthermore, such a series of meetings in Latin America would better enable the Council to take cognizance of the problems that were of concern to the Latin American peoples. For these reasons, the Soviet delegation shared the view of other members of the Security Council and subscribed to the proposal to approve in principle the proposal of the Government of Panama for holding meetings of the Security Council in Panama City from 15 to 21 March and to transmit that proposal to the Security Council Committee on Council Meetings away from Headquarters so that it might study all its concrete aspects and present an appropriate report with its recommendations to the Security Council. At the meeting of the Security Council on 11 January 1972, he recalled, unanimous understanding had been reached that the main principles governing the practice of convening the Security Council in Africa could be applied in all similar situations,

as had been stressed in the final statement of the President of the Security Council, which, as everyone was aware, had not given rise to any objections or remarks on the part of the members of the Security Council.

757. The representative of the United States said that when the Council had discussed the matter of holding Council meetings in Africa, his delegation had enumerated certain factors that should be given serious consideration when the question of holding occasional meetings away from Headquarters was discussed. The invitation under discussion was not directly analogous to that of the previous year, which had not constituted a precedent. In Addis Ababa, the Council had considered urgent items of its agenda on which it had spent a large proportion of its time. His delegation was not aware of any comparably urgent items concerning the Latin American region of which the Council was actively seized that would justify meetings away from Headquarters, which the Charter provided might be held in such places as in the Council's judgement would "best facilitate its work". That being so, holding the proposed meetings was likely to appear capricious and based on the particular interests and the special considerations of an individual member. The agenda, of necessity, would be vague, general and contrived. Special issues would almost certainly be raised, and the net effect would be the artificial stimulation of debate on subjects not requiring Security Council consideration at the time. Neither an exchange on generalities nor an unnecessary debate on specifics would redound to the prestige and stature of the Council, or indeed to the prestige and stature of the United Nations. If there were bilateral problems, the best and the traditional way to proceed was through bilateral negotiations and, thereafter, should the need arise, through the existing regional system, utilizing the instrumentalities provided under Chapter VIII of the Charter. The representative of Panama had raised just such an issue in mentioning the Panama Canal, the status of which was under active bilateral negotiation. The United States did not, of course, accept the contention that the Canal Zone was a colonialist enclave. Moreover, it was already evident that the prospect of the Council meetings was stimulating a heated propaganda campaign in Panama, which would not be conducive to the kind of atmosphere needed for Security Council meetings or helpful for the future course of bilateral negotiations. The Council should not forget that practical questions arose in connexion with meetings away from Headquarters—such questions as finances and availability of communications. The members of the Security Council would be well advised to consider seriously the reservations that had been expressed and the consequences of the example for the future if the Council were to accept Panama's invitation.

758. The representative of Yugoslavia affirmed his delegation's strong and unqualified support for holding a session of the Council in Panama and urged the Council to agree unanimously to accept the invitation of the Panamanian Government. The success, the work and the accomplishments of the historic meetings in Addis Ababa would, by themselves, be enough to justify turning similar attention to the problems of peace, international security and co-operation of another great region and continent. Moreover, the proposed agenda would make it possible to engage in a very useful debate and to take adequate decisions on the problems of Latin America relating to the maintenance and pro-

motion of international peace, security and co-operation. Dealing with the relevant problems of Panama and of Latin America would constitute an exercise in preventive diplomacy, which the world badly needed. Yugoslavia was particularly grateful to Panama and all the Latin American countries because, in inviting the Council to help them deal with their problems, they had shown their undiminished confidence in the United Nations, in the Security Council and in their role and possibilities. That confidence was particularly valuable at a time when one so often heard lamentations over the so-called decrease in prestige of the United Nations and the Council. With regard to the exact drafting of the agenda for the meeting in Panama and other political matters of a substantive nature, the Yugoslav delegation welcomed the spirit of flexibility that had been indicated by many members.

759. The representative of India said that his delegation welcomed the offer of the Government of Panama and greatly looked forward to a most satisfactory organization of the meetings. His delegation's attitude was based on the fact that the proposal had received the unanimous support of the Latin American countries. It was desirable for the Council to respond positively and speedily to the unanimous wishes of a large and significant group of the United Nations. The agenda for the proposed meeting had been framed in general and broad terms that were nevertheless important, because the strengthening of international peace and security and the promotion of international co-operation in any region were legitimate matters for the Council's concern. Different regions faced problems that were peculiar to them, and for the Council to consider those problems as a whole was a worthy end and should be pursued. With regard to procedures, there should not be any difficulty in following the same pattern as that adopted for the meetings in Africa. In supporting the proposal of Panama, the Indian delegation noted that important details of substance and procedure would have to be worked out in advance in order to ensure the success of the meetings.

760. The representative of Kenya said that, in addition to being an expression of solidarity between his country and Panama, his delegation's wholehearted support of the Panamanian proposal rested on certain basic principles and considerations. The success of the meetings in Addis Ababa had shown the need for meetings away from Headquarters from time to time when justified by the nature of the problems to be dealt with. The presence of the Council in Panama City would greatly assist it in obtaining a full appreciation of the problems of Latin America. Moreover, the absence of the Council from Headquarters would in no way diminish its capability to deal with any unforeseen situation; with modern means of communication, the Council could function continuously as required by the Charter in Panama City just as at Headquarters. Finally, his delegation agreed that the procedure followed with regard to the meetings in Africa should again be followed.

761. The representative of the Sudan welcomed and supported the proposal of Panama. The agenda, which concerned the strengthening of international peace and security and international co-operation in Latin America, was closely connected with the problems of peace and security in Africa and elsewhere, and the meetings in Panama would help the Council to formulate a wider view and better understanding of the problems that it had the responsibility to solve. It was encour-

aging that the Latin American countries themselves welcomed the convening of the Council in Panama City, and that Panama had offered to provide all facilities and security and to make an appreciable financial contribution. His delegation agreed that the Council should accept the invitation in principle and authorize its Committee to report at the end of the following week on its study.

762. The President, speaking as the representative of Indonesia, stated that, for many of the same reasons given by others, his Government supported the invitation extended to the Council by the Government of Panama. His delegation also agreed that the same procedure should be followed as during the preparations for the Security Council meetings in Africa and that the matter should be referred to the Security Council Committee on Meetings away from Headquarters for further consideration of all its aspects.

Decisions: *At the 1685th meeting, on 16 January 1973, the Security Council decided without objection (a) to accept in principle, the invitation of Panama to meet in Panama City from 15 to 21 March 1973 and (b) to ask the Security Council Committee on Council Meetings away from Headquarters to consider all aspects of the Council's requirements, to make recommendations on technical, administrative, financial, legal, political and other aspects of the question, including the precise formulation of an agreed agenda, and to report to the Security Council not later than the end of the following week.*

3. REPORT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL COMMITTEE ON COUNCIL MEETINGS AWAY FROM HEADQUARTERS

763. On 25 January, the Security Council Committee on Council Meetings away from Headquarters submitted its second report (S/10868) to the Security Council. The Committee had held six meetings between 17 and 25 January, and agreed to follow the procedures adopted at its first meeting on 12 January 1972. The report devoted separate chapters to administrative and technical questions, to legal questions and to political questions. It also contained an annex concerning the administrative, technical and financial aspects of the arrangements for the meetings in Panama City.

764. With regard to the funding of the costs of the proposed Security Council meetings in Panama City, the United States had drawn attention to the need for the host Government to bear the additional cost involved in holding meetings of the Security Council in its territory, for inasmuch as the General Assembly had established that principle with regard to United Nations bodies by its resolutions 2609 (XXIV) and 2960 (XXVII), the Security Council should apply it to any invitations received to meet away from Headquarters. Some members of the Committee had expressed the view that the Council should act with prudence, as it might set precedents for the future. Most members, however, had considered that General Assembly resolution 2609 (XXIV) did not qualify the Security Council's power under Article 28, paragraph 3, of the Charter to hold meetings away from Headquarters when it considered that such meetings would facilitate its work, whether or not at the invitation of a host Government and whether or not the additional expenses were defrayed by the inviting Government. Consequently, they had maintained that additional expenses would be the responsibility of the Organization.

In summing up, the Chairman had stated that all members agreed that that was a very important aspect of the Committee's work. The majority had felt that the Council was acting under the provisions of Article 28, paragraph 3, and that the procedure to be followed with regard to funding should be the same as in the case of its meetings in Addis Ababa. The members of the Committee had expressed the hope that all possible efforts would be made to meet additional costs to the United Nations arising from meetings of the Council away from Headquarters in 1973 from the existing United Nations regular budget, as had been found possible in the case of the meetings held in Addis Ababa, without prejudice to the application of that recommendation to possible future meetings of the Council away from Headquarters.

765. In the course of the Committee's discussion, it had been repeatedly stressed that the technical arrangements for servicing the meetings in Panama and the communications facilities that would be required must be adequate to preserve the ability of the Security Council to discharge its primary responsibility under the Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security and to be so organized as to be able to function continuously.

766. The Committee's attention had also been drawn to the Council's directive to the Committee that it should endeavour to draft general guidelines that could be applied in all similar situations that might arise in the future (S/PV.1625). The Committee had agreed that it would meet again within three months after the meetings in Panama in order to discuss relevant questions related to any future meetings of the Security Council away from Headquarters, in line with the Committee's terms of reference.

767. The Committee made the following recommendations to the Security Council:

(a) That the Council confirm its decision to hold meetings in Panama City, beginning on Thursday 15 March and ending on Wednesday 21 March 1973;

(b) That, in principle, two meetings be held on each working day;

(c) That the meetings be provided with full verbatim records in accordance with rule 49 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council;

(d) That the agenda for the meetings to be held in Panama City be "Consideration of measures for the maintenance and strengthening of international peace and security in Latin America in conformity with the provisions and principles of the Charter";

(e) That the Council request the Secretary-General, in the light of the stated readiness of the Government of Panama to act as a host to the Security Council meetings and to provide certain facilities without charge to the United Nations, to enter into immediate negotiations with that Government with a view to concluding a conference agreement along the lines set out in the model agreement annexed to the Committee's first report (S/10514, annex 2);

(f) That the Council acknowledge with gratitude the offer of the Government of Panama to act as host to the Security Council.

768. Finally, the Committee had decided to recommend to the Security Council the adoption of the following draft resolution:

"The Security Council,

"Having considered the letter dated 9 January 1973 from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Panama addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/10858) by which the Security Council was informed, on behalf of the Government of Panama, that the latter had decided, on the basis of Article 28, paragraph 3, of the Charter of the United Nations, to propose that the Security Council should meet at Panama City, from 15 to 21 March 1973,

"Taking note of the unanimous support of the Latin American Group (S/10859) for the proposal of the Government of Panama,

"Recalling the decisions taken at its 1685th meeting on 16 January 1973, in particular the decision to accept in principle the proposal of Panama to meet at Panama City between 15 and 21 March 1973,

"Taking note, with gratitude, of the offer by the Government of Panama, in acting as host to the Security Council, to place at the Council's disposal whatever technical facilities and services might be necessary to ensure the success of the Council's meetings to be held at Panama City and to contribute appropriately to the costs arising therefrom,

"Having discussed the second report of the Security Council Committee on Council Meetings away from Headquarters (S/10868),

"Taking note, in particular, of the information preliminary cost estimates as contained in the annex to the Committee's report,

"Bearing in mind the recommendations submitted by the Committee in chapter VII of its report,

"1. Decides to hold meetings at Panama City, beginning on Thursday, 15 March, and ending on Wednesday, 21 March 1973, and that the agenda for these meetings shall be the 'Consideration of measures for the maintenance and strengthening of international peace and security in Latin America in conformity with the provisions and principles of the Charter';

"2. Expresses its gratitude to the Government of Panama for its stated readiness to act as host to the Security Council meetings and to provide certain facilities without cost to the United Nations;

"3. Requests the Secretary-General to enter into immediate negotiations with the Government of Panama with a view to concluding an appropriate conference agreement in accordance with the Committee's relevant recommendations."

4. CONSIDERATION OF THE REPORT AT THE 1686TH MEETING (26 JANUARY 1973)

769. The Security Council considered the second report of the Committee on Council meetings away from Headquarters (S/10868) at its 1686th meeting on 26 January.

Decision: *At its 1686th meeting, on 26 January 1973, the recommendations contained in paragraph 22 of the report of the Security Council Committee on Council Meetings away from Headquarters (S/10868) and the draft resolution recommended in paragraph 23 of that report were adopted without objection as representing the consensus of the views of the members of the Council. The draft resolution was adopted unanimously as resolution 325 (1973).*

5. OTHER COMMUNICATIONS

770. By a letter dated 9 March 1973 (S/10900), the representative of Panama, the President of the Security Council, requested the Secretary-General to circulate as a document of the Security Council a study entitled "The Economy of Panama and the Canal Zone", which had been carried out at Panama's request by experts provided by the Mexico City Office of the Economic Commission for Latin America and issued in Spanish only.

B. Meetings of the Security Council in Panama City from 15 through 21 March 1973

771. In accordance with resolution 325 (1973), the Security Council held 10 meetings, the 1695th to the 1704th, in Panama City from 15 to 21 March 1973. The provisional agenda for those meetings, as recommended by resolution 325 (1973), was "Consideration of measures for the maintenance and strengthening of international peace and security in Latin America in conformity with the provisions and principles of the Charter". During the course of those meetings the Security Council received messages from the President of Yugoslavia, the Prime Minister of India, the Holy See, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Argentina, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Brazil, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the German Democratic Republic, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Guatemala, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Nicaragua. These messages were read into the record of the Council by its President.

772. At its opening meeting in Panama City, the Council was addressed by the head of the Government of Panama, General Omar Torrijos, and by the Secretary-General.

773. In his address, General Torrijos, after welcoming the official visitors to his country in connexion with the meetings of the Council, stated that Panama understood full well the struggle of people who were suffering the humiliation of colonialism and of other peoples who, like the Panamanians, were suffering restrictions and subjection. Panama could not accept the economic subjection of one country by another, or political, economic or cultural penetration, since that was nothing other than neo-colonialism, a veiled and disguised colonialism that appeared in the form of economic assistance with conditions, assistance aimed not at the development of the country but at control over the people. It was an inherent and inalienable right of Panama to exploit its geographical position for the benefit of its own development. The struggle being fought by the peoples of the third world to obtain their true political and economic independence constituted one of the worthiest examples of a heritage to succeeding generations. The United Nations should not stand by as a mere spectator before the drama of mankind but should take a more active role in the solution of the true problems besetting the peoples. It was extremely difficult to understand how a country whose hallmark had been not to be colonialist insisted on maintaining a colony in the very heart of Panama. The representatives of the United States should know that it was more noble to redress an injustice than to perpetuate an error. Panama asked for moral help in the struggle engaged in by the weak. That struggle could triumph only when it was assisted by the conscience

of the world, and the Panamanian people was already reaching the limit of its patience.

774. The Secretary-General expressed thanks to the Government of Panama for its generous hospitality, and stated that regional co-operation had been fostered by the United Nations since the earliest days. In fact, even in matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security, which was the primary responsibility of the Security Council, regional action was not precluded. It was right that the Security Council should be made aware of the particular problems and potentialities of Latin America. The session of the Security Council in Panama should clearly demonstrate to the peoples of Latin America the deep concern and involvement of the United Nations in the establishment of a peaceful and prosperous future for them.

775. At its 1696th meeting, also held on 15 March, the President, after drawing attention to a letter to him dated 28 February (S/10892) from the representatives of Panama and Peru, extended an invitation, in accordance with their request and with the consent of the Council, under rule 39 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, to the Secretary-General of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL) and to the delegation accompanying him. During the course of the meetings in Panama, pursuant to their requests in accordance with Article 31 of the Charter, representatives of the following States Members of the United Nations were invited, with the consent of the Council, to participate in the discussion without the right to vote: Algeria, Argentina, Bolivia, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mauritania, Mexico, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zaire and Zambia.

776. The representative of Peru drew attention to certain specific situations where, because of non-application of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, international peace and security were endangered and said that the Council must deal with those situations in order to prevent future conflicts. First, he cited the problem of the so-called Canal Zone that the Republic of Panama had been faced with since achieving its independence, which was a shattering example of an unjust relationship between sovereign States. The situation of the Canal, he said, could not be legally defined as other than a colonial enclave. An agreement should be arrived at that would unequivocally establish the full sovereignty and unhampered jurisdiction of Panama over its entire territory, so that it might exercise full responsibility for the functioning of the interoceanic Canal, freely dispose of its natural resources and participate in the economic benefits to be derived from it. The solution must also guarantee a truly peaceful use of the waterway for the benefit of the international community through the neutralization of the Canal. The persistence of colonial situations in Latin America constituted a further permanent threat to the maintenance of international peace and security in the region. It was imperative that the principles of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) be fully and scrupulously implemented. Other critical situations in Latin America included all those forms of coercion resorted to by imperialism in order to maintain internal and external dominion over the countries of the area. Among those were economic and political measures

that had been termed "economic aggression". He referred to the amendments known as the Pell, Gonzalez, Hickenlooper amendments and other United States legislative acts as proof that the policy followed by the United States was in open contradiction to the elementary principles of international co-existence, because they hindered the progress of the developing countries. Peru, he said, would continue to contend that its full exercise of sovereignty and marine jurisdiction over the 200 miles of sea adjacent to its coasts was just on the basis of legitimate geographical, geological, economic and social reasons, and the threat of the application of coercive measures could not intimidate his country. The countries of Latin America which, like Peru, were devoting themselves to the transformation of their socio-economic structures found in certain transnational firms one of their main obstacles, because in many cases those firms tended to apply coercive measures affecting international co-operation, to create virtual economic or financial blockades in international sources of credit and even to interfere in international trade itself. Those activities constituted violations of the United Nations Charter, as had been recognized in a series of resolutions adopted by the General Assembly. Another situation that he mentioned was the isolation of Cuba from the inter-American community and the blockade of that country, which was at variance with the principles set forth in the Charter. Moreover, Peru, which had encouraged and advocated the Treaty of Tlatelolco for the denuclearization of Latin America, called upon the great Powers that had not already done so to adhere to it and drew attention to the danger inherent in the continuation of nuclear tests, particularly those being carried out in the South Pacific.

777. The representative of Guyana stated that it was the clear duty of the Council continuously to explore new ways of discharging its responsibilities, one of which must surely be the elaboration and development of preventive diplomacy. The investigative jurisdiction conferred by Article 34 of the Charter was not restricted to specific disputes brought to the Council on the basis of adversary proceedings but could be invoked by institutionalizing a system of periodic checks through discriminate use of the power conferred by Article 28, paragraph 3. The Government of Guyana supported wholeheartedly the objectives of the Treaty of Tlatelolco; but Guyana was not a signatory to that Treaty because it was said to be excluded by article 25 of the Treaty from accepting its obligations because of a prior dispute between an extra-continental country and a Latin American State, which had existed before Guyana attained independence. Such exclusionary arrangements damaged the fabric of Latin American co-operation. The Council's examination of means of securing the maintenance and strengthening of international peace and security in Latin America should take account of the economic conditions of the region. The new thrust for economic security was based on certain principles: respect for the permanent sovereignty of all States over their natural resources, whether of land or of the seas and submarine areas adjacent and sub-jacent to their coasts; respect for, and active support of, the right of all States to carry out such collective and structural changes as they deemed indispensable to their social and economic progress; the necessity for effective dialogue with the dominant economic Powers and, more especially, with the dominant economic Power within the hemisphere itself, so that economic

relations might more closely reflect the declared objectives of the international development strategy; and, beyond relations between States, a determined effort to grapple with the many-sided problems arising from the economic power complexes for which the multinational corporations had been responsible. Those efforts, founded on the concept of self-reliance, needed and deserved the positive support of the Council as Latin America entered a crucial period of change. The Council should acknowledge that economic, no less than military, aggression was a violation of the Charter, constituting not merely a threat to, but an assault upon, the peace and security of the area. It should also come to grips with the phenomenon of the multinational corporation and devise mechanisms for ensuring that its non-governmental character did not place it beyond the reach of the Council's authority. The Council must also consider those issues that agitated relations between Panama and the United States of America. It was to the credit of both Governments that they had embarked upon processes of bilateral dialogue and negotiation that had as their agreed objective the establishment of new arrangements for the operation of that important waterway for the world's shipping. It was the duty of the Council to give its full support and every assistance to all such efforts for a peaceful and effective solution.

778. The representative of Mexico recalled that the General Assembly had expressed with particular firmness its belief that there was a close interrelationship between the strengthening of international security and disarmament and the economic development of countries. In regard to disarmament, the Latin American region could be proud of having given the world a significant example by establishing the first — and so far the only — zone covered by a statute for the complete absence of nuclear weapons over densely populated territories. The Council would do well to add its powerful voice to those of the General Assembly and of the Secretary-General to urge States that could become parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, as well as those for whom the two Additional Protocols were intended, to take all the appropriate measures so that the Treaty would rapidly be in force with the largest possible number of countries and be most effective. Concerning economic development, he stated that the growing gap between the industrialized countries and the developing countries constituted one of the most serious threats to the peace of the world. To build a just and equitable international economic order, where the rights of all countries, particularly the rights of the developing countries, were defined and protected, was a primary duty of the international community. The charter on the economic rights and duties of States proposed by the President of Mexico at the Third United Nations Conference on Trade and Development in April 1972 would represent an invaluable contribution to the fulfilment of that primary duty, and it was to be hoped that it would soon come into force. Economic co-operation among nations within that framework would constitute one of the most effective means of consolidating peace. With regard to the problem of the Panama Canal, which had aspects of interest to the entire international community, if the two parties directly concerned strove to adjust their respective positions to the principles of the United Nations Charter, it would not be difficult to arrive at a mutually and generally accepted agreement. All America was awaiting the outcome. It was difficult in modern times to conceive of a treaty in

perpetuity being still in force, above all, when almost all the burdens were imposed on one party and the other enjoyed all — or almost all — the prerogatives.

779. The representative of Colombia stated that, in Latin American eyes, a sovereign and independent State should have the right to exploit the natural resources of its territory. Foreign capital must be invested in the region with a view to a genuine participation in the economic and social development of the countries and not for speculative purposes. Foreign capital could give considerable assistance to development if it helped, rather than hindered, the advance of national industry with real technological contributions. The regulation of commodity prices and opening up of markets for processed goods were essential to overcome the colonial mercantile scheme, which had imposed an exchange of industrial goods by a few privileged countries for raw materials from the poorer countries. It would also be necessary to re-evaluate the financial and monetary situation. If one sincerely sought peace and security, it was indispensable to give priority to the economic conditions of the countries of the third world, among them Latin America. With regard to disarmament, a major responsibility of the great Powers, Colombia believed that it was desirable to eliminate unnecessary or sophisticated armaments in Latin America as one means of contributing to universal disarmament and increasing investments for economic and social development. The Treaty of Tlatelolco was indispensable in preventing Latin America from becoming a storage depot for nuclear weapons or an atomic testing ground. Concerning the law of the sea, it was necessary to incorporate in international law the doctrine of the sovereignty of the coastal States over the natural living resources of the sea adjacent to their coasts, in order to preserve those resources for the benefit of those States and to permit freedom of navigation and overflights. The problem of the Panama Canal was a bilateral question, and the two States concerned had undertaken direct negotiations, through which it was hoped they would obtain a solution. It seemed clear that under international law any independent State had clear sovereign power within the territory marked out by its national frontiers. The contrary would be tantamount to maintaining in perpetuity situations of colonial domination. On the other hand, Colombia enjoyed special transit rights through the Panama Canal, and there was a continental interest in free transit for all nations. The interoceanic Canal constituted one of the most important maritime routes for the world, and its free transit was essential for international trade and communication.

780. The representative of Cuba stated that the hemisphere showed clearly the growing gap between development and under-development in Latin America and the growing development of the United States which, usurping the rights of the native population, extracted the wealth of those countries, taken over their natural resources, forced labour conditions down, exploited investments, forced financial dependency upon them, broken off scientific exchange through the transmission of obsolete technology, and was engaged in ideological penetration and political dominion, as well as diplomatic and military usurpation. One could not depend on the international co-operation of imperialism to shatter the vicious circle of relations between the developed capitalist countries and the dependent and under-developed nations. There could be no liberation and development without a revolutionary change in the

economic and social structures that would make basic changes in the means of production, such as agrarian reform and the nationalization of the key sectors of the economy. Cuba, Chile and Peru were the first exponents of the new revolutionary situation that had gained ground in Latin America as a challenge to the ominous conditions that existed. In the field of disarmament, he said, Cuba had not subscribed to the Treaty of Tlatelolco because its aims would be unattainable until it covered also denuclearization of the only nuclear Power in the hemisphere. The main item on the agenda was the threat to international peace and security in the hemisphere that lay in neo-colonial relations imposed on Panama by the United States under a treaty that infringed and violated the most elementary norms of international law. Cuba considered that the perpetuity of that neo-colonial agreement should be abrogated, and the concessions as well, because there had been no free consent. The will of the United States had been imposed without the approval of the Panamanian people. As the neo-colonial enclave was affecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Panama, full enjoyment of its inherent powers over the entire territory of the isthmus must be returned to that country. Cuba considered imperative the immediate dismantling of the military bases and the neutralization of the Canal. Cuba also considered the nationalization of that natural resource for the benefit of its people to be an inalienable and imprescriptible right of Panama that must be exercised immediately. If peace and security were desired in Latin America, the rights to full independence, sovereignty and self-determination must be respected, including the power and right of all States to carry out structural changes and select their roads to development without foreign interference, be it economic blockade, trade embargo, coercive action in international credit organizations, diplomatic pressure, direct or indirect reprisal, ideological frontiers, the Hickenlooper amendment or open or veiled aggression. The hour had already struck when all forms and manifestations of colonialism and neo-colonialism in Latin America must be wiped out, including the Associated Free State of Puerto Rico, the seditious activities of transnational enterprises and the naval base of Guantánamo, a part of Cuba's national territory taken over against the express will of its people and used after the triumph of the Cuban revolution as a nest for counter-revolutionaries and spies. It was up to the Security Council to set the political and juridical framework that would guarantee recognition, obedience and respect for the sovereign rights of Panama in its negotiations with the United States regarding the Canal Zone. The alternative was clear-cut and final: either the Canal and the Canal Zone were made Panamanian and Latin America was allowed to be freed and developed or peace and security would be increasingly endangered in that part of the world.

781. The representative of the United States, speaking in exercise of his right of reply, rejected without qualification the calumny directed against his country by the representative of Cuba, as well as the counsels of hate which had poisoned the atmosphere of the Security Council, a body dedicated to friendship and concord. The accusations against his country were so far removed from the truth as to be unworthy of detailed reply. There were many differences that must be patiently resolved by the process of diplomacy in the western hemisphere and in the world; but the approach that had just been heard was not the way to achieve

the high purposes of the Security Council or to fulfil the world's hopes for it and for the United Nations. The current meeting was being held to contribute to the maintenance of peace and security in the western hemisphere; the statements of the representative of Cuba had done nothing to advance that goal.

782. At the 1697th meeting, on 16 March, the representative of Ecuador stated that the Security Council, in studying the problems affecting the security and sovereignty of the nations of Latin America, would include the problem of Panama, which was one requiring a just and adequate solution, inasmuch as Panamanian interests, as well as those of the entire hemispheric community, were at stake. It was imperative that scrupulous respect be paid to the legal equality of States, and, political security must go hand in hand with economic security. The security of Latin America required its economic development and its social and cultural growth. Such development must necessarily call for the recognition of the full right of all States to enjoy and exploit their natural resources within their own sovereignty and jurisdiction. A source of great concern and worry, and a threat to the peace of America, was the question of fishing rights in areas outside the coastal zone and in the strategic, political and economic hegemony flouting the legitimate marine rights of Latin America. That usurpation not only stood in the way of development by taking away resources but threatened national sovereignty and dignity. Ecuador categorically rejected that type of policy, just as it protested a system of sanctions imposed beyond the juridical rights of great Powers in order to curtail the rights of coastal States over their adjacent seas, the soil and subsoil thereof and the natural resources therein. In Latin America, as in the rest of the world, the norms and principles that guided international co-existence must prevail. Scrupulous observance of those principles was the unequivocal way of guaranteeing mutual respect among States and unhampered utilization of their natural resources to benefit and assist the development of peoples. Any policy that, directly or indirectly, might undermine those fundamental tenets would create an atmosphere of concern and a threat to international security. Ecuador was fully convinced that in Panama the Security Council would carry out a careful consideration of the major problems besetting Latin America and thus defend the security and development of its peoples under the aegis and with the safeguards of those principles for which the United Nations and OAS stood.

783. The representative of Chile stated that it was particularly important that the Security Council should meet its responsibilities in the case of Latin America, because arbitrary actions and injustices had been perpetrated under the shelter of interpretations imposed by the most powerful country on the continent. One of the matters of the greatest legal and political importance that the Council should consider was the coercive measures applied to Cuba by the system of regional security within the framework of OAS, which constituted a grave threat to peace. It should also consider those resolutions of the General Assembly intended to implement the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security, namely, General Assembly resolutions 2880 (XXVI) and 2993 (XXVII). The internal laws of the United States were another form of pressure used by imperialism to maintain dominance over other countries. Some of those laws affected Peru and Ecuador, which, together with Chile, were

members of the maritime system of the southern Pacific designed to preserve and protect the economic wealth of the 200-mile maritime zone. Other laws, such as those that instructed the representative of the United States to vote against applications for credits by countries which had nationalized United States property and interests, constituted a grave threat to Chile's economic security in violation of the resolutions of the General Assembly mentioned above. The initiative of the President of Mexico for a charter of the economic rights and duties of States would be an effective means to consolidate peace and security and had the enthusiastic support of the Chilean Government. Because it had applied a consistent policy of recovering its natural resources and vital sectors of its economy, Chile had suffered the consequences of a series of aggressive activities, direct and indirect, by some major transnational companies that had been affected by that policy. Some of those actions were even criminal and a matter of public notoriety, and his delegation wished to draw attention to that matter because it constituted one of the gravest threats against Chile in violation of the principles of international law contained in the relevant General Assembly resolutions. Finally, he stated, Chile was alarmed that the question of the Panama Canal had not been solved through bilateral negotiations, owing to the intransigence of a great Power. Given that situation, which threatened a small peace-loving State and could endanger international peace and security, the Chilean delegation expressed the solidarity of its Government with the just cause of the Government and people of Panama in their struggle to recover full sovereignty over the entire territory without their consent.

784. The representative of El Salvador, after reviewing the background of the Panama Canal issue, stated that the current status of the Canal was a political anachronism which he hoped would be revised appropriately and in time, first, through the efforts of those directly concerned or, second, through the appropriate organs of the regional system and the international community. He considered that regional and universal participation were necessary in order to encourage and help in the achievement of a direct settlement. Sovereignty over natural resources was an unchallengeable right, and in the last few years anything that might be in opposition to that right had been objected to by international public opinion. It was clear that the greatest natural resource of Panama was its geographical location. El Salvador fully supported the claims of Panama over the Canal Zone, as did other Latin American States. His Government appealed to the friendly Governments directly concerned in the controversy to re-examine their relations and their agreements and to bring to bear the knowledge and respect for those principles that they had helped to forge in the course of their participation in international organizations. He trusted that the dissected territory of Panama would soon be united, physically, politically and legally, and that its great geographical resources would be left forever to benefit the Panamanians themselves and thereby allow that nation to fulfil its universal mission when it offered its geographical resources to all the nations of the world for their maritime needs.

785. The representative of Argentina stated that his Government supported Panama in its claim for full and effective sovereignty over the Panama Canal Zone

and expected that Panama's aspirations would find an adequate response in more vigorous negotiations in future. New legal rules to regulate that situation were needed to bring it up to date with the times; and the perpetuity of the Treaty of 1903 must give way to new political, economic and legal elements. Latin America had always attached the utmost value to the standard of peace through law, a legal heritage that represented one of the most important contributions offered by the region to the international community. Argentina had always emphasized the fundamental importance of such principles as non-intervention in the external or internal affairs of States, respect for ideological pluralism, rejection of foreign interference in any form, legal equality among States, peaceful solution of international disputes, opposition to the threat or use of force in inter-State relations, respect for the territorial integrity of every State, non-recognition of the acquisition of territories by force, non-use of coercive measures, whether political or economic, self-determination of peoples with proper safeguard for the territorial integrity of States, preservation of the fundamental rights of the human person and condemnation of every form of violence that threatened those rights, the sovereign right of each people freely to dispose of its natural resources, the obligation to protect the common environment, a just basis for the structure of international trade and steps to prevent the adoption in their absence of decisions affecting the developing countries in the economic and financial fields. The continuing arms race was one of the situations that conspired against the relaxation of tension throughout the world. Argentina believed that new impetus must be given to negotiations on disarmament. To that end it was indispensable that all the nuclear Powers, including France and the People's Republic of China, should participate. Another factor that disturbed international security was the survival of colonial situations in all regions of the world. In accordance with General Assembly resolution 2065 (XX), negotiations must continue to find a peaceful solution to the dispute between Argentina and the United Kingdom regarding sovereignty over the Malvinas Islands. If the United Kingdom was not prepared to continue the negotiations recommended by that resolution, Argentina would feel free to act to seek the final eradication of that anachronistic colonial situation. The continuation of such a situation could only serve as an irritant to all relations with Latin America, particularly because the question of the Malvinas Islands was not the only colonial vestige still affecting the American continent.

786. Mr. Gros Espiell, Secretary-General of OPANAL, to whom an invitation had been extended under rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedures, put before the Council a number of considerations relating to the Treaty of Tlatelolco and indicating the contribution the Security Council could make towards solving the problems of peace and security in Latin America. He described the provisions of the Treaty and the functions of OPANAL and expressed the hope that the two Latin American States that had not yet signed the Treaty and the two signatory States that had not yet ratified the Treaty would soon be able to do so. Two of the four non-Latin American States with responsibilities for the Territories in the zone, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, had signed and ratified Additional Protocol I of the Treaty, but the others had not. It would make a fundamental contribution to the peace and security of the region if the latter two States

signed and ratified that Protocol. Two nuclear-weapon States, the United States and the United Kingdom, had signed and ratified Additional Protocol II, and the People's Republic of China had taken an important first step by committing itself to respect the denuclearization for warlike purposes of Latin America; but the two other nuclear-weapon States had failed to sign that Protocol. It was to be hoped that the Security Council would join the General Assembly in requesting those States to sign that document.

787. At the 1698th meeting, held on the same day, the representative of Jamaica stated that one of the root causes of international tension was the effective denial of the right of self-determination to peoples. He said that because of fear for their security, the people of Belize had not been able to reach out for the sovereignty and independence that was rightfully theirs. Interference in the domestic affairs of States by other States, and the maintenance of large arsenals were also cause of international tension. Moreover, international co-operation in economic relations was significantly inadequate. Nations had to struggle with the problems of poverty and under-development and to provide the higher standard of living demanded by their peoples within a system of international economic relations that ensured that the lion's share of the gains from production continued to accrue to the wealthy nations. There was no long-term cause of tension or threat to international peace more gravely menacing than the conditions governing economic relations among nations. With regard to the Panama Canal, he noted that the original Treaty of 1903 had twice been reviewed, and on both occasions, in recognition of the changing patterns of relations between the parties concerned, substantial readjustments in favour of Panama had been agreed upon. Both parties, therefore, should be encouraged to continue the process of peaceful negotiation based on the principle of the sovereign equality of States. With regard to disarmament, he urged that those great Powers that had not yet done so should speedily sign and ratify Additional Protocol II to the Treaty of Tlatelolco and that every independent State in the region should become a party to the Treaty itself. He considered it important that the Council actively concern itself not merely with direct and imminent threats to peace that might arise in Latin America but with the causes of tension, the economic inequities and the failures to observe the principles of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other States that might lead eventually to the breakdown of international peace and security.

788. The representative of Venezuela stated that one of the conditions necessary for the establishment of complete and genuine peace was real equality among national communities, including the final elimination of racism. Another was an order among the peoples of the world inspired by international social justice. A third condition was the establishment of active solidarity that would really unite the different peoples of the earth. In Latin America there was a clear awareness that it was the sovereign right of all States to develop, explore, conserve, exploit, make use of and dispose of their natural resources. There was also firm support for the principle that any attempt to prevent the exercise of that legitimate right would jeopardize the principle of self-determination and non-intervention and might become a threat to international peace and security. In the case of the Panama Canal, the negotiations between the parties had not lived up

to expectations, but it was to be hoped that the two States, with which Venezuela maintained cordial relations, would be able to arrive at a just and equitable solution by way of direct negotiations, which was the best means for the peaceful settlement of disputes. He reaffirmed the complete solidarity of the people and Government of Venezuela with the people and Government of Panama in their just claims.

789. The representative of Uruguay stated that his country considered that the question of the Panama Canal was a bilateral matter, even though it did affect general principles and interests. It was the subject of negotiations between Panama and the United States, and Uruguay ardently hoped that it would be solved in a manner satisfactory to both parties in order to comply with the principles of justice, equity and the sovereign equality of States. He also stressed the importance that Uruguay attached to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which served as an instrument for peace and security on the continent, and he urged the Security Council to help ensure the signature and ratification of both the Treaty and its Protocols. Uruguay had adopted an unshakable stand regarding affirmation of the principle of the right of all nations to sovereignty over their natural resources and reiterated its full right to the utilization of the resources of its territorial sea, whose outer limits were legitimately set at 200 maritime miles, as well as the exploitation of the resources of its continental shelf.

790. The representative of Costa Rica considered the question of the Panama Canal a bilateral matter to be solved directly by the parties concerned. He hoped that the bilateral negotiations would be resumed in a spirit of harmony and justice. Costa Rica firmly supported the aspirations of Panama in its effort to renegotiate the Canal Treaty so as to secure complete Panamanian sovereignty over the Canal Zone and obtain greater benefits from its geographical position. That stand was taken with no hostility towards the Government of the United States, with whom his country had excellent relations and whose diplomats were determined to arrive at a just solution of the problem. History showed that as long as the Treaty remained in force there could be no just treatment for Panama. The United States must grant Panama the abrogation of the Canal Treaty of 1903 and replace it by another that would equitably regulate the operation and defence of the Panama Canal, with Panamanian participation in its administration, without the United States claiming sovereignty over the Canal Zone and privileges for its nationals living there or depriving Panamanians of the legitimate benefits of their geographical position, thereby while eliminating forever the irritating situation of maintaining a Government within another Government.

791. The representative of Bolivia stated that no programme to develop the integration of Latin America could be truly effective while Bolivia remained isolated and land-locked; nor could any international forum be satisfied if it did not endeavour to find a solution to the Bolivian-Chilean problem. Bolivia joined in protesting other injustices, but nothing had been said about the right of all peoples to enjoy access to the sea. Peoples trapped by mountains were isolated and their economic, social and political progress and improvement indefinitely postponed. The Government and People of Bolivia stressed their firm will to return to the sea. That unchallenged and permanent right

could not be denied by anyone, unless he was endeavouring to perpetuate an injustice and condemn to final strangulation a nation that had proved its sincere solidarity with peace-loving and freedom-loving peoples, including those of Panama.

792. The representative of Guatemala, speaking in exercise of his right of reply, referred to the subject of Belize because the representatives of Guyana and Jamaica had alluded to the intention of "a neighbouring country" of Belize. He said that Guatemala had waged a tenacious struggle to regain part of its territory but that the development of Peten, the northern department of Guatemala, had been hindered by a wall in the form of a British colony that stood in the way of access to the sea. Peten and Belize were one geopolitically and indispensable to one another for the development of both. Conversations with the United Kingdom to find an equitable solution to the problem, sometimes joined by colleagues in Belize, had been suspended for the time being because, at the end of 1971, in an effort to intimidate it, excessive numbers of British troops had been landed on the territory of Belize and were still there. Guatemala had at all times sought an equitable solution, trying to safeguard law, justice and the balanced development of the region. As far as the people of Belize were concerned, Guatemala had offered them helpful assistance to allow them to develop integrally with Guatemala in an atmosphere of peace and security. Guatemala's rights to the territory of Belize were inalienable and imprescriptible. It was possible that one day Guatemala would be forced to turn to the Security Council, but so far the problem had not been submitted to the Council.

793. The President, speaking as the representative of Panama, submitted the following draft resolution (S/10931), sponsored by Panama and Peru, regarding the Panama Canal:

"The Security Council,

"Having considered the question of the Panama Canal Zone under the item entitled 'Consideration of measures for the maintenance and strengthening of international peace and security in Latin America in conformity with the provisions and principles of the Charter',

"Bearing in mind that it is a purpose of the United Nations to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace,

"Having heard the statements made before it by the representatives of the Republic of Panama and the United States of America,

"1. Takes note that both Governments, in the Joint Declaration signed before the Council of the Organization of American States on 3 April 1964, agreed to reach a fair and just agreement;

"2. Takes note further of the disposition shown by the Governments of Panama and the United States of America to conclude the following agreements :

"(a) To abrogate the Isthmian Canal Convention of 1903 and its amendments;

"(b) To conclude an entirely new treaty regarding the present Panama Canal;

"(c) To respect Panama's sovereignty in all its territory;

"(d) To ensure the reintegration of the territory known as the Canal Zone with the Republic of Panama, putting an end to said Zone as an area under United States jurisdiction;

"(e) To give back to Panama the jurisdictional prerogatives assumed by the United States in the so-called Panama Canal Zone, on the dates subject to negotiation;

"(f) To lay the groundwork for the assumption by the Republic of Panama of full responsibility for the operation of the Canal;

"3. Calls upon the parties directly concerned to execute promptly a new treaty, including the agreements mentioned above, for the purpose of eliminating the causes of conflict between the two countries;

"4. Urges the Governments of the United States of America and the Republic of Panama to resume negotiations in a high spirit of friendship, mutual respect and co-operation;

"5. Declares that the effective neutralization of the Panama Canal will foster international peace and security and the maintenance of the peaceful use of the Canal by the international community;

"6. Decides to propose the inclusion of the item on the question of the neutralization of interoceanic canals in the agenda of the next regular session of the General Assembly;

"7. Decides to keep the question under consideration."

794. Introducing the draft resolution, the representative of Panama stated that the two delegations had been encouraged to submit it by the statements that had been made regarding the situation of the Panama Canal Zone and the Canal itself, and by the fact that the Council had the power to adopt effective measures to prevent and eliminate threats to the peace. Panama and the United States had committed themselves to agree on a just and equitable settlement of the problem, but so far no satisfactory agreement between the parties had been achieved, and the controversy had become an explosive situation likely to endanger international peace and security. Clearly the Council had the power to study the matter. Since the United States, through its most authorized spokesmen, had expressed its readiness to achieve formal and specific agreements on the Canal Zone and the interoceanic Canal, the draft resolution offered a constructive formula that might allow the Security Council, in exercise of the powers vested in it by Article 37, paragraph 2 of the Charter, to indicate ways by which the two parties could solve the problem.

795. The representative of the United Kingdom, in exercise of the right of reply, rejected the account given by the representative of Guatemala of developments concerning British Honduras (Belize). He agreed that the issue was not on the agenda of the Council, and his delegation did not wish it to be on the agenda. However, his Government had no doubt about its sovereignty in British Honduras (Belize) and shared the hope that a peaceful settlement could be reached in discussions between the two Governments.

796. At the 1699th meeting, on 19 March, the Security Council agreed to a request made by the representatives of Guinea, Kenya and the Sudan in a letter dated 16 March (S/10930) that it extend an invitation under rule 39 of the provisional rules of

procedure to Mr. Mamadou Diarra, Executive Secretary of OAU in New York. Similar invitations were extended under rule 39 to the Chairman of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and to the Chairman of the Special Committee on *Apartheid*, who had addressed letters to the President of the Security Council, informing him of decisions taken by those two United Nations Committees to request that their respective Chairmen be given the opportunity to address the Council.

797. The representative of Trinidad and Tobago urged that the Governments of Panama and the United States must be encouraged to resume negotiations with the least possible delay on the basis of the principles of international relations that had come to be accepted in the contemporary world. His Government supported Panama in its determination to reach a fair and just agreement. He referred also to another historical residue — avoidance by the regional organization of adherence to the principles of universality and non-discrimination in relations between States. He deplored the exclusionary arrangements that persisted in the inter-American system, as well as Cuba's isolation from that system. Moreover, his Government supported the legitimate aspirations of the people of British Honduras to exercise their inalienable right to self-determination and independence. Finally, it was the hope of his delegation that the Security Council Committee on Council Meetings away from Headquarters would be able to meet as indicated in paragraph 18 of its second report (S/10868) and succeed in developing further and positively the Council's ideas with regard to the opportunities provided in Article 28, paragraph 3, of the Charter.

798. The representative of Zambia stated that his country would fully support any measures that might ensure for the States of Latin America the safety of their territorial integrity and sovereignty. In his capacity as President of the United Nations Council for Namibia, he conveyed on its behalf felicitations and appreciation to the States of Latin America for the stalwart manner in which they had supported that Council's work, both in the General Assembly and as members of the Council for Namibia.

799. The representative of China stated that the Chinese Government and people fully understood, deeply sympathized with and actively supported the Panamanian Government and people in their patriotic struggle against an unequal treaty imposed on them by imperialists. The Panamanian Government's position with regard to the Canal Zone was just and its demand reasonable. The Latin American States had initiated the struggle for 200-mile maritime rights, and it was his Government's position that all coastal countries were entitled to determine reasonably the limits of their territorial seas and jurisdiction according to their geographical conditions, taking into account the needs of their security and national economic interests, and had the right to dispose of their natural resources in their coastal seas, sea-bed and the subsoil thereof. The Chinese Government also attached great importance to, and supported the efforts of, the Latin American countries for the denuclearization of Latin America. His delegation was pleased that China's position regarding the Latin American nuclear-free zone had been welcomed and understood by many Latin American

countries. The Chinese Government had consistently stood for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. It was ready to work together with the peoples of Latin America for the attainment of that lofty goal. China was a developing country, as were those of Latin America. The Chinese Government and people firmly supported the Latin American countries and peoples in their just struggle to safeguard their national independence, protect their national resources and develop their national economies. China was convinced that it was essential to rely on one's own strength and to wage a protracted arduous struggle in pursuance of the policy of relying mainly on one's own efforts, while seeking external assistance as an auxiliary in the development of the national economy. His delegation considered that the Security Council should support the struggle for independence waged by the colonial peoples in the Caribbean that had not yet achieved independence, the struggle of the Panamanian people to recover their territory and sovereignty over the Canal Zone and the Cuban people's struggle to recover Guantánamo, where the United States continued to maintain its military base. It should demand the withdrawal of all foreign troops and the dismantling of all foreign military bases from Latin America and help to safeguard the national independence, protect the national resources and develop the national economy of the Latin American countries.

800. The representative of Indonesia stated that his delegation hoped to contribute to the establishment of international peace and security in Latin America, as well as elsewhere, although it recognized that the strengthening of peace and security in any region should primarily be the responsibility of the countries of that region. The problems of peace and security in Latin America, therefore, should remain primarily the concern of the countries of Latin America themselves, although, of course, those from outside the area should try to contribute as much as possible to their solution. He pointed out that the problem of sovereignty over natural resources constituted one of the important elements for the economic and social development of a country and its people and was therefore a factor that might influence peace and security. To avoid social and political unrest it was important for developing countries to attain a sufficient stage of material well-being to satisfy the growing needs and demands of its people. That might be accomplished by effective exploration and rational exploitation of the country's natural resources. However, not all developing countries had means to develop their natural resources on their own. Most of them lacked the necessary funds and technical know-how and needed outside assistance to speed up the process. Indonesia considered that private foreign investment could help provide the necessary financial and technological tools for the exploitation of natural resources; but it was necessary, first, to ensure that the economic objectives of the nation and any negative aspects of private foreign investment could be met, in order to be able to minimize, if not to prevent entirely, the possibility of coercion by foreign economic and financial interests. It was necessary that those who sought the rewards offered by such investment should adjust themselves to the milieu, the social and political climate in which they operated. The existence of affluent enclaves, especially if they were foreign, contrasting blatantly with the local surroundings, would certainly not be conducive to the political and social peace. His delegation understood that there was basic agreement with

regard to the sovereign rights of Panama over the territory. The implementation of that basic agreement was a matter of negotiation, taking into account the legitimate interests of both parties and of the world at large for the efficient functioning and the quality of services of the Canal as an important waterway connecting two important world seas. His delegation hoped that the successful conclusion of the negotiations could be speeded up in order to avoid undesired developments that might endanger peace and security in the region.

801. The representative of Yugoslavia stated his delegation's full support for Panama's indisputable right to have its effective sovereignty and jurisdiction fully established over every inch of its territory — its inherent right fully to integrate both parts of its own country and nation and to be the sovereign owner and user of all its natural resources and geographic assets. There must be, without delay, full re-integration of the so-called Canal Zone with the rest of Panama and respect for its national sovereignty. Panama should assume full responsibility for the functioning of the transoceanic Canal, and arrangements for the defence of any part of its territory should be freely and solely decided by Panama. It would be preferable for all that to be done through negotiations by the parties directly involved, provided the negotiations were conducted in good faith and aimed at the timely and effective granting of Panama's basic rights. Moreover, all colonial enclaves and all vestiges of foreign domination in Latin America, particularly those affecting the territorial integrity of States or their right to choose their own ways of life, should be removed once and for all. With regard to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, his delegation urged that it and its two Protocols be adhered to by all States entitled or invited to adhere to it, without any discrimination, in the hope that the successful denuclearization of that vast region would lead in time to denuclearization spreading over the entire globe. In addition, no one had the right to conduct nuclear tests in other people's areas and to contaminate their environments. The proposal of a charter on economic rights and obligations of States put forward by the President of Mexico had Yugoslavia's full support. It also supported the position and national requirements of Latin American countries for a 200-mile limit to the territorial sea, national sovereignty over the natural resources of the sea-bed and the sea itself through the new concepts of the patrimonial sea. It likewise advocated the normalization of relations between all countries in Latin America against any form of discrimination or establishment of artificial barriers among them and against any attempts at isolation, blockade or economic coercion. Finally, he declared, it was high time that the cold war isolation and blockade of Cuba were removed.

802. The representative of Australia, observing that the problem of the Panama Canal Zone was principally a bilateral dispute, made the following points. First, the continued operation of the Panama Canal at the current high level of efficiency was of vital importance to commerce, communications and security throughout the world and, thus, was of paramount interest to all. Second, the 1903 Treaty contained features that were anachronistic and overdue for change. Third, a significant measure of agreement already existed between the two parties on the broad outlines of the changes that were necessary. With goodwill on both sides there should be no insuperable difficulty in settling the remaining differences. It was not for the

Security Council to attempt to dictate to the two parties the terms of reference under which they should negotiate revision of a bilateral agreement, but the Council's broad responsibility in preserving international peace and security justified an expression of hope that the parties would find it possible to resume negotiations and reach an early settlement. With regard to the remnants of colonialism in Latin America, it was only right that the principle of self-determination should be applicable to the residual colonial situations there, even if it meant that dependent Territory might not, for special reasons, wish to accept independent status, even though the administering Power was willing to grant it. His Government recognized the right of countries, particularly developing countries, to regulate the exploitation of their natural resources for the benefit of their economies, including the right to nationalize or expropriate property owned by foreign nationals; but there was a concomitant duty to ensure that there was prompt, adequate and effective compensation. Disputes over compensation should be settled wherever possible in national courts, but, if that were not possible, General Assembly resolution 1803 (XVII) provided for recourse to arbitration or international adjudication. To that end, greater use should be made of the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes. Australia could understand the anxiety of some Latin American countries about the possible adverse consequences of unregulated foreign investment in their economic and social structures. Nevertheless, Australia, like many Latin American countries, owed a great deal of its development to investments from overseas and would continue to do so. Finally, Australia had gladly supported General Assembly resolution 2286 (XXII) endorsing the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the Assembly's subsequent call to those Powers that had not done so to sign and ratify the Treaty and its Protocols.

803. The Chairman of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, stated that the contribution of Latin American countries in the field of decolonization was of long standing. The Special Committee and the international community would continue to rely on the active support and solidarity of the Latin American nations for the common task of complete liquidation of colonialism in all its forms and manifestations. When the Security Council considered the question of the maintenance of peace and security in the Latin American region, it should bear in mind the threat to peace from colonialism in southern Africa, the repercussions of which would undoubtedly affect the Latin American region.

804. At the 1700th meeting, held on the same day, the President, after drawing attention to document S/10933 containing a letter to the President of the Council from the Permanent Representative of the Sudan, invited, with the consent of the Council, Mr. Talib El-Shebib, Observer of the League of Arab States at the United Nations, to address the Council under rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure.

805. The representative of the Dominican Republic stated that his Government had wished, by attending the meeting of the Security Council in Panama, to make a moral contribution to the attainment of the legitimate aspirations of Panama. It was convinced that viable solutions to disputes could be found only through

open and sincere dialogue. The Dominican Republic had faith that in both the regional system and the United Nations there existed instruments which, when used legally and with goodwill could reconcile the most delicate and profound differences.

806. The representative of Kenya stated that the Security Council should commend the Latin Americans for the practical steps at the regional level towards the maintenance of international peace and security that they had demonstrated in concluding the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America. His delegation hoped that the other regions of the world gradually emulate the Latin American example and that the Treaty would become universal within the Latin American region. With regard to the question of the Panama Canal his delegation held the view that it was basically a bilateral issue to be resolved between Panama and the United States and would like to see the two countries resolve their differences equitably on the basis of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. It was encouraging that the two parties had initiated negotiations for that purpose. Members of the Council wished to give full support and extend every assistance to ensure that peaceful and just solutions would be arrived at that would fully respect the national sovereignty of the States in question and ensure full and effective realization of the legitimate desire of the Government and people of Panama to exercise full sovereignty over their natural resources in conformity with the spirit and principles of the United Nations Charter and in accordance with the various General Assembly resolutions on the subject. It was accepted by both the United States and Panama that the conditions applicable when the Treaty of 1903 was signed had drastically changed over the years and that a far-reaching revision of that Treaty was now overdue. The parties should renegotiate their treaty relations in a spirit of mutual accommodation and good faith so as to effect just and long-lasting arrangements. Finally, he wished to underscore the intrinsic unity between the peoples of Latin America and the peoples of Asia and Africa as members of the third world.

807. The representative of Austria paid tribute to the role played by Latin American statesmen in the League of Nations and the United Nations, particularly in matters of economic co-operation and disarmament. He then commented on two sets of questions that had been dealt with by almost all the speakers. The first was the problem of the Panama Canal and Canal Zone. Any solution should be based on a number of principles, one of which was the principle of territorial integrity and sovereignty, and on the consideration that developing countries should be able to benefit from the advantages that nature and geographical position offered them. In an interdependent world, however, there was also interdependence between national and international interests, between the legitimate rights and aspirations of one people and the legitimate rights and the aspirations of the international community as a whole. That interdependence was obvious in an area so intimately linked to world trade and communication. He was confident that the two countries actively involved in the Canal were fully aware of those special responsibilities. Austria hoped that their future negotiations would create the basis for new friendship and confidence between the two countries. As far as the existence of colonial sit-

uations was concerned, the position of Austria was clear and had been expressed on numerous occasions in the United Nations. Today, there was certainly no basis for the continued existence of colonial and dependent Territories, a fact that was all the more true for the continent of America, which had led the anti-colonial struggle since the end of the eighteenth century. Nevertheless, as several speakers had pointed out, the situation of some of the remaining dependent Territories was not exclusively of a colonial nature. Imaginative efforts and continuous search would surely provide a basis for the attainment of satisfactory solutions that took into account the legitimate aspirations of the peoples concerned, as laid down in the United Nations Charter. Those principles included the right of nations to sovereignty and territorial integrity and to the achievement of the goals of economic and social justice, freedom and human dignity.

808. The representative of Guinea stated that because the countries of the third world were not united and did not stand shoulder to shoulder, Cuba continued to be isolated from the other States of Latin America and had been subjected to an economic blockade. With regard to the problem of the Panama Canal Zone, her delegation hoped that more intensive bilateral negotiations would be instituted between the Governments of the United States and Panama and that the political situation would be stabilized with the restoration of unrestricted Panamanian sovereignty over its territory. She had no doubt that, given the efforts of the two Governments to arrive at a revision of the Canal Treaty, Washington would succeed in resuming negotiations with the Government of Panama in order to restore to it its jurisdiction over the totality of its territory. It went without saying that the peaceful settlement must be made in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter and serve the best interests of the Government and the people of Panama. The Council's meetings would thus have helped to create better conditions of co-operation for the peoples of the hemisphere.

809. The representative of Algeria stated that the blockade of Cuba imposed by the United States was part of a trend of denying small peoples the freedom to make their economic and political choices, choices which the great Powers claimed for themselves. Pillage and exploitation of the natural resources of the countries of the third world constituted another, and not the least dangerous, form of foreign intervention since the period of colonial expansion. While it was currently carried out by less ostensible methods, it was nevertheless a grave attack against the peoples' interests that would not be tolerated very much longer. Peoples throughout the world were claiming international justice in the Security Council. And that claim acquired a particular resonance when the Council was meeting in Panama, in one of those regions of the world where there was a conflict between the interests of a great Power and the aspirations of a small country to its independence and to the preservation of its sovereignty over its territory and resources. There was nothing that could justify the predominance of the interests of the great Power over those of the country in which they were operating, because security considerations could in no case justify stifling the legitimate concerns of that country for protection against any foreign attack.

810. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics stated that the main reason why

the countries of Latin America, even with enormous natural resources at their disposal, had still not reached the desired level of economic development was that they had been fettered by international imperialist monopolies that exploited their natural wealth for huge profits, leaving almost nothing for the economic and social development of the countries themselves. The Soviet Union supported the just demands of the countries of Latin America for national sovereignty over their natural resources and decisively opposed any attempts to bring pressure to bear on States that were building their national economies, carrying out progressive social and economic transformations and defending their sovereign right to exercise ownership over their natural resources. The policy of pressure, blockade and isolation brought to bear against Cuba was a flagrant violation of the principles and purposes of the United Nations Charter. The Soviet Union also sympathized with the noble idea of creating a nuclear-free zone in Latin America, on the condition that it was a zone really free from nuclear weapons. Turning Latin America into a zone completely free from nuclear weapons would unquestionably be an important factor in strengthening international peace and security in that continent and throughout the world. As the Council knew, the Soviet Government had declared its readiness to respect the status of Mexico as a zone completely free from nuclear weapons, if other nuclear Powers would undertake similar obligations. If other Latin American countries turned their territories into zones completely free from nuclear weapons, then the Soviet Union would be prepared to respect the status of those countries as a nuclear-free zone. Of course, the transit of nuclear weapons through the territory of States parties to the zone and peaceful nuclear explosions contrary to the terms of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons must also be prohibited. He added that an agreement on a nuclear-free zone should not be extended to the vast reaches of the open sea in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. His Government would reserve the right to review its obligations to observe the status of nuclear-free zones if any State in regard to which the Soviet Union might have undertaken an appropriate obligation should commit an act of aggression or become an accessory to aggression. Panama's geographical position was its most important natural resource, and the Canal Zone, which geographically, politically, economically and socially belonged to Panama, was an inalienable part of its national territory. The restoration of Panamanian sovereignty over the Zone was one of the inevitable and main factors in developing the Panamanian nation and eliminating a source of constant tension in America. The Panama Canal was a most important inter-ocean route; it must be used in a manner not detrimental to the lawful sovereign rights and interests of Panama; its operation must effectively respect the principle of the freedom of international shipping; and it must serve the good of all the world. Only a realistic and responsible approach based on respect for Panama's sovereign rights and the interests of international shipping would make it possible to find a solution to the Canal problem that would be in keeping with the interests of world peace and the restoration of sound and normal relations among States. Accordingly, his delegation expressed its support for a settlement of the Panama Canal problem that would ensure respect for the effective sovereignty and full jurisdiction of Panama over its entire territory and for the freedom

of international shipping. The Soviet delegation supported the draft resolution on the Panama Canal submitted by the delegations of Panama and Peru, which contained a demand for the revocation of the 1903 Panama Canal Treaty and various proposals for an equal and just solution to the problem. The Council should make every effort to ensure that the trend towards international *détente* produced positive results in the Latin American continent.

811. Mr. El-Shebid, Observer of the League of Arab States at the United Nations, stated that the Arab group again expressed its full solidarity with the peoples of Latin America and hoped that the series of meetings of the Security Council in Panama would make a decisive contribution to the cause of peace, justice and true self-determination throughout the continent.

812. The representative of Canada stated that his country was deeply interested in the Council's discussions for two main reasons: it was a Member of the United Nations, with a long and demonstrated interest in international peace and security, and it was a North American nation that had steadily been developing closer links with the countries of Latin America, bilaterally and through the inter-American regional system. The question of the Panama Canal had been in the forefront of the issues subsumed in the agenda before the Council. Canada, for its part, extended its good wishes to the two parties directly involved in their continued efforts to find new and mutually agreed solutions through direct negotiations. A successful outcome would be of the greatest importance to the two Governments and peoples concerned and to the world community, which depended on that indispensable route from sea to sea.

813. Mr. Diarra, Executive Secretary of OAU in New York, stated that he had been charged to convey to the President of the Council and, through him, to all Latin America the warm congratulations of OAU and a pledge of its active and continuing solidarity and moral support. Moreover, he wished to reaffirm to the authorities of Panama that their ways and means of finding equitable solutions to their problems were supported by Africa. The countries of Africa assured Latin America of their unequivocal support, and, in the sense of the development of fraternal co-operation, Africa looked to Latin America, realm of law and justice, for an ever more committed and dynamic solidarity.

814. The representative of Honduras referred to two territorial issues that had affected his country before they were settled. He stated that Honduras had always been in solidarity with just and noble causes and that the demands of Panama were just and noble in regard to the signing of a new treaty whereby the two countries concerned, the United States and Panama, would regulate their relations in a fitting manner in accordance with the postulates of law and the requirements of contemporary civilization. His Government expressed its wish that the two Governments would find a just, worthy and fair formula that would reconcile the interests of both.

815. The representative of Peru, on behalf of Panama, Peru and Yugoslavia, submitted the following draft resolution (S/10932/Rev.1) relating to the use of any type of coercive measures that might affect the sovereignty of the State of Latin America:

"The Security Council,

"Recalling General Assembly resolutions 1803 (XVII) and 3016 (XXVII) concerning permanent sovereignty over natural resources,

"Reaffirming General Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV), which states that no State may use or encourage the use of economic, political or any other type of measures to coerce another State in order to obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights and to secure from it advantages of any kind;

"Further recalling General Assembly resolution 2993 (XXVII) on implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security, in particular paragraph 4,

"Noting with deep concern the existence and use of coercive measures which affect the free exercise of permanent sovereignty over the natural resources of Latin American countries,

"Recognizing that the use or encouragement of the use of coercive measures may create situations likely to endanger peace and security in Latin America,

"1. Urges States to adopt measures to impede the activities of those enterprises which deliberately attempt to coerce Latin American countries;

"2. Requests States, with a view to maintaining and strengthening peace and security in Latin America, to refrain from using or encouraging the use of any type of coercive measure in the region."

He explained that the draft resolution took up a number of aspects of the many fundamental resolutions adopted by the General Assembly that categorically proclaimed the indisputable principle of the permanent sovereignty of States over their natural resources and that it also requested States to abstain from utilizing any form of coercion, of a political, economic or other nature, so that no country would be hampered in the free exercise of its sovereignty and jurisdiction over its natural resources, services and assets. The continued existence of such types of coercion damaged and eroded the principles of peace and co-operation among States and undermined efforts to strengthen peace and security in the region. The Security Council meetings in Panama must consider that problem, which had created and still led to tension and conflict among the States of the region and could well become a threat to peace and security.

816. At the 1701st meeting, on 20 March, the Secretary-General made a statement. After mentioning the important role of the Latin American States in the establishment and development of the United Nations, he referred to a number of problems that had been raised in the course of the debate relating to economic development, including the full use of natural resources, decolonization, disarmament and non-intervention. One issue of special concern to the States of Latin America was the question of the Panama Canal, which had been mentioned by every speaker. That problem awaited a solution that could only be based on the respect for law and the search for justice and would have to take into account the basic principles enshrined in the Charter, such as the principles of territorial integrity, sovereign equality and the obligation to settle all international disputes by peaceful means and the principle that had become an accepted common standard, namely, that any State was entitled

to put to full use and for its own account all its natural potentialities. He appealed strongly to Panama and the United States to seek a solution in a spirit of friendship and confidence and further urged the members of the Council to seek an agreement that would help the parties concerned in their efforts towards a solution that would take into account national aspirations, as well as the legitimate rights and interests of the community of nations.

817. The representative of the Sudan stated that the legitimate and inalienable rights that Latin America strove to establish, namely, respect for national independence, territorial integrity, self-determination, free exploitation of their natural resources and social progress, were the same aspirations and ambitions of the African and Arab worlds. The ardent desire expressed by Latin American countries at both the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development and the United Nations for economic advancement and social justice was a trend to which his delegation gave full support and encouragement. Sudan also supported the efforts being made by Latin American peoples to control their national resources, reassert their sovereignty and defend the interests of their countries. It was a matter of principle and the policy of his Government to uphold the right of any country to full and effective sovereignty and to the integrity of the totality of its territories. His delegation was pleased to note that the two parties concerned with the Panama Canal were agreed on the sovereignty and jurisdiction of Panama over all its national territory, including the Canal. It therefore expressed its full sympathy for Panama's demand that the 1903 Treaty should be abrogated and that a new treaty should emerge as soon as possible whereby Panama's effective sovereignty and total jurisdiction over all its territory would be vindicated. In keeping with those views and taking into account the opinions that continuance of the dispute was likely to endanger the maintenance of peace and security, his delegation would vote in favour of any draft resolution that took those views into consideration or that would contribute to the maintenance and the strengthening of international peace and security in Latin America.

818. The representative of India stated that the most urgent issue before the Security Council was the question of the Panama Canal. His delegation was glad that the unequal Treaty of 1903 had been recognized as such by the Government of the United States, which had fully accepted that a far-reaching revision of its relationship with Panama was overdue. The Panamanian Government had also indicated that the United States had agreed to abrogate that Treaty and replace it with a modern one. His delegation welcomed those developments. It had also been informed that the concept of perpetuity would be given up, that American jurisdiction in Panama would disappear, and that the negotiations would, on the one hand, ensure the full sovereignty of the Panamanian Government and, on the other, keep the Canal free for transit to all ships without discrimination. Those concepts seemed to have been accepted by both parties, and they were referred to in flexible terms in the draft resolution before the Council. The parties, while respecting the principles already agreed to, could work out the details, not as a result of any directives from the Security Council but as a result of negotiations between equals. His delegation hoped that the draft, or any

subsequent revision of it, would command the approval of all the members of the Council. The only additional draft resolution that the Council might consider related to the exploitation of natural resources. India was in general sympathy with the draft resolution that had been submitted by the Foreign Minister of Peru. He hoped that after further examination and consultation, the Council would be in a position to adopt a unanimous decision on that subject. His delegation considered that the other subjects of discussion should not be embodied in any formal resolutions at that stage but might be dealt with in a declaration mentioning the issues and stating briefly the consensus of the Council on them in general terms. If such a declaration could be worked out, it could indicate the general reaction of the international community to such problems and the direction to move in order to find solutions. Inasmuch as some were of a strictly bilateral nature, it was to be hoped that negotiations by the parties concerned would produce solutions in the shortest possible time within the general framework of the Charter and of the various resolutions already adopted.

819. The representative of France noted that foremost among concerns expressed in the Council had been the question of the Panama Canal. As many speakers had emphasized, it was a problem that primarily concerned Panama and the United States, because it involved negotiating an instrument to replace the agreement concluded by those two countries 70 years ago. His delegation hoped that the two parties would quickly succeed in reaching agreement on the terms of a new treaty, inasmuch as, according to the information they themselves had given, they were already in agreement on the principal objectives. However, it was not for the Security Council to enter into the details of an agreement under negotiation or to dictate the terms of the arrangement to the parties. They should continue and complete their task, respecting the principles of sovereignty and co-operation that should guide their relations, so as to maintain the use of a waterway that was important to the entire international community.

820. The other situations to which the Council's attention had been drawn seemed to involve an awareness of the all-too-frequent gap between principles and their application. His delegation wondered what role the Security Council could play when it was a question not of particular situations to which the principles of the Charter should be applied but of their formulation and their enunciation, if not of their revocation, which appeared to be the role of the General Assembly or the Economic and Social Council. If it undertook a task not specifically its own, the Security Council might, in future, be in danger of encroaching on the prerogatives of the General Assembly and other organs of the United Nations and of becoming absorbed in over-general discussions and thus find itself incapable of carrying out the missions expressly entrusted to it under Article 24 of the Charter, on which it was, in fact, called to meet very frequently. Furthermore, some confusion might be created if the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council and the Security Council adopted provisions on identical subjects that were not strictly similar. The Security Council should not be asked to approve texts couched in general terms, setting forth universal principles or dealing with subjects currently under discussion elsewhere, and his delegation could not support such texts.

821. The representative of Zaire stated that the debate in the Security Council had revealed the interests that the Latin American countries attached to the problem of sovereignty over natural resources, which was closely linked to economic independence. His delegation suggested that the Council might appeal to all Member States to assist the developing countries to exercise permanent sovereignty over their natural resources. Similarly, it might be helpful if it recommended the drafting of an international convention on respect for the permanent sovereignty of States over their natural resources open for signature by all States. Although neither of those two proposals automatically excluded the other, the Council could decide which formula it preferred. The persistence of some problems poisoned international relations and created a political climate that might tempt a peaceful State to resort to force because the situation had become untenable or lead to a series of events likely to provoke the use of force without either party having at the outset desired such an outcome. With regard to the Panama Canal and the Canal Zone, his delegation earnestly hoped that the two parties would negotiate the question in an effort to find a just, peaceful and lasting solution.

822. The representative of the United Kingdom, after reviewing the economic commercial and cultural relations between his country and the Latin American continent, said that he wished to sound a note of caution in relation to the role and competence of the Security Council. Economic questions could have important political implications, but many of the matters that had been raised at the Council meetings, such as permanent sovereignty over natural resources, were properly the responsibility of other principal organs of the United Nations and, indeed, were already under active consideration in the Economic and Social Council. The role and competence of the Security Council must be respected. Though the Council was a body of the highest prestige and authority, it was not the right forum in which to debate questions that belonged to other United Nations organs, still less to adopt resolutions on those matters. It should not pronounce upon questions of principle or of general application — that was for the General Assembly — but should deal with specific problems brought to its attention in the light of the purposes and principles of the Charter and in accordance with its provisions. A number of contentious issues had inevitably been mentioned during the debate that reflected the particular preoccupations of individual countries, and they deserved to receive a sympathetic hearing. On the other hand, many of them were essentially bilateral issues, on which the process of direct diplomacy was continuing and which neither side had made the subject of specific complaint to the Council. There had been numerous references to the position of the Canal Zone in relation to the maintenance of peace and security in the region. All were agreed on the importance of the Canal to the international community, particularly from the economic point of view. Differences over the Canal must not lead to a situation where its role as a link between nations was endangered and it became a focus of instability. He was pleased that neither party had suggested that such a situation had arisen. His delegation shared the doubts expressed about third parties getting involved in a matter on which they did not have all the facts and the view that the existing agreement governing regulation of the Canal was, in certain respects, anachronistic and in urgent need of re-

vision, a view that seemed to be accepted by both parties. As a major maritime country the United Kingdom considered it important that the regulation of the Canal should be based on an accepted understanding between the parties principally concerned, and it shared the hope that those negotiations would be brought to a satisfactory conclusion. Much attention had been given also to the legacy of colonialism. Most speakers seemed to agree that that was not one of the major problems confronting Latin America and that such colonial questions as remained unsolved did not require the attention of the Security Council. The questions of the Falkland Islands and of Belize had both been mentioned, but the representative of Argentina and the representative of Guatemala had indicated that they considered that the issues could best be tackled on the basis of bilateral discussions. His Government welcomed and endorsed that view.

823. The representative of the United States recalled the long and cordial relationship of his country with the independent nations of the hemisphere, demonstrated by the history of unilateral and multilateral assistance that his country had offered to them. He summarized briefly the United States position on some issues that had been raised in statements before the Council. His country had always been and continued to be a strong advocate of the Latin American nuclear-free zone. Although the United States did not question the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources, his delegation did not believe that the complex issue was properly before the Council. Similarly, it felt that the question of multinational corporations, which had been raised in different contexts, should not be brought before the Council, as it was currently under discussion in several other, more appropriate United Nations bodies. His country shared the judgement reflected in Economic and Social Council resolution 1721 (LIII) of 28 July 1972 that those corporations were "frequently effective agents for the transfer of technology, as well as capital, to developing countries". No country had to welcome or even accept foreign investment, and, if it did so, it could establish its own rules. However, it was also obliged to abide by those rules, to compensate the investor for retroactive changes in the rules or, in the case of expropriation or nationalization of private property, to make adequate provision for just compensation as required by international law. With regard to the Panama Canal and Zone, his delegation, no less than others that had spoken, supported Panama's just aspirations. The United States negotiators, cognizant of those aspirations, had already recognized that (1) the 1903 Canal Treaty should be replaced by a new, modern treaty; (2) any new Canal Treaty should be of fixed duration, rejecting the concept of perpetuity; (3) Panama should have returned to it a substantial territory now part of the Canal Zone, with arrangements for use of other areas. Those other areas should be the minimum required for United States operations and defence of the Canal and would be integrated into the legal, economic, social and cultural life of Panama within a time-table to be agreed upon; (4) Panama should exercise its jurisdiction in the Canal area pursuant to a mutually agreed time-table; and (5) Panama should receive substantially increased annual payments for the use of its territory relating to the Canal. That being the case, those who attacked the 1903 Treaty were attacking a phantom foe. The 1903 Treaty had already been revised significantly to Panama's advantage. The United States was

ready to change it again or to write a new treaty when negotiations continued in the spirit of friendship and co-operation that should be the hallmark of Panama-United States relations. The question then arose, he continued, as to what contribution the Council could make at its meetings in Latin America, and what it would carry back to the United Nations Headquarters as a result. For the Council to take a partisan stand or reflect only a parochial viewpoint would risk undermining the processes of bilateral and regional diplomacy that had served the hemisphere so well.

824. At the 1702nd meeting, held the same day, the President, speaking as the representative of Panama in exercise of his right of reply, said that the jurisdiction of the United Nations in Latin America could not be diminished by that of OAS, the structure of which needed re-examination. The purposes of the United States in the bilateral negotiations with Panama regarding the Canal Zone could not satisfy Panama, he said, as to agree to them would only lead to increasing the causes of conflict between the two countries. There was no logic in the affirmation that for the Canal to serve world trade efficiently the United States must have the right to increase its capability; nor was it in accord with Panama's legitimate aspirations to regain complete jurisdiction over its territory and to exercise sovereign rights over its natural resources. The representative of the United States had explained that the considerable growth of Panama's economy had resulted in part from contributions received from abroad, including aid given by the United States. That might be true, but it represented only one side of the coin. On the other side were the sizable profits that the United States had been receiving since 1910, when the Panama Canal was opened, through its use of Panama's geographical position in regard to the Canal. Those profits included strategic and political benefits, as well as strictly economic benefits. Panama was seeking a change in structure, but, so far, there had been no real bilateral negotiations. There had been North American proposals designed to disguise, in perpetuity, the colonialist enclave, and Panamanian proposals intended to put an end to that enclave were not, and had never been, accepted by the United States. Basically, the United States wished to maintain the *status quo*, changing it only in name. The Security Council must play a vital role in the solution of the problem and not accept false bilateral negotiations as genuine. Though Panama certainly wanted the two countries to negotiate, the world must be alert and vigilant, so that those bilateral negotiations would really be that and not the imposition of the will of the stronger.

825. The representative of Chile stated, with regard to the statement of the representative of Bolivia, that the Chilean Government had repeatedly expressed its willingness to undertake a dialogue between the two countries and believed that the resumption of diplomatic relations would be a positive and constructive step. Chile reiterated its adherence to the principles of international law regarding the intangibility of treaties freely entered into and stressed that the existing historical and juridical systems regulating relations between Bolivia and Chile in no way implied a challenge to the sovereign rights of Bolivia. The necessary conditions must be gradually created within the framework of Andean integration so that Bolivia and Chile would be able to expand their common ground and strengthen their ties of friendship and co-operation.

826. The President, speaking as the representative of Panama, submitted a revised draft resolution (S/10931/Rev.1) sponsored by Guinea, Kenya, Panama, Peru, the Sudan and Yugoslavia, and subsequently by India and Indonesia. It read as follows:

"The Security Council,

"Having considered the question of the Panama Canal under the item entitled 'Consideration of measures for the maintenance and strengthening of international peace and security in Latin America in conformity with the provisions and principles of the Charter',

"Recalling that it is a purpose of the United Nations to bring about, in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace,

"Bearing in mind that the Republic of Panama is sovereign over its territory and that the free and fruitful exercise of sovereignty by peoples and nations over their natural resources should be fostered through mutual respect among States, based on their sovereign equality,

"Having heard the statements made before it by the representatives of the members of the Council by Latin American Ministers for Foreign Affairs and by representatives of other States and organizations specially invited,

"1. Takes note that the Governments of the Republic of Panama and the United States of America, in the Joint Declaration signed before the Council of the Organization of American States, acting provisionally as Organ of Consultation, on 3 April 1964, agreed to reach a just and fair agreement, with a view to the prompt elimination of the causes of conflict between them;

"2. Takes note also of the willingness shown by the Governments of the United States of America and the Republic of Panama to establish in a formal instrument agreements on the abrogation of the 1903 convention on the Isthmian Canal and its amendments and to conclude a new, just and fair treaty concerning the present Panama Canal which would fulfil Panama's legitimate aspirations and guarantee full respect for Panama's effective sovereignty over all of its territory;

"3. Urges the Governments of the United States of America and the Republic of Panama to continue negotiations in a high spirit of friendship, mutual respect and co-operation and to conclude without delay a new treaty aimed at the prompt elimination of the causes of conflict between them;

"4. Decides to keep the question under consideration."

He explained that Panama was putting before the Council a basic problem that affected international peace and security. Because it was suffering the noxious consequences of a colonial situation, Panama had not completed its process of independence with respect to a particular belt of its territory known as the Panama Canal Zone. That process would be completed only when the presence of the United States in that Zone was ended and that belt of territory was incorporated politically, economically and culturally in the rest of the Republic. Panama was convinced that the draft resolution would help to achieve the objectives it had put before the Council.

827. As President of the Council, he announced that the draft resolution submitted by Panama, Peru and Yugoslavia (S/10932/Rev.1) had three additional sponsors: Guinea, Kenya and the Sudan.

828. The representative of the United States, speaking in exercise of his right of reply, noted that there were points of difference between the Governments of Panama and the United States, and requested the Foreign Minister of Panama to continue negotiations for the sake of good relations between their two Governments and for the sake of international understanding.

829. At the 1703rd meeting, on 21 March, the President of the Security Council, the Secretary-General, the Chairman of the United Nations Special Committee on *Apartheid*, the representative of the USSR and the representative of Kenya made statements in connexion with the celebration of the International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. The President also read a statement by the representatives of Guinea, India, Kenya and the Sudan, expressing their agreement with the Latin American members of the Council that the elimination of colonialism in Africa, Asia and Latin America was a vital prerequisite to the maintenance and strengthening of international peace and security.

830. The President, speaking as the representative of Panama, stated that the Panama Canal Zone, as a territory subjected to colonialism, suffered from racial and other discrimination, which was a characteristic evil accompanying colonialism. Within that Zone, the United States Government practised discrimination in many forms, including racial segregation and discrimination in employment and salaries, education and housing.

831. At its 1704th meeting, held the same day, the President, speaking as the representative of Panama, referred to the draft resolution dealing with the Panama Canal Zone (S/10931/Rev.1) and said that the powers assumed by the United States on Panamanian soil had created a colonial type of situation that was a burden to Panama, damaged its integrity and constituted a physical and political mortgage that could no longer be extended. It was logical that Panamanians should aspire to remedy the situation, which was, in fact, likely to endanger international peace and security. Constant friction resulted from the discrimination, both visible and disguised, that occurred in the administration of the Canal, predominantly in the granting of employment, salaries, pensions and other essentials. Panama had been deprived of its main ports at both ends of the Canal and had been unable to benefit from the multiple possibilities offered by its geographical position for the exploitation of international trade, even though the Canal should serve Panama in the utilization of its natural resources. Within the Zone, United States officials were exercising the functions of government and imposing laws and regulations decided upon by their legislature. Foreign judges handed down judgements on Panamanian citizens, and other nationals, and a foreign flag flew where only the Panamanian flag should fly as a symbol and proof of the sovereignty of the Republic of Panama.

832. Among the causes of conflict that most damaged Panamanian interests were the perpetuity of the Canal concession, the unilateral interpretation by the United States of the existing contractual stipulations and their *de facto* imposition on Panama, the exercise of United

States jurisdiction over the Canal Zone, which had turned that Zone into a colonialist enclave, the installation of military bases for purposes other than protecting the Canal and the insufficient and unjust benefits derived by Panama from the interoceanic waterway. The United States had publicly admitted Panama's sovereignty over the so-called Canal Zone, yet it still claimed that it required the use, occupation and control of the entire 10-mile-wide strip of Panamanian territory. As the territorial sovereign and coastal State of the interoceanic Canal, Panama was fully aware of its obligation to ensure the safe and expeditious functioning of the Canal. The Government and people of Panama had complete confidence that the Security Council possessed sufficient authority to settle the question in accordance with the principles of international law and justice and pursuant to the terms of Chapter VI of the Charter on the peaceful settlement of disputes. An effective contribution might well be the adoption of the two draft resolutions before the Council. There could be no doubt that such action would greatly contribute to the strengthening of international security as a prelude to a new era in which the claims of Panama, of Latin America and of the world would be satisfied.

Decision: *At the 1704th meeting, on 21 March 1973, the revised draft resolution sponsored by Guinea, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Panama, Peru, Sudan and Yugoslavia (S/10931/Rev.1) received 13 votes in favour, 1 against (United States of America) and 1 abstention (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland) and was not adopted owing to the negative vote of a permanent member of the Council.*

833. Speaking in explanation of vote, the representative of the United States said that his delegation regretted having had to cast a negative vote, because there was much in the draft resolution with which it could agree. Its vote should have come as no surprise to Panama, however, as the United States had made clear its serious concern that a series of Council meetings designed to put pressure on one party to ongoing bilateral negotiations could make those negotiations more difficult and impair the usefulness of that major organ of the United Nations. Up to the moment of departure for Panama, the United States had continued to receive assurances that everything would be done to maintain an atmosphere of moderation and restraint. Though that had proved true of the situation outside the meeting chamber, it had not been true of some of the statements before the Council. His delegation had made strenuous and repeated efforts in friendly conversations with its Panamanian hosts to arrive at a mutually acceptable form for a resolution, but its sincere efforts had been rejected. The United States, however, had been and was prepared to acknowledge the just aspirations of the Republic of Panama, for it recognized those aspirations. Though it agreed with much in the draft resolution, the United States had voted against it because all the matters involved were in the process of bilateral negotiations. It was inappropriate for the Security Council to adopt a resolution dealing with matters of substance in a continuing negotiation, and the Foreign Minister of Panama had himself spoken of the negotiations as continuing. Moreover, the draft resolution was unbalanced and incomplete and therefore subject to serious misinterpretation; and it contained sweeping generalities, whereas the real difficulties lay in the application of

those generalities. Finally, it dealt with the points of interest to Panama but ignored those legitimate interests important to the United States. The Panama Canal was not a work of nature or a natural resource but a very complex enterprise. To devise a new régime for it required thoughtful and meticulous negotiation to achieve a fair reconciliation of interests. The United States had been and was prepared for such negotiations. Finally, his delegation considered that the nature and the outcome of the meetings should be assessed with great care so as to avoid any repetition of a course of action that could prove damaging to the role and the reputation of the Security Council. It would be most unfortunate if the Security Council were to be transformed into a small replica of the General Assembly, thereby impairing its capacity to deal effectively with specific issues affecting peace and security.

834. The representative of the United Kingdom said that his delegation regarded the question as essentially a bilateral issue between the parties concerned. If it had been possible to arrive at a formulation that took account of the concern of both parties, the adoption of a resolution by the Security Council at the end of its meetings in Panama might have been helpful in improving the atmosphere for further negotiations. If, as in the present case, it was unacceptable to one of the two parties, a resolution did not serve any useful purpose. His delegation had accordingly abstained.

835. The representative of Guinea said that in sponsoring the draft resolution her delegation had wished to indicate its solidarity with the people and Government of Panama and to express its complete support for their cause, the cause of dignity, sovereignty and justice. She hoped that through negotiations the parties would arrive at a peaceful settlement in conformity with the aspirations of the people of Panama.

836. The representative of France said that his delegation had voted in favour of the draft resolution because, unlike other texts that had previously been circulated, it had not gone into the details of a settlement but had referred only to general principles, the validity of which could not be challenged. It was the consistent position of his Government that the Security Council could not dictate to parties the specific terms of a settlement that they were in the process of negotiating, but it could indicate the general principles on the basis of which it believed such a settlement should be established. He regretted that it had not been possible to find a formula acceptable to both sides and that the debate had provided an opportunity for too broad statements but hoped that the parties would be able to reach agreement in the near future.

837. The representative of Kenya said that his delegation had voted in favour of the draft resolution because the case put forward by Panama for more equitable control of the Canal was fair and just. The sovereign right of every State to dispose of its wealth and natural resources, which was a constituent of the right to self-determination, must be respected.

838. The representative of Yugoslavia said that his delegation was sure that the people of Panama would take the vote not as a defeat but as a challenge in their just struggle and expressed the hope that the next time those who must do so would reconsider and be more flexible, inasmuch as the question would surely come up again for consideration in the not too distant future.

839. The representative of Peru said that the draft resolution had been a really positive step to channel the solution of the conflict in the right direction. Unfortunately, it had been vetoed by the United States; but that veto, instead of being a failure or defeat, added dignity to the struggle of the people and Government of Panama.

840. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that he categorically disagreed with the view expressed by the representative of the United States that discussion of questions such as the one to which the Security Council meetings had been devoted could harm the prestige and role of the Council. The discussion of the question and the positive votes of the overwhelming majority of Council members — 13 out of 15 — in defence of the rights and sovereignty of Panama showed that the role and prestige of the United Nations had, on the contrary, been enhanced. Panama was not alone, as its position had received overwhelming support from other Latin American countries, from members of the Security Council and from others who had participated in the discussion.

841. The Council then turned to consideration of the draft resolution sponsored by Guinea, Kenya, Panama, Peru, the Sudan and Yugoslavia (S/10932/Rev.2).

842. Speaking before the vote, the representative of Australia explained that his delegation had some doubts whether the Council was the most appropriate organ of the United Nations to take action on the matter, but it would, nevertheless, vote in its favour, as it was in sympathy with its main objectives. However, the draft resolution should not prevent commercial enterprises from taking legal steps to secure payment of compensation for expropriated properties or assets; for international law permitted nationalization of foreign-owned assets, but it also provided for compensation and for certain legal processes if a dispute arose over the terms of compensation.

843. The representative of France recalled the doubts he had expressed whether the Council should take a stand on general principles without reference to specific situations and, in particular, in regard to questions that were within the competence of another United Nations organ. The Security Council should therefore take note of the views expressed and refer consideration of the question to a qualified United Nations organ, which could be the General Assembly or the Economic and Social Council or even the Working Group on the charter of the economic rights and duties of States. In the circumstances, his delegation would abstain on the draft resolution.

844. The representative of the United Kingdom said that his delegation would abstain on the draft resolution primarily because the matter fell outside the competence of the Security Council. The proper forum might be the General Assembly or the Economic and Social Council, where it was indeed an item on the agenda. By that, he did not mean that his delegation would have supported the draft had it been submitted to the Economic and Social Council, because some of its phrasing implied that illegitimate coercive measures were actually being applied in Latin America, without specifying what measures or by whom or against what countries they were taken. The formulation was much too imprecise and prejudicial to form a basis for a call upon States to take punitive measures against anyone.

845. The representative of Indonesia recognized that foreign assistance could be helpful to speed up the process of development. Such assistance, however, whether on a governmental basis or in the form of private investment, must in no way become an instrument of coercion. As his delegation agreed with the ideas incorporated in the draft resolution, he would vote in favour of it.

846. The representative of the United States said his delegation's decision to abstain on the draft resolution was based on the following considerations. Sovereignty over natural resources was not an appropriate subject for Security Council action under the Charter of the United Nations. The United States, of course, would not condone the use of coercive measures by one State to secure advantages from another State in violation of international law. But it did not accept the premise that such coercive measures were being used or that measures were being taken in a manner likely to endanger peace and security in Latin America. Such economic issues not involving a threat to international peace and security were properly the subject of discussion in other United Nations organs. General Assembly resolution 1803 (XVII) recognized that sovereignty over natural resources was to be exercised in accordance with international law and expressly provided that foreign investment agreements should be observed in good faith and that appropriate compensation should be paid in cases of nationalization. Those points were not clearly reflected in the text of the draft resolution; nor did it adequately take into account provisions of the Charters of the United Nations and OAS and the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, which provided for collective measures involving coercion and were vital to the maintenance of international peace and security.

Decision: *At the 1704th meeting on 21 March 1973, the revised draft resolution sponsored by Guinea, Kenya, Panama, Peru, Sudan and Yugoslavia (S/10932/Rev.2) was adopted by 12 votes to none, with 3 abstentions (France, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America), as resolution 330 (1973).*

847. Resolution 330 (1973) read as follows:

"The Security Council,

"Recalling General Assembly resolutions 1803 (XVII) of 14 December 1962 and 3016 (XXVII) of 18 December 1972 concerning permanent sovereignty over natural resources,

"Reaffirming General Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV) of 24 October 1970, which states that no State may use or encourage the use of economic, political or any other type of measures to coerce another State in order to obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights and to secure from it advantages of any kind,

"Further recalling General Assembly resolution 2993 (XXVII) of 15 December 1972 on implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security, in particular paragraph 4 thereof,

"Noting with deep concern the existence and use of coercive measures which affect the free exercise of permanent sovereignty over the natural resources of Latin American countries,

"Recognizing that the use or encouragement of the use of coercive measures may create situations likely to endanger peace and security in Latin America,

"1. Urges States to adopt appropriate measures to impede the activities of those enterprises which deliberately attempt to coerce Latin American countries;

"2. Requests States, with a view to maintaining and strengthening peace and security in Latin America, to refrain from using or encouraging the use of any type of coercive measures against States of the region."

848. The representative of Austria said that a Security Council resolution on the subject was not imperative, because the General Assembly and other United Nations bodies had clearly spelt out its main considerations. However, his delegation had voted in its favour because it agreed with the basic points and objectives.

849. The representative of India said that, although his delegation had voted in favour of the draft resolution, it considered that the language as it finally emerged was not sufficiently clear in identifying the type of coercive measures against which it was directed, and he would have preferred language such as that used in the recent resolution of the Economic and Social Council. For those reasons, his delegation had not been a sponsor of the draft resolution and in voting for it did not intend in any manner to detract from the authority or jurisdiction of other appropriate United Nations organs.

850. The representative of Kenya said that his delegation had voted for the draft resolution to demonstrate its solidarity with Latin America. The activities of the Economic and Social Council concerning the matter were adequate, but information received from Latin American friends about pressure emanating from certain multinational corporations—perhaps with the connivance of certain States—had led his delegation to believe that it was a matter of serious concern for international peace and security.

851. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that his delegation saw a political rather than an economic basis for the resolution, as coercion in relations among States always had a political character; it worsened relations among States, led to threats to the peace and threatened breaches of the peace. That was why the Soviet delegation had voted for the resolution, which constituted a warning by the Security Council to those States and Governments which might contemplate acting in defence or in support of their own or multinational monopolies if those monopolies instituted coercive measures against countries which acted in defence of their sovereignty over their own natural resources. In that connexion he expressed the hope that the Security Council would take an appropriate decision whereby the principle of non-use of force in international relations would be firmly established as a most important rule of international law.

852. The representative of Peru said that the Security Council, in adopting the resolution, had met its responsibilities; therefore the people of Latin America who had suffered, were suffering and might suffer damage from coercive measures had renewed their hope in the United Nations. It would have a vast significance in

his continent and would undoubtedly constitute an effective argument in the just struggle for national liberation and against foreign dependence.

853. The representative of China said that the Chinese delegation had voted in favour of the two draft resolutions because it considered that they corresponded to what the Security Council should do on questions of that nature. The facts showed that it had been necessary and useful for the Security Council in its meetings in Panama, to concentrate its discussion on a number of important questions currently facing Latin America. Those meetings had played, and would continue to play, a positive role in the just struggle of the peoples of Panama and the rest of Latin America. The meetings had also produced a further strengthening of unity and co-operation among the Asian, African and Latin American countries. His delegation was gratified by those positive achievements.

854. The President of the Council made a statement, giving a brief summary, formulated in broad terms, of the main points of the discussions that the Security Council had had during its meeting in Panama City. He said that most speakers had expressed the view that the continued existence of colonialism or neo-colonialism in Latin America or other regions of the world increased tension, interfered with economic development and was inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. They felt that it was imperative that the decolonization process be accelerated.

855. Many representatives had spoken of the problems of economic dependence of the Latin American States created by the domination of the area by foreign economic interests and of the widening gap between the industrialized and the developing countries which, in their view, constituted a serious threat to the peace of the world. In that context, they had stressed that all nations had the right to explore, develop and conserve their own natural resources and that any attempt, direct or indirect, to prevent the full exercise of that right jeopardized the principle of self-determination and non-intervention. Many had been critical of the use of various kinds of coercive measures by some States against others in contravention of the principles of the Charter and had urged the adoption of measures to prevent coercion by foreign economic and financial interests. Other representatives had pointed out that private foreign investment had helped in the development of countries by providing the necessary financial and technological means for the exploitation of their natural resources. Still, others had emphasized that the right of the developing countries to exploit their natural resources should be accompanied by the duty to provide prompt and adequate compensation in case of nationalization, in accordance with international law.

856. Several representatives had upheld the right of every Latin American State to choose its political, economic and social system without interference from any other State and had called for the elimination of policies aimed at blockading and isolating any State of the region because of its political, economic and social system. They had expressed the view that the trend towards international *détente* should also apply to the region and that the principles of non-intervention, economic co-operation, self-determination and friendly relations among States should be observed.

All States must observe the principle of non-use of force in their international relations. Attention was also drawn by one delegation to General Assembly resolution 2936 (XXVII) on the non-use of force in international relations and the permanent prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, and also to the need for the Security Council to take appropriate measures in conformity with that resolution as soon as possible.

857. A further point raised by some speakers had been the presence of foreign military bases on the territory of some Latin American States. Those speakers had maintained that those bases had been used to interfere in the countries' internal affairs and that they should be removed.

858. With regard to the Panama Canal, many speakers had upheld Panama's right to full sovereignty and jurisdiction over its entire territory, including the Panama Canal Zone; the denial of that right had been a constant source of tension and hence a threat to peace and security in Latin America. In order to remove that threat, it was essential that Panama's sovereignty over the Canal Zone be fully restored and that foreign military bases be removed from the area. Almost all speakers had held the view that Panama was entitled to use its geographical position to the fullest extent for its own economic development. Some representatives, while expressing their support for the aspirations of the Panamanian people, had pointed out that the question was the subject of negotiations between the parties principally concerned and had expressed the hope that those negotiations would be resumed and a settlement reached without foreign intervention. There was general agreement that any solution of the Panama

Canal question must be based on law and justice and on the basic principles of the United Nations Charter.

859. Several speakers had also emphasized the contribution of the Latin American States to the strengthening of international peace and security through the conclusion of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America. In that connexion, some delegations had noted that for its broadest and most effective implementation the Treaty should receive the support of all States that were or might become parties to it or to its two Additional Protocols.

860. Finally, several representatives had praised the practice of holding meetings of the Security Council away from Headquarters, as such meetings gave the people of the area greater assurance of the Organization's interest in their problems and, at the same time, enhanced the Council's capacity to assess in a direct manner the issues and problems of the area and the aspirations of its peoples.

861. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Panama addressed the Council and expressed appreciation and satisfaction over the results of the meetings of the Security Council in Panama City. He announced that, in due course, his Government would request the inclusion of the question of the Panama Canal Zone in the agenda of the Security Council and of the General Assembly.

862. Speaking on behalf of the members of the Council, the representative of Guinea read a statement of consensus (S/10934), expressing the gratitude of the Council to Panama as the host country for the series of Council meetings.

Part Two

OTHER MATTERS CONSIDERED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Chapter 9

ADMISSION OF NEW MEMBERS

A. Application of the People's Republic of Bangladesh

863. In a letter dated 8 August 1972, circulated with a note (S/10759) by the Secretary-General, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of Bangladesh submitted the application of Bangladesh for admission to membership in the United Nations and declared that Bangladesh accepted the obligations contained in the Charter of the United Nations.

864. The application was included in the provisional agenda of the 1658th meeting of the Security Council, held on 10 August.

865. At that meeting, the representative of China stated that the application of Bangladesh should not be considered because the Bangladesh Government was still obstructing the implementation of the United Nations resolutions concerning the withdrawal of troops and the release of prisoners of war. That action was a direct violation of the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly at its twenty-sixth session and by the Security Council, as well as of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and was totally incompatible with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter. In those circumstances, his delegation held that Bangladesh did not qualify for membership in the United Nations and could not agree to its consideration by the Council in the prevailing circumstances.

866. The representative of Yugoslavia stated that his Government firmly supported the application of Bangladesh and agreed that it be given immediate consideration by the Council, which he hoped would take a prompt and favourable decision.

867. The representative of Guinea pointed out that the Security Council was confronted with different information about the situation prevailing in Bangladesh, and that East Pakistan and West Pakistan were having talks. In view of those circumstances, she considered that the Security Council should avoid a hasty decision and allow time for those consultations to be successfully carried out. She therefore suggested that the Council send a three-member mission to Bangladesh to investigate the situation and to report to it thereon.

868. The representative of the Sudan expressed full support for the suggestion made by Guinea.

Decision: *The agenda was adopted by 11 votes in favour to 1 against (China), with Guinea, Somalia and the Sudan not participating in the vote.*

869. The representative of Somalia said that the application of Bangladesh should be viewed within the delicate political framework prevailing within the Indian subcontinent. Crucial issues giving rise to doubts and uncertainties continued to fog the relations be-

tween Pakistan and the secessionist State of Bangladesh. Its delegation would have hoped that the application could be submitted in a more favourable climate, for it would certainly be unfortunate if the Council's decision on the application of Bangladesh had to contain reservations and opposition.

870. The representative of Guinea regretted that the suggestion she had made had not been taken into consideration by the members of the Council, as her delegation believed that more information was needed before the application of Bangladesh could be considered.

871. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics stated that the Council should, without any delay and without recourse to any supplementary procedures, give a positive response to the request from the Government of Bangladesh. Bangladesh had been officially recognized by more than 80 States—10 of them members of the Security Council—and already belonged to a number of the specialized agencies of the United Nations. It unquestionably satisfied all of the specific conditions required by Article 4 of the Charter for membership in the United Nations and was capable of discharging the obligations incumbent on a Member State. Its admission would help to foster the universality of the Organization and the early and complete normalization of relations between all States of the Hindustan peninsula. At the same time, membership in the United Nations would enable it to overcome the devastating consequences of the events that had recently taken place on its soil.

872. The President said that, from the consultations he had held, it appeared that the majority were in favour of referring the application of Bangladesh to the Committee on the Admission of New Members, in accordance with rule 59 of the provisional rules of procedure.

873. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics stated that in his opinion the Security Council could decide not to have recourse to the provisions of rule 59. It should, rather, take a decision on the admission without delay. In view of the President's remarks, however, he was prepared to agree but would request the President to convene the Committee on the Admission of New Members as soon as possible.

874. The representative of India stressed that the Government of Bangladesh had already solemnly declared that it accepted the obligations contained in the Charter of the United Nations and undertook to fulfil them. Admission of the new State of Bangladesh would be a further significant step in making the United Nations more universal, more representative and thus

more effective. Bangladesh was the eighth most populous country in the world and had dedicated itself to the basic principles of democracy, socialism, secularism and an egalitarian society. Nearly two thirds of the total membership of the United Nations, with as many as 10 members of the Security Council, including four permanent members, had established diplomatic relations with Bangladesh. Furthermore, Bangladesh had already been admitted to membership in a number of specialized agencies of the United Nations without any negative votes. Bangladesh had co-operated fully with the United Nations and its representatives in carrying out in the area one of the biggest humanitarian and relief operations ever undertaken by the United Nations. The admission of Bangladesh, apart from being an acknowledgement of reality, would also serve to consolidate peace and stability in the Indian subcontinent. Though his delegation would have preferred that the Security Council immediately take a decision admitting Bangladesh to the United Nations, the procedure already set in the Council for the consideration of the application could be equally expeditious. He hoped that the Government of Bangladesh would be enabled to join the United Nations and make an effective contribution at the forthcoming session of the General Assembly.

875. The representative of Yugoslavia said that the case before the Council was clear, as the People's Republic of Bangladesh fully satisfied all the legal and political requirements set out by the Charter in Article 4, inasmuch as it was being a peace-loving country that subscribed fully to the principles of full national sovereignty and non-interference in the affairs of others. As a new country faced with tremendous economic and other difficulties resulting from the war and natural catastrophes, it particularly needed and deserved all the support and assistance of the international community. His delegation believed that it was the Council's duty to act favourably and promptly on the substance, since there were no valid grounds for delay, but it would not oppose reference of the application to the Council's Committee on the Admission of New Members, provided that the Committee met promptly and made its report to the Council before the expiration of the deadline stipulated in rule 59 of the provisional rules of procedure.

876. The representative of China reiterated his delegation's firm opposition to consideration by the Security Council of Bangladesh's application for membership in the United Nations under existing circumstances. He stated that, on 21 November 1971, the Indian Government, with the active encouragement and energetic support of the Soviet Union, had launched a large-scale war of aggression against Pakistan that seriously undermined the peace of the South Asian subcontinent. The General Assembly, in resolution 2793 (XXVI) adopted on 7 December by an overwhelming majority, had called upon the Governments of India and Pakistan to take all measures for an immediate cease-fire and withdrawal of their armed forces on the territory of the other to their own side of the India-Pakistan borders. Subsequently, the Security Council, in resolution 307 (1971), had called upon those concerned to take all measures necessary to preserve life, observe the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and fully apply the provisions therein for the protection of wounded and sick prisoners of war and the civilian population. Contrary to article 118 of the relevant Geneva Convention of 1949, the Indian Gov-

ernment was detaining over 90,000 Pakistani prisoners of war and civilians and had failed to withdraw all its troops to its own territory in accordance with the United Nations resolutions, and Bangladesh was threatening the trial of Pakistani prisoners. It was therefore obvious, he continued, that, before those relevant United Nations resolutions had been implemented and a reasonable settlement of the issues between India, Pakistan and Bangladesh had been reached, Bangladesh was not at all qualified to be admitted into the United Nations, and consideration by the Security Council of its application was entirely out of the question. Refusal to implement the relevant resolutions of the United Nations could not be described as acceptance of the obligations contained in the Charter.

877. The representative of India rejected the charges that had been made against his country and deplored the effort to inject polemics into the debate. The people of the subcontinent were capable of working out their own solutions, and the world community should encourage their efforts to establish a brotherly atmosphere rather than try to sow seeds of doubt and mistrust among them. He emphasized that discussions were in progress and agreements were being reached to normalize the situation and said that it would be helpful if the outside world were to encourage those trends.

878. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, speaking in exercise of his right of reply, said that making the admission of Bangladesh depend on prior implementation of United Nations resolutions was artificial and completely anti-constitutional, as the Charter did not stipulate any condition for membership in the United Nations other than those set forth in Article 4; nor was there any mention of the need to implement any particular resolution. Furthermore, there was not, and could not be, any provision in the Charter to the effect that no State could be admitted to membership if it had a dispute or an unresolved problem, particularly one that was a legacy of the past for which the State in question was not responsible. Had such a prior condition for membership in the United Nations really existed, many Member States would not have become Members because they had inherited unresolved territorial or other problems with their neighbours. He expressed particular surprise that the demand that Bangladesh implement United Nations resolutions had been put forward by the representative of a State which was itself unwilling to recognize decisions taken during a period when it was not participating in the United Nations.

Decision: At the 1658th meeting, on 10 August, the President, noting that there had been no formal objection to the application of rule 59 of the provisional rules of procedure, declared adopted his proposal to refer the application of the People's Republic of Bangladesh to the Committee on the Admission of New Members.

879. In a letter dated 20 August addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/10766), the representative of Pakistan transmitted excerpts from a statement made by the President of Pakistan, Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, in the National Assembly of Pakistan on 14 August which related to the question of the admission of Bangladesh to the United Nations. The President had reiterated that the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council should be enforced and had stressed that his Government was

prepared to discuss with the leaders of East Pakistan what their future relationship and links should be, in talks free from any pre-conditions. He had insisted that those discussions were necessary before any decision could be taken and that it was the Dacca authorities who had refused to enter into a dialogue. In his letter, the representative of Pakistan expressed the view of his Government that the admission of Bangladesh must be seen against the background of the circumstances that had led to its creation, the action taken by the United Nations, the status of implementation of the decisions of the Organization and subsequent developments. He cited the terms of Security Council resolution 307 (1971) and article 118 of the third Geneva Convention of 1949 and said that, by not carrying out its obligations arising thereunder, Bangladesh was obstructing progress towards peace in the subcontinent and failed to show that it was a peace-loving State, able and willing to carry out its obligations. Therefore, it did not qualify at that time for admission to the United Nations.

880. A letter dated 23 August was addressed to the President of the Security Council by the Chargé d'affaires of the Embassy of the People's Republic of Bangladesh in Washington and was circulated as a document (S/10774), in accordance with the request contained therein. Referring to the letter from Pakistan (S/10766), the Chargé d'affaires stated that, in support of its contention that action on the application of Bangladesh would not be proper or opportune, Pakistan had raised a number of irrelevant issues and made incorrect and misleading statements relating to pending matters of bilateral concern between the two countries. However, membership in the United Nations could not be linked with the state of bilateral relations between the applicant and any other State, as the International Court of Justice had stated in its advisory opinion of 28 May 1948 that, in deciding on the qualifications of an applicant, an existing Member should be guided exclusively by Article 4 of the Charter and not by extraneous political considerations. He further stated that Bangladesh was the eighth largest State of the world and that its democratically elected Government had established unchallenged authority throughout the country; that there were no foreign troops in Bangladesh; that more than 85 countries had accorded it full diplomatic recognition; that it was a member of several specialized agencies; that it had solemnly affirmed its intent to undertake all the obligations flowing from the Charter; and that it had taken all necessary steps to protect the life and property of all ethnic and linguistic minorities and extended full co-operation to the United Nations and other international agencies. He expressed the hope of his Government that the Security Council would resist unjustified manoeuvres and give prompt and favourable consideration to its application for membership.

881. On 23 August, the Committee on the Admission of New Members submitted its report (S/10773) to the Security Council concerning the application of the People's Republic of Bangladesh. The Committee had examined the application at two meetings held on 11 and 21 August, in the course of which members of the Committee had expressed the views of their delegations concerning the application. The report stated that, in the absence of any formal objection, it had been decided that rule 59 of the provisional rules of procedure should be waived in

order to enable the Committee to report to the Security Council its conclusions on the item by 21 August.

882. Annexed to the Committee's report was a draft resolution (S/10768) submitted to the Security Council on 21 August by the delegation of China, whereby the Council would decide to postpone consideration of the question pending the full implementation of the relevant resolutions—General Assembly resolution 2793 (XXVI) and Security Council resolution 307 (1971). It was indicated that the Chinese delegation would ask that its draft resolution be accorded precedence in the Security Council, in accordance with the provisional rules of procedure.

883. The Committee had also received a draft resolution (S/C.2/L.1) sponsored by India, the USSR and Yugoslavia, whereby the Committee would decide to recommend to the Security Council that the People's Republic of Bangladesh be accepted as a member of the United Nations.

884. The report stated that, after the Chairman recalled occasions in the past when the Committee had taken a vote on the attitude of delegations towards admission of an applicant State, the sponsors of the three-Power draft (S/C.2/L.1) had agreed that, instead of a vote on their draft resolution, a vote should be taken on the attitude of delegations towards the application of Bangladesh. The Chairman had pointed out that a vote in the Committee could not constitute a substantive decision, which remained within the exclusive competence of the Security Council.

885. The Committee reported that, in a vote on the attitude of members towards the application of Bangladesh for membership in the United Nations, the attitude of 11 delegations had been favourable (Argentina, Belgium, France, India, Italy, Japan, Panama, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and Yugoslavia), that of one delegation (Guinea) had been unfavourable and three delegations (China, Somalia and the Sudan) had not participated in the vote. The delegation of China stated its firm opposition to a vote on the draft resolution (S/C.2/L.1), for such practices were in total contravention of the rules of procedure of the Security Council and were, therefore, illegal and null and void.

886. At its 1659th meeting, on 24 August, the Council continued its consideration of the application of the People's Republic of Bangladesh. The Council had before it the draft resolution (S/10768) submitted on 21 August by the delegation of China and a four-Power draft resolution (S/10771) submitted on 23 August by India, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and Yugoslavia.

887. The Chinese draft resolution (S/10768) read as follows:

"The Security Council,

"Having considered the deliberations of the Committee on the Admission of new Members concerning document S/10759,

"Recalling General Assembly resolution 2793 (XXVI) of 7 December 1971, as well as Security Council resolution 307 (1971) of 21 December 1971, and, particularly, the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 3 of the latter, concerning troop withdrawal and release and repatriation of prisoners of

war in observance of the Geneva Conventions by all those concerned,

"Affirming that compliance with the pertinent resolutions of the United Nations which gave expression to the will of the overwhelming majority of the countries of the world is an important indication of an applicant's ability and willingness to carry out the obligations contained in the Charter,

"Reaffirming that the provisions of its resolution 307 (1971) are applicable to all those concerned in the recent conflict on the south Asian sub-continent,

"Deeply concerned that its resolution 307 (1971) has not yet been implemented, especially with regard to its paragraphs 1 and 3,

"Reiterating the importance and urgency of the full implementation of General Assembly resolution 2793 (XXVI) and Security Council resolution 307 (1971),

"1. Decides to postpone consideration of the matter referred to in document S/10759, pending the full implementation of the above resolutions;

"2. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council at an early date on the full implementation of the above resolutions by all those concerned."

888. The four-Power draft resolution (S/10771) read as follows:

"The Security Council,

"Having examined the application of the People's Republic of Bangladesh for admission to the United Nations (S/10759),

"Recommends to the General Assembly that the People's Republic of Bangladesh be admitted to membership in the United Nations."

889. The representative of China, referring to General Assembly resolution 2793 (XXVI) and Security Council resolution 307 (1971), said that those two resolutions, particularly paragraphs 1 and 3 of the Council's resolution, explicitly demanded that all those concerned must withdraw their troops to their respective territories and to positions on the cease-fire line between India and Pakistan in Jammu and Kashmir and must release and repatriate prisoners of war in observance of the Geneva Conventions, but that those resolutions had not yet been implemented by the parties concerned. It was the view of the Chinese delegation that all States Members of the United Nations had an imperative duty to urge full implementation of those resolutions at an early date. The only conclusion to be drawn from the provisions of Article 4 of the Charter was that implementation of the two relevant United Nations resolutions expressing the will of the overwhelming majority of the countries of the world was a significant indication of the applicant's ability and willingness to fulfil the obligations contained in the Charter. To separate the question of the application before the Council from the implementation of the relevant United Nations resolutions was contrary to the letter and spirit of the Charter. The Chinese delegation had therefore supported its draft resolution (S/10768) with the view to postponing consideration of the application, pending the full implementation of the relevant United Nations resolutions. If the Soviet Union, India and other countries insisted on pressing

the Security Council for the immediate admission of Bangladesh to the United Nations, his delegation would categorically vote against it.

890. The representative of India said that the report of the Committee on the Admission of New Members clearly indicated that the overwhelming majority of its members favoured the immediate admission of Bangladesh. In the Council, as well as in the Committee, attempts had been made to link consideration of the application with extraneous and irrelevant pre-conditions, such as bilateral relations between different States and the implementation of Bangladesh of two United Nations resolutions. The Chinese draft resolution (S/10768) contained the latest reflection of those attempts, which had already been repudiated by an overwhelming majority of the members of the Council. In an advisory opinion of 28 May 1948 on Article 4, paragraph 1, of the Charter, the International Court of Justice had stated that no State was juridically entitled to make its consent to admission dependent on conditions not expressly provided by paragraph 1 of the said Article. It was incontestable, therefore, that the admission of a new Member State could not be made conditional on anything other than Article 4. The argument about the presence of foreign troops in the territory of an applicant State was also a completely irrelevant consideration. Moreover, Bangladesh had categorically stated that there were no foreign troops on its soil. Thus, the Chinese resolution contained provisions that were entirely outside the scope of the issue. He added that nothing in General Assembly resolution 2793 (XXVI) applied to Bangladesh, and never during the extensive debates that had preceded the Council's adoption of resolution 307 (1971) had any delegation contended that it applied to Bangladesh. Referring to the four-Power draft resolution (S/10771), he said that the sponsors urged that an immediate decision be taken on it, as any further delay, whether limited or unlimited, conditional or unconditional, could only contribute to increasing tensions in the subcontinent and making more difficult the realization of durable peace and harmony among the countries in the area.

891. The representative of Yugoslavia said that Bangladesh met all the requirements for membership postulated by the Charter in Article 4 and was eminently willing and able to assume and carry out the obligations and duties of a Member State. In the view of his Government, there were no just grounds to bar the entry of Bangladesh into the Organization, and those realistically and constructively interested in the promotion of peace and security in the area and in the world and desirous that each country contribute its best, could not ignore the new reality of Bangladesh and the opportunity simultaneously to strengthen that country's independence, the universality of the United Nations and its over-all performance and efficiency. The full contribution of an independent, non-aligned Bangladesh to the United Nations would constitute a major achievement and a step forward for everyone. In its active support for the right of Bangladesh to enter the Organization, his Government was proceeding from the premise that such a right was not and should not be the subject or the cause for any confrontation. Yugoslavia had friendly and normal relations with all the countries of the subcontinent and with all the major Asian and non-Asian factors that influenced developments there.

892. The representative of the United Kingdom said that his delegation was a sponsor of the draft resolution concerning the application of Bangladesh, which had been recently accepted as a member of the Commonwealth. His delegation was entirely satisfied that Bangladesh was qualified to be a Member of the United Nations and that it was determined to uphold the principles of the Charter. In his delegation's view, the arguments adduced in relation to resolution 307 (1971) did not justify any further postponement of consideration of the application, and delay would not help the situation in the subcontinent. On the contrary, tension was more likely to be relieved by the early admission of Bangladesh to the United Nations rather than by making its admission subject to special conditions.

893. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that it was clear that Bangladesh had accepted the obligations contained in the Charter and solemnly undertaken to fulfil them. Thus it was qualified for admission. His Government's position with regard to Bangladesh was consistent and based on principle, as it had supported the movement of peoples for national independence since its inception. The Soviet Union was consistently in favour of further development of good relations with all countries in the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent and of promoting and strengthening peace in Asia. The Soviet people had profound sympathy for the struggle of the eastern Bengali people and welcomed the victory that had led to its establishment as the independent sovereign State of Bangladesh. As a sponsor of the Four-Power draft resolution (S/10771), he appealed to all members of the Security Council, in particular the permanent members, to adopt it. Turning to the Chinese draft resolution (S/10768), he said that it was in direct contradiction to Article 4 of the Charter and the first paragraph of rule 60 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, which contained the only requirements laid down for all States applying for membership. The draft resolution arbitrarily expanded those requirements and was therefore an unconstitutional attempt to introduce discrimination or favouritism, contrary to the principle of the sovereign equality of States.

894. The representative of the Sudan said that his delegation could see no fairer course of action than postponement of consideration of the matter until the parties involved had given effect to the relevant resolutions of the Security Council. That viewpoint was incorporated in the draft resolution proposed by China. His delegation found that draft more in conformity with its views, but on condition that the way should not be barred indefinitely for Bangladesh. That position was motivated by humanitarian consideration for some 90,000 prisoners of war whose fate was still far from certain. As Bangladesh had a major say in deciding their fate and was insisting on putting some of them on trial for war crimes, their release would be a test and proof of the peace-loving nature of the applicant. In deciding whether or not an applicant State was peace-loving, the Council had to take into consideration its record of adherence to Council resolutions and resolutions of the United Nations as a whole. He considered that a brief postponement of admission to membership might facilitate the implementation of the Council's resolutions and the release of the prisoners of war. He formally proposed, under rule 33, para-

graph 3, of the provisional rules of procedure, that, before a vote was taken the meeting be adjourned until the following afternoon.

895. The representative of Japan said that his delegation would support the application of Bangladesh because there was no doubt that it was qualified for membership and that its admission to the United Nations would contribute to the promotion of the cause of the world organization. His delegation would therefore vote in favour of the four-Power draft resolution and could not support the Chinese draft resolution.

896. The representative of Argentina said that his delegation was prepared at any time to vote for the approval of the request of Bangladesh for admission to the United Nations and that, essentially, its position was based on legal considerations deriving from a strict interpretation of the standards contained in the United Nations Charter. Article 4 of the Charter established five conditions for the admission of a new Member to the Organization, and in its advisory opinion of 28 May 1948 the International Court of Justice had stated very clearly that the requirements laid down in Article 4 of the Charter were complete, that is to say, it was not possible to add other conditions, however reasonable and logical they might appear. His delegation firmly believed that the People's Republic of Bangladesh fulfilled all the requirements contained in the Charter and that settlement of pending problems would be facilitated by its admission.

897. The representative of Italy recalled that his delegation had suggested that no hasty decision should be taken on the application of Bangladesh, in view of the fact that past experience had proved that, in the presence of firm opposition by a permanent member, a vote would prove profitable neither to the United Nations nor to Bangladesh itself. He would, however, vote in favour of the four-Power draft resolution, because Italy had, from the outset, whole-heartedly welcomed and supported the application of Bangladesh for immediate admission to the United Nations. Such a decision would be a further significant step towards the achievement of the universality of the world Organization. It had been the constant practice and policy of his Government to support the admission to the United Nations of States that it had already recognized, such as Bangladesh, and, in fact, Italy had already voted in favour of its membership in a number of specialized agencies of the United Nations.

898. The representative of France said that his Government considered that Bangladesh belonged in the United Nations and that it should occupy its place without delay. It therefore regretted that the application did not have unanimous support in the Council. Because of the dramatic circumstances surrounding the birth of Bangladesh, very serious problems remained outstanding and conflicts persisted between the parties. His Government had made strenuous efforts to find out whether there might be favourable prospects for overcoming the obstacles confronting the Council, but, to its great regret, no new factors had emerged that would give the French Government grounds to think that any further delay might, in the near future, facilitate the search for a solution acceptable to all the interested parties. In the circumstances, his delegation intended to abstain on the Chinese draft resolution and to vote in favour of the draft resolution recommending to the General Assembly the admission of Bangladesh.

899. A procedural discussion on the motion of the representative of the Sudan then ensued, in which the representatives of the USSR, India, Somalia, the Sudan, Yugoslavia and China took part. The motion to adjourn until the following afternoon, before voting on the two draft resolutions before the Council, was then put to a vote.

Decision: *The motion was adopted by 9 votes in favour to 4 against (India, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Yugoslavia), with 2 abstentions (France and Panama).*

900. At the 1660th meeting, on 25 August, the representative of Panama said that the People's Republic of Bangladesh had an undeniable right to be a Member of the United Nations, inasmuch as it fulfilled all the requirements for membership established by the Charter. Panama would vote in favour of its prompt entry as a new Member of the United Nations and could not support the draft resolution submitted by the delegation of China.

901. The President, speaking as the representative of Belgium, stated that his Government wished to contribute to the creation of a climate of relaxation of tension in the Indian subcontinent and firmly believed that the presence of Bangladesh within the United Nations was an important factor in bringing about such a relaxation. Belgium had recognized Bangladesh and given it considerable assistance. It had also sponsored its entry into the World Health Organization. Therefore his delegation would vote for the four-Power draft resolution. Bangladesh fulfilled the five conditions laid down in Article 4, paragraph 1, of the Charter, which, he maintained, were restrictive and not given merely as an example. His delegation was not therefore in a position to support the draft resolution introduced by the representative of China. His delegation had hoped that the new State could enter with the unanimous support of the 15 members of the Council and the support of Pakistan, and that by the time the candidacy of Bangladesh for membership was presented, all outstanding questions stemming from the events of December 1971 would have been solved to the satisfaction of all the parties concerned.

902. The representative of Somalia stated that it was obvious that there were widely opposed viewpoints, not so much on the admission of Bangladesh *per se*, but on the timing and conditions under which it should join the United Nations. In the circumstances, it seemed only right and proper that the Council should proceed with great circumspection and without undue haste. However, the majority of the Council's members appeared to favour a rapid decision on the matter. His delegation would abstain from voting on the Chinese draft resolution because it did not consider it equitable that Bangladesh's application should be considered only after all the provisions of Council resolution 307 (1971) had been fully implemented. It would suffice for Bangladesh to comply only with those provisions that concerned it directly, as many of its provisions were directed solely towards relations between India and Pakistan. Somalia would also abstain on the four-Power resolution in its current form. There were 80,000 Pakistani prisoners of war and 10,000 civilian internees, including many women and children, whose release and repatriation were subject to the approval of the Government of Bangladesh. Resolution 307 (1971) contained a demand for their release, and for the

Council to approve the application of Bangladesh without reference to the letter and spirit of that resolution would be a disservice to the Organization. There was no precedent for an applicant State coming to the United Nations seeking membership while holding in custody 80,000 troops and 10,000 civilian internees, contrary to a Security Council resolution. On behalf of the delegations of Guinea, Somalia and the Sudan, he submitted an amendment (S/10775) to the four-Power draft resolution (S/10771) that would have made the admission of Bangladesh to the United Nations "subject to the immediate implementation of those provisions of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 relating to the release and repatriation of prisoners of war and civilian internees as mentioned in Security Council resolution 307 (1971)".

903. The representative of Guinea said that the dramatic circumstances in which the People's Republic of Bangladesh had been created were well known and that was why her delegation maintained that the admission of Bangladesh could not be dissociated from the implementation of resolution 307 (1971). Guinea had always sought to encourage all attempts to negotiate and had always been against hasty solutions, which, in its opinion, might hamper the process of negotiations instead of assisting them. Accordingly, she would have no difficulty in voting for the Chinese draft resolution. If the three-Power amendment to the four-Power draft resolution was accepted, Guinea would vote for that draft resolution; otherwise, it would abstain from voting on the four-Power draft resolution as originally submitted.

904. The representative of India said that the Council was discussing the limited question of the admission of Bangladesh. The Council should be guided by the interpretation of the Charter given by the International Court of Justice which held that no external circumstances, no additional conditions, no irrelevant matters should be brought up on the question of admission. He also said that there had been little or no delay in the admission of new Members since 1965. He added that the problems between Bangladesh and Pakistan could be solved, but only if there was negotiation on the basis of equality. But those problems had nothing to do with the admission of Bangladesh. In his letter to the Council the *Chargé d'affaires* of Bangladesh in Washington had stated that Bangladesh was prepared to settle all its outstanding problems with Pakistan on the basis of the sovereign equality of States, national dignity, respect for territorial integrity and non-interference in each other's affairs. His delegation would, therefore, categorically reject the three-Power amendment because, if it were added, there would be very little difference in substance between the four-Power and the Chinese draft resolutions.

905. The representative of Somalia drew attention to a statement issued on 25 August in which the International Commission of Jurists had urged the Indian Government to take immediately all necessary steps to liberate and repatriate the Pakistani prisoners of war detained in India, in conformity with the third Geneva Convention of 1949. In considering the admission of Bangladesh, account should be taken of whether it had complied with the elementary obligation to act in conformity with the provisions of the Geneva Convention.

906. The representative of Yugoslavia said that the proposed amendment would delay the solution of the problem and link it with other extraneous problems and

developments. As a sponsor of the four-Power draft resolution, Yugoslavia would vote against the amendment.

907. The representative of the Sudan said that, as things were improving on the subcontinent at a satisfactory rate, a short delay would probably suffice to settle all residual disputes. The sponsors of the three-Power amendment believed that the negotiations in progress would bear fruit by the time the matter was brought before the General Assembly, on the basis of absolute equality between Pakistan and Bangladesh. Moreover, they wished to avoid a vote that would result in the rejection of the application.

Decision: *At the 1660th meeting, on 25 August 1973, the draft resolution submitted by China (S/10768) received 3 votes in favour (China, Guinea and the Sudan), 3 against (India, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Yugoslavia) and 9 abstentions and, having failed to obtain the required majority of votes, was not adopted.*

908. The representative of China said that his delegation's draft had been put forward in defence of the principles of the United Nations Charter, the implementation of the relevant resolutions of the United Nations expressing the will of the overwhelming majority of the countries of the world and the fundamental interests of the entire people of the South Asian subcontinent. Because of the strenuous obstruction and sabotage by the Soviet Union and India, that draft resolution, which was in full accord with the principles of the United Nations Charter, had regrettably not been adopted. In view of the circumstances under which Bangladesh had been established, it was obvious that the question of its application for membership should not be examined in deviation from the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council concerning last year's war of aggression in the South Asian subcontinent. His delegation considered that the Secretary-General should report to the Security Council on the full implementation of those resolutions. Article 4 of the Charter provided that applicants for membership in the United Nations must not only declare their readiness to accept the obligations contained in the Charter but must, in the judgement of the Organization, be able and willing to carry out those obligations before they were qualified for admission. As the Bangladesh authorities had shown open contempt for the principles of the Charter and refused to comply with the relevant resolutions, they should not expect the Security Council to shut its eyes and make a judgement asserting that they were able and willing to carry out their Charter obligations. Their inability and unwillingness to carry out the obligations contained in the Charter proved their direct contravention of Article 4 and the complete lack of qualification for being admitted into the United Nations. He considered that the Soviet and Indian Governments had ulterior motives for opposing postponement of the consideration of the application and for insisting on dragging Bangladesh into the United Nations before the relevant United Nations resolutions had been implemented. He charged that those two countries, taking advantage of the consequences of the war of aggression, were refusing to withdraw all the Indian troops and detaining more than 90,000 prisoners of war and civilians as hostages in order to blackmail Pakistan and pressure the United Nations. In August 1971, the Governments of India and the Soviet Union had concluded a treaty of peace, friendship and co-operation, which, he said, was in

essence an aggressive treaty of military alliance that stripped the Indian Government of its cloak of non-alignment. Subsequently, he charged, the Soviet Government had supported India in launching its war of aggression against Pakistan and, after the cease-fire, obstructed a reasonable solution to the relationship between the parties on the South Asian subcontinent in an attempt to aggravate division and antagonism and to utilize the contradictions in order to control India and Bangladesh, infiltrate into the Indian Ocean area and the South Asian subcontinent and expand its sphere of influence and contend for hegemony. In refusing to postpone the consideration of Bangladesh's application and pressing for a vote in the Security Council on the application in order to force the Chinese delegation to vote against it, the USSR was merely using Bangladesh as a pawn to take its chestnuts out of the fire. In recent years, in the guise of support and assistance, it had subjected a number of third world countries, including countries in Africa and the Middle East, to aggression, subversion, control and interference. Some of its schemes had already been revealed, and some were being revealed. If certain people on the South Asian subcontinent still had some sense of national confidence, why could they not take the initiative to unite the subcontinent first and facilitate a reasonable settlement of the relevant issues, instead of allowing themselves to be led by others? Out of consideration for a genuine relaxation of the situation on the South Asian subcontinent and the vital interests of the entire people there, the Chinese delegation wished to make its position clear in advance.

Decisions: *At the 1660th meeting, on 25 August 1973, the three-Power amendment (S/10775) to the four-Power draft resolution (S/10771) received 4 votes in favour (Guinea, Somalia, Sudan and United States of America), 4 against (India, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Yugoslavia) and 7 abstentions and, having failed to obtain the required majority, was not adopted.*

The four-Power draft resolution (S/10771) received 11 votes in favour, 1 against (China) and 3 abstentions (Guinea, Sudan, Somalia) and was not adopted owing to the negative vote of a permanent member of the Council.

909. The representative of the United States stated that his delegation regretted that the Council had been unable to agree either on a recommendation for the admission of Bangladesh to the United Nations or on a further but limited postponement, which might have made possible a resolution of the underlying problems that had contributed to the impasse. The United States had extended recognition to Bangladesh and had provided assistance to its people and Government in their task of economic and social reconstruction. His Government sincerely believed that progress towards the normalization of relations between the nations of the subcontinent would best be advanced by full and speedy implementation of all provisions of Security Council resolution 307 (1971). In particular, the provisions of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War should be implemented as soon as possible. Given the ruling of the International Court of Justice and the provision of the Charter, the language of the three-Power draft amendment was debatable, but his delegation had voted in its favour because of the great importance his Government attached to the release of prisoners of war.

910. The representative of Argentina said that the attitude of his delegation to the three-Power amendment had been based solely on legal considerations and that, within that context, no conditions could be set for the admission of a State to the United Nations except those contained in Article 4 of the Charter, however just, reasonable and desirable such conditions might appear to be or, even in fact, be. Accordingly, he had abstained on the three-Power amendment.

911. The representative of India noted that the Chinese draft resolution had not been accepted by the majority of the Council, which had rejected its provisions linking the application of Bangladesh with pre-conditions extraneous to the Charter. The four-Power draft resolution, on the other hand, had received majority support but had not been adopted only because a single permanent member had voted against it. His delegation did not believe that the outcome would make any positive contribution to the realization of peace, which could best be worked out on the basis of the sovereignty and equality of the three States on the sub-continent. It therefore hoped that the obstacles would be overcome before the opening of the forthcoming session of the General Assembly.

912. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics recalled the appeal that he had made prior to the voting that all, including the permanent members of the Council, show a spirit of understanding of the interests and needs of Bangladesh and vote in favour of the four-Power draft resolution. He had also hoped that, following the postponement proposed by the representative of the Sudan, the intervening time would have been used to enable the Council to adopt a unanimous resolution recommending the admission of Bangladesh. Despite his appeal, however, which had been supported by the majority of the Council, because of the attitude of the Chinese delegation the request of Bangladesh for admission to membership in the United Nations could not be met at the current time. The discussion in the Council had shown that the overwhelming majority of its members were in favour of accepting the application of Bangladesh. It had also brought out the unfounded, unconstitutional, anti-Charter nature of the objections to its admission. The representative of China, he declared, had resorted to all kinds of unjustified inventions and anti-Soviet attacks. In its attitude towards the application of Bangladesh, China had acted against the interests of the national liberation movements of the oppressed peoples in general and the national liberation movement of the East Bengal people in particular. Furthermore, its action was contrary to the development of healthy tendencies and to the improvement of the atmosphere in the Indian subcontinent and the whole of Asia. By taking a stand against the admission of Bangladesh to the United Nations, China had acted contrary to the principle of universality and to the Charter, which clearly and unambiguously laid down the conditions for the admission of new Members. China's stand against the admission of Bangladesh ran counter to the idea of co-operation among sovereign Member States, which his delegation considered to be precisely the real reason and motivation underlying China's actions. The position of the Soviet Union was always one of principle. The USSR had adhered to principle for 22 years in the matter of the restoration of the legitimate rights of the People's Republic of China and, as a matter of principle, it would continue

to favour the admission of the People's Republic of Bangladesh.

913. The representative of Italy said that his delegation's first objective had been the immediate admission of Bangladesh. If that solution were unobtainable, Italy's second aim had been, and still was, the membership of Bangladesh at the earliest possible stage during the next session of the General Assembly. His delegation sincerely hoped that the situation in the Asian sub-continent would evolve in the spirit of the Simla Agreement towards an atmosphere of reconciliation and co-operation, so as to make it possible for the Council to reconsider Bangladesh's application at an early date.

914. The representative of France reiterated that his delegation was in favour of the implementation of Security Council resolution 307 (1971) and the strict observance of the Geneva Conventions of 1949; but it did not believe that the Council, in considering the application of Bangladesh for membership, should take into account anything other than the conditions to be found in the Charter itself. For the future, his delegation hoped that the parties concerned would draw sound conclusions from the debate and resolutely try to find acceptable solutions. France, for its part, had already embarked on that undertaking and was prepared to lend its assistance to any attempt to find a settlement of the outstanding problems.

915. The representative of China said that any decision to admit Bangladesh to the United Nations in the prevailing circumstances would involve an important question of principle, namely, respect for the principles and purposes of the Charter, for the obligations of Member States and for the relevant United Nations resolutions. Inasmuch as China was participating in the work of the United Nations, it had to act according to principle and could never compromise on important questions of principle. After very serious and careful consideration the Chinese delegation had made the firm decision to use the veto in defence of the principles of the Charter and relevant United Nations resolutions. The debate on the matter before the Council had very clearly shown that the Chinese delegation had been compelled to use the veto. The peoples of the whole world were clearly aware that the Chinese people had consistently and firmly supported the just struggle of the oppressed nations and peoples of the world and firmly opposed imperialist schemes of aggression, interference, control and subversion. That fact could not be altered by any slanderous remarks.

916. The representative of the Sudan said that, for reasons already stated, his delegation had opted for postponement of admission until certain conditions were fulfilled. Without such fulfilment, the Council would not be justified in considering the issue of admission. His delegation's position was not only disinterested and highly motivated but based on the realities in the region and on the provisions of the Security Council resolution 307 (1971) and was without any prejudice to the *de facto* or even the *de jure* existence or status of Bangladesh. His delegation had constantly warned against a stalemate such as that currently faced by the Council, which was not in the best interest of Bangladesh or any of the countries of the subcontinent.

917. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that it was clear from the two statements by the Chinese representative attempting to justify his use of the veto that the veto had been used

for unjust purposes, as just purposes did not require any such justification or explanation.

918. The representative of Somalia said that the situation in the Council would not have developed as it had if some delegations had not pressed their views to a vote. He stressed that the application of Bangladesh could not be isolated from the prisoners of war in the custody of Bangladesh. No State applying for membership could claim to have met the criteria of Article 4 of the Charter when it held in custody 90,000 prisoners of war of a State Member of the Organization. Somalia wanted Bangladesh to join the United Nations, but one who craved equity must come with clean hands.

919. The President, speaking as the representative of Belgium, said that his delegation's abstention on the three-Power amendment was an expression of its serious concern at the fact that almost nine months after the cessation of hostilities, 80,000 prisoners of war and 10,000 Pakistani officials had still not been liberated or repatriated. Belgium could not accept the use of human beings as hostages for purely political purposes and negotiations.

920. The Council then considered its draft special report concerning the application of the People's Republic of Bangladesh for membership in the United Nations, which, after oral modification, it approved for submission to the General Assembly in accordance with rule 60 of its provisional rules of procedure.

B. Application of the German Democratic Republic

921. In a letter dated 12 June 1973 circulated by the Secretary-General (S/10945), the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the German Democratic Republic

submitted the application of the German Democratic Republic for admission to membership in the United Nations, together with a declaration, signed by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the German Democratic Republic, accepting the obligations contained in the Charter of the United Nations. The letter welcomed the fact that the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and France had, in a joint declaration of 9 November 1972, agreed to support the applications of the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany for membership in the United Nations.

C. Application of the Federal Republic of Germany

922. In a letter dated 13 June 1973 circulated by the Secretary-General (S/10949), the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany submitted the application of the Federal Republic of Germany for admission to membership in the United Nations, together with a declaration, signed by the Federal President and the Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs, accepting the obligations contained in the Charter of the United Nations.

923. In a further letter dated 13 June (S/10950), the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany stated that the Federal Republic of Germany also accepted, from the date on which it was admitted to membership in the United Nations, the rights and obligations contained in the Charter of the United Nations with respect to Berlin (West) and would represent the interests of Berlin (West) in the United Nations and its subsidiary organs.

Chapter 10

ELECTION OF FIVE MEMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

924. In a memorandum dated 10 August 1972 (S/10744), the Secretary-General drew attention to the fact that, on 5 February 1973, the terms of office of five members of the International Court of Justice would expire and that the Security Council and the General Assembly at its twenty-seventh regular session would have to elect five judges for a term of office of nine years beginning on 6 February 1973. The memorandum also outlined the procedure for the elections in the Security Council and in the General Assembly.

925. On 11 August, in accordance with Article 7 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, the Secretary-General transmitted to the General Assembly and the Security Council the list of candidates nominated by national groups (S/10745) to fill the five vacancies in the Court.

926. At its 1671st meeting, on 30 October, the Security Council proceeded to vote by secret ballot on the candidates included in the list (S/10745 and Add.1-6). The President stated that, in accordance with the practice followed by the Council, when more than five candidates received the required absolute majority of eight votes, a new vote would have to be taken on all candidates until the required number of candidates and no more had received an absolute majority in the Council.

927. On the first and second ballots, six candidates received the required majority:

| | |
|-----------------------------------|-----------------------|
| Mr. Isaac Forster (Senegal) | 15 votes and 14 votes |
| Mr. Nagendra Singh (India) | 14 votes and 14 votes |
| Mr. André Gros (France) | 13 votes and 13 votes |

| | |
|---|-----------------------|
| Sir Humphrey Waldock (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland) | 12 votes and 13 votes |
| Mr. José María Ruda (Argentina) | 9 votes and 9 votes |
| Mr. Carlos García-Bauer (Guatemala) | 8 votes and 9 votes |

928. On the third ballot, the following five candidates received the required absolute majority :

| | |
|---|----|
| Mr. Isaac Forster (Senegal) | 14 |
| Mr. Nagendra Singh (India) | 14 |
| Mr. André Gros (France) | 13 |
| Sir Humphrey Waldock (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland) | 13 |
| Mr. José María Ruda (Argentina) | 10 |

929. The President of the Council communicated to the President of the General Assembly the names of the five candidates who had received the required majority in the Council. After a suspension of the meeting, the President informed the Council that, in the balloting held simultaneously in the General Assembly, the same five candidates had obtained the required majority of votes and had therefore been elected members of the International Court of Justice for a term of office of nine years beginning on 6 February 1973.

Chapter 11

QUESTION CONCERNING THE HOLDING OF MEETINGS OF THE COUNCIL AWAY FROM HEADQUARTERS

930. In the course of its consideration of the request of the Government of Panama concerning the holding of meetings of the Security Council in Panama City (see chapter 8), the Security Council decided, at its 1685th meeting, on 10 January 1973, to ask the Security Council Committee on Council Meetings away from Headquarters to consider all aspects of the Council's requirements.

931. In its report (S/10868) submitted to the Security Council on 25 January, the Committee indicated that its attention had been drawn to the Council's directive to it to endeavour to draft general guide-lines that could be applied in all similar situations that might arise in the future and stated that it had agreed to meet again following the meetings in Panama in order to discuss relevant questions related to any future meetings of the Council away from Headquarters, in line with its terms of reference.

Part Three

THE MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE

Chapter 12

WORK OF THE MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE

932. The Military Staff Committee functioned continuously under the draft rules of procedure during the period under review and held a total of 26 meetings without considering matters of substance.

Part Four

MATTERS BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL BUT NOT DISCUSSED IN THE COUNCIL DURING THE PERIOD COVERED

Chapter 13

COMMUNICATION FROM LAOS

933. By a letter dated 23 June 1972 (S/10719), the representative of Laos transmitted to the Secretary-General the text of a message addressed to him by the Primer Minister and Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Kingdom of Laos, drawing attention to the serious situation then developing in his country. The message stated that North Viet-Nameese troops equipped with powerful weapons had been repulsed in their attack on the Plain of Jars but that the situation in the south had become dangerously worse. The Prime Minister annexed the text of his latest protest on the matter to the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Laos, which, he asserted, had been paralysed for years by a lack of unity among its members. He therefore requested the Secretary-General to inform the Security Council of the facts that he had submitted to the International Commission, in order that the world might acknowledge the aggression that had been directed against his country for more than 20 years. Requesting that justice be done to Laos in accordance with the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations, the Prime Minister added that he would be grateful for any intervention to promote peace in Laos.

Chapter 14

COMMUNICATIONS FROM THE KHMER REPUBLIC

934. In a letter dated 21 August 1972 (S/10769), the representative of the Khmer Republic submitted a complaint to the President of the Security Council concerning intensification by North Viet-Nameese and Viet-Cong forces on 6 August of their general offensive against the Khmer Republic.

935. In view of the extreme gravity of the situation caused by that aggression, in flagrant violation of the Geneva Agreements of 20 July 1954 and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, his Government urgently appealed to all peace-loving Members of the United Nations to exert the necessary pressure on the Hanoi Government to put an end to its unjustifiable war against the Khmer Republic, which was a faithful Member of the United Nations.

936. By a letter dated 13 October 1972 (S/10812), the representative of the Khmer Republic transmitted to the President of the Security Council, a message from the President of the Khmer Republic, complaining of a raid in Phnom Penh on 7 October by Viet-Cong and North Viet-Nameese commandos and stating that his Government reserved the right to claim compensation from the North Viet-Nameese and the Viet-Cong, at the end of hostilities, for the damage and losses caused by them since their invasion of the Khmer Republic.

Chapter 15

COMMUNICATION CONCERNING VIET-NAM

937. By a letter dated 30 October 1972 (S/10821), the representative of the Mongolian People's Republic transmitted to the Secretary-General the text of a statement issued by his Government on 28 October concerning a draft agreement on the termination of the war and the re-establishment of peace in Viet-Nam that

had been submitted by the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam at a confidential meeting between its representatives and those of the United States of America in order to reach a peaceful settlement of the Viet-Nameese problem. According to the statement, the American side had brought up the question of a so-called difficulty in Saigon at the last moment and had attempted to postpone the signing of the agreement, thereby creating artificial obstacles to the practical realization of the agreement already reached on the cessation of hostilities and the re-establishment of peace in Viet-Nam.

Chapter 16

REPORTS ON THE STRATEGIC TRUST TERRITORY OF THE PACIFIC ISLANDS

938. The report of the Trusteeship Council on the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, covering the period from 19 June 1971 to 16 June 1972, was communicated to the Security Council in document S/10753 (*Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-seventh Year, Special Supplement No. 1*).

939. Pursuant to paragraph 3 of Security Council resolution 70 (1949) of 7 March 1949, the Secretary-General, on 13 June 1973, transmitted to members of the Security Council the report (S/10947) of the Government of the United States of America on the administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands for the period from 1 July 1971 to 30 June 1972.

Chapter 17

COMMUNICATIONS AND REPORTS CONCERNING THE SITUATION IN THE INDIA/PAKISTAN SUBCONTINENT

940. By a letter dated 21 June 1972 (S/10714), the representative of Pakistan transmitted to the Secretary-General a list containing complaints of further violations of the cease-fire by Indian armed forces.

941. On 11 August 1972, the Secretary-General, in pursuance of his responsibilities under Security Council resolution 307 (1971), submitted to the Security Council the final report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees on the activities of the United Nations focal point for assistance to refugees from East Bengal in India (S/10539/Add.3). The report, which concluded a series of earlier reports (S/10466, S/10539 and Add.1 and 2), had earlier been transmitted to the Economic and Social Council, which had taken note of it with appreciation.

942. By a letter dated 30 August 1972 (S/10776), the representative of Pakistan transmitted to the Secretary-General the text of a statement issued on 24 August by the International Commission of Jurists, which had urged the Indian Government to liberate and repatriate the Pakistani prisoners of war detained in India.

943. In reports dated 1 January 1973 (S/10853), 15 January (S/10853/Add.1), 13 March (S/10853/Add.2) and 26 April (S/10853/Add.3) the Secretary-General carried forward his previous reports, supplying information in accordance with Security Council resolution 307 (1971) and General Assembly resolution 2970 (XXVI) regarding the United Nations relief efforts in India and in Bangladesh.

Chapter 18

COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING THE ISLANDS OF ABU MUSA, THE GREATER TUNB AND THE LESSER TUNB

944. In a letter dated 17 July 1972 (S/10740) addressed to the President of the Security Council, the representatives of Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Republic, Morocco, Oman, People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates

and Yemen stressed the position of their Governments that the islands of Abu Musa, the Greater Tunb and the Lesser Tunb, which, they said, had been militarily occupied by Iran, were Arab. History, the letter added, attested to their continued Arab identity and character, and they constituted an integral part of the United Arab Emirates and of the Arab homeland, as had been affirmed in decisions taken by the Council of the League of Arab States.

945. In a reply dated 7 August (S/10756), the representative of Iran stated that there had been no "military occupation" of the islands in question, but rather a re-establishment of Iran's rightful authority after a long interruption by colonial domination of the Persian Gulf. It was a matter for regret that, at a time when the Middle East was tense because of major unresolved problems affecting areas where there were true Arab interests, a few Governments should have succeeded in misleading others into lending their names to sponsorship of such a frivolous claim. However, he concluded, nothing could affect the historically established sovereign rights of Iran over the islands of Tunb, Lesser Tunb and Abu Musa.

Chapter 19

COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING RELATIONS BETWEEN THE PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN AND OMAN

946. In a letter dated 21 September 1972 to the President of the Security Council (S/10797), the representative of Oman complained that a series of acts of aggression had been perpetrated by the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen against the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Sultanate of Oman. He cited incidents of mortar and machine-gun fire that had occurred between 22 May and 21 September.

947. In a letter dated 25 September (S/10803), the representative of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen reiterated his charges submitted in May 1972 that the British military forces stationed in Oman had seriously escalated the military provocations along his country's eastern borders. Moreover, he said, the unfounded allegation of Oman in document S/10797 seemed to be a pretext to cloak the British colonial motivations to perpetrate further aggression against the Yemeni people.

Chapter 20

COMMUNICATION FROM THE LIBYAN ARAB REPUBLIC

948. In a letter dated 30 May 1973 (S/10939) to the President of the Security Council, the representative of the Libyan Arab Republic complained that a grave situation had resulted from acts of aggression perpetrated against his country by the United States of America and stated that the presence of the American Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean constituted a direct threat to the security and safety of the Mediterranean coastal States. He cited, in particular, two incidents, the first on 21 March, when an American military plane had entered Libyan air space on a reconnaissance mission, and the second on 30 April, when an American aircraft carrier was based near the Libyan coast, transmitting radar beams to detect the movements of the Libyan Air Force and launching a wave of military planes that interfered with Libyan training flights in the area.

Chapter 21

COMMUNICATION FROM EQUATORIAL GUINEA

949. By a letter dated 11 September 1972 (S/10789) addressed to the President of the Council, the representative of Equatorial Guinea transmitted a telegram in which his Minister for External Affairs complained that Gabon, after extending its territorial waters to 170 miles, had invaded all of the islands

belonging to Equatorial Guinea, arrested the guards there and sunk the vessels linking the islands with the mainland. He requested prompt withdrawal of the Gabonese forces from the territorial waters of Equatorial Guinea.

Chapter 22

REPORTS OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON APARTHEID

950. By a note dated 28 September 1972 (S/10777), the Secretary-General informed the Security Council that the Chairman of the Special Committee on *Apartheid* had addressed a letter to him on 23 August, transmitting the report adopted unanimously by the Special Committee on that date, which was submitted to the General Assembly and the Security Council in accordance with the provisions of General Assembly resolution 2775 (XXVI) of 29 November 1971. The Secretary-General informed the Council that the report of the Special Committee appeared as *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-seventh Session, Supplement No. 22 (A/8722)*.

951. By notes dated 17 October and 1 December 1972 (S/10777/Add.1 and Add.2), the Secretary-General informed the Security Council that an addendum to the report of the Special Committee on *Apartheid* had been forwarded by the Chairman of the Special Committee by a letter dated 16 October and appeared in document A/8722/Add.1, and that a second addendum to the report had been issued on 30 November and appeared in document A/8722/Add.2.

952. By a letter dated 28 November 1972 (S/10843), the Secretary-General transmitted to the Security Council resolution 2923 E (XXVII), adopted by the General Assembly on 15 November, and drew particular attention to paragraphs 7 and 8, which reaffirmed the Assembly's conviction that economic and other sanctions under Chapter VII of the Charter constituted one of the essential means of achieving a peaceful solution of the grave situation in South Africa and requested the Security Council to consider the question urgently with a view to adopting such effective measures under Chapter VII.

Chapter 23

COMMUNICATION FROM THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY

953. By a letter dated 19 July 1972 (S/10741), the Executive Secretary of the Organization of African Unity in New York transmitted to the President of the Security Council for the information of the Council, in accordance with Article 54 of the Charter, the texts of resolutions adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU at its ninth session held at Rabat from 12 to 15 June 1972. The resolutions bore the following titles:

- (1) Resolution on the continued aggression against the Arab Republic of Egypt
- (2) Resolution on Zimbabwe
- (3) Resolution on the Portuguese colonies
- (4) Resolution on Namibia
- (5) Resolution on *apartheid* and racial discrimination
- (6) Recommendations on special measures to be adopted by decolonization and the struggle against *apartheid* and racial discrimination
- (7) Resolution on the situation in Territories under Portuguese domination.

Chapter 24

COMMUNICATION CONCERNING RELATIONS BETWEEN FRANCE AND POLAND

954. In a joint letter dated 10 November 1972 (S/10835) to the President of the Security Council, the representatives of France and Poland drew attention to the Declaration on Friendship and Co-operation between the Polish People's

Republic and the French Republic that had been published at the conclusion of talks between the President of the French Republic and the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers Party, held at Paris from 2 to 6 October. The Declaration emphasized political, economic, cultural and scientific co-operation between the two States, as well as the relaxation of tension and strengthening of security in Europe.

Chapter 25

COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING THE QUESTION OF ICELANDIC FISHERIES

955. By a note dated 25 September 1972 (S/10778/Rev.1), the Secretary-General transmitted to the Security Council a copy of the two orders of 17 August by which the International Court of Justice had indicated interim measures of protection in the Fisheries Jurisdiction Cases, namely, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Iceland and Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland. Pursuant to article 41, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, the Security Council was thus given notice of the provisional measures indicated pending the Court's final decision in the proceedings. Among the measures indicated by the Court were that the parties should ensure that no action of any kind was taken that might aggravate or extend the dispute or that might prejudice the rights of the other party in carrying out whatever decision on merits the Court might render; that Iceland should refrain from taking any measures against vessels of the States concerned engaged in fishing activities outside the 12-mile fishery zone around Iceland; and that vessels of the States concerned should not take an annual catch in excess of the previously defined limits.

956. In a letter dated 28 May 1973 (S/10936) to the President of the Council, the representative of the United Kingdom complained that on 26 May an Icelandic gunboat had repeatedly fired upon and hit an unarmed British fishing vessel while it was fishing some 30 miles off the coast of Iceland in conformity with the order of the International Court of Justice of 17 August 1972, an action which he termed the gravest of a series of increasingly dangerous actions against British trawlers carried out in disregard of the hazard to human life. He stated that his Government had meticulously observed the terms of that order limiting the British catch in the waters concerned to 170,000 metric tons a year but that the Icelandic Government had ignored the order and followed a consistent policy

of forceful action against British fishing vessels. He added that it was not until after shooting incidents on 14 May that the British Government had ordered naval vessels into the area on 19 May for the purpose of affording protection to those fishing vessels. He reiterated his Government's desire to come to a negotiated settlement.

957. In a letter dated 29 May (S/10937) to the President of the Security Council, the representative of Iceland complained of serious acts of aggression committed by the United Kingdom against Iceland. He stated that on 19 May the United Kingdom had dispatched three naval vessels, aided by military aircraft and helicopters, into the fisheries jurisdiction zone of Iceland for the explicit purpose of aiding and abetting British trawlers fishing there in violation of Icelandic laws and regulations. He added that his Government viewed that invasion of British warships into Icelandic waters as a hostile act and a clear infringement of the sovereign rights of Iceland in violation of the Charter of the United Nations. That constituted an act of aggression against Iceland under the terms of Article 39 of the Charter and a breach of the peace in the area. He explained that, on 1 September 1972, the Icelandic fisheries jurisdiction had been extended from 12 to 50 miles to permit his country to obtain control over its only natural resource, in full conformity with principles enunciated in a number of General Assembly resolutions. The United Kingdom had objected to that extension and had brought the matter before the International Court of Justice. The letter concluded by stating that negotiations had been well advanced between the two Governments regarding British fishing concessions in the new 50-mile zone when the decision had been made to send in the British warships. His Government had always been and remained willing to reach a peaceful settlement of the matter through negotiation with the United Kingdom.

Chapter 26

COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE STRENGTHENING OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

958. In a letter to the Secretary-General dated 31 July 1972 (S/10749), the President of the Security Council referred to the former's note of 25 February 1972 concerning General Assembly resolution 2880 (XXVI) on implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security and to the letter of 31 March from the President to the members of the Council (S/10583). The President informed the Secretary-General that the members of the Security Council,

for whom the question of strengthening of international security was of great importance, were considering the form and content of information on the steps taken by the Council in compliance with the Declaration for inclusion in the Secretary-General's report.

959. By a letter to the Secretary-General dated 31 October (S/10822), the President of the Security Council transmitted the Council's reply to the Secretary-General's letter of 25 February regarding General

Assembly resolution 2880 (XXVI). The reply stated that the Security Council attached great importance to the Declaration. Since December 1970, when the Declaration was adopted, the Council had directed its deliberations primarily to the problems of Africa and the Middle East and to the admission of new members, the situation in the South Asian subcontinent and the Cyprus question. In addition, the Council had taken, as required, certain actions relating to peace-keeping operations, observer groups and sanctions, and it had had recourse to the diplomatic techniques of negotiation and conciliation, on-the-spot missions of inquiry, a special group of members of the Security Council, the good offices of the Secretary-General and a request for an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice. During that period, the Security Council had also held a meeting away from Headquarters and had resorted to a number of subsidiary organs, new and old. In fulfilling its mission, the Council abided scrupulously by the purposes and principles of the Charter and remained convinced that the implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security in its entirety would depend on strict and full observance by all Member States of the objectives, principles and obligations of the Charter as a whole and on their implementation of the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with their obligations under Article 25 of the Charter. The Council was equally convinced of the need for all Member States to do everything in their power to enhance by all possible means the Council's authority and effectiveness.

960. The President of the Council attached as an annex to his letter the text of a statement sent to him by the delegation of the People's Republic of China. The statement said that the Chinese delegation had not taken part in the discussion and formulation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security. It would have to make a further study of the contents of the Declaration and reserved the right to make comments on the Declaration at a later date. The Chinese delegation also had reservations with regard to the contents of the reply to the Secretary-General.

961. On 20 June 1972, the President of the Security Council announced (S/10705) that the members of the Security Council on that day had adopted by consensus the following decisions:

"Members of the Security Council are gravely concerned at the threat to the lives of passengers and crews arising from the hijacking of aircraft and other unlawful interference with international civil aviation. In these circumstances, they wish to reaffirm Security Council resolution 286 (1970) of 9 September 1970 and to recall that the General Assembly has expressed its deep concern about the situation.

"Members of the Security Council condemn and consider it necessary to put an end to acts that are directed against the safety of civil aviation and that are being perpetrated in various parts of the world presenting serious obstacles to the normal use of air transportation, an important means of international intercourse.

"The Security Council calls upon States to take all appropriate measures within their jurisdiction to deter and prevent such acts and to take effective measures to deal with those who commit such acts.

"The Security Council invites all States to expand and intensify co-operative international efforts and measures in this field, in conformity with Charter obligations, with a view to ensuring the maximum possible safety and reliability of international civil aviation."

962. In a letter dated 22 June addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/10709), the representative of India, referring to the decision of 20 June, stated that though India accepted the consensus as showing concern with the evil of hijacking and

indicating the course of action all could pursue, it had considerable reservation on the procedure followed. In his delegation's view, any action or decision by the Council without a Council meeting, particularly when the provisional rules of procedure had not been suspended, could have serious and far-reaching legal and other consequences. Though his Government continued to believe that informal consultations were both valid and valuable, it felt that the procedure followed should not constitute a precedent for future action by the Council on matters concerning international peace and security.

963. In a letter dated 22 June addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/10711), the representative of Italy stated that, during the consultations, he had reserved the right to state his Government's position subsequently. He added that his Government would have preferred that the Security Council take a firmer stand on the question of the unlawful interference with international civil aviation, including in its decision, in particular, a pressing appeal to all Member States to accede to the Tokyo, The Hague and Montreal Conventions concerning the safety of international civil aviation and to implement at once, as Italy had decided to do, their fundamental principles. It would have also preferred the adoption of a resolution on the matter in a formal meeting rather than a decision agreed upon by the members of the Council through informal consultations, because, in its view such circumvention of obstacles of a substantive nature might create a trend towards a further weakening of the significance of the decisions taken by the Security Council, contrary to the necessity of strengthening the action, the authority and the effectiveness of the main United Nations body.

Chapter 27

COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING THE SITUATION CREATED BY INCREASING INCIDENTS INVOLVING THE HIJACKING OF COMMERCIAL AIRCRAFT

COMMUNICATION CONCERNING THE NON-USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND PERMANENT PROHIBITION OF THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

964. By a letter dated 5 December 1972 (S/10844), the Secretary-General transmitted to the President of the Security Council the text of General Assembly resolution 2936 (XXVII) of 29 November 1972 on the agenda item entitled "Non-use of force in international relations and permanent prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons". In paragraph 2 of the resolution, the General Assembly recommended that the Security Council should take, as soon as possible, appropriate measures for the full implementation of the declaration of the General Assembly set forth in paragraph 1.

APPENDICES

I. Membership of the Security Council during the years 1972 and 1973

| 1972 | 1973 |
|--|--|
| Argentina | Australia |
| Belgium | Austria |
| China | China |
| France | France |
| Guinea | Guinea |
| India | India |
| Italy | Indonesia |
| Japan | Kenya |
| Panama | Panama |
| Somalia | Peru |
| Sudan | Sudan |
| Union of Soviet Socialist Republics | Union of Soviet Socialist Republics |
| United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland | United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland |
| United States of America | United States of America |
| Yugoslavia | Yugoslavia |

II. Representatives and deputy, alternate and acting representatives accredited to the Security Council

The following representatives and deputy, alternate and acting representatives served on the Security Council during the period covered by the present report:

| | |
|------------------------------------|---|
| <i>Argentina^a</i> | <i>India</i> |
| Mr. Eduardo F. McLoughlin | Mr. Samar Sen |
| Mr. Carlos Ortiz de Rozas | Mr. N. P. Jain |
| Mr. Julio César Carasales | Mr. Aditya Narayan Haksar |
| Mr. Gastón de Prat Gay | Mr. P. P. de Souza ^c |
| <i>Australia^b</i> | <i>Indonesia^b</i> |
| Sir Laurence McIntyre | Mr. Chaidir Anwar Sani |
| Mr. Charles Robin Ashwin | Mr. Yoga Soegomo |
| Mr. Lance Joseph | Mr. R. Kusumasmoro |
| Mr. H. C. Mott | Mr. Rudy Gontha |
| <i>Austria^b</i> | Mr. Djoko Joewono |
| Mr. Peter Jankowitsch | <i>Italy^a</i> |
| Mr. Wolfgang Wolte | Mr. Piero Vinci |
| Mr. Georg J. Lennkh | Mr. Alberto Cavaglieri |
| <i>Belgium^a</i> | Mr. Giovanni Migliuolo |
| Mr. Edouard Longestaey | Mr. Massimo Castaldo |
| Mr. Michel Van Ussel | <i>Japan^a</i> |
| Mr. Daniel Massonet | Mr. Toru Nakagawa |
| <i>China</i> | Mr. Motoo Ogiso |
| Mr. Huang Hua | Mr. Nagao Yoshida |
| Mr. Chen Chu | <i>Kenya^b</i> |
| Mr. Chuang Yen | Mr. Joseph Odero-Jowi |
| Mr. Hsiung Hsiang-hui ^c | Mr. Ochieng Adala |
| <i>France</i> | Mr. Peter Joseph Ndung'u |
| Mr. Louis de Guiringaud | Mr. Frank X. J. C. Njenga |
| Mr. François de La Gorce | Mr. Donald Wacieni Kaniaru |
| Mr. Jacques Lecompt | <i>Panama</i> |
| Mr. Guy Scalabre | General Omar Torrijos Herrera |
| Miss Marcelle Campana ^c | Mr. Juan Antonio Tack |
| Mr. André Travert | Mr. Aquilino E. Boyd |
| <i>Guinea</i> | Mr. Narciso E. Garay |
| Mr. Fily Cissoko | Mr. Dídimo Ríos |
| Mr. El Hadj Abdoulaye Touré | Mr. Jorge E. Illueca |
| Mrs. Jeanne Martin Cissé | Mr. Juan Antonio Stagg |
| Mr. Hady Touré | Mr. Nander A. Pitty ^c |
| Mr. Philippe Maddy | Mr. Carlos Alfredo López Guevara ^c |
| Mr. Mohamed Sako ^c | Mr. Diógenes de la Rosa ^c |

Peru^b

General Miguel Angel de la Flor Valle
Mr. Javier Pérez de Cuéllar
Mr. Ricardo Walter Stubbs

Somalia^a

Mr. Abdulrahim Abby Farah
Mr. Hussein Nur Elmi
Mr. Hassan Kaid Abdulleh

Sudan

Mr. Mansour Khalid
Mr. Fakhreddine Mohamed
Mr. Rahmatalla Abdulla
Mr. Salah Ahmed Ibrahim
Mr. Izzeldin Hamid
Mr. Omer Elsheikh
Mr. Isaac Odhong La
Mr. Abdel Magied A. Hassan

^a Term of office ended on 31 December 1972.

^b Term of office began on 1 January 1973.

^c Appointed for the meetings of the Council held in Panama.

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Mr. Yakov Aleksandrovich Malik
Mr. Viktor Levonovich Issraelyan
Mr. Richard S. Ovinnikov^c
Mr. Vasily Stepanovich Safronchuk
Mr. Nikolai Konstantinovich Tarasov

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Sir Colin Crowe
Mr. K. D. Jamieson
Mr. D. Malcolm^c
Mr. M. S. Weir
Mr. J. R. Freeland
Mr. P. C. Petrie
Mr. M. C. S. Weston

United States of America

Mr. George Bush
Mr. John A. Scali
Mr. Christopher H. Phillips
Mr. W. Tapley Bennett, Jr.

Yugoslavia

Mr. Lazar Mojsov
Mr. Miljan Komatina
Mr. Cvijeto Job

III. Presidents of the Security Council

The following representatives served as President of the Security Council during the period covered by the present report:

Yugoslavia

Mr. Lazar Mojsov (16 to 30 June 1972)

Argentina

Mr. Carlos Ortiz de Rozas (1 to 31 July 1972)

Belgium

Mr. Edouard Longierstaey (1 to 31 August 1972)

China

Mr. Huang Hua (1 to 30 September 1972)

France

Mr. Louis de Guiringaud (1 to 31 October 1972)

Guinea

Mrs. Jeanne Martin Cissé (1 to 30 November 1972)

India

Mr. Samar Sen (1 to 31 December 1972)

Indonesia

Mr. Chaidir Anwar Sani (1 to 31 January 1973)

Kenya

Mr. Joseph Odero-Jowi (1 to 28 February 1973)

Panama

General Omar Torrijos Herrera
Mr. Juan Antonio Tack
Mr. Aquilino E. Boyd } (1 to 31 March 1973)

Peru

Mr. Javier Pérez de Cuéllar (1 to 30 April 1973)

Sudan

Mr. Rahmatalla Abdulla (1 to 31 May 1973)

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Mr. Yakov Aleksandrovich Malik (1 to 15 June 1973)

IV. Meetings of the Security Council during the period from 16 June 1972 to 15 June 1973

| Meeting | Subject | Date | Meeting | Subject | Date |
|---------|---|--------------|---------|---|--------------|
| 1648th | The situation in the Middle East: | 23 June 1972 | 1649th | Ditto | 24 June 1972 |
| | (a) Letter dated 23 June 1972 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/10715) | | 1650th | The situation in the Middle East: | 26 June 1972 |
| | (b) Letter dated 23 June 1972 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/10716) | | | (a) Letter dated 23 June 1972 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/10715) | |
| | | | | (b) Letter dated 26 June 1972 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Presi- | |

| Meeting | Subject | Date | Meeting | Subject | Date |
|---------|--|----------------|------------------|--|-------------------|
| | dent of the Security Council (S/10720) | | | The situation in the Middle East: | 10 September 1972 |
| | The situation in the Middle East: | | 1661st | (a) Letter dated 9 September 1972 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/10782) | |
| 1651st | Letter dated 23 June 1972 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/10716) | 18 July 1972 | | (b) Letter dated 10 September 1972 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/10783) | |
| | The situation in the Middle East: | | 1662nd | Ditto | 10 September 1972 |
| | (a) Letter dated 5 July 1972 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/10730) | | 1663rd | Question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia: | 27 September 1972 |
| | (b) Letter dated 5 July 1972 from the Chargé d'affaires <i>ad interim</i> of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/10731) | | | Letter dated 20 September 1972 from the Permanent Representatives of Guinea, Somalia and the Sudan addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/10798) | |
| 1652nd | Ditto | 20 July 1972 | 1664th | Ditto | 28 September 1972 |
| 1653rd | Ditto | 21 July 1972 | 1665th | Ditto | 29 September 1972 |
| 1654th | Question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia: | 28 July 1972 | 1666th | Ditto | 29 September 1972 |
| | Special report of the Committee established in pursuance of Security Council resolution 253 (1968) (S/10632) | | 1667th | Complaint by Senegal: | 19 October 1972 |
| | | | | Letter dated 16 October 1972 from the Permanent Representative of Senegal addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/10807) | |
| 1655th | Ditto | 28 July 1972 | 1668th | Ditto | 20 October 1972 |
| 1656th | The situation in Namibia: | 31 July 1972 | 1669th | Ditto | 23 October 1972 |
| | Report by the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 309 (1972) concerning the question of Namibia (S/10738) | | 1670th (private) | Consideration of the report of the Security Council to the General Assembly | 24 October 1972 |
| 1657th | Ditto | 1 August 1972 | 1671st | Election of five members of the International Court of Justice (S/10744, S/10745 and Add.1-6, S/10761, S/10772) | 30 October 1972 |
| 1658th | Admission of new Members: | 10 August 1972 | | | |
| | Application of the People's Republic of Bangladesh for admission to membership in the United Nations—note by the Secretary-General (S/10759) | | 1672nd | Question concerning the situation in the Territories under Portuguese administration: | 15 November 1972 |
| 1659th | Admission of new Members: | 24 August 1972 | | Letter dated 7 November 1972 from the representatives of Algeria, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Dahomey, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Republic, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Niger, Ni- | |
| | Report of the Committee on the Admission of New Members concerning the application of the People's Republic of Bangladesh for membership in the United Nations (S/10773) | | | | |
| 1660th | Ditto | 25 August 1972 | | | |

| Meeting | Subject | Date |
|---------|---|------------------|
| | geria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Zaïre and Zambia addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/10828) | |
| 1673rd | Ditto | 16 November 1972 |
| 1674th | Ditto | 17 November 1972 |
| 1675th | Ditto | 21 November 1972 |
| 1676th | Ditto | 21 November 1972 |
| 1677th | Ditto | 22 November 1972 |
| 1678th | The situation in Namibia: Report by the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 319 (1972) concerning the question of Namibia (S/10832) | 28 November 1972 |
| 1679th | Ditto | 30 November 1972 |
| 1680th | Ditto | 1 December 1972 |
| 1681st | Ditto | 4 December 1972 |
| 1682nd | Ditto | 6 December 1972 |
| 1683rd | Letter dated 26 December 1963, from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/5488) Report by the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus (S/10842) | 12 December 1972 |
| 1684th | The situation in Namibia: Implementation of paragraph 8 of Security Council resolution 323 (1972) Request of Panama concerning the holding of meetings of the Security Council in Panama City: Letter dated 9 January 1973 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Panama addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/10858) | 16 January 1973 |
| 1685th | Request of Panama concerning the holding of meetings of the Security Council in Panama City: Letter dated 9 January 1973 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Panama addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/10858) | 16 January 1973 |
| 1686th | Request of Panama concerning the holding of meetings of the Security Council in Panama City: | 26 January 1973 |

| Meeting | Subject | Date |
|---------|--|-----------------|
| | Second report of the Security Council Committee on Council Meetings away from Headquarters (S/10868) | |
| 1687th | Complaint by Zambia: (a) Letter dated 24 January 1973 from the Permanent Representative of Zambia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/10865) (b) Letter dated 23 January 1973 from the representatives of Guinea, Kenya and the Sudan addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/10866) (c) Letter dated 26 January 1973 from the Acting Permanent Representative of Yugoslavia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/10869) | 29 January 1973 |
| 1688th | Ditto | 30 January 1973 |
| 1689th | Ditto | 31 January 1973 |
| 1690th | Ditto | 1 February 1973 |
| 1691st | Ditto | 2 February 1973 |
| 1692nd | Complaint by Zambia: Report of the Security Council Special Mission established under resolution 326 (1973) (S/10896 and Add.1) | 8 March 1973 |
| 1693rd | Ditto | 9 March 1973 |
| 1694th | Ditto | 10 March 1973 |
| 1695th | Consideration of measures for the maintenance and strengthening of international peace and security in Latin America in conformity with the provisions and principles of the Charter | 15 March 1973 |
| 1696th | Ditto | 15 March 1973 |
| 1697th | Ditto | 16 March 1973 |
| 1698th | Ditto | 16 March 1973 |
| 1699th | Ditto | 19 March 1973 |
| 1700th | Ditto | 19 March 1973 |
| 1701st | Ditto | 20 March 1973 |
| 1702nd | Ditto | 20 March 1973 |
| 1703rd | Ditto | 21 March 1973 |
| 1704th | Ditto | 21 March 1973 |
| 1705th | The situation in the Middle East: Letter dated 12 April 1973 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations ad- | 12 April 1973 |

| <i>Meeting</i> | <i>Subject</i> | <i>Date</i> | <i>Meeting</i> | <i>Subject</i> | <i>Date</i> |
|----------------|--|---------------|----------------|---|--------------|
| | dressed to the President of the Security Council (S/10913) | | 1716th | Ditto | 22 May 1973 |
| 1706th | Ditto | 13 April 1973 | 1717th | Examination of the situation in the Middle East: | 6 June 1973 |
| 1707th | Ditto | 16 April 1973 | | (a) Security Council resolution 331 (1973) | |
| 1708th | Ditto | 17 April 1973 | | (b) Report of the Secretary-General under Security Council resolution 331 (1973) of 20 April 1973 (S/10929) | |
| 1709th | Ditto | 18 April 1973 | | | |
| 1710th | Ditto | 20 April 1973 | | | |
| 1711th | Ditto | 21 April 1973 | | | |
| 1712th | Question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia: | 14 May 1973 | 1718th | Ditto | 7 June 1973 |
| | (a) Letter dated 8 May 1973 from the representatives of Guinea and Kenya to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/10925) | | 1719th | Ditto | 8 June 1973 |
| | (b) Second special report of the Committee established in pursuance of Security Council resolution 253 (1968) concerning the question of Southern Rhodesia (S/10920) | | 1720th | Ditto | 11 June 1973 |
| 1713th | Ditto | 16 May 1973 | 1721st | Ditto | 11 June 1973 |
| 1714th | Ditto | 17 May 1973 | 1722nd | Ditto | 12 June 1973 |
| 1715th | Ditto | 18 May 1973 | 1723rd | Ditto | 12 June 1973 |
| | | | 1724th | Ditto | 13 June 1973 |
| | | | 1725th | Ditto | 14 June 1973 |
| | | | 1726th | Ditto | 14 June 1973 |
| | | | 1727th | Letter dated 26 December 1963 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/5488) | 15 June 1973 |
| | | | | Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus (S/10940) | |
| | | | 1728th | Ditto | 15 June 1973 |

V. Resolutions adopted by the Security Council during the period from 16 June 1972 to 15 June 1973

| <i>Resolution No.</i> | <i>Date of adoption</i> | <i>Subject</i> |
|-----------------------|-------------------------|--|
| 316 (1972) | 26 June 1972 | The situation in the Middle East |
| 317 (1972) | 21 July 1972 | The situation in the Middle East |
| 318 (1972) | 28 July 1972 | Question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia |
| 319 (1972) | 1 August 1972 | The situation in Namibia |
| 320 (1972) | 29 September 1972 | Question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia |
| 321 (1972) | 23 October 1972 | Complaint by Senegal |
| 322 (1972) | 22 November 1972 | Question concerning the situation in Territories under Portuguese administration |
| 323 (1972) | 6 December 1972 | The situation in Namibia |
| 324 (1972) | 12 December 1972 | The Cyprus question |
| 325 (1973) | 26 January 1973 | Request of Panama concerning the holding of meetings of the Security Council in Panama City |
| 326 (1973) | 2 February 1973 | Complaint by Zambia |
| 327 (1973) | 2 February 1973 | Complaint by Zambia |
| 328 (1973) | 10 March 1973 | Complaint by Zambia |
| 329 (1973) | 10 March 1973 | Complaint by Zambia |
| 330 (1973) | 21 March 1973 | Consideration of measures for the maintenance and strengthening of international peace and security in Latin America in conformity with the provisions and principles of the Charter |
| 331 (1973) | 20 April 1973 | The situation in the Middle East |
| 332 (1973) | 21 April 1973 | The situation in the Middle East |
| 333 (1973) | 22 May 1973 | Question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia |

VI. Meetings of subsidiary bodies of the Security Council during the period from 16 June 1972 to 15 June 1973

1. Security Council Committee on the Admission of New Members

| Meeting | Date |
|---------|----------------|
| 40th | 11 August 1973 |
| 41st | 21 August 1973 |

2. Security Council Committee established in pursuance of resolution 253 (1968) concerning the question of Southern Rhodesia

| Meeting | Date |
|---------|-------------------|
| 103rd | 29 June 1972 |
| 104th | 2 August 1972 |
| 105th | 3 August 1972 |
| 106th | 18 August 1972 |
| 107th | 31 August 1972 |
| 108th | 5 September 1972 |
| 109th | 6 September 1972 |
| 110th | 8 September 1972 |
| 111th | 12 September 1972 |
| 112th | 13 September 1972 |
| 113th | 14 September 1972 |
| 114th | 18 September 1972 |
| 115th | 20 December 1972 |
| 116th | 22 December 1972 |
| 117th | 11 January 1973 |
| 118th | 15 January 1973 |
| 119th | 18 January 1973 |
| 120th | 24 January 1973 |
| 121st | 8 February 1973 |
| 122nd | 14 February 1973 |
| 123rd | 16 February 1973 |
| 124th | 20 February 1973 |
| 125th | 21 February 1973 |
| 126th | 21 February 1973 |
| 127th | 23 February 1973 |
| 128th | 26 February 1973 |

| Meeting | Date |
|---------|-----------------------|
| 129th | 28 February 1973 |
| 130th | 2 March 1973 |
| 131st | 5 March 1973 |
| 132nd | 6 March 1973 |
| 133rd | 7 March 1973 |
| 134th | 28 March 1973 |
| 135th | 3 April 1973 |
| 136th | 10 April 1973 |
| 137th | 11 April 1973 |
| 138th | 11 April 1973 |
| 139th | 12 April 1973 |
| 140th | 16, 18, 24 April 1973 |
| 141st | 7 May 1973 |
| 142nd | 14 May 1973 |
| 143rd | 24 May 1973 |
| 144th | 30 May 1973 |

3. Ad Hoc Sub-Committee on Namibia

| Meeting | Date |
|---------|------------------|
| 22nd | 20 July 1972 |
| 23rd | 13 December 1972 |

4. Committee on Council Meetings away from Headquarters

| Meeting | Date |
|---------|-----------------|
| 9th | 17 January 1973 |
| 10th | 19 January 1973 |
| 11th | 22 January 1973 |
| 12th | 23 January 1973 |
| 13th | 25 January 1973 |
| 14th | 25 January 1973 |

5. Committee of Experts Established by the Security Council at its 1506th Meeting

No meeting of the above Committee was held during the period. The last (11th) meeting was held on 23 April 1971.

VII. Representatives, Chairmen and Principal Secretaries of the Military Staff Committee

A. REPRESENTATIVES OF EACH SERVICE IN RESPECT OF EACH DELEGATION

16 June 1972 to 15 June 1973

Chinese delegation

| | |
|--|------------------------------|
| Mr. Lin Fang, Army representative and head of delegation | 16 June 1972 to present |
| Mr. Chan Wu-tang, Air Force representative | 29 September 1972 to present |
| Mr. Yang Ming-liang, Naval representative | 16 June 1972 to present |
| Mr. Chi Shu-jang, Assistant to the head of delegation | 16 June 1972 to present |

French delegation

| | |
|--|-------------------------|
| Brigadier General E. de Grasset, French Army | 16 June 1972 to present |
| Colonel M. J. Espieux, French Air Force | 16 June 1972 to present |
| Lieutenant Commander P. Andrieu, French Navy | 16 June 1972 to present |

USSR delegation

| | |
|--|----------------------------------|
| Major General V. S. Tovma, USSR Armed Forces | 16 June 1972 to present |
| Captain 1st Rank N. I. Roshchin, USSR Navy | 16 June 1972 to 15 November 1972 |
| Colonel V. I. Pereverzev, USSR Air Force | 16 June 1972 to 15 November 1972 |
| Colonel R. N. Soupriagin, USSR Armed Forces | 16 June 1972 to present |
| Colonel V. I. Linkevich, USSR Armed Forces | 15 November 1972 to present |
| Captain 3rd Rank. A. P. Koval, USSR Armed Forces | 15 November 1972 to present |

United Kingdom delegation

| | |
|---|------------------------------|
| Air Marshal Sir John Lapsley, Royal Air Force | 16 June 1972 to 27 May 1973 |
| Vice Admiral I. Easton, Royal Navy | 27 May 1973 to present |
| Rear Admiral W. D. S. Scott, Royal Navy | 16 June 1972 to present |
| Brigadier G. H. Mills, British Army | 16 June 1972 to 1 March 1973 |
| Brigadier H. G. Woods, British Army | 1 March 1973 to present |
| Air Commodore W. Harbison, Royal Air Force | 2 August 1972 to present |

United States delegation

| | |
|--|----------------------------------|
| Lieutenant General A. J. Russell, US Air Force | 16 June 1972 to present |
| Vice Admiral H. L. Harty, Jr., US Navy | 16 June 1972 to present |
| Lieutenant General R. G. Stilwell, US Army | 16 June 1972 to 16 November 1972 |
| Lieutenant General D. H. Cowles, US Army | 16 November 1972 to present |

B. CHAIRMEN AT MEETINGS

16 June 1972 to 15 June 1973

| <i>Meeting</i> | <i>Date</i> | <i>Chairman</i> | <i>Delegation</i> |
|----------------|---------------|--|-------------------|
| 705th | 29 June 1972 | Lieutenant General A. J. Russell, US Air Force | USA |
| 706th | 13 July 1972 | Mr. Lin Fang, Army representative | China |
| 707th | 27 July 1972 | Mr. Lin Fang, Army representative | China |
| 708th | 10 Aug. 1972 | Brigadier General E. de Grasset, French Army | France |
| 709th | 24 Aug. 1972 | Brigadier General E. de Grasset, French Army | France |
| 710th | 7 Sept. 1972 | Colonel V. I. Pereversev, USSR Air Force | USSR |
| 711th | 21 Sept. 1972 | Captain 1st Rank N. I. Roshchin, USSR Navy | USSR |
| 712th | 5 Oct. 1972 | Air Marshal Sir John Lapsley, Royal Air Force | UK |
| 713th | 19 Oct. 1972 | Brigadier G. H. Mills, British Army | UK |
| 714th | 2 Nov. 1972 | Vice Admiral H. L. Harty, Jr., US Navy | USA |
| 715th | 16 Nov. 1972 | Colonel C. S. Johnson, Jr., US Army | USA |
| 716th | 30 Nov. 1972 | Colonel C. S. Johnson, Jr., US Army | USA |
| 717th | 14 Dec. 1972 | Mr. Lin Fang, Army representative | China |
| 718th | 28 Dec. 1972 | Mr. Lin Fang, Army representative | China |
| 719th | 11 Jan. 1973 | Brigadier General E. de Grasset, French Army | France |
| 720th | 25 Jan. 1973 | Brigadier General E. de Grasset, French Army | France |
| 721st | 8 Feb. 1973 | Colonel R. N. Soupriagin, USSR Armed Forces | USSR |
| 722nd | 22 Feb. 1973 | Colonel R. N. Soupriagin, USSR Armed Forces | USSR |
| 723rd | 8 Mar. 1973 | Air Commodore W. Harbison, Royal Air Force | UK |
| 724th | 22 Mar. 1973 | Air Marshal Sir John Lapsley, Royal Air Force | UK |
| 725th | 5 Apr. 1973 | Vice Admiral H. L. Harty, Jr., US Navy | USA |
| 726th | 19 Apr. 1973 | Colonel C. S. Johnson, Jr., US Army | USA |
| 727th | 3 May 1973 | Mr. Lin Fang, Army representative | China |
| 728th | 17 May 1973 | Mr. Lin Fang, Army representative | China |
| 729th | 31 May 1973 | Mr. Lin Fang, Army representative | China |
| 730th | 14 June 1973 | Brigadier General E. de Grasset, French Army | France |

C. PRINCIPAL SECRETARIES AT MEETINGS

16 June 1972 to 15 June 1973

| <i>Meeting</i> | <i>Date</i> | <i>Principal Secretary</i> | <i>Delegation</i> |
|----------------|---------------|--|-------------------|
| 705th | 29 June 1972 | Colonel R. E. Sheridan, US Air Force | USA |
| 706th | 13 July 1972 | Mr. Yang Ming-liang, Naval representative | China |
| 707th | 27 July 1972 | Mr. Yang Ming-liang, Naval representative | China |
| 708th | 10 Aug. 1972 | Colonel M. J. Espieux, French Air Force | France |
| 709th | 24 Aug. 1972 | Colonel L. R. Follain, French Army | France |
| 710th | 7 Sept. 1972 | Colonel R. N. Soupriagin, Soviet Army | USSR |
| 711th | 21 Sept. 1972 | Colonel R. N. Soupriagin, Soviet Army | USSR |
| 712th | 5 Oct. 1972 | Group Captain H. A. Caillard, Royal Air Force | UK |
| 713th | 19 Oct. 1972 | Colonel J. Wilson, British Army | UK |
| 714th | 2 Nov. 1972 | Colonel R. E. Sheridan, US Air Force | USA |
| 715th | 16 Nov. 1972 | Colonel R. E. Sheridan, US Air Force | USA |
| 716th | 30 Nov. 1972 | Colonel R. E. Sheridan, US Air Force | USA |
| 717th | 14 Dec. 1972 | Mr. Chi Shu-jiang, Assistant to the head of delegation | China |
| 718th | 28 Dec. 1972 | Mr. Yang Ming-liang, Naval representative | China |
| 719th | 11 Jan. 1973 | Colonel L. R. Follain, French Army | France |
| 720th | 25 Jan. 1973 | Colonel L. R. Follain, French Army | France |
| 721st | 8 Feb. 1973 | Captain 3rd Rank A. P. Koval, USSR Armed Forces | USSR |
| 722nd | 22 Feb. 1973 | Captain 3rd Rank A. P. Koval, USSR Armed Forces | USSR |
| 723rd | 8 Mar. 1973 | Group Captain H. A. Caillard, Royal Air Force | UK |
| 724th | 22 Mar. 1973 | Colonel J. C. C. Richards, Royal Marines | UK |
| 725th | 5 Apr. 1973 | Colonel R. E. Sheridan, US Air Force | USA |
| 726th | 19 Apr. 1973 | Colonel C. S. Johnson, Jr., US Army | USA |
| 727th | 3 May 1973 | Mr. Chi Shu-jiang, Assistant to the head of delegation | China |
| 728th | 17 May 1973 | Mr. Yang Ming-liang, Naval representative | China |
| 729th | 31 May 1973 | Mr. Chi Shu-jiang, Assistant to the head of delegation | China |
| 730th | 14 June 1973 | Major J. L. Crespín, French Army | France |