



**REPORT
OF
THE SECURITY COUNCIL**

16 July 1967—15 July 1968

**GENERAL ASSEMBLY
OFFICIAL RECORDS : TWENTY-THIRD SESSION
SUPPLEMENT No. 2 (A/7202)**

(133 p.)

UNITED NATIONS

**REPORT
OF
THE SECURITY COUNCIL**

16 July 1967 – 15 July 1968

**GENERAL ASSEMBLY
OFFICIAL RECORDS : TWENTY-THIRD SESSION
SUPPLEMENT No. 2 (A/7202)**



UNITED NATIONS
New York, 1968

NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION	Page 1
--------------------	-----------

Part I

Questions considered by the Security Council under its responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security

Chapter

1. THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST	
A. Referral to the Security Council of the proceedings of the fifth emergency special session of the General Assembly on the situation in the Middle East	3
B. Communications received by the Security Council from 16 July to 20 October 1967	3
C. Communications to the Security Council and requests for a meeting	8
D. Consideration by the Council at the 1369th to 1371st meetings (24-25 October 1967)	9
E. Reports of the Secretary-General on the observance of the cease-fire	12
F. Consideration by the Council at the 1373rd, 1375th, 1377th and 1379th to 1382nd meetings (9-22 November)	13
G. Reports of the Secretary-General and communications received by the Council up to 31 December 1967	23
H. Developments between 1 January and 18 March 1968	24
I. Communications to the Council and requests for meetings	26
J. Consideration at the 1401st to 1407th meetings (21 March to 24 March 1968)	26
K. Communications and requests for meetings received by the Council from 27 March to 4 April 1968	35
L. Consideration by the Council at its 1409th to 1412th meetings (30 March to 4 April 1968)	35
M. Communications to the Council and request for a meeting	39
N. Consideration by the Council at the 1416th to 1426th meetings (27 April to 21 May 1968)	40
O. Other communications received by the Council before 15 July 1968	49
2. COMPLAINTS BY THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: LETTER DATED 3 NOVEMBER 1967, FROM THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO, ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL	
A. Request for a meeting of the Security Council	52
B. Consideration at the 1372nd, 1374th, 1376th and 1378th meetings (8-15 November 1967)	52
C. Subsequent communications	57
3. LETTER DATED 26 DECEMBER 1963 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CYPRUS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL	
A. Communications and reports received between 16 July and 24 November 1967	57
B. Consideration at the 1383rd meeting (24/25 November 1967)	59

CONTENTS (continued)

Chapter	Page
C. Communications and reports received between 27 November and 31 December 1967	60
D. Consideration at the 1385th and 1386th meetings (20 and 22 December 1967)	61
E. Communications and reports received between 1 January and 18 March 1968	64
F. Consideration at the 1398th meeting (18 March 1968)	65
G. Communications and reports received between 18 March and 15 July 1968	67
H. Consideration at the 1432nd meeting (18 June 1968)	67
 4. THE QUESTION OF SOUTH WEST AFRICA	
A. Communications to the Security Council and requests for a meeting	69
B. Consideration at the 1387th meeting (25 January 1968)	69
C. Communications to the Security Council and requests for a meeting ...	73
D. Consideration at the 1390th to 1397th meetings (16 February to 14 March 1968)	73
E. Subsequent communications to the Council	81
 5. LETTER DATED 25 JANUARY 1968 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL	82
 6. QUESTION CONCERNING THE SITUATION IN SOUTHERN RHODESIA: LETTERS DATED 2 AND 30 AUGUST 1963 ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON BEHALF OF THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THIRTY-TWO MEMBER STATES (S/5382 and S/5409)	
LETTER DATED 12 MARCH 1968 ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL BY THE REPRESENTATIVES OF ALGERIA, BOTSWANA, BURUNDI, CAMEROON, CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC, CHAD, CONGO (BRAZZAVILLE), CONGO (DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF), DAHOMEY, ETHIOPIA, GABON, GHANA, GUINEA, IVORY COAST, KENYA, LESOTHO, LIBERIA, LIBYA, MADAGASCAR, MALI, MAURITANIA, MOROCCO, NIGER, NIGERIA, RWANDA, SENEGAL, SIERRA LEONE, SOMALIA, SUDAN, TOGO, TUNISIA, UGANDA, UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC, UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA, UPPER VOLTA AND ZAMBIA (S/8454)	86
 7. LETTER DATED 21 MAY 1968 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE <i>ad interim</i> OF HAITI ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL	
A. Request for a meeting of the Security Council	99
B. Consideration at the 1427th meeting (27 May 1968)	100
C. Communications received by the Security Council	101
 8. LETTER DATED 12 JUNE 1968 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL	101

Part II

Other matters considered by the Council

9. ADMISSION OF NEW MEMBERS	
A. Application of the People's Republic of Southern Yemen	106
B. Application of Mauritius	106
C. Other communications concerning the admission of new Members	106

The Military Staff Committee

Chapter	Page
10. WORK OF THE MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE	108

Part IV

Matters brought to the attention of the Security Council but not discussed in the Council during the period covered

11. COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING COMPLAINTS BY GREECE AGAINST TURKEY AND BY TURKEY AGAINST GREECE	109
12. COMMUNICATIONS RELATING TO COMPLAINTS CONCERNING ACTS OF AGGRESSION AGAINST THE TERRITORY AND CIVILIAN POPULATION OF CAMBODIA	109
13. COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING RELATIONS BETWEEN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO, BELGIUM AND PORTUGAL	112
14. COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING RELATIONS BETWEEN CAMBODIA AND THAILAND	113
15. COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING RELATIONS BETWEEN SENEGAL AND PORTUGAL	115
16. COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING RELATIONS BETWEEN GUINEA AND THE IVORY COAST	115
17. COMMUNICATIONS FROM THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES CONCERNING FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING ON CUBA	117
18. REPORTS ON THE STRATEGIC TRUST TERRITORY OF THE PACIFIC ISLANDS ..	117
19. QUESTION OF RACE CONFLICT IN SOUTH AFRICA RESULTING FROM THE POLICIES OF <i>apartheid</i> OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA	
A. Note by the Secretary-General	118
B. Reports of 18 and 30 October 1967 from the Special Committee on the Policies of <i>Apartheid</i> of the Government of the Republic of South Africa	118
C. Resolution 2307 (XXII) adopted by the General Assembly on 13 December 1967	118
20. COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING RELATIONS BETWEEN GUINEA AND PORTUGAL	119
21. COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING THE SITUATION IN TERRITORIES UNDER PORTUGUESE ADMINISTRATION	119
22. COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND YEMEN	119
23. COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING THE INDIA-PAKISTAN QUESTION	120

APPENDICES

I. Representatives and deputy, alternate and acting representatives accredited to the Security Council	121
II. Presidents of the Security Council	122
III. Meetings of the Security Council during the period from 16 July 1967 to 15 July 1968	122
IV. Representatives, chairmen and principal secretaries of the Military Staff Committee	126

INTRODUCTION

The present report¹ is submitted to the General Assembly by the Security Council in accordance with Article 24, paragraph 3, and Article 15, paragraph 1, of the Charter.

Essentially a summary and guide reflecting the broad lines of the debates, the report is not intended as a substitute for the records of the Security Council, which constitute the only comprehensive and authoritative account of its deliberations.

With respect to the membership of the Security Council during the period covered, it will be recalled that the General Assembly, at its 1595th meeting, on 6 November 1967, approved the membership of Algeria, Hungary, Pakistan, Paraguay and Senegal as non-permanent members of the Security Council to fill the vacancies resulting from the expiration, on 31 December 1967, of the terms of office of Argentina, Bulgaria, Japan, Mali and Nigeria.

The period covered in the present report is from 16 July 1967 to 15 July 1968. The Council held sixty-six meetings during that period.

¹ This is the twenty-third annual report of the Security Council to the General Assembly. The previous reports were submitted under the symbols A/93, A/366, A/620, A/945, A/1361, A/1873, A/2167, A/2437, A/2712, A/2935, A/3137, A/3648, A/3901, A/4190, A/4494, A/4867, A/5202, A/5502, A/5802, A/6002, A/6302 and A/6702.

Part I

QUESTIONS CONSIDERED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL UNDER ITS RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY

Chapter 1

THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

A. Referral to the Security Council of the proceedings of the fifth emergency special session of the General Assembly on the situation in the Middle East

1. By a letter dated 21 July 1967 (S/8088), the Secretary-General transmitted to the President of the Security Council the text of General Assembly resolution 2256 (ES-V) of 21 July 1967 and forwarded, as requested in the operative part of the resolution, the records, documents, draft resolutions and adopted resolutions of the fifth emergency special session of the General Assembly.

B. Communications received by the Security Council from 16 July to 20 October 1967

2. During this period the Council received the following communications relating to various aspects of the situation in the Middle East:

(a) *Communication relating to the fifth emergency special session of the General Assembly on the situation in the Middle East*

3. In a letter dated 24 July 1967 (S/8090), the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics transmitted to the Council the text of a statement by the Soviet Government on the work of the fifth emergency special session of the General Assembly, which, *inter alia*, noted that the Assembly had proved unable to adopt a decision dealing with the main problem in the Middle East, namely, that of the withdrawal of the Israel forces from the occupied Arab territories to the positions they held before 5 June 1967, and maintained that the United States, some of its allies and those countries subjected to United States pressure had prevented the General Assembly from discharging its proper duty in accordance with the aims of the United Nations Charter.

(b) *Communications relating to charges of military action and other violent incidents in violation of the Security Council cease-fire resolutions and related matters*

4. In this connexion, the Council received the following communications:

Letters dated 17 July (S/8067), 18 July (S/8075), 16 October (S/8195), 18 October (S/8198) from the representative of Jordan.

Letters dated 17 July (S/8065 and S/8068), 18 July (S/8074), 19 July (S/8076, S/8079 and S/8087), 8 September (S/8145), 26 September (S/8169), 29

September (S/8173 and Corr.1), 4 October (S/8181), 10 October (S/8188), 13 October (S/8192), 15 October (S/8194), 20 October (S/8202) from the representative of Israel.

Letter dated 17 July (S/8071) from the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Letters dated 17 July (S/8070), 6 September (S/8140), 22 September (S/8163), 6 October (S/8183) from the representative of the United Arab Republic.

Letter dated 31 July (S/8106) from the representative of Lebanon informing the Secretary-General that the Government of Lebanon accepted the Security Council resolutions 233 (1967) and 234 (1967) of 6 and 7 June 1967.

Letters dated 27 September (S/8171), 10 October (S/8187) from the representative of Syria.

(c) *Communications relating to the treatment of civilian population and prisoners of war and related matters*

5. In this connexion, the Council received the following communications:

Letters dated 16 July (S/8086), 17 July (S/8064) from the representative of the United Arab Republic.

Letters dated 17 July (S/8069), 19 July (S/8082), 24 July (S/8092), 1 August (S/8104), 2 August (S/8105), 3 August (S/8108), 15 August (S/8123), 25 August (S/8134), 28 August (S/8137) and 8 September (S/8147) from the representative of Israel.

Letters dated 19 July (S/8077), 18 August (S/8125), 1 September (S/8138) and 3 October (S/8178) from the representative of Syria.

Letters dated 27 July (S/8101), 4 August (S/8110), 8 August (S/8115), 10 August (S/8117) from the representative of Jordan.

Letter dated 18 August (S/8127) from the Chairman of the Arab Group of States.

(d) *Communications relating to the situation existing in and around the city of Jerusalem and its Holy Places*

6. In this connexion, the Council received the following communications:

Letters dated 19 July (S/8078), 2 August (S/8107), 3 August (S/8109) from the representative of Jordan.

Letter dated 25 July (S/8093 and Corr.1) from the representative of Syria.

(e) *Reports of the Secretary-General*

7. In connexion with the violations of the cease-fire the Secretary-General, in a supplementary report dated 17 July 1967 (S/7930/Add.23), reported that after a heavy exchange of fire between Israel and United Arab Republic forces on 15 July in the Suez sector, both sides had accepted a cease-fire proposal by General Odd Bull, Chief of Staff of UNTSO. The Secretary-General also informed the Council that advance parties of United Nations military observers would begin observation operations on both sides of the Suez sector on 17 July.

8. In three further supplementary reports issued between 24 July and 11 August (S/7930/Add.24-26), the Secretary-General reported that the situation in general had remained quiet in the Suez sector. On 26 July there had been an exchange of fire in the Israel-Syria sector, but a cease-fire proposal had been accepted by both sides.

9. On 10 August the Secretary-General reported (S/8053/Add.1) that since the beginning of UNTSO cease-fire observation on the Suez sector on 17 July, United Nations military observers had, by 5 August, been increased to sixteen on both sides of the Canal, with three observation posts on the United Arab Republic side and four on the Israel side. On the basis of revised estimates calling for a total of forty-six temporary observers in the sector, he proposed to secure twenty-one additional observers. The report also explained a proposal made by the Chief of Staff of UNTSO to Israel and the United Arab Republic to stop all military activity in the Suez Canal, including the movement of boats in or into the Canal, but not including boats of the Suez Canal Authority, for a period of one month starting on 27 July 1967. Israel had accepted the proposal on condition of reciprocity and the United Arab Republic had stated that maintenance of the present situation under which it was not carrying out any military activity in the Suez Canal would ensure against any threat to the cease-fire decision. In a further report of 28 August (S/8053/Add.2), the Secretary-General reported that both Israel and the United Arab Republic had agreed that the arrangement of 27 July would continue in effect until otherwise agreed by the two parties.

10. In two supplementary reports issued on 25 and 28 August (S/7930/Add.30 and 31), the Secretary-General reported that since 11 August the situation in general had remained quiet in the Israel-Syria sector. Regarding the situation in the Suez sector, there had been considerable air activity on both sides, and a heavy exchange of fire had taken place on 26 August at a point south of Ismailia.

11. On 4 and 7 September the Secretary-General communicated reports (S/7930/Add.32-34) from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO indicating that a heavy exchange of fire on 4 September had been started by a United Arab Republic shot directed at Israel boats in Suez Bay and that the United Arab Republic had again initiated firing on 6 September in the Ismailia area. Observers had eventually obtained effective cease-fires.

12. In eight additional reports issued between 12 and 30 September (S/7930/Add.35-41), the Secre-

tary-General reported on new exchanges of fire on 12, 20, 21, 22, 25, 27 and 29 September, stating that United Nations military observers' reports indicated that the firing on 12 September was initiated by the United Arab Republic and that on 21 September by Israel. He reported further exchanges of fire on 27 September along the whole area from Kantara to Suez, and appealed to both parties to exercise the utmost restraint in the Suez Canal sector, to observe strictly the agreed arrangements and to use the United Nations cease-fire machinery. As regards the Israel-Syria sector, the Secretary-General reported that as at 30 September the situation in general remained quiet.

13. On 4 October the Secretary-General informed the Council (S/8182) of the financial implications concerning the stationing of United Nations military observers in the Suez sector.

14. In a report of 13 October (S/7930/Add.42), the Secretary-General said, *inter alia*, that since 30 September the situation in the Suez sector had remained quiet except for overflights by both sides on 11 October. In the Israel-Syria sector the situation in general remained quiet as at 13 October.

15. In connexion with his efforts to obtain the return of Government House Headquarters to UNTSO, the Secretary-General on 11 August 1967 (S/7930/Add.27) informed the Council of a proposal made by the Government of Israel to return Government House and one third of its grounds. Israel had given assurances that it would make no military use of the area which had not been offered for return. In a further report dated 22 August (S/7930/Add.29), the Secretary-General informed the Council that he had authorized UNTSO to return to the area offered because of its urgent need of the facilities and as a practical step only. That action, the Secretary-General added, was without prejudice to the claims he had maintained that the United Nations was entitled to the return and exclusive occupancy and possession of the whole Government House compound. UNTSO resumed occupancy on 23 August.

16. In a letter dated 25 July (S/8094), the representative of Syria conveyed to the Secretary-General his Government's attitude regarding the terms of reference and functioning of UNTSO.

17. Pursuant to paragraph 3 of Security Council resolution 237 (1967) of 14 June 1967 concerning the alleviation of the sufferings of civil populations and prisoners of war, the Secretary-General, on 18 August, submitted an interim report (S/8124) based upon information received from the Commissioner-General of UNRWA and interim reports from his Special Representative to the Middle East, Mr. Nils-Göran Gussing.

18. The report dealt, *inter alia*, with the needs of persons displaced during and after the recent conflict and emergency assistance promised for them, as well as the problem of return of persons who had fled from the West Bank of the Jordan to the East Bank and with arrangements for their return made by representatives of the Governments concerned, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Jordanian Red Crescent.

19. By a note dated 25 August (S/8133), the Secretary-General transmitted to the Council a message he had sent to the Government of Israel requesting an extension of the deadline for the return of refugees to the West Bank beyond 31 August 1967, the date

set by Israel. The reply of Israel stating its compliance with the request was received on 11 September (S/8153).

20. On 15 September the Secretary-General announced (S/8155) that a report on the humanitarian aspects of the situation in the Middle East would be forthcoming.

21. On 2 October the Secretary-General transmitted to the Council a final report (S/8158) based on information obtained by his Special Representative, Mr. Gussing, on the situation of the population in areas currently under Israel control, the measures taken to shelter and to facilitate the return of those who had fled, the treatment of prisoners of war and the protection of civilians. The Special Representative had received excellent co-operation at all levels in the countries he had visited and had been allowed full freedom of movement; however, he had met with spokesmen of the civilian population, displaced persons, prisoners of war and local authorities only in the company of government representatives. The Special Representative believed that, particularly in the occupied areas, it would have been of great psychological importance and would have provided for franker exchanges if he had had the opportunity to meet and talk without witnesses to whomever he wished. This view was conveyed to Israel representatives without result.

22. Reporting on the safety, welfare, and security of the population in areas under Israel control, which had been placed under Israel military administration, the Secretary-General stated that in the Syrian area the entire population had left except for some 6,000 Druses, who had not wanted to leave and were living peacefully, and some 250 other civilians, mainly in Kuneitra. Syrian complaints regarding alleged violation by Israel of humanitarian principles, to which the Special Representative could not give the required individual on-the-spot investigation, had not therefore been verified. Israel had rejected the allegations. The Special Representative, however, had looked into selected issues which were the subject of continuing Syrian complaints: namely, the alleged systematic efforts to expel the entire original population from the area and the alleged looting and demolition of entire villages after the cessation of hostilities. Regarding the movement of population, Mr. Gussing reported that while there were strong indications that the majority of the population had left before the end of hostilities, he had found it difficult, in view of conflicting reports on subsequent events, to determine the line between physical and psychological pressure. At the local level, it seemed clear that certain actions allowed by local commanders had been an important cause of flight. He had never been informed of any action taken by the Israel authorities to reassure the population. As for looting, the Special Representative felt reasonably sure that responsibility for the extensive looting of Kuneitra lay to a great extent with the Israel forces. Syria had also complained of "excavations" and "international robbery" of historic treasures at an archaeological site near Banias, but Mr. Gussing reported that he could find no trace of any recent digging in those parts of the site shown to him. On the question of demolition of villages, he felt that the vast destruction observed in three of four villages mentioned in Syrian complaints could be attributed largely to military operations.

23. Concerning the occupied West Bank area of Jordan, of its population of 1.1 million people, including 430,000 registered UNRWA refugees, 200,000 had left

for the East Bank during and after the fighting, and an additional substantial number had been displaced. Jordanian complaints relevant to the West Bank civil population, which Israel had either commented on or rejected as unfounded, could not all be investigated in detail or verified by the Special Representative. As to complaints of Israel's attempts to create another Arab exodus to the East Bank, the truth seemed to lie somewhere between an Israel statement that "no encouragement" was given to the population to flee and the allegations of brutal force and intimidation made by refugees. The impact of hostilities and military occupation, particularly when no measures of reassurance had been taken, had clearly been a main factor in the exodus.

24. Regarding persons displaced by Israel demolition of certain villages which had been the subject of Jordanian complaints, the Special Representative provided more specific details. In the border town of Qalqiliya, 850 of 2,000 dwellings had been demolished. Israel claimed that the destruction had been caused by actual fighting; the Arab mayor stated that only fifteen to twenty houses had been destroyed during the fighting and before the population had been advised to leave by the Israel commander. The population had been allowed to return three weeks later. Three villages in the Latrun area had been destroyed: an Israel liaison officer stated that most of the destruction had taken place during the fighting, and the Israel Minister of Defence stated that the damaged villages had been destroyed for strategic and security reasons. These displaced villagers had not been allowed to return. In the Hebron area two villages had been demolished. The reason given by Israel was that they were "El Fatah" terrorist bases; the *Mukhtar* claimed that "El Fatah" members only passed through them and that the inhabitants had never co-operated.

25. As for Jordanian complaints about alleged looting "of everything" found in banks by Israel occupying forces, Israel had rejected the allegations. Israel spokesmen said that the bank books and money had been removed against signed receipts solely to check on the situation of the banks. The Special Representative had found it difficult to form a firm opinion regarding reports of looting of private property by military personnel inasmuch as it took place two months before his arrival. Israel authorities had stated that measures had been taken to prevent looting and to stop it when it occurred.

26. Views on the economic and social conditions of the civilian population on the West Bank had been conflicting. Observation of four main towns indicated that as a result of hostilities the general economy had come to a standstill. The Israel Government had assured the Special Representative that it had taken initial measures to reactivate that economy. Delay in resumption of normal life would require continued provision of food relief for persons not at present under UNRWA's care.

27. The United Arab Republic-administered Gaza Strip and Sinai, occupied by Israel, consisted, respectively, of an area densely populated by about 455,000 persons, of whom 315,000 were UNRWA-registered refugees and of a vast peninsula with most of its 45,000 to 55,000 inhabitants in the two towns of El-Arish and East Kantara. The report sketched the post-hostilities economic and social conditions characterized by unemployment and hardship.

28. Regarding movement of population, Israel had enabled residents of the Gaza area to visit relatives on the West Bank of Jordan. Six large buses were said to leave daily; it was not known whether six busloads of people also returned every day. The military governor of the area stated that the population had been informed that those who wanted to go and work on the West Bank could do so.

29. After describing the difficult position of the 1,000 civil servants and their families in El-Arish, the Special Representative stated that transfer of the 5,000 persons to the West Bank of the Canal had started, by agreement, but he had later been informed that the United Arab Republic no longer wished them to cross but to stay so that their presence might bolster the morale of the population. The Government of the United Arab Republic objected, however, to the Israel detention of some 290 civil servants who had been stationed in Gaza and requested that they be permitted to rejoin their families who had been allowed to cross the Canal.

30. Turning to the situation of persons who had fled from areas under Israel occupation and the question of their return, the report described the emergency assistance provided and current pressing needs. The persons involved were 200,000 who had moved from the West to the East Bank of the Jordan; another 110,000 persons, according to Syria, although Israel put the estimate at 85,000, who had moved out of the south-western corner of Syria; and 35,000 who had moved across the Canal from the Gaza Strip or Sinai. The number of UNRWA-registered refugees included in the three groups were respectively 93,000, 17,000 and 3,000.

31. Recalling that in its resolution 237 (1967) the Security Council had called upon Israel to facilitate the return of these displaced persons, the report detailed information obtained by the Special Representative on the three groups.

32. The Syrian Government strongly desired the return of the Syrian displaced persons through intervention by the United Nations but was not willing to enter into direct negotiations with Israel. The Israel Government's attitude to the return of the displaced persons, applicable to both Syria and the United Arab Republic, was that Israel and Jordan had reached an agreement and that, when talks were initiated with Syria and Egypt, it would be prepared to discuss any outstanding issues, including the return of the displaced civilians.

33. In early July Israel had announced its intention of authorizing the return of displaced persons to the West Bank on certain conditions and had set 10 August as the deadline for the return. A dispute over the application form required by Israel had not been resolved until a meeting between representatives of Israel, ICRC and the Jordanian Red Crescent on 6 August. The distribution of application forms had begun on 12 August, and Israel had extended the deadline to 31 August. According to the Jordanian Government, by 28 August Israel had approved only 4,763 applications, covering 16,266 persons, of the 40,000 applications, involving 170,000 persons, which had been transmitted through ICRC. On 9 September Jordan stated that the total number of displaced persons who had returned was 14,150 (14,056 according to Israel). Israel and Jordan had offered various conflicting reasons why the return operation had not

functioned smoothly. Jordan charged that Israel approval of applications had excluded UNRWA-registered refugees and displaced persons in East Bank camps, as well as those from the areas of Jerusalem, Bethlehem and Jericho. Israel charged that a Jordanian campaign against Israel of increasing violence and direct incitement of both the prospective returnees and West Bank inhabitants had seriously impeded the whole question of the return of the displaced persons.

34. The Special Representative pointed out that only 35,000 persons could have returned by 31 August at the potential daily rate mentioned by Israel. He had been able to assure Israel that Jordan wished to proceed with the return operation in an atmosphere of restraint. In response to a request by the Secretary-General on 24 August for extension of the deadline, Israel had informed him that displaced persons who had been unable to use previously issued permits would be allowed to return within a fixed period of time and that additional individual and reunion-of-family applications would be considered.

35. Displaced persons in the United Arab Republic had expressed their desire to return to their homes. The Israel attitude to their return was the same as that set forth above (see para. 32) in the case of Syrian displaced persons. The United Arab Republic held the view that the Special Representative should initiate discussions regarding return and that the ICRC might assume responsibility for implementing any agreement reached.

36. Regarding the correct treatment of prisoners of war, referred to in paragraph 2 of Security Council resolution 237 (1967), Mr. Gussing stated that on the whole the ICRC had been able to play an important role as agent and neutral intermediary in the area of conflict. Jordan, Syria and the United Arab Republic had accused Israel of maltreatment and execution of prisoners of war. Israel had denied the allegations and had expressed concern over treatment of Israel prisoners of war in Arab countries, alleging murder of several Israel pilots by the United Arab Republic and by Syria. The Special Representative had not been in a position to investigate these accusations, but in visits to prisoner-of-war camps had gathered the impression that treatment was correct on both sides. An exchange of prisoners had been successfully concluded through the ICRC between Israel on the one side and Jordan, Syria and Lebanon on the other. Negotiations between Israel and the United Arab Republic through the ICRC had not yet led to any agreement.

37. Regarding the treatment of Jewish minorities, particularly in certain Arab States, about which Israel had expressed concern, the Secretary-General had informed Mr. Gussing that the provisions of Security Council resolution 237 (1967) might properly be interpreted as having application to the treatment of both Arab and Jewish persons in the States involved in the war. Since this particular aspect of the protection of civilians in time of war could be taken up only towards the end of his stay in the area of conflict, the Special Representative had had very little time for discussion or investigation of the actual situation of minorities. Letters of inquiry had been sent by the Special Representative to Israel, Syria and the United Arab Republic. Israel had replied that except for security measures, which were no longer in effect,

there had been no discrimination against Arab citizens. The United Arab Republic had expressed to Mr. Gussing its firm opinion that Security Council resolution 237 (1967) did not apply to its Jewish minority and had requested clarification of that interpretation. Jews of Egyptian nationality, it maintained, were solely the responsibility of the UAR Government. The Special Representative indicated that there were persistent allegations that 500 to 600 men of the estimated Jewish minority of 2,500 in the United Arab Republic had been kept in detention since the beginning of the war. In discussion of his letter with the Syrian Government, the latter had assured Mr. Gussing that the Jewish minority in Syria (about 4,000 persons) was treated in exactly the same way as other Syrian citizens. For security reasons, certain Jews suspected of anti-Government activities were restricted in their movements, as were certain Christians and Moslems.

38. In conclusion, the report noted the efforts of Governments and international organizations to help the people affected by the war. The Secretary-General expressed appreciation for all the voluntary contributions to relieve the distressed populations and appealed to all to contribute to that humanitarian task.

39. Pursuant to paragraph 3 of General Assembly resolution 2254 (ES-V) of 14 July 1967 concerning the situation in Jerusalem, the Secretary-General circulated to the Security Council a note dated 14 August (S/8121), announcing the appointment of Ambassador Ernesto A. Thalmann of Switzerland as his Personal Representative in Jerusalem. The Secretary-General pointed out that Mr. Thalmann's mission would be solely to obtain information as a basis for the report requested under the above-mentioned resolution and would not entail any negotiations relating to the implementation of that resolution.

40. On 12 September the Secretary-General submitted to the Council a two-part report (S/8146) on the situation in Jerusalem. The first part was based on information gathered by his Personal Representative during his two-week mission.

41. After setting out figures on changes in Jerusalem's geography, population and municipal administration, the Personal Representative stated that Israel leaders had made clear to him beyond any doubt that Israel was taking every step to place under its sovereignty those parts of the city not controlled before June 1967. For practical reasons, not all Israel laws and regulations were yet being enforced, but the declared objective was to equalize the legal and administrative status of residents of all parts of the city. The Israel authorities had stated unequivocally that the process of integration was irreversible and not negotiable.

42. While admitting serious economic problems of adjustment in East Jerusalem, Israel authorities maintained that in many respects the economy was in a prosperous state due to the flow of Israelis and that the adverse effects of the cessation of tourism should not be unduly protracted. Everything was being done not to cut off East Jerusalem from its West Bank source of supply, especially of agricultural produce. Israel excise and customs duties, income tax, municipal taxes and vehicle licence fees were being applied in East Jerusalem, all at higher rates than those previously paid there. The question of the increased cost of living was being studied, and the pay of salaried officials had been increased but not to a level equal to the

Israel scale. Serious obstacles to economic recovery had been caused by monetary problems, including the closure of West Jerusalem banks and the rate of exchange of the Jordan dinar to the Israel pound.

43. Measures concerning the judiciary had included moving the High Rabbinical Court to East Jerusalem. Moslem courts, the Israel authorities stated, were functioning in the same manner as in the past.

44. As for education, it was intended to introduce as soon as possible in East Jerusalem all the educational laws and regulations applicable in Israel to Arab children, using the existing curriculum and textbooks and maintaining Arabic as the basic language of instruction. All previously employed teachers had been invited to continue their work. Information from other sources made the Personal Representative doubtful whether the teachers would be prepared to co-operate with the Israel authorities in reopening the schools.

45. Turning to the situation in Jerusalem as described by Arab personalities, the Personal Representative explained that the disproportionately large amount of information received from the Israel side, as compared with that from Arab sources, was due partly to the fact that his investigations were carried out in an Israel-controlled area. Israel representatives had stated that the Arab personalities interviewed were, with few exceptions, members of the Palestine Liberation Organization and did not truly represent the population. The Personal Representative noted that the Arab-provided documents were signed by a wide range of personalities, including many previous Jordan officials and recognized religious leaders.

46. The report described the most important Arab complaints against the Israel authorities. Most Arabs stated the Moslem population was shocked by Israel desecration of Moslem Holy Places. The bulldozing of 135 Arab-owned houses in the Maghrabi Quarter (adjoining the Wailing Wall) and expulsion of their inhabitants had aroused strong feelings, as had the eviction of 3,000 residents from the so-called Jewish Quarter. The application of Israel civil law was unacceptable to the Arabs, as was the Israel claim of jurisdiction over the Moslem religious courts and control over sermons preached from the El-Aksa Mosque. The dissolution of the elected Municipal Council of East Jerusalem was described by the Arabs as a violation of international law. Action taken by Arab notables to establish a public administration in accordance with Jordanian law had not been recognized by the Israel authorities. Measures by Israel with respect to taxes, customs duties, licences, absentee properties and other economic matters were considered oppressive, and there was a growing feeling of economic strangulation. There was pronounced aversion to efforts by the Israel authorities to apply their own educational system to Arab schools.

47. The Personal Representative was told that the Arabs were ready to co-operate with a military occupation régime on questions of administration and public welfare but were opposed to civil incorporation by force into the Israel State system, which they regarded as a violation of international law, which prohibited an occupying Power from changing the legal and administrative structure.

48. All representatives of the religious communities met by the Personal Representative agreed that the Holy Places needed special protection and that their believers should have free access to those places.

Reassuring statements made in this connexion by Israel authorities were favourably received. Apart from the Moslems, essentially only the Catholic Church adopted a systematically divergent attitude: the Holy See was convinced that the only solution offering sufficient guarantee for the protection of Jerusalem and its Holy Places was to place that city and its vicinity under an international régime in the form of a *corpus separatum*. Various religious leaders hoped that their links with the outside world, including the Arab countries, would remain open. The Personal Representative was assured by Israel that a liberal practice would be pursued; so far as entry from Arab countries was concerned, it was for those countries to issue the relevant permits.

49. Part II of the report set forth the response of Israel dated 11 September to the Secretary-General's letter of 15 July 1967 transmitting the General Assembly's resolution 2254 (ES-V) of 14 July 1967. In that reply, the Israel Foreign Minister stated that it was necessary to ensure equal rights and opportunities to all residents of the city. No international or other interest would be served by the institution of divisions and barriers. It was his Government's policy to secure appropriate expression of the special interest of the three great religions in Jerusalem, in co-operation with the universal interests concerned, by ensuring that the Moslem, as well as the Christian and Jewish, Holy Places should be scrupulously respected and placed under the responsibility of a recognized Moslem authority.

C. Communications to the Security Council and requests for a meeting

50. In letters dated 21 and 22 October (S/8203 and S/8204) addressed to the President of the Security Council, the representative of Israel charged the United Arab Republic with a premeditated and unprovoked attack at 17.30 hours local time on 21 October on the Israel destroyer *Eilat*, at position 31°20.5' north, 32°8' east on the high seas to the north of the Sinai peninsula, while it was on a routine patrol, which had been known to the United Arab Republic for several months. The first surface-to-surface missiles launched from within Port Said harbour, approximately fourteen nautical miles distant, had immobilized the ship, which dropped anchor. Two more missiles fired at 19.30 hours at the helpless vessel had forced abandonment of the sinking *Eilat* at 20.30 hours. Casualties had included fifteen killed, thirty-six missing and forty-eight wounded, eight of them seriously. The representative of Israel denied that the ship had opened fire on Port Said as had been alleged by the United Arab Republic authorities. He termed the attack a wanton act of aggression and charged that it was the culmination of a series of violations of the cease-fire resolutions and an outrageous violation of the international law of the sea.

51. In a supplementary report dated 22 October (S/7930/Add.43), the Secretary-General reported, on the basis of information submitted by the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, that on 21 October the senior liaison officer of the United Arab Republic had reported that at 15.50 hours GMT one Israel boat had entered UAR territorial waters, that it had opened fire at 15.55 hours GMT and that fire had been returned and the destroyer sunk at 16.17 hours GMT. At 18.45 hours GMT, the Israel liaison officer had confirmed

that the Israel destroyer had been attacked and presumably sunk. He believed the ship was approximately thirteen miles east of Port Said and approximately ten miles off shore. In response to a message from the Chief of Staff that he expected no interference with any rescue operations, the senior liaison officer of the United Arab Republic had informed him that the local commander had been forbidden to fire. The Chief of Staff had no verified information about the nature of the attack as the United Nations military observers in the Suez Canal sector had no means of observing such incidents at sea. On 24 October the Secretary-General reported (S/7930/Add.49) that the Chief of Staff had been informed by the senior liaison officer of the United Arab Republic that the destroyer had been hit by a guided missile from a United Arab Republic torpedo boat outside Port Said when it was eleven nautical miles north-east of Port Said.

52. In a letter dated 22 October (S/8205), the representative of the United Arab Republic informed the Security Council that at 17.30 hours local time, on 21 October, an Israel destroyer had been seen speeding in UAR territorial waters off Port Said and that the United Arab Republic naval units in Port Said had been compelled to act in self-defence to stop the advance of the Israel vessel. The subsequent exchange of fire had resulted in the sinking of the destroyer. He added that this latest aggressive violation of the cease-fire followed the series of attacks on populated cities of the Suez Canal sector which had prompted the United Arab Republic to evacuate over 300,000 of that sector's inhabitants.

53. In a further letter dated 24 October (S/8207), the representative of the United Arab Republic charged Israel forces with unprovoked premeditated flagrant aggression at 12.30 hours GMT, on 24 October, when they had started a continuous shelling of the city of Suez resulting in extensive human losses and severe damage to property. The Israel forces had also systematically shelled and completely or severely damaged industrial installations, including the petroleum refineries in Suez, the Nasr plants for fertilizer, and installations in the Suez harbour. Those military operations could not be justified as a retaliatory measure against the sinking of the Israel destroyer in territorial waters because they were conducted against civilian and industrial installations, not military targets. The Israel forces, he said, had not responded to the cease-fire request of United Nations military observers until their planned aggression had been implemented. He requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider that grave situation and take prompt action against Israel in accordance with the United Nations Charter.

54. By a letter dated 24 October (S/8208), the representative of Israel charged that United Arab Republic forces had opened fire from the cities of Port Ibrahim and Suez on the west bank of the Suez Canal on Israel forces on the east bank north of Port Taufiq at 14.30 hours. The artillery fire had been returned. Because of the location of the Egyptian artillery some oil refineries were believed to have been hit. He added that a cease-fire proposed by United Nations military observers for 17.30 hours had been accepted by both parties and had taken effect. He requested an urgent meeting of the Council to deal with the open aggression and violations of the cease-fire resolutions by the United Arab Republic.

55. On 24 and 25 October the Secretary-General transmitted reports on the events of 24 October (S/7930/Add.44-48) from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, indicating that United Nations military observers had not ascertained the initiation of firing south of Little Bitter Lake heard at 12.23 hours GMT on 24 October. Israel forces had initiated artillery fire at 12.31 hours GMT at the oil refinery approximately five kilometres west of Port Taufiq. Heavy exchange of fire had developed at 12.35 hours GMT in Port Taufiq-Suez area. At 12.35 hours GMT, United Nations Military Observers had proposed a cease-fire for 13.30 hours GMT. The United Arab Republic had accepted. At 13.25 hours GMT, Israel had stated it would agree to a cease-fire at 15.30 hours GMT. After vain United Nations military observers' efforts to obtain acceptance by Israel for an earlier cease-fire, the Chief of Staff had finally proposed one for 15.30 hours GMT, a proposal accepted by the United Arab Republic at 14.45 hours GMT and Israel at 15.13 hours GMT. Heavy sporadic firing had continued until the cease-fire time.

D. Consideration by the Council at the 1369th to 1371st meetings (24-25 October 1967)

56. At the 1369th meeting on 24 October, the provisional agenda consisted of the letters of 24 October from the United Arab Republic and Israel. The representatives of the United Arab Republic, Israel, Jordan and Syria were invited, at their request, to take part in the Council's discussion.

57. The representative of the United Arab Republic charged that Israel's act of war on 24 October was the most violent since its aggression of 5 June and was carried out against the entire civilian and industrial life in the Suez area, one of the most vital industrial sites in his country. The reports of the Chief of Staff made clear that Israel had rejected the first cease-fire proposal because two more hours were needed to implement Israel's plan of aggression and destruction. That aggression was totally unprovoked and premeditated. It followed the violation of the territorial waters of the United Arab Republic by the Israel destroyer *Eilat* on 21 October and its attempt to carry out aggression against the city of Port Said. The destroyer was subsequently sunk, in self-defence, by his Government's forces. That destroyer had sunk two United Arab Republic boats in the territorial waters of Port Said on 12 July 1967. He called upon the Council to condemn the Israel aggression and to apply enforcement measures under the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter.

58. The representative of Israel charged that the destroyer *Eilat* had been attacked by Egyptian naval craft equipped with Soviet Komar missiles while on routine patrol outside Egyptian territorial waters. The later renewal of the attack on and the sinking of the helpless vessel showed the premeditated nature of the action. There had been nineteen killed, twenty-eight were missing and ninety-one wounded. The use of missiles was a deliberate act of military escalation. The United Arab Republic had been preparing for the situation by evacuating the population of the Suez area and by creating tension by radio and press announcements that the renewal of fighting was imminent. Cairo's Press and radio had gloated over news of the sinking. The incidents of 24 October were the culmination of a long series of provocative Egyptian

violations of the cease-fire by the shelling of Israel forces from gun emplacements near built-up areas. If there were no reciprocity as regards the cessation of fire, he declared, then naturally the whole system collapsed. Israel was ready to meet representatives of the United Arab Republic and of any other Arab State forthwith to discuss measures to lay the basis for a peaceful future.

59. With regard to the charge that Israel had been at fault in not agreeing to the first cease-fire proposal, the representative of Israel stated that the delay in effecting the cease-fire was due to the fact that an Israel communications centre had been hit at the beginning of the incidents. Israel was prepared to co-operate in an investigation to determine the position of the *Eilat* when it was sunk and was confident that such an investigation would corroborate that the ship was sunk on the high seas.

60. The representative of the United Kingdom thought that the whole weight of the Council should be applied to a demand that the cease-fire be observed, and belligerence from both sides abandoned. In his view, the Council should have met and acted earlier. He reminded the Council that the United Kingdom had repeatedly urged the appointment of a United Nations special representative. His Government's proposals had been absolutely clear. It could not be accused of delay, or of opposition to United Nations action when the 1967 war broke out. It was delay which had led to conflict, then to deadlock and currently to more death and destruction. The Council should take urgent action towards a fair and balanced resolution appointing a United Nations special representative to deal with the situation on the spot.

61. The representative of Canada observed that the current outbreak of hostilities underlined the precarious nature of the cease-fire. He suggested several measures to be adopted by the Council: first, the Council should call upon all parties to observe scrupulously the cease-fire and to halt all military activities in the area; second, the Council should request a report from the Secretary-General on what additional resources the Chief-of-Staff of UNTSO might need to carry out his task under the consensus of the Council on 9/10 July 1967 for surveillance of the cease-fire in the area; and third, the Secretary-General should be immediately authorized, as the delegations of Canada, India and the United Kingdom had advocated since early June, to send a special representative to the Middle East to start the process towards restoring peace on the basis of a fair and balanced resolution.

62. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics condemned the premeditated shelling of inhabited areas and industrial targets by Israel forces, which had opened fire and disregarded United Nations military observers appeals for an immediate cease-fire. That action, he said, followed the provocative sending of an Israel destroyer into the territorial waters of the United Arab Republic, which had had to take measures in legitimate self-defence. The new act of provocation by Israel's armed forces was a very serious violation of the Security Council decision on a cease-fire and a defiance of the generally recognized rules of international law and the principles of the United Nations Charter. Israel's actions had not been some kind of error or accident, but a deliberate act of barbarity planned in advance. The counter-complaint hurriedly put forward in the Security Council by Israel

was intended to mislead the Council and world public opinion. The Soviet Union firmly supported the United Arab Republic's legitimate request for an unconditional condemnation of the aggressive actions of Israel in the area of the town of Suez. Peace could not be restored in the Near East until the illegal occupation of Arab lands by Israel was ended. It was essential to hasten the achievement of a political settlement in the Near East. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics then introduced the following draft resolution (S/8212):

"The Security Council,

"Having considered the communication of the representative of the United Arab Republic concerning a new act of aggression by Israel in the area of the city of Suez,

"Having considered also the information provided by the Secretary-General in document S/7930/Add. 44 that the Israel forces began and continued an artillery barrage, ignoring the proposal by the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization for an immediate cease-fire,

"Expressing grave concern that the said act of aggression has resulted in heavy losses among the peaceful population and in serious physical damage,

"Considering that the actions of the Israel armed forces in the area of the city of Suez constitute a gross violation of the Security Council resolutions of 6 June 1967 (resolution 233 (1967)) and of 7 June 1967 (resolution 234 (1967)) calling for a cease-fire and the cessation of military activities, as well as of other Security Council resolutions on that question,

"1. Strongly condemns Israel for the act of aggression committed by it in the area of the city of Suez;

"2. Demands that Israel compensate the United Arab Republic for the damage caused by that act;

"3. Urgently calls upon Israel strictly to observe the aforementioned resolutions of the Security Council concerning the cease-fire and the cessation of military activities."

63. The representative of Jordan said that nearly five months had passed since Israel occupied large tracts of Arab territory and nothing had been done to change that situation. The recent attack by Israel on Suez, he said, was but one link in a chain of continued Israel aggression. In the occupied parts of Jordan, he went on, Israel forces in disregard of international law and the Charter were committing crimes unparalleled in modern history. Human torture, looting and obliteration of Jordanian villages abounded. Those acts continued, he said, because the United Nations shrank from taking a clear and effective stand. He urged the Council to condemn Israel aggression and order the withdrawal of Israel occupation forces to the lines existing prior to 5 June 1967.

64. The representative of the United States expressed concern over the loss of life and destruction resulting from the sinking of the *Eilat* and the exchange of artillery fire at Suez. He emphasized that the first step towards peace must be a complete cease-fire and cessation of violence between the parties. The United States, he added, would co-operate in giving the United Nations machinery in the area a strength commensurate with its tasks. The events of the last days

underscored the need to move towards a just settlement of all the questions outstanding between the parties. The Council should now demand scrupulous adherence to the cease-fire while condemning all violations; it should deal with the situation even-handedly without taking one-sided views or adopting one-sided resolutions. He introduced the following draft resolution (S/8213):

"The Security Council,

"Gravely concerned at the reports and complaints it has received of military hostilities in violation of the cease-fire between Israel and the United Arab Republic,

"Convinced that progress toward the establishment of a just and durable peace in the area requires mutual respect for the cease-fire, in accordance with resolutions of the Security Council and the agreements of the parties,

"1. Condemns any and all violations of the cease-fire;

"2. Insists that the Member States concerned scrupulously respect the cease-fire as contained in resolutions 233 (1967), 234 (1967), 235 (1967) and 236 (1967) and the consensus of 10 July and co-operate fully with the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization and the United Nations Military Observers in their tasks in connexion therewith;

"3. Calls on the Governments concerned to issue categorical instructions to all military forces to refrain from all firing, as required by these resolutions."

65. The representative of India said that the deliberate nature of the attack by Israel on the Suez area was proved by Israel's refusal to accept UNTSO's first cease-fire proposal. He maintained that Israel's policy of retaliation was impermissible under Security Council decisions. Moreover, Israel's action infringed the Security Council cease-fire resolution 236 (1967) of 12 June. In view of the conflicting statements by Israel and the United Arab Republic concerning the Israel destroyer he suggested that the Secretary-General should order further investigation to determine whether the destroyer was in territorial waters or on the high seas when sunk. India believed that there could be no reduction of tension in the area unless Israel forces first withdrew from the occupied territories. He agreed on the need for a fair and balanced resolution which should be based on certain fundamental guidelines.

66. The representative of Brazil stated that the regrettable military action could only postpone the date of a lasting settlement. He emphasized that strict observance of the cease-fire was a necessary first step.

67. The representative of Bulgaria said that the Israel destroyer by entering United Arab Republic territorial waters had provoked just retaliation, which had been used by Israel as a pretext for the Suez attack. Moreover, the Israel forces had delayed acceptance of the cease-fire in order to complete their planned massacre of the population and destruction of the installations. He added that as long as Israel continued to occupy Arab territory, there would always be the temptation on the part of Israel leaders to undertake military action in order to expand their territorial gains; the Council must take the necessary measures

to resolve the situation created by Israel's aggression of 5 June. He declared that the Council must condemn Israel for its aggression, demand compensation for the damage and call on Israel to observe strictly the Security Council cease-fire resolutions as proposed in the draft resolution tabled by the USSR.

68. The representative of France regretted that there had once again been a resort to force, which could only reopen a cycle of reprisals and counter-reprisals. Without more information he did not wish to pass judgement on responsibility for the incidents but stressed that only on the basis of a strict observance of the cease-fire by both parties could the wider task of re-establishing normal conditions in the whole area be undertaken.

69. The representative of Denmark said that the incidents in the Middle East had again proved the instability of existing arrangements there. The cease-fire must be fully respected and all violations deplored and condemned. His delegation would consider favourably any request from the Secretary-General to strengthen the cease-fire machinery in the area. It was the Council's duty to strive for a just and durable peace and to formulate, in a fair and balanced way, the principles that should guide a lasting settlement.

70. The representative of Mali charged that Israel had violated the cease-fire by its premeditated aggression against Suez, resulting in destruction of 80 per cent of the industries there and loss of life. His delegation shared the concern expressed by other members of the Council about the precarious nature of the cease-fire arising from Israel's territorial claims and military occupation of Arab territories. He added that as long as Israel continued its occupation, the situation in the Middle East would remain fatally explosive. The Council, he said, must condemn Israel's violation of the cease-fire resolutions of the Security Council and must order strict observance of the cease-fire by the parties and demand fair compensation for the damage suffered by the United Arab Republic. He expressed support for the USSR draft resolution.

71. The representative of Ethiopia said that his delegation was anxious to ensure respect of the cease-fire resolutions of the Security Council and to strengthen the cease-fire machinery. He thought the Council should request of the Secretary-General a full report of the recent incidents in the area so that the Council might take appropriate action. However, as other members of the Council had pointed out, the cease-fire was only a precarious first step for building peace in the area. Further measures were necessary to change the present dangerous stalemate to a state of just and durable peace. In that connexion, he supported the suggestions of the United Kingdom representative and said that the dispatch of a Special Representative to the area was long overdue. In his view the Special Representative should make contacts with the Governments concerned and operate within the context of general and comprehensive guidelines set out by the Council.

72. The representative of Argentina, stressing the gravity of the events which had taken place, said that further information was needed to decide on the responsibilities of each of the parties. He believed that the Council should speedily find a formula which would establish a clear-cut balance of interests and obligations on the part of the parties concerned and set up a constructive dialogue among them. He hoped that agree-

ment on a substantive resolution might be reached that would open the way to a just and lasting peace.

73. At the 1370th meeting of the Council, on 25 October, the representative of Nigeria declared that if it were proved that the Israel destroyer had been sunk in circumstances in which it should not have been attacked and if there were conclusive evidence that the Israel action against Suez was a reprisal action, he would join in condemning both actions. Noting the draft resolutions of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States, he considered it would be reckless to vote upon them since a resolution not having the general support of the Council did not have the effect it should. He suggested a short suspension of the meeting to allow consultations on a compromise draft resolution which would not damage the position of the two major Powers but produce an effective decision as a necessary step towards continuing efforts to deal with the Arab-Israel question as a whole.

74. The Council then adjourned.

75. At the opening of the 1371st meeting of the Council, on the same day, the President announced that, as a result of consultations, agreement had been reached on the text of the following draft resolution:

"The Security Council,

"Gravely concerned over recent military activities in the Middle East carried out in spite of the Security Council resolutions ordering a cease-fire,

"Having heard and considered the statements made by the parties concerned,

"Taking into consideration the information on the said activities provided by the Secretary-General in documents S/7930/Add.43, Add.44, Add.45, Add.46, Add.47, Add.48 and Add.49,

"1. Condemns the violations of the cease-fire;

"2. Regrets the casualties and loss of property resulting from the violations;

"3. Reaffirms the necessity of the strict observance of the cease-fire resolutions;

"4. Demands of the Member States concerned to cease immediately all prohibited military activities in the area, and to co-operate fully and promptly with the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization."

76. There being no objection to granting priority in the vote to the draft resolution, the President put it to the vote.

Decision: *At the 1371st meeting, on 25 October, the draft resolution was adopted unanimously (resolution 240 (1967))*

77. After adoption of the resolution, the Secretary-General stated that the need to strengthen the observer operation, established in the Suez Canal sector following the Council's consensus of 9/10 July 1967, had become increasingly apparent. At present, forty-three observers manning nine Observation Posts were patrolling parts of the Canal sector in jeeps. Their mobility was limited and they had no facilities to observe by air or sea.

78. Consultation with the Chief of Staff of UNTSO on means to make the operation more fully effective in

maintaining the cease-fire had made apparent the necessity of steps along the following lines: (1) increasing the number of observers from the present forty-three to ninety; (2) doubling the Observation Posts from nine to eighteen; (3) using, possibly, four small patrol craft to patrol the waters of the Canal and adjacent waters; (4) acquiring and making use of four small helicopters to increase observer mobility and for air observation, two on each side of the Canal. All such measures would relate exclusively to the Council's cease-fire resolutions and its consensus, and therefore, would be of a provisional and temporary nature. A substantial increase in costs, beyond the estimate set out in document S/8182, would result from the strengthening of the observer operation. The Secretary-General also reminded the Council that there was only token observer representation in the Israel-Jordan and Israel-Lebanon sectors and therefore no machinery to assist in implementing the Council's resolutions of 6 and 7 June, which applied to all sectors.

79. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics declared that though his delegation's draft resolution was completely justified and Israel's sole responsibility clear, he had not opposed the resolution presented by the President because of the desire of some members for unanimity. In the circumstances there was no need to put the USSR draft to a vote. He stressed that peace in the area was impossible as long as Israel forces occupied Arab territories, and added that it was highly regrettable that neither the Council nor the General Assembly had taken steps to liquidate the consequences of Israel aggression. At the same time, he said, there was a unanimous feeling in the Council that consultations must be speeded to work out a decision leading to a political settlement in the Near East. With regard to the Secretary-General's statement concerning the increase in the number of United Nations observers in the Suez Canal sector and certain other measures connected with supervision of the implementation of the Security Council decisions on a cease-fire and cessation of hostilities, the USSR representative noted that, according to the Secretary-General, the Council was still not seized of reports concerning many details. He added that any increase in the number of observers must be examined by the Council in conformity with its competence under the Charter.

80. The representative of the United States said the Council had acted positively and wisely in reaffirming the Council's cease-fire orders, in demanding mutual and scrupulous observance of the cease-fire by the parties, and in condemning all violations. He observed that the Council had refused to take a one-sided view of the situation and had dealt with the incidents in a balanced manner. As a result there was no need to vote on his draft resolution. He believed that recent events underlined the fact that although a cease-fire was essential, the situation also required new steps towards a durable, permanent and just peace. The United States regarded the steps proposed by the Secretary-General to strengthen the observation operation in the Canal sector as in accord with his responsibilities and his authority under the Charter and established practices of the United Nations and therefore fully supported the Secretary-General's initiative.

81. The representative of China said that his delegation whole-heartedly welcomed the resolution just adopted by the Council as an essential first step. With-

out an effective cease-fire, a climate conducive to a durable settlement could not be created.

82. The representative of Syria condemned the premeditated Israel attack on Suez. That act of aggression, he said, had been confirmed by the report of the Secretary-General on 24 October. He said that the pretext for the massacre of 24 October had been the sinking of the Israel destroyer in United Arab Republic territorial waters. Israel peace appeals, he said, were cynical and hypocritical, and were usually made at gunpoint under conditions of conquest and duress. He affirmed that by rejecting the United Nations armistice machinery and all efforts towards peace, Israel had embarked upon a doctrine of belligerency.

83. The President, speaking as the representative of Japan welcomed the resolution adopted by the Council as a first step. He urged the Council to find a formula which, acceptable to the parties, would establish a durable and just peace in the Middle East.

E. Reports of the Secretary-General on the observance of the cease-fire

84. In a report dated 31 October 1967 (S/8053/Add.3 and Corr.1), the Secretary-General, after further consultation with the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, reported on the requirements and details for the possible strengthening of the observer operation mentioned in his statement at the 1371st meeting of the Council on 25 October. The report outlined the tentative deployment plan for the additional observers, including the Observation Posts to be established in consultation with the parties, the need for further consultations with the parties about the nationalities of the observers, the areas of operation of the proposed patrol craft and helicopters and other communications and logistic problems. The Secretary-General emphasized that those measures would not suffice to maintain the cease-fire unless the parties exercised the utmost restraint and he therefore renewed his appeal of 27 September that in cases of alleged violations of the cease-fire each side make use of the United Nations observation system instead of continuing the practice of resorting directly to violent measures. During this period the Secretary-General also issued three supplementary reports (S/7930/Add.50-52) on the observance of the cease-fire. The reports indicated overflights by both sides in the Canal sector. The situation in general had remained quiet in the Israel-Syrian sector.

85. On 10 November the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics submitted a draft resolution (S/8236), whereby the Security Council would authorize the Secretary-General to increase the number of observers in the Suez Canal sector. The text of the draft resolution read as follows:

"The Security Council,

"Recalling its resolutions 233 of 6 June 1967, 234 of 7 June 1967 and 240 of 25 October 1967,

"Recalling further the consensus reached at its 1366th meeting on 9 July 1967 concerning the sending of observers to the Suez Canal sector,

"Noting the Secretary-General's statement at the 1371st meeting of the Security Council on 25 October 1967 and the Secretary-General's reports S/8053 of 11 July 1967, S/8053/Add.1 of 10 August 1967 and

S/8053/Add.3 and Corr.1 of 31 October 1967 concerning the stationing of United Nations observers in the Suez Canal sector, the desirability of sending additional United Nations observers to the area and the provision to them of technical facilities and means of transport with a view to the more effective implementation of the Council's decision concerning a cease-fire and the cessation of all military activities,

"*Noting further* the Secretary-General's report S/8182 of 4 October 1967 on the financial implications in regard to the stationing of additional observers in the Suez Canal sector,

"*Taking cognisance* of the above-mentioned reports by the Secretary-General,

"*Authorizes* the Secretary-General to increase the number of observers in the Suez Canal sector to ninety and to take the measures proposed in his report to the Security Council (S/8053/Add.3 and Corr.1) concerning the provision of additional technical facilities and means of transport for the United Nations observer group."

F. Consideration by the Council at the 1373rd, 1375th, 1377th and 1379th to 1382nd meetings (9-22 November)

86. In a letter dated 7 November 1967 (S/8226), the United Arab Republic requested an urgent meeting of the Council to consider the dangerous situation prevailing in the Middle East as a result of the persistence of Israel not to withdraw its armed forces from all the territories which it occupied as a result of its aggression committed on 5 June 1967 against the United Arab Republic, Jordan and Syria.

87. At the 1373rd meeting, on 9 November, the Council included the United Arab Republic letter in its agenda and invited the representatives of the United Arab Republic, Israel and Jordan, at their request, to take seats at the Council table.

88. On a point of order, the representative of the United States, citing the established practice of the Council, moved that the parties concerned which had indicated their desire to speak, namely, the United Arab Republic and Israel, be heard prior to the members of the Council.

Decision: *Following a brief discussion in which the representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, India, the United States and Nigeria made statements, the Council, at the suggestion of the representative of Nigeria, agreed on a short recess for consultation.*

89. When the Council resumed its meeting, further discussion took place, after which the President put the United States motion to a vote.

Decision: *The United States motion received 8 votes in favour, none against and 7 abstentions, and was not adopted.*

90. After the vote, the President drew the Council's attention to the following two draft resolutions. One, submitted on 7 November 1967 by India, Mali and Nigeria (S/8227), read as follows:

"The Security Council,

"Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East,

"Recalling its resolution 233 (1967) of 6 June 1967 on the outbreak of fighting which called for, as a first step, an immediate cease-fire and for a cessation of all military activities in the area,

"Recalling further General Assembly resolution 2256 (ES-V),

"Emphasizing the urgency of reducing tensions, restoring peace and bringing about normalcy in the area,

"1. Affirms that a just and lasting peace in the Middle East must be achieved within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations and more particularly of the following principles:

"(i) Occupation or acquisition of territory by military conquest is inadmissible under the Charter of the United Nations and consequently Israel's armed forces should withdraw from all the territories occupied as a result of the recent conflict;

"(ii) Likewise, every State has the right to live in peace and complete security free from threats or acts of war and consequently all States in the area should terminate the state or claim of belligerency and settle their international disputes by peaceful means;

"(iii) Likewise, every State of the area has the right to be secure within its borders and it is obligatory on all Member States of the area to respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of one another;

"2. Affirms further:

"(i) There should be a just settlement of the question of Palestine refugees;

"(ii) There should be guarantee of freedom of navigation in accordance with international law through international waterways in the area;

"3. Requests the Secretary-General to dispatch a special representative to the area who would contact the States concerned in order to co-ordinate efforts to achieve the purposes of this resolution and to submit a report to the Council within thirty days."

91. The second draft resolution (S/8229), also submitted on 7 November, by the United States, read as follows:

"The Security Council,

"Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East,

"Recalling its resolution 233 (1967) on the outbreak of fighting which called, as a first step, for an immediate cease-fire and for a cessation of all military activities in the area,

"Recalling further General Assembly resolution 2256 (ES-V),

"Emphasizing the urgency of reducing tensions and bringing about a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security,

"Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter,

"1. *Affirms* that the fulfilment of the above Charter principles requires the achievement of a state of just and lasting peace in the Middle East embracing withdrawal of armed forces from occupied territories, termination of claims or states of belligerence, and mutual recognition and respect for the right of every State in the area to sovereign existence, territorial integrity, political independence, secure and recognized boundaries, and freedom from the threat or use of force;

"2. *Affirms further* the necessity:

"(a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;

"(b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;

"(c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;

"(d) For achieving a limitation of the wasteful and destructive arms race in the area;

"3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned with a view to assisting them in the working out of solutions in accordance with the purposes of this resolution and in creating a just and lasting peace in the area;

"4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible."

92. Opening the debate on 9 November, the Foreign Minister of the United Arab Republic stated that the latest aggression of Israel on 24 October had left no doubt as to the gravity of the present situation in the area. Since the aggression of Israel on 5 June the Council had failed to do its clear duty: to condemn the aggression, order Israel to withdraw its forces to the positions held on 4 June 1967, and determine Israel's responsibility for the damages and losses inflicted on the Arab countries. The emergency special session of the General Assembly had been unable to translate into a resolution its unanimous commitment to the principle that military occupation of any part of the territory of one State by another was totally inadmissible. He maintained that the failure of the United Nations to act had encouraged Israel to defy the resolutions of the emergency session on Jerusalem and on the return of the refugees and to embark upon further acts of aggression in the Suez Canal sector. That policy of terror, he said, had resulted in heavy civilian casualties there and had led his Government to evacuate more than 300,000 inhabitants. Referring to the August 1967 Khartoum summit meeting, he said that its decision was for peace but not surrender, for a political solution the cornerstone of which was the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Israel forces to the pre-5 June positions. That was a basic requirement under the United Nations Charter. It was the duty of the Security Council to eliminate the present aggression and initiate a course that would bring normalcy to the area through the application of the Charter. The central issue in the Middle East situation was the expulsion by force of the people of Palestine from their homes. The United Nations, the successor of the League of Nations, was the only valid framework for enabling that people to exercise their right to self-determination.

93. Continuing, the Foreign Minister said that Israel's aggression of 5 June must be considered in its grave dimensions. Israel's obligations under the Charter and under the General Armistice Agreements, the binding nature of which was stated in their provisions, were inescapable. He urged that military, political and economic assistance to Israel be withheld until Israel complied with its Charter obligations and withdrew its forces from all the territories it had occupied as a result of its aggression. The situation, he said, fell into the category of breaches of the peace which required the Council to apply the Charter provisions. He concluded that a minimum measure to be taken by the Council would be a demand for immediate withdrawal to the positions of 4 June. Should Israel refuse to withdraw, the Council must apply enforcement measures.

94. The representative of India, introducing the three-Power draft resolution on behalf of the sponsors (S/8227), said that the Afro-Asian and Latin American members of the Council had examined all proposals put forward during the Assembly's fifth emergency session and had taken into account the views of other Councils' members and of the parties concerned in order to produce a fair and balanced text. The draft resolution closely paralleled the Latin American draft submitted to the General Assembly's fifth emergency session. Its aim was not only to set forth in clear language the principles within the framework of the Charter on which the solution of the problems in the Middle East should be based, but to link them so as to give equal validity to each and to ensure equality of obligations. Thus, paragraph 1 provided for withdrawal of Israel forces from all the territories occupied as a result of the recent conflict. It not only called for the termination of the state of belligerence but also of any claim of belligerence; it emphasized the recognition of the right of every State in the area to be secure within its borders. With regard to the question of refugees, provided for under paragraph 2, it was clearly intended to comprehend only the Palestinian refugees and not those who had acquired that status as a result of the June conflict. In the sponsors' view, as soon as Israel withdrew its forces, the problem of the so-called new refugees caused by the June conflict would automatically cease to exist. As for the question of freedom of navigation, some questions had been raised during informal consultations regarding the reference "in accordance with international law". The sponsors, he said, would examine carefully any arguments which might be advanced in the Council with regard to that or other provisions in the draft. While he was aware that some of its provisions were not in accordance with the wishes of the parties and there were differences within the Council, the co-sponsors had tried to narrow down those differences so as to initiate a process of peaceful settlement of the West Asian crisis.

95. The representative of Nigeria stated that his Government's objective was not merely to restore the *status quo* before 5 June to create a climate in which all of the people in the area could live in peace. He considered the three-Power draft a definite improvement upon the Latin American draft resolution and emphasized that it was submitted for decision under Chapter VI of the Charter. He had not been able to persuade either the Arabs or the Israelis that what they sought was unobtainable: namely, on the one hand, no negotiations until after unconditional withdrawal of the Israel forces and, on the other, no withdrawal

except as a result of bilateral negotiations. However, he recommended the three-Power draft as the most balanced one and declared the Council must tell both parties that unless they moved they could not have peace in the Middle East.

96. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics declared that withdrawal of Israel forces from the occupied Arab territories was the prerequisite for a Near East settlement. Yet Israel was taking measures to consolidate its occupation by colonization and talk of a greater Israel and by attempts to annex Jerusalem in defiance of international law and United Nations resolutions. He charged that the aggression by Israel had not only blocked the Suez Canal, in violation of international agreements, but the presence of Israel troops had prevented the United Arab Republic from reopening the Canal to navigation. He added that the expansionist designs of Israel continued to achieve connivance from powerful supporters—above all the United States. Although some of its provisions did not take fully into account the positions of the Soviet Union, his delegation would support the three-Power draft if the Arab countries did not oppose it. In essence, the Soviet Union's position on the question of the settlement of the situation in the Middle East was that aggression must be condemned; Israel's troops must be withdrawn to the lines occupied before 5 June; and Israel must compensate the Arab States for the damage caused to them and must implement the General Assembly resolution on Jerusalem. As for the United States draft resolution, he said that it was designed to support the claims of the aggressor to Arab lands. It would seem that the essential condition for lasting peace in the Near East must be not a clear-cut provision concerning the withdrawal of Israel troops from Arab lands, but the solution of a whole series of other problems. That condition served the interests of Israel only. He believed the new formula for withdrawal of troops in the United States draft was a step backwards as compared with that provided in the Latin American draft and was intermingled with references to "secure and recognized boundaries". The Soviet representative asked what were those boundaries. Who was to judge how secure those boundaries were, and who must recognize them? Those questions, the Soviet representative contended, remained unanswered and left much leeway for different interpretations, which might allow Israel to withdraw its troops only to the lines it judged convenient. It was significant that Israel claimed that the Armistice Agreements of 1949 were no longer binding. The American draft admitted that Israel troops would not necessarily be withdrawn from all conquered Arab land and contained no provision regarding the inadmissibility of acquisition of territory by conquest.

97. The representative of the United Kingdom thought that there was overwhelming agreement on the way to start towards a durable and just settlement. There must be no more delay; the present opportunity might be the last for the Council.

98. Continuing, the representative of the United Kingdom said that the main aim was to achieve a durable peace in the Middle East. His Government would never wish to be associated with any settlement which meant a return to an uneasy truce. At the start of the conflict his Government's policy had been clear. It had consistently recommended that the Secretary-General be authorized to send a special representative,

that there must be withdrawal from occupied territories and an end to belligerency, that secure frontiers could not be settled by conquest, and that nothing should be done in Jerusalem or elsewhere to prejudice the final outcome of the desired settlement. The United Kingdom was concerned that there should be freedom of navigation through international waterways. It had urged an imaginative and comprehensive policy on the problems of the refugees. There was no change in its position.

99. Finally, he stated that as soon as the Council had formulated the principles which would serve as the framework for a final settlement, the United Nations special representative would have a key role to play and should be left free to use his best judgement within the agreed principles. Until he started work in the Middle East, there would be no progress.

100. The representative of the United States said that, although his delegation would have preferred that the Council meet only after the intensive diplomatic consultations then in progress had led to advance agreement, his delegation nevertheless would do all in its power to make the meeting an occasion of progress towards peace. Action by the Council in exercise of its Charter responsibilities was long overdue. The objective of his delegation's draft resolution was to open a new path to a just and lasting peace in the Middle East in which every State in the area could live in security, justice, honour and dignity. Its terms reflected the conviction that a durable peace must embrace the five fundamental principles set forth by President Johnson on 19 June 1967, namely, the recognized right of national life, justice for the refugees, innocent maritime passage, limits on the wasteful and destructive arms race and political independence and territorial integrity for all. The principal parties on both sides had accepted those principles as the framework for a just peace. How the draft's objectives could be achieved in practice could only be worked out in consultations with the parties which the special representative would undertake. Peace in the Middle East depended primarily upon the parties to the conflict.

101. The representative of the United States went on to say that his delegation's draft resolution contained a mandate which should be acceptable within the Council and was sufficiently comprehensive for all the States directly concerned; so that the process of diplomacy could be set in motion. Such a mandate could not be stated in terms entirely satisfactory either to the Arab States or Israel. It was therefore stated in terms of guidelines which, in his opinion, took into account and in no way prejudiced the positions or the vital interests of the States involved. The most constructive contribution the Council could make at that stage was to provide such guidelines for the special representative; it was not for the Council to seek to impose the exact terms of a settlement. His delegation believed that a United Nations representative should be sent to the area promptly. He pledged that his Government's diplomatic and political influence would be exerted under the draft resolution in support of the efforts of the United Nations representative to achieve a fair and equitable settlement.

102. The representative of Ethiopia said that his delegation, in urging that a special representative be sent to the Middle East as soon as possible, had in mind three important considerations: first, that an

effective United Nations presence be speedily established in the area; second, that the special representative should operate within the context of agreed guidelines and third, that the guidelines should have the backing of the Council as a whole. In that spirit his delegation supported the principles embodied in the three-Power draft resolution. However, it was essential that the work of the special representative should not begin on a note of discord, but rather with the unreserved support of all members of the Council, particularly the major Powers.

103. The representative of Canada said that there was common ground that the United Nations could and must assist in bringing about peaceful conditions in the Middle East, and it seemed to be generally recognized that the appointment of a special representative would be helpful. There was also common ground on the necessity for a political, not for an imposed, solution under Chapter VI of the Charter. This meant that the co-operation of the parties directly concerned was essential; and that the mandate given to the special representative required an equitable balance of obligations on all parties. Although the problem of withdrawal was crucial, it could not stand in isolation. The Council must ensure that the circumstances that led to the hostilities last June did not recur. The representative of Canada regretted that the three-Power draft did not serve the desired objective of beginning the process of peaceful settlement. He preferred the United States draft because it more fully met the criteria of equilibrium.

104. The representative of Denmark stated that a solution should be built on interrelated principles that would include withdrawal of Israel troops, safeguarding of the territorial and political integrity of all States in the area—including a final settlement of the borders in the area—right of free passage through the Suez Canal and the Straits of Tiran, limitations on arms shipments into the Middle East, and settlement of the refugee problem. With respect to these fundamental political problems no resolution would be useful unless a scrupulous balance between the claims on both sides could be found, so that both sides could live with the resolution. In formulating guidelines to be given for the work of a special representative to be sent to the Middle East the Council was operating under Chapter VI of the Charter. The active co-operation of the parties concerned would be essential in the search for a solution.

105. The representative of France stated that only a political solution of the Middle East could possibly be envisaged. It would consequently be unrealistic to say that direct negotiations should be undertaken between Israel and the Arab Governments, which had refused such negotiations for twenty years. It was within the framework of the United Nations that such action could be undertaken at present. His Government had always believed that it fell to the Security Council to find a solution, but agreement among the great Powers was essential. Withdrawal of Israel troops from the occupied territories, he said, was imperative to create conditions conducive to a peaceful solution, it being understood that each of the States concerned had the right to exist and to see its security assured. His delegation agreed with the proposal to send a Special Representative, but felt that he would not be able to carry out useful work, unless the principles guiding his task were set out clearly by the Security Council. Finally, he said that the consideration that

Arabs and Israelis must be able to live together in peace would dictate his Government's position at the present discussion.

106. The representative of Japan felt that neither of the draft resolutions adequately reflected a consensus of the Council. He hoped further consultations might lead to a compromise and the unanimous consensus which was so important.

107. The representative of Argentina stated that the Security Council must find a solution to the problem by peaceful means. No one should be asked to renounce his legitimate interests, but at the same time there must be a clear balance of mutual concessions within a framework in which the parties might express their views freely and no one would negotiate under the threat of pressure. For that reason his delegation could not support operative paragraph 2 of the Soviet draft resolution. He did not believe that the simple withdrawal of troops would necessarily bring with it a return to peace; it should be accompanied by a cessation of belligerency. The position of his Government on withdrawal and other important aspects of the Middle Eastern problem had been explicitly stated in the Latin American draft resolution submitted to the fifth emergency special session of the General Assembly. He still believed that that draft resolution would provide an adequate solution today.

108. At the 1375th meeting of the Council, on 13 November, the representative of Syria was also invited, at his request, to take a seat at the Council table.

109. The Foreign Minister of Israel declared, in reply to the charges of the United Arab Republic, that that Government, heavy with responsibility for nineteen years of purposeful aggression, had been unmistakably responsible for its aggressive attempt in June to destroy the State of Israel. After citing actions taken and statements made in May and June 1967 for that purpose by the United Arab Republic Government and other Arab States, he stated that it was his Government's supreme national purpose never to return to the danger and vulnerability from which Israel had emerged. Stating that the representatives of the United Arab Republic and the Soviet Union had on 9 November sought to persuade the Council that Israel's refusal to be strangled and bludgeoned to death was an act of "aggression", he affirmed that the charge of Israel "aggression" was a violent untruth. He recalled that proposals seeking to define Israel's action as "aggression" had been rejected in the Security Council on 14 June 1967 and in the fifth emergency special session of the General Assembly on 4 July. He maintained that Israel's defensive action had been taken when the choice was to live or to perish. His Government's thinking on the political, juridical, territorial and security aspects of the Middle Eastern problem was based on the premise that, having repelled aggression and being threatened with its renewal, no new assault should succeed.

110. As for the Soviet and Arab suggestion that the way to peace was to restore the 4 June situation through the withdrawal of the Israel forces, the Foreign Minister declared that many statesmen had expounded its folly and injustice at the emergency session of the General Assembly. He emphasized that the profound need of the Middle East was for constructive innovation. A durable edifice of relations ensuring peace and security must be built. His Government's policy

was to respect the Council's cease-fire until it was replaced by peace treaties, concluded by direct negotiation between Israel and the Arab States, ending the state of war, determining the agreed national frontiers of States, and ensuring a mutually guaranteed security. He stated that there could be no return to the shattered armistice régime, which the United Arab Republic had converted into a formula for belligerency, blockade and an alibi for refusal to make peace. The armistice lines must be superseded by agreed and permanent national boundaries; such permanent and secure boundaries were the central issue to be negotiated in a peace settlement, without which no solution of the deadlock could be envisaged. A negotiated boundary meant stability, a demarcation line meant the maintenance of reciprocal territorial claims. The only alternative to the cease-fire was now formal peace; any other course would be a prelude to the next explosion. Against the Khartoum policy of no recognition, no negotiation and no peace, Israel presented its policy: recognition, negotiation, peace. As for the statement of the representative of France that it would be unrealistic to have negotiations without withdrawal, he stated that it was unrealistic to believe that there could be withdrawal without negotiation.

111. The Foreign Minister drew attention to the fact that the United Arab Republic representative had promised nothing in return for what he had asked. Israel, the Foreign Minister continued, must assume that it was still the policy of the United Arab Republic to close the Suez Canal to Israel shipping, to regard the Gulf of Aqaba as an internal Arab waterway, to continue the economic boycott, and to maintain territorial claims beyond the point of the withdrawal to the 4 June position.

112. Declaring that his Government's standard of judgement on draft resolutions before the Council was whether or not they prejudiced in advance Israel's negotiating positions, the Foreign Minister rejected unreservedly the three-Power draft, stating, *inter alia*, that it prejudiced the territorial and security problems by asking for withdrawal without a final peace treaty and by defining in advance the territorial and security situation which should follow the cease-fire. He asserted that it was for the sovereign Governments of the area to determine through negotiation the situation to succeed the cease-fire. Furthermore, the draft's statement on maritime freedom was compatible with the United Arab Republic's doctrine on the exclusion of Israel from the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba.

113. Israel, the Foreign Minister continued, would constructively consider any proposal based on a negotiated peace in accordance with Chapter VI of the Charter, which did not prejudice its substantive interests in advance. In Israel's view, a United Nations representative could play a useful role in bringing parties together only if his directives did not prejudice Israel's policies or negotiating position in advance. At a peace negotiation Israel would make constructive proposals conducive to the interest and the national honour of all negotiating States.

114. The representative of Jordan said that if the United Nations did not do its duty and effect Israel withdrawal from all Arab territories occupied since 5 June, the pre-condition for peace in the area, Arab representatives would have to explain to their peoples that they had no other course but to use their own resources to liquidate Israel aggression, no matter what the price. The representative of Jordan went on to say

that the main threats to peace and security in the area had been Israel's systematic expansionist policy based on aggression and denial of justice to the Palestine refugees. Israel, he said, had no right to aspire to peace while it continued to defy United Nations resolutions and refused to accept the pre-conditions for peace. He added that Israel's insecurity was of its own making, and the only expression of belligerency by the Arabs had been their uncompromising refusal to recognize an unjust and illegal situation.

115. The representative of Bulgaria stressed that the Western Powers, which had voted for the Latin American draft resolution at the fifth emergency special session of the General Assembly when they were sure it had little chance of being adopted because of the then prevailing situation in the Near East, did not now agree with the principles of that draft which were now embodied in the three-Power draft resolution. He observed that the formula for withdrawal in the United States draft resolution was intended to allow the aggressor to continue the occupation of Arab territories and to decide when to withdraw the occupation troops. Furthermore, in the three-Power draft resolution the mandate of the Special Representative was clearly defined, while in the United States draft his role was limited to assisting the parties in creating a just and lasting peace in the area.

116. Continuing, the representative of Bulgaria said that the most realistic method to a peaceful settlement was direct and active United Nations participation. Israel's insistence on direct negotiations with Arab States was a negotiation of all the agreements concluded under United Nations auspices and a negation of any negotiation at all. The return of the aggressor to the positions of 4 June was, he said, the fundamental step that must precede any political solution of the other outstanding problems; otherwise, the aggressor could act from a position of strength and use the usurped territories as bargaining counters. In conclusion, the representative of Bulgaria said that a just and lasting political solution must include a settlement of the refugee question, including that of the Arab population of Palestine and the new refugees.

117. In reply to the remarks of the Foreign Minister of Israel on the three-Power draft resolution, the representative of India stated, *inter alia*, that the aim of that draft was to provide a framework of principles and guidelines within which the special representative could contact the parties concerned in order to co-ordinate efforts towards initiating the process of peaceful settlement. He emphasized that in accordance with Article 33 of the Charter it was left to the parties to seek a solution by negotiation or by some other peaceful means of their own choice.

118. At the 1377th meeting of the Council, on 15 November, the representative of Syria said that none of the draft resolutions before the Council were acceptable to his Government because they subjected withdrawal to conditions. The Council was faced with one basic issue only, namely, that of a premeditated war of aggression by Israel against the Arab States. The United Nations should deal with that war and its consequences. He declared that the only draft resolution in harmony with the Charter was that submitted at the emergency session by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics calling for condemnation of Israel aggression, withdrawal of Israel troops, and compensation to the Arabs.

119. Speaking on Israel's policies in the occupied territories, the representative of Syria said that his delegation had on various occasions drawn the Council's attention to the acts of lawlessness committed by Israel in occupied Syrian territory. By its words and actions, he said, Israel had shown that it attached no value to United Nations resolutions calling for the return of Arab refugees to their homeland, and the rescission of Israel's illegal measures to annex the city of Jerusalem.

120. While reserving his right to speak on the draft resolutions before the Council, he stated that Syria would never submit to aggression and would not subscribe to any resolution which would reward the aggressor.

121. The representative of the United Kingdom, stressing the urgent need for immediate and effective action by the Council, observed that the demand by the Arab States for withdrawal and the solution of the refugee problems, on the one hand, and the demand by Israel for a permanent peace and secure boundaries, on the other, did not conflict and were of equal validity. To imagine that one could be secured without the other was a delusion. He felt that there was enough common ground on purpose and principle for the Council to make a final and successful effort in further informal consultations to arrive at an acceptable text. The Council must pass a resolution, he hoped unanimously, which would be the first step to a just and peaceful settlement.

122. The representative of the United States, in reply to earlier comments on his delegation's draft resolution, said that the language in paragraph 1 of the draft was sound and carefully balanced in what it required of the respective parties, namely, that Israel must withdraw, that the Arab States must renounce the state of belligerency and claim of belligerency which they had maintained for many years; and that the States on both sides must terminate the present state of war and must mutually recognize each others' rights under the Charter. He went on to emphasize that the interdependence of the principles stated in paragraph 1 was inherent in the nature of the situation and the history of the conflict. To seek withdrawal without secure and recognized boundaries, for example, would be just as fruitless as to seek secure and recognized boundaries without withdrawal. He pointed out that there had never been secure and recognized boundaries in the area. Neither the armistice lines of 1949 nor the cease-fire lines of 1967 answered that description. An agreement on such boundaries, he said, was an absolute essential to a just and lasting peace just as withdrawal was. He added that secure boundaries could not be determined either by force or by unilateral action of any of the States, nor could they be imposed from the outside. The timing of steps to be taken by the parties would need careful working out with the assistance of the Special Representative; it was not his Government's conception that any one step should be relegated to the end of the process. The provisions of paragraph 2 were no less vital to a durable peace settlement. Guarantees concerning freedom of navigation in the Straits and in the Suez Canal for all States was a requirement for peace, as was the solution of the refugee problem which was not merely a political grievance, but a profoundly humanitarian problem. The key provision in the entire draft was the appointment of the special representative: his crucial role would be to foster on both sides the

pragmatic will to peace which could overcome the undeniable difficulties in defining mutually acceptable terms. Finally, under the terms of the draft resolution, he renewed his Government's pledge to exert its full diplomatic and political influence in support of the efforts of the United Nations representative to achieve a fair and equitable settlement.

123. The representative of Canada said that the basic approach supported by his delegation was that the mandate of the special representative should be within Chapter VI of the Charter; that the principles and guidelines should be balanced and non-prejudicial to both sides and that the objective was to initiate the process of a peaceful settlement without delay. He urged additional and determined efforts in further private consultations as proposed by the United Kingdom.

124. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that the statement by the United States representative had not answered the questions concerning withdrawal, and emphasized that the absence in the American draft of a clear-cut provision concerning the withdrawal of troops from all territories could not be divorced from that draft's concept of "secure and recognized" boundaries which would make it possible for Israel arbitrarily to fix new boundaries and to withdraw only to lines deemed convenient to it. The withdrawal provision must be so clear-cut as to allow no one to give his own interpretation of it. He hoped for a clear United States statement in favour of withdrawal from all occupied territories.

125. At the 1379th meeting of the Council, on 16 November, the representative of the United Kingdom introduced the following draft resolution (S/8247):

"The Security Council,

"Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East,

"Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security,

"Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter,

"1. Affirms that the fulfilment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:

"(i) Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;

"(ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;

"2. Affirms further the necessity

"(a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;

"(b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;

"(c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;

"3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contact with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution;

"4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible."

126. In introducing the draft resolution, the representative of the United Kingdom stated that its provisions were drawn from the work undertaken and the proposals put forward by other members of the Council and represented a sincere attempt to meet the just claims of both sides and also to discharge the urgent responsibility of the Council for effective action. The alternative to agreement, even at this late hour, was too terrible to contemplate. He commended the draft to the Council as a balanced whole and a just finding.

127. With regard to paragraph 1, and with due respect for fulfilment of Charter principles, he considered it essential that there should be applied the principles of both withdrawal and security, and had no doubt that the words set out throughout that paragraph were perfectly clear. As to paragraph 2, he believed that there was no disagreement that there must be a guarantee of freedom of navigation through international waterways. There must be a just settlement of the refugee problem. There must be a guarantee and adequate means to ensure the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area. As to paragraph 3, the United Nations special representative should be free to decide himself the exact means and methods by which he pursued his endeavours in contact with the States concerned both to promote agreement and to assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted and final settlement.

128. The representative of the United Arab Republic reiterated his Government's position that under no circumstances would it compromise on the withdrawal of the Israel forces from all the territories occupied after 4 June. An aggression, he said, had taken place against the Charter, and therefore the consequences of that aggression had to be fully eliminated in accordance with it.

129. The Foreign Minister of Israel restated the general principles of his Government's policy and affirmed that agreement on secure and recognized boundaries was absolutely essential, and that any constructive resolution should emphasize the duty of the States of the Middle East to work out conditions of peace in direct negotiation. Israel would examine any draft resolution in accordance with that policy.

130. The President, speaking as the representative of Mali, stated that the first task of the Council was to ensure implementation of the provisions of the Charter, namely, withdrawal of the Israel forces to positions occupied prior to the aggression. It would be a serious error to link that withdrawal to any other element of the crisis in the Middle East. To do so would create a very dangerous precedent. Secondly, there must be justice to the Arab people of Palestine, who had a natural right to return to their homes. Non-

compliance with that sacred right had led to the incessant crises of the last twenty years. Breaking the vicious circle of reprisals and counter-reprisals must begin with a political and humane solution to the fate of the Arab refugees. Thirdly, there should be freedom of navigation for all States in the international waterways in accordance with international agreements and conventions. The objective of the three-Power draft resolution, of which his delegation was a co-sponsor, was to fulfil those conditions which were essential for peace in the Middle East.

131. At the opening of the 1380th meeting of the Council, on 17 November, the representative of Bulgaria proposed that the meeting of the Council be adjourned until Monday afternoon, 20 November, so as to allow time for consideration of the draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom.

Decision: *The Council agreed, without objection, to the Bulgarian motion.*

132. At the 1381st meeting of the Security Council, on 20 November, the representative of Jordan charged that Israel forces had carried out an unprovoked attack against the Jordanian refugee camp at El Karama, resulting in thirteen killed and twenty-eight wounded.

133. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics declared that it was indisputable that only the withdrawal of the aggressor's troops from all of the territories conquered by him could pave the way to a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. In the present situation his Government considered it to be its duty to make new efforts towards a political settlement and therefore was submitting a new draft resolution (S/8253), the text of which read as follows:

"The Security Council,

"Expressing concern at the lack of progress towards a political settlement in the Middle East and at the increased tension in the area,

"Noting that there have even been violations of the cease-fire called for by the Security Council in its resolutions 233 of 6 June, 234 of 7 June, 235 of 9 June and 236 of 12 June 1967, a cease-fire which was regarded as a first step towards the achievement of a just peace in the area and which was to have been strengthened by other appropriate measures,

"Recalling General Assembly resolutions 2252 (ES-V), 2253 (ES-V), 2254 (ES-V) and 2256 (ES-V),

"Emphasizing the urgent necessity of restoring peace and establishing normal conditions in the Middle East,

"1. Declares that peace and final solutions to this problem can be achieved within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations;

"2. Urges that the following steps should be taken:

"(a) The parties to the conflict should immediately withdraw their forces to the positions they held before 5 June 1967 in accordance with the principle that the seizure of territories as a result of war is inadmissible;

"(b) All States Members of the United Nations in the area should immediately recognize that each of them has the right to exist as an independent national State and to live in peace and security, and should renounce all claims and desist from all acts inconsistent with the foregoing;

"3. *Deems it necessary* in this connexion to continue its consideration of the situation in the Middle East, collaborating directly with the parties concerned and making use of the presence of the United Nations, with a view to achieving an appropriate and just solution of all aspects of the problem on the basis of the following principles:

"(a) The use or threat of force in relations between States is incompatible with the Charter of the United Nations;

"(b) Every State must respect the political independence and territorial integrity of all other States in the area;

"(c) There must be a just settlement of the question of the Palestine refugees;

"(d) Innocent passage through international waterways in the area in accordance with international agreements;

"4. *Considers* that, in harmony with the steps to be taken along the lines indicated above, all States in the area should put an end to the state of belligerency, take measures to limit the useless and destructive arms race, and discharge the obligations assumed by them under the Charter of the United Nations and international agreements."

134. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics then stated that the Soviet draft resolution contained all the key elements of a political settlement on the need of which the views of the overwhelming majority of Member States of the United Nations converged.

135. His delegation's draft resolution contained a clear-cut provision on the key question of the withdrawal of the Israel troops from all occupied territories of the Arab States to positions that those troops held before 5 June 1967. The provision was drafted in such a manner that that measure must be carried out without delay. The draft also reflected the Soviet Government's position in favour of recognition of the inalienable right of all the States of the Middle East, including Israel, to an independent national existence. It also reflected his Government's support for the independence, freedom and territorial integrity of States, no matter in what part of the globe they were located, and the inadmissibility and cessation of aggression, no matter on whose part it had been committed. The Soviet Union was in favour of a peaceful and just solution of the problem of the Arab refugees, guided by their lawful rights and interests. The Soviet draft also supported innocent passage of all ships through international waterways, with due respect for the sovereign rights and territorial integrity of States through whose territory those waterways flowed.

136. As mentioned in paragraph 4, the Soviet Union favoured limiting the armaments race in the Middle East and solving that problem on the basis of the liquidation of the consequences of Israel aggression. He said that renewed United States arms deliveries to Israel were hardly likely to be conducive to a settlement but, on the contrary, would encourage Israel's aggressive designs.

137. The representative of the United Kingdom expressed surprise that in the USSR draft resolution there was no reference to the appointment of a United Nations special representative, the one main matter on which he had understood all to be fully agreed. He stated that in drafting its resolution, his delegation

had in mind two stages. The first was the statement of principles and the appointment of the special representative. The second stage was the work which that representative was to undertake in the Middle East, guided by the principles set out in the draft resolution, but not restricted as to the means and method which he employed. He believed that it would be wrong to endeavour in advance to specify exactly how those principles should be applied. He remained convinced that the balanced formulation of the United Kingdom draft offered the only basis on which the practical co-operation of both sides could be won.

138. The representative of the United States said that his delegation, although adhering to the views expressed in its draft resolution, would vote in favour of the United Kingdom draft resolution for two reasons. First because it commanded a substantial consensus in the Council and was entirely consistent with United States policy as set out by President Johnson on 19 June and second, because it was non-prejudicial to and sufficiently mindful of the legitimate and vital interests of all parties so that they should be able to co-operate with the special representative. He pledged that the influence of his Government would be exerted under the United Kingdom draft in support of the efforts of the special representative. The USSR draft resolution was not an even-handed, non-prejudicial draft; it did not meet the test of exact balance, acquiescence by the parties and workability.

139. At the 1382nd meeting of the Council, on 22 November, the representative of Syria stated that his Government could not accept the United Kingdom draft resolution because the central issue of withdrawal was made subject to concessions to be imposed on the Arab countries, because it ignored Israel's aggression, because it was silent on the systematic violations of the Security Council cease-fire resolutions and Israel's defiance of General Assembly resolutions concerning the status of Jerusalem and the return of the new refugees since 5 June, and, finally, because it ignored the various United Nations resolutions on the Palestine question and the right of the Palestine people to self-determination. The adoption of the United Kingdom draft resolution, he concluded, would open another unjust and tragic chapter in the history of the Arab world.

140. The representative of Ethiopia declared that his delegation's position on the proposals before the Council would be determined by three main considerations: first, any proposal should be based on the United Nations Charter and its relevant principles. Second, it should be balanced in the affirmation of those principles and in the recognition of the problems involved. His delegation considered it essential that due emphasis should be placed on the inadmissibility of acquisition of territory by war, and hence on the imperative requirement that all Israel forces be withdrawn from the territories occupied as a result of military conflict, as well as on the need to ensure conditions of permanent peace in which all States in the area could live in security. That meant termination of claims or states of belligerency. Moreover, there must be a just and final solution of the problem of refugees. There must also be a guarantee of freedom of navigation through international waterways for all nations. And third, the guidelines for the special representative would have to be such as, on the one hand, not to depart from the basic principles of the Charter while, on the other hand, allowing the representative sufficient dis-

cretion in his delicate task of contacts and preparations for a negotiated settlement. In conclusion, he stressed that the success of the United Nations presence in the area depended on the co-operation and support of all members of the Council, particularly the major Powers, and of the parties directly concerned.

141. The representative of India, stating the position of the sponsors of the three-Power draft resolution, emphasized that the draft gave equal validity to the principles of withdrawal, non-belligerency and secure borders, principles which provided the context within which the problem of the Palestine refugees and that of freedom of navigation in waterways could be solved. The principle of the inadmissibility of territorial acquisition by force was absolutely essential. No decision could be accepted, or acquiesced in, that left out territories occupied by military conquest from the provision of withdrawal. He added that the three-Power draft was aimed at initiating the process of peaceful settlement under Article 33 of the Charter, leaving it to the parties concerned the choice of any of the methods of peaceful settlement.

142. Turning to the United Kingdom draft resolution, the representative of India recalled that during the General Assembly special emergency session the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom had upheld the principle of the inadmissibility of territorial aggrandizement as a result of war. He had also stated on a later occasion that Israel must withdraw, that its neighbours must recognize its right to exist, and that Israel must enjoy security within its frontiers. In the light of those policy statements, his delegation's vote would be determined by its clear understanding that the United Kingdom draft resolution committed the Council to the application of the principle of total withdrawal of Israel forces from all the territories occupied by Israel as a result of the June conflict. That being so, Israel could not use the words "secure and recognized boundaries" to retain any occupied territory. He said that the delegations of Mali and Nigeria concurred in that position and had authorized him to state that they would not press the three-Power draft resolution to a vote.

143. The representative of the United Kingdom said that he was sure that all would recognize that it was only the resolution that would bind all and that he regarded its wording as clear. On its own views and understandings and interpretations each delegation rightly spoke only for itself.

144. The representative of the United States indicated that he was prepared to give priority to the United Kingdom draft and added that if adopted he would not press his delegation's draft resolution (S/8229) to a vote.

Decision: *At the 1382nd meeting of the Council, on 22 November, the draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom (S/8247) was adopted unanimously (resolution 242 (1967)).*

145. Following the vote, the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that the Soviet Government would have preferred the Security Council to adopt the Soviet draft resolution (S/8253) at the present stage, since that text best answered the purpose of eliminating the consequences of Israel's aggression and establishing a lasting peace in the Near East. The Soviet delegation had voted for the draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom on the

basis of the interpretation of the draft resolution put forward by the representative of India, which the Soviet delegation shared. Thus in the resolution adopted by the Security Council "withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict" was put forward as the first essential principle for the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. The Soviet delegation understood that provision of the resolution adopted to mean the withdrawal of Israel's forces from absolutely all territories of Arab States occupied by them as a result of the attack on those States of 5 June 1967. That was confirmed by the fact that the preamble of the United Kingdom draft resolution emphasized "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war". Consequently, the provision in the draft resolution concerning the right of all States in the Middle East "to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries" could not serve as an excuse for maintaining Israel's forces on any part of Arab territory seized by them as a result of the war. That was the essential content of the resolution. The most important task now was to ensure the immediate implementation of the resolution and, first and foremost, to secure the withdrawal of Israel's forces from all territories occupied by them as a result of aggression. The representative of the Soviet Union stated that at the present stage his delegation would not press its draft resolution (S/8253) to a vote.

146. The representative of Nigeria stated that the resolution just adopted contained the essential factors for the peaceful and just settlement of the Middle East situation and expressed the hope that the parties concerned would co-operate with the Special Representative in his peace-making tasks.

147. The Foreign Minister of Israel stated that Israel's position remained unchanged. It was now understood as axiomatic that movement from the ceasefire lines could be envisaged only in the framework of a just and lasting peace. The central affirmation of the adopted resolution was the need for such a peace based on secure and recognized boundaries. There was a clear understanding that it was only within the establishment of permanent peace with secure and recognized boundaries, mutually agreed by the parties, that the other principles could be given effect. Israel did not believe that Member States had the right to refuse direct negotiation with those to whom they addressed their claims. The only possible peace that could be established in the Middle East was one that the Governments there built together; it could not be imposed.

148. Commenting on the remarks of the Indian representative, the Foreign Minister declared that he had sought to interpret the resolution in the image of his own wishes. Establishment of a peace settlement, including secure and recognized boundaries, was quite different from withdrawal, without final peace, to demarcation lines. For Israel, the resolution said what it said. It did not say what it had specifically and consciously avoided saying. He would communicate to his Government for its consideration nothing except the original English text of the draft resolution as presented on 16 November.

149. The representative of the United States declared that his delegation had voted for the resolution because it found it entirely consistent with its Government's policy on the Middle East, the five principles of President Johnson and his own statements before the Council. He added that, had not the United Kingdom draft been so delicately balanced, his delegation

would have offered an amendment so that the Council could endorse the need to achieve limitation of the arms race in the Middle East. He had been encouraged by a provision to that effect in the USSR draft resolution of 20 November. He did not conceive that the mandate of the Special Representative excluded his exploring that urgent requirement of peace. He renewed his Government's pledge to use its diplomatic and political influence to support the efforts of the Special Representative to achieve a fair and equitable settlement.

150. The representative of France stated that his delegation had felt that to be really useful, draft resolutions should leave no room for ambiguity and that the Special Representative must be given very precise principles on which to act. In his view the three-Power draft would have had significant advantages. His delegation would have preferred the United Kingdom resolution to be more explicit on certain points, including the mandate of the Special Representative. However, on the essential question of the withdrawal of the forces of occupation, the French text of the adopted resolution, which was equally authentic with the English text, left no room for ambiguity since it spoke of withdrawal "*des territoires occupés*", thus giving a precise interpretation to the expression "territories occupied". He had heard with satisfaction the representative of the United Kingdom stress the link between that paragraph and the principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territories by force. The resolution had affirmed a second principle concerning the termination of all belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and its right to live in peace within its boundaries. His delegation had voted for that resolution, finding in it the general principles necessary for a solution to the problem. However, the adoption of the resolution was only a first step.

151. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics stated that in voting for the United Kingdom draft resolution his delegation fully shared the interpretation of the representative of India that the provision regarding withdrawal meant withdrawal of Israel forces from all conquered territories of the Arab States. That was confirmed by the fact that the resolution's preamble emphasized the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war. Consequently, the provision regarding secure and recognized boundaries could not serve as a pretext for the maintenance of Israel forces on any part of those Arab territories.

152. The representative of Brazil regretted that the non-permanent members of the Council had not succeeded in drawing up a draft text acceptable to all, on the basis of the Latin American proposal. He stated the incontestable principle that occupation or acquisition of territories by the threat or use of force should not be recognized. Its acceptance did not imply that borderlines could not be rectified as a result of an agreement freely concluded among the interested States. Although the resolution did not give full satisfaction, his delegation had voted for it because its principles reflected most of those in the Latin American proposal and because the implementation of that resolution seemed to be viable.

153. The representative of Canada stated that his delegation's approach to all proposals had been determined by the extent to which they would help get under way diplomatic processes for a peaceful settle-

ment. The adopted resolution took into account the essential interests of both sides and represented a fair, balanced and non-prejudicial basis for the dispatch to the Middle East of a Special Representative of the Secretary-General.

154. The representative of Bulgaria stated that the resolution had proved the only possible compromise which did not jeopardize the interests of the victims of aggression and might open the way to a political settlement, if strictly and judiciously applied. Although he would have liked the Council to take much more energetic and efficient measures, the adopted resolution was an adequate reply to the question of withdrawal of Israel forces from all the territories occupied since 4 June and adequately defined the terms of reference of the Special Representative. He hoped that it would be respected and applied in good faith.

155. The representative of the United Arab Republic reaffirmed his Government's position that the first step towards peace was the full withdrawal of the Israel forces from all the territories occupied in the June conflict and that the inalienable rights of the people of Palestine, which had been recognized and repeatedly affirmed by the United Nations resolutions, should not be allowed to fall by the wayside.

156. The representative of Jordan also reaffirmed that the essential step towards peace was the immediate and complete withdrawal of Israel forces from all the territories occupied in the recent conflict.

157. The representative of Argentina had supported the resolution because it was generally acceptable and based on the Latin American proposal but would have preferred the clearer formula for withdrawal in that proposal, namely, "Israel to withdraw all its forces from all the territories occupied by it as a result of the recent conflict". His delegation had always maintained that no international order could be based on threats or the use of force. The acquisition or occupation of territories by force could not be accepted.

158. The representative of Japan thought that the adopted resolution stated in clear and simple terms the principles and objectives on which peace in the Middle East must be based. He emphasized that the success of the Special Representative's mission demanded the utmost support of the Council and, above all, the co-operation of the parties concerned.

159. The representative of Denmark said that he had voted for the resolution because it fully met his delegation's point of view as to procedure and was compatible with its position on substance. It represented a compromise, taking into account the essential interests of the parties concerned. Denmark urged all the parties to extend their full co-operation and goodwill to the Special Representative.

160. The representative of China expressed satisfaction that the resolution had commanded the unanimous support of the Council and hoped that the parties would not allow the intensity of their feelings to impair the prospects for constructive steps towards peace in the Middle East.

161. The representative of the United States, referring to the views expressed by various members in explanation of their votes, stated that the voting had not taken place on those views but on the draft resolution.

162. The President, speaking as the representative of Mali, said that his delegation's vote for the resolution was in keeping with the interpretation of the

representative of India that withdrawal of Israel forces from all the territories occupied since 5 June could not be linked to any condition and that the just solution of the refugee problem lay in the implementation of the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council with a view to restoring the inalienable rights of the people of Palestine. He stressed that the resolution contained specific obligations to renounce belligerency and to guarantee freedom of navigation in the international waterways of the area.

G. Reports of the Secretary-General and communications received by the Council up to 31 December 1967

163. In a note dated 23 November (S/8259), the Secretary-General informed the Security Council that, pursuant to paragraph 3 of the Council's resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November, he had designated Ambassador Gunnar Jarring of Sweden as his Special Representative in the Middle East. He had, on the same day, addressed identical notes to Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and the United Arab Republic in which he had informed them of his designation of Ambassador Jarring, and expressed the hope that each of the Governments concerned would extend to Ambassador Jarring its full co-operation and afford him all facilities for the effective discharge of his mission.

164. Ambassador Jarring accepted the designation and arrived at United Nations Headquarters for consultations on 26 November.

165. In a report dated 1 December (S/8053/Add.4), the Secretary-General stated that he had been recruiting forty-seven additional observers from countries mutually acceptable to the parties, as follows: Argentina, Austria, Chile, Finland, France, Ireland and Sweden and that the first new observers would be arriving early in December. In another report of the same date (S/8182/Add.1), he informed the Council that the total additional expenditure for observers through 31 December 1967 was estimated at \$US315,820. Continuance through 1968 of the Suez Canal sector observer operation would cost \$US873,000. Cost estimates of other measures to strengthen the operation would be reported when figures were available.

166. By a letter dated 6 December (S/8287), the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics requested an urgent meeting of the Council to consider the draft resolution (S/8236) submitted by the USSR on 10 November 1967 by which the Council would authorize the Secretary-General to increase the number of observers in the Suez Canal sector to ninety and to take the measures proposed in his report of 31 October 1967 (S/8053/Add.3/Corr.1) concerning the provision of additional technical facilities and means of transport for the United Nations observer group.

167. On 8 December the President of the Council circulated a statement (S/8289) in which it was said that after consultations he had had with representatives, he understood there was no objection to his transmittal of the following statement as reflecting the view of the members of the Council. Referring to the Secretary-General's report of 31 October, the statement said that the members, "recalling the consensus reached at its 1366th meeting on 9 July 1967, recognize the necessity of the enlargement by the Secretary-General of the number of observers in the Suez Canal zone and the provision of additional technical material and means of transportation".

168. On 22 December the Secretary-General, pursuant to paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November, submitted a report (S/8309) on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative. The report indicated that after consultations at United Nations Headquarters with the parties concerned, and with the concurrence of the Government of Cyprus, Ambassador Jarring had decided to set up the headquarters of the United Nations Middle East Mission (UNMEM) in Cyprus. It further stated that Ambassador Jarring had arrived in Cyprus on 10 December, and by 20 December had completed a first round of visits to the Governments of Israel, Jordan and the United Arab Republic, which, the report said, had extended to him courtesy and willingness to co-operate and had welcomed the prospect of continuing the conversations. Also, each of the Governments visited had agreed to keep the details of the conversations confidential.

169. During November and December 1967, the Council also received communications from Israel and Jordan. These included charges by Israel (S/8222, S/8254) of terrorist activities being carried out by armed marauders coming from Jordan with the encouragement of the Jordanian authorities; and charges by Jordan (S/8258) of Israel's shelling and bombing of Jordanian defensive positions on 21 November. In connexion with the latter incidents, the Secretary-General, in a supplementary report issued on 21 November (S/7930/Add.55), stated that because there was no United Nations observation operation in the Israel-Jordan sector, UNTSO could determine neither the origin nor the scope of the firing. However, a cease-fire proposal by the Chief of Staff of UNTSO had been accepted by both parties and taken effect.

170. In a note dated 29 November (S/8279), Israel requested the Secretary-General to circulate its note of 15 November and his reply of 24 November concerning the status of acceptances of the cease-fire resolutions of the Security Council by the Governments of Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia and Yemen, to which the Secretary-General had sent the texts of the resolutions. The Secretary-General's reply stated that no communication in reply had been received from those Governments.

171. On 8 December Jordan complained (S/8290) that Israel had expelled 294 members of the Nuwaseirat tribe and forced them to cross the river to the East Bank in violation of resolution 237 (1967) of 15 June 1967. Israel denied the charges (S/8295), stating that for security reasons it had been necessary to proclaim the area of the nomadic tribe a restricted area and that some of the tribesmen had voluntarily crossed the river. Israel also denied the charge of Israel aggression on 20 November, stating that the Jordanian forces had opened fire on an Israel patrol from positions in the village of El-Karama. Fire had been returned to silence the assault.

172. On 22 December Jordan complained (S/8311) of the deportation by Israel of two prominent Arab leaders because of their refusal to co-operate with the Israel authorities. It charged that most of the leaders who had signed a memorandum rejecting the annexation of Jerusalem by Israel had been either arrested, exiled or deported, in violation of resolution 237 (1967). In reply, Israel stated (S/8322) that the action concerning the two Arab leaders had been taken in order to ensure the security and welfare of the population of the area concerned.

H. Developments between 1 January and 18 March 1968

173. Between January and the middle of March 1968, many communications were sent to the Security Council and the Secretary-General by Israel and Jordan. The bulk of these communications dealt with complaints of violations of the cease-fire made by each side against the other. Those alleged by Jordan (letters dated 2 January, S/8321; 10 January, S/8334; 26 January, S/8361; 30 January, S/8368; 9 February, S/8391; 13 February, S/8400; 15 February, S/8409; 16 February, S/8419; and 19 February, S/8423) concerned firing by Israel forces against Jordanian positions east of the River Jordan, and shelling and bombing of villages and refugee camps. Those alleged by Israel (letters dated 5 January, S/8328; 8 January, S/8329; 25 January, S/8359; 26 January, S/8364; 2 February, S/8379; 8 February, S/8387; 9 February, S/8392; 11 February, S/8395; and 15 February, S/8404 and S/8405) related to firing by Jordanian forces on Israel positions, shelling of Israel villages, acts of hostility and sabotage raids carried out against Israel villages by persons coming from Jordan, who, Israel alleged, had the support of Jordanian authorities and armed forces.

174. Measures taken by Israel within the occupied part of the City of Jerusalem were also the subject of letters addressed to the Security Council and the General Assembly in February and March by Jordan and Israel. By letters dated 23 and 28 February and 28 March (S/8427 and Add.1, S/8433, S/8507), Jordan charged that recent Israel measures bulldozing Arab property in the Magharba Quarter and planning enlargement of the western area of the Wailing Wall of Jerusalem amounted to naked aggression and made a mockery of the two General Assembly resolutions (2253 (ES-V) of 4 July and 2254 (ES-V) of 14 July 1967) on Jerusalem which had called upon Israel to rescind and desist forthwith from any measures that would alter the status of Jerusalem. Equally, Jordan protested the expropriation of 838 acres of areas adjacent to the Old City as another attempt to uproot the Arab inhabitants. Both measures had been vehemently protested by the Arab leaders of Jerusalem, who considered that Israel was proceeding with its plans of annexation in utter disregard of Security Council and General Assembly resolutions. With these communications, Jordan transmitted to the Council the text of a report issued in 1930 by the Commission appointed by the United Kingdom Government, with the approval of the Council of the League of Nations, to determine the rights and claims of Moslems and Jews in connexion with the Western or Wailing Wall at Jerusalem, which, Jordan noted, had unequivocally established that the Wailing Wall and the surrounding area was Moslem property.

175. The charges by Jordan were rejected by Israel (letter dated 5 March, S/8439 and Add.1), which asserted that the allegations were without foundation, but followed logically on the destructive attitude adopted by the Jordanian authorities towards the City of Jerusalem and its Holy Places during the period it was under Jordanian control, when it had relentlessly set about destroying the Jewish Quarter, including its synagogues and places of learning and the Cemetery on the Mount of Olives. Those acts of desecration had been described fully in a document published by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Israel, a copy of which

was being submitted to the Council. As for the Wailing Wall, it held a unique place in the history and faith of the Jewish people and no Arab conquest of Palestine had effected any change whatsoever in the sacredness of the Wall to Judaism. The policy of Israel, which was reiterated, was that the Holy Places should be protected from desecration and any other violation and from anything likely to violate the freedom of access of the members of the different religions to the places sacred to them or their feelings with regard to those places. In pursuance of that policy, the different Holy Places of Judaism, Christianity and Islam were administered under the responsibility of the respective religious authorities which held them sacred. As for Jordan's charges concerning expropriations, Israel maintained that the plans for construction of new housing in the modern part of Jerusalem called for location on vacant land of which about two thirds was public domain or belonged to Jews, while the Arab owners of one third would receive compensation in accordance with the law.

176. In the same period, charges were made by the United Arab Republic (letters dated 18 January, S/8344; 31 January, S/8373 and Corr.1; 2 February, S/8380; 29 February, S/8434; 4 March, S/8436) and by Lebanon whose Permanent Representative served as Chairman of the Arab Group of States at that time (letter dated 23 January, S/8354) to the effect that the Israel forces in the occupied territories, contrary to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and in defiance of Security Council resolution 237 (1967) of 14 June 1967 and General Assembly resolutions 2253 (ES-V) and 2254 (ES-V) of 4 and 14 July 1967, were carrying out military operations and acts of violence aimed at terrifying and coercing the civilian population in those areas and inducing them to flee or acquiesce in accepting the foreign occupation of Israel.

177. Israel denied the charges (letters dated 22 January, S/8349; 31 January, S/8371; 6 February, S/8383; 11 March, S/8451), stating that they only reflected the United Arab Republic Government's policy of continued belligerency and wilful distortion of administrative measures taken by Israel authorities to protect life and property and maintain public order in the areas under its control.

178. On 7 March Jordan charged (S/8445) Israel with arbitrarily deporting Mr. El-Khtab, Mayor of Jerusalem, in flagrant violation of Security Council resolution 237 (1967) which called on Israel to ensure the safety, welfare and security of all the inhabitants of the occupied territories. It added that this and other acts of expulsion of Jordanian citizens by Israel authorities were designed to break the will of the people and were part of Israel's plan to change the national character of the City of Jerusalem and the occupied territories. In reply, Israel claimed (S/8452) that Mr. El-Khatib had been an agent of the Jordanian Government in promoting tension and public unrest behind the cease-fire lines and, because of those activities and the threats to public order and security which they posed, he had been ordered to cross the cease-fire lines to Jordan.

179. On 10 and 13 March, Jordan (S/8458) and Morocco (S/8459), whose Permanent Representative served as Chairman of the Arab Group of States at that time, protested against a decree issued on 29 February by Israel authorities to the effect that the occupied Arab territories were no longer to be regarded

as "enemy territory" and which had established custom and civilian control posts for official entry into and exit from "Israel." They alleged that those measures constituted glaring proof of Israel's plan for expansion and annexation of occupied Arab territories in defiance of the principles of the United Nations Charter and the General Assembly and Security Council resolutions.

180. The Secretary-General also submitted a report (S/8309/Add.1) to the Council on 17 January on the progress of the efforts of his Special Representative to the Middle East, setting forth the itinerary the Representative had followed in his consultations with the Governments in the area, and describing in general the types of questions dealt with in his talks, as it was premature to report on the substance of those discussions. They related to the large and fundamental problems referred to in Security Council resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, and to secondary problems whose solution would contribute to an improvement of the general atmosphere by relieving certain unnecessary hardships which had resulted from the June 1967 hostilities, including the release of stranded ships, the exchange of prisoners of war and measures of a humanitarian character. The Governments visited had continued to extend courtesy and willingness to co-operate and had expressed positive reactions concerning the desirability of continued steps to improve the general atmosphere while searching for solutions to the fundamental problems.

181. In a supplementary report issued on 26 January (S/7930/Add.62), the Secretary-General informed the Council of an exchange of machine-gun fire, initiated from the east side, in the Suez Canal sector, and efforts which eventually succeeded, to secure a cease-fire.

182. On 30 January the United Arab Republic charged (S/8369) that on that morning Israel forces had twice fired upon Suez Canal Authority boats in an endeavour to obstruct operations for the release of fifteen ships stranded in the Suez Canal and had shelled United Arab Republic positions which returned the fire in self-defence.

183. On 31 January the Secretary-General reported (S/7930/Add.63) that the 30 January incident had occurred when Suez Canal Authority boats, engaged in a technical survey of navigational conditions northward in the Canal, had been fired upon by the Israel Defence Forces, and the firing had been returned by United Arab Republic forces; heavy fire had continued from both sides until a cease-fire became effective on the same day. The incident had a bearing on plans which had been developed, after consultation with both the United Arab Republic and Israel, by the Secretary-General's Special Representative to the Middle East, Ambassador Jarring, who had sought to safeguard the cease-fire while an evacuation operation and its preparatory phases were being carried out. Information in advance of all activity and the schedule of work were to have been conveyed by the United Arab Republic to the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, who would have kept the Israel authorities informed of the arrangements with a view to preventing any breach of the cease-fire. However, in view of the conflicting positions taken by the parties regarding the northern part of the Canal, UNTSO had warned the United Arab Republic that it could not give assurance about maintaining the cease-fire if the survey boats moved northward. The Secretary-General had on 28 January urged Israel to permit

the survey of the Canal to the north to proceed under the eyes of the United Nations observers, as he felt the projected survey to be a technical undertaking whose findings should not be prejudged and which could not afford any security risk for Israel. Pending Israel's reply, he had informed the United Arab Republic on 29 January of his hope that, pending the outcome of his efforts to resolve the difficulty over the question of survey to the north, the work towards the south would continue on schedule, and if it should indicate that all the stranded ships could be evacuated to the south there would be no problem. UNTSO was informed that it was unlikely that Israel would be willing to consider its agreement regarding the southward release of the stranded ships to include any survey work to the north. By the time the Israel reply to the Secretary-General's letter of 28 January was received, the shooting had broken out on 30 January, and Israel charged the United Arab Republic with having violated the cease-fire arrangements as well as with responsibility for having blocked the exit of the stranded ships and for keeping them there. In conclusion, the Secretary-General said that the difficulties encountered by the operation demonstrated graphically the complexities and hazards involved in seeking solutions even to relatively non-controversial matters on which the parties themselves were agreed in principle. The United Arab Republic authorities had halted the whole operation for evacuating the ships and the future possibilities for its completion were in serious doubt. The Secretary-General hoped that it might still be possible to effect an arrangement that would enable that important effort to be successfully concluded.

184. By a letter dated 1 February (S/8378), the representative of the United Arab Republic transmitted the text of a statement by its Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 30 January concerning the question of the release of the stranded ships. The statement gave an account of the plan and operation undertaken by the Suez Canal Authority for the release of the stranded ships and accused Israel of resorting to the use of force to obstruct that operation. It denied the existence of any agreement prohibiting navigation in the Suez Canal as claimed by Israel, and affirmed that in letters exchanged with the Chief of Staff of UNTSO it was made clear that the Suez Canal Authority should continue to move its boats for the safety of the stranded ships in the Canal. In conclusion, the statement said that in the face of Israel's attack on 30 January, the Canal Authority had been compelled to discontinue the operation.

185. In a letter of 7 February (S/8385), Israel denied the charges and, in turn, accused the United Arab Republic of resorting to distortions and pretexts to sabotage the release of the ships. The letter stated that Israel was in favour of an early opening of the Canal to free navigation for ships of all nations. Until that was achieved, the letter continued, Israel must insist that the conditions created in the Suez Canal under the cease-fire and the arrangements concerning navigation in the Canal be fully respected. The letter claimed that those arrangements which had been set out in documents S/8053/Add.1 and S/8053/Add.2 of 10 and 28 August 1967 prohibited the movement of boats and craft in and into the Canal, the sole exception relating to the supplying of the stranded ships. Therefore, the sailing of any vessel in the Canal by one of the cease-fire signatories was a breach of that arrangement unless the other signatory agreed. The letter

pointed out that Israel had agreed to Ambassador Jarring's proposal to allow the southward exit of the stranded ships, without prejudice to the arrangement on mutual abstention from navigation. The sending of boats northward into the Canal had been an act of direct and deliberate provocation on the part of the United Arab Republic.

186. On 2 March the Secretary-General circulated a note (S/8435) under General Assembly resolution 2252 (ES-V) and Security Council resolution 237 (1967) on humanitarian assistance, stressing the appeals made by the Assembly for special contributions to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), and added his own appeal to all Governments to make urgently whatever contributions they could to meet the new emergency refugee situation then facing the Government of Jordan and UNRWA. In that connexion, he attached a special report of the Commissioner-General of UNRWA on the exodus from the Jordan Valley which had followed military incidents along the River on 8 and 15 February. Those incidents had caused casualties and widespread alarm among the civilian population living on the east side of the Jordan Valley, and among those were displaced persons from areas occupied by Israel in June 1967 and refugee residents of UNRWA's Karamah Camp, where the warehouse was destroyed and schools, health and other facilities damaged. As a result, about 75,000 refugees, displaced persons and villagers had sought refuge on higher ground to the east away from the scene of the firing. At the request of Jordan, UNRWA was continuing its services for those remaining in the Valley and was working closely with the Government to provide emergency assistance to the newly displaced persons at places where they were then located. Those developments confronted Jordan and UNRWA with a new emergency of large proportions, whose dimensions could not be fully assessed at that stage.

I. Communications to the Council and requests for meetings

187. In two letters dated 18 March (S/8470, S/8475), Israel charged Jordan with a series of cease-fire violations and acts of terrorism and sabotage emanating from Jordanian territory and emphasized that Jordan must accept full responsibility for those acts which imposed a heavy strain on the cease-fire structure. The letter added that Israel had the right and duty to take all necessary measures for the security of the territory and population under its jurisdiction.

188. On 19 March Jordan informed (S/8478) the Council that Israel authorities were contemplating a mass armed attack against the East Bank of Jordan. In two further letters dated 20 March (S/8482, S/8483), Jordan rejected Israel's charges as groundless and held that they were intended to mask Israel's aggressive plans.

189. In a further letter dated 21 March 1968 (S/8484), the representative of Jordan charged that Israel had on that morning launched a mass attack, and requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the situation. On the same day, the representative of Israel also requested (S/8486) an urgent meeting of the Security Council to deal with the continuous acts of aggression and violations of the cease-fire by Jordan. The letter referred to information which Israel had received that an increased large-scale

campaign of raids and sabotage was about to be launched from Jordan and to preventive measures which the Israel Defence Forces had been compelled to take that morning against training centres and staging bases situated on the East Bank of the Jordan.

190. In a report submitted on 21 March (S/7930/Add.64), the Secretary-General stated that the Chief of Staff of UNTSO had advised him that morning most urgently that he had appealed to the Governments of Israel and Jordan to stop the fighting and to observe the Security Council cease-fire. The Secretary-General pointed out that in recent days there had been indications from various sources of increasing tension in the Israel-Jordan sector, relating to terrorist activities on the Israel side and threats of retaliatory action by Israel. There had also been reports of an unusual build-up of Israel military force in the Jordan Valley area. But, unfortunately, those developments could not be verified because no United Nations observers were deployed in the Israel-Jordan sector. The report further stated that an initiative by Jordan to arrange a meeting of Israel and Jordan liaison officers under United Nations auspices had failed as the Israel side had rejected any United Nations presence, a rejection which the Secretary-General thought in the circumstances seemed unnecessarily negative and rigid. In a further report on the same day (S/7930/Add.65), the Secretary-General reported that Israel had accepted the Chief of Staff's appeal for a cease-fire on condition of reciprocity, while Jordan stated that it would respond positively once Israel withdrew its forces to their positions and ceased the firing.

J. Consideration at the 1401st to 1407th meetings (21 March to 24 March 1968)

191. At the 1401st meeting of the Security Council, on 21 March, the provisional agenda, consisting of the Jordanian and Israel letters of 21 March, was adopted. The representatives of Jordan, Israel, the United Arab Republic, Iraq and Morocco were invited, at their request, to take seats at the Council table.

192. The representative of Jordan said that Israel, instead of facilitating the task of the United Nations Representative and showing its acceptance of the Council's 22 November resolution had, by its premeditated attack, shown its defiance and utter contempt for the United Nations. His Government had kept the Council informed of Israel's violations and acts of lawlessness in the occupied territories and had warned the Council of Israel's plans for a mass attack against Jordan. The present attack, Jordan charged, was larger than the usual retaliatory raid and had been directed against civilians and refugees at the Karamah Camp near the cease-fire area. Casualties were numerous and damage heavy. The representative of Jordan went on to say that, if Israel was not condemned, and if Chapter VII of the Charter was not invoked, the entire concept of law and equity as embodied in the Charter would be jeopardized. In that connexion, the representative of Jordan recalled that in resolution 228 of 25 November 1966, adopted following Israel's attack on a Jordanian village, the Council had censured Israel for its large-scale military action and had emphasized that actions of military reprisal could not be tolerated, and if repeated, the Council would have to consider further and more effective steps envisaged in the Charter. He urged the Council to take immediate action and thus prevent the problem from becoming more explosive.

193. The representative of Israel said that the twenty-year-old war in the Middle East was continuing despite United Nations decisions calling for a permanent peace, the Armistice Agreements which were to lead to a final peace settlement, Charter obligations, and the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967 prohibiting the exercise of belligerency through terror, sabotage, blockade and boycott. Time and again, he said, the Council had failed Israel when it appealed to it for action and assistance to preserve peace. Israel had on previous occasions brought to the attention of the Council numerous hostile acts directed against Israel from Jordan. Continuing, the representative of Israel quoted from a statement made by his Prime Minister in the Knesset on 21 March that, faced with verified information that an increased large-scale campaign of terror was about to be launched, Israel had had no choice but to act in self-defence to avert the danger. The statement charged that recently terrorist and sabotage activities originating from Jordan had spread and terrorist organizations had established training bases near the cease-fire line from which they could carry out acts of sabotage. It stressed that Israel respected and would continue to abide by the cease-fire agreement, but demanded that Jordan do the same. The cease-fire, the statement said, obliged not only the abstention from any military activities by regular armies, but also the prevention of any acts of aggression and terrorism on the part of any factor present within the territory of those States which had agreed to the cease-fire.

194. In conclusion, the representative of Israel urged that the Council should call on Jordan to abandon its policy of war, put an end to acts of aggression from its territory, and move forward on the path of peace.

195. At the 1402nd meeting of the Council, on 21 March, the representative of Syria was invited, at his request, to participate in the Council's discussion.

196. The representative of the United States said that, upon receipt of the reports of that day's events, his Government immediately issued a statement which deplored the Israel military action across the cease-fire lines and characterized it as damaging to the hopes for a peaceful settlement. The United States opposed violence from any quarter in the Middle East. It opposed military actions in violation of the Council's cease-fire resolutions and opposed acts of terrorism which were in violation of the cease-fire. Further, it believed that military counter-actions, such as that which had just taken place on a scale out of proportion to the acts of violence which had preceded it, were greatly to be deplored. The parties in such situations should be guided by the rule stated in Security Council resolution 56 (1948) of 19 August 1948, regarding the obligation of each party to prevent truce violations either by individuals or groups under its authority or in the territory under its control or by undertaking reprisals or retaliation against the other party. His delegation deemed those principles applicable to the cease-fire resolutions of 1967. Violence was not the answer to the problems in the Middle East. The wise and effective response was to have recourse to all available peaceful means to end the provocations. For that reason, his Government believed that it was vital to strengthen the United Nations role in the Israel-Jordan sector of the cease-fire line. The absence of observers in the Israel-Jordan sector, he noted, handicapped the task of the Chief of Staff of UNTSO and the Secretary-

General in observing and supervising the cease-fire in the area.

197. His delegation was gravely concerned with the peril which recent events had created for the all-important peace-making process set in motion by the Council's 22 November resolution, under which the Secretary-General's Special Representative, Ambassador Jarring, had been working tirelessly and patiently to fulfil his difficult mandate.

198. Finally, the representative of the United States emphasized that the parties must scrupulously comply with the cease-fire arrangements, must co-operate in strengthening the supervision of those arrangements, and must rededicate themselves to the principles of the 22 November resolution and co-operate with Ambassador Jarring to hasten the achievement of the objectives set forth by the Security Council, namely, a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area could live in security.

199. The representative of Algeria thought that the situation created by the Israel attack was particularly disquieting because it was a direct continuation of Israel's behaviour of 5 June, and dovetailed with an over-all policy of provocation followed by repeated aggressions. The war waged by Israel upon the Arab States was only the manifestation, he said, of a colonial type of policy, which had led to the eviction from their homeland of a profoundly peaceful population. The crux of the problem still was the desire of the Palestinians to recover their national rights. He went on to say that in carrying out its aggressive policies Israel had benefited from the complicity and support of certain capitals and also from the assistance of certain Zionist organizations. He declared that following the aggression of 5 June Israel had evolved a policy of systematic oppression and destruction to remove the Arab population remaining in the occupied areas, whom it regarded as an obstacle to annexation. Israel, he said, had thus far achieved a series of *fait accomplis* which it wished to impose on the international community and, above all, on the Arab world. Concluding, the representative of Algeria said that the imperialist concept of reprisals could not be tolerated; what some called "terrorism" was, in fact, the strengthening of the Arab resistance movements against the enemy occupation.

200. The representative of Pakistan said that there was not a shadow of a doubt that the Israel attack was premeditated and that it was part of a series of well-planned actions by Israel against its Arab neighbours in disregard of the Security Council resolutions calling upon Israel to cease and desist from all acts of aggression in the name of retaliatory action. He emphasized that as long as the Israel forces were not withdrawn from territories occupied by them since June 1967, it was inevitable that a resistance movement should grow among the population of those territories. The doctrine of the right of reprisal which Israel had on previous occasions asserted before the Council had been regarded by the Security Council as intolerable. The Council, he concluded, should condemn Israel, call on it to withdraw its forces forthwith and put an end to its violations of the Geneva Conventions.

201. The representative of France said that the fact that the Israel operation, directed especially against a refugee camp, that of Karameh, had been pictured as a reprisal in no way diminished Israel's responsibility for it. Even if the events supposedly preceding Israel's action were to be used as an excuse, the action

was out of proportion to the events. Moreover, the very idea of reprisals had never seemed acceptable to his Government; it had been condemned by the United Nations Organization and the Charter. His Government had repeatedly stressed that so-called acts of terrorism were the almost inevitable consequence of military occupation. The Security Council was duty-bound to condemn the Israel military operation, call for the withdrawal of Israel forces from the occupied territories, and demand prompt and full compliance with the resolution of 22 November 1967.

202. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that Israel, as in the past, was trying to justify its aggression and its violation of Security Council decisions as an act of reprisal. The aggressive acts of Israel clearly proved that its policy was designed to annex the Arab territories it occupied as the result of aggression in flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter. Recent events showed that Israel, in pursuing its aggressive line, relied primarily on the political, economic, military and diplomatic assistance of the United States, Great Britain and certain other Western Powers; those countries, he added, must cease that assistance and co-operate to improve the situation in the Middle East. His Government had repeatedly stated that the most important prerequisite for a political settlement was the immediate withdrawal of Israel troops from all the occupied Arab territories to positions held before 5 June 1967.

203. As regards the sending of United Nations observers to the Israel-Jordan sector, the representative of the USSR expressed doubts about the value of sending those observers to the region, adding that their presence would not prevent Israel from committing acts of military provocation and aggression. Moreover, as indicated in the Secretary-General's report of 21 March (S/7930/Add.64) Israel had refused to meet with representatives of Jordan in the presence of the United Nations. The Security Council, he concluded, should categorically condemn Israel's latest act of aggression, and, if it proved necessary, should apply sanctions against Israel.

204. The representative of India said that the latest action of the Israel authorities was in utter defiance of resolution 236 (1967) of 12 June 1967, which specifically prohibited any forward military movement subsequent to the cease-fire. It was incumbent upon the Council to act immediately and not only order an immediate cessation of hostilities and withdrawal of Israel military forces which had crossed the Jordan River, but demand that Israel should desist from such actions in the future. His delegation had always held that the Council could not expect the return of peace and security to the area without the withdrawal of the Israel forces from occupied Arab lands. That principle had been clearly recognized in the Security Council resolution of 22 November, the full implementation of which was required in order to lay the foundation of lasting peace in West Asia.

205. The representative of Iraq observed that it was not accidental that the Council's 22 November resolution did not contain a provision for direct negotiations; that resolution, he added, maintained a delicate balance in which the main effort of the international community to settle the problem peacefully was entrusted not to the parties directly concerned, but to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. However, the Government of Israel had sought to interpret the resolution in its own way, trying to show that it provided

for direct negotiations when everyone knew that such a resolution could not get through the Council. He declared that Israel had tried by every means at its disposal to prevent the success of the Special Representative's mission and the achievement of a peaceful solution of the problem. The massive attack against Jordan, he said, was the culmination of that policy. He pointed out that it was inconceivable that, in a country under occupation and repressive military rule, there would not be opposition from its inhabitants. The people of Palestine, he said, were no different from other peoples who had fought against foreign occupation. There was no Government in the Arab world that was able or willing to prevent the activities of those freedom fighters. Moreover, the cease-fire resolution was addressed to Governments and not to individuals acting without the instigation of any Government. The activities of those freedom fighters could not be considered as violations of the cease-fire resolution. It was the action of the Israel armed forces that could properly be considered as a violation of the cease-fire resolution. Therefore, the Council must invoke Chapter VII of the Charter and take enforcement and punitive measures against Israel, including sanctions.

206. The representative of Ethiopia said that the military reprisal by Israel could not even be justified by what the Israel representative described as measures designed to meet the need to avert terrorist activities alleged to have been committed by armed bands organized on the Jordanian side of the armistice position. While his delegation fully recognized the need for strict observance of the cease-fire provisions and the need to avoid hostile acts on all sides, it held that military reprisals were impermissible. The Council, he said, had no alternative but to deplore Israel's act of reprisal and to demand that it withdraw its forces to the cease-fire positions behind the West Bank of the Jordan. The way to peace in the Middle East, he maintained, lay in the acceptance by both sides of resolution 242 (1967) of the Council as the basis for lasting peace.

207. The representative of Morocco said that a look at the map of the Middle East would show that over the past twenty years Israel, which contended that it had to struggle daily for its existence, had spread widely. He stated that in spite of the fact that the Tripartite Agreement of 1950 had committed the three Great Powers to respect the *status quo* of the region, those Powers had not raised a finger when the *status quo* was repeatedly altered. As for the cease-fire resolution of June 1967, the Arab side had supported it from the very beginning, while Israel had not only rejected it until it had achieved its objectives, but had not been satisfied with the cease-fire resolution itself and from that time onwards there had been a constant stream of Israel actions to annex the conquered territories. He said that the Security Council must condemn Israel and there must be no question of putting its military action on the same footing with the action of those who, in the light of illegal aggression, could only take the legal action of liberation. The Security Council, he concluded, must stand up to its obligations and responsibilities.

208. The representative of Hungary said that it was the duty of the Council to condemn the latest Israel aggression against Jordan and to do everything to prevent the recurrence of such attacks. He declared that, in contrast to the attitude of the Arab States which had repeatedly stated their willingness to abide

by the terms of the 22 November resolution, Israel had so far refused to do so, in direct contravention of Article 25 of the Charter. The Council should achieve, by all means at its disposal, the full implementation of the 22 November resolution to eliminate all consequences of the Israel aggression. Israel, he said, should be made to understand that the United Nations would not tolerate any Charter violations.

209. The representative of the United States, replying to criticism of the United States attitude regarding the problems in the Middle East, recalled that on 4 November 1966, when Israel had brought a complaint before the Council against Syria's violation of its obligations under previous Security Council resolutions, the United States had supported a draft resolution inviting the Government of Syria to strengthen its measures for preventing terrorist activities and calling upon both Syria and Israel to facilitate the work of UNTSO. That draft resolution had not been adopted because of the negative vote of the Soviet Union. Also, on 25 November 1966 when Jordan had brought to the Council a complaint of Israel violation of its obligations, the Council, with the support of the United States, had adopted a far more drastic resolution deploring Israel's large-scale military action on that occasion. He had suggested that the United Nations extend its supervisory functions to the Israel-Jordan sector cease-fire line in the interest of making progress towards the implementation of previous Council resolutions and seeing that the cease-fire was scrupulously adhered to by all parties.

210. The representative of Israel, speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that if the Soviet Government were interested in peace in the area, its representative would have spoken words of peace and understanding and not of abuse and hate. As regards Algeria, the representative of Israel went on, that country had declared its rejection of the cease-fire and it persisted in that attitude.

211. The representative of Iraq, exercising his right of reply, said that the twenty-year-old war, about which the representative of Israel had spoken, had not started in 1948 but in 1897 when a group of European Jews had decided to establish a State in Palestine which for fourteen centuries had been predominantly Arab. He charged that Israel was imposing new repressive measures on the Arab population and that its actions were calculated to ensure the failure of the mission of the Secretary-General's Special Representative so that the measures already taken to annex the occupied territories could be consolidated. For those reasons, the representative of Iraq said, action by the Council was of vital importance. Failure by the Council to take resolute action would undoubtedly be regarded by Israel as encouragement to embark upon new aggression and adventures.

212. The representative of Algeria stated, in reply, that his Government was not ready to accept decisions which it considered unjust against the Palestine people, the Rhodesian people, or the South African people.

213. At the 1403rd meeting of the Council, on 21 March 1968, the representative of the United Kingdom said that the Council's first demand must be for an end to all violence. It was essential for the Council to call immediately for a return to the cease-fire line of June which, he emphasized, must lead to a return to the 22 November resolution. His Government deplored the latest deliberate and most serious breach of

the cease-fire and agreed with Council members that had condemned the practice of retaliation. It especially deplored resort to violence at a time when it had hoped that United Nations action put in train in the Council would lead towards a peace settlement. It must be made clear that the Council stood by the entire November resolution. His delegation was convinced that there was no other course to follow if a secure settlement and permanent peace was to be attained. Events since November, the representative of the United Kingdom continued, made it more necessary than ever to support the efforts of the Secretary-General's Representative and to insist that the framework for a settlement which was drawn up four months ago be respected and carried out completely. His Government was not prepared to countenance or condone any violent attack of the kind now before the Council. All the patient work of Ambassador Jarring had been put in jeopardy, but a new start could be made towards sanity. He trusted that members of the Council would keep uppermost in their minds the need not to block but to open the way for the Secretary-General's Representative to go forward steadily and surely to eventual success.

214. The representative of the United Arab Republic said that Israel's attack was bound to aggravate further the already inflammable situation existing in the area. His Government had on several occasions informed the Security Council of Israel's continuing policy of repression of the Arab population of the occupied territories. Such aggression and violation of the Security Council and General Assembly resolutions, as well as of fundamental human freedoms, especially those of the refugees who were in the custody of the United Nations, could neither be condoned nor ignored. The Arab peoples in the occupied territories, the representative of the United Arab Republic asserted, were entitled, just as all other oppressed peoples, to struggle for freedom. The movement of resistance by the Arab population was solely aimed at achieving the worthy cause of liberating their transgressed land, while, on the other hand, the acts of butchery and massacres committed by the Israelis concentrated on implementing the Zionist policy of expansion by prolonging their occupation of Arab territories.

215. In the view of the delegation of the United Arab Republic, to condemn Israel's criminal action would not be adequate. Israel prided itself on its long list of condemnations. It was necessary now to consider further steps envisaged in the Charter which laid down in no ambiguous terms the modalities for carrying out the Council's responsibilities with respect to acts of aggression. Articles 41 and 42 gave the Security Council ample latitude to exercise its authority.

216. The representative of Canada said that following a mounting number of incidents of infiltration and sabotage on the Israel side of the Israel-Jordan sector, an extensive military action by Israel in Jordan had brought about a highly dangerous situation in the Middle East. The Security Council could not condone those acts of violence. It must insist on scrupulous observance of the cease-fire and a cessation of all military activities as required by several Security Council resolutions. He would at the same time appeal to Israel and Jordan to facilitate the assignment by the Secretary-General of United Nations observers to supervise the cease-fire. The Council, he added, was undoubtedly placed at a disadvantage by the absence of an impartial source of information which only the United Nations observers could provide.

217. The representative of Canada went on to say that in addition to other measures the Council might consider taking this opportunity to reaffirm its resolution of 22 November; call on the parties concerned to accept that resolution; and call on the parties concerned to co-operate with the Secretary-General's Special Representative in his endeavours to achieve an accepted settlement. He hoped that whatever else might come of the debates, Council action would strengthen Ambassador Jarring's mission and the will of the Governments concerned to work for political solutions rather than have recourse to force.

218. The representative of Denmark said that the latest incidents along the cease-fire line had demonstrated once more the deplorable lack of stability in the area and the urgent need for a just and lasting peace as called for unanimously by the Security Council in its resolution of 22 November 1967. His Government deplored all violations of the cease-fire resolutions which were not only contrary to the specific arrangements in force in the area, but impeded progress towards the objective of the 22 November resolution. In the view of his delegation, lasting solutions could be achieved only through the mission of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. Therefore, it was the duty of all members of the Council and of all Members of the United Nations to support it; above all, it was the duty of the parties concerned to co-operate with Ambassador Jarring, extend to him all the goodwill to which he was entitled, and do nothing which might jeopardize his mission. The Government of Denmark would also support the Secretary-General in such endeavours as he might find opportune to strengthen United Nations supervision in the area.

219. The representative of Brazil said that his delegation had heard with a sense of shock the news of the military operations carried out by Israel on the east side of the Jordan River. It had equally viewed with grave concern the series of armed attacks carried out from Jordan territory across the cease-fire line. Both actions constituted an unmistakable violation of the cease-fire resolutions and jeopardized the prospects for peace under the Council's resolution of 22 November. His delegation felt that the Council should deplore the recent violations of the cease-fire and warn both parties against repeating such actions. The Council should also give due attention to the need for deploying United Nations observers in the Israel-Jordan sector of the cease-fire line. His delegation considered that the vital condition for progress towards peace in the Middle East was the maintenance of the cease-fire.

220. The representative of Paraguay said that the Security Council could not condone acts of violence and certainly could not condone them as acts of reprisal. His delegation trusted that the Council would act promptly and effectively to prevent any recurrence of a breach of the cease-fire, guarantee implementation of its November resolution, continue the peace-making activities of the Secretary-General and his Special Representative, and create once more an atmosphere conducive to the attainment of peace in the Middle East.

221. The representative of China said that no Government, even under extreme provocation, was justified in taking the law into its own hands. His delegation therefore felt that Israel's attack in the name of retaliation called for censure. The first task of the Council was to arrange for a return to normality, at least such normality as the resolutions of the Council had sought to establish since June 1967. It seemed to his delega-

tion that the United Nations should establish its presence in the Israel-Jordan sector without further delay.

222. At the 1404th meeting of the Council, on 22 March, the representative of Jordan said that Israel had arbitrarily expelled Jordanian citizens from the West Bank of Jordan, including the Mayor of Jerusalem Mr. Rouhi El-Khatib, the former Foreign Minister of Jordan, Mr. Anton Attalah, and others. The President of Israel, Mr. Shazar, the representative of Jordan said, had called for more Jewish immigrants to Jerusalem to take over Arab property and reap what the Arabs had sown. After mentioning some other actions of Israel on occupied Jordanian territory during the last six months, the representative stressed that Jordan had maintained an attitude of restraint and patience and, as had been advised by some members of the Council, had not brought the question to the Security Council until that moment. What was before the Security Council was an act of aggression. The least the Security Council could do was to condemn the aggression, censure the aggressor, and invoke Chapter VII of the Charter. Otherwise, Security Council resolutions would become meaningless.

223. The representative of Syria said that the latest Israel aggression was a continuation of what the Israelis had been perpetrating against the Arabs under the yoke of their occupation or domination, and in violation of the Geneva Conventions which Israel had ratified on 12 August 1949. It was also an implementation of Israel's unceasing quest for *Lebensraum* and a consolidation of its conquests. As for the word "terrorist" used in the debate, his delegation wanted to clarify that if the word was used to describe the Arab people of Palestine, who had become a nation in exile, or Arabs living under the Israel occupation, then that description contradicted the references to the Arab refugees as the term was used by the highest United Nations officials and in United Nations resolutions. The Secretary-General, in the introduction to his annual report submitted to the twenty-second session of the General Assembly, had said that "... people everywhere, and this certainly applies to the Palestine refugees, have a natural right to be in their homeland and to have a future". The General Assembly had adopted numerous resolutions reaffirming that right. The Arabs, the representative of Syria affirmed, were still the legal owners of their lands and property and had never ceded their inalienable rights or accepted the conquest as a *fait accompli*.

224. The Representative of Israel said that the statement of the representative of the United Arab Republic had made it clear that that Government would not alter its policies of continued belligerency, disregard of international law, and defiance of the United Nations Charter. No Government was more responsible for the events of June 1967 than the Government of the United Arab Republic, he said. Syria, he added, had rejected the Security Council resolution of 22 November, it had refused to receive Ambassador Jarring, and had no qualms in proclaiming that it would continue to wage war on Israel. The representative of Iraq, he continued, had carefully avoided any reference to Iraq's responsibility for the Middle East war of 1948, to its joining the fighting in June 1967, and to its refusal to accept the cease-fire called for by the Security Council. Iraqi forces, the representative of Israel charged, remained in Jordanian territory assisting the marauder units. It was not by accident, the representative of Israel affirmed, that those Arab States

had joined hands in the complaint about Israel's defensive action against terrorist raids.

225. The representative of Israel further declared that the nature, organization and location of the sabotage forces had been known to Israel defensive authorities. The existence of the saboteur bases and their activities had been a matter of public knowledge in Jordan. In the action that had taken place, he said, Israel had found that Karameh had ceased to be a civilian settlement and had been transformed into a huge base fully armed and under the complete control of the terrorists.

226. Concluding, the representative of Israel said that he had asked for an urgent meeting of the Council to seek relief from the campaign of murder and sabotage staged from Jordan which was the central factor of tension in the area. He asked the Council to condemn warfare by any means and to help in moving forward to peace and security.

227. At the 1405th meeting, on 22 March, the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that the statements by the representative of Israel showed that Tel Aviv had no intention of renouncing its provocative and aggressive policy. It was Israel which bore the complete responsibility for the new act of piratical aggression against Jordan and for the delay in implementing the Council resolution of 22 November 1967. Furthermore, Israel, in disregard of General Assembly resolutions, had issued decrees annexing the seized Arab territories and was resisting the clearing of the Suez Canal.

228. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics then read a statement issued on 22 March 1968 by the Soviet Government (S/8495), which said, *inter alia*, that the aim of the present actions of Israel, which had the support of the United States Government and of international Zionism, was to delay as long as possible a political settlement in the Middle East, to impose its imperialistic terms on the Arabs, to force them to surrender and to renounce the territories belonging to them. The statement further said that the demand for the withdrawal of Israel forces from all occupied territories had been given prominence in the resolution adopted by the Security Council on 22 November 1967; that demand was the main, imperative condition for the restoration of peace in the Middle East. The United Nations, the statement continued, had been officially informed of the readiness of Arab States to comply with that Security Council resolution. Israel, on the contrary, had from the very beginning promoted, and was promoting, a policy of obstructing the Security Council and General Assembly decisions on the Middle East. The Soviet Union, the statement added, together with other peace-loving States, was firmly determined to press for an end to Israel aggression, the return to the lawful owners of the territories captured from Arab States, and the achievement of the necessary political settlement in the Middle East on the basis of respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of every State in the area.

229. The representative of the United States, referring to the statement of the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, declared that the records of the Council showed that the policy of the United States had been clear, explicit and even-handed throughout. His Government favoured the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East; it did not favour the return to a state of belligerency, uncertain

boundaries or hostilities. Moreover, his Government had used, and would continue to use, its full political influence in support of the Council's resolution of 22 November and of Ambassador Jarring's mission. The Soviet Union could make a major contribution if it would truly use its political influence in the direction of a just and lasting peace in the area.

230. The representative of Syria said that once again the representative of Israel had spoken of peace and had deplored the attitude of the Arabs. But Israel's appeals for peace, he said, did not deceive anyone. For what had Israel done with the General Assembly and Security Council resolutions reaffirming the rights of Arab refugees of Palestine and of those refugees later driven from the Demilitarized Zones? Between 1947 and 1968, Israel had expanded four times its original area and its doors were wide open to immigrants from all over the world while the legal inhabitants of Palestine lived in exile. One could not impose peace by occupying somebody else's house and then asking him to submit to one's own terms.

231. The representative of Iraq remarked that it was significant that the representative of the United States, in discussing the Security Council's resolution of 22 November 1967, had mentioned non-belligerence, secure and permanent boundaries, and the necessity not to return to the situation existing before the war, but had omitted the two most important provisions: that of the withdrawal of Israel forces from occupied Arab territories, and that of the inadmissibility of territorial gains by military force.

232. Turning to the problem before the Council, the representative of Iraq declared that no one could deny that the Israel attack on 21 March was a grave and serious violation of the cease-fire resolution. The Israel action was not a reaction to provocation nor an act of reprisal and that was admitted by the Chief of Staff of the Israel Army on the news broadcasts. But even if Israel's action was to be considered as an act of reprisal, the Security Council had on many occasions stated that reprisals and acts of retaliation were not permissible under the Charter. Therefore, he said, the Council should express its opposition to bloodshed and slaughter and should warn against a recurrence of such acts, which would only result in the weakening of the peace-making process of the United Nations.

233. In statements in exercise of the right of reply, the representative of the United States said that his Government supported the resolution of 22 November 1967 in all its parts and in all its aspects.

234. The representative of Israel declared that the thesis that acts of aggression carried out by small military or para-military units or by individual marauders were not violations of the cease-fire was precisely the thesis which had been used to justify warfare against Israel during the truce, under the Armistice, and now under the cease-fire. It was a thesis which had brought about the renewal of hostilities in 1956 and in June 1967. It was an attempt to gain immunity for the continuation of war, terror and murder.

235. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics pointed out that the aim of the representative of the United States during the discussion of this question in the Security Council had quite clearly been to avoid the main issue of peaceful settlement in the Middle East, which was the question of recognizing the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967 and of agreeing to implement it and to co-operate with

the representative of the Secretary-General, Ambassador Jarring. The main point of the resolution was the question of the withdrawal of Israel troops from the Arab territories occupied by Israel. He said that the Arab Governments had officially informed the United Nations of their readiness to comply with the Security Council's resolution of 22 November and to co-operate with the Representative of the Secretary-General in the Middle East; therefore, there was no need to exert influence on them. However, Israel had made no such statement. The United States, he added, should exert its influence so that Israel officially declared that it recognized the resolution and was ready to proceed immediately to the withdrawal of Israel troops from the occupied territories.

236. The representative of the United States said he spoke for the United States and for no other country in the Security Council. He said his Government had used its political and diplomatic influence with all countries concerned in support of the 22 November resolution. His Government continued to hope that the Soviet Union would similarly use its diplomatic influence and would state its support of the resolution in all its parts. The Special Representative would then have the wholehearted support of the Council behind the resolution as a whole.

237. The representative of Morocco in his statement declared that for two days the Council had allowed itself to be led into a debate which related only to the general context of the unfortunate situation in the Middle East which had obtained for twenty years. A resolution on the Middle East had been adopted in November 1967. It had a meaning and scope and was binding on those who had voted for it; it was a decision that must be imposed on those to whom it was addressed. But since that resolution was adopted, the efforts of the Special Representative had been met with direct or covert opposition and dilatory tactics designed to delay a serious solution. Meanwhile, Israel had been allowed to undertake actions of the utmost gravity with impunity and without the slightest international reaction.

238. His delegation saw no reason why the Council should not act with respect to the specific problem before it. The situation, he said, was clear: a punitive expedition had been carried out and recognized as such by Israel in violation of a Security Council resolution and international law. The Council must not remain indifferent, he said.

239. The representative of the Soviet Union noted that the United States representative had given no answer to the questions whether Israel agreed with the Security Council resolution of 22 November, whether it agreed to implement it, and whether it agreed to withdraw its troops to the line of 5 June. He said the United States should know that the Soviet Union did not vote for resolutions which it did not accept and recognize. In reply to the United States representative's statement that there had been no answer whether the Soviet Union supported the resolution in all its parts, the Soviet representative said his Government had voted for all parts of the resolution of 22 November 1967, and consequently recognized all parts of the resolution.

240. At the 1406th meeting, on 23 March, the representative of Israel stated that the basic problem before the Council was that the Arab States, Members of the United Nations, were waging an illegal, aggressive war against Israel, another Member State. The Council

could not remain silent on that. The entire world, he added, awaited the Council's decision on the respective complaints; on the one hand, a complaint against the sanctuary that Jordan openly granted on its territory to terrorists; and, on the other hand, a complaint on measures taken by Israel in defence against that sinister type of aggression. He was certain that members of the Council would realize how heavily their decision would weigh upon the prospects of peace and security in the Middle East.

241. The representative of Jordan observed that Israel had come to the Security Council after committing a crime. The motives behind the Israel complaint were nothing but an attempt to divert the attention of the Council from the real issue before it to irrelevant and fabricated allegations. Resistance to aggression and foreign domination in the West Bank, Gaza and Syria was a natural, normal reaction. The people of Karameh had resisted the invaders. The claim that Karameh was a terrorist base was only an attempt to justify the killing of every young man in the village on the allegation that he was a member of El-Fatah.

242. Commenting on the suggestion of having observers on the cease-fire line, the representative of Jordan declared that there was no cease-fire line; there were cease-fire resolutions and a cease-fire area. His country welcomed the strengthening of observers on both sides of the Armistice Demarcation Line, which was the line recognized by the United Nations. His country wanted to see the Armistice Agreement fully activated and it did not support anything new which would freeze the so-called cease-fire line which would enable Israel to consolidate the fruits of its aggression and its programme for new expansion. The Mixed Armistice Commission, he added, was the only United Nations machinery created for observing.

243. The representative of Saudi Arabia said that the so-called "terrorists" were Palestine freedom fighters trying to regain their homeland. Yet nobody around the Council table mentioned the Palestinian people. It was the Palestinian people, and not Arab States, who had a dispute with Israel, which had usurped their land. If Jordan, or Syria or the United Arab Republic wanted to come to an agreement with Israel, the Palestinians in those countries would not remain docile and silent. As long as the Palestinian people were not taken into consideration by the Council and the world at large, every arrangement or treaty that might be worked out by third parties would boomerang.

244. On 23 March India, Pakistan and Senegal submitted the following draft resolution (S/8498):

"The Security Council,

"Having heard the statements of the representatives of Jordan and Israel concerning the grave Israel military action across the East Bank of Jordan on 21 March 1968,

"Having noted the supplementary information provided by the Chief of Staff of UNTSO as contained in documents S/7930/Add.64 and Add.65, and also the contents of the letters of the Permanent Representative of Jordan in documents S/8478 and S/8483,

"Observing that this military action by the armed forces of Israel on the territory of Jordan was of a large-scale and carefully planned nature,

"Recalling resolution 236 (1967) by which the Security Council condemned any and all violations of the cease-fire,

"Recalling further resolution 237 (1967) which called upon the Government of Israel to ensure the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of the areas where military operations have taken place,

"1. Condemns this military action launched by Israel in flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter and of the cease-fire resolutions;

"2. Warns Israel that actions of military reprisals cannot be tolerated and that the Security Council would have to consider such measures as are envisaged in the Charter to ensure against repetition of such acts;

"3. Calls upon Israel to desist from acts or activities in contravention of resolution 237 (1967);

"4. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the situation under review and to report to the Security Council as appropriate."

245. At the opening of the 1407th meeting of the Council, on 24 March 1968, the President stated that the members of the Security Council had held consultations for the purpose of agreeing on an acceptable draft resolution. These consultations had resulted in the following text, the preamble of which took note of the letters of both Israel and Jordan:

"The Security Council,

"Having heard the statements of the representatives of Jordan and Israel,

"Having noted the contents of the letters of the Permanent Representatives of Jordan and Israel in documents S/8470, S/8475, S/8478, S/8483, S/8484 and S/8486,

"Having noted further the supplementary information provided by the Chief of Staff of UNTSO as contained in documents S/7930/Add.64 and Add.65,

"Recalling resolution 236 (1967) by which the Security Council condemned any and all violations of the cease-fire,

"Observing that the military action by the armed forces of Israel on the territory of Jordan was of a large-scale and carefully planned nature,

"Considering that all violent incidents and other violations of the cease-fire should be prevented and not overlooking past incidents of this nature,

"Recalling further resolution 237 (1967) which called upon the Government of Israel to ensure the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of the areas where military operations have taken place,

"1. Deplores the loss of life and heavy damage to property;

"2. Condemns the military action launched by Israel in flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter and the cease-fire resolutions;

"3. Deplores all violent incidents in violation of the cease-fire and declares that such actions of military reprisal and other grave violations of the cease-fire cannot be tolerated and that the Security Council would have to consider further and more effective steps as envisaged in the Charter to ensure against repetition of such acts;

"4. Calls upon Israel to desist from acts or activities in contravention of resolution 237 (1967);

"5. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the situation under review and to report to the Security Council as appropriate.

Decision: *At the 1407th meeting, on 24 March 1968, the above draft resolution was adopted unanimously (resolution 248 (1968)).*

246. The representative of the United States said that he had sought to make the position of his Government on the question before the Council as clear as possible in his statement at the meeting of the Council on 21 March. After restating that position, the representative of the United States said that his delegation had been able to support the resolution because it took into account all types of violence in violation of the cease-fire. It was the duty of the Council and of all concerned to eliminate resort to all types of violence by scrupulous compliance with the cease-fire resolutions and arrangements.

247. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that the Soviet delegation had voted for the resolution because it considered it a firm action designed to bridle the aggressor, a condemnation of the newest Israel aggression, and a serious warning for the future. However, the decision was the very minimum of what the Council should have done. The statement of the representative of the United States, in which he had attempted to give a one-sided interpretation of the Council's decision, was additional evidence of United States general policy towards Israel aggression.

248. The representative of Paraguay said that the resolution was in keeping with the general views he had previously expressed and was therefore acceptable to his delegation.

249. The representative of the United Kingdom emphasized that the resolution just adopted referred back to resolution 236 (1967) of 12 June 1967 in which the Security Council had condemned any and all violations of the cease-fire. It had been essential to make it clear that no violence would be condoned; all violations must be stopped if there was to be hope for the future.

250. The representative of Brazil stated that his delegation supported the resolution because it covered large-scale military operations undertaken by Israel as well as all acts of violence launched from Jordanian territory across the cease-fire line.

251. The representative of Canada said that his delegation, in voting in favour of the resolution, recognized that while it condemned Israel's major military action, it did not condone violent incidents, whatever their source. He would have liked to see an appropriate reference to UNTSO and to the Jarring mission.

252. The representative of Denmark stated that his delegation had voted for the resolution because, while dealing in particular with Israel's military action, it also dealt clearly with all violent incidents in violation of the cease-fire.

253. The representative of Pakistan stated that the delegations of India, Senegal and Pakistan which co-sponsored draft resolution S/8498 submitted on 23 November had not asked for an immediate vote on their draft because they believed further efforts should be made to reach a compromise text that would command unanimity. They were pleased at the unanimous

agreement on the text adopted; however, Pakistan had voted for the resolution with sorrow, for it would not bring back the many dead on both sides; nor did it require Israel to make reparations for the untold damage inflicted on a poor country. Paragraph 3 of the resolution did not in any way imply that the sporadic acts of terrorism alleged by Israel were to be equated with the large-scale Israeli military attack. The Security Council could not permit an interpretation of that paragraph that would, in the event of any future incident, enable Israel to claim freedom to launch any military attack against Jordan or its neighbours.

254. The representative of Algeria said that his delegation rejected any interpretation of the resolution which sought to disguise the problems engendered by the aggression and occupation. Efforts had been made to find interpretations of the resolution that the text simply could not carry. Such interpretations were not in accord with the terms or the spirit of the resolution. His delegation had voted for the resolution and only for the resolution. It would continue to respect the right of the freedom fighters of Palestine to resist tyranny.

255. The representative of Hungary said that the resolution just adopted was not complete. Due reparations to Jordan should have been included in the resolution. Speaking of operative paragraph 3, the representative of Hungary said that in the opinion of his delegation the reprisals by Israel authorities against civilians in the occupied areas, the numerous armed violations of the cease-fire, the destruction of homes and human lives, and the colonization of the occupied areas were all violations of the cease-fire. His delegation believed that on the basis of the Charter and international law, the civilian population of the occupied areas had every right to fight for freedom.

256. The representative of France said that his delegation, while asking for strict respect for the cease-fire, would find it unacceptable to try to place on the same footing military operations planned by Governments and acts of individuals or groups or even to establish any parallel between them. The resolution left no doubt in that respect: that was why his delegation had voted for it.

257. The representative of Iraq said that although the resolution did not go far enough, it contained certain positive elements. It was quite clear that it was addressed to Israel. There was a clear condemnation of the Israel military action as a violation of the United Nations Charter and the cease-fire, and it called upon Israel to desist from actions in contravention of Security Council resolution 237 (1967). The refusal of the representative of Israel to say that his Government abided by the 22 November resolution was an added reason for the freedom fighters to continue their struggle until their land was liberated from the aggressor.

258. The representative of Morocco stated that the text of the resolution was sufficiently clear not to call for interpretations based more on what it did not say than on what it did say. The resolution condemned Israel and insisted that it refrain from committing such acts in the future. It did not put the two parties on the same footing.

259. The representative of Israel said that the Council had adopted a resolution which referred to both the Israel and Jordanian complaints on the agenda. Jordan had told the Council that it would

persist in warfare and that it would do nothing to prevent violations of the cease-fire by raids, terror and sabotage. Israel could not accept the condemnation of the military action which its defence forces had been compelled to undertake against terrorist bases on Jordanian territory. Israel was most unhappy to take such actions as they involved loss of life on both sides. However, when they proved necessary in self-defence, Israel could not accept censure, especially from an organ operating within the terms of the United Nations Charter, which enshrined the right of every State to self-defence. His delegation had noted with appreciation that Council members who did not identify themselves with the point of view of the forces of war in the Middle East had recognized the danger and perniciousness of the armed attacks, raids and acts of sabotage which had made necessary Israel's action against the terrorist bases. Israel would abide by its obligations under the cease-fire; however, the cease-fire could exist only on the basis of full reciprocity. If the cease-fire was violated in any way whatsoever, Israel would maintain its right and duty to take all necessary measures for the security of the territory and the population under its responsibility.

260. The representative of Jordan expressed satisfaction with the unanimous adoption of the resolution which had established no link between Israel's aggression and its allegations and charges. The Council had in effect rejected Israel's allegations concerning so-called individual incidents of terrorism. But the Council did not go far enough. The nature and scale of the attack against Jordan and Jordanian citizens should have moved the Council to apply the provisions of Chapter VII calling for sanctions. That was all the more so since that was not the first time the Council had condemned or censured Israel. It should be a final warning. The representative of Jordan then informed the Council that on that very day, 24 March, Israel forces had shelled Jordanian positions for two hours. Villages were also shelled north of the East Bank near Shunna.

261. At the same meeting (1407th), the representative of Saudi Arabia was invited, at his request, to take a seat at the Council table.

262. The representative of Saudi Arabia said that the resolution just adopted would not bring peace to the Holy Land because of the diametrically opposed interpretations given in the Council. Interpretations of the resolution would only intensify and broaden the scope of the conflict. Freedom fighters could not be equated with terrorists. The indigenous people of Palestine had been a peaceful people. There had been no troubles between the Moslems and the Christians, on the one hand, and the Moslems and the Jews on the other hand. It was the incursion of the eastern European groups who had used a noble religion, Judaism, as a motivation for a political and an economic end. After reviewing the history of the Jews in Palestine, he asserted that the indigenous people of Palestine would not remain docile. They would never be eradicated. If the Jews had come to the Holy Land as Jews and not as Israel citizens, they would perhaps have benefited a hundredfold from the Arabs, and the economic door would have been open to them.

263. The representative of Israel stated with regard to the Jordanian allegation that Israel forces had attacked Jordanian positions and villages on 24 March, that the Israel forces returned fire in self-defence; and the only way to avoid Israel fire against Jor-

danian military positions was to make certain that Jordanian positions did not attack Israel forces or Israel citizens.

264. The representative of Jordan said in reply that if Israel was worried about violations, why had it objected to the reactivation of the Mixed Armistice Commission, the only machinery in the area recognized by the Security Council which could send observers to the spot and investigate.

K. Communications and requests for meetings received by the Council from 27 March to 4 April 1968

265. In a letter dated 27 March (S/8505) addressed to the President of the Security Council, the representative of Jordan drew the attention of the Council to the new Israel threats against Jordan made by the Israel Prime Minister in a speech before the Israel Parliament on the previous day. The speech, it was stated, embodied some allegations against Jordan which were intended to mislead world public opinion and to pave the way for a future justification of a new Israel attack against Jordan. Jordan had no connexion whatsoever with the incidents which had allegedly occurred in the Arab territory occupied by Israel, and did not consider itself responsible for the safety and security of the Israel forces occupying those territories.

266. In three letters dated 29 March (S/8510, S/8511 and S/8515), the representative of Israel stated that Jordanian army positions had opened a large concerted attack on Israel villages and civilian population in the Upper Jordan Valley. He listed a series of violations of the cease-fire in addition to raids and acts of sabotage which, it was stated, had been carried out from Jordanian territory. The Jordanian actions were in frequent violation of the cease-fire.

267. In a letter dated 29 March (S/8516), the representative of Jordan requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider Israel's aggression against the East Bank of the Jordan in defiance of the Security Council resolution of 24 March 1968.

268. In a letter dated 29 March (S/8517), the representative of Israel, referring to his previous letter of the same day concerning Jordanian acts of aggression, requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council.

269. Also on 29 March, the Council received a report from the Secretary-General (S/8309/Add.2) on the progress of the efforts of his Special Representative to the Middle East, Ambassador Gunnar Jarring. The report reviewed Mr. Jarring's visits to the various capitals of the countries concerned and stated that Ambassador Jarring had found a basic difference of outlook between the parties, which had been described in some detail by the parties themselves in the Council documents and in the course of meetings held in March. His efforts had been directed towards obtaining an agreed statement of position concerning the implementation of the 22 November resolution, which could then be followed by meetings between the parties under his auspices. So far, those efforts had not resulted in agreement, and had, moreover, been interrupted by events during the latter part of March. Contacts were being renewed and a further report would be submitted when the results were known.

L. Consideration by the Council at its 1409th to 1412th meetings (30 March to 4 April 1968)

270. At the 1409th meeting, on 30 March 1968, the provisional agenda, consisting of the Jordanian communication dated 29 March (S/8516) and the Israel communication of the same date (S/8517) was adopted, and the representatives of Israel and Jordan were invited, at their request, to take part in the Council's discussion without the right to vote.

271. The Security Council had before it a supplementary report dated 30 March from the Secretary-General (S/7930/Add.66), who was called upon by the 24 March resolution to keep the situation under review and to report to the Security Council. The Secretary-General regretted his inability to submit a helpful report on the fighting of the previous day, since no United Nations observers had been stationed in the Israel-Jordan sector. The Secretary-General observed that the presence of United Nations observers in the area could be helpful in preserving a cease-fire in ways other than reporting. The mere fact of their watchful presence could be something of a deterrent to military activity. He noted that largely because of the presence of United Nations observers, the cease-fire resolutions were better served and maintained in the Suez Canal and Israel-Syria sectors than in the Israel-Jordan sector.

272. The representative of Jordan stated that on 29 March 1968 the Israel forces had shelled without provocation Jordanian positions on the northern part of the East Bank of the Jordan using tanks and mortar fire. The Israel air force then indiscriminately bombed Jordanian frontier villages inhabited by civilians. The area bombarded provided the most vital water resources for the East Bank. In bombarding agricultural lands, the Israelis aimed to deprive the inhabitants of their only means of livelihood, to terrorize them and thus force them to move further east, creating a new vacuum for Israel's aggressive designs. The Israel Minister for Tourism, Mr. Moshe Kol, had claimed that next time the attacks would be wider in scope. It was clear that unless immediate action was taken by the Council, Israel would continue wilful violations of Council resolutions. The merciless attacks against Jordan had been preceded by a conference of the chiefs of Israel Defence Ministry missions in Europe which was discussing its 1968 armament programme. The chiefs of mission were recalled from the United States of America, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and other European countries. The first essential step to be taken by the Security Council was to call for an immediate halt to any shipment of arms to Israel. Those Member States that continued to arm Israel, despite its repeated aggression against Jordan, were assuming a great responsibility. The Council had already issued a solemn warning that grave violations of the cease-fire could not be tolerated and it should ponder another important question—to take more effective measures to bring about the immediate and complete withdrawal of all Israel forces from territories forcibly occupied. Additional delay would lead to further deterioration of an already explosive situation and result in an intensification of the resistance movement.

273. The representative of Israel said that, the day following the adoption of the resolution on 24 March, the Foreign Minister of Jordan had declared that the

condemnation contained in the resolution was directed against Israel and the paragraph on cease-fire violations did not concern Jordan. The representative of Israel then listed a series of incidents that had occurred between 22 and 29 March, which he said were started by Jordan in violation of the cease-fire. Jordan still proclaimed that it was at war with Israel and that it did not intend to terminate acts of aggression, raids, terror and sabotage against Israel. If Israel were not to take military security measures, Jordan must cease its warfare. If Jordan continued to wage and encourage aggression, the Government of Israel, like any other Government in the world, would not remain passive and forgo its right to self-defence. The concept that Governments of neighbouring Arab States, which were bound by their obligations under the cease-fire, remained free to aid and abet armed attacks on Israel through organized terrorism and sabotage was inadmissible. Such activities constituted a continuation of warlike action under cover of the cease-fire. He expressed a hope that the Security Council would realize that from the outcome of its debate the forces of war in the area would either see further encouragement, as they did after the 24 March resolution, or find in it a clear warning not to persist in their acts of aggression in violation of the cease-fire.

274. The representative of the United States of America said that his Government opposed military actions in violation of the cease-fire in the Middle East as well as acts of terrorism in violation of the cease-fire. The Council, in its resolution of 24 March 1968, served notice not only that actions of military reprisal and all other violent incidents in grave violation of the cease-fire were intolerable, but also that the Council would have to consider effective steps to ensure against their repetition. This new eruption of violence had made it clear that the Council should immediately heed the Secretary-General's wise advice and consider the stationing of United Nations observers in the Israel-Jordan cease-fire sector as soon as possible.

275. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that the dangerous situation before the Council contained three basic facts: first, Israel, in disregard of the repeated decisions of the Security Council on a cease-fire in the Middle East and on the liquidation of the consequences of its aggression, was continuing its policy of armed aggression against neighbouring Arab States; second, that meant that the decisions so far adopted by the Security Council for the purpose of halting Israel aggression had not been effective enough to restore peace in the Middle East region; third, it followed from the above-mentioned consideration that the Security Council was faced with the necessity to take more effective measures with regard to the aggressor, as provided for in the United Nations Charter and in the Security Council resolution of 24 March. If the Council adopted effective measures to halt aggression, the Soviet Union would be ready to take part in the implementation of such measures.

276. The representative of Algeria said it was obvious that Israel intended to impose its own solution in order to establish its own kind of peace in the Middle East and that the confusion deliberately fostered by certain Powers with regard to the interpretation of the Council resolution of 24 March gave the Tel Aviv authorities reason to believe that they were assured of a more understanding attitude in future. Yet the basic reasons for the aggressive Zionist policy

proceeded from its programme of territorial expansion which Zionism intended to pursue. Using the active resistance of the Palestinian people as a pretext, the Tel Aviv authorities were determinedly carrying out massive military operations allegedly in response to the Palestine struggle for freedom. The substance of the Middle East problem was, in reality, the right of the Palestinian nation to full integrity and sovereignty. It was time the Security Council concerned itself with the problem posed by the usurpation of Palestine, as a solution to that problem was the only way in which an end could be put to the aggression which they knew must indefinitely perpetuate itself, and to create the necessary conditions for a general and stable peace. To permit the territories involved to remain occupied and to leave their populations under the yoke of the occupation policy would result in a reward to aggression and to the aggressor. The Council must stress the legitimate and justified nature of the struggle for liberation, and the concrete and effective endeavours that must be pressed to halt and disarm those who put their aggressive intentions into action and made reprisals a political and juridical institution.

277. The representative of Hungary said that the recent act of aggression by Israel was an expression of a military policy of conquest, domination and expansion aimed at ruling over other peoples by ruthless and violent force. The duty of the United Nations was to stop that series of aggressions and to call upon those members of the Council and the Organization which supported the Israel Government by supplying it with offensive weapons, capital and economic assistance to cease their assistance and co-operation with the aggressor in the Middle East. The duty of the United Nations, based on the Charter, was to protect the interests of the victims of the aggression. The contemptuous refusal by Israel to implement resolutions 242 (1967) and 248 (1968) constituted a very clear violation of Article 25 of the Charter, which called for strong measures against a Government which refused to implement resolutions.

278. The representative of the United Kingdom said that the Security Council must ensure that the cease-fire was made effective. Merely to maintain the cease-fire was not enough. The Council had laid down the framework of a settlement which was acceptable to everyone concerned. However, such acceptance of the resolution could not be given without two clear obligations being created: first, to carry it out in full and, second, to co-operate with the United Nations and with Ambassador Jarring for that purpose.

279. In exercise of the right of reply, the representative of Jordan said that the Security Council had not adopted anything more than a cease-fire resolution. A cease-fire did not mean peace, peace with occupation, coexistence with aggression. Regarding the question of observers, it was in the interest of the Security Council to insist that its same machinery should be stationed in the same area in which it had operated prior to June 1967. The Armistice Agreement, as the Secretary-General had said, was still valid and no one had a veto concerning revocation of that Agreement, neither Jordan nor Israel.

280. At the 1410th meeting, on 1 April, the representative of Syria was also, at his request, invited to take a seat at the Council table.

281. The representative of Israel informed the Council that acts of aggression against Israel were continuing. The people of Israel had been subjected

to the Arab war of aggression for twenty years. By the decision of Arab Governments, the war was not terminated, but continuing. It continued by the method of raid, terror and sabotage. Following the defeat of Arab frontal aggression last June, this was the method most readily available to the Arab States and one on which the Arab Governments relied to prepare the ground for the resumption of full-scale military activities. He directed the Council's attention to what he said were facts which emphasized the official military character of the terrorist war machine and its activities. He appealed to the Security Council to see the situation as it was, in all its gravity, and to take a clear stand on the dangers of continued Jordanian warfare by raid, terror and murder, and to assist in putting an end to this warfare and advancing Israel and the Arab States towards peace.

282. The representative of Jordan said it could not be argued that because there were no observers present at the time of the Israel attack the Security Council was not in a position to make any findings. There was a complete confession made by the Israel Defence Minister who had said over the Israel radio that the attacks on Jordan were part of the campaign that would continue until Israel reached a decision with the Arabs. To make out of the Israel crime a call for observers was not helpful, because it amounted to diversion. But if the Council deemed it fit to deal with that question at a later stage, after having given Jordan's complaint an adequate and effective remedy by invoking Chapter VII of the Charter, then it was the duty of the Council to take action that was not in conflict with existing arrangements concerning peace-keeping in the area, namely, the Armistice machinery. To do otherwise would be to weaken the Council's own resolution of 22 November 1967, which by calling for "withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict" recognized the machinery existing before 5 June and the Demarcation Line of the Armistice Agreement. No action should be taken by the Council which might explicitly or implicitly create a new situation which would affect the character of the cease-fire. The cease-fire was conceived as a temporary stage in order to enable the Security Council to take steps to bring about the complete liquidation of the acts of aggression, so that no fruits could be gained through aggression.

283. The representative of Canada said that the parties should, as a matter of co-operation and voluntary arrangement, allow United Nations observers to function in the Israel-Jordan sector in a mobile fashion. He urged all the parties concerned to extend full co-operation to Ambassador Jarring on the basis of the acceptance of the Council's resolution of 22 November 1967 as a whole.

284. The representative of France said that the Council could not permit its authority to be flouted or its decisions to be ignored. It must demand respect for them, and in particular, respect for resolutions 242 (1967) and 248 (1968) of 22 November 1967 and 24 March 1968. While the presence of the United Nations in the area might serve as a deterrent to military activity, there could be no question of taking action which might in any way appear to be condoning conquest or military occupation.

285. The representative of Pakistan said that the Security Council must acknowledge that the immediate cause of the problem before the Council was the continued occupation of Arab territories by Israel. The

Council must call upon Israel to accept and implement without any further delay Security Council resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967 and to co-operate unreservedly with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General by withdrawing its forces from all the territories occupied since 5 June 1967. As for the presence of United Nations observers in the Israel-Jordan sector, he stressed that the machinery of the United Nations should not be so exploited as to lead to an insidious transformation of an occupation into a *de facto* annexation of territory acquired by military conquest.

286. The representative of Brazil stressed the vital importance his Government attributed to the need for the most scrupulous respect of the cease-fire. His Government was concerned as to the possible effects of the most recent events on the future and on the prospects of the Jarring mission. His delegation welcomed the suggestion made by the Secretary-General on the need for United Nations observers in the Jordan-Israel sector of the cease-fire line.

287. The representative of Denmark recalled his statement of 21 March 1968 in the Council in which he suggested the strengthening of the United Nations supervisory functions. The supplemental information presented by the Secretary-General (S/7930/Add.66), confirmed the need in this respect. His delegation was prepared to give positive consideration to any practical steps, such as deployment of UNTSO observers in an appropriate area, that could strengthen the Secretary-General in the discharge of his reporting responsibilities, and that would help in deterring further violations of the cease-fire.

288. The representative of Israel, exercising the right of reply, said that the United Nations, for the first time in many years, was working towards a just and lasting peace that would establish precisely those elements that, in the words of the Jordanian representative, did not exist under the Armistice, such as the right to live in peace, the right to live free from threats of force, and the right to freedom of navigation. The United Nations was now actively engaged in an effort to establish boundaries, in an effort to define territory.

289. The representative of Jordan replied by saying that the Armistice Agreement did not fix boundaries for Israel. The boundaries for Israel were fixed by the United Nations. There was a resolution referring to boundaries. It had been affirmed by the United Nations, by the Security Council and by the General Assembly.

290. At the 1411th meeting, on 2 April, the representatives of the United Arab Republic and Iraq were also invited, at their request, to take seats at the Council table.

291. The representative of India restated his delegation's view that as long as Israel refused to withdraw from Arab territories occupied since June 1967, there would be little worth-while prospect for peace in the area. It was therefore imperative that Israel should agree to implement fully the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967. It was equally important that the parties should co-operate with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in his task of bringing about the implementation of that resolution.

292. The representative of Syria said that there would be a renewal of large-scale military operations by Israel against the Arab States. The continuous

attacks on Jordan under the pretext of stopping infiltration, and the large concentration of Israel troops on Syrian borders and in Sinai were proof of Israel's aggressive designs and military planning. Israel was continuing its policy of armed aggression against the Arab States and the resolutions of the Security Council had not halted that aggression. The threat of the Council to take effective measures as provided by the Charter did not deter Israel from repeating its acts of aggression, always in wider dimensions. The Council would fail in its responsibility if it did not halt the aggressor and uphold the right of the victim to its integrity and independence. The right of the Palestinian people to resist liquidation of their personality and rights, and the right of every Arab under Israel occupation to resist annexation and occupation was a natural right, the sanctity and integrity of which were recognized by the United Nations Charter and scores of resolutions on colonialism.

293. The representative of Iraq said there was one central issue before the Council: would Israel be allowed to solidify its occupation and thereby be enabled to realize its avowed aim of annexing the occupied Arab territories? There was virtual unanimity among Member States that territorial conquest by military force was inadmissible under the Charter, and therefore on the need for the complete withdrawal of Israel troops from the occupied territories. Besides flatly rejecting the resolution of 22 November, Israel had completely disregarded two General Assembly resolutions on Jerusalem, refused to apply the Security Council resolution on refugees and the Geneva Convention to the inhabitants of the occupied territories in Palestine, and it had unilaterally denounced the Armistice Agreements. All the problems besetting that area had been created as a result of the onslaught of Zionism against the people of Palestine. Nothing would be settled and nothing would endure until the consequences and implications of that aggression were recognized and fearlessly dealt with.

294. The representative of Ethiopia said that it was the urgent duty of the Council to ensure that its cease-fire decisions were fully implemented so that a climate could be created in the area which would be conducive to the ultimate and urgent goal—that of establishing peace based on resolution 242 (1967), unanimously adopted by the Security Council on 22 November 1967. The immediate task of the Council must be to reaffirm resolution 248 (1968) and, in view of the Secretary-General's request, to envisage appropriate and acceptable arrangements for the stationing of observers in the Israel-Jordan cease-fire sector. The cease-fire arrangements and, for that matter, the special mission of Mr. Jarring, should be envisaged as being of only temporary duration, without any permanent character, and without prejudice to the rights and positions of any party in any given situation.

295. The representative of Paraguay said that the possibilities for achieving a just and stable peace in the Middle East were to be found in the implementation by everyone of the provisions of the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967. In addition to facilitating the work of Ambassador Jarring, the United Nations presence in that area would be equally important. His delegation, together with other Latin American delegations, were convinced that no stable international order could be built on threats or the use of force, and that no recognition should be given to

the occupation or acquisition of territories acquired by such means.

296. The representative of the United Arab Republic said that the Israel authorities, hiding behind an alleged right of self-defence and using the pretext that they were defending themselves against so-called terrorist activities, were merely trying to justify their persistent policy of expansion at the expense of the Arab States and people. Direct and indirect attempts had been made to vilify the noble endeavours of the national liberation movement in the Arab-occupied territories. In resolution 2160 (XXI) entitled "Strict observance of the prohibition of the threat or use of force in international relations, and of the right of peoples to self-determination", the General Assembly recognized that peoples subjected to colonial oppression were entitled to seek and receive all possible support in their struggle in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter. All States Members of the United Nations were by virtue of that resolution requested to give assistance and aid to peoples under the yoke of colonialism. The Security Council should make it clear to the Israel authorities that it expected them to withdraw forthwith from all occupied territories and should indicate unequivocally that their reluctance to abide by the principles of the Charter, and their defiance of the United Nations resolutions and their refusal to withdraw their troops from the occupied territories constituted a threat to peace and security in the area, and hence a threat to international peace and security.

297. The representative of Israel brought to the attention of the Council additional acts of aggression which he said had been committed against his country across the Jordan River. He recalled that on 4 September 1965, when Pakistan sent infiltrators across the cease-fire line between India and Pakistan, the representative of India said that his Government had no choice but to defend itself by preventive action, including action across the cease-fire line.

298. Commenting on the statements of the representative of Iraq and the United Arab Republic, the representative of Israel said that those two countries refused to make peace with Israel and promised before the Security Council to wage war against it by murder and sabotage despite their obligations under the Charter, despite Security Council decisions. The Council was not discussing alleged opposition of the population in areas under Israel control, but it was discussing organized incursions from the outside in breach of Security Council resolutions and of Charter provisions. If there were a State in the Middle East whose actions symbolized above those of all others a perverse inhumanity, it was Syria. Moreover, the Jewish communities of Syria lived in dismal oppression and suffering, deprived of food and freedom of movement, many of them in prison and concentration camps.

299. The representative of Syria, exercising the right of reply, denied the allegations of the representative of Israel about the treatment of the Jewish community in Syria and expressed doubt that the Israel representative, by his reference to development plans for occupied Arab territories, was trying to convince the Council that Israel had waged war against three Arab States and occupied large areas in order to develop Arab agriculture and to put into effect some development plans.

300. The representative of Iraq, in reply, said that if Israel had had the slightest intention of implementing the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967, it would not have gone to all the effort and expense of launching a five-year plan in the occupied areas of the West Bank of Jordan. He added that both the Arabs and the Jews had lived in peace and harmony for centuries over all the Arab world. It was with the advent of Zionism and with the imposition of the Zionist programme by force on the people of Palestine that that peace and traditional harmony had been destroyed.

301. The representative of India, in reply, referred to his previous statement and said that Israel could follow the example of India and Pakistan and withdraw from territories occupied in June 1967 and not expand the area of occupation over Arab peoples and Arab territories.

302. At the 1412th meeting, on 4 April, the representative of Jordan reiterated his Government's attitude with regard to the stationing of observers in the cease-fire area. The cease-fire resolution was neither intended to consolidate the Israel aggression, nor to create a new line with stationed observers to be used as a shield for such consolidation. In pursuance to resolution 237 (1967), the Secretary-General could not submit to the Council a helpful report on Israel's claims simply because the Israelis would not permit the stationing of observers within the occupied territories. The immediate and complete withdrawal of Israel troops would reactivate and revive the only valid machinery in the area, the armistice machinery. Then observers could certainly function more effectively on the Armistice Demarcation Line, which was the only line recognized by the United Nations.

303. He declared that the bombing by Israel of more than a dozen villages, food-producing areas and civilian population, and the extension of the bombing to villages far beyond the cease-fire area, which was by itself an act of genocide, should warrant censure and sanctions by the Security Council. In this connexion, he said that the Israel military missions in the United States and in many European capitals were now preparing the 1968 plans for acquiring arms and military supplies from the United States and certain other Western countries.

304. The representative of Israel said that as the Security Council proceeded with its deliberations, Arab aggression against Israel continued. Warlike pronouncements were made daily in the Arab capitals. The terrorist machine was being openly geared for further operations. Armed attacks and incursions continued. He strongly stressed the urgency of measures that the Jordanian authorities must take without further delay to put a final and total end to acts of aggression perpetrated from their territory against Israel. He reiterated Israel's policy to abide fully by its obligations under the cease-fire on the basis of reciprocity. However, Israel expected the Arab States to act accordingly. The Arab population on the West Bank did not want war and conflict with Israel. It wanted peace and co-existence. What concerned the Arab rulers today was perhaps less the fact that Israel had successfully repelled their aggression than the fact that in areas under Israel control it had been proved that Israelis and Arabs could live together, work together and understand each other. The Arab people, like people everywhere, wanted peace and tranquillity, happiness and progress.

305. In exercise of the right of reply, the representative of Jordan said that distortions by Israel were made for obvious reasons, but the problem was not one of words but one of deeds. If Israel really wanted good Arab-Israel relations, it should vacate the occupied areas, accept the people who had been expelled from what was allotted to be Israel, implement the decision calling for repatriation and show by their behaviour that they could live with the Arabs.

306. At the same meeting, the representative of Saudi Arabia was invited, at his request, to take a seat at the Council table.

307. The representative of Saudi Arabia said that the argument now as in previous meetings proceeded on the assumption that there was dispute between Jordan and Israel as such. But like it or not, there was still a Palestinian people who were pursuing their struggle to regain their homeland. The United Nations, he said, had made a mistake in adopting the resolution on the partition of Palestine: for it had been done under pressure and without respecting the principles of self-determination. The way out of the impasse, he thought, was to ask the Eastern European Jews now in Israel if they wished to emigrate to Western countries, and the Arab refugees if they wished to return to their homes. Council discussions, he said, were becoming purely academic. At one time, the veto was useful; now consensus had taken its place. Coexistence among the great Powers was to be applauded, but the small, weak Powers paid a high price for that consensus. What was to prevent the major Powers, now that they were co-existing, from issuing a withdrawal ultimatum to Israel? To continue as the Council and the United Nations had been doing lately meant only loss of prestige for the Organization. Concluding, he said that there was no problem between Arabs and Jews as such, but only between the Palestinians and their Arab neighbours, on the one hand, and the Zionists, on the other. The Arabs wished only to be left alone. They were willing to trade and co-operate with the Western Powers, but a people could not be displaced. The situation in the Middle East was one of sheer exploitation, occupation and domination.

Decision: *At the 1412th meeting, on 4 April 1968, the President made the following statement as a result of consultations which had taken place on the item:*

"Having heard the statements of the parties in regard to the renewal of the hostilities, the members of the Security Council are deeply concerned at the deteriorating situation in the area. They, therefore, consider that the Council should remain seized of the situation and keep it under close review".

M. Communications to the Council and request for a meeting

308. By a letter dated 18 April 1968 (S/8549), the representative of Jordan drew the Council's attention to Israel's decision to hold a military parade in Jerusalem on 2 May 1968, and attached a map of the proposed parade route, nearly half of which, it was asserted, was in occupied Arab Jerusalem. Such a parade, the representative of Jordan said, would be a flagrant violation of the letter and spirit of the General Armistice Agreement, of Security Council resolution 162 (1961) of 11 April 1961, endorsing the Mixed Armistice Commission decision of 20 March 1961 which condemned such parades, and of General

Assembly resolutions 2253 (ES-V), 2254 (ES-V) of 4 and 14 July 1967, respectively. In order to prevent further deterioration of the situation, Jordan asked the Secretary-General to take adequate steps to remedy it and to ensure that the parade was not held.

309. In a further letter dated 25 April (S/8560), addressed to the President of the Security Council, the representative of Jordan stated that since the adoption of the General Assembly resolutions (2253 (ES-V) and 2254 (ES-V)), Israel had continued to carry out its plans for annexation and illegal appropriation of Arab lands in Jerusalem and had persisted in carrying out projects calculated to bring about drastic changes in the national and historical character of the Holy City. It charged that those violations were culminating in the military parade planned for 2 May, which, because of its nature and the heavy military equipment to be used, constituted a serious provocation which would lead to further deterioration in an explosive situation. Jordan therefore requested an urgent meeting of the Council to consider that development and the situation in Jerusalem and to take measures to remedy the situation.

310. In a note dated 26 April 1968 (S/8561), the Secretary-General informed the Security Council of a note he had felt it necessary to address to the Government of Israel on 20 April expressing his concern about plans to hold a military parade on Israel's Independence Day on 2 May, much of which, it was understood, would be on the east side of the Armistice Demarcation Line. In his note to the Government of Israel, the Secretary-General had emphasized that the holding of a military parade in that area, at that time, would almost surely cause an increase in tension in the Near East and could well have an adverse effect on the efforts then going forward to find a peaceful settlement of the problems in the area. He had further stated that his concern about the proposed parade also related to General Assembly resolutions 2253 (ES-V), 2254 (ES-V) and Security Council resolution 162 (1961), as well as to his position on the General Armistice Agreement between Israel and Jordan as stated in the introduction to his annual report 16 June 1966-15 June 1967.

311. The Secretary-General noted that so far there had been no reply from the Government of Israel to his note of 20 April.

N. Consideration by the Council at the 1416th to 1426th meetings (27 April to 21 May 1968)

312. At its 1416th meeting, on 27 April 1968, the Council included the Jordanian complaint in its agenda and invited the representatives of Israel and Jordan, at their request, to take places at the Council table.

313. The representative of Jordan stated that his Government had requested an urgent meeting of the Council to forestall a situation fraught with danger, which might have repercussions far beyond the immediate area. The planned parade, the representative of Jordan said, was only one visible aspect of Israel's plans to annex Jerusalem in defiance of General Assembly resolutions of 4 and 14 July 1967, which had declared invalid measures taken by Israel to change the status of Jerusalem and had called upon Israel to rescind such measures and to desist forthwith from taking any action to alter the status of the City.

314. He quoted passages from the Secretary-General's report of 12 September 1967 (S/8146) on

the situation in Jerusalem to the effect that Israel authorities had made it clear to the Secretary-General's Representative, Mr. Ernesto Thalmann, that they were taking every step to place under Israel's authority those parts of Jerusalem not under its control before June 1967, and had stated that the process of integration was "irreversible and not negotiable". The Israel authorities had been busy consolidating their gains by applying repressive measures against the Arab inhabitants, confiscating and bulldozing Arab property and uprooting thousands of Arab people from their homes. Arab leaders and people from all walks of life had protested those measures and rejected the steps taken by Israel authorities to annex Jerusalem.

315. Israel, the representative of Jordan continued, had no valid claim to Jerusalem. As regards some of the religious shrines, his delegation had recently drawn the Council's attention to the report of the Commission appointed by the United Kingdom Government with the approval of the Council of the League of Nations, to determine the rights and claims of the Moslems and Jews in connexion with the Western or Wailing Wall at Jerusalem (S/8427/Add.1), which had found, among other things, that the Wailing Wall and the surrounding area were Moslem property. Thus, the legal facts, the representative of Jordan continued, clearly showed that recent Israel measures were naked aggression and made nonsense of Israel's allegations that they were simply administrative measures.

316. As for the planned military parade, with heavy military equipment in excess of that allowed by the Armistice Agreement, it constituted a provocative act, a breach of the Armistice Agreement and a violation of Security Council resolution 162 (1961) of 11 April 1961, which had endorsed the decision of the Israel-Jordan Mixed Armistice Commission of 20 March 1961. He hoped that the Security Council would take more effective measures this time and, as a first step, call on Israel not to hold the parade.

317. The representative of Israel asserted that the Jordanian complaint was an attempt to create new tensions and misunderstanding, and constituted in effect a complaint about the celebration of Israel's independence, the reconstruction of synagogues and houses of learning destroyed by Jordan in the Jewish Quarter of Jerusalem, and the restoration of the Western Wall of King Solomon's Temple free from slums, dirt and profanation. Jordan's objection was not to the parade, but to what it stood for: Israel's existence, its liberty, and its defeat of Arab aggression. Instead of joining the United Nations efforts to guide the nations of the Middle East towards a just and lasting peace, Jordan asked for a return to the Armistice Agreements, which no longer existed because the Arabs had destroyed them by the military attack on Israel on 5 June 1967. Israel's relations with the Arab States were now founded upon, and were regulated by, the cease-fire established by the Security Council, and within the cease-fire area Israel forces were free to move, act and parade as they saw fit. The Assembly resolutions of 4 and 14 July 1967 had referred to the legislation which Israel had adopted in June 1967 and were not aimed at preventing military parades in the city, nor were they intended to paralyse construction in Jerusalem.

318. Continuing, the representative of Israel charged Jordan with concocting unfounded allegations about housing development in Jerusalem and asserted that most of the land involved in the reconstruction projects

was Jewish-owned and public domain and that the undertaking was one of normal urban development. Divided for nineteen years because of Jordanian aggression, Jerusalem was again united, the Holy Places were protected, restoration was in progress and life was normal and peaceful in a city where a quarter of a million Jews and 70,000 Arabs mingled in growing understanding.

319. In conclusion, the representative of Israel said that the present situation called for a clear, unequivocal summons to disavow belligerency, terminate warfare, and move onward to peace.

320. The representative of the United Kingdom stated that his Government stood firmly by its statements and votes in the General Assembly and in the Council on the future of Jerusalem. As for the military parade, his delegation applied only one test: whether or not it would increase tensions and adversely affect current efforts to find a peaceful and permanent settlement. In the opinion of his delegation, the Council should discourage any action which made a peaceful settlement more difficult and might lead to greater bitterness or conflict.

321. At the 1417th meeting, on 27 April 1968, the representative of Algeria said that only the gravest consequences could be expected from Israel's military parade in Jerusalem. A greater danger was that Zionism, which based its ambitions on a fanciful interpretation of the Bible, gave a would-be religious nature to new steps towards complete annexation. Adding a religious conflict to a political-military situation would give the present conflict an implacable character. Moreover, the planned parade violated all United Nations resolutions on Jerusalem since 1948. It had become obvious that Israel's refusal to implement the resolutions, particularly those of 4 and 14 July 1967, reflected once again its contempt for its international obligations. Israel might want peace some day, but only when it had satisfied its territorial ambitions and filled the annexed territories with immigrants. Therefore, self-defence to escape extermination was the understandable and legitimate reaction of the people of Palestine. It was the duty of the Council, above all, to condemn and put an end to Israel's backward policy. The Council must immediately forbid any aggravation of the situation by the annexation of Jerusalem and any acts of deliberate provocation.

322. The representative of Hungary stated that the policy of Israel towards Jerusalem illustrated the kind of peace and coexistence Israel offered to its Arab neighbours. By gradually shifting its governmental organs to Jerusalem, Israel had begun to erode the Israel-Jordan Armistice Agreement of 1949. The process of annexation, which had begun when the Israel forces moved across the Demarcation Line in June 1967, had been continued by the demolition of Arab tenements, the appropriation of Arab land and the forced resettlement of Israel citizens in the Jordanian part of Jerusalem in violations of General Assembly resolutions 2253 (ES-V) and 2254 (ES-V). The argument advanced by Israel that the Armistice Agreement, and all resolutions based thereon, was null and void could not be accepted by any Member of the Organization. Only by mutual consent—of which Israel had never informed the Council—might the parties to the Agreement revise or suspend it.

323. In conclusion, the representative of Hungary stated that Israel was openly violating the United

Nations Charter by trying to annex territory of another Member State of the Organization, including the City of Jerusalem, and arrogantly planning to hold a provocative military parade. Such an attitude could not be tolerated by the Security Council which should condemn Israel's policy and demand that it accept and implement without delay the provisions of the Armistice Agreement, the earlier resolutions of the Security Council, especially resolution 162 (1961), and General Assembly resolutions 2253 (ES-V) and 2254 (ES-V). The Council should call upon Israel to desist from taking any action which might violate those decisions.

324. The representative of Senegal stated that, in the view of his Government, Israel evacuation of the occupied territories was the first step towards the peaceful solution of the grievous problem of the Middle East. Israel was, of course, aware that military parades were considered an act of sovereign power. For that reason and because of the provocative nature of the parade, his Government urgently appealed to Israel to refrain from any act which could further aggravate the already tense situation in the Middle East. The holding of the parade east of the Demarcation Line was a deliberate violation of important provisions of the Armistice Agreement. His Government proclaimed its solidarity with the Arab peoples in general and, in particular, with Jordan on the question before the Council. His delegation would associate itself with any proposal forbidding Israel to hold the parade.

325. The representative of Ethiopia declared that the intended parade in Jerusalem was the kind of action that could aggravate the explosive situation in the Middle East. His delegation agreed with the Secretary-General's assessment that the parade would increase tensions and would have an adverse effect on the current efforts to find a peaceful settlement of the problems in the Middle East and it therefore endorsed the Secretary-General's wise call for moderation addressed to the Government of Israel. His delegation also joined other Council members in their appeal to the Government of Israel to abandon its plans for the parade.

326. The representative of Canada said that he wished to emphasize the position taken by Canada in the General Assembly in July 1967: that the question of Jerusalem and the Holy Places could not be considered or resolved as an isolated issue. His Government was opposed to any unilateral actions regarding Jerusalem which would be prejudicial to the legitimate international concern about that city, to the preservation of special spiritual and religious interests there, or to the settlement sought by Ambassador Jarring. His delegation could not condone any steps which would alter the status of Jerusalem or endanger the prospects for a peaceful and agreed settlement. In the present circumstances, the planned parade was inevitably provocative and was bound to raise tensions. By implication, it seemed to prejudice the future of Jerusalem. Canada regretted Israel's decision to hold the parade, and particularly the decision to route it through the part of Jerusalem occupied by Israel during the June 1967 fighting.

327. The representative of France said that although it was understandable that Israel should wish to commemorate the anniversary of its independence, the planning of the parade through a sector of Jerusalem occupied by Israel forces after the events of June 1967 could not but be considered as part of a policy which, ever since the June conflict, had been characterized by similarly inspired actions. At its fifth emergency

special session, the General Assembly, in its two resolutions 2253 (ES-V) and 2254 (ES-V), had dealt with the measures adopted by Israel on 29 June to "unify" Jerusalem. His delegation, the representative of France continued, had voted for both resolutions and the French Government had stated that it could not recognize the measures taken by Israel in defiance of those resolutions. Those actions not only seemed illegal but they could aggravate tension and add to the complexity of a problem which must be solved peacefully. His delegation did not doubt the assurances given by the Israel authorities that they would take measures to protect and ensure free access by all to the Holy Places. However, the basic question was that of sovereignty. The future of Jerusalem could not be determined unilaterally; it directly concerned Jordan, as well as the international community, for the Holy City of three religions must cease to be an element of discord and become a symbol of peace.

328. The representative of India said that Israel must desist from all measures tending to aggravate the serious situation prevailing in the area. The proposed military parade could only exacerbate existing tensions and further vitiate the atmosphere. It was incumbent upon the Council to take the immediate, although interim, step of calling on Israel to desist from holding the parade.

329. The representative of Paraguay said the parade to celebrate Israel's independence could only introduce further dangerous elements into the existing situation and render more difficult the delicate peace mission entrusted to the Secretary-General and his Special Representative. Therefore, his delegation considered that the military parade should not be held, and trusted that Israel would heed its appeal.

330. The representative of Pakistan declared that there could be no doubt that the parade, if held, would seriously set back the process of achieving a peaceful settlement of the situation in the Middle East. The Council, therefore, would be remiss in its duty if it did not call upon Israel in the plainest language to refrain from holding the parade. On behalf of the delegations of India, Senegal and Pakistan, he introduced the following draft resolution (S/8563):

"The Security Council,

"Having heard the statements of the representatives of Jordan and Israel,

"Having considered the Secretary-General's note (S/8561),

"Recalling its resolution 162 (1961) of 11 April 1961,

"Considering that the holding of a military parade in Jerusalem will aggravate tensions in the area and will have an adverse effect on a peaceful settlement of the problems in the area,

"1. Calls upon Israel to refrain from holding the military parade in Jerusalem which is contemplated for 2 May 1968;

"2. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the implementation of this resolution."

331. After commending the draft resolution to the Council, the representative of Pakistan recalled that, by its resolution 162 (1961), the Council had forbidden a military parade by Israel even though that parade was to take place on the Israel side of the Armistice

Demarcation Line in Jerusalem and even though the situation then was far less explosive than today. At that time, the crucial question had been how the military parade would affect public feelings, the Armistice Agreements and the attitudes of the parties concerned towards those agreements. The situation now was even more crucial. Moreover, the Pakistan delegation regarded the question of the status of the City of Jerusalem as of supreme importance.

332. The representative of China observed that, although normally there was nothing unusual about holding a parade to celebrate a national holiday, in the present circumstances a military parade in Jerusalem could not fail to arouse resentment in Jordan. Moreover, the legal status of the area in which the parade was to be held was directly at issue. His delegation therefore regarded the Secretary-General's note to Israel of 20 April a timely warning, and joined in the appeal to Israel to refrain from any provocative act.

333. The President, speaking as the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, said that the provocative intent of the Government of Israel to hold a military parade in the Arab part of Jerusalem was yet another confirmation of the expansionist policies of Israel. It was an attempt to support, by a display of military might, illegal aspirations of Israel in respect of the Arab part of Jerusalem, in a new defiance of the Charter. Israel continued to ignore Council resolutions 162 (1961), 2253 (ES-V) and 2254 (ES-V) and by its actions, particularly by the decision to stage the parade, had demonstrated that it was not even thinking of leaving the Arab part of Jerusalem. The Secretary-General's note to Israel, he said, reflected the concern of the overwhelming majority of the Members of the Organization. The Council must urgently demand that Israel desist from carrying out its military parade in Jerusalem, and specifically in the Arab section of that city. His delegation would give its full support to the three-Power draft resolution. Should Israel not comply with it, further measures would have to be considered. Events in Jerusalem and the other occupied Arab lands were signs of the grave situation which Israel was deliberately creating in the Middle East, as well as additional confirmation of the fact that so long as the troops of Israel did not leave the territories of the Arab States which Israel had seized, there would be no peace in the region.

334. The representative of Jordan, replying to the statement of Israel said, *inter alia*, that no one shared the view advanced by the representative of Israel that the Armistice Agreement was a ghost. The Secretary-General had stated that neither the Council nor the Assembly had indicated that the validity and applicability of the Armistice Agreements had been changed by the recent hostilities or the war of 1956, and that there was no provision in them for unilateral termination of their application. Moreover, the representative of Israel contradicted his own Foreign Minister who had previously stated that Israel regarded the Armistice Agreement as permanent, and that the fact that certain mutual claims remained unsettled in no way affected its existence or caused the breakdown of the Armistice system.

335. Following further statements in exercise of the right of reply made by Israel and Jordan, the Security Council, at the request of the representative of the United States, held a brief recess for the purposes of consultation on the three-Power draft resolution.

336. As a result of the consultations, the second preambular paragraph of the three-Power draft resolution was modified by the addition of the words "particularly his note to the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations", following the reference to the Secretary-General's note; and the third preambular paragraph, referring to resolution 162 (1961), was deleted.

Decision: *At the 1417th meeting, on 27 April 1968, the draft resolution (S/8563), as modified, was adopted unanimously (resolution 250 (1968)).*

337. Following the vote, the representative of Israel stated that his delegation could not accept the resolution advising Israel not to hold the parade because under the cease-fire the matter fell within Israel's internal jurisdiction.

338. The representative of Jordan expressed satisfaction that the Council had taken prompt action on the first part of his Government's complaint. The Council, he said, was still seized with the second part of his complaint which was the situation in Jerusalem.

339. In a letter dated 30 April 1968 addressed to the Secretary-General (S/8565), the Foreign Minister of Israel stated that, after giving careful attention to the Secretary-General's cable transmitting Security Council resolution 250 (1968) of 27 April 1968, and to his report to the Security Council of 26 April, it was his Government's considered judgement that the ceremony of 2 May need not and would not have the adverse effects predicted in some quarters. Jordan's objections, he asserted, were based on implacable hostility, not on disinterested concern for regional peace, and its aim was to create, not to alleviate, tension. The tension in the area sprang not from peaceful ceremonies within the cease-fire line, but from terrorist acts across it.

340. In a letter dated 1 May addressed to the Secretary-General (S/8568), the representative of Jordan complained that Israel policemen had mistreated a group of Arab women in Jerusalem who were trying to submit a petition to the Israel authorities protesting against the proposed military parade. Attached to the letter of the representative of Jordan were photographs of the incident, together with a copy of the petition in question.

341. At its 1418th meeting, on 1 May, the Council, on the suggestion of the representative of Algeria, agreed, without objection, to add to the provisional agenda the report of the Secretary-General under General Assembly resolution 2254 (ES-V) relating to Jerusalem (S/8146).

342. The representative of Jordan said that his Government had requested him, as a matter of urgency, to inform the Council that it had irrefutable evidence that the Israel authorities intended to hold the parade despite the Council resolution of 27 April. His Government appealed to the Council to do everything possible to prevent further deterioration of the already explosive situation. Israel's defiance of the Council's decision made it clear that Israel was deliberately and premeditatedly obstructing all efforts to find a peaceful settlement of the problems of the area. Yet, he asserted, some Powers for reasons of political expediency were reluctant to help the Council take adequate measures. If the efforts of the Secretary-General's Special Representative were to be strengthened, it would be necessary to prevent violations leading to a change of the *status quo* in Jerusalem.

343. The representative of Israel, after reading out the text of the reply of 30 April 1968 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel to the Secretary-General, remarked that the Council should give greater weight to its resolutions and those of the General Assembly on vital questions of peace in the Middle East which Jordan and other Arab States had refused to implement than to the matter of the parade.

344. The representative of Algeria said that a new *fait accompli* was taking shape; by one gradual measure after another, the Tel Aviv authorities were imposing what, in their view, should be the final status of Jerusalem. Although no spectacular measures had yet been applied by Israel, the Council was progressively but ineluctably witnessing a qualitative change in the status of Jerusalem. It would be deplorable, the representative of Algeria continued, if the Council reacted only when the Zionist authorities annexed the city. The Council must ensure respect for its decisions. It must condemn Israel for its defiance of the 27 April resolution and then consider what further measures should be taken.

345. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that, in his letter of 30 April, the Foreign Minister of Israel had attempted to justify the military parade by pointing out that it would take place at a considerable distance from the cease-fire line and would not increase tension in the area. None of the members which had voted for the resolution of 27 April, he said, would agree with that interpretation. Such assertions, connected with the calculations of the Government of Tel Aviv to consider the cease-fire line as a final frontier between Israel and Jordan, could only be viewed as a new instance of the expansionist policy, which regarded the occupied part of Jerusalem as Israel territory. The Council, basing itself on the provisions of the General Assembly resolutions of 4 and 14 July, must categorically reject such an interpretation. The Foreign Minister also failed to state officially that it was his Government's, as well as the Council's, objective to secure a peaceful settlement. Furthermore, as in previous official documents, nothing was said about recognition and implementation, including the withdrawal of troops from Arab territory, of the Security Council resolution of 22 November.

346. The Council, the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said, should demand that Israel stop its lawless actions in Jerusalem and abide by United Nations resolutions. The Soviet Union was ready to take part in any measures which the Council as a whole, including its permanent members, might find necessary to take in order to curb the aggressor.

347. The representative of the United States said that his Government had repeatedly expressed its concern about the status of Jerusalem and had pointed out that a just settlement of the city's status was inseparably linked to other aspects of the problems which still defied solution. That was, he said, the clear import of the resolution unanimously adopted on 22 November 1967. Peace would not and could not be achieved by a patchwork of resolutions dealing with one or another symptom of tension and discord in the Middle East. Such a piecemeal approach had been tried time and again, and it had failed. He feared the Council was on the verge of drifting again into the same situation. The main concern of the Council should be to foster the success of Ambassador Jarring's mission to achieve a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. The Council could not impose the terms of a peace settlement on

the parties; it was the parties themselves, as envisaged in the 22 November resolution, which should engage in a peace-making process with the help of a United Nations representative. Only thus could the Council succeed in replacing relations based on the premise of a temporary respite in hostilities by relations based on mutual tolerance and willingness to accept one another and to live in permanent peace.

348. In a further statement, the representative of Israel said that his Government, in statements to Ambassador Jarring, had declared its acceptance of the 22 November resolution by the promotion of agreement on the establishment of a just and durable peace. He reaffirmed that Israel was willing to seek agreement with each Arab State on all matters included in that resolution. It had accepted Mr. Jarring's proposal for a meeting with each of its neighbours under his auspices. No Arab State had yet accepted that proposal; instead, they still subscribed to the Khartoum declaration: "No negotiations with Israel, no recognition of Israel, and no peace with Israel".

349. At the 1419th meeting, on the morning of 2 May, the Security Council adjourned, following a statement by the Secretary-General to the effect that the parade had been held as scheduled and that he would shortly submit a report on the question.

350. In a report of 2 May (S/8567) submitted in compliance with resolution 250 (1968), the Secretary-General informed the Council with regret that the parade had taken place in Jerusalem as scheduled, having been held in the area east of the Armistice Demarcation Line for approximately two hours and ten minutes. As far as he knew, there had been no incidents, but in the absence of United Nations observers, it was not possible to provide fully verified information. However, from information received from various sources, the main equipment and personnel for the parade were said to have been concentrated in the eastern part of Jerusalem, as were the main reviewing stand and the spectators' stands. Attached to the report were excerpts from an article in the *Jerusalem Post* listing the units, vehicles and equipment for the parade.

351. At the 1420th meeting of the Council, on 2 May, the President read out the text of the following draft resolution which had resulted from consultations among the members of the Council:

"The Security Council,

"Noting the Secretary-General's reports of 26 April (S/8561) and 2 May 1968 (S/8567),

"Recalling resolution 250 (1968) of 27 April 1968,

"Deeply deplores the holding by Israel of the military parade in Jerusalem on 2 May 1968 in disregard of the unanimous decision adopted by the Council on 27 April 1968."

Decision: *At the 1420th meeting, on 2 May, the draft resolution was adopted unanimously (resolution 251 (1968)).*

352. The representative of Israel stated that the parade had not violated any principle of international law, had created no new situation and had endangered no lives. It had been a parade of thanksgiving and deliverance after twenty years of Arab aggression.

353. The representative of Jordan said that since the Council was now to turn to the discussion on the

situation in Jerusalem it would be very helpful if the Council would invite Mr. Rouhi El-Khatib, the elected Mayor of Jerusalem, to appear before the Council in order to supply the Council with information under rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council.

354. At the 1421st meeting of the Council, on 3 May, the President drew attention to a letter of 2 May (S/8570) from the representative of Jordan, in which Jordan requested that the elected Mayor of Jerusalem, Mr. Rouhi El-Khatib, be invited to appear before the Council under rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure. The President stated that following consultations with the members of the Council it was agreed that Mr. Rouhi El-Khatib should be heard by the Council under rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure. He would proceed accordingly, if there was no objection.

355. The representative of Algeria said that his delegation understood that Mr. El-Khatib was being invited in his capacity as the elected Mayor of Jerusalem. That was in accordance with rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure. He stressed that the competence of Mr. El-Khatib to appear before the Council arose from the fact that he was the elected Mayor of Jerusalem.

356. The President replied that he did not consider it necessary or desirable for the Council to pronounce itself on that point. The agreement he had obtained from the members of the Council was that Mr. Rouhi El-Khatib should be invited in accordance with rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure. He would proceed accordingly.

357. Following a brief procedural discussion, during the course of which the representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Pakistan and Hungary associated themselves with the views expressed by the representative of Algeria, the President invited Mr. El-Khatib to take a place at the Council table and address the Council.

358. Mr. El-Khatib charged that during the first three weeks of the occupation, the Israel authorities had spread terror throughout the city, looting, mistreating anyone showing dissatisfaction and arbitrarily gaoling hundreds and thousands for unlimited periods. In the Magharba Quarter, the Israel authorities, he said, had bulldozed 135 houses which belonged to the North African Moslem communities, causing the inhabitants to scatter. Israel authorities and Jewish religious bodies had also directed a campaign against the inhabitants of the neighbouring area of the Western Wall of the El-Aksa Mosque, legally proved to be Moslem property. That campaign had later been extended to cover wider areas in the heart of the Moslem quarters and, to some extent, the houses standing in the old Jewish quarter, 80 per cent of which was Arab property. The inhabitants had been given notice by Israel religious bodies, confirmed by army authorities, to evacuate the area within three days. On 27 June 1967, the Israel authorities, he said, had issued a decree of death to the Arab status of Jerusalem by passing an act announcing the annexation of Arab Jerusalem to Israel, and on 29 June a Military Defence Order had dissolved the Arab Municipal Council and dismissed the Mayor and members of the Council.

359. Since then, Mr. El-Khatib continued, the situation in Arab Jerusalem had deteriorated. The Israel authorities had taken one carefully planned and quickly

executed measure after another. Israel had subjected Arab Jerusalem to Israel civil laws and regulations and had imposed its educational system. The "Law of the Properties of Absentees", entitling the Israel authorities to expropriate all property of so-called absentee Arabs, had swallowed much of the Arab property in the area and was one of the means devised to liquidate the Palestine case. He spoke of two construction projects which the Israel authorities intended to carry out on recently seized Arab lands in Jerusalem which, he said, would have the effect of separating the Arabs of Jerusalem from those in adjoining Arab towns and villages. The effects of the war, the closing of Arab banks, the unbearable conditions imposed by the Israel authorities for restoring their operations, and the steady drop in the tourist industry had reduced Arab employment by more than 50 per cent. More than 8,000 people, Mr. El-Khatib said, had had to leave the city and cross the Jordan River. Every Arab in Jerusalem, he asserted, had only one choice: either to stay and live in misery or leave. Israel, he charged, refused to implement the Council's resolution of 14 June 1967 which called on Israel to ensure the safety and welfare of the inhabitants of the areas of military operations and to facilitate the return of the inhabitants who had fled after the outbreak of hostilities in June 1967. The claim by Israel that most of the land involved in the reconstruction projects was Jewish-owned and in the public domain was, he said, untrue. Official records in the Department of Land Registry in Jerusalem showed clearly that Jewish organizations and individuals owned less than 8 per cent of the total area seized, the Government of Jordan owned less than 1 per cent, and 91 per cent belong to Arab individuals, families and companies in Jerusalem. The construction of the new Israel quarter, and the others to follow, confirmed the grounds for the Arabs' anxiety that Israel was planning and working to consolidate expansion and to change the character of Jerusalem.

360. In conclusion, Mr. El-Khatib said that the Arabs of Jerusalem resolutely opposed all measures of the Israel occupying authorities for the "unification" of the two sectors of the City under Israel sovereignty. They proclaimed to the whole world that this annexation, sometimes camouflaged as "administrative measures", was carried out against their will.

361. The representative of Hungary said that his delegation had made it clear that in its view the status of Jerusalem was regulated by the General Armistice Agreement which remained valid, until modified or suspended by its two signatories, and contained no provision for unilateral renunciation which Israel sought, regrettably with the support of a Great Power, which had openly espoused the maintenance of the territorial integrity of all Middle Eastern States. To effect the desired changes in the status of Jerusalem, Israel, contrary to the principles of the United Nations Charter, had used force and attempted to explain its anachronistic approach by claims about acquired rights to Jerusalem on historic grounds. But what, he asked, were the criteria for choosing Israel as the allegedly rightful owner of the city over other peoples who had controlled Jerusalem before or after the Jewish State? What would happen to all frontiers were such standards to be applied to determine the territory of modern States? He rejected the claim of the representative of Israel to speak on behalf of the "Jewish people" and stressed that no representative is entitled to speak in the Council on behalf of citizens of other States. His

delegation remained convinced that compliance with Security Council resolution 242 of 22 November 1967 and the two resolutions adopted at the fifth emergency special session of the General Assembly was the only possible way to solve the problem of Jerusalem and peace in the Middle East.

362. The representative of Israel rejected the charges made by Jordan and referred to the report submitted by the Secretary-General on 12 September 1967, in which Mr. Thalmann, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, had stated that he had been struck by the great activity and the mingling of Jews and Arabs in Jerusalem where uniforms were few and weapons fewer. He had also reported that the Arab personnel of the Old City had been absorbed in the equivalent departments in the Israel municipality.

363. The situation, the representative of Israel continued, had improved further since Mr. Thalmann's report. Public services and schools were operating normally. No changes had been made in the curriculum of Arab schools; in municipal schools, the curriculum current in Israel's Arab schools, which included studies in Arab history and Islam, was followed. All Moslem and Christian institutions were pursuing their activities without hindrance under the same leadership. As the Foreign Minister of Israel had pointed out in his letter of 30 April 1967 to the Secretary-General, Israel was deeply aware of the universal interest in Jerusalem and had reaffirmed its willingness to work for formal settlements satisfactory to the Christian, Moslem and Jewish faiths.

364. Continuing, the representative of Israel said that Mr. El-Khatib was not an elected mayor, but an appointee of the Government of Jordan, and a member of the National Council of the Palestine Liberation Army. He charged that as an agent of the Government of Jordan, Mr. El-Khatib had continued to promote tension and public unrest after the cease-fire and to act as an intermediary for the transmission of directives and instructions from Amman and the transfer and distribution of funds for promoting breaches of public order. He had been ordered to cross the cease-fire line. He pointed out that the plan to develop the Jewish quarter involved an area which Jordan had destroyed in 1948 and allowed to degenerate into a slum. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and other bodies had stressed the need for urban development in the area. Another urban development project concerned the area of Neveh Yaacov in the northern part of East Jerusalem, a village razed to the ground by the Jordanian Army in 1948. Most of the land involved was Jewish property or in the public domain, and all private claimants would be compensated.

365. In conclusion, the representative of Israel stressed that Israel's aim remained to live in peace with its neighbours. That aim could be achieved, but only if warfare by terror, warfare by threat and warfare in the international organizations stopped.

366. The representative of Jordan declared that the issue before the Council was the violation by Israel of the Council's resolution of 22 November which emphasized the inadmissibility of territorial gains by force and of the two General Assembly resolutions declaring that the status of Jerusalem should not be changed. The aim of the representative of Israel, he said, was to confuse the issue and to use the Council as a forum for fund-raising in the United States. As for

Mr. El-Khatib, the representative of Jordan said that in Jordan all members of the Municipal Council were elected by the people and the Government then appointed one of them as Mayor of the city.

367. At the 1422nd meeting, on 6 May, the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics stated that the information before the Council showed that Israel continued a policy of arbitrariness and violence towards the Arab population in the occupied part of Jerusalem. The Government of Israel, in defiance of the United Nations, had issued a number of statements demonstrating its intention to Israelize the occupied part of Jerusalem and to deprive the city of its Arab personality; it had followed them by the illegal action the Mayor of Jerusalem had described. The occupation of Arab lands and the persecution of the Arab population were acts of aggression. The rulers of Israel and their imperialist protectors, he contended, were entirely responsible for the delay in reaching a political settlement in the Middle East. It was the Council's duty to demand that Israel cease such illegal acts. In accordance with the United Nations Charter, the Council should take all necessary measures to eliminate the obstacles to a political settlement, the primary condition for which was the immediate withdrawal of Israel troops from all the occupied Arab territories in accordance with the Council's resolution of 22 November. The Soviet Union would continue to render all possible support and assistance to the Arab countries in their just struggle for the elimination of the consequences of Israel aggression.

368. The representative of Pakistan stated that the letter of the Foreign Minister of Israel had failed to explain why Israel's ceremony of thanksgiving should take the form of a massive display of military might. Moreover, the letter had not even mentioned the resolution of 27 April 1968. Apart from that, there were two fallacies in the letter: first, the issue was not whether the provocative parade was within or across the cease-fire line, but Israel's right to flaunt its military might in a city over which it had no sovereignty and whose status it was specifically asked not to alter; second, the letter was based on the premise that, by virtue of its military power and its victory, Israel was entitled to act without regard for the Security Council or the conscience of mankind as voiced by the General Assembly. Compliance with the Council's 27 April resolution would have entailed no sacrifice of Israel's interests or claims. Israel was simply asked to abstain from a provocative act and show respect for world opinion. Its refusal to exercise even that modicum of restraint revealed its attitude towards the issues of war and peace.

369. Continuing, the representative of Pakistan referred to the General Armistice Agreement, General Assembly resolutions 181 (II), 194 (III), 303 (IV), 2253 (ES-V) and 2254 (ES-V), all of them prohibiting any attempt by Israel to establish sovereignty over Jerusalem. Those instruments were reinforced by the expressed will of the population of the Old City of Jerusalem, as stated in the report of the Secretary-General under General Assembly resolution 2254 (ES-V). Israel, the representative of Pakistan asserted, was deliberately trying to obfuscate the issue by presenting a wholly subjective interpretation and injecting into the discussion the elements of a mystique and the assertion of an elemental primordial right. The delegation of Pakistan, which had the greatest respect for Judaism and for its sentiments towards Jerusalem,

did not think it permissible to cite that religion and culture and invoke its memories in order to justify wholly illegal acts which indicated a complete rejection of the decisions of the United Nations. The representative of Israel had tried to show that Jerusalem had not been Arab. What else had it been since the seventh century? The arguments advanced by the representative of Israel did not bear on the issues of international peace and security, which demanded effective measures from the Council. If the drift towards disaster in the Middle East, the representative of Pakistan said, was to be halted, the Council must call on Israel to respect the General Assembly resolutions concerning Jerusalem, rescind all measures to alter its status, and refrain from such actions in the future.

370. At the 1423rd meeting, on 7 May, the representative of Jordan, refuting Israel's charge that the West Bank had been taken by Jordan through conquest, said that the will of the Arab people of Jerusalem had been expressed in numerous statements, demonstrations and protests which called for the rescission of the annexation of Jerusalem, the immediate withdrawal of Israel, and the re-establishment of the unity of Jordan. The refusal of the Municipal Council to recognize the annexation and co-operate with the usurping régime was sufficient proof. The people of the West Bank and the Gaza area, he declared, were one in their determination to reject and oppose the occupation. The punitive measures taken by the Israel authorities against the Arab population answered all the falsifications made by the representative of Israel. The Council resolution 237 (1967) called upon the Government of Israel to ensure the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of the area; however, the orders and decrees issued by the Israel Defence Army defied that resolution. He cited cases of arbitrary arrest, expulsion and other violations of human rights. He urged the Council to condemn Israel's measures changing the status of Jerusalem if justice and peace were to be restored in the area.

371. The representative of Israel said that while the Council debate went on, Jordanian artillery was shelling Israel villages and farms and sabotage raids continued with the participation of ever larger commando units. He described a recent clash between commando units and an Israel patrol in which, he said, the saboteurs, who had worn Egyptian army uniforms and appeared to belong to Egyptian regular units, had been killed. Israel came to the Council to plead with it to stop those persistent violations of the cease-fire, which were a direct threat to the hopes for a peaceful settlement. The present Jordanian complaint was but another expression of active belligerency, another attempt to thwart Israel-Arab understanding, and obstruct the Council's work to deal effectively with Arab aggression. Jerusalem was now rejuvenated after nineteen years of artificial division, and all its inhabitants were gradually joining together to rebuild it. He reiterated that Israel had no desire to exercise exclusive and unilateral control over the Holy Places; it had already taken steps to work out special arrangements with those traditionally concerned to ensure the universal character of Christian and Moslem Holy Places. There was only one way to judge conditions in East Jerusalem, he said, and that was to listen to the people, not to the bellicose pronouncements of hostile Governments and disgruntled agents of Jordanian rule. The Arab residents of Jerusalem had rejected all attempts by outside elements to prevent

Israel-Arab co-operation in the administration of the city; they adopted the attitude of joint effort for the benefit of the city. Jerusalem land registries and title deeds were available to all. Not 3,000 persons, but 160 families were evacuated from the Jewish Quarter or were moved out of the synagogue ruins; all had received alternative housing and full compensation.

372. Israel, he said, did not suggest that Jerusalem's problems had been solved. It was too much to expect that the 60,000 Arabs would love the 200,000 Jews in Jerusalem, but both groups were better off than before. Jerusalem was now a venture in coexistence.

373. At the 1424th meeting, on 9 May, the representative of the United States said that the United States position on Jerusalem was well known. His Government did not accept or recognize unilateral actions by any State in the area as altering the status of Jerusalem and had publicly stated that such unilateral measures, including expropriation of land and legislated administrative action by the Government of Israel, could not be considered other than interim and provisional, and could not affect the present international status nor prejudice the final and permanent status of Jerusalem. He stated that while the question of Jerusalem was a most important issue, it could not be realistically solved apart from other aspects of the situation in the Middle East dealt with in the resolution of 22 November, nor could it be excluded from the scope of that resolution. In the achievement of a peaceful and accepted settlement embracing all aspects of the complex Middle East problem, the parties themselves must necessarily be engaged, and the legitimate interests of all concerned must be taken into account. The resolution of 22 November was the lodestar of the journey towards peace, and the United States continued to support it unreservedly, in its entirety, and in all its parts. The best way to support the November resolution was to stress the Council's support for the peace-making efforts of the Special Representative, to call on all the parties to refrain from all actions that might prejudice Mr. Jarring's efforts and to extend to him full co-operation in carrying out that most difficult mission. The Council must preserve the unity of 22 November and the common desire for constructive action so that the peace-making process then initiated might be carried on in such a manner that the goal all hoped for would be achieved.

374. The representative of Senegal said that his Government deeply deplored Israel's failure to respect the Council's 27 April resolution. Senegal was at one with its Arab brethren and wished to help them obtain a just peace under United Nations auspices. He stressed that Senegal could never accept military occupation, much less annexation of territory. Negotiations, he said, must aim at a return to the *status quo ante* or, better still, respect for United Nations decisions. That presupposed the withdrawal of Israel troops to their previous positions. As for Jerusalem, his delegation maintained that no one had the right to challenge the status of Jerusalem. Senegal appealed to Israel to facilitate Mr. Jarring's mission and to all men of goodwill to try to find a just and lasting solution.

375. The representative of Jordan, referring to the statement by the representative of the United States, said he had not brought the question of Jerusalem before the Council for an over-all solution, but to seek certain interim measures to stop the continued violation by Israel of General Assembly resolutions 2253

(ES-V) and 2254 (ES-V) on Jerusalem, which, if continued, would make future consideration and implementation of the 22 November resolution difficult.

376. At the 1425th meeting, on 20 May, the representative of Pakistan introduced a draft resolution (S/8590), co-sponsored by Pakistan and Senegal, which he stated was the product of prolonged and careful consultations among the seven Asian, African and Latin American members of the Council. It was essentially a proposal of an interim nature which did not in any way embody a decision of the Council regarding the disposition of the city of Jerusalem but sought only to reaffirm the General Assembly's resolutions on the subject. Because of its limited scope, it did not include a call for the withdrawal of Israel's forces and other personnel from that city, but simply sought to preclude any measures or actions constituting attempts to change the status of the city. It was important, while there was still reason to entertain the hope that efforts towards a political settlement of the Middle East problem might bear fruit, that the Council do its best to prevent actions and occurrences which deepened and further complicated the conflict and rendered its resolution still more difficult.

377. The text of the draft resolution of Pakistan and Senegal (S/8590) read as follows:

"The Security Council,

"Recalling General Assembly resolutions 2253 (ES-V) and 2254 (ES-V) of 4 and 14 July 1967,

'Having considered the letter (S/8560) of the Permanent Representative of Jordan on the situation in Jerusalem and the report of the Secretary-General (S/8146),

"Having heard the statements made before the Council,

"Noting that since the adoption of the above-mentioned resolutions, Israel has taken further measures and actions in contravention of those resolutions,

"Reaffirming the established principle under the Charter of the United Nations that acquisition of territory by military conquest is inadmissible,

"1. Deplores the failure of Israel to comply with the General Assembly resolutions mentioned above;

"2. Considers that the legislative and administrative measures and actions, including expropriation of land and properties thereon, taken by Israel are invalid and cannot change the legal status of Jerusalem;

3. Urgently calls upon Israel to rescind all measures already taken and to desist forthwith from taking any further action which tends to change the status of Jerusalem;

"4. Requests the Secretary-General to report urgently to the Security Council on the measures taken by Israel in implementation of the present resolution;

"5. Decides to remain seized of the matter and to consider the question further in the light of the Secretary-General's report."

378. At the 1426th meeting, on 21 May, the representative of Pakistan submitted a revised text of the two-Power draft resolution (S/8590/Rev.2), which read as follows:

"The Security Council,

"Recalling General Assembly resolutions 2253 (ES-V) and 2254 (ES-V) of 4 and 14 July 1967,

"Having considered the letter (S/8560) of the Permanent Representative of Jordan on the situation in Jerusalem and the report of the Secretary-General (S/8146),

"Having heard the statements made before the Council,

"Noting that since the adoption of the above-mentioned resolutions, Israel has taken further measures and actions in contravention of those resolutions,

"Bearing in mind the need to work for a just and lasting peace,

"Reaffirming that acquisition of territory by military conquest is inadmissible,

"1. Deplores the failure of Israel to comply with the General Assembly resolutions mentioned above;

"2. Considers that all legislative and administrative measures and actions taken by Israel, including expropriation of land and properties thereon, which tend to change the legal status of Jerusalem are invalid and cannot change that status;

"3. Urgently calls upon Israel to rescind all such measures already taken and to desist forthwith from taking any further action which tends to change the status of Jerusalem;

"4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the implementation of the present resolution."

379. The representative of the United States stated that his Government had hoped the Council would be able to act on this issue with the same unanimity it had evidenced on other aspects of the Middle East situation since the previous June. Although his delegation shared many of the concerns of the members supporting the draft, it could not support the two-Power draft resolution because it considered, first, that the Council should encourage and support the peace-making processes initiated in Security Council resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, and second, that the Council and all concerned should avoid any action which might prejudice efforts to achieve a just and lasting peace in the area, including actions or measures purporting to alter the status of Jerusalem. The draft resolution was seriously deficient on both counts. It was essential that a peaceful and accepted settlement, in conformity with the resolution of 22 November, encompass all aspects of the Middle East problem, including Jerusalem. That seemed to be the general view among the members of the Council, yet the two-Power draft resolution unfortunately would work in the direction of isolating one part of the problem from the rest. Further, the United States was not in a position to vote favourably on a text which contained specific—and selective—reference to two General Assembly resolutions on which it had previously abstained.

380. The United States was prepared to declare that unilateral actions and measures by Israel could not be accepted or recognized as altering or prejudging the status of Jerusalem, and to call upon Israel to refrain from such actions. At the same time, his delegation believed that it was essential to call on all parties to avoid all acts that might prejudice efforts to achieve a just and lasting peace in the area and express sup-

port for Mr. Jarring's mission. It was simply incomprehensible that such a reference was not included in the draft resolution.

381. The representative of Canada stated that his Government could not condone any steps which would either alter or attempt to alter unilaterally the status of Jerusalem or endanger the prospects for a settlement. There was a consensus in the Council on those points. It had been clear from the beginning that a draft resolution like the one presented could not command unanimous support in the Council. The draft, if adopted, would be the first resolution adopted without unanimity since the November 22 resolution establishing the basis for the Special Representative's mission. It would be self-defeating to divide the Council on only one of the problems covered by the November resolution. Furthermore, adopting the draft resolution would mean starting along the road to application of sanctions in the event that Israel did not comply with its requirements. His delegation did not think it was wise for the Council to pursue that course when it was fully committed to a diplomatic approach. The Canadian delegation, therefore, would abstain in the vote.

382. The representative of Brazil said that his country had consistently supported the principle of internationalization of Jerusalem, and had not recognized any unilateral actions by Jordan or Israel to change the city's status. The problem of Jerusalem should be solved within the context of the organic solution of the Middle East problem contemplated in Security Council resolution 242 (1967). However, that did not mean that the Council should take no action or that any action on permanent principles would necessarily prejudice the Special Representative's work. On the contrary, the Council must, in the meantime, make it clear, as the Assembly already had, that it rejected any measures taken by Israel to alter the international status of Jerusalem and would not recognize changes in that status. In the light of those considerations, the Brazilian delegation would vote for the revised draft.

383. The representative of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics said that his delegation would vote for the draft, although it considered that it should be strengthened by a more decisive condemnation of the illegal expansionist acts by Israel in the Arab part of Jerusalem. Most members of the Council, including the Soviet Union, considered that by its annexationist measures with regard to the Arab part of Jerusalem, Israel had flagrantly violated the principle that the acquisition of territory by military conquest was inadmissible and contrary to the United Nations Charter. Others, notably the United States, were attempting to present the situation in such a way that the Council need not demand the rescinding of those measures, because, in their view, they were temporary and, therefore, would not affect the status of Jerusalem either now or in the future. Attempts to cover up the illegal activities of the aggressor, the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said, amounted to encouraging it to commit further acts of aggression. The argument that adoption of the draft resolution might hinder the implementation of the Jarring mission was artificial. The only obstacle to a political settlement was the policy of Israel and its supporters.

Decision: *At the 1426th meeting, on 21 May, the two-Power draft resolution (S/8590/Rev.2) was adopted by 13 votes to none, with 2 abstentions (Canada and United States) (resolution 252 (1968)).*

384. After the vote, the representative of Paraguay said that his delegation had voted for the resolution because it contributed to the preservation of the international status of Jerusalem under General Assembly resolutions.

385. The representative of Denmark said that already because of the failure to obtain unanimous support for the resolution his delegation doubted the political expediency of adopting it; however, he had voted in favour because his Government did not, in principle, disagree with its contents. Nevertheless, adopting such resolutions on isolated questions was not the proper way to accelerate a solution of the Middle East problem which must be a comprehensive one in accordance with resolution 242 (1967). The absence of any reference to that resolution in the present text was not only deplorable but also surprising.

386. The representative of Jordan thought that the resolution reaffirmed the General Assembly resolutions of 4 and 14 July 1967, as well as the principle that acquisition of territory by military conquest was inadmissible. He agreed that the resolution should have been adopted unanimously. However, the Powers that had spoken about being wise, practical and realistic, were responsible for the division in the Council.

387. The representative of Israel declared that the resolution adopted was neither practical nor reasonable. It disregarded Israel's basic rights and sought to violate the natural unity of Jerusalem and overlooked the interests and welfare of its inhabitants. He maintained that the resolution neither changed nor added to the pattern of Security Council resolutions on the situation in the Middle East, but it did add to the determination of the people of Israel to gird themselves for even greater fortitude in defence of their rights and in pursuit of peace and security.

388. The President, speaking as the representative of the United Kingdom, said that because he felt that the whole weight of the Council should be applied to the achievement of a settlement in the Middle East, he had directed every effort of argument and persuasion to a single proposition, namely, that the Council should proceed in unity on the common ground of general agreement. That common ground existed, limited but firm, and the Council could have proceeded on that basis. However, he had felt at times that not all members had put first the pursuit of an ultimate settlement. Nevertheless he trusted that the Council could now turn to its main objective in an atmosphere not of rancour, but of reason and support, and encourage and facilitate the efforts to put agreed provisions and principles into practical effect.

O. Other communications received by the Security Council before 15 July 1968

389. During and subsequent to its series of meetings held in April and May 1968, the Security Council received the following communications relating to various aspects of the situation in the Middle East:

(a) Communications relating to charges of violations of the Security Council's cease-fire orders

Letter of 8 April (S/8533) from Jordan charging that an armoured Israel battalion consisting of tanks supported by helicopters crossed the Jordan River on the morning of 8 April, entering villages south of the Dead Sea, and that Israel paratroopers landed in the area east of the cease-fire sector.

Letter of 8 April (S/8535) from Israel charging that on 8 April Jordanian forces opened fire on Israel forces across the Jordan River, that Israel patrols in the eastern Negev encountered a unit of armed saboteurs from Jordan inside Israel and pursued them to their base across the cease-fire line, and that an Israel command car was blown up by an anti-vehicle mine in the Jordan Valley.

Letter of 6 May (S/8578) from Jordan charging that during the months of January, February and March and the first week of April, Israel military aircraft violated Jordanian air space more than 100 times.

Letter of 6 May (S/8579) from Jordan charging Israel with planting anti-vehicle mines following the incident of 8 April, one of which had destroyed a car of the Jordanian Manganese Company and killed four of its passengers, and also charging further incidents on 11 April in which a military ration car was blown up, and Jordanian farmers were fired upon.

Letter of 12 May (S/8583) from Lebanon charging Israel with shelling the village of Hula on the night of 11-12 May causing casualties and heavy damage.

Letter of 14 May (S/8585) from Israel in reply to the Lebanese letter of 12 May charging that Lebanon had joined in pursuing a policy of active belligerency against Israel and that Israel villages had been shelled from Lebanese territory on 7 and 12 May.

Letter of 20 May (S/8591) from Lebanon denying the charges contained in the Israel letter of 14 May (S/8585) and charging Israel officials with expansionist ambitions for Lebanese waters and for the southern part of Lebanon.

Letter of 4 June (S/8613) from Jordan charging that in a surprise attack that day Israel forces were heavily bombing areas in Jordan, including the city of Irbid, using military aircraft, missiles and artillery and also land-to-land rockets, causing heavy casualties.

Letter of 4 June (S/8614) from Israel charging that a large-scale Jordanian assault had been taking place since that morning and that in view of the persistence and intensification of the artillery barrage it became necessary to order Israel aircraft to take action to silence the sources of fire.

Letter of 4 June (S/8615) from Israel stating that the Jordanian attacks ended at 1815 hours local time and quiet prevailed on the border, and charging that the Jordanian attack of 4 June came in the wake of a series of acts of aggression on 16 May, 25 through 31 May and 1 and 2 June.

Letter of 5 June (S/8616) from Jordan requesting an urgent meeting of the Security Council with reference to its letter of 4 June (S/8613).

Letter of 5 June (S/817) from Israel requesting an urgent meeting of the Security Council with reference to its letters of 4 June (S/8614 and S/8615).

(The letters of 5 June from Jordan and Israel were placed on the provisional agenda of the 1429th meeting of the Security Council on 5 June 1968, but the provisional agenda was not adopted by the Council at that meeting, which was devoted to statements concerning the assassination of Senator Robert F. Kennedy. The Council did not discuss these complaints during the period covered by the present report.)

Letter of 15 June (S/8637) from Israel charging that on 14 June mortar fire was opened from Lebanese territory on an Israel village in Upper Galilee.

Letter of 15 June (S/8638) from Lebanon charging that on 14 June a group of Israel armed forces crossed the borders of Lebanon and shelled a village.

Letter of 21 June (S/8649) from Jordan enclosing a list of thirty-nine incidents during the months of April and May and the first week of June in which Israel military forces engaged in attacks on the East Bank of the Jordan River.

Letter of 24 June (S/8651) from Israel charging that between 26 May and 23 June there had been sixty-eight Jordanian violations of the cease-fire, forty-nine of them attacks from military positions employing artillery, mortars, bazookas and machine-guns, eleven mining raids and eight attacks by armed commandos who had penetrated across the cease-fire line.

Letter of 10 July (S/8677 and Corr.1) from the United Arab Republic charging that Israel armed forces opened fire on that date on the city of Suez, causing heavy casualties among the civilian population.

Letter of 11 July (S/8678) from Lebanon transmitting the text of a report made to the Chairman of the Israel-Lebanese Mixed Armistice Commission concerning an investigation conducted by a United Nations military observer into the incident which took place on 11-12 May at Hula.

Supplemental information received from the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, circulated by the Secretary-General on 27 April (S/7930/Add.67 and Add.68), 22 May (S/7930/Add.69), 14 June (S/7930/Add.70), 17 June (S/7930/Add.71), 24 June (S/7930/Add.72) and 9 July (S/7930/Add.73); the reports of the United Nations military observers related to breaches of the cease-fire in the Suez Canal sector which took place on 27 April, 22 May, 14 June, 15 June, 23 June and 8 July.

(b) *Communications relating to the treatment of civil populations in the areas occupied by Israel since the outbreak of hostilities, and related matters*

Letter of 18 April (S/8550) from Syria protesting that Israel had destroyed at least 30 villages in the Golan Heights, looted private property and expelled 115,000 people from occupied Syrian territory, while continuing to establish "Nahal" colonies in the occupied territory.

Note by the Secretary-General (S/8553) dated 19 April concerning his correspondence with the Governments of Israel, Jordan, Syria and the United Arab Republic with regard to the implementation of Security Council resolution 237 (1967) and General Assembly resolution 2252 (ES-V) on humanitarian questions and the usefulness of again sending a representative to the area in order to make it possible for the Secretary-General to meet his reporting obligations under those resolutions.

Letter of 24 April (S/8558) from Israel denying the charges contained in the Syrian letter of 18 April (S/8550).

Letter of 10 May (S/8586) from Jordan transmitting a copy of a resolution adopted by the International Conference on Human Rights in Teheran on 7 May relating, *inter alia*, to the rights of inhabitants in the Middle East to return home.

Letter of 16 May (S/8588) from the United Arab Republic protesting that Israel authorities continued to violate the provisions of the Geneva Conventions

of 1949 as well as United Nations resolutions through mass destruction of homes and other buildings, eviction of 35,000 Arab inhabitants of the Gaza Strip during February, undermining the work of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency and imposing long curfews with a view "to empty the Strip".

Letter of 26 May (S/8596) from Israel referring to complaints of the United Arab Republic and charging it with using the name of the Palestinian Arabs again to camouflage its current strategy of war by sabotage and terror.

Letter of 3 June (S/8609) from Jordan charging another serious violation perpetrated by the Israel forces of occupation in Al-Khalil (Hebron) in collaboration with a group of religious Jews who tried to settle in the town.

Letter of 7 June (S/8626) from Israel rejecting the Jordanian charges of 3 June (S/8609) as magnified and distorted.

Letter of 18 June (S/8642) from Jordan transmitting articles from the British Press concerning the demolition of villages and expropriation of property in towns and villages in areas occupied by Israel since 5 June 1967.

Letter of 18 June (S/8643) from Syria charging Israel with a systematic policy of colonization in Syrian-Arab occupied territories through the establishment of Israel settlements and pressuring remaining Syrians to leave.

Letter of 27 June (S/8654) from Israel in reply to the Syrian letter of 18 June (S/8643) charging Syria with particular ferocity and viciousness in its belligerency, necessitating measures to ensure the maintenance of the cease-fire and to protect Israel from Syrian attacks.

Letter of 27 June (S/8656) from Jordan transmitting a United States press report on life in the Jordan Valley following Israel attacks.

Letter of 1 July (S/8663) from Israel referring to the Jordanian letter of 27 June (S/8656) and asserting that the incident of 4 June referred to had been a large-scale Jordanian attack on Israel villages to which Israel forces had been compelled to react in self-defence to silence the shelling.

Letter of 8 July (S/8674) from Jordan referring to the Israel letter of 1 July (S/8663) and stating that what the letter referred to as "the incident of 4 June" had been in essence an organized and premeditated aggression by Israel that had been preceded by belligerent statements and reports of a heavy Israel troop build-up.

(c) *Communications concerning the treatment of Jewish communities in Arab States*

Letter of 31 May (S/8607) from Israel concerning charges of continuing discrimination and persecution of Jews in Arab States, especially in Syria, Egypt and Iraq, and charging that a particularly serious aggravation had occurred in the situation of the Jewish community in Iraq.

Letter of 3 June (S/8610) from Iraq replying to the Israel letter of 31 May (S/8607) protesting that the contents of the letter were entirely outside the scope of the item entitled "the situation in the Middle East", asserting that Jews in Iraq enjoyed complete equality with other citizens, and charging that Israel was attempting to divert attention from the problem

of direct concern to the United Nations, namely, the plight of the Arab population in territories occupied by Israel.

Letter of 25 June (S/8653) from Israel replying to the Iraqi letter of 3 June (S/8610) and reiterating charges of discriminatory treatment and oppression of Jews in Iraq.

Letter of 27 June (S/8657) from Iraq protesting the publication as an official document of the Israel letter of 25 June (S/8653) and charging that Israel's concern was not the welfare of the Jews but the objectives of resettlement of emigrant Jews in the Arab territories occupied after 5 June 1967.

(d) *Communications relating to the situation existing in and around the city of Jerusalem and its Holy Places*

Letter of 16 April (S/8546) from Jordan concerning Israel claims, contained in the letter of 5 March (S/8439), that two thirds of appropriated land in Jerusalem was public domain or belonged to private Jewish persons; the Jordanian letter rejected that claim and attached a map which in Jordan's view showed the strategic location of the area where the Jewish community was to be established in order to serve as a barrier between the residents of the northern and southern sections of the West Bank.

Letter of 19 April (S/8552) from Jordan rejecting Israel's charges in its letter of 5 March (S/8439/Add.1) and attaching a document which, it was claimed, showed the devastation of Holy Places of other religions under twenty years of Israel occupation in Jerusalem.

Letter of 3 May (S/8571) from the United Arab Republic stating that Israel's defiance of the Security Council resolution regarding its military parade in Jerusalem jeopardized the efforts of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to achieve a peaceful settlement of the grave situation in the Middle East.

Letter of 9 May (S/8582) from Israel in reply to the United Arab Republic's letter of 3 May (S/8571) reviewing from the Israel point of view the record of the United Arab Republic regarding United Nations resolutions.

Letter of 12 June (S/8634) from Jordan drawing attention to a new Order of the Israel Finance Minister of 18 April by which more Arab lands and buildings in the Old City of Jerusalem were expropriated, all of which, it was claimed, were 100 per cent Arab-owned, with a view to replacing the expelled Arabs with Jewish residents.

Letter of 28 June (S/8661) from Israel stating that the Jordanian charges of 12 June (S/8634) had been discussed in detail in the Council and that only agreement between the parties could resolve the outstanding differences between them.

Letter of 3 July (S/8666) from Jordan referring to the Israel letter of 28 June (S/8661) and stating that new Israel appropriations should not be ignored, particularly when they constituted fresh violations of Security Council resolution 252 (1968).

Letter of 3 July (S/8667) from Jordan transmitting a United States press report concerning an Israel resettlement project in the Arab area of Jerusalem designed to eradicate the Arab character of certain areas of the city.

(e) *Communications relating to the implementation of Security Council resolutions and the situation in the Middle East in general*

Letter of 19 March (S/8479) from the United Arab Republic transmitting the statement made on 13 March by its Minister for Foreign Affairs regarding the situation in the Middle East declaring, *inter alia*, that the United Arab Republic had informed Mr. Jarring of its readiness to implement the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967.

Letter of 21 March (S/8494) from Israel transmitting excerpts from a press conference statement made on 12 March by its Minister for Foreign Affairs analysing the policy of the United Arab Republic which he asserted was "No peace, no negotiation, no recognition", and stating that Israel's policy was to seek the replacement of the cease-fire arrangements by permanent peace.

Letter of 22 March (S/8496) from Libya protesting Israel's attack on Jordan while Mr. Jarring was in the area using his good offices to bring about the implementation of the Council's resolution of 22 November 1967.

Letter of 25 March (S/8501) from Mongolia transmitting a copy of a message from the Chairman of the Presidium to King Hussein, dated 23 March, on Israel's violation of the cease-fire resolution.

Letter of 2 April (S/8528) from Italy denying the inference by Jordan at the 1409th meeting that Israel was acquiring arms and military equipment from Italy.

Letter of 23 April (S/8556) from Israel charging that the Arab Governments were continuing to wage active warfare against Israel in contravention of the cease-fire by means of armed incursions and sabotage raids supported, encouraged, supplied and directed by the Arab States acting in concert.

Letter of 24 April (S/8559) from Jordan charging that the Israel letter of 23 April (S/8556) was timed for propaganda purposes for circulation at the opening of the resumed twenty-second session of the General Assembly and designed to divert attention from the fact that the Israelis were still occupying Arab territories by force in defiance of United Nations resolutions.

Letter of 8 May (S/8581) from the United Arab Republic also rejecting the complaints in the Israel letter of 23 April (S/8556) and transmitting a list of declarations by Israel officials which it was asserted made no secret of the expansionist designs harboured by Israel towards the lands of the Arab peoples, which had naturally led to resistance by Arabs in defence of their country, their families and their property.

COMPLAINTS BY THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

LETTER DATED 3 NOVEMBER 1967, FROM THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO, ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

A. Request for a meeting of the Security Council

390. In a letter dated 3 November 1967 (S/8218), the Permanent Representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo transmitted to the President of the Security Council a letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs and External Trade of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in which it was charged that, on the evening of 1 November, an armed band of mercenaries had invaded the Congolese territory at Kisenge and was now approaching Kolwezi. Although all mercenaries had been ordered by the Congolese Government to leave the country as from July 1967, the mercenaries under Major Schramme had rebelled and occupied Bukavu, where fighting had again broken out on 29 October. Intercepted messages from Major Schramme to Angola requesting armed intervention on behalf of the mercenaries constituted irrefutable proof of Portugal's collusion with the mercenaries for the purpose of overthrowing the established order in the Congo. The letter stated that such an attitude was contrary to the obligations imposed by the Charter and a violation of the many resolutions adopted by the Security Council, especially that of 14 October 1966. The letter requested the Security Council to take the necessary measures to stop the aggression and ensure the safety of persons and property in the threatened area.

B. Consideration at the 1372nd, 1374th, 1376th and 1378th meetings (8-15 November 1967)

391. At the 1372nd meeting, on 8 November 1967, the Security Council decided to include the item in its agenda and invited, at their request, the representatives of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Portugal, Burundi, Zambia and Algeria, to participate without vote in the debate.

392. The representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo recalled that this was the third time within a year that his country had come to the Council to discuss something that was all too well known. In October 1966, the Council adopted a resolution (226 (1966)) which urged Portugal not to allow territories under its domination to be used as a base for interference in the domestic affairs of the Congo. The Council resolution followed consideration of the Congolese complaint that a mercenary training camp had been discovered in Ardèche in France. The Congo thanked the French Government for the attitude it had taken in the matter. A few months later, on 10 July 1967, the Council had had to meet again on a similar complaint.

393. Continuing, he said the present aggression had been intended to cause an uprising in the Congo and to give the mercenaries a base on the Kolwezi plain, so as to help those at Bukavu. The Congolese forces had checked the mercenary advance. He stated that the Press had provided eyewitness accounts of the presence of mercenaries and training camps in Angola. He circulated as evidence photographs of white mercenaries and former Katangese *gendarmes* in Nova Chaves, Angola. He could also show a copy of a note

from the Belgian Foreign Office, which gave details of the entry into the Congo by eighteen European mercenaries and two Katangese *gendarmes* on 1 November, and the developments following their entry. Most of the mercenaries were French, one was Colombian and one Viet-Nameese. Fighting had broken out on 2 November between the mercenaries, using machine-guns, mortars and bazookas, and the Congolese National Army. European refugees were taken to Angola and turned over to the Portuguese soldiers at Kayanda. Some were sent to Belgium by air from Angola, and others were soon to be evacuated.

394. He also cited press reports indicating that an intensive weapons traffic was being carried on between Lisbon and African areas, especially Nigeria and Angola. It was not possible that the Portuguese authorities did not know what was happening. Portugal could not deny the facts yet it continued to flout decisions of the Security Council with regrettable collusion between Portugal and some Western Governments.

395. The Democratic Republic of the Congo, he continued, was not asking for moral condemnation only but also for concrete measures against Portugal. The Council, he said, should reaffirm its previous resolutions in the matter, particularly those of 14 October 1966 and 10 July 1967. The Council should condemn the practice of mercenary recruitment which Member States should prohibit within their territories.

396. The representative of Portugal said that Portugal had nothing to do with the internal situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Despite the repeated complaints of the Government of Kinshasa against Portugal concerning mercenaries, everybody knew that the mercenaries of Kisangani and Bukavu, for example, had not come from outside, but had been serving the Congolese Government.

397. When the Congo complained to the Council against Portugal last year, Portugal had denied the charges and had offered to have the Congolese accusation investigated by the Council and by the Secretary-General. That offer was not followed up. Whenever there was trouble inside the Congo, its Government tried to throw the blame on some outsider and found Portugal a convenient target for that purpose.

398. For seven years, the Kinshasa Government had been promoting armed aggression against Portugal and had not made a secret of providing bases for use against Angola. Portugal had not paid the Congo back in its own coin for making its territory available for armed attacks against Portugal. It practised good neighbourliness, respected the territorial integrity of other States and continued to keep its transportation lines open for the Congo's external trade. Portugal had refuted point by point the accusations contained in the Congo letters of 28 July and 10 August.

399. Turning to mercenary activities inside the Congo which were linked with messages from Major Schramme said to have been apparently intercepted by the Congolese authorities, the representative of Portugal said that those messages had been intercepted, but it had not been stated to whom they were addressed.

Mischief on the part of Portugal could have only arisen if help had been sent from Angola as a result of those alleged messages. Certain news media had invented and propagated the wildest fantasies alleging an invasion of the Congo from Angola. Later, the Congolese Government no longer alleged an invasion, but an infiltration by 100 mercenaries across the Angolan border. On 3 November the Portuguese Government had officially denied the accusation made against it by the Congo. He then reiterated the invitation to have the accusations investigated by the Council on the terms indicated.

400. The representative of the United Kingdom said that the situation in the Congo was confused. It was hard to draw clear conclusions. But it was clear that mercenaries were the curse of the Congo and everything should be done to eliminate the evil so that the Congo could develop peacefully. It would be a matter of most serious concern if it could be shown that Council resolution 239 (1966) of 10 July 1966 had been flouted. Without an impartial inquiry it was difficult to know all the facts but, in spite of the statement of the representative of Portugal, it was very hard to believe that mercenaries could have been assembled and armed in Angola without the knowledge of the Portuguese authorities, whose duty it was to prevent mercenaries from attacking the Congo from Angola. He welcomed the information that the Portuguese authorities were undertaking an inquiry, but if it were established that mercenaries had entered the Congo from Angola, the Council could not fail to be gravely disturbed and all who made the mercenary attack possible would bear a heavy responsibility.

401. The representative of Ethiopia said that the serious developments reported by the representative of the Congo were but part of a greater offensive launched by the enemies of African independence. The latest manifestations of intervention and subversion were the continuation of the same actions which the United Nations had repeatedly condemned. He said that the launching pad for those activities was Angola, and the evidence was there for all to see. The Press had reported that while Portugal had denied that the mercenary force had come from Angola, the United States and other Western Powers had been accumulating evidence for weeks of its presence there. The Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity which had met recently in Kinshasa, had condemned the mercenary aggression against the Congo, and had considered the mercenary activities as a serious threat to the security of African States.

402. The problem of mercenary activities was only a ramification of more fundamental problems in southern Africa with which the United Nations had so far failed to cope effectively, namely, *apartheid* in South Africa, the rebellion of the white settlers in Rhodesia, the usurpation of an international territory in South West Africa and Portuguese colonialism. The Council should condemn the actions of Portugal and its accomplices in such criminal and illegal acts of subversion and intervention and should demand the immediate cessation of mercenary adventures once and for all.

403. The representative of the United States said that the account of the recent incursions into the Congo made by the representative of that country and the knowledge of his own delegation of the history of the mercenary problem in the Congo created a strong

presumption that the resolutions of the Council had been violated. It was very difficult for his delegation to understand how foreign mercenaries could be present in Angola, make preparations for such a misadventure and then leave Angola for the Congo without the knowledge or at least the acquiescence of the Portuguese authorities. The United States had let Portugal know its concern about that matter. He added that the mercenary problem should be eliminated, and that all countries, especially those bordering on the Congo, have the responsibility to ensure compliance with the resolutions of the Council.

404. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that the Council must act to put an end to the shameful practice of the use of mercenaries against the African States by the forces of colonialism and imperialism. The attempt of the forces of colonialism to carry out open armed intervention in the Congo was part of the imperialists' plan to prevent the young countries of Africa from enjoying their independence, availing themselves of the general state of tension in the world caused by the aggression of the United States against the Viet-Nameese people, and of Israel in the Middle East. Probably, the events in the Congo were not an isolated action by the mercenaries, but one link in the chain of a common conspiracy of imperialism which tried to thwart the movement of the peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America towards genuine national independence and freedom.

405. He asked the United Kingdom representative whether his Government's refusal to use force in Southern Rhodesia did not serve the interests of those forces which threatened the independence of African nations. Portuguese colonialism drew its strength from NATO, which furnished Lisbon weapons for its struggle against the peoples of Africa. The aim of the United States, the United Kingdom, Belgium and Portugal was to preserve the position of the monopolies through supporting Tshombé and securing the secession of Katanga. Events around the Congo also showed how the political alliance of racism and colonialism created in southern Africa with the support of the great imperialist Powers was fraught with great danger for the peoples of Africa. The Soviet Union supported the Africans in their demand that the evil forces against the Congo be condemned and the sovereignty of the African States protected in accordance with the Charter. The Council should also demand that the allies of Portugal in NATO cease their assistance and support to the Portuguese colonialists.

406. The representative of France said that his Government, although disturbed by the events in the Congo, was encouraged by the Congo's own ability to deal with the activities of the mercenaries. The French Government was gratified, because it wished for the final re-establishment in the Congo of domestic peace, stability, economic development and progress towards prosperity. The activities of the mercenaries should be put to an end. It was unthinkable that the existence of the Democratic Republic of the Congo should again be troubled without the United Nations expressing its disapprobation. It was difficult, as the representative of the Congo had stated, to present proof of what had happened, but the presumptions were serious. The Security Council must be given assurance that Portugal was taking all possible steps to prevent mercenary activities; the representative of Portugal should dispel any doubts which the Council might have on that score. France had long since taken

drastic measures to prevent the recruitment of mercenaries in its territory and to discourage adventurers. In particular, it had prohibited since 1961 any recruitment in its territory on behalf of any forces whatsoever in the Congo. Thanks to those provisions, it had been able to suppress such efforts as the opening of a clandestine training camp as referred to by the representative of the Congo. Moreover, France was ready to associate itself with any co-ordinated measures to stop the return of mercenaries to the Congo.

407. The representative of the United Kingdom, exercising his right of reply, said that if the representative of the Soviet Union could not distinguish between a condemnation of the use of force in the Congo and a reluctance to use force in Rhodesia, he could not help him. United Kingdom opposition to the use of force was consistent and in accordance with the principles and precepts of the Charter.

408. Also exercising his right of reply, the representative of the United States said that his country had helped the Congo, both bilaterally and through the United Nations, whereas the Soviet Union had supported secession in the eastern Congo and had opposed United Nations efforts to help that country. The United States was prepared for a full and open comparison of the records of the Soviet Union and its own regarding the Congo.

409. The representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in response to the statement made by the representative of Portugal, said that the Portuguese representative had denied everything with the arrogance and cynicism which was the hallmark of his country. The lack of substance in that statement had been noted by all.

410. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, exercising his right of reply, said that he did not ask for the United Kingdom's help in determining the distinction between the concepts of an open, armed intervention and invasion of a State, and what was happening in the case of the racist régime in Rhodesia and other territories with which the British Government maintained clearly defined relations. The USSR was quite able to understand what was going on. The matter was to know whether by announcing that it would not use force against the racist Southern Rhodesia régime the United Kingdom did not encourage actions by its partners, including Portugal, to undermine the independent African nations.

411. He added that the delivery of weapons from the United States and other NATO members to Portugal made it possible for the latter to use them against the African peoples fighting for their independence, and there was no indication that the United States intended to stop its support of the Lisbon régime. The Soviet Union, he said, would remind the United States, which was trying to turn history upside down, of the facts about the fight of the Congolese people against the forces of imperialism and colonialism. It must not be forgotten how much bloodshed and suffering the Congolese people had had to bear because of the attempts by imperialist forces to recover their privileges in the Congo and maintain colonial domination. An eternal reminder of that was the bloodshed by many Congolese for the sake of liberating their country and for the sake of Patrice Lumumba, who had given his life for the liberation of the Congo.

412. The representative of Portugal, in exercising his right of reply, said that it would seem that the representative of the Congo expected him to admit everything simply because the Congolese Government had made accusations. Those accusations went even further than was originally intended by the Congolese Government. In that respect, he asked the representative of the USSR to ask the Congolese representative if there were any Portuguese nationals among the mercenaries. His delegation had not simply limited itself to denying everything; it had made the constructive suggestion that the Council should undertake an investigation.

413. At the 1374th meeting, on 10 November, the representative of Portugal said that it seemed that the Congolese representative had attempted to expand the basis of the original complaint of collusion on the part of Portugal with the mercenaries to the allegation that mercenaries had come from Angola. Those allegations appeared to be based either on newspaper reports, or photographs which could have been faked. There was nothing to indicate that the figures in the photographs were mercenaries or that they were taken in Angola. The alleged letter purportedly taken from the files of the Belgian Government could also be a forgery as all Portuguese requests to examine it had been refused. Assuming the letter was authentic, it was essential to remember that it did not say that the mercenaries were Portuguese nationals or that they were sent by the Portuguese Government on their alleged mission inside the Congo. He asked whether it was proper to produce as evidence an internal document of a third Government.

414. He added that responsibility for the activities of mercenaries did not rest with Portugal but with those countries whose nationals were recruited and whose territory was used for training them. Countries concerned with the security of Congolese people might also express similar concern for the lives of Angolans threatened by infiltrating murderers sent from the Congo. The Portuguese authorities had always taken all reasonable measures to prevent unlawful activities launched against the Congo from Portuguese territory, but it was the Congolese Government that was in the best position to know and identify the mercenaries since they had first been employed by the Congolese Government. It could easily circulate lists of known mercenaries to all Governments, including the Government of Portugal, requesting that those individuals be impeded from returning to the Congo. Such a move would greatly facilitate the task of assisting the Congo in its difficulties. He said that Portugal abhorred the troubles brought on the Congo by soldiers of fortune just as much as it detested the murdering bands of terrorists sent by the Congo into Angola. These difficulties could be solved by agreeing upon mutually acceptable co-operation.

415. The representative of Burundi said that the security of his country was linked with the Congo and had itself been threatened with invasion by the mercenary chief. The Council had witnessed the daring apologies that were attempted by Portugal which tried to whitewash the acts of the mercenaries. But the denials of Lisbon were belied by documents, newspapers and in acts by Governments. Thus, the evidence against Lisbon was incontrovertible. He said that the economic survival of Portugal depended entirely on the fabulous resources of Africa and it was seeking to live for ever as a parasite. The devastation in the Congo caused by

intrusions from Angola would continue until the United Nations attacked the root of the evil by ending the presence of Portugal in Africa. Only by totally eradicating colonialism could peace and security be restored to the heart of Africa. Portugal's conduct towards the United Nations amounted to revolt, resistance and defiance of the Charter. Energetic measures of coercion were necessary against the Portuguese arsenal in Angola if targets threatened by these war preparations were to be protected. The members of the Security Council would readily agree on the necessity to set up an international organization that would be consonant with the aspirations of mankind by putting an end to egotistical attitudes which flouted the efficiency of the acts of the United Nations.

416. The representative of Zambia said that the problems of mercenaries in the Congo had been in existence since the days of the secessionist régime of Moïse Tshombé: the white mercenaries were fighting in defence of colonialism and not because they loved Tshombé as an individual. The recent mercenary invasion of the Democratic Republic of the Congo was a threat to Africa in particular and the world in general. Fighting in defence of colonialism, the mercenaries had disrupted peace and economic progress in the Congo and caused untold loss of life and property. Irrefutable evidence existed to prove that the latest aggression was committed by mercenaries who came from Angola with the knowledge and support of the Portuguese authorities. Zambia fully supported the Congolese position calling upon the Security Council to condemn Portugal and requesting all countries to prevent recruitment and training of mercenaries on their soil. The African people had suffered too long from foreign domination and exploitation. They should now be left in peace to develop politically and economically, and to tackle the massive task of eradicating disease, illiteracy and poverty.

417. The representative of Canada said that his country had continually supported United Nations efforts to sustain the independence, territorial integrity and stability of the Congo. After hearing the statement of the Deputy Foreign Minister of the Congo, it would be very difficult to deny that additional mercenaries had entered the Congo from Angola. It was hard to imagine that that could have happened without, at least, the knowledge of the Portuguese. The Council had a clear duty to take effective action to eliminate the threat of mercenary incursions in the Congo.

418. The representative of Japan said that it might be very difficult to provide conclusive evidence on the question before the Council. However, in the light of past experience, the Congo had every reason to entertain fears and suspicions. If, as seemed to be the case, the mercenaries of 1 November used Angola as a base for armed incursion into the Congo whether with or without Portuguese acquiescence, then the Government of Portugal must be held responsible. Such action or negligence must also be condemned as a gross violation of Security Council resolutions, and the Council should ask Portugal for a firm commitment not to allow foreign mercenaries to operate from its territories against the Congo. Interference by foreign mercenaries had long plagued the Congo and seriously obstructed the path of national unity and progress. The Security Council must act positively so that a young and dynamic African country could live in peace and prosperity without any external interference.

419. The representative of Algeria said that the aggression by mercenaries amounted to a disguised form of gunboat diplomacy which ran the risk of unleashing dramatic events which everyone feared. On the political level, it was significant that in 1963, during the failure of the Katangese secession, mercenaries had taken refuge in Angola. Last July, their leaders sought refuge in Rhodesia. It must be repeated that until the colonial systems in Rhodesia, South Africa and the Territories under Portuguese administration were not definitely ended, such events would continue and the security of neither the Congo nor of any other country could be assured. He added that, to keep to the essential point, it should be remembered that from the first day of its independence, the Congo had not ceased to be the prey of imperialist rivalries and the object of foreign intervention, and that the aim of those imperialists was to put an end to the liberation movement in the Congo. The safeguarding of peace in the Congo and in Africa was a responsibility of the Security Council. Nowadays more than ever before, when aggression followed Viet-Nam and the Middle East, the Council should be equal to its responsibilities and condemn the aggressor.

420. The representative of Denmark said that the latest incursions by mercenaries in the Congo appeared to have been contained, but the aims and origins of the operations implied a dangerous trend. Any country which allowed armed bands to operate from its territory against another country was violating the United Nations Charter. Such behaviour violated resolution 226 (1966) and resolution 239 (1967). The Democratic Republic of the Congo had presented impressive evidence to uphold its complaint of new aggression by armed intruders. The Security Council's repeated appeals for non-intervention in the Congo's internal affairs must be scrupulously heeded by all Governments. In that regard, a special obligation rested on the Congo's neighbours to ensure that adjacent territories were not abused in contravention of the Council's resolutions. The Congo had been exposed far too long to disturbances from outside. Those must now be brought to an end so that the peaceful development of the Congo could be pursued unhampered.

421. The representative of Bulgaria said that the responsibility of Portugal for the mercenary activities in the Congo was clear. Even the closest friends of Portugal which were at the head of the Atlantic alliance did not hesitate any more to recognize the responsibility of their ally even though they sought to attenuate it. He shared the opinion expressed by the representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo that the Security Council should condemn Portugal, reaffirm earlier resolutions on the issue (particularly 226 (1966) of 14 October 1966 and 239 (1967) of 10 July 1967) and thirdly, condemn the principle of recruiting mercenaries. The present dangerous situation could be resolved only by constraining Portugal to respect decisions and resolutions of the General Assembly and Security Council. Also, the international monopolies should be called upon to stop malevolent activities that exploited African peoples for their own benefit. The United Nations, and particularly the Security Council, must help the African peoples to rid themselves of the scourge of the colonial yoke. Only then could those peoples enjoy true peaceful development and independence.

422. The representative of China admitted that it was not easy to establish beyond any shadow of doubt

all the pertinent facts involved in the matter. But on the basis of the statement of the representative of the Congo, as well as on reports from other sources, there was a strong presumption that the mercenaries did in fact come from Angola. He added that the Security Council should be guided by its original principles in regard to the Congo: *i.e.*, the unity, territorial integrity and political independence of the Congo must be preserved; the Congo must not be a battleground for rival ideologies; and the Congolese people must be given the opportunity to develop their own institutions and resources free of external interference. With regard to mercenaries, all countries—particularly those bordering the Congo—had grave responsibility to abide by the terms of the relevant Security Council resolutions.

423. The representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, exercising his right of reply, said that all those who had spoken during the debate had unmistakably recognized that the bands of mercenaries had come from Angola. He said that if the representative of Portugal still contended that the Belgian letter presented to the Council was a forgery, all he needed to do was to communicate with the Belgian Foreign Ministry which provided the Congolese Ambassador in Brussels with the document. His Government was not very interested in the Portuguese delegate's claim that the mercenaries were not of Portuguese nationality. The substance of the Congo's accusation was that Portugal permitted those mercenaries to use Angola as a training and launching base for operations against the Congo.

424. The representative of Portugal, in exercise of his right of reply, said that Portugal refuted the Congolese allegations of "barbarous repressions" being conducted in Angola. There was also no shred of evidence to support allegations that mercenary bases existed in Angola or of any infiltrations from Angola into the Congo.

425. At the 1376th meeting, on 14 November, the representative of Portugal denied any role, either direct or indirect, by his Government in the activities of mercenaries. He also stated that his Government had no knowledge of their recruitment or activities in its territories, and denied that any mercenaries had been located in any Portuguese territory. He drew the attention of the Council to his Government's statement which had been circulated to the members of the Council as document S/8238. Among other things, it revealed that 492 refugees, among them 213 armed Congolese and 75 armed Europeans who did not include any Portuguese nationals, had crossed into Angola from the Congo. Portugal would give asylum to the Congolese, while repatriating the seventy-five Europeans to their respective countries. His delegation hoped that the countries of which the seventy-five Europeans were nationals would ensure that, if they were mercenaries, they were not given passports enabling them to travel again to the Congo. He said that his country wanted to know whether the alleged mercenaries comprised white men and Congolese, or whether they consisted only of the so-called volunteers serving in the Congolese army who were called mercenaries only when they turned against their employers. In addition to the answers to those questions, Portugal also wanted to know the mind of the Council for its future guidance, as it did not wish to be brought back to the Council to be subjected to judgement based on mere assumptions.

426. The representative of Nigeria said that Burundi, Zambia and Algeria had been designated to put forward the African case in support of the Congo. Ethiopia had also spoken in support of the case. A special committee of the Organization of African Unity had just met in Kinshasa and the President of the Congo had made an important statement on that occasion. The last word had not yet been heard from Africa regarding the problem of mercenaries on the continent.

427. The representative of India said that Angola seemed to be the main source of the Congo's recurring troubles. The denials of the representative of Portugal had not been convincing. He agreed with the representatives of the United Kingdom, the United States and other delegations that it was difficult to believe that Portuguese authorities could have been unaware of the activities of the mercenaries in question. The Council could not fail to respond to the Congo's appeal that it be left alone to live in peace.

428. The representative of Brazil said that, if established, the facts alleged by the Congo were of a most serious nature in themselves, irrespective of the violations they constituted of the Security Council resolutions. The Council should condemn all kinds of subversive activities and breaches of the principles of the Charter, irrespective of who perpetrated them. The evidence presented was not sufficient to establish unequivocally Portugal's participation in the recent events in Katanga. Furthermore, it would be difficult to single out any one country, or rather citizens or organizations of a single country, as mainly responsible for the mercenary operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. He asked whether those operations were not, by their nature, scale and purpose, of a multinational character, and launched from different places. All aspects of the activities relating to the recruitment, training and transit of those mercenaries should be investigated by the Council as a first step towards eliminating the problem.

429. The representative of Argentina said that, although the Council did not have more helpful evidence to enable it to act with greater force, it was clear that Angola was being used as a spearhead for intervention in the Congo. His delegation deplored intervention at any level and, without defining and proving intent and co-participation, believed it should be rooted out of international life.

430. The President, speaking as the representative of Mali, said that the representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo had presented incontrovertible documents to substantiate the charges against Portugal, which had not heeded Council resolutions on that problem. He added that the Security Council should condemn the activities of Portugal and take appropriate measures to curb them. All countries should prohibit the recruitment of mercenaries, who must be treated as criminals by all Governments.

431. At the 1378th meeting, on 15 November, the President informed the Council that following informal consultations a consensus had been reached on the text of a draft resolution. He also stated that one of the members of the Security Council had reserved the right to make observations on one particular paragraph. He then read the following text:

"The Security Council,

"Concerned by the serious situation created in the Democratic Republic of the Congo following the

armed attacks committed against that country by foreign forces of mercenaries,

"Concerned that Portugal allowed those mercenaries to use the territory of Angola under its administration as a base for their armed attacks against the Democratic Republic of the Congo,

"Taking into consideration the support and assistance that those mercenaries have continued to receive from some foreign sources with regard to recruitment and training, as well as transport and supply of arms,

"Concerned at the threat which the organization of such forces poses to the territorial integrity and independence of States,

"Reaffirming its resolutions 226 (1966) of 14 October 1966 and 239 (1967) of 11 July 1967,

"1. Condemns any act of interference in the internal affairs of the Democratic Republic of the Congo;

"2. Condemns, in particular, the failure of Portugal, in violation of the above-mentioned Security Council resolutions, to prevent the mercenaries from using the territory of Angola under its administration as a base of operations for armed attacks against the Democratic Republic of the Congo;

"3. Calls upon Portugal to put an end immediately, in conformity with the above-mentioned resolutions of the Security Council, to the provision to the mercenaries of any assistance whatsoever;

"4. Calls upon all countries receiving mercenaries who have participated in the armed attacks against the Democratic Republic of the Congo to take appropriate measures to prevent them from renewing their activities against any State;

"5. Calls upon all Member States to co-operate with the Security Council in the implementation of this resolution;

"6. Decides that the Security Council should remain seized of the question and requests the Secretary-General to follow the implementation of the present resolution."

Decision: *At the 1378th meeting, on 15 November 1967, the draft resolution was adopted without objection (resolution 241 (1967)).*

432. The representative of Brazil stated that, because of the wishes of the Council, his delegation did not ask for a vote on the resolution; otherwise Brazil would have abstained, as it could not support operative paragraphs 2 and 3 of the resolution just adopted.

433. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that the aggression against the Congo, the violation of the principles of the Charter and of the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Internal Affairs of States had been so

glaring that even those members of the Council who were Portugal's NATO allies had been constrained to dissociate themselves from any support of the Portuguese activities in Africa. Although the resolution just adopted did to some extent condemn the Portuguese authorities it was inadequate. There should have been a more decisive condemnation and measures should have been taken to prevent such interventions in the internal affairs of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

434. The representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo thanked the Council for its concern about the peace and territorial integrity of his country. The danger was not over, since the mercenaries themselves had stated that they would return. Members should use their influence with the Portuguese Government to stop those activities, which the Council had condemned. Those who hired the mercenaries should also be condemned.

435. The representative of Portugal said that the resolution just adopted by the Council was unacceptable to his country. His Government strongly repudiated and rejected its implications, particularly those contained in the second preambular paragraph and in operative paragraphs 2 and 3. The Government of Portugal wished to place on record its strong reservation regarding the resolution.

C. Subsequent communications

436. In a letter dated 28 June 1968 (S/8660) addressed to the President of the Security Council, the Permanent Representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo charged that, on 23 June 1968, aircraft of the Portuguese air force operating in Angola had bombed the Congolese village of Yongo causing considerable damage to houses and wounding two inhabitants. That was the third of a series of aggressive acts committed by Portugal against the Congo during the previous few weeks. Twenty-seven persons had been killed the first time, and eighteen the second time. Those aggressions constituted a violation of the resolutions adopted by the Security Council and the General Assembly and of the provisions of the Charter.

437. In a letter dated 5 July 1968 (S/8672) addressed to the President of the Security Council, the Permanent Representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo charged that Portuguese forces stationed in Angola had committed further acts of aggression against the Congo, in violation of the principles of the Charter and of relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council. On 26 June fifteen Portuguese soldiers had entered the Congolese territory and seized five Angolan refugees. On 30 June, Portuguese armed forces had fired ten times at three Congolese on the frontier with Angola; and on 2 July 1968, they had bombed three Congolese villages.

Chapter 3

LETTER DATED 26 DECEMBER 1963 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CYPRUS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

A. Communications and reports received between 16 July and 24 November 1967

438. In a letter dated 26 July 1967 (S/8099), the representative of Turkey forwarded the text of a mes-

sage from Dr. Fazil Kuchuk to the Secretary-General calling attention to the fact that the Cyprus Government had enacted legislation allegedly to integrate "more than 10,000 Greek troops" from Greece into the National Guard of Cyprus.

439. On 24 August 1967 the Secretary-General appealed to Governments (S/8136) for further voluntary contributions to provide the necessary financial support for the United Nations Peace-keeping Operation in Cyprus. He stated that new pledges totalling approximately \$8.8 million must be received if the Organization was to cover in full the costs involved in maintaining the Force until 26 December 1967.

440. In a letter dated 6 September 1967 (S/8141), the representative of Cyprus transmitted to the Secretary-General the text of a statement of 2 September by the President of Cyprus concerning normalization measures taken by the Government. As a result of those measures, Government armed posts and fortifications were left unmanned in Paphos and Limassol districts and road blocks on trunk roads removed throughout the island.

441. In a letter dated 5 September 1967 (S/8143), the representative of Greece announced that his Government had decided to make a \$600,000 voluntary contribution for UNFICYP, covering the period from 27 June to 26 December 1967.

442. On 16 November 1967 the Secretary-General informed (S/8248) the Security Council about developments in the Ayios Theodoros-Kophinou area, where a Cyprus Police patrol escorted by National Guard troops had engaged in heavy fighting with local Turkish Cypriot fighters over the issue of resuming Cyprus Police patrols which had been temporarily discontinued in July by the Government. Despite UNFICYP attempts from September 1967 to help negotiate a fair settlement, the National Guard and the Cyprus Police on 14 November had resumed patrolling villages in the area against the advice of UNFICYP and on 15 November Turkish Cypriot fighters had fired at the patrol. National Guard troops and the patrol had returned the fire with excessive force, overrun Turkish Cypriot fighters' positions and consequently set a deep political crisis on its course.

443. The Government of Turkey considered the fighting a provocation which had been planned and premeditated by General Grivas, Supreme Commander of the Cyprus armed forces. It had requested UNFICYP to interpose itself between the fighting factions.

444. From the beginning of the fighting, the Secretary-General in New York, the Force Commander and his Special Representative in Nicosia had made incessant attempts to effect a cease-fire. Finally, five minutes before midnight (local time) on 15 November, the Foreign Minister of Cyprus had informed the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Cyprus that a cease-fire had been ordered by the Government, effective immediately. The cease-fire, however, had not been fully observed during that night and sporadic fighting had continued the following morning.

445. In a letter dated 18 November 1967 (S/8251 and Corr.1), the representative of Cyprus brought to the urgent attention of the President of the Security Council alleged instances of threats of force and aggression by Turkey against the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of Cypriot air space by Turkish military aircraft.

446. On 18 November 1967 the Secretary-General informed (S/8248/Add.1) the Security Council that the situation in the Ayios Theodoros-Kophinou area remained calm but tense. Shooting incidents in Nicosia and an exchange of fire at the Kokkina enclave had been

reported by UNFICYP the previous night. Throughout the morning of 18 November, aircraft sightings had been reported by UNFICYP at Famagusta and Nicosia. The representatives of Cyprus and Greece had expressed to the Secretary-General their Governments' anxiety about those overflights and the dangerous consequences which might ensue from them. On the same day, the Secretary-General had appealed to Turkey for restraint.

447. On 20 November 1967 the Secretary-General reported (S/8258/Add.2) that firing had broken out in the Limnitis enclave on 18 November and had quickly spread to areas around the enclave. Overflights by Turkish military jet aircraft had continued on 19 November.

448. On 22 November 1967 the Secretary-General addressed an urgent appeal (S/8248/Add.3) to the President of Cyprus and the Prime Ministers of Greece and Turkey. The appeal stated, *inter alia*, that alarming reports continued to reach the Secretary-General of military preparations, the movement of forces and threatening statements by the Governments particularly concerned, as a consequence of the unfortunate recent incidents of fighting in Cyprus. Such activities could only increase the danger of military conflict in the area. The Secretary-General had felt obliged in the circumstances to appeal to the three Governments to avoid any action that could precipitate a new outbreak of hostilities and to exercise the utmost restraint. On the same day, the Secretary-General had also suggested the exceptional step of sending to the three capitals, with the approval of the Governments concerned, a high-level representative to assist them in all possible ways to reduce the existing tension.

449. In a letter dated 22 November 1967 (S/8260), the representative of Cyprus called attention to further violations of Cypriot air space by Turkish military aircraft on 18, 19 and 20 November.

450. On 23 November 1967 the Secretary-General informed (S/8248/Add.4) the Security Council that he had designated Mr. José Rolz-Bennett, Under-Secretary for Special Political Affairs, to act as his Personal Representative for the Cyprus mission. Mr. Rolz-Bennett left New York that evening for Ankara, Athens and Nicosia.

451. In a letter dated 23 November 1967 (S/8261), the representative of Cyprus informed the President of the Security Council about further violations of Cypriot air space by Turkish military aircraft, in disregard of the Secretary-General's appeal (S/8248/Add.3).

452. In a message of 24 November 1967 (S/8248/Add.6), the Prime Minister of Greece pointed out that the Greek Government had exercised all its influence for the rapid return to normality in the Ayios Theodoros-Kophinou area. It had refrained from any menacing or provocative statements and even from taking certain defensive measures which might be construed as provocation and it had restrained Greek press comments. Greece desired the settlement of any dispute by peaceful means; therefore, the Prime Minister requested the Secretary-General actively to pursue his efforts and promised the co-operation of the Greek Government.

453. On 24 November 1967 the Secretary-General addressed a new appeal (S/8248/Add.5) to the President of Cyprus and the Prime Ministers of Greece and Turkey. The Secretary-General stated that the portents regarding Cyprus were increasingly ominous and that

Greece and Turkey appeared to be at the brink of war over Cyprus. The United Nations should do all that it could to avert that catastrophe. He again appealed, in the strongest possible terms, to Cyprus, Greece and Turkey to exercise the utmost restraint, to avoid all acts or threat of force and to be temperate in their public utterances relating to the Cyprus problem and to relations among themselves. The Secretary-General believed that tension could be eased and the imminent threat of war removed by a reasoned effort by the three parties to agree upon and arrange for a substantial reduction of the non-Cypriot armed forces in Cyprus, other than those of the United Nations. Such reduction would be in stages and should envisage the ultimate withdrawal from Cyprus of all non-Cypriot armed forces other than those of the United Nations. The Secretary-General appealed to the Governments concerned to agree to the suggestion and to undertake a work programme for such a phased reduction of their forces. The Secretary-General offered his personal and UNFICYP's assistance towards achieving that end.

454. In a letter dated 24 November 1967 (S/8262), the representative of Cyprus requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council "in view of the clear threat of imminent invasion of the territory of the Republic of Cyprus by Turkish forces".

B. Consideration at the 1383rd meeting (24/25 November 1967)

455. The letter dated 24 November 1967 (S/8262) from the representative of Cyprus was included in the agenda of the 1383rd meeting of the Council on 24 November 1967. The representatives of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey were invited, at their request, to participate in the discussion.

456. The representative of Cyprus said that Cyprus was under imminent threat of attack and invasion by Turkey. He referred to continuous threats of invasion, preparations for invasion by Turkish military forces and the Turkish navy and to a series of overflights by Turkish aircraft. A military source in Ankara had said that air force, army and navy units were on the alert in south-central Turkey, only forty miles from Cyprus. The Prime Minister of Turkey had also indicated that landings would be made on Cyprus. The representative of Cyprus therefore appealed to the Security Council to protect Cyprus from that invasion. It had been said that Turkey's threatening moves were the result of the events at Ayios Theodoros. That was not the case. Cyprus had been actually threatened by Turkey with invasion before and the Security Council's action had saved the situation then. Cyprus again needed the protection of the Security Council.

457. The representative of Turkey said that the Eastern Mediterranean was once again jeopardized by the irresponsible actions of the Greeks and the Greek Cypriots under General Grivas. The territorial integrity and the independence of Cyprus was in mortal danger because the Greek Army had infiltrated and actually occupied the part of Cyprus which was under Greek Cypriot administration. Relying on the military strength they had built up in complete disregard of the Security Council's resolution of 4 March 1964, Greece and the Greek Cypriots had adopted measures designed to lead to the annexation of Cyprus to Greece. The military action against the Turkish Cypriot villages of Ayios Theodoros and Kophinou had been launched with that goal in mind. If the Turkish Government had not taken a firm attitude and if the Secretary-General and

UNFICYP had not intervened so energetically, other Turkish Cypriot settlements in Cyprus would have suffered the same fate as Ayios Theodoros and Kophinou. The Turkish Government had therefore come firmly to believe that the illegal Greek army of occupation in Cyprus was the only element which threatened the peace of the island, posed the greatest danger to the security and life of the Turkish community in Cyprus and represented the most direct impediment to the effective functioning of UNFICYP. Consequently, it should go if peace was to return to Cyprus. The Turkish Government felt that the Security Council should condemn the inhuman crimes perpetrated against the Turkish community at Kophinou and Ayios Theodoros and call for the payment of compensation to the inhabitants of the two villages.

458. The representative of Greece deplored the incident at Ayios Theodoros. At the root of those events lay the Turkish Government's refusal for two months to agree to the resumption of patrols to the village of Ayios Theodoros. It seemed clear that the Turkish Government wanted to create a new enclave in the region to prevent peaceful coexistence between the Turkish and the Greek community there. Turkey had left nothing undone to create an atmosphere charged with tension. The Prime Ministers of Greece and Turkey had met on 9 and 10 September 1967 and had agreed that appropriate measures would be taken to prevent any increase of tension in Cyprus, and to strengthen the bonds of friendship and co-operation between Turkey and Greece. Contrary to that pledge and long before the events at Ayios Theodoros, Turkish personalities had helped to create a war climate by making inflammatory statements while the Turkish Government had actually set itself on a course of provocative acts which included the mass violation of Greek air space by Turkish military planes from 2 November. The immediate task of the Security Council was to prevent the use of force against a Member of the United Nations. Greece had done everything possible to preserve peace. In order to be fully informed of the situation in Cyprus, the Greek Government had asked General Grivas to return to Athens.

459. The representative of the USSR said that the Soviet Government consistently supported the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus. It firmly opposed any attempt to settle the Cyprus question behind the backs of the people of Cyprus in the interests of the imperialist Powers. Recent events increased the threat to the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus and to the peace and security of the whole Eastern Mediterranean area. The Greek Army was reported to have been put on alert, and the reactionary clique of officers in Athens was making provocative statements to create a pretext for intervention in the affairs of Cyprus. Turkey, for its part, because of the aggravation of the situation in Cyprus, pleading its own definite interests, had taken a number of measures. Turkish warships were on manoeuvres in the region of Cyprus. The Soviet Government had already drawn attention to the fact that the military coup in Greece in April 1967 had created a direct threat to the independence and the normal democratic development of Cyprus. Reactionary circles in Greece had been working out plans for the military solution of the Cyprus problem and for the liquidation of the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus by *enosis*. With outside help, they also attempted to turn the whole island into a NATO military base.

460. In the interest of maintaining peace in the area, the Soviet Government had called upon the parties to exercise restraint and renounce attempts to solve the problems between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots by the use of arms. The expansion of the conflict, particularly a military clash, might bring consequences which were difficult to foresee.

461. The representative of the United Kingdom pointed out that the situation was critical. The Council should devote its attention to serious efforts to find the action most conducive to maintaining peace and should not resort to accusations. He commended the steps the Secretary-General had undertaken in the direction of the reduction of the tensions.

462. The representative of the United States was deeply disturbed by the dangerous situation. He called attention to efforts initiated by the Secretary-General with commendable vigour and urgency and to other efforts by his own country which were under way to avert armed conflict. He appealed to all to exercise every means to maintain the peace and co-operate with the current peace efforts which offered promise of a permanent settlement. He rejected categorically the remarks of the representative of the USSR concerning the United States Government and its NATO allies.

463. After a recess suggested by the President, he announced that a consensus had been arrived at on the following text (S/8266):

"After holding consultations with the members of the Council, I have been authorized to make the following statement on behalf of the Security Council:

"The Council has now acquainted itself with the position of the parties directly concerned. It is gravely concerned in view of the tense and dangerous situation with regard to Cyprus. The Council notes with satisfaction the efforts undertaken by the Secretary-General to help maintain peace in the region and calls upon all the parties concerned to show the utmost moderation and restraint and to refrain from any act which might aggravate the situation in Cyprus and constitute a threat to the peace. The Security Council further requests all concerned urgently to assist and co-operate in keeping the peace and arriving at a permanent settlement in accordance with Security Council resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964."

Decision: *At the 1383rd meeting, on 24/25 November 1967, the consensus (S/8266) was adopted without objection.*

C. Communications and reports received between 27 November and 31 December 1967

464. In a letter dated 27 November 1967 (S/8268), the representative of the USSR transmitted the text of a statement by his Government of 22 November concerning the question of Cyprus. The statement said that the situation in and around Cyprus had deteriorated as a result of the armed clash which had occurred on 15 November in Cyprus. The events in Cyprus, however, must be regarded in connexion with the policy of the reactionary circles in Greece which had been making plans for the solution of the Cyprus problem by military methods through *enosis*, and in connexion with the designs of certain NATO circles. The Government of Turkey had also taken military measures, citing its specific interests in Cyprus. The Soviet Government closely followed developments in Cyprus

and in view of the events it deemed it necessary to restate that the USSR stood for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus and would favour the peaceful settlement of all problems between the Greek and the Turkish population of Cyprus without any interference from the outside.

465. In a letter dated 27 November 1967 (S/8248/Add.6), the President of Cyprus welcomed the Secretary-General's personal offer of assistance to the three Governments. The President of Cyprus considered it imperative to have effective international assurances for the respect of the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic. He expressed his Government's gratitude for the efforts the Secretary-General had made, including the initiative in sending Mr. Rolz-Bennett on his visit to the three capitals.

466. In his reply dated 27 November 1967 (S/8248/Add.6) to the Secretary-General's second appeal (S/8248/Add.5), the Prime Minister of Greece accepted the Secretary-General's suggestions and endorsed the appeal as a whole. However, he considered it essential that the Turkish Government should give formal assurances for respecting the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus and refraining from any military intervention in the affairs of the Republic. Furthermore, if there was to be a withdrawal of non-Cypriot forces from Cyprus, that move should be accompanied by a recall of measures of military preparedness taken by the Turkish Government. The Prime Minister of Greece further agreed with the Secretary-General that the aim should be the ultimate complete withdrawal from Cyprus of non-Cypriot forces other than those of the United Nations.

467. According to the record of an oral communication by the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the Secretary-General of 28 November (S/8248/Add.6), Turkey considered the Secretary-General's appeal as a means of keeping open the peaceful approaches to the desired results. Consistent with the spirit of the appeal, members of the Turkish Government had had frank conversations with Mr. Rolz-Bennett and with other emissaries and had explained to them the policies and peaceful intentions of Turkey. In the view of the Turkish Government, the purpose of the Secretary-General's appeal could best be served if the party to which it had been mainly addressed, Greece, would act with a spirit of understanding and adopt without delay a constructive attitude.

468. In a letter dated 27 November 1967 (S/8270), the representative of Turkey transmitted a message from Dr. Fazil Kuchuk, Vice-President of Cyprus, to the Secretary-General concerning reports of the distribution to the Cyprus Police of arms which were said by the representative of Turkey to have been kept in custody by UNFICYP before the incidents of 15 November 1967.

469. In a letter dated 29 November 1967 (S/8278), the representative of Cyprus charged Turkey with further violations of Cypriot air space and territorial waters by Turkish aircraft and naval vessels from 25 to 29 November, in disregard of the consensus adopted by the Security Council on 24/25 November.

470. On 3 December 1967 the Secretary-General addressed a third appeal (S/8248/Add.6) to the President of Cyprus and the Prime Ministers of Greece and Turkey. The Secretary-General noted that his previous appeals had received generally favourable reactions. Subsequent to those appeals, the Secretary-General

had been informed that there had been consultations and discussions involving the parties. In view of those consultations, the Secretary-General deemed it necessary to appeal further to the Governments of Greece and Turkey to take immediate measures to end any threat to the security of one another as well as of Cyprus and, as a first step, "to carry out an expeditious withdrawal of those of their forces in excess of their respective contingents in Cyprus". The Secretary-General understood that, subject to the necessary action by the Security Council, UNFICYP's mandate might be enlarged, if desired, for the realization of quiet and peace in Cyprus. He made available his good offices in connexion with these matters.

471. The replies (S/8248/Add.7) to the Secretary-General's third appeal (S/8248/Add.6) from the Prime Ministers of Greece and Turkey were received on the same day—3 December—as was a preliminary response from the Cyprus Government.

472. The Prime Minister of Greece took note (S/8248/Add.7, para. b.) of the Secretary-General's appeal, welcomed the message, accepted its contents and expressed his Government's readiness to carry it out expeditiously.

473. The Prime Minister of Turkey informed the Secretary-General (S/8248/Add.7, para. c.) that the Turkish Government had accepted his appeal and was ready to carry it out expeditiously. In view of the tragic events in Cyprus, the Turkish Government fully supported the enlargement of UNFICYP's mandate and functions to include supervision of disarmament in Cyprus that would extend to all forces constituted after 1963. The Government of Turkey considered such measures as an indispensable guarantee for the security of the Turkish community and for the prevention of new menaces to peace in the island and the region. The purpose of the arrangements was to resolve the crisis. Consequently, measures taken would not affect the validity of existing treaties and would not prejudice the modalities of a final solution.

474. In his substantive reply dated 4 December 1967 (S/8248/Add.8), the President of Cyprus shared the view that the withdrawal from Cyprus of the forces of Greece and Turkey in excess of their respective contingents would be a step towards the ultimate and complete withdrawal of all non-Cypriot armed forces other than those of the United Nations, and that it would be consistent with the Secretary-General's second appeal of 24 November 1967 (S/8248/Add.5). Threats to the security of Cyprus had been the main danger to international peace in the area during the current crisis and on previous occasions. The Government of Cyprus welcomed the Secretary-General's appeal for immediate measures to put an end to such threats, and considered that effective guarantees against military intervention were a demanding necessity and should be ensured through the Security Council. The question of any further role of UNFICYP or enlargement of its mandate would have to be considered by the Security Council, with due regard to the sovereignty of Cyprus. The Government of Cyprus looked forward to UNFICYP's contribution to measures aimed at the establishment of peace and security for all the people of Cyprus. The Government had carefully noted and gladly accepted the Secretary-General's good offices proffered in his appeals in relation to matters referred to therein and during the relevant discussions in the Security Council.

475. In his message of 6 December 1967 (S/8248/Add.9), the President of Cyprus formally asked for the Secretary-General's good offices. The Foreign Minister of Cyprus was to leave for New York to exchange views with the Secretary-General on relevant matters.

476. On 8 December 1967 the Secretary-General submitted to the Council his eleventh report on the United Nations Peace-keeping Operation in Cyprus (S/8286), covering the period from 13 June to 8 December 1967. The Secretary-General observed that the events in Cyprus and their very serious repercussions had shown that relatively small incidents could easily develop into an imminent threat to international peace. The Secretary-General's appeals and the efforts of his Personal Representative, Mr. José Rolz-Bennett, had demonstrated the need for a positive demilitarization of Cyprus. That would be a decisive step towards securing peace on the island. Although it had been possible this time to stem the tide, it was of the utmost urgency to act in the search for a lasting solution to the Cyprus question. The mediation effort had been inoperative. Neither the parties nor the Security Council could afford to allow the situation to stumble from crisis to deeper crisis. The Secretary-General, therefore, urged all concerned to seize the opportunity emerging from the recent crisis and to display statesmanship and goodwill to resolve that complex and long-standing issue. He assured the Security Council that the good offices of the Secretary-General continued to be available to the parties and to the Security Council to that end.

477. In a letter dated 12 December 1967 (S/8294), the representative of Turkey transmitted the text of a statement of 3 December from Vice-President Kuchuk to the Secretary-General in connexion with the appeal addressed to Turkey, Greece and Cyprus by the Secretary-General (S/8248/Add.6).

478. In a letter dated 29 December 1967 (S/8318), the representative of Cyprus transmitted the text of a statement made by the President of Cyprus concerning the establishment of a "Provisional Cyprus Turkish administration". The President of Cyprus regarded the establishment of that new administration as a flagrantly unlawful step and declared its possible actions entirely null and void. He also considered that step a direct intervention by Turkey in the internal affairs of Cyprus with the aim of undermining the good offices of the Secretary-General.

479. In a letter dated 30 December 1967 (S/8320), the representative of Greece stated that the establishment of a so-called "temporary Turkish Cypriot administration" was in direct contravention of the spirit and the letter of the Secretary-General's appeals for the settlement of the latest crisis in Cyprus. Such an action might undermine the chances of possible *détente* towards a final solution for the Cyprus problem.

D. Consideration at the 1385th and 1386th meetings (20 and 22 December 1967)

480. At the 1385th meeting, on 20 December 1967, the report of the Secretary-General (S/8286) was included in the agenda. The representatives of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey were again invited, at their request, to participate without the right to vote in the discussion. At his request (S/8293) and under rule 39 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, the Council agreed to hear a statement by Mr. Osman Örek, representing the Turkish community of Cyprus.

481. The representative of Cyprus said that talks or negotiations could not be conducted fruitfully under threat of invasion. In response to the Secretary-General's appeal of 24 November 1967 (S/8248/Add.5) the Greek and the Turkish Governments had agreed to withdraw from Cyprus troops in excess of their respective contingents. It was therefore more imperative than ever to provide Cyprus with an effective guarantee against the possibility of external attack. The Cyprus Government took the view that it would be in the interest of peace if there were a complete withdrawal of Greek and Turkish troops from Cyprus, accompanied by such a guarantee. In that case, the Cyprus Government would be ready to consider the question of complete internal disarmament, including the dismantling of the National Guard. The Cyprus problem was not a problem between Greece and Turkey but a problem which concerned the people of Cyprus. The Cyprus Government was, therefore, not consenting at that time to any new bilateral effort between Greece and Turkey with regard to the Cyprus problem.

482. The representative of Turkey said that the real disease in Cyprus was the desire of the Greek Cypriots for *enosis* with Greece by any means. It was the Council's responsibility to take measures to prevent the recurrence of the Cyprus crisis. There were three stages to peace. The first, withdrawal of Greek troops which had infiltrated into Cyprus, was under way. The next step should be the disarming and disbanding of illegal troops created in violation of the Cyprus Constitution. This stage would necessarily involve a more active role for UNFICYP. The final stage would come when all parties, including the Turkish Cypriot community, could peacefully reach a settlement by themselves or through the United Nations. It was a bitter fact of life that ever since its creation in March 1964, the Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus had been unable to prevent military aggressions by the Greek Cypriots, although it had averted escalations into a holocaust. If the United Nations Peace-keeping Force was hamstrung by narrow concepts of authority it could do no more than maintain an explosive *status quo* and so might even delay for ever a final peaceful settlement.

483. The representative of Greece said that Greece had complied with the appeals of the Secretary-General. In turn, Greece asked the Security Council to fill the gap in the island's defences against attack from abroad, for the threat to Cyprus would not automatically disappear with the withdrawal of Greek forces. The task should be to work out arrangements for the consolidation of peace and security in the region; Greece would give support to such an effort. A process of entering into a certain phase of consultations was under way with the good offices of the Secretary-General. That phase should be approached with an open mind and readiness for co-operation.

484. At the invitation of the President, Mr. Osman Örek made a statement. He said that in the last four years the world had come to realize the true nature of the Cyprus problem. It transpired from experience that the sole aim of the Greek leaders in Cyprus had been to misuse Cyprus's independence and its United Nations membership as an instrument for bringing about *enosis*. An objective analysis of the situation would reveal that the Turkish community had been robbed of its rights and attempts had been made to abrogate the Treaty of Guarantee of 1960 which had provided for its security. It was encouraging that Greece and Turkey had agreed to proposals by the

Secretary-General. However, the armed threat against the Turkish Cypriots must also cease immediately. If the Greek Cypriots indeed wanted peace and tranquillity, a golden opportunity had opened up for them to lay down their arms and prepare the groundwork for an agreed settlement of the Cyprus problem. To that end, the Turkish Cypriots would be co-operative.

485. The representative of the United Kingdom said that the mandate of the Force was to expire in five or six days but States providing troops to the Force had little time to take decisions in so short a period. In those circumstances, there was a general feeling that the Council should act soon by extending for three months the mandate of the Force and by considering the Secretary-General's suggestions, including his offer of good offices. Perhaps no final solution would be found soon; the Security Council however could find the right course to prevent the recurrence of similar crises in Cyprus. It was inadequate merely to renew the mandate of UNFICYP periodically, without also trying as hard as possible to make some advances towards a general settlement.

486. At the 1386th meeting, on 22 December 1967, the President informed members of the Council that as a result of intensive consultations agreement had been reached on the text of the following draft resolution:

"The Security Council,

"Noting the appeals addressed by the Secretary-General to the Governments of Greece, Turkey and Cyprus on 22 November, 24 November and 3 December and the report of the Secretary-General of 8 December 1967 (S/8286),

"Noting the replies of the three Governments concerned to the appeal of the Secretary-General of 3 December in which the Secretary-General proffered his good offices, and their replies to his previous appeals,

"Noting from the said report of the Secretary-General that circumstances continue to require the presence of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus for a further period,

"Noting that the Government of Cyprus has agreed that it is necessary to continue the Force beyond 26 December 1967,

"1. Reaffirms its resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 and its subsequent resolutions as well as its expressions of consensus on this question;

"2. Extends the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force established under the Council's resolution 186 (1964), for a period of three months ending on 26 March 1968;

"3. Invites the parties promptly to avail themselves of the good offices proffered by the Secretary-General and requests the Secretary-General to report on the results to the Council as appropriate;

"4. Calls upon all the parties concerned to continue to show the utmost moderation and restraint and refrain from any act which might aggravate the situation;

"5. Urges the parties concerned to undertake a new determined effort to achieve the objectives of the Security Council with a view, as requested in the Council's consensus of 24/25 November 1967, to keeping the peace and arriving at a permanent settlement in accordance with Security Council resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964;

"6. *Decides to remain seized of this question and to reconvene for its further consideration as soon as circumstances and developments so require.*"

487. The representative of France observed that the recent crisis in Cyprus had aggravated further the differences created between the Great Powers by crisis in the Middle East. The French Government was happy to note that the leaders of Ankara, Athens and Nicosia had responded to the appeals by the Secretary-General. France was also gratified by the agreement on military disengagements in Cyprus. The situation, however, was still far from being normal. The French delegation therefore had no objection to the extension of the Force's mandate provided that it would be for a short term, such as three months, and that it remained in any case within the framework of the resolution of 4 March 1964. But it was necessary that during the short extension the three Governments make a concerted effort to achieve a lasting solution for the Cyprus problem. The desired effort on their part was, to a certain extent, the very condition for the extension of the mandate of UNFICYP.

488. The representative of the USSR stated that in view of the acute aggravation of the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean the question of the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the territory of Cyprus, and the dismantling of all foreign bases there, in order to ensure the complete independence and integrity of the Republic of Cyprus, acquired special importance. He emphasized that the current events in Cyprus could not be considered without reference to the policy of reactionary circles in Greece, which were trying, with the support of outside forces and the help of their agents in Cyprus, to transform the whole island of Cyprus into a NATO military base and deal summarily with the democratic forces in that country. The representative of the USSR pointed out that the successive extensions of the mandate of the Force for almost four years could not be considered normal. The position of the Soviet Union regarding the use of United Nations armed forces to avert or halt aggressive activities and protect the sovereignty of the State which was the victim of the aggression had been stated at length in the memoranda from the Soviet Government dated 10 June 1964 and 16 March 1967. Decisions to send United Nations armed forces into a particular country should be taken as a very extreme measure after careful consideration of all the facts pertaining to the case and with regard for the fact that the use of foreign troops, including United Nations troops, to settle conflicts and even their mere presence on the territory of other States could, as the sad experience of the past had shown, produce the opposite results—interference in the internal affairs of States, serious international complications and an aggravation of tension. The indispensable condition for the adoption of such an extreme measure as the use of United Nations armed forces should always and in all circumstances be strict observance of all the provisions of the United Nations Charter relating to the use of force to maintain or restore peace. On the basis of that position, the Soviet Government had in principle been opposed to sending foreign troops to Cyprus but it had not opposed the Security Council's action in March 1964 because it had wanted to meet the desire of Cyprus whose Government had considered the step a useful one, despite its deficiencies. Turkey had also agreed to the Security Council's action. The Soviet Government however would firmly oppose any transformation of UNFICYP into a police force which might use arms

against either the Greek or the Turkish community in Cyprus. Regarding the draft resolution, the Soviet delegation would not prevent its adoption provided it was the desire of Cyprus and other interested parties and if it were in full accord with resolution 186 (1964) adopted by the Security Council on 4 March 1964, i.e., if the present functions of the United Nations forces in Cyprus and the present procedure for financing them on a voluntary basis were retained.

Decision: *At the 1386th meeting, on 22 December 1967, the draft resolution read by the President of the Council was adopted unanimously (resolution 244 (1967)).*

489. After the vote, the Secretary-General stated that he was immediately requesting the Governments which had been providing contingents for the Force to continue to make the contingents available. He also wished to assure the Security Council and the parties concerned that he was immediately available to help them find a way to resolve their differences and renewed his offer of good offices to them. In the absence of guidance from the Council as to the points which had been the subject of negotiations with the parties, the Secretary-General warned the Council about the difficulties ahead.

490. The representative of Canada said that the resolution just adopted placed the extension of UNFICYP in the proper context by emphasizing the need of a permanent settlement. Furthermore, the resolution offered hopes that the coming weeks would be used by the parties for clarifying various issues. Meanwhile co-operation with UNFICYP should be improved.

491. The representative of Denmark said that past events showed that the presence of a peace-keeping force in Cyprus was in itself not enough for containing a dangerous situation; it had to be combined with energetic efforts in the political field.

492. The representative of the United States was pleased to support on behalf of his Government the draft resolution extending the life of the United Nations Force in Cyprus. He noted that it was only due to strenuous efforts by many, including the Secretary-General and his Representative, Mr. Rolz-Bennett, and the ultimate co-operation of Greece, Turkey and Cyprus that the mounting threat of the outbreak of hostilities in Cyprus had subsided. He considered that the Secretary-General's appeal of 3 December (S/8248/Add.6), which the three parties welcomed, represented a critical element in the favourable turn of events. The withdrawal of Greek and Turkish troops from Cyprus and the extension of the good offices of the Secretary-General were important factors towards a permanent solution. Noting the United States had contributed more than \$30 million to UNFICYP, he said the United States would continue to support the work of UNFICYP both politically and financially. He regretted that the Council had once again been subjected to the platitudinous Soviet theme concerning an imperialist conspiracy to extinguish the independence of Cyprus. He said that it was precisely those countries which the representative of the USSR accused of such a plot which had been in the forefront of efforts, applauded by all of the parties concerned, to uphold the independence of Cyprus. He added that the intensive efforts of the United States emissary could hardly be considered anything but a vital commitment to ensure peace and security and to create opportunities to find a solution to the Cyprus problem. He also objected to

the Soviet representative's description of UNFICYP as a foreign force, stating it is an agent of the world organization, established by the Security Council at the request of the Government of Cyprus.

493. The representative of the USSR said that the United States representative had taken the remarks about plots being hatched and an imperialist conspiracy against Cyprus as being addressed to him, because the matter was more obvious to him. No attempts to eulogize the mission of the United States emissary, Mr. Vance, and to portray him as a peacemaker could conceal the interference by NATO and Washington in the internal affairs of Cyprus. The representative of the USSR expressed regret at the fact that the United States representative considered that it was platitudinous to demand respect for and observance of the United Nations Charter.

E. Communications and reports received between 1 January and 18 March 1968

494. In a special report dated 3 January 1968 (S/8323), the Secretary-General informed the Security Council about the position the Cyprus Government and Greece had taken regarding the establishment of a "Provisional Cyprus Turkish administration" (S/8318, S/8320) and added that on 30 December 1967, the Cyprus Government had also informed a number of foreign ambassadors in Cyprus that any visits by them to the head of the new administration would be regarded as contrary to their accreditation to the President of the Republic. On the same day, the Cyprus Government declared Mr. Zaki Kuneralp, Secretary-General of the Turkish Foreign Ministry, *persona non grata*, for his participation in the establishment of that administration. Also on the same day, the representative of Turkey indicated to the Secretary-General that the establishment of the "Provisional Cyprus Turkish administration" represented reorganization of Turkish Cypriot administrative affairs and had been carried out within the framework of the Cyprus Constitution. The measures were practical and were not related to the final solution of the Cyprus question.

495. In a letter dated 5 January 1968 (S/8324), the representative of Cyprus informed the Secretary-General of a series of pacification measures the Cyprus Government had announced. However, in view of the establishment of the "Provisional Cyprus Turkish administration" the pacification measures were not to be extended to the Turkish quarter of Nicosia. Furthermore, as from 4 January 1968, the officials and members of that administration would not be allowed to enter or leave the Turkish quarter of Nicosia.

496. In a letter dated 5 January 1968 (S/8326), the representative of Turkey considered the new restrictions on the free movement of certain members of the Turkish community a breach of law and equity and in flagrant contradiction with the Secretary-General's 3 December 1967 appeal (S/8248/Add.6) and resolution 244 (1967) of 22 December 1967.

497. In a letter dated 8 January 1968 (S/8327), the representative of Turkey replied to the letter from the representative of Greece (S/8320) concerning the establishment of a "Provisional Cyprus Turkish administration" and stated that the measure had brought practical change to the *de facto* situation on the island existing since 1964 as a result of the policy of the Greek Cypriot administration. He stated that the administrative reorganization of Turkish Cypriot affairs did not

in any way affect the disarmament of illegal forces in Cyprus, was not in contradiction with Security Council resolutions on Cyprus and was carried out at the initiative of and by the Turkish Cypriots without any interference by Turkey.

498. In a letter dated 8 January 1968 (S/8330), the representative of Turkey transmitted the text of a cable of 5 January from Vice-President Kuchuk to the Secretary-General concerning the "Provisional Cyprus Turkish administration".

499. In a letter dated 8 January 1968 (S/8331), the representative of Turkey transmitted the text of a cable from Dr. Kuchuk to the Secretary-General in connexion with the Secretary-General's special report on Cyprus (S/8323).

500. In a letter dated 13 January 1968 (S/8338), the representative of Cyprus transmitted to the Secretary-General a statement by the President of Cyprus in which he announced his decision to seek renewal of his mandate through elections. The President felt that the Cyprus question had entered its most critical phase. That required courageous decisions and important initiatives to break the deadlock. He therefore felt he could not continue as President of Cyprus without a new expression of its people's will as to the handling of the Cyprus problem.

501. In a letter dated 14 January 1968 (S/8341), the representative of Greece replied to the letter of 8 January (S/8327) by the representative of Turkey concerning the establishment of a "Provisional Cyprus Turkish administration".

502. In a letter dated 12 January 1968 (S/8342), the Secretary-General appealed to Governments for further voluntary contributions for the financing of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus.

503. In a letter dated 18 January 1968 (S/8343), the representative of Turkey transmitted the text of a statement of 15 January from Dr. Kuchuk to the Secretary-General in connexion with the statement of the President of Cyprus (S/8338) regarding elections.

504. In a letter dated 21 January 1968 (S/8348), the representative of Cyprus replied to the letter of 8 January (S/8327) by the representative of Turkey.

505. In a letter dated 22 January 1968 (S/8350), the representative of Turkey transmitted the text of a message from Dr. Fazil Kuchuk to the Secretary-General concerning elections. Following a discussion on 16 January 1968 with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Cyprus of the question of the re-election of the President of the Republic, Dr. Fazil Kuchuk stated that the Turkish community, desirous of abiding by the provisions of the Constitution, had decided to hold a separate election of the Vice-President, in accordance with article 39 (I) of the Constitution of Cyprus, on the same day as the President of the Republic was going to be elected. UNFICYP's assistance was requested in such matters as safe transport of ballot boxes, free travelling of candidates to and from Turkish areas all over the island and free travelling of electors to and from polling stations and preventing the Greek Cypriots from taking any action that might undermine free elections.

506. In a letter dated 25 January 1968 (S/8358), the representative of Turkey replied to the letter of 21 January (S/8348) by the representative of Cyprus concerning the question of *enosis*.

507. In a letter dated 26 January 1968 (S/8362), the representative of Turkey replied to the letter of 14 January (S/8341) by the representative of Greece concerning the creation of a "Provisional Cyprus Turkish administration" and the withdrawal of excess Greek forces from Cyprus.

508. In a letter dated 31 January 1968 (S/8374), the representative of Turkey transmitted a message from Dr. Fazil Kuchuk to the Secretary-General regarding unconstitutional acts against the Turkish community.

509. In a letter dated 29 January 1968 (S/8375), the representative of Greece replied to the letter of 26 January (S/8362) by the representative of Turkey concerning the fulfilment of Greece's obligations in withdrawing excess Greek forces from Cyprus.

510. In a letter dated 6 February 1968 (S/8386), the representative of Turkey transmitted the text of a message from Dr. Fazil Kuchuk to the Secretary-General. It stated that the restrictions imposed upon members of the "Provisional Cyprus Turkish administration" also applied to the Turkish members of the Cyprus House of Representatives and to other officials of the Turkish Communal Chamber.

511. In a letter dated 10 February 1968 (S/8393), the representative of Cyprus replied to the letter of 25 January (S/8358) by the representative of Turkey concerning Turkish policy regarding Cyprus.

512. In a letter dated 9 March 1968 (S/8449), the representative of Cyprus informed the Secretary-General that as of 8 March all existing restrictions in respect of the Turkish quarter of Nicosia had been lifted by the Cyprus Government. It was hoped that the decision of the Cyprus Government, which had restored complete freedom of movement for the Turkish Cypriots throughout the island, would be appreciated by the Turkish Cypriots who were expected to respond in a spirit of goodwill to the decision of the Cyprus Government.

513. On 9 March 1968 the Secretary-General submitted to the Council his twelfth report on the United Nations peace-keeping operation in Cyprus (S/8446), covering the period from 9 December 1967 to 8 March 1968. The Secretary-General said that this latest three-month period had been the quietest since December 1963. It was to be hoped that the crisis in November 1967 might have made both Greek and Turkish Cypriots realize the urgent need to compose their differences. The lifting of restrictions imposed against the Turkish Cypriots and the main Turkish Cypriot enclave in Nicosia had contributed to the relaxation of tension, which in turn had been reflected in the sharp reduction of shooting incidents and a beginning of military disengagement in some places. What was needed was an acceleration of the momentum towards a solution of the Cyprus problems. The discussions under the good offices proffered by the Secretary-General had not yet succeeded in bridging the divergent views of the parties. However, the improved atmosphere might lead the parties to a more amenable and compromising attitude.

514. In the light of the improved atmosphere, the Secretary-General placed before the parties and the Security Council an outline of initiatives on the steps which in his view should be taken in the search for a solution to the Cyprus problem: (1) extension by the Government of Cyprus of its normalization measures to the whole of Cyprus should make possible those

necessary measures by the Turkish Cypriot leadership for a full return to normal conditions and, as a first step, to abandon its policy of preventing Greek Cypriots from moving freely in the Turkish Cypriot-controlled areas; (2) both the Government and the Turkish leadership should accept UNFICYP's proposals for military deconfrontation; (3) the Secretary-General would call upon the parties to show a spirit of accommodation; (4) the Special Representative of the Secretary-General would invite leading Greek and Cypriot personalities to meet for initiating talks on the Cyprus problem; (5) the Secretary-General would call on both Greece and Turkey to assist in the measures by encouraging the respective communities in Cyprus to respond positively to the steps outlined; and (6) the Secretary-General would call on the Government of Cyprus and the Turkish Cypriot leadership to avoid incidents that might disturb the prevailing atmosphere of quiet. In these circumstances the Secretary-General considered the extension of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus for three months justified.

515. The Secretary-General also reported that on 25 February 1968 elections had been held for the Presidency. Only Greek Cypriots had voted. Archbishop Makarios had received 95.45 per cent of the votes cast. There had been no actual balloting to fill the office of the Vice-President. On 15 February 1968, the Turkish Cypriot returning officer had declared Dr. Fazil Kuchuk automatically re-elected in the absence of any other candidate and by virtue of the election laws applicable before 1964. Mr. Mehmet Zekia former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Republic, had announced on 27 January 1968 that he would not become a candidate for the Vice-Presidency in order to preserve the unity of the Turkish Cypriot community and in view of the assurances given publicly by Dr. Kuchuk that, as soon as normal conditions were re-established, new elections would be held to fill the office of the Vice-President.

F. Consideration at the 1398th meeting (18 March 1968)

516. At the 1398th meeting of the Council, on 18 March 1968, the report of the Secretary-General (S/8446) was included in the agenda. The representatives of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey were invited, at their request, to participate without vote in the discussion.

517. At the beginning of the meeting the President of the Council announced that prior consultations had resulted in agreement on the text of the following draft resolution:

"The Security Council,

"Noting from the report of the Secretary-General of 9 March 1968 (S/8446) that in the present circumstances the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus is still needed if peace is to be maintained in the island,

"Noting that the Government of Cyprus has agreed that in view of the prevailing conditions in the island it is necessary to continue the Force beyond 26 March 1968,

"Noting, from the observations in the report, the new conditions prevailing in the island,

"1. Reaffirms its resolutions 186 (1964) of 4 March, 187 (1964) of 13 March, 192 (1964) of

20 June, 193 (1964) of 9 August, 194 (1964) of 25 September and 198 (1964) of 18 December 1964, 201 (1965) of 19 March, 206 (1965) of 15 June, 207 (1965) of 10 August and 219 (1965) of 17 December 1965, 220 (1966) of 16 March, 222 (1966) of 16 June, 231 (1966) of 15 December 1966, 238 (1967) of 19 June and 244 (1967) of 22 December 1967; and the consensus expressed by the President at the 1143rd meeting on 11 August 1964 and at the 1383rd meeting on 24/25 November 1967;

"2. *Urges* the parties concerned to act with the utmost restraint and to continue determined co-operative efforts to achieve the objectives of the Security Council by availing themselves in a constructive manner of the present auspicious climate and opportunities;

"3. *Extends* once more the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force, established under Security Council resolution 186 (1964), for a further period of three months ending 26 June 1968, in the expectation that by then sufficient progress towards a final solution will make possible a withdrawal or substantial reduction of the Force."

518. The representative of Cyprus said that the Secretary-General's report was most encouraging. The relative calm which had been prevailing in Cyprus lately had made it possible for the Government to lift all restrictions previously imposed upon the Turkish Cypriots. He urged the Turkish Cypriot leadership to respond positively to the pacification measures. He also stressed the willingness of the Cyprus Government to continue to co-operate with the Secretary-General in his endeavour to bring about talks between the leaders of the two communities in Cyprus.

519. The representative of Turkey said that the Turkish community was prepared in principle to consider favourably the Secretary-General's suggestion to have greater freedom of movement in Turkish-controlled areas in Cyprus if the lifting of the restrictions on the Turkish community were permanent. The representative of Turkey expressed disappointment at the failure of the efforts of the Secretary-General within the framework of his good offices at that time but welcomed any exploratory unofficial contacts between the two communities as had been suggested by the Secretary-General. It was Turkey's desire that within the next three-month period, efforts to reach a peaceful and agreed settlement of the Cyprus question should succeed.

520. The representative of Greece said that Greece fully endorsed the proposal made by the Secretary-General in his report, particularly the suggestion which directly concerned the Greek Government. Greece had always shown evidence of goodwill to work for the solution of the Cyprus problem. He was convinced that the presence of the United Nations Force in Cyprus would contribute to the maintenance of peace in the region.

521. The representative of Hungary said that the substance of the Cyprus question was basically internal. It should be solved by the people of Cyprus without any outside interference. The tragic events of past years had clearly demonstrated that the use of force could bring no solution. It was a welcome development, therefore, that normalization measures had been taken by the Cyprus Government. The Hungarian delegation supported the extension of the mandate of

the Force, provided that it was done under resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964.

522. The representative of India supported the course of action the Secretary-General had suggested and also the draft resolution in the hope that the parties concerned would make good use of the present climate and would arrange a lasting settlement of their problems.

523. The representative of Pakistan noted the refreshing contrast that prevailed in Cyprus in comparison with the situation that had prevailed during November and December 1967. He said that if the crisis then had not been averted, the whole area might have been plunged into war. In the light of the present more propitious circumstances, his delegation concurred in the recommendation that the stationing of the United Nations Force in Cyprus be extended for a further period of three months.

524. The representative of Canada said the Council should urge all parties to take advantage of the improved atmosphere to continue moves towards a peaceful settlement. In the hope that the momentum towards a political settlement could indeed be maintained, it was appropriate for the Council to extend the mandate of the Force for a further period so that current opportunities for progress could in every way be explored. It might be hoped that, as the situation improved further, there would be less need for UNFICYP, at least at its current strength.

525. The representative of the USSR said that the position of the Soviet Union on the question of Cyprus remained unchanged. The USSR had always considered that the Cyprus question should be settled by peaceful means. There was no doubt that the internal matters of Cyprus must be settled by the Cypriots themselves and without any interference from abroad. To ensure the full independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus, all foreign troops must be withdrawn from Cyprus and all foreign bases liquidated. The Soviet delegation considered that the presence of United Nations armed forces in Cyprus for such a long time could not be regarded as normal. The Soviet delegation would not oppose the extension of the mandate of the Force for a further three-month period, but only because that was the desire of the Government of Cyprus and the other parties concerned. But such an extension should fulfil the central condition that it be carried out in strict conformity with resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964.

526. The representative of France stated that his delegation would have no objection to a short-term extension of the mandate in the form in which that mandate had been provided for in the resolution of 4 March 1964. However, the presence of the Force could obviously not be a substitute for settlement of the question. The initiative of a broad dialogue among all the parties concerned would provide the means by which progress could and should be made towards the attainment of a true peace.

Decision: *At the 1398th meeting, on 18 March 1968, the draft resolution submitted by the President of the Council was adopted unanimously (resolution 247 (1968)).*

527. After the vote, the representative of the United Kingdom said that his country was anxious to continue to play a part in the renewed efforts towards a final settlement. It would maintain its military contingent in

the Force and would continue to meet the costs of its contingent for the three months ahead. He called upon all the parties concerned to tackle the difficult Cyprus question with a new determination. In addition, the United Kingdom Government pledged itself to contribute \$1 million towards the cost of UNFICYP during the three-month period immediately ahead.

528. The representative of the United States was encouraged by the improvement of the situation in Cyprus and welcomed the normalization and pacification measures the Cyprus Government had adopted. The United States also supported the Secretary-General's concept of talks between representatives of the two Cypriot communities and would support any other means which would permit the interested parties to find a mutually agreeable procedure for reaching a settlement.

529. The representative of Denmark pledged his Government's support for the Force through the maintenance of its military and police contingents with UNFICYP. The Danish Government hoped that the parties concerned would use the present favourable conditions for the solution of the basic problems which only they could work out.

530. The representative of Paraguay joined other members in support of the resolution and also hoped that the parties would further improve the present atmosphere by allowing normal conditions truly to take root in Cyprus.

G. Communications and reports received between 18 March and 15 July 1968

531. In a letter dated 18 March 1968 (S/8473), the representative of Greece transmitted to the Secretary-General a cheque for the amount of \$300,000 representing the Greek contribution to UNFICYP for the three-month period from 26 December 1967 to 26 March 1968.

532. In a letter dated 20 March 1968 (S/8493), the representative of Greece informed the Secretary-General that his Government intended to make a voluntary contribution to UNFICYP for the new three-month period from 26 March to 26 June 1968.

533. In a letter dated 25 May 1968 (S/8597) the representative of Greece transmitted to the Secretary-General a cheque for the amount of \$300,000 representing the Greek contribution to UNFICYP for that three-month period.

534. On 11 June 1968, the Secretary-General submitted to the Council his thirteenth report on the United Nations peace-keeping operation in Cyprus covering the period 9 March to 7 June 1968 (S/8622 and Corr.1). The Secretary-General stated that the relaxation of tension in Cyprus which had set in at the beginning of the year had continued. In addition, there were recent indications that both Greek and Turkish Cypriots had at last begun to realize that they could not solve their dispute by force. The initiative the Secretary-General had taken in his report of 9 March (S/8446) in the search for a solution to the Cyprus problem had not yet been completely realized. The Turkish leadership had not yet found it possible to respond to the Government's normalization measures with steps of its own so as to further a steady movement towards normality. On the other hand, two prominent leaders of the two communities, Mr. Glafkos Clerides and Mr. Rauf Denktash, after preliminary talks in Nicosia on the initiative of the Special

Representative of the Secretary-General in Cyprus, had met in Beirut from 2 to 5 June 1968, where they had agreed to continue their talks in Nicosia again as from 24 June 1968. This direct channel of communication between the two communities was most encouraging. The Secretary-General attached very great importance to the inter-communal talks and hoped that they would constitute an important step towards a settlement of the Cyprus problem. Despite the success of inter-communal communications, the situation remained basically unstable in the island. It was therefore unavoidable that the mandate of UNFICYP should be extended for an additional six months until 26 December 1968.

535. On 27 June 1968, the Secretary-General appealed to Governments (S/8664) for further voluntary contributions for the financing of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus for the period from 26 June to 26 December 1968.

H. Consideration at the 1432nd meeting (18 June 1968)

536. At the 1432nd meeting of the Council, on 18 June 1968, the Secretary-General's report (S/8622 and Corr.1) on the United Nations operation in Cyprus for the period from 9 March to 7 June 1968 was included in the agenda. At their request, the representatives of Cyprus, Turkey and Greece were invited again to participate without the right to vote in the discussion.

537. The President of the Council announced that as a result of prior consultations the following draft resolution (S/8639) had been prepared:

"The Security Council,

"Noting from the report of the Secretary-General of 11 June 1968 (S/8622 and Corr.1) that in the present circumstances the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus is still needed if peace is to be maintained in the island,

"Noting that the Government of Cyprus has agreed that in view of the prevailing conditions in the island it is necessary to continue the Force beyond 26 June 1968,

"Noting, from the observations in the report, the encouraging recent developments in the island,

"1. Reaffirms its resolutions 186 (1964) of 4 March, 187 (1964) of 13 March, 192 (1964) of 20 June, 193 (1964) of 9 August, 194 (1964) of 25 September and 198 (1964) of 18 December 1964, 201 (1965) of 19 March, 206 (1965) of 15 June, 207 (1965) of 10 August and 219 (1965) of 17 December 1965, 220 (1966) of 16 March, 222 (1966) of 16 June and 231 (1966) of 15 December 1966, 238 (1967) of 19 June and 244 (1967) of 22 December 1967 and 247 (1968) of 18 March 1968, and the consensus expressed by the President at the 1143rd meeting on 11 August 1964 and at the 1383rd meeting on 24/25 November 1967;

"2. Urges the parties concerned to act with the utmost restraint and to continue determined co-operative efforts to achieve the objectives of the Security Council by availing themselves in a constructive manner of the present auspicious climate and opportunities;

"3. Extends once more the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force, estab-

lished under Security Council resolution 186 (1964), for a further period ending 15 December 1968, in the expectation that by then sufficient progress towards a final solution will make possible a withdrawal or substantial reduction of the Force."

538. The representative of Cyprus said there had been no military clashes and incidents which might have jeopardized the improving political atmosphere. It had thus become possible to arrange the first meaningful exchanges of views and consultations between the two sides since 1963. The Secretary-General's report showed that the Government's pacification measures had been well received by the ordinary Turkish Cypriots and that attitude had contributed to the present climate. It was however regrettable that the Turkish Cypriot leaders had not yet responded to the Government's pacification measures and that Turkish restrictions continued. He hoped that the Turkish leadership would find it possible to make the necessary concessions for a full return to normal conditions. Notwithstanding the lack of Turkish pacification measures, the Government of Cyprus would continue its pacification policy.

539. The representative of Turkey stated that UNFICYP's presence in full strength in Cyprus was essential to bolster present efforts towards a negotiated settlement and to provide a sense of security in the Turkish community during the talks. His Government fully agreed with the Secretary-General's recommendation for the extension of the Force's mandate. He pledged his Government's full support of the inter-communal talks in the hope that they would lead to a final peaceful solution of the problem. The normalization measures taken by the Greek Cypriot administration had gone a long way towards preparing the ground for the inter-communal talks. The Turkish community, for its part, was prepared to take counter-measures of normalization when and as a sense of security was firmly established. He noted with regret that the Greek Cypriot administration had decided not to take into account the claims of the Turkish community for compensation for the loss of life and property during the fighting in November 1967. He thought that a humanitarian approach to this problem and reconsideration of the matter by the Greek Cypriot administration would go a long way towards building bridges between the two communities. The Turkish Government also hoped that UNFICYP would ask for a reconsideration of a decision by the Greek Cypriot administration that it would distribute certain arms held under UNFICYP's control and inspection.

540. The representative of Greece said that the evolution towards an improved climate was the result of constant, patient and persevering work behind the scenes. It was obvious that the United Nations presence was required at this delicate stage. The Security Council could once more give essential assistance to the two parties by extending the mandate of the Force for the period indicated and by appealing to United Nations Members for voluntary contributions.

541. The representative of the USSR stated that the position of the Soviet Union on the question of Cyprus was well known—it was always aimed at lessening tensions in the region. The Soviet Government supported the struggle for full independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus. In order to preserve the independence and integrity of the Republic, the territory of Cyprus must be cleared of all foreign troops and the foreign military bases there should also be liquidated. Although the

Soviet Government did not consider the continued presence of the United Nations forces in Cyprus justified, it would not hinder an extension of the presence of those forces on the island for an additional six months, in view of the fact that the extension of the Force's mandate was in accord with the wishes of the Government of Cyprus and of the interested parties. Strict observance of the terms of Security Council resolution 186 (1964) with regard to the functions of the United Nations forces and the present procedure for financing them on a voluntary basis was however an essential condition to such an extension.

Decision: *At the 1432nd meeting, on 18 June 1968, the draft resolution (S/8639) was adopted unanimously (resolution 254 (1968)).*

542. The representative of the United Kingdom said that the existing favourable opportunities should not be missed. The United Kingdom Government hoped that further practical measures would be taken for reducing military confrontations. There was a need for the full restoration of the freedom of movement and for a rapidly expanding series of positive actions to restore mutual trust and confidence in Cyprus. The United Kingdom Government was prepared to continue to make its contribution both by continuing to provide the largest military contingent in UNFICYP and by financial subvention. But all Members must look forward to a reduction and in the end to the termination of this most successful peace-keeping effort. United Kingdom commitments were, of course, subject to subsequent developments in that direction.

543. The representative of Pakistan observed that the year 1968 was a year of hope for Cyprus. A direct channel of communications between the two communities had been opened. Various restrictions had been lifted which had contributed to the improvement of the situation. But all this was only a beginning; basic differences still divided the two communities. The Pakistan Government was concerned about the intention of the Government of Cyprus to distribute the light arms now in store until December 1968. That decision would prejudice efforts to promote a climate of trust.

544. The representative of Canada stated that, despite encouraging developments, the future course of events on the island remained somewhat uncertain. That was the reason why Canada would have preferred a shorter extension of the Force's mandate to keep events under review in the light of the evolving situation. In any case, Canada hoped that the six-month period would be understood as a measure to facilitate and not to delay the vigorous pursuit of the inter-communal talks. The Canadian Government would review its own contribution to the Force in the light of progress which might be made.

545. The representative of Denmark expressed his Government's hope that the two communities would find it possible to make the concessions and accommodations necessary for agreement. The talks might be protracted; the Danish delegation therefore supported the extension of the Force's mandate, hoping that by the end of the new period some substantial results would have been reached.

546. The representative of Hungary said there was no better way to find a solution than through direct contacts between the Cypriots concerned. He also said that the principle of self-determination should serve

as the basis of a political solution for the Cyprus problem. Hungary had reservations about an extension of UNFICYP's mandate for six months but had voted favourably on the draft resolution. It was guided by

the view given in the Secretary-General's report that progress towards a final solution during the new mandate would make the withdrawal or substantial reduction of the Force possible.

Chapter 4

THE QUESTION OF SOUTH WEST AFRICA

A. Communications to the Security Council and requests for a meeting

547. By a letter dated 28 November 1967 (S/8275 and Corr.1), the President of the United Nations Council for South West Africa transmitted to the President of the Security Council the text of a consensus adopted on the previous day by the United Nations Council for South West Africa, in which it had noted with concern the arrest, deportation and trial in Pretoria of thirty-seven South West Africans charged with offences under the South African Terrorism Act of 1967, called for their release and drew the urgent attention of the General Assembly and the Security Council to that matter.

548. By a letter dated 19 December (S/8306), the Secretary-General transmitted to the President of the Security Council the text of resolution 2324 (XXII), adopted by the General Assembly on 16 December, which condemned the arrest, deportation and trial of the thirty-seven South West Africans, called for their release and repatriation, appealed to States and international organizations to use their influence to that end with the Government of South Africa, drew the Security Council's attention to the resolution and called for reports from the Secretary-General on its implementation.

549. By a further letter of the same date (S/8307), the Secretary-General transmitted to the President of the Security Council the text of General Assembly resolution 2325 (XXII) of 16 December and drew attention to paragraphs 7 and 8, in which the General Assembly requested the Security Council to take effective steps to enable the United Nations to fulfil the responsibilities it had assumed with respect to South West Africa, and to take all appropriate measures to enable the United Nations Council for South West Africa to discharge fully the functions and responsibilities entrusted to it.

550. In a letter dated 23 January 1968 (S/8353), the President of the United Nations Council for South West Africa, on behalf of that Council, informed the President of the Security Council of a meeting held by the United Nations Council for South West Africa on 23 January. The Council had noted with regret that the Government of South Africa had not complied with the Security Council's consensus nor with General Assembly resolution 2324 (XXII). It therefore saw no alternative but to express the hope that the Security Council would take effective measures to ensure that the Government of South Africa discontinued the illegal trial and release and repatriate the South West Africans concerned. The President of the Security Council was asked to bring this to the attention of the members of that Council as a matter of urgency. On 25 January a memorandum concerning the current trial in South Africa was issued by the United Nations Council for South West Africa (S/8353/Add.1).

551. In a letter dated 24 January (S/8355 and Add.1 and 2) addressed to the President of the Security

Council, the representatives of fifty-three Member States requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council to examine the question of South West Africa. This question, they stated, had assumed the most serious and urgent dimension following the decision of the South African Government to resume the "illegal" trial of thirty-five South West Africans in violation of their rights, of the international status of South West Africa, and of General Assembly resolutions on the question. They urged the Security Council to take effective and appropriate measures to ensure that the Government of South Africa complied with the resolutions and discontinued forthwith the illegal trial and released and repatriated the thirty-five South West Africans to their homeland.

552. On 25 January, the Secretary-General, in pursuance of paragraph 5 of General Assembly resolutions 2324 (XXII), reported to the Security Council (S/8357 and Add.1) on his communications with respect to the resolution and on the replies received from Governments, specialized agencies and other inter-governmental organizations with respect to paragraph 3. Additional replies were received later and issued as addenda to the report (S/8357/Add.2-25).

B. Consideration at the 1387th meeting (25 January 1968)

553. At the 1387th meeting of the Security Council on 25 January, before the Council adopted its agenda, the representative of Algeria, drawing attention to rule 15 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, asked for clarification from the President on the procedure for the approval by the Council of reports by the Secretary-General on the credentials of representatives. The practice had been to approve such reports tacitly, but it was the view of his delegation that if any observation or objection was put forward concerning one or several reports of the Secretary-General, the explicit approval of those reports was required. This interpretation was supported by the representatives of France and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

554. The President of the Security Council stated that in view of the importance of the question he would, on behalf of the Security Council, if there were no objections, request the Secretary-General to report on the recent practice regarding the credentials of members of the Council.

555. On 26 January, the Secretary-General issued a report (S/8365 and Corr.1) on the practice of the Security Council regarding the credentials of its members. Since 1948, he stated, the reports of the Secretary-General had been circulated to all delegations of the Council and, in the absence of any request that they be considered by the Council, had been considered approved without objection. In practice, the credentials under rule 13 had been submitted, and reported on by the Secretary-General, only at times when changes in the representation of members of the Council had

been made, and when at the beginning of each year the representatives of the newly elected non-permanent members of the Security Council were designated. This practice had continued up to the present and there had been very few instances where questions had been raised concerning the credentials of members of the Security Council.

556. The Secretary-General also noted that there had been no objection at the 1387th meeting of the Council to the Secretary-General's reports on the credentials of the new members of the Council whose term of office commenced at the beginning of the year, and therefore it would appear, in accordance with established practice, that they were approved in the usual manner.

557. After the adoption of the agenda, the Security Council invited the representative of Nigeria to participate, without vote, in the consideration of the question in accordance with his request.

558. The representative of Algeria said that the African-Asian delegations had asked for the meeting because they were concerned with the activities of the South African authorities in a territory over which they no longer had the power of legal administration. In contempt of the United Nations, those authorities had refused to recognize the abrogation of the mandate or the authority of the United Nations Council for South West Africa. Their illegal arrest of thirty-five nationals of South West Africa violated the decision of the General Assembly and the capital punishment with which those prisoners were threatened was meant to be a final test of United Nations weakness.

559. The United Nations, as the legal Administering Authority now in South West Africa, was responsible for and must save the lives of the thirty-five persons; the Council should take the necessary measures to secure their immediate release and return to their homes. Practical and concrete measures must also be devised to permit the United Nations to carry out its task fully in the long run and to lead South West Africa to total independence. The Security Council should reaffirm its authority in face of the deliberate challenge by South Africa.

560. The representative of Ethiopia said that South Africa had climaxed its defiance of the international community by staging illegal trials of South West Africans under *ex post facto* legislation, which was in itself a violation of legal principles. Under that law, the so-called Terrorism Act, which carried the death sentence, a defendant was considered guilty unless he could prove his innocence "beyond a reasonable doubt". This law which was part of the *apartheid* régime deserved the condemnation of the international community, but its extension to South West Africa, for which the United Nations had responsibility, made it a direct challenge to the Organization and its principles.

561. The Security Council, the representative of Ethiopia urged, should immediately confirm General Assembly resolution 2324 (XXII) and demand that South Africa stop the trial and release and repatriate the South Africans concerned. It was also necessary that all Member States, especially South Africa's trading partners, do all they could to see that the Council's decision was implemented. Ethiopia appealed, in particular, to the major Powers concerned, for on them, as permanent members, fell a special responsibility. If South Africa had its way, the outcome of the illegal

trials would bring shame on the United Nations and a heavy sense of guilt to the conscience of all mankind.

562. The representative of the United States said the Council was for the first time seized with a problem directly relating to South West Africa. The General Assembly had denounced the trial in question and the Terrorism Act, but the South African authorities had ignored that resolution. That Act violated basic standards of justice and its application to South West Africa was inadmissible. His Government's position was based on respect for law and preference for a peaceful solution of the question. It therefore regretted that South Africa had closed the avenues to peaceful dissent, thereby inculcating violence. The trial should be halted and the defendants, to whom the international community had a responsibility, freed. The Council should forthwith call on South Africa to release and repatriate those being tried and to cease its application of the Terrorism Act to the international territory. The United States would continue to exert every appropriate effort to secure the release of the thirty-five South West Africans.

563. The representative of Canada said that he hoped the Security Council would unanimously reaffirm the General Assembly's call upon South Africa to discontinue the illegal trial and release and repatriate the prisoners. South Africa, which was a Member State of the United Nations, had an obligation to heed the call of the Council.

564. The representative of India urged the Council to act swiftly regarding the trial. The racist South African Government, he said, had advanced the date of the judgement from 5 February to 26 January in an effort to confront the United Nations with a *fait accompli*. Not only the General Assembly but also many private humanitarian, professional and other associations the world over had condemned the Terrorism Act and protested its illegal application to South West Africa. The Government of South Africa had defied the calls of the United Nations to discontinue the trial. In the view of the Indian delegation, the Security Council must, in unequivocal terms, call upon the Government of South Africa forthwith to discontinue the illegal trial and to release and repatriate the South West Africans concerned. The question before the Council was not exclusively political; it was also humanitarian. Thirty-five South West Africans might lose their lives because they wanted freedom for their territory and its people. The prestige and authority of the Council would be seriously undermined if it failed to act quickly.

565. The representative of France noted that the date for the verdict in the trial had been advanced to 26 January. In these circumstances, his delegation had gladly agreed to an urgent meeting of the Council. The defendants had been arrested in South West Africa, over which the United Nations had specific responsibility, for alleged crimes committed in that Territory. They had been taken to South Africa, where they had been kept *incommunicado* for over one year. Now they were being tried under retroactive legislation, whose provisions infringed solidly established legal principles. France, which had voted in favour of the resolution on the subject adopted by the General Assembly, hoped South Africa would heed the voice of reason and act in accordance with recognized rules of law and justice, taking into account the international character of South West Africa. Failure to do so would only increase the hostility of the people of the Territory against a policy

of racial discrimination, a policy which France condemned most vehemently.

566. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said his delegation shared the concern and indignation felt at the illegal acts against the people of South West Africa by the racist régime of Pretoria. The repression of the leaders of the National Liberation Movement in South West Africa was incompatible with the principles of the United Nations and the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. It was a violation of the legal rights of the people of the Territory and of its international status. The régime of terror and oppression which plagued South Africa itself had been extended to South West Africa. The Pretoria régime defied the United Nations because of the active support it received from its major trading partners, notably the United States, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany. The Pretoria régime could not possibly have resisted the insistent demands of the overwhelming majority of Members of the United Nations for any length of time without the active support of those States. Thus the key question continued to be the cessation of any kind of political, economic, financial or any other support of the so-called South African Republic on the part of its main allies, the Western Powers. The Soviet Union supported the just struggle of the people of South West Africa for liberation from the colonial yoke. The Soviet delegation shared the views expressed by representatives of Africa and Asia and was ready to support a decision of the Security Council in keeping with the Charter and which would put an end to the arbitrary activities of the racist Pretoria régime.

567. The representative of Denmark welcomed the convening of the Council in view of South Africa's refusal to discontinue the illegal trial as called for by the General Assembly. The Terrorism Act was a highly objectionable piece of legislation, and the trial in question was a mockery of justice. In the opinion of the delegation of Denmark, the Council must call upon the Government of South Africa to release the South West Africans concerned and to discontinue the trials and it must also reaffirm that the trial, arrest and deportation of the South West Africans constituted a violation of the international status of the Territory.

568. The representative of Hungary said that any measure taken by South Africa in South West Africa since the termination of the mandate had to be regarded as an act of aggression. Defying the United Nations, the minority régime in South Africa had expanded the application of its generally condemned policy of *apartheid* in South West Africa. The explanation was that South African white imperialism, in close co-operation with the Smith régime and Portugal, was trying to expand, and in those endeavours was receiving the active support of other Powers. His delegation would support a draft resolution calling upon the minority settler régime in South Africa to discontinue the trial and release the South West African patriots. However, the Security Council could be satisfied with its own achievements only after the total removal of the illegal presence of South Africa from South West Africa and the attainment of the complete independence of that Territory. His delegation wished to express its admiration of the South West African patriots for their fight for liberty and freedom. The Hungarian people were concerned and the Hungarian Solidarity Committee, representing all mass organizations in the country,

had sent a telegram to the Prime Minister of the Republic of South Africa protesting about the trial.

569. The representative of Senegal said that South Africa had a long record of defiance of United Nations resolutions. It had refused to hand over to the United Nations Council for South West Africa the administration of the Territory, as called for in General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI). Since South Africa would not heed the voice of reason, it was necessary for the United Nations to adopt coercive measures to force it to comply with United Nations decisions. The Security Council must take effective measures to divest South Africa of sovereignty over South West Africa, permitting the United Nations to assume its responsibilities for the Territory. To do otherwise would perpetuate the suffering of the people in the Territory. The prestige of the United Nations and the trust placed in it by small countries was also at stake. The General Assembly, in resolution 2324 (XXII), adopted by an overwhelming majority, had condemned the arrest, deportation and the illegal trial of the thirty-five South West African nationals and had called on South Africa to end the trial and to release and repatriate the men. South Africa had ignored the resolution. The sentence under the Terrorism Act could be foreseen, but the movement for freedom could not be rolled back. The representative of Senegal appealed for the same unanimity in the Security Council that had appeared in the General Assembly when the resolution was adopted.

570. The representative of the United Kingdom said the provisions of the Terrorism Act were, in various respects, abhorrent to his Government. It operated retroactively, transferred the burden of proof from the prosecution to the defence in a wide range of circumstances, and stigmatized as punishable by the same penalties as for treason virtually any conduct of which the South African administration disapproved. The British Government particularly abhorred and condemned the fact that the retrospective criminal legislation carried the supreme penalty of death. It was a matter for grave concern that the South African Government had not modified its course of action in response to the pleas of the international community. The United Kingdom, which had voted the previous month for the relevant General Assembly resolution, would support the draft resolution which he understood the President of the Council was to introduce.

571. The representative of Paraguay said there was no juridical, moral or any other reason for South Africa to continue the trial under discussion. The General Assembly by an overwhelming majority had terminated the mandate and declared that South West Africa came under the direct responsibility of the United Nations. The Security Council must fulfil the responsibilities defined in that resolution. Inhabitants of the Territory enjoying international status had been illegally detained, deported and tried by an authority with no right to exercise administrative responsibility. The lives of those thirty-five men were in dire danger. The General Assembly had called for an end to the trial and the Security Council should add the weight of its influence to that of the Assembly.

572. The representative of Brazil said that his Government's position regarding South West Africa in general, and on the trial in particular, was based on his nation's traditional opposition to colonialism. The Government of South Africa had ignored the decisions of the General Assembly, had refused to release

and repatriate the thirty-five South West Africans and had decided to go ahead with the illegal trial of those men. The trial should also be considered in the light of those human rights which had been enshrined in the San Francisco Charter, and to which all Member States of the Organization were committed. His delegation, which had supported the General Assembly resolutions on the matter, was ready to support a decision of the Security Council.

573. The representative of China said that his delegation had supported the General Assembly resolution on the matter and would support a similar measure to reinforce the Assembly's action.

574. The representative of Nigeria said that the United Nations Council for South West Africa, of which he was the current president, had been established as a legitimate organ of the United Nations to administer South West Africa following the termination of the mandate over the Territory by the General Assembly in resolution 2145 (XXI). South Africa had refused to co-operate with the Council. If all Member States, particularly South Africa's major trading partners and traditional friends, had been willing to translate their votes for General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) into practical effect, South Africa would not now be challenging the United Nations. The United Nations Council for South West Africa considered any legislation enacted by the South African Government after the termination of the mandate as illegal. That administration's continued presence in South West Africa was an act of open aggression against the people of the Territory and a defiance of the authority and resolutions of the United Nations. Until the South African authorities withdrew from the Territory, the United Nations Council for South West Africa could not discharge its responsibilities effectively, which it was determined to do. On behalf of the Council he wished to protest against the current illegal trials of the thirty-five South West African nationals, which had been widely condemned as a travesty of law and justice. The least the Security Council could do was to uphold General Assembly resolution 2324 (XXII) on the trials. The fight for independence and dignity in South West Africa would continue, and those now on trial by South Africa would join the hall of fame with other African heroes. He hoped the Security Council would not fail them.

575. The President, speaking as the representative of Pakistan, said that the debate had shown the Council's deep concern over the trial in South Africa and he hoped that that would find forceful expression in a unanimous resolution. While the immediate need was to secure the release and repatriation of the South West Africans, the trial was only one manifestation of the grave situation in South West Africa, resulting from the South African Government's refusal to transfer the administration of the Territory to the United Nations. That challenge should be met. The Council, in repeated resolutions, had pronounced itself forthrightly against the repressive policies of the South African Government in South Africa; it was under a much greater compulsion to take a stronger stand in the case of South West Africa, the international status of which was beyond question. As a minimum, the Council should call on South Africa to implement General Assembly resolution 2324 (XXII) and condemn its refusal to do so thus far. It should take whatever steps might become necessary to obtain the release and repatriation of the South West Africans.

576. The President then read the text of the draft resolution, which he said had been the product of informal consultations among Security Council members. The text of the draft resolution read as follows:

"The Security Council,

"Taking note of General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) of 27 October 1966, by which it terminated South Africa's Mandate over South West Africa and decided, inter alia, that South Africa has no other right to administer the Territory and that henceforth South West Africa comes under the direct responsibility of the United Nations,

"Taking note further of General Assembly resolution 2324 (XXII) of 16 December 1967, in which it condemned the illegal arrest, deportation and trial at Pretoria of thirty-seven South West Africans, as a flagrant violation by the Government of South Africa of their rights, of the international status of the Territory and of General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI),

"Gravely concerned that the Government of South Africa has ignored world public opinion so overwhelmingly expressed in General Assembly resolution 2324 (XXII) by refusing to discontinue this illegal trial and to release and repatriate the South West Africans concerned,

"Taking into consideration the letter of 23 January 1968 from the President of the United Nations Council for South West Africa (S/8353),

"Noting with great concern that the trial is being held under arbitrary laws whose application has been illegally extended to the Territory of South West Africa in defiance of General Assembly resolutions,

"Mindful of the grave consequences of the continued illegal application of these arbitrary laws by the Government of South Africa to the Territory of South West Africa,

"Conscious of the special responsibilities of the United Nations towards the people and the Territory of South West Africa,

"1. Condemns the refusal of the Government of South Africa to comply with the provisions of General Assembly resolution 2324 (XXII);

"2. Calls upon the Government of South Africa to discontinue forthwith this illegal trial and to release and repatriate the South West Africans concerned;

"3. Invites all States to exert their influence in order to induce the Government of South Africa to comply with the provisions of the present resolution;

"4. Requests the Secretary-General to follow closely the implementation of the present resolution and to report thereon to the Security Council at the earliest possible date;

"5. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter."

Decision: *At the 1387th meeting, on 25 January 1968, the draft resolution as read by the President of the Security Council was adopted unanimously (resolution 245 (1968)).*

577. The representative of France stated that his delegation, which shared the feelings of the majority of delegations, had supported the resolution although it had not voted for General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) mentioned in the first preambular paragraph.

Further, it considered that the General Assembly's resolution was not binding on the Security Council, which, in accordance with the distribution of powers provided for in the Charter, remained master of its own decisions on the question of South West Africa.

578. The representative of the United Kingdom said that his delegation reserved its position on those parts of the resolution which referred to or flowed from General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI), and its support for the resolution and its wording must be understood in that sense. His delegation had doubts, in particular, about the unqualified use of the word "illegal" in the resolution. His Government considered the Terrorism Act repugnant, and despite its reservations, desired to be associated with the plea addressed by the Security Council, in its resolution, to South Africa in respect of the trial.

C. Communications to the Security Council and requests for a meeting

579. In a letter dated 9 February 1968 (S/8394) addressed to the President of the Security Council, the President of the United Nations Council for South West Africa stated that the United Nations Council for South West Africa, as the authority charged by the General Assembly to administer the Territory until independence, had received with profound shock and indignation the news of the sentences passed on thirty-three South West Africans, in contravention of General Assembly resolution 2324 (XXII) and Security Council resolution 245 (1968). Since the Government of South Africa had disregarded the will of the General Assembly and the unanimous decision of the Security Council, it was the view of the United Nations Council for South West Africa that the Security Council, as the highest authority of the United Nations, should consider taking appropriate action. To that end, the members of the United Nations Council for South West Africa had decided unanimously to ask on behalf of their Governments for an urgent meeting of the Security Council.

580. In a letter dated 12 February 1968 (S/8397) addressed to the President of the Security Council, the representatives of eleven Member States, members of the United Nations Council for South West Africa, requested the convening of an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the situation resulting from the continuation of the illegal trial of thirty-four South West Africans, and the sentences on thirty-three of them in defiance of General Assembly resolution 2324 (XXII) and Security Council resolution 245 (1968) of 25 January. This request was subsequently supported by the representatives of fifty-one other Member States (S/8398 and Add.1/Rev.1 and Add. 2; S/8416; S/8417; S/8421).

581. On 13 February 1968 the Secretary-General submitted to the Security Council a report (S/8399) in pursuance of Security Council resolution 245 (1968). The report contained a letter from the Permanent Representative of South Africa (S/8370) dated 30 January 1968, transmitting a communication from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of South Africa in which he informed the Secretary-General that the position of the South African Government relating to the relevant General Assembly resolution was set out in the communication which he had addressed to the Secretary-General on 26 September 1967. He stated further that, as indicated by the South

African Prime Minister on 16 December 1967, the case of the persons accused of terrorism was still before the South African courts.

582. The Secretary-General stated that some replies received since the adoption of Security Council resolution 245 (1968) referred also to General Assembly resolution 2324 (XXII), on which the Secretary-General had reported in document S/8357 and addenda, as the two resolutions were similar in substance. For convenience of reference and to avoid duplication, further replies to both resolutions would be brought to the attention of the members of the Council in addenda to document S/8357 (see above, para. 552).

583. In a letter dated 15 February 1968 (S/8410), the Chairman of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples transmitted to the President of the Security Council the consensus on the question of South West Africa adopted by the Special Committee on 15 February 1968 in which the Special Committee expressed the view that the Security Council should consider urgently taking effective action.

584. By a letter dated 15 February 1968 (S/8411), the Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights drew the attention of the President of the Security Council to the consensus reached by the Commission on 9 February 1968, concerning the illegal conviction, by the Supreme Court of Pretoria, of the South West Africans.

D. Consideration at the 1390th to 1397th meetings (16 February-14 March 1968)

585. At the 1390th meeting on 16 February 1968 and before the Council adopted its agenda, the representative of Algeria asked when the Council would consider the report of the Secretary-General on the credentials of the members of the Security Council. The President stated that the representative of Algeria had a standing right, in accordance with the rules of procedure, to raise the consideration of any question, including any report which the Security Council had requested from the Secretary-General, such as that contained in document S/8365 and Corr.1.

586. At the 1391st meeting the Security Council invited, at their request, the representatives of Guyana, Turkey, Chile, Indonesia, Yugoslavia, Nigeria, the United Arab Republic and Zambia to participate without vote in the consideration of the question.

587. The representative of Pakistan said that the Council was faced with a clear defiance of its resolution 245 (1968). It must act to end the Pretoria trial and ensure the release and repatriation of the South West Africans illegally tried under laws which were contrary to those recognized by civilized nations and abhorrent to humane traditions. All mankind condemned the travesty of law and human rights in those South African laws. The Security Council must discharge its responsibility under the United Nations Charter and must equally uphold the authority of the General Assembly. Members requesting the meeting as well as other members hoped that the Council would take early and effective action to deal with the situation caused by South Africa's defiance of resolution 245 (1968) and that all United Nations Members, particularly those having relations with South Africa, would use their influence to make South Africa comply with the

obligation of its United Nations membership. The Council must condemn South Africa, demand that it revoke the sentences and repatriate the detainees immediately, warn that continued refusal to implement the Council resolution would constrain the latter to take more drastic steps envisaged in the Charter to secure compliance and request the Secretary-General to follow closely the implementation of any Security Council action and to report by a specified early date. The Council must remain actively seized of that matter. It was Pakistan's view that South Africa would not see reason unless enforcement measures under Chapter VII of the Charter were adopted.

588. The representative of Senegal said the sentence passed on the thirty-three South West African nationals by the Supreme Court of Pretoria amply proved that South Africa did not intend to honour its obligations under the Charter. The international community had rightly been indignant at that illegal sentence and the Commission on Human Rights had expressed its indignation in a consensus (S/8411) which had been communicated to the Government of South Africa. The numerous repressive laws of South Africa, being illegally applied to South West Africa, were designed to shake the will of the African majority in its struggle for political and racial equality. South West Africans would then swell the numbers of the thousands of political prisoners already held in South African prisons under conditions described by the Commission on Human Rights' *Ad Hoc* Working Group of Experts as falling short of all international and civilized standards. But the movement of decolonization could not be stopped, for the African liberation movements were just and would prevail. But the Security Council must act speedily and effectively and demand that South Africa heed United Nations decisions. If its demands were ignored, enforcement measures must be taken. The Great Powers must co-operate in ensuring that the Council's decisions were respected. South Africa would then understand that Members were prepared to act in unison to enable the Organization to administer South West Africa effectively.

589. The representative of Denmark said that the United Nations in General Assembly resolution 2324 (XXII) and Security Council resolution 245 (1968) had clearly established that the trial of the thirty-three South West Africans was illegal, and had enjoined South Africa to discontinue it. Denmark had supported those resolutions and called on South Africa to comply with them; it protested the conviction of the South West Africans. The majority of world opinion firmly backed the United Nations in that matter and shared its disgust and indignation at the outcome of that mock trial. South Africa had acted arrogantly and ruthlessly in continuing to defy the demands of the world community. The Council's main concern must be the South West African prisoners. If positive results were to be obtained, any steps must be taken in concerted action. Any other approach would be a recipe for failure. His delegation was prepared to enter into consultations with a view to obtaining unanimous agreement on further constructive moves to secure the release and repatriation of the South West Africans.

590. The representative of Canada said that nineteen of the thirty-three South West Africans had been sentenced to life imprisonment under the terms of a retroactive Act whose provisions were a deplorable denial of fundamental human rights. The Canadian Government had arranged for a member of its Embassy

in Pretoria to be present at the trial and had also presented its views regarding South West Africa and the treatment of its inhabitants directly to the South African authorities. His delegation agreed that the Council should act promptly and effectively but considered that, to be effective, any Council action had to have the support of all its members.

591. The representative of the United States said the South West Africans had been tried under laws that denied them elementary human rights and heavy sentences had been imposed. Moreover, the trial judge had stated that in future trials the death sentences might be imposed. That was designed to prevent attempts at peaceful political action and to neutralize political opposition by such organizations as the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO). The application of the South African Terrorism Act to South West Africa was contrary to South Africa's international obligations, the international status of the territory, international law and the fundamental rights of the inhabitants. The defendants and any other South West Africans being held under the Terrorism Act should be released and repatriated immediately. Affidavits had been sworn giving details of brutality by South African police against some of the detainees. The prisoners had been tried in a foreign court under an invalid law and had, in effect, been sentenced on charges other than those for which they had been prosecuted, without benefit of some of the most important safeguards normally available to the defence. His Government viewed with serious concern reports in the South African Press that other alleged terrorists had been arrested under the Terrorism Act. To bring practical relief to the South Africans who had been sentenced and others who might be charged, he suggested that the United Nations, through its appropriate organs, including the Secretary-General, and individual Member States should continue and increase their efforts to persuade South Africa of the wrongness of its action and to secure the release and repatriation of the prisoners. His own Government had made its position clear to South Africa directly and would continue to do so. Secondly, South Africa should be divested of the cloak of legality with which it had attempted to cover its illegal actions. The suggestion of recourse to the International Court of Justice should be explored. Thirdly, as suggested in the Commission on Human Rights, a special representative of the Secretary-General should be dispatched to South Africa to undertake all possible humanitarian measures to alleviate the conditions in the area. Fourthly, every additional effort should be undertaken to secure humane treatment of the detainees, and the Council should ask that the International Red Cross be given full, continuous and unimpeded access to each South West African detained under the Terrorism Act. Fifthly, the Security Council should reaffirm its recent resolution.

592. The representative of Hungary said that South Africa had consistently defied United Nations resolutions and had violated all the obligations of membership in the Organization. South Africa had been encouraged in its policy of racial discrimination by the evidence of such discrimination in other countries, which thus shared the responsibility for its sinister actions. South Africa had had the courage to treat South West Africans inhumanly and to keep them in a state of backwardness, resisting their demand for self-determination, because it knew that the words

spoken by certain Powers in the Security Council would not be matched by deeds. The \$5,000 million in foreign investments in South Africa spoke louder than any verbal condemnations. Moreover, certain Powers had military arrangements with South Africa, sharing, for instance, naval bases there. Hungary, a member of the Special Committee on the Policies of *Apartheid* of the Government of the Republic of South Africa, had been actively concerned with the situation in South Africa and had pointed out that only resolute action by all the leading Members of the United Nations would make the Pretoria régime realize that its policies could not receive continued support. The trial of the South West Africans was an international problem, since South West Africa was temporarily under United Nations mandate. The continued presence of the South African administration in South West Africa was illegal, and no law passed by South Africa after the mandate had been terminated by the General Assembly could be held to apply to South West Africa. His delegation firmly supported the appeal of the United Nations for moral and material assistance to South West Africa in its struggle for freedom and independence and would endorse all strong and effective measures the Council might take to ensure the earliest possible release of the South West African patriots concerned.

593. The representative of Guyana said that the great Powers had shown an amazing impotence in their response to resolution 245 (1968). South Africa was assured by the measured tones of the debate that the Council would be indecisive. The whole world had recognized that the trial and condemnation of the South West Africans in Pretoria was without legal foundation or justification. States must not merely make noises of protest; they must substantiate such noise with action that would make South Africa recognize that it could not with impunity challenge and disregard the United Nations. If the matter truly concerned the Security Council, it would ensure that positive action resulted from its deliberation.

594. The representative of France said that the South West Africans had been tried under legislation that shocked the conscience of humanity. His delegation agreed with the request for an urgent meeting of the Council because the fate of nationals of a Territory with international status was at stake and because of the highly dubious circumstances surrounding the accusations, trials and sentences. His Government wished again to express its concern at the attitude of the South African Government as it had done directly through its Ambassador in Pretoria. The French delegation had previously denounced in forceful terms a procedure which appeared to it to constitute a veritable denial of justice and had expressed the hope that South Africa, bearing in mind the international status of South West Africa, would heed the voice of reason and the voice of humanity and act in accordance with recognized rules of law and justice. It regretted that South Africa had turned a deaf ear to the appeals of the General Assembly and the Security Council. His delegation noted with relief that none of the accused had received the death sentence, and that therefore the irreparable had not been committed and hoped that a new appeal to reason and justice would be heard. It was ready to endorse such a pressing and solemn appeal.

595. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that the picture was very sombre. The racist Pretoria authorities had completely

disregarded a Security Council decision of only a month ago and hurled an insolent act of defiance at the Council. One could comment on the fate meted out to the South West African patriots only with a deep sense of indignation and abhorrence. The Soviet Union Committee for Solidarity with the Countries of Africa and Asia had cabled the Secretary-General stating that Soviet citizens were indignant at South Africa's arbitrary and illegal actions and protested against the shameful mockery of a trial to which the South West African patriots had been subjected. The German Democratic Republic had also cabled the Secretary-General protesting against the trial and resolutely condemning the attempts of South Africa to apply the policies of *apartheid* to South West Africa. The trial had been staged by the South African authorities to frighten the people of South West Africa and to suppress the national liberation movement there. The tragedy of the people of that Territory was a direct consequence of the unrelenting attempts by the colonialists and racists, supported by international imperialists and reaction, to thwart, by any means, the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in the case of South West Africa. The racists of South Africa would not be able so insolently to defy the United Nations did they not continue to receive the support and assistance of their political and military allies, among them the United States, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany. The evidence showed that the ruling circles of several Western countries, because of their military, political, economic and strategic interests, were endeavouring to maintain the present colonialist and racist régime in South Africa. Those circumstances must be recognized despite statements by some representatives presenting a rather pitiful collection of remedies and steps to ensure implementation of the Council's decisions. The key requirement was the ending of all military, economic and political assistance to South Africa by its Western allies and the United Nations should concentrate on that. The Soviet Union continued to oppose any repressive action against the liberation movement in South West Africa and condemned the mock trial of its leaders. It would continue to support the just struggle of the people of South West Africa for freedom and independence. His delegation would support any Security Council decision to that end.

596. The representative of Chile said that South Africa had challenged the United Nations itself. The Security Council must ensure that its resolution 245 (1968) of 25 January was complied with. The problem was one that concerned mankind as a whole. His delegation wanted to reaffirm its condemnation of South Africa's attitude, which went beyond South West Africa and challenged the very concept of human rights. Chile, along with the other members of the United Nations Council for South West Africa, would continue its efforts to find a solution which could win general support. He called for a categorical censure of South Africa's violation of the resolutions of the Security Council and for effective steps and appropriate measures to ensure compliance with the resolutions. All measures provided for in the Charter should be considered.

597. At the 1392nd meeting, on 19 February 1968, the Security Council invited the representative of Colombia, at his request (S/8422), to participate without vote in the consideration of the question.

598. The representative of Brazil said that his country had been dismayed by South Africa's action in continuing the trial and sentencing the South West Africans, despite the Council's resolutions of 25 January, which had called on South Africa to discontinue the illegal trial, and in disregard of General Assembly resolution 2324 (XXII) and the expression of indignation of many independent institutions throughout the world. Brazil considered that the illegality of the South African Government's decision was twofold: the South West Africans were not subject to the jurisdiction of South African courts and, even had they been subject to that jurisdiction, the Terrorism Act under which they had been tried was inadmissible as it incorporated the principle of retroactivity. The problems of the illegal trial and the question of jurisdiction should be considered in the context of the official South African policy of *apartheid*. The Council should act boldly and effectively to secure the release of the South West Africans; it should try to base its decision on the maximum weight of approval possible.

599. The representative of India stated that, when the Council adopted its 25 January resolution, it had had no illusions about South Africa's response; hence its decision to remain seized of the matter. The Council's fears had been justified, for South Africa had once again defied its decision. The inhumanity and barbarity implicit in the sentencing of the South West Africans was obvious. The illegal trial was a political vendetta against the South West Africans who had challenged the South African occupation and the trial itself had been a travesty of law. He described testimony presented to the *Ad Hoc* Group of Experts appointed by the Commission on Human Rights regarding the ill-treatment of South West African prisoners, under detention in South Africa. South Africa had persisted in its defiance, despite universal condemnation of the illegal trial because it was assured that some of its allies would not concur in any coercive action against it. His delegation regretted that the Governments of countries having relations with South Africa were not prepared to exercise the necessary pressure. The time had come for effective action against South Africa under the Charter, in particular Chapter VII. All members of the Council, permanent and non-permanent, had a moral, legal and political obligation to take effective and, if necessary, coercive action to secure South Africa's compliance with the Council's decision. His delegation had no faith that diplomatic methods would bring South Africa to its senses and, as it saw it, there was no alternative to sanctions.

600. The representative of the United Kingdom said that the question before the Council raised issues of freedom and justice in which everyone must be concerned and involved. He shared the indignation already expressed in the debate and the realization that, in order to serve the best interests of the people of South West Africa, it was necessary for the Council to act with a full sense of responsibility. The United Kingdom's aim remained that of enabling all the people of South West Africa to proceed to free and full self-determination and independence and its contention was that this should be achieved by Members acting together not by words alone, however sincere, but by considered and deliberate action within the clear capacity of the Organization. As regards the Pretoria trial, he repeated that the United Kingdom abhorred and condemned the Terrorism Act. It had sent an observer to the trial and had conveyed to the South

African Government its concern regarding both the trial and the legislation under which the prisoners were charged. The Council must act within its clear capacity or it would be guilty of raising hopes it could not fulfil. The members should do everything possible to act in agreement, lest they give comfort and encouragement, not to those they wished to help, but to those whose policies and actions they rejected and condemned.

601. The representative of Ethiopia said that he had warned the Security Council that South Africa would once again reject its call; nothing else could be expected from that racist Government. Mere resolutions were not enough, but the United Nations could take some consolation in knowing that it had helped to save innocent lives from the death penalty. The Council was duty bound to see that those unlawfully imprisoned were released and repatriated. Resolution 2145 (XXI) of the General Assembly had terminated South Africa's mandate over South West Africa and the Territory was now the direct responsibility of the United Nations, so that South Africa could not legally promulgate laws with respect to it or arrest and try South West Africans. It should be made clear that the Council had condemned the trials precisely because they pre-empted United Nations responsibility. What was involved was South Africa's refusal to carry out the decisions of the Council in accordance with Article 25 of the Charter and the Council should, at the least, not rule out the possibility of invoking more effective action on the basis of that Article.

602. The representative of Ethiopia said that the Council should now: condemn South Africa's refusal to comply with its resolution; demand the immediate release and repatriation of the South West Africans; call on all those Member States which had political and economic relations with South Africa to exercise a maximum influence to make South Africa comply with the demands of the United Nations on South Africa, particularly with regard to the release and repatriation of the prisoners; and contemplate more effective action to ensure that its previous decision was implemented.

603. The representative of Algeria emphasized that the problem confronting the Security Council was purely a political one. A humanitarian interpretation of the last resolution had wished to limit its foreseeable consequences to the liberation of those unjustly detained. The ambiguity had resulted in a formal unanimity which had settled nothing. The Council should now seek more concrete measures, such as those provided for in Article 40 of the Charter, to ensure respect for the authority of the United Nations over South West Africa, in particular with regard to freeing the nationals of that Territory. The United Nations must end South Africa's illegal occupation and administration of South West Africa. The Great Powers must agree once and for all to bring to bear the weight of their influence and to re-examine their policy towards South West Africa and especially towards the Government of South Africa. The Council must now decide on practical measures that could put an end to the consequences of the policy of the Government of South Africa. The Terrorism Act was only one element of South Africa's imperialistic policy aimed at repressing the African liberation movements, a policy which was also expressed by such terms as "The Suppression of Communism Law" and was designed to extend *apartheid* for the protection of the white race against the African peoples, which were determined

to regain their independence. The moral and political authority of some great Powers was at stake; a new weak decision of the Council would show the capitulation of those Powers on which the effectiveness of the Council's decision depended. The Council had the choice of contenting itself with reaffirming its previous useless resolutions or of taking the necessary measures, even if they were provisional, to ensure the liberation of the prisoners and to consolidate its legal and political position in the matter. This meant to make full use of the enforcement possibilities contained in the Charter. Article 5 of the Charter had to be considered, with a view to a solution asking the United Nations to assume its direct responsibilities over South West Africa.

604. The representative of China said that his delegation deplored the harsh sentences handed down by a court without competence. South Africa's claim to be a nation under the rule of law could not be reconciled with the retroactive Terrorism Act and the trial and conviction of the South West Africans under it, particularly in view of the international status of South West Africa. The Council must act to secure compliance with its resolution. It must take swift and effective action to secure the release of the South West Africans. But such action to be effective would require the full support of all United Nations Members, particularly those capable of influencing South Africa. His delegation would study any proposals before the Council in that light.

605. The President of the Security Council, speaking as the representative of Paraguay, said that in January his delegation had hoped that it was not too late to make a new and urgent appeal to South Africa. Now there was a new flagrant violation by South Africa, which had openly challenged the Council. South Africa, which had no right to exercise any administrative or other function in South West Africa, must be condemned for its defiance of the January resolution. It must revoke the sentences and repatriate the South West Africans. The Council must devise ways of making its resolution 245 (1968) effective and obtaining speedy compliance by the Government of South Africa. With that end in mind, his delegation was ready to co-operate with other members of the Council.

606. The representative of the United Arab Republic called on the Council to uphold the principles of the Charter and preserve the prestige of the United Nations. The Council's previous resolution had been based on three facts: (a) that South Africa had no right to administer South West Africa and therefore no jurisdiction over those involved in the trial; (b) that the United Nations had a special responsibility towards the Territory and its people; and (c) that Member States had an obligation to assist in putting into effect the decisions of the United Nations. South Africa had defied the Council's resolution, and the Council must act firmly in face of that defiance. It was high time the South African authorities learnt to respect the will of the international community. His delegation found satisfaction and encouragement in the fact that the previous resolution on that question had been adopted unanimously. There was even more reason for the Council to act unanimously in face of South Africa's defiance.

607. At the 1393rd meeting, on 21 February 1968, the representative of Indonesia emphasized his Government's profound concern regarding the tragic events occurring in South Africa. The Organization could not remain silent in the face of the threat to its prestige

and authority posed by South Africa's defiance of its resolutions, nor could the Council tolerate such a betrayal of a Member's obligations under the Charter. Also, the violation of human rights by a Member State was a threat to peace in that area. In his delegation's opinion, Security Council resolution 245 (1968) was a decision, not a recommendation, and, as such, was binding on all Members under Article 25 of the Charter. But nothing had been done to change the situation materially. Some Members had conveyed their concern to the Government of South Africa, but Members with great power and influence still maintained diplomatic and economic ties with South Africa and could achieve what the resolution demanded. Regarding recourse to the International Court of Justice, he said, past experience had not been encouraging. In any case, the problem was a political one and it had to be settled by political means by the Security Council. If South Africa persisted in its defiance, further measures must be taken. The Charter contained provisions, such as those under Chapter VII, which could be brought to bear. In addition, the office of the Secretary-General could be used, as well as the personal good offices of the Secretary-General.

608. The representative of Zambia expressed indignation at the refusal of the Pretoria authorities to comply with Security Council resolution 245 (1968). Although a Member of the United Nations, South Africa had never abided by the Charter. It had committed evil acts in the name of Christianity and anti-communism, and had sown hatred by its policy of *apartheid*. This policy was now being extended to a Territory directly under United Nations responsibility. The Council should take enforcement measures if South Africa did not comply with its decision. Zambia's policy was one of peace but there could be no peace in a situation where people were oppressed and held under military force, and where the resolutions of the United Nations were ignored with impunity. The Security Council must act resolutely in the case of the South West Africans in detention in Pretoria.

609. The representative of Turkey said that thirty-three South West Africans had been convicted in persistent defiance of General Assembly resolutions and in violation of their human rights and of the international status of the Territory. The practice of enacting retroactive legislation for repressive political purposes must be condemned, but more than mere condemnations were called for. Since the termination of its mandate over South West Africa, South Africa had no legal right to administer the Territory, which had come under the responsibility of the United Nations in general and the Council for South West Africa in particular. Therefore, the members of that Council had called for that session of the Security Council with a view to immediate action for the release and repatriation of the South West Africans. The representative of Turkey recalled that the President of his country in an address to the African-Asian group of the United Nations during the previous April had stated regarding South West Africa that the world waited to see whether the majority of nations, genuinely united behind an objective, could also unite behind the practical means of realizing that objective. He appealed to the Council to find the most effective and immediate course to bring urgent help to the South West African prisoners.

610. The representative of Yugoslavia said that the sentencing of the South West African members of the

national liberation movement had met with indignation and condemnation by the international community. The Council's concern was justified since South African action represented a gross violation of fundamental human rights and of generally accepted norms of international law, as well as of the principles of the Charter. The so-called evidence of guilt of the defendants was merely a statement of principles of the aspirations of the people of the Territory for freedom and independence. It was incumbent upon the Security Council to insist upon the implementation of its resolution 245 (1968). South Africa must be strongly condemned and categorically requested to release and repatriate the prisoners immediately. If it failed to comply, the Council should consider taking effective measures, not excluding enforcement measures envisaged in the Charter. It should also call on all States, particularly those with extensive economic and political relations with South Africa, to exert maximum influence to make South Africa abandon its present policy.

611. The representative of Colombia said that his delegation concurred with the views expressed by other delegations, members of the United Nations Council for South West Africa. The Security Council must adopt measures to ensure compliance with its January resolution on the illegal trial. His delegation hoped that its decision would make it easier for the United Nations Council for South West Africa effectively to carry out the mandate entrusted to it.

612. At the 1394th meeting, on 29 February 1968, the President of the Council drew the attention of members to a draft resolution (S/8429) sponsored by Algeria, Brazil, Ethiopia, India, Pakistan, Paraguay and Senegal. The text of the draft resolution read as follows:

"The Security Council,

"Recalling its resolution 245 (1968) of 25 January 1968, by which it unanimously condemned the refusal of the Government of South Africa to comply with the provisions of General Assembly resolution 2324 (XXII) of 16 December 1967 and further called upon it to discontinue forthwith the illegal trial and to release and repatriate the South West Africans concerned,

"Taking into account General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) of 27 October 1966 by which the General Assembly of the United Nations terminated the Mandate of South Africa over South West Africa and assumed direct responsibility for the Territory until its independence,

"Reaffirming the inalienable right of the people and Territory of South West Africa to freedom and independence in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and with the provisions of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, and other relevant resolutions of the General Assembly,

"Mindful of the obligation of Member States to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the Charter,

"Distressed that the Government of South Africa has failed to comply with Security Council resolution 245 (1968),

"Taking into account the memorandum of the United Nations Council for South West Africa of 25 January 1968 on the illegal detention and trial

of the South West Africans concerned as also the letter of 10 February 1968 from the President of the United Nations Council for South West Africa,

"Reaffirming that the continued detention and trial and subsequent sentencing of the South West Africans constitute an illegal act and a flagrant violation of the rights of the South West Africans concerned, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and of the international status of the Territory now under direct United Nations responsibility,

"Cognizant of its special responsibility towards the people and the Territory of South West Africa,

"1. Censures the Government of South Africa for its flagrant defiance of Security Council resolution 245 (1968) as well as of the authority of the United Nations of which South Africa is a Member;

"2. Demands that the Government of South Africa forthwith release and repatriate the South West Africans concerned;

"3. Calls upon the Members of the United Nations to co-operate with the Security Council, in fulfilment of their obligations under the Charter, to ensure that the Government of South Africa complies with the provisions of the present resolution;

"4. Decides that in the event of failure on the part of the Government of South Africa to comply with the provisions of the present resolution, which will be in violation of Article 25 of the Charter, the Security Council will meet immediately to decide on the application of effective measures as envisaged in the Charter of the United Nations;

"5. Requests the Secretary-General to follow closely the implementation of the present resolution and to report thereon to the Security Council by ... March 1968;

"6. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter."

613. The representative of the United Kingdom suggested that, as it was important that members should act together in that matter, further urgent consultations should be held. The representative of Ethiopia, while accepting the suggestion of the representative of the United Kingdom, reiterated the urgency of the problem, especially in view of reports of further arrests. The President appealed to members to carry out the consultations with the urgency required by the circumstances.

614. At the 1395th meeting, on 4 March 1968, the representative of Pakistan introduced the draft resolution (S/8429) on behalf of the sponsors, following consultation among members of the Security Council and with delegations of other interested Member States. In regard to paragraph 1, he stated, the Council would be failing in its duty if it did not censure the South African Government for its deliberate disregard of resolution 245 (1968) and of the authority of the United Nations. Paragraph 2 demanded in plain language the release and repatriation forthwith of the South West Africans. Paragraph 3 was stronger than the equivalent paragraph of resolution 245 (1968); the sponsors believed that it was necessary to summon all the resources of persuasion, and even pressure, commanded by the entire membership to ensure South Africa's compliance. In regard to operative paragraph 4, the sponsors were convinced that it was necessary for the Council to make clear that it would act effectively if South Africa disregarded the present draft resolu-

tion. The time had come for the Council to adopt a resolution of the nature of a decision under Chapter VI of the Charter rather than to make yet another recommendation. Should South Africa again defy the Council, the Council could not exclude from consideration the application of appropriate measures under Chapter VII and other relevant Articles of the Charter. A warning to South Africa was necessary, because it was reported to be preparing another illegal trial of South West Africans. Paragraph 5 requested the Secretary-General to report on the implementation of the resolution with a time-limit, which the sponsors would propose should be two weeks.

615. The representative of Pakistan stated that the text contemplated a course of action by the Security Council which the sponsors considered the minimum, in the light of South Africa's actions. The draft resolution did not preclude the possible appointment of a special representative by the Secretary-General to achieve the release of the South West Africans. Despite intensive consultations, differences between the sponsors and the delegations of the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada and France, mainly pertaining to the language of the draft resolution, had not so far been reconciled; however, the sponsors remained ready to hold further consultations. Much as the African and Asian members would have liked to propose a text more commensurate in their judgement with the gravity of the situation, the representative of Pakistan stated, they had taken into account the views of others and couched the text in terms which did not bind anyone in advance to action under Chapter VII of the Charter. It was the sponsors' hope that the permanent members would bring the greatest possible influence to bear on South Africa.

616. The representative of Algeria said the African members would have liked the Council to impose respect for its January resolution by resorting to the means provided in the Charter. However, the pusillanimous attitude of some members had made that impossible, regrettably. Pretoria would no doubt exploit that attitude. Without unanimity, it would be increasingly difficult to secure implementation of the Council's decisions. Energetic action was necessary if difficulties for the Organization were to be avoided, which would have serious consequences for its authority and for South West Africa and southern Africa as a whole. States which still had trade or other relations with South Africa should put pressure on that country; paragraph 3 of the draft resolution contained nothing to alarm those Powers which were convinced of the just cause of the United Nations in South West Africa. The allusion in paragraph 4 to Article 25 did not necessarily imply a mechanical reference to a specific Chapter of the Charter; the paragraph was designed to make it possible to take useful action, barring no possibility. To reach an agreed result, the co-sponsors had to agree to some restrictions, and the other Powers had to take advantage of that situation to bring their weight to bear in support of the Security Council. There must be solidarity among members to strengthen the authority and the effectiveness of the action of the Security Council. To adopt a weaker resolution would be an admission of failure; a unanimous vote for the present draft resolution could effectively lead South Africa to take measures enabling it to prevent any confrontation. The co-sponsors were prepared to study carefully any constructive suggestion or initiative.

617. The representative of Brazil, on behalf of his delegation and that of Paraguay, observed that the draft expressed the commitment of the United Nations to human rights, to the role of law and to racial equality. It corresponded to the will of the majority of Members of the United Nations and would, if adopted, mean that the Council had duly discharged its Charter obligations. It did not commit the Council to any specific course of action and did not prejudge further action. There was only one commitment: to meet again and forthwith in case of new defiance by South Africa. To achieve unanimity, Paraguay and Brazil were prepared to enter into negotiations with all delegations. He expressed the hope that South Africa would reconsider its decision not to comply with Security Council resolution 245 (1968).

618. The representative of Pakistan expressed the appreciation of the sponsors to the delegations of the Soviet Union and Hungary for their contribution to the text.

619. The representative of Nigeria said it had been hoped that South Africa would implement Security Council resolution 245 (1968). Regrettably, South Africa in contempt of world opinion and in disregard of the resolution had proceeded with the illegal trial and had imposed harsh sentences on the South West Africans. The Council must now act or its competence and standing would be called into question and its effectiveness seriously impaired. The representative of Nigeria stated that eight more South West Africans had been arraigned for trial by South Africa under its Terrorism and Suppression of Communism Acts. There had been reports that some 220 South West Africans were in detention and would soon be tried in the courts on similar spurious charges. The problem must be seen as a challenge to the authority of the Security Council, which must retain its will and capacity to act. Nigeria supported the draft resolution as it sought to warn South Africa of its obligations under the Charter. If South Africa did not comply with those obligations, the Council must, with courage and humanity, face its obligations.

620. The representative of the United States said that the representative of Pakistan in presenting the draft resolution on behalf of the co-sponsors had shown a spirit of concern, resolution and responsibility, and at the same time of conciliation. The preservation of the Council's unanimity was essential if the common objective of securing the prompt release and repatriation of the South West Africans who had been sentenced and of preventing further illegal prosecutions by South Africa were to be achieved. The proposals that had been submitted by several delegations which were not sponsors of the draft were not intended to weaken the Council's abhorrence of South Africa's action or the Council's will to take effective action thereto; rather they embraced a reflection of the law of the Charter and a realistic appraisal of the best method to proceed in order to achieve the practical result all sought in common. His delegation with other delegations was prepared to continue the consultations in an effort to bring about general agreement.

621. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics declared that the Pretoria régime had arrested South West African patriots in what was a double violation of international legality: seizing people on a Territory not under its jurisdiction and accusing them of acts committed in the Territory of a country not under its jurisdiction. The whole action was an

unprecedented violation of international legality; it was a manifestation of international gangsterism. It was the duty of the United Nations and the Council to defend the elementary rights of the people of South West Africa. He expressed support for the draft resolution. However, he said, it had some defects. For instance, the appeal in paragraph 3 should rightly be directed to those who continued to protect the racists, such as the United States, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany which continued to maintain close relations with the South Africa régime. Only with such support had South Africa been able to ignore the decisions of the United Nations concerning South West Africa. He would vote for the draft on the understanding that the appeal in paragraph 3 applied to those countries which continued to give full assistance to the racists in South Africa.

622. The representative of the United Kingdom stated that he had urged consultations in the hope of achieving unanimity, and he wanted to express appreciation to the sponsors for the co-operation they had shown. His delegation hoped that the consultations could be resumed as soon as possible. His delegation shared the sense of urgency and was anxious that unanimity be achieved.

623. The representative of Denmark stated that his delegation found it essential that the consultations be continued with the clear aim of achieving that agreement among members which was so important to achieve the release of the prisoners.

624. At the 1396th meeting, on 5 March 1968, the representative of India said it was imperative for the Security Council to take urgent steps, not excluding sanctions, to deal with the situation created by South Africa's defiance of the Security Council's resolution and to convince that country of the futility of persisting in its stubborn arrogance. His delegation believed that Article 25 had very close and perhaps exclusive links with Chapter VII of the Charter, but allusion to that Article did not necessarily imply a mechanical reference to a specific Chapter of the Charter. The present case was not a dispute between two or more Member States; it was a dispute between the Organization and a Member State which had persistently defied it. Therefore, the clear warning under Article 25 was essential. Although the draft resolution did not fully meet its views, India had co-sponsored it in a spirit of compromise and with the clear understanding that it was only the first essential step. If South Africa refused to comply with its provisions, effective measures must be adopted by the Council and should be supported by all delegations.

625. The representative of Hungary declared that in its deliberation on the illegal trial and sentencing of the South West African patriots, the Council had been confronted with problems of a moral, legal and political nature. Further, South West Africa was a United Nations responsibility so that in a way the authority and prestige of the Organization was at stake. The draft resolution on the whole adequately responded to the situation created by South Africa's defiance of the United Nations. However, paragraph 3 should have specifically referred to those States, such as the United States, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany, which continued to maintain close economic, diplomatic and military links with South Africa, despite valid United Nations resolutions. In refusing to implement resolution 245 (1968) South Africa had clearly violated its responsibilities under the

Charter. If South Africa's supporters failed to persuade it to implement the resolution, the Security Council would have to consider more effective measures to bring about the release of the South West Africans. Hungary supported the intention of the sponsors and hoped that the draft would not be weakened and that it would be implemented without delay.

626. At the 1397th meeting, on 14 May 1968, the President stated that, after many consultations with members, he was in a position to put before the Council a text on which he believed there could be a unanimous vote. The text read as follows:

"The Security Council,

"Recalling its resolution 245 (1968) of 25 January 1968, by which it unanimously condemned the refusal of the Government of South Africa to comply with the provisions of General Assembly resolution 2324 (XXII) of 16 December 1967 and further called upon it to discontinue forthwith the illegal trial and to release and repatriate the South West Africans concerned,

"Taking into account General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) of 27 October 1966 by which the General Assembly of the United Nations terminated the Mandate of South Africa over South West Africa and assumed direct responsibility for the Territory until its independence,

"Reaffirming the inalienable right of the people and Territory of South West Africa to freedom and independence in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and with the provisions of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960,

"Mindful that Member States shall fulfil all their obligations as set forth in the Charter,

"Distressed that the Government of South Africa has failed to comply with Security Council resolution 245 (1968),

"Taking into account the memorandum of the United Nations Council for South West Africa of 25 January 1968 on the illegal detention and trial of the South West Africans concerned as also the letter of 10 February 1968 from the President of the United Nations Council for South West Africa,

"Reaffirming that the continued detention and trial and subsequent sentencing of the South West Africans constitute an illegal act and a flagrant violation of the rights of the South West Africans concerned, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and of the international status of the Territory now under direct United Nations responsibility,

"Cognizant of its special responsibility towards the people and the Territory of South West Africa,

"1. Censures the Government of South Africa for its flagrant defiance of Security Council resolution 245 (1968) as well as of the authority of the United Nations of which South Africa is a Member;

"2. Demands that the Government of South Africa forthwith release and repatriate the South West Africans concerned;

"3. Calls upon Members of the United Nations to co-operate with the Security Council, in pursuance of their obligations under the Charter, in order to obtain compliance by the Government of South Africa with the provisions of the present resolution;

"4. *Urges* Member States who are in a position to contribute to the implementation of the present resolution to assist the Security Council in order to obtain compliance by the Government of South Africa with the provisions of the present resolution;

"5. *Decides* that in the event of failure on the part of the Government of South Africa to comply with the provisions of the present resolution, the Security Council will meet immediately to determine upon effective steps or measures in conformity with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations;

"6. Requests the Secretary-General to follow closely the implementation of the present resolution and to report thereon to the Security Council not later than 31 March 1968;

"7. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter."

Decision: *At the 1397th meeting, on 14 March 1968, the draft resolution was adopted unanimously (resolution 246 (1968)).*

627. The representative of the United Kingdom stated that his delegation had made clear its position and policy in regard to South West Africa and the Pretoria trial in previous speeches in the Assembly and the Council. On the question of action under Chapter VII of the Charter, it had made its position absolutely clear. It considered that the Council's action should not be weakened by division, and had appealed for consultations. The statement of the representative of Pakistan, introducing the seven-Power draft resolution, had opened the door to agreement: he had said that the draft resolution did not preclude the sending of a special representative of the Secretary-General to South Africa and that it did not bind any member in advance to action under Chapter VII. On that basis consultation had been undertaken and had led to agreed and concerted action.

628. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said the Soviet delegation had supported the draft resolution notwithstanding its shortcomings, because its main features were the demand for the immediate release and repatriation of the South West African nationalists and the censure of the racists. His delegation had voted for the resolution on the understanding that paragraph 4 was in effect a demand addressed to the United States and the United Kingdom to assist in putting an end to the oppression of South West African patriots and cease all support to the racist régime of Pretoria.

629. The representative of Canada recalled the statement by the representative of Pakistan on 4 March. The latter's assurance that the text did not bind the Council in advance to a specific course of action had made possible the happy result of the consultations.

630. The representative of France explained that his delegation had voted for the resolution, despite its reservations regarding some preambular paragraphs, since it could not accept the extension to South West Africa of an *apartheid* policy which it condemned. As stated by the spokesman for the co-sponsors, the resolution did not prejudice future action by the Council.

631. The representative of the United States expressed his appreciation to the sponsors of the draft resolution for their spirit of conciliation in the interests of maintaining unity. Among the changes agreed to was the omission of the reference to Article 25 of the

Charter which the United States would have regarded as inappropriate for a Chapter VI resolution. Particularly helpful to a common agreement was the assurance of the sponsors that their draft contained no commitment to, nor exclusion of, any Charter approach in any future consideration by the Council of this matter. The resolution was an expression of the firm will and intent of the international community on an issue of international responsibility, and must be heeded.

632. The representative of Ethiopia stated that he had voted for the resolution in a spirit of co-operation, without prejudice to his Government's position, as already presented to the Council, which remained unchanged.

633. The representative of Hungary said that in voting for the resolution his delegation had taken into consideration that urgent effective action was required to correct the injustice done to the South West Africans. States voting in favour of the draft were now bound to demand that South Africa comply with its terms. Implementation of resolutions and observance of the principles of the Charter involved, if necessary, the application of Chapter VII. It was his delegation's view that that was shown clearly in paragraph 5 of the resolution. The resolution was a step towards ensuring the freedom of the people of South West Africa and this was why his delegation had voted for it.

634. The representative of Denmark said that his delegation had stressed throughout that to achieve maximum effectiveness, the broadest possible agreement and, if possible, unanimity in the Council had to be established and maintained. He therefore welcomed agreement on the resolution.

E. Subsequent communications to the Council

635. In pursuance of the request made by the Security Council in paragraph 6 of resolution 246 (1968), the Secretary-General submitted on 30 March 1968 a report (S/8506) in which he informed the Council that on 14 March 1968 he had transmitted the text of that resolution to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of South Africa and on 15 March 1968 had handed an aide-mémoire to the Permanent Representative of South Africa. In that aide-mémoire the Secretary-General, referring to statements made in the Security Council, informed the Permanent Representative of South Africa of his plans to send to South Africa a Personal Representative for the purposes laid down in operative paragraph 2 of resolution 246 (1968).

636. On 30 March 1968 the Secretary-General received a reply (S/8506/Annex I) dated 27 March 1968 from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of South Africa in which he reviewed discussions between South Africa and the United Nations regarding South West Africa since 1966. He stated that his Government had the duty of maintaining order, stability and economic well-being in the Territory. Convicted terrorists could not be released nor could their release be discussed. South Africa had all along been ready and willing to enlighten whoever was objectively interested in the well-being of the inhabitants of South West Africa and in that light South Africa would be willing to receive the Secretary-General's Personal Representative provided he was mutually acceptable, and provided also that South Africa could be assured that factual information made available to him would not, as so often in the past, be ignored.

637. On 18 March 1968 the Secretary-General transmitted also the text of resolution 246 (1968) to the States Members of the United Nations and, referring in particular to paragraphs 2, 3 and 4, asked for information on the response of Governments to paragraphs 3 and 4. The subsequent replies of thirty-two Governments are contained in S/8506/Annex II and S/8506/Add.1-4.

638. By a letter dated 1 April 1968 (S/8524), the President of the United Nations Council for South West Africa informed the Security Council pursuant to General Assembly resolutions 2248 (S-V) and 2325 (XXII) that the Council for South West Africa had decided to proceed to South West Africa, in pursuance of paragraph 3, section IV, of General Assembly resolution 2248 (S-V) and of General Assembly resolution 2325 (XXII) and to visit the Republic of Zambia and the United Republic of Tanzania. By a telegram dated 11 April 1968 (S/8543) to the President of the Security Council, the President of the United Nations Council for South West Africa gave further information concerning that Council's efforts to travel to South West Africa.

639. By a telegram dated 13 April 1968 (S/8548), the President of the United Nations Council for South West Africa informed the Security Council that the Government of South Africa in further defiance of

the Security Council had allowed the sentencing of another South West African, and had introduced a bill to empower the Government to establish so-called separate homelands in South West Africa in defiance of the authority of the United Nations as established under General Assembly resolutions 2145 (XXI) and 2248 (S-V).

640. By a letter dated 27 May 1968 (S/8600/Rev.1) to the President of the Security Council, the President of the United Nations Council for South West Africa, referring to the communication of 13 April, transmitted a copy of the declaration adopted by the Council for South West Africa on 27 May relating to the bill before the South African Parliament. The Council placed on record its grave concern at this illegal action calculated to destroy the unity of the people and the territorial integrity of the Territory.

641. By a letter dated 12 June 1968 (S/8635) addressed to the President of the Security Council, the Secretary-General transmitted the text of resolution 2372 (XXII) adopted by the General Assembly at its 1671st plenary meeting on 12 June 1968, and drew attention to paragraph 13 of the resolution by which the General Assembly recommended to the Council urgently to take all appropriate steps to secure the implementation of the resolution.

Chapter 5

LETTER DATED 25 JANUARY 1968 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

642. By a letter dated 25 January 1968 (S/8360), the representative of the United States of America requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the grave threat to peace which had been brought about by a series of increasingly dangerous and aggressive military actions by North Korean authorities in violation of the Armistice Agreement, of international law and of the Charter. The letter said that the repeated violations of the Armistice Agreement by North Korean authorities had become increasingly serious during the past year and a half, during which armed personnel on many occasions had been dispatched from North Korea across the Demilitarized Zone into the Republic of Korea on missions of terrorism and political assassination. A particularly grave incident had occurred when a band of armed terrorists had been sent into the Republic of Korea with the apparent intention of assassinating President Park. The letter also stated that North Korea had wilfully committed an act of wanton lawlessness against a United States naval vessel on the high seas. On 23 January, the USS *Pueblo*, while operating in international waters, had been illegally seized by armed North Korean vessels, and the ship and crew were still under forcible detention by North Korean authorities.

643. Earlier, on 2 November 1967, a special report of the United Nations Command (S/8217) was transmitted by the United States representative to the Security Council. The report drew attention to a drastic increase of violations by North Korea of the Military Armistice Agreement from fifty incidents in 1966 to 543 in the first ten months of 1967, resulting from the deliberate infiltration into the Demilitarized Zone and the Republic of Korea by land and by sea

of armed personnel groups from North Korea for the purpose of setting ambushes, performing raids near the Demilitarized Zone, laying mines and engaging in other subversive activities. The report also noted that, as a result of this infiltration, there had been in 1967 (as at 18 October) 144 military and civilian persons killed and another 332 wounded (contrasted with 39 and 34, respectively, during 1966). Stating that these violations constituted clear evidence of North Korean unwillingness to keep faith with the Armistice Agreement and that the North Koreans have shown themselves unwilling to co-operate with the machinery established by the Armistice Agreement, including that for the investigation of violations of the Agreement, the report noted the great restraint exercised by the United Nations Command in the face of North Korean attacks. After reaffirming the Command's resolve and determination to preserve peace and security in Korea, the report stated that the United Nations Command would continue to seek the co-operation of North Korea in the Armistice machinery in order to reduce Armistice violations, decrease tension in the Demilitarized Zone, and establish a more peaceful atmosphere throughout Korea. A further report of the United Nations Command, transmitted by the United States representative on 27 January 1968 (S/8366), gave details of the dispatch of a team of thirty-one North Korean agents, armed with sub-machine guns, grenades and explosives, through the Demilitarized Zone into the Republic of Korea with the assigned mission to assassinate President Park of the Republic of Korea. It also reported on the additional human casualties which had been caused by North Korean attacks across the Demarcation Lines since the United Nations Command report of 2 November 1967, including: 20 military killed,

another 50 wounded; 7 police and other civilians killed, another 4 wounded.

644. The Security Council considered the complaints of the United States at its 1388th and 1389th meetings, on 26 and 27 January 1968. When the United States letter was included in the provisional agenda of the 1388th meeting of the Council on 26 January 1968, the representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Hungary, opposing inclusion of the item, declared that the accusations levelled against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea were utterly unfounded. The seizure or detention of a foreign ship which had invaded the territorial waters of any State with hostile intent was the internal affair of that State and it could not be debated in the Security Council. They stated that the main source of the tension in Korea was the presence on the territory of the southern part of Korea of aggressive armed forces of the United States of America, together with the navy of the United States in the waters off the shores of Korea.

645. The representative of the Soviet Union said that the attempt to draw the Security Council into a consideration of the slander by the United States of America against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea not only could not help to reduce tension in the Korean peninsula but could only still further inflame the atmosphere and increase the threat to peace and security in the area. He considered it necessary to draw the attention of the Council to the fact that the United States had made accusations against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea which it knew were unfounded. The aggressor in Korea was not the Democratic People's Republic of Korea but the United States; it was those who had invaded the soil of the Korean people, had been occupying the south of Korea for many years and were trying to impose on the Korean people the puppet régime of a clique of venal traitors. The repeated proposals of peace-loving States Members of the United Nations for the withdrawal of all foreign armed forces from South Korea had met with opposition from the United States and all who supported it. The United States had also ignored frequent warnings by the Soviet Union and other peace-loving States about the dangerous and explosive nature of the situation in Korea created by the occupation of the south of Korea by United States and other foreign troops. It was thus solely the fault of the United States that a hotbed of tension still existed in Korea, creating a threat to peace and security in that area and setting an obstacle in the way of a peaceful settlement of the Korean problem. It could thus be seen that the United States request for a meeting of the Security Council was simply a manoeuvre designed to divest it of responsibility for the continuing tension in Korea and mask the reprehensible imperialist plans of the United States in the Far East and particularly vis-à-vis the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

646. The United States representative stated that the representative of the Soviet Union had not yet heard the evidence which was to be offered after the agenda was adopted. He declared that his country had brought to the Council on an urgent basis a matter which affected the peace and security of an important area. It had sought an urgent meeting of the Security Council because of the belief that if it was at all possible, this situation should be settled peacefully through diplomatic channels and that the Security

Council, as the primary diplomatic channel, had primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.

647. The representative of Canada expressed support for inclusion of the item, stating that the Council should deal with a dangerous situation brought to it by a Member State and that it should lose no time in taking up the matter and bringing the healing touch of diplomacy to bear on the situation. Seizure of the ship, the representative of Canada added, was a very unhappy omen for future peace in the area unless steps were taken to deal effectively, equitably and promptly with the consequences.

648. The representative of the United Kingdom said that there was a grave situation and that the Security Council must play its proper part. He urged that the Council should decide without further delay to adopt its agenda and to proceed at once to consider the question which had very properly been brought to its attention.

649. Speaking in exercise of the right of reply, the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics stated that he would vote against the inscription of the item suggested by the United States.

650. The provisional agenda was adopted at the same meeting (26 January) by 12 votes to 3 (Algeria, Hungary and USSR).

651. The representative of India explained that his vote for inclusion of the item should not be construed to amount to agreement with, or support for, the contents of the letter of the representative of the United States.

652. The representative of France also noted that his delegation had agreed that the matter be studied in the Council on the understanding that the debate would allow each State to express its views.

653. The representative of Algeria explained that he had voted against inclusion because of the lack of verified information available to the Council regarding the events that really took place in the Gulf of Wonsan and out of concern to avoid dramatization of the situation.

654. The President of the Council, speaking as the representative of Pakistan, stated that his affirmative vote on the adoption of the agenda did not reflect his judgement on matters of substance.

655. The United States representative, in presenting the United States complaint before the Council, stated that North Korean authorities had brought about a grave threat to peace through the seizure and forcible detention of a virtually unarmed vessel of the United States Navy and its crew on the high seas and through a campaign of steadily growing infiltration, sabotage and terrorism which reached a climax in the attempted assassination of the President of the Republic of Korea in Seoul. He said that the resulting danger to international peace and security would be removed only if action were taken forthwith to secure the release of the vessel, the USS *Pueblo*, and its crew and to end the pattern of North Korean armed transgressions against the Republic of Korea.

656. Turning to the fact of these two aspects of North Korean aggressive conduct, the United States representative dealt first with the seizure and detention of the *Pueblo* and its crew. He noted that at 12 noon (Korean time) on 23 January, the USS *Pueblo*—manned by a crew of 83 and sailing in international

waters off the North Korean coast—was confronted by a heavily armed North Korean patrol boat identified as a submarine chaser. Noting the *Pueblo* was operating under strict instructions which required it to stay at least thirteen nautical miles from the North Korean coast, the United States representative, referring to a map provided for the convenience of the Council, cited a report from the *Pueblo* and a monitored report from the North Korean vessel at exactly the same time to show conclusively that the *Pueblo* was in international waters at the time it was first approached by the submarine chaser. Quoting further a monitored oral message from the North Korean craft to its base some ten minutes later, the United States representative stated that the information available to the United States, as reported by the *Pueblo*, and to North Korean authorities, as transmitted by its own ship, was virtually identical: i.e., the *Pueblo* was, when first approached, 16.3 nautical miles from the nearest point of the North Korean mainland on the peninsula of Hodo-Pando and 15.3 miles from the island of Ung-do. Interestingly enough, concerning the small margin of difference which existed, the North Korean ship reported the *Pueblo* about a mile further away from the shoreline than the United States report of the *Pueblo* position.

657. The United States representative then recounted the events—involving the *Pueblo*, the North Korean patrol boat, the three additional armed vessels which joined it, and two MIG aircraft which appeared and circled the *Pueblo*—which preceded the armed boarding and seizure of the *Pueblo* and its entry under force into the port of Wonsan. He stressed that the North Korean naval vessels, within a few minutes of the boarding of the *Pueblo*, had reported their position as being about 21.3 miles from the nearest North Korean land.

658. The United States representative stated that he wished to lay to rest intimations that the *Pueblo* had entered into North Korean territorial waters on 23 January prior to the approach made by North Korean vessels. Availing himself of a second map and again citing reports from the *Pueblo* and those monitored from North Korean vessels, he tracked the course of the *Pueblo* from the morning of 23 January—when it was at a location in international waters to which it had come from the south-east—until it was first approached by a North Korean vessel at noon, at another point in international waters. He also stated that the *Pueblo*, in seeking to escape encirclement by the North Korean vessels, did not move in the direction which would have transgressed the twelve-mile limit. He said the physical evidence—international Morse code signals and monitored voice reports—was incontrovertible that the *Pueblo*, when first approached and when seized, was in international waters and beyond the twelve-mile limit and that the North Koreans knew this; he noted further that the *Pueblo* was so lightly armed the North Koreans even reported it was unarmed in one of their reports which was monitored.

659. In these circumstances, the forcible stopping, boarding, and seizure of the *Pueblo* on the high seas was a knowing and wilful aggressive act—one no Member of the United Nations could tolerate.

660. After noting that Soviet ships engage in exactly the same activities as the *Pueblo* and sail much closer to the shores of other States, the United States representative took up the second category of North Korean aggressive actions: their systematic campaign

of infiltration, sabotage, and terrorism across the Armistice Demarcation Line. He reviewed the contents of two reports from the United Nations Command—that of 2 November 1967 (S/8217) and that of 27 January 1968 (S/8366). Stressing that the steady increase in the tempo and scope of the series of North Korean attacks across the Demilitarized Zone threatened to undermine the whole structure of the Armistice régime in Korea, he said that the Armistice Agreement must be restored to its full vigour and the weight and influence of the Council exerted to this end.

661. He concluded by urging the Council promptly and effectively to help secure the safe return of the *Pueblo* and its crew and to restore the vigour and effectiveness of the Armistice Agreement.

662. The representative of the USSR pointed out the groundlessness of the accusations levelled against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea by the United States. He said that the deterioration of the situation in Korea was a direct result of the aggressive acts committed by United States and South Korea armed forces on both land and sea against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. In that connexion, he drew attention to the memorandum submitted by the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in October 1967 to the twenty-second session of the General Assembly, which stated that since 1966 "there has been created the sharpest tension ever seen after the Armistice along the Military Demarcation Line in Korea, and a dangerous situation has remained unabated for more than a year now which may ignite war at any moment". That conclusion had been reached by the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on the basis of a large number of facts relating to acts of armed provocation by United States and South Korean armed forces. The same memorandum stated that, since the Korean Armistice, from July 1953 to September 1967, United States and South Korean troops had committed 52,000 violations of various kinds along the Demarcation Line, there had been 568 cases of artillery firing into the territory of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, over thirty armed attacks and over 800 cases of intrusion into the coastal waters of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea by warships. In 1967 alone, United States troops had fired five times as many shots at targets in the territory of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as they had fired during the whole of the preceding thirteen years since the Armistice. The escalation of provocative actions against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was accompanied by wide-scale measures to strengthen the South Korean army. To equip that army, the United States was supplying to South Korea increasing numbers of Hawk, Nike-Hercules and Nike-Ajax guided missiles, supersonic military planes, including fighter-bombers, heavy and medium tanks, long-range artillery, large warships and other weapons and military equipment. More and more military airfields were being built on the territory of South Korea and South Korean ports were being fitted out as naval bases.

663. The representative of the USSR said that the United States request to convene the Security Council was an attempt to distort the facts and to conceal the illegal and hostile acts and the aggression of the United States against the Korean people, which had continued for many years. In the United States in recent days, a war psychosis had been building up. Threats were being made against the Democratic

People's Republic of Korea and measures of mobilization were being taken. The continuing presence on the territory of South Korea of aggressive forces of the United States was the main source of tension in Korea. He cited the memorandum submitted to the General Assembly by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in October 1967 in connexion with the systematic incidents and troubles on the Demarcation Line, to the effect that from the conclusion of the Armistice in July 1953 up until September 1967 there were over 800 cases of intrusion of military vessels into the territorial waters of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The real danger lay in the hope of some people in South Korea that a new military aggression could be committed against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The intrusion of the *Pueblo* into the territorial waters of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for the purpose of espionage activities constituted another dangerous act of provocation by the United States and was a violation of the elementary principles of international law and the sovereignty of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Only the immediate withdrawal of foreign forces from South Korea and the cessation of foreign interference in the affairs of the Korean people would pave the way for a peaceful settlement of the Korean problem.

664. With regard to the circumstances of the detention of the *Pueblo* in the territorial waters of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the representative of the USSR said that the United States representative had given a false one-sided version of the events connected with the detention of the vessel. In that connexion, the representative of the USSR referred to testimony given by Captain Bucher of the *Pueblo*, who had admitted that the vessel, on the instructions of the United States Central Intelligence Agency, had been engaged in espionage activities in the territorial waters of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The testimony given by the Captain of the *Pueblo* left no doubt about the location of the vessel at the time when it was detained in the territorial waters of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea or about the hostile designs with which that vessel had penetrated into the territorial waters of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, in violation of its territorial integrity and sovereignty. According to Bucher's testimony, the *Pueblo* had been studying the network of radar installations, the characteristics of various ports, the number of incoming and outgoing vessels and the manoeuvrability of the vessels of the Korean People's Army. In addition, Bucher had stated that they had spied on various military installations and the position of armed forces along the eastern coast and had reached a point 7.6 miles from Nede. It was then, in the words of Captain Bucher, that a patrol boat of the Korean People's Army had appeared. The location of that point was 39°17'4" north latitude, 127°46'9" east longitude. The facts of the detention of the *Pueblo*, based on actual data, were given in the statement by the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of 23 January 1968, which read: "Today vessels of our People's Army siezed an armed espionage vessel of the United States imperialist aggressors, which had intruded into the territorial waters of the Republic and was engaged in hostile activities there".

665. At the 1389th meeting, on 27 January, the representative of the United Kingdom emphasized the gravity of the matter and the crucial interest of

everybody to achieve early and effective action by the Security Council. He said that in response to the general and deep concern in the United Kingdom, the British Foreign Secretary had spoken in the British Parliament on the previous day and expressed the sense of outrage felt in the United Kingdom at the seizure on the high seas of a ship which was peacefully carrying out a legitimate purpose. In addition to the detailed and convincing report on the seizure of the United States ship *Pueblo* on the high seas which the Council had heard, the Council had also heard confirmation of disquieting evidence of the increase in violations of the Korean Armistice Agreement. The Council must deplore all breaches of the Armistice Agreement and reaffirm the need for respect for the Agreement. The need was to clear the ground in order to go forward with more satisfactory implementation of the basic agreement. This could be done by restoring the situation, by quickly reducing tension, and by allowing the ship and her crew to go free.

666. The representative of Ethiopia said that, in the view of his delegation, the Council found itself at the great disadvantage of not having full and verified information on what actually had happened and needed to take some agreed action to initiate an immediate investigation. He suggested that it would be appropriate and in the established tradition of the Council to invite North Korea, as a party to the dispute, to take its full part in the carrying out of the investigation, to appear and to present its case before the Council. That would enable the Council to possess first-hand submissions from all sides and to gain fuller and more balanced information on the matter as a whole. He called upon the parties concerned to help the Council in its efforts by exercising maximum restraint and by agreeing to make certain gestures of conciliation and goodwill.

667. The representative of Hungary stated that it was clear that the *Pueblo* had entered North Korean coastal waters to gather intelligence data on radio signals in preparation for an eventual attack on that country. The issue before the Council was not the case of the *Pueblo*, but the policy of the United States—a policy of hostility, of threats and aggression. The United States had ignored the repeated warnings by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea concerning the grave dangers of its hostile acts. In view of the constant attacks against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, of the many border violations, of the continued United States military occupation of South Korea, and of the misrule of that unhappy land, it was the Democratic People's Republic which should expect the United Nations to put an end to United States intervention in the affairs of the Korean people. The United States was responsible for the present tension; the Democratic People's Republic of Korea wanted nothing more than peace and an end to the hostile acts of the United States. The Council should strive to put an end to the United States policy of provocations and ask that Government to cease its threats of armed intervention against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and to abide by the principles of the Charter; the foreign occupation of South Korea must end, and its people be enabled to exercise their right of self-determination.

668. The representative of Canada said that the discussion of the item on the agenda revealed one important point of common ground—the degree of seriousness which was attached to the rising state of tension

in the Korean area and that the *Pueblo* incident had been a serious source of exacerbation of that tension. He said that progress would best be achieved by urgent consultations among the members of the Council.

669. Speaking in exercise of the right of reply, the representative of the United States charged Soviet ships with gathering information in proximity to the United States and in many other countries of the world. He expressed the hope that the Council would reaffirm that the Armistice Agreement of 1953 should be scrupulously adhered to in Korea and that its machinery should be utilized in order to preserve peace in the area.

670. Exercising the right of reply, the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics pointed out that the intrusion of the *Pueblo* into North Korean territorial waters was a typical example of numerous

violations by the United States of the Armistice Agreement. The *Pueblo* had been detained since it had been indulging in illegal and hostile activities in the territorial waters of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. In this connexion the acts undertaken by the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea were measures of self-defence and by no means a violation of international law.

671. The representative of Hungary, exercising his right of reply, pointed out that the United States policy of violation of the sovereignty of other countries could lead only to further international tension and that only by defending the sovereignty of all States would it be possible to pursue a policy of peace.

672. The Council then adjourned after the President had stated that there would be consultations among its members.

Chapter 6

QUESTION CONCERNING THE SITUATION IN SOUTHERN RHODESIA: LETTERS DATED 2 AND 30 AUGUST 1963 ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON BEHALF OF THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THIRTY-TWO MEMBER STATES (S/5382 AND S/5409)

LETTER DATED 12 MARCH 1968 ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL BY THE REPRESENTATIVES OF ALGERIA, BOTSWANA, BURUNDI, CAMEROON, CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC, CHAD, CONGO (BRAZZAVILLE), CONGO (DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF), DAHOMEY, ETHIOPIA, GABON, GHANA, GUINEA, IVORY COAST, KENYA, LESOTHO, LIBERIA, LIBYA, MADAGASCAR, MALI, MAURITANIA, MOROCCO, NIGER, NIGERIA, RWANDA, SENEGAL, SIERRA LEONE, SOMALIA, SUDAN, TOGO, TUNISIA, UGANDA, UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC, UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA, UPPER VOLTA AND ZAMBIA (S/8454)

673. On 27 July 1967 the Secretary-General submitted a third addendum (S/7781/Add.3) to his report in pursuance of resolution 232 (1966) of 16 December 1966. The addendum contained the substantive parts of additional replies received to the notes of the Secretary-General of 17 December 1966 and 13 January 1967. The addendum stated that since the trade statistics provided related only to the first few months of 1967 and since several of Southern Rhodesia's trading partners and, in particular, some of its immediate neighbours, had not responded to the Secretary-General's request for information about their trade with Southern Rhodesia, it was still not possible to make any definitive conclusions on the progress of the implementation of the Council's resolution. It could only be said that while there had been a significant decline in the trade between Southern Rhodesia and many of its trading partners in most of the commodities listed in the resolution, there had been continuing traffic in certain important commodities.

674. On 22 September 1967 the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Portugal communicated (S/8166) a statement of the losses suffered by the economy of the Province of Mozambique by reason of the continued application of a number of measures provided for in the resolutions of the Security Council of 9 April and 16 December 1966. He reiterated the desire of his Government for consultations with the Security Council under Article 50 of the Charter to agree upon modalities of the payment of the indemnification to which the Province of Mozambique had a right.

675. On 10 November 1967, the Secretary-General transmitted (S/8241) to the Council the text of General Assembly resolution 2262 (XXII) of 3 November,

paragraph 17 of which drew the attention of the Council to the necessity of applying the necessary measures under Chapter VII of the Charter in view of the deterioration of the grave situation in Southern Rhodesia.

676. A fourth addendum to the Secretary-General's report (S/7781/Add.4 and Corr.1) was submitted to the Security Council on 30 November 1967. In addition to the substantive parts of further replies to the notes of the Secretary-General, it contained an analysis of the statistical data furnished by States under the Council's resolution. Imports into the reporting countries had amounted to \$25 million in the first half of 1967, compared with \$227 million in the year 1965. The reporting countries had been, in 1965, the recipients of 53 per cent of Southern Rhodesia's exports, the remainder of which had gone almost entirely to Zambia, Malawi and South Africa. In the absence of statistical reports from those three countries for the period under review—the first half of 1967—it was not possible at present to evaluate that part of the total trade. Exports of the reporting countries to Southern Rhodesia had amounted to \$30 million in the first half of 1967, compared with \$185 million in the year 1965. The reporting countries had been, in 1965, suppliers of 64 per cent of the imports of Southern Rhodesia, the remainder of which had come principally from South Africa, Zambia, Malawi and Mozambique, for which statistical data were not yet available for review. The analysis set forth data on the eleven commodity groups specified in resolution 232 (1966), which had amounted to \$20 million in the first half of 1967, compared with \$207 million in the year 1965. (The report also noted that the various figures contained in

it covered trade which had taken place before adoption of the resolution but which appeared only in the statistics for the year 1967.)

677. The most important of the commodities was tobacco, Southern Rhodesian exports of which had amounted to \$132 million in 1965. The available data indicated that, in the first half of 1967, Rhodesian tobacco had virtually disappeared from the world market. The recorded imports of the reporting countries had been explained as having been, in most cases, bonded stores of earlier date. An analysis of the sources of supply of the main tobacco markets had revealed that the former consumers of the Southern Rhodesian crop had, in 1967, met their requirements mainly by an expansion of imports from the United States. It was estimated that, as a result of a fall in Southern Rhodesia's exports, more than 140,000 metric tons of tobacco were still in Southern Rhodesian hands. Southern Rhodesian exports of the next most important commodity, asbestos, had amounted to \$30 million in 1965. The recorded imports of the reporting countries in the first half of 1967 had amounted to \$1.7 million, which compared with \$22 million in 1965. The report noted that imports of the reporting countries from South Africa, an important producer of asbestos, had been increasing, amounting to \$26 million in the first half of 1967, compared with \$39 million in the year 1965. Most of the reporting countries appeared to have ceased to import copper from Southern Rhodesia in 1967. It appeared from the material that imports of copper into the Federal Republic of Germany, although somewhat lower than in 1965, had continued in the first half of 1967. The report also provided various figures on imports from Southern Rhodesia of chromite, meat and meat products, sugar, hides, skins and leather, iron ore and pig iron. Continued observation of the trade in chromite would be necessary and it was not possible, without fuller data, to review the trade in the other commodities.

678. Exports of the reporting countries to Southern Rhodesia of the four commodity groups specified in resolution 232 (1966) had amounted to approximately \$1 million in the first half of 1967, as compared with \$35 million in the year 1965.

679. As to petroleum supplies to Southern Rhodesia, no meaningful evaluation of the status was possible from the data reported by the reporting countries because the traditional suppliers had been countries in the Middle East region, none of which had as yet reported its data to the Secretary-General. Iran, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and Netherlands Antilles had been normal, major suppliers of petroleum products, not only to Southern Rhodesia but also to South Africa, Mozambique and Angola. Since South Africa in recent periods had not disclosed countries of origin for its petroleum imports or countries of destination for its petroleum exports, even approximate evaluation of the Southern Rhodesia petroleum situation, in combination with that of South Africa, was not possible without direct statistical information from their principal suppliers.

680. On 14 December 1967, the representative of the United Kingdom expressed (S/8297) to the Secretary-General the hope of his Government that the Governments which had not yet supplied trade statistics, including those which had no trade with Southern Rhodesia, would soon comply with the request of the Secretary-General. The reporting countries so far re-

presented less than one third of the membership of the Organization and did not include many countries which must have a considerable trade in some of the commodities in question. He suggested that the Secretary-General might wish to consider reminding the Governments which had not yet reported of the importance of their doing so, if it was to be possible to build up a complete picture of how the sanctions were operating.

681. In the course of March and April 1968, the Security Council received a series of communications S/8444, S/8447, S/8448, S/8457, S/8460, S/8465, S/8480, S/8485, S/8503, S/8504, S/8513, S/8523 and S/8529) condemning and expressing shock at the execution, which in many instances was termed assassination, of five Africans by the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia. In a letter (S/8442) dated 7 March, the Chairman of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples transmitted to the Council the text of a resolution adopted that day by the Special Committee which drew the urgent attention of the Council to the grave situation in Southern Rhodesia "with a view to taking effective action to deal with it". A further letter (S/8474) from the Chairman, dated 19 March, transmitted the text of his statement before the Special Committee and drew attention to the summary records of the Committee. On 7 March the Council also received a letter (S/8443) transmitting the text of the consensus on the subject arrived at by the Commission on Human Rights. On 20 March a letter (S/8481) was received from Portugal on the subject of losses incurred by Mozambique.

682. On 12 March the representatives of thirty-six African countries requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council to examine the situation in Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). The letter (S/8454) stated that it was now obvious that the selective mandatory sanctions adopted in resolution 232 (1966) of 16 December 1966 had failed, as had been dramatically demonstrated by the recent tragic assassination of political prisoners by the racist régime in Rhodesia. More such assassinations were also planned and expected. No effort had been made in the meantime by the administering Power to enter into negotiations with leaders of the African political parties with a view to establishing a government meeting the legitimate aspiration of the people of Zimbabwe. Having regard to those facts and the recent deterioration of the situation, it was urgently incumbent upon the Council to examine the continuing grave situation which still constituted a threat to international peace and security and to envisage the necessary measures and action under Chapter VII of the Charter.

683. On 19 March the representatives of two of the signatories of the above letter, Botswana (S/8476 and Corr.1) and Lesotho (S/8477), explained that although their Governments supported the general sentiment of that letter, they did not advocate the use of force.

684. The question was included in the agenda of the 1399th meeting of the Security Council, on 19 March 1968, when the representatives of Jamaica and Zambia were invited to participate in the discussion in accordance with their requests.

685. The representative of Algeria said that the justified emotion that had swept world opinion and

the anger aroused in all the African peoples by the assassination perpetrated by the racist régime of Salisbury, had sharply reminded the world of the tragic fate of the people of Zimbabwe. The failure of the policy of sanctions advocated by the United Kingdom was the result of attempts to isolate the problems of southern Africa from each other. Some countries—primarily non-African régimes, neighbours of Rhodesia—continued to trade with Rhodesia. If sanctions were to be effective, Rhodesia must be isolated economically from its immediate neighbours. But the United Kingdom was diffident regarding any policy implying a confrontation with the colonialist minority. No doubt the United Kingdom in 1965 had seized the Council of the Rhodesian question and asked for the application of selective sanctions because that initiative offered it an opportunity to water down its responsibilities. He said that the Council must express its determination to see the administering Power and the international community act firmly to prevent Rhodesia from becoming another Palestine.

686. The United Kingdom, the Algerian representative declared, was responsible for present events. It fell to that country, as a colonial Power, in accordance with the Charter, to create conditions that would enable the people of Rhodesia to become independent. Instead, the United Kingdom had shown a preference for a so-called dialogue with a European minority which at the same time was called rebellious. The British position, even if undertaken in good faith, was a grave political blunder. The Security Council, he said, must enjoin the United Kingdom and the community of nations to treat those responsible for the Salisbury murders as international criminals and some means to establish the effectiveness of the sanctions should be considered. The sanctions must be total. A last and serious warning must be issued to South Africa and Portugal. All States must be asked to implement all the measures provided for in Article 41 of the Charter, including the interruption of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraph and radio and other communications. Finally, the international community should consider all necessary measures for the defence of Zambia, in order to prevent an attack on it by the illegal régime on the pretext that it was serving as a sanctuary for the liberation movement.

687. The representative of the United Kingdom said that he could not accept the charges that the United Kingdom had sought to minimize its responsibilities, to delay the search for a solution and had given assurances to the illegal régime. The position of his Government from the beginning had been that all the people of Rhodesia should have a voice in their Government and that the illegal régime should be brought to an end. The first and overriding duty of the Council, he said, was to make clear, in unmistakable and unanimous terms, its condemnation of the illegal executions and to demand that no more illegal hangings be carried out. When the Council had done its first duty to the prisoners, it should proceed at once to consider the whole question of what further action could be taken to restore the situation in Rhodesia, to end the rebellion and to prepare for the advance to free democratic government. One of his Government's first acts had been to warn of the consequences of an illegal declaration of independence. It had throughout declared and maintained the principles on which it believed a just settlement should be based. It had set itself to achieve its aims by peaceful means. His country had

faced. There had been delays, mistakes and miscalculations of the economic and financial difficulties it had recently faced. There had been delays, mistakes and miscalculations; there had also been evasions and failures. The time had come to examine what had been done and what more could be done.

688. The representative of the United Kingdom said that he hoped the Council would not abandon the course it had set and resort to sweeping demands that could not be met. There were effective measures still to be taken. The Council had a duty not to decide that one of the main weapons of international enforcement had proved useless, and to explore and examine every effective and practicable method to supplement and sustain the measures already taken. The Council needed to convince everyone, including the illegal régime in Rhodesia, that there would be no escape from the situation except by a return to the road of legality, democratic advance and free government so wantonly abandoned on 11 November 1965.

689. The representative of Ethiopia said that colonialism was desperately trying to push back the frontiers of independence in southern Africa and viciously repressing the indigenous peoples, for it saw their independence as a threat to it. In South Africa, a garrison State had been created; South West Africa had been usurped; a colonial war was being waged in the Portuguese Territories; in Southern Rhodesia, the threat to international peace and security became more obvious every day. The problems of southern Africa could not be considered separately; a concerted move against all of them was necessary. At the time of the unilateral declaration of independence, the United Kingdom had failed to declare that the use of force to prevent the rebellion should not be discounted. Since then, the policy of vacillation had continued and Smith had escalated his defiance and embarked on a policy of *apartheid*.

690. With the increased repression, the representative of Ethiopia continued, African resistance had inevitably increased. Deprived of any legitimate means of redress, the Africans had decided to meet the violence of the oppressors by effective resistance to the point that South African counter-insurgency forces had been brought in by the Smith régime. The resistance would continue to grow and colonialism would inevitably look upon the neighbouring independent African States as a threat. Warning that aggression against those countries was a distinct possibility, he said that the Council must prepare itself for that eventuality. The threat to international peace and security was fast becoming an imminent one. The Council should address itself to evaluating the effects of the selective mandatory sanctions and should consider new measures. By selective sanctions the Smith régime had been provided with time to make the necessary adjustments in its economy. He stressed that resolution 232 (1966) had been adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter, so that Article 25 clearly applied. Sanctions would not work unless South Africa and the Portuguese territories were included. General and comprehensive sanctions must be undertaken. Moreover, sanctions without follow-up measures would not be effective. If the United Kingdom wished to bring the rebellion to an end, it must assume its direct responsibility and play the major role in the process of implementation.

691. At the 1400th meeting, on 20 March 1968, the representative of India said that the executions showed the futility of attempting to solve the problem by half-hearted measures. Unless strong, determined and early

action was taken, the minority régime would persist in its criminal policy. The selective sanctions, he stated, had failed. Though they had had some effect on the economy, they had not produced the promised political results. His delegation had always held that the Government of the United Kingdom, as the administering Power, was fully entitled to launch a police action in the colony where law and order had completely broken down. The murders committed by the Smith régime and the repressive measures taken by it to deal with the unrest among the people of Zimbabwe provided more than the required justification for the administering Power to intervene with force.

692. He said that the Council should call on the United Kingdom to adopt effective measures, not excluding the use of force, to fulfil its responsibilities. There should also be comprehensive mandatory economic sanctions, coupled with a warning that all States Members of the Organization would be bound to comply with them in terms of their obligations under Article 25 of the Charter. That was necessary because two Member States which were in close alliance with Southern Rhodesia, in an effort to perpetuate white supremacy in southern Africa, had openly and unashamedly declared their intention to continue to help the Smith régime.

693. The representative of Canada said that the Council should condemn the executions and demand that those responsible desist from further inhuman acts and political persecutions. Canada had faithfully applied the sanctions imposed by the Security Council. Although they had not so far succeeded in achieving the aim of a change of régime and a return to legality in Rhodesia, his delegation did not speak of them as having failed because they had clearly had some impact on the economy and general situation in Rhodesia. The impact could have been greater if Council directives had been carried out by all. He stated that the use of force to bring down the illegal régime, which some advocated, must be weighed carefully for it might involve a full-scale invasion and war. The human and material cost of such action inside and outside Rhodesia could not be ignored. If the Council was to decide on the use of force by the United Nations, the Members which would have to carry the main burden of implementing the decision would have to be in agreement. He did not believe that a basis existed for such agreement. Moreover, it was quite clear that the United Kingdom was not prepared to embark on that approach to a solution at the time.

694. The Council, he said, should carefully weigh the advantages and disadvantages of abandoning the course on which it had embarked for the first time in the history of the United Nations. In the light of the experience with selective sanctions, it might be too much to hope that comprehensive economic sanctions would quickly achieve the Council's purpose; but they would no doubt have an effect on the Rhodesian régime and enhance the impact of the Council's measures. His delegation was prepared to support any appropriate moves by the Security Council to impose more stringent sanctions and to enter into consultations to that end.

695. The representative of France recalled his Government's legal position on the question, namely, that Rhodesia was a British colony and that it and all its internal problems were the responsibility of the United Kingdom. France had condemned the so-called declaration of independence and neither recognized

nor maintained diplomatic relations with the *de facto* authority that had set itself up in Salisbury. Naturally, it did not seem possible to France to regard the Security Council as being legally empowered to rule on a matter in which a dependent territory was opposed to the metropolitan country. But that did not mean that France would not assist the responsible authority to shoulder its responsibilities. His Government had prohibited all products included in the resolution of December 1966.

696. The French delegation deplored the fact that the efforts of the administering Power had not succeeded in preventing the five criminal executions and had the greatest misgivings about the fate of the condemned persons awaiting a decision on their fate; it had been relieved to learn that the sentences of thirty-five of them had been commuted. France had associated itself with the consensus by which the Commission on Human Rights had called upon the United Kingdom Government to restore human rights and fundamental freedoms in its colony; it trusted that the Government of the United Kingdom would soon make known the measures it intended to take to put an end to the Rhodesian crisis, which had lasted too long. The experience of the recent past enabled the French delegation to affirm that it was not impossible to find a means of resolving such a crisis.

697. The representative of Jamaica said that the judicial murder of five Africans symbolized a situation characterized by repression, violation of human rights and discrimination. The reported incursions of guerrilla forces during the last few days showed the inevitability of a violent response to repression. His delegation saluted the efforts of the Zimbabwe nationalists. There was no use in saying that sanctions had not been given time to work or that they had failed because not all States had co-operated; everyone had known beforehand who would not co-operate and why. He asked whether the United Kingdom's references to practical action could refer to closing the border of Southern Rhodesia to goods and equipment from South Africa and economic sanctions against South Africa and Portugal. Quoting the text of a resolution adopted by the Jamaican Parliament, he stated that his Government supported the use of force to overthrow the illegal régime. That was the only way it saw of overthrowing the régime quickly and with a minimum of further economic dislocation of Zambia, and Jamaica was ready to contribute, within its capacity, to any force organized directly under the authority of the United Nations.

698. The representative of Denmark said that his Government and people shared the anger and disgust aroused by the executions and other illegal acts of the Smith régime, which had embarked on a road that might well lead towards disaster. He emphasized that it was the unanimous wish of the Security Council that the rebellion be brought to an end. Denmark had complied fully with the Security Council resolutions on the question and, in fact, had gone considerably farther than required by prohibiting all exports to, or imports from, Southern Rhodesia. It would be prepared to support extension and tightening up of the economic sanctions. His delegation pledged full co-operation in the consultations that should now take place so that the Council could assess the possibilities for effective action.

699. The representative of the United States, reviewing the situation of condemned prisoners in Southern Rhodesia and the illegal régime's legislation on

the subject, declared that his Government condemned as an outrage the illegal hanging of the five condemned men and shared the world-wide sense of alarm at the prospect that more hangings might follow, pursuant to legislation which violated the most elementary standards of human justice. The régime had even moved to embrace the odious racial policies of South Africa. The hanging of the gallows trap in Salisbury must end any lingering doubts about the nature of the régime, its intentions for the future and its contemptuous disregard for the rights of the overwhelming majority of the population. Now more than ever the United States looked upon the situation with shock and grave concern. For while the United States had made every effort to ensure full compliance with the selective mandatory sanctions against Southern Rhodesia, it shared the recognition that these had not achieved their desired goal. It earnestly hoped that the Council would, quickly and unanimously, find ways to achieve the common objective. The Council should express its sympathy with regard to the difficulties faced by countries such as Zambia, whose non-racial policy contrasted so sharply with the deplorable policies being followed in Southern Rhodesia.

700. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that the crimes of the racists in Southern Rhodesia were designed to stifle the growing movement of the Zimbabwe people to liberate themselves from colonial oppression. The existence of the racist régime in Southern Rhodesia was undoubtedly part of the designs of imperialism, which included plans to create obstacles to the complete liberation of Africa and to transform Southern Rhodesia, together with South Africa and the Portuguese colonies in Africa, into a strongpoint of colonialism and racism. The United Kingdom could have prevented the consolidation of the racist régime by merely lifting a finger; instead, it had abetted the régime, engaged in negotiations with it and taken it under its wing.

701. The Soviet Union, he stated, had pointed out in December 1966 that the proposed measures would only serve as a smoke-screen for the colonialists and protect the interests of monopoly capital. Citing figures concerning the supply of oil and the statements of the General Assembly regarding the activities of foreign financial and other interests, the USSR representative said that it was obvious that, if the Western Powers severed all economic relations with the Smith régime, its economic foundations would be undermined. But some were not likely to do so even in the political and diplomatic field. United States official publications showed that the United States had a consular office in Salisbury, with six officials. The Smith régime was receiving oil and other commodities and was increasing its mining production with the assistance and participation of Western monopolies. New foreign investments were still being made in Southern Rhodesia, and the level of imports during the first half of 1967 had been nearly 20 per cent higher than in the same period in 1966. A special role in the wilful subversion of the Council's decision was played by South Africa and Portugal. The USSR representative said that the military councils of the racist régimes of South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and the Portuguese colonialists were planning aggressive actions against independent African States.

702. The representative of the Soviet Union said that his Government was ready to continue its co-operation with the African countries and other peace-

loving States to bring to bear full assistance to the people of Zimbabwe in its lawful and just struggle. The Council must ask all States to give full moral and material support to the people of Zimbabwe in its lawful struggle for freedom and independence and take measures against all States, including South Africa and Portugal, which continued to maintain economic and other relations with the racist régime of Southern Rhodesia. The United Kingdom must take effective measures against the racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia. There must be unconditional implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples through general elections in Southern Rhodesia on the basis of "one man one vote" and the immediate transfer of power to a majority government expressing the will of the people of Zimbabwe. In conformity with the Charter, the Council must decree exhaustive and effective sanctions against the racist régime in Southern Rhodesia in order to eradicate that hotbed of racism and neo-colonialism once and for all.

703. The representative of the United Kingdom, in reply, expressed regret that the representative of the Soviet Union, instead of moving towards co-operation and agreement, had made grave accusations against his country. No country had done more than the United Kingdom to give effect to the purposes and decisions of the Council. The evidence for the statement that the United Kingdom had abetted the illegal régime came from those correctly described as Southern Rhodesia racists and was wholly unreliable, as was the information concerning oil supplies to Southern Rhodesia.

704. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that his facts and sources had been verified.

705. At the 1408th meeting, on 26 March 1968, the representative of Hungary said that it was disturbing that the racist régimes of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia both received support from certain Western Powers which, while strongly denouncing those régimes, did not back their verbal condemnations with action. Perhaps the most important factor was the policy of the United Kingdom which, despite its verbal condemnations of the régime, gave it *de facto* recognition. In the past, the United Kingdom had used force against other colonial authorities; but the Salisbury rebels, because of their skin colour, were being treated differently. The NATO allies of the United Kingdom followed its attitude. The Federal Republic of Germany had increased its trade with Southern Rhodesia, in contrast with the attitude of the German Democratic Republic. South Africa and Portugal played a decisive role in protecting the Salisbury régime from the effects of the sanctions, which were far too limited in scope. It was significant that South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and Portugal maintained strong ties with NATO. The socialist countries had strictly applied the December 1966 resolution of the Council: his country had gone beyond it even before the adoption of that resolution. They were helping the Zimbabwe people and favoured full sanctions. The Council should translate the universal indignation into the most severe sanctions; insist that the aim was the overthrow of the illegal régime, not a modification of its policies; and the United Kingdom must take measures to help achieve the immediate independence of the people of Zimbabwe.

706. The representative of Zambia said that the day was not far off, unless the United Kingdom took

appropriate action, when the situation would be completely out of hand and the neighbouring Governments would sooner or later be drawn into confrontation with the rebel régime on a purely racial basis. The United Kingdom had stated that it would use force only if there was a breakdown of law and order. But Southern Rhodesia had been declared independent unilaterally; the Press had been muzzled and the courts had been forced to give the Smith régime *de facto* recognition; there had been hangings of Africans, despite the Queen's reprieve; foreign troops had entered the Territory to assist the régime in suppressing the indigenous people's struggle for liberation. All this was evidence that law and order had broken down. Was the United Kingdom waiting until the throats of Europeans had actually been slit, and did it intend to move in then to help the Europeans fight back the enraged black insurgents? All acts of violence in Southern Rhodesia were the responsibility of the United Kingdom, which was the competent authority in the Territory.

707. The Rhodesian situation, he stated, was a serious threat to Zambia, which shared borders with Southern Rhodesia and with Mozambique, South West Africa and Angola. Zambia was not responsible for incidents on its borders and the Security Council should take effective measures to protect it from a sneak invasion in the form of reprisal by the trigger-happy white settlers. Southern Rhodesia had managed to evade the Security Council's economic sanctions, but Zambia had suffered a great deal as a result of its implementation of the sanctions programme. Portugal and South Africa, despite their obligations as Member States, were supplying the rebel territory with oil and re-exporting its commodities. The acts of the trading partners of those two States, which were encouraging them, should be condemned. Further sanctions, as advocated by the United Kingdom, made no sense without a commitment to the use of force to make them effective. He called upon the United Kingdom, whose responsibility it was to resolve the Rhodesian problem, to send troops to the territory to restore law and order there.

708. The representative of Brazil condemned the action of the régime in Southern Rhodesia in hanging five Africans, in callous disregard of reprieves granted by the British Crown. The régime should reconsider the course upon which it had embarked since November 1965, and which could only spell more sorrow and suffering for a population which had been denied every basic political and civil right. Brazil would continue to apply strictly the economic sanctions voted by the Council against Southern Rhodesia. All members of the Council agreed on the need for taking positive action to stop Southern Rhodesia from continuing along the perilous path it had chosen. The problem was as to method. He suggested that the Council should strongly censure the *de facto* régime for the illegal execution of the African nationalists and warn it against the repetition of such crimes. Although Southern Rhodesia's economic life seemed to have been hurt by the sanctions, the Salisbury régime had somehow managed to survive and to ignore its condemnation by the international community. The course of wisdom lay in tightening to the breaking-point the economic pressure on Southern Rhodesia. The white minority should be induced to withdraw support of the Smith régime by a broadened trade embargo. As the Council was well aware, economic sanctions were only one of many

kinds of sanctions, short of the use of force, available under Article 41 of the Charter.

709. The representative of Pakistan said that his Government and people had expressed their horror at the action of the usurper régime in putting to death five freedom fighters of Zimbabwe. The United Kingdom had given the assurance that in the event law and order broke down in the Territory it would resort to the use of force. He asked if the contemptuous defiance of the authority and prerogative of the Crown and the recourse to a reign of terror were not indicative of a collapse of law and order. Selective mandatory sanctions had failed, as it had been warned they would, and South Africa and Portugal had fortified the illegal régime in its defiance of the international community. The United Kingdom should no longer rule out resolute measures including, if necessary, the use of force. The Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, should impose comprehensive mandatory sanctions and make clear to all Member States their obligation under Article 25 of the Charter to accept and carry out its decision. The Council should establish a procedure for plugging loop-holes and to ensure the implementation of these measures under its own supervision and control.

710. The representative of China expressed his country's shock at the executions and said that the measures so far used against the régime in Southern Rhodesia had been either too limited in scope or too restricted in application. However, his delegation had then felt, as it still did, that the use of force should be left to the discretion of the United Kingdom, as the administering Power. Force should not be lightly used; but the legitimate use of force should not be precluded as a last resort. His Government, for its part, had faithfully implemented the Security Council's present sanctions programme against Rhodesia, but many countries, including some most vociferous about the imposition of sanctions, had continued to trade with Southern Rhodesia. He supported comprehensive mandatory economic sanctions against the illegal régime.

711. The representative of Paraguay said that his country protested the executions by the illegal régime and paid tribute to the martyrs. The inhuman acts of the Smith régime must be condemned, the lives of other prisoners protected, the rebellion brought to an end and power restored to the people of Zimbabwe. His delegation would endeavour to bring about adoption of measures to achieve those objectives.

712. The President, speaking as representative of Senegal, said that his country had repeatedly called for radical action to put an end to the illegal régime and free the Zimbabwe people from slavery. Knowing that the United Kingdom had committed itself to not using force against it, the rebel régime had become more arrogant, even spurning the Queen's commutation of the sentences of the African nationalists. His delegation had always regarded the selective mandatory sanctions as an illusion. The United Kingdom must apply more energetic economic sanctions, and if necessary resort to the use of force. It was the duty of the Security Council to impose comprehensive mandatory sanctions against Southern Rhodesia and to take effective measures to ensure implementation of its decision.

713. The representative of the United Kingdom regretted that the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Zambia had spoken so bitterly. However, he understood the reasons for the bitterness and admired Zam-

bia's stand in the face of strains and sacrifices. But the only question was what practical action could now be taken. He had offered to consult with members of the Council to find common ground and that offer had been taken up; he would welcome consultation with the Foreign Minister of Zambia and had so offered. He believed that consultations would not be wasted since, in all the African and Asian statements he had seen, whatever else was asked for, there was a demand that the Council should examine what more could be done to make sanctions more fully effective.

714. On 16 April 1968 the following draft resolution (S/8545 and Corr.1) was submitted by Algeria, Ethiopia, India, Pakistan and Senegal:

"The Security Council,

"Recalling and reaffirming its resolutions 216 (1965) of 12 November 1965, 217 (1965) of 20 November 1965, 221 (1966) of 9 April 1966, and 232 (1966) of 16 December 1966,

"Reaffirming in particular its resolution 232 (1966) in which it determined that the situation in Southern Rhodesia constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

"Taking note of resolution 2262 (XXII) adopted by the General Assembly on 3 November 1967 and resolution A/AC.109/287 adopted by the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples on 7 March 1966,

"Gravely concerned that the measures so far taken have failed to resolve the situation in Southern Rhodesia,

"Gravely concerned further that the measures taken by the Security Council have not been fully complied with by all States,

"Noting that the Governments of the Republic of South Africa and Portugal, in particular, in contravention of their obligation under Article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations, have not only carried on trade with the illegal racist minority régime of Southern Rhodesia contrary to the terms of Security Council resolution 232 (1966), but have in fact given active assistance to that régime enabling it to counter the effects of the measures decided upon by the Security Council,

"Affirming the primary responsibility of the Government of the United Kingdom to enable the people of Southern Rhodesia to exercise their right of self-determination and independence,

"Emphasizing the responsibility of the Government of the United Kingdom for the situation that prevails in Southern Rhodesia and the consequences that have flowed therefrom,

"Condemning the recent execution of political prisoners in Southern Rhodesia by the illegal racist minority régime as contrary to law and an aggravation of the threat to international peace and security,

"Reaffirming its recognition of the legitimacy of the struggle of the people of Southern Rhodesia for freedom and independence,

"Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

"1. Calls upon the Government of the United Kingdom to take immediately all requisite measures

to stop the execution of political prisoners in Southern Rhodesia;

"2. Calls upon all States to sever immediately all economic and other relations with the illegal racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia;

"3. Calls upon all States to carry out this decision of the Security Council in accordance with their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations;

"4. Censures the Governments of Portugal and South Africa for their assistance to the illegal racist minority régime in defiance of the resolution of the Security Council;

"5. Decides to take resolute and effective action in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter against the Governments of South Africa and Portugal in the event that they persist in defying the decisions of the Security Council;

"6. Urges all States to render moral and material assistance to the national liberation movements of Southern Rhodesia in order to enable them to achieve their freedom and independence;

"7. Urges the United Kingdom as the administering Power to take urgently all necessary measures including the use of force to bring an end to the rebellion in Southern Rhodesia and enable the people to exercise their right to self-determination and independence in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV);

"8. Calls upon Member States, and in particular those with primary responsibility under the Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security, to assist effectively in the implementation of the measures called for by the present resolution;

"9. Requests all States to report to the Secretary-General on the measures taken to implement the present resolution;

"10. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the implementation of this resolution;

"11. Decides to maintain the item on its agenda and to meet within thirty days to review the implementation of the measures called for by the present resolution."

715. At the 1413th meeting, on 18 April, the representative of Ethiopia, introducing the five-Power draft resolution, said that the sponsors firmly believed that the main responsibility for enabling the people of Southern Rhodesia to exercise their right to self-determination and independence fell on the United Kingdom as the administering Power. In so far as the United Kingdom had not taken effective action to bring the Rhodesian rebellion to an end, it must bear the responsibility for its continuation and tragic consequences. The Council must urge the United Kingdom to use all the means at its disposal, including the use of force, to end the rebellion. Selective sanctions had proved inadequate and had failed, and the Council must now agree on mandatory, comprehensive sanctions and call on all States to sever all economic and other relations with the illegal racist minority régime. That was the only way the Salisbury régime could be made to feel the full impact of its isolation from the rest of the world. Sanctions were not useful unless counteractions by those bent on undermining the Council's efforts were eliminated. The rebellion in Southern Rhodesia could not have continued without assistance from South Africa and Portugal. The Council

should not only condemn those two countries for their defiance, but also forestall the possibility of future misbehaviour by deciding to take resolute and effective action. The Council should call upon all Member States, and in particular the trading partners of South Africa and Portugal, to co-operate in the implementation of the comprehensive mandatory sanctions. More needed to be done in the area of implementation and follow-up if the efforts of the Council were to be effective. It should agree upon some effective mechanism that would enable it to ensure full and effective compliance.

716. On 22 April the United Kingdom submitted the following draft resolution (S/8554):

"The Security Council,

"Recalling and reaffirming its resolutions 216 (1965) of 12 November 1965, 217 (1965) of 20 November 1965, 221 (1966) of 9 April 1966, and 232 (1966) of 16 December 1966,

"Noting with great concern that the measures taken so far have failed to bring the rebellion in Southern Rhodesia to an end,

"Deploping the recent inhuman executions carried out by the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia which have flagrantly affronted the conscience of mankind and have been universally condemned,

"Reaffirming that, to the extent not superseded in this resolution, the measures provided for in resolutions 217 (1965) of 20 November 1965, and 232 (1966) of 16 December 1966, as well as those initiated by Member States in implementation of those resolutions, shall continue in effect,

"Reaffirming its determination that the present situation in Southern Rhodesia constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

"Acting in accordance with Articles 39 and 41 of the United Nations Charter,

"1. Decides that States Members of the United Nations shall prevent:

"(a) The import into their territories of all commodities and products originating in Southern Rhodesia and exported therefrom after the date of this resolution (whether or not the commodities or products are for consumption or processing in their territories, whether or not they are imported in bond and whether or not any special legal status with respect to the import of goods is enjoyed by the port or other place where they are imported or stored);

"(b) Any activities by their nationals or in their territories which promote or are calculated to promote the export of any commodities or products from Southern Rhodesia; and any dealings by their nationals or in their territories in any commodities or products originating in Southern Rhodesia and exported therefrom after the date of this resolution, including in particular any transfer of funds to Southern Rhodesia for the purposes of such activities or dealings;

"(c) The shipment in vessels or aircraft of their registration or under charter to their nationals or the carriage (whether or not in bond) by land transport facilities across their territories of any commodities or products originating in Southern Rhodesia and exported therefrom after the date of this resolution;

"(d) The sale or supply by their nationals or from their territories of any commodities or products (whether or not originating in their territories but not including medical supplies, educational equipment, documents, books, periodicals, newspapers, cinematograph films containing only news or other informative or educational matter, television films containing only such matter, other material for cinematograph, television or radio purposes containing only such matter or, in special humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs) to any person or body in Southern Rhodesia or to any other person or body for the purposes of any business carried on in or operated from Southern Rhodesia; and any activities by their nationals or in their territories which promote or are calculated to promote such sale or supply;

"(e) The shipment in vessels or aircraft of their registration or under charter to their nationals or the carriage (whether or not in bond) by land transport facilities across their territories of any such commodities or products which are consigned to any person or body in Southern Rhodesia or to any other person or body for the purposes of any business carried on in or operated from Southern Rhodesia;

"2. Decides that States Members of the United Nations shall not make available to the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia or to any commercial, industrial or public utility undertaking in Southern Rhodesia any funds for investment or any other financial or economic resources and shall prevent their nationals and any persons within their territories from making available to the régime or to any such undertaking any such funds or resources and from remitting any other funds to persons or bodies within Southern Rhodesia except payments exclusively for pensions or other humanitarian, educational or information purposes;

"3. Decides that States Members of the United Nations shall:

"(a) Prevent the entry into their territories, save on exceptional humanitarian grounds, of any person travelling on a Southern Rhodesian passport, regardless of its date of issue, or on a purported passport issued by or on behalf of the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia;

"(b) Take all possible measures to prevent the entry into their territories of persons whom they have reason to believe to be ordinarily resident in Southern Rhodesia and whom they have reason to believe to have furthered or encouraged or to be likely to further or encourage the unlawful actions of the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia or any activities which are calculated to evade any measures decided upon in this resolution or in resolution 232 (1966) of 16 December 1966;

"4. Decides that States Members of the United Nations shall prevent airline companies constituted in their territories and aircraft of their registration or under charter to their nationals from operating to or from Southern Rhodesia and from linking up with any airline company constituted or aircraft registered in Southern Rhodesia;

"5. Calls upon States Members of the United Nations to take all practicable measures to discourage their nationals from emigrating to Southern Rhodesia;

"6. Decides that all States Members of the United Nations shall give effect to the decisions set out in

operative paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 of this resolution notwithstanding any contract entered into or licence granted before the date of this resolution save that landlocked States of southern Africa shall be obliged to carry out those decisions only in so far as their position permits;

"7. *Calls upon* all States Members of the United Nations to carry out these decisions of the Security Council in accordance with Article 25 of the United Nations Charter, and reminds them that failure or refusal by any of them to do so would constitute a violation of that Article;

"8. *Urges*, having regard to the principles stated in Article 2 of the United Nations Charter, States not Members of the United Nations to act in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs 1 to 6 of this resolution;

"9. *Calls upon* States Members of the United Nations or of the specialized agencies to report to the Secretary-General by 1 June 1968 the measures each has taken in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs 1 to 6 of this resolution;

"10. *Requests* the Secretary-General to supervise and report at regular intervals to the Council on the progress of the implementation of resolution 232 (1966) of 16 December 1966, and of this resolution, the first report to be submitted not later than 1 July 1968;

"11. *Calls upon* each State Member of the United Nations or of the specialized agencies to report to the Secretary-General at such intervals and in such form as may be indicated by the Secretary-General the quantity and value of its trade in such commodities or products as may be so indicated;

"12. *Requests* the Secretary-General to seek from any State Member of the United Nations or of the specialized agencies such further information regarding the trade of that State, or regarding any activities that may constitute an evasion of the measures decided upon in this resolution, as he may consider necessary for the proper discharge of his duty to report to the Council in pursuance of this resolution;

"13. *Calls upon* all States Members of the United Nations or of the specialized agencies to supply such further information as may be sought by the Secretary-General in pursuance of this resolution;

"14. *Decides* to establish a committee composed of all members of the Security Council which shall, for the purpose of enabling the Council to secure full implementation of resolution 232 (1966) and of this resolution:

"(a) Consider the reports made to the Council by the Secretary-General in pursuance of those resolutions;

"(b) In consultation as appropriate with the Secretary-General, evaluate the information contained in the Secretary-General's reports (including reports of cases where States have failed to supply information requested by the Secretary-General) and assess its significance for the implementation of those resolutions;

"(c) In the light of its consideration of the Secretary-General's reports, advise the Secretary-General with respect to the further exercise of his functions under those resolutions;

"(d) Report from time to time to the Council on the discharge of its functions under this paragraph;

"15. *Decides* to keep this item on its agenda for further action as appropriate in the light of developments."

717. At the 1415th meeting, on 23 April, the representative of the United Kingdom, introducing the draft resolution submitted by his delegation, said that it was the result of a joint and intensive examination of every aspect of the complicated problems before the Council. Some members would wish the United Kingdom to go further, but the present proposal was the widest area on which agreement could be reached. Two tests were applicable: that the measures were capable of effective implementation and that they had the effect of showing to the illegal régime and everyone else that the illegal course on which the régime had embarked could not succeed and could lead only to political isolation and economic stagnation.

718. His Government had carefully weighed every word of the draft resolution, which was an instrument forged with the greatest care to give effect to comprehensive mandatory economic sanctions. Its main effect and purpose was to impose a total ban on all imports from Rhodesia, closing gaps and, subject to certain stated exceptions mainly on humanitarian and educational grounds, to impose equally a total ban on all exports to Southern Rhodesia. Special care had been given in the consultations to the vital question of supervision and implementation.

719. The problem was so menacing, the United Kingdom representative said, that the Council must assess what it could do, and act within its clear capacity. Progress would be made not by declarations, generalizations and empty threats, but only by effective, practical and persistent action. Some said force was the only way, but he was sure that there were effective measures still to be taken. In spite of the difficulties and limitations, it was the Council's duty not to decide that sanctions—one of the main weapons of international enforcement—had proved useless, but to explore and examine every effective and practicable method to supplement and sustain the measures already taken. The Council must convince everyone, especially the illegal régime, that it meant to go on. Its obligation was to all the people of Rhodesia, especially the more than 4 million Africans denied freedom to participate in the Government of their own country. The Council owed it to them not to raise hopes it had no power to satisfy, but to take effective action, and to act in unity.

720. On 28 May, following consultations among members of the Council, the following draft resolution was submitted (S/8601):

"The Security Council,

"Recalling and reaffirming its resolutions 216 (1965) of 12 November 1965, 217 (1965) of 20 November 1965, 221 (1966) of 9 April 1966, and 232 (1966) of 16 December 1966,

"Taking note of resolution 2262 (XXII) adopted by the General Assembly on 3 November 1967,

"Noting with great concern that the measures taken so far have failed to bring the rebellion in Southern Rhodesia to an end,

"Reaffirming that, to the extent not superseded in this resolution, the measures provided for in resolutions 217 (1965) of 20 November 1965, and 232 (1966) of 16 December 1966, as well as those ini-

tiated by Member States in implementation of those resolutions, shall continue in effect,

"Gravely concerned that the measures taken by the Security Council have not been complied with by all States and that some States, contrary to resolution 232 (1966) of the Security Council and to their obligations under Article 25 of the Charter, have failed to prevent trade with the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia,

"Condemning the recent inhuman executions carried out by the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia which have flagrantly affronted the conscience of mankind and have been universally condemned,

"Affirming the primary responsibility of the Government of the United Kingdom to enable the people of Southern Rhodesia to achieve self-determination and independence, and in particular their responsibility for dealing with the prevailing situation,

"Recognising the legitimacy of the struggle of the people of Southern Rhodesia to secure the enjoyment of their rights as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and in conformity with the objectives of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV),

"Reaffirming its determination that the present situation in Southern Rhodesia constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

"Acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter,

"1. Condemns all measures of political repression, including arrests, detentions, trials and executions which violate fundamental freedoms and rights of the people of Southern Rhodesia, and calls upon the Government of the United Kingdom to take all possible measures to put an end to such actions;

"2. Calls upon the United Kingdom as the administering Power in the discharge of its responsibility to take urgently all effective measures to bring to an end the rebellion in Southern Rhodesia, and enable the people to secure the enjoyment of their rights as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and in conformity with the objectives of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV);

"3. Decides that, in furtherance of the objective of ending the rebellion, all States Members of the United Nations shall prevent:

"(a) The import into their territories of all commodities and products originating in Southern Rhodesia and exported therefrom after the date of this resolution (whether or not the commodities or products are for consumption or processing in their territories, whether or not they are imported in bond and whether or not any special legal status with respect to the import of goods is enjoyed by the port or other place where they are imported or stored);

"(b) Any activities by their nationals or in their territories which would promote or are calculated to promote the export of any commodities or products from Southern Rhodesia; and any dealings by their nationals or in their territories in any commodities or products originating in Southern Rhodesia and exported therefrom after the date of this resolution, including in particular any transfer of funds to Southern Rhodesia for the purposes of such activities or dealings;

"(c) The shipment in vessels or aircraft of their registration or under charter to their nationals, or the carriage (whether or not in bond) by land

transport facilities across their territories of any commodities or products originating in Southern Rhodesia and exported therefrom after the date of this resolution;

"(d) The sale or supply by their nationals or from their territories of any commodities or products (whether or not originating in their territories, but not including supplies intended strictly for medical purposes, educational equipment and material for use in schools and other educational institutions, publications, news material and, in special humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs) to any person or body in Southern Rhodesia or to any other person or body for the purposes of any business carried on in or operated from Southern Rhodesia, and any activities by their nationals or in their territories which promote or are calculated to promote such sale or supply;

"(e) The shipment in vessels or aircraft of their registration, or under charter to their nationals, or the carriage (whether or not in bond) by land transport facilities across their territories of any such commodities or products which are consigned to any person or body in Southern Rhodesia, or to any other person or body for the purposes of any business carried on in or operated from Southern Rhodesia;

"4. Decides that all States Members of the United Nations shall not make available to the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia or to any commercial, industrial or public utility undertaking, including tourist enterprises, in Southern Rhodesia any funds for investment or any other financial or economic resources and shall prevent their nationals and any persons within their territories from making available to the régime or to any such undertaking any such funds or resources and from remitting any other funds to persons or bodies within Southern Rhodesia except payments exclusively for pensions or for strictly medical, humanitarian or educational purposes or for the provision of news material and, in special humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs;

"5. Decides that all States Members of the United Nations shall:

"(a) Prevent the entry into their territories, save on exceptional humanitarian grounds, of any person travelling on a Southern Rhodesian passport, regardless of its date of issue, or on a purported passport issued by or on behalf of the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia; and

"(b) Take all possible measures to prevent the entry into their territories of persons whom they have reason to believe to be ordinarily resident in Southern Rhodesia and whom they have reason to believe to have furthered or encouraged, or to be likely to further or encourage, the unlawful actions of the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia or any activities which are calculated to evade any measure decided upon in this resolution or resolution 232 (1966) of 16 December 1966;

"6. Decides that all States Members of the United Nations shall prevent airline companies constituted in their territories and aircraft of their registration or under charter to their nationals from operating to or from Southern Rhodesia and from linking up with any airline company constituted or aircraft registered in Southern Rhodesia;

"7. Decides that all States Members of the United Nations shall give effect to the decisions set out in

operative paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 6 of this resolution notwithstanding any contract entered into or licence granted before the date of this resolution;

"8. *Calls upon* all States Members of the United Nations or of the specialized agencies to take all possible measures to prevent activities by their nationals and persons in their territories promoting, assisting or encouraging emigration to Southern Rhodesia, with a view to stopping such emigration;

"9. *Requests* all States Members of the United Nations or of the specialized agencies to take all possible further action under Article 41 of the Charter to deal with the situation in Southern Rhodesia, not excluding any of the measures provided in that Article;

"10. *Emphasizes* the need for the withdrawal of all consular and trade representation in Southern Rhodesia, in addition to the provisions of operative paragraph 6 of resolution 217 (1965);

"11. *Calls upon* all States Members of the United Nations to carry out these decisions of the Security Council in accordance with Article 25 of the United Nations Charter and reminds them that failure or refusal by any one of them to do so would constitute a violation of that Article;

"12. *Deplores* the attitude of States that have not complied with their obligations under Article 25 of the Charter, and censures in particular those States which have persisted in trading with the illegal régime in defiance of the resolutions of the Security Council, and which have given active assistance to the régime;

"13. *Urges* all States Members of the United Nations to render moral and material assistance to the people of Southern Rhodesia in their struggle to achieve their freedom and independence;

"14. *Urges*, having regard to the principles stated in Article 2 of the United Nations Charter, States not Members of the United Nations to act in accordance with the provisions of the present resolution;

"15. *Requests* States Members of the United Nations, the United Nations Organization, the specialized agencies, and other international organizations in the United Nations system to extend assistance to Zambia as a matter of priority with a view to helping her solve such special economic problems as she may be confronted with arising from the carrying out of these decisions of the Security Council;

"16. *Calls upon* all States Members of the United Nations, and in particular those with primary responsibility under the Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security, to assist effectively in the implementation of the measures called for by the present resolution;

"17. *Considers* that the United Kingdom as the administering Power should ensure that no settlement is reached without taking into account the views of the people of Southern Rhodesia, and in particular the political parties favouring majority rule, and that it is acceptable to the people of Southern Rhodesia as a whole;

"18. *Calls upon* all States Members of the United Nations or of the specialized agencies to report to the Secretary-General by 1 August 1968 on measures taken to implement the present resolution;

"19. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the implementation of this resolution, the first report to be made not later than 1 September 1968;

"20. *Decides* to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, a committee of the Security Council to undertake the following tasks and to report to it with its observations:

"(a) To examine such reports on the implementation of the present resolution as are submitted by the Secretary-General;

"(b) To seek from any State Member of the United Nations or of the specialized agencies such further information regarding the trade of that State (including information regarding the commodities and products exempted from the prohibition contained in operative paragraph 3 (d) above) or regarding any activities by any nationals of that State or in its territories that may constitute an evasion of the measures decided upon in this resolution as it may consider necessary for the proper discharge of its duty to report to the Security Council;

"21. *Requests* the United Kingdom, as the administering Power, to give maximum assistance to the committee, and to provide the committee with any information which it may receive in order that the measures envisaged in this resolution and resolution 232 (1966) may be rendered fully effective;

"22. *Calls upon* all States Members of the United Nations, or of the specialized agencies, as well as the specialized agencies themselves, to supply such further information as may be sought by the Committee in pursuance of this resolution;

"23. *Decides* to maintain this item on its agenda for further action as appropriate in the light of developments."

721. At the 1428th meeting, on 29 May, the President (United Kingdom) informed the Council that he had decided, in accordance with rule 20 of the provisional rules of procedure, not to preside over the Council during the present discussion of the question of Southern Rhodesia. At his invitation, the representative of the United States accordingly took the Chair.

722. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that the principal reason for the ineffectiveness of the decisions of the Council was the active and comprehensive support of the racist régime in Southern Rhodesia by powerful capitalistic monopolies of such countries as Great Britain, the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany and Japan. No references to the so-called uncontrolled character of the activities of private capital made by the representatives of those countries whose monopolies continued to remain allies of the régime of the white racists could remove from the Governments of those countries the responsibility for undermining and subverting the decisions of the Security Council on economic sanctions. While the new draft resolution contained positive elements and constituted a certain step forward in comparison with the Council's previous decisions, the measures it contained were still not sufficiently comprehensive. Thus, the draft did not provide for the complete cessation of relations of all kinds at the State level, did not require the breaking off of all communications, contained insufficiently clear formulations with regard to the banning of immigration

to Southern Rhodesia and provided a number of unjustifiable exceptions in the matter of breaking off trade relations. Although it contained some censure of them, the draft did not name any of the major accomplices of the Salisbury régime, nor did it provide for a ban on negotiations with that régime. The provisions of the draft were the very minimum of those measures which the Council must take if it was to put an end to the situation in Southern Rhodesia. The draft did not state everything consistently and with sufficient clearness. There was therefore no guarantee or assurance that a Council decision on the basis of the draft would prove adequate for a solution of the problem of Southern Rhodesia in the interests of the people of Zimbabwe, of the other peoples of Africa, or of international peace. In view of the position of the African and Asian countries, the Soviet Union would not object to the adoption of the draft despite its shortcomings. However, a certain oversimplification and inaccurate generalization of the substance of the problem of Southern Rhodesia as a whole had crept into paragraph 15.

723. He submitted the following amendment (S/8603):

"15. Decides that the material losses that may be inflicted on Zambia in connexion with the implementation of this decision of the Security Council shall be compensated by those States which, having failed to take the necessary measures to put an end to the illegal racist régime in Southern Rhodesia and, in particular, the measures provided for in the above-mentioned resolutions of the Security Council and of the General Assembly, bear political responsibility for the continued existence of this régime in Southern Rhodesia."

Decisions: *At the 1428th meeting, on 29 May 1968, the USSR amendment (S/8603) to paragraph 15 of the draft resolution (S/8601) received 7 votes in favour (Algeria, Ethiopia, Hungary, India, Pakistan, Senegal, USSR), none against and 8 abstentions, and was thus rejected. The Council then took a separate vote on operative paragraph 15 of the draft, which was adopted by 13 votes in favour, none against and 2 abstentions (Hungary, USSR.)*

The draft resolution as a whole was adopted unanimously (resolution 253 (1968)).

724. The representative of the United Kingdom expressed gratitude for the constructive and candid co-operation of the members of the Council in the intensive consultations that had permitted arriving at the decision taken by the Council despite the last-minute intervention of the Soviet Union. Each member no doubt had reservations on some of the provisions included in the resolution, but common ground had been achieved. The United Kingdom would faithfully and fully carry out the mandatory requirements of that text and called on everyone else to do the same. Where the resolution included non-mandatory requests, it would carefully consider what action it could take on the basis of the test of effectiveness and the test of the effect upon the illegal régime. The special responsibility of the United Kingdom as administering authority—recognized and emphasized in the resolution—must be borne in mind. It had been accepted in the consultations that it would retain its Mission and communications with Rhodesia. The principle that any settlement must be acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole had throughout been declared and maintained by his Government. Impatient talk to the effect that force should be used and that dangers of starting a conflict

in southern Africa could be brushed aside was unjustified and defeatist. It was what the illegal régime wished to hear. His Government had no intention of abandoning the fundamental principles of democratic government, majority rule, self-determination and racial equality. Nor did it have any intention of betraying the Charter principle that the interests of the inhabitants should be paramount.

725. The representative of Pakistan regretted that the United Kingdom had not found the African-Asian draft resolution acceptable as a basis for negotiations with a view to its unanimous adoption. The African and Asian members of the Council had been faced with a choice of proceeding to formulate a revised text with the co-operation and assistance of their Latin American colleagues which, though commanding a majority of votes, would not be implemented by the administering Power, or to work out a compromise text acceptable to the United Kingdom which would be adopted unanimously. They had taken the latter course in the firm conviction that the administering Power must continue to bear the primary responsibility for taking the measures decided upon by the Council, to end the white rebellion in Southern Rhodesia and to enable its people to achieve independence. The resolution fell short of what in their belief and judgement was required; the United Kingdom had not only the right, but the duty to use force against the illegal régime and its supporters and indeed to bring them to trial and punishment. Nevertheless, the resolution reflected a considerable advance in enlarging the scope of mandatory sanctions against the usurper régime and in tightening the measures of implementation. The illegal régime had pitted itself against the entire world and the Council had given its answer to that challenge.

726. The representative of France said that his delegation shared in large measure the feelings that guided the sponsors of the African-Asian draft resolution. Like them, it hoped that an end would be put as quickly as possible to a state of affairs whose prolongation justified the most serious concern. The French Government remained convinced that primary responsibility for the solution of the Rhodesian conflict lay with the United Kingdom. However, it felt that the magnitude of the reaction which that crisis had aroused in the world should be fully taken into account. Accordingly, in the face of so serious a situation, it had, while abiding entirely by its legal position, decided to express its feeling in the clearest possible terms and to vote for the resolution. The text, the result of lengthy and painstaking negotiations marked by a spirit of compromise, could not be completely devoid of imperfections. In particular, the provisions included in paragraph 5 (b), which would lead Member States to prohibit the entry into their territory of their nationals residing in Southern Rhodesia, hardly seemed compatible with the legislation of many countries, especially that of France.

727. The representative of Ethiopia said that his delegation continued to believe that the United Kingdom, as administering Power, should take urgently all necessary measures, including the use of force, to bring the rebellion to an end and enable the people of Southern Rhodesia to exercise their right of self-determination and independence. His delegation did not regard the resolution as a substitute for all effective action which the United Kingdom was required to take, but as measures to strengthen and supplement the steps required of the administering Power. The Coun-

cil should condemn Governments like those of South Africa and Portugal for their co-operation and assistance to the illegal minority régime. If they persisted in their defiance, the Council should take resolute and effective action against them in accordance with the Charter.

728. The representative of Senegal said that his Government was not completely satisfied with the resolution, for it had hoped for a more complete list of sanctions; but matters being as they were, it had been necessary to choose the possible.

729. The representative of India said that the resolution, by its very nature, was a compromise between the positions of those who believed that no measures available under the Charter should be excluded and those who believed in graduated measures. India continued to believe that the most effective and certain method of dealing with the rebellion would be resolute action by the administering Power, including the use of force. Even a clear unequivocal declaration that it did not rule out the use of force would be sufficient to bring down the régime. However, the comprehensive mandatory sanctions contained in the new resolution were a step forward. It was likely that the same Powers instrumental in the failure of selective sanctions would continue to counter the effects of the comprehensive sanctions. The administering Power, in particular, should think constructively about what the next logical step might be if the present efforts did not succeed. It was the responsibility of the international community to render all possible assistance to Zambia to enable it to overcome at least part of the hardships to which it would doubtless be subjected.

730. The representative of Canada said that his Government had repeatedly stated that Southern Rhodesia must not be granted independence before majority rule, and had supported Security Council action directed towards change in the régime and return to legality. Canada had voted for the resolution because it was right to move from selective measures to a more severe programme based on a comprehensive trade embargo, with tighter implementation. It was an accommodation of various points of view about the most effective Council action to promote the objective of ending the situation in Rhodesia; and it strengthened past procedures for implementation and verification of measures taken against the régime. Canada intended to observe the provisions of the resolution, some paragraphs of which might require new laws and regulations.

731. The representative of Hungary said he had voted for the resolution in the expectation that effective measures would be applied to bring an end to the illegal rule of the white minority régime in Southern Rhodesia. Paragraph 15 of the resolution did not do full justice to countries that had definitely and unreservedly complied with the resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly. It concealed the fact that a great number of countries had consistently violated and ignored those resolutions and, therefore, bore primary responsibility for averting any negative consequences that might ensue as a result of sanctions for countries bordering on Southern Rhodesia. It also ignored the fact that the existence of the Smith régime depended on the assistance of such Western Powers as the United Kingdom, the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany, and of other States such as South Africa and Portugal. His Government, for its part, maintained close relations with Zambia and

would continue to render economic assistance to the people of that country.

732. The representative of Denmark believed that the unanimous adoption of the resolution constituted a significant step towards independence for Southern Rhodesia under constitutional government and majority rule. The envisaged political solution would call for patience and perseverance. Regarding operative paragraph 5 (b), his Government was not in a position to prevent Danish citizens from returning to Denmark. As to paragraph 9, the problem appeared to be international in nature and should therefore be approached on a multilateral basis.

733. The President, speaking as representative of the United States, said that his Government's policy remained to seek a peaceful solution of the Rhodesian problem that would ensure political justice and equal opportunity for all Rhodesians, regardless of race. It would continue to support United Nations and United Kingdom efforts towards that end and would apply the mandatory provisions contained in the resolution adopted with the same vigour it had applied those of resolution 232 (1966). He noted that paragraph 5 of the resolution recognized that many States did not have the legal possibility to bar entry to their territories of their own nationals. The United States would carefully consider paragraphs 9 and 10, the language of which was not mandatory, being an expression of need and a request, and take into account its profound belief in a free flow of information and communication throughout the world, which it felt should apply to Rhodesia as well. The United States had no trade representation there. His Government deeply regretted and deplored that the régime in Salisbury had intensified its efforts to maintain its illegal control over the Rhodesian people, leaving no alternative but to make the sanctions programme as effective as possible.

734. In a fifth addendum (S/7781/Add.5), issued on 13 June 1968, to his report in pursuance of resolution 232 (1966), the Secretary-General reproduced the text of a further note sent to States Members of the United Nations or of the specialized agencies on 11 March, reminding them of his earlier requests for reports on action taken and for statistical data on imports and exports of commodities listed in paragraph 2 of resolution 232 (1966). The addendum also contained a statistical analysis covering the year 1967, as well as statistical tables setting forth the material received from reporting Governments.

735. In the analysis it was noted that the statistics in some instances covered shipments and trade undertaken in 1966 before the adoption of the Security Council's resolution. The countries accounting for the greater part of the imports of \$40 million were the Federal Republic of Germany (\$16 million), United States (\$6.5 million), Switzerland (\$3.9 million), Portugal (\$5.3 million), Netherlands (\$2.4 million), Belgium-Luxembourg (\$2.0 million), France (\$1.1 million) and Japan (\$1.3 million); where explanations of those imports were available they were shown in notes to the statistical tables.

736. The reporting countries had been, in 1965, the recipients of 79 per cent of Southern Rhodesia's exports, the remainder of which had gone almost entirely to Malawi and South Africa. In the absence of statistical reports from these two countries for the period under review, it was not possible at present to evaluate that part of the total trade.

737. Exports of the reporting countries to Southern Rhodesia had amounted to about \$54 million in 1967 which compared with \$187 million in the year 1965. The countries accounting for the greater part of these exports were Japan (\$13.6 million), Federal Republic of Germany (\$12.3 million), Netherlands (\$4.7 million), France (\$4.0 million), United States (\$3.8 million), United Kingdom (\$2.9 million), Belgium-Luxembourg (\$1.9 million), Switzerland (\$1.9 million), Portugal (\$1.8 million), Australia (\$1.4 million), Italy (\$1.3 million) and Austria (\$1.3 million); as in the case of imports, this trade involved considerations of the timing of export contracts and the recording of shipments. The reporting countries had been, in 1965, suppliers of 68 per cent of the imports of Southern Rhodesia, the remainder of which had come principally from South Africa, Malawi, Mozambique and Iran for which countries statistical data were not yet available for review.

738. In an analysis of trade in statistical commodity groups, it was stated that imports from Southern Rhodesia into the reporting countries of the eleven commodity groups specified in paragraph 2 (a) of resolution 232 (1966) had amounted to \$35 million in 1967, which compared with \$230 million in the year 1965. The most important of these commodities was tobacco, Southern Rhodesian exports of which had amounted to \$132 million in 1965. Normally, Southern Rhodesian exports of tobacco accounted for approximately 13 per cent of world exports of all raw tobacco and over 25 per cent of flue-cured tobacco.

739. The conclusion which the analysis indicated was that the markets formerly supplied by Southern Rhodesia had met their requirements to the extent of 77 million pounds by increased imports from the United States, by reducing stocks by 85 million pounds and by increased imports from four Asian countries of 44 million pounds. There was a gap of approximately 60 million pounds (value about \$30 million) which remained to be investigated in relation to stock changes in countries for which stock data were not yet available.

740. The next most important commodity was asbestos, Southern Rhodesian exports of which had amounted to \$30 million in 1965. In 1967, the recorded imports of the reporting countries amounted to £3.3 million which compared with \$23 million in the year 1965. It was noted that imports of the reporting countries from South Africa, an important producer of asbestos, had increased to an amount of \$55 million in 1967, which compared with \$40 million in the year 1965. Prior to 1966 South Africa had been exporting asbestos at a steady level (e.g., during 1960-1963 at a level of about \$35 million and during 1964-1965 of about \$39 million). Data for recent periods on imports into South Africa from Southern Rhodesia were not available. Southern Rhodesia's copper exports in 1965

had amounted to \$18.3 million. Most of the reporting countries appeared to have ceased to import copper from Southern Rhodesia in 1967. However, the possibility existed that certain imports of copper into the Federal Republic of Germany amounting to \$10 million in 1967 had been of Southern Rhodesian origin.

741. The chief importer of Southern Rhodesia's chromite had been traditionally the United States, to which Southern Rhodesia had sent \$5 million worth out of total exports of \$10.7 million in 1965. In 1967, the United States had imported \$3.4 million worth of chromite which had been explained as shipped from Southern Rhodesia before 16 December 1966. In 1965, Southern Rhodesia had exported chromite to South Africa amounting to \$3.7 million. Data for recent periods on imports into South Africa from Southern Rhodesia were not available.

742. Imports of other commodities mentioned in paragraph 2 (a) of resolution 232 (1966) into the reporting countries from Southern Rhodesia in 1967 had amounted to \$8.5 million, which compared with \$47 million in the year 1965. Because of the small magnitude of the trade involved, no meaningful analysis was possible for these commodities at present.

743. Exports of the reporting countries to Southern Rhodesia of the four commodity groups in paragraph 2 (d)-(f) of resolution 232 (1966) had amounted to approximately \$1.1 million in 1967 compared with \$35 million in the year 1965. Motor vehicles and parts had accounted for \$1.01 million of that amount, which compared with the figure of \$33 million in the year 1965.

744. No meaningful evaluation of the status as regards petroleum supplies to Southern Rhodesia was possible from the data reported by the reporting countries. The reason for that was that the traditional suppliers had been countries in the Middle East region, none of which had as yet reported its data to the Secretary-General. It was known, however, that, following the closure of the only Southern Rhodesian refinery in January 1966, no imports of crude petroleum were required. Iran, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia had been normal major suppliers of petroleum products, not only to Southern Rhodesia but also to South Africa, Mozambique and Angola. Since South Africa in recent periods had not disclosed countries of origin for its petroleum imports (nor countries of destination for its petroleum exports), even an approximate evaluation of the Southern Rhodesia petroleum situation in combination with that of South Africa was not possible without direct statistical information from their principal suppliers. The reported exports of petroleum products to South Africa, which amounted to approximately \$29 million in 1967 (compared with \$23 million in the year 1965) were mainly lubricating oils, greases, jelly and waxes.

Chapter 7

LETTER DATED 21 MAY 1968 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE *AD INTERIM* OF HAITI ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

A. Request for a meeting of the Security Council

745. In a letter dated 20 May 1968 (S/8592), the Permanent Representative *a.i.* of Haiti informed the Secretary-General that on that day a pirate aircraft

had bombed Port-au-Prince, directing one of its bombs at the private apartments of the Head of State and his family. On the afternoon of the same day, unidentified aircraft had bombed Cap-Haitien, killing

innocent civilians. According to information received, adventurers in the pay of ex-President Paul E. Magloire, Luc Fouché and Father Jean-Baptiste Georges, all in the United States, had planned to acquire aircraft to bomb Haiti. That act of international brigandage, the latter said, could only have been committed as a result of the tolerance of certain Member States of the United Nations, and it constituted a flagrant violation of international law and of the United Nations Charter. In all probability, the territories most likely to have been used for those criminal purposes were the United States, Cuba, Jamaica, the Dominican Republic or the Bahamas. It was essential that an immediate end be put to those acts which infringed on the sovereignty of Haiti.

746. In a letter dated 21 May 1968 (S/8593) addressed to the President of the Security Council, the Permanent Representative *a.i.* of Haiti said that, in view of the danger which the armed aggression represented to international peace and security, his Government had requested the Secretary-General, in accordance with Article 99 of the Charter, to draw the Council's attention to that threat to peace, a situation covered by Article 39.

747. The letter said that it should be noted that at the time when the National Palace was being bombed, two jets flew over the island of Gonave. General mobilization had been ordered in the Dominican Republic and there had been a concentration of Dominican armed forces on the Haitian-Dominican border because the Dominican authorities seemed to have jumped to the conclusion that the aggression against Haiti was ultimately aimed at their country, where they believed General Caamaño wanted to establish a Castroite régime. It was even reported that some United States military units in the Caribbean had been placed on the alert, ready for any eventuality. Some United States newspapers had earlier predicted an act of aggression which would threaten the life of the Haitian President; and an NBC television programme had stated that chaos was imminent in Haiti because of the forthcoming disappearance of the President, adding that in such an event the United States, which had occupied Haiti from 1916 to 1934, was ready to intervene. Furthermore, for over three years, a radio station operated in New York by a group of Haitian exiles, "La Voix de l'Union", had been propagating insults against the President and senior government officials and inciting the people of Haiti to revolt against the Government. The programmes had continued despite protest notes from the Haitian Government to the Government of the United States.

748. The letter requested that the Security Council be convened so that the facts might be established, and appropriate measures taken in accordance with Article 39 of the Charter to reduce the state of tension which threatened international peace and security.

B. Consideration at the 1427th meeting (27 May 1968)

749. At its 1427th meeting, on 27 May 1968, the Security Council decided to include the item in its agenda and invited the representative of Haiti to participate without the right to vote in discussions on the matter.

750. The representative of Haiti said that the repeated acts of aggression against his country, which

were carried out from other territories, could endanger international peace and security. Those acts assumed different forms, sometimes vicious press campaigns, pernicious propaganda on radio, cinema and television ridiculing and fostering hatred of the Negro peasants of Haiti and their Government; sometimes economic strangulation designed to block international and private avenues of co-operation for solving the economic, social and humanitarian problems confronting Haiti. Inexhaustible financial sources had backed eight armed invasions attempting to overthrow the Government and stop the national revolution. These acts of aggression had reached a climax on 20 May in the attack against the territorial integrity and political independence of a Member country, the right of self-determination of its Negro masses, and the persons of its Chief of State and his family. He said his Government accused no one, no people, no Government, no country, but it did invoke clear and distinct texts which provided solutions for situations such as that in Haiti.

751. Quoting passages from an article in *Foreign Affairs*, October 1965, by John N. Plank of the Brookings Institute, in support of his statement, the representative of Haiti said that the history of the intervention of the United States in the Dominican Republic could be repeated. In Mr. Plank's view the situation in Haiti corresponded most closely to that found by President Johnson in the Dominican Republic. Preventive intervention in Haiti, therefore, might be considered appropriate and necessary.

752. Every time the head of the Haitian Government undertook some major work of infra-structure to put the world's first Negro republic firmly on the road to progress and civilization, he was confronted by a vast international conspiracy. When after the second Punta del Este Conference in 1962, the Haitian Government undertook the construction of the François Duvalier international airport, the grave events of 1963 had occurred. Now, four days after the Government concluded a contract for a major hydro-electric project, Port-au-Prince and Cap-Haitien had been bombed. In 1958 a group of political refugees living in the United States and some Americans had invaded Haiti at a cost of fifty lives. Haiti had denounced those subversive acts to the United States and had urged it to forbid the refugees to abuse American hospitality by transforming American territory into a centre of subversion against the Haitian Government. Then in 1963 had come the Dominican-Haitian conflict. A rebel invasion had been planned by a vast international conspiracy supported by the so-called Haitian Government in exile, formed in Puerto Rico. The Dominican Republic had invaded Haiti several times; constantly violated Haitian airspace; mobilized its army; massed troops on the Haitian-Dominican frontier; and broadcast and published propaganda advocating the overthrow of the Haitian Government. Those expeditions, though doomed to failure, had created a general state of insecurity and upset internal public order, undermining the contribution that tourism could make to the economy.

753. He said that his Government would not be satisfied with mere recommendations or simple expressions of regret. The Security Council should make recommendations to forbid any State to traffic in arms and war materials, supply food, except for the use of Governments, equip, arm or use any vessel or aircraft for warlike purposes, or tolerate enterprises engaging in pernicious propaganda that could threaten the prestige of Governments or upset internal public order.

754. The representative of Haiti went on to describe the frustrated invasion and the bombing of Port-au-Prince and Cap-Haitien, which he said had been planned by exiles residing in the United States and executed by American pilots living in the Bahamas. The invasion could not have been carried out without the tolerance of United Nations Members. Haitian exiles living in the United States and mercenaries had planned in New York, Miami and Melbourne, Florida, to assassinate the President of Haiti and his family, Government officials and members of the population and destroy Port-au-Prince and Cap-Haitien. United States police should have known of these plans. Those perpetual threats by the powerful forced Haiti to stay on a war-time footing in self-defence. However, those acts of aggression, the purpose of which was to cause the Government and people of Haiti to take desperate solutions, had failed. Those acts of international brigandage, coupled with the serious political crisis prevailing in the area of the Caribbean, constituted a threat to the peace of the hemisphere and the world.

755. He said that his Government requested the immediate cessation of activities infringing upon Haiti's territorial integrity and national sovereignty; punishment as an example to all who, contrary to international agreements and the Charters of the Organization of American States and the United Nations, used the territory of certain countries, principally the United States and some islands of the Caribbean, for their criminal actions; that the Council take the necessary measures to prevent repetition of acts infringing upon the fundamental rights of the Republic of Haiti, its Government and its people and impeding the development and progress of Haiti in the community of nations; and that the guilty parties be compelled to pay the Government of Haiti and its people equitable reparation for the loss of life and destruction of property.

756. The representative of the United States said that his Government was always ready to investigate all information indicating activities on its soil that violated its laws, but it could proceed only on the basis of established facts. His Government had immediately requested Haiti to supply the maximum information available. However, from information received and from statements made by the Government of Haiti, it was his Government's understanding that the situation was under control. Therefore, the most appropriate course would be for Haiti to pursue the matter with any Government it deemed necessary. The United States remained prepared to co-operate in such an effort.

757. The representative of Brazil said that the situation prevailing in Haiti was still far from clear and that the information available in the Council was too vague and fragmentary and did not provide a sound basis on which the Council could proceed to a full debate on the complaint, much less to any decision on the matter. As the source of the alleged aggression had not been established, the Council could not determine whether the incident in question was an instance of outside aggression or internal conflict. If it were the latter, Article 2 (7) of the Charter should be borne in mind. He said that his delegation was of the view that the Council should refrain from taking any action on the matter until at least one method for the pacific settlement of disputes had been tried, especially any of those which were provided by the Charter of Bogota.

758. The representative of the USSR said that his delegation would study the statement of the representative of Haiti who had set forth very serious charges against foreign States.

759. Speaking as the representative of the United Kingdom, the President of the Council said that, after careful investigation, the Governor of Bahamas had reported that there was no positive evidence of flights to Haiti at the time in question.

At the end of the 1427th meeting, the President of the Council stated that the meeting was adjourned and that he would announce the time of the next meeting of the Council on this subject after consulting members.

C. Communications received by the Security Council

760. In a letter dated 24 May 1968 (S/8598) addressed to the Secretary-General, the Permanent Representative of Jamaica stated that Jamaica had not been associated in any respect with aircraft that attacked the Republic of Haiti and that his Government had already informed the Haitian Consul in Kingston that Jamaica was not a base from which any aircraft had operated to bomb Haiti.

761. In a letter dated 27 May 1968 (S/8599), the Permanent Representative of the Dominican Republic informed the Secretary-General that his Government reiterated its position of complete neutrality and of non-intervention in affairs concerning other States and that any internal measures it had adopted were solely designed to preserve that neutrality.

Chapter 8

LETTER DATED 12 JUNE 1968 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

762. In a letter dated 12 June 1968 addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/8630), the representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States requested an early meeting of the Council to consider a draft resolution (S/8631) they had submitted on

the same date in response, the letter said, to the desire of many Members that appropriate measures be taken to safeguard their security in conjunction with their adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The text of the draft resolution read as follows:

"The Security Council,

"Noting with appreciation the desire of a large number of States to subscribe to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and thereby to undertake not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices,

"Taking into consideration the concern of certain of these States that, in conjunction with their adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, appropriate measures be undertaken to safeguard their security,

"Bearing in mind that any aggression accompanied by the use of nuclear weapons would endanger the peace and security of all States,

"1. Recognizes that aggression with nuclear weapons or the threat of such aggression against a non-nuclear-weapon State would create a situation in which the Security Council, and above all its nuclear weapon State permanent members, would have to act immediately in accordance with their obligations under the United Nations Charter;

"2. Welcomes the intention expressed by certain States that they will provide or support immediate assistance, in accordance with the Charter, to any non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that is a victim of an act or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used;

"3. Reaffirms in particular the inherent right, recognized under Article 51 of the Charter, of individual and collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security."

763. At the 1430th meeting, on 17 June, the Council included the item in its agenda without objection.

764. At the same meeting the representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States made separate statements, during the course of which each representative read the text of the following declaration:

"The Government of the [Soviet Union, United States, United Kingdom] notes with appreciation the desire expressed by a large number of States to subscribe to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

"We welcome the willingness of these States to undertake not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

"The [Soviet Union, United Kingdom, United States] also notes the concern of certain of these States that, in conjunction with their adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear

Weapons, appropriate measures be undertaken to safeguard their security. Any aggression accompanied by the use of nuclear weapons would endanger the peace and security of all States.

"Bearing these considerations in mind, the [Soviet Union, United Kingdom, United States] declares the following:

"Aggression with nuclear weapons, or the threat of such aggression, against a non-nuclear-weapon State would create a qualitatively new situation in which the nuclear-weapon States which are permanent members of the United Nations Security Council would have to act immediately through the Security Council to take the measures necessary to counter such aggression or to remove the threat of aggression in accordance with the United Nations Charter, which calls for taking 'effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace'. Therefore, any State which commits aggression accompanied by the use of nuclear weapons or which threatens such aggression must be aware that its actions are to be countered effectively by measures to be taken in accordance with the United Nations Charter to suppress the aggression or remove the threat of aggression.

"The [Soviet Union, United Kingdom, United States] affirms its intention, as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, to seek immediate Security Council action to provide assistance, in accordance with the Charter, to any non-nuclear-weapon State, party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, that is a victim of an act of aggression or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used.

"The [Soviet Union, United Kingdom, United States] reaffirms in particular the inherent right, recognized under Article 51 of the Charter, of individual and collective self-defence if an armed attack, including a nuclear attack, occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.

"The [Soviet Union, United Kingdom, United States] vote for the resolution before us and this statement of the way in which the [Soviet Union, United Kingdom, United States] intends to act in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations are based upon the fact that the resolution is supported by other permanent members of the Security Council who are nuclear-weapon States and are also proposing to sign the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and that these States have made similar statements as to the way in which they intend to act in accordance with the Charter".

765. In his statement, the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics pointed out that the three-Power draft resolution resulted from the generally recognized fact that any act of aggression accompanied by the use of nuclear weapons would endanger the peace and security of all States. The key provision of the draft resolution was contained in paragraph 1 which provided the solution to the question of strengthening the security of the non-nuclear countries within the framework of the Security Council, upon which the United Nations Charter placed the primary responsibility for the maintenance of inter-

national peace and security. The draft resolution expressed a positive attitude toward the intention of certain States to provide or support immediate assistance, in accordance with the Charter, to any non-nuclear-weapon State that was a party to the Treaty and which became a victim of an act or the object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons were used. The Soviet Union stood among those countries which intended to provide or support, if necessary, immediate assistance to the countries concerned.

766. The representative of the United Kingdom stressed four points which his delegation regarded as being of primary importance in connexion with the security assurances embodied in the draft resolution and the declaration: First, the assurances were given as a result of representations made by non-nuclear-weapon States, to which his Government and others had readily responded. Second, the assurances had deliberately been made without any limitation in time and to meet world-wide diversity of security interests. For that reason, they were, and must be, in general terms. Third, the three co-sponsors considered it right that the assurances be given in the Security Council and within the framework of the Charter. To do otherwise could have derogated from the authority of the United Nations and from their obligations as Members of the United Nations. Fourth, it should be clear that any country contemplating nuclear aggression, or the threat of it, against a non-nuclear signatory of the Treaty would be deterred by the assurances given in common by the most powerful nuclear States in the world. No one could doubt that the determination of East and West to prevent any act or threat of nuclear aggression was a development of the utmost importance in world affairs.

767. The President, speaking as the representative of the United States, said that the three-Power draft resolution and the declaration made in conjunction with it would lay a firm political, moral and legal basis for ensuring the security of non-nuclear-weapon Parties to the Charter. Those assurances combined with the Non-Proliferation Treaty would give each State, if not perfect security, more security than it would otherwise enjoy. In that context, the adoption of the draft resolution would be a major contribution to international peace and security.

768. The representative of France declared that his delegation's position on the draft resolution was in line with that taken in the General Assembly, when France abstained on the resolution on the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Although the adoption of the draft resolution would in no way alter the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter, his Government could not join the sponsors of the draft or the declaration because it believed that the only solution to the nuclear menace lay in the cessation of the production and the destruction of the stockpiles of nuclear arms. The nations of the world would not be secure until the nuclear Powers agreed upon and achieved nuclear disarmament. France, which had equipped itself with nuclear weapons solely for defensive purposes, would be receptive to any initiative which the other Powers might be prepared to accept with it in that field.

769. At the 1431st meeting, on 18 June, the representative of Canada said his Government had supported the right of non-nuclear-weapon States to expect security assurances in return for renouncing nuclear weapons. The proposal now made by the three nuclear Powers fell squarely within the framework of the

United Nations Charter and seemed to be the best answer at present to this difficult and complex question. His delegation hoped that the other two nuclear Powers would follow suit in due course. The draft resolution and the solemn declarations of three major nuclear Powers were of the highest political importance. The resolution reaffirmed Article 51 of the Charter concerning the right of States to individual and collective self-defence until the Council took action. This was an important assertion that a non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty threatened with or subjected to nuclear attack could reasonably expect assistance from one or more of the nuclear Powers supporting the resolution, pending Council action.

770. The representative of Denmark stated that his Government had welcomed the adoption of General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII) and now welcomed the agreement of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States embodied in the draft resolution before the Council and in their statements. That agreement was seen as a token that these countries considered it in their own vital interest that no non-nuclear-weapon State should be subject to nuclear aggression or the threat of such aggression. The political significance of that agreement, therefore, went far beyond the text of the guarantee formula embodied in it. His delegation was satisfied that the solution proposed provided such global security as might be obtained in the prevailing international situation. At any rate, it provided a greater measure of security than was now at hand.

771. The representative of Paraguay stated that although the Non-Proliferation Treaty did not entirely meet the wishes of the Latin American States, the advantages of the Treaty had led his Government to support it. Paraguay had thus pledged to undertake all the obligations of the Treaty and was therefore entitled to special guarantees from the nuclear Powers. Although no guarantee could provide absolute security, guarantees were preferable to none at all. It was therefore in his Government's interest to accept them.

772. The representative of Hungary observed that the draft resolution constituted an important step in applying the United Nations Charter to the realm of nuclear weapons—a contingency not envisaged when the Charter was drafted. It would provide meaningful implementation of the Charter provisions for the maintenance of international peace and security. The three identical declarations and the draft resolution provided for the widest possible adherence to the Treaty and strengthened the collective security system under the Charter. They were also a powerful deterrent to nuclear aggression. The non-nuclear countries could hardly expect stronger assurances.

773. The representative of Senegal said that the fact that East and West had achieved an agreement was an historic event. The draft resolution and the declaration were obviously made in good faith and were aimed at protecting the security of non-nuclear States. In any case, it was necessary to evaluate objectively what would happen in case of nuclear aggression in the absence of any security assurances.

774. At the 1433rd meeting, on 19 June, the representative of Algeria stated that the draft resolution gave the treaty the nature of a collective security covenant from which only the signatories would benefit. It was unprecedented for the Council to act as a guarantor for any covenant. Moreover, while the

United Nations Charter placed the responsibility for safeguarding and maintaining peace on the five permanent members of the Security Council, the draft resolution required the agreement of only three permanent members, thus calling into question a balance worked out when the Council was created. That was a biased approach and implied an indirect alteration of the Charter. The draft resolution seemed to be directed against the People's Republic of China. The restoration of its rights in the United Nations would be the decisive test of the effectiveness of the resolution. China had repeatedly declared that it would under no circumstances be the first to use nuclear weapons and France did not envisage offensive use of its nuclear arsenal. However, those two nuclear Powers were not ready to enter into commitments similar to those assumed by the other three nuclear Powers. Consequently, the assurances were either inadequate or unnecessary.

775. The representative of Brazil said that the United Nations Charter set up a universal security machinery which included all Members of the Organization without exception. However, the guarantees referred to in the draft resolution were offered by only three of the five nuclear Powers and would apply only to parties to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation. Moreover, while the Charter established juridical obligations, the draft resolution and the unilateral declarations of the three great Powers were only statements of intention. The draft resolution, therefore, fell short of assuring the guarantees against all kinds of aggression already contemplated in the Charter. The proposed assurances also failed to meet the objective of establishing an acceptable balance of obligations and responsibilities between nuclear and non-nuclear States.

776. The representative of Ethiopia observed that the question of security assurances was one of re-adapting the collective security system established under the Charter to meet the exigencies of the atomic age and not of establishing yet another competing collective security system on the sole behalf of those States accepting the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Under the United Nations Charter, all Member States, including all permanent members of the Security Council, assume the obligation to come to the assistance of a victim of aggression. The fact that aggression is committed by means of atomic weapons or that the use of atomic weapons is threatened could not change the character of that obligation. The collective security guarantee inherent in the United Nations Charter must be applicable to all Member States without discrimination. At the same time, his delegation appealed to all Member States to adhere to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The best means to ensure the security of all nations was to sign a convention prohibiting the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons and, pending signature of such a convention, a clear undertaking by the nuclear Powers not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States. It was regrettable that such a pledge was not forthcoming as was also the failure to refer to the General Assembly resolution calling on the nuclear Powers not to use these weapons.

777. The representative of China said that neither the draft resolution nor the declarations had added anything to the provisions of the Charter. Aggression was aggression, whatever the weapons used. In that light, one might question whether the draft resolution was necessary. The record of the Security Council with regard to the prevention and removal of threats to

the peace and the suppression of acts of aggression was unfortunately not such as to lend credibility to the proposed security assurances. There also remained the problem of arriving at a consensus on what constituted aggression, nuclear or otherwise. But no system of security guarantees could be absolute and watertight. The guarantees embodied in the draft resolution, though far from perfect, were better than none and gave the non-nuclear States more protection than they would have otherwise. His delegation attached great importance to the fact that both the draft resolution and the declarations reaffirmed the inherent right of individual and collective self-defence. This was vital to all who relied on regional arrangements or other multilateral or bilateral arrangements for their national security.

778. The representative of Pakistan stated that the question of security assurances required the most careful consideration and his delegation had hoped that the vote would be deferred until after the conference of non-nuclear States. In view of the absence of an agreed definition of aggression, the draft resolution should rather have dealt with the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons. The existence of the veto made the assurances uncertain and the declarations were only declarations of intent. It seemed only just that if non-nuclear States forswore nuclear weapons for defence, the nuclear Powers should in return renounce the use of such weapons against them. The draft resolution, by making a State's adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty a condition for receiving protection against nuclear aggression or the threat thereof gave preferential treatment to States adhering to the Treaty. The draft resolution and the declarations reaffirmed the inherent right, recognized in the Charter, to individual and collective self-defence. That right existed independently of the Charter and could not limit a State's option in obtaining assistance to prevent or counter a nuclear attack. The draft resolution opened the possibility of the three nuclear Powers acting to deter or suppress a nuclear attack before the Council could act or when it was unable to act. At the same time few of the non-nuclear-weapon States could realistically expect that possibility to become an actuality.

779. The element of deterrence to a would-be aggressor and the assurance of protection to its victim would have been strengthened if it had been made clear in the declarations that effective assistance would be forthcoming regardless of whether or not that State was aligned in a military alliance. The provisions of Article 51 of the Charter were no longer adequate to the requirements of the right of self-defence in an age of nuclear weapons. Such a right could hardly be restricted to the actual occurrence of a nuclear armed attack. Few non-nuclear-weapon States would be able to survive a nuclear strike to exercise the right of self-defence. Only a few States could derive from the draft resolution real assurance of security against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, apart from the non-nuclear-weapon States belonging to the NATO or Warsaw Pacts or protected by unilateral guarantees outside the United Nations. To inspire general confidence, security guarantees had to be based on full recognition of the imperatives of the qualitatively new situation that had arisen from the perils of the nuclear age. These guarantees had to meet, not only the exigencies of present political and power relations in the world, but also the foreseeable developments in the future.

780. The representative of India said that the real hope of security for non-nuclear-weapon States lay in nuclear disarmament. However, it was obvious that action in that field would take time and would have to be sought by stages. Until then, and purely as an interim measure, the nuclear-weapon States had a definite obligation to assure non-nuclear-weapon States that their security would not be endangered in any way by the use or threat of use of such weapons, and that those weapons would not be used as instruments of pressure, intimidation or blackmail. Any security assurances that nuclear-weapon States might offer should not be regarded as a *quid pro quo* for signing a non-proliferation treaty. Any linking of security assurances to the signature of a non-proliferation treaty would be contrary to Charter provisions since the Charter did not discriminate between those who might adhere to a particular treaty and those who might not. The Charter was clear that the assistance of the Security Council should be available in equal measure to all States and not merely to the signatories of a particular treaty. It would be inappropriate, therefore, for the Council to welcome the partial assurances mentioned in paragraph 3. It was to the interest of the international community that non-nuclear-weapon States be encouraged to remain in that category. That could be done only by ensuring the security of all non-nuclear-weapon States in conformity with the Charter, regardless of whether or not they signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The draft resolution did not fully accord with the basic principles which should govern the problem of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States.

Decision: *At the 1433rd meeting, on 19 June 1968, the three-Power draft resolution (S/8631) was adopted by 10 votes in favour, none against and 5 abstentions (Algeria, Brazil, France, India and Pakistan) (resolution 255 (1968)).*

781. After the vote, the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics stated that by the adoption of the draft resolution the United Nations had successfully completed an important stage by preparing the road for the signing of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and its ratification. The Treaty would be an important step towards the creation of favourable conditions for the cessation of the nuclear arms race and towards nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

782. The President, speaking as the representative of the United States, said the resolution would be a major contribution to international peace and security and would lay a firm basis for ensuring the security of non-nuclear-weapon parties to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and reaffirmed his Government's pledge to move as speedily as possible to sign the Treaty and seek its ratification. The Treaty was a giant step towards nuclear disarmament, and his Government in discharging its commitment to enter into negotiations on further nuclear disarmament measures, would not wait for the Treaty to enter into force. His Government had instructed its negotiators to commence such negotiations immediately.

Part II

OTHER MATTERS CONSIDERED BY THE COUNCIL

Chapter 9

ADMISSION OF NEW MEMBERS

A. Application of the People's Republic of Southern Yemen

783. In a telegram dated 30 November 1967 (S/8284), the President of the People's Republic of Southern Yemen submitted the application of the People's Republic for admission to membership in the United Nations, together with a declaration, signed by the President, accepting the obligations contained in the Charter of the United Nations. The telegram was confirmed by a letter of the same date.

784. The Security Council considered the application of the People's Republic of Southern Yemen at its 1384th meeting, on 12 December 1967. The following draft resolution was submitted by Ethiopia, India, Japan, Mali, Nigeria and the United Kingdom (S/8292):

"The Security Council,

"Having examined the application of the People's Republic of Southern Yemen for admission to the United Nations (S/8284),

"Recommends to the General Assembly that the People's Republic of Southern Yemen be admitted to membership in the United Nations."

Decision: *At the 1384th meeting, on 12 December 1967, the draft resolution (S/8292) was adopted unanimously (resolution 243 (1967)).*

B. Application of Mauritius

785. In a letter dated 12 March 1968 (S/8466), the Prime Minister of Mauritius submitted the application of Mauritius for admission to membership in the United Nations, in which he declared that his Government accepted the obligations contained in the Charter of the United Nations.

786. The Security Council considered the application of Mauritius at its 1414th meeting, on 18 April 1968. The following draft resolution was submitted by Algeria, Canada, Ethiopia, India, Pakistan, Senegal and the United Kingdom (S/8547/Rev.1 and Add.1):

"The Security Council,

"Having examined the application of Mauritius for admission to the United Nations (S/8466),

"Recommends to the General Assembly that Mauritius be admitted to membership in the United Nations."

Decision: *At the 1414th meeting, on 18 April 1968, the draft resolution (S/8547/Rev.1 and Add.1) was adopted unanimously (resolution 249 (1968)).*

C. Other communications concerning the admission of new Members

787. In a letter addressed to the President of the Security Council on 13 December 1967 (S/8296), the representative of the United States said that his Government had given careful attention to the considerations expressed by the Secretary-General in the introduction to his annual report to the General Assembly's twenty-second session (A/6701/Add.1) with respect to those States which had been referred to as "micro-States"—entities especially small in area, population and human and economic resources which were currently emerging as independent States. The Secretary-General, referring to Article 4 of the Charter, had suggested that it might be opportune for the competent organs to undertake a comprehensive study of the criteria for membership with a view to laying down the necessary limitations on full membership while also defining other forms of association which would benefit both the "micro-States" and the United Nations. It was the belief of the United States that examination of the considerations presented by the Secretary-General was most likely to be fruitful if it were made in terms of general principles and procedures, and at a time when no membership applications were pending in the Security Council. The United States further believed that the Security Council could usefully and appropriately seek the assistance and advice of its standing Committee on the Admission of New Members in examining the issues outlined by the Secretary-General with a view to providing the members and the Council with appropriate information. Accordingly, the United States requested the President to consult the members of the Council about the possibility of reconvening the Committee for such a purpose.

788. On 29 December the President of the Council for the month of December 1967 addressed a reply (S/8316) to the representative of the United States indicating that the Council's preoccupation with another question early in the month, and the subsequent Christmas and New Year holidays, had precluded the possibility of dealing with the matter. He had therefore asked the Secretariat to bring it to the notice of his successor in office.

789. The President of the Council for January 1968, in a letter to the representative of the United States dated 31 January (S/8376), stated that he had engaged

in consultations with the members of the Council concerning the United States suggestions, but that during that process the Council had been urgently seized of another request by the United States. He had not been able, therefore, to conclude his consultations for the reconvening of the Committee on the Admission of New Members and was, accordingly, requesting his successor to proceed further in the matter.

790. In a letter dated 29 February 1968 (S/8437), the President of the Council for February 1968 informed the representative of the United States that

as it had not been opportune to reconvene the above-mentioned Committee during the month, he would request the President for March to continue consultations on the matter.

791. On 20 March 1968 the President of the Council for March addressed a letter (S/8520) to the representative of the United States in which he stated that as the urgency of the numerous questions which the Council had to consider during March had prevented him from doing so himself, he would request his successor to resume the consultations on the matter.

Part III

THE MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE

Chapter 10

WORK OF THE MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE

792. The Military Staff Committee has been functioning continuously under the draft rules of procedure during the period under review and has held a total of twenty-six meetings without considering matters of substance.

Part IV

MATTERS BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL BUT NOT DISCUSSED IN THE COUNCIL DURING THE PERIOD COVERED

Chapter 11

COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING COMPLAINTS BY GREECE AGAINST TURKEY AND BY TURKEY AGAINST GREECE

793. During the period under review, the Secretary-General received communications from the representatives of Greece and Turkey.

794. Communications from the representative of Greece included the following:

Letters dated 18 July (S/8091), 4, 8, 10, 15, 24, 25, 27 and 28 November (S/8224, S/8225, S/8230, S/8239, S/8246, S/8267, S/8273, S/8274, S/8276) and 2 and 23 December (S/8285, S/8317) complaining of the violation of Greek air space by Turkish military aircraft; and letters dated 18 October (S/8201), 17 November (S/8250) and 18 De-

cember (S/8302) rejecting complaints made in letters from the representative of Turkey.

795. Communications from the representative of Turkey included:

A letter dated 13 September (S/8156) complaining of the violation of Turkish air space by Greek military aircraft; a letter dated 22 November (S/8256) complaining of buzzing Turkish war ships navigating in international waters by Greek military aircraft; and letters dated 31 August (S/8142), 13 and 14 November (S/8240, S/8244) and 1 December (S/8282) rejecting complaints made in letters from the representative of Greece.

Chapter 12

COMMUNICATIONS RELATING TO COMPLAINTS CONCERNING ACTS OF AGGRESSION AGAINST THE TERRITORY AND CIVILIAN POPULATION OF CAMBODIA

796. During the period under review, the representative of Cambodia addressed over fifty communications to the President of the Security Council. Most of these communications contained charges of violations of Cambodian territory, air space or territorial waters by the armed forces of the United States and the Republic of Viet-Nam and concluded by stating that the Government of Cambodia had protested most strongly against these acts of aggression and provocation and demanded that the Governments of the United States and the Republic of Viet-Nam immediately cease such acts.

797. Included in the Cambodian communications were details of many alleged incidents and charges that elements of United States-South Viet-Nameese forces had with various weapons fired across the frontiers at villages and guard posts or penetrated into Cambodian territory attacking similar targets and planting mines, and that they had with airplanes and helicopters violated Cambodian air space, machine-gunning and firing rockets at villages, guard posts and Khmer villagers working in their fields, and occasionally dropping mines and poisonous booby-traps. The communications charged that these numerous incidents had resulted in deaths and injuries inflicted on Khmer civilians and members of the Cambodian armed forces, as well as damage to dwellings, livestock and other property.

798. Charges were also made that armed vessels of the United States and the Republic of Viet-Nam penetrated into Khmer territorial waters, sometimes firing at Khmer fishermen, seizing fishing boats and Khmer fishermen.

799. The Cambodian representative also charged a number of large-scale penetrations by United States-South Viet-Nameese forces, ranging from 100 to 300 soldiers, transported by helicopters and supported by aircraft and artillery fire, which attacked villages and guard posts with consequent casualties, sometimes burning or temporarily occupying Cambodian villages.

800. Some communications claimed that the members of the International Commission for Supervision and Control, the military and press attachés of diplomatic missions in Phnom-Penh, as well as national and international press correspondents, upon the invitation of the Royal Government, had visited and seen for themselves the scene of the attacks and violence reported.

801. With reference to previous complaints of the Cambodian representative, the Permanent Observer of the Republic of Viet-Nam, in a letter dated 25 July 1967 (S/8100), informed the Security Council that his Government had not thought it necessary to deny each time the charges submitted by the Cambodian repre-

sentative, which were often of a minor nature and attributable either to the imprecise character of the common frontiers or to deliberate acts of provocation by the Viet-Cong. After the investigation of the charges, his Government had recognized as valid complaints concerning five incidents occurring between June 1964 and March 1967 and had agreed to pay damages to the victims, but had found baseless the other complaints lodged by the Cambodian Government, which had disregarded repeated protests against the use of Cambodian territory by the Viet-Cong and the North Viet-Nameese as a base for aggression into the territory of the Republic of Viet-Nam.

802. By a letter of 11 September (S/8150), the Cambodian representative stated that on 15 July 1967 Cambodian defence forces, while pursuing a group of foreigners on Khmer territory, had captured a South Viet-Nameese soldier disguised as a Viet-Cong. Under interrogation that captive had revealed that the task of his company was to disguise its men as Viet-Cong and to smuggle them into Khmer territory in order to identify strategic points and seek evidence of the presence of Viet-Cong. The letter concluded that the sole aim of those acts in Cambodian territory was to find pretexts for extending the war into Cambodia.

803. In a letter dated 15 November (S/8245), the representative of Cambodia complained that since 16 October 1967 the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam had again taken arbitrary action against merchant ships by preventing them from entering and leaving Cambodia via the Mekong river. He stressed that those acts were in violation of the international obligations of the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam under the Paris Convention of 29 December 1954 and demanded an immediate cessation of such acts. In reply to this charge the Permanent Observer of the Republic of Viet-Nam by a letter dated 20 November 1967 (S/8255) informed the Security Council that the movement of merchant ships on the Mekong river had been temporarily halted for minesweeping and military operations and that normal conditions had resumed on 2 November 1967.

804. In communications dated 11 September (S/8149) and 27 and 30 November 1967 (S/8272 and S/8280), the representative of Cambodia transmitted for the information of the Security Council statements of the Royal Government on the intensification of a systematic campaign in the American press which charged that Khmer territory was being used as a channel for supplying arms, ammunition and food to, and as the "inviolable sanctuary" for, the armed forces of the National Liberation Front and the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, and as a base for launching attacks upon the American expeditionary invasion force. The Government of Cambodia qualified those accusations as totally unfounded and pointed out that they were obviously intended to prepare international public opinion for an extension of United States aggression against neutral Cambodia. It also claimed that the International Control Commission, military attachés accredited to Cambodia, correspondents and representatives of other organizations had carried out exhaustive investigations in all frontier regions in which, according to the American propaganda, Viet-Nameese military bases existed, and in all cases recognized the worthless and unfounded nature of the accusations. Stressing that it was absolutely impossible for Viet-Nameese armed units of any size to pass through Khmer territory as the Royal Khmer Armed Forces would not permit it,

the Government of Cambodia recognized that it could not prevent altogether the infiltration of small groups of a few persons across its frontier and considered that the chief responsibility rested on the United States which, with more than a million men at its disposal, was unable to control the Viet-Nameese-Khmer Frontier. The Government of Cambodia, pointing out that it had always respected the Geneva Agreements of 1954, appealed to the United Nations and asked all countries to demand that the American Government forthwith cease its provocations, its infiltration of armed elements and its attacks against frontier villages and air violations, which were intolerable infringements of Cambodian sovereignty.

805. By a letter of 27 December 1967 (S/8312), the representative of Cambodia transmitted a statement of his Government expressing its concern over press reports of plans to give the Commander of the United States armed forces in South Viet-Nam complete authority for the "hot pursuit" of troops of the National Liberation Front and the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam claimed to be seeking refuge on Cambodian territory. Emphasizing once again its claim that the International Control Commission had already clearly expressed its disagreement with the accusations about the presence of Viet-Nameese forces in Cambodia, the Royal Government warned the United States Government of the consequences of the entry of American forces into Khmer territory and stated that the Khmer people were determined to oppose aggression against Cambodia and to appeal for direct aid to all peace-loving countries.

806. By a letter dated 10 June 1968 (S/8628), the representative of Cambodia stated that on 20 May 1968 the Royal Khmer Navy had intercepted a Philippine tugboat in Cambodian river waters 1.5 kilometers from the frontier with eight Philippine and two United States nationals. It was reported that on 25 May the Australian Embassy in Phnom Penh, representing United States interests in Cambodia, had submitted a request by the United States Government for the release of the two American nationals on the grounds that the waters had been violated because of an error of navigation. The Government of Cambodia had rejected the United States claim that there had been an error of navigation and protested against this deliberate violation of Cambodian territorial waters by a vessel used by the United States Armed Forces. On 11 June 1968 (S/8629) the representative of Cambodia reported to the Council that on 10 June the Government of Cambodia had released the two Americans mentioned above, without conditions, as a tribute to the memory of Senator Robert Kennedy.

807. Listed below and briefly summarized are letters other than those already mentioned from the representative of Cambodia to the President of the Security Council for the information of the Council.

Letter dated 17 July 1967 (S/8072), charging that spotter aircraft of the United States-South Viet-Nameese armed forces had several times violated Cambodian air space in June 1967 and that on 14 June two helicopters had violated Cambodian air space and machine-gunned the Khmer inhabitants, wounding two of them.

Letter dated 19 July 1967 (S/8083) charging elements of the United States-South Viet-Nameese armed forces with several penetrations into Khmer territory and firing on Khmer inhabitants and border guards.

Letter dated 21 August 1967 (S/8131), charging that a skirmish between a patrol of the Khmer National Defence forces and a combat unit of the United States-South Viet-Nameese armed forces inside Khmer territory had resulted in the killing of two South Viet-Nameese soldiers in uniforms with insignia of parachutists.

Letter dated 21 August 1967 (S/8132), charging that helicopters, reconnaissance aircraft and jet aircraft of the United States-South Viet-Nameese armed forces in the period of March-June 1967 had eleven times violated Cambodian air space and in several cases machine-gunned and fired rockets on Khmer outposts and villages.

Letter dated 11 September 1967 (S/8152), charging that from 30 July to 24 August 1967 observation planes and helicopters of the United States-South Viet-Nameese armed forces several times violated Cambodian air space and fired rockets at border posts inside Cambodian territory, and that their naval vessels had disembarked troops which had penetrated into Khmer territory and attacked the advanced positions of Khmer defence forces killing and seriously wounding Cambodian soldiers and civilians.

Letter dated 19 September 1967 (S/8161), charging the troops of the United States-South Viet-Nameese armed forces with numerous cases of penetration into Cambodian territory and artillery and mortar firing at the Cambodian villages, posts and Cambodian defence forces and inhabitants.

Letter dated 25 September 1967 (S/8167), charging troops of the United States-South Viet-Nameese armed forces with penetration into Cambodian territory in the night of 2/3 September 1967 and attack on the post of the Khmer provincial guard, resulting in casualties on the Cambodian side.

Letter dated 25 September 1967 (S/8168), charging that aircraft of the United States-South Viet-Nameese armed forces had scattered poisoned and deadly booby-traps over the Cambodian province of Rattanakiri in order to spread terror among the Khmer civilian population.

Letter dated 2 October 1967 (S/8177), charging that in numerous cases the troops of the United States-South Viet-Nameese armed forces had shelled Cambodian villages and posts and penetrated inside the demarcation line and into Cambodian territory.

Letter dated 6 October 1967 (S/8185), charging that from 10 August to 5 September 1967 aircraft and helicopters of the United States-South Viet-Nameese armed forces had fifteen times violated Cambodian air space and barbarously attacked peaceful Khmer inhabitants.

Letter dated 18 October 1967 (S/8199), charging that on 7 October an armed river craft of the United States-South Viet-Nameese armed forces which had penetrated into Cambodian territorial waters had been, at its request, escorted to the Cambodian shore by the Khmer Royal Navy.

Letter dated 2 November 1967 (S/8220), charging that on 21 October 1967 an L-19 type aircraft of the United States-South Viet-Nameese armed forces had violated Cambodian air space and fired rockets killing two and wounding four Khmer farmers.

Letter dated 8 December 1967 (S/8288), charging a warship of the United States-South Viet-Nameese

Navy with violation of Cambodian territorial waters on 16 October and firing grenades at Khmer fishermen.

Letter dated 10 January 1968 (S/8336), charging that on 11 December 1967 a spotter aircraft of the United States-South Viet-Nameese armed forces had violated Cambodian air space and fired at Khmer inhabitants engaged in fishing.

Letter dated 1 February 1968 (S/8377), charging penetration of ten armed soldiers of South Viet-nam into Khmer territory.

Letter dated 7 February 1967 (S/8389), charging several violations of Cambodian air space and territory by the United States-South Viet-Nameese armed forces.

Letter dated 8 February 1968 (S/8390), charging that on 18 January 1968 detachments of the United States-South Viet-Nameese armed forces had penetrated into Khmer territory and opened fire at Khmer defence forces.

Letter dated 14 February 1968 (S/8406), charging a violation of Cambodian air space by an aircraft of the United States-South Viet-Nameese armed forces and shelling of Khmer villagers.

Letter dated 21 February 1968 (S/8426), charging soldiers of the United States-South Viet-Nameese forces with the shelling of Khmer villages in the border area.

Letter dated 28 February 1968 (S/8430), charging that on 9 December 1967 three launches of the United States-South Viet-Nameese navy had violated Cambodian territorial waters and carried off two Cambodian fishing vessels with their owners and fishing tackle.

Letter dated 28 February 1968 (S/8431), charging penetration by United States-South Viet-Nameese soldiers into Cambodian territory and their firing on inhabitants.

Letter dated 6 March (S/8440), charging the United States-South Viet-Nameese armed forces with construction of an advance post eighty metres inside Cambodian territory.

Letter dated 6 March (S/8441), charging shelling by the United States-South Viet-Nameese armed forces of Cambodian territory.

Letter dated 14 March (S/8462), charging the United States-South Viet-Nameese armed forces with planting booby-traps on Cambodian territory.

Letter dated 14 March 1968 (S/8463), charging penetration by six South Viet-Nameese soldiers into Khmer territory.

Letter dated 20 March 1968 (S/8492) charging that helicopters of the United States-South Viet-Nameese armed forces had landed soldiers in Cambodian territory.

Letter dated 28 March 1968 (S/8508), charging that in the night of 24/25 February 1968 some thirty heavily armed South Viet-Nameese soldiers, disguised as civilians, had penetrated into Cambodian territory.

Letter dated 28 March 1968 (S/8509), charging cases of violation of Cambodian territory by the United States-South Viet-Nameese armed personnel.

Letter dated 8 April 1968 (S/8537), charging the bombing of Cambodian territory by an aircraft of the United States-South Viet-Nameese armed forces.

Letter dated 29 April 1968 (S/8569), charging violations of Cambodian air space and territory and acts of aggression against inhabitants by the United States-South Viet-Nameese armed forces.

Letter dated 3 May 1968 (S/8572), charging the United States-South Viet-Nameese armed forces with incursions into Khmer territory and premeditated acts of aggression against Khmer peasants and the Cambodian defence forces.

Letter dated 3 May 1968 (S/8574), protesting against the reported project of NASA of orbiting a mirror-satellite for military purposes.

Letter dated 6 May 1968 (S/8576), charging the United States-South Viet-Nameese air force with repeated violations of Cambodian air space which in some cases had been followed by acts of aggression against the peaceful population.

Letter dated 6 May 1968 (S/8577), charging that United States-South Viet-Nameese air force helicopters had violated Khmer air space on 26 April 1968.

Letter dated 14 May 1968 (S/8587), charging the United States-South Viet-Nameese armed forces with deliberate penetration of an estimated three companies of troops into Khmer territory and of six armed hydro-foil craft into Cambodian territorial waters.

Letter dated 29 May 1968 (S/8604), charging the United States-South Viet-Nameese air force with twelve violations of Cambodian air space in April 1968, in some cases followed by attacks against the Khmer civilian population.

Letter dated 29 May 1968 (S/8605), charging the United States-South Viet-Nameese armed forces with criminal acts committed inside Cambodian territory in April 1968.

Letter dated 29 May 1968 (S/8606), charging the United States-South Viet-Nameese armed forces with deliberate acts of aggression in the night of 28/29 April 1968, followed by the kidnapping of elements of the Khmer defence forces.

Letter dated 3 June 1968 (S/8611), charging that on 4 May the Cambodian provincial guard, national police and customs post at the commune of Bavet in Svay Rieng Province had been heavily damaged by the artillery, machine-gun and rocket fire of the troops and helicopters of the United States-South Viet-Nameese armed forces, with the result that several persons had been killed and wounded. Cambodia had demanded that damage caused should be made good by the Governments of the United States and the Republic of Viet-Nam.

Letter dated 6 June 1968 (S/8621), transmitting the text of the statement of 5 June 1968 by the Royal Government of Cambodia charging aircraft of the United States-South Viet-Nameese armed forces with acts of aggression against Khmer territory in the night of 30 to 31 May 1968.

Letter dated 6 June 1968 (S/8623), charging United States-South Viet-Nameese forces with violations of Cambodian territory on 7 and 9 April and 16 May.

Letter dated 6 June 1968 (S/8624), charging that a group of about twenty soldiers of the United States-South Viet-Nameese forces in the night of 20/21 May had penetrated into Cambodian territory and fired at a Khmer military post, killing two persons and wounding four.

Letter dated 12 June 1968 (S/8632), charging that the United States-South Viet-Nameese armed forces had deliberately committed new acts of aggression and violation of Cambodian territory and air space in April-May 1968.

Letter dated 18 June 1968 (S/8645), forwarding additional details to the information reported in the letter of 6 June 1968 (S/8621).

Letter dated 19 June 1968 (S/8646), charging the United States-South Viet-Nameese armed forces with further violations of Cambodian territory and air space followed in certain cases by deliberate acts of aggression.

Letter dated 19 June 1968 (S/8647), charging that on 2 June 1968 three helicopters of the United States-South Viet-Nameese armed forces had violated Cambodian air space and machine-gunned defence installations of the Khmer armed forces wounding two soldiers.

Letter dated 25 June 1968 (S/8655), charging that reconnaissance aircraft of the United States-South Viet-Nameese armed forces had violated Cambodian air space on 1 and 2 June 1968 and deliberately attacked Khmer villages killing and wounding several inhabitants.

Letter dated 2 July 1968 (S/8669), charging the United States-South Viet-Nameese armed forces with repeated violations of Cambodian air space from 18 May to 1 June 1968.

Letter dated 5 July 1968 (S/8671), forwarding to the Council a statement of the Cambodian Government of 2 July charging an attack by two helicopters of the United States armed forces on 29 June on a group of Cambodian villagers which resulted in fourteen persons killed and four seriously wounded.

Letter dated 8 July 1968 (S/8675), charging that on 20 May 1968 about 300 soldiers of the United States-South Viet-Nameese armed forces had penetrated Khmer territory under the cover of four helicopters and a reconnaissance aircraft.

Chapter 13

COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING RELATIONS BETWEEN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO, BELGIUM AND PORTUGAL

808. On 20 July 1967 a letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (S/8081/Rev.1) was transmitted to the Secretary-General, charging that aircraft coming from Angola and from Rhodesia had often violated the Congolese

air space, bombing frontier villages and landing mercenaries and persons involved in sabotage in the Congo. Mercenaries who had stolen Congolese aircraft had also entered Angola and Rhodesia with impunity. The letter requested the Secretary-General, within the

framework of the powers granted him by the Security Council, to ask the Governments of Portugal and the United Kingdom to inform the Congolese Government what steps they had taken to apply the Security Council resolutions and, if possible, to intervene personally to ensure that those countries hand over for trial all mercenaries guilty of acts of violence in the Congo and to ensure the return of stolen aircraft.

809. On 28 July another letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (S/8102), addressed to the Secretary-General, said that mercenaries were then being recruited in Belgium and that twenty mercenaries had left Belgium for Luanda. The obvious aim of those activities, he said, was to stir up further trouble in the Congo.

810. On 4 August a letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Belgium (S/8113) was transmitted to the Secretary-General, stating that the Belgian Government had declared on several occasions that it was maintaining its policy of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of the Congo. Moreover, his Government had decided to request Parliament to approve a law drastically reinforcing existing measures to prevent the recruitment of mercenaries. The Belgian Government had immediately communicated to the Congolese authorities the information in its possession on the recent departure for Africa of persons who appeared to have been recruited as mercenaries.

811. On 10 August another communication from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (S/8118) to the President of the Security Council said that the presence at Luanda of mercenaries and two aircraft, one known to have belonged to Mr. Tshombé, and radio communications intercepted between mercenaries in the Congo and two bases in Angola were in flagrant contradiction with the Security Council resolutions 226 (1966) and 239 (1967). In order to combat the activities of mercenaries in the Congo and to avoid a possible extension of the conflict, the Congolese Government invited members of the Security Council and countries friendly to the Congo to supply logistic support or assistance of any other kind for maintaining order in the region and to provide aid to the populations which had suffered so much.

812. In a letter dated 19 August (S/8129) addressed to the President of the Security Council, the Chargé d'Affaires of Portugal rejected the charges contained in the letters of 28 July and 10 August from the Congolese Minister of Foreign Affairs. However, he added, an aircraft of the "super-constellation" type belonging to "Air Transafrique" did land in Luanda when in need of repairs. Its documentation was in order and it had already left the Territory. The individuals mentioned in the Congolese note of 10 August had entered and left the Territory weeks back while in transit. Their documentation was in order and they had not indulged in any political activities contrary to Portuguese laws. The accusations made by the Congolese Government represented merely an expedient to explain or justify its internal difficulties. He recalled the Portuguese proposal of 3 October 1966, for an investigation regarding bases for mercenaries in Angola on the condition that the Congo also authorize a prior investigation regarding military bases existing in its territory directed against Angola, bases whose existence the Congo had officially admitted in the letter of 23 February 1967 (document A/AC.109/227 of 7 March 1967).

813. On 29 September the Chargé d'Affaires of the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed a letter (S/8174) to the President of the Security Council in which he said that Portugal was acting as a broker in the matter of mercenaries, receiving individuals and material in its territory and in Angola. Portugal admitted, in its letter of 19 August, that mercenaries had stayed in Angola and that a Super-Constellation landed in Luanda. Therefore, it was inconceivable that Portugal should describe the Congolese statement of the facts as an expedient to justify Congolese "internal difficulties".

814. It was true that the Congo was giving moral and material support to the people of Angola in order to help them to reclaim their rights. In doing so, the Congo was not only aiding a fraternal African people to recapture its dignity, but acting in accordance with United Nations resolutions, in particular General Assembly resolutions 2107 (XX) of 26 January 1966 and 2184 (XXI) of 14 December 1966.

Chapter 14

COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING RELATIONS BETWEEN CAMBODIA AND THAILAND

815. During the period under review the representatives of Cambodia and Thailand forwarded to the President of the Security Council, for the information of the Council, thirty communications containing mutual charges and countercharges of frontier violations, shooting at border posts and villages, violations of territorial waters and air space, mine planting, etc.

816. Included in twenty-four communications to the Security Council received from the representative of Cambodia were many charges that on numerous occasions armed elements from Thailand had deliberately penetrated into Cambodian territory, sometimes in groups of up to fifty men, clashed with detachments of the Cambodian armed forces and planted mines and booby-traps on Khmer territory. Numerous casualties to

both Khmer villagers and military personnel, as well as damage to property, were stated to have resulted from such violations. Such cases were mentioned in letters of the representative of Cambodia dated 21 August 1967 (S/8130), 11 September 1967 (S/8154), 19 September (S/8162), 2 October 1967 (S/8176), 12 October (S/8191), 2 November 1967 (S/8219), 24 November (S/8271), 22 December 1967 (S/8310), 21 February 1968 (S/8425), 28 February (S/8432), 14 March 1968 (S/8461), 8 April 1968 (S/8538), 3 May 1968 (S/8573), 6 June 1968 (S/8625), 12 June (S/8633), 19 June (S/8648) and 2 July 1968 (S/8668). A serious incident was reported to the Security Council by the representative of Cambodia in his letter of 29 May 1968 (S/8608), to the effect

that on 10 May a group of Thai soldiers estimated at about 300 men was encountered by a patrol of the Khmer royal forces six kilometres inside Cambodian territory. As a result of exchange of fire, several Cambodian soldiers were wounded, including two wounded fatally.

817. A number of the Cambodian complaints to the Security Council also charged violations of air space by Thai aircraft and deliberate penetration by Thai warships and fishing boats into territorial waters of Cambodia. In a letter dated 19 July 1967 (S/8084) the representative of Cambodia charged, that on 15 and 16 June Thai warships violated Cambodian territorial waters and fired cannon shots at Cambodian posts and that on 17 June forty-two Thai fishing boats escorted by three military ships came to fish in Cambodian territorial waters.

818. In a letter dated 25 July 1967 (S/8098), the representative of Cambodia stated that during the night of 12/13 July the explosion of a mine planted by armed elements from Thailand had caused damage to a railway. A similar charge was also mentioned in a letter of the Cambodian representative dated 10 January 1968 (S/8335).

819. In a letter dated 2 July 1968 (S/8668) the representative of Cambodia charged that on 28 May a Thai aircraft had violated Cambodian air space over Battambang province and scattered yellow powder over the area.

820. Most of the communications of the representative of Cambodia concluded by statements that the Government of Cambodia had strongly protested against such acts of aggression and demanded that the Royal Government of Thailand put an end without delay to criminal acts of armed provocation on Khmer territory.

821. In turn, in letters dated 11 October 1967 (S/8189), 5 January 1968 (S/8332), 5 April 1968 (S/8540) the representative of Thailand registered his Government's protests against aggressive acts committed against Thai authorities and civilians in the border areas. He charged Cambodian armed elements with crossing the border into Thai territory, sometimes in groups of up to fifty men, planting mines there, firing at Thai villages and border police stations, intrusion of Cambodian patrol boats into Thai territorial waters and their firing at Thai fishing boats within territorial waters of Thailand. Such actions allegedly caused occasional casualties and also property damage. He also stated that, in a number of cases, Cambodian patrol boats had violated Thai territorial waters, seized and towed away Thai fishing boats and fishermen.

822. In his communication of 11 October 1967 (S/8190), the representative of Thailand stated that his Government had been subjected to a series of false charges and provocations from Cambodia, as illustrated by letters from the representative of Cambodia dated 22 May, 25 July, 19 and 21 August, 11 and 19 September 1967.

823. In response to the letter of the representative of Thailand of 11 October 1967 (S/8189), the representative of Cambodia stated on 18 October (S/8200)

that careful inquiries of the Cambodian authorities had shown that no Cambodian soldiers or elements had entered Thai territory on dates and at the times indicated in the letter of Thailand to lay mines or to direct mortar or machine-gun fire at Thai authorities and inhabitants.

824. In a letter of 8 August 1967 (S/8116), the representative of Cambodia, referring to information supplied during interrogation by a Khmer-Krom, stressed that it confirmed once again that it was in fact the Americans and Thais together who had created and were maintaining the Khmer-Serei movement for the obvious purpose of undermining the policy of peace and neutrality adopted by the Royal Government of Cambodia in order to protect its international independence and territorial integrity. He charged the United States of America and Thailand with interference in the affairs of Cambodia in direct violation of the principles of the United Nations Charter. These charges were categorically denied by the representative of Thailand in his letter to the Security Council dated 11 October 1967 (S/8190), which stated that they were designed to cover up Cambodia's complicity with the communist aggressors.

825. In connexion with the letter of the representative of Thailand (S/8190), the representative of Cambodia again claimed in a letter dated 27 October 1967 (S/8216) that in all their statements the members of the Khmer-Serei movement who had given themselves up to the Cambodian authorities had demonstrated unmistakably that it was the Americans, the Thais and the Saigon régime who had set up and subsidized the mercenary Khmer-Serei movement in order to create insecurity in Cambodia's frontier areas and sabotage Cambodia's policy of national independence, peace and neutrality. It was also stressed in the letter that neutral and peaceful Cambodia was a member of no block and no military or ideological organization, and that it neither threatened nor provoked any country. The representative of Cambodia concluded by charging that the militarist and dictatorial Government at Bangkok stubbornly pursued its criminal and senseless policy by almost daily committing acts of aggression and provocation against neutral and peaceful Cambodia.

826. In a letter dated 15 September 1967 (S/8157), the Secretary-General notified the President of the Security Council that the Governments of Cambodia and Thailand had signified their desire that the assignment of Special Representative Ambassador de Ribbing, who had been appointed by the Secretary-General in August 1966, be extended for a further period to 16 February 1968.

827. On 15 February 1968 (S/8420) the Secretary-General informed the Council that, after consultation with the two Governments concerned, he had concluded that there was no continued agreement on a further extension and therefore notified both Governments of the termination of his Special Representative's mission. The Secretary-General concluded by stating that he was hopeful that there would be no aggravation of the situation between Cambodia and Thailand and that the two Governments would continue to act with the necessary restraint in a region beset by grave tensions.

COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING RELATIONS BETWEEN SENEGAL AND PORTUGAL

828. In a letter dated 19 July 1967 (S/8080) addressed to the President of the Security Council, the Permanent Representative of Senegal said that on 12 July 1967, Portuguese soldiers from Guinea-Bissao had penetrated Senegalese territory as far as the village of Boussolomm in the Niaguis *arrondissement*. After having fired on Senegalese citizens, killing a young man, the Portuguese had kidnapped a Senegalese couple. Portugal was responsible for the serious violation of Senegal's territorial integrity.

829. In a further letter dated 11 September 1967 (S/8151), the Permanent Representative of Senegal charged that on 5 August 1967 Portuguese soldiers from Guinea-Bissao, supported by heavy weapons and machine-guns, had infiltrated the area of Santiaba-Manjack and had remained for several hours on Senegalese territory, engaging in destruction, thefts and pillage. Seven houses were burnt, plantations and rice barns were looted and much property was destroyed or stolen.

830. On 22 September 1967 (S/8164) the Chargé d'Affaires of Portugal addressed a letter to the President of the Security Council replying to the letter of Senegal of 12 September and stating that, on the night of 5/6 August, several terrorist elements coming from Senegalese territory had crossed the frontier of Guinea and attacked the hamlet of Cossolol Catetia, utilizing machine-guns and sub-machine-guns and causing two dead and six wounded. The population had reacted in self-defence, having repulsed and pursued the invaders beyond the frontier. The Portuguese armed forces had not proceeded beyond the limits of the national territory. There had been no violation of Senegalese territory; consequently the accusation made to this ef-

fect was devoid of foundation. Portugal could not refrain from underlining that the episode referred to would not have taken place if Senegal had not authorized terrorist elements to utilize its territory as a base of aggression. So long as Senegal persisted in disrespecting its international obligations for peace and good neighbourliness, the entire responsibility for such episodes and their consequences belonged to it.

831. In a letter dated 9 October 1967 (S/8186) addressed to the President of the Security Council, the Chairman *ad interim* of the delegation of Senegal to the twenty-second session of the General Assembly, charged that on 1 September, Portuguese elements opened fire on Senegalese territory with automatic weapons and mortars; that on 16 September, Portuguese elements infiltrated into Senegalese territory in the area of Santhiaba-Manjacque, where they set fire to seven houses and engaged in looting; and that on 23 September, Portuguese elements infiltrated into Senegal and killed one refugee.

832. In a further letter dated 29 November 1967 (S/8277), the Permanent Representative of Senegal charged further violations of its territory committed by Portugal: on 7 October Portuguese aircraft had flown over the M'Pack *arrondissement*, thus violating Senegalese air space; during the night of 5/6 November Portuguese elements had crossed the Senegalese border and thrown two grenades, wounding several people; on 5 November Portuguese elements had crossed the border, carried off a refugee, struck a woman and stolen some money. Portugal, it was stated, was responsible for these violations of Senegal's territorial integrity.

Chapter 16

COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING RELATIONS BETWEEN GUINEA AND THE IVORY COAST

833. On 14 August 1967 the Secretary-General submitted to the Security Council a report (S/8120 and Add.1) concerning the situation which had arisen between the Republic of Guinea and the Ivory Coast as the result of the detention by the Ivory Coast authorities of prominent members of the Guinean delegation to the fifth special emergency session and other Guinea nationals on 26 June 1967 in Abidjan during an unscheduled landing of their aircraft, a KLM flight. The report outlined the efforts of the Secretary-General to obtain the release of the Guinean diplomats as well as the exercise of his good offices to obtain the release of nationals and residents of the Ivory Coast detained by the Guinea authorities.

834. In a telegram dated 30 June, the Government of Guinea had protested against the Ivory Coast's action and drawn the attention of the Secretary-General to the special responsibility of the United Nations in that matter. Following the request made by a number of Member States, the Secretary-General on 30 June in an aide-mémoire had appealed to the Ivory Coast Government to release the Guinean personalities. On

3 July the Foreign Minister of the Ivory Coast had replied in an aide-mémoire that the detention of the Guinean personalities was a consequence of the prior arbitrary arrest of several nationals and residents of the Ivory Coast by the authorities of Guinea. For two years, an Ivory Coast official, Mr. F. Kamano, had been detained by the Guinean authorities and had been tortured so as to implicate himself in a plot which the Ivory Coast was alleged to have contrived against Guinea with the aim of overthrowing President Sékou Touré. Reference was also made to the seizure, in February 1967, of a fishing boat flying the Ivory Coast flag and the detention of its crew of twenty-two persons. In both cases, the aide-mémoire added, the Government of Guinea had rejected approaches made in order to obtain the release of the persons detained and the return of the trawler. The Ivory Coast regretted that it was obliged to detain the Guinean nationals until the release of the Ivory Coast nationals and the trawler and its crew.

835. The Secretary-General's report continued that in a series of conversations with the Foreign Minister

of the Ivory Coast, the Secretary-General had reiterated his appeal stating that he could not link the detention of the Guinea personalities, which was in contravention of international agreements, with the cases of Mr. Kamano and the trawler, although willing to exercise his good offices in those cases. On 10 July, following requests by the Ivory Coast and Guinea, the Secretary-General had designated as his Personal Representative Mr. José Rolz-Bennett to discuss with the two Governments a solution to the difficulties that had arisen. Mr. Rolz-Bennett, Under-Secretary for Special Political Affairs, had been joined later by Mr. Djermakoye, Under-Secretary for the Department of Trusteeship and Non-Self-Governing Territories.

836. In letters to the Secretary-General on 6 July and 13 July 1967, the President of Guinea had outlined the position of his Government. He stated that the trawler and its crew, which had been seized in Guinean territorial waters and Mr. Kamano had acted in violation of Guinean laws. Their cases could in no circumstances be linked or equated with the detention of the Guinean personalities, which constituted a flagrant violation of international agreements concluded under the auspices of the United Nations, which was responsible for their immediate release of the detainees. Therefore, any procedure which envisaged a simultaneous or near simultaneous release by both sides was unacceptable to Guinea. Nevertheless, the President stated that, while maintaining his position of principle, he would, after the release of the Guinean nationals, place himself at the disposal of the Secretary-General regarding the Ivory Coast nationals detained in Guinea.

837. The report indicated that at subsequent meetings with the Secretary-General's Personal Representative, the President and Foreign Minister of the Ivory Coast had amplified the previously stated position of their Government and proposed as an equitable solution the simultaneous release of the Guinean personalities, and Mr. Kamano and the crew of the trawler. In a letter to the President of the Ivory Coast on 20 July, the Secretary-General had stated that he did not feel that the President's proposals were conducive to the objective sought, and he had submitted certain suggestions designed to solve the differences between the two countries. The Government of the Ivory Coast had then made counter-proposals. After further discussions with representatives of both countries in Conakry and Paris, it had appeared that no procedure acceptable to both parties could be reached.

838. In a letter dated 28 July addressed to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Ivory Coast, the Secretary-General had formally requested the immediate release of the Guinean nationals. The letter pointed out that the Guinean diplomats were covered by immunities provided for in article IV, section 11 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations of 13 February 1946. As for Mr. Montlouis, a UPU official and his family, they were covered during their journey by immunities provided for in the Convention on Privileges and Im-

munities of the Specialized Agencies of 21 November 1947. The Government of the Ivory Coast was party to both conventions. Moreover, the letter added, the action of the Ivory Coast appeared to contravene the general principles of international law embodied in article 40 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations with regard to the inviolability of diplomatic agents when travelling abroad in exercise of their official duties. The Secretary-General concluded the letter by expressing his confidence that the release of the nationals and residents of the Ivory Coast detained in Guinea would soon follow the release of the Guinean citizens in Abidjan.

839. The Government of the Ivory Coast had replied in a letter dated 10 August that the legal arguments adduced by the Secretary-General did not seem relevant as a gross violation of Ivory Coast laws on transit had been committed by the Guinean diplomats who had left the transit waiting room and had entered the territory of the Ivory Coast without a transit visa.

840. In a telegram dated 11 August 1967, and reproduced in an addendum to his report, the Secretary-General informed the President of Guinea of the latest developments in his efforts to obtain the release of the Guinean officials detained in Abidjan, and of his intention to present to the States Members of the United Nations a detailed report on the issue. The Secretary-General further stated that he would consider other measures he might take in order to remedy a state of affairs which constituted in his opinion a clear infringement of international agreements. The telegram also expressed the Secretary-General's appreciation of the understanding and restraint that the President of Guinea had shown. In a telegram dated 14 August 1967, also reproduced in the addendum, the President of Guinea requested the Secretary-General to inscribe the matter on the agenda of the General Assembly and the Security Council. The addendum also contained copies of letters dated 14 and 16 August 1967 from the *Chargé d'Affaires a.i.* of Guinea, informing the Secretary-General that his Government, convinced that the United Nations must discharge its responsibilities regarding the illegal detention of the Guinean delegation, had decided to suspend, without prejudice to its membership status, all participation in meetings and conferences of the United Nations specialized agencies until the release of the members of its delegation.

841. On 27 September, in an explanatory memorandum attached to a note (A/6832/Rev.1) concerning a request for the inclusion of an additional item in the agenda of the twenty-second session of the General Assembly, the Secretary-General stated, *inter alia*, that he had received on 25 September an official communication from the Ivory Coast Government to the effect that it was on that day releasing the Guinean nationals detained in Abidjan. On 26 September Guinea officially informed the Secretary-General of the release on 22 September of the Ivory Coast residents and nationals.

COMMUNICATIONS FROM THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES CONCERNING FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING ON CUBA

842. By a letter dated 26 September 1967 (S/8170) addressed to the Secretary-General, the Secretary-General of the Organization of American States transmitted, for the information of the Security Council, the text of the Final Act of the Twelfth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics, which had been held in Washington, D.C., from 19 June to 24 September 1967, the final three-day sessions at Ministerial level, together with copies of the reports of Committees I and II of the said Meeting of Consultation.

843. The Final Act contained, *inter alia*, resolution III, by the operative part of which the Meeting of Consultation, *inter alia*, condemned the present Government of Cuba for its repeated acts of aggression and intervention against Venezuela and for its persistent policy of intervention in the internal affairs of Bolivia and other American States, through incitement and active support of armed bands and other subversive activities directed against the Governments of those States. The resolution requested that States, which were not members of the Organization of American States (OAS), that shared the principles of the inter-American system to restrict their trade and financial operations as well as sea and air transport with Cuba, particularly when conducted through State agencies, until such time as the Cuban régime ceased its policy of intervention and aggression. It requested the Governments that supported the establishment of the so-called Afro-Asian-Latin-American People's Solidarity Organization (AALAPSO) to withdraw their support from that organization and from the projected "Second Tri-Continental Conference". It expressed to States which were not members of the OAS and which supported the Cuban Government the concern of the members of the OAS inasmuch as that support tended to stimulate the interventionist and aggressive activities of the Cuban régime against the countries of the Western Hemisphere. The resolution recommended to OAS members, among other things, that, in accordance with earlier OAS recommendations, they prevent the movement of propaganda funds, men and arms from Cuba to other American countries; that they adopt or intensify measures of vigilance and control on their coasts and borders to prevent the entry into or exit from their territory of men, arms and equipment coming from Cuba for purposes of subversion; that they maintain strict vigilance over the activities of the so-called

Latin American Solidarity Organization (LASO) and its national committees; and that these measures be co-ordinated among neighbouring countries. Further, the resolution recommended the OAS members to decline shipment of any governmental or government-financed cargo in, or allow refuelling in their ports of, any vessel that had engaged in the shipment of cargo to or from Cuba. Finally, the resolution reaffirmed the exclusive responsibility of the Government of each member State in the maintenance of order and of internal and external security, without prejudice to its adherence to the principles of collective and mutual security for the preservation of peace.

844. The Final Act also contained resolution IV by which the Meeting recommended to the member States of the Organization of American States that they bring to the attention of the competent organ of the United Nations the acts of the present Government of Cuba that ran counter to resolution 2131 (XX) of the General Assembly.

845. In connexion with the Twelfth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers for Foreign Affairs, the Permanent Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics had transmitted to the Secretary-General, for circulation to the Security Council, the text of a TASS statement dated 18 September 1967. The statement charged that the United States and a number of Latin American countries had stepped up their anti-Cuban campaign and, under the cloak of the Organization of American States, were preparing new acts of provocation against Cuba. Plans were being made, the statement said, for a sea and air blockade of Cuba and clumsy attempts were being made by United States spokesmen to create the impression that the United States had virtually the right to carry out a military invasion of Cuba. Furthermore, persistent pressure was being put on the Latin American countries to agree to the creation of "inter-American armed forces", the function of which would be to serve as an instrument of armed repression against any Latin American country whose policy deviated from the course dictated in Washington. In the face of that new campaign against Cuba, the statement concluded, the Soviet Union would, as it had in the past, give Cuba every support and assistance in its struggle for independence and for the right to follow the road chosen by the Cuban people.

Chapter 18

REPORTS ON THE STRATEGIC TRUST TERRITORY OF THE PACIFIC ISLANDS

846. On 8 August 1967 the Secretary-General transmitted to the Security Council the report (S/8020) of the Trusteeship Council on the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, covering the period from 27 July 1966 to 30 June 1967.

847. On 6 June 1968 the Secretary-General transmitted to the members of the Council the report (S/8620) of the United States Government on the administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands for the period from 1 July 1966 to 30 June 1967.

QUESTION OF RACE CONFLICT IN SOUTH AFRICA RESULTING FROM THE POLICIES OF APARTHEID OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

A. Note by the Secretary-General

848. The Secretary-General, in accordance with paragraph 2 of the General Assembly resolution 2144 B (XXI) of 26 October 1966, transmitted to the Security Council on 28 September 1967 (S/8172) a list of all the resolutions adopted so far by the General Assembly on the question of *apartheid*, together with all the reports available on this subject. In his note, the Secretary-General listed a total of twenty-nine resolutions adopted between 8 December 1946 and 16 December 1966, and twenty-seven reports issued during the same period, of which fourteen were transmitted by the Secretary-General and four by the Special Committee on the Policies of *Apartheid* of the Government of the Republic of South Africa.

B. Reports of 18 and 30 October 1967 from the Special Committee on the Policies of *Apartheid* of the Government of the Republic of South Africa

849. On 18 and 30 October 1967, the Special Committee on the Policies of *Apartheid* of the Government of the Republic of South Africa submitted to the Security Council and the General Assembly two reports (S/8196 and Add.1) in which it reviewed its work and the new developments in the Republic of South Africa since its report of 21 October 1966. It also made a number of recommendations.

850. Reviewing its work during the period under consideration, the Special Committee stated that it had been represented at the European Conference against *Apartheid* convened in Paris on 6 and 7 May 1967 by the French Liaison Committee against *Apartheid*. It also referred, among other things, to its active participation in the commemoration, on 21 March, of the International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination and to its part in organizing the International Seminar on *Apartheid*, Racial Discrimination and Colonialism in southern Africa, held at Kitwe, Zambia, from 25 July to 4 August 1967.

851. The Special Committee reported that a Unit on *Apartheid* had been established within the Section for African Questions of the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs in pursuance of paragraph 13 of the General Assembly resolution 2144 A (XXI) of 26 October 1966. The Unit had co-operated with the Office of Public Information in the dissemination of information on the work of the United Nations organs with regard to the policies of *apartheid*.

852. Of the new developments in the Republic of South Africa, the Special Committee reported that the Government of the Republic of South Africa had persisted in its defiance of United Nations decisions on South West Africa and Southern Rhodesia and had intensified its hostility and contempt towards the United Nations. The Government of the Republic of South Africa had continued to implement measures of racial separation and discrimination and had introduced new repressive legislation including: the Terrorism Act, which provides for a maximum sentence of death and

a minimum sentence of five years' imprisonment; the Suppression of Communism Amendment Act; and the General Law Amendment Act, which extended for another year the provision for detention of persons after they had completed their sentences under certain security laws.

853. The Committee warned of the grave danger of violent conflict resulting from the racial policies of the South African Government, which was being aggravated by the expansion of the military and police forces of that Government in co-operation with other major States, notably the United Kingdom. Violent clashes had already occurred in South West Africa and South African forces had admittedly entered Southern Rhodesia to thwart, alongside Southern Rhodesian forces, the efforts of Zimbabwe nationalist fighters.

854. The Special Committee, while reaffirming its full endorsement of past proposals for an international campaign against *apartheid* under the auspices of the United Nations, emphasized the need for urgent action by the United Nations Security Council, urging it to reaffirm its past resolutions on the question and to adopt firm measures to ensure the full effectiveness of the arms embargo against South Africa.

855. The Committee reiterated its conviction that it was only through the imposition of mandatory and universally applied economic sanctions that the problem of *apartheid* in South Africa could be peacefully resolved. It also expressed the hope that the main trading partners of South Africa would support such action. The Committee recommended that the General Assembly should reiterate its recognition of the legitimacy of the struggle of the people of South Africa for their rights under the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and urged all States and organizations to provide those people with moral, political and material assistance. It also recommended that the General Assembly should warn the South African Government that the international community would not tolerate any action taken against other States for their support of the legitimate struggle against *apartheid*, and that the General Assembly should request all States to deny assistance and co-operation to the South African Government in its efforts to suppress that legitimate struggle.

856. The Committee recommended that the situation in South Africa should be considered in the context of the explosive situation in the whole of southern Africa and expressed the hope that the General Assembly would give serious consideration to the recommendations of the International Seminar held at Kitwe.

C. Resolution 2307 (XXII) adopted by the General Assembly on 13 December 1967

857. By a letter dated 19 December 1967 (S/8304), the Secretary-General transmitted to the Security Council the text of resolution 2307 (XXII) adopted by the General Assembly on 13 December 1967 with regard to the policies of *apartheid* of the Government

of the Republic of South Africa. In paragraph 4 of the resolution the General Assembly "Once again draws the attention of the Security Council to the grave situation in South Africa and in southern Africa as a whole and requests it to resume consideration of

the question of *apartheid* with a view to ensuring the full implementation of its resolutions and the adoption of more effective measures to secure an end to the policies of *apartheid* of the Government of the Republic of South Africa".

Chapter 20

COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING RELATIONS BETWEEN GUINEA AND PORTUGAL

858. In a letter of 13 October 1967 (S/8193) addressed to the President of the Security Council, the representative of Guinea complained of a number of warlike acts perpetrated against Guinea by Portugal from the occupied territory of Guinea-Bissao. On 4 October three Portuguese aircraft had attacked and bombed the Guinean village of Kankodi forty kilometres inside Guinean territory, causing the death of eleven nationals of Guinea including women, children and aged persons. This provocation, it was stated, followed a long series of armed attacks launched in 1965 and 1966 against Guinean villages. The Republic of Guinea protested most vigorously against the adventurist policy of the Lisbon Government and warned the Portuguese authorities and their allies of the serious consequences which might result from them.

Chapter 21

COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING THE SITUATION IN TERRITORIES UNDER PORTUGUESE ADMINISTRATION

859. By a letter dated 30 November 1967 (S/8281), the Secretary-General transmitted to the President of the Security Council the text of resolutions 2270 (XXII) on the question of Territories under Portuguese administration, adopted by the General Assembly on 17 November 1967, by which the Assembly drew the urgent attention of the Council to the continued deterioration of the situation in those Territories as well as to the consequences of the violations by Portugal of the sovereignty of the neighbouring independent African States and recommended to the Security Council the adoption of measures to make mandatory the provisions of its resolutions concerning that question, in particular resolution 218 (1965) and those of the General Assembly resolutions 2107 (XX) and 2184 (XXI).

860. In a letter dated 26 June 1968 (S/8658), the Chairman of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples transmitted to the President of the Security Council the text of a resolution adopted by the Special Committee at its 614th meeting, on 26 June 1968. The letter drew the attention of the Security Council to paragraphs 11, 12 and 19 of that resolution (document A/AC.109/292).

Chapter 22

COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND YEMEN

861. In a letter dated 17 November 1967 (S/8249) addressed to the Secretary-General, the representative of the Arab Republic of Yemen charged that on three occasions between 7 and 9 November 1967, British aircraft had violated Yemen's air space and had strafed by rocket and machine-gun fire the whole area between Shoraijah and Karesh. He added that such acts of provocation and open aggression against the sovereignty of the Arab Republic of Yemen were a manifestation of British policy aimed at thwarting the progress of the revolution in South Yemen.

862. In a letter dated 22 November 1967 (S/8527) addressed to the Secretary-General, the representative of the United Kingdom stated that his Government had thoroughly investigated the complaints of the Arab Republic of Yemen and found them to be untrue.

COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING THE INDIA-PAKISTAN QUESTION

863. In a letter dated 28 December 1967 (S/8315/Rev.1) addressed to the President of the Security Council, the representative of Pakistan drew attention to the recent adoption by the Indian Parliament of a bill known as "The Prevention of Unlawful Activities Bill (1967)" which, Pakistan said, was designed to suppress the demand in Jammu and Kashmir for exercising the right of self-determination in accordance with United Nations resolutions. "These resolutions were accepted by both India and Pakistan and constitute an international agreement in regard to the disposition of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. In so far as that bill was sought to be extended to the occupied territory of Jammu and Kashmir, it represented yet another act by the Government of India to make a peaceful settlement of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute more difficult. The people of the occupied territory had been subjected to a renewed campaign of oppression and threats. Moreover, the refusal by the Indian Government to allow the return of tens of thousands of Jammu and Kashmir nationals who had been forced to seek refuge in Azad Kashmir, or in Pakistan during the war of 1965 and its aftermath lent an ominous significance to such threats. The Government of Pakistan regretted that by intensifying the suppression of the people of Jammu and Kashmir, the Indian Government was preventing the promotion of a propitious climate for negotiations between the two countries towards the settlement of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute.

864. In a letter dated 10 January 1968 (S/8333) addressed to the President of the Security Council, the representative of India referring to the Pakistan letters of 27 April and 28 December 1967 (S/7862 and S/8315/Rev.1), stated that they followed the usual pattern of propagandist communications to the Security Council and had made false and unwarranted allegations which amounted to gross interference in India's internal affairs. Matters pertaining to the domestic jurisdiction of India were no concern of Pakistan and the Government of India were not prepared to engage in any discussion or exchanges thereon. The Government of India, the letter added, was prepared

to start talks towards resolving the outstanding issues between the two countries by peaceful means and in a spirit of good-neighbourliness.

865. In a letter dated 7 February 1968 (S/8388), the representative of Pakistan regretted that the representative of India instead of replying to the points raised in his letters had chosen to describe them as "propagandist" and had resorted to the plea of domestic jurisdiction. The facts stated in his letters were based on the unimpeachable evidence of impartial observers and were reported not only in the world press but also in Indian newspapers. While the Government of Pakistan noted the Indian Government's offer to start talks on outstanding disputes, it could not understand India's refusal to engage in discussions and exchanges on the dispute concerning Jammu and Kashmir. If the offer for negotiations made by the Government of India was to be treated as genuine, it was imperative that India abandon the claim of domestic jurisdiction in respect of acts which were designed to preclude a just and honourable settlement and which had served only to exacerbate tension and prevent negotiations.

866. In reply, the representative of India in a letter of 12 March (S/8456 and Corr.1), said that Pakistan had not only misrepresented India's stand on Indo-Pakistan talks, but insisted that India abandon its jurisdiction in one of its constituent States as a precondition to the talks. As the Foreign Minister of India had stated in the General Assembly on 29 September 1966, the fact that India was prepared to discuss all differences with Pakistan in accordance with the letter and spirit of the Tashkent Declaration and to settle those differences by peaceful means did not, and could not, mean that India must give up its stand in regard to the status of the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir. Were each side to insist on preconditions, India would be entitled to ask Pakistan to vacate two fifths of Indian territory in Jammu and Kashmir that it illegally held. India, the letter concluded, was prepared to start talks, without preconditions, and hoped that Pakistan would adopt a similar co-operative and realistic approach.

APPENDICES

I. Representatives and deputy, alternate and acting representatives accredited to the Security Council

The following representatives and deputy, alternate and acting representatives were accredited to the Security Council during the period covered by the present report:

Algeria^a

Mr. Tewfik Bouattoura
Mr. Hadj Benabdelkader Azzout

Argentina^b

Dr. José María Ruda
Mr. Hugo Juan Gobbi
Mr. Santos Néstor Martínez

Brasil

Mr. José Sette Camara
Mr. M. Geraldo de Carvalho Silos
Mr. M. Celso Antônio de Souza e Silva
Mr. Quintino S. Deseta

Bulgaria^b

Mr. Milko Tarabanov

Canada

Mr. George Ignatieff
Mr. Paul André Beaulieu
Mr. Gordon E. Cox
Mr. Sydney Allan Freifeld

China

Mr. Liu Chieh
Mr. Yu Chi Hsueh
Dr. Chun-Ming Chang

Denmark

Mr. Hans R. Tabor
Mr. Otto R. Borch
Mr. Skjold G. Mellbin
Mr. Torben G. Dithmer

Ethiopia

Lij Endalkachew Makonnen
Mr. Kifle Wodajo

France

Mr. Roger Seydoux
Mr. Armand Bérard
Mr. Jacques Tiné
Mr. Claude Chayet
Mr. Fernand Rouillon

Hungary^a

Mr. Károly Csatorday
Mr. József Tardos
Mr. Endre Zádor

India

Mr. Gopalaswami Parthasarathi
Mr. B. C. Mishra

Japan^b

Mr. Akira Matsui
Mr. Senjin Tsuruoka
Mr. Isao Abe
Mr. Tokichiro Uomoto

Mali^b

Mr. Moussa Léo Keita
Mr. Mamadou Boubacar Kante

Nigeria^b

Chief S. O. Adebo
Mr. J. T. F. Iyalla
Mr. B. A. Clark

Pakistan^a

Mr. Agha Shahi
Mr. S. A. Pasha
Mr. Mohammad Yunus

Paraguay^a

Mr. Miguel Solano López
Dr. Víctor Manuel Jara Recalde
Dr. Manuel Avila

Senegal^a

Mr. Ousmane Socé Diop
Mr. Ibrahima Boye
Mr. Abdou Ciss

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Mr. Nikolai Trofimovich Fedorenko
Mr. Yakov Aleksandrovich Malik
Mr. Platon Dmitrievich Morozov
Mr. Nikolai Panteleimonovich Kulebiakin
Mr. Lev Isaakovich Mendelevich
Mr. Aleksei Vasilyevich Zakharov
Dr. Viktor Levonovich Issraelyan
Mr. Nikolai Konstantinovich Tarassov

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Lord Caradon
Sir Leslie Glass
Mr. C. P. Hope
Mr. David H. T. Hildyard
Mr. Edward Youde
Mr. Henry Darwin

United States of America

Mr. Arthur J. Goldberg
Mr. George W. Ball
Mr. William B. Buffum
Mr. Richard F. Pedersen

^a Term of office began on 1 January 1968.

^b Term of office ended on 31 December 1967.

II. Presidents of the Security Council

The following representatives held office of President of the Security Council during the period covered by the present report:

Ethiopia

Lij Endalkachew Makonnen (16 to 31 July 1967)

France

Mr. Roger Seydoux (1 to 31 August 1967)

India

Mr. Gopalaswami Parthasarathi (1 to 30 September 1967)

Japan

Mr. Senjin Tsuruoka (1 to 31 October 1967)

Mali

Mr. Mamadou Boubacar Kante (1 to 30 November 1967)

Nigeria

Chief S. O. Adebo (1 to 31 December 1967)

Pakistan

Mr. Agha Shahi (1 to 31 January 1968)

Paraguay

Mr. Miguel Solano López (1 to 29 February 1968)

Senegal

Mr. Ousmane Socé Diop (1 to 31 March 1968)

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Mr. Yakov Aleksandrovich Malik (1 to 30 April 1968)

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Lord Caradon (1 to 31 May 1968)

United States of America

Mr. Arthur J. Goldberg (1 to 30 June 1968)

Algeria

Mr. Tewfik Bouattoura (1 to 15 July 1968)

III. Meetings of the Security Council during the period from 16 July 1967 to 15 July 1968

Meeting	Subject	Date
1368th (private)	Consideration of the report of the Security Council to the General Assembly	27 September 1967
1369th	The situation in the Middle East: (a) Letter dated 24 October 1967 from the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Republic addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/8207) (b) Letter dated 24 October 1967 from the Permanent Representative of Israel addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/8208)	24 October 1967
1370th	Ditto	25 October 1967
1371st	Ditto	25 October 1967
1372nd	Complaints by the Democratic Republic of the Congo: Letter dated 3 November 1967 from the Permanent Representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/8218)	8 November 1967
1373rd	The situation in the Middle East: Letter dated 7 November 1967 from the Permanent Representative	9-10 November 1967

Meeting	Subject	Date
	of the United Arab Republic addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/8226)	
1374th	Complaints by the Democratic Republic of the Congo: Letter dated 3 November 1967 from the Permanent Representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/8218)	10 November 1967
1375th	The situation in the Middle East: Letter dated 7 November 1967 from the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Republic addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/8226)	13 November 1967
1376th	Complaints by the Democratic Republic of the Congo: Letter dated 3 November 1967 from the Permanent Representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/8218)	14 November 1967
1377th	The situation in the Middle East: Letter dated 7 November 1967 from the Permanent Representative of the United Arab	15 November 1967

Meeting	Subject	Date
	Republic addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/8226)	
1378th	Complaints by the Democratic Republic of the Congo: Letter dated 3 November 1967 from the Permanent Representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/8218)	15 November 1967
1379th	The situation in the Middle East: Letter dated 7 November 1967 from the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Republic addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/8226)	16 November 1967
1380th	Ditto	17 November 1967
1381st	Ditto	20 November 1967
1382nd	Ditto	22 November 1967
1383rd	Letter dated 26 December 1963 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/5488) Letter dated 24 November 1967 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/8262)	24-25 November 1967
1384th	Admission of new Members: Letter dated 30 November 1967 from the People's Republic of Southern Yemen addressed to the Secretary-General (S/8284)	12 December 1967
1385th	Letter dated 26 December 1963 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/5488) Report by the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus (S/8286)	20 December 1967
1386th	Ditto	22 December 1967
1387th	The question of South West Africa: Letter dated 24 January 1968 addressed to the President of the Security Council by the representatives of Afghanistan, Algeria, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Democratic Republic of), Dahomey, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea,	25 January 1968

Meeting	Subject	Date
	India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Kenya, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Togo, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Republic, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Yemen, Yugoslavia and Zambia (S/8355)	
	Letter dated 23 January 1968 addressed to the President of the Security Council by the President of the United Nations Council for South West Africa (S/8353)	
1388th	Letter dated 25 January 1968 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/8360)	26 January 1968
1389th	Ditto	27 January 1968
1390th	The question of South West Africa: Letter dated 12 February 1968 addressed to the President of the Security Council by the representatives of Chile, Colombia, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Turkey, United Arab Republic, Yugoslavia and Zambia (S/8397) Letter dated 12 February 1968 addressed to the President of the Security Council by the representatives of Afghanistan, Algeria, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Ceylon, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Democratic Republic of), Cyprus, Dahomey, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Nepal, Niger, Philippines, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, United Republic of Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Upper Volta and	16 February 1968

Meeting	Subject	Date
	Yemen (S/8398/Add.1/ Rev.1 and Add.2)	
1391st	Ditto	16 February 1968
1392nd	Ditto	19 February 1968
1393rd	Ditto	21 February 1968
1394th	Ditto	29 February 1968
1395th	Ditto	4 March 1968
1396th	Ditto	5 March 1968
1397th	Ditto	14 March 1968
1398th	Letter dated 26 December 1963 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/5488)	18 March 1968
	Report by the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus (S/8446)	
1399th	Question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia: Letters dated 2 and 30 August 1963 addressed to the President of the Security Council on behalf of the representatives of thirty-two Member States (S/5382 and S/5409)	19 March 1968
	Letter dated 12 March 1968 addressed to the President of the Security Council by the representatives of Algeria, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Democratic Republic of), Dahomey, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Republic, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta and Zambia (S/8454)	
1400th	Ditto	20 March 1968
1401st	The situation in the Middle East:	21 March 1968
	(a) Letter dated 21 March 1968 from the Permanent Representative of Jordan addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/8484)	
	(b) Letter dated 21 March 1968 from the Permanent Representative of Israel addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/8486)	

Meeting	Subject	Date
1402nd	Ditto	21 March 1968
1403rd	Ditto	21 March 1968
1404th	Ditto	22 March 1968
1405th	Ditto	22 March 1968
1406th	Ditto	23 March 1968
1407th	Ditto	24 March 1968
1408th	Question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia: Letters dated 2 and 30 August 1963 addressed to the President of the Security Council on behalf of the representatives of thirty-two Member States (S/5382 and S/5409):	26 March 1968
	Letter dated 12 March 1968 addressed to the President of the Security Council by the representatives of Algeria, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Democratic Republic of), Dahomey, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Republic, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta and Zambia (S/8454)	
1409th	The situation in the Middle East:	30 March 1968
	(a) Letter dated 29 March 1968 from the Permanent Representative of Jordan addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/8516)	
	(b) Letter dated 29 March 1968 from the Permanent Representative of Israel addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/8517)	
1410th	Ditto	1 April 1968
1411th	Ditto	2 April 1968
1412th	Ditto	4 April 1968
1413th	Question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia: Letters dated 2 and 30 August 1963 addressed to the President of the Security Council on behalf of the representatives of thirty-two Member States (S/5382 and S/5409):	18 April 1968

Meeting	Subject	Date	Meeting	Subject	Date
	Letter dated 12 March 1968 addressed to the President of the Security Council by the representatives of Algeria, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Democratic Republic of), Dahomey, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Republic, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta and Zambia (S/8454)		1417th	Ditto	27 April 1968
1414th	Admission of new Members	18 April 1968	1418th	The situation in the Middle East: Letter dated 25 April 1968 from the Permanent Representative of Jordan addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/8560) Report of the Secretary-General under General Assembly resolution 2254 (ES-V) relating to Jerusalem (S/8146)	1 May 1968
	Letter dated 12 March 1968 from the Prime Minister of Mauritius addressed to the Secretary-General (S/8466)		1419th	Ditto	2 May 1968
1415th	Question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia: Letters dated 2 and 30 August 1963 addressed to the President of the Security Council on behalf of the representatives of thirty-two Member States (S/5382 and S/5409) Letter dated 12 March 1968 addressed to the President of the Security Council by the representatives of Algeria, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Democratic Republic of), Dahomey, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Republic, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta and Zambia (S/8454)	23 April 1968	1420th	Ditto	2 May 1968
			1421st	Ditto	3 May 1968
			1422nd	Ditto	6 May 1968
			1423rd	Ditto	7 May 1968
			1424th	Ditto	9 May 1968
			1425th	Ditto	20 May 1968
			1426th	Ditto	21 May 1968
1416th	The situation in the Middle East: Letter dated 25 April 1968 from the Permanent Representative of Jordan addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/8560)	27 April 1968	1427th	Letter dated 21 May 1968 from the Permanent Representative <i>ad interim</i> of Haiti addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/8593)	27 May 1968
			1428th	Question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia: Letters dated 2 and 30 August 1963 addressed to the President of the Security Council on behalf of the representatives of thirty-two Member States (S/5382 and S/5409): Letter dated 12 March 1968 addressed to the President of the Security Council by the representatives of Algeria, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Democratic Republic of), Dahomey, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Republic, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta and Zambia (S/8454)	29 May 1968
			1429th	Tribute to Senator Robert F. Kennedy	5 June 1968
			1430th	Letter dated 12 June 1968 from the Permanent Representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and	17 June 1968

Meeting	Subject	Date	Meeting	Subject	Date
	Northern Ireland and the United States of America addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/8630)			Cyprus (S/8622 and Corr.1)	
1431st	Ditto	18 June 1968	1433rd	Letter dated 12 June 1968 from the Permanent Representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/8630)	19 June 1968
1432nd	Letter dated 26 December 1963 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/5488) Report by the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in	18 June 1968			

IV. Representatives, chairmen and principal secretaries of the Military Staff Committee

A. REPRESENTATIVES OF EACH SERVICE IN RESPECT OF EACH DELEGATION

16 July 1967 to 15 July 1968

Period of service from 16 July 1967

Chinese Delegation

General Wang Shu-ming, Chinese Air Force	16 July 1967 to present time
Rear Admiral Hsiung Teh-shu, Chinese Navy	16 July 1967 to present time
Colonel Hwang Hsiung-sheng, Acting Army Representative	16 October 1967 to present time

French Delegation

Brigadier General G. Arnous-Riviere, French Army	16 July 1967 to present time
Commander H. J. J. Roulleaux-Dugage, French Navy	16 July 1967 to 7 December 1967
Commander J. P. Murgue, French Navy	7 December 1967 to present time
Colonel Roland Charles, French Air Force	16 July 1967 to present time

USSR Delegation

Major General V. I. Meshcheryakov, Soviet Army	16 July 1967 to present time
Captain 1st Rank V. N. Vashchenko, USSR Navy	16 July 1967 to present time
Colonel V. S. Afanasiev, USSR Air Force	16 July 1967 to present time

United Kingdom Delegation

Major General R. A. Fyffe, British Army	16 July 1967 to 26 October 1967
Lieutenant General Sir George Lea, British Army	26 October 1967 to present time
Rear Admiral L. E. S. H. Le Bailly, Royal Navy	16 July 1967 to present time
Air Vice Marshal Alan D. Frank, Royal Air Force	16 July 1967 to 18 December 1967
Air Vice Marshal D. Crowley-Milling, Royal Air Force	18 December 1967 to present time

United States Delegation

Lt. General A. J. Goodpaster, US Army	16 July 1967 to present time
Vice-Admiral A. McB. Jackson, Jr., US Navy	16 July 1967 to present time
Lt. General Thomas P. Gerrity, US Air Force	16 July 1967 to 1 August 1967
Lt. General Hewitt T. Wheless, US Air Force	1 August 1967 to present time

B. CHAIRMEN AT MEETINGS

16 July 1967 to 15 July 1968

Meeting	Date	Chairman	Delegation
578th	20 July 1967	General Wang Shu-ming, Chinese Air Force	China
579th	3 Aug. 1967	Brigadier General G. Arnous-Riviere, French Army	France
580th	17 Aug. 1967	Brigadier General G. Arnous-Riviere, French Army	France
581st	31 Aug. 1967	Brigadier General G. Arnous-Riviere, French Army	France
582nd	14 Sep. 1967	Captain 1st Rank V. N. Vashchenko, USSR Navy	USSR
583rd	28 Sep. 1967	Captain 1st Rank V. N. Vashchenko, USSR Navy	USSR
584th	12 Oct. 1967	Colonel I. S. Harrison, Royal Marines	UK
585th	26 Oct. 1967	Air Vice Marshal A. D. Frank, Royal Air Force	UK

<i>Meeting</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Chairman</i>	<i>Delegation</i>
586th	9 Nov. 1967	Vice Admiral Andrew McB. Jackson, Jr., US Navy	US
587th	22 Nov. 1967	Vice Admiral Andrew McB. Jackson, Jr., US Navy	US
588th	7 Dec. 1967	General Wang Shu-ming, Chinese Air Force	China
589th	21 Dec. 1967	General Wang Shu-ming, Chinese Air Force	China
590th	4 Jan. 1968	Brigadier General G. Arnous-Riviere, French Army	France
591st	18 Jan. 1968	Brigadier General G. Arnous-Riviere, French Army	France
592nd	1 Feb. 1968	Major General V. I. Meshcheryakov, Soviet Army	USSR
593rd	15 Feb. 1968	Captain 1st Rank V. N. Vashchenko, USSR Navy	USSR
594th	14 Mar. 1968	Lieutenant General Sir George Lea, British Army	UK
595th	14 Mar. 1968	Lieutenant General Sir George Lea, British Army	UK
596th	28 Mar. 1968	Lieutenant General Sir George Lea, British Army	UK
597th	11 Apr. 1968	Vice Admiral Andrew McB. Jackson, Jr., US Navy	US
598th	25 Apr. 1968	Vice Admiral Andrew McB. Jackson, Jr., US Navy	US
599th	9 May 1968	General Wang Shu-ming, Chinese Air Force	China
600th	23 May 1968	General Wang Shu-ming, Chinese Air Force	China
601st	6 June 1968	Brigadier General G. Arnous-Riviere, French Army	France
602nd	20 June 1968	Brigadier General G. Arnous-Riviere, French Army	France
603rd	3 July 1968	Captain 1st Rank V. N. Vashchenko, USSR Navy	USSR

C. PRINCIPAL SECRETARIES AT MEETINGS

16 July 1967 to 15 July 1968

<i>Meeting</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Principal Secretary</i>	<i>Delegation</i>
578th	20 July 1967	Colonel Hwang Hsiung-sheng, Chinese Air Force	China
579th	3 Aug. 1967	Lt. Colonel L. F. Monteagle, French Army	France
580th	17 Aug. 1967	Lt. Colonel L. F. Monteagle, French Army	France
581st	31 Aug. 1967	Lt. Colonel L. F. Monteagle, French Army	France
582nd	14 Sep. 1967	Lt. Colonel Y. P. Vetrov, Soviet Army	USSR
583rd	28 Sep. 1967	Lt. Colonel Y. P. Vetrov, Soviet Army	USSR
584th	12 Oct. 1967	Colonel I. S. Harrison, Royal Marines	UK
585th	26 Oct. 1967	Colonel H. J. Sweeney, British Army	UK
586th	9 Nov. 1967	Colonel James M. Boyd, US Air Force	US
587th	22 Nov. 1967	Captain Archer R. Gordon, US Navy	US
588th	7 Dec. 1967	Colonel Hwang Hsiung-sheng, Chinese Air Force	China
589th	21 Dec. 1967	Colonel Hwang Hsiung-sheng, Chinese Air Force	China
590th	4 Jan. 1968	Lt. Colonel J. F. Podeur, French Army	France
591st	18 Jan. 1968	Colonel Roland Charles, French Air Force	France
592nd	1 Feb. 1968	Lt. Colonel Y. P. Vetrov, Soviet Army	USSR
593rd	15 Feb. 1968	Lt. Colonel Y. P. Vetrov, Soviet Army	USSR
594th	14 Mar. 1968	Colonel I. S. Harrison, Royal Marines	UK
595th	14 Mar. 1968	Colonel I. S. Harrison, Royal Marines	UK
596th	28 Mar. 1968	Colonel I. S. Harrison, Royal Marines	UK
597th	11 Apr. 1968	Captain Archer R. Gordon, US Navy	US
598th	25 Apr. 1968	Captain Archer R. Gordon, US Navy	US
599th	9 May 1968	Colonel Hwang Hsiung-sheng, Chinese Air Force	China
600th	23 May 1968	Colonel Hwang Hsiung-sheng, Chinese Air Force	China
601st	6 June 1968	Lt. Colonel J. F. Podeur, French Army	France
602nd	20 June 1968	Colonel Roland Charles, French Air Force	France
603rd	3 July 1968	Colonel V. S. Tovma, Soviet Army	USSR

HOW TO OBTAIN UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATIONS

United Nations publications may be obtained from bookstores and distributors throughout the world. Consult your bookstore or write to: United Nations, Sales Section, New York or Geneva.

COMMENT SE PROCURER LES PUBLICATIONS DES NATIONS UNIES

Les publications des Nations Unies sont en vente dans les librairies et les agences dépositaires du monde entier. Informez-vous auprès de votre librairie ou adressez-vous à: Nations Unies, Section des ventes, New York ou Genève.

COMO CONSEGUIR PUBLICACIONES DE LAS NACIONES UNIDAS

Las publicaciones de las Naciones Unidas están en venta en librerías y casas distribuidoras en todas partes del mundo. Consulte a su librero o dirijase a: Naciones Unidas, Sección de Ventas, Nueva York o Ginebra.