

**Seventh Review Conference of the States Parties  
to the Convention on the Prohibition of the  
Development, Production and Stockpiling  
of Bacteriological (Biological) and  
Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction**

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Agenda item 10

**Review of the operation of the Convention  
as provided for in its article XII**

**Statement by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the States  
members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization in  
connection with the Seventh Review Conference of the States  
Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the  
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological  
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction**

**Submitted by Belarus on behalf of the States members of the Collective  
Security Treaty Organization**

1. We reaffirm our unconditional support for the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, which is one of the key multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation mechanisms prohibiting an entire class of weapons of mass destruction.
2. Guided by the goal of ensuring a safer and more secure world, we reaffirm our undertaking to comply strictly with all the obligations under the Convention and, first and foremost, never in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain this type of weapon or other biological agents or toxins for hostile purposes.
3. We trust that we will be able to devise effective steps at the Seventh Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention to enhance the Convention regime's effectiveness and agree on a range of specific measures for its implementation.
4. We believe that the implementation of the decisions of the Sixth Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention, including the holding of annual intersessional meetings with the participation of the expert community, constitutes a good basis for adopting a balanced and substantive final document of the forthcoming Conference.
5. We consider universalization of the Convention a priority task. We are certain of the importance of consistent and dedicated work to involve all States in the Convention without exception. We call on States that are not parties to the Convention to accede to it as soon as possible.
6. We are convinced that an objective and comprehensive analysis of the accumulated challenges in the field of biosafety, as well as the current stage of development of biological science and the attendant threats and risks, make the elaboration of effective

mechanisms to monitor compliance with the Convention all the more imperative. In this regard, we believe that the development of a legally binding mechanism to monitor compliance with the Convention is the most effective way of reinforcing the prohibition on biological and toxin weapons and increasing confidence that the Convention is being observed by all States parties. We deem it important to continue discussion of this issue during the forthcoming 2012–2015 intersessional period.

7. We consider confidence-building measures to be an important instrument for ensuring transparency in biological activities. We believe that discussion should continue during the next intersessional period on further improving and increasing confidence-building measures, including in the context of recent scientific and technological advances.

8. We are firmly convinced that the comprehensive and swift adoption of national measures to implement the Convention by all States parties would further enhance the role of the Convention as an important multilateral disarmament mechanism and promote, among other things, greater international cooperation for peaceful purposes as set out in article X of the Convention.

9. Given the rapid developments in the life sciences and biotechnology, we consider it necessary to focus more attention on the effect of scientific and technological progress on the Convention regime. It would also be useful to consider possible measures to improve the mechanisms established under article V, concerning consultations, and article VI, concerning investigations.

10. We support the efforts of the President of the Conference, Ambassador Paul van den IJssel to ensure that the substantive work of the Conference is carried out and significant results are achieved.

11. We are committed to working constructively with all the States parties to the Convention to reach consensus on the main issues before the Review Conference and strengthen international efforts to make extensive use of the Conference's potential for the benefit of humanity.

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