



**REPORT
OF
THE SECURITY COUNCIL**

16 July 1965—15 July 1966

**GENERAL ASSEMBLY
OFFICIAL RECORDS : TWENTY-FIRST SESSION
SUPPLEMENT No. 2 (A/6302)**

UNITED NATIONS

104/1

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UNITED NATIONS
New York, 1967

NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

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INTRODUCTION

The present report¹ is submitted to the General Assembly by the Security Council in accordance with Article 24, paragraph 3, and Article 15, paragraph 1, of the Charter.

Essentially a summary and guide reflecting the broad lines of the debates, the report is not intended as a substitute for the records of the Security Council, which constitute the only comprehensive and authoritative account of its deliberations.

With respect to the membership of the Security Council during the period covered, it will be recalled that, as a result of an amendment to Article 23 of the Charter which entered into force on 31 August 1965, membership in the Security Council was enlarged from eleven to fifteen as of 1 January 1966.

At its 1392nd and 1393rd plenary meetings, held on 10 and 13 December 1965, the General Assembly dealt with the election of non-permanent members of the Security Council to fill the vacancies arising from the expiration on 31 December 1965 of the terms of office of Bolivia, the Ivory Coast and Malaysia and the additional vacancies arising from the amendment to Article 23. The Assembly first agreed, in accordance with an understanding announced by the President of the General Assembly on 30 December 1964, that the term of office of Jordan should be continued until 31 December 1966. The Assembly next proceeded to elect Argentina, Bulgaria and Mali to two-year terms, in accordance with the pattern decided upon in resolution 1991 A (XVIII) of 17 December 1963, to fill the three seats falling vacant. Then the Assembly elected Nigeria, Uganda, New Zealand and Japan to the additional non-permanent seats on the Security Council, and finally it decided that Nigeria and Japan should have two-year terms on the Council, and that Uganda and New Zealand should each serve for a one-year period.

The period covered in the present report is from 16 July 1965 to 15 July 1966. The Council held fifty-nine meetings during that period.

¹ This is the twenty-first annual report of the Security Council to the General Assembly. The previous reports were submitted under the symbols A/93, A/366, A/620, A/945, A/1361, A/1873, A/2167, A/2437, A/2712, A/2935, A/3137, A/3648, A/3901, A/4190, A/4494, A/4867, A/5202, A/5502, A/5802, and A/6002.

Part I

QUESTIONS CONSIDERED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL UNDER ITS RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY

Chapter 1

LETTER DATED 1 MAY 1965 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

A. Reports of the Secretary-General dated 16, 21 and 22 July 1965

1. On 16 July 1965, the Secretary-General submitted to the Security Council a report (S/6530) containing information received from his Representative, Mr. José Antonio Mayobre, on the situation in the Dominican Republic during the period from 19 June to 15 July 1965. The report stated that, despite a number of isolated incidents, the cease-fire in Santo Domingo had been maintained and negotiations for a political settlement had been undertaken by the *Ad Hoc* Committee of the Organization of American States on the basis of the proposals submitted to the contending parties—the “Constitutional Government” and the “Government of National Reconstruction”—on 18 June 1965. The Secretary-General went on to report that the situation outside Santo Domingo, which had been potentially explosive since May, owing mainly to deteriorating economic conditions, the ineffectiveness of civilian authority and military and police repression, had become more acute following an abortive uprising by armed civilians at San Francisco de Macoris on 25 June and an attack against a police post at Ramon Santana on 2 July. Repeated complaints had been received of violation of human rights in Santo Domingo as well as in the provinces, involving alleged executions, arbitrary arrests and cases of missing persons, reportedly arrested, but whose whereabouts were not known. In some areas, corpses had been found and identified as those of the missing persons, but in many other cases it had not been possible to obtain any information about them despite repeated inquiries made by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. The Secretary-General also drew attention to the serious economic and social situation in the Dominican Republic. Economic activities in the public sector were virtually at a standstill and public revenues had declined; industries were producing at 40 per cent of their capacity and the agricultural sector had been seriously affected by the break-down in transport, marketing and finance. Some measure of relief had been provided in the public sector by the payment, by the OAS, of wages and salaries of public employees from funds made available by the United States Government. These payments, however, were not accepted by the Caamaño group. The report noted that an early political solution that would relax tension and dispel fears for the individual's personal safety was essential. Such a solution should be accompanied by an emergency programme of external financial and technical assistance designed to resolve not only the serious problems arising

from the present crisis, but also the basic deficiencies inherent in the economic structure of the country. Once that was done, an economic and development plan should be formulated and adequate machinery should be established to implement it.

2. On 21 July, the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council (S/6542) that on 20 July, the Caamaño zone had been hit by twenty-two rounds of 81 millimetre mortar fire which, according to his Representative's investigation, had originated from an area under the control of the Imbert forces. The firing had resulted in three casualties including one dead.

3. In a report dated 22 July (S/6553), the Secretary-General informed the Council of the situation in the south-western provinces of the Dominican Republic visited by United Nations observers. They had found no visible signs of either political agitation or military and police repression in the area and had observed that conditions were generally normal.

B. Communications from the Organization of American States

4. By a cable dated 17 July 1965 (S/6536 and Corr.1), the Assistant Secretary General of the OAS transmitted for the information of the Security Council the text of an OAS communication stating that joint patrols of the Inter-American Peace Force and the National Police had been authorized in the United States-manned corridor in Santo Domingo as of 14 July because of unprovoked civilian attacks on members of the National Police and, in accordance with the Act of Santo Domingo, to maintain law and order.

5. By cables dated 16, 17, 19 and 20 July 1965 (S/6532, S/6535, S/6540 and S/6541) the Assistant Secretary General of the OAS transmitted for the information of the Council reports issued by the Inter-American Peace Force on violations of the cease-fire in Santo Domingo and reports on the activities of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.

6. The Secretary General of the OAS had also transmitted to the Security Council a report (S/6522) submitted by the OAS Technical Commission of Experts which had been appointed to investigate alleged executions of political prisoners in Santo Domingo. In its conclusions the report stated that there were persuasive indications for attributing the detention, transfer, and execution of prisoners to police and military elements. Certain bodies found by the Commission had

been identified as persons who had been arrested and shot, the bodies being left without burial. All the bodies found were in areas controlled by the "National Reconstruction Government". Moreover, the circumstances and timing of those acts suggested not only their military origin, but also a policy of seeking to eliminate adversaries, executing them hurriedly without trial, and abandoning their unburied bodies as a warning to others.

C. Consideration at the 1229th to 1233rd meetings (20-26 July 1965)

7. The Security Council resumed consideration of the Dominican question at five meetings held between 20 and 26 July 1965.

8. At the 1230th meeting of the Council on 20 July, the President invited the representative of Cuba, at his request, to participate in the discussion without the right to vote. The Council also invited Mr. Rubén Brache and Mr. Guaroa Velázquez to be heard in accordance with a decision taken at the 1229th meeting.

9. At the outset of the meeting, the President drew attention to a cable, dated 14 July, from Mr. Cury, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the "Constitutional Government of the Dominican Republic", requesting the convening of an urgent meeting of the Council and to other cables received from Mr. Cury between 14 and 18 July.

10. Mr. Rubén Brache stated that his Government had requested an emergency meeting of the Security Council because the so-called "National Reconstruction Government", backed and armed by the Government of the United States of America, was continuing its brutal campaign of repression of the civilian population. Similarly, the interventionist troops, most of them North American, had closed and strengthened the circle around the zone occupied by the Constitutional Government, and reinforced their already considerable military force in the international corridor, the security zone and the northern part of the city. The request of the Constitutional Government that the invading troops, in accordance with the terms of the cease-fire, withdraw to the positions they had held before the bombings of 15-16 June 1965, had not been heeded.

11. His Government had repeatedly complained of the arbitrary arrests, tortures, and other violations of human rights committed by the forces of the so-called National Reconstruction Government. The report presented by the OAS commission of criminologists contained evidence that the United States military intervention had aggravated the reign of terror in the Dominican Republic. He charged the OAS with complicity in the repressive actions carried out by the police at the service of the National Reconstruction Government and called for the immediate withdrawal of the Inter-American Peace Force as the only guarantee for peace in the country.

12. Mr. Guaroa Velázquez said that the Government of National Reconstruction, the only legally constituted government in the Dominican Republic, had instructed him to bring before the Council its position concerning the Dominican question. He read out the text of a cable sent by his Government which said, *inter alia*, that the Inter-American Peace Force was preventing the regular police from taking action in the sector held by the rebels. Therefore the National Reconstruction Government, which was in a position to guarantee order and security

throughout the country, requested that the Peace Force be withdrawn from the Dominican Republic. Furthermore, the National Reconstruction Government considered that the attitude of the Peace Force constituted intervention in the internal affairs of the country, in violation of Article 2 (4) and (7) of the United Nations Charter. His government's protests to the OAS in that connexion had been ignored by that body and by the Peace Force in violation of the OAS Charter. The National Reconstruction Government believed that the continued existence of a centre of rebellion under the protection of the Peace Force created a potentially explosive situation in the Dominican Republic.

13. The accusations made in the report of the OAS commission of criminologists that government police and military authorities had committed repressive acts were entirely false; the presumed executions mentioned in the report had taken place before 21 May, when the area concerned had been under the control of rebel forces. The civilian Dominican authorities had actively co-operated in the investigation of those atrocities, and it was the intention of the Dominican Government to discover and punish the guilty persons, who were not mentioned in the report of the criminologists.

14. The representative of Cuba stated that as long as the Dominican Republic was occupied by a great Power in flagrant violation of the Charter of the OAS and of the United Nations, the Security Council would be called upon to face up to its responsibilities.

15. In the month that had elapsed since the Council had last met on the Dominican question, it had become clear that the crisis in the Dominican Republic could not be solved under the present circumstances and that there might at any time be an attempt by the interventionist forces to eliminate the defenders of Dominican constitutionalism. Important parts of the formula offered by the so-called Bunker mission, in particular the proposal that the invading troops should remain in the island, had not been accepted by the Constitutional Government. Therefore, as before, military pressure was being brought upon the Constitutional Government by the United States through its two instruments, the so-called Inter-American Force and Imbert's troops.

16. The role played by the Inter-American Peace Force on Dominican territory each day increased the responsibility to history of the Latin American States whose docile votes had made its establishment possible. The statement made by the Brazilian general in nominal command of the Force to the effect that the cease-fire did not apply to the Force placed that body even further outside international legality and was an example of what the Governments and peoples of Latin America could expect in the future if they yielded to United States pressure to create such a force on a permanent basis.

17. As regarded the Imbert troops, their responsibility for acts of provocation and violations of the cease-fire was clearly established in the Secretary-General's report. The joint patrols of United States occupation forces and the Imbert police operating in the United States-manned corridor were an example, if one was needed, of the close ties existing between Imbert and the United States.

18. The President, speaking as the representative of the USSR, said that United States armed intervention in the Dominican Republic continued in open defiance of the main provisions of the United Nations Charter,

which prohibited the use of force against the territorial integrity and independence of States. As his delegation had already pointed out, the goal of United States intervention was to impose on the Dominican Republic a military dictatorship abhorred by the Dominican people. The statement just made by Mr. Brache showed the consequences of that intervention, which fully justified the request by the Constitutional Government that the Security Council take concrete steps to protect the sovereignty of the Dominican Republic.

19. The representative of the USSR went on to say that United States actions in the Dominican Republic were a reversion to gunboat diplomacy. Further, through blatant pressure, the United States had turned some of the Latin American States and the Organization of American States into participants in its illegal acts. Those actions were in flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter, in particular of Article 53, which prohibited regional organizations from taking any enforcement action without Security Council authorization.

20. It was only the intervention of the United States forces that had prevented the Dominican people from attaining the goals of their revolution. Later, in order to conceal their true designs those forces had been renamed the Inter-American Peace Force. However, Mr. Brache's statement and innumerable documents at the disposal of the Council, as well as the analysis of the situation made in the Secretary-General's report, showed the kind of peace those forces had imposed on the Dominican people. The Security Council was confronted with continuing violations of the cease-fire agreement by the interventionist forces, attempts to impose on the Dominican people a régime acceptable to Washington, increased terror and repression and increasing economic chaos in the country.

21. His delegation considered that, in order to guarantee the independence and territorial integrity of the Dominican Republic and assure protection of the human rights and freedoms of the Dominican people, the following measures must be put into effect. First, all United States and other interventionist forces and their weapons must be withdrawn from the Dominican Republic. Second, the Security Council resolutions of 14 and 22 May 1965 must be strictly observed. There must be a strict cease-fire and an immediate end to troop concentrations and preparations for action against the patriotic forces. Third, all mass executions and suppression of human rights must cease and the climate of terror must end. Fourth, the Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic must actively discharge the duties given him in the resolutions of 14 and 22 May, and must report regularly to the Security Council on the situation in the Dominican Republic. The investigation of violations of the cease-fire was only part of the task of informing the Council. The staff of the Secretary-General's Representative must be increased. And, fifth, the Security Council must protect the sovereignty and independence of the Dominican Republic. It was duty-bound to follow the situation closely and not to tolerate or condone the repression of the patriotic forces.

22. The achievement of those objectives would be facilitated by holding a series of meetings of the Security Council in Santo Domingo. Such meetings would also help members of the Council to acquire a better knowledge of the situation in the Dominican Republic and would be consonant with the provisions of the Charter.

23. In conclusion, the representative of the USSR said that the main requirement for normalizing conditions in the Dominican Republic was still the withdrawal of all foreign troops. The Dominican people must at long last be given an opportunity to decide their own fate.

24. The representative of the United States of America said that he was aware of no development which warranted the convening of the Council. The allegations made in Mr. Cury's communications to the President of the Security Council were totally contrary to fact. The *Ad Hoc* Committee of the OAS had left the Dominican Republic in order to report, in person, to the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of the OAS in Washington. During the Committee's absence, the OAS had been represented by its Secretary General, Dr. José Mora and his staff. There had been no build-up of troops or material by the Inter-American Peace Force in the Dominican Republic; in fact, some 9,000 troops had been withdrawn. The Peace Force, he continued, operated only in the international safety zone and the communications corridor, and the handful of persons detained by the Force within those areas had committed crimes which would result in arrest in any city in the world. There had been no repressive action against the civilian population.

25. His Government deplored and condemned the violation of human rights which had certainly been committed in the Dominican Republic. Measures had been taken by the OAS to prevent the recurrence of such acts. The Inter-American Commission of Human Rights had been represented in the Dominican Republic since May and both factions had promised it their fullest co-operation; furthermore, a group of expert criminologists had made an investigation and submitted a report. It was thanks to the OAS that the violation of human rights had been fully exposed and held before world opinion. That exposure was the best assurance against their recurrence.

26. With regard to demands for the withdrawal of the Inter-American Peace Force, the representative of the United States said that each of the two contending factions in the Dominican Republic had made it clear that it wished the withdrawal of the Force in order to be free to extend its control over the whole country. Since it was apparent that neither faction would yield peacefully to the other, the only way to prevent the resumption of the civil war was by maintaining the presence of the IAPF in the Dominican Republic.

27. Turning to the economic situation, the representative of the United States said that aside from the City of Santo Domingo, the country had suffered little economic deterioration from the political crisis. The establishment of a programme of economic and technical assistance to promote recovery and help the Dominican Republic to solve its most urgent economic and social problems had been, and was, an important feature of the OAS proposal for a solution of the Dominican crisis. The OAS had already provided over \$42 million in emergency assistance and was considering additional aid.

28. In conclusion the representative of the United States said that, despite the most difficult and trying circumstances, the *Ad Hoc* Committee was continuing its efforts, with good prospects, to bring about a political solution agreed to by both factions. The Dominican people were eager to restore normal conditions in the country, and the Council would do well to support the

Dominican people and the OAS in their joint efforts towards the realization of those aspirations.

29. The President, exercising the right of reply as the representative of the USSR, said that the United States had once again failed to answer the question his delegation had so often asked, namely, by what right the United States had intervened and continued to intervene, under the flag of the OAS, in the internal affairs of the Dominican Republic. The United Nations Charter forbade any interference by regional organizations without Security Council authorization. The United States Government could not evade the political, moral and legal responsibility which it bore for its armed intervention in the country. No one would be deluded by the allegations which had just been presented by the United States that the withdrawal of the United States troops would bring chaos and a resumption of civil war in the Dominican Republic. The intervention of American marines in the Dominican Republic had been due to the total failure of the conspiracy led by Dominican military circles and the victory of the party representing the Dominican people and that intervention had changed the balance of power in favour of the enemies of the Dominican people. The activities of the so-called *Ad Hoc* Committee of the OAS were nothing but a smoke-screen behind which Washington had tried to impose its will on the Dominican people.

30. The United States representative had spoken of the generous assistance which the aggressor was giving its victim, but the United States had an obligation to satisfy demands of the Dominican people for compensation for the colossal damage which its intervention had cost. Although the representative of the United States, in his statement, had attempted to present a picture of well-being and tranquillity in the Dominican Republic, everyone was aware of the tremendous cost of the United States policy designed to prevent national liberation movements in different parts of the world.

31. At the 1231st meeting of the Security Council on 22 July, the representative of Jordan expressed his delegation's concern over the confirmed violations of the cease-fire in the Dominican Republic, all of which, according to the Secretary-General's report of 16 July, except one attributed to the Inter-American Peace Force, had been committed by the forces of General Imbert. On the other hand, none of the reports by the OAS on violations of the cease-fire by the Caamaño forces had been confirmed in the report of the Secretary-General. Furthermore, the report of the Secretary-General had noted that an atmosphere of fear prevailed in the area of San Francisco de Macoris due to police repression and denial of civil rights. His delegation hoped that the report of the OAS commission of criminologists describing the violence against adversaries, real or presumed, carried out by General Imbert's security forces would be taken into account by the Security Council in its present deliberations, and wished to express its appreciation to Mr. Mayobre for his report on the situation in the Dominican Republic during the period in question.

32. The representative of France stated that the Secretary-General's report of 16 July, apart from any other consideration, fully justified further discussion of the Dominican question by the Security Council. In that connexion, his delegation wished to express its appreciation of the impartiality and objectivity with which Mr. Mayobre had discharged his task.

33. The representative of France noted that high Latin American personalities had confirmed information widely published in the Press on atrocities committed in the Santo Domingo area; there could be no doubt that such acts had been committed and who was responsible for them. His delegation could not but note that the presence of the interventionist force had not prevented events that could only elicit the Council's condemnation. While there were no open hostilities at the present moment, the Secretary-General's report showed that the cease-fire had been violated often and remained precarious, and that conditions in the provinces were deteriorating. In view of the situation, the presence of the Secretary-General's Representative in Santo Domingo continued to be useful. The establishment of a provisional government, as representative of the Dominican people as possible, was increasingly urgent.

34. The representative of Uruguay praised the Secretary-General and his Representative in the Dominican Republic for their efforts in keeping the Council fully informed of the developments in that country. It was clear that the events reported by the Secretary-General, including the movement and deployment of troops, constituted a violation of the Security Council's order for a strict cease-fire, which covered all military forces in the Dominican Republic.

35. The report of the OAS commission of criminologists clearly pointed to the authorities of the Government of National Reconstruction as responsible for the atrocities committed. His delegation wished to express its condemnation of the atrocities and its belief that the Council could not remain indifferent to those violations of human rights and would find a formula to express its concern.

36. At the same meeting Mr. Rubén Brache rebutted Mr. Guaroa Velázquez's charges that the executions to which the OAS commission of criminologists referred had occurred when the area concerned was under the control of the constitutionalist forces. The report itself, he noted, indicated clearly that the zone was under the control of the National Reconstruction Government.

37. As to the reasons for convening the Council, the representative of the United States should recognize that the violations of human rights which were still being committed in the Dominican Republic amply justified the meeting, especially in the view of Dominicans, who were the victims of the crime of genocide.

38. His Government again requested the Council to use all its power and prestige to ensure the withdrawal of the so-called Inter-American Peace Force, for there could be no peace in the Dominican Republic so long as that Force remained there.

39. At the 1232nd meeting on 26 July, the representative of the Netherlands observed that the discussions in progress to form a provisional government in the Dominican Republic provided some ground for optimism. His delegation wished to associate itself with previous speakers who had expressed their appreciation for the manner in which the Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic was fulfilling his task. However, it had noted with concern the violations of the cease-fire, and considered that it was essential for reaching any solution of the Dominican problem that the cease-fire be strictly observed and that further bloodshed be prevented.

40. His delegation had been alarmed by recent developments such as arbitrary arrests and indiscriminate shooting and wished to put on record its condemnation

of those violations of human rights. The reports received by the Council, particularly that of the OAS commission of criminologists, indicated that elementary human rights had been grossly violated in the Dominican Republic. It was his delegation's sincere hope that a repetition of such acts would be prevented in the future.

41. Mr. Brache declared that it was with profound sorrow and indignation that he had to inform the Council that the acts of repression committed by the forces of the Government of National Reconstruction continued in the areas occupied by the Inter-American Peace Force, and that the repression in the interior of the country had reached an intensity equal to, or greater than, that of the worst years of the Trujillo era. That, together with the grave economic situation, created an explosive situation; a rapid and just solution of the political problem could no longer be postponed. The withdrawal of the interventionist Inter-American Peace Force would enable the Dominican people to exercise their right to self-determination and to achieve by themselves their long-awaited democratic government.

42. Mr. Guaroa Velázquez stressed that the Government of National Reconstruction was the real Government of the Dominican Republic, whereas the so-called Constitutional Government which occupied only a few blocks of the old city of Santo Domingo was a mere fiction. With reference to violations of the cease-fire, the Secretary-General's reports indicated clearly that they had been for the most part committed by the rebel forces in their efforts to extend the rebellion to the rest of the country. Furthermore, the Government of National Reconstruction believed that no cease-fire had been agreed to or arranged in the regular manner; at any rate, any cease-fire that might have existed had expired because of the incessant violations by the rebel faction. Neither the United Nations nor the OAS could, under Article 2, paragraph 7, or Article 17 of their respective charters, intervene in the situation in the Dominican Republic since it was a civil war and as such an internal matter.

43. As to the alleged violations of human rights, the report of the commission of criminologists, if studied carefully, appeared to be deficient, confused and contradictory and could not therefore serve as a basis for establishing responsibilities and sanctions. Indeed the President of the commission, Dr. Daniel Schweitzer, had said that he disagreed with several statements in the report as he considered them to be biased. The Government of National Reconstruction formally requested the Security Council to arrange for the sending to the Dominican Republic of an investigating committee composed of truly democratic and important persons from other parts of the world and reiterated its request that the Inter-American Peace Force be immediately withdrawn from the Dominican Republic.

44. At the 1233rd meeting of the Council, on 26 July 1965, the President said that he had prepared a statement summing up the agreed views of the members of the Council. Those views were as follows: (1) Information received by the Council and the Secretary-General's reports of 16 and 21 July testified to the fact that, in spite of the Council's resolutions 203 (1965) of 14 May and 205 (1965) of 22 May 1965, violations of the cease-fire had taken place. Acts of repression against the civilian population and other violations of human rights, as well as data on the deterioration of the economic situation in the Dominican Republic, had been brought to the Council's attention. (2) Members of

the Council had condemned gross violations of human rights in the Dominican Republic, had expressed the desire that such violations should cease, and had indicated again the need for the strict observance of the cease-fire in accordance with the Council's resolutions. (3) The members of the Council considered it necessary that the Council continue to watch closely the situation in the Dominican Republic and that the Secretary-General continue to report on it.

45. At the same meeting, the representative of the United Kingdom associated his delegation with the President's statement. It was essential, he added, that the cease-fire called for by the Council in its resolutions of 14 and 22 May be strictly observed. Breaches of the cease-fire not only contravened those resolutions but hampered the difficult negotiations for a political settlement in which the OAS *Ad Hoc* Committee, under the chairmanship of Ambassador Bunker, was currently engaged. His delegation sincerely hoped that the efforts of the OAS would soon be successfully concluded. The report of the committee of criminologists underlined the urgent and imperative need to put an end to the civil strife in the Republic. The Council should continue to watch the situation closely. He expressed his delegation's appreciation of the assistance given in this regard by the Secretary-General and his representative on the spot.

46. The representative of the United States observed that the President's statement represented the primary concerns in regard to the situation in the Dominican Republic expressed by the Council members. On the other hand, his delegation considered it important to note that the OAS, represented in the Dominican Republic by the Inter-American Peace Force, by its *Ad Hoc* Committee and its Commission on Human Rights, was dealing energetically and, on the whole, successfully with the problems of primary concern to the Security Council, namely, the maintenance of the cease-fire and the investigation and prevention of violation of human rights. The panel of criminologists called together by the Inter-American Human Rights Commission to investigate charges of atrocities had kept the Security Council fully informed of its activities. Moreover, the OAS, particularly its *Ad Hoc* Committee, was diligently pursuing, in co-operation with the various political factions and elements in the Dominican Republic, its efforts to facilitate a political settlement acceptable to the Dominican people as a whole and leading to a restoration of peace and stable democratic institutions in the country.

47. The President, speaking as the representative of the USSR, stated that his delegation did not object to the President's formulating, in agreement with other members of the Council, certain conclusions arrived at by members of the Security Council during the debate on the Dominican situation at the meetings held between 20 and 26 July. At the same time, his delegation considered that the Council's adoption of the resolutions of 14 and 22 May and the expansion of their terms in the text just adopted did not, despite their usefulness, eliminate the most important problems upon which a radical solution of the Dominican question depended. Those problems and the whole question of the situation in the Dominican Republic remained before the Council.

48. His delegation could not accept the version of the events in the Dominican Republic which the representative of the United States had just given. It was well known, for instance, that the United States inter-

ventionists had drawn the OAS into their intervention in the Dominican Republic in violation of key provisions of the United Nations Charter prohibiting regional organizations from taking enforcement action without authorization from the Security Council. It was absolutely essential that the interventionist forces be immediately withdrawn from the territory of the Dominican Republic, for only in that way would that country be able to decide its own destiny.

D. Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council covering the period 22 July-17 August 1965

49. In a report covering the period 22 July-17 August 1965 (S/6615), the Secretary-General informed the Council that, except for a few minor incidents, the cease-fire in Santo Domingo had been maintained, and negotiations for a political settlement were being continued by the *Ad Hoc* Committee of the Organization of American States on the basis of new proposals submitted to the contending Dominican parties on 9 August 1965.

50. While his Representative continued to receive complaints of alleged cases of arbitrary arrest by the forces of the "National Reconstruction Government", the human rights situation had, in general, improved. A number of civilian political prisoners had been released by the "National Reconstruction Government". However, so far no military prisoners had been released by either faction.

E. Communications received by the Security Council from the Organization of American States between 22 July and 17 August 1965

51. By a cable dated 9 August 1965 (S/6608) the Assistant Secretary General of the Organization of American States transmitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations the texts of new proposals submitted on 9 August 1965 by the OAS *Ad Hoc* Committee to the "Government of National Reconstruction" and the "Constitutionalist Government" for a political settlement of the Dominican crisis. The proposals were contained in two documents entitled "Act of Dominican Reconciliation" and "Institutional Act". These documents were made public simultaneously with a "Declaration to the Dominican People" which was issued by the OAS *Ad Hoc* Committee in Santo Domingo.

52. The "Act of Dominican Reconciliation" included provisions for the acceptance by both parties of a provisional government, to be presided over by Dr. Héctor García Godoy, general amnesty and the release of all political prisoners, the surrender of all arms in the hands of civilians, the return of the armed forces to their barracks, and of military personnel on the Constitutionalist side to their units, and the initiation of negotiations concerning the manner and date of withdrawal of the Inter-American Peace Force.

53. The "Institutional Act" provided, *inter alia*, that the provisional government would hold general elections within nine months from the date on which the Institutional Act entered into force and would turn over power to the elected government within thirty days after the elections. The elected government would, within four months after taking office, convoke a con-

stituent assembly which would decide on the constitutional problem.

54. In the "Declaration to the Dominican People", the *Ad Hoc* Commission stressed the need for peace and unity in the Dominican Republic and appealed to the Dominican people to support the proposals embodied in the Reconciliation Act so that the country might return to peace and normality.

55. By a cable dated 13 August (S/6612), the Secretary General of the OAS transmitted to the Security Council the text of a report of the OAS *Ad Hoc* Committee to the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. The report stated that the Committee had held a meeting with the members of the National Reconstruction Government in the course of which General Imbert had announced his Government's acceptance of the Act of Dominican Reconciliation in the form in which it had been submitted. The *Ad Hoc* Committee had also had a meeting with the Constitutionalist Government, during which the latter had suggested changes in the proposed Act. The Constitutionalist Government had insisted that certain members of its own armed forces should be given treatment different from that provided for in the Act and was also trying to secure the removal from their posts of certain officers who were, at present, leading the country's regular armed forces.

56. Between 22 July and 17 August 1965, the Secretary-General of the Organization of American States transmitted to the Security Council reports of the Inter-American Peace Force concerning attacks against the Force by the forces of the Constitutionalist Government (S/6555, S/6557, S/6560, S/6563, S/6577, S/6587, S/6588, S/6595, S/6598, S/6600, S/6604).

57. During this period, the Organization of American States also kept the Security Council informed of the activities of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in Santo Domingo (S/6547, S/6555, S/6557, S/6559, S/6568, S/6570, S/6574, S/6590, S/6595, S/6598, S/6600, S/6604, S/6616).

F. Report of the Secretary-General covering the period 17 August-2 September 1965

58. In a report issued for the above period (S/6649/Corr.1), the Secretary-General informed the Council concerning breaches of the cease-fire which had occurred on 28 and 29 August as a result of machine-gun and mortar fire originating from positions under the control of the Imbert forces. The Secretary-General also reported the resignation, on 30 August, of the members of the "Government of National Reconstruction" headed by General Imbert, and the signing, on 31 August, of the Act of Reconciliation by the leaders of the "Constitutionalist Government". On the same day, the Chiefs of the Armed Forces and the National Police had signed a declaration appended to a separate but identical text of the Act of Reconciliation in which they had pledged acceptance of the Act of Reconciliation and the Institutional Act, as well as support for Dr. Héctor García Godoy as Provisional President.

59. The Secretary-General also reported that, on 31 August, the "Constitutional Government" had freed 108 political prisoners, and had subsequently reported that it was holding no more political prisoners. On 1 and 2 September, 38 prisoners had been released by the "Government of National Reconstruction".

G. Communications received by the Security Council from the Organization of American States between 17 August and 2 September 1965

60. By a cable dated 20 August (S/6627), the Secretary General of the Organization of American States transmitted to the Security Council the text of a cable sent by the OAS *Ad Hoc* Committee to the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, in which the *Ad Hoc* Committee, *inter alia*, recommended that as soon as the Provisional Government had been installed in the Dominican Republic, a resolution should be adopted providing that the manner and date of the withdrawal of the Inter-American Peace Force should be decided upon by the Provisional Government, jointly with the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs.

61. By a cable dated 27 August (S/6643), the Secretary General of the Organization of American States transmitted a report from the *Ad Hoc* Committee of the Organization of American States to the Tenth Meeting of Consultation, dealing with further efforts by the Committee to achieve agreement between the parties on the basis of its proposals of 9 August 1965.

62. By a cable dated 31 August (S/6644), the Secretary General of the Organization of American States transmitted to the Council the text of a report from the Commander of the Inter-American Peace Force to the Tenth Meeting of Consultation concerning the firing incident which had taken place in Santo Domingo on 29 August. On the morning of 30 August, a team of investigators from the Inter-American Peace Force had attempted to enter the area controlled by military forces of the "Government of National Reconstruction" to determine the exact origin of the mortar firing, but had not been permitted to enter the area by the authorities of the aforementioned government.

63. By a letter dated 1 September (S/6655), the Secretary General of the Organization of American States transmitted two copies of the Act of Dominican Reconciliation which had been signed separately by members of the "Constitutional Government" and of the *Ad Hoc* Committee, and by the Chiefs of the Dominican Armed Forces and National Police on 31 August 1965.

64. The operative part of the Act of Dominican Reconciliation provided, *inter alia*, that:

(1) The two parties would accept the Provisional Government presided over by Dr. Héctor García Godoy as the sole and sovereign government of the Dominican Republic and would pledge their fullest co-operation to it.

(2) The parties would accept the Institutional Act as the constitutional instrument under which the Provisional Government would exercise its functions.

(3) The Provisional Government would, on the day on which it took office, proclaim a general amnesty and would take the necessary measures to release all political prisoners.

(4) Immediately following the inauguration of the Provisional Government, the contending forces would begin to withdraw their defences from the zones now under their control. The Inter-American Peace Force would return to its bases, leaving only the barbed wire and a reduced number of observation posts in the present lines. Demilitarization and the disarming of

civilians would begin immediately within the "Constitutionalist" Zone. The observation posts and check points of the Inter-American Peace Force would be withdrawn as soon as the demilitarization of the zone and the disarming of civilians had been verified by the Provisional Government. The Provisional Government would take the necessary steps to verify that the terms of this article had been carried out. The Provisional President would indicate where the Inter-American Peace Force would be transferred until the date of its departure from the country had been decided.

(5) The Provisional Government would assume responsibility for the maintenance of public order within the security zone. In discharging that responsibility, it might take whatever steps it deemed necessary.

(6) The Provisional Government would, as soon as possible, establish special centres for the collection of arms held by the civilian population.

(7) The present "Constitutional Government" would take all necessary measures to ensure that all arms now in the possession of civilians under its jurisdiction were delivered to the collection centres. The Provisional Government would take such measures as might be necessary to recover all arms that were not surrendered voluntarily.

(8) Soon after the installation of the Provisional Government, the armed forces would return to their barracks and place themselves under their Commander-in-Chief, the Provisional President. All military personnel who had participated in the conflict would rejoin the armed forces without discrimination or reprisals.

(9) In accordance with the declaration of general amnesty, no officer or enlisted man of the armed forces would be submitted to court martial or subject to punishment of any kind for acts, except common crimes, committed since 23 April 1965. Any officer or enlisted man who wished to retire would be permitted to do so in accordance with the prescribed procedure. Any officer or enlisted man who wished to leave the country might do so under appropriate guarantees and with assistance provided by the Provisional Government.

(10) The Provisional Government would initiate negotiations with the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs concerning the manner and date of the withdrawal of the Inter-American Peace Force from the national territory.

65. During the period, the Organization of American States also forwarded to the Security Council other communications dealing with the activities of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the OAS *Ad Hoc* Committee; reactions by political parties and private organizations to the *Ad Hoc* Committee's proposals for a political settlement, declarations of support for the proposals from organizations, associations and institutions; and reports issued by the Commander of the Inter-American Peace Force concerning breaches of the cease-fire (S/6616, S/6622, S/6624, S/6625, S/6628, S/6629, S/6633, S/6634, S/6642, S/6643, S/6646, S/6652).

66. On 3 September 1965, Dr. Héctor García Godoy was installed as President of the Provisional Government of the Dominican Republic.

H. Reports of the Secretary-General covering the period 2 September-30 October 1965

67. In a report covering the period up to 23 October 1965 (S/6822), the Secretary-General informed the

Security Council that since the installation of the Provisional Government under President Héctor García Godoy, the country, despite serious setbacks, had moved slowly but steadily towards normalization and pacification. Progress had been made on the questions of the demilitarization and policing of Ciudad Nueva—the former “Constitutionalist” Zone—and the integration of the police force. However, negotiations on other key issues such as the integration of the “Constitutionalist” armed forces personnel, had proceeded at a disappointing pace, in a climate marred by mutual mistrust and aggravated by acts of terrorism and violence. On 20 October, the Provisional President had announced a new plan for the collection of weapons in the hands of civilians.

68. In addenda to the above report, dated 26, 28 and 30 October (S/6822/Add.1, 2 and 3), the Secretary-General reported to the Council that on 22-23 October firing had been renewed in the area around the Ozama fortress, and that sporadic but indiscriminate shooting had spread to other sectors of the city. On 23 October, a provincial governor had been killed and six other provincial officials had been wounded by unknown persons in a northern province.

69. The report went on to say that, in view of the continued crisis in the relations between the civilian authorities and the Dominican Armed Forces, and fearing a military occupation of Ciudad Nueva, Provisional President García Godoy had asked the Inter-American Peace Force to secure all vulnerable points and government buildings in Ciudad Nueva. Thereupon, units of the Inter-American Peace Force had been deployed in the city during the morning of 25 October. On the same day, troops of the Dominican Armed Forces had sealed off a sector of Ciudad Nueva, restricting all civilian movement. Shortly thereafter, the office of the Provisional President had issued a communiqué, stating that troops of the Dominican Armed Forces had received orders to return to their barracks and that law and order were to be maintained by the National Police with the assistance of the Inter-American Peace Force.

70. The Secretary-General's Representative in Santo Domingo, the report said, had received complaints by civilians in Ciudad Nueva that troops of the Inter-American Peace Force, together with elements of the National Police, had searched houses and had arrested a number of civilians. He had also received requests, including some from government officials, that he use his good offices to secure the release of the detained persons.

71. On 26-27 October there had been a number of demonstrations against the Inter-American Peace Force which had been dispersed by the Inter-American Peace Force troops without incidents.

72. As of 26 October, the report stated, the presidential decree confining all military personnel to barracks had been applied only to “Constitutionalist” troops and not to the Dominican Armed Force. Meanwhile, acts of violence and lawlessness had occurred elsewhere in the city of Santo Domingo and in the interior of the country. On 26 October, Dominican troops had occupied the airport of Santo Domingo and had prevented the Director of Immigration and other officials from reaching it. Violence in the provinces, the report said, had claimed two leaders of the Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD), and a third member of that party had

been critically wounded. By 28 October, tension in Santo Domingo had diminished, but the crisis that had arisen between the Provisional Government and the high command of the Dominican Armed Forces continued.

I. Communications received by the Security Council from the Organization of American States between 4 September and 30 October 1965

73. By a letter dated 20 October 1965 (S/6843 and Corr.1), the Secretary General of the Organization of American States transmitted to the Security Council copies of the second general report dated 24 September 1965 submitted by the *Ad Hoc* Committee to the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. The report reviewed the activities of the Committee since 18 June, with special reference to the negotiations for achieving a political settlement of the Dominican crisis, the installation of the Provisional Government, and measures taken by the latter to restore peace and normality in the country. It pointed out that the Provisional Government, in compliance with the Act of Dominican Reconciliation, had decreed a general political amnesty. The Provisional President had also issued a decree, dated 5 September, whereby the previously autonomous Armed Forces Training Centre under the command of General Elías Wessin y Wessin had been reintegrated into the regular Dominican army. The Provisional Government had also decided that General Wessin y Wessin should be retired from active military service and should be given a post abroad in the diplomatic service. After an initial refusal by General Wessin y Wessin to abide by the orders of the Provisional President, the Provisional Government, with the assistance of the *Ad Hoc* Committee and the Commander-in-Chief of the Inter-American Peace Force, had obtained compliance by General Wessin y Wessin, who had left the country on 9 September to take up the post of Consul General of the Dominican Republic in Miami, Florida.

74. In its conclusions, the report stated that, with the installation of the Provisional Government, the *Ad Hoc* Committee believed that it had fulfilled one of the fundamental tasks entrusted to it by the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. In the opinion of the Committee, the Dominican people, under the new Government, would be able to return to the peace and tranquillity needed to achieve its economic and social recovery.

75. During the period in which the Provisional Government would be in power, the Organization of American States, the report stated, should provide for the following activities:

(a) Maintenance of the Inter-American Peace Force in the Dominican Republic until the Tenth Meeting of Consultation, in agreement with the President of the Provisional Government, decided upon its withdrawal;

(b) The continuing presence of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, at the request of the Provisional Government;

(c) Designation of an OAS Electoral Committee to advise the Provisional Government in the organization and holding of elections; and

(d) Establishment of a programme of technical and economic assistance to the Dominican Republic.

76. The report recommended that the Tenth Meeting of Consultation continue its work until the installation of the Constitutional Government, chosen in elections to be held in accordance with the Institutional Act; that the *Ad Hoc* Committee continue to function in order that it might give advice and guidance to the Inter-American Peace Force; that the Tenth Meeting of Consultation recommend to the member States that they offer, through the Organization of American States, technical and economic assistance to the Dominican Republic, and that it request the assistance of the Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress in the preparation and implementation of an economic recovery and development plan for the country; that the Tenth Meeting of Consultation designate "an outstanding personality" from one of the member States as Special Representative of the Organization of American States, who would be appointed by the Secretary General of the Organization to supervise and co-ordinate all technical and economic activities of the Organization of American States in the Dominican Republic; that the General Secretariat make a study of claims presented by Dominican citizens for damages and injuries as a result of the events which began on 24 April 1965; and that the Tenth Meeting of Consultation adopt a resolution amending paragraph 5 of its resolution of 6 May 1965, in connexion with establishing the manner and date of withdrawal of the Inter-American Peace Force from the Dominican Republic.

77. By a letter dated 21 October (S/6844), the Secretary General of the Organization of American States transmitted the text of a resolution adopted on 19 October 1965 by the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, under which the Tenth Meeting of Consultation recommended to the Council of the Organization, and to the General Secretariat, the Inter-American specialized organizations and other entities connected with the Inter-American system that they give attention, with priority, to requests for technical and financial advice and assistance by the Dominican Provisional Government, and that they co-operate with that Government in whatever way they might agree upon.

78. By a cable dated 29 October (S/6847), the Secretary General of the Organization of American States forwarded to the Security Council the text of a report dated 25 October from the *Ad Hoc* Committee, addressed to the President of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation. The report referred to the difficulties impeding full implementation of the Act of Dominican Reconciliation which, it said, had been complicated by disagreement between the civil authorities and the armed forces in the Dominican Republic. In that connexion, the representatives of the civil authorities had alleged that the leaders of the armed forces had refused to comply with the instructions issued by the Government, while the armed forces had asserted that the Government was favouring elements linked with the former "Constitutional Government".

79. Further communications received by the Security Council from the Organization of American States during this period included communications dealing with matters concerning the new Provisional Government, the activities of the *Ad Hoc* Committee and the Inter-American Commission for Human Rights, and reported violations of the cease-fire (S/6663, S/6674, S/6676, S/6677, S/6681, S/6741).

J. Further communications received by the Security Council from the Organization of American States during the period up to 23 November 1965

80. By cables dated 1, 13 and 23 November (S/6856, S/6931, S/6970), the Organization of American States forwarded to the Security Council the text of reports by the OAS *Ad Hoc* Committee to the Tenth Meeting of Consultation dealing with various aspects of the situation in the Dominican Republic during that period, including the deployment of Inter-American Peace Force units in the former "Constitutionalist" zone, the policing of that zone, relations between the civilian and military authorities, the gradual withdrawal from the "Constitutionalist" zone of units of the Inter-American Peace Force, and the efforts being made by the Provisional Government to restore normal conditions and stimulate economic activity in Santo Domingo and throughout the country.

K. Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council dated 25 November 1965

81. In a report to the Security Council dated 25 November (S/6975), the Secretary-General stated that the situation in the Dominican Republic had improved. The bulk of the Inter-American Peace Force had been withdrawn from the city, and the National Police was gradually assuming responsibility for the maintenance of law and order. Relations between the civilian and the military authorities had also improved. An attempted coup d'état against the Provisional Government, led by elements of the extreme right in Santiago de los Caballeros, the second largest city in the country, had been successfully repressed on 23 November by the police and elements of the armed forces, without bloodshed. On the day of the abortive coup d'état, Inter-American Peace Force contingents had been sent, at the request of the Provisional Government, to Santiago and Barahona, and the Chairman of the OAS *Ad Hoc* Committee had issued a statement to the Press expressing complete OAS support of the Provisional Government.

L. Reports of the Secretary-General to the Security Council during the month of December 1965

82. In a report issued on 3 December (S/6991), the Secretary-General informed the Council that the Provisional Government had set 1 June 1966 as the date for national elections. The Provisional Government had also announced, on the same day, that the period for turning in firearms under the purchase scheme had been extended until 10 December 1965. In addition to firearms, civilians had turned in some grenades and ammunition in response to an appeal which had been made by the Provisional President.

83. On 17 December, the Secretary-General reported (S/7025 and Add.1) that new disturbances had taken place in Santo Domingo in connexion with a strike, subsequently settled, by public employees and sugar worker unions.

84. In reports issued between 20 and 27 December (S/7032 and Add.1, 2 and 3), the Secretary-General informed the Council concerning a series of incidents and acts of violence which had taken place at Santiago

de los Caballeros and Santo Domingo. The trouble, the reports said, had started at Santiago de los Caballeros on the morning of 19 December, where several hundred former "Constitutionalist" officers, including Colonel Francisco Caamaño, had arrived to attend a mass in memory of a "Constitutionalist" officer killed during the April revolution. When the group of "Constitutionalists" had repaired to the Hotel Matun, troops of the Dominican Air Force had surrounded the building and had opened heavy fire on the hotel. The "Constitutionalists" had returned the fire. A cease-fire had been negotiated by the officer in command of the Inter-American Peace Force troops, which had been asked by the Provisional President to assist in restoring law and order in the area.

M. Communications received by the Security Council from the Organization of American States during the month of December 1965

85. By cables dated 4 and 21 December (S/6994 and S/7034), the Secretary General of the Organization of American States forwarded to the Security Council the text of two reports of the OAS *Ad Hoc* Committee to the Tenth Meeting of Consultation, dealing with events in the Dominican Republic.

N. Reports of the Secretary-General to the Security Council during the month of January 1966

86. In eight reports covering developments in the Dominican Republic during January 1966 (S/7232/Add.4-11), the Secretary-General informed the Security Council of a number of developments set out below.

87. In an address to the nation broadcast on 3 January, Provisional President García Godoy had appealed to the Dominican people for concord and mutual understanding, and had announced that a group of officers would have to leave the country for special missions and diplomatic posts abroad.

88. On 6 January, the Provisional President had issued decrees appointing a new Minister of the Armed Forces and new Armed Service Chiefs, and providing for the transfer abroad of several high-ranking military officers, including Commodore Rivera Caminero, former Minister of the Armed Forces, and Colonel Francisco Caamaño Deñó. On the same day, the Dominican Armed Forces had issued a communiqué objecting to the President's decision and had occupied the studios of Radio Television Santo Domingo and the telecommunications centre in Santo Domingo. In response to a request for assistance by the Provisional Government, detachments of the Inter-American Peace Force, after a day's negotiations with the Dominican Armed Forces, had taken over the above-mentioned buildings, which were subsequently turned over to the Provisional Government. The OAS *Ad Hoc* Committee had issued a communiqué expressing its full support of the Provisional Government.

89. The report stated that, although terrorism had somewhat declined, there had been several serious incidents in Santo Domingo, including the shooting of Mr. Leon Bosch, the son of the former President Juan Bosch, by a sergeant of the Dominican Armed Forces. On 19 January, the Government had closed down two radio stations in Santiago because they had encouraged the Armed Forces to disobey Government orders.

90. On 11 January, six former "Constitutionalist" officers had left the Dominican Republic to take up diplomatic posts abroad in compliance with the President's order of 6 January. On 22 January, four high-ranking leaders of the "Constitutionalist" forces, including Colonel Francisco Caamaño, had departed from the Dominican Republic to assume diplomatic posts abroad.

91. The Secretary-General also informed the Council that on 17 January General Alvaro Alves Da Silva Braga had assumed the command of the Inter-American Peace Force, replacing General Hugo Panasco Alvim of Brazil. General Bruce Palmer, Jr., had handed over the command of the United States Forces of the Inter-American Peace Force to Brigadier-General Robert R. Linvill.

O. Communications received by the Security Council from the Organization of American States during the month of January 1966

92. During the month of January 1966, the Secretary General of the Organization of American States transmitted to the Security Council the text of reports of the OAS *Ad Hoc* Committee to the Tenth Meeting of Consultation (S/7073, S/7074, S/7084, S/7089, S/7100/Corr.1) giving an account of developments in the Dominican Republic and of the co-operation and support given by the *Ad Hoc* Committee to the Provisional Government during the political-military crisis which had arisen as a result of changes and transfers in the Dominican Armed Forces ordered by the Provisional President.

P. Reports of the Secretary-General to the Security Council covering the month of February 1966

93. In six reports, covering developments in the Dominican Republic during the month of February (S/7032/Add.12-17), the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council several serious incidents and acts of terrorism which had occurred in and outside Santo Domingo, beginning 7 February. These included a shooting incident in Santo Domingo between elements of the Dominican Armed Forces and police and former "Constitutionalist" officers and a clash between students in Santo Domingo and the National Police.

94. The situation had been aggravated by a general strike, called by trade unions and political groups, demanding punishment of those responsible for the shooting of students and the departure of high-ranking officers of the Dominican Armed Forces. As a result, economic activity in the city and nearby commercial areas had come to almost a complete standstill.

95. On 11 February, the Minister of the Armed Forces, Commodore Rivera Caminero, had left the Dominican Republic to assume the post of Naval Attaché in Washington, D.C. A new Minister of the Armed Forces had been appointed.

96. On 16 February, President García Godoy, in a radio broadcast to the country, had announced that he was giving orders to put into effect the decrees of 8 January, concerning changes and transfers in the Dominican Armed Forces. He had ordered all public employees to return to work on penalty of dismissal, and had stressed his Government's determination to enforce the law and to fight both "Communist subversion" and that directed by the opposite extreme.

97. On 17 February, strike leaders had asked the workers to return to work. Consequently, normal activities had been restored on the following day.

98. On 26 February, the Provisional Government had announced further changes in the command of the Dominican Armed Forces, and the creation of three new posts of Vice Ministers of the Armed Forces. The President had also appointed a new Chief of Police. On the same day, he had decreed an amnesty for all persons who had participated in the abortive coup d'état on 22 November 1965.

Q. Communications received by the Security Council from the Organization of American States during the month of February 1966

99. During February, the Security Council received three communications from the Secretary General of the OAS (S/7133 and Corr.1, S/7148, S/7163), transmitting the text of further reports of the OAS *Ad Hoc* Committee to the Tenth Meeting of Consultation on events in the Dominican Republic, together with the appeals which had been made to the Dominican people to restore peace and order, including a message from His Holiness Pope Paul VI.

R. Reports of the Secretary-General to the Security Council covering the month of March 1966

100. During the month of March, the Secretary-General issued eight reports (S/7032/Add.18-25), informing the Security Council of developments in the Dominican Republic for that period. The reports dealt mainly with further incidents which had occurred in the Dominican Republic, and with developments concerning elections and the electoral campaign which had officially started on 1 March 1966.

101. Among the most serious incidents had been the shooting to death of a bodyguard of Professor Juan Bosch by a member of the National Police on 6 March, following which there had been an exchange of fire between members of Professor Bosch's guard and members of the police. There had also been incidents involving soldiers of the Inter-American Peace Force.

102. On matters relating to elections, the reports informed the Council, *inter alia*, of the following: a letter, dated 1 March, from President García Godoy to the leaders of the political parties recommending that they exert every effort in order that the electoral campaign might develop in an atmosphere of understanding and order; a circular issued by the Minister of the Armed Forces to the Chiefs of the Armed Services establishing rules of conduct for the Armed Forces during the electoral campaign and emphasizing that no member of the Armed Forces should mix in political matters (similar instructions had been issued to the National Police by the new Chief of Police, General José Morillo); and the recognition by the Central Electoral Board of the following political parties: Partido Liberal Evolucionista (PLE), Partido Nacionalista Revolucionario Democrático (PNRD), Unión Cívica Nacional (UCN), Partido Revolucionario Social Cristiano (PRSC), Partido Revolucionario Dominicano (PRD), Partido Reformista (PR) and Alianza Social Demócrata (ASD).

103. During this period, the Government had announced the transfer abroad of further military personnel from the former "Constitutionalist" group and from the Dominican Armed Forces. Also, the Chief of the National Police had reported new measures for the collection of weapons and ammunition in the hands of civilians, and changes made in police personnel.

S. Reports of the Secretary-General to the Security Council covering the month of April 1966

104. During the month of April, the Secretary-General issued five reports (S/7032/Add.26-30), informing the Security Council, *inter alia*, of the following events relating to the forthcoming elections in the Dominican Republic:

105. On 2 April, a movement called the "24 April Movement" had been established in Santo Domingo under the leadership of the former "Constitutionalist" Minister of the Presidency, Héctor Aristy. In a manifesto published on the same day, the Movement had declared that it was not a political party and that its objective was to fight against "foreign intervention" and in favour of constitutional legality and economic and social development.

106. On 7 April, the Provisional Government had abrogated Act No. 77 of 2 December 1963, under which the Movimiento 14 de Junio had been declared illegal. Thereupon, the Movimiento 14 de Junio had been recognized by the Central Electoral Board as a political party.

107. On 8 April, the Provisional Government had recognized, provisionally and only for the purpose of the forthcoming elections, the following organizations or political parties: Partido Acción Revolucionaria, Partido Demócrata Cristiano, Partido Democrático Obrero Campesino and Partido Progresista Demócrata-Cristiano.

108. At national conventions held during the month of April by several political parties, the following nominations for candidates to the presidency and vice-presidency had been made:

The Partido Revolucionario Dominicano (PRD) had decided to take part in the elections and had chosen as its candidates for the presidency and vice-presidency, respectively, Mr. Juan Bosch and Mr. Silvestre Antonio Guzmán. The Partido Revolucionario Social Cristiano (PRSC) had decided to support the presidential and vice-presidential candidates of the PRD.

The Partido Liberal Evolucionista (PLE), supported by the Partido Nacionalista Revolucionario Democrático (PNRD), had nominated Mr. Rafael F. Bonnelly, leader of the Movimiento de Integración Nacional (MIN), as its candidate for President, and Dr. Tabare Alvarez Pereyra, a member of the PLE, as Vice-President.

The Partido Reformista (PR), supported by the Partido Demócrata Cristiano (PDC), and by the Partido Vanguardia Revolucionaria Dominicana (VRD), had nominated Dr. Joaquín Balaguer and Mr. Francisco Augusto Lora as candidates for the presidency and vice-presidency, respectively.

The Partido Alianza Social Demócrata (PASD) had decided not to take part in the election.

At its national convention on 15 April, the Movimiento Revolucionario 14 de Junio had announced that it was giving its support to the candidatures of Mr. Bosch and Mr. Guzmán. Subsequently, Mr. Bosch had made a statement accepting the support of the PRSC, but rejecting that of the Movimiento Revolucionario 14 de Junio.

109. The reports also contained information regarding incidents which had taken place in the Dominican Republic during that period. While there had been fewer cases of terrorism in Santo Domingo and in the provinces, students and other groups had held demonstrations protesting the presence of the Inter-American Peace Force in the country. There had also been some unrest among municipal workers.

110. On 20 and 21 April, six former "Constitutionalist" cadets and a lieutenant-colonel from the "27 February camp" had been transferred abroad.

T. Communications received by the Security Council from the Organization of American States during the months of March and April 1966

111. During this period, the Secretary General of the Organization of American States forwarded to the Security Council the text of reports of the OAS *Ad Hoc* Committee to the Tenth Meeting of Consultation giving detailed accounts of events in the Dominican Republic (S/7206, S/7217, S/7227, S/7254).

U. Reports of the Secretary-General to the Security Council during the month of May 1966

112. In four reports issued during the month of May (S/7032/Add.31-34 and Add.31/Corr.1), the Secretary-General informed the Council of events in the Dominican Republic relating to the forthcoming elections and other developments.

113. During the first two weeks of May, several clashes had occurred in Santo Domingo and in the provinces between members of the Partido Revolucionario Dominicano and the Partido Reformista. On 6 May, the Provisional Government had established an Electoral Police whose main task was to protect political leaders during the electoral campaign. On 11 May, Provisional President García Godoy had, in a televised speech, expressed concern over certain signs of pressure exerted by minority groups intent upon disturbing the electoral process. He had appealed to all sectors of the population to maintain a peaceful and orderly atmosphere for the elections.

114. On 13 May, the Provisional Government had announced that twenty-eight prominent Latin American personalities whose names had been submitted to the Provisional Government by the Organization of American States had agreed to observe the elections in the Dominican Republic. On the same day, the OAS *Ad Hoc* Committee had announced that IAPF personnel would be confined to barracks on Election Day.

115. On 17 May, Professor Juan Bosch, presidential candidate of the Partido Revolucionario Dominicano, had charged that members of the Armed Forces and the National Police had persecuted members of his party since the beginning of the electoral campaign and had engaged in political activities on behalf of the Partido Reformista. He had announced that the Executive Committee of his party had decided to give the

Provisional Government forty-eight hours to put an end to that situation, failing which the PRD would withdraw from the electoral campaign.

116. On 18 May, President Héctor García Godoy, in a speech to the nation, had confirmed his Government's guarantees of freedom to all political parties participating in the electoral campaign and had made a new and solemn promise that that freedom would be respected. The President had announced his decision to confine all armed forces to their barracks from 19 May until Election Day. In addition, he had announced the appointment of a Commission composed of one representative chosen by each of the presidential candidates, one official of the Central Electoral Board and a special representative of the President of the Republic, to investigate complaints made by the political parties and to ensure that the decrees and regulations enacted by the Government to guarantee freedom to political parties would be implemented.

117. Following the speech by the Provisional President, and statements made by the Minister of the Armed Forces and the Chief of the National Police guaranteeing non-interference by army and police elements in political activities in the electoral campaign, the Executive Committee of the Partido Revolucionario Dominicano had announced that since the measures taken by the Provisional Government had resolved the political crisis, the party would participate in the elections.

118. On 23 May, the Central Electoral Board had turned down a request by the Movimiento Revolucionario 14 de Junio that its members be allowed to vote as such for the Bosch-Guzmán ticket. The Board had based its decision on the fact that Mr. Bosch had officially informed it of his party's refusal to accept the support of the Movement. The Movement had been informed that if its followers wished to vote for the Bosch-Guzmán ticket, they would have to do so on the white ballots of the PRD.

119. On 29 May, the OAS *Ad Hoc* Committee had indicated, in a press statement, that forty-one observers invited by the OAS would observe elections in twenty-one provinces of the Republic and in the National District. The observers would submit a report to the Provisional Governments.

120. At midnight on 30 May the electoral campaign had officially ended. The political parties and their candidates were as follows:

Dr. Joaquín Balaguer and Mr. Francisco Augusto Lora, respectively, were supported by the Partido Reformista, the Partido Demócrata Cristiano, the Partido Progresista Demócrata-Cristiano and the Partido Liberal Evolucionista.

Mr. Rafael F. Bonnelly and Dr. Abel Fernández Simo, respectively, were supported by the Partido Acción Revolucionaria, the Partido Nacionalista Revolucionario Democrático, the Partido Vanguardia Revolucionaria Dominicana and the Partido Unión Cívica Nacional.

Professor Juan Bosch and Mr. Silvestre Antonio Guzmán, respectively, were supported by the Partido Revolucionario Dominicano and the Partido Revolucionario Social Cristiano.

121. On 30 May, Provisional President García Godoy had sent a communication to the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers of the Organization of American States, informing it that he had

instructed the Dominican representative to the OAS to request a meeting of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation in order to ask for the withdrawal of the Inter-American Peace Force from Dominican territory. During the second part of May, further clashes between rival political parties had taken place in and outside Santo Domingo, as well as incidents involving the police and army.

V. Communications received by the Security Council from the Organization of American States during the month of May 1966

123. By a cable dated 13 May (S/7303), the OAS Secretary General transmitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, for the information of the Security Council, the text of a resolution adopted on that day by the Tenth Meeting of Consultation, in which it authorized the OAS Secretary General, in response to a note of 28 April from the Provisional President of the Dominican Republic, to extend invitations on behalf of the latter to outstanding persons from various countries of their hemisphere to witness and observe, in their individual capacity, the elections on 1 June 1966, and requested the OAS Council to allocate the required funds for that purpose.

124. By a cable dated 27 May (S/7324), the OAS Secretary General transmitted to the Secretary-General, for the information of the Security Council, the text of a report dated 20 May 1966 of the OAS *Ad Hoc* Committee to the Tenth Meeting of Consultation. The report, which gave an account of events connected with the forthcoming elections in the Dominican Republic and other related matters, stated, *inter alia*, that in response to requests from the Provisional Government of the Dominican Republic, the Inter-American Peace Force had begun to transfer its troops to points outside the city of Santo Domingo, to be replaced by members of the Dominican Armed Forces and the National Police. The only Peace Force troops remaining in the city were those of a small contingent stationed near the "27 February camp". The report further stated that, in accordance with information available to the *Ad Hoc* Committee, the electoral climate seemed satisfactory, despite incidents which had occurred between the principal parties in the heat of the electoral campaign.

125. By a cable dated 31 May (S/7332), the OAS Secretary General transmitted to the Secretary-General, for the information of the Security Council, a further report, dated 26 May, of the OAS *Ad Hoc* Committee to the Tenth Meeting of Consultation. The report contained, *inter alia*, information on the composition and functions of the Commission to investigate acts which might disrupt the electoral process, established on 18 May by the Provisional Government.

W. Reports of the Secretary-General to the Security Council during the month of June 1966

126. On 4 June, the Secretary-General issued a report (S/7338), dealing mainly with the elections which had been held in the Dominican Republic on 1 June 1966.

127. The report stated, *inter alia*, that, apart from a few minor incidents, the elections had proceeded in a calm and orderly manner. On 1 June, the Provisional

President, Héctor García Godoy, in an address to the nation, had expressed satisfaction with the way in which the elections had been held and had asked the Dominican people to maintain an orderly attitude in order to resolve peacefully the problems which faced the country.

128. On 3 June, the Central Electoral Board had furnished provisional results of the election which gave Dr. Joaquín Balaguer 754,409 votes and Professor Juan Bosch 517,784 votes.

129. On 3 June, one person had been killed and three others wounded when members of the National Police had dispersed a group of demonstrators protesting the results of the election at a public park in Santo Domingo. On the night of the same day, heavy shooting had broken out between police and army elements on the one hand, and the guards stationed at the house of Mr. Héctor Aristy, a former "Constitutionalist" leader, on the other. Two of Mr. Aristy's guards had been killed and one wounded.

130. On the same day, the Executive Committee of the Partido Revolucionario Dominicano had decided to contest the results of the elections in those municipalities where, it said, there was proof of irregularities.

131. Also on 3 June, the Central Electoral Board had issued a communiqué stating that complaints received by the Board to the effect that polling boxes, ballots and some materials used in polling stations had been found, should not be interpreted as evidence of fraud which might cloud the honest elections of 1 June. There had been isolated cases in which the personnel in charge of polling stations had neglected to collect the materials in question upon completion of the voting and persons, apparently bent on creating anxiety among the people, had spread the news that those materials had been used to the detriment of the political interest of particular sectors.

132. In an addendum issued on 15 June (S/7338/Add.1), the Secretary-General informed the Council of the following events.

133. On 4 June, the Partido Revolucionario Dominicano had submitted to the Central Electoral Board a document stating that the irregularities which had occurred during the elections had been "serious and grave". The PRD had requested the Board to order a scrutiny and verification of the election results and, on that basis, to decide whether the elections had been valid or should be annulled.

134. On 7 June, the PRD had challenged the President of the Central Electoral Board, Dr. Angel M. Liz, and had taken exception to the 3 June communiqué issued by the Board, which the PRD contended had implied a judgement *a priori* on the honesty and legality of the elections.

135. In addition, the Movimiento Revolucionario 14 de Junio, the Partido Revolucionario Social Cristiano, and a number of labour organizations had charged that the elections had been fraudulent.

136. On 7 June, the Partido Reformista, commenting on the PRD document contesting the election results, had stated that the PRD had failed to furnish evidence of specific cases of fraud as well as the facts which would determine the existence of fraud during the elections, and had therefore totally rejected the charges made by the PRD.

137. On 13 June, Mr. Bosch in a speech defining his party's position on the contesting of elections and the attitude of the party towards the new Government had stated that, while his party could submit ample evidence of the irregularities committed during the elections, it would not challenge the election results. The PRD, he said, had lost the elections because of "fraud and coercion" and, in particular, because "threats to peasants had been effective owing to the conditions obtaining in the countryside". Stressing the importance of the role of the opposition in a democracy, the PRD leader had stated that his party would not accept either a coalition government or a government of unity, but would offer a "creative, democratic and serious" opposition to assist in reconstructing the country economically and socially and to protect the rights of its citizens.

138. In an addendum issued on 22 June (S/7338/Add.2), the Secretary-General informed the Security Council of the final results of the elections on 1 June 1966, as given by the Central Electoral Board in Santo Domingo on 21 June. These were as follows: Dr. Joaquín Balaguer 769,265 votes, Professor Juan Bosch 525,230 votes, and Mr. Rafael F. Bonnelly 39,535 votes.

139. In a statement, the President of the Central Electoral Board had set forth the following points in connexion with the results of the election: (1) the Partido Revolucionario Dominicano and the Partido Revolucionario Social Cristiano had contested the results of the elections in 189 electoral polling stations, totalling 68,919 votes. After subtracting that number of votes from the total number of votes obtained by Dr. Joaquín Balaguer and Mr. Juan Bosch, the figures for each of these candidates were as follows: Dr. Joaquín Balaguer 700,346; Mr. Juan Bosch 456,311; (2) no other contestations relating to the elections had been presented to the Central Electoral Board at the end of the period provided for the submission of such contestations; (3) in view of the fact that the contestations made had not altered the results of the election of Joaquín Balaguer and Augusto Lora, the Central Electoral Board declared that the latter had been elected to the offices of President and Vice-President, respectively.

140. In the congressional elections the Partido Reformista had won twenty-two seats in the Senate and forty-seven seats in the Chamber of Deputies and the Partido Revolucionario Dominicano five seats in the Senate and twenty-six seats in the Chamber of Deputies.

141. The breakdown by provinces of the total number of votes obtained by political parties was set forth in an annex to the report of the Secretary-General.

142. In an addendum issued on 30 June (S/7338/Add.4), the Security Council was informed that, in accordance with a resolution adopted on 24 June by the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Organization of American States, elements of the Inter-American Peace Force had started to withdraw from the Dominican Republic. According to a communiqué issued on 28 June by the Peace Force headquarters in Santo Domingo, subsequent departures of Peace Force troops and equipment would be spaced over a three-month period. The communiqué had noted that the total strength of the Force had been reduced, since May 1965, from 23,000 men to its present level of approximately 8,000.

X. Communications received by the Security Council from the Organization of American States during the month of June 1966

143. By a cable dated 1 June (S/7335), the OAS Secretary General forwarded to the Security Council a further report of the OAS *Ad Hoc* Committee to the Tenth Meeting of Consultation dealing with electoral developments in the Dominican Republic.

144. By a cable dated 6 June (S/7342), the OAS Secretary General transmitted to the Secretary-General, for the information of the Security Council, the text of a report, dated 2 June 1966, submitted by the Group of Observers appointed by the Organization of American States to observe the elections in the Dominican Republic, to the Provisional President, Dr. Héctor García Godoy. The report stated, *inter alia*, that election officials had performed their tasks efficiently and impartially, while the police authorities had kept aloof from the electoral proceedings themselves. The observers had commended the orderliness with which the voting had been conducted and had concluded that a level of honesty and good faith had been attained which made it possible to consider the electoral proceedings completely satisfactory.

145. Finally, the report stated that in the opinion of all the observers the elections had been an "outstanding act of democratic purity" that was a credit to the political and elections authorities, to the leaders of the participating political parties and to all Dominican citizens.

146. By a cable also dated 6 June (S/7343), the OAS Secretary General transmitted to the Security Council the text of a report, dated 2 June, of the *Ad Hoc* Committee to the Tenth Meeting of Consultation, on the results of the elections. The report stated, *inter alia*, that the elections had been conducted in an atmosphere of "perfect order, peace and freedom". Appended to the report were a statement by the *Ad Hoc* Committee relative to the conduct of the voting, and a statement issued by a group of the OAS observers, both expressing satisfaction at the manner in which the elections had been held and congratulating the Dominican people.

Y. Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council dated 2 July 1966

147. A report submitted to the Council on 2 July (S/7338/Add.5) by the Secretary-General stated that on 1 July Dr. Balaguer and Mr. Francisco Augusto Lora had been sworn in as President and Vice-President of the Dominican Republic by the President of the National Assembly. In his inaugural address, Dr. Balaguer had stated that the country was returning to a system of law and that no one would be permitted to live outside legal norms. He had set forth a policy of austerity to place the Republic's economic, administrative and financial structure on a sounder footing. His Government would support the OAS and would work within it to the end that national sovereignty was never again infringed by foreign troops. While his Government intended to act drastically if extremists sought to disturb the peace, it would protect opponents against persecution and would ensure that the symbols of past oppression would disappear forever from Dominican life.

**LETTER DATED 26 DECEMBER 1963 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CYPRUS
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL**

**A. Communications and reports received between
16 July and 2 August 1965**

148. On 25 July 1965, in a communication transmitted by the representative of Turkey, the Vice-President of Cyprus (S/6562) charged that the Greek members of the Cyprus House of Representatives had prevented the Turkish members from attending the meeting of the House on 23 July 1965 and had proceeded to enact electoral legislation which in his view was inconsistent with the Constitution of the Republic and disregarded the existence of the Turkish community as an equal party in the island. Such action also was contrary to Security Council resolution 186 of 4 March 1964.

149. On 29 July 1965 the Secretary-General in his report on recent developments in Cyprus (S/6569) drew the attention of the Security Council to a number of developments which had increased tension in the island. He stated that on 20 July 1965 the Government of Cyprus had approved a bill extending the tenure of the President of the Republic and of the members of the House of Representatives for a period not exceeding twelve months, with no reference to the Vice-President. The Government had also approved an electoral bill which made no mention of the communal distinction provided for in the Constitution of 1960. Both bills had been adopted by the House of Representatives on 23 July 1965. On the same day the Turkish Cypriot members of the House of Representatives had adopted a resolution extending the term of office of the Vice-President and of the Turkish Cypriot members of the House for a period not exceeding a year.

150. Throughout the period of increased tension, Mr. Bernardes, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Cyprus, and Gen. Thimayya, the UNFICYP Commander, had made available their good offices to the Government of Cyprus and to the Turkish Cypriot community and had thus succeeded in keeping channels of communication open between them.

151. The Secretary-General himself had on 27 July 1965 appealed through his representatives in Cyprus to the Government and to the Turkish Cypriot leadership to exercise restraint and to avoid any actions which might precipitate a crisis. He had received positive assurances from both the parties concerned.

152. On 30 July 1965 the representative of Turkey drew the attention of the President of the Council (S/6571) to the two laws enacted by the House of Representatives of the Republic of Cyprus, stating that they constituted a flagrant violation of the international agreements upon which the Constitution of Cyprus had been based and had been enacted in utter disregard of Security Council resolution 186 of 4 March 1964. He requested an early meeting of the Council to consider the matter and to take steps to prevent the recurrence of such actions.

153. On the same day, the representative of Cyprus informed the President of the Council (S/6573) of his Government's position on the recent enactments by the Cyprus Legislature. He stated that transitional

measures had been made necessary by the approaching expiration on 16 August 1965 of the terms of office of the President and of the members of the House of Representatives, and that as the matter was one falling within the domestic jurisdiction of Cyprus, any outside interference must be rejected. He also restated his Government's position that the international treaties concerning Cyprus had been imposed from outside without the consent of the people of Cyprus and were in conflict with the Charter of the United Nations. In no case, he said, would the new legislation follow the previous divisive constitutional provisions.

154. On 31 July 1965 the representative of Cyprus requested the President of the Council (S/6581) to convene an emergency meeting of the Council to consider his Government's complaint against the Government of Turkey for acts of interference in the internal affairs of Cyprus and for the threat of the use of force against its territorial integrity and political independence in violation of the Charter.

155. On 2 August the Secretary-General in a further report to the Council (S/6586) informed its members concerning measures taken by the Turkish Cypriots making temporary provision for the election of the Vice-President of the Republic and of the Turkish Cypriot members of the House of Representatives. These measures further stipulated that only electoral laws in effect before 21 December 1963 should apply to members of the Turkish Cypriot community.

156. Various other communications were received during this period from the representative of Cyprus concerning military manoeuvres by the Cypriot armed forces (S/6534) and the return to Cyprus of Turkish Cypriot students from abroad (S/6549), and from the representative of Turkey concerning alleged arbitrary acts against the members of the Turkish community in Cyprus (S/6576).

**B. Consideration at the 1234th to 1236th
meetings (3-10 August 1965)**

157. The letters of 30 July 1965 from the representative of Turkey (S/6171) and of 31 July 1965 from the representative of Cyprus (S/6581) were included in the agenda of the 1234th meeting of the Council on 3 August 1965 and the representatives of Cyprus, Turkey and Greece were again invited, at their request, to take part in the discussion.

158. Opening the debate, the representative of Turkey again expressed his view that the ultimate aim of the Greek Cypriot community was union with Greece, which it had tried to achieve by a series of *faits accomplis* since the adoption of the Council's resolution of 4 March 1964. The new electoral law enacted in Cyprus was another measure of that kind. The Turkish Cypriot members of the executive and legislative organs of the Republic had repeatedly proposed the convening of the Constitutional Government and Parliament but their proposals had been rejected by the Greek Cypriot leadership. The term "Government of Cyprus" could therefore only be taken to mean the *de facto* Greek Cypriot administration.

159. He also drew the Council's attention to Turkey's rights under the Treaty of Guarantee to his Government's call upon the other Guarantor Powers to hold consultations under article 4 of that Treaty and to its protest to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Cyprus against the measures taken by the Cyprus Legislature. In conclusion, he pointed out that what was at stake was not only the rights of the Turkish community in Cyprus or of Turkey but the peace of the region and the effectiveness of the Council in keeping the peace.

160. The representative of Cyprus said that in bringing its complaint before the Council Turkey wished to create further tension with a view to justifying a possible new military action against Cyprus. His Government was concerned at the threat of aggression posed by Turkey, particularly in its note of 27 July 1965 claiming to reserve the right to take all necessary actions under the Treaty of Guarantee if anything took place in Cyprus that was not to its liking. The present grave situation in Cyprus had been caused not by the enactment of any new law but by Turkey's interference in the island's internal affairs and its continuous efforts to create a situation of *de facto* division there.

161. Explaining the new law enacted by his Government, he said that Cyprus, like any other sovereign State, was entitled to amend its electoral legislation and to extend the term of office of the President or Parliament in order to ensure the normal functioning of the State. As the United Nations Mediator in Cyprus had recognized, events in Cyprus since December 1963 had created a situation which made it impossible to return to the Constitution of 1960. The new electoral law could therefore in no way follow the divisive line of the previous constitutional provisions, which, by their abnormality and proven unworkability, had been one of the main causes of the Cyprus crisis. The Treaty of Guarantee which, from the beginning, had been in direct conflict with the Charter, had been imposed on the people of Cyprus under duress and blackmail. When the island had been subjected to bombings in August 1964 the invalidity of the Treaty of Guarantee had become obvious, and as far as the Government of Cyprus was concerned it no longer existed.

162. His Government would do its best to keep the peace in Cyprus and to co-operate fully with UNFICYP and with the United Nations Mediator on the basis of the Council's resolution of 4 March 1964.

163. The representative of Greece said that he understood the overcautious view shared by some Members of the Organization with regard to the timing of the new legislation enacted by the Government of Cyprus but he failed to understand why Turkey had come to the Council with its complaint. The reports of the Secretary-General, despite the increase in tension which they noted, contained nothing alarming, and the Secretary-General had received assurances of restraint and avoidance of any action which might precipitate a crisis from both sides in the dispute in Cyprus.

164. The policy of Turkey on Cyprus had always been a negative and obstructive one and it was regrettable that Turkey still seemed unwilling to agree to correcting the fallacies of the 1960 Constitution, especially at a time when his Government had begun talks with Turkey looking towards a peaceful settlement of the Cyprus question.

165. The representative of Turkey, speaking in reply, said that Turkey had made no threats against the ter-

ritorial integrity and political independence of Cyprus. The note addressed to Cyprus by Turkey on 27 July had been a formal cautionary statement and could in no sense be interpreted as a threat. The assertion that the Treaty of Guarantee, because it had been violated, was no longer valid was illogical. The Treaty had been fully accepted by all the parties concerned and no one at the time had referred to any conflict between it and the Charter. In conclusion he rejected again the report of the United Nations Mediator on Cyprus but expressed his Government's willingness to continue in the search for an agreed settlement concerning Cyprus.

166. The representative of Cyprus said it was his Government's position that the London Agreements had ceased to exist. If Turkey insisted upon their validity it would do well to take the matter to the International Court of Justice. Talks between Greece and Turkey could help improve the atmosphere but the problem of Cyprus could be solved only through the exercise by Cypriots of their right of self-determination.

167. Cyprus was co-operating closely with the United Nations Mediator, and hoped that he would be allowed to continue his work. Despite certain reservations, his Government believed that the criteria laid down by the Mediator were right and in the spirit of the United Nations Charter. Its basic policy was that Greeks and Turks in Cyprus could and must live together.

168. In a letter dated 4 August 1965 (S/6594), the representative of Turkey requested that Mr. R. Denktas, President of the Turkish Communal Chamber of Cyprus, be given the opportunity to address the Council under rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure.

169. At the 1235th meeting of the Council on 5 August 1965 the President of the Council, speaking as the representative of the United Kingdom, said that his Government's consistent policy towards Cyprus had been to encourage progress towards a political settlement acceptable to all concerned on the basis of the Council's resolution of 4 March 1964, the spirit and purpose of which they had supported with all their power. His Government regarded the new electoral law as a breach of the Cyprus Constitution and regretted that the Cyprus Government had taken such action in the light of operative paragraphs 1 and 3 of the 4 March resolution. The Treaty of Guarantee was part of the series of treaties on which the independence of Cyprus depended. They were freely negotiated and could not be abrogated unilaterally. A change could be brought about only through negotiations or by any other method acceptable to the parties concerned. It seemed desirable to his Government that, until the Treaties relating to Cyprus could be altered by mutual agreement, the organs of the Cyprus Government should function constitutionally. The new legislation had made the situation more difficult and it had led the Turkish Cypriot leaders to take parallel action about which his Government took precisely the same view. Therefore, he urged the Government of Cyprus not to take any further measures to give effect to the new legislation and approved the counsels of moderation given to both the parties in Cyprus by the Secretary-General and his representatives in Cyprus.

170. The representative of the United States noted that the new legislation in Cyprus could hardly be qualified as "restrained" within the terms of the Council's resolution of 4 March 1964. The United States joined the Secretary-General in urging restraint and the

avoidance of action likely to aggravate the situation, whatever the legal rights any of the parties claimed. They must all endeavour to negotiate and accommodate their differences with a respect for the rights of all concerned. Strict adherence to the Council's resolution of 4 March 1964 was necessary if progress towards an agreed solution was to be achieved.

171. The representative of France said that his Government had welcomed the improvement in the situation in Cyprus during recent months. However, the action just taken by the Cyprus Government jeopardized the progress made. It might be useful for the Council to reaffirm its resolution of 4 March 1964, for observance of its provisions would facilitate direct talks, and to express the hope that no unilateral measures would be taken to jeopardize its effectiveness. Both sides should refrain not only from any resort to force but from any threat of its use.

172. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that his Government continued to support a solution of the Cyprus question on the basis of respect for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus and for the legitimate rights of both the Greek and the Turkish Cypriots. In its view the removal of all foreign troops from the territory of Cyprus and the liquidation of foreign military bases there were the main prerequisites which would allow the people of Cyprus to decide their domestic affairs without foreign interference. All the parties involved should observe fully the Council's resolution of 4 March 1964.

173. The representative of Turkey said that his Government had been seeking a solution to which all parties could agree, but on condition that no efforts would be made to impose a solution by force and be *faits accomplis*. Turkey had acted in good faith, but there was reason to doubt the sincerity of Greece.

174. The representative of Greece said that the Council should not allow itself to be diverted from the two main facts. Cyprus was calm and efforts to achieve a lasting solution of the problem were continuing.

175. In accordance with the Council's decision under rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure, Mr. Denktas was then invited by the President to address the Council. Mr. Denktas said that the new law enacted by the Government of Cyprus was illegal and designed to complete the process of robbing the Turkish Cypriot community of its constitutional rights. The Council should condemn the Government's action as a measure contrary to the Council's resolution of 4 March 1964. If the new laws were implemented, the Turkish Cypriot community would have no choice but to protect its rights with political countermeasures or whatever other measures were necessary. The partnership between the Greek and Turkish communities of Cyprus established by the Constitution could not be unilaterally abrogated. If the Greek Cypriots continued to apply their plan for achieving *enosis*—a plan which included the revision of the Constitution, the abrogation of the Treaty of Guarantee, a new campaign for self-determination and finally a referendum and a declaration of *enosis*—and to disregard the constitutional rights of the Turkish Cypriots, the results would be disastrous for Cyprus.

176. The representative of Cyprus appealed to the Council to give the people of Cyprus a chance to work out their own solution without foreign interference and blackmail, in strict adherence to the Council's resolution of 4 March 1964 and to the United Nations Charter.

177. The representative of Turkey said that Turkey had always sought not partition but the independence and integrity of Cyprus in a federal régime. Such a régime was the only constitutional system which could give full guarantees to the Turkish minority.

178. The representative of Cyprus said that the solution the representative of Turkey had proposed was out of the question. His Government continued to seek a solution to the problem worked out in co-operation with the United Nations and providing a United Nations guarantee for the Turkish minority.

179. On 9 August 1965 the representative of Turkey transmitted a letter from Mr. R. Denktas (S/6601) replying to the statement of the representative of Cyprus at the 1235th meeting of the Council on 5 August. In another letter of 9 August 1965 (S/6602) the representative of Turkey drew the Council's attention to further developments in Cyprus relating to the election of the President of the Cyprus House of Representatives and two newly enacted laws, one of them dealing with the question of a so-called Ministry of Education and the second amending the law of conscription. He stressed that the new laws had no constitutional validity and were contrary to the Council's resolutions.

180. In a second addendum to his report on recent developments in Cyprus (S/6569/Add.2) issued on 10 August 1965, the Secretary-General, at the request of the representative of Turkey, brought to the Council's attention information about the election of the President of the House of Representatives in Cyprus, Mr. G. Clerides, for a period not exceeding one year and about legislative action concerning the representatives of the Armenian, Maronite and Latin religious groups which, under the Constitution of 1960, had been members of the Greek Communal Chamber.

181. At the 1236th meeting of the Council on 10 August 1965 the following draft resolution (S/6603), sponsored by Bolivia, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Malaysia, Netherlands and Uruguay, was introduced:

"The Security Council,

"Noting the report of the Secretary-General (S/6569) of 29 July 1965 stating that recent developments in Cyprus have increased tension in the island,

"Noting the further reports of the Secretary-General of 2 August (S/6586), 5 August (S/6569/Add.1) and 10 August 1965 (S/6569/Add.2),

"Having heard the statements of the parties concerned,

"1. Reaffirms its resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964;

"2. Calls upon all parties, in conformity with the above resolution, to avoid any action which is likely to worsen the situation.

Decision: *At the 1236th meeting, on 10 August 1965, the draft resolution (S/6603) was adopted unanimously (resolution 207 (1965)).*

C. Communications and reports received between 10 August and 3 November 1965

182. During this period a series of communications was addressed to the Security Council or to the Secretary-General by the representatives of Cyprus, Turkey and Greece. Those from the representative of Turkey included a number of letters bringing to the

attention of the Council communications from Dr. F. Küçük, Vice-President of Cyprus.

183. Letters dated 25 August (S/6630, S/6631, S/6632), 3 September (S/6654), and 7 and 9 September (S/6665 and S/6675) from the representative of Cyprus dealt, *inter alia*, with his Government's call for self-determination of the people of Cyprus; its rejection of the concept of "partnership" between the communities in Cyprus; the text of its note of 2 September to Turkey regarding the Treaty of Alliance and its protest against violation of the air space of Cyprus by Turkish military aircraft.

184. Letters dated 10 August (S/6606), 27 August (S/6635, S/6638) and 2, 7, 9, 14, 17, 21 and 28 September (S/6635, S/6638, S/6653, S/6667, S/6682, S/6697, S/6704, S/6708 and S/6724) from the representative of Turkey included the following: a message from Dr. Küçük, Vice-President of Cyprus, concerning the Council's debate on 5 August; a reply to the letter from the representative of Cyprus dated 25 August; a communication drawing attention to the increased psychological pressure on the Turkish Cypriot community in Cyprus; a reply to the letter of the representative of Greece dated 2 September; a message from Dr. Küçük concerning the possibility of peaceful intercommunal coexistence in Cyprus within the framework of a federal Government; a message by Mr. Denktas, President of the Turkish Communal Chamber of Cyprus, on the question of "partnership" of the two communities in Cyprus; further information on the increased psychological pressure against the Turkish Cypriots by the Cyprus Government; a denial of the Cyprus Government's allegation that the air space of Cyprus had been violated; messages from Dr. Küçük concerning the economic restrictions imposed on the Turkish Cypriots; and complaints concerning the armed attack by Greek Cypriots against the mixed village of Polimnia in Cyprus; armed clashes between the Greeks and Turks in the area of Limmitis village and the alleged distortion of a statement made by the Prime Minister of Turkey.

185. In a letter dated 2 September (S/6650) the representative of Greece stressed his Government's support for self-determination and freedom from foreign interference for Cyprus and replied to the letter of the representative of Turkey dated 2 September.

186. On 23 September 1965 the Secretary-General submitted a new report (S/6702) on the financial situation in respect of the United Nations operation in Cyprus, informing the Council that a gap of over \$9 million still existed between requirements and resources to cover the expenses of UNFICYP up to 26 December 1965.

187. In letters dated 28 October 1965 the Secretary-General (S/6863) appealed to all Governments of the United Nations for further voluntary contributions for the financing of UNFICYP.

188. In a letter dated 4 November 1965 (S/6877) the representative of Turkey requested the President of the Council to call an immediate emergency meeting of the Council in order to consider the extremely dangerous situation created by a new Greek Cypriot armed attack against the Turkish quarter of the port city of Famagusta. In his view this new Greek Cypriot offensive was part of a plan to extend the unconstitutional authority of the Greek Cypriot régime in order to impose a solution based on *faits accomplis* on the other parties in the dispute. It was imperative to halt this

offensive immediately and secure observance of and adherence to the cease-fire agreement of 15 May 1964 and to the Council's resolutions of 4 March 1964 and 10 August 1965.

189. On 5 November 1965 the Secretary-General in a report to the Council (S/6881) described the development of events which had led to the armed clashes between 2 and 5 November in the area of Famagusta and action by UNFICYP concerning this situation.

190. The Secretary-General stated that the difficulties had their origin in the decision of the Cyprus Government to build a new harbour and coastal fortifications near the area of the walled city of Famagusta, a Turkish stronghold, which the Turkish Cypriots regarded as a threat to their community. In September 1965 the tension had risen as both sides set up additional new positions, against the advice of the UNFICYP Commander. Firing had begun on 2 November near the Turkish village of Sakharía and had spread to other areas around the walled city of Famagusta until 4 November. The Turkish Cypriot leaders also complained that during those days essential food supplies could not be moved into the walled city and restrictions had been imposed on movement in the old city.

191. The Secretary-General then reviewed the contacts entered into by his Special Representative in Cyprus with the President, the Vice-President and high Government officials, and the efforts of the UNFICYP Command to remedy the situation locally. Both the parties had been asked to exercise restraint and to make efforts to restore normalcy and thus to avoid any possible large-scale fighting in the island. The Government of Cyprus and the Turkish Cypriot leadership had put forward proposals for the solution of the local situation.

192. In addenda to his report dated 5 and 6 November (S/6881/Add.1-2) the Secretary-General informed the Council that as of 2007 hours GMT on 5 November, the cease-fire in the Famagusta area was being observed; and that UNFICYP had made possible some local arrangements, agreed by both sides, by which relaxation of the tension in the area had been achieved.

D. Consideration at the 1252nd meeting (5 November 1965)

193. The letter dated 4 November 1965 from the representative of Turkey and the report of the Secretary-General were included in the agenda of the 1252nd meeting of the Council on 5 November 1965. The representatives of Cyprus, Turkey and Greece again participated in the discussion, pursuant to their requests.

194. The representative of Turkey charged that more than 10,000 Turkish Cypriots were at that moment under attack by Greek Cypriot forces in the city of Famagusta and had been sealed off from the rest of the island. His Government had exercised restraint in the face of the aggressive attack in Famagusta and had placed its confidence in the Council for the maintenance of peace on the island. He warned again that Greece and the Greek Cypriots had constantly tried to solve the Cyprus problem through *faits accomplis*. Greece had dispatched 10,000 troops to Cyprus and had helped equip 40,000 Greek Cypriot troops under the command of a Greek, General Grivas. Its plan for *enosis* had been systematically implemented by military encroachments and economic pressures, not excluding even starvation. The events in the Famagusta area were a part of the

Greek Cypriot plan for implementing the policy of *enosis*.

195. He appealed to the Council to stop the Greek Cypriot attacks in the Famagusta area and to take any measures it might deem appropriate for securing the observance of its resolutions by all parties. The Council should call upon the Greek Cypriots, in accordance with the Agreement of 5 May 1964, to withdraw from the positions they had occupied as a result of their aggression.

196. The representative of Cyprus said that the Turkish representative had presented a false picture of the situation in Cyprus. The report of the Secretary-General established that the Turkish Cypriots in the Famagusta area had begun the firing and that peace had already been restored in the area when the representative of Turkey had requested the emergency meeting of the Council.

197. He also drew the Council's attention to Turkey's request for discussion of the situation in Cyprus by the Council of NATO. His Government from the beginning of the Cyprus crisis had placed its faith in the Security Council and had struggled to have not NATO troops but the United Nations Force in Cyprus. It had made every effort to ensure implementation of the Council's resolution of 4 March 1964. On the other hand Turkey, following its policy of division of the people of Cyprus, was responsible for preventing the restoration of normal conditions in the island and for the inactivity of the United Nations Mediator on Cyprus. It now wished to create a tense situation in order to change the atmosphere that had been established through his Government's Declaration of Intent in connexion with the international guarantee of human and minority rights, with particular reference to the Turkish Cypriots.

198. The representative of Greece said that Turkey was seeking to exaggerate the gravity of the incidents in Famagusta in order to make political capital out of them. Calm had prevailed in Cyprus for many months. The Government of Cyprus had publicly declared its readiness to grant to the minorities in the island the most extensive human and political rights under the direct supervision and control of the United Nations. That offer had been rejected by Turkey, which immediately afterward had exerted pressure on the Greeks and the Greek Orthodox Church in Istanbul and on Greece itself by repeated border incidents and by overflights of Greek air space. Now, according to a press report, the Foreign Minister of Turkey had announced in the Parliament that the armed forces of the country had been alerted and were ready to take action, in view of the worsening situation in Cyprus. He asked the Council to reaffirm its full confidence in the effectiveness of UNFICYP to cope with developments in the island as they arose.

199. The representative of Turkey said that he was glad to hear that a cease-fire had been established in Famagusta and considered that the Council's meeting had been instrumental in bringing it about. The Council should now endeavour to effect a withdrawal by the Greek Cypriot National Guard to the positions occupied by it prior to 2 November.

200. The representative of the United States said that his Government was prepared to support any reasonable action by the Council to make its concern about the situation in Famagusta evident and to inhibit the recurrence of similar unnecessary violence. He

stressed that it was incumbent upon all concerned to co-operate in ensuring peace in the island and to refrain from all provocative activity.

201. The representative of the United Kingdom said his delegation trusted that the patient work of UNFICYP and the Secretary-General's representative would receive the support and co-operation which the Council had requested, that the resolutions of the Council would be strictly observed and that all concerned would exercise the utmost restraint.

202. The representative of the USSR said that his Government regretted the new exacerbation of the situation in Cyprus and continued to believe that the Cyprus problem could and must be solved by peaceful means, with due regard for the principles of justice and without any interference, in any form whatsoever, from outside. In the situation which had arisen, it was especially necessary that the parties concerned should adhere strictly to the Council's resolutions of 4 March 1964 and 10 August 1965.

203. The President of the Council made a statement in which he said that after consulting members of the Council and taking into account the statements of the representatives of Cyprus, Turkey and Greece and the reports of the Secretary-General, he would appeal to all the parties to show the utmost moderation, to co-operate in the full application of the Council's resolutions, and to refrain from any action likely to worsen the situation in Cyprus. The Council would continue to follow the situation and would be kept informed of developments by the Secretary-General.

E. Communications and reports received between 6 November and 16 December 1965

204. In a report on the financial situation in respect of the United Nations Operation in Cyprus dated 19 November 1965 (S/6954), the Secretary-General informed the Council that there was still a gap of \$6.9 million between requirements and financial resources to cover the expenses of UNFICYP up to 26 December 1965. He wished formally to call the Council's attention to the hard and urgent fact that UNFICYP could not be maintained in Cyprus without the financial means to defray its costs.

205. On 10 December 1965, the Secretary-General submitted his sixth report (S/7001) on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus covering the period from 11 June to 8 December 1965. The forthcoming period, the report stated, would mark a crucial stage in the Organization's peace efforts in the island. The Cyprus operation was beginning to assume the dimensions of a dilemma for the Organization. It had originally been launched in the expectation that as an emergency measure it would be of short duration, but the realities of the conflict had continuously required its prolongation. That situation could not be continued indefinitely.

206. The presence and functioning of UNFICYP had provided a climate of relative calm in which a peaceful solution might be found. But little political progress had been achieved. The armed confrontation, mutual hatreds, mistrust and suspicions between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities had remained unchanged. If the leaders of the two communities did not demonstrate their willingness to resolve their differences the prospects for an early solution would be dim. A political impasse had paralysed the mediation effort and present indications were that it would not easily be broken. Yet it must be clear that mediation

in some form offered the main hope for a breakthrough to future harmony and tranquillity.

207. The Secretary-General appealed again to all Members of the Organization to contribute to the Force's voluntary fund and thus to provide the necessary financial support for the extension of UNFICYP's mandate, preferably for a period of six months.

208. UNFICYP, the Secretary-General observed, had played an important role in maintaining law and order in Cyprus and had in its day-to-day activities prevented the outbreak of possible serious incidents. But the fighting in the Famagusta area in early November had again caused increased tension in the island and only a gradual return to an uneasy truce had been achieved in December. During that period UNFICYP had played an important role in averting overt fighting between the two communities in Cyprus. The Secretary-General's Special Representative and the Commander of the Force had proposed to the Cyprus Government and to the Turkish Cypriot leadership a large-scale defortification programme under UNFICYP auspices which, after further clarification, had been accepted by both sides.

209. The advance towards normalization in civilian fields of activity had been only modest, the Secretary-General continued. UNFICYP could do no more than assist in overcoming the hardships resulting from the division between the two communities and take steps to prevent the creation of new difficulties.

210. There had been some improvement in the economic life of the island as a whole and especially within the Greek Cypriot community. The Government of Cyprus had continued to allow Turkish Cypriot freedom of movement subject only to identification and search and had removed certain items from the list of materials whose entry into Turkish Cypriot areas was prohibited. UNFICYP had achieved only a little progress in its efforts to facilitate the normal functioning of public services across communal lines and the resettlement of Turkish Cypriot refugees.

211. In a letter dated 13 December 1965 (S/7013), the representative of Turkey transmitted the text of a message from the Vice-President of Cyprus informing the Council that the Greek members of the House of Representatives had, in violation of the Cyprus Constitution, passed a law providing for the establishment of a new Public Service Commission. This action could leave the rights and interests of the nearly 3,000 Turkish members of the public service without any guarantee.

F. Consideration at the 1270th meeting (17 December 1965)

212. The report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus (S/7001) was included in the agenda of the 1270th meeting of the Council. The Council also had before it his two reports on the financial situation relating to the Cyprus operation as of 23 September and 19 November 1965. At their request, the representatives of Cyprus, Turkey and Greece were again invited to participate in the debate.

213. The Secretary-General, supplementing the observations contained in his report of 10 December (S/7001), said he was firmly of the view that the United Nations operation in Cyprus should be extended for a six-month period beyond 26 December 1965, and that assurances of the necessary financial support for

UNFICYP should be given prior to a decision to extend the Force's mandate. He also expressed doubts about the propriety and efficacy of the established method of financing UNFICYP.

214. The representative of the Netherlands said that the UNFICYP presence had undoubtedly stopped the fighting, prevented the outbreak of new hostilities and brought a large measure of calm to Cyprus. After that essential first step the United Nations should help to bring about a solution of the underlying political problem by giving new impetus to negotiations between the parties. He also felt that the cost of UNFICYP should be reduced, that the parties directly concerned should make a larger contribution and that all Members of the Organization who had not contributed should do so now. The Council should urge the parties concerned to enter into negotiations with United Nations mediation, and if it decided to extend UNFICYP's mandate for three months, should do so in the hope that sufficient progress would be achieved to justify the beginning of a phased withdrawal of UNFICYP. His delegation would have liked these elements to be incorporated in a draft resolution, but since the Council was under pressure of time, it had refrained from insisting on the inclusion of these elements in the draft resolution to be introduced.

215. His Government's future contribution to UNFICYP would have to be smaller than in the past, and would depend on evidence of progress towards a solution of the problem. The Netherlands Government also was of the opinion that any future extension of UNFICYP should be made dependent upon the same condition.

216. The representative of Cyprus expressed approval of the constructive work carried out in Cyprus by UNFICYP. In his view, the lack of improvement in the situation was due to the policy of the Turkish Cypriot leadership, supported by Turkey, which had prevented any reconciliation between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. The Turkish Cypriot leadership had also rejected his Government's proposals for dismantling of the fortified positions on both sides, its offer to build houses for the Turkish community and its Declaration of Intent. A solution was possible for the island if Turkey would abandon its policy of partition.

217. The representative of Turkey expressed agreement with the Secretary-General's report and said that Turkey would give up its claim to partition if the Greek Cypriots would renounce the policy of *enosis*. Mediation was the only way out, and the Council's resolution of 4 March 1964 should be reactivated.

218. The representative of Greece supported the recommendation for the extension of UNFICYP and joined in the Secretary-General's appeal to all Members to contribute to the operation. His Government would continue to pursue the effort to find a peaceful solution of the Cyprus problem in the spirit of the United Nations Mediator's report.

219. The representative of Malaysia introduced a draft resolution (S/7024), co-sponsored by Bolivia, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Malaysia, Netherlands and Uruguay, under the operative paragraphs of which the Council would: (1) reaffirm its previous resolutions on the question; (2) again extend the stationing in Cyprus of UNFICYP for an additional period of three months, ending 26 March 1966; and (3) call upon the parties directly concerned to make an earnest, persistent and intensified effort to achieve a peaceful settlement of the problem of Cyprus.

220. The representative of the United Kingdom supported the continued presence of UNFICYP in Cyprus and joined the Secretary-General's appeal for voluntary financial contributions.

221. The representative of the United States supported the extension of UNFICYP's mandate and appealed to all Member States to contribute to the maintenance of the Force. He also supported a call upon the parties concerned to bring their dispute to a peaceful end and urged the Secretary-General, in consultation with the parties, to reactivate the mediation efforts called for in the Council's resolution of 4 March 1964.

222. The representative of Jordan suggested a change in the wording of operative paragraph 3 to call for "a peaceful solution and an agreed settlement of the problem of Cyprus, in accordance with the resolution of 4 March 1964 and the United Nations Charter".

223. The representative of Bolivia said that the parties concerned should be called upon to negotiate so that the problem of Cyprus did not become a constant burden to the United Nations.

224. The representative of the USSR said that the Soviet Union had found it possible to consent to the dispatch of United Nations troops to Cyprus only because the Government of Cyprus had agreed to it, and also in view of the fact that the functions of those troops in Cyprus and the conditions for their financing had been clearly laid down in the Security Council resolution of 4 March 1964. He underlined the need for the parties concerned to intensify their efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement of the problem, in accordance with the Council's resolutions and with the United Nations Charter.

225. The representative of the Ivory Coast proposed the addition to the phrase proposed by the representative of Jordan in operative paragraph 3 of the draft resolution of the words "having in mind the well-being of the people of Cyprus as a whole and the preservation of international peace and security".

226. The representative of Malaysia said that after consultations, the sponsors of the draft resolution had agreed to delete operative paragraph 3.

227. The representative of Uruguay said that Cyprus should find a way to live without the need for foreign forces or an outside presence on its soil, and there should be neither partition nor *enosis*.

Decision: *At the 1270th meeting, on 17 December 1965, the draft resolution (S/7024), as amended by the co-sponsors, was adopted unanimously (resolution 219 (1965)).*

228. It reads as follows:

"The Security Council,

"Noting that the report of the Secretary-General dated 10 December 1965 (S/7001) states that the United Nations Peace-keeping Force is needed in Cyprus,

"Noting that the Government of Cyprus has agreed that in view of the prevailing conditions in the island it is necessary to continue the Force beyond 26 December 1965,

"1. Reaffirms its resolutions 186 (1964) of 4 March, 187 (1964) of 13 March, 192 (1964) of 20 June, 193 (1964) of 9 August, 194 (1964) of 25 September and 198 (1964) of 18 December 1964, 201 (1965) of 19 March, 206 (1965) of 15 June and 207

(1965) of 10 August 1965 and the consensus expressed by the President on 11 August 1964;

"2. Extends once again the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force, established under Security Council resolution 186 (1964), for an additional period of three months, ending 26 March 1966.*

229. On 31 December 1965, the Secretary-General informed the Council (S/7054) that the United Nations Mediator on Cyprus, Mr. Galo Plaza, had submitted his resignation on 22 December, owing to the controversy over the contents of his report and over his functioning as Mediator and to the impasse created by that situation in his mediation efforts. The Secretary-General had accepted the Mediator's resignation and expressed his regret over the circumstances which had led Mr. Galo Plaza to that decision, stating that in his view the report of the Mediator continued to be a most important contribution to the search for a just and lasting solution to the Cyprus problem.

G. Communications received between 1 January and 10 March 1966

230. On 28 January 1966, the Secretary-General appealed to Governments (S/7107) for further voluntary contributions to provide the necessary financial support for the United Nations Peace-keeping Operation in Cyprus. He drew attention to the fact that approximately \$11 million would be required if all financial obligations relating to the Force were to be met by the end of the extended period of UNFICYP's mandate on 26 March 1966.

231. In a note of 4 March 1966 (S/7180), the Secretary-General informed the Council that on 2 March 1966, after having informed the parties directly concerned, he had broadened the responsibilities of his Special Representative in Cyprus, Mr. C. Bernardes of Brazil. The instructions given to him were without prejudice to the mediation function as envisaged in the Council's resolution of 4 March 1964 and asked him to use his good offices and such approaches to the parties concerned as were likely to be productive, in the first instance in discussion at any level of problems of either a local or a broader nature.

232. In this period a further series of communications was addressed to the Secretary-General by the representatives of Cyprus, Turkey and Greece.

233. Letters dated 8 February (S/7128), 7 March (S/7186/Rev.1) and 10 March (S/7197, S/7198) from the representative of Turkey, dealt, *inter alia*, with the communiqué issued by the Government of Greece and Cyprus on 2 February 1966; Turkey's opposition to *enosis* and its preference for the maintenance of an independent State of Cyprus under conditions safeguarding that independence; and the rejection by Dr. Küçük, Vice-President of Cyprus, and by Turkey, of accusations against the Turkish Cypriot community and the staff of the Turkish Embassy in Nicosia in connexion with bomb incidents in Cyprus.

234. Letters dated 11 February (S/7138) and 11 March 1966 (S/7194) from the representative of Greece transmitted the text of the communiqué issued by the Governments of Greece and Cyprus on 2 February 1966; and a reply to the Turkish letter of 7 March which stated that Greece had never denounced the treaties on Cyprus but considered that they should be replaced by other arrangements corresponding better to the real needs of the situation in Cyprus.

235. Letters dated 14 February (S/7138), 21 February (S/7155), 7 March (S/7182) and 9 March 1966 (S/7189) from the representative of Cyprus dealt, *inter alia*, with: the communiqué of Greece and Cyprus dated 2 February; the policy of Turkey on Cyprus, and evidence of the direct involvement of officials of the Turkish Embassy in acts of sabotage committed in 1964 and 1965.

236. On 10 March 1966, the Secretary-General submitted to the Council his seventh report on the United Nations Peace-keeping Operation in Cyprus (S/7191) covering the period from 9 December 1965 to 10 March 1966.

237. Nothing, the Secretary-General said, had occurred during the period covered, in Cyprus or elsewhere, to change the views he had expressed in his last report. In the political field the parties concerned and especially the leaders of the two communities had shown little will to intensify their efforts towards those mutual accommodations in viewpoint and position which were essential to pacific settlement of the problem.

238. In the military field the situation had remained calm and the cease-fire had continued to be observed despite a number of minor incidents in certain areas of Cyprus. However, the possibility of renewed fighting was still present if steps were not taken in time to control the minor clashes. The continued functioning of UNFICYP was therefore still indispensable if relative calm was to be maintained. On the other hand, it had proved possible to reduce the strength of the Force to about 4,500 officers and men without compromising the effectiveness of UNFICYP in carrying out its mandate.

239. The Secretary-General described the assistance given by UNFICYP in the administrative and economic fields, carried out across inter-communal lines, and stressed the efforts of UNFICYP to reduce steadily its own role in those fields with the aim of restoring normal conditions and achieving more direct co-operation between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots.

240. The Secretary-General noted that there had been a number of indications that the Cyprus population as a whole was increasingly impatient for a return to normal conditions and for a solution of the Cyprus problem. That factor might have a positive influence upon the efforts being made to find a solution. He also expressed the hope that all concerned would assist his Special Representative in Cyprus to achieve discussions on current limited matters in Cyprus and thus to provide a solid basis for efforts to tackle more fundamental problems.

241. The Secretary-General informed the Council that his efforts towards achieving a resumption of the mediation function had thus far been unavailing.

242. In a review of the financial situation of UNFICYP, the Secretary-General stated that it continued to be acute and that the deficit remained at about \$5 million. Should the Council extend the mandate of the Force for a period of six months, the additional costs to the United Nations would be approximately \$10 million and there should be assurance of adequate financial support to sustain it in advance.

243. In conclusion the Secretary-General paid tribute to UNFICYP's personnel for its skilled and effective work in Cyprus and to the memory of the late Gen. K. S. Thimayya, the Commander of the Force, who had died suddenly of natural causes in Nicosia on 18 December 1965.

H. Consideration at the 1274th and 1275th meetings (15 and 16 March 1966)

244. At the 1274th meeting of the Council on 15 March 1966 the report of the Secretary-General (S/7191) was included in the agenda. The representatives of Cyprus, Turkey and Greece were again invited, at their request, to participate in the discussion.

245. The Council also had before it the following draft resolution (S/7205), submitted by Argentina, Japan, Mali, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Uganda and Uruguay:

"The Security Council,

"Noting from the report of the Secretary-General of 10 March 1966 (S/7191) that in the present circumstances the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus is still needed if peace is to be maintained in the island,

"Noting that the Government of Cyprus has agreed that in view of the prevailing conditions in the island it is necessary to continue the Force beyond 26 March 1966,

"Noting that the basic problem, according to the Secretary-General's report, remains unsolved,

"1. Reaffirms its resolutions 186 (1964) of 4 March, 187 (1964) of 13 March, 192 (1964) of 20 June, 193 (1964) of 9 August, 194 (1964) of 25 September and 198 (1964) of 18 December 1964, 201 (1965) of 19 March, 206 (1965) of 15 June, 207 (1965) of 10 August and 219 (1965) of 17 December 1965 and the consensus expressed by the President at the 1143rd meeting, on 11 August 1964;

"2. Urges the parties concerned to act with the utmost restraint and to make determined efforts with a view to achieving the objectives of the Security Council;

"3. Extends once more the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force, established under Security Council resolution 186 (1964), for a period of three months ending 26 June 1966, in the firm hope that by the end of this period substantial progress towards a solution will have been achieved."

246. Introducing the draft resolution, the representative of Nigeria said that it was intended to place at the Secretary-General's disposal the opportunity to continue the useful work he had been carrying on for the solution of the problem and to avoid anything which might hinder the search for a solution.

247. At the 1275th meeting of the Council the representative of the USSR restated his Government's support for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus, for observance of the lawful rights of both national communities in Cyprus and for the peaceful settlement of the internal problems of Cyprus by the Cypriots themselves without any outside interference, particularly from NATO. In that connexion all foreign troops should be withdrawn from Cyprus and all foreign military bases should be dismantled. The USSR had no objection to the extension of the Force's mandate if that was done in accordance with the Council's resolution of 4 March 1964.

Decision: *At the 1275th meeting, on 16 March 1966, the draft resolution (S/7205) was adopted unanimously (resolution 220 (1966)).*

248. After the vote, the Secretary-General said that the action of the Council in again extending the Force's

mandate was essential in the light of the continuing circumstances in the island. He was disappointed, however, that the resolution made no effort to strengthen the inadequate financial support for UNFICYP. There was still a substantial deficit which could be met only by further contributions.

249. The representative of the United Kingdom pointed out that his Government had given practical support to the Secretary-General both by providing a military contingent at no cost to the United Nations and by making a financial contribution totalling over \$10 million including a new pledge of up to \$1 million to help meet the deficit reported by the Secretary-General. The British Government would continue to provide military and financial support to UNFICYP and appealed to other Governments to join in sharing the burden in order to ensure that the Secretary-General and UNFICYP were enabled to complete their tasks. He also welcomed the broadened responsibilities of the Secretary-General's Special Representative in Cyprus and stressed that the key to settlement lay primarily with the parties.

250. The representative of Argentina stated that the positive results achieved by the United Nations presence in Cyprus would have lasting meaning only if they served to create the atmosphere indispensable for the achievement of a true solution.

251. The representative of Japan regretted that the Secretary-General's efforts to achieve a resumption of the mediation function had been unavailing, but welcomed the broadened responsibilities of his Special Representative in Cyprus. In his view, the international community had every right to expect that all parties concerned would co-operate faithfully and in a conciliatory spirit to bring about a prompt and peaceful solution to the problem. It was not realistic to assume that a relatively small number of countries would indefinitely make voluntary contributions to an emergency peace-keeping operation if positive progress towards a peaceful solution was not forthcoming.

252. The representative of New Zealand welcomed the additional responsibilities of the Secretary-General's Special Representative in Cyprus as a device which could enable the parties to discover or enlarge areas of agreement among them. It was not unreasonable to expect that efforts made by the international community should be matched by efforts made by the parties to reach an accommodation. He regretted that the resolution contained no reference to the question of finance. In his view such failures by the Council to face up to the financial implications in making decisions undermined its authority.

253. The representative of the Netherlands said that the decision of his Government to acquiesce once again in the continued presence of UNFICYP troops in Cyprus was based on the conviction that their presence had been beneficial and that their withdrawal at that time would endanger peace in the island as well as the solution which was sought by all. His delegation shared the growing concern of many Members of the United Nations, particularly those that contributed militarily or financially to the Cyprus operation, at the lack of progress towards a political solution. By sponsoring the resolution and by voting for it his Government did not in itself assume any commitment to make a further financial contribution. His Government's decision with regard to future financial contributions would depend on evidence of progress towards a solution of the Cyprus problem.

254. The representative of the United States declared that his Government would continue to support the United Nations operation in Cyprus, expressed the belief that the time was at hand to intensify the search for a basic solution and appealed for increased voluntary contributions to UNFICYP, especially by members of the Council who had not yet contributed.

255. The representative of Uruguay said that insufficient progress had been made towards a solution of the Cyprus problem. It was imperative for the Council, instead of adopting stopgap measures such as extending the stationing of the United Nations Force in the island, to address itself to the substance of the problem by facilitating the exercise by the people of Cyprus of their right of self-determination through the exercise of their constituent power, without pressure from outside.

256. The representative of Cyprus noted that there had been an improvement in the normalization of life in Cyprus and a measure of success with regard to freedom of movement. He approved the broadened responsibilities given the Secretary-General's Special Representative in Cyprus, and stressed that a return to normal conditions in the island was needed if a positive solution of the problem was to be found.

257. The representative of Turkey stressed his Government's desire to promote a peaceful and agreed settlement of the Cyprus question on the basis of the Council's resolution of 4 March 1964 and its readiness to co-operate in the common effort to attain that result.

258. The representative of Greece said that his Government would do all in its power to achieve progress towards a peaceful solution in accordance with the United Nations Charter.

I. Communications received between 17 March and 16 June 1966

259. In a letter dated 24 March 1966 the Secretary-General (S/7220) again appealed to Governments of all Member States and non-member States maintaining Permanent Observer's offices at Headquarters for further voluntary contributions for the financing of UNFICYP. He drew attention to his report of 10 March (S/7191) and to the Council's resolution of 16 March (S/RES/220/1966) and said that a gap of over \$7.3 million still remained between the estimated costs and the voluntary contributions pledged to UNFICYP up to 26 June 1966.

260. During this period a number of communications were received from the representatives of Cyprus and Turkey. The representative of Cyprus in letters dated 2 May (S/7276) explained his Government's position regarding the appointment of two new ministers in Cyprus. Letters dated 21 March (S/7216), 25 April (S/7267), 2 and 16 May (S/7274, S/7304), 1 June (S/7331) and 3 June (S/7331, S/7337) from the representative of Turkey included the following: another reply to the letter of the representative of Greece dated 10 March; a message from Dr. Küçük, Vice-President of Cyprus, in connexion with the appointment of two Greek Cypriots to ministerial posts held, under the Constitution of Cyprus, by Turkish Cypriots; a complaint concerning violations of freedom of religion and sacrilege allegedly committed by Greek Cypriots in Larnaca; and an urgent message from Dr. Manyera, the Turkish Cypriot Minister of Health, on the arbitrary sealing of the Turkish sector of Nicosia by the Cyprus Government.

261. In his eighth report on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus dated 10 June 1966 (S/7350 and Add.1), the Secretary-General stated that under the prevailing circumstances in Cyprus it was clear that UNFICYP's continued presence was indispensable if a disastrous reversion to violence and conflict was to be avoided. He recommended extension of the Force's mandate for a further period of six months. There had recently been an increase in incidents which he regarded as manifestations of a disturbing deterioration in the relations between the Government of Cyprus and the Turkish Cypriot leadership. That situation did not allow for any further reduction in the Force beyond the current strength of a total of 4,861 officers and men.

262. Conditions in Cyprus, the Secretary-General continued, and the situation of UNFICYP there, tended strongly to underscore the maxim that peace-keeping was a means and not an end. Peace-keeping could provide an atmosphere of quiet and could buy a reasonable time for peace-making, for resolving the differences which gave rise to the conflict. It was, however, and could only be, a first step towards pacific settlement. The fact must be faced that affairs in Cyprus had not as yet advanced beyond that first stage. Indeed, it was becoming apparent that in order to move the situation effectively towards a solution, efforts at the highest level might have to be undertaken.

263. UNFICYP continued to promote a policy of "deconfrontation" by interposing its own personnel in sensitive areas. Its efforts towards a return to normal conditions of life in the island had repeatedly been hampered by the tendency of the Government and of the Turkish Cypriot leadership to consider any steps towards normalcy as a possible erosion of their basic political positions, despite the desire among the Cypriots as a whole to see normal life restored.

264. A series of bombing incidents had taken place in the last three months and in that connexion the Secretary-General appealed to the responsible leaders in both communities to do all in their power to prevent irresponsible terrorist activities and not to allow such acts to undo the work which had already been accomplished in co-operation with UNFICYP towards restoring normalcy in the island.

265. The Secretary-General also reviewed the activities of his Special Representative in Cyprus. In his recent consultations with the President and the Vice-President of Cyprus, the Special Representative had been assured of their co-operation in carrying out his broadened responsibilities and had been given certain views on the possible start of direct talks between the Government and the Turkish Cypriot leadership on a number of urgent technical and political matters. Discussions had not yet started owing to the bombing incidents, for which the Government of Cyprus held the Turkish Cypriot community responsible.

266. The Secretary-General also referred to the consultations of his Special Representative in Cyprus with the Governments of Turkey and Greece in May and expressed the hope that the forthcoming bilateral talks between those Governments would contribute to the pacific settlement of the Cyprus problem. He stressed that efforts had to be undertaken by the parties concerned at the highest level to resolve the problem successfully.

267. He was unable to report any progress regarding a resumption of the mediation function.

268. Finally he reviewed the financial aspects of the United Nations Operation in Cyprus and informed the

Council that there would be a deficit of over \$3 million on 26 June 1966. He considered the method of voluntary contributions an inadequate and insecure basis for financing a peace operation and felt that as such it should not be considered a feasible means of financing any future United Nations peace operation.

J. Consideration by the Council at the 1286th meeting (16 June 1966)

269. The report of the Secretary-General was included in the agenda of the 1286th meeting of the Council on 16 June 1966, and the representatives of Cyprus, Turkey and Greece were again invited, at their request, to participate in the discussion.

270. The representative of the Netherlands introduced the following draft resolution (S/7358) on behalf of Argentina, Japan, Jordan, Mali, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria and Uganda:

"The Security Council,

"Noting from the report of the Secretary-General of 10 June 1966 (S/7350) that in the present circumstances the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus is still needed if peace is to be maintained in the island,

"Noting that the Government of Cyprus has agreed that in view of the prevailing conditions in the island it is necessary to continue the Force beyond 26 June 1966,

"1. Reaffirms its resolutions 186 (1964) of 4 March, 187 (1964) of 13 March, 192 (1964) of 20 June, 193 (1964) of 9 August, 194 (1964) of 25 September and 198 (1964) of 18 December 1964, 201 (1965) of 19 March, 206 (1965) of 15 June, 207 (1965) of 10 August and 219 (1965) of 17 December 1965, and 220 (1966) of 16 March 1966, and the consensus expressed by the President at the 1143rd meeting, on 11 August 1964;

"2. Urges the parties concerned to act with the utmost restraint and to make determined efforts with a view to achieving the objectives of the Security Council;

"3. Extends the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force, established under Security Council resolution 186 (1964), for a period of six months ending 26 December 1966, in the firm hope that by the end of this period substantial progress towards a solution will have been achieved so as to render possible a withdrawal or a substantial reduction of the Force."

271. The representative of the Netherlands stated that in submitting this text, the intention of the co-sponsors had been to limit the resolution to the extension of UNFICYP and to omit any element which could give rise to a controversial debate. This was done because there seemed to be new hope for a contribution to a solution of the Cyprus problem. The extension of UNFICYP for six months instead of three months was proposed not only for practical reasons, but also in the hope that by the end of that period substantial progress towards a solution would have been achieved so as to render possible a withdrawal or a substantial reduction of the force.

Decision: *At the 1286th meeting on 16 June 1966, the draft resolution (S/7358) was adopted unanimously (resolution 222 (1966)).*

272. The representative of the United Kingdom said that his Government would continue to give the Secretary-General and UNFICYP every possible support and to encourage all efforts to reduce tension and facilitate a final agreement. He appealed again to other members to join financially in the co-operative international effort in Cyprus.

273. The representative of France said that a six-month extension of UNFICYP's mandate appeared acceptable to him inasmuch as the resolution mentioned at the same time the Council's firm hope that by the end of that period progress would have been made towards a solution of the Cyprus problem. Generally speaking, his delegation felt that a peace-keeping operation which was extended too long could hinder the political settlement of a crisis by relieving the parties concerned of responsibility for making the necessary efforts. It would thus have preferred to see the Council limit the extension of UNFICYP's mandate to three months, which would have afforded a better means of bringing pressure to bear on the parties to negotiate. In connexion with the section of the Secretary-General's report dealing with financing, he observed, after recalling his abstention in the vote on paragraph 4 of the resolution of 4 March 1964, that some of the matters raised in the report seemed to go beyond the limits of the Cyprus question. In any case, he thought it essential for the Council to be able to choose the most suitable method of financing for each particular United Nations operation, no method being excluded *a priori*.

274. The representative of Nigeria said he agreed with the Secretary-General that a more practicable basis would have to be found for financing future peace-keeping operations.

275. The representative of Argentina said that UNFICYP should serve primarily to create stabilized conditions for the solution of political problems. The resolution adopted by the Council contained the elements necessary to achieve that objective.

276. The representative of Japan said that the Council had a right to expect that in the forthcoming period the parties directly concerned would make efforts to compose their differences in a conciliatory spirit.

277. The representative of the Netherlands said that the somewhat pessimistic evaluation of the situation by the Secretary-General in his latest report was a cause of deep concern to his delegation, but that there had also been some proof of determined efforts with a view to achieving the objectives of the Council. His delegation welcomed the joint announcement on 9 June by the Foreign Ministers of Turkey and Greece to the effect that they had agreed on the procedure to be followed for the initiation of a confidential dialogue in order to facilitate without delay a peaceful and agreed solution of the question of Cyprus and other problems affecting the relations between the two countries. It seemed therefore justified to extend UNFICYP's presence for six months, in the hope that that could be, if possible, the last extension of the Force. As regards the financing of UNFICYP, his Government had decided to make voluntary contributions, though in reduced amounts, for the periods 26 March-26 June and 26 June-26 December 1966. That would be the last contribution by the Netherlands if the present deadlock should persist.

278. The representative of Uruguay said that he would have preferred a resolution expressing the hope

that by the end of this period the self-determination of the people of Cyprus would have been achieved. He noted that Cyprus had still not exercised an essential right of sovereignty, that of drawing up its own constitution. He added that the dilatory practice of approving extension after extension was preventing the Council from coming to grips with the substance of the problem, which was to work out effective formulas whereby the people of Cyprus could exercise their constituent power, applying the principle of self-determination, without pressure or ties. Lastly, he stated that the Security Council should face up to its responsibility of fulfilling its obligations in the matter.

279. The representative of the United States declared his Government's continued support for the United Nations Operation in Cyprus and called for renewed efforts towards a peaceful solution.

280. The representative of the USSR restated his Government's position that the solution of the Cyprus question was a matter for the Cypriots themselves. He opposed all attempts to solve the problem of Cyprus over the heads of Cypriots in the interests of NATO and reaffirmed his delegation's position regarding the Council's resolution of 4 March 1964, and especially paragraph 4 of that resolution. He also emphasized that in voting in favour of the resolution adopted at the Council's 1286th meeting the Soviet delegation had proceeded on the understanding that the extension of the United Nations troops' stay in Cyprus would be effected strictly in accordance with the provisions of the Council resolution of 4 March 1964 and, in particular, subject to the condition that the existing functions of the United Nations troops in Cyprus and the arrangements in force for their financing—i.e., voluntary arrangements—would be kept unchanged.

281. The President, speaking as the representative of New Zealand, expressed regret that the people of Cyprus had become hostages to the intransigent positions taken in their behalf by the leaders of their communities.

282. The representative of Cyprus said that the problem of Cyprus had been complicated artificially and that foreign intervention in the interests of divisiveness was the cause of the crisis. Essentially there was nothing dividing the people of Cyprus and the problems could be solved by the Cypriots themselves.

283. The representative of Turkey said that a solution to the problem of Cyprus could be achieved if no outside influence in the interests of *enosis* was exerted.

284. The representative of Greece said that fresh efforts were being made by Greece and Turkey on the basis of the principles and recommendations of the United Nations to contribute towards finding a just solution to the problem of Cyprus.

K. Communications received between 17 June and 15 July 1966

285. In a letter dated 21 June (S/7376) the Secretary-General appealed urgently for voluntary contributions for the financing of UNFICYP to cover the costs of about \$11 million involved in maintaining the Force during the next six-month period.

286. Letters dated 23 June (S/7375/Corr.1) and 24 June (S/7377 and S/7378) from the representative

of Turkey contained, *inter alia*: a message from Dr. Küçük, Vice-President of Cyprus on the recent sealing-off of the Turkish section of Nicosia and the abduction of some Turkish Cypriots by the Cyprus administration; a message from Dr. Küçük on the action taken by the Turkish judges following the recent developments in

Cyprus and the reaction of Turkey to the recurrent blockade of the Turkish sector of Nicosia.

287. In a letter dated 2 July (S/7396), the representative of Cyprus complained of alleged subversive and aggressive actions undertaken against Cyprus by Turkey.

Chapter 3

THE INDIA-PAKISTAN QUESTION

A. Report by the Secretary-General

288. On 3 September 1965 the Secretary-General submitted to the Security Council a report (S/6651) informing the members of his deep concern about the grave situation that had developed in Kashmir and of the steps he had taken in seeking to avert further deterioration of the situation. There could be little doubt, the Secretary-General said, that the Kashmir problem had again become acute and was now dangerously serious. Implicit in it was a potential threat to peace not only between India and Pakistan but to the broader peace. There was, of course, a long and extensive background to the Kashmir problem, but, as Secretary-General, his primary concern at the present stage had necessarily been with the current breaches of the cease-fire agreement and the cease-fire line. Though fully aware of the political factors in the situation, he could not presume to act as political arbiter. It was enough to say that the cease-fire agreement, entered into by the parties at Karachi on 29 July 1949, had now collapsed. Each side, naturally, put forth justifications for its own actions. In any case, it seemed to him that the quiet which would result from mutual observance of the cease-fire would afford the most favourable climate in which to seek a resolution of political differences. The differences over Kashmir were sharp, great and ominous. They must be resolved if peace in that area was ever to be secure.

289. There had been a disturbing increase in the number of incidents involving violations of the cease-fire line since the beginning of 1965: as of mid-June 1965, a total of 2,231 complaints from both sides had been submitted to the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), and 377 violations had been confirmed by investigations of the Observers, 218 of which had been committed by Pakistan and 159 by India. Among the most serious of the violations was one that had occurred in May, when Indian troops in battalion strength had attacked and captured Pakistan positions in the Kargil area. The Secretary-General had appealed to India to withdraw its troops from the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line and, on assurance that United Nations Observers would henceforth be stationed on both sides of the line in that area, India had agreed to do so. Subsequently, there had been some military attacks on the Srinagar-Leh road by armed elements from the Pakistan side.

290. The current serious trouble affecting the cease-fire dated from 5 August 1965, and consisted of a large number of violations of the cease-fire line by crossings of the line, artillery fire across it and the occupation of positions on the wrong side of the line. General Nimmo, the Chief Military Observer of UNMOGIP,

had indicated that the series of violations that had begun on 5 August had been to a considerable extent in the form of armed men, generally not in uniform, crossing the cease-fire line from the Pakistan side for the purpose of armed action on the Indian side. That was a conclusion reached by General Nimmo on the basis of investigations by United Nations Observers, in the light of the extensiveness and character of the raiding activities and their proximity to the cease-fire line, even though in most cases the actual identity of those engaging in the armed attacks on the Indian side of the line and their actual crossing of it could not be verified by direct observation or evidence. On 9 August the Secretary-General had addressed an appeal to the Government of Pakistan for observance of the cease-fire line and to the Government of India for restraint as regarded any retaliatory action from its side. Those appeals had been repeated orally in subsequent days, and the Secretary-General had also asked that all personnel of either party on the wrong side of the line be withdrawn. He had not obtained any assurance from Pakistan that the cease-fire would be respected or that efforts would be exerted to restore normal conditions, but India had conveyed assurances that it would act with restraint with regard to retaliatory acts and would respect the cease-fire line if Pakistan did likewise. After having encountered difficulties from the parties in an effort to prepare a public statement on the matter and in sending a personal representative to the area to talk with both sides, the Secretary-General had instead asked General Nimmo on 23 August to consult promptly with him at United Nations Headquarters. In view of the continuing deterioration of the situation, and of reports indicating the steady escalation of the fighting in the air and on the ground, involving regular army forces on both sides, he had, on 1 September, appealed to the Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan to indicate immediately their intention henceforth to respect the 1949 cease-fire agreement.

291. Restoration of the cease-fire and a return to normal conditions along the cease-fire line, the Secretary-General continued, could be achieved only under the following conditions:

(a) A willingness of both parties to respect the Agreement they had entered into.

(b) A readiness on the part of the Government of Pakistan to take effective steps to prevent crossings of the cease-fire line from the Pakistan side by armed men, whether or not in uniform.

(c) Evacuation by each party of positions of the other party now occupied and withdrawal of all armed personnel of each party to its own side of the Line, which would include the withdrawal once more of Indian troops from Pakistan positions in the Kargil area.

(d) A halt by both parties to the firing across the cease-fire line that had been occurring from both sides in some sectors with artillery and smaller guns.

(e) Allowing full freedom of movement and access to United Nations Observers by both parties on both sides of the line.

B. Consideration at the 1237th to 1242nd meetings (4-20 September 1965)

292. At its 1237th meeting, on 4 September 1965, the question was placed on the Council's provisional agenda. The President, explaining the circumstances that had led him to convene the meeting, stated that the consultations he and the Secretary-General had held over the past few days had revealed a general desire for an urgent meeting of the Council to consider the serious conflict taking place in Kashmir. Acting under rule 1 of the Security Council's provisional rules of procedure, and in accordance with the past practice of the Council, he had called a meeting for that afternoon. He regretted that in view of the emergency he had not had sufficient time to advise all members in advance of the exact hour of the meeting.

293. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that rule 1 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure was linked with rules 2 and 3 and could not be invoked separately. Rule 1 invested the President only with the power of deciding on the timing of the meeting once it had been decided at the request of a member of the Council to convene it in accordance with rule 2 or as provided for by the Charter in accordance with rule 3. The Soviet delegation, which had always insisted on strict observance of the rules of procedure, could not agree with the interpretation given to those rules by the President in calling the present meeting. The Soviet delegation also protested that the President under the plea of urgency had not consulted all delegations even with regard to the timing of the meeting.

294. The representatives of Malaysia, China and the United Kingdom agreed with the interpretation of rules 1 to 3 given by the President, and maintained that rules 1 and 2 were mutually exclusive and that rule 2 did not cancel or detract from rule 1.

295. The representative of the Netherlands said his Government believed that because of the deterioration of the situation in Kashmir urgent circumstances existed that should be examined without delay by the Council. It therefore supported the President's call for the meeting.

296. The representative of the USSR said that while his delegation continued to maintain that rule 1 of the provisional rules of procedure could not be invoked apart from rules 2 and 3, the procedural problem before the Council had been solved by the Netherlands representative's statement, which constituted a formal request for the convening of the Council.

297. The provisional agenda was then adopted, and the representatives of India and Pakistan were invited to participate in the discussion without the right to vote.

298. The representative of India, opening the debate, recalled that the India-Pakistan question had been on the Council's agenda since January 1948, when India had first complained of Pakistan's aggression against the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir. No satisfactory solution had yet been reached, primarily because

the Council refused to face the simple fact of aggression by Pakistan. Although the cease-fire agreement of 1949 had not led to the vacation of Pakistan's aggression against Kashmir, the Government of India had always endeavoured to respect that Agreement. The Government and leaders of Pakistan, however, had shown scant regard for the cease-fire agreement and the cease-fire line. Over the years they had perfected the technique of sending troops across the line in civilian disguise. Most of those armed infiltrators, including the so-called "freedom fighters" and the members of the Azad Kashmir reserve forces, were part of Pakistan's regular or irregular army. There could thus be no doubt that whatever happened in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir was under the control, direction and inspiration of the Government of Pakistan.

299. That was the background of the invasion of Kashmir on 5 August 1965. On that day about 5,000 Pakistan troops, disguised as civilians, had begun to cross the Cease-Fire Line and the international border into the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir. Their objectives were to destroy key installations, cut road communications, assassinate political leaders and officials and terrorize the population. Pakistan's complicity in the operations of the infiltrators was completely proved by the nature, type and markings of the weapons captured, the statements made by the captured men and officers and the messages which they had transmitted on mobile transmitters. Above all, the Secretary-General's report of 3 September 1965 (S/6651) established Pakistan's complicity in the whole affair.

300. Similar attacks had been made earlier and in May 1965 the Indian army had been forced to counter-attack the Pakistan troops in the Kargil sector and had captured three of their posts in order to ensure the safety of the road from Srinagar to Leh. India's forces had then been withdrawn from those posts at the end of June. During the current invasion of the State, and for exactly the same reasons, Indian forces had once again occupied the three posts, and had been forced, purely as a defensive measure, to cross the cease-fire line and to occupy strategic points in the Tithwal and Uri sectors.

301. This was the action which Pakistan claimed had led it to cross the cease-fire line on 1 September 1965. In fact, the strength of the Pakistan troops engaged, and the support provided by armoured regiments and aircraft, left no doubt that the Pakistan attack had been premeditated, well-planned and in utter violation of the Charter of the United Nations, the accepted principles of international law and the cease-fire agreement.

302. In spite of the overwhelming evidence that the invasion had been organized by Pakistan and was directly controlled and conducted by it, Pakistan continued to maintain the fiction that what had occurred was a revolt of the people of the State against India. No such revolt had taken place. The revolutionary council alleged to have been set up by the people of the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir did not exist. The facts were that Pakistan had once again committed aggression against the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir, and had thereby torn the Cease-Fire Agreement to shreds and reduced the cease-fire line to a shambles. By sending thousands of troops across the cease-fire line Pakistan had violated even part I of the UNCIP resolution of 13 August 1948, the only part of that resolution that had ever been implemented. The

Security Council must therefore consider the facts and now, at last, come to the correct conclusion, which was that by condoning the aggression of 1947-1948 the Council had unwittingly given some legal semblance to Pakistan's armed presence in a part of the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir, and so given it an excuse for perpetrating further aggression. The Council must condemn Pakistan as an aggressor and instruct it to withdraw from all parts of the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir.

303. At the same meeting, the representative of India read out the reply sent on that date by his Prime Minister to the Secretary-General's message of 1 September. The Prime Minister stated that the root cause of the dangerous situation was the continuing massive infiltrations from the Pakistan side of armed personnel who were in fact members of the Pakistan armed forces. While appreciating the Secretary-General's peace efforts, the Prime Minister asserted that those efforts must begin by ascertaining from Pakistan if it would accept responsibility for withdrawing not only its armed forces but also the infiltrators, and for preventing further infiltrations.

304. The representative of Pakistan said that his Government was giving the appeal made by the Secretary-General to the President of Pakistan the most earnest consideration. While reserving the right to present his Government's position at a later stage, he repudiated the allegations made by the representative of India, which were based on deliberate fictions and could be controverted by facts. Those facts related not only to India's traditional contempt for the Security Council's resolutions but its more recent aggressive acts, including its being the first to cross the cease-fire line early in May 1965, the escalation of the conflict by its air force and the shelling of a town in West Pakistan.

305. At the same meeting, the representative of Malaysia submitted the following draft resolution (S/6657) sponsored by Bolivia, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Malaysia, the Netherlands and Uruguay:

"The Security Council,

"Noting the report of the Secretary-General of 3 September 1965 (S/6651),

"Having heard the statements of the representatives of India and Pakistan,

"Concerned at the deteriorating situation along the cease-fire line in Kashmir,

"1. Calls upon the Governments of India and Pakistan to take forthwith all steps for an immediate cease-fire;

"2. Calls upon the two Governments to respect the cease-fire line and have all armed personnel of each party withdrawn to its own side of the line;

"3. Calls upon the two Governments to co-operate fully with the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) in its task of supervising the observance of the cease-fire;

"4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council within three days on the implementation of the present resolution."

306. Introducing the draft resolution, the representative of Malaysia noted that it made no findings or judgements regarding the tragic situation that had developed along and beyond the cease-fire line between India and Pakistan in Kashmir. It called attention to the obligations already assumed under the Charter by both States. The urgency of the situation was evident

from reports coming from the area. The Security Council, the supreme United Nations organ responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security, owed it to itself to prevent the escalation of the present situation towards a wider war.

307. The representative of the Netherlands said that a problem with which the Security Council had been engaged since 1947 had returned with greater intensity and needed the Council's urgent attention. Since several earnest appeals had been made by the Secretary-General and by a number of Governments to the contending parties, which appeals had as yet not been heeded, the Council could not remain inactive with regard to acts which fell clearly within the purview of Chapter VII of the Charter. At the present stage of its deliberations the Council should urge both Governments to respect fully the cease-fire line by ceasing immediately all military actions, by preventing crossings of the line by armed personnel or civilians from both sides of the line, by halting all firing across that line, by withdrawing all armed personnel from the other side of the line and by co-operating with the United Nations Military Observer Group, which should have full freedom of movement and access. That was the purpose of the joint draft resolution, and the Netherlands delegation hoped for its unanimous adoption. The resolution should be seen as but a first step towards creating a favourable climate for the restoration of peace.

308. The representative of the United Kingdom said that the Council's first duty was to exert every effort to bring the fighting between India and Pakistan to an end. It was clear that the Kashmir problem must be solved if there was to be peace and stability on the sub-continent; however, such a solution could only be found by peaceful negotiations and not through force. For the present the Council must concentrate on bringing about a cessation of hostilities. His delegation fully endorsed the actions already taken by the Secretary-General and believed that the Council's adoption of the six-Power draft resolution would provide support for the Secretary-General's efforts to restore peace.

309. The representative of Jordan said that it was the Council's duty to see that the cease-fire established between India and Pakistan in Kashmir was respected and strictly observed. However, continued observance of the cease-fire could not be guaranteed merely by renewing appeals. What was required was a realization by the two countries that the political problem between them must be settled peacefully, with due regard to the claims, resolutions and agreements relating to it. Once the cessation of hostilities called for in the draft resolution had been achieved the Security Council should make a serious effort to look into the wider and basic aspects of the India-Pakistan question.

310. The representative of the USSR said that the Soviet people were deeply concerned over the armed conflict that had broken out in Kashmir, which was a part of the legacy of colonialism. In pursuit of its policy of peaceful coexistence, the Soviet Union had steadfastly supported the solution of disputes between States through negotiation and peaceful means. It hoped that India and Pakistan, which had already demonstrated their acceptance of such a policy, would find a way to bring about an immediate cessation of hostilities leading to a settlement of the conflict in Kashmir.

311. The representative of China said that the Council was indebted to the Secretary-General for his report (S/6651) and for his efforts to re-establish the cease-

fire. It must now give its full support to those efforts. China would support the draft resolution, which met the requirements of the present situation.

312. The representative of the Ivory Coast said that the Secretary-General's report, the press dispatches and the statements of the Indian and Pakistan leaders clearly indicated the seriousness of the situation which had resulted from the use of force by the two countries. The Security Council must do all it could to restore peace in the area and for that reason the Ivory Coast was co-sponsoring the draft resolution before the Council.

313. The President, speaking as the representative of the United States, said the United States considered that the immediate task before the Council was the cessation of the conflict. It fully supported the Secretary-General's efforts, including his appeal to the two Governments and the conditions he had outlined in that appeal for a restoration of the cease-fire. It also fully supported the six-Power draft resolution.

Decision: *At the 1237th meeting, on 4 September 1965, the draft resolution (S/6657) was adopted unanimously (resolution 209 (1965)).*

314. Speaking in explanation of his vote, the representative of France said that the resolution met the immediate requirements of a situation that was a matter of great concern to all. The emergency measures stipulated in the resolution constituted an essential preliminary to a more fundamental examination of the issue on which the Council might decide to embark subsequently.

315. At its 1238th meeting, on 6 September, the Security Council had before it a report by the Secretary-General (S/6661) on developments in the conflict between India and Pakistan. No official response to the Council's call for a cease-fire had been received from either Government, while reports from the Chief Military Observer in Kashmir, General R. Nimmo, indicated that the conflict was broadening and intensifying. According to information received by General Nimmo from the Pakistan army, Indian troops had attacked across the West Pakistan border and major attacks had been launched against Lahore, Sialkot and Kasur, all in Pakistan, by a large part of the Indian army.

316. The representative of Pakistan said that India's invasion of Pakistan was an event without parallel in the history of the United Nations. It was not only a brazen aggression on the territory of a Member State but a deliberate transgression of the very purposes and principles of the United Nations. Pakistan, which was one fifth of India's size and immeasurably smaller in military capacity and economic potential, had never harboured any aggressive designs upon India. However, India's greater size and military power had never been able to make Pakistan accept Indian usurpation of Kashmir.

317. The present attack on Pakistan had come as the culmination of a series of planned, provocative acts. Although the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, in response to the Security Council's 1964 appeal for a climate of moderation between the two countries, had offered a moratorium on all contentious issues between India and Pakistan, India's response had been the announcement, on 4 December 1964, of its decision to annex Kashmir in a way that would make self-determination impossible and the rearrest, in May, of Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah, the Kashmir leader who favoured self-determination.

318. Those political moves had been followed by military action. Indian troops had been massed in offensive positions along the borders of West and East Pakistan and, on 17 May, Indian forces had crossed the cease-fire line in the Kargil area of Kashmir and occupied three posts on the Pakistan side. That action, together with the movement of troops from the Chinese frontier area, were clear pointers to Indian designs on Kashmir.

319. None of those actions had had anything to do with the alleged infiltration of armed men into Indian-occupied Kashmir. Pakistan had solemnly declared that no troops of Pakistan or Azad Kashmir had crossed the cease-fire line, and had suggested that the Secretary-General's Personal Representative, Dr. Ralph Bunche, should proceed to both parts of Kashmir and examine the situation for himself. If there was any truth in India's allegations it should have welcomed the proposal.

320. The cease-fire line had been in a state of agitation for almost a year, with numerous violations on both sides. But there was a difference between violation and invasion, and it was India that had staged an invasion in Kashmir. That action had been announced in the Indian Parliament and publicized in the Indian Press. When, after exercising restraint for two weeks, Pakistan had been forced to take defensive action in the Chhamb area of Kashmir, India had been the first to throw aircraft into combat and thus make another move towards escalation of the conflict. Finally, on 6 September, India had exceeded all those actions by attacking Pakistan itself across the international border.

321. India had made use of several pretexts for its attack on Pakistan. It had alleged that a Pakistan plane had strafed an Indian base in Amritsar. That allegation was completely untrue. Another pretext was that Pakistan forces had crossed the "international frontier" into Jammu and Kashmir. There was no international frontier between Jammu and Kashmir and Pakistan, for the State was not a part of the Indian Union, but a territory in dispute, whose disposition was still to be determined through the implementation of the international agreement embodied in the two UNCIP resolutions. The Indian attack was in fact an act of naked aggression consistent with the attitude India had maintained in the Kashmir dispute for eighteen years, which was to thwart every attempt, spurn every offer, and ignore every Security Council resolution which would facilitate implementation of the international agreement embodied in the two resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, jointly accepted by India and Pakistan. Ever since the establishment of India and Pakistan as sovereign nations, India had sought to undo the partition of British India and to annex Pakistan; the occupation of Kashmir was a vital part of its design of eventually crushing Pakistan.

322. Pakistan appealed to all freedom-loving countries to support it in its exercise of its inherent right of self-defence. It would exercise that right until the Security Council took effective measures to vacate India's aggression against Pakistan and Jammu and Kashmir. Such measures, including enforcement action, were urgently required, and were the only way to secure a lasting peace in the region.

323. The representative of India then read to the Council his Government's comments on the resolution adopted by the Council at its last meeting. Neither the resolution nor the discussions preceding its adoption had taken into account Pakistan's violation of the in-

ternational border south of the Cease-Fire Line, which had changed the entire character of the situation. It was obvious that Pakistan was preparing a large-scale offensive against India. The Government of India had had no alternative but to move across the Wagah border to stop Pakistan at the bases from which the attacks in Jammu and Kashmir were being mounted and supported. The Secretary-General's report of 3 September clearly established that aggression had been committed by Pakistan. The Council's appeal should therefore have been addressed to Pakistan alone, for India, as was borne out in the same report, had always respected the cease-fire line.

324. It was India's view that an immediate cease-fire and the implementation of Security Council resolution 209 could be brought about only when Pakistan stopped further crossings of the cease-fire line by armed and unarmed personnel, civil and military, whether or not in uniform, and removed all such personnel, already on the Indian side of the line. Pakistan must also vacate its aggression in the Chhamb area, and undertake to respect the international border between India and Pakistan. Furthermore, India would have to be satisfied that such a situation would not recur.

325. At the same meeting, the representative of Malaysia introduced the following draft resolution (S/6662), co-sponsored by Bolivia, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Malaysia, the Netherlands and Uruguay:

"The Security Council,

"Noting the report of the Secretary-General (S/6661) on developments in the situation in Kashmir since the adoption of Security Council resolution 209 (1965) of 4 September 1965 calling for a cease-fire,

"Noting with deep concern the extension of the fighting which adds immeasurably to the seriousness of the situation,

"1. Calls upon the parties to cease hostilities in the entire area of conflict immediately, and promptly withdraw all armed personnel to the positions held by them before 5 August 1965;

"2. Requests the Secretary-General to exert every possible effort to give effect to the present resolution and to resolution 209 (1965), to take all measures possible to strengthen the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan, and to keep the Council promptly and currently informed on the implementation of the resolutions and on the situation in the area;

"3. Decides to keep this issue under urgent and continuous review so that the Council may determine what further steps may be necessary to secure peace and security in the area."

Decision: *At the 1238th meeting on 6 September the draft resolution (S/6662) was adopted unanimously (resolution 210 (1965)).*

326. After the adoption of the resolution, the Secretary-General informed the Council that he would exert every effort, including an early visit to the area, to achieve the end sought by all.

327. The President, on behalf of the Council, welcomed the Secretary-General's decision to go to the area, and expressed the hope that his efforts would help bring the present conflict to an end and point the way to an enduring peace between India and Pakistan.

328. In a telegram received on 6 September (S/6666), the President of Pakistan, replying to the

Secretary-General's message of 1 September, stated that the cease-fire had been reduced to nullity not on 5 August, but over a long period of time as a result of Indian design. The cease-fire itself flowed from resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan of 1948 and 1949 which constituted an agreement between the two parties to implement the pledge of a plebiscite in Kashmir—an agreement that had been subsequently repudiated by India. The people of Kashmir had now taken up arms in response to the unlawful Indian Government course of annexing the occupied portion of the State. After failing to suppress the revolt, India had embarked on a course of unlimited aggression across the cease-fire line, compelling the Azad Kashmir forces, backed by the Pakistan Army, to cross the line. Finally, the President expressed his misgivings about the proposal for a mere return to the *status quo ante* without assurance that the United Nations would strive to implement its resolutions concerning self-determination for Kashmir. However, he welcomed the Secretary-General's assistance toward the restoration of peace in Kashmir and the solution of its problems.

329. In pursuit of the mandate given to him by the Security Council, the Secretary-General departed for the sub-continent on 7 September and returned to New York on 16 September.

330. In a preliminary report on his mission (S/6683) dated 16 September 1965, the Secretary-General said that on 12 September, after discussions with the Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan, he had sent identical appeals to them calling for an immediate and unconditional cessation of hostilities. The India Prime Minister's reply of 14 September accepted the Secretary-General's proposal, provided that Pakistan was agreeable also. However, he stated, until Pakistan withdrew its armed infiltrators, Indian security forces would have to deal with them. The reply of the President of Pakistan, also received on 14 September, said that Pakistan would welcome a cease-fire which would provide a self-executing arrangement for a final settlement of the Kashmir dispute.

331. Later on 14 September the Secretary-General had sent a second message to the President of Pakistan and the Prime Minister of India expressing his appreciation of their positive attitude towards the cease-fire, but noting that both had added conditions and qualifications which the Secretary-General could only refer to the Security Council. Pending consideration by the Council, the Secretary-General again asked both parties to agree to order a cease-fire in the whole area of conflict.

332. The Indian Prime Minister had replied on 15 September reaffirming his willingness to order a simple cease-fire as soon as it was confirmed that Pakistan had agreed to do likewise.

333. While awaiting the reply of the President of Pakistan, the Secretary-General had sent a third message to the Prime Minister and the President, imploring them to stop the fighting, and suggesting that urgent consideration be given to a meeting between them, either with or without the Secretary-General's presence. He had assured them that he remained at their disposal for any assistance he might render and noted that certain offers had been made by world leaders indicating that they were available for conciliatory assistance.

334. On 16 September a reply had been received from the President of Pakistan stating that while

Pakistan was agreeable to stop fighting in principle, a cease-fire could be meaningful only if it was followed by such steps as would lead to a durable and honourable settlement of the Kashmir dispute.

335. In a further report on his mission (S/6686) submitted to the Council on 16 September, the Secretary-General stated that in the course of his talks with the Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan he had heard a detailed exposition of their views on the critical situation which had developed over Kashmir. Both sides had expressed their desire for a cease-fire and a cessation of hostilities. Despite this, the Secretary-General reported, he had not yet succeeded in securing an effective measure of compliance by the two sides with the Security Council's resolutions, as both had posed conditions which made the acceptance of a cease-fire very difficult for the other side. The Council was thus faced with a situation of the greatest difficulty and complexity. Nevertheless, the Secretary-General felt strongly that the Council had also a rare opportunity to show that peace could be restored and international harmony promoted by the concerted efforts of the international community. In those circumstances the Council might take a number of steps: it could, first, order the two Governments concerned, pursuant to Article 40 of the Charter, to desist from further hostile military action, and declare that failure to comply with this order would demonstrate the existence of a breach of the peace within the meaning of Article 39 of the Charter. The Council might also consider what assistance it could provide in ensuring the observance of the cease-fire and the withdrawal of all armed personnel by the two sides. It could also request the two Heads of Government to meet to discuss the current situation and the problems underlying it as a first step in resolving the outstanding differences between their two countries.

336. The Secretary-General also submitted a separate report on the military situation (S/6687), stating that a sizable number of infiltrators continued to operate on the Indian side of the cease-fire line, and tribesmen from the north-west frontier were arriving at the front. The report listed Indian crossings of the cease-fire line, of the Jammu border, and of the India-Pakistan border, as well as Pakistan crossings of the cease-fire line, and noted that there had been a considerable use of air forces by both sides.

337. At its 1239th meeting on 17 September, the Council also had before it the text (S/6685) of messages sent by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR to Prime Minister Shastri and President Ayub, expressing the concern of the USSR over the conflict and offering its good offices should both parties consider them useful.

338. Speaking at the same meeting, the representative of India emphasized his country's desire for peace, and said that every step it had taken in the present conflict had been in self-defence. The Council's records established beyond doubt that Pakistan had been the aggressor in this conflict; that it had mounted an invasion of India on 5 August 1965 in the hope of inciting the people of Kashmir to revolt and the Muslims of India to communal strife, and when that attempt had failed it had attacked India with its regular forces. Moreover, it was now becoming evident that Pakistan had launched its attack on India in the expectation that China would support it. While India had made every effort to come to an understanding with Pakistan, all those efforts had been rebuffed by Paki-

stan. India's repeated offers of a "no-war pact" had always been rejected. The attempts to hold ministerial meetings in 1964, after the last discussion of the India-Pakistan question, had come to nothing. Similarly, the efforts of the Chief United Nations Military Observer to arrange a meeting between the military representatives of India and Pakistan to discuss problems arising out of the violations of the Cease-Fire Line had not succeeded because of Pakistan's non-acceptance. Even during the present conflict, India's response to the Secretary-General's mission and to the Security Council's resolutions calling for a cease-fire had been positive. Pakistan, on the other hand, had posed conditions such as to make the establishment of a cease-fire impossible.

339. The Security Council should confine itself to the simple question of the cessation of hostilities, and should not mix it with the settlement of the political issue. The Council must recognize the fact of Pakistan's aggression, must note that while India had unconditionally accepted a cease-fire Pakistan had refused to do so, and must determine the existence of a threat to international peace and security within the meaning of Article 39 of the Charter.

340. The President, speaking as the representative of the United States, stated that his Government suspended arms shipment to both countries since, in support of the Security Council resolution calling for a cease-fire, it wished to help bring about an end to the present conflict. It also deplored the use of the arms that it had supplied in contravention of solemn agreements. The United States hoped that the issues between India and Pakistan would be resolved under conditions of peace.

341. The representative of Jordan said that, as one of the sponsors of the Council's resolution of 6 September, his delegation could not subscribe to the Indian representative's interpretation of the date 5 August contained in that resolution as signifying the beginning of what he had called aggression by Pakistan against India. The date 5 August was intended merely to be an indication regarding the lines behind which the armed forces of both India and Pakistan were asked to withdraw, and was not meant to pass judgement on the claim of infiltration or to establish a fact in that regard.

342. At the 1240th meeting of the Council on 18 September, the representative of Pakistan said that his Government's concern over the seriousness of the situation had led it to suggest to the Secretary-General, when he came to Pakistan: first, that there should be an immediate cease-fire; second, that immediately thereafter the forces of both India and Pakistan should withdraw completely from the disputed area of Jammu and Kashmir, including Azad Kashmir; third, that a United Nations force should take over the security functions in the State; and fourth, that a United Nations-conducted plebiscite should be held within three months of the cease-fire to ascertain the wishes of the people of Jammu and Kashmir on the question of accession of their State to India or Pakistan. That was the only way to restore permanent peace to the sub-continent.

343. Pakistan favoured a cease-fire, he continued, because it wanted a peaceful solution of the dispute, and peace in the sub-continent was essential for economic development. But the cease-fire should be part of a comprehensive agreement. There was no point in reverting to the cease-fire conditions of 1949 which,

instead of peace, had brought suffering and war to the people of Kashmir. India's charge that members of the Pakistan army had crossed the cease-fire line on 5 August was untrue. No troops of Azad Kashmir or Pakistan had crossed the cease-fire line until after India had made repeated thrusts and had launched a major offensive against Azad Kashmir. The hue and cry about infiltrators raised by India was intended to give it a pretext for a new campaign of terror and repression against the people of Kashmir who had risen against India's military occupation.

344. With regard to the question of aggression, it must be remembered that when the Security Council had met on 6 September it had had to deal with an action which was not only unprecedented but a complete violation of the purposes and principles of the United Nations. India's attack had been premeditated, as was indicated by the rapid spread of the fighting and by Indian statements that India would attack Pakistan at a time and place of its own choosing. On the very day that the Secretary-General had left for the sub-continent Indian forces had opened two new fronts against Pakistan, one in the south from Rajasthan and the other in the Sialkot area. The Secretary-General's reports on his mission showed that, while both Governments had agreed in principle to a cease-fire, conditions had been attached by both. By its conditions India wished to have a free hand to deal with the oppressed people of Jammu and Kashmir, to deploy its troops in the State territory without regard to the international agreement of 13 August 1948, and to maintain its unilateral declaration that the State of Jammu and Kashmir was an integral part of the Indian Union.

345. Pakistan agreed with the Secretary-General that the Security Council should continue its efforts for a cease-fire and a long-term solution of the Kashmir question. However, the Secretary-General's proposals for a long-term solution had made no mention of the international agreement between India and Pakistan embodied in the two UNCIP resolutions. It was the Security Council's duty to see that the obligations accepted by India and Pakistan were fully carried out.

346. With regard to the Secretary-General's suggestion that in the absence of compliance by the parties the Council should recognize the existence of a breach of the peace within the meaning of Article 39, Pakistan would point out that so far the Council had taken action only under Chapter VI of the Charter and, therefore, departure from past practice would be a momentous decision, requiring careful consideration.

347. Pakistan shared the Secretary-General's disappointment that his efforts in the cause of peace had not met with success. That was due partly to his restricted terms of reference and partly to the negative attitude of India. The Prime Minister of India, in his letter of 14 September, had clearly imposed the condition that the cease-fire not be linked to the Kashmir dispute, which was the cause of the war. In fact the letter amounted to a rejection of the cease-fire, for, while ostensibly agreeing to a cessation of fighting, India wished to retain a free hand to deal with the oppressed people of the State who had risen in revolt.

348. The Indian representative's allegation that Pakistan was conspiring with China to destroy India was a baseless attempt to impress public opinion. The last thing Pakistan wished was to have the Kashmir

dispute embroiled in the conflicts and rivalries of the great Powers.

349. At the Council's 1241st meeting, on 18 September, the representative of Jordan said that the Council had entered the stage of discussing the more substantive aspects of the question before it. The two resolutions of 4 and 6 September had been of an emergency character and the debate had not gone into the fundamental political question. Since then the armed conflict between India and Pakistan had reached wider dimensions, taking the shape of military operations across international borders. From those developments it could be concluded that efforts to enforce a cease-fire would not yield positive results unless the basic issue was squarely faced. It was for that reason that all past resolutions of the Security Council had emphasized the right of self-determination for the people of Kashmir along with a cease-fire. As the Secretary-General had stated in his report (S/6683), both sides had posed conditions which made the acceptance of a cease-fire very difficult for the other side. While India had stated that the cease-fire should have no bearing on the future of Kashmir, which India considered an integral part of its Union, Pakistan had asked that the agreement on a cease-fire to be purposeful should contain arrangements for the final settlement of the dispute. Thus it was clear that in the absence of common ground direct talks between the parties were hardly likely to succeed and the Council itself should turn its attention to the problem. The Council would be failing in its duty if it were to limit itself only to the task of stopping the fighting without at the same time taking positive steps to resolve the Kashmir dispute. It should uphold the right of self-determination which had formed the basis of its previous resolutions on Kashmir and, as the Secretary-General had asked in his report (S/6683), it should explore, as a matter of urgency, methods for achieving enduring peace between India and Pakistan.

350. The representative of Malaysia said that the date of 5 August had been included in Security Council resolution 210 because it was in fact the starting point in the train of events related by the Secretary-General in his report (S/6651), which was the foundation for the Council's present debate.

351. At present, he continued, the sole concern of the Security Council should be to bring about a cessation of the hostilities. Pakistan had said that a cease-fire should be purposeful and should provide for a self-executing arrangement for the settlement of the Kashmir dispute. The logic of that argument would commit the Security Council to having secured for a State the position of provoking a conflict in order to gain a political profit from it. The replies given by the two Governments to the Secretary-General's request for an unconditional cease-fire made clear India's willingness to establish a cease-fire as compared with Pakistan's unhelpful attitude in that respect. It was Pakistan alone which had posed certain preconditions for a cease-fire. In the circumstances, any resolution the Council might adopt should have the following essential parts: acknowledgement of India's ready acceptance of the Security Council's call for a cease-fire; an expression of regret that Pakistan felt unable to agree to an unconditional cease-fire; deploring of the recourse to large-scale infiltration into Kashmir as inconsistent with a desire for a peaceful settlement;

and a call on Pakistan to cease hostilities as of a particular date and time.

352. The representative of the United Kingdom said that the Council had already acted twice with urgency and unity in adopting its resolutions of 4 and 6 September and the need for further urgent action was at present even greater than before. His Government had fully supported the Secretary-General's recent mission and believed that the courses of action set out in his report provided a useful basis for further urgent discussions in the Council.

353. The representative of the Netherlands said that although the cease-fire called for by the Council had not yet come into being, some progress towards that end has been made through the efforts of the Secretary-General. The Council's task at present was not to weigh all the actions by one party against those of the other but to stop the fighting and, beyond that, to promote a settlement of the problem from which the fighting had originated. India had expressed fears of a repetition of armed infiltration. While the Council could not guarantee that cease-fire violations would not take place in the future, it could contribute to that end by increasing the strength of its military observer group in Kashmir. Pakistan, on the other hand, was apprehensive that acceptance by it of an unconditional cease-fire would mean only a return to the *status quo* without opening the way for a settlement of the dispute. Pakistan's fear seemed justified because the many decisions of the Security Council on the Kashmir question had not yet been implemented. The attitude of the Netherlands had always been that the question should be solved on the basis of free self-determination of the people of the State of Jammu and Kashmir and that the decisions of UNCIP and the Security Council on that subject offered a just means to achieve that aim. It therefore sympathized with Pakistan's apprehension that the basic political conflict might be left unsolved. In order to alleviate that fear, the Council could make it clear that a cease-fire and a withdrawal of troops would have to be followed by talks between the parties and by effective measures to solve the Kashmir problem. Many of the suggestions contained in the Secretary-General's second report (S/6686) could form the basis for the Council's action. The Council, acting under Article 40 of the Charter, could decide on a specific time-limit for the cessation of hostilities and offer its assistance for ensuring the observance of the cease-fire. With regard to the long-range objective, it could set in motion a process whereby the parties could be brought to start negotiations for a settlement of the dispute between them.

354. The President, speaking as the representative of the United States, said it was essential that the Council act urgently to bring about an immediate cease-fire and the restoration of peace on the sub-continent. He commended the Secretary-General on his efforts to give effect to the Council's resolutions and endorsed his proposals to the parties, which the Council should proceed promptly to implement. The United States also agreed with the Secretary-General that renewed efforts should be made to resolve the outstanding differences between India and Pakistan, but that those efforts could be effective only under conditions of peace. He said that the United States position was in full support of United Nations activity in the area and that its consistent attitude had been to support a peaceful solution of all aspects of differences between India and

Pakistan. He added that the existence of a spirit of friendship between the United States and both countries caused his country to share the deep concern of all Council members over the extension of fighting. In the present circumstances, the Council must act quickly and firmly, and all States truly dedicated to peace and security and to the Charter of the United Nations must heed its voice.

355. The representative of France said that the continuation of hostilities between India and Pakistan in spite of the Council's two resolutions was profoundly alarming and harmful not only to the two countries but to the United Nations and the peace of the world. He hoped that the Council would reaffirm its resolutions in the most categorical manner and also that the present phase of the crisis would not lead the Council to cease giving its careful attention to the root causes of the conflict. The Council should not conclude its present debate without opening the door to discussions looking towards a solution of the substantive political problems between India and Pakistan, first of all that of Kashmir.

356. The representative of China said that his delegation welcomed the recommendations made by the Secretary-General and would support any resolution that would bring about an effective cessation of hostilities. In the present grave situation, the foremost prerequisite to a final settlement of the Kashmir dispute was an immediate cease-fire.

357. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that the expansion of the armed conflict between India and Pakistan was exacerbating the already tense situation created in South-East Asia by the aggression of United States imperialism and was doing great harm to the interests of peace throughout the world. Continuation of the conflict could only benefit those forces which were seeking to disunite and pit against each other the States which had liberated themselves from the colonial yoke. The Soviet Union's position on the question before the Council was determined by its general policy of peace and its conviction that issues in dispute between States, regardless of their origin, must be settled by peaceful means. In that connexion, the Soviet Government had indicated its readiness to offer its good offices to the parties, if that should be desired by both of them. At the present juncture, it was clear that attention must be concentrated on the need to implement the Security Council's resolutions of 4 and 6 September and to ensure that the hostilities between India and Pakistan were immediately halted. The normalization of the situation might make it possible for the parties, within the spirit of the Charter and of the principles of Bandung, to enter into negotiations looking towards a peaceful settlement of the dispute between them.

358. At the same meeting, the representative of India said that the war had now taken on a new dimension, for Chinese troops were massing on the Indian border; they had already indulged in probing actions at four points and were poised for an invasion or a serious attack. In India's view, that was an extension of the Indian-Pakistan conflict; China was fighting India through Pakistan.

359. With regard to the cessation of hostilities, the representative of India went on, India was prepared unconditionally to accept a cease-fire. If Pakistan was not prepared to do so the Council, in any resolution

it might adopt, should make a clear distinction between those two positions.

360. By a letter dated 17 September 1965 (S/6692), India had previously transmitted the text of notes exchanged between the Government of India and the Government of the People's Republic of China regarding the border situation between their countries and of a statement made by the Prime Minister of India concerning that question. In one of the notes, dated 15 September, the Government of the People's Republic of China demanded that India "dismantle all its military works for aggression on the Chinese side of the China-Sikkim boundary or on the boundary itself within three days of the delivery of the present note". The Indian Government, in a note of the same date, said that the allegations contained in the Chinese note were groundless and had been fabricated as a pretext for further aggression against India. The responsibility for the consequences that might follow from such aggression by China would lie squarely with the Chinese Government.

361. At its 1242nd meeting, on 20 September, the representative of Pakistan informed the Council that the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR had sent another message to the President of Pakistan and the Prime Minister of India inviting them to meet on Soviet territory. It had also been reported that Chairman Kosygin would be prepared to take part in such a meeting if that was desired by Pakistan and India. The Government of Pakistan deeply appreciated the Soviet Union's offer and was giving urgent consideration to the message received from Chairman Kosygin.

362. The representative of Uruguay said that the measures immediately required by the situation were a cease-fire and the withdrawal of all military forces, regardless of their nature. Those provisional measures would in no way, however, prejudice the rights, claims or positions of the parties concerned, as the substantive problems involved must be solved ultimately in accordance with the principles and purposes of the Charter, and particularly of Articles 1, paragraph 1, and 1, paragraph 2.

363. At the same meeting, the representative of the Netherlands submitted the following draft resolution (S/6694):

"The Security Council,

"Having considered the reports of the Secretary-General on his consultations with the Government of India and Pakistan,

"Commending the Secretary-General for his unrelenting efforts in furtherance of the objectives of Security Council resolutions 209 (1965) and 210 (1965) of 4 and 6 September 1965,

"Having heard the statements of the representatives of India and Pakistan,

"Noting the differing replies by the parties to an appeal for a cease-fire as set out in the report of the Secretary-General (S/6683), but noting further with concern that no cease-fire has yet come into being,

"Convinced that an early cessation of hostilities is essential as a first step towards a peaceful settlement of the outstanding differences between the two countries on Kashmir and other related matters,

"1. Demands that a cease-fire should take effect on Wednesday, 22 September 1965, at 0700 hours GMT, and calls upon both Governments to issue

orders for a cease-fire at that moment and a subsequent withdrawal of all armed personnel to the positions held by them before 5 August 1965;

"2. Requests the Secretary-General to provide the necessary assistance to ensure supervision of the cease-fire and the withdrawal of all armed personnel;

"3. Calls on all States to refrain from any action which might aggravate the situation in the area;

"4. Decides to consider, as soon as paragraph 1 of Council resolution 210 (1965) has been implemented, what steps could be taken to assist towards a settlement of the political problem underlying the present conflict, and in the meantime calls on the two Governments to utilize all peaceful means, including those listed in Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations, to this end;

"5. Requests the Secretary-General to exert every possible effort to give effect to the present resolution, to seek a peaceful solution, and to report to the Security Council thereon."

364. In introducing the draft resolution, the representative of the Netherlands said that its first and main object was to stop the fighting before it could spread to other areas. Its second main purpose was to open up an avenue to the parties to renew negotiations about the underlying political problem from which the present fighting had originated. For both those purposes the draft resolution offered the assistance of the United Nations. It was hoped that the resolution would be adopted by the Council during the same meeting with as many votes as possible, and above all with the unanimity of the permanent members.

365. In reply to the representative of Malaysia, who had asked whether the Netherlands representative objected to having each part of the draft resolution voted upon separately, the representative of the Netherlands stated that the elements of the draft resolution were closely interwoven, and that he could therefore not agree to Malaysia's request. The President ruled that, on the basis of rule 32 of the provisional rules of procedure, the draft resolution had to be voted upon as a whole.

366. The representative of Pakistan said that the draft resolution failed to deal with the basic problem underlying the conflict. There was no other way than a plebiscite in Jammu and Kashmir to resolve the differences between India and Pakistan in a just and honourable manner.

Decision: *At the 1242nd meeting on 20 September 1965, the draft resolution (S/6694) was adopted by 10 votes to none, with 1 abstention (Jordan) (resolution 211 (1965)).*

367. The representative of Jordan said that he had not voted for the draft resolution because he felt that the situation now required was a reaffirmation by the Security Council of its resolution of 21 April 1948 and the resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949. The Council should demand that the parties undertake peaceful discussions on the basis of those resolutions within a reasonable time.

368. The representative of Malaysia said that he had voted in favour of the draft resolution, in spite of reservations regarding the fourth preambular paragraph and operative paragraph 4, because he shared the anxiety of the other members of the Council that there should be a cease-fire as soon as possible.

369. The representative of France said that the resolution the Council had just adopted was important because it both called for a cease-fire and reaffirmed the Council's interest in the political problem that lay at the root of the dispute. It was essential that the Council, should, at the present stage, both show itself to be impartial and recognize that as soon as the fighting was ended a new and serious effort must be made to bring about a genuine political settlement.

370. The representative of the Ivory Coast said that he had voted in favour of the draft resolution because he felt that no opportunity to promote international co-operation for peace should be let pass.

371. The President said that he regarded the resolution just adopted by the Council as an even-handed one, in that it addressed itself both to the problem at hand, which was the restoration of peace, and to the fact that there were underlying problems which required consideration. Speaking as representative of the United States, he called upon the peoples of India and Pakistan to understand and support the challenge of statesmanship which the Council had made to their leaders. The United Nations could succeed in coping with the problems and disputes of the world only to the extent that Members used it in the interest of peace.

C. Reports by the Secretary-General and consideration at the 1244th and 1245th meetings (22 and 27 September 1965)

372. In a report of 21 September 1965 (S/6699), the Secretary-General gave an account of the action he had taken to give effect to Security Council resolution 211 (1965). The resolution had been transmitted to the two Governments and a reply had been received from Prime Minister Shastri stating that India was willing to order a simple cease-fire and cessation of hostilities on being informed of Pakistan's agreement to do likewise. No word had yet been received from Pakistan, but it was expected that the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, who was coming to New York, would bring a message concerning the resolution.

373. The Secretary-General also informed the Council that supervision of a cease-fire along a line extending more than 1,000 miles would require an initial team of at least 100 Military Observers, with supporting staff and equipment, at an estimated cost of \$1,645,000 for a three-month period. Arrangements were in hand to provide the necessary personnel, transport and equipment.

374. In a supplementary report (S/6699/Add.3) of 23 September, the Secretary-General said that he had decided to organize the United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission (UNIPOM) to supervise the cease-fire and withdrawals on the frontier between India and Pakistan as an organization separate from the United Nations Military Observers Group for India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) which had similar functions on the cease-fire line in Kashmir. Though separate entities, the two groups would be closely co-ordinated both administratively and operationally. On 24 September the Secretary-General reported (S/6699/Add.4) that he had appointed Major-General B. F. MacDonald, of Canada, as Chief Officer of UNIPOM.

375. On 22 September, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, speaking at the Council's 1244th meeting,

announced that, although Pakistan considered Security Council resolution 211 (1965) unsatisfactory, orders for a cease-fire had been issued. That action had been taken in the interests of peace and in order to enable the Council to evolve a self-executing procedure which would lead to settlement of the root cause of the conflict. However, a cessation of hostilities was not enough. The Security Council must now address itself to the heart of the problem. If it did not, within a definite time-limit, put its full weight and moral responsibility behind an equitable and honourable settlement of the Kashmir dispute, Pakistan would have to leave the United Nations.

376. The representative of India said that his Government must have reasonable notice of Pakistan's agreement to order a cease-fire and requested that a new time be set.

377. The President, speaking on behalf of the Security Council, expressed satisfaction that the two parties had accepted the cease-fire, and called upon them to implement their adherence to it as rapidly as possible, and in any case not later than 2200 hours GMT on 22 September.

378. At its 1245th meeting, on 27 September, the Council had before it reports from the Secretary-General (S/6710 and Add.1 and 2) indicating that the military situation throughout the area of conflict remained fluid. Numerous complaints alleging violations of the cease-fire had been submitted by both sides and United Nations Observers reported that the situation had further deteriorated in the whole Lahore sector. Complaints about positions on the wrong side of the line were reported to be "continuous" and emanated from both sides.

379. Concerning the withdrawal provisions of the Council resolution, the Secretary-General, in his messages of 20 and 23 September, had requested both Governments to submit a plan and schedule for implementation. For his part, the Chief Military Observer had been in contact with the respective commands.

380. The President read out to the Council the text of the following draft resolution, which he said reflected the consensus of the members of the Council on the basis of his consultations with them:

"The Security Council,

"Noting the reports of the Secretary-General (S/6710 and Add.1 and 2),

"Reaffirming its resolutions 209 (1965) of 4 September, 210 (1965) of 6 September and 211 (1965) of 20 September 1965,

"Expressing its grave concern that the cease-fire agreed to unconditionally by the Governments of India and Pakistan is not holding,

"Recalling that the cease-fire demand in the Council's resolutions was unanimously endorsed by the Council and agreed to by the Governments of both India and Pakistan,

"Demands that the parties urgently honour their commitments to the Council to observe the cease-fire, and further calls upon the parties promptly to withdraw all armed personnel as necessary steps in the full implementation of resolution 211 (1965)."

381. The President noted that the representative of Jordan had made a reservation to Security Council resolution 211 (1965) of 20 September at the time of its adoption, which reservation was still maintained.

Decision: *At the 1245th meeting, on 27 September 1965, the draft resolution was adopted without objection (resolution 214 (1965)).*

382. The representative of India said that the resolution the Council had just adopted should in fairness and justice have been addressed only to Pakistan. While India had at every stage expressed its willingness to accept an unconditional cease-fire, Pakistan had from the very beginning been opposed to one. The Security Council's records as well as the statements made by Pakistan's representatives proved conclusively that Pakistan had started the present trouble on 5 August 1965 with the intention of creating and maintaining an armed conflict with India to force a settlement of what it called "the Kashmir question" on its own terms. It was therefore clear that Pakistan had not accepted an unconditional cease-fire and had no intention of observing it. The issue before the Council was clear. Until Pakistan was made to comply with the Council's call for a cease-fire, no useful purpose could be served by any kind of discussion as to any possible subsequent steps. The Council should take note of that fact and confine itself to the task, first, of securing Pakistan's compliance with the call for a cease-fire.

383. The representative of Pakistan recalled that India had requested and received an extension of the deadline for a cease-fire laid down by the Council in resolution 211. It had now become clear that India had sought that extension in order to alter the military situation to its advantage during the interval. It had made use of the extension to undertake an offensive against Pakistan and, as the reports by United Nations Observers (S/6710 and Add.1-2) made clear, had been responsible for the subsequent violations of the cease-fire. It was of the utmost importance that the Security Council should take immediate and effective measures to stop violations of the cease-fire by India. Unless Indian incursions into Pakistan positions were halted immediately the situation would deteriorate rapidly and go out of control. Pakistan believed that India was deliberately creating those incidents and violations in order to frustrate the Council's efforts for an honourable and enduring solution of the Kashmir problem. It was imperative that a self-executing procedure for the settlement of the dispute should be evolved as soon as possible. Events had shown that the implementation of paragraph 1 of resolution 211 (1965) was not enough. It was of the utmost importance and urgency that the Security Council should initiate immediate action for the implementation of paragraph 4 of the resolution and bring lasting peace to the sub-continent.

384. The replies of Pakistan and India to the Secretary-General's messages on the subject of withdrawals were received on 26 and 28 September respectively. The Permanent Representative of Pakistan stated (S/6715) that no withdrawals could take place until a mutually acceptable programme for that purpose had been agreed upon by the two commands. It would be hard to evolve such an arrangement without concurrent steps for an honourable political settlement. The Indian reply (S/6720) stressed that the withdrawals must cover both Pakistan regular forces and armed men not in uniform. The Indian Government suggested that the Secretary-General send his representatives to discuss the matter with the two Governments, and to assist in working out a co-ordinated plan.

385. On 4 October, the Secretary-General reported to the Council (S/6699/Add.7) concerning the instructions he had given to the Chief Officer of UNIPOM. These specified that UNIPOM was an observation mission with the primary duty of observing and reporting on the area of conflict outside of Kashmir and beyond the Kashmir cease-fire line. The Observers in the field were to do all they reasonably could to persuade local commanders to restore the cease-fire in cases where firing had occurred, but had no authority to order an end to firing. The Secretary-General stated that, in order to ensure close co-operation and co-ordination between UNMOGIP and UNIPOM, he had asked the Chief Officer of UNIPOM to maintain the closest contact with General Nimmo who, in view of his long experience in the area, would exercise a general overseeing function with regard to both operations.

D. Reports of the Secretary-General and consideration at the 1247th to 1249th meetings (25-28 October 1965)

386. At the end of October 1965, the Security Council held three further meetings to consider the India-Pakistan question. During the intervening period, the Secretary-General issued a series of reports on the observance of the cease-fire (S/6710/Add.3-5) indicating that there had been numerous confirmed breaches and that the continued existence of the cease-fire must be considered precarious. There was continued heavy fighting in the Rajasthan area. The Secretary-General also gave an account of the efforts of the Chief Officer of UNIPOM to stop the fighting by negotiating agreements for tactical readjustment. He also issued reports (S/6719/Add.2-3) on his efforts to ensure compliance with the withdrawal provision of Council resolution 211 (1965), stating that the withdrawals of all armed personnel foreseen in the resolution had not taken place and there was no indication that they were likely to take place soon unless some new effort was made. On 13 October, he had sent messages to the Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan renewing his appeal for steps to bring about the withdrawals, and suggesting that the plans for such withdrawals might be co-ordinated with the assistance of the United Nations Military Observers, or by a Representative to be designated for this purpose by the Secretary-General. In the light of the Pakistan and Indian replies, dated 18 October, the Secretary-General had on 22 October dispatched letters in which he informed them that he intended to name Major-General S. Sarmento of Brazil, the Commander of UNEF, as his Representative, who would visit both capitals and arrange to meet with the representatives of the parties to seek agreement on a plan and schedule for the withdrawals. On 25 October 1965 the Secretary-General received a message from the President of Pakistan (S/6825) accepting the proposal for the appointment of a representative on withdrawals.

387. During this period the Council also received a large number of communications from both India and Pakistan complaining of violations of the cease-fire by the other side.

388. In a letter of 22 October (S/6821) Pakistan requested that an urgent meeting of the Security Council be convened to consider the grave and rapidly deteriorating situation created by the virtual collapse

of the cease-fire, the total disregard by India of the letter and spirit of the Council's resolution of 20 September and the reports concerning the campaign of genocide and repression launched by Indian authorities in Kashmir.

389. By a letter dated 24 October (S/6823), India stated that it would be prepared to participate in a discussion by the Council of issues relating to the cease-fire and withdrawal of armed personnel called for under Security Council resolution 211 (1965). However, as the State of Jammu and Kashmir was a constituent unit of the Indian Union, Pakistan's attempt to obtain a discussion in the Council of the so-called "grave political developments" within that State amounted to gross interference in the internal affairs of India, and India would be unable to participate in any such discussion by the Council.

390. The Council's 1247th meeting was convened on 25 October, with the representatives of Pakistan and India participating without the right to vote.

391. The representative of Pakistan said that although nearly a month had passed since the Council's last resolution, the cease-fire remained unstable and negotiations had still to begin on withdrawal of troops and a settlement of the political problem of Kashmir. India had flouted the cease-fire agreement by following a deliberate and systematic plan to seize forcibly as much territory as possible and had endeavoured to improve its military position by occupying areas which it had failed to capture during the war. Moreover, it had unleashed a reign of terror against the resistance movement in the occupied part of Jammu and Kashmir—a movement which encompassed the entire population of the area—and was violating the Geneva Convention on the treatment of prisoners of war. The truth of those charges could be verified by a visit to any part of Indian-occupied Jammu and Kashmir by any impartial observer, and he wished formally to reiterate his Government's request that a fact-finding committee of the Security Council, or the Secretary-General of the United Nations, should without further delay visit the State of Jammu and Kashmir to see for themselves what was happening there, report the facts to the Council, and suggest prompt and effective measures to end that intolerable situation.

392. What was happening in Indian-occupied Jammu and Kashmir made the need for prompt action to bring about a settlement of the basic problem more urgent than ever. India must not be allowed to repeat past tactics and once again hold up implementation of Security Council resolutions. The Security Council had given the people of Kashmir a pledge that they would not be placed under a sovereignty imposed by any army of occupation. The Council should have the strength to fulfil that pledge. Pakistan had stopped fighting in order to avert further bloodshed and the danger of a more widespread conflict. However, it could not be expected to exercise endless restraint in the face of India's proven aggressiveness.

393. During the course of the above statement, the representative of India took the floor to say that the representative of Pakistan was referring to matters exclusively within the internal jurisdiction of India which were not relevant to the discussion. India was participating in the meeting on the distinct understanding that the only two issues under discussion would be the stabilization of the cease-fire and what further

steps were to be taken for the withdrawal of troops and all armed personnel. In view of the statement by the representative of Pakistan, India therefore had no option but to dissociate itself from the discussion. The representative of India then withdrew from the Council table.

394. The representative of the USSR emphasized the need to strengthen and consolidate the cease-fire and to take the next step towards strengthening peace between India and Pakistan. It was necessary that there be a more rapid withdrawal of the armed forces and personnel of both sides to the positions held by them before 5 August 1965, in accordance with the Security Council's resolutions. In connexion with the implementation of those resolutions, he said that the Secretary-General's actions regarding observers in India and Pakistan departed from the provisions of the United Nations Charter, under which only the Security Council was competent to take decisions on specific questions involving United Nations observers, such as their number, functions and financing. The Council should set a definite time-limit, which should not exceed three months, for the presence of United Nations observers in India and Pakistan.

395. The representative of the United States said that his Government continued to support fully the Council's resolutions on the India-Pakistan question, and strongly urged that they be fully implemented. It considered that the actions taken by the Secretary-General in implementing the resolutions had been exactly in accordance with them, and that he had advised the members of the Council, step by step, of every action he had taken. There would have been time at any point during those proceedings to raise the question of whether the Secretary-General was proceeding properly, and that had not been done. His Government emphatically rejected the suggestion that the Secretary-General had acted beyond his mandate or that he should have consulted the Council in advance on the details of the actions he had taken under that mandate.

396. The representative of the United Kingdom said he was satisfied that the Secretary-General had throughout acted in complete accord with the clear mandates given to him by the Security Council in its four resolutions on the question, and believed that what he had done under those resolutions had been a proper exercise of his responsibility.

397. The representative of France said that his delegation, without challenging the urgent measures the Secretary-General might have to take, considered that, in setting up any peace-keeping operation, the Council itself should decide on matters such as the main characteristics of the operation, and on its command, duration and financing and should, on the basis of the Secretary-General's proposals, fix a ceiling for the expenses to which it might give rise.

398. At the Council's 1248th meeting, on 27 October, the representative of Jordan endorsed all the steps which had been taken to implement the Council's resolution 211 of 20 September, and expressed appreciation of the reports submitted by the Secretary-General. Resolution 211 (1965) had been intended to achieve three results: an effective cease-fire and the withdrawal of troops to the old positions; the re-establishment of the old cease-fire line in Jammu and Kashmir; and action for a political settlement of the Jammu and

Kashmir dispute. Those three aims were inseparable, for the dispute could not go on without more bloodshed and the risk of escalation to uncontrollable proportions. With the cease-fire in effect, the Council was duty-bound to formulate a procedure for a political settlement which would be workable, equitable and in conformity with standing resolutions. Above all, the past decisions of the United Nations recognizing the right of the people of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to determine their own destiny must be respected.

399. Some uncertainty had been expressed in the Council recently concerning the scope of the Secretary-General's authority. His delegation considered that the office of Secretary-General, as one of the main organs of the United Nations, must be enabled to function properly and effectively even if that required a liberal interpretation of the Charter.

400. He also expressed concern at the gravity of the charges made by Pakistan in recent letters and in the statement of its representative in the Council. The Secretary-General's Representative, who had already been sent to the area of conflict, might be directed to look into those charges and ascertain the facts, or the Secretary-General himself might wish to consider visiting the area of conflict again. The Council might also wish to establish a special committee to assist it in determining what steps could be taken to find a just and honourable settlement of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute.

401. The representative of the United Kingdom said that the constitutional and financial questions which had been raised in the Council's debate on 25 October were important and must be satisfactorily settled but the Council's most immediate and urgent task, on which it should at present concentrate all its efforts, was that of rendering effective the cease-fire between India and Pakistan, together with the withdrawal of all armed personnel, which the Council had demanded. He welcomed and endorsed the efforts which the Secretary-General had made. His delegation considered that the Secretary-General had throughout acted in complete accord with the clear mandate given to him by the Council.

402. The representative of the Ivory Coast said that the Council, in its present debate, should strive to create an atmosphere such as would foster resumption of negotiations between the parties. By making the cease-fire effective by supporting the measures advocated by the Secretary-General in order to ensure the withdrawal of armed forces and by inviting the parties to co-operate with the Secretary-General and the United Nations observers to achieve that objective, the Council, with the collaboration of the Secretary-General, would be able to find methods which would make it possible for the two parties to find a political solution.

403. He did not consider that the Secretary-General, in the actions he had so far taken to implement the Council's resolutions, had exceeded the mandate given to him by the Council.

404. At the Council's 1249th meeting, on 28 October, the representative of France said that, in present circumstances, it would be useful for the Council to address a final appeal to India and Pakistan for the complete implementation of the Council's resolutions. It should be possible to work out a withdrawal plan if the parties were convinced of the need for concilia-

tion and if the Council bore in mind that its task was to consider what measures might be taken to contribute to a settlement of the underlying political problem.

405. The representative of China supported the Secretary-General's proposal concerning the formulation of an agreed plan and schedule for the withdrawal of armed forces and said he did not think that the Secretary-General, in the actions he had taken to give effect to the Council's resolutions, had exceeded his authority.

406. The representative of Malaysia said that the Council's sole immediate concern should be the strengthening of the cease-fire and enforcement of the steps to be taken to arrange the withdrawal of troops and armed personnel. He endorsed the actions taken by the Secretary-General, who, in his view, had diligently and efficiently carried out the precise duties placed on him by the Council, and had kept the Council informed of his activities almost from day to day.

407. In letters of 26 and 27 October (S/6833, S/6835, S/6836), India stated that it would continue to dissociate itself from the discussion in the Council and commented on the statement made in the Council by the representative of Pakistan on 25 October. India had noted with deep regret some of the statements made by the representative of Pakistan, which were an outrage on the Security Council and an insult to the people of India. The Government of India would continue to extend its full co-operation to the United Nations in the efforts to stabilize the cease-fire and to draw up plans for the withdrawal of all armed personnel. However, Pakistan's attempts to inch forward despite the cease-fire, its preparations to launch thousands more infiltrators into the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir, its efforts to improve its tactical positions with an eye on the "second round" threatened by its Foreign Minister—all these activities stood in the way of the stabilization of the cease-fire.

408. In letters of 29 October and 2 November (S/6845, S/6865), Pakistan stated that there was no basis for the Indian claim that developments in the State of Jammu and Kashmir were a matter lying within the domestic jurisdiction of the Indian Government. Jammu and Kashmir was disputed territory and not a constituent part of India, and the Security Council's jurisdiction over the issue had been accepted by both parties to the dispute when, in January 1948, they had offered to let the future of the State of Jammu and Kashmir be decided by a plebiscite under the auspices of the United Nations. India's refusal to participate in the Council's discussion on that specious and unfounded plea was no doubt intended to inhibit further discussion of the Jammu and Kashmir situation in the Council and to permit India to carry on with impunity its campaign of oppression in occupied Jammu and Kashmir. It had served only to give a final demonstration of the Indian Government's intransigence.

E. Consideration at the 1251st meeting (5 November 1965)

409. The Security Council resumed consideration of the Indian-Pakistan question at its 1251st meeting, on 5 November 1965. It had before it the following draft resolution (S/6876), sponsored by Bolivia, the Ivory Coast, Malaysia, the Netherlands and Uruguay:

"The Security Council,

"*Regretting* the delay in the full achievement of a complete and effective cease-fire and a prompt withdrawal of armed personnel to the positions held by them before 5 August 1965, as called for in its resolutions 209 (1965) of 4 September, 210 (1965) of 6 September, 211 (1965) of 20 September and 214 (1965) of 27 September 1965,

"1. *Reaffirms* its resolution 211 (1965) in all its parts;

"2. *Requests* the Governments of India and Pakistan to co-operate towards a full implementation of paragraph 1 of resolution 211 (1965); calls upon them to instruct their armed personnel to co-operate with the United Nations and cease all military activity; and insists that there be an end to violations of the cease-fire;

"3. *Demands* the prompt and unconditional execution of the proposal already agreed to in principle by the Governments of India and Pakistan that their representatives meet with a suitable representative of the Secretary-General, to be appointed without delay after consultation with both parties, for the formulation of an agreed plan and schedule for the withdrawals by both parties; urges that such a meeting take place as soon as possible and that such a plan contain a time-limit on its implementation; and requests the Secretary-General to report on the progress achieved in this respect within three weeks of the adoption of the present resolution;

"4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit for its consideration as soon as possible a report on compliance with the present resolution."

410. Introducing the draft resolution, the representative of the Netherlands said that the appeal which the Council had on four occasions addressed to both parties to effect a cease-fire and a withdrawal of their armed personnel had received only partial response. Although both India and Pakistan had expressed their readiness to accept a cessation of hostilities and although the cease-fire had come into effect more than six weeks ago, it was obvious from the Secretary-General's reports on the maintenance of the cease-fire that its continuance was constantly in danger. His country was also deeply disturbed by the press reports from Kashmir about the suppression of the freedom of political expression and about excesses reportedly taking place in the fighting area. But the remedy lay not in condemning or investigating specific examples of such acts, but in putting an end to the circumstances which had given rise to such excesses. The Council must therefore concentrate on the three elements of its resolution: the cease-fire, the withdrawal of the forces, and tackling the underlying political problem. Those three elements were closely interconnected, but they could not all be achieved at once. It was therefore necessary to proceed in phases. The first phase was the cease-fire. That had been achieved, but was still precarious, and would remain so as long as huge armed forces remained in close contact facing each other. The Council must therefore now concentrate on the second phase, the withdrawal of forces. It was the purpose of the draft resolution to indicate in clear and concrete terms what action should now be taken to effect that withdrawal.

411. His delegation, the Netherlands representative continued, could find no fault with the way in which the Secretary-General had carried out the difficult

task entrusted to him by the Council. However, it was highly desirable, both for the restoration of peace between India and Pakistan and for future peace-keeping operations, that the Council find a method for dealing with the practical problem of how to have its resolutions carried out without prejudice to future decisions of principle and in a manner which could command the unanimous support of its members. His delegation recommended a middle course based on three principles: first, that the Council should always be entitled to interpret its own resolutions, and should, whenever it deemed that desirable, give broad directives for their execution; second, that ultimate approval of the financial aspects rested with the General Assembly; and, third, that the Secretary-General should have sufficient freedom of movement to carry out the resolutions without having to ask the Council's authorization for every step in detail. A practical system based on those three principles implied that the Secretary-General should continue to report formally and regularly on the steps taken, but also that it might be helpful if he would perhaps in the future more than theretofore consult informally with members of the Council about intended steps. Likewise it meant that the Secretary-General should, as soon as possible after a Security Council resolution of that nature had been adopted, make an estimate of the expenses so that the Security Council could give a directive on the general level of expenses, the final approval and apportioning being left to the General Assembly.

412. The representative of Uruguay endorsed the unanimous concern expressed by members of the Council that there be a complete cease-fire and respect for the line at which the forces of the two parties stood on 5 August 1965. He supported the decisions taken by the Secretary-General and, as opinion unanimously favoured facilitating and financing the Secretary-General's proposals for a reasonable period of time, he saw no objections to acting along those lines as long as the Secretary-General duly informed the Council regarding the new steps he planned to take.

413. The grave charges made by Pakistan regarding the situation in Jammu and Kashmir might be looked into by the President or a special three-member committee of the Council. The Council's resolution of 20 September had implied a threefold commitment—a cease-fire, withdrawal of troops and armed men, and examination of measures that might be adopted in order to contribute to a solution of the substantive problem. The Council could not shirk its duty of working for a solution to a dispute that was a threat to world peace.

414. The President, speaking as the representative of Bolivia, spoke in support of the draft resolution and expressed approval of the actions taken by the Secretary-General.

415. The representative of France supported the draft resolution, subject to the reservations contained in the comments he had made at the Council's 1247th meeting concerning the principles which must guide the Security Council in the implementation of its decisions.

416. The representative of the United States, in supporting the draft resolution, said that its emphasis on withdrawal, which was the most urgent need of the moment, did not alter the even balance of the Council's resolution of 20 September, under which it stood committed to consider what steps could be taken to assist towards a settlement of the underlying political problem.

417. The representative of Jordan said that he was unable to support the draft resolution. Withdrawal and a solution of the basic problem were two sides of the same coin; it was unrealistic to insist on one and not to put the same emphasis on the other.

Decision: *At the 1251st meeting, on 5 November 1965 the draft resolution (S/6876) was adopted by 9 votes to none, with 2 abstentions (Jordan and USSR) (resolution 215 (1965)).* ..

418. Speaking after the vote, the representative of the USSR said that the principal task at the present time was to ensure compliance with the provisions concerning the cease-fire and the swiftest possible withdrawal of the troops and armed personnel of both sides to the positions which they had occupied up to 5 August 1965. The Soviet delegation still maintained that position, considering that it was in accordance with the interests of the Indian and Pakistan peoples and the interests of peace.

419. It was also emphasized that—despite the fact that the Soviet delegation had pointed out to the Security Council at the 1247th meeting that the actions which the Secretary-General had taken in the matter of United Nations observers in India and Pakistan, and which had followed the adoption of the resolutions of 6 and 20 September 1965 by the Council, were at variance with basic provisions of the United Nations Charter—the abnormal situation and the incorrect practice had not been brought to an end and had not been put right. Such highly important specific questions connected with United Nations military observers continued to be dealt with in circumvention of the Security Council. Under basic provisions of the United Nations Charter, only the Security Council was competent to take the appropriate decisions on all specific questions connected with United Nations military observers. Those considerations based on the Charter and on principle, which the Soviet delegation had expressed, had been ignored in the resolution just adopted. The USSR had therefore been unable to support the resolution. If, in the future, concrete questions concerning the United Nations observers in India and Pakistan were decided upon in circumvention of the Security Council and in violation of the Charter, the Soviet Union reserved its right to draw the necessary conclusions and to revise its position accordingly.

F. Reports and communications received up to 31 December 1965

420. Following the Security Council's meeting of 5 November, the Secretary-General submitted a number of reports on the observance of the cease-fire and on his efforts to give effect to the Council's resolutions. On 25 November 1965 he reported (S/6719/Add.4) that, in view of the unavailability of General Sarmiento, he had appointed as his Representative Brigadier-General Tulio Marambio, of Chile, who was to meet with representatives of India and Pakistan for the purpose of formulating an agreed plan and schedule for the withdrawals, as envisaged in Security Council resolution 215 (1965) of 5 November 1965. In a report dated 15 December 1965 (S/6699/Add.11), he drew the Council's attention to the fact that the first three-month period of the cease-fire demanded by the Security Council on 20 September would have elapsed on 22 December. He noted that while some degree of quiet had been established along the cease-fire line the inci-

dents continued and tension between the parties persisted at numerous points. He also noted that both India and Pakistan had informed him of their desire that the United Nations continue its observer function after 22 December 1965. The Secretary-General indicated his intention, in the circumstances, to continue the United Nations activities relating to the cease-fire and withdrawal provisions of the Security Council's resolutions. That would mean the continuation of UNIPOM for a second period of three months, the maintenance of the added strength of UNMOGIP possibly through 1966, and the prolongation of General Marambio's mission. The estimated costs of UNIPOM for 1965 remained at the figure of \$1,427,000, and the estimated cost for its continuation for another three months was \$819,000. The cost for the strengthening of UNMOGIP was now estimated at \$830,000 for 1965 and at \$1,740,000 for the calendar year 1966. On the assumption that appropriation action with respect to UNMOGIP would be taken by the General Assembly, it would be possible, as an interim measure, to continue to finance the commitments in respect of UNIPOM and General Marambio's mission under the provisions of the annual General Assembly resolution relating to unforeseen and extraordinary expenses.

421. In an earlier report of 14 October 1965 (S/6699/Add.9), the Secretary-General had informed the Council that a total of ninety Observers had been provided for UNIPOM by ten Member States: Brazil, Burma, Canada, Ceylon, Ethiopia, Ireland, Nepal, the Netherlands, Nigeria and Venezuela. As of 11 October, UNMOGIP's strength had been increased to 102 Observers, provided by eleven countries: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Finland, Italy, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden and Uruguay.

422. On 30 December 1965 the Secretary-General reported (S/6710/Add.14) that, at a meeting in New Delhi on 15 December, the Chief of Army Staff, Indian Army, had informed the Chief Military Observer of UNMOGIP and the Chief Officer of UNIPOM of his intention to order a unilateral cessation of firing by all formations, effective 26 December. On 22 December, the Chief of General Staff, Pakistan, had agreed to take similar action.

423. In addition to those already referred to, a large number of other communications were sent by India and Pakistan to the Secretary-General or the President of the Security Council during this period. The bulk of these communications dealt with complaints of violation of the cease-fire made by each side against the other. Most of the alleged violations related to firing by one side against positions held by the other, flights of enemy aircraft over areas held by the complainant's side, and patrolling, wiring and mining by enemy forces forward of their positions. In this connexion, the Secretary-General informed the Security Council that all complaints received at Headquarters were automatically transmitted to UNMOGIP or UNIPOM for immediate investigation and the results of such investigations included in his reports to the Council on the observance of the cease-fire.

424. India and Pakistan also transmitted a number of communications relating to other matters. Pakistan complained about alleged atrocities committed against civilians in Indian-occupied areas, mistreatment of prisoners of war and internees and outrages against the members and premises of the Pakistan High Commission in New Delhi and the Deputy High Commission

in Calcutta (S/6739, S/6754, S/6760, S/6801, S/6834, S/6855, S/6857, S/6879, S/6949, S/6950, S/6998, S/7038). Pakistan also protested against the alleged violation by India of the Indus Waters Treaty of 1960 (S/6978, S/7037) and the Rann of Kutch Agreement (S/7002) and violations of East Pakistan's air space by Indian Air Force planes (S/7026). On its part, India replied to these allegations (S/6985, S/7039, S/7044) and protested against actions taken by Pakistan, including the alleged inhuman treatment of Indian diplomatic personnel in Pakistan, the continued recruitment and training of irregulars in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, and the shooting down over Indian territory of a civilian aircraft carrying the Chief Minister of Gujarat and other civilian personnel (S/6774, S/6775, S/6790, S/7014, S/7020, S/7027, S/7028). India also transmitted to the Council the text of notes (S/6763, S/6776) exchanged between the Indian Government and the Government of the People's Republic of China concerning the Sino-Indian boundary.

425. A number of communications were also exchanged between the Secretary-General and the two parties regarding arrangements for the implementation of the Security Council's resolutions. In several of its letters on this subject (S/6735, S/6742), India expressed the view that the supervision of the cease-fire in the entire area of conflict should be ensured through a single observer organization under a single command. On its side, the Government of Pakistan stated, in a letter of 5 October 1965 (S/6751), that any attempted merging of the two observer operations (UNMOGIP and UNIPOM) would be illegal and arbitrary. UNMOGIP derived its authority from the provisions of the UNCIP resolution of 13 August 1948 and bore no relation, beyond that of the administrative co-ordination dictated by practical necessities, to UNIPOM, which was based on Security Council resolution 211 of 20 September 1965. In an aide-mémoire of 2 October 1965 (S/6738), the Secretary-General stated that, as UNMOGIP was limited in its terms of reference to the Cease-Fire Line in Kashmir, whereas the conflict between India and Pakistan had extended beyond that Line to the borders of the two countries, it had been necessary to set up a new operation in order to carry out fully the directive of the Security Council in its resolution of 20 September.

G. Subsequent developments to 26 February 1966

426. On 8 December 1965 it was announced that Prime Minister Shastri of India and President Ayub Khan of Pakistan, acting at the invitation of the Government of the USSR, had agreed to meet at Tashkent, beginning on 4 January 1966, to discuss the problems of their two countries. By a letter of 24 March 1966 (S/7221), India transmitted to the Security Council the text of a Declaration signed at Tashkent on 10 January 1966 by the Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan in which they declared their firm resolve to restore normal and peaceful relations between their countries and reaffirmed their obligation under the Charter not to have recourse to force and to settle their disputes through peaceful means. The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan further agreed that all armed personnel of the two countries should be withdrawn not later than 25 February 1966 to the positions they held prior to 5 August 1965, and that both sides should observe the cease-fire terms on the cease-fire line. The Declaration also expressed agree-

ment, *inter alia*, on the repatriation of prisoners of war, the restoration of economic and trade relations and of the normal functioning of diplomatic missions of both countries, and on continued discussion of other matters of direct concern to the two countries.

427. On 17 February 1966 the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council (S/6719/Add.5) that, in a series of joint meetings of the military representatives of India and Pakistan convened under the auspices of his Representative, General Marambio, agreement had been reached between the parties on a plan for disengagement and withdrawal of their troops and on the ground rules for the implementation of the plan. The agreement, which had been given final approval by the parties on 29 January 1966, provided for the disengagement and withdrawal of armed personnel in two stages. During the first stage, both forces would, within a five-day period, withdraw to a distance of 1,000 yards from the line of actual control in specified areas where their respective positions were too close to each other, and would, within the next twenty-one days, remove and nullify all defences. After the dismantling of defences had taken place, all troops, paramilitary forces and armed police who were on the other side of the international border and the Cease-Fire Line would be withdrawn. This withdrawal was to be completed by 25 February 1966. If disagreements arose which could not be resolved by the two parties, the good offices of General Marambio would be requested and his decision would be final and binding on both sides.

428. On 23 February the Secretary-General reported to the Council (S/6699/Add.12) that the first stage of the withdrawals had been completed on 20 February and it was expected that the entire operation would be completed by the target date. If those expectations were fulfilled, General Marambio's responsibilities would come to an end on 28 February and his mission would be terminated on that date. The task of the United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission (UNIPOM) would also have been successfully completed and that mission would be disbanded no later than 22 March 1966. There would also be a gradual reduction of the fifty-nine new Observers appointed in September 1965 to the United Nations Military Observer Group for India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP).

429. On 26 February 1966 the Secretary-General reported (S/6719/Add.6) that the withdrawal of troops by India and Pakistan had been completed on schedule on 25 February. The withdrawal provisions of the Security Council's resolutions had thus been fulfilled by the two parties.

H. Communications received from 26 February to 15 July 1966

430. In a letter of 1 April 1966 (S/7231) Pakistan complained that Indian forces were continuing to occupy three areas in the Sialkot Sector, in violation of the troop withdrawal agreement. The failure of the Indian Government to vacate the three areas concerned constituted a serious breach of that agreement. The Government of Pakistan had implemented its part of the agreement without reservation and expected India to do the same without further delay.

431. In a letter of 6 April 1966 (S/7233 and Corr.2), India stated that the matter referred to in Pakistan's letter of 1 April 1966 had been taken up

between the two local commanders, and whatever adjustments in position were necessary had already been carried out in the light of mutually agreed conclusions. It was surprising that Pakistan had sought to exploit that relatively unimportant matter for propaganda purposes, contrary to the spirit of the Tashkent Declaration.

432. In a letter of 12 April 1966 (S/7251), Pakistan stated that the description by India of the issue raised in its letter of 1 April 1966 (S/7231) as "a relatively unimportant matter" was disingenuous, as the important thing was not the size of the territory involved but the conclusion to be drawn as to the intentions of the parties with regard to the agreements so recently concluded. If instead of observing the letter and spirit of agreements, either side sought loopholes for self-aggrandizement, then the difficulties in the way of restoring mutual confidence would be immeasurably increased, and the spirit in which the two nations

decided at Tashkent to make a new beginning was bound to be eroded.

433. India, in a letter of 21 April 1966 (S/7262), said that it had amply demonstrated its readiness and resolve to implement the Tashkent Declaration in letter and spirit. It had already presented the facts in perspective in its letter of 6 April 1966.

434. In a letter of 19 May 1966 (S/7310) Pakistan complained of an alleged breach of the cease-fire agreement by Indian forces on 29 April 1966.

435. By a letter of 8 June 1966 (S/7347), India denied the alleged breach of the cease-fire agreement and expressed regret that Pakistan was continuing its propaganda drive against India.

436. In a letter dated 29 June 1966 (S/7389), India complained that Pakistan troops had encroached on the Indian side of the cease-fire line in an area approximately six and a half miles south-south-west of Naushahra.

Chapter 4

QUESTION CONCERNING THE SITUATION IN TERRITORIES UNDER PORTUGUESE ADMINISTRATION: LETTERS DATED 2 AND 30 AUGUST 1963 ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON BEHALF OF THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THIRTY-TWO MEMBER STATES

A. Request for a meeting of the Security Council

437. In a letter dated 28 July 1965 (S/6585) addressed to the President of the Security Council, the representatives of thirty-two African States requested an early meeting of the Council to consider once again the situation in the Territories under Portuguese administration. The letter referred to Security Council resolutions 180 of 31 July and 183 of 11 December 1963 and stated that Portugal had not only persisted in its refusal to implement the measures called for in the resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly, but had intensified its repressive measures against the peoples of those Territories.

438. In a letter dated 15 October (S/6791), the representatives of Liberia, Madagascar, Sierra Leone and Tunisia informed the President of the Council that the Organization of African Unity had instructed them to bring before the Security Council the question of African Territories occupied by Portugal and requested that the Security Council meet to consider the matter.

B. Consideration at the 1250th, 1253rd to 1256th and 1266th to 1268th meetings (4-23 November 1965)

439. At the 1250th meeting on 4 November 1965, the Security Council decided to include the item in its agenda and invited the representatives of Liberia, Madagascar, Sierra Leone, Tunisia and Portugal to participate without vote in the consideration of the question.

440. The representative of Liberia recalled that, in previous appearances before the Council in 1963, he had made a comprehensive review of the developments which had led the African Heads of State and Government to give his colleagues and himself a mandate to bring the question to the Council's attention. On 31 July 1963, the Security Council had adopted a resolu-

tion rejecting Portugal's contention that the Territories under its administration were integral parts of Portugal, recognizing the right of the peoples of the Territories to independence and calling upon Portugal to cease all acts of repression, and to enter into negotiations with the representatives of the political parties within and outside the Territories with a view to transferring power to freely elected political institutions. In pursuance of paragraph 7 of that resolution, the Secretary-General had initiated contacts in which nine African States and Portugal had participated. However, those exploratory contacts had failed because of the interpretation which Portugal placed on the word "self-determination".

441. The Secretary-General's latest report (S/5727), of 29 May 1964, indicated that no further progress had been made towards a solution of the problem. In fact, contrary to what had been requested of it by the Council, the only action taken by Portugal thus far in the Territories under its administration had been designed to tighten its grip over the peoples of those Territories and to integrate them further into Portugal. The United Nations Special Committee on Territories under Portuguese Administration had reviewed the new measures taken by Portugal, including the new electoral laws under which elections had been held in March 1964, and had concluded that the reforms not only failed to meet the basic aspirations of the peoples of the Territories but had not even brought about any significant changes in political, economic, social and educational conditions. The Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (Committee of Twenty-Four) had heard statements from representatives of Angola, Mozambique and Portuguese Guinea testifying to the repression practised by Portugal in those Territories. It was clear from those statements that the situation was now far more dangerous and

explosive than it had been two years before, when the Security Council had determined that it was disturbing the peace and security of Africa.

442. The extent of the fighting in those Territories was evidenced by the amount of troops and military equipment the Portuguese Government was obliged to maintain there. It had been reported that in Angola alone Portuguese forces numbered about 60,000. In Mozambique, Portugal had constructed eight new military bases, and it maintained some 40,000 troops there. There were also 20,000 troops in so-called Portuguese Guinea.

443. It was disappointing that some Members of the United Nations had found it appropriate and expedient to supply arms, aircraft and ammunition to Portugal, contrary to the terms and intent of the Security Council's resolutions. Great harm was done to the United Nations when its Members flouted its decisions. The African States requested the Council to take appropriate action that would ensure that the decisions it had already taken on the matter of the Territories under Portuguese administration could be respected and implemented.

444. The representative of Tunisia said that despite the decisions of the Council and the resolutions of the General Assembly, the situation in the Territories under Portuguese domination remained very grave. For five years the Government of Portugal had maintained a state of colonial war and general repression against the nationalists of Angola, Mozambique and so-called Portuguese Guinea. Guerrilla warfare was becoming general in those Territories, and tens of thousands of families had sought refuge in neighbouring countries, creating complex problems for them and for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Moreover, Portuguese military forces had carried out incursions into Senegal. Thus, the situation was indeed a threat to international peace and security.

445. His delegation had hoped that all the changes that had taken place in Africa and elsewhere would lead the Portuguese Government to recognize the irreversible course of history and to give up its hopeless efforts to stop that course. It was impossible to believe that the peoples of Angola, Mozambique and the other Territories under Portuguese domination could passively watch the liberation of their neighbours and brothers and resign themselves to remaining under foreign domination. Tunisia had hoped to see in the colonial policy of the Government of Lisbon at least the beginnings of a change of direction. But Portugal continued to carry out its inhuman repression of the populations for which it had moral and political responsibility, thus showing that it intended to continue along the same path and that it was not ready to abide by the decisions of the United Nations. Moreover, its determination to continue the war and to intensify its military efforts had had the benefit of the support of its friends and allies in the Atlantic Pact. Since it had been clearly proven that the Portuguese Government was using modern weapons supplied by its allies within the framework of NATO to repress the liberation movements, it was the duty of its allies to abstain from supplying any military assistance, especially when a reduction of international tension seemed to favour the ending of such assistance. In addition to the military assistance supplied by some countries, Portugal benefited from the economic support of numerous foreign interests. Such foreign interests, when established in Territories which were still non-self-governing, could

only support colonial power, because in the colonized countries exploitation of resources was undertaken without consent of the peoples and on the basis of legislation which only considered the interests of the colonial Power.

446. The continuation of repression and war in the Territories had had dangerous repercussions and direct effects both on the neighbouring countries and on the whole continent of Africa. The complacency of certain countries and the passive attitude of others had encouraged the European minority of Southern Rhodesia to rebel against the administering Power. The situation in the Portuguese Territories could only be examined within the framework of the dangerous situation existing in neighbouring countries, namely, Southern Rhodesia and South Africa, which were partners and allies of Portugal.

447. The gravity of the situation in the Territories required a clear and energetic decision by the Security Council. While reinforcing the measures it had already taken, the Security Council should decide upon serious economic measures which would make Portugal modify its policy and implement the pertinent resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

448. The representative of Sierra Leone said it was evident from the report prepared by the Committee of Twenty-Four (A/6000/Add.3) that the Portuguese Government had, in the last two years, persisted in the implementation of the Overseas Organic Law of 1963, the chief aim of which was to foster and consolidate the integration with Portugal of the Territories under its domination, in contravention of the expressed will of the majority of the indigenous inhabitants of the Territories and in defiance of the resolutions of both the General Assembly and the Council. Yet, as the Committee's report also made clear, although Portuguese citizenship had been imposed on the people of the Territories against their wishes, the existing electoral rules had been so framed as to deny the vote to the majority of the indigenous inhabitants, despite the position taken by the Portuguese Government, which emphasized that the right to vote was extended to all on the same basis.

449. Turning to the economic policy pursued by Portugal with the active collaboration of foreign enterprises, it seemed clear from available evidence that the economic operations conducted in the Overseas Territories resulted in shameless exploitation and denial of the economic, social and political rights of the Africans. According to the recent study of the subject carried out by the Special Committee, the great majority of Africans were subject to oppressive working conditions and unjust wages and to practices that amounted to forced labour. Ill-health and high infant mortality rates prevailed, while illiteracy rates continued to be among the highest in the world.

450. But perhaps the most disturbing aspect of the question was the size and intensity of the colonial war being waged by Portugal in the Territories under its administration. It was estimated that that war effort was currently costing Portugal about \$350,000 a day. It was surprising that Portugal, one of the poorest countries in Europe, felt able to continue that military operation with determination and confidence. The sources of its finances seemed to come, to a large extent, from external loans from three countries: the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Federal Republic of Germany. Those countries claimed that the loans to

Portugal were for development. In view of the usual insistence by the same donor countries that money given should be used on designated projects and against the background of complaints that loans and aid were being used by Portugal to acquire arms and ammunition for the military oppression of the peoples in its Territories, the donor countries and institutions involved should make it a point of duty to ensure that whatever funds were made available to Portugal for development were not misdirected into its colonial warfare and repression.

451. It was not only with funds that Portugal was being assisted. Through NATO, of which it was a member, Portugal had access to and continued to receive supplies of the most modern and advanced weapons. It was argued by the NATO suppliers of those arms that they were not for use in the Overseas Territories, but it was difficult to resist the conclusion that a nation publicly committed to "sacrifices in blood and money" would use all the resources at its disposal in the prosecution of its intentions. Perhaps it would be to the benefit of all if those NATO Powers took the trouble to verify that the arms they supplied were not used in the colonial war. In the absence of such verifications, the best assurance would be that there should be no supply of arms or ammunition of any kind to Portugal under any arrangements whatsoever.

452. The representative of Madagascar drew attention to the resolution adopted on 10 June 1965 by the Committee of Twenty-Four, which condemned the colonial policies of Portugal and declared that the situation prevailing in Angola, Mozambique and the other Territories occupied by Portugal was a threat to the peace and security not only of Africa but of the whole world. Portugal's persistent refusal to satisfy the legitimate aspirations of the people of its African Territories had resulted in the establishment of a régime which was based solely on force. Such a régime was driven to resort to increasingly arbitrary repressive measures and to maintaining a police and military apparatus which was increasingly severe and increasingly costly. Portugal must realize that it could not, in the twentieth century, cling to a policy of colonial domination which could have no future. The people under its administration in Africa no longer wanted to be dominated by it. They knew that in their aspirations they enjoyed the increasingly active support of the 200 million Africans who, united in the Organization of African Unity, were firmly resolved to ensure that justice was done. It was now necessary for the United Nations to decide whether it could continue to tolerate a situation wherein its most solemn decisions remained a dead letter, and allow one State to refuse with impunity to grant the inalienable right of self-determination to the people it was administering by force. The four African States which had spoken for all of Africa were expecting a clear-cut decision from the Security Council.

453. At the Council's 1253rd meeting, on 8 November 1965, the representative of Portugal said that the statements made by the representatives of Liberia, Tunisia, Sierra Leone and Madagascar were a mere repetition of previous statements, containing the same accusations and distortions and the same refusal to understand and accept realities. Some of the charges made, such as the allegation that millions of Angolans had fled into neighbouring countries, were preposterous. Others were based on the most glaring misrepresentations of fact. It was alleged that educational facilities in the Portuguese Territories were poor. Certainly,

Portugal did not regard them as sufficient or perfect, but they were far better than in most African countries. It was not true that there were no health services; in fact, the proportion of doctors to population was higher than in many African countries. The new electoral law criticized by the representative of Liberia was precisely the same in continental Portugal and in the Overseas Provinces. The "alliance" between "the Governments of Lisbon, Pretoria and Salisbury" alluded to by the representative of Tunisia did not exist, nor had Portugal received any foreign funds whatsoever, in either grants or loans, to finance what the representative of Sierra Leone had referred to as a "massive colonial war".

454. It had been charged by all four of the African representatives who had addressed the Council that Portugal's attitude had been intransigent during the conversations which had taken place in October 1963; that NATO was giving Portugal military assistance for its operations in Africa, and that foreign investments in the African provinces encouraged repression and were detrimental to the interests of the peoples concerned. With regard to the first point, the four accusing countries agreed that the question of a definition of self-determination had been thoroughly debated during the conversations of October 1963. Portugal had presented its own idea of self-determination, which was perfectly in harmony with the Charter of the United Nations, i.e., that self-determination implied the consent of the people to the form of government and their agreement to the structure of the State and the system of administration. Portugal had offered to discuss ways and means of investigating the charges persistently levelled at it; those offers had been refused by the African delegations. With regard to the alleged NATO help, he would say only that Portugal did not utilize and had no intention of utilizing NATO equipment in Africa. Finally, with regard to foreign investment in Portuguese overseas territories, he failed to understand how the growth and creation of new industries could jeopardize or be detrimental to the interests and progress of the people as a whole.

455. The four delegations which had criticized Portuguese policy had based their criticism on the views of private persons who presented themselves as "petitioners". Many other people had visited Angola and Mozambique, which were free and open territories, and had returned with high praise for the conditions of peace and progress they had found there.

456. It was said that Portugal was threatening international peace and security; in particular, by the "incursions" it was alleged to make into the Republic of Senegal. The truth was that Portugal had made no incursions into Senegal, and when frontier incidents had occurred it had offered to have them investigated by a tripartite commission appointed by the United Nations. Senegal had always refused. Portugal was the victim, not the aggressor, and the accusation made against it was merely a device to conceal the activities of others. It was no longer possible to deny that there was a vast network of foreign interests, ranging from Governments to philanthropic foundations, which was endeavouring to disturb the peace in Angola and Mozambique. It had been widely reported in the Press that Ghana had become "an arsenal for Angola liberation fighters" and that "volunteers" from various countries were being trained in Tunisia to fight in Angola. Numerous training and military bases had been estab-

lished in Tanzania for attacks against neighbouring territories, including Mozambique. It was high time for the Council to look deeply and seriously into this international threat to peace and security and to accuse the real aggressors. His delegation requested the Council to do so.

457. The accusing delegations had suggested that Portugal was not and had never been willing to co-operate with the United Nations. That was not accurate. Portugal had made many proposals for co-operation with the United Nations, which had been rejected by the African delegations. As recently as 18 May 1965 it had proposed the appointment by the Security Council of a tripartite commission to investigate new charges by Senegal concerning alleged border incidents. Again the proposal had been rejected. However, since the same accusations were still being repeated, Portugal would be prepared to consider new ways and means to have them investigated. If the Council were to find it useful and timely to appoint a sub-committee including one representative of Portugal and one for the African countries to assess whether there was a threat to international peace and security on Portugal's part or on the part of others, and to investigate the bases and camps in foreign territories and the infiltration across borders, Portugal would be prepared to extend its full co-operation, after the mandate of such a sub-committee was agreed upon.

458. It had been alleged that Portuguese policy was unacceptable and anachronistic, and that Portugal was able to pursue it only because it was helped by NATO, or by foreign investments, or by international financial circles. Portugal denied all this, and the African countries would be wise if they had the courage to face and accept the real explanation, which was that Portugal's policy was animated by a sense of racial democracy and the determination to further the welfare of all in a society where all were granted the same opportunities.

459. The representative of the Ivory Coast said that the Security Council, in its resolutions of 31 July and 11 December 1963, had recognized the dangers to which Portuguese colonialism was exposing the peace and security of Africa and prescribed certain steps aimed at avoiding any further deterioration in the situation. Portugal had failed to implement those resolutions and had flouted the authority on the Council not only in not applying them but in imposing its colonial doctrines on Africa through the use of force. Portugal was devoting a budget of \$130 million to its war effort—a burden which it could not sustain without the help supplied it by its NATO partners. That was why Portugal's friends must heed the appeals of the United Nations and compel Portugal to put an end to the unnecessary and useless war by depriving it of the means to wage it. Africans rejected the constitutional fiction by which Portugal sought to evade accounting to the world community for the administration of its Territories. The Security Council must demand that Portugal recognize the right to self-determination of the Territories under its administration; end the useless colonial war; grant amnesty to political prisoners and exiles, and negotiate with the nationalists in preparation for independence.

460. In connexion with his statement at the 1253rd meeting of the Council, the representative of Portugal, in a letter of 8 November 1965 (S/6886), transmitted a list of 140 alleged violations of air space over Portu-

guese Guinea which had occurred within the first six months of 1965.

461. At the 1254th meeting, on 9 November 1965, the representative of Tunisia cited recent Press reports corroborating his earlier statement that a state of war existed in Portugal's African Territories. Portugal had been waging a colonial war since 1961, a war which was growing in scope and dangerously threatening the peace and security of Africa.

462. The Portuguese representative had attempted to prove Portugal's desire to co-operate with the United Nations, but the fact was that Portugal had refused to give effect to a single resolution of the General Assembly or the Security Council or to co-operate with the Organization in implementing them. The Portuguese representative had also formally denied the existence of any alliance or *entente* between Portugal and South Africa. Nevertheless, the Portuguese delegation had taken care not to express in public any disapproval of the policy of the South African Government during the debates on apartheid in the General Assembly and the Security Council.

463. Portugal maintained that it accepted the principle of self-determination and that its disagreement with the other Members of the United Nations turned only on the question of how that principle was to be interpreted. But it had been recognized by the General Assembly and the Security Council that the basis for self-determination was the ability of a population to make a free choice of the various possibilities for its future, whereas the Portuguese conception limited and predetermined that choice. It was essential that the Portuguese Government should accept the interpretation of self-determination laid down in the Security Council resolution of 11 December 1963. Only then would the fundamental cause of the dangerous conflict which had arisen between Portugal and the people of its African Territories disappear, and make possible a peaceful, negotiated solution in an atmosphere of renewed friendship.

464. The representative of Malaysia said that the obligations which the General Assembly and the Security Council sought to impose on Portugal stemmed directly from Article 73 of the Charter, dealing with Non-Self-Governing Territories, and the interpretation that Article had borne since General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. He had studied the political constitution of Portugal as well as the political and administrative statutes of Angola and Mozambique and, in his view, there could be no doubt whatsoever that, whether they were called colonies, overseas territories or overseas provinces, the territories with which the Security Council was at present concerned were in fact the colonial Non-Self-Governing Territories of Portugal.

465. The representative of Jordan said that self-determination was a legal right the meaning of which had been defined by the United Nations in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). It was not open to Portugal to introduce a new criterion to fit its colonial policy and its attitude of exploitation in the three Territories under its administration. The majority of the Members of the United Nations had gained their independence as a result of the implementation of the right of self-determination, and the Portuguese Territories could not be the exception to the rule. The spirit of liberation was awake in Africa, and there was no

room in the contemporary world for domination and exploitation. A change of policy would be in Portugal's own interest. If, however, Portugal continued to defy the authority of the United Nations and continued its policy of repression and exploitation of the peoples of Angola, Mozambique and so-called Portuguese Guinea, then the Security Council was duty-bound to consider further steps to protect the rights of those peoples.

466. The representative of the United Kingdom said that a single decision by Portugal to accept the principle of self-determination, as it was understood in the United Nations, as the declared aim of Portuguese policy in Africa, could change not only the present situation but the whole outlook for the future. In a free association relations between Portugal and Africa could be preserved and even strengthened. Such a policy would be in the interests of both Africans and Portugal. He denied the allegation that the United Kingdom had provided arms to assist the Portuguese Government to maintain its present policy in its overseas Territories. The delivery of arms and military equipment to the Portuguese overseas Territories had been suspended four years ago, and since then the United Kingdom had consistently followed a policy in accordance with the Security Council resolution of 31 July 1963. Nor had the United Kingdom Government, as a member of NATO, contributed in any way to the Portuguese armed forces in Africa. It was no part of the function and purpose of NATO to support the policy of the Portuguese Government in Africa, and neither as a member of NATO nor acting independently had the United Kingdom Government any intention of providing arms or military equipment for such use. Looking to the future, his Government would like to see a renewal of associations between the representatives of the African countries and the Portuguese Government. Two years ago, there had seemed some hope of progress in such associations, and the efforts in that direction should be revived and reinforced.

467. The representative of the Netherlands said that his Government was not unaware of the political and social reforms which Portugal had recently initiated in its overseas Territories nor of the essentially multiracial character of Portuguese society. Nevertheless, it could not accept Portugal's constitutional thesis with regard to its overseas Territories and hoped that it would follow the example of other Western colonial Powers and apply the principle of self-determination to all its Non-Self-Governing overseas Territories. The Netherlands would like to see Portugal provide the inhabitants of those Territories with an opportunity to express themselves freely on the status they favoured for their lands. From the records, it seemed that the Government of Portugal was in principle not opposed to the idea, and in this, it seemed to his delegation, lay the possibility of a common point of departure.

468. The Security Council was once more called upon to try to promote a solution of the dispute before it. In his delegation's view, that solution must be found by peaceful means, and those means under the Charter had not yet been exhausted. There was every reason to resume discussion of the question with Portugal under the auspices of the United Nations. Perhaps the Secretary-General could be invited to lend his good offices towards a resumption of such talks. Prior to this, or in conjunction with renewed talks, it might be useful if the Portuguese Government were to invite representatives of the United Nations to visit the overseas Territories in order to gain first-hand knowledge

of the situation. With regard to the suggestion of the Portuguese representative that the Security Council should appoint a sub-committee, his delegation felt that the mandate of any body which might be set up should not be limited to the investigation of the threat to international peace and security, but should also cover the question of self-determination, which was the heart of the matter. It was not too late for a concerted effort to find a peaceful and honourable solution to the problem on that basis.

469. At the 1255th meeting, on 10 November 1965, the President informed the Council that he had received a letter from the representative of the United Republic of Tanzania asking that he be allowed to participate in the debate. Pursuant to his request, the representative of the United Republic of Tanzania was invited to take part in the Council's discussion.

470. The representative of Portugal, replying to statements made by some of the previous speakers, said that the representative of the Ivory Coast had recognized that the problem before the Council was that of the threat to international peace and security posed by the training camps and infiltration to which he had referred. The representative of Malaysia had provided the Council with an interpretation of Article 73 of the Charter, but it should be made clear that that Article had been the subject of debate and interpretation for fifteen years. He was glad to confirm the statement by the representative of the United Kingdom that no military equipment was being sent by the United Kingdom, either individually or as a member of NATO, for use in Portuguese overseas Territories, but would also like to point out that Portugal had not requested the United Kingdom Government to supply it with any military equipment.

471. The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania said that he wished to reply to the allegations against his country made by the representative of Portugal. Those allegations were an effort to divide the countries of Africa against each other and to divert the world's attention from the atrocities Portugal was committing against the African people in Mozambique, Angola and so-called Portuguese Guinea. What the Portuguese representative had referred to as training camps and military bases in Tanzania were in fact either refugee camps administered by civil or religious authorities or national service training centres. In fact it was Portugal which posed a threat to international peace and security and which was defying the United Nations. Thousands of Africans had had to flee their homelands in Mozambique and Angola because of mass shootings, the burning of villages, the use of workers as slave labour and other sufferings. They had gone to Tanzania and the neighbouring African States seeking aid and relief. The leaders of his Government had stated publicly that Tanzania would fight colonialism in Africa until the whole continent was liberated, and would give aid to all those forces which were fighting against colonialism. Portugal's war against the Africans was an infringement of the Charter and it was necessary to apply sanctions against that country. The Council should state unambiguously that Portugal's behaviour in Africa was contrary to the Charter and was, indeed, a threat to international peace and security within the meaning of Chapter VII of the Charter.

472. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that in their convincing statements to the Council the representatives of independent Africa

had demonstrated that in carrying out their inhuman policies the Portuguese authorities were ignoring world public opinion as well as the decisions of the United Nations. Numerous facts indicated that Portugal's punitive action against the African people was being supported by its NATO allies. Loans from the United States and West Germany were feeding its military budget, and Portuguese officers and men were being trained, as part of NATO, for service in Africa. Those countries were supporting Portugal not only because of the NATO alliance and strategic considerations but also because of the close ties of the Portuguese colonialists with large foreign companies, which had exclusive concessional rights for exploiting the Territories. The Security Council should immediately take effective measures to bridle the Portuguese colonialists and to compel them to carry out the Council's decisions. First, the Council should apply the necessary sanctions against Portugal, as provided for in the Charter. Secondly, the United Nations must be more active in the liquidation of all remaining colonial régimes, and utilize all means to that end. For its part, the Soviet Union was in favour of all countries giving moral and material assistance to the peoples struggling for independence, and, as a socialist state, would continue to provide all possible assistance to them. The Security Council could not ignore the fact that certain NATO Powers endorsed Portuguese policy. It was duty-bound to draw the necessary conclusions and take them into consideration when adopting appropriate measures. The Council must do everything possible to ensure that its decisions were implemented so that the criminal policies of Portuguese colonialism were ended. His delegation was convinced that the people languishing in bondage under Portuguese colonialism would soon have their hopes fulfilled and acquire their freedom and independence.

473. At the 1256th meeting of the Council, on 11 November 1965, the representative of the United States said that his Government had for a number of years forbidden the provision of arms or military equipment to Portugal from public or private sources without specific assurance that they would not be used in the Portuguese Territories, and had also prohibited the direct export of arms or equipment to those Territories. Nor did NATO make arms available to Portugal. The Portuguese Government's attitude towards its Territories could not be attributed to its membership in NATO; in fact, the evidence was quite to the contrary, since all the other members of NATO which had had colonies were following or had followed the process of decolonization. The United States had no programmes of economic assistance either to Portugal or to its overseas Territories. His delegation could not, however, accept the contention that it was foreign private investment in those Territories which was impeding the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence in those Territories, nor the proposition that the immediate withdrawal of foreign investment, which related to the welfare of the people of the Territories, would be to their advantage.

474. Turning to the substance of the question, his delegation felt that the contacts of 1963 should be re-established and that an effort should be made to close the gap between the parties on the basis of the Council's resolution of 11 December 1963. The Council might therefore first reaffirm that resolution, thereby reaffirming the concept of self-determination for the Portuguese Territories and the definition of self-determination laid down in the resolution, and then recommend that dis-

cussions be initiated promptly between Portugal and the African States on the basis of the resolution. The Council might also request the Secretary-General to continue his earlier efforts with the parties concerned, and to report to the Council as appropriate. All of the parties concerned should recognize that it was their responsibility under the Charter to explore every possible avenue for a peaceful solution of the problem. Resumed contacts on that basis were not only desirable but plainly required to carry out the purposes of the Charter and to implement the Council's previous resolutions.

475. The representative of Uruguay said that colonialism was contrary to the legal, political and moral conscience of the modern world. Accordingly, the continuation of a colonial régime, regardless of whether it was good or bad, in itself became a threat to general peace and security. The peoples of Mozambique, Angola and Portuguese Guinea must be given the right to decide on their own future. His delegation was inclined to agree with the suggestion of the representative of Portugal that an investigation committee should be set up, but would again remind Portugal that it must comply with the relevant resolutions of the Security Council. His delegation also considered that the Secretary-General should be requested to continue his efforts to that end.

476. The representative of Tunisia said that discussions with Portugal would be possible only when the Portuguese Government had unequivocally accepted a definition of self-determination which would allow for a choice of sovereignty in independence by the peoples of its African Territories.

477. The representative of China said that his delegation had always maintained that the Territories under Portuguese administration were Non-Self-Governing Territories within the meaning of Chapter XI of the Charter. The Portuguese Government gave a restricted interpretation to the concept of self-determination, while the majority in the United Nations interpreted it as implying not only self-government but the possibility of eventual independence. The situation in the Portuguese Territories was potentially explosive, and his delegation would appeal to the Portuguese Government to accept the principle of self-determination as defined in the United Nations. If the Africans in those Territories chose integration with Portugal, it was their right to do so. If they chose independence, that was also their right. But it was not for Portugal to decide on their behalf. His delegation hoped that Portugal would change its hard and fast position and would at least meet the African States halfway, so that useful talks could be initiated between the parties concerned.

478. The representative of the USSR said it was well known that the weapons and armaments used by the Portuguese armed forces to kill Africans were chiefly produced in West Germany, the United States, the United Kingdom and Italy, and were obtained by Portugal from NATO. If that was not so, the relevant statements to the contrary should have been made by the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom.

479. The President, speaking as the representative of Bolivia, said that the peoples of the Portuguese Territories wanted complete independence and were supported in their struggle by all the free peoples of the world. It would be futile to try to stop the advance towards liberation of the peoples of Angola, Mozambique and Portuguese Guinea. In fact, it would be

suicidal for Portugal not to understand that inevitable development of history and to accept a solution corresponding to Portugal's historical tradition. The Security Council had adopted clear-cut resolutions on the Portuguese Territories. It was now for the Council to determine how compliance with those resolutions could best be ensured.

480. When the Council resumed consideration of the question, at its 1266th meeting, held on 22 November 1965, it had before it the following draft resolution (S/6953), sponsored by the Ivory Coast, Jordan, Liberia, Malaysia, Sierra Leone and Tunisia:

"The Security Council,

"Having examined the question of the situation in the Territories under Portuguese administration submitted by thirty-two African States,

"Recalling its resolutions 180 (1963) of 31 July and 183 (1963) of 11 December 1963,

"Noting with deep concern the continued refusal of Portugal to take the necessary steps to implement the aforementioned resolutions of the Security Council,

"Considering that, in spite of the measures laid down by the Security Council in paragraph 5 of resolution 180 (1963), the Government of Portugal is intensifying its measures of repression and its military operations against the African population with a view to defeating their legitimate hopes of achieving self-determination and independence,

"Convinced that the implementation of the pertinent resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly, and in particular Council resolutions 180 (1963) and 183 (1963), is the only means to achieve a peaceful solution of the question of Portuguese Territories in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

"Recalling General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 15 December 1960,

"1. Affirms that the situation resulting from the policies of Portugal both as regards the African population of its colonies and the neighbouring States endangers international peace and security;

"2. Deplores the failure of the Government of Portugal to comply with previous resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly and to recognize the right of the peoples under its administration to self-determination and independence;

"3. Reaffirms the interpretation of the principle of self-determination as laid down in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and in Security Council resolution 183 (1963);

"4. Calls upon Portugal to give immediate effect in the Territories under its administration to the principle of self-determination as referred to in paragraph 3 above;

"5. Reaffirms its urgent demand to Portugal for:

"(a) The immediate recognition of the right of the peoples of the Territories under its administration to self-determination and independence;

"(b) The immediate cessation of all acts of repression and the withdrawal of all military and other forces at present employed for that purpose;

"(c) The promulgation of an unconditional political amnesty and the establishment of conditions that will allow the free functioning of political parties;

"(d) Negotiations, on the basis of the recognition of the right to self-determination, with the authorized representatives of the political parties within and outside the Territories with a view to the transfer of power to political institutions freely elected and representative of the peoples, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV);

"(e) The granting of independence immediately thereafter to all the Territories under its administration in accordance with the aspirations of the peoples;

"6. Calls upon all States to comply with paragraph 6 of its resolution 180 (1963);

"7. Calls upon all States to take all necessary measures to prevent the sale and shipment of equipment and materials for the manufacture and maintenance of arms and ammunitions in Portugal, and the Territories under Portuguese administration;

"8. Calls upon all States to take all the necessary measures either separately or collectively to boycott all Portuguese imports and exports;

"9. Requests all States to inform the Secretary-General on whatever measures are undertaken towards implementation of paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 of the present resolution;

"10. Requests the Secretary-General to ensure the implementation of the provisions of the present resolution, to provide such assistance as he may deem necessary and to report to the Security Council not later than 30 June 1966."

481. The representative of Tunisia said that the situation in the Portuguese Territories, which the Council had already characterized as seriously disturbing peace and security, had clearly worsened and should now be recognized as endangering international peace and security. The embargo on arms and military equipment decided upon by the Council in its resolution of 31 July 1963 did not seem to have been put into effect at all, while one of the consequences of foreign investment in the Portuguese Territories was to provide indirect but substantial support for Portugal's repressive policies. It therefore seemed logical to extend the embargo to all equipment and materials that might be used for the manufacture of weapons and to put an end to all imports and exports to and from Portugal. Those were among the main purposes of the draft resolution. Its sponsors believed that the measures proposed would have a greater likelihood of being effective if they were applied at the present stage of the situation, before it had deteriorated beyond repair. What was asked of Portugal was not the recognition of the right of the population under its administration to a predetermined choice but the sincere recognition of their right to self-determination, and the granting to those populations of an opportunity freely to exercise that right.

482. The representative of Portugal said that the draft resolution took no account of all of the comments and suggestions made by Portugal during the debate. His delegation totally rejected the allegations made in the fourth preambular paragraph and operative paragraph 1, and continued to believe that, at the very least, those allegations should be carefully investigated by the Council before any decision was taken. Although the sponsors of the draft had said that they did not wish to prejudge the choice to be made by the inhabitants of the Overseas Territories, operative paragraph 5 did in fact predetermine the issue. The measure pro-

posed in operative paragraph 8 could only be regarded as utterly irresponsible. Even if the allegations made against Portugal had been proved—as they were not—the iniquitous measures so hastily proposed and clearly falling under Chapter VII of the Charter would be absolutely out of proportion.

483. The representative of the Ivory Coast, speaking in support of the draft resolution, said that it was intended to draw attention to the fact that Portugal's policy in Africa endangered international peace and security and that its interpretation of the principle of self-determination was wrong; to ensure that the necessary steps were taken to prevent the situation from endangering international peace and security, and to ask Portugal to accept the concept of self-determination as understood by the United Nations and laid down in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). It had been clearly demonstrated that a state of war existed in Portugal's African Territories which was growing in intensity from day to day. The alliance between Portugal, South Africa and Southern Rhodesia was also an element in the dangerous situation, as were the attacks on neighbouring African territories by Portugal. Certain proposals had been made in the Council concerning negotiations with Portugal, but his delegation considered that Portugal, in accepting self-determination as defined in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), would merely have to get in touch with the nationalists against whom it was now fighting and negotiate with them ways and means for the application of that self-determination. There would then be no need for the other African States to negotiate with Portugal.

484. At the 1267th meeting of the Council, on 22 November, the President announced that Madagascar had joined the sponsors of the draft resolution (S/6953 and Add.1), which had now been reissued with slight drafting changes (S/6953/Rev.1).

485. Speaking at the same meeting, the representative of Liberia said that the draft resolution, which his delegation had co-sponsored, was an attempt to get the Council to take effective action to ensure that its previous resolutions were implemented by Member States and not flouted or ignored. He urged members of the Council to give it their full support.

486. The representative of the USSR said that the Soviet Union warmly supported any measure that would allow the peoples oppressed by Portugal to exercise their rights to self-determination and independence. His delegation would therefore vote in favour of the draft resolution although it was a compromise text which did not fully meet the aspirations of the peoples concerned.

487. The representative of China said that if a separate vote was taken on operative paragraph 8 his delegation would be obliged to abstain. It would, however, vote in favour of the draft resolution as a whole.

488. The representative of France said that he fully agreed with the definition of self-determination given by the representative of Tunisia, and hoped to see it universally applied. His delegation would be unable to support the draft resolution not because of any divergence of views on that point but because of its views concerning the competence of the United Nations in the situation with which the Council was dealing.

489. At the 1268th meeting of the Council on 23 November 1965, the representative of Uruguay in-

troduced the two following amendments (S/6965) to the joint draft resolution (S/6953/Rev.1): (1) to replace the word "endangers" in operative paragraph 1 by "seriously disturbs", and (2) to replace operative paragraphs 6 and 7 by the following paragraph 6:

"6. *Requests* all States to refrain forthwith from offering the Portuguese Government any assistance which would enable it to continue its repression of the people of the Territories under its administration; and to take all the necessary measures to prevent the sale and supply of arms and military equipment to the Portuguese Government for this purpose, including the sale and shipment of equipment and materials for the manufacture and maintenance of arms and ammunition to be used in the Territories under Portuguese administration;"

490. The representative of Uruguay also requested that a separate vote be taken on operative paragraph 8 of the joint draft resolution.

Decisions: *At the 1268th meeting, on 23 November 1965, the first Uruguayan amendment (S/6965) was adopted by 10 votes to none, with 1 abstention (France); the second Uruguayan amendment (S/6965) was adopted by 8 votes to none, with 3 abstentions (France, Netherlands and United Kingdom); operative paragraph 8 of the revised draft resolution (S/6953/Rev.1) received 4 votes in favour (Ivory Coast, Jordan, Malaysia, USSR), none against, and 7 abstentions, and was not adopted, having failed to obtain the necessary majority.*

491. The representative of the Netherlands said that the essence of his Government's position on the whole question of the Portuguese Territories was that it sincerely hoped that the Portuguese Government would allow these Territories to have self-determination in the sense in which it was generally understood in the United Nations.

492. With regard to the text of the draft resolution, paragraph 5 (a) presented his Government with some difficulty because the words "and independence" might create the impression that that was the only result that could possibly arise from self-determination.

493. The Council then voted on the revised draft resolution (S/6953/Rev.1), as amended.

Decision: *At the 1268th meeting on 23 November 1965, the revised draft resolution (S/6953/Rev.1), as amended, was adopted by 7 votes to none, with 4 abstentions (France, Netherlands, United Kingdom and United States (resolution 218 (1965))).*

494. The representative of the United States explained that his delegation had abstained because of certain reservations on various points in question. His Government strongly believed that Portugal should recognize the right to self-determination, as defined by the General Assembly and the Security Council, of the peoples of the Portuguese Territories. However, the resolution adopted by the Council was lacking in one important respect. It was the responsibility both of the Council and the parties concerned to explore every possible avenue towards a peaceful solution of the problem. The Council should therefore have demanded the prompt initiation of discussions between Portugal and the African States, on the basis of its recommendations of December 1963. His delegation hoped, nevertheless, that such discussions would take place, and would point out that the Secretary-General retained his authorization, under prior resolutions of the Council,

to play a constructive role in the development of negotiations.

495. The representative of the USSR said that although the draft resolution had not fully reflected the aspirations of the peoples struggling for liberation from Portuguese colonialism, his delegation had found it possible to vote for it. In that connexion it had taken into account the appeals of its African friends and had met the wishes of the countries which had brought the matter before the Council. By abstaining in the course of the vote on the draft resolution, the United States, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands had demonstrated once again their moral and political support of their NATO ally, Portugal, and the true worth of the verbal declarations they made regarding their readiness to respect the rights of the African peoples to self-determination and full independence.

496. The representative of the Ivory Coast said it was regrettable that some States participating in the compromise negotiations on the draft resolution had not, at the last minute, seen fit to support the resolution.

497. The representative of Portugal said that he wished to place on record his delegation's strong reservations in regard to the resolution just adopted.

C. Subsequent communications

498. By a letter dated 11 December 1965 (S/7011) addressed to the President of the Security Council, Portugal transmitted a list of forty alleged violations of the air space over Portuguese Guinea which had occurred during the month of October 1965.

499. In letters dated 22 December 1965 (S/7041), 29 December 1965 (S/7057), 7 January 1966 (S/7077), 31 January 1966 (S/7111), 11 February 1966 (S/7149), 10 March 1966 (S/7209), 30 March 1966 (S/7230), 31 May 1966 (S/7328) and 1 June 1966 (S/7340), the representatives of the USSR, the Byelorussian SSR, India, the Ukrainian SSR, Bulgaria, Ethiopia, Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia informed the Secretary-General, in response to his note of 3 December 1965, transmitting the text of Security Council resolution 218 (1965), that their respective Governments had taken all the necessary steps to carry out the provisions of the said resolution, and had severed diplomatic, consular and economic relations with the Government of Portugal.

500. On 27 January 1966, the Secretary-General transmitted to the President of the Security Council (S/7103) the text of resolution 2107 (XX), concerning the question of Territories under Portuguese administration, adopted by the General Assembly at its 1407th plenary meeting on 21 December 1965.

501. By a note verbale dated 26 April 1966 (S/7290), the Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of Bulgaria transmitted to the Secretary-General a letter addressed to him on 23 March 1966 by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the German Democratic Republic stating the position of the Government of the German Democratic Republic with regard to Security Council resolution 218 (1965).

502. In a report of 30 June 1966 (S/7385) the Secretary-General informed the Council that, pursuant

to operative paragraphs 7 and 8 of resolution 218 (1965), he had transmitted the text of that resolution to all States Members of the United Nations and of the specialized agencies, stating that he would appreciate information on the measures undertaken by them in pursuance of the resolution. As of 30 June 1966 fifty-one replies had been received, the substantive parts of which were reproduced in an annex to the report.

503. On 26 November 1965, the Secretary-General continued, he had transmitted the text of the resolution to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Portugal, and had stated that he would welcome information on measures taken or contemplated by the Government of Portugal toward the implementation of the resolution and any indication from the Foreign Minister on assistance which might appropriately be provided by the Secretary-General under that resolution or an opportunity to discuss the matter with him. The Foreign Minister of Portugal had replied on 21 March 1966, stating that the Portuguese Government expressed its appreciation of the Secretary-General's suggestion, declared its readiness to follow it up in practical terms and awaited any proposals the Secretary-General might wish to submit for its consideration.

504. By letter dated 11 April 1966 addressed to the Foreign Minister of Portugal the Secretary-General had stated that he would welcome an opportunity to discuss with the Foreign Minister as soon as possible the measures to be taken for the implementation of Security Council resolution 218, and in particular operative paragraphs 4 and 5 of that resolution, which were addressed to the Portuguese Government.

505. In an addendum to his report (S/7385/Add.1) of 1 July 1966, the Secretary-General transmitted the text of a reply of 28 June 1966 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Portugal to his letter of 11 April 1966. In his reply, the Minister for Foreign Affairs referred to the Portuguese Government's intention of helping to explore various problems with which the Security Council had been dealing, among which it laid stress on those relating to regional co-operation among States and to international peace and security. In those circumstances, it was prepared to accept the Secretary-General's suggestion for the prompt discussion of those problems, and wished to point out the appropriateness of taking advantage of the opportunity afforded by the coming session of the General Assembly to engage in talks on those matters on such occasion in the course of that session as might be agreed upon, first with the Secretary-General alone and later within such broader framework as might be mutually judged appropriate.

506. In a further addendum to his report (S/7385/Add.2) the Secretary-General informed the Council that he had replied to the letter of 28 June from the Foreign Minister of Portugal assuring him that he would be happy to discuss with him all relevant questions within the context of resolution 218 (1965). He added that he had taken note of the Foreign Minister's proposal that the discussions take place during the forthcoming session of the General Assembly and would be grateful to receive his suggestion as to a convenient date.

QUESTION CONCERNING THE SITUATION IN SOUTHERN RHODESIA: LETTERS DATED 2 AND 30 AUGUST 1963 ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON BEHALF OF THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THIRTY-TWO MEMBER STATES

A. Communications received from 16 July to 10 November 1965

507. By letter dated 21 July 1965 (S/6567), the Chairman of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples transmitted to the Security Council the text of a resolution adopted by the Special Committee on 18 June, and which dealt, *inter alia*, with the situation in Southern Rhodesia.

508. By letter dated 27 October (S/6838), the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics requested circulation as a Council document of a TASS statement on Southern Rhodesia dated 25 October.

B. Consideration by the Council at the 1257th to 1265th meetings (12-20 November 1965)

509. By letter dated 11 November 1965 (S/6896), the representative of the United Kingdom informed the President of the Council that the authorities in Southern Rhodesia had made an announcement that day purporting, illegally and unilaterally, to declare independence for Southern Rhodesia. His Government wished to inform the Council of the situation created by that illegal action and of the steps it was taking to meet the situation, and he therefore requested an urgent meeting of the Council.

510. On the same day, a letter dated 10 November from the President of the General Assembly was circulated as a Council document (S/6897). It transmitted the texts of General Assembly resolutions 2012 (XX) of 12 October and 2022 (XX) of 5 November 1965, dealing with the situation in Southern Rhodesia.

511. Another letter (S/6908) from the President of the Assembly dated 11 November transmitted resolution 2024 (XX) adopted that day by the Assembly, in which it was recommended that the Council consider the situation as a matter of urgency.

512. Also on 11 November, the representatives of thirty-five African States addressed a request (S/6902) to the President to convene an emergency meeting of the Council. The unilateral declaration of the independence of Southern Rhodesia, it was stated, had created a threat to international peace and security.

513. Another letter (S/6903) circulated that day was addressed to the President of the Council by the representatives of twenty-two African and Asian States. This letter expressed the conviction of their Governments that the unilateral declaration of independence aggravated an already explosive situation and threatened international peace and security.

514. The item, the title of which listed the above communications as sub-items, was included in the agenda of the 1257th meeting on 12 November 1965, when the President, with the consent of the Council, and in accordance with their respective requests (S/6904, S/6905, S/6906, S/6907, S/6909, S/6910, S/6912, S/6913, S/6916 and S/6919), invited the representatives of Algeria, India, Pakistan, Ghana, Zambia, Sierra

Leone, Senegal, Mali, Tanzania and Nigeria to participate in the discussion without vote. The representatives of Guinea and Ethiopia, in accordance with their requests (S/6919 and S/6922) were invited to participate at the 1258th and 1259th meetings respectively. The representatives of Mauritania, Gambia and Jamaica, in accordance with their requests (S/6932, S/6933 and S/6934), were invited to participate at the 1261st meeting. The representative of Somalia (S/6941) and Sudan (S/6944) were invited at the 1263rd meeting.

515. The representative of the United Kingdom stated that the declaration by a group of persons, who had been until recently the Government of Southern Rhodesia, that Southern Rhodesia was independent of Britain was illegal and invalid since only the British Parliament had the right and authority to accord independence to Southern Rhodesia. The illegal act had been performed with the intention of establishing a form of government which would ensure that the power to control Southern Rhodesia's future remained in the hands of a white minority comprising only one twentieth of the population. The United Kingdom would grant independence only on terms acceptable to the people of Southern Rhodesia as a whole. Mr. Smith and his colleagues had rejected Mr. Wilson's two propositions either to hold a referendum, or to appoint a Royal Commission and had chosen instead to carry out their illegal act. On them alone lay the responsibility for that act and for its consequences.

516. The representative of the United Kingdom said that the only lawful government of Southern Rhodesia was now the United Kingdom Government. However, that Government had no physical presence in the territory and in Southern Rhodesia there was, therefore, no rule of law. The re-establishment of the rule of law in the territory was clearly and unmistakably a British responsibility. But the United Kingdom had deemed it right to bring the matter before the Council immediately, since it was of world concern and for a practical reason, namely to ask for the goodwill, co-operation and active support of members in the steps it was taking. It did not believe that the use of military force could contribute to the solution of the problem. It was one thing to start the use of force, it was another to predict or contain its extent. Moreover, the attempt to impose a constitutional solution by the use of military force would not only involve misery for millions of innocent people but would thrust into a still more distant future the right and just solution of the problem.

517. The Governor of Southern Rhodesia had informed the former Prime Minister and other ministers of Southern Rhodesia that they no longer held office. Member States, he asked, should refuse to recognize the illegal régime, ignore passports issued by it and refuse to give credence to any persons claiming to be its representatives. The United Kingdom had prohibited all export of arms to Southern Rhodesia, imposed exchange control restrictions and prohibited all exports of United Kingdom capital to Southern Rhodesia, denied Southern Rhodesia access to the London capital market and all Commonwealth trade preference and export credits, and proposed to ban the import into the

United Kingdom of Southern Rhodesian tobacco and sugar, which represented more than 70 per cent of its purchases from Southern Rhodesia, and more than one third of the territory's exports. If all Member States supported the United Kingdom sincerely in applying those measures the effect on the Southern Rhodesian economy would be very severe. Speed was essential; if at once by general agreement in the United Nations the people of Southern Rhodesia and the world were shown that those first measures attracted overwhelming support, then the Organization would have contributed greatly to the results which it sought to achieve.

518. The representative of Ghana said that because of the act of treason and rebellion by the Ian Smith clique, the 4 million Africans in Southern Rhodesia were without any protection whatsoever, dangerously exposed to the whim and caprice of a shameless racist régime which had thus created a threat to international peace and security. At the time of the dissolution of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, the African States had warned the United Kingdom against transferring armed forces and aircraft to the minority government in Southern Rhodesia, but the United Kingdom had shown disregard for their apprehensions by vetoing the relevant draft resolution in the Security Council. Events had justified the African assessment of the situation. If the United Kingdom Government's declaration of 27 October 1964 had been carried to its logical conclusion with a threat to use force, Ian Smith would not have dared to defy the United Kingdom. But Prime Minister Wilson was reported to have stated in Salisbury that the Africans there were not ready to rule their country, and that the British Government would not forcibly impose majority rule; that had emboldened Mr. Smith. The use of force by the United Kingdom in Aden and British Guiana indicated to African States that the British Government was always ready to use troops against its colonial subjects if their skin was black or brown but that the blood of white Rhodesian rebels was too sacred to be shed in the interests of African majority rule. The African States, he declared, called upon the Council to take appropriate action under Chapter VII of the Charter since events in Southern Rhodesia constituted a threat to international peace and security.

519. The African States, the representative of Ghana continued, would take steps to implement their resolution of 22 October 1965, at Accra, which called upon them to use all possible means, including force, to oppose a unilateral declaration of independence and to give immediate assistance to the people of Southern Rhodesia with a view to establishing a majority government in that territory. Ghana would not recognize any independent State of Rhodesia unless it had been established on the basis of majority rule, and Ghana would oppose the entry of a State under minority rule in Southern Rhodesia to the Commonwealth, the United Nations or other international bodies. The African States would not allow the British betrayal of 4 million Africans, and would use force, if necessary, to have majority rule established in Southern Rhodesia. The Council should order full sanctions against the Ian Smith régime in accordance with Chapter VII of the Charter, and should urge the British Government to suspend the 1961 Constitution.

520. The representative of the United States of America said that the unilateral declaration of Southern Rhodesian independence was one of the most shocking events since the dawn of the present era of decoloniza-

tion, and was fraught with the gravest consequences. A small, stubborn and sadly mistaken minority had made a spurious declaration of independence in the interest of preserving a privileged minority's position. There was no room for conjecture about the United Kingdom's determination to bring the rebellion honourably to an end. The United States was irrevocably dedicated to the principle of self-determination and independence acceptable to all the people of Southern Rhodesia. It hoped that that could be achieved peacefully and that the lines of communication would be reopened. The United States supported the United Kingdom's efforts to bring about independence in accordance with the Charter. All Members must stand behind the United Kingdom and support it in making effective the stern measures it had taken against Mr. Smith's régime.

521. The United States, he continued, had recalled its Consul General from Salisbury and had withdrawn diplomatic status from Southern Rhodesian members of the British Embassy in Washington, had instituted an embargo on the sale or shipment of arms in the territory, and would withhold the sugar quota for 1966. The United States would also suspend action on all applications for United States loans and credit guarantees. It would make clear to any potential United States investor the grave risk for any United States capital in Southern Rhodesia. The United States would discourage all private travel to Southern Rhodesia, and it was considering actively what other steps it could take in the matter. The Security Council should support the United Kingdom in its efforts and call on it to take any other appropriate steps to end the rebellion. The declaration was aimed at subjugating 4 million Africans. The Council should be determined and unyielding in seeing that the people of Southern Rhodesia exercised self-determination and obtained majority rule.

522. The representative of Senegal said that if the unilateral declaration of independence in Southern Rhodesia went unpunished it would undermine the moral standing of the United Kingdom and the authority of the United Nations. The United Kingdom had a responsibility towards the 4 million Africans in Southern Rhodesia, and recent history had shown that economic sanctions alone were unlikely to produce results. Vigorous measures, including the use of armed force, were needed to crush the rebellion, and all Members should lend their support to the United Kingdom. The Southern Rhodesian Constitution should be abrogated by force, if necessary, and replaced with one providing for majority rule and independence conferred by the United Kingdom.

523. The representative of Jordan proposed that the Council take a preliminary decision to declare illegal the action of the minority government, condemn that action and call on all States not to recognize that régime and to refrain from any possible assistance to it.

524. He also proposed, under rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, that the Council should invite the two States, South Africa and Portugal, which had voted against the Assembly's resolution the previous day, to participate in the debate.

525. After some discussion, the Council agreed, without objection, to invite the Governments of Portugal and South Africa to take part in the discussion.

526. In letters dated 15 November 1965 (S/6935 and S/6938) the representative of South Africa and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Portugal declined

the invitation. The representative of South Africa reiterated his Government's view that the question of Rhodesia was one of exclusively domestic concern in which the United Nations was not competent to intervene. It was in the best interest of a peaceful solution of the present conflict of views that every endeavour should be made to localize the issues involved and to discourage the extension of the controversy onto a much wider international plane.

527. The Foreign Minister of Portugal said that the discussion had made it clear that the proposal to invite Portugal to participate had been based on its votes in the Assembly, indicating a desire to investigate the reasons motivating those votes. Such an investigation would undoubtedly fall outside the competence of the Council as defined in the Charter. The invitation was also at variance with rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure.

528. At the 1258th meeting (12 November) the representative of Jordan introduced the following draft resolution (S/6921/Rev.1):

"The Security Council,

"1. Decides to condemn the unilateral declaration of independence made by a racist minority in Southern Rhodesia;

"2. Decides to call upon all States not to recognize this illegal racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia and to refrain from rendering any assistance to this illegal régime."

529. The representative of France said that his delegation wished to state clearly and categorically its disapproval of the unilateral declaration of independence in Salisbury. It would not have any relations with the *de facto* Salisbury authorities or give them any assistance. However, the fact that it was a rebellion determined the limits of the United Nations action. The conflict was not between States, but between the United Kingdom and Southern Rhodesia, and was not of an international character. Action by the Security Council would be tantamount to sanctioning the claims of Salisbury to international status. The problem was an internal British matter on which the Council should take no decision. France would, therefore, abstain in any votes in the Council on the question.

530. The representative of China said that, despite the serious admonitions of the United Nations, the minority group in Southern Rhodesia had caused a situation of extreme gravity. There was no difference between the administering Power and the African States on the objective: to safeguard the rights of the 4 million indigenous inhabitants of the territory. Southern Rhodesia could not long withstand economic siege. He hoped that that might result in a reversal of policy there. Further measures would be the responsibility of the administering Power. The Council, for its part, should condemn the unilateral declaration of independence.

Decision: *At the 1258th meeting on 12 November 1965, the revised draft resolution (S/6921/Rev.1) was adopted by 10 votes to none, with 1 abstention (France) (resolution 216 (1965)).*

531. The representative of Mali said that the present situation in Southern Rhodesia had occurred with the encouragement and even complicity of the United Kingdom. The African majority has thus been betrayed despite United Nations resolutions and appeals and warnings of the African States, all of which had been

ignored. The United Kingdom now joined the international community in deploring the present crisis. No one could say that the British Government, by announcing that it would not use force, had not led the Rhodesian settlers to declare independence. The measures envisaged in the statement of the United Kingdom delegation were weak and of dubious effect. It recognized its responsibility, but had not informed the Council of steps to guarantee the security of the people of the territory or to restore legality and establish a democratic government. The Security Council should seek the assistance of the Organization of African Unity, under Article 53 of the Charter, in taking steps to re-establish the rule of law and to ensure the introduction of democratic institutions in Southern Rhodesia. It should invite the United Kingdom to take effective measures, including the use of force, to re-establish normal conditions in the territory and arrange for the Zimbabwe people to benefit from General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples. Mali did not see how the use of force could be avoided in a case of rebellion.

532. The representative of India emphasized the gravity of the issue. The tragedy of British rule in Southern Rhodesia was that scrupulous care to build a society in which a majority ruled had never been seriously pursued. There had been reactionary and repressive legislation against the majority, and the nationalists had been imprisoned, flogged, exiled and tortured. The forthright statement of the British Prime Minister on 27 October 1964 had unfortunately not been followed by action to curb the outrageous behaviour and ambitions of Mr. Smith and his fellow conspirators. The United Kingdom must now be helped to put an end to the rebellion and India would offer all support to the African nationalists of Southern Rhodesia. The situation demanded sterner measures than those already outlined by the United Kingdom. It was now a question of a threat to peace, and the Council must take action to reverse the process set in motion by the Smith clique. India would recognize any provisional government set up by the Organization of African Unity, and would offer its co-operation to the United Nations in its efforts to remedy the situation.

533. The representative of Nigeria declared that the Security Council must take a tough line to strengthen the hand of the United Kingdom in coercing the rebels to capitulate, though the economic measures outlined by the United Kingdom were hopelessly inadequate. The ban on tobacco would not take effect for some time, since all the present crop had been sold. There should be a total embargo on British exports to Southern Rhodesia, including oil. The Council should ensure that Portugal and South Africa did not do anything that might render the sanctions against Rhodesia ineffective. The Southern Rhodesia question was going to be a test of the sincerity of the big Powers which claimed to be friends of Africa. The African States would not let the aggression go unchecked, and a racial war with wide repercussions might break out on that continent.

534. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that extremely dangerous events for international peace and security had occurred. A handful of racists had tried to usurp power openly, denying the 4 million people of Zimbabwe their right to independence. The United Kingdom had condemned

the action of the Smith clique, and it had recognized, though belatedly, the international character of the question. It had allowed events to escalate and, in practice, it had not only intended to remain inactive, but, in fact, to condone such activities. The statement it had made that day had urged moderation and patience, but the programme of action it had outlined was one of half-measures not likely to make any serious impression on the racialists. An oil embargo should be included in the measures to be taken against Southern Rhodesia. The territory had sold the whole of its tobacco crop abroad, so that the question of further sales did not arise until March 1966. The United Kingdom had full responsibility for the tragic turn of events, for its condoning of the activities of the racialists and for the fact that all means of pressure—of which it had more than enough—had not been brought to bear. Attention should also be drawn to the role of British and other foreign monopolies as one of the main forces supporting the criminal activities of the Smith régime.

535. Foreign monopolies such as the following British companies: Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa, Rio Tinto Zinc, Shell and Unilever, and the American companies Ford and Roan Selection Trust, *et al.* were interested in the success of the Southern Rhodesian racists' shady venture with a declaration of "independence". Those companies were also active in South Africa, the ally of the Southern Rhodesian racists. Every time a question arose in the Security Council concerning one or other of the crimes of colonialism in Africa south of the Equator, those same British and American monopolies emerged as one of the prime movers.

536. The Soviet Union sided with the people of Zimbabwe and demanded abrogation of the 1961 Constitution, the freeing of all the nationalist leaders, elections on the basis of one man, one vote, and application of the United Nations Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. The Security Council should take political, economic and other sanctions against the racist régime. The USSR wished to have the most radical measures taken against Portugal and South Africa, and it would co-operate with the countries of Africa in full support of the people of Zimbabwe.

537. At the 1259th meeting on 13 November, the representative of Pakistan said that the spectre of another régime like that of South Africa was before the world. The unilateral declaration of independence was a challenge to the international community, since no attention had been paid to General Assembly and Security Council resolutions on Southern Rhodesia. If the African majority in the territory did not receive outside support, the Smith régime might unleash new repression, leading to bloodshed. His delegation doubted whether the economic measures announced by the United Kingdom were adequate. The Security Council should apply itself not only to adopting a resolution, but to considering the implementation of concrete measures within a specific period of time and action under Chapter VII of the Charter should be seriously considered. The matter was a threat to international peace and security.

538. The representative of the United Kingdom said that the preliminary resolution adopted the previous day had been gratifying to the United Kingdom. Some delegations, however, had criticized not only the steps

Britain was taking but also its past actions. The delegations concerned should know that the armed forces Southern Rhodesia had received at the demise of the Rhodesian Federation had belonged to it even before that Federation was established. These were not British forces, but Southern Rhodesian forces whose homes were in Southern Rhodesia. When the Federation came to an end, Zambia and Malawi had agreed that the former Southern Rhodesian forces should revert to that territory. The 1961 Constitution had a built-in tendency towards majority rule and one of the reasons for Ian Smith's action was to tamper with the Constitution. He rejected allegations that the United Kingdom had in some way connived at the unilateral declaration of independence. The USSR, which had made that allegation, did not have the same experience as the United Kingdom in bringing peoples to independence. To those who contrasted action in the present case with the action Britain had taken regarding British Guiana and Aden, he would say that the action in the other two cases formed part of a policy towards those territories which was unmistakably intended to bring them speedily to full independence. Had the United Kingdom attempted to use military force to impose a constitution, that would have been a measure wholly inappropriate to the purpose in view and one fraught with misery for large numbers of innocent people. The Security Council had the immediate task of getting the world to support the measures the United Kingdom was taking. He would also remind members who had advocated an oil embargo that such action could not be carried out by one country alone, but would involve carefully planned international action.

539. The United Kingdom representative then introduced the following draft resolution (S/6928):

"The Security Council,

"Gravely concerned by the rebellious actions of the former régime in Southern Rhodesia in purporting to assume independence by illegal and unconstitutional means,

"Determining that the continuance of the resulting situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security,

"Noting the expressed determination of the United Kingdom to establish in Southern Rhodesia conditions which will enable the inhabitants of that territory to determine its own future in accordance with the wishes of all its people,

"Noting the measures taken by the United Kingdom Government to deal with the situation created by the unilateral declaration of independence,

"Reaffirming its resolution 216 (1965) of 12 November 1965,

"1. Refuses to recognize such a unilateral declaration of independence as having any legal validity;

"2. Reiterates its call to all States to refuse to recognize the illegal and unconstitutional régime in Southern Rhodesia;

"3. Calls upon all States to refrain from any action which could give aid and comfort to that régime, and, in particular, to refrain from supplying arms, equipment, or war material to it;

"4. Calls upon all States to lend all necessary assistance and support to the United Kingdom Government in making effective the measures taken by that

Government, including the financial and economic measures, to bring the rebellion in Southern Rhodesia to an end."

540. The representative of Algeria said that the United Kingdom had acted with hesitation and even complicity in the case. How could the international community be persuaded of the present sincerity of the United Kingdom in view of its past actions? In its dealings with Mr. Smith, it had ignored the rights of the majority and, by stating that it would not use force, it had opened the road to a unilateral declaration of independence. The United Kingdom had shirked its responsibilities and weakened the authority of the United Nations, denying the very competence of the Organization to deal with the situation in Southern Rhodesia. Now it was asking the United Nations to remedy a situation which had been created by its own passivity. The measure it had announced could only be preliminary. The United Nations must demand of the United Kingdom that it lead Southern Rhodesia to full independence on the basis of universal suffrage. The African States would, through the Organization of African Unity, see to it that another South Africa did not come into existence in the heart of the continent. Algeria, he said, would give every assistance to the people of Zimbabwe in their struggle for their rights.

541. The representative of the Ivory Coast noted that the United Kingdom itself had stated that the situation created by the action of the minority group in Southern Rhodesia was serious for Africa and the world. The Council should consider the matter under Chapter VII of the Charter, in the light of Articles 39 to 51. The United Kingdom must face up to the situation. In the case of Algeria, France had carried out its responsibilities while maintaining that the United Nations had no competence in the case. The situation was clearer now, since the United Kingdom was today the legal Government of Southern Rhodesia. It had been a mistake on the part of the British Government to tell the settlers in advance that no military force would be used against them in the event of an act of rebellion, and the Ivory Coast would have been at San Francisco when the Charter was signed if its former colonizers had spoken in such terms. Joshua Nkomo and Ndabaningi Sithole, the leaders of the Zimbabwe people, were being held as hostages by the whites of British origin. The drama of Stanleyville ought not to be followed by that of Salisbury, but would the British act to save black hostages held by white rebels? The United Kingdom and its allies, supported by the United Nations, could end the rebellion quickly. The African countries would provide their troops with staging bases for their operations against Southern Rhodesia in an effort to move into the country and take over its administration. Those who proposed economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia had, in the past, often said that such sanctions would be ineffective in regard to South Africa. Either the United Kingdom should send troops to close the borders with the Portuguese territories and South Africa or the same sanctions should be applied against Portugal and South Africa, which had stated that they would continue relations with Southern Rhodesia. The United Kingdom action should be supported, but other measures should be added under Articles 42 and 43 of the Charter. On behalf of the African countries, he submitted the following draft resolution (S/6929):

"The Security Council,

"Deeply concerned about the situation in Southern Rhodesia,

"Bearing in mind that the declaration of independence in Southern Rhodesia by the racist minority settler régime constitutes a rebellion against the United Kingdom Government,

"Convinced that this declaration of independence constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

"Noting that the measures envisaged by the United Kingdom Government will be ineffective without the use of force,

"Reaffirming its resolutions 216 (1965) of 12 November 1965,

"Recalling General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, 1747 (XVI) of 28 June 1962, 1760 (XVII) of 31 October 1962, 1883 (XVIII) of 14 October 1963, 1889 (XVIII) of 6 November 1963, 1956 (XVIII) of 11 December 1963, 2012 (XX) of 12 October 1965, 2022 (XX) of 8 November 1965, the resolutions adopted by the Special Committee on 22 April 1965 and 28 May 1965, and Security Council resolution 202 (1965) of 6 May 1965,

"1. Determines that the situation resulting from this declaration of independence constitutes a threat to international peace and security;

"2. Declares illegal the seizure of power by the racist minority settler régime in Southern Rhodesia;

"3. Calls upon the United Kingdom and all other States to take immediate steps to protect the lives of the 4 million Africans and other inhabitants of the territory who oppose this rebellion;

"4. Further calls upon the United Kingdom Government in addition to the measures it has proposed to take with regard to the situation in Southern Rhodesia, to suspend the 1961 Constitution;

"5. Calls upon all States not to recognize the racist minority settler régime and to withdraw recognition of any State recognizing that régime;

"6. Demands that the rebellion by the racist minority settler régime be immediately crushed and law and order established in that African territory;

"7. Demands further that majority rule be established in the territory on the basis of the principle of 'one man, one vote';

"8. Calls upon all States to enforce on the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia a complete interruption of economic relations, including an embargo on supplies of oil and petroleum products, and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio and other means of communication and severance of diplomatic and consular relations, in accordance with Article 41 of the Charter;

"9. Decides to take all the enforcement measures provided for under Articles 42 and 43 of the Charter against the racist minority settler régime;

"10. Authorizes the Secretary-General to ensure the immediate implementation of this resolution and to report as soon as possible."

542. The representative of Sierra Leone declared that responsibility for what had happened lay on the United Kingdom, which by inactivity and cynical acquiescence had emboldened the white racists of

Southern Rhodesia to the point of defying world opinion. It had been warned many times, and advised to take the action which it now proposed too late, but which if taken in time could have avoided the situation. The African majority was now at the mercy of Ian Smith, who was determined to impose another apartheid régime in Southern Africa. Without the use of military force as well, British economic sanctions would be only a farce and an empty exercise in public gamesmanship. The United Kingdom Government's reluctance to act decisively in Southern Rhodesia was, no doubt, due to the opposition to the use of force on part of many people in Great Britain, but the United Kingdom had a duty to the Africans as well as the white people in Southern Rhodesia. The situation in that territory was a challenge to all of Africa. Notwithstanding its limited resources, Sierra Leone was prepared to make financial and military contributions towards securing freedom and justice for the people of Southern Rhodesia.

543. The representative of the USSR said that the task of the Council was to expel the racist clique and take steps to ensure freedom and independence for the people of Zimbabwe. He did not dispute the experience acquired by the United Kingdom in colonial matters; but the British Empire had not been founded on humanitarian motives, and had crumbled because of the pressure of national liberation movements.

544. At the 1260th meeting on 13 November, the representative of Ethiopia said that the proposals of the United Kingdom were inadequate and, instead of ensuring law and order and bringing the rebel régime to heel, they would entrench the position of that régime. The Council must rule, under Chapter VII of the Charter, that the situation threatened international peace and security. The sanctions proposed by the United Kingdom would require the use of force against Portugal and South Africa for their effective implementation. Since the United Kingdom had declared it would not use force, the Security Council should take the initiative to restore the rights of the 4 million Africans. The United Kingdom draft, in its preamble, had shown that Britain still was not prepared to introduce the principle of one man, one vote; the Council should adopt the Ivory Coast draft resolution, which envisaged drastic action that would lead to the solution of the problem.

545. The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania said the measures proposed by the United Kingdom were not enough. There ought also to have been an assurance that Southern Rhodesia assets in London banks would be blocked. The use of force was the only effective answer, but the British Government had ruled that course out. The British Foreign Secretary had flown all the way to New York to deceive the world and save Ian Smith from military intervention. The United Kingdom was playing for time so that the rebel régime might become entrenched and consolidated. The Council was witnessing another Munich. There was no time to lose, and the Council should act under Chapter VII of the Charter, especially under Article 42. Otherwise a situation would arise which would make it impossible for any African Government or people to stand idly by. They had no intention of being humiliated by Mr. Smith.

546. The representative of Zambia said that after passively watching the rebels commit treason, the United Kingdom had come to the United Nations to

propose ineffective economic sanctions. Zambia had since 1963 advocated that Britain employ armed force in its dealings with Southern Rhodesia; his Government had offered its territory to the United Kingdom as a base for military action against Southern Rhodesia. The loss of a few lives in that country would be better than the indefinite subjection of 4 million Africans by a few thousand psychotic whites. There had been increased troop movements on the Rhodesia-Zambian border, and it was the British Government which had, at the dissolution of the Federation, transferred all the jet fighters to Southern Rhodesia. The British imperialists had made Zambia's economy dependent on Southern Rhodesia, but despite that fact, his country urged the use of force to quell the rebellion. The Council should act under Chapter VII of the Charter. It should adopt, not the United Kingdom draft resolution, but that sponsored by the African States.

547. The representative of the Netherlands said that the measures proposed by the United Kingdom could be effective if supported by all States. The full pressure of the United Nations and its membership should now be brought to bear on Mr. Smith and his followers without delay. His delegation wished to warn against the disastrous consequences which the use of armed force, which African delegations had called for, might lead to. Military intervention in Southern Rhodesia might lead to a full-scale war which could spread. The task of the Security Council was to avoid bloodshed and find a peaceful solution for this problem, not to embark on a punitive war. The application of all possible measures, short of war, should bring down the rebel régime. The first and foremost need was speedy action and the highest possible degree of unanimity, particularly as there was general agreement in the Council on the result members wished to achieve. The only difference of opinion was on the nature of the measures to be applied. If there was a choice, his delegation preferred the United Kingdom draft resolution to the one submitted by the African States.

548. The representative of Malaysia said that the draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom was rather far removed from the realities of the situation. The problem was either one of bringing the rebels to heel, in which case the United Kingdom did not need the Security Council, or a matter on which the Council was to determine what it wanted to do. The action already taken by the United Kingdom did not fall within Chapter VI of the Charter. There was a threat to peace in the situation that had arisen in Southern Rhodesia, and by bringing the matter to the Security Council, the British Government could only be regarded as asking for a determination by the Council that peace was threatened, and that under Article 39 of the Charter it must take action in accordance with Articles 41 and 42. Effective sanctions were those that brought pressure to bear quickly. He asked what the United Kingdom would do with regard to the 4 million Africans in the event of a union of Southern Rhodesia and its neighbour, South Africa.

549. The representative of Guinea said that the Ian Smith clique had thrown a challenge to Africa and the world. Unless the borders between Southern Rhodesia and the Portuguese Territories and South Africa were sealed, Ian Smith would get all the assistance he required. It was too late for anything but the use of armed force, unless the United Kingdom meant to accept a fait accompli in Southern Rhodesia. The Security Coun-

cil must invoke Articles 41 and 42 of the Charter against the rebel régime. The African States would make any sacrifice to prevent the creation of a second South Africa in the heart of their continent.

550. The representative of Jordan said the minority group in Southern Rhodesia had defied the United Nations and violated human rights. By seeking the Council's assistance, the United Kingdom had conceded that a threat to international peace existed. While appreciating the measures taken by the United Kingdom, he would warn that these did not go far enough. The Council must face up to the situation with firmness—the great Powers could not just say that they were against the unilateral declaration of independence and do nothing.

551. At the 1261st meeting on 16 November, the representative of Mauritania said that the United Kingdom statement had caused first disappointment, then astonishment and finally a feeling of revolt. The British Foreign Secretary had undertaken the long journey to New York merely to ask the United Nations to be calm. There were more effective measures than those the United Kingdom Government had proposed—for example, an oil embargo. Portugal and South Africa would give Southern Rhodesia all assistance. The Ivory Coast draft resolution was comprehensive, and the Security Council should adopt it.

552. The representative of Uruguay said that his delegation unreservedly condemned the rebellion in Southern Rhodesia and hoped that the African States would reach agreement with the United Kingdom on the immediate steps to be taken to bring it to an end. Chapter VII must be applied, but Uruguay would not support the use of armed force, at present, to enforce decisions. A truly universal economic and financial blockade imposed under Article 41 of the Charter would strangle the Smith régime. He would point out, however, that, as the United Kingdom had not renounced its responsibility as the Administering Authority for the territory, it did not require any express authorization from the United Nations to take whatever action it considered necessary.

553. The representative of Gambia said that his Government endorsed all the measures taken by the United Kingdom. History had shown that sanctions alone were not effective; and armed intervention should not be ruled out.

554. The representative of the USSR said that the reply of South Africa (S/6935) to the invitation of the Council confirmed the deep concern expressed by African representatives that the position of that country only complicated the adoption of measures envisaged by the Security Council.

555. The representative of Jordan shared the views expressed by the USSR representative.

556. At the 1262nd meeting on 16 November, the representative of Jamaica said it was necessary to state clearly that a threat to peace and security existed. The narrow range of sanctions which the United Kingdom had announced would be ineffective without the full co-operation of South Africa and Portugal. Jamaica would support any United Kingdom or United Nations action, including the use of force to end the rebellion in Southern Rhodesia. It was necessary that the Council confer with the United Kingdom on the consequences of the use of force and on whether the British Government would avail itself of United

Nations assistance in the form of police and military units to protect the lives of African leaders and others opposing the rebellion and to seal off the border of Southern Rhodesia with South Africa.

557. At the 1263rd meeting on 17 November, the representative of the Ivory Coast asked if the United Kingdom representative was in a position to make a statement on the situation of 4,000 African employees of the postal service in Southern Rhodesia, who had been required to sign a pledge of loyalty to the Smith régime or expect dismissal, and who had appealed to the United Kingdom to know what attitude they should adopt.

558. The representative of the United Kingdom said in reply that he had no more information than the Ivory Coast representative. The item of news underlined the importance of bringing the rebellion speedily to an end. Appealing for Council action in support of his Government's measures without any further delay, he said that the question was one mentioned in the Charter as a situation which could develop into a threat to international peace and security. No breach of the international peace had as yet taken place and the United Kingdom would not allow that to occur. It was neither appropriate nor sensible to speak of armed intervention to settle the constitutional question of Southern Rhodesia. Many members had urged wider economic measures, including an embargo on oil. The United Kingdom was entirely ready to widen the range of its measures to include an oil embargo. The Council should, therefore, appoint a working group of its own members of study very speedily the methods by which such wider measures could be imposed and what the consequences would be. Some of the consequences might redound severely on some of Southern Rhodesia's near neighbours, and the Council should consider that. Moreover, the whole burden should not fall exclusively on the United Kingdom. He would be prepared also to see a reference to the United Kingdom envisaging "other appropriate measures as the situation would seem to require" in any Council resolution. His Government had now received from the British Parliament the necessary legal powers enabling it to take financial, economic and political measures against the illegal régime in Salisbury and had taken those measures; so to those who had said that the United Kingdom talked but did not act, the answer was that it had acted.

559. In reply to a question raised by the representative of Jordan, he explained that while it would not be appropriate to use force as a way of imposing a constitutional settlement in Southern Rhodesia, it was true, as his Prime Minister had stated, that circumstances might arise in which force would need to be used for the purposes mentioned by the Prime Minister.

560. The representative of Sudan regarded the United Kingdom's readiness to consider an oil embargo as heartening. The replies of the Governments of Portugal and South Africa, however, meant that the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia would be recognized and supported by at least two Member Governments of the United Nations. The sanctions announced by the British Government would not really topple the Government of Southern Rhodesia. If the United Kingdom used armed force against Mr. Smith, it would receive the unstinting support of the United Nations. The Security Council should take action under Chapter VII of the Charter.

561. The representative of Somalia stated that the situation in Southern Rhodesia was a threat to international peace and security and the Security Council should deal with it under Chapter VII of the Charter, especially Articles 41 and 42. The Ivory Coast draft resolution reflected the thinking of all Africans on the matter and he supported it. The current United Kingdom sanctions were not likely to deter the rebels. He was glad to hear that the British Government was now considering an oil embargo. Military intervention was necessary, and the 1961 Constitution should be revoked. The United Kingdom should voluntarily place Southern Rhodesia under United Nations trusteeship. If they were to be made effective, it might be necessary to extend sanctions and a blockade to South Africa and Portugal.

562. The representative of the Ivory Coast said measures should be taken that would ensure the fall of the Smith régime within three months. That was why some had suggested the use of armed force, if the present measures proved ineffective. The Council should take coercive measures under the Charter.

563. On 19 November, the following draft resolution (S/6955) was submitted by Bolivia and Uruguay:

"The Security Council,

"Deeply concerned about the situation in Southern Rhodesia,

"Considering that the illegal authorities in Southern Rhodesia have proclaimed independence and that the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, as the administering Power, looks upon this as an act of rebellion,

"Noting that the Government of the United Kingdom has taken certain measures to meet the situation and that to be effective these measures should correspond to the gravity of the situation,

"1. Determines that the situation resulting from the proclamation of independence by the illegal authorities in Southern Rhodesia is of grave concern, that the Government of the United Kingdom should put an end to it and that its continuance in time constitutes a threat to international peace and security;

"2. Reaffirms its resolution 216 (1965) of 12 November 1965 and General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960;

"3. Condemns the usurpation of power by a racist settler minority in Southern Rhodesia and regards the declaration of independence by it as having no legal validity;

"4. Calls upon the Government of the United Kingdom to quell this rebellion of the racist minority;

"5. Further calls upon the Government of the United Kingdom to take all other appropriate measures which would prove effective in eliminating the authority of the usurpers and in bringing the minority régime in Southern Rhodesia to an immediate end;

"6. Calls upon all States not to recognize this illegal authority and not to entertain any diplomatic or other relations with it;

"7. Calls upon the Government of the United Kingdom, as the working of the Constitution of 1961 has broken down, to take immediate measures in order to allow the people of Southern Rhodesia

to determine their own future consistent with the objectives of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

"8. Calls upon all States to refrain from any action which would assist and encourage the illegal régime and, in particular, to desist from providing it with arms, equipment and military material, and to do their utmost in order to break all economic relations with Southern Rhodesia including an embargo on oil and petroleum products;

"9. Calls upon the Government of the United Kingdom to enforce urgently and with vigour all the measures it has announced, as well as those mentioned in paragraph 8 above;

"10. Calls upon the Organization of African Unity to do all in its power to assist in the implementation of the present resolution, in conformity with Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations;

"11. Decides to keep the question under review in order to examine what other measures it may deem it necessary to take."

564. At the 1264th meeting on 19 November, in response to a request by the representative of Uruguay, the Council decided to give priority to the joint draft.

565. In introducing the joint draft, the representative of Uruguay noted that there were differences between the two draft resolutions already before the Council and neither of them had been entirely satisfactory. By eliminating the differences, the new draft had bridged the gap. It was not the last word as one of the operative paragraphs left the matter open. Neither Chapter VI nor VII of the Charter had been brought to bear, and there was no reference in the draft to the use of force. The draft invited the United Kingdom to adopt such measures as would fulfil the provisions of the Charter and would grant independence and self-government to Southern Rhodesia with the full participation of all sections of the people.

566. The representative of Jordan said that the new draft did not represent a final determination of the issue, as it called on the Council to keep the matter under constant review to decide on further measures. He had hoped for a clearer, more specific draft reflecting the realities of the situation, but that had not proved possible. He would vote for the draft.

567. The representative of Ghana recalled that he had urged the Council to endorse the United Kingdom measures and also to take action under Chapter VII of the Charter. The African States were taking steps to give a meaning to their resolutions on Southern Rhodesia. The whole international community must mobilize its forces to crush the rebels.

568. The representative of the United Kingdom said the question was not now one of debate or consultations, but of action. The Council should proceed as rapidly as possible to action, which his delegation believed was imperative.

569. At the 1265th meeting, on 20 November, the first operative paragraph of the joint draft was modified to read:

"Determines that the situation resulting from the proclamation of independence by the illegal authorities in Southern Rhodesia is extremely grave, that the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland should put an end to it and

that its continuance in time constitutes a threat to international peace and security”.

Decision: *At the 1265th meeting, on 20 November 1965, the draft resolution (S/6955), as modified, was adopted by 10 votes to none, with 1 abstention (France) (resolution 217 (1965)).*

570. The representative of the USSR said it had become obvious that the Smith régime had influential protectors in the colonialist camp. The United Kingdom draft resolution (S/6928) had been designed to place the solution of the problem exclusively in the hands of the United Kingdom, which bore complete responsibility for the crimes of racism committed in Southern Rhodesia. His delegation had voted for the resolution just adopted, although “it would have preferred the Security Council to take more effective measures against the racists of Southern Rhodesia. However, taking into account the views of the African States and the fact that the question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia remained under consideration by the Security Council, his delegation had been able to endorse the draft resolution”.

571. The representative of the Ivory Coast said the Council had agreed that the situation in Southern Rhodesia threatened international peace and security. The African nations would not permit the creation of a consortium of racist States in their continent. If the United Kingdom draft was put to the vote, he would vote against it. The resolution just adopted did not give the Africans complete satisfaction, but his delegation had found it possible to support it as a provisional measure. The African draft would not be pressed to a vote now, but it was being left before the Council. If the Council had to take the matter up again, then it would have to examine that draft resolution within the context of Chapter VII of the Charter.

572. The representative of the Netherlands said that his delegation had reservations about the second part of operative paragraph 8 of the resolution just passed. There were real legal and economic problems involved. The Netherlands Government had already begun examining the means to apply the measures. However, it could not yet give a binding obligation to implement them.

573. The representative of Malaysia said that he had voted for the resolution, but had to say that it fell far short of his Government's expectations with regard to the action that should be taken by the Council. He would have preferred the Ivory Coast draft, had it been put to the vote. The United Kingdom had secured the support of the Council; it should act with firmness and speed.

574. The representative of the United States paid tribute to the representatives of Bolivia, Uruguay and the Ivory Coast for having arrived at an acceptable text. Agreement was essential. His Government had now given orders that Southern Rhodesia's 1965 sugar quota, amounting to 9,500 tons, which was already on the high seas en route to the United States, should not be accepted. He took note of the statement made earlier by the representative of Uruguay that the text of the resolution just approved did not mention whether Chapter VI or VII of the Charter was brought to bear, and he expressed his Government's agreement with that interpretation.

575. The representative of the United Kingdom said that the adoption of a widely acceptable resolution having become an accomplished fact, he would not now

insist on his delegation's own draft. Operative paragraph 1 of the resolution should not be regarded as coming under Chapter VII of the Charter. The objective of his Government's policy was to allow all the people of Southern Rhodesia to determine their own future. He stressed that the practical measures his country was taking to this end would be much more speedily effective if they were supported and matched by like action on the part of other nations.

576. The President, speaking as the representative of Bolivia, said the people of Southern Rhodesia must be allowed to enjoy full democratic freedom, and the United Kingdom was the only responsible authority in the matter. It had expressed determination to end the present situation in the territory and to allow the people to choose their own future. However, if the situation developed into a bloody struggle, the United Kingdom would have to defend itself before world public opinion. It should not hesitate to use force, if necessary.

C. Communications received from 11 November 1965 to 6 April 1966

577. After renewed Council consideration of the question was requested on 11 November, and until the next series of Council meetings on the subject, in April 1966, a large number of communications was received and circulated as Council documents, in addition to those mentioned in the account of the debate in the Council. Most of these communications transmitted statements on the question of Southern Rhodesia by the Member State in question (these included cases in which additional measures by the Council were advocated), or gave accounts of the measures taken in response to the resolutions of the Security Council on this subject. The following were among the documents mainly of this nature: S/6923 and S/7140 of 12 November and 14 December 1965, from Guinea; S/6924 of 11 November, from Uganda; S/6930 of 12 November 1965 and S/7083 of 10 January 1966, from Israel; S/6940 of 15 November, S/7068 of 5 January 1966, and S/7068/Add.1 of 12 March, from the USSR; S/6942 of 12 November and S/7143 of 10 February 1966, from Yugoslavia; S/6943 of 16 November 1965, and S/7159 of 19 February 1966, from Mongolia; S/6946 of 15 November, from Trinidad and Tobago; S/6951 of 18 November 1965 and S/7119 of 4 February 1966, from Haiti; S/6959 of 12 November and S/7092 of 7 January 1966, from India; S/6961 of 19 November, from Cuba; S/6966 of 22 November and S/7153 of 17 February 1966, from Nigeria; S/6969 of 16 November, from Jamaica; S/6971 of 22 November, from Iran; S/6972 of 16 November, from Albania; S/6979 of 29 November 1965 and S/7141 of 11 February 1966, from the Dominican Republic; S/6986 of 1 December 1965, S/6986/Add.1 of 24 March 1966 and S/6986/Add.2 of 31 March, from Greece; S/6990 of 3 December 1965 and S/7114 of 28 January 1966, from Japan; S/7005 of 10 December, from Denmark; S/7006 of 12 December, from Kenya; S/7008 of 10 December, from Norway; S/7010 of 10 December and S/7012 of 14 December, from Sweden; S/7015 of 7 December, from Romania; S/7016 of 13 December and S/7048 of 27 December, from Italy; S/7046 of 23 December 1965 and S/7162 of 18 February 1966, from the Netherlands; S/7052 of 22 December 1965 and S/7161 of 18 February 1966 from Belgium; S/7053 of 27 December, from the Byelorussian SSR; S/7055 of

15 December, and S/7160 of 23 February 1966, from Luxembourg; S/7056 of 29 December, from Iraq; S/7082 of 10 January and S/7164 of 21 February, from Canada; S/7087 of 14 January and S/7087/Add.1 of 24 February, from Poland; S/7088 of 13 January, S/7088/Add.1 of 28 February, and S/7170 of 28 February, from the United States; S/7093 of 18 January, from New Zealand; S/7094 of 18 January, from Argentina; S/7099 of 20 January, from Cyprus; S/7101 of 25 January, from Finland; S/7104 of 28 January, from Australia; S/7110 of 31 January, from the Ukrainian SSR; S/7112 of 28 January, from Colombia; S/7113 of 31 January, from Burundi; S/7115 of 26 January, from Austria; S/7118 of 4 February, from Yemen; S/7120 of 4 February, from Jordan; S/7121 of 4 February, from Bulgaria; S/7122 of 4 February, from Brazil; S/7124 of 7 February, from Liberia; S/7127 of 8 February, from Pakistan; S/7130 of 8 February, from China; S/7132 of 8 February, from Ireland; S/7135 of 8 February, from Rwanda; S/7139 of 14 December 1965, from Nicaragua; S/7144 of 11 February 1966, from Libya; S/7156 of 17 February, from Hungary; S/7157 of 15 February, from Ceylon; S/7167 of 23 February, from Czechoslovakia; S/7177 of 21 February, from the Democratic Republic of the Congo; S/7181 of 4 March, from the Secretary-General, transmitting notes from the Federal Republic of Germany; S/7187 of 2 March, from the United Arab Republic; S/7188 of 8 March, from Singapore; S/7213 of 9 March, from Madagascar; S/7214 of 10 March, from Cameroon; S/7218 of 23 March, from Upper Volta; S/7225 of 25 March, from Malaysia; S/7226 of 21 March, from Ecuador; S/7228 of 28 March, from the Philippines; and S/7234 of 1 April, from Chile.

578. In addition to the above, communications from the United Kingdom dated 17 December 1965 (S/7021) and 31 January 1966 (S/7108) set forth further measures taken by the United Kingdom Government under Security Council resolution 217 (1965), including measures to prevent oil and oil products from reaching the territory, and a ban on imports from and exports to the territory.

579. A letter dated 19 November from the Director-General of the ILO (S/6957) transmitted to the Council the text of a resolution adopted that day by the Governing Body of the ILO.

D. Consideration at the 1276th and 1277th meetings (9 April 1966)

580. In a letter dated 7 April 1966 (S/7235), the Deputy Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland requested the President of the Security Council to convene an emergency meeting of the Council at 4.00 p.m. the same afternoon, in order that his Government might make proposals to meet the situation arising from the arrival at Beira of an oil tanker, which might result in substantial supplies of oil reaching Southern Rhodesia in contravention of the oil embargo imposed by the British Government in conformity with Security Council resolution 217 of 20 November 1965.

581. On the same day, the United Kingdom submitted a draft resolution (S/7236), which, as revised on 8 April (S/7236/Rev.1), read as follows:

"The Security Council,

"Recalling its resolutions 216 (1965) of 12 November 1965 and 217 (1965) of 20 November 1965 and in particular its call to all States to do their utmost to break off economic relations with Southern Rhodesia, including an embargo on oil and petroleum products,

"Gravely concerned at reports that substantial supplies of oil may reach Southern Rhodesia as a result of an oil tanker having arrived at Beira and the approach of a further tanker which may lead to the resumption of pumping through the Companhia do Pipeline Moçambique-Rhodesia pipeline with the acquiescence of the Portuguese authorities,

"Considering that such supplies will afford great assistance and encouragement to the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia, thereby enabling it to remain longer in being,

"1. Determines that the resulting situation constitutes a threat to the peace;

"2. Calls upon the Portuguese Government not to permit oil to be pumped through the pipeline from Beira to Southern Rhodesia;

"3. Calls upon the Portuguese Government not to receive at Beira oil destined for Southern Rhodesia;

"4. Calls upon all States to ensure the diversion of any of their vessels reasonably believed to be carrying oil destined for Southern Rhodesia which may be en route for Beira;

*"5. Calls upon the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to prevent, by the use of force if necessary, the arrival at Beira of vessels reasonably believed to be carrying oil destined for Southern Rhodesia, and empowers the United Kingdom to arrest and detain the tanker known as the *Joanna V* upon her departure from Beira in the event her oil cargo is discharged there."*

582. Also on 7 April, the Secretary-General addressed a letter (S/7237) to the President of the Security Council, stating that at 1920 hours the following members of the Council—Argentina, China, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, the United States of America and Uruguay—had requested him to transmit a message to the President. The message stated that a majority of the members of the Security Council had expressed to the President earlier on 7 April their agreement that a meeting of the Council should be convened that day; they were prepared to meet in the Council that evening and were holding themselves ready for that purpose; and wished the Secretary-General to know that and to convey that view formally and urgently to the President of the Council. The Secretary-General's letter added that the representatives of France and Jordan had informed him individually that they, too, agreed that a meeting of the Security Council should be convened on 7 April.

583. In a letter dated 8 April (S/7238), the representative of the United Kingdom informed the President of the Security Council that the formal request made in his letter of 7 April (S/7235) was made pursuant to rule 2 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, which provided that "the President shall call a meeting of the Security Council at the request of any member of the Council". While he was aware of the practice whereby the President sought the views of other members of the Council on the timing of any request for a meeting—a practice which operated for the convenience of members—it remained the pre-

rogative of the President to call a meeting without such consultation should circumstances so require, and the United Kingdom representative considered that the terms of rule 2 imposed upon the President a duty to call a meeting at the request of any member of the Council, the more particularly if the situation was one of great urgency. Although there was ample precedent in the practice of the Council to that effect, there was certainly no precedent for the refusal of the President to call an urgent meeting in the face of a request to which a majority of Council members had agreed. Moreover, Article 28 of the Charter provided that "the Security Council shall be so organized as to be able to function continuously", and a grave and most serious precedent for the proper functioning of the Council in emergency situations was created if the President failed to fulfill the duties imposed upon him with respect to the convening of a meeting. In the light of those considerations, he expressed profound dissatisfaction at the failure to convene a meeting of the Council on 7 April, and his regret that no formal explanation had been afforded for that refusal to accede to his request. In the circumstances he insisted that a meeting of the Council be convened without further delay to consider the situation referred to in his letter of 7 April.

584. With a letter dated 8 April (S/7240), the President of the Security Council transmitted to the Secretary-General the text of a telephone conversation he had had with the Under-Secretary for Special Political Affairs on the evening of 7 April. It stated that the President had noted with some surprise the message transmitted to him by the Secretary-General on behalf of certain members of the Security Council. Such a procedure was without precedent in the history of the Council, since it had always been the prerogative of the President to call a meeting of the Council at the request of a member and after consultations with all the members to set a date and time convenient to them all. The President had therefore followed the customary procedure by engaging in consultations with the members of the Security Council, and at that time those consultations were still going on. Consequently he was not yet in a position to announce the date and time of the meeting. He hoped to conclude those consultations on Friday, 8 April, and thereby be able to announce a time and date for the Security Council meeting.

585. On 8 April, the President informed the Secretary-General (S/7241) that, after the customary consultations with all the members of the Security Council, he was in a position to convene a meeting on 9 April.

586. In a letter dated 8 April (S/7244), the representative of Greece set forth the action taken by his Government under its prohibition against Greek ships transporting oil for Southern Rhodesia. The *Joanna V* had been deleted from the register and was no longer a Greek ship; the master had been referred to a disciplinary council. The owners of the *Manuela* had given assurances that she would not sail to Beira.

587. At the 1276th meeting (9 April), the Council included the United Kingdom letter of 7 April (S/7235) in the agenda as a sub-item under the general heading of the present chapter. The representatives of Sierra Leone and Algeria were invited to participate in the discussion in accordance with their requests (S/7239 and S/7242).

588. The representative of the United Kingdom recalled the contents of his communications of 7 and 8

April (S/7235 and S/7238) to the President calling for an emergency meeting of the Council. He also referred to the draft resolution (S/7236) submitted by his delegation on 7 April and read out a revised draft (S/7236/Rev.1) which it had submitted the following day in order to make it clear that operative paragraph 4 applied to all States. He stated that the United Kingdom had been in consultation with the Government of Greece and it appreciated what Greece had done in support of an effective embargo against the supply of oil to Southern Rhodesia. He did not propose at that time to raise the question of the serious situation which had arisen when the application for an emergency meeting of the Council had not been accepted. The constitutional issue was so important that more time was needed for reflection, so that members could ensure that the course adopted was the best for the future in the interests of the United Nations. While his delegation remained gravely concerned, he trusted that no one on the Council would doubt that his delegation made the request for an emergency meeting because it was and remained essential to deal with a matter of great importance, and to deal with it at once. He was not raising a new issue but reporting a serious challenge to the authority of the United Nations and was seeking the Council's authority to respond to that challenge with vigorous and forthright action. His Government had responded to the Council's call on 20 November 1965 for an oil embargo against Southern Rhodesia. The embargo was now threatened as a tanker, the *Joanna V*, with a full cargo of oil, was in the port of Beira, while another tanker, the *Manuela*, also with a full cargo of oil, had recently been close to Beira and could put in there very soon. Other tankers would surely follow unless the Council acted promptly. He sought the Council's authority, even at that late hour, to prevent the breach of the oil embargo; without it his Government must face the defiance of the United Nations with its hands tied. The Council should enable his Government to take within the law all steps, including force, to stop the arrival at Beira of vessels taking oil to the rebel régime. It would be an extraordinary thing if the Council refused to help to give effect to its own previous decision.

589. The representative of the Netherlands said that inasmuch as last November the Council had expressed its deep concern about the Southern Rhodesia situation and in view of recent developments it was imperative that the Council meet without delay. The Council should block now any action which tended to undermine the effectiveness of its previous decisions. It could do no better at that moment than to take the only effective measure to halt the shipment of oil to Southern Rhodesia by conferring on the United Kingdom Government the mandatory power and authority to intercept all vessels attempting to defy the oil blockade. The Netherlands delegation was ready to vote for the United Kingdom draft resolution that day.

590. The following amendments (S/7243) to the revised United Kingdom draft resolution were submitted by Mali, Nigeria and Uganda:

"After the first preambular paragraph insert the following paragraphs:

"Noting that economic measures have failed to produce the desired political results,

"Deeply concerned at the reports that oil has been reaching Southern Rhodesia,"

"In operative paragraph 1 delete the words 'the resulting situation' and insert 'the situation prevailing

in Southern Rhodesia' and after the word 'peace' add 'and security'.

"After operative paragraph 3 of the draft resolution insert the following paragraph:

"*Calls upon* the Government of South Africa to take all measures necessary to prevent the supply of oil to Southern Rhodesia";

"Delete operative paragraph 5 of the draft resolution and replace it by the following paragraph:

"*Calls upon* the Government of the United Kingdom to prevent by all means including the use of force, the transportation into Southern Rhodesia of oil or other merchandise and empowers the United Kingdom to take measures necessary for the immediate implementation of this resolution";

"Add the following two paragraphs at the end of the United Kingdom draft resolution:

"*Calls upon* all States to apply measures for the complete interruption of economic relations and of communications with the settler minority régime and any other means in conformity with Articles 41 and 42 of the Charter;

"*Calls upon* the United Kingdom Government to employ all measures including the use of armed force to bring down the settler minority régime in Southern Rhodesia and to implement forthwith resolution 1514 (XV) of the General Assembly."

591. The representative of Uganda noted that certain aspersions had been cast on the wisdom of the Council's President in not holding a meeting at the time requested, and the United Kingdom had referred to Article 28 of the Charter and rule 2 of the rules of procedure. But Article 28 had been misinterpreted. The Council did not function continuously but stopped from time to time until reconvened by the President. Regarding rule 2, the President had absolute discretion as to the timing of the meeting. He had to consult all members and that was precisely what he had been doing: the Southern Rhodesia question was of extreme importance to the African States, and their representatives at the United Nations had to consult their Governments. The amendments presented by Mali, Nigeria and Uganda represented a consensus among all the African Member States of the United Nations. They wanted the régime in Salisbury ended, but they did not believe that the United Kingdom had a monopoly of wisdom in bringing that régime to an end. At the Lagos meeting of Commonwealth leaders in January, the African members who did not agree that economic sanctions alone could topple the Smith régime had been assured by the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom that the sanctions would bring the Salisbury Government to its knees in only a matter of weeks, not months. Now months had gone by with no end in sight. Britain must now take unpopular measures, and the amendments presented by the African members aimed at strengthening Britain's hand. Beira was a symptom, not the root cause of the trouble, which was in Salisbury. The United Kingdom had agreed to move into the realm of Chapter VII of the Charter; there was no reason why all the powers of Article 41 and 42 should not be applied, and that was the purpose of the amendments.

592. The representative of the United States said that the important constitutional and procedural issues that had been raised regarding the manner in which the meeting had been set should be considered more

fully at another time as the Council had urgent problems before it. The Council would be making international law that day if it approved the United Kingdom draft resolution which called for force, if necessary, to prevent the arrival at the port of Beira of tankers carrying oil for Southern Rhodesia. It was not an easy decision for the United States Government to support a resolution of that character. Reviewing the measures which the United States had taken—as quickly as it could, for such measures could not be taken overnight—he pointed out that they would entail a trade loss to the United States of many millions of dollars. The problem must be met vigorously and promptly as proposed in the draft resolution. The Council's previous resolutions condemning and aiming to end the rebellion in Southern Rhodesia had been followed by an impressive response on the part of Member Governments of the United Nations, and, despite the fact that the ultimate goal had not been reached, members should take pride and satisfaction in what the great body of world opinion had done in response to an appeal by the Security Council. The Council should and could agree that day on action to prevent the oil shipments to Southern Rhodesia.

593. The representative of the USSR expressed surprise at the remarks made by the representatives of the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and the United States concerning the procedure the President had followed in convening the Council, inasmuch as those remarks had no factual or juridical basis. The President's actions had been quite in keeping with the established practice and had been objective. His delegation rejected any allegations to the contrary.

594. The Southern Rhodesia situation, the Soviet representative continued, threatened not only the cause of peace in Africa, but international peace and security. The Soviet Union was ready to assist the African States in their efforts to liberate the people of Zimbabwe. The United Kingdom representative's dramatic statements had contained no declaration of his Government's intention to implement the United Nations decision regarding the granting of independence to the people of Zimbabwe. Economic sanctions had been implemented very late and had been ineffective, since Britain itself and Southern Rhodesia's closest allies, Portugal and South Africa, had been assisting the Smith régime. There were alarming indications that the régime had been strengthened since last November. The United Kingdom draft resolution appeared to aim at justifying that Government's inactivity with respect to compliance with the November resolution. The United Kingdom had more than adequate naval strength in the area to stop a tanker from reaching the shores of Mozambique. The CPMR pipeline referred to in the draft resolution was owned by a company in which a London firm, Lonrho, controlled 62.5 per cent of the capital. The Portuguese press release of 8 April showed the United Kingdom's responsibility for the present situation, stating that Britain could have prevented the oil reaching the tankers at the source. The release also pointed out that there was Dutch financing of the tanker involved. A Greek company and a Panamanian company were also involved in the affair. The Security Council must condemn the activities of the United Kingdom, Portugal and South Africa. Greece bore responsibility for the Greek tankers that had taken part in the supply of oil. The widest steps must be taken to ensure that United Nations resolutions were implemented. The United Kingdom draft was inadequate, as it did not ensure

decisive action, while the amendments submitted by the three African delegations on the whole followed the right direction in insisting on self-determination and the need for strong economic and other sanctions.

595. At the 1277th meeting, also on 9 April, the representative of Kenya was also invited to participate in the discussion in accordance with his request (S/7245).

596. The representative of New Zealand said the representatives of Uganda and the Soviet Union had given interpretations of the Charter and the rules of procedure which could not be left unchallenged. Rules 1 and 2, relating to the calling of meetings of the Council—and, underlying them, Article 28 of the Charter—were fundamental. The calling of a Council meeting at the request of any member was mandatory, not permissive. The only option for the President was the fixing of the time of the meeting, and courtesy led to the practice of consulting members on this point. But despite the delay most Council members, including New Zealand, had not been consulted regarding the time which the President had fixed for the meeting. The precedent was one which, if followed, could impair most seriously the ability of the Council to preserve international peace and security.

597. The amendments tabled by the three African States, he continued, were far-reaching in their implications and would require careful study. In the meantime one segment of the problem faced the Council in urgent form. Since resolution 217 of 20 November 1965 had been adopted an unprecedented display of collective action—the burden of which did not, however, fall equally upon all—had been witnessed. Now, however, the whole exercise in peaceful persuasion might be jeopardized by an apparent act of defiance on a relatively large scale. If one tanker went through, it would demonstrate that the embargo could be broken, the experiment in collective action might thus be led to falter, and a further extension of unconstitutional rule would presumably result. His delegation supported the United Kingdom draft. The essential issue was whether the Council moved empirically by a step-by-step process, having regard for the practical consequences at each stage, or whether it plunged into measures regardless of the consequences for the people and States affected or the future of the United Nations. It had never been conceived to be the aim of the sanctions to ruin the economy of Rhodesia for a generation. The action taken was intended to be selective and restricted. A further turning of the screw of sanctions, as requested by the United Kingdom draft, would give people inside Southern Rhodesia time to think about the long-term implications of the illegal régime's cause and those countries which had acquiesced in flouting the Security Council's call a further time to re-examine their policies in the light of the action now taken against Portugal. Far from being a grudging move, the United Kingdom proposal, if adopted, would strengthen the great new coercive weapon of economic sanctions and would thus mark a significant point in the evolution of the United Nations and its techniques of persuasion.

598. The representative of Nigeria doubted whether under the rules of procedure members had the right to question the President in the exercise of his duties and discretion. At a later stage, he would deal in detail with that matter. Regarding the timing of the meeting, delegations like his own needed time to consult their Governments and get instructions. The situation in

Southern Rhodesia was an affront to the independent African nations. His delegation agreed with the sense of the United Kingdom draft, even though it did not understand the request for authority to arrest the *Joanna V* after it had discharged its cargo of oil. Nigeria regarded the draft as too limited and restricted. Mandatory sanctions and the use of force would topple the totalitarian administration in Salisbury, thus accomplishing one step in the direction of setting the people of Southern Rhodesia on their feet and creating an independent State. The economic sanctions which the United Kingdom had said would bring down the Ian Smith régime in a matter of weeks were not producing results. The oil embargo had been breached, the Rhodesian tobacco crop sold, and Ian Smith was riding high in Salisbury. His delegation did not oppose the measures proposed in the United Kingdom resolution, but considered it should be understood that they were only a small part of the many measures which should be taken. They could not and should not preclude other action by the Security Council or other organs. The minimum measures the African States were proposing would be approved by all peace-loving nations of the world.

599. The representative of Argentina said his delegation was concerned over the situation in Southern Rhodesia, the recent incidents and the delays that had taken place before the President could set a time for a meeting. Twenty-four hours were sufficient for consultations and the receiving of instructions, hence Argentina's concern over the forty-eight-hour delay.

600. Reaffirming his country's support for the measures taken by the Council, he observed that the latter was faced with the possibility that the oil embargo would be flouted with the participation of a number of Member States. Argentina had sympathetically considered the United Kingdom draft resolution, despite the fact that it only partially covered a very limited aspect of the Rhodesian problem, while the African amendments widened the scope of Security Council action. The amendment calling on South Africa to prevent the supply of oil to Southern Rhodesia was acceptable. However, the amendments calling on the United Kingdom to prevent by all means, including the use of force, the transportation into Southern Rhodesia of oil and other merchandise and to take measures necessary for the immediate implementation of the resolution, seemed too wide. He could accept the United Kingdom operative paragraph 5. His delegation could not accept reference to Article 42, and it could not agree to authorization of unilateral use of force. There should, instead, be a reaffirmation of operative paragraph 5 of the November resolution calling on the United Kingdom to take appropriate measures to end the Smith régime.

601. The representative of Sierra Leone said that Southern Rhodesia continued to constitute a threat to international peace and security, thanks to the vacillation and negligence of the United Kingdom Government. As recently as 6 April the British delegation had refused to support a consensus in the Committee of Twenty-Four calling for Security Council action with specific reference to the use of force under Articles 41 and 42, since measures already taken by the United Kingdom had proved inadequate, and had made personal representations to him as Chairman of the Committee that the time was premature for Security Council action. But the next day, the United Kingdom had assumed a grave air of urgency to dramatize its so-called anxiety for urgent Security Council action. The

facts concerning the tanker had been an open secret on 6 April. The United Kingdom was now seeking to divert attention from the real issue to a petty incident of the presence of oil tankers in the Mozambique Channel. The pipeline in question was owned by an Anglo-Portuguese company among whose directors were highly placed Britons. Two-thirds of the company's shares were owned by the British. It was perhaps safer for the British to initiate sanctions against poor Portugal than against South Africa in which their investments totalled \$3,000 million. The British, who had time and again rejected the idea of using force against the Smith régime, had now at last come to the conclusion that the use of force, however limited, was inevitable. But the United Kingdom draft was pathetically inadequate. There was no value in isolating that particular incident from the larger argument as to whether at that stage the Security Council should be called upon to impose mandatory sanctions under Articles 41 and 42 of Chapter VII of the Charter. The amendments submitted by Mali, Nigeria and Uganda should be accepted by the United Kingdom if it really meant to bring the Rhodesian régime to its knees. The United Kingdom draft expressed no concern about the Africans of Southern Rhodesia. The situation in Southern Rhodesia was a challenge to democracy and civilization.

602. The representative of Japan said that, despite the urgency of the matter, two days had been allowed to pass before the Council was convened. His delegation expressed grave reservations regarding that and the possibility of an undesirable precedent being set. Japan had followed with growing anxiety the developments of the last few days. The Security Council should act swiftly and vigorously to nullify the attempts being made to circumvent its oil embargo against Southern Rhodesia. The most appropriate instrument for carrying out the Council's decisions was the United Kingdom, whose responsibility the Southern Rhodesian question primarily was, and which sought the Council's authority to prevent oil from reaching the rebellious territory through Mozambique. The Japanese delegation would vote for the United Kingdom draft. The Mali-Nigeria-Uganda amendments called for measures that had far-reaching implications and which, for that reason, required careful study.

603. The representative of Jordan said that the fact that the Council was again considering the problem of Rhodesia demonstrated that last November's resolutions had not been adequate. A more far-reaching remedy was necessary, and Chapter VII of the Charter should now be invoked. There was proof that the situation in Southern Rhodesia was deteriorating and explosive, hence the need for effective action. The United Kingdom draft did not go far enough. The threat to peace did not result from the arrival at Beira of one oil tanker and the approach of another, but from the whole situation. Perhaps internal factors in the United Kingdom last November had not made it possible for the Government to take stronger action against the rebel régime; but his delegation now saw no justification for any further hesitation. The amendments submitted by Mali, Nigeria and Uganda improved the United Kingdom draft resolution and met the points he had raised.

604. The representative of France said that his delegation had agreed that the Security Council should meet on 7 April. He recalled that France disapproved of the unilateral declaration of independence by the Smith

régime and had in no way recognized that government. France was fundamentally opposed to racial discrimination. The Southern Rhodesian territory was within the province of the Government of London and that fact determined the attitude of France and the limits of United Nations action. The crisis was an internal British affair, and it was up to the United Kingdom itself to take necessary measures. Whenever London had taken such measures France as well as other nations had supported it. Obviously, the United Kingdom was not satisfied with the co-operation it had received from certain States. France did not disagree that this problem was an international one, but it would be artificial to invoke Chapter VII of the Charter in connexion with it.

605. The representative of Bulgaria asked whether the spectacle created in connexion with the calling of the meeting was decorous, and said that the impression it had been sought to create was not in keeping with the true intentions of those who had raised the question in the Council. His Government supported United Nations resolutions and recommendations of the Organization of African Unity on the Southern Rhodesia problem. The situation in that territory had been the result of British policy from the very beginning. A similar policy had resulted in the establishment of the racist State of South Africa. Last November the United Kingdom had assured members of the Security Council that the economic measures it proposed to effect against Southern Rhodesia would topple Mr. Smith's régime within a few months. Months had passed since then, and the Press had begun to urge the British Prime Minister to face the fact that economic sanctions had failed to bring down the rebel régime in Southern Rhodesia. The presence of the *Joanna V* in the Mozambique Channel had been made public on 4 April. World public opinion would have welcomed earlier action by the Government of the United Kingdom. The tanker should have been stopped before it reached the port of Beira. The United Kingdom Government's measures against the racists were inadequate. Radical, effective measures were needed. Bulgaria considered that the United Kingdom draft resolution would do nothing more than encourage Mr. Ian Smith's régime. If the Mali-Nigeria-Uganda amendments were adopted, there might be some hope of improvement in the situation.

606. The representative of Uruguay said that for the first time the problem was being placed within the scope of Chapter VII of the Charter by the United Kingdom's proposals. The draft resolution therefore required very careful study by his Government, but, since the draft contained an element of indisputable urgency, his delegation was not requesting a postponement of the vote, in which it would be obliged to abstain.

607. The representative of China said that although the United Kingdom draft resolution fell short of what was required to bring down the Ian Smith régime, it was a step forward in the direction envisaged in the Council's previous resolutions, and should have the support of the Council. The three-Power amendments were more comprehensive in scope and more drastic in nature.

608. The representative of Greece, who had been invited to make a statement in accordance with his request (S/7246), said that he had asked to speak because of the statement by the Soviet representative attributing to Greece responsibility for some cases of transport of oil destined for Southern Rhodesia. Greece

had not recognized the Smith régime, and had instituted an arms embargo against Rhodesia. It had ended all trade with and banned all shipments to the territory. His country was one of the few which had adopted specific legislation preventing oil deliveries to Rhodesia. The *Joanna V* was no longer a Greek ship, having also been removed from the Greek registry. The owners of the *Manuela* had given assurance that it would not sail to Beira.

609. The representative of the USSR said that he had mentioned the undeniable fact that Greek vessels were carrying oil for Rhodesia. The Greek Government's action had not prevented oil from going to Southern Rhodesia and its international responsibilities remained.

610. The representative of the United Kingdom welcomed the efforts of those who had been anxious to unite rather than divide, who had been looking for action and who had been seeking common ground. There seemed to be common agreement on stopping the delivery of oil to Beira and stopping the pumping through the pipeline. The amendments constituted very important proposals, but they were new and could not be accepted without instructions. That did not mean that those vital matters should not be discussed by the Council, and any member could ask for a meeting on those issues. He asked for action to be taken that night to prevent the tankers from reaching Beira; it would be a very grave decision if the Council did not take urgent action.

611. The representative of the USSR said that the United Kingdom draft resolution was inadequate and did not deal with some important aspects of the matter. Adoption of the three-Power amendments might make it possible to bring the Council to a solution of the problem and result, perhaps, in a unanimous decision. His delegation did not share the view that the part of the problem on which the United Kingdom draft was based was so urgent that everything else must be sacrificed. No delegation wanted to see the supply of oil to Southern Rhodesia continue by sea or by land. If the United Kingdom sincerely wanted to stop the shipments of oil, it could do so on the basis of the Council's resolution of 20 November 1965.

612. The President, speaking as the representative of Mali, said that the present debate was not intended to solve the problem of Southern Rhodesia. The United Kingdom should seek concrete solutions to this problem instead of bringing up matters of one or two oil tankers. Mali would have liked to see the United Kingdom use force to close the borders of Southern Rhodesia. Mali reaffirmed the right of the Zimbabwe people to self-determination and independence. The measures that had been suggested were the minimum the United Kingdom should adopt. Mali still doubted whether Britain really needed United Nations help in trying to establish order in its colony.

Decision: *At the 1277th meeting, on 9 April 1966, the amendments submitted by Mali, Nigeria and Uganda (S/7243) to the revised United Kingdom draft resolution (S/7236/Rev.1) were voted upon as follows: the amendment to the preamble, the amendment to the first operative paragraph, and the amendment to insert a new operative paragraph after operative paragraph 3 each received 7 votes in favour (Argentina, Bulgaria, Jordan, Mali, Nigeria, Uganda, USSR) to none against, with 8 abstentions (China, France, Japan, Netherlands,*

New Zealand, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay) and were not adopted, having failed to obtain the necessary majority.

The revised draft resolution (S/7236/Rev.1) was then adopted by 10 votes to none, with 5 abstentions (Bulgaria, France, Mali, USSR, Uruguay) (resolution 221 (1966)).

613. The representative of Jordan said that his delegation had supported all the amendments, since they were necessary to reflect the reality of the situation. It was unfortunate that they had not been accepted. He had also voted for the United Kingdom draft, not for what it omitted, but because it was a first step towards remedying the situation.

614. The representative of the USSR said his delegation had voted for all of the three-Power amendments, as they would in a number of respects have altered the situation with regard to the implementation of last year's resolution to liquidate the unbearable situation in Southern Rhodesia. The Security Council should condemn the Governments which were sabotaging the implementation of the resolution, and, in the first place, South Africa and Portugal. The hypocrisy of the United Kingdom had been shown by its rejection of the amendments. Britain, the United States and their allies had rejected even the paragraph seeking to call on South Africa to prevent oil from entering Rhodesia.

615. The representative of Nigeria, who said that he was speaking also on behalf of Uganda, did not understand how any delegation could have failed to support a paragraph merely calling on South Africa not to supply oil to Southern Rhodesia. The resolution just adopted did not preclude further action, and early efforts should be made to resuscitate the amendments. Nigeria had voted for the United Kingdom draft resolution, after the rejection of the amendments, since it was designed to prevent more oil from reaching Southern Rhodesia. Anything preventing aid to Mr. Smith's régime was worth supporting.

616. The representative of China said he had abstained on the amendments because he believed they raised matters which warranted separate consideration and treatment, and should not be included in a resolution with a limited purpose. He had voted for the United Kingdom resolution, inadequate though it was, because it was necessary to halt the supply of oil to Southern Rhodesia.

617. The representative of the United Kingdom said he had not been prepared to accept the African amendments because there had been no time to consider them. It was unjustified, therefore, for the representative of the Soviet Union to accuse him of hypocrisy of which he was no more guilty than the representative of the Soviet Union had been in abstaining on the United Kingdom resolution. His Government would report to the Security Council through the Secretary-General on action taken to give effect to the resolution adopted.

618. The representative of Bulgaria had voted for all the amendments because he felt that their adoption would to some extent improve the United Kingdom draft resolution. His delegation had abstained on the United Kingdom draft, which it regarded as having a propagandistic aim.

**E. Further communications received after
7 April 1966**

619. In a letter dated 11 April (S/7249), the representative of the United Kingdom informed the President of the Security Council of action taken to prevent the tanker *Manuela* from reaching Beira. According to a further letter (S/7256), dated 14 April, the tanker had proceeded to Durban.

620. In a letter dated 21 April (S/7261), the representative of the United States set out the views of his Government on the situation which had arisen between 7 and 9 April following the request for an urgent meeting of the Council. In a review of the relevant rules and Charter provisions, as well as of the practice followed by the Council in the past, he stated, *inter alia*, that rule 2 was mandatory and did not give the President the choice of convening or not convening the Council when a member so requested. Even if a majority of members were opposed to a meeting, it must be held. Those members opposed to a meeting might express their views on the agenda when the meeting was convened, or might seek to adjourn the meeting, but the President was bound to convene a meeting. In setting the time of a meeting under rule 1, the President acted not as a representative of his country but as a servant of the Council, and did not exercise an arbitrary or unfettered discretion. His decision must be related to the requirements of Articles 24 and 28 and of rule 2 and to the urgency of the request or situation.

621. The President of the Security Council for the month of April 1966 (the representative of Mali) replied to this United States letter in a letter dated 29 April (S/7272). In this reply, he stated that he considered that he had acted entirely in accordance with the provisional rules, and especially rule 2. There had been no infringement of the rules with respect to the request of the United Kingdom. The customary consultations had been held in accordance with normal practice. While some members had been prepared for an immediate meeting, others had not. The procedure followed at the latest meeting of the Council could not be regarded as setting a precedent, as was demonstrated by reference to previous specified occasions, such as the requests of 30 January 1962 and 1 May 1965 for meetings of the Security Council.

622. By a letter dated 21 April (S/7263), the Chairman of the Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples transmitted to the Council the text of a resolution adopted by the Special Committee on 21 April on the question of Southern Rhodesia.

623. Further resolutions of the Special Committee, adopted on 31 May and 22 June were transmitted on 14 June (S/7371) and on 1 July (S/7395).

624. In a letter dated 27 April 1966 (S/7271), the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Portugal communicated to the Secretary-General reservations to which the Council's resolution of 9 April had given rise: the preamble set forth only assumptions concerning some of which no facts whatsoever had been proved, and its inconsistency with the operative part did not appear a sound basis for a resolution with such serious implications. The resolution was a document containing only preventive provisions and was intended for general guidance. It was thus not a mandatory resolution, but

simply a recommendation. The letter expressed reservations in connexion with the validity of the decision of the Council in view of the abstention of two permanent members; it also raised a series of legal points in that connexion. It termed the resolution "a clear denial of the principle of the freedom of the seas and the principle of free access to the sea by land-locked countries". The Portuguese Government did not believe that the Security Council could legislate against international law as now in force. There was also the question whether the matter of Southern Rhodesia could still be regarded as coming within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United Kingdom, or now came within the international jurisdiction of the Council. If the point was not clarified, there would be no way of knowing who would be authorized to supervise compliance, if the resolution should be regarded as binding, unless the Council was regarded as having abdicated part of its responsibilities in favour of a single Member State. He requested that the Secretary-General submit the reservations to the Office of Legal Affairs and give him its replies.

625. The Secretary-General replied (S/7373) to this letter on 21 June, stating that the Office of Legal Affairs had prepared a detailed study of the points raised; he had also studied the question whether it was appropriate for the Secretariat to establish the practice of responding in substance to a request from a Member State for advice regarding the validity and interpretation of decisions of principal organs of the United Nations. The latter question must be answered in the negative; only the Security Council was in a position to give an authoritative interpretation of its resolution, of the Charter Articles on which it was based, and of the procedures followed in adopting it. However, since those considerations might not have been known to the Government of Portugal, and in order to avoid any possible misconceptions, he felt he should inform the Foreign Minister that the detailed study prepared for the Secretary-General's information did not, in its conclusions, support any of the reservations advanced by the Government of Portugal.

626. In a note dated 22 June (S/7392), the representative of South Africa transmitted to the Secretary-General a communication from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of South Africa reserving the position of his Government regarding the validity of the Council resolution of 9 April and the procedure whereby the Security Council had purported to adopt it.

627. Communications received during this period also included further statements on the item or set forth measures taken by Member States under the Council's resolutions. These included documents S/7253 of 13 April, from Venezuela; S/7258 of 15 April, from Pakistan; S/7294 of 13 May, from Portugal; S/7308 of 18 May and S/7345 of 3 June, from Kenya; S/7181/Add.1 of 18 May, from the Secretary-General, transmitting a note from the Federal Republic of Germany; S/7313 of 20 May, from Algeria; S/7323 of 27 May, from Chile; S/7362 of 15 June, from Japan; and S/7508 of 11 July, from Peru.

**F. Consideration at the 1278th to 1285th
meetings (17-23 May 1966)**

628. In a letter to the President of the Council dated 10 May 1966 (S/7285), the representatives of

thirty-two African States requested that the Council be convened immediately to examine the situation in Southern Rhodesia. The members of the Council were aware that the racist régime in Southern Rhodesia was still holding out, and that the measures adopted by the Council had proved ineffective in bringing it down. On 9 April, the Council had had to authorize the use of the provisions found only in Chapter VII of the Charter to ensure the observance of its oil embargo against Southern Rhodesia. However, that use of force covered only one relatively minor sector while substantial quantities of oil and petroleum products were entering the territory through other sectors and preparations were said to be in progress for a permanent supply system through those sectors. It was regrettable that no effort had been made by the administering Power to open negotiations with the leaders of the African political parties. Any arrangements arrived at between the United Kingdom and the Salisbury racist régime, during any negotiations envisaged by the parties, which excluded the genuine representatives of the people of Zimbabwe and which failed to guarantee the rights of the majority, would aggravate an already explosive situation and would thus lead to a racial conflict all over southern Africa. The situation constituted a threat to international peace and security and the Security Council should examine, under Chapter VII of the Charter, the necessary measures to establish majority rule in Southern Rhodesia in accordance with the Declaration set forth in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

629. The following draft resolution, submitted by Mali, Nigeria and Uganda, was annexed to the above letter (S/7285/Add.1):

"The Security Council,

"Recalling its resolutions 216 (1965) of 12 November 1965, 217 (1965) of 20 November 1965 and 221 (1966) of 9 April 1966, and in particular its call to all States to do their utmost to break off all economic relations with Southern Rhodesia, including an embargo on oil and petroleum products,

"Noting with concern that this call has not been heeded by all States and that economic measures have failed to bring down the racist régime of Salisbury,

"Pointing out that the grave threat to international peace and security inherent in the situation in Southern Rhodesia has already induced it to authorize the use of force, by its resolution 221 (1966), in exercise of the powers which Chapter VII of the Charter alone confers upon it,

"Gravely concerned by the reports that substantial supplies of oil are reaching Southern Rhodesia and that arrangements are being made to devise a permanent system of oil supply to that territory,

"Noting with regret that the administering Power has made no effort to open negotiations with the leaders of African political parties with a view to establishing in Southern Rhodesia a Government consistent with the aspirations of the people of Zimbabwe,

"Disturbed at the grave consequences which negotiations between the United Kingdom and the racist régime of Salisbury, without the participation of the genuine representatives of the people of Zimbabwe, might entail for the rights of that people to freedom and independence,

"1. Determines that the situation in Southern Rhodesia continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security;

"2. Calls upon all States to apply measures with a view to the complete severance of economic relations and communications with Southern Rhodesia in accordance with Article 41 of the Charter;

"3. Invites the Portuguese and South African Governments, in particular, to take forthwith the necessary measures under Article 41 of the Charter to sever economic relations and communications with Southern Rhodesia;

"4. Calls upon all States, and particularly the Portuguese and South African Governments, to take all necessary measures to prevent the supply of oil and petroleum products to Southern Rhodesia;

"5. Calls upon the United Kingdom to take the measures provided for in Chapter VII of the Charter in order, by the use of air, sea or land forces, to prevent any supplies, including oil and petroleum products, from reaching Southern Rhodesia;

"6. Reaffirms the inalienable rights of the people of Southern Rhodesia to freedom and independence in accordance with the Declaration contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), and recognizes the legitimacy of their struggle to secure the enjoyment of their rights as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations;

"7. Calls upon the United Kingdom to hold consultations with the leaders of African political parties with a view to the establishment of a régime consistent with the aspirations of the people of Zimbabwe;

"8. Draws the attention of the United Kingdom Government to the harmful consequences which the present negotiations might entail for the establishment of a régime based on universal suffrage;

"9. Calls upon the United Kingdom Government to take all necessary measures, including the use of force, to abolish the racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia and to ensure the immediate application of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV)."

630. The African letter was listed as a sub-item under the general title of this chapter when the Council adopted its agenda at the 1278th meeting on 17 May.

631. In accordance with their requests (S/7292, S/7295, S/7297, S/7298, S/7299 and S/7301), the representatives of India, Pakistan, Senegal, Zambia, Algeria and Sierra Leone were invited to participate, without the right to vote, in the Council's deliberations.

632. The representative of Zambia said that the rebellion in Southern Rhodesia continued to threaten the peace of Zambia, Africa and the rest of the world. The Council should call for concrete and effective measures to quell the rebellion at an early date. His Government had been patient in the interest of peace, and had urged the United Kingdom to liquidate the rebel régime. The former Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland had left his country with a legacy of common services, such as the Kariba Dam and the Rhodesia Railways, and Zambia's economic foundations were linked with those of Southern Rhodesia. The Salisbury régime had threatened to cut off Zambia's share of power from the Kariba Dam and to strangle his nation economically. That was why the rebellion was of foremost concern to his nation, which was not prepared to tolerate indefinitely the minority régime. The British

Government had created a climate suitable for the birth of the Smith régime, and, after its establishment, had undertaken the policy of economic sanctions known from the start to be futile and ineffective against an illegal colonialist régime. The United Kingdom must stop shirking its duty and responsibility and must take immediate measures, as it had done in other colonies, by using force to quell the rebellion. His Government was not motivated by the desire to kill the Southern Rhodesia whites, but by a desire to avoid a situation which would lead to a greater loss of life. The United Kingdom should suspend the 1961 Constitution, release all political detainees, then convene a representative constitutional conference and fix an early date for the territory's independence under majority rule. He supported the joint draft resolution. The present talks between the United Kingdom and the Smith régime, without the representatives of the African people, were a development that had shocked Zambia, since the British Government had always ruled out any talks with that rebel régime and had promised that economic sanctions would achieve results. Its present action amounted to a *de facto* recognition of the minority régime.

633. The representative of Senegal found it difficult to understand why the United Kingdom refused to use force against the rebels in Southern Rhodesia when it had not hesitated to use force and take other measures in British Guiana, Kenya, South Arabia and elsewhere. The Rhodesian affair constituted a test case for the United Nations. In spite of all the resolutions it had adopted and all the promises made, there had been no progress towards a peaceful settlement. The Smith régime had the support not only of Portugal and South Africa, but of business circles in London. The Security Council resolution of 9 April had not produced results. On its own initiative, the United Kingdom had asked the Council for powers under Chapter VII of the Charter. There was a double standard, however, since the resolution referred only to oil supplied to Southern Rhodesia through Beira by Portugal, while oil was sent in quantity from South Africa to the territory. Amendments aimed at preventing oil entering Southern Rhodesia by road and rail from South Africa had been rejected. The Council could understand the bitterness felt by the African States about the situation in Southern Rhodesia, which was an increasing threat to international peace, and why they insisted that Chapter VII of the Charter be invoked. The United Kingdom should understand that whatever contacts took place between the Smith régime and itself should not imply *de facto* recognition of that régime. The Council should adopt the draft resolution before it so as to provide the basis for the firm action it was now time to take.

634. The representative of India said that the responsibility of the United Nations was to prevent the situation from becoming a threat to peace and to assist the Zimbabwe people towards independence. The Council's November resolution had been half-hearted, and economic sanctions had failed because they had not been implemented by all States. Portugal and South Africa had helped Southern Rhodesia overcome the consequences of the limited boycott. The failure of the sanctions had also been due to the considerable investments of many countries in Southern Rhodesia. Studies of the Committee of Twenty-Four showed that British shareholders had interests in the territory's tobacco, sugar, textile, and mining industries. All major oil

companies were participating in supplying oil to Southern Rhodesia from South Africa by road and rail, and the embargo would not succeed unless it was applied to all neighbouring countries. Other measures were needed to bring the illegal régime to heel, and adoption by the Council of the three-Power draft resolution would help the people of Zimbabwe to freedom. The United Kingdom's present negotiations with the Smith régime were wholly unacceptable to India. The British Government should make it clear that the continuation of the rebellion would make the use of force imperative; promise the abrogation of the 1961 Constitution and set a date for the independence of Zimbabwe under majority rule, and it should declare that there would be an interim government representing all sections of the territory's population. Unless those minimum steps were implemented, violence was inevitable. India, for its part, would continue to assist the people of Zimbabwe through the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity. He hoped the Security Council would adopt positive and concrete measures.

635. The representative of Pakistan said that his Government had lent its full and unqualified support to the decisions of the United Nations as contained in Security Council resolution 217 of 20 November 1965. Among other measures, it had refused to recognize the illegal racist régime in Southern Rhodesia and had severed all economic relations with it. From the beginning, it had viewed the unilateral declaration of independence as a grave threat to international peace and security. Contrary to the assurances of Prime Minister Wilson, sanctions had failed to bring about the capitulation of the rebel régime. The international community wanted to quell the rebellion, but Portugal and South Africa, by their succour and comfort, had largely enabled the rebel government to resist the pressure from the Organization. The Council's 9 April resolution had been a step in the right direction; it must now be followed by more decisive measures under Chapter VII of the Charter. The Council should also call upon the administering Power to redeem its pledges and to carry out the mandate of the Organization.

636. At the 1279th meeting on 17 May, the representative of Algeria said that the conditions which had led to the present talks between the United Kingdom and the Smith régime, rather than the talks themselves, had caused grave concern in Africa. The pessimistic evaluation of the measures undertaken by the United Kingdom had proved to be well-founded, and their ineffectiveness had soon become apparent. The object of the secret talks in London was not to discuss the future of a white minority in a free Southern Rhodesia but, paradoxically, the rights which the handful of racists would design to grant to the Southern Rhodesian people. The United Kingdom could no longer avoid a choice between a continuation of imperialist policies and a willingness to establish an independent African State. Developments towards the total liberation of Africa had led the colonial Powers to reappraise their methods and to devise a new strategy to safeguard imperialist economic and political interests. The outcome of the present talks could only be a reinforcement of the domination of the Smith régime over the Zimbabwe people. The United Kingdom should, if it meant to thwart Smith's aims, take effective action, first aimed at South Africa, Smith's accomplice. Algeria was convinced that the talks were intended to legalize what had been perpetrated in November 1965. That

would lead the Zimbabwe people to resorting to the only alternative left to them, namely armed force and guerrilla warfare. Such revolutionary action had already begun, for instance, at Sinoia on 29 April, when seven African fighters had been killed by the police. The Security Council must put an end to the threat to peace in Southern Rhodesia, which would only disappear when the people of Zimbabwe attained independence.

637. The representative of Nigeria said that on the Southern Rhodesian question Africa spoke with one voice. Introducing the joint draft resolution, he said that it had been drafted with the co-operation of all members of the OAU, who were also Members of the United Nations. Despite the hopes that had been held about the effectiveness of the new United Kingdom Government in tackling the Rhodesian situation, it had taken inadequate measures. Its most recent decision to open talks with the Smith Government made Africans apprehensive; as a member of the Commonwealth he felt a great sense of pain and shame at the British record. The Africans' patience was not inexhaustible. They had now returned to the Council to demand resolute measures. The African States would be prepared to consider any suggestions towards improving their draft resolution, but they would not welcome any amendments which would water down the text or render it ineffective. Article 41 of the Charter, the Nigerian representative said, was meant to be applied in the proper circumstances, and Southern Rhodesia was such a case. Portugal and South Africa were mentioned in the resolution in order to make clear to them that they were regarded as the chief culprits. He doubted whether the African States would have come to the Council if the talks that were taking place were being conducted through the Governor of Southern Rhodesia with the participation of representatives of all sections of the Territory's population. The talks were not in the interests of Africa. It appeared that some members of the Council were hesitant about the words "use of force", even though they had agreed to those words on 9 April. The African States wanted only as much force to be used as was necessary. He urged the Council to approve the joint draft and appealed to the United Kingdom not to stand in the way of the measures proposed in it.

638. The representative of Sierra Leone said the African States had requested the convening of the Council owing to the rapidly deteriorating situation in Southern Rhodesia. The manner in which Mr. Wilson and his Government had been handling the problem of Southern Rhodesia was certainly not calculated to win the confidence of the peoples of Africa. The problem had at last reached the stage where the only course open to the United Nations was resort to such action as might be necessary under Articles 41 and 42 of Chapter VII to bring the illegal régime to an end. It was a strange development that the British who, shortly before, had been advocating the use of force, if necessary, to arrest adventurous tankers in order speedily to bring down the Smith régime, were now locked in great consultations with representatives of that same régime. The Council must accept the challenge of the occasion and take those steps which alone would ensure stability, peace and security in Southern Rhodesia.

639. At the 1280th meeting on 18 May, the Secretary-General, in reply to a question by the representative of Nigeria, said that he had received com-

munications from Dr. Lardner-Burke, who called himself "Minister of Justice" of Rhodesia. Mr. Lardner-Burke had invoked Article 32 of the Charter in requesting to be invited to participate in the Security Council debate. Members were aware that the legal status of Southern Rhodesia was that of a Non-Self-Governing Territory, under General Assembly resolutions. Article 32 did not apply in this case. In the circumstances, it was for the Council to decide what consideration, if any, it wished to give to the telegrams. He had therefore made these available to members of the Council. Because the Council had labelled the Ian Smith régime illegal, and in line with the policy of the Secretariat not to enter into communication with illegal régimes, he had decided not to reply to the various telegrams from Salisbury.

640. The President said that the Secretary-General's statement both covered and settled the matter.

641. The representative of the United Kingdom said that the resolution adopted by the Council in April had been a limited but decisive action in the Southern Rhodesian sanctions campaign; it was also an unprecedented action in the history of the United Nations. The United Kingdom's Southern Rhodesia policy had always been clear and consistent and was not a policy based on expediency. His Government's policy of exploring every possibility of negotiation offered an acceptable alternative to conflict. The United Kingdom had given effect immediately to the Council's November resolution. It had prohibited all exports to Southern Rhodesia, denied that Territory Commonwealth preferences and banned all imports from it. The cost of those measures had been very substantial. In connexion with the oil embargo, his Government had had to make provision for oil supplies to Zambia. The oil airlift to Zambia alone had cost the United Kingdom \$3 million a month and it had committed more than \$10 million of British funds for the equipment and maintenance of alternative supply routes to Zambia. In those urgent measures, the United Kingdom had worked in full and close co-operation with Zambia. Its clear motive in all the measures was to restore Southern Rhodesia to the rule of law. The United Kingdom acknowledged that many others who had joined it had consequently suffered disruption of trade, and it respected the motives that had led them to those decisions. Taken together the measures represented a momentous international endeavour for the cause of racial justice and equality. The United Kingdom had always maintained that Southern Rhodesia was its responsibility and it had taken the lead to achieve the purposes it had publicly declared. He could understand the impatience of those who advocated the use of force, but the United Kingdom had set itself to achieve its purposes if possible without bloodshed. Those who decried sanctions not only fortified the obstinacy of the illegal régime, but also belittled and questioned one of the instruments of international authority provided by the Charter. In reply to those who said that sanctions did not work, he replied that in Salisbury it was being realized that sanctions were shaking the whole structure of credit. Rhodesian tobacco sales had gone badly, and the steel industry had been hit. There was widespread unemployment. The British Government had never underestimated the difficulties and the dangers, but the aims it had set for itself were attainable. The timing and tactics were the United Kingdom's first responsibility.

642. The purpose of the informal talks in London was merely to see whether a basis for negotiation

existed. They were without commitment on either side. No member of the British Parliament would accept a settlement which would condone an illegal act, but to have rejected the approach from Salisbury for talks would have been indefensible. The United Kingdom representative said that the seven main decisions—to give a plain warning, to endeavour to prevent any illegal declaration, to come to the Council immediately the declaration was made, to embark on a comprehensive policy of economic sanctions, to consult and act with the Commonwealth, to stop the oil tankers, and to keep open the door to a return to constitutional rule—were right; they had been steps deliberately planned, representing together a clear and consistent policy. The problem should be isolated and contained, not expanded with the grave danger of escalation. If hasty action were taken now, when the outcome of the talks was not yet known, and if the Security Council were to achieve only deadlock, it would be a disservice to the people of Rhodesia as well as to the authority of the United Nations. The United Kingdom would not betray the interests of the African people and accepted the legitimate interest of the United Nations. If the talks did not lead to a just settlement, then a new situation would arise, and the United Kingdom would have to consider the whole problem further.

643. The representative of the USSR said that the urgent meeting of the Council at the request of the African States was in itself evidence that the situation in Southern Rhodesia was an increasing threat to international peace. The forces of colonialism and racism continued to deny to the Zimbabwe people the realization of their legitimate aspirations. Those forces in Southern Rhodesia had found powerful protectors in London, Washington and Bonn, and in certain other capitals. The United Kingdom had failed to carry out the decisions of the United Nations on the Territory, and broad collusion by the forces of colonialism had enabled the Salisbury régime to strengthen itself economically and militarily. The economic sanctions had turned out to be ineffective, as a result of the sabotage by a number of Member Governments of the United Nations. The resolution adopted by the Council on 9 April had not increased the effectiveness of economic sanctions, which were now characterized by international public opinion as a farce. South Africa and Portugal were undermining the oil embargo with impunity and providing financial assistance to the racist régime of Ian Smith. By abstaining and refusing to support the proposals of the African members of the Council on 9 April, the United Kingdom and the United States had used a veiled veto and prevented the adoption of the amendments. The Soviet Union agreed with the views of the African people on the Southern Rhodesia situation. Instead of ending the Smith régime, the United Kingdom was trying to reach an agreement with it at the expense of the Zimbabwe people. The Soviet Union was complying fully with United Nations resolutions on the question, and it supported the demand by the African and Asian countries that urgent and effective measures be taken for a solution of the problem. Their demands were clear: the immediate elimination of the régime of the usurpers; the repeal of the racist constitution of 1961; the establishment of a firm time-limit for the granting of independence; the holding of elections on the basis of universal suffrage in accordance with the principle of one man, one vote; and the immediate transfer of authority in the Territory to a government which reflected the aspirations

of the African majority in Southern Rhodesia in accordance with the United Nations Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. The Council must condemn the Portuguese colonialists and the South African racists and all others who supported the racist régime in Southern Rhodesia. The resolution before the Council was inadequate. Chapter VII of the Charter should be invoked.

644. At the 1281st meeting on 18 May, the representative of the United States said that the Council should be guided in the matter by the paramount consideration that it must not convert a victory of purpose and achievement into a defeat of disagreement and disunity. Members were united in the resolve that the unilateral declaration of independence by the Smith régime should not succeed, and they were united on the goal of self-determination for all the people of Southern Rhodesia. The United States was living up to its convictions with deeds, and it had taken costly economic action in conformity with Security Council resolutions on the problem. The United States had cut off virtually all exports to Rhodesia, except for some of humanitarian importance only. The accusations of bad faith made by the representative of the Soviet Union were groundless. The Southern Rhodesia question involved a basic moral issue, and the United States was anxious that there be a restoration of constitutional authority in the Territory. The principle of one man, one vote was one that the United States wanted for all countries, including its own. The United Kingdom had stated, *inter alia*, that it would have to be satisfied that any basis for independence was acceptable to the Rhodesian people as a whole. The talks going on in London were not negotiations. The Smith régime, which had approached the United Kingdom for those talks, was evidently feeling the pinch of the economic restrictions which most Member States were applying against it. Surely, the United Kingdom had to respond to a request for talks, and it was the counsel of wisdom to investigate any opportunity for solution of the problem by peaceful, not violent means. The United Nations stood for peace. Members should see that the actions taken by the United Kingdom demonstrated its good faith. His delegation believed that the Council should remain seized of the item and of the draft resolution submitted by the three African members. It should follow with close attention the progress of the talks and determine if they showed any prospect of advance towards a proper solution of the Rhodesian problem.

645. The representative of Uruguay, after reiterating his Government's repudiation of the minority régime in Southern Rhodesia, stated that, since the measures so far taken had been ineffectual, the time had come to employ certain mandatory measures not involving the use of armed force, under Chapter VII of the Charter. All States should be called upon to refuse to recognize the rebel régime, to stop oil deliveries to Southern Rhodesia, and to have no economic relations with it, except, for humanitarian reasons, for deliveries of food, clothing and medicines. He was aware that those measures would constitute a serious step. For practical reasons the Security Council should not at present undertake to control such measures. Those measures were mandatory and failure to comply with them would induce the Council, in the future, to consider what action should be taken. So far as the possible use of armed force was concerned, the Uruguayan delegation wished to differentiate between two separate

situations of a legal nature. One was the use of force by the United Kingdom as the administering Power in Southern Rhodesia; and the other was the use of force to carry out measures which might affect third countries. He appreciated the fact that a recommendation on the lines of the second alternative might produce useful results but expressed reservations concerning that procedure because it would grant a given country discretionary rights. He also thought that the recommendation to make armed forces available would not be automatically binding on any country since the agreements provided for in Article 43 of the Charter had not been signed. Since his country traditionally held the view that all peaceful measures for the settlement of disputes must be exhausted, it could not support a text calling upon the United Kingdom to use force. Uruguay did not want to prejudge the usefulness of the London talks, on the understanding that they did not imply recognition of the Salisbury régime. The Security Council should adopt practical measures within its competence. A formula should be worked out which could command the Council's approval, and he expressed the hope that such a formula would be supported by the United Kingdom and other great Powers.

646. The representative of New Zealand said that his country was thoroughly conscious of the issues inherent in the Southern Rhodesian question and of their relevance to the future relations of peoples of different colour, to the future of the Commonwealth and to the future of the United Nations. His Government was aware also of the intensity of feeling of the African Governments on this matter. For these reasons it had taken the economic steps recorded in its letters to the Secretary-General and had subscribed to the emergency action taken by the Council in April. But it considered that each step should be taken with full regard for the consequences and in full knowledge of the ability to carry it through. Perhaps partly as a result of the determination shown at the Council's meeting in April, the leaders of the illegal régime had approached the United Kingdom to see if there was some way out of the position in which they had found themselves. The significance of that initiative could not be lightly dismissed and must represent a response to the economic pressures. The United Kingdom had reiterated its resolve to carry out its obligations to the people of Southern Rhodesia as a whole, and the words of the United Kingdom Government had been matched by costly deeds. The fact that talks were taking place at all had to be accepted by adherents of a Charter which enjoined parties to a dispute to seek, first of all, a pacific settlement. Although the Africans were not represented at the present talks, there was no suggestion that they and other groups would be denied their rightful role in any future, more substantive talks. Optimism about the outcome of the talks was inappropriate but the British Government had acted properly in not rejecting the approach from the *de facto* régime out of hand. In the meanwhile the diplomatic and economic pressures on Salisbury should continue, but since debate in the Council, and adoption or, even more, rejection of certain courses of action, might affect the talks adversely and encourage those whom the Council was concerned to subdue, New Zealand did not support any further action being taken at that juncture. His country was not disposed prematurely to disparage the effectiveness as tools of peaceful persuasion of the diplomatic and economic sanctions now in force or prematurely to discard them. They were not instantaneous

in effect but were selective and controllable. The use of force, he concluded, was not acceptable when a credible alternative cause existed and was not a course of action likely to make possible the eventual emergence in Southern Rhodesia of that multiracial society to which all still said they looked forward.

647. The representative of Japan said that his Government, while recognizing that the effects of the sanctions adopted by the Council in November had not been as rapid as desired, considered that they had begun to show results. Hasty or ill-considered action by the Council should be avoided as it might impair efforts towards a settlement. Every encouragement should be given to the efforts being made in the direction of peaceful change. As long as the slightest chance of a peaceful settlement existed, the Security Council should not take any precipitate action.

648. At the 1282nd meeting on 19 May, the representative of Jordan said that the results of the British step-by-step approach had been disappointing. The longer the Smith régime continued the more difficult it would be to solve the problem. Despite the Council's injunction, oil had continued to reach Southern Rhodesia, while Rhodesian sugar and tobacco were finding their way to outside markets through South Africa. Portugal and South Africa had continued to serve as artificial lungs, giving life to the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia. The Beira oil embargo could not bring down the rebel régime, since another pipeline was operating at full capacity. The United Kingdom had appealed for patience, but it had not presented a clear and complete plan. It was now time to ask what the next step would be towards bringing the Smith régime to heel. The question should be asked whether the step-by-step approach was intended by the United Kingdom to prepare the ground for divesting itself of its primary responsibility in the matter and throwing the whole problem into the lap of the United Nations. The United Kingdom was trying to solve an act of treason through informal talks with the traitors. The latter had grown so confident that they were now seeking to be invited to participate in the Council's consideration of the question. If the present talks failed, would the United Kingdom seal the border effectively and use force if necessary? Would the United Kingdom agree if the Security Council asked to send observers to key posts on the South African-Rhodesian border to ensure the embargo? Or would it repeat what it had done in the case of Palestine, namely turn over its responsibility to the United Nations?

649. The representative of Uganda said that the crux of the matter was the lack of confidence felt by Africans generally towards the United Kingdom and its attitude on Southern Rhodesia. Africa had lost faith in the British capacity to follow an impartial line where black and white were concerned. Some believed that when Ian Smith had left for Southern Rhodesia to issue the unilateral declaration of independence, he had done so with the blessing of Mr. Wilson and that all the plans must have been worked out between them. Criticizing the six points put forward by the British Government, he said that what was essential was the implementation of the "one man, one vote" principle. It covered the first three points. As for the fourth—progress towards ending racial discrimination—Kenya and Zambia had shown that the Africans did not revenge themselves against the misbehaviour of the whites against them. But whites had been known to discrimi-

nate against blacks. The last two principles, namely that the basis for a settlement must be acceptable to the people as a whole, and that there should be no oppression of the majority by the minority or vice versa, would also be covered by the "one man, one vote" principle. A situation similar to that of the Mau Mau in Kenya was about to erupt in Southern Rhodesia unless steps were taken soon to prevent it.

650. The representative of France said that his Government shared the apprehensions of the African nations over the deteriorating conditions in Southern Rhodesia. Salisbury's challenge was unprecedented and apartheid indeed existed in Southern Rhodesia. France strongly condemned such a policy. The unanimity among the African States on the matter was an important factor, and France welcomed it. However, events had not given his Government cause to change its previous position. The nature of the measures taken against the régime in Salisbury had not changed. Talks had been initiated between London and the *de facto* authorities in Southern Rhodesia, but his delegation would not be willing to regard those talks as implying recognition of the Smith régime; it considered that the Southern Rhodesian problem continued to remain the responsibility of the British Government alone, and it was for that Government to adopt any measures which might be called for in the circumstances. His delegation was convinced that the United Kingdom fully appreciated the gravity of the situation.

651. The representative of China observed that economic sanctions had not as yet brought the Smith régime to its knees, but their effect was already being felt in the Territory and would be felt increasingly. The African Governments had been justifiably dissatisfied with the results achieved to date, but the United Kingdom had stressed its desire for a peaceful solution. It seemed to accept the proposition that the use of force might be required at some future time if a peaceful settlement could not be attained. Implementation of any decision of the Council would not be possible without the complete endorsement of the United Kingdom. The Council should leave the matter of using force to the discretion of the United Kingdom and should call on all States, especially the immediate neighbours of Southern Rhodesia, to carry out the previous decisions of the United Nations on the question with increasing vigour and faithfulness. The Council should avoid giving any impression of being divided on the matter as that would only encourage the Smith régime to continue in its present course.

652. At the 1283rd meeting on 19 May, the representative of Argentina said that the existence of régimes based on racial discrimination shocked his nation's conscience. Despite the Security Council's embargo, increasing amounts of oil and petroleum products were flowing into Southern Rhodesia from neighbouring States. Even though they were in a more difficult position than more distant countries, the neighbouring States should sacrifice their economic and political interests for the maintenance of international peace and security. It would be wise to make a last appeal to those who had so far refused to comply with Security Council resolution 217 (1965). However, it would be impossible to assess the London talks at this time, and his delegation felt that for the moment at least the Council should avoid hasty action which might hamper progress towards a solution. The United Kingdom had an obligation to inform the Council at the right time

on the results of the talks. His delegation could not support the reference in the draft resolution to the use of force; any such measures should be applied only in extreme cases. The Security Council, moreover, could not impose on any country the use of its armed forces. The United Kingdom did not need such authorization since Southern Rhodesia was its accepted responsibility.

653. At the 1284th meeting on 20 May, the representative of Bulgaria paid tribute to the effective manner in which the African representatives had conveyed the deep concern of their Governments about the Southern Rhodesia situation. The United Kingdom had resorted to half-measures of an economic nature and, in spite of the requests by the African States, had attempted to have the Council adopt only measures which had been altogether ineffective. The United Kingdom was now having talks with the Smith régime—a step which served only to cover up a *de facto* recognition of a government which it had declared rebellious. The actions of the United Kingdom were contrary to the decisions of the United Nations on decolonization. A return to the 1961 Constitution could only mean the perpetuation of colonial rule over the Zimbabwe people. The Security Council should act immediately and effectively in order to solve this problem, which was a menace to international peace and security. Force must be used to abolish the racist régime of Ian Smith. All remaining sources of supply for Southern Rhodesia must be cut off beginning with South Africa, the principal source of supply for oil and other products, and United Nations resolutions on the problem must be implemented.

654. The representative of Mali said it seemed that the rebellion had first been inspired, subsequently encouraged, and ultimately supported. The British Government was now negotiating with Mr. Smith instead of with the representatives of the African people of Southern Rhodesia, whose leaders were being arrested, imprisoned and tortured. British attitudes towards Southern Rhodesia were still determined by considerations of profit and the Council had been informed of the losses due to the imposition of sanctions. There was no reckoning of the material, as well as moral, losses sustained by the people of Zimbabwe and of Zambia. Yet Zambia was ready to shoulder further sacrifices to help liberate its Zimbabwe brothers. It was apparent that the economic measures taken by Britain were not effective, and that Smith had strengthened himself; hence the Africans' request for stronger action. They were not asking for the elimination of the whites from the Territory—they were not racists, and they wanted to be convinced that the British were not racists, either. The Africans wanted justice done, and to see the Ian Smith régime eliminated.

655. The representative of Zambia said that his country was totally opposed to British policy on Southern Rhodesia. It wanted independence for that Territory on the basis of majority rule, with guarantees for the rights of the minority. Mandatory sanctions would at least hasten the eradication of the Smith régime. There was no doubt in his mind that Britain had broken its word a number of times. Mr. Wilson had assured the British Parliament and the world that he would never negotiate with the rebels unless they approached the Governor as private individuals, yet today representatives of the illegal régime were holding secret talks with British officials in London. Britain had broken

its word to Zambia over compensation for loss of military aircraft and weapons transferred to the whites in Southern Rhodesia at the dissolution of the Central African Federation. As for the economic assistance and protection supposedly given to Zambia, the United Kingdom had benefited far more from Zambia than *vice versa*. In any case, the cost of the measures was due to the unrealistic policies pursued in Southern Rhodesia. Had vigorous steps been taken in time, Britain would not have been obliged to take such measures. The African nations, which had been patient for six months, now wanted the United Kingdom to take immediate measures to prevent a major conflict in Central Africa. The Security Council should not turn a deaf ear to Africa's call.

656. The President, speaking as the representative of the Netherlands, said it was going too far to assert that the measures so far taken had been ineffective, even though it was true that the illegal régime was still in existence. The Rhodesian economy was in real difficulty, and the fact that the rebels themselves had asked for talks should not be overlooked. Countries with an extensive trade with Southern Rhodesia had broken off relations, and the United Kingdom had applied the oil embargo, with most oil-trading countries following suit. The sanctions applied against Southern Rhodesia were the biggest operation of that kind since the League of Nations sanctions against Mussolini in 1935. The measures had also meant great sacrifice for the nations which had been the main trading partners of Rhodesia. The demand in the draft for the use of force would require large-scale military action and would entail considerable bloodshed, and none could be sure that a war would not spread further. It was not the Security Council's duty to decide on the use of force while there was a fair chance that the problem could be solved peacefully. Since the United Kingdom was still the legal authority in Southern Rhodesia, a decision when and to what extent to use force lay in the first place with the Government of that country. The draft resolution would constitute an application of Article 42, though there was nothing in the draft declaring that economic measures under Article 41 had proved inadequate. It was not possible to call for economic measures under Article 41 and, at the same time, for the use of force under Article 42. It would also be inopportune to apply the provisions of the draft while exploratory talks were taking place in London. That, clearly, was not the end of the illegal régime, but it was equally clear that it would have been irresponsible for the United Kingdom to reject a request for such talks. The call for consultations with the African political leaders was a perfectly reasonable request, but its implementation would be automatic, since the United Kingdom was determined that a settlement would be based on its declared principles. The adoption by the Security Council of a resolution calling for mandatory sanctions might endanger any possibilities for a peaceful settlement, and his delegation could not support such a move. Since a rejection of the draft might well have an effect contrary to the desire of the sponsors, the better course might be to postpone further consideration of the issue and action on the draft until it became known whether or not a peaceful settlement was possible.

657. At the 1285th meeting on 23 May, the representative of Nigeria recalled that he had invited members to offer any improvements they had to the text of the joint draft and had let it be known that amend-

ments that would water down the text would not be accepted by the sponsors. The purpose was to remove the illegal régime from Southern Rhodesia. The time for fence-sitting was over; sanctions must be made mandatory.

658. The representative of Argentina said that his delegation would have preferred a more flexible attitude on the part of the sponsors regarding the draft. It was necessary for the Council to appeal to States, particularly the neighbours of Southern Rhodesia, to carry out previous recommendations of the United Nations on the question, before asking for further measures. His delegation could not support the draft, even though there were constructive provisions in it which Argentina could have supported, such as operative paragraphs 4, 6 and 7. It could also have supported operative paragraph 9, but not the call for the use of force.

659. The representative of Uruguay said the Council should find a formula permitting it to take further steps towards a solution, namely binding sanctions, for example in the diplomatic and economic fields, not involving the use of force. He regretted that there had not been as much resort to consultations as the situation required. His delegation would abstain in the vote.

660. The representative of China said his delegation was under instructions to give general support to the draft resolution except for the provisions relating to Chapter VII of the Charter. The resolution would still be forceful without those provisions. But if the resolution was put to the vote as it stood, he would have no alternative but to abstain.

Decision: *The draft resolution (S/7285/Add.1) was voted upon at the 1285th meeting on 23 May 1966. There were 6 votes in favour (Bulgaria, Jordan, Mali, Nigeria, Uganda, USSR) 1 against (New Zealand) and 8 abstentions (Argentina, China, France, Japan, Netherlands, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay), and the draft resolution was not adopted, having failed to obtain the necessary majority.*

661. The representative of Japan said it was difficult to deny that a threat to the peace existed in the Southern Rhodesia situation, but that it did not automatically imply the taking of measures such as some of those contemplated in the draft resolution. His delegation had serious doubts about the appropriateness of such measures as the severance of economic relations and communications with Southern Rhodesia under Article 41 of the Charter. Nor was a resort to force appropriate.

662. The representative of Mali said the voice of Africa had been heard by the whole world during the debate on a crucial issue. The draft resolution the Council had rejected had not been a drastic one. It was through tribulation that one discovered who one's friends were. The Africans remained convinced that truth and right were on their side. History would be the judge.

663. The representative of the United Kingdom said that in the course of the debate there had been much evidence of the intensity of feeling which existed in the Council. It had led sometimes to misstatements and misjudgements, some of them farfetched, unfair and unfounded, particularly the statement that the illegal declaration of independence in Southern Rhodesia had been made with the collusion of the United Kingdom Government. The statement had been self-defeating. The matter the Council was dealing with was one not of feeling, but of judgement, and the United Kingdom

was convinced that the problems should be isolated and contained, not added to; that the sanctions were having a cumulative effect; that economic pressure was an acceptable alternative to conflict; and that there should always be a willingness to negotiate. His Government had confirmed that there would be no betrayal of African interests, and that the situation would be considered further if the present talks did not lead to a just settlement for all the people of Southern Rhodesia. It was not the purpose of the Council for members to score victories over one another, but to seek a way forward. He regretted that it had been necessary to have a vote—something which had divided the Council. But that was not a cause for abandoning the search for a solution; and members might resolve to maintain consultations and continue to seek a just solution acceptable to the people of Southern Rhodesia as a whole.

664. The representative of the USSR said that his delegation had voted for the draft resolution, notwithstanding its inadequacy in not encompassing all aspects of the problem. Measures should be taken for the speedy liquidation of this threatening situation, including the application of sanctions under Chapter VII of the Charter. The Council should resolutely condemn the Governments which had sabotaged the previous resolutions, and in the first instance, those of Portugal and South Africa. The USSR shared the demand that the racist clique of Salisbury be condemned. The policy followed in Southern Rhodesia by the United Kingdom, which had been unwilling to support the draft resolution, was inimical to the interests of peace and security. That country, the United States and their NATO allies supported the racists in Salisbury. The United Kingdom, the United States and the other Western Powers had voted against those provisions of the draft of the African Powers which in substance repeated earlier decisions of the Council or were direct consequences of Security Council decisions which had not yet been implemented. They had used the veiled veto, but could not conceal the fact that they had shown

no concern for the Zimbabwe people, and had laid down an open challenge to the people of Africa. The Western Powers had voted against the granting of independence and freedom to the people of Zimbabwe.

665. The representative of France said that he understood why the representatives of Nigeria and Mali had spoken as they had. However, the solution of that painful problem was not to be found in New York.

666. The representative of the United States said that it was highly inaccurate to assert that by abstaining on the draft resolution, those doing so had voted against previous resolutions of the Council. The African delegations had asked that the resolution be voted upon as a whole. The United States delegation did not agree with that position, but had respected the views of those maintaining it. The previous decisions of the Council remained in effect. The African members had been motivated by deep concern for the people of Southern Rhodesia, but he did not consider that all those voting for the resolution had been, as could be seen from the Soviet statement. The United Kingdom should pursue all possibilities for a peaceful settlement and the Council should follow the talks to see if they gave promise of a just solution of the problem.

667. The representative of Bulgaria said that it was not by half-way measures or talks with the racist régime that the rights of the Zimbabwe people would be restored. Effective action was the aim of the African draft resolution. The chief concern of some Governments seemed to be to meet the needs and claims of the white minority. Bulgaria had always supported every effort directed towards removing the colonial yoke.

668. The President, speaking as representative of the Netherlands, said that his delegation, considering that the time was inopportune for a vote on the draft resolution, had had no choice but to abstain. That did not indicate or prejudice its position with regard to the substance of the various provisions in the text.

Chapter 6

LETTER DATED 31 JANUARY 1966 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

A. Communications received between 30 July 1965 and 31 January 1966

669. In a letter dated 30 July 1965 (S/6575 and Corr.1) addressed to the President of the Security Council, the representative of the United States recalled the announcement made by the President of the United States on 28 July that steps were being taken by his Government to lend further assistance to the Republic of Viet-Nam in resisting armed aggression. At the same time, the President had reaffirmed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations the willingness of the United States to enter into negotiations on the question of Viet-Nam for its peaceful settlement without preconditions and he had again invited all Members of the Organization to use their influence to bring about discussions in a negotiating forum.

670. In his letter of 30 July 1965, the United States representative, recalling the efforts made by his Government in the last four and a half years to resolve the

issues in South-East Asia by peaceful negotiations, stated that unfortunately, none of the initiatives taken on at least fifteen occasions had met with any favourable response whatever. He also noted it was especially unfortunate that North Viet-Nam had denied the competence of the United Nations to concern itself with the question in any manner and had even refused to participate in Council discussions. The United States wished to re-emphasize that it would continue to provide assistance to the people of the Republic of Viet-Nam in defending their independence and sovereignty, to assist in the economic and social advancement of South-East Asia, and to explore, alone and jointly with others, all possible routes to an honourable and durable peace in South-East Asia, and that it stood ready to collaborate unconditionally with members of the Security Council in the search for an acceptable formula to restore peace and security in that area.

671. On 4 January 1966, the representative of the United States stated in a letter addressed to the

Secretary-General (S/7067) that during the last two weeks his Government had taken a number of steps in pursuit of peace, in part in response to the appeals addressed to it before Christmas by His Holiness the Pope and by the Secretary-General. President Johnson had dispatched messages or personal representatives to his Holiness the Pope, to the Secretary-General and to a considerable number of Chiefs of State or Heads of Government. The bombing of North Viet-Nam had not been resumed since the Christmas truce.

672. In the messages conveyed to a number of Governments, the United States had declared that it was prepared for discussions or negotiations without any prior conditions or on the basis of the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962; that a reciprocal reduction of hostilities could be envisaged and a cease-fire could be the first order of business in any negotiations; that it was ready to withdraw its forces from South Viet-Nam once the latter was in a position to determine its own future without external interference; that the United States desired no continuing military presence or bases in Viet-Nam; and that the question of the reunification of the two Viet-Nams should be decided by the free decision of their two peoples. The United States representative concluded his letter by urging organs of the United Nations and all States to give more thought to what they might do to help restore peace and security to Viet-Nam.

673. In a letter dated 31 January 1966 (S/7105), the representative of the United States requested the President of the Security Council to call an urgent meeting of the Council to consider the situation in Viet-Nam. He recalled previous appeals from the United States—President Johnson's letter to the Secretary-General of 28 July 1965, and his own letters of 30 July 1965, and 4 January 1966, addressed, respectively, to the President of the Council and the Secretary-General—for whatever help the Council and its members or any other United Nations organ might give in ending the Viet-Nam conflict. He also noted that the United States, because it had been advised that a pause in the bombing of North Viet-Nam might contribute to the latter's acceptance of the offer of unconditional negotiations, had suspended the bombing for thirty-seven days, had communicated its views to a very large number of Governments, and that those views had been transmitted both directly and indirectly to the Government of North Viet-Nam and received by that Government.

674. Not only had there been no affirmative response from Hanoi, but on 28 January Hanoi had broadcast a message addressed by President Ho Chi Minh to certain Heads of State which made quite clear his unwillingness to proceed with unconditional negotiations and his insistence on a number of preconditions which, if assented to, would have amounted to an acceptance of Hanoi's solution before negotiations had ever begun.

675. The United States Government had therefore concluded that it should now bring the problem formally before the Council, in the light of the latter's obligations under the Charter to maintain international peace and in view of the failure so far of all efforts outside the United Nations to restore peace.

676. On the same day, the United States representative submitted a draft resolution (S/7106), which read as follows:

"The Security Council,

"Deeply concerned at the continuation of hostilities in Viet Nam,

"Mindful of its responsibilities for the maintenance of international peace and security,

"Noting that the provisions of the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962 have not been implemented,

"Desirous of contributing to a peaceful and honourable settlement of the conflict in Viet-Nam,

"Recognizing the right of all peoples, including those in Viet-Nam to self-determination,

"1. Calls for immediate discussions without preconditions at — on — date, among the appropriate interested Governments to arrange a conference looking towards the application of the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962 and the establishment of a durable peace in South-East Asia;

"2. Recommends that the first order of business of such a conference be arrangements for a cessation of hostilities under effective supervision;

"3. Offers to assist in achieving the purposes of this resolution by all appropriate means, including the provision of arbitrators or mediators;

"4. Calls on all concerned to co-operate fully in the implementation of this resolution;

"5. Requests the Secretary-General to assist as appropriate in the implementation of this resolution."

B. Consideration at the 1271st to 1273rd meetings (1-2 February 1966)

677. At the 1271st meeting, held on 1 February 1966, the question was placed on the Council's provisional agenda. The representative of the United States of America declared that his Government's recourse to the Security Council signalled not the end but a new dimension to the peace offensive in which the United States had been engaged, and that it arose from the urgency of finding a way to end the fighting in Viet-Nam, the failure of every other effort to bring about negotiations, and the primacy of the Council's responsibility for maintaining peace and security. While unflinching in its determination to resist aggression and especially to put an end to the flagrant violation of the provisions of the Geneva Accords by North Viet-Nam, which, aided by Peiping, had led, equipped and sustained the fighting in the South, his Government had never lost sight of the need for a peaceful settlement. To that end, the United States had, in 1965, made repeated appeals for whatever help the United Nations, collectively or individually through any of its organs, including the Secretary-General, might provide in bringing about unconditional discussions and negotiations for an acceptable formula to restore peace in Viet-Nam. The United States through President Johnson, had proposed "unconditional discussions" on the Viet-Nam situation. It had supported and encouraged a British proposal that the United Kingdom and the USSR, as co-chairmen of the Geneva Conferences, explore the possible basis for a Viet-Name settlement with all the Geneva Conference countries, responded affirmatively to an appeal for "negotiations without preconditions" from seventeen non-aligned nations; showed sympathetic interest in an Indian proposal for a cessation of hostilities and the policing of the border between North and South Viet-Nam by an Afro-Asian force; and in, mid-May, had undertaken a brief pause in the aerial attacks against military targets in North Viet-Nam,

making the purpose of that action known to North Viet-Nam. Despite all those efforts, neither Hanoi nor Peiping had shown any sign that they desired to move the problem to the conference table. Nevertheless, the United States had persevered in its quest for peace, and had once more suspended the bombing of North Viet-Nam on 24 December 1965 in spite of Hanoi's intransigence both in words and in action.

678. The purpose of that suspension, which had lasted thirty-seven days, had been to ascertain whether the bombing was in fact a decisive barrier to negotiations and whether Hanoi also desired to reduce the range of armed conflict and to bring about a peaceful settlement.

679. During the suspension, the United States Government had consulted with more than 115 Governments and had explained its objectives to Hanoi before the suspension was one week old. Unfortunately, its restraint and patience had gone unrewarded. Infiltrations of men and *matériel* from the North to the South went on at a high level; acts of violence in South Viet-Nam had continued at the record high levels set just before the suspension.

680. Finally on 29 January, Hanoi had made public a letter addressed by President Ho Chi Minh to certain Heads of State or Government in which three preconditions for negotiations were laid down: that the United States must accept the four-point stand of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam (DRV); that the United States must end unconditionally and for good all bombing raids and other war acts against the DRV; that the United States must recognize the National Front for the Liberation of South Viet-Nam as the sole genuine representative of the people of South Viet-Nam.

681. In exchange for those demands, President Ho Chi Minh offered nothing. In short, he rejected flatly the two objectives which the United States had sought to achieve by the prolonged suspension of its bombings; a move toward negotiations and a reciprocal reduction of hostilities. But the United States wanted to go on seeking a forum which would permit the beginning of negotiations. Its views on the elements of such a formula had already been stated in its letter of 4 January 1966 to the Secretary-General. On the other hand, President Johnson had said on 12 January 1966 that the United States would meet at any conference table, discuss any proposals and consider the views of any group. The United States had brought the Viet-Nam situation before the Council, the principal organ of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace, to give it the formal opportunity to see whether it could find a new formula which would succeed where others had failed.

682. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics objected to the convening of the Security Council and to the inclusion of the question of Viet-Nam in the agenda, since the latter should be settled only within the framework of the Geneva Accords. Moreover, by bringing that question to the Council simultaneously with the resumption of its barbaric air raids on the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, the United States had resorted to a diversionary tactic with a view to covering the expansion of its aggressive war and to using the Council to stage a propaganda show. In fact, the United States was unwilling to revert to strict compliance with the Geneva Accords of 1954 since it refused to recognize that the National Liberation Front was the sole genuine representative of the South

Viet-Nam people with whom to negotiate. While the United States continued to act in the question of Viet-Nam from a position of brute force, the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam had again recently demonstrated its readiness to achieve a just settlement by sending messages to the Heads of State or Government of many countries stating that if the Government of the United States was genuinely interested in peaceful settlement, it must recognize the four points of the position taken by the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and stop unconditionally and definitively the bombing and all other military acts against the territory of the latter.

683. But the United States had resumed its bombings two days after these messages were sent out. On 31 January, the Soviet Government had declared that such behaviour showed that the United States did not want the war to end and that the so-called peace initiative was really intended to prepare the ground for a further escalation of the war.

684. The representative of the United Kingdom supported the United States Government's action in bringing the question to the Security Council. His Government had hoped that the North Viet-Namese would take advantage of the suspension of bombing to respond to repeated United States efforts to negotiate, but the North Viet-Namese still refused and, in consequence, the British Government understood and supported the decision of the United States Government to resume the bombing which they had suspended in the hope of reaching a peaceful settlement.

685. The representative of France stated that the United Nations, where only one of the principal parties concerned was represented, did not constitute the proper forum in which to achieve a peaceful solution. Even if the other parties were invited, the discussion could not be held on an equal footing. It might even be disputed that the United Nations was empowered to discuss a question which had formerly been settled within the framework of the Geneva Conference, and which remained within the competence thereof. Moreover, the intervention of the United Nations would only add to the existing confusion as all parties to the conflict constantly referred to the need for respecting the principles of the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962. France would therefore not support the inclusion of the question of Viet-Nam in the agenda.

686. The representative of Mali, while not disputing the right of the United States to call for a meeting of the Security Council, felt that a discussion of the question of Viet-Nam in the Council was not appropriate in the present context. With the exception of the United States, all the other parties concerned not only were not Members of the Organization, but had explicitly expressed their opposition to any discussion of the question in the United Nations. On the other hand, the resumption of the bombing by the United States and the simultaneous convening of the Security Council did not seem to be good strategy or to constitute the best way to a lasting solution of the Viet-Nam tragedy. Because of the existence of the Geneva Agreements, the inclusion of the item in the Council's agenda would have political and juridical implications whose examination would necessitate some time. For all those reasons, he would oppose the examination of the question by the Council at that stage.

687. The representative of Nigeria stated that since the Council had the primary responsibility for the main-

tenance of international peace and security, his country would never condemn the United States for bringing to the notice of the Council a matter which was a threat to or already a violation of international peace. He wondered, however, whether this was the right time to take up that question, and felt that it was unfortunate that the United States had deemed it necessary to resume the bombing of North Viet-Nam. In his view, the question of South-East Asia revolved around the question of the People's Republic of China, and it was regrettable that the latter was not a Member of the United Nations. He declared that Nigeria would abstain from voting on the inclusion of the item in the agenda.

688. At the 1272nd meeting, on 1 February 1966, the representative of Uganda stated that he did not subscribe to the view that the Security Council was not the appropriate forum in which to consider the issue of Viet-Nam. In fact, that issue should have been brought before the Council long before the bombings of North Viet-Nam had ever begun, and before the United States had become deeply involved in Viet-Nam. But the Council could reach the right decision only by hearing direct evidence from the four parties concerned, namely, the People's Republic of China, the National Liberation Front, the South Viet-Nameese people and the North Viet-Nameese people. Until he could be assured that an invitation would be extended by the Council to all the parties involved, he could not agree that any useful purpose would be served by including the item in the agenda. He wondered whether it would not be enough if, without pushing the issue to a vote, the President were to conclude the debate, summarizing it as best he could, and bringing out the points of agreement and of disagreement. The meeting would then be postponed and another venue agreed upon; perhaps it would be better for the matter to be referred to the Geneva venue.

689. The representative of Bulgaria said it remained his Government's position that the question of Viet-Nam should be discussed and settled within the framework of the Geneva Agreements of 1954.

690. It was interesting to note that the United States had never brought to the United Nations the question of whether it should or should not undertake an aggression or bombings. It had put the question only when the crime had already been committed because it knew very well that the Council would not have given it permission to resume the bombing. The reasons which determined his delegation's opposition to the inclusion of the matter in the Security Council's agenda were the same as those which had determined the convening of the Geneva Conference in 1954. Those reasons had been explained clearly by the Secretary-General at a press conference on 20 January 1966, when he had said that some of the parties primarily involved in the conflict were still not Members of the United Nations, and that that was the gravest impediment to any United Nations involvement in finding a peaceful solution to the Viet-Nam conflict.

691. As the Council could not discuss the problem in an effective manner and there were other forums in which, if it were really desired, the question could be dealt with, the representative of Bulgaria would oppose the inscription of the question on the agenda.

692. The representative of New Zealand stated that in spite of unparalleled diplomatic activity in search of peace over the past two months, there had not been the

slightest indication on the part of Hanoi or the National Liberation Front of their readiness to join in negotiations except on their own terms.

693. The United States, seeing that continued self-denial on the military front did not produce results on the diplomatic front, had found itself compelled to resume bombing, but had made clear that its objective remained the achievement of a political solution. This determination was expressed by its decision to place the question before the Council, which, however, should not necessarily be regarded as an appropriate vehicle for negotiation. Discussion in the Council, if approached in a constructive spirit, could open up new possibilities for an approach to this difficult problem.

694. The representative of Jordan proposed that the vote on the adoption of the agenda be postponed to a future date.

695. The representative of Argentina considered that the Security Council must face up to its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace when, as in the question of Viet-Nam, peace not only was endangered but had already been breached.

696. The representative of Uruguay expressed his support for the adoption of the agenda as his country had always defended the right of any State to turn to the Council as the highest body responsible for the maintenance of international peace.

697. The representative of the Netherlands felt that the Security Council would fail in the duty entrusted to it by the Charter if it refused even to put the question on the agenda. It had been said that not all the countries involved were Members of the United Nations, but that could not be a determining factor against discussion in the Council since, under Article 2, paragraph 6 of the Charter, the Organization was to ensure that States which were not Members of the United Nations should respect the principles of the Charter regarding the maintenance of international peace. His delegation had no objection to inviting the countries concerned, notably South Viet-Nam, North Viet-Nam and the People's Republic of China. Another objection raised to the inclusion of the question in the agenda was that the problem should be solved in the context not of the United Nations, but of the Geneva Conference of 1954. Basically his delegation could agree with that point of view, but that did not constitute a reason to object to the proposed discussion in the Security Council. The purpose of the discussion was not to resolve the problem within the context of the United Nations but to arrange a pre-conference looking towards the application of the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962.

698. The resumption of the bombings had also been referred to as a third objection since the situation created thereby was hardly propitious for fruitful debate. His delegation considered, on the contrary, that recent developments made it all the more necessary to discuss the subject. If events were allowed to run their course, a further escalation of the war seemed inevitable.

699. The representative of China was of the opinion that the Security Council would abdicate its primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace if it refused to include the item in its agenda. He objected to the point of view of those who contended that the item could not be considered in the absence of the Chinese Communists and stressed that their presence would only serve to make any solution of the Viet-Nam situation impossible.

700. The President, speaking as the representative of Japan, declared that his Government approved and supported the decision taken by the United States Government to bring the question of Viet-Nam to the Council as one of the means available in the search for a peaceful solution of the question.

701. The representative of the United States said that his Government would, of course, welcome the reconvening of the Geneva Conference. It should be noted, however, that a specific request made by the Government of the United Kingdom, one of the co-chairmen of the Conference, to the Government of the Soviet Union, the other co-chairman, had been rejected by the latter. The door to Geneva being momentarily closed, the question was whether the door to the United Nations should also be closed. The choice was not whether to deal with Viet-Nam in the Council or deal with it in Geneva, but whether to deal with it at all.

702. The fact that several of the parties to the conflict were not Members of the United Nations was no obstacle to their presenting their case, as they would be invited under Article 32 of the Charter to participate, without vote, in the discussions of the Council.

703. It had been asked why the United States had not brought the problem of Viet-Nam to the Council before. In that connexion the representative of the United States observed that his Government had brought an aspect of the problem—the Gulf of Tonkin incident—before the Council in 1964, and it was not its fault that the matter had not been fully explored. The United States did not expect the Council itself to solve the whole problem of Viet-Nam. What the United States was asking the Council to do was no different from what the non-aligned countries had sought in their appeal. It asked only that the Council lend its tremendous weight and prestige to solving the problem by calling for immediate discussions without preconditions among the appropriate interested Governments to arrange a conference looking towards the application of the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962. Public opinion almost everywhere considered the Viet-Nam situation the most serious threat to peace confronting mankind, so that what was at stake was how the world would judge the Council if it refused even to discuss the situation.

704. The representative of Mali supported a suggestion made by the representatives of Uganda and Jordan that no vote should be taken on the agenda in order to allow time for consultations to take place unofficially among the members of the Council with a view to trying to find an adequate formula which would facilitate negotiations in accordance with the Geneva Agreement.

705. The representative of Nigeria associated himself with the appeals made for a postponement of a vote on the agenda.

706. The representative of the USSR referred to an allusion made by the representative of the United States to the position of his country as a co-chairman of the Geneva Conference. The United States representative had resorted to a distortion of the actual state of affairs. It was sufficient to note that when the Geneva Accords were reached there was not a single American soldier in Viet-Nam while today there were hundreds of thousands.

707. The Soviet representative also called the attention of the Council to the reply sent by the Chairman of the Presidium of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Mr. Podgorny, to the message from President

Ho Chi Minh, which pointed out that the dispatch of American troops to South Viet-Nam, the use by them of napalm bombs against the population of South Viet-Nam, the bombing of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and the violation of its air space constituted acts of aggression and the flouting of the standards of international law and the Geneva Accords of 1954.

708. The Soviet Union would continue in future to assist the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam to strengthen its defences and to repel all aggression. As for the Soviet people, it supported the position of the Government of that country and the programme of the National Liberation Front.

709. The Soviet communication underlined that if the Government of the United States sought a peaceful settlement, it must recognize the justness of the four points set out by President Ho Chi Minh, and must for all time stop its bombings and other acts of aggression against the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam. Unfortunately, the resumption of the barbarous bombings in the North had revealed to the whole world the falsity of the so-called "peace offensive" of the United States.

Decision: *On the proposal of the representative of Jordan, the decision on the adoption of the agenda was postponed until 2 February, at 3 p.m.*

710. At the 1273rd meeting, on 2 February 1966, the representative of Jordan stated that he would support the adoption of the agenda since his delegation believed that the mere adoption of the agenda did not in any way prejudice the substance of or the principles involved in the issue.

711. The representative of the USSR reiterated that the settlement of the problem of Viet-Nam was possible only on the basis of strict and unconditional respect for the Geneva Accords of 1954 and called attention to the appeal of President Ho Chi Minh of 24 January in which he had stressed the fact that in 1954 the United States had given its solemn promise in Geneva to refrain from the violation of the 1954 Geneva Accords by means of the threat or use of force.

712. The primary purpose pursued by the United States in bringing the problem of Viet-Nam before the Council was to cover the true facts, especially its violation of the Geneva Accords, so as to enable it to evade its obligations under those Accords.

713. The Soviet representative mentioned a message published on 2 February 1966 by the National Liberation Front of South Viet-Nam stating that the Security Council had no right to take any decisions on questions involving South Viet-Nam and that it would regard as null and void all Council resolutions on that issue. A settlement of the problem, he emphasized, must be based on the Geneva Accords and be achieved with the participation of all the interested parties, including the National Liberation Front.

714. The so-called pause in the bombings on the part of the United States in North Viet-Nam had been nothing but a bluff. By staging a propaganda farce in the Council and trying to obtain some sort of justification which would allow it to hide behind the authority and prestige of the Organization, the United States wished to obtain a blank cheque to extend further its aggressive war in Viet-Nam.

715. The representative of the United States said that the Soviet representative had omitted a part of the statement made by the United States at Geneva

in 1954, in which it had stated that it would view any renewal of the aggression in violation of the aforesaid agreements with grave concern and as seriously threatening international peace and security. Moreover, the United States rejected completely the Soviet contention that it had violated the Geneva Accords. In fact, the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Viet-Nam had stated in its Special Report of 2 June 1962 to the co-chairmen of the Geneva Conference that it had come to the conclusion that, in specific instances, there was evidence to show that armed and unarmed personnel, arms, munitions and other supplies had been sent from the North to the South, and that the zone in the North had been used for inciting and supporting activities in the South aimed at the overthrow of the Government in the South. Such actions constituted violations of articles 10, 19, 24 and 27 of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Viet-Nam. One of the purposes of the United States in coming to the Council was not to conceal facts but to expose what the real facts were.

716. The representative of the USSR observed that the attempt made by the United States representative to whitewash American aggression merely confirmed that it was precisely the United States that was most flagrantly flouting the Geneva Accords. The United States armed forces now on the territory of South Viet-Nam were trying to repress in a bloody operation a people that had risen in defense of the freedom and independence of Viet-Nam.

Decision: *The agenda was adopted by 9 votes (Argentina, China, Japan, Jordan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, United Kingdom, United States and Uruguay) to 2 (Bulgaria, the USSR), with 4 abstentions (France, Mali, Nigeria and Uganda).*

Decision: *At the end of the 1273rd meeting, at the suggestion of the President, the Council decided in the absence of any objection that informal and private consultations would be held in order to decide on the most effective and appropriate ways of continuing the debate in the future.*

C. Subsequent communications

717. On 26 February 1966, the President of the Council transmitted to the Secretary-General (S/7168) the text of a letter he had sent to the members of the Council reporting that the informal consultations envisaged by the Council in its decision of 2 February had been held. Serious differences remained unsolved, especially as to whether consideration of the problem of Viet-Nam in the forum of the Council would be useful under the circumstances. Some members, in conformity with the position they had taken during the debate, had not participated in the consultations. These differences of view had given rise to the feeling that it would be inopportune for the Council to hold a further debate at the time and that a report in the form of a letter appeared preferable to a formal meeting of the Council. The President felt that he could detect a certain degree of common feeling among many members of the Council. There was general grave concern and growing anxiety over the continuation of hostilities in Viet-Nam and a strong desire for the early cessation of hostilities and a peaceful solution of the Viet-Nam problem. There appeared also to be a feeling that the termination of the conflict in Viet-Nam should be sought through negotiations in an appropriate forum in order to work out the implementation of the Geneva Accords. Meanwhile, the

President concluded, the Security Council remained seized of the Viet-Nam problem.

718. In a letter of 28 February 1966 addressed to the President of the Council (S/7173), the representative of France stated that there had been no substantive discussion in the Council and that informal and private consultations clearly could not take the place of such discussions. Therefore, no conclusion should be put forward regarding the feeling of the Council or of any of its members.

719. On 1 March 1966, the representative of the USSR addressed a letter to the President of the Council (S/7175) in which he stated that the action taken by the latter aroused strong objections since the Council had not instructed its President to make any statements and he had therefore had no right to send such a letter in his capacity as President of the Security Council. This action of the President went beyond the limits of his competence and violated the Security Council's rules of procedure. It could only be regarded as a blatant attempt to support the manoeuvre of the United States. The USSR therefore considered that the President's statement was illegal and had no legal force whatsoever.

720. In a letter to the President of the Council dated 3 March (S/7174) the representative of Bulgaria noted that since no substantive debate had taken place in the Council and since the problem could not be solved within the United Nations, the Council had not authorized its President to draw conclusions or sum up the feeling of its members in an official document. The Bulgarian delegation considered it necessary to send back the letter addressed to it by the President on 26 February.

721. In a letter of 2 March addressed to the President of the Council (S/7176/Rev.1) the representative of Mali declared that he wished to enter the most express reservations regarding both the principle and the motives of the letter dated 26 February 1966 from the President of the Council, especially in view of the fact that the meetings held on 1 and 2 February had been devoted to procedural discussions relating solely to the adoption of the agenda. As no discussion had been held on the question, there could be no grounds for discussing any conclusions. The communication dated 26 February 1966 could not constitute a valid precedent in the practice of the Council.

722. On 30 June 1966, the representative of the United States informed the President of the Security Council (S/7391) that his Government had been required to take further steps to counter and limit the increased intensity of North Viet-Nam's aggression against the Republic of Viet-Nam. In view of a substantial increase in the level of infiltration of armed men and war supplies from North Viet-Nam into South Viet-Nam, the United States had felt compelled to send its aircraft to attack the largest petroleum facilities in North Viet-Nam, i.e., those located near Hanoi and Haiphong, since petroleum products had been a key factor in the increased infiltration from the North. Further evidence of this could be found in the construction by North Viet-Nam, often outside its own borders, of new routes and the improvement of existing ones, permitting infiltration by truck into South Viet-Nam in all types of weather.

723. Every effort had been made to prevent harm to civilians and avoid destruction of non-military facilities.

724. It was a tragedy that repeated efforts to open negotiations had been answered from North Viet-Nam by an increase in the tempo of its military build-up and operations.

725. The United States objectives in Viet-Nam were limited: it did not seek to change or destroy the Government of North Viet-Nam or its people; it did not wish to turn South Viet-Nam into a permanent ally of the West; nor did it seek to establish permanent military bases there. It sought only to afford the people of South Viet-Nam the opportunity to shape their own destiny free of coercion.

726. The United States had learned from two aerial bombing pauses that it was not enough to stop the bombing over North Viet-Nam while other military operations continued. It was the war, not just the bombing, that should come to an end.

727. In identical letters dated 11 July 1966 (S/7401, S/7402 and S/7403) addressed to the President of the Security Council, the representatives of the USSR, of the Byelorussian SSR and of the Ukrainian SSR, pointed out, with reference to the letter dated 30 June from the representative of the United States, that the Government of the United States had embarked on a course of expanding the shameful war against the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and the Viet-Nameese people as a whole. It was intensifying the publicity campaign about its desire for a "peaceful settlement" at the very moment when, by carrying out barbaric

bombing attacks on the Hanoi and Haiphong areas, it had expanded its aggression in Viet-Nam and utterly exposed its real objectives.

728. These representatives resolutely condemned the aggressive actions of the United States in Viet-Nam and stressed that the way to peace in that country lay through the cessation of United States aggression and intervention in the internal affairs of the Viet-Nameese people.

729. In a letter dated 12 July, addressed to the President of the Council (S/7407), the representative of Bulgaria, referring to the communication of the United States representative of 30 June, stated that it constituted a new manoeuvre using hypocritical declarations in favour of peace with a view to covering and justifying the expansion of the war in Viet-Nam. The recent air raids on Hanoi and Haiphong proved once more the flagrant violation of the 1954 Geneva Agreements by the United States.

730. The only way for the United States to prevent a major disaster was not to send such "explanatory" letters but, *inter alia*, to put an end to its aggressive war, stop the air raids in the North, and withdraw its forces from the South.

731. In the four above-mentioned communications, the representatives of the USSR, the Byelorussian SSR, the Ukrainian SSR and Bulgaria stated that they were returning the letter of the United States representative dated 30 June which had been circulated as a Security Council document.

Part II

OTHER MATTERS CONSIDERED BY THE COUNCIL

Chapter 7

ADMISSION OF NEW MEMBERS TO THE UNITED NATIONS

A. Application of the Maldives Islands

732. In a letter dated 1 September 1965 (S/6645), the Prime Minister of the Maldives Islands submitted the application of the Maldives Islands for admission to membership in the United Nations, together with a declaration, signed by the Prime Minister of the Maldives Islands, accepting the obligations contained in the Charter of the United Nations.

733. The Security Council considered the application of the Maldives Islands at its 1243rd meeting, on 20 September 1965. The following draft resolution was submitted by Jordan, Malaysia and the United Kingdom (S/6695):

"The Security Council,

"Having examined the application of the Maldives Islands for admission to the United Nations,

"Recommends to the General Assembly that the Maldives Islands be admitted to membership in the United Nations."

734. Following statements by all its members, in which the representatives of France and the United States mentioned the possibility that the Council might wish to make use of rule 59 of the provisional rules of procedure in the future, the Council voted on the joint draft resolution.

Decision: *At the 1243rd meeting, on 20 September 1965, the draft resolution (S/6695) was adopted unanimously (resolution 212 (1965)).*

B. Application of Singapore

735. In a telegram dated 2 September 1965 (S/6648), the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Singapore submitted the application of Singapore for admission to membership in the United Nations, together with a declaration signed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Singapore, accepting the obligations contained in the Charter of the United Nations.

736. The Security Council considered the application of Singapore at its 1243rd meeting on 20 September 1965. The following draft resolution was submitted by the Ivory Coast, Jordan, Malaysia and the United Kingdom (S/6696):

"The Security Council,

"Having examined the application of Singapore for admission to the United Nations,

"Recommends to the General Assembly that Singapore be admitted to membership in the United Nations."

737. Following statements by all its members, the Council voted on the joint draft resolution.

Decision: *At the 1243rd meeting, on 20 September 1965, the draft resolution (S/6696) was adopted unanimously (resolution 213 (1965)).*

C. Application of Guyana

738. In a telegram dated 4 June 1966 (S/7341) followed by a letter dated 4 June 1966 (S/7349), the Prime Minister of Guyana submitted the application of Guyana for admission to membership in the United Nations, together with a declaration, signed by the Prime Minister, accepting the obligations contained in the Charter of the United Nations.

739. The Security Council considered the application of Guyana at its 1287th meeting on 21 June 1966. The following draft resolution was submitted by Argentina, New Zealand, Nigeria, Uganda, United Kingdom and Uruguay (S/7361):

"The Security Council,

"Having examined the application of Guyana for admission to the United Nations,

"Recommends to the General Assembly that Guyana be admitted to membership in the United Nations."

740. In the course of the debate, the representative of Venezuela, who had been granted permission to attend the meeting of the Council and participated, without vote, in the consideration of the application, made a statement.

741. Following statements by the members, the Council voted on the joint draft resolution.

Decision: *At the 1243rd meeting, on 20 September 1965, the draft resolution (S/7361) was adopted unanimously (resolution 223 (1966)).*

ELECTION OF MEMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

A. Date of election to fill a vacancy in the International Court of Justice

742. At the 1236th meeting held on 10 August 1965, the Security Council, in resolution 208 (1965), noted that a vacancy in the International Court of Justice had occurred as a result of the death on 4 August 1965 of Judge Abdel Hamid Badawi. In accordance with the provisions of article 14 of the Statute of the Court, the Council decided that an election to fill the vacancy for the remainder of Judge Badawi's term, namely, until 5 February 1967, should take place during the twentieth session of the General Assembly.

B. Election to fill a vacancy in the International Court of Justice

743. Pursuant to the decision taken in resolution 208 (1965) of 10 August 1965, preparations were made for the Security Council and the General As-

sembly to proceed with the election of a member of the International Court of Justice during the twentieth session of the General Assembly. On 22 October, the Secretary-General circulated to the Security Council and to the General Assembly a list (S/6817) of candidates nominated by national groups for the election to fill the vacancy caused by the death of Judge Badawi. Addenda were circulated on 12, 15 and 16 November (S/6817/Add.1-3) and a Note on the subject from Syria was circulated on 15 November (S/6937).

744. In the voting in the Security Council at the 1262nd meeting on 16 November, Mr. Fouad Ammoun (Lebanon) received 11 votes. On the same day in the General Assembly, Mr. Ammoun also received a majority of votes at the 1378th plenary meeting, and the President declared that, having received the required majority both in the Security Council and in the General Assembly, Mr. Ammoun had been elected to fill the vacant seat in the International Court of Justice.

Part III

THE MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE

Chapter 9

WORK OF THE MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE

745. The Military Staff Committee has been functioning continuously under the draft rules of procedure during the period under review and has held a total of twenty-six meetings without considering matters of substance.

Part IV

MATTERS BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL BUT NOT DISCUSSED IN THE COUNCIL DURING THE PERIOD COVERED

Chapter 10

COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

746. In a letter dated 2 August 1965, addressed to the Secretary-General (S/6589), the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that the payment of \$1.5 million to the Belgian Government by the United Nations Secretariat on behalf of the United Nations, in settlement of claims by Belgian citizens for the losses they had allegedly suffered as a result of the actions of United Nations forces, was unlawful and contrary to decisions taken by the United Nations. Belgium had committed aggression against the Congo and, as the aggressor, had neither moral nor legal grounds for making claims against the United Nations either on its own behalf or on behalf of its nationals. Belgium was responsible to the Congo and to the United Nations for its aggression against the Congo and the consequences thereof, and not vice versa. The United Nations Secretariat had no right in this case to enter into any agreement whatever on behalf of the United Nations concerning the payment of compensation without being empowered to do so by the Security Council.

747. The Belgian Government had failed to implement the Security Council's resolutions of 12 and 22 July and 9 August 1960 on the immediate withdrawal of Belgian troops from the territory of the Congo, and in November 1964 it had committed a fresh act of aggression in dropping its paratroopers on the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

748. In these circumstances, the payment by the United Nations Secretariat of compensation to the Belgian Government for so-called damages caused by United Nations forces to Belgian nationals in the Congo could only be regarded as encouragement to the aggressor, a sort of bonus for highway robbery. In accordance with the generally recognized rules of international law on the aggressor's responsibility for aggression committed by him, the Belgian Government, and no one else, must bear full moral and material responsibility for all consequences of its aggression against

the Congo. The delegation of the USSR to the United Nations declared that it expected the Secretary-General to take immediate measures to annul the above-mentioned agreement concerning compensation concluded by the United Nations Secretariat.

749. In a reply to the Soviet representative dated 6 August (S/6597), the Secretary-General pointed out that it had always been the policy of the United Nations, acting through the Secretary-General, to compensate individuals, whether Belgian citizens or individuals of other nationalities, who had suffered damages for which the Organization was legally liable. Such a policy was in keeping with generally recognized legal principles, with the Convention on Privileges and Immunities, with the international conventions concerning the protection of the life and property of civilian populations during hostilities, and with the considerations of equity and humanity. Claims for damages due solely to military operations, as well as claims for damages caused by persons other than United Nations personnel had been excluded. The claims had been investigated by the competent services of ONUC and at United Nations Headquarters. Of approximately 1,400 claims submitted by Belgian nationals, the United Nations had accepted only 581.

750. It had been found practically and legally advantageous that the payment be effected to the claimants through their Government. The Belgian Government had agreed and a lump sum compensation of \$1.5 million had been paid by offsetting it against Belgium's unpaid ONUC assessments amounting to about \$3.2 million. Similar arrangements, covering about 300 unsettled claims, had been discussed with the Governments of other countries. The Secretary-General had acted in his capacity as chief administrative officer of the United Nations in accordance with the established practice of the United Nations under which claims of private individuals were considered and settled under the authority of the Secretary-General.

Chapter 11

THE QUESTION OF RACE CONFLICT IN SOUTH AFRICA RESULTING FROM THE POLICIES OF APARTHEID OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

A. Report of 10 August 1965 by the Special Committee on the Policies of apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa

751. On 10 August 1965, the Special Committee on the Policies of apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa transmitted to the Security Council and the General Assembly a report (S/6605)

in which it reviewed the developments in the Republic of South Africa since its report of 30 November 1964, analysed the main elements of the situation in South Africa, stressed the need for urgent and decisive international measures, and transmitted a number of recommendations.

752. The Special Committee stated that the failure of competent United Nations organs to take appropriate

measures over the years, particularly since the Sharpeville massacre and the Security Council resolution of 1 April 1960, had led to continuous and rapid aggravation of the situation in South Africa. The developments of the past year showed that the South African Government had been emboldened to continue on its disastrous course by: (a) the failure of the General Assembly during the first part of the nineteenth session to consider the situation in South Africa, and the feeling that the United Nations had become weaker; (b) international developments which had given the impression that attention had been diverted from the situation in South Africa and that the great Powers were unlikely to agree on concerted action to resolve the situation in South Africa; and (c) the impression in South Africa that the report of the Expert Committee of the Security Council reflected little likelihood of effective economic sanctions in the near future because of the continued opposition of certain great Powers and major trading partners.

753. The Special Committee, therefore, considered that action under Chapter VII of the Charter, with the full co-operation of all the permanent members of the Security Council and the major trading partners of South Africa, was indispensable to reverse the tragic course of events and move towards a solution.

754. The Special Committee reaffirmed its recommendation that the General Assembly and the Security Council recognize that the situation in the Republic of South Africa constitutes a serious threat to the peace, calling for mandatory measures provided in Chapter VII of the Charter and that economic sanctions were the only effective means for a peaceful solution of the situation. It reiterated its recommendation for total economic sanctions against the Republic of South Africa, until the South African Government agreed to comply with its obligations under the Charter. To be fully effective, such sanctions should be decided on by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter and their full implementation by all States ensued.

755. Without prejudice to such decisive action, the Special Committee recommended a series of partial measures worthy of urgent consideration by States designed to ensure compliance by the South African Government with certain minimum, but vital, demands, in order to prevent an aggravation of the situation. Such measures should include full implementation, without restrictive and unilateral interpretation, of the Council's decisions calling for cessation of the sale and shipment to South Africa of arms and of equipment and materials for the manufacture and maintenance of arms and ammunition in South Africa. Also recommended was cessation of the export of aircraft and naval craft together with machinery for their manufacture, and of all forms of military co-operation with South Africa; prohibition of investment in or technical assistance for armaments manufacture and the petroleum industry, and the emigration of technical personnel to assist in the development of such industries; review of all agreements with South Africa for military bases, space-tracking facilities, import and export quotas and preferential tariff arrangements; recall of chiefs of diplomatic consular missions; and the grant of the right of asylum to refugees from South Africa.

756. The Special Committee further recommended certain additional specific measures, along with a declaration of determination to impose total economic sanc-

tions if necessary, to persuade the South African Government to abandon its policies and comply with the resolutions adopted by the Security Council and the General Assembly. Included in these measures were recommendations for States to prohibit or discourage investments, loans or credit to South African companies; to deny facilities for ships and planes touching at South Africa; to prohibit or discourage emigration to that country; to bar petroleum and its products to South Africa and prohibit any assistance for its production within the country; to prohibit trade with South Africa in rubber, chemicals, minerals and other raw materials; and to deny any assistance for the manufacture of motor vehicles and rolling stock in the Republic.

757. In connexion with those recommendations, the Special Committee further recommended that the Security Council and the General Assembly commend States which had taken effective measures to implement their decisions, invite all other States to take such action and report without delay, and express regret at the actions of States which had acted contrary to those decisions.

758. Other matters dealt with in the Special Committee's report included a recommendation for the establishment of a United Nations trust fund to receive voluntary contributions, in cash and in kind, from States, organizations and individuals for the purpose of supplementing the efforts of voluntary organizations engaged in providing relief and assistance for legal aid to the victims of repression because of their opposition to apartheid in South Africa, as well as relief for their dependants and assistance to refugees. Such humanitarian efforts, the Special Committee emphasized, should supplement and not be substituted for effective action to resolve the situation in South Africa. Moreover, the Special Committee urged various measures for the widest dissemination of information on the dangers of apartheid in order to keep world opinion informed and encouraged to support United Nations efforts to resolve the situation. It also reiterated its grave concern over the numerous charges of ill-treatment and torture of opponents of the policies of apartheid and its recommendation for an impartial international investigation of those charges.

759. The Special Committee stressed the need for full co-operation of the specialized agencies and regional and other inter-governmental organizations in assuring implementation of economic sanctions, and recommended that all international agencies take the necessary steps to deny economic and technical assistance to the South African Government, but without precluding humanitarian assistance to the victims of apartheid policies. Such agencies should be encouraged to consider positive, active and concerted measures to counteract apartheid, to render humanitarian assistance to its victims and to help disseminate information on its dangers and on United Nations efforts to resolve the situation.

B. Request for a meeting of the Security Council

760. By letter dated 28 July 1965 (S/6584), the representatives of Algeria, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Democratic Republic of), Dahomey, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, United

Arab Republic, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta and Zambia requested that the Security Council be convened as soon as possible to resume consideration of the situation resulting from the policy of apartheid of the Republic of South Africa.

761. By letter dated 15 October 1965 (S/6791), the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Liberia, Madagascar, Sierra Leone and Tunisia stated that they had been instructed by the Organization of African Unity to bring the question of apartheid in South Africa before the Security Council and requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council to discuss the question.

762. By letter dated 22 November 1965 (S/6964), the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the above four States requested that the consideration of the question be deferred to a later date in view of the serious situation then prevailing in Southern Rhodesia and the implications it would certainly have on the question of apartheid.

C. Resolution 2054 (XX) adopted by the General Assembly on 15 December 1965

763. By letter dated 10 January 1966 (S/7090), the Secretary-General transmitted to the Security Council the text of resolution 2054 (XX) adopted by the General Assembly on 15 December 1965 with regard to the policies of apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa. He drew the attention of the Security Council to operative paragraph 6 of part A of the resolution in which the General Assembly "draws the attention of the Security Council to the fact that the situation in South Africa constitutes a threat to international peace and security, that action under Chapter VII of the Charter is essential in order to solve the problem of apartheid and that universally applied economic sanctions are the only means of achieving a peaceful solution".

D. Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations programme for the education and training abroad of South Africans in pursuance of Security Council resolution 191 of 18 June 1964

764. On 9 November 1965, the Secretary-General submitted a report (S/6891) on the establishment of the United Nations Programme for the Education and Training abroad of South Africans in pursuance of resolution 191 of 18 June 1964, by which the Security Council had invited him "in consultation with appropriate United Nations specialized agencies to establish an educational and training programme for the purpose of arranging for education and training abroad for South Africans".

765. The Secretary-General reviewed the consultations he had held and the results of a survey of the relevant bilateral and non-governmental programmes for the education and training of South Africans abroad, the location and number of South Africans abroad who needed assistance to complete higher education and training or sought facilities for such education and training, the availability of facilities and the special problems involved in the placement of South Africans.

766. Meanwhile, pending the finalization of the programme, the Secretary-General had made arrangements for a limited number of fellowships and grants to be provided during the academic year 1965-66 for

education at the secondary and college level. For the financing of this limited programme, a sum of \$237,000 had been provided as voluntary contributions by Member States as follows: Denmark, \$37,000; Norway, \$25,000; Sweden, \$30,000; United Kingdom, \$70,000; and the United States, \$75,000. It was expected that between forty and fifty awards would be made in this programme for studies in the fields of teaching, law, general and specialized medicine, nursing, hospital administration, accountancy and book-keeping, physical and social sciences, etc.

767. The Secretary-General stated that he was now immediately establishing the United Nations Educational and Training Programme for South Africans, and anticipated that with the recruitment of the necessary staff and the availability of funds, the programme would be in full operation at the beginning of 1966. He considered it essential for the effectiveness of the programme that the plans should cover a reasonably long period, and an appeal would be sent soon to Member States for pledges and contributions towards a target of \$2 million for education and training and for the administrative costs of an initial three-year period.

768. The programme would be directed from United Nations Headquarters by a Director who would be responsible, under the guidance of the Secretary-General, for soliciting contributions, maintaining co-ordination with other United Nations educational and training programmes for Southern Africa and deciding policy matters.

769. Offices would be set up in Geneva and Lusaka for the administration of the programme. The Economic Commission for Africa would be invited to help ensure that maximum use was made of education and training possibilities in Africa and the services of the Resident Representatives and other United Nations field offices would be utilized as necessary. The programme would secure the close co-operation and active participation of the appropriate specialized agencies of the United Nations.

770. While many of the details of operation would have to be worked out on the basis of experience and the changing circumstances, the programme envisaged a many-sided effort, with the co-operation of specialized agencies and the support of numerous voluntary organizations, to implement the decision of the Security Council in the light of the report of the Group of Experts. The Secretary-General hoped that the programme would receive the financial and other support adequate to its objectives of enabling as many South Africans as possible to play a full part as quickly as possible in the political, economic and social advance of their country, and of showing, by positive action, the general international desire to assist the people of South Africa in their efforts to progress in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter.

E. Report of 27 June 1966 by the Special Committee

771. On 27 June 1966, the Special Committee on the Policies of apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa submitted a report (S/7387) to the Security Council and the General Assembly on the question of implementation of operative paragraph 3 of General Assembly resolution 2054 A (XX) of 15 December 1965. By this paragraph, the General Assembly had decided to enlarge the Special Committee

by the addition of six members, to be appointed by the President of the General Assembly on the basis of the following criteria:

"(a) Primary responsibility with regard to world trade;

"(b) Primary responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security;

"(c) Equitable geographical distribution."

772. In a letter dated 31 March 1966 addressed to the Secretary-General, the President of the twentieth session of the General Assembly had stated that the consultations with Member States had not produced the expected indications in order to select the six additional members of the Committee in keeping with the very precise requirements set forth in the resolution of the General Assembly. Under those circumstances he believed that there was no other choice left but to have the matter re-examined by the General Assembly at its next session.

773. The Special Committee, however, requested the President of the Assembly to make formal approaches to Member States concerned and to inform it of the results of those approaches. On 14 June 1966, the President of the twentieth session of the General Assembly indicated in a letter to the Secretary-General that he had made formal approaches as requested by the Special Committee and that he was still unable to designate the six additional members in accordance with the requirements of the General Assembly resolution, as fourteen of the nineteen Member States approached had stated their unwillingness to be designated as members of the Committee.

774. While commending the Soviet Union, which indicated its willingness to serve on the Committee and to co-operate in effective measures to end the policies of apartheid, the Special Committee considered that the

situation created by the responses of other Member States required examination by the General Assembly as indicated by the President of the twentieth session. The Special Committee had therefore decided to submit a special report to the General Assembly and the Security Council in order to enable all Member States to give due consideration to the matter and to facilitate appropriate discussions by the General Assembly. It considered that the refusal to participate in the Committee, particularly of the major trading partners, including three permanent members of the Security Council—France, the United Kingdom and the United States—which bore a special responsibility on questions pertaining to the maintenance of international peace and security, constituted a most disturbing precedent which could have grave implications. Such refusal, furthermore, seriously undermined the authority and prestige of the United Nations as an international forum for harmonizing the attitudes of Member States and for resolving international conflicts by peaceful means.

775. The Special Committee also considered that if the above attitude reflected a hostility by the Powers concerned to effective peaceful measures, as provided in Chapter VII of the Charter, to resolve the situation, they would bear a tremendous responsibility for the alternative of a violent conflict which could not but have the gravest repercussions on international peace and on the course of history. It therefore once again appealed to those Powers to reconsider their attitudes and facilitate effective peaceful action under the auspices of the United Nations. It expressed the hope that other Member States and world public opinion would persuade those Powers to take such a course.

776. Replies from the Member States approached by the President of the twentieth session of the General Assembly were annexed to the report of the Special Committee.

Chapter 12

COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING DEVELOPMENTS RELATING TO YEMEN

777. In a letter dated 26 July 1965 (S/6364), addressed to the President of the Security Council, the representative of the United Kingdom stated that since the Yemen air attack on the Territory of the Federation of South Arabia on 29 June there had been two further violations of the Federation's air space.

778. In a letter dated 30 July (S/6591), the representative of the Yemen Arab Republic denied that Yemeni planes had violated the air space of the Federation. His Government had notified the British authorities that as a result of the infiltration of an anti-revolutionary group coming from the British Protectorate of Beihan, a military operation had taken place in the area and two aircraft had been ordered to pursue the infiltrators, but the Yemeni forces had had clear orders not to cross the Beihan borders. The British Protectorate of Beihan had been used as a base for infiltration against the Yemen Arab Republic.

779. In a letter of 13 August addressed to the Secretary-General (S/6617), the representative of the United Kingdom said that while his Government welcomed the information that the Yemeni authorities had issued orders to their forces not to cross the border between Yemen and the Federation, the United Kingdom Government could not accept the

explanation of the Republican authorities for the 29 June incident. With regard to the allegation that British forces had bombarded Qatabah on 19 May and 1, 3, 12 and 13 July, the United Kingdom Government had made a full investigation of these alleged incidents which showed that no British or Federation forces fired across the border on any of the dates mentioned.

780. In a letter of 1 October (S/6733) the representative of Yemen charged that British aircraft had violated Yemeni air space on 4, 5, 9, 12 and 27 August and that British troops had opened fire against Yemeni territory.

781. In reply, the United Kingdom representative, in a letter dated 8 November (S/6887), stated that the Yemeni allegations had all been thoroughly investigated and that investigation had revealed that no British military aircraft could have been responsible for the alleged overflights of Yemeni territory and that no British forces or forces of the Federation had fired on Yemeni territory on 20 and 28 August. On 25 September, the letter added, artillery in Baidha had fired on Mukairas in the Federation of South Arabia. When further firing took place on 26 September, Federation forces had been compelled in self-defence to return the fire from the Yemen. Their fire had been aimed solely

at the guns firing against Federation territory and no British aircraft had overflown Yemeni territory on that date.

782. In a letter dated 29 November (S/6983), the representative of Yemen said that there had been fourteen new acts of aggression committed against his country. The Yemeni Government, in drawing the attention of the Security Council to this dangerous situation, reserved to itself the legitimate right of self-defence should the situation deteriorate or persist.

783. On 25 April 1966, the representative of Yemen addressed a letter to the President of the Security Council (S/7266) in which he complained that British war planes had violated the air space of the Yemen Arab Republic on 10, 20 and 25 March and on 20 April 1966, and that on 14 April the Yemeni town of Qatabah had been subjected to heavy British bombardment. The Government of the Yemen Arab Republic, the letter said, strongly protested the continuous British acts of provocation. British measures in Aden and in the occupied South of Yemen constituted flagrant violations of the United Nations Charter and of elementary rules of international law.

784. The Government of the Yemen Arab Republic reiterated its unswerving belief that the only remedy to this deteriorating situation was immediate and complete British withdrawal from occupied South Yemen. It reserved its full right, guaranteed by the Charter, to take whatever measures it deemed necessary for self-defence. The responsibility for any consequences resulting from British policies must be wholly shouldered by the British authorities.

785. The representative of the United Kingdom, in a letter dated 9 May (S/7284), stated that the Yemeni allegations would be fully investigated and the results would be conveyed to the Yemeni Republic authorities. There was no foundation for the Yemeni claims to the States of the Protectorate of South Arabia; these States were under the protection of the United Kingdom Government, which was responsible for their external relations. Moreover, it was the intention of the United Kingdom Government that South Arabia, including Aden, should become sovereign and independent by 1968. The attainment of early independence by the process of peaceful negotiation was being obstructed by violence and terrorism openly inspired and organized from outside South Arabia.

Chapter 13

COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING COMPLAINTS BY GREECE AGAINST TURKEY AND BY TURKEY AGAINST GREECE

786. During the period under review the Secretary-General received a series of communications from the representatives of Greece and Turkey.

787. Communications from the representative of Greece included the following: letters dated 15 July (S/6358), 16 and 19 August (S/6618, S/6619, S/6623); 11, 14, 25 and 29 September (S/6679, S/6684, S/6721, S/6729); 1, 12, 25 and 30 October 1965 (S/6732, S/6787, S/6830, S/6853); 8, 10, 12, 22 and 23 February 1966 (S/7129, S/7131, S/7137, S/7158, S/7165); 13 and 19 April (S/7255, S/7260); 6, 10, 17 and 30 May (S/7282, S/7287, S/7307, S/7329), 24 June (S/7383) and 12 July 1966 (S/7406) concerning the alleged violation of Greek air space by Turkish military aircraft; letters dated 24 September (S/6718) and 1 and 18 October 1965 (S/6734, S/6820) concerning the alleged mass deportation of Greeks from Turkey; letters dated 27 September (S/6723) and 13 October 1965 (S/6783) concerning the alleged measures taken by the Government of Turkey against the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Istanbul; a letter dated 4 November 1965 (S/6872) con-

cerning a statement made by the Prime Minister of Turkey; and letters dated 9 March (S/7193) and 12 and 23 May (S/7302, S/7318) and 11 July 1966 (S/7405) replying to complaints made in letters of Turkey.

788. Communications from the representative of Turkey included: letters dated 22 July 1965 (S/6551); 8 February (S/7125) and 12 and 27 April 1966 (S/7252, S/7269) on the alleged violation of Turkish air space by Greek military aircraft; letters dated 22 July 1965 (S/6550) and 3 May 1966 (S/7278) on the alleged violation of Turkish territorial waters by Greek craft; a letter dated 25 March 1966 concerning the alleged firing on a Turkish aircraft over the Greek frontier; and letters dated 14 July (S/6526), 29 September (S/6728), 7, 18 and 25 October (S/6758, S/6809, S/6831), 11 November 1965 (S/6914), 3 January (S/7065), 25 March (S/7224), 23 May (S/7317), 13 June (S/7368) and 5 and 11 July 1966 (S/7398, S/7404) replying to complaints made in letters of Greece.

Chapter 14

COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING THE QUESTION OF SOUTH WEST AFRICA

789. By a letter dated 21 July 1965 (S/6565), the Chairman of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples transmitted to the Security Council the text of a resolution adopted by the Special Committee on 17 June 1965. He drew the attention of the Council to operative paragraphs 5 and 6 of the resolution, by which the Special Committee "recommends to the General Assembly and the Security Council to take appro-

priate steps to safeguard the sovereignty of the people of South West Africa and the integrity of the Territory and to this end to take the necessary and concrete adequate measures in co-operation with the Organization of African Unity" and "draws the attention of the Security Council to the serious situation prevailing in South West Africa".

790. By a letter dated 13 January 1966 (S/7091) the Secretary-General transmitted to the Security Council the text of resolution 2074 (XX) concerning the

question of South West Africa adopted by the General Assembly on 17 December 1965. He drew attention to operative paragraph 13 of the resolution in which the General Assembly "requests the Security Council to keep watch over the critical situation prevailing in South West Africa" in the light of "the serious threat to international peace and security in that part of Africa, which has been further aggravated by the racist rebellion in Southern Rhodesia".

791. By a letter dated 14 June 1966 (S/7370), the Chairman of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples transmitted a resolution adopted by the Special Committee at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 9

June 1966. In operative paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of the resolution, the Special Committee drew the attention of the Security Council to the serious situation prevailing in South West Africa and its aggravation caused by the racist rebellion in Southern Rhodesia and its consequences for international peace and security; recommended that the Security Council make it obligatory for all States to implement the measures contained in General Assembly resolution 1899 (XVIII) of 13 November 1963 and in particular those mentioned in paragraph 7 thereof; and further recommended that the Security Council take the necessary measures to ensure the withdrawal of all military bases and installations from the Territory.

Chapter 15

COMMUNICATION CONCERNING THE QUESTION OF BASUTOLAND, BECHUANALAND AND SWAZILAND

792. By a letter dated 21 July 1965 (S/6566), the Chairman of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples transmitted to the Security Council the text of a resolution adopted by the Special Committee on 17 June 1965 on the question of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland. He referred in particular to the provisions of operative paragraphs 4 and 5 of the resolution by which the Committee "draws the attention of the Security Council to the threat to the territorial integrity of the Territories posed by the expansionist policy of the Government of the Republic of South Africa" and "recommends to the General Assembly and to the Security Council urgently to consider and initiate the measures necessary to ensure the territorial integrity of the Territories and the safeguarding of their sovereignty".

Chapter 16

COMMUNICATION CONCERNING RELATIONS BETWEEN HAITI AND THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

793. By a cable of 10 July 1965 addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/6533) and circulated to the Council on 16 July, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Haiti transmitted two notes sent by the Haitian Government to the Organization of American States and the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of American Ministers of Foreign Affairs calling attention to a serious threat from Dominican territory against the territorial integrity of Haiti. The Haitian Government stated that a number of persons claiming to be Haitians but having acquired the status of residents in the Dominican Republic were making preparations in the Barahona area to move towards the Haitian frontier with the intention of penetrating into Haiti. Among them were a nucleus of communist-indoctrinated shock elements. The Haitian Government requested the Meeting of Consultation to order a detailed study of the facts and to order such action to be taken, if the facts were verified, as would put an end to the Castroite communist plans for the subversion of Haiti.

Chapter 17

REPORTS ON THE STRATEGIC TRUST TERRITORY OF THE PACIFIC ISLANDS

794. On 3 August 1965, the Secretary-General transmitted to the Security Council the report of the Trusteeship Council (S/6490) on the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, covering the period from 30 June 1964 to 30 June 1965.

This report contained in an annex a statement made by the Secretary-General at the 1245th meeting of the Trusteeship Council on 28 May 1965.

795. On 27 May 1966, the Secretary-General transmitted to the members of the Council the report (S/7322) of the United States Government on the administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands for the period from 1 July 1964 to 30 June 1965.

Chapter 18

COMMUNICATIONS RELATING TO COMPLAINTS CONCERNING ACTS OF AGGRESSION AGAINST THE TERRITORY AND CIVILIAN POPULATION OF CAMBODIA

796. During the period under review, the representative of Cambodia addressed a number of communications to the President of the Security Council bringing to the latter's attention further alleged violations of Cambodian territory and air space by forces of the Republic of Viet-Nam and the United States.

797. In a letter dated 18 August 1965 (S/6640), the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Cambodia protested against the reference made by the Permanent Representative of the United States, in a letter of 30 July addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/6575 and Corr.1), to the United States Government's endorsement of a larger role for the United Nations in South-East Asia, including a United Nations mission of observers along the frontier between Viet-Nam and Cambodia and a United Nations mission to investigate alleged suppression of minority rights in Viet-Nam. The letter rejected this United States move as a proposal to violate Cambodian national sovereignty. Moreover, the United States proposal for United Nations investigation of "alleged suppression of minority rights in Viet-Nam" was evidence of the rashness and hypocrisy of the United States Government, since the policy of genocide pursued by the Saigon authorities against all minorities in South Viet-Nam was clear for all observers on the spot, including United States observers.

798. On 30 August 1965, the representative of Cambodia informed the President of the Council (S/6641) that on 25 August, some sixty soldiers of the armed forces of the Republic of Viet-Nam had fired on Cambodian villagers inside Cambodian territory, killing three and wounding one.

799. In a communiqué transmitted to the Security Council on 7 September 1965 (S/6670), the Cambodian Government strongly protested against renewed accusations that North Viet-Nameese forces were present in Khmer territory. Such accusations had been found to be false, *inter alia*, by the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Cambodia and the Office of the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General in Thailand and Cambodia.

800. In letters of 16 October 1965 (S/6802/Rev.1), 18 October 1965 (S/6803 and Corr.1) and 25 April

1966 (S/7265) addressed to the President of the Security Council, the representative of Cambodia protested against various raids, attacks or provocative acts committed by the United States-South Viet-Nameese forces against the territory of Cambodia.

801. In the first instance, several aircraft, two of them helicopters, had penetrated some thirty kilometres inside Cambodian territory in the province of Prey-Veng, and the occupants of the helicopters had addressed the inhabitants over loudspeakers, inciting them to leave for South Viet-Nam in anticipation of an imminent attack on Cambodia by South Viet-Nam.

802. In the second case, the United States-South Viet-Nameese air forces were charged with three successive raids on three villages in the province of Svay Rieng, which had caused seven dead and six seriously wounded, and resulted in heavy damage. This had been verified by the ICC and foreign military attachés.

803. In the third communication, two incidents were reported: the first involving 100 United States-South Viet-Nameese soldiers who had committed aggression against a Cambodian village in the province of Takéo, 2,500 metres inside the frontier from South Viet-Nam, killing two villagers and wounding six. In the second incident, about fifty soldiers of the same forces had infiltrated Cambodian territory for the purpose of attacking a provincial guard post and a village situated 600 metres inside the demarcation line, also in the province of Takéo. One villager had been killed and eleven persons wounded.

804. In a letter of 8 January 1966 addressed to the Secretary-General (S/7072 and Corr.1), the representative of the United States reiterated that his Government had no quarrel whatsoever with the desire of Cambodia to go its own way in peace and security, free from external alignment. However, Cambodia could not be secure so long as the North Viet-Nameese Government continued to direct massive violence in South Viet-Nam. The United States Government had noted with interest the Cambodian proposal that the ICC assume an increased supervisory role in Cambodia and hoped that it would lead to the development of effective measures to prevent any possible abuse of Cambodian territory.

Chapter 19

COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING RELATIONS BETWEEN CAMBODIA AND THAILAND

805. By a letter of 16 September 1965 (S/6689), addressed to the President of the Security Council, the representative of Cambodia protested against an act of aggression by about thirty Thai armed elements who on

11 September had penetrated several kilometres into Cambodian territory, opened fire on villages, killed one man and one girl, wounded three other persons and abducted two Cambodian families as hostages.

806. In a letter of 18 September (S/6693), the representative of Thailand categorically rejected all Cambodian claims concerning border and other incidents alleged to have been created by Thailand, whose Government wished instead to call attention to the mounting collusion between Cambodia and a communist imperialistic group of nations with a view to preparing aggression against Thailand.

807. In a letter of 4 October (S/6749), the representative of Cambodia denied those charges and stated that Cambodia pursued a policy of peace and neutrality, giving no operational nor logistic aid to the popular forces fighting legitimately against the imperialistic United States and its accomplice, Thailand.

808. On 29 October, the representative of Thailand informed the members of the Security Council (S/6846) that a thorough investigation into the incident of 11 September alleged by Cambodia had established that no armed elements from Thailand had entered Cambodian territory.

809. In a letter of 2 December (S/6989), the representative of Cambodia formally protested against a new act of aggression committed on 17 November by about fifty soldiers of the Thai armed forces, who, he charged, had attacked a Cambodian post situated 800 metres from the border. During that incident, several civilians had been killed and one Cambodian soldier had lost his life.

810. In a letter of 28 December (S/7047), the representative of Thailand rejected the Cambodian accusation as totally false. He added that a careful investigation had shown that an incident had actually taken place on 17 November on the Cambodian side of the frontier, but no incident had originated from the Thai side of the border.

811. On 6 January 1966, the representative of Thailand rejected, in a letter addressed to the President of the Council (S/7071), the Cambodian charges concerning an incident of 11 December in Cambodian territory, and complained that Cambodian soldiers had, on the contrary, penetrated about 2 kilometres into Thai territory on 15 December 1965 and had fired into a Thai village on 2 January 1966.

812. In a letter dated 22 January 1966 (S/7047), addressed to the President of the Council, the representative of Thailand rejected a Cambodian accusation against his country concerning an incident at Osmach on 30 and 31 December 1965 and noted that, according to reports coming from Cambodia itself, there had recently been several serious eruptions of discontent inside Cambodia against the policies pursued by the Cambodian ruler. Moreover, during the night of 5 and 6 January 1966, Cambodian soldiers had recommenced intermittent bursts of rifle and machine-gun fire into Thai territory.

813. In a further letter dated 24 January 1966 (S/7098), the representative of Thailand stated that on 21 January 1966 Cambodian soldiers had fired across the border into Thai territory near the village of Ban Haad Lek, in the province of Trat.

814. In a communication of 7 February 1966 (S/7126), addressed to the President of the Council, the representative of Cambodia categorically denied the allegations made by Thailand on 24 January and stated that the incident in question was initiated on

21 January by the Thai armed forces, which had penetrated about 800 metres into Cambodian territory. This new Thai act of aggression was the third against the Cambodian post of Chhne Khsach in the space of some weeks. On 23 and 24 January, Thai warships had cruised before Haad Lek and four Thai jet aircraft had flown repeatedly over the capital of Koli-Kong Province.

815. In a letter of 16 February 1966 (S/7147), the representative of Thailand informed the President of the Council that on 12 and 13 February, Cambodian soldiers had crossed the border three times into Thai territory and had made two attacks on Thai military units on guard at the village of Haad Lek.

816. In a letter dated 25 February 1966 (S/7166), the representative of Thailand stated that the Cambodian communication dated 7 February contained nothing but a mass of invented incidents and propaganda. The facts surrounding the incidents in the Thai-Cambodian border area around Trat Province were simple enough. Cambodia had taken advantage of the tension in that area to sustain a campaign of provocative actions there in order to serve the aims of her communist allies.

817. By a letter of 23 April 1966 (S/7279), the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Cambodia brought before the Security Council a complaint against Thailand for its repeated aggressions against Khmer territory and the occupation by force of the temple of Preah Vihear, in violation of the United Nations Charter and of the Judgement of the International Court of Justice of 15 June 1962 confirming that the temple of Preah Vihear was situated in Cambodian territory. On 7 April 1966, he stated, 100 Thai soldiers had attacked and burned the Cambodian post held by nine guards appointed to watch over the temple of Preah Vihear. The aggressors had captured five of these guards and occupied the temple. On 6 April, Cambodian forces had reoccupied the temple after stiff resistance from the Thais, who had killed the five captured men before withdrawing. On 19 April a battalion of Thai soldiers had attacked the Khmer position at Preah Vihear, trying to take the temple by storm. This recurrence of the incidents and provocations initiated by Thai forces on 16-17 November, 30-31 December 1965 and 3 April 1966 seemed likely to be the prelude to a large-scale attack on Cambodia.

818. The Foreign Minister of Cambodia concluded his letter by referring to Article 94, paragraph 2 of the Charter, which provides that if a party fails to implement a judgement of the Court, the other party may have recourse to the Council which may, if it deems necessary, make recommendations or decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to the judgement.

819. In another letter of 17 May 1966 (S/7305), the representative of Cambodia reported a new series of acts of aggression, involving large-scale warlike operations committed by Thai forces at Preah Vihear between 14 and 22 April 1966.

820. In further communications of 19 and 24 May and 8, 14 and 15 June (S/7309, S/7319, S/7348, S/7353 and S/7356) the representative of Cambodia complained of new acts of aggression committed by Thai armed forces against Cambodia.

821. In a letter of 17 June (S/7366), the representative of Thailand said that the charges made in the Cambodian representative's letters of 19 and 24 May

falsified the facts in order to mislead world public opinion. After careful investigation, no evidence had been found that any Thai soldiers had crossed the border into Cambodia. On the contrary, on 18, 19, 21, 23 and 25 April and on 5 May 1966, Cambodian soldiers from the Phra Viharn post had repeatedly fired with rifles, machine-guns, automatic rifles and mortars into Thai territory.

822. In letters of 17 and 27 June 1966 (S/7364, S/7381), the representative of Cambodia complained of further acts of aggression committed by Thai elements on 12 and 17 June 1966.

823. In a reply of 28 June (S/7384), the representative of Thailand stated that investigations conducted by Thai authorities had failed to uncover any evidence to substantiate the Cambodian charges. It was a matter of serious concern to the Thai Government that the Government of Cambodia should deem it advisable to keep up its barrage of false and blatant accusations.

824. In a letter of 1 July 1966 (S/7393), Thailand complained of two acts of aggression committed by Cambodia within Thai territorial waters against Thai fishing vessels and their crews.

Chapter 20

COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING THE PALESTINE QUESTION

825. In a letter dated 30 September 1965 (S/6731), the representative of Syria transmitted to the Secretary-General a memorandum from the Palestine Liberation Organization relating to a mob attack against the Arab population in Ramleh, alleged to have taken place on 22 August 1965.

826. In a letter dated 13 October (S/6780), the representative of Israel replied that in publicly condemning the outbreak the Prime Minister of Israel had reaffirmed that all citizens were assured of equal rights and protection under the laws of Israel, and that this would be rigidly enforced by the authorities.

827. In a letter dated 1 November (S/6852), the representative of Jordan complained to the President of the Security Council that a fully equipped detachment of the Israel regular army had escorted twenty-four tractors into no-man's land in the Latrun Sector on 30 October. The United Nations authorities had requested an immediate withdrawal of the Israel armed forces from the area, but instead reinforcements had been called in. In another letter dated 1 November (S/6854), the representative of Jordan requested the Secretary-General to take appropriate action in the rapidly deteriorating situation.

828. In a letter dated 2 November (S/6866), addressed to the President of the Security Council, the representative of Israel replied that the Jordanian account of the border incidents in the Latrun area did not reflect the facts. Ever since the Armistice Agreement of 1949, farmers from the neighbouring villages on both sides had been cultivating fields situated within the no-man's land in the Latrun area. He stated further that these incidents were being dealt with through the Armistice machinery.

829. By a letter dated 11 November (S/6898), the representative of Lebanon informed members of the Security Council that during the night of 28-29 October, Israel armed forces in uniform had penetrated into Lebanese territory and carried out acts of sabotage in two different places, as had been confirmed by the United Nations observers. These acts of aggression, he stated, constituted a serious and specific violation of the Armistice Agreement, and were creating a dangerous threat to peace in the region.

830. In a letter dated 19 November (S/6956), addressed to the President of the Security Council, the representative of Israel stated that the Israel action on the night of 28-29 October had been preceded by three acts of sabotage perpetrated against Israel border vil-

lages on 2 June, 26-27 August and 27 October. The action had been taken, he stated, to impress upon all concerned the extreme gravity with which his Government viewed the continuation of these sabotage activities, and the imperative need to put a stop to them.

831. In a letter dated 1 May 1966 (S/7275), the representative of Jordan complained to the President of the Security Council that on 29-30 April 1966 Israel regular armed forces crossed the Armistice Demarcation Line into the Hebron district. They launched an unprovoked attack on the village of Rafat, three kilometres inside Jordan, and blew up nineteen houses. Before withdrawal, the Israel soldiers opened their artillery fire on the police station causing substantial damage and injuring two Jordanian soldiers. At the same time, another unit of the Israel regular armed forces penetrated four kilometres into Jordan territory, crossed the Jordan River and attacked unarmed farmers' houses and the Sheikh Hussein police station. At least eight civilians were killed, several seriously injured and four houses blown up.

832. In a letter dated 2 May (S/7277), the representative of Israel informed the President of the Security Council of certain recent occurrences in the Israel-Jordan border area, attributed to an Arab terrorist and sabotage group known as El-Fatah which commenced in January 1965 organized armed incursions into Israel territory from neighbouring Arab States. These occurrences had been described earlier in Security Council documents S/6208, S/6387, S/6414 and S/6956 and constituted the immediate background to the Israel action on the night of 29-30 April 1966.

833. In a letter dated 4 May (S/7280), the representative of Jordan referred to his letter of 8 March 1965 (S/6222), in which he denied categorically and emphatically any knowledge of or responsibility for the acts complained of by Israel in its letter of 2 May, and pointed out that there was no conclusive evidence to establish that the alleged perpetrators had crossed from and to Jordan. He referred further to his letter of 28 May 1965 (S/6390) in connexion with Israel military attacks against the village of Al-Manshiyat and the towns of Jenin and Qulqilya in Jordan. He referred the President of the Council to his letter of 3 May in which he had requested that a complete report on the investigations of the last grave violations of the Armistice Agreement by Israel be requested of the Secretary-General for circulation to all members of the Security Council.

834. In a letter dated 5 May (S/7281), addressed to the Secretary-General, the representative of Jordan

referred to the 1063rd meeting of the Security Council held on 3 September 1963 in connexion with the Palestine question, in which the representative of Morocco requested the Secretary-General to instruct the Chief of Staff of UNTSO to prepare a report describing in detail how far the Armistice Agreements were being applied along the demarcation lines and in all the demilitarized zones, and how far the Armistice had been observed by the parties concerned. In view of the repeated grave violations of the General Armistice Agreement by Israel, the representative of Jordan requested the circulation of the above-mentioned report as an official document of the Security Council.

835. In a letter dated 6 May (S/7283), the Secretary-General in connexion with the Jordan letter of 5 May, stated that a draft report in the form of a summary, covering the period from the beginning of the Armistice Agreement in 1949 through July 1964, had been prepared and submitted to him by the Chief of Staff. However, he considered it undesirable to circulate it for the reason that as a summary it could not cover all complaints and therefore would be open to objections from both sides for the omission of particular cases. Having in mind the commitment originally made to the Council, the Secretary-General agreed to have prepared for circulation to the Council a report which would be a modified and reduced compilation consisting of the following: (1) a concise statement of the essential facts of each complaint that had been made; (2) a concise statement of any action that had been taken on the complaints; (3) a summary of positions taken by the Chairmen of the Mixed Armistice Commissions where such positions had been formally stated; and (4) the results or conclusions reached by the Mixed Armistice Commission when they had taken action.

836. In a letter dated 11 May (S/7288), the representative of Syria informed the President of the Council that from 29 April 1966 to date, the Israel authorities had issued warlike statements threatening Syria and neighbouring Arab States. One such statement given on 29 April by the Prime Minister of Israel had been followed at midnight of 29-30 April by a well-planned and executed attack by regular Israel forces on Jordan.

837. In a letter dated 11 May (S/7289), the representative of Israel drew the attention of the President of the Security Council to the gross violation of the Israel-Jordan General Armistice Agreement by the forces of Jordan in the incident of 10 May along the border patrol track to the north of Beersheba. Heavy fire was suddenly and without warning opened on a work party, although due notification to Jordan through the proper United Nations channel had been made. The Israel casualties were two killed and three wounded. Israel had lodged a complaint with the Mixed Armistice Commission and an emergency meeting of the Commission had been requested.

838. In a further letter dated 12 May (S/7291), the representative of Israel informed the President of the Security Council that the United Nations investigation had been carried out at the scene of the incident, while at the same time work on the track was resumed in the presence of United Nations military observers and it was completed without further incident or Jordanian interference.

839. In a letter dated 13 May (S/7293), the representative of Jordan, in connexion with the incident of 29-30 April referred to in his letter of 1 May (S/7275),

informed the President of the Security Council that the number of farmers killed as a result of the unprovoked attacks by Israel had now risen to eleven.

840. In a letter dated 16 May (S/7296 and Corr.1), the representative of Israel, in reply to the letter of 11 May (S/7288) from the representative of Syria, informed the President of the Security Council that Syria was the source, training ground, principal supplier and main support of a terrorist organization, variously known as El-Fatah (conquest) and El-Asefa (storm). Since January 1965, hired terrorists belonging to the organization had perpetrated forty-seven individual acts of violence in Israel, and caused death, injury and destruction among the hardworking farming communities in Israel border areas. The latest of these incidents had taken place in the fields of the village of Al-Magor in the vicinity of the Sea of Galilee and about one thousand metres away from Syrian territory. Two young farmers had lost their lives.

841. In a letter dated 18 May (S/7306), addressed to the President of the Security Council, the representative of Jordan, in connexion with the Israel letter of 11 May (S/7289) regarding the incident that occurred on 10 May, stated that Israel forces had opened automatic fire on Jordanian farmers within Jordanian territory, who were working peacefully in their fields, forcing them to flee to their village of Beit Mersim. The Israel fire was then directed against the village itself. The military forces of Jordan had had to return fire in self-defence.

842. In a letter dated 19 May (S/7311), the representative of Jordan informed the President of the Security Council that the Mixed Armistice Commission had at an emergency meeting on 16 May condemned Israel for the premeditated acts of aggression on the night of 29-30 April. He requested the circulation of the full text of the decision of the Mixed Armistice Commission as an official document to members of the Security Council. He further informed the President of the Security Council that on 15 May an Israel military unit manœuvring close to the Jordanian village of Badrass had directed its automatic fire on the village, and had injured three children, two of them critically.

843. In a letter dated 24 May (S/7320), to the President of the Security Council, the representative of Syria, in connexion with the Israel complaint of 16 May (S/7296), stated that the Israel allegation that Syria was the source and training ground of the organization known as El-Fatah and El-Asefa was completely groundless and deliberately misleading. This simply echoed the warlike statements against Syria of the Zionist-Israel leaders in Palestine. He stated that the reference in the Israel complaint to an alleged condemnation of Syria by the Security Council was false and therefore misleading. No condemnation had ever been adopted by the Security Council against Syria.

844. In a letter dated 25 May (S/7321), the President of the Security Council, referring to the request made by the representative of Jordan in his letter dated 19 May (S/7311), stated that investigation of relevant practice appeared to indicate that decisions of the Mixed Armistice Commission had not been published in separate Security Council documents. Its decisions were published at the appropriate place and time in accordance with its normal practice. A certain number of decisions of the Mixed Armistice Commission in the region had, however, in the past appeared in Security Council documents, either incorporated in or annexed to letters of the Permanent Representatives

of one of the States parties to this or similar agreements.

845. In reply, the representative of Jordan in his letter dated 27 May (S/7325) stated that the decisions of the Mixed Armistice Commission, since March 1955 and until the end of 1961, had been transmitted to the members of the Security Council. In addition, the Security Council was informed bi-monthly when no decisions had been taken by the Commission. To his knowledge, this practice had never been overruled by the Council nor had the Council been informed of any change vis-à-vis this matter. However, since his delegation did not want to see the circulation of the decisions of the Mixed Armistice Commission delayed any further, he transmitted therewith the full text of the decision of the Mixed Armistice Commission of 16 May 1966, condemning Israel for the acts of aggression committed against Jordan on the night of 29-30 April.

846. In a letter dated 29 May (S/7326), the representative of Israel, referring to the letter of 24 May (S/7320) from the representative of Syria, drew the attention of the President of the Security Council to the following observations: (a) it was noteworthy that the Syrian letter made a general denial of responsibility for the El-Fatah terrorist organization, but did not try to refute the specific facts indicating such responsibility as set out in the Israel letter of 16 May 1966 (S/7296); (b) Israel had been faced for years with a constant succession of armed attacks, sabotage, terror and murder perpetrated by regular and irregular forces under the direct control of Syrian Governments and openly encouraged and incited by them; (c) concerning the number of complaints referred to in the Syrian letter, it was unclear whom this statistic was meant to impress or mislead. Those were routine complaints and the Mixed Armistice Commission had a backlog of approximately 60,000 like them; (d) the Syrian letter did not produce a single shred of contemporary evidence for attributing aggressive intent to Israel. The position of the Government of Israel on these Syrian allegations had been defined by the Prime Minister in a statement made to the Press on 28 May. Mr. Eshkol had emphatically rejected the rumours and imputations broadcast by Syria concerning so-called Israel threats to Syrian security.

847. In a further letter dated 31 May (S/7330) addressed to the representative of Jordan concerning the request for publication of decisions of the Mixed Armistice Commission referred to in Jordan's letter of 27 May (S/7325), the President of the Security Council pointed out that it was not his intention to furnish any legal grounds which might prevent circulation of such decisions. During the investigations which had been conducted into relevant practice, the discussion which had taken place at the 694th meeting of the Security Council had not been overlooked. As a result of that discussion, decisions of the Commission were periodically communicated to the members of the Security Council for their information, under cover of a *note verbale*. This informal distribution, however, had not altered the fact that in the past decisions under discussion had not been distributed as official documents of the Council, unless they were forwarded by one of the parties concerned.

848. In a letter dated 1 June (S/7333) addressed to the President of the Security Council, the representative of Jordan transmitted the text of another resolution adopted by the Mixed Armistice Commission

at its 428th emergency meeting held on 17 May 1966, condemning the Israel authorities for their unprovoked premeditated attack on the night of 29-30 April against the Jordanian village of Rafat and Rujm El Madfa's police post, Hebron area.

849. In a letter dated 1 June (S/7334), referring to the letter of the President of the Security Council dated 31 May (S/7330), the representative of Jordan stated that his delegation had never received, periodically or otherwise, any such decisions of the Mixed Armistice Commission. He requested that pending final determination by the Council as to the circulation of all decisions of the Commission as official Security Council documents, they be transmitted to the members of the Council for their information under cover of a *note verbale*. This was not only in conformity with established practice of the Security Council, but also because the Security Council was still seized of the Palestine question.

850. In a letter dated 20 June (S/7367), addressed to the President of the Security Council, the representative of Jordan transmitted the text of the resolution adopted by the Mixed Armistice Commission on 9 June 1966, in connexion with the Badrass incident cited in his letter dated 19 May (S/7311).

851. In a further letter dated 30 June (S/7388) addressed to the representative of Jordan concerning periodical communication to the members of the Security Council of decisions of the Mixed Armistice Commission referred to in Jordan's letter of 1 June (S/7334), the President of the Security Council stated that, pending a determination by the Security Council as a whole on the question of having the decisions circulated as official documents of the Council or of reinstituting the previous informal procedure, it had been arranged, in consultation with the Secretary-General, that copies of the relevant texts should be made available on an informal basis to the representatives at the United Nations of the parties directly concerned, for their information, immediately they were received in the Secretariat. The President of the Council noted that the texts received by the Secretariat did not have the status of certified true copies and that therefore copies supplied by the Secretariat could have no greater status.

852. In a letter of 14 July 1966 (S/7411 and Corr.1) addressed to the President of the Security Council, the representative of Israel stated that there had been a sudden recrudescence of sabotage and road-mining attacks in Israel border areas, carried out from Syria, including four attacks carried out within the last two days. After those outrages, the letter continued, planes of the Israel Air Force had on 14 July been ordered to carry out a brief attack to the south-east of Almagor on Syrian tractors and mechanical equipment. That action had been meant to impress upon the Syrian authorities the gravity with which Israel viewed continual Syrian violence against its population and territory.

853. [In this connexion, it should be noted that the representative of Syria addressed a letter to the President of the Security Council on 18 July (S/7412), after the close of the period covered by the present report, charging that an Israel air attack had been made on Syria on 14 July and denying responsibility for the incidents alleged by Israel.]

Chapter 21

COMMUNICATION CONCERNING THE GENERAL REGULATION AND REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS AND INFORMATION ON THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED NATIONS

854. In a letter dated 21 September 1965 (S/6707), the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission drew attention to the session of the Commission held at Headquarters, New York, between 21 April and 16 June 1965, and transmitted the texts of two resolutions (DC/224 and DC/225) adopted by the Commission during that session.

Chapter 22

COMMUNICATION CONCERNING RELATIONS BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO (BRAZZAVILLE) AND THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

855. In a letter dated 22 September 1965 (S/6706) addressed to the President of the Security Council, the representative of the Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville) stated that 300 soldiers of the Democratic Republic of the Congo had violated the territory of the Congo (Brazzaville) on 14 September 1965 at the locality of Mfouati, in the southern frontier region. His Government wished to draw attention once again to the possible consequences of a repetition of such acts of aggression and intimidation.

Chapter 23

COMMUNICATION ON THE VISIT OF HIS HOLINESS POPE PAUL VI TO THE UNITED NATIONS

856. In a letter dated 21 September 1965 (S/6701), the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Uruguay drew attention to the forthcoming visit of His Holiness Pope Paul VI to the United Nations and suggested that, in view of the tremendous political and moral significance of the event, the Security Council should hold a special solemn meeting to receive the Supreme Pontiff.

Chapter 24

COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING THE SITUATION IN ADEN

857. In a letter of 1 October 1965 (S/6733), the representative of Yemen drew the attention of the Security Council to "the latest serious and aggressive acts" of the British authorities against the people of Aden. Instead of complying with Security Council resolution 188 (1964) of 9 April 1964 and General Assembly resolution 1949 (XVIII), the British authorities in occupied South Yemen had suspended the constitution, dissolved the legislative council, dismissed the Council of Ministers and tightened the state of emergency in the Territory.

858. On 5 October, the representatives of Algeria, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, the United Arab Republic and Yemen addressed a letter to the President of the Security Council (S/6748) in which they complained against the British Government's suspension of the Aden Constitution and the dismissal of the Council of Ministers of Aden. Aden was now ruled directly by the British High Commission and the state of emergency had been intensified. These arbitrary measures were contrary to the provisions of the Charter and to the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Special

Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

859. In reply, the United Kingdom representative stated on 13 October (S/6786) that his Government had repeatedly declared its firm intention to bring South Arabia to independence not later than 1968. In view of a terrorist campaign in Aden which the former Aden Ministers had refused to condemn, it had become necessary for the United Kingdom to suspend certain provisions of the Constitution. The United Kingdom's action, in a matter wholly within its own responsibilities, had had as its objectives the restoration of peaceful conditions in Aden and progress towards the self-determination and independence of South Arabia.

860. In a further reply on 10 November (S/6887) the United Kingdom representative stated that the alleged acts of aggression against Yemeni territory contained in S/6733 had all been investigated and had proved to be unfounded.

861. On 10 November the President of the General Assembly transmitted to the President of the Security

Council (S/6900), the text of resolution 2023 (XX) concerning Aden adopted by the General Assembly at its 1368th meeting on 5 November 1965.

862. By a letter of 15 June 1966 (S/7372), the Chairman of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries

and Peoples transmitted the text of a resolution on the question of Aden adopted by the Special Committee on 15 June 1966. In operative paragraph 10 of the resolution, the Committee drew the attention of the Security Council "to the dangerous situation prevailing in the area as a result of British military action against the people of the Territory".

Chapter 25

COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING THE "FIRST SOLIDARITY CONFERENCE OF THE PEOPLES OF ASIA, AFRICA AND LATIN AMERICA" IN HAVANA

863. In a letter dated 7 February 1966 (S/7123), the representatives of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela called the attention of the President of the Security Council to the "First Solidarity Conference of the Peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America", held on 3 January 1966 in Havana, Cuba. They stated that the objective of the Conference had been to stimulate and promote the violent change of governments and fundamental political institutions in different countries. Together with Communist party officials of numerous countries, the Conference had been attended by outstanding persons in the Governments of States Members of the United Nations, and had had the support of several Governments, especially that of Cuba. The proclamation adopted by the Conference on the use of force for attaining its objectives, the establishment of permanent machinery to that end and the recommendations on methods of infiltration and subversion had violated the fundamental principles of international law as stipulated in the Charter of the United Nations and the provisions of the Declaration contained in General Assembly resolution 2131 (XX). The letter called the attention of the Security Council to those facts and the consequences they entailed for peace and international security.

864. In a cable dated 9 February 1966 (S/7133 and Corr.1), the Secretary General of the Organization of American States (OAS) informed the Secretary-General of the United Nations of a resolution adopted by the Council of the Organization of American States. In that resolution, the OAS Council had, *inter alia*, resolved to condemn the "Conference of Solidarity among the Peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America" held in January 1966 in Havana, Cuba and the participation in it of official or officially sponsored delegations of United Nations Member States. The Council had also called upon a special committee of the OAS to study and investigate the deliberations, conclusions and projections of the Conference and to submit a report to the OAS Council.

865. In a letter dated 10 February 1966 (S/7134), the *Chargé d'Affaires a.i.* of Cuba transmitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations a letter from his Prime Minister, Mr. Fidel Castro Ruz, which declared that the letter of the eighteen Latin American States (S/7123) was cynical in accusing Cuba and the "Solidarity Conference of the Peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America" of intervention in the affairs of Latin American States. Not the Conference but the United States Government had intervened militarily on the American continent whenever it had considered

that necessary. The United States pursued its interventionist policy not only in Latin America but also in Africa, Asia and the rest of the world. Those Latin American Governments which had protested against the "First Solidarity Conference" to the United Nations were accomplices of the United States and some of them were direct participants in the United States military occupation of the Dominican Republic. It was true that the representatives of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America had decided to intensify the struggle against intervention and to assist the peoples struggling against interventionist and aggressive imperialism. Their stand could no more be labelled intervention than that of the eighteenth-century French revolutionaries or the nineteenth-century Latin American revolutionaries. The Cuban Government fully adhered to the decisions adopted by the First Solidarity Conference of the Peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America and was well aware that the hidden purpose of the protest by the eighteen Latin American Governments was to justify the future acts of intervention by the United States in other Latin American countries and to prepare the way for aggression against Cuba.

866. In a letter dated 11 February 1966 (S/7142), the Permanent Representative of Mexico informed the Secretary-General that the Mexican Government had abstained from voting on the resolution adopted by the Council of the Organization of American States (S/7133), despite references in the resolution to the Declaration contained in General Assembly resolution 2131 (XX), which had had the full support of the Mexican Government at the twentieth session of the General Assembly. To make the Mexican Government's position on the issue clear, the Permanent Representative of Mexico attached to his letter excerpts from a statement and an explanation of vote that had been made by the Mexican representative in the course of the debate in the Council of the Organization of American States. Both statements had condemned any act which constituted a violation of the precepts of operative paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Declaration, but had emphasized that Mexico did not consider it appropriate for the OAS Council to go beyond the unanimous protest it had registered against the seditious propaganda and threats of intervention which had emerged from the so-called Solidarity Conference. The Government of Mexico held that the principle of non-intervention was compatible only with collective action exceptionally and specifically provided for in treaties. It was the privilege of every State to determine the ways in which its institutions were to be protected. But the Mexican Government could not agree to the arrogation to themselves by international bodies, with-

out the formality of a treaty, of powers which the Latin American peoples had not granted to them.

867. In a letter dated 19 February 1966 (S/7152), the Permanent Representative of the USSR stated that the Havana Conference had provided a forum in which representatives of public opinion in Asia, Africa and Latin America had considered matters relating to the struggle of the peoples against imperialist, colonialist and neo-colonialist exploitation. From their letter to the President of the Security Council (S/7123), it was clear that the representatives of the Latin American countries were pursuing aims which were in no way related to the tasks of the Security Council under the United Nations Charter. The letter in fact represented an attempt to divert attention from the real violations of the United Nations Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States committed by the United States, which was perpetrating armed aggression in South Viet-Nam and armed intervention in the Dominican Republic. The same might be said of the letter from the Secretary General of the OAS Council (S/7133). The Soviet Government considered that the duty of all States interested in strengthening peace was to call upon the United States and those States associated with it to put an end to their activities constituting a threat to peace. The Soviet

Government condemned any foreign intervention in the domestic affairs of States and in the sovereign rights of peoples. That was the position of the Soviet Government with regard to the countries in Latin America, with which the Soviet Union wished to maintain only friendly relations.

868. In a letter dated 1 March 1966 (S/7178), the Permanent Representative of the Mongolian People's Republic stated that the letter from the eighteen Latin American States (S/7123) answered the designs of the United States, which wished to divert attention from the real issues of the day. The letter was not directed at the practical application of the principle of non-intervention to such actual acts of intervention and aggression as those committed by the United States in Viet-Nam and the Dominican Republic. The principle of non-intervention could not be used to curtail the activities of public organizations, which had the right to express their attitude towards imperialism, national independence, social progress and peace. The participants in the Havana Conference had done no more than express themselves on those issues. Such activities in no way came within the jurisdiction of the United Nations Security Council. Neither the Council nor the General Assembly's Declaration on non-intervention should be used as a screen for United States aggression.

Chapter 26

COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING THE QUESTION OF MEMBERSHIP IN THE UNITED NATIONS

A. Letter from the Permanent Representative of Bulgaria requesting circulation of the application of the German Democratic Republic for membership in the United Nations and other communications supporting this application

869. On 2 March 1966 the Secretary-General forwarded to the members of the Security Council copies of a letter he had received, through the Permanent Representative of Poland, from the Chairman of the Council of State of the German Democratic Republic. At the written request of the Permanent Representative of Bulgaria, the letter, together with an accompanying declaration and memorandum, were subsequently circulated to the Security Council (S/7192). The memorandum stated that the German Democratic Republic was a peace-loving, sovereign State which met all requirements for membership in the United Nations and was willing and able to fulfil all obligations arising therefrom. Its membership in the United Nations would help it to implement its policy, which was aimed at safeguarding peace in Europe, and would at the same time contribute to the universality of the United Nations.

870. The German Democratic Republic, the memorandum continued, was submitting its application for admission in full awareness of the fact that for the last sixteen years two sovereign German States had been in existence on German territory, and had developed independently. Peaceful understanding and the normalization of relations between the two German States were essential preconditions for their peaceful reunification, and the Government of the German Democratic Republic was convinced that its admission

to the United Nations would further those goals. Moreover, it considered that the admission of the West German Federal Republic to the United Nations would also serve this aim.

871. The German Democratic Republic, the memorandum continued, had conscientiously and consistently fulfilled all obligations arising from the Potsdam Agreement, and its policy had always been in conformity with the United Nations Charter. Since 1954 it had unreservedly exercised all sovereign rights, and maintained diplomatic, consular and other official relations with numerous States. It had for years attentively followed the work of the United Nations, and it participated actively, within the scope of its possibilities, in the work of numerous United Nations bodies and specialized agencies. Those examples were clear proof of the fact that the German Democratic Republic was able and willing to carry out the obligations arising from the Charter and was capable of making important contributions to the aims of the United Nations. Its membership in the United Nations would also undoubtedly help facilitate the settlement of still outstanding questions arising from the Second World War.

872. In a letter dated 7 March 1966 (S/7184), the representative of the USSR stated that his Government fully supported the application of the German Democratic Republic for membership in the United Nations and considered it necessary that the Security Council should duly examine that application. The admission of the German Democratic Republic would be wholly in keeping with the interests of developing international co-operation and of maintaining universal peace and security. The German Democratic Republic occupied an important place in the system of international relations and was a serious factor for peace in Europe.

The present situation, in which certain large countries in Central Europe were not represented in the United Nations, in itself reduced the effectiveness of the Organization. It was obvious, moreover, that the United Nations could not consider itself genuinely universal if States which wished to contribute to its activity and which met the requirements of the Charter were denied the chance to participate in the Organization. Membership in the United Nations was open to all peace-loving States which accepted the obligations contained in the Charter. The peace-loving character of the German Democratic Republic was confirmed by all its actions throughout the sixteen years of its existence, and it thus fully satisfied the requirements laid down for membership in Article 4 of the Charter.

873. It should be borne in mind, the letter continued, that the Potsdam Agreements included a special provision to the effect that the German people should be given, in due course, the opportunity to take their place among the free and peaceful peoples of the world. The assertion made by some countries that one of the existing German States represented the whole German people flatly contradicted both the *de facto* situation and the existing international agreements. The existence of two German States—the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany—in the territory of the former Reich was an indisputable fact. The admission of the German Democratic Republic, and any similar decision which might be taken with regard to the other German State, would not in any degree affect the provisions of Article 107 of the Charter concerning the validity of the Allied Agreements adopted as a result of the Second World War.

874. Communications supporting the application were subsequently transmitted by Cuba (8 March 1966, S/7185), Mongolia (9 March 1966, S/7190), Bulgaria (10 March 1966, S/7192), Hungary (11 March 1966, S/7195), Romania (14 March 1966, S/7199/Rev.1), Poland (14 March 1966, S/7204), Czechoslovakia (17 March 1966, S/7210) and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (23 May 1966, S/7314).

875. By a letter dated 20 April 1966 (S/7259), the USSR reaffirmed its support of the application for membership made by the German Democratic Republic. The United Nations, it stated, as the Organization responsible for the maintenance of peace and security, was founded on the actual state of affairs in the world and, in accordance with the principle of universality, it included various States irrespective of their social character and ideologies. In present circumstances no country participating in international affairs could fail to take account of the role of the German Democratic Republic, as a sovereign State, in world politics and in the stabilization of the European situation. Under Article 4 of the Charter, membership in the United Nations was open to all peace-loving States which accepted the obligations contained in the Charter and, in the judgement of the Organization, were able and willing to carry them out. That was the only lawful approach and there could be no doubt that it was also applicable in deciding the question of the admission of the German Democratic Republic. Arguments concerning the alleged right of the Federal Republic of Germany to represent the population not only of the Federal Republic but also of the German Democratic Republic were therefore obviously groundless.

876. When claims by States to represent the population of other countries were put forward in the United Nations, their essential intent was to violate the basic principles of the United Nations. In the present case there was also an effort to satisfy to some extent the revanchist ambitions of certain circles in the Federal Republic of Germany. The Soviet Union could not but take a negative view of such efforts, which would mean—whether intentionally or not—helping to heighten international tension and encouraging those aggressive forces in the Federal Republic which advocated the forcible revision of existing frontiers in Europe.

877. It was also important, the letter continued, to note that the admission to the United Nations of the German Democratic Republic and possibly also of the Federal Republic of Germany would contribute to the necessary understanding between the two German States and thus to their gradual *rapprochement*. In fact, any objections raised to the admission of the German Democratic Republic or of both German States were, in the last analysis, directed equally against any *rapprochement* between them.

B. Letter from France, the United Kingdom and the United States which maintains that the so-called German Democratic Republic cannot be eligible for membership in the United Nations, which is open only to States

878. In a joint letter of 16 March 1966 (S/7207), France, the United Kingdom and the United States stated that the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany was the only Government entitled to speak on behalf of the German people in international affairs, and was, furthermore, the only authority in Germany resulting from free elections. The great majority of the world community had refused recognition of the so-called German Democratic Republic. No specialized agency of the United Nations had admitted it to any form of active participation whatever. It could not be eligible for membership in the United Nations, which, according to Article 4 of the Charter, was open only to States.

879. Under the agreements concluded at the end of the Second World War, the joint letter continued, France, the United Kingdom and the United States shared with the Soviet Union responsibility for the settlement of the German question and for the reunification of Germany. In that regard it should be recalled that at the Geneva Conference on 23 July 1955, the Heads of Government of the four States had agreed that the settlement of the German question and the reunification of Germany by means of free elections should be carried out in conformity with the national interests of the German people and the interests of European security.

880. For their part, France, the United Kingdom and the United States had always striven to promote a solution of the question by implementation of the principle of self-determination. They would continue their efforts to achieve that aim. Attempts to establish the so-called German Democratic Republic as a separate State could only frustrate that objective and thus make more difficult a peaceful settlement in Europe.

**COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING AN ACCIDENT INVOLVING NUCLEAR WEAPONS
OVER THE SPANISH COAST**

881. By a letter dated 17 February 1966 (S/7151), the Permanent Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics transmitted to the President of the Security Council the text of a memorandum of 16 February 1966 from the Soviet Union to the United States Government on a reported accident involving United States military aircraft, one of them carrying nuclear weapons on board. The Soviet memorandum stated that it had been officially reported that a United States B-52 bomber carrying nuclear weapons had been involved in an accident over the Spanish coast on 17 January 1966. As a result of that accident, four hydrogen bombs had fallen in Spanish territory and in Mediterranean coastal waters and at least one of them had released radio-active substances. In the Soviet Government's view, the United States actions and policy which had given rise to the circumstances of the accident were contrary to the principles of international law, in particular the Moscow treaty of 1963 which had been designed to put an end to the contamination of man's environment by radio-active substances. The contamination of Spanish coastal waters had brought about a real threat of contamination of the high seas, which again was contrary to the principle of the freedom of the high seas, and was a violation of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas signed and ratified by the United States Government. Despite repeated warnings by the USSR Government against the dangers of such practices, United States aircraft continued to be sent on flights with nuclear weapons on board over the territory of other States and the high seas. Such flights created possibilities of incidents which might lead to grave consequences, as was proved by what had happened over the Spanish coast. To eliminate any possibility of a recurrence of such dangerous incidents it was necessary to put an end to flights by aircraft carrying atomic and hydrogen weapons beyond their national frontiers. Incidents such as the one over Spain threatened the security not only of those peoples whose Governments permitted the United States to use their air space for

such purposes, but of the peoples of other countries. The security of many different peoples must not be permitted to depend on certain Governments which gave their consent to those flights. The Soviet Government held that the immediate cessation of flights by aircraft carrying nuclear weapons beyond their national frontiers and the strict observance of international agreements in these fields would serve to prevent dangerous accidents and incidents and would serve the cause of peace.

882. By a letter dated 26 February 1966 (S/7169), the Permanent Representative of the United States of America forwarded to the Secretary-General the text of a reply by the United States Government to the Soviet Government's memorandum of 16 February 1966 on the B-52 accident over the Spanish coast. The reply rejected the allegations made in the Soviet memorandum and stated that no nuclear weapon test, no nuclear explosion of any kind, and no radio-active pollution of the sea had been involved in the unfortunate accident over the coast of Spain. Consequently, there had been no violation of international legal principles and agreements such as the Soviet memorandum had alleged. It was common knowledge that United States military flights were carried out with the agreement of nations to reinforce their collective security against the threat posed by the huge nuclear forces of the Soviet Union. The United States policies and practices designed to meet that nuclear threat had been adopted only after the most careful assessment of security requirements and after provision of necessary safeguards. It was not surprising that the Soviet Government was opposed to military security measures undertaken against the threat of its armed power. It was, however, a matter of deep regret that it should be willing to distort the meaning of international treaties to suit the purpose of a propaganda campaign. If the Soviet Government had been genuinely concerned about possible violations of international agreements and law, it would have requested and awaited a reply and clarification from the United States Government on the incident.

Chapter 28

COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING RELATIONS BETWEEN GHANA AND GUINEA

883. In a letter dated 25 April 1966 (S/7268) addressed to the President of the Security Council, the representative of Ghana drew attention to "certain provocative acts and proclamations" by the President of the Republic of Guinea against Ghana, and, in particular, his "declaration of war" on Ghana as contained in a special broadcast by Conakry Radio on 10 March 1966. The President of Guinea, the letter added, had given as his reason for this intervention in the affairs of a sovereign State the creation in 1959 of the Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union, which he said had been approved by the Parliaments of the three countries.

884. The Government of Ghana wished to point out that this abortive Union, together with all other African regional political groupings, had become void with the establishment of the Organization of African Unity in 1963. Moreover, the Government of Ghana had no objection if Kwame Nkrumah was granted political asylum in Guinea, but it strongly protested that the deposed

President of Ghana was permitted to use Guinea as a base for subversion against Ghana. The pronouncements and threats of the President of Guinea and his support of the deposed President of Ghana in the latter's attempt to subvert the Government of Ghana constituted gross and unwarranted interference in the internal affairs of Ghana and were likely to constitute a threat to the maintenance of international peace and security.

885. In a letter of 27 April 1966 (S/7270) addressed to the President of the Security Council, the representative of Guinea stated that the accusation contained in the Ghanaian letter concerning an alleged declaration of war by the President of Guinea was a pure figment of the imagination. The Government of the Republic of Guinea considered that the African States should take to heart the provisions of the United Nations Charter, in particular Article 52, paragraph 2, concerning the duties of States parties to regional arrangements, and the provisions of the charter of the Organization of African Unity.

COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING RELATIONS BETWEEN NICARAGUA AND CUBA

886. In a letter dated 24 June 1966 addressed to the Secretary-General (S/7386/Rev.1), the Permanent Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics drew the attention of the Secretary-General to statements which had been made by the President of Nicaragua at United Nations Headquarters in New York on 8 June 1966 and at Washington on 10 June 1966 stating his willingness to make the territory of Nicaragua available for an armed invasion of the Republic of Cuba. In this connexion, the letter recalled the attempted invasion of Cuba by imperialist mercenaries in 1961 at Playa Giron, Cuba and the severe condemnation by world public opinion of those who had inspired and organized that adventure, including the Government of Nicaragua. By advocating the organization of another armed invasion of Cuba, the Government of Nicaragua was flagrantly violating the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty adopted by the General Assembly. The Soviet Government shared the just indignation of the Government of Cuba over the provocative statements by the President of Nicaragua and its view that such a policy of provocation and threats was dangerous to peace.

887. In a letter to the Secretary-General dated 5 July 1966 (S/7513), the Deputy Permanent Representative of Nicaragua, commenting on the letter of the Soviet Union of 24 June 1966, stated it was totally inconsistent with the democratic realities within which the Nicaraguan Government functions, respectful of international undertakings and observing a conduct of respect, equity and justice enabling it to occupy its place in the world community. Denying the allegations of the USSR with regard to Nicaraguan support for an invasion of Cuba, the letter pointed out that the declarations of the "Conference of Solidarity among the Peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America" held at Havana in January 1966, defined the aggressive policy of international Communism and especially the Communist Government of Cuba directed against the peoples of Africa, Asia and, above all, Latin America. The letter pointed out that the Organization of American States had been obliged, on 2 February 1966, to adopt a resolution condemning this policy of intervention and aggression which was a flagrant violation of resolution 2131 (XX) of the United Nations. The letter also stated that President Schick of Nicaragua had guided Nicaragua along democratic lines in the interest of the well being of the Nicaraguan people, proof that the malicious attempt to brand Nicaragua as a danger to the peace of the continent was nonsense.

Chapter 30

COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING RELATIONS BETWEEN PORTUGAL AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO (BRAZZAVILLE)

888. In a letter dated 9 June 1966 (S/7352), the representative of the Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville) stated that on 8 June 1966 two Portuguese aircraft flying at low altitude had dropped bombs on two Congolese villages of the frontier region situated between the Sub-Prefecture of Kimongo and Portuguese Cabinda. On the same day, another Portuguese aircraft had flown over the frontier at low altitude but had not violated Congolese air space. His Government protested vigorously against these acts of provocation, which might endanger peace in Africa.

889. In a letter of 16 June 1966 (S/7360), the representative of Portugal stated that his Government had made a rigorous investigation of the accusations contained in the letter of 9 June from the Republic of the Congo (S/7352) and could as a result affirm that those accusations were absolutely baseless. No Portuguese planes had violated Congolese air space or dropped any bombs on Congolese territory. Since it was alleged that the planes were flying at low altitude, the Portuguese Government invited the Congolese Government to specify the types of the planes, their velocity, the direction of their flight, the type of bombs alleged to have been dropped and to produce other evidence which it would doubtless have in its possession if the facts alleged were true. The Portuguese Government firmly rejected the Congolese protest, which, in its view, was intended solely to distract attention from the aggressive acts perpetrated by terrorists concentrated in the areas referred to in the Congolese letter.

APPENDICES

I. Representatives and deputy, alternate and acting representatives accredited to the Security Council

The following representatives and deputy, alternate and acting representatives were accredited to the Security Council during the period covered by the present report:

Argentina^a

Dr. José María Ruda
Dr. Raúl Quijano
Mr. Carlos Alberto Gofí Demarchi

Bolivia^b

Mr. Fernando Ortiz Sanz
Mr. Guillermo Scott-Murga

Bulgaria^a

Mr. Milko Tarabanov
Mr. Konstantin Tellalov

China

Mr. Liu Chieh
Mr. Yu Chi Hsueh
Dr. Chun-Ming Chang

France

Mr. Roger Seydoux
Mr. Jacques Tiné
Mr. Claude Arnaud
Mr. Jean Plihon

Ivory Coast^b

Mr. Arsène Assouan Usher

Japan^a

Mr. Akira Matsui
Mr. Isao Abe

Jordan

Mr. Abdul Monem Rifa'i
Dr. Muhammad H. El-Farra
Dr. Walid Saadi

Malaysia^b

Mr. Radhakrishna Ramani
Mr. Raja Aznam

Malí^a

Mr. Sori Coulibaly
Mr. Moussa Léo Keita

Netherlands

Dr. J. G. de Beus
Mr. J. Polderman
Jonkheer L. Quarles van Ufford

New Zealand^a

Mr. Frank Henry Corner
Mr. John George McArthur

Nigeria^a

Chief S. O. Adebo
Mr. J. T. F. Iyalla
Mr. B. A. Clark

Uganda^a

Mr. Apollo K. Kironde
Mr. E. Otema Allimadi
Mr. Mathias K. L. Lubega

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Mr. Nikolai Trofimovich Fedorenko
Mr. Platon Dmitrievich Morozov
Mr. Evgeny Nikolaevich Makeev
Mr. Nikolai Panteleimonovich Kulebyakin

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Lord Caradon
Sir Roger Jackling
Mr. C. P. Hope

United States of America

Mr. Adlai E. Stevenson
Mr. Arthur J. Goldberg
Mr. Francis T. P. Plimpton
Mr. Charles W. Yost
Mr. James M. Nabrit, Jr.
Mr. James Roosevelt
Mrs. Eugenie M. Anderson

Uruguay

Dr. Carlos María Velázquez
Mr. Luis Vidal Zaglio
Dr. Héctor Payssé Reyes
Dr. Pedro P. Berro
Mr. Mateo Marques-Sere

^a Term of office began on 1 January 1966.

^b Term of office ended on 31 December 1965.

II. Presidents of the Security Council

The following representatives held the office of President of the Security Council during the period covered by the present report:

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Mr. Platon Dmitrievich Morozov (16 to 31 July 1965)

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Sir Roger Jackling (1 to 31 August 1965)

United States of America

Mr. Arthur J. Goldberg (1 to 30 September 1965)

Uruguay

Dr. Héctor Payssé Reyes (1 to 31 October 1965)

Bolivia

Mr. Fernando Ortiz Sanz (1 to 30 November 1965)

China

Mr. Liu Chieh (1 to 31 December 1965)

France

Mr. Roger Seydoux (1 to 31 January 1966)

Japan

Mr. Akira Matsui (1 to 28 February 1966)

Jordan

Dr. Muhammad H. El-Farra (1 to 31 March 1966)

Mali

Mr. Moussa Léo Keita (1 to 30 April 1966)

Netherlands

Dr. J. G. de Beus (1 to 31 May 1966)

New Zealand

Mr. Frank H. Corner (1 to 30 June 1966)

Nigeria

Chief S. O. Adebo (1 to 15 July 1966)

III. Meetings of the Security Council during the period from 16 July 1965 to 15 July 1966

<i>Meeting</i>	<i>Subject</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Meeting</i>	<i>Subject</i>	<i>Date</i>
1229th	Letter dated 1 May 1965 from the Permanent Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/6316) (regarding the Dominican Republic)	20 July 1965	1253rd	Question concerning the situation in territories under Portuguese administration: Letter dated 11 July 1963 addressed to the President of the Security Council by the representatives of thirty-two Member States (S/5347)	8 November 1965
1230th	Ditto	20 July 1965	1254th	Ditto	9 November 1965
1231st	Ditto	22 July 1965	1255th	Ditto	10 November 1965
1232nd	Ditto	26 July 1965	1256th	Ditto	11 November 1965
1233rd	Ditto	26 July 1965	1257th	Question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia: Letters dated 2 and 30 August 1963 addressed to the President of the Security Council on behalf of the representatives of thirty-two Member States (S/5382 and S/5409)	12 November 1965
1234th	Letter dated 26 December 1963 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/5488)	3 August 1965			
1235th	Ditto	5 August 1965	1258th	Ditto	12 November 1965
1236th	Ditto	10 August 1965	1259th	Ditto	13 November 1965
	Date of the election to fill a vacancy in the International Court of Justice		1260th	Ditto	13 November 1965
1237th	The India-Pakistan question	4 September 1965	1261st	Ditto	15 November 1965
1238th	Ditto	6 September 1965	1262nd	Election of a member of the International Court of Justice to fill the vacancy caused by the death of Judge Abdel Hamid Badawi (S/6817 and Add.1 and Add.2, and S/6818)	16 November 1965
1239th	Ditto	17 September 1965		Question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia: Letters dated 2 and 30 August 1963 addressed to the President of the Security Council on behalf of the representatives of thirty-two Member States (S/5382 and S/5409)	
1240th	Ditto	18 September 1965			
1241st	Ditto	18 September 1965			
1242nd	Ditto	20 September 1965			
1243rd	Admission of new Members	20 September 1965			
1244th	The India-Pakistan question	22 September 1965			
1245th	Ditto	27 September 1965			
1246th	Consideration of the report of the Security Council to the General Assembly (private)	28 September 1965	1263rd	Question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia: Letters dated 2 and 30 August 1963 addressed to the President of the Security Council on behalf of the representatives of thirty-two Member States (S/5382 and S/5409)	17 November 1965
1247th	The India-Pakistan question	25 October 1965			
1248th	The India-Pakistan question	27 October 1965			
1249th	Ditto	28 October 1965			
1250th	Question concerning the situation in territories under Portuguese administration: Letter dated 11 July 1963 addressed to the President of the Security Council by the representatives of thirty-two Member States (S/5347)	4 November 1965	1264th	Ditto	19 November 1965
1251st	The India-Pakistan question	5 November 1965	1265th	Ditto	20 November 1965
1252nd	Letter dated 26 December 1963 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/5488)	5 November 1965	1266th	Question concerning the situation in territories under Portuguese administration: Letter dated 11 July 1963 addressed to the	22 November 1965

<i>Meeting</i>	<i>Subject</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Meeting</i>	<i>Subject</i>	<i>Date</i>
	President of the Security Council by the representatives of thirty-two Member States (S/5347)		1275th	Ditto	16 March 1966
1267th	Ditto	22 November 1965	1276th	Question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia: Letters dated 2 and 30 August 1963 addressed to the President of the Security Council on behalf of the representatives of thirty-two Member States (S/5382 and S/5409)	9 April 1966
1268th	Ditto	23 November 1965			
1269th	Organization of work	16 December 1965	1277th	Ditto	9 April 1966
1270th	Letter dated 26 December 1963 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/5488)	17 December 1965	1278th	Ditto	17 May 1966
1271st	Letter dated 31 January 1966 from the Representative of the United States of America addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/7105) (regarding Viet-Nam)	1 February 1966	1279th	Ditto	17 May 1966
1272nd	Ditto	1 February 1966	1280th	Ditto	18 May 1966
1273rd	Ditto	2 February 1966	1281st	Ditto	18 May 1966
1274th	Letter dated 26 December 1963 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/5488)	15 March 1966	1282nd	Ditto	19 May 1966
			1283rd	Ditto	19 May 1966
			1284th	Ditto	20 May 1966
			1285th	Ditto	23 May 1966
			1286th	Letter dated 26 December 1963 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/5488)	16 June 1966
			1287th	Admission of new Members	21 June 1966

IV. Representatives, chairman and principal secretaries of the Military Staff Committee

A. REPRESENTATIVES OF EACH SERVICE IN RESPECT OF EACH DELEGATION

China

General Wang Shu-ming, Chinese Air Force	<i>Period of service from 16 July 1965</i> 16 July 1965 to present time
Rear Admiral Yang Yuan-chung, Chinese Navy	16 July 1965 to present time

France

Général de Brigade J. Compagnon, French Army	16 July 1965 to 18 August 1965
Général de Brigade G. Arnous-Rivière, French Army	18 August 1965 to present time
Capitaine de Frégate H. J. J. Rouleaux-Dugage, French Navy	16 July 1965 to present time
Colonel Maurice Boileau, French Air Force	16 July 1965 to 1 August 1965
Colonel Roland Charles, French Air Force	1 August 1965 to present time

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Major General V. I. Meshcheryakov, Soviet Army	16 July 1965 to present time
Captain A. R. Astafiev, Soviet Navy	16 July 1965 to present time
Major General A. N. Chizhov, Soviet Air Force	16 July 1965 to 19 August 1965
Colonel V. S. Afanasiev, Soviet Air Force	19 August 1965 to present time

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Major General R. E. T. St. John, British Army	16 July 1965 to 4 August 1965
Major General R. A. Fyffe, British Army	4 August 1965 to present time
Rear Admiral P. M. Compston, Royal Navy	16 July 1965 to present time
Air Vice-Marshal Ian G. Esplin, Royal Air Force	16 July 1965 to present time
Air Vice-Marshal A. D. Frank, Royal Air Force	30 September 1965 to present time

United States of America

Lt. General Thomas V. Dunn, US Army	16 July 1965 to 10 February 1966
Lt. General Charles H. Bonesteel III, US Army	10 February 1966 to present time
Vice-Admiral John S. McCain, Jr., US Navy	16 July 1965 to present time
Lt. General James Ferguson, US Air Force	16 July 1965 to present time

B. CHAIRMEN AT MEETINGS

<i>Meeting</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Chairman</i>	<i>Delegation</i>
526th	22 July 1965	Général de Brigade J. Compagon, French Army	France
527th	5 August 1965	Colonel V. I. Meshcheryakov, Soviet Army	USSR
528th	19 August 1965	Colonel V. I. Meshcheryakov, Soviet Army	USSR
529th	2 September 1965	Rear Admiral P. M. Compston, Royal Navy	United Kingdom
530th	16 September 1965	Major General R. A. Fyffe, British Army	United Kingdom
531st	30 September 1965	Air Vice-Marshal A. D. Frank, Royal Air Force	United Kingdom
532nd	14 October 1965	Vice-Admiral John S. McCain, Jr., US Navy	United States
533rd	28 October 1965	Vice-Admiral John S. McCain, Jr., US Navy	United States
534th	10 November 1965	Rear Admiral Yang Yuan-chung, Chinese Navy	China
535th	24 November 1965	General Wang Shu-ming, Chinese Air Force	China
536th	9 December 1965	Général de Brigade G. Arnous-Rivière, French Army	France
537th	23 December 1965	Général de Brigade G. Arnous-Rivière, French Army	France
538th	6 January 1966	Captain A. R. Astafiev, Soviet Navy	USSR
539th	20 January 1966	Colonel V. S. Afanasiev, Soviet Air Force	USSR
540th	3 February 1966	Rear Admiral P. M. Compston, Royal Navy	United Kingdom
541st	17 February 1966	Colonel C. H. Cowan, British Army	United Kingdom
542nd	3 March 1966	Colonel C. F. Nelson, US Army	United States
543rd	17 March 1966	Colonel J. M. Boyd, US Air Force	United States
544th	31 March 1966	Vice-Admiral John S. McCain, Jr., US Navy	United States
545th	14 April 1966	General Wang Shu-ming, Chinese Air Force	China
546th	28 April 1966	General Wang Shu-ming, Chinese Air Force	China
547th	12 May 1966	Lt. Colonel L. F. Monteagle, French Army	France
548th	26 May 1966	Général de Brigade G. Arnous-Rivière, French Army	France
549th	9 June 1966	Major General V. I. Meshcheryakov, Soviet Army	USSR
550th	23 June 1966	Captain A. R. Astafiev, Soviet Navy	USSR
551st	7 July 1966	Rear Admiral P. M. Compston, Royal Navy	United Kingdom

C. PRINCIPAL SECRETARIES AT MEETINGS

<i>Meeting</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Principal Secretary</i>	<i>Delegation</i>
526th	22 July 1965	Lt. Colonel L. F. Monteagle, French Army	France
527th	5 August 1965	Colonel V. I. Meshcheryakov, Soviet Army	USSR
528th	19 August 1965	Colonel V. I. Meshcheryakov, Soviet Army	USSR
529th	2 September 1965	Captain D. M. H. Stobie, Royal Navy	United Kingdom
530th	16 September 1965	Colonel C. H. Cowan, British Army	United Kingdom
531st	30 September 1965	Group Captain B. P. Mugford, Royal Air Force	United Kingdom
532nd	14 October 1965	Captain A. H. Warner, Jr., US Navy	United States
533rd	28 October 1965	Captain A. H. Warner, Jr., US Navy	United States
534th	10 November 1965	Colonel Hwang Hsiung-sheng, Chinese Air Force	China
535th	24 November 1965	Colonel Hwang Hsiung-sheng, Chinese Air Force	China
536th	9 December 1965	Lt. Colonel L. F. Monteagle, French Army	France
537th	23 December 1965	Lt. Colonel L. F. Monteagle, French Army	France
538th	6 January 1966	Colonel V. S. Tovma, Soviet Army	USSR
539th	20 January 1966	Captain 2nd Rank A. D. Golovtchenko, Soviet Navy	USSR
540th	3 February 1966	Lt. Colonel W. R. P. Adams, British Army	United Kingdom
541st	17 February 1966	Colonel C. H. Cowan, British Army	United Kingdom
542nd	3 March 1966	Colonel J. M. Boyd, US Air Force	United States
543rd	17 March 1966	Captain A. H. Warner, Jr., US Navy	United States
544th	31 March 1966	Colonel J. M. Boyd, US Air Force	United States
545th	14 April 1966	Colonel Hwang Hsiung-sheng, Chinese Air Force	China
546th	28 April 1966	Colonel Hwang Hsiung-sheng, Chinese Air Force	China
547th	12 May 1966	Lt. Colonel L. F. Monteagle, French Army	France
548th	26 May 1966	Lt. Colonel L. F. Monteagle, French Army	France
549th	9 June 1966	Major Y. P. Vetrov, Soviet Army	USSR
550th	23 June 1966	Major Y. P. Vetrov, Soviet Army	USSR
551st	7 July 1966	Colonel A. J. S. Crockett, Royal Marines	United Kingdom