

UNITED



NATIONS

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**REPORT
OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL
TO
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
16 July 1958 to 15 July 1959**

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

**OFFICIAL RECORDS : FOURTEENTH SESSION
SUPPLEMENT No. 2 (A/4190)**

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NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

INTRODUCTION	v
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PART I

Questions considered by the Security Council under its responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security

Chapter

1. LETTER DATED 22 MAY 1958 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF LEBANON ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL CONCERNING: "COMPLAINT BY LEBANON IN RESPECT OF A SITUATION ARISING FROM THE INTERVENTION OF THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF LEBANON, THE CONTINUANCE OF WHICH IS LIKELY TO ENDANGER THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY"	1
LETTER DATED 17 JULY 1958 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF JORDAN ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL CONCERN- ING: "COMPLAINT BY THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN OF INTER- FERENCE IN ITS DOMESTIC AFFAIRS BY THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC" ..	1
A. Further consideration of the complaint by Lebanon	1
B. Submission of the complaint by Jordan	3
C. Security Council resolution of 7 August 1958	13
D. Further reports of the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon and withdrawal of the Group	16
E. Removal of the Lebanese complaint from the list of matters of which the Security Council is seized	17
2. THE PALESTINE QUESTION	18
A. Complaint by Israel against the United Arab Republic concerning an incident of 3 December 1958 in the Huleh area	18
B. Complaint by Israel against the United Arab Republic concerning an incident of 23 January 1959 at Ma'ale Habashan	21
C. Other communications	22

PART II

Other matters considered by the Council

3. THE DATE OF ELECTION TO FILL A VACANCY IN THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE	25
4. ADMISSION OF NEW MEMBERS	25
A. Application of the Republic of Guinea	25
B. Consideration of proposals relating to the applications of the Republic of Korea, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Viet-Nam	25

PART III

The Military Staff Committee

<i>Chapter</i>	<i>Page</i>
5. WORK OF THE MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE	29

PART IV

Matters brought to the attention of the Security Council but not discussed in the Council

6. COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING THE INDIA-PAKISTAN QUESTION	31
7. REPORTS ON THE STRATEGIC TRUST TERRITORY OF THE PACIFIC ISLANDS . .	34
8. COMMUNICATIONS FROM THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES . . .	34
9. COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING THE SITUATION IN THE SOUTHERN PART OF THE ARABIAN PENINSULA	35
10. COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING PROPOSALS FOR THE CONVENING OF A MEETING OF HEADS OF GOVERNMENTS	35
11. LETTER DATED 25 JULY 1958 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL	36
12. REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE OF EXPERTS TO STUDY THE POSSIBILITY OF DETECTING VIOLATIONS OF A POSSIBLE AGREEMENT ON THE SUSPEN- SION OF NUCLEAR TESTS	36
13. COMMUNICATIONS FROM THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC RELATING TO THE SUEZ CANAL	36
14. LETTER DATED 29 SEPTEMBER 1958 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF LIBYA ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL	36
15. COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING THE SITUATION ON THE CAMBODIAN- THAI FRONTIER	37
16. QUESTION OF MEASURES TO PREVENT SURPRISE ATTACK	37
17. COMMUNICATIONS FROM THE REPRESENTATIVES OF TUNISIA AND FRANCE	38
18. COMMUNICATIONS FROM SAUDI ARABIA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND	38
19. COMMUNICATION RELATING TO THE KOREAN QUESTION	38
20. LETTER DATED 10 JULY 1959 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVES OF AFGHANIS- TAN, BURMA, CEYLON, ETHIOPIA, THE FEDERATION OF MALAYA, GHANA, GUINEA, INDONESIA, IRAN, IRAQ, JORDAN, LEBANON, LIBERIA, LIBYA, MOROCCO, NEPAL, PAKISTAN, SAUDI ARABIA, SUDAN, TUNISIA, THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC AND YEMEN CONCERNING ALGERIA . . .	39

Appendices

I. Representatives and deputy, alternate and acting representatives accred- ited to the Security Council	40
II. Presidents of the Security Council	40
III. Meetings of the Security Council during the period from 16 July 1958 to 15 July 1959	41
IV. Representatives, Chairmen and Principal Secretaries of the Military Staff Committee (16 July 1958 to 15 July 1959)	41

INTRODUCTION

The present report¹ is submitted to the General Assembly by the Security Council in accordance with Article 24, paragraph 3, and Article 15, paragraph 1, of the Charter.

Essentially a summary and guide reflecting the broad lines of the debates, the report is not intended as a substitute for the records of the Security Council, which

constitute the only comprehensive and authoritative account of its deliberations.

With respect to the membership of the Security Council during the period covered, it will be recalled that the General Assembly, at its 775th plenary meeting on 8 October 1958, elected Argentina, Italy and Tunisia as non-permanent members of the Council to fill vacancies resulting from the expiration, on 31 December 1958, of the term of office of Colombia, Iraq and Sweden.

The period covered in the present report is from 16 July 1958 to 15 July 1959. The Council held seventeen meetings during that period.

¹This is the fourteenth annual report of the Security Council to the General Assembly. The previous reports were submitted under the symbols A/93, A/366, A/620, A/945, A/1361, A/1873, A/2167, A/2437, A/2712, A/2935, A/3157, A/3648 and A/3901.

PART I

Questions considered by the Security Council under its responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security

Chapter I

LETTER DATED 22 MAY 1958 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF LEBANON ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL CONCERNING: "COMPLAINT BY LEBANON IN RESPECT OF A SITUATION ARISING FROM THE INTERVENTION OF THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF LEBANON, THE CONTINUANCE OF WHICH IS LIKELY TO ENDANGER THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY"

LETTER DATED 17 JULY 1958 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF JORDAN ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL CONCERNING: "COMPLAINT BY THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN OF INTERFERENCE IN ITS DOMESTIC AFFAIRS BY THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC"

A. Further consideration of the complaint by Lebanon¹

1. On 16 July 1958, the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon submitted, through the Secretary-General, an interim report (S/4051) to the Security Council. It stated that, on 15 July, the Group had completed the task of obtaining full freedom of access to all sections of the Lebanese frontier, and provided details of the arrangements made.

2. At the 829th meeting of the council on 16 July 1958, the Secretary-General, noting that the interim report of the Observation Group described the completion of arrangements for inspection all along the Lebanese border, expressed the hope that the Group would retain its key position although it might not be the only tool used by the United Nations in the effort to ensure against infiltration and the smuggling of arms.

3. The representative of the United States said that the United States draft resolution (S/4050 and Corr. 1)² had three principal purposes. It fully supported and sought to strengthen the operations of the Observation Group; it provided the basis for additional arrangements by the Secretary-General with a view to making contingents available, as necessary, as a further measure to protect the territorial integrity and political independence of Lebanon and to ensure that there was no illegal infiltration of personnel or supply of arms or other *matériel* across the Lebanese borders; and would make it possible for the United States forces to withdraw promptly if the provisions of the draft resolution were quickly carried out. He emphasized the importance

which his Government attached to the role of the Observation Group and declared that the United States forces would co-operate with the Group in every way. The Secretary-General was in the best position to determine and to work out, in co-operation with the Government of Lebanon, additional measures which would help to improve the operations of the Group. The United States was confident that he would continue to take every feasible step to that end. In that connection, the United States delegation recognized that the means available to the Group were insufficient to meet all aspects of the serious situation. The draft resolution therefore envisaged further additional measures by the United Nations in order to protect Lebanon's independence. That would make possible a prompt withdrawal of United States armed forces. The task of the contingents would be, first, to protect the territorial integrity and independence of Lebanon, and secondly, to ensure that there was no infiltration of personnel, or supply of arms or other *matériel*. United Nations forces would not be there to engage in hostilities or to fight a war, although it should be fully clear that they would have the authority to fire in self-defence in performance of their duties to prevent infiltration and to protect the integrity of Lebanon. The reference to the General Assembly resolutions entitled "Essentials of peace" and "Peace through deeds" was relevant as a reminder that the United Nations must meet and deal effectively with the problem of indirect aggression.

4. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that, although the United States representative praised the Observation Group, the results of the work of that Group were ignored, rejected or doubted. Whereas the United States draft resolution represented infiltration as continuing, there was no reference to what the Council had been told in that respect by the Observation Group. There was nothing in

¹For the previous consideration of this matter by the Security Council, see *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirteenth Session, Supplement No. 2, chapter 6*.

²See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirteenth Session, Supplement No. 2, para. 420*.

the reports of the Observation Group or the statements of the Secretary-General to support the assertion of the representative of the United States that, with the outbreak of the revolt in Iraq, the infiltration of arms and personnel had suddenly become much more alarming.³ Statements in the United States Press, he continued, left no doubt that the United States troops were in Lebanon not to uphold the Chamoun Government but to prevent the further spread of the disease of Arab nationalism which was coming from Iraq. Since it would be difficult to cure that disease, it could be assumed that something else was being planned in Lebanon. The name of Jordan had been mentioned, and punitive operations against the new Government of Iraq were also being envisaged. There was thus a great abyss between the high-sounding words used by the United States and the dark plans which those words were intended to cover.

5. The United States representative had stated, the USSR representative continued, that the United States troops did not wish to fight. Statements of opposition leaders in Lebanon made it apparent, however, that they would have to fight the Lebanese people. Adoption of the United States draft resolution would mean endorsing armed intervention and an act of aggression against the Lebanese people specifically and the Arab people generally. That the Council could not do. Reference had been made to provisions of the Charter concerning the right of self-defence, but the Charter said specifically that that right was enjoyed when there was a direct attack, when a State was threatened from outside. No such situation had been noted in Lebanon by the Council or by any other organ of the United Nations, and of course none had existed. The introduction of American troops, however, was a very grave threat not only to the independence of Lebanon but to international peace and security in the area and throughout the world. No self-respecting independent State, the USSR representative declared, would ever agree to send even so-called United Nations contingents to Lebanon under the conditions now extant there. The Charter envisaged the establishment of an international force to assist the victims of aggression in repelling aggression, but the Observation Group had not reported, and the Council had not noted, the existence of aggression in Lebanon. If United Nations contingents were sent, it would be merely to suppress the Lebanese people in flagrant contradiction to the Charter which forbade intervention in the domestic affairs of States. The appropriate course for the Council to follow was charted in the USSR draft resolution (S/4047).⁴ If the Council did not take the steps envisaged in that proposal, it would have to share the responsibility for the deterioration of the international situation, which the United States had so far borne alone.

6. The representative of the United States, in reply, declared that his delegation thought that the United Nations was not helpless against aggression by internal subversion from without, whereas the USSR representative thought that it was. The situation in Lebanon was part of a much bigger picture. In that connexion, he cited various reports received by the United States regarding assistance to members of the opposition in Lebanon from the United Arab Republic. He emphasized that no country was more friendly to Arab nationalism than the United States; the United States Government had demonstrated that on many an occasion. But there was a fundamental difference between the normal aspirations of nationalism, which were

proper and healthy, and the subversion of the independence of small nations.

7. The representative of Japan expressed deep concern over the recent developments in the Middle Eastern situation. There was much room for argument with regard to the recent United States move in Lebanon. His delegation shared the view of the representative of the United States that it was not an ideal way to solve present problems. The right thing for the Council to do in the circumstances would be to take a step which would assist in bringing about a situation where an early evacuation of the United States forces became possible. His delegation had some misgivings concerning the circumstances which had made necessary the landing of United States forces, but would support the United States draft resolution with the following observations: operative paragraph 1 appeared not quite consonant with the report of the Observation Group and his delegation had to reserve its position concerning the contribution of contingents.

8. At the 830th meeting on 16 July, the representative of the United Arab Republic reiterated that the armed intervention of the United States in Lebanon was unjustified and that, as the statements of the Secretary-General and the Observation Group attested, the situation in that country had been improving continuously. The Council was faced in Lebanon with a civil war—a Lebanese problem which the Lebanese themselves would have to resolve. The Iraqi events were also strictly internal in nature and likewise could not justify the intervention. Article 51 of the Charter did not apply: there had been no armed aggression against Lebanon, and the matter had already been discussed in the Council, which had adopted a resolution on it on 11 June 1958. It was regrettable that the United States should have taken such a decision unilaterally. Its action recalled painful memories and would detract from the reputation of the United States in the Middle East. He quoted the text of a message, addressed to the President of the Security Council and to the Secretary-General by the President of the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies, protesting against the landing of American forces, which was termed a threat to peace and security in the Middle East, and demanding their immediate evacuation.

9. Referring to the United States draft resolution, the representative of the United Arab Republic declared that operative paragraph 1 was not consistent with the report of the Observation Group or with the facts. Further, the Council could not endorse the armed intervention of the United States, as was suggested in the preamble. His delegation also had misgivings concerning operative paragraph 3. What would the United Nations forces have to do and on what basis would they be sent to Lebanon? Finally, referring to the reports cited by the representative of the United States at the previous meeting, he declared that it was unwise to put on record in the Council information received from intelligence sources. The Council was not in a position to consider such information.

10. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics read a statement by his Government in connexion with the events in the Middle and Near East. In that statement, the USSR Government declared that the real reason for the armed intervention of the United States in Lebanon was the attempt of the oil monopolies of the United States and of other western countries to retain their colonial domination in the countries of the Middle and Near East and also the obvious bankruptcy of their policies in that area, the bankruptcy of the

³ *Ibid.*, para. 387.

⁴ *Ibid.*, para. 409.

Baghdad Pact and of the ill-fated and notorious Eisenhower Doctrine. Thus the colonial Powers had met the creation of the Republic of Iraq with unconcealed hostility. The President of Lebanon had been inspired to make a statement requesting the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and France to send their troops to Lebanon. It was well known, however, that in Lebanon events were occurring which had their basis in strictly domestic considerations. The landing of American troops in Lebanon was an act of armed intervention in regard to all freedom-loving Arab countries. That was demonstrated by the fact that the United States Government had linked the dispatch of its troops with events in Iraq, as well as by the fact that King Hussein of Jordan, obviously acting on the advice of his protectors, had taken the provocative step of announcing himself to be the head of the already defunct Iraqi-Jordan Federation.

11. The armed intervention of the United States in Lebanon, the USSR statement continued, created a great threat to the peace and was fraught with very far-reaching consequences. Having embarked upon the course of gross violation of the Charter of the United Nations, the United States Government now sought to confront the Security Council and the United Nations as a whole with a *fait accompli* and, through pressure, to obtain United Nations endorsement of its unilateral aggressive action. The situation which had developed as a result of the open aggression of the United States, supported by the colonial Powers, was such that the Council and the General Assembly must take the most urgent and emphatic measures to put an end to aggression and to uphold the national independence of the Arab countries which had been subjected to an unprovoked attack. The USSR Government insistently appealed to the Government of the United States to end its armed intervention in the domestic affairs of the Arab countries and to withdraw forthwith its troops from Lebanon. The Soviet Union could not remain indifferent to the events which constituted a serious threat to an area adjacent to its national frontiers and it assumed freedom of action that might be dictated by the interests of the maintenance of peace and security.

12. The Secretary-General and the President, in reply to questions put by the representative of Lebanon, stated that no communication had so far been received by them from the President of the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies.

13. The representative of Sweden noted that the new element to which reference was made to justify the provision of military assistance by the United States to Lebanon was events in another country. The implication would seem to be that something similar could happen in Lebanon. To the extent that the Council was confronted with a decision of a State to request assistance from another State in order to stabilize an internal situation, that was not a question falling directly within the jurisdiction of the United Nations. In that connexion, he referred to Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter. On the other hand, it had been stated that the United States had acted in accordance with the principle expressed in the Charter on collective self-defence. It was apparently considered that measures had been taken in accordance with Article 51 or at least in the spirit of that Article. According to the Charter, measures of that kind came under the examination of the Council. One of the conditions for Article 51 to be applicable was that an armed attack had occurred against a Member State. The Swedish Government did not consider that that condi-

tion had been fulfilled in the present case, nor did it consider that there was an international conflict in the terms of Article 51. The action taken by the United States Government had substantially altered the conditions of the observers in Lebanon, and the question was whether in practice they were able to fulfil their task as set forth in the Council resolution of 11 June. The proper course to take, in his Government's opinion, might be to suspend until further notice the activities of the observers in Lebanon.

14. The representative of the United States hoped that the Observation Group would not be suspended and that, on the contrary, it would continue and would develop its activities.

15. The Secretary-General stated that he hoped to have, by the following day, an elaboration of the preliminary report presented that day by the Observation Group, an elaboration which might give a more satisfactory basis for an evaluation of the significance of that operation in the existing situation.

16. On 17 July, the Secretary-General transmitted to the Security Council the second interim report (S/4052) of the Observation Group. In his letter of transmittal, he stated that he fully endorsed the plan outlined in the report as representing an adequate interpretation of the Security Council resolution of 11 June, in the light of the needs and possibilities flowing from the progressive development of the operations of the Group. In that regard, he referred to the interpretation of that resolution that he had made on 15 July.⁵

17. In its second interim report, the Observation Group set out the results of a review of its needs in the light of its having secured access to all sections of the Lebanese frontier on 15 July. Among other things, it stated its intention to suggest to the Secretary-General that a force of unarmed non-commissioned personnel and other ranks should be assigned to it, indicated that the number of observers would have to be raised to 200, and described its requirements in respect of aircraft and crews. The actual strategy of observation activities, the Group said, had been undergoing a fundamental change with the development of the organization and increasing access to the border areas. Under this new strategy instead of making use of probing operations to points on the frontier from the widely scattered outstations and posts, permanent posts could now be established at or near the main road intersections with the frontier. In addition to increased air patrols, more extensive patrolling between those posts, on foot or by mule in areas where jeeps could not operate, was the next logical step. With the envisaged increase in the observer force and the addition of enlisted personnel, together with supporting equipment, direct and constant patrolling of the actual frontier would be possible.

B. Submission of the complaint by Jordan

18. In a letter dated 17 July 1958 (S/4053), addressed to the President of the Security Council, the permanent representative of Jordan requested the inclusion, for urgent consideration, of the following item in the agenda of the Security Council: "Complaint by the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan of interference in its domestic affairs by the United Arab Republic".

19. At the 831st meeting on 17 July, the President suggested that the letter from the representative of Jordan be discussed first.

20. The representative of the Union of Soviet Social-

⁵ *Ibid.*, paras. 390-394.

ist Republics observed that it was difficult to decide whether the Jordanian complaint warranted urgent consideration, since no explanation had been given in the letter from the representative of Jordan. His delegation did not object to the inclusion of the item in the agenda, but that fact should not in any way be construed to mean that it endorsed the wording of the item or recognized that the charges of Jordan against the United Arab Republic were valid. Inclusion of the item would enable the Security Council thoroughly to consider the question of the armed intervention of the United Kingdom in Jordan. The Lebanese question and the new item might be discussed concurrently by the Council. The situation in the Near East was so grave and was deteriorating so rapidly that the Council must try to save its time.

Decision: *The provisional agenda, in which the letter dated 22 May 1958 from the representative of Lebanon and the letter dated 17 July 1958 from the representative of Jordan figured as items 2 and 3, was adopted, with the understanding that the two items would be discussed concurrently. The representative of Jordan was invited to take a place at the Council table.*

21. The representative of Jordan declared that his country had always been peaceful and had maintained an attitude of good will towards the other Arab States. But for more than a year, it had been subjected to continuous attempts to overthrow its Government by subversive elements employed from outside. The plot by the United Arab Republic to subvert the machinery of government in Jordan was well known. It had been frustrated by the courage and alertness of the King and by the loyalty of the army and people of Jordan. He noted that some of the officers involved in the attempted *coup d'état* of April 1957 had been given refuge in Egypt and Syria and had been allowed to carry on with their activities against the Jordan Government. The failure of that earlier attempt had not prevented the United Arab Republic from openly manifesting its hostility to Jordan. The smuggling of saboteurs and agents into the country together with clandestine supplies of arms, ammunition and supplies, had become common. The radio and Press of the United Arab Republic had been directed to create the confusion and subversion necessary to bring about the realization of the sinister plan to overthrow the existing régime in Jordan. That campaign was conducted in the name of Arab nationalism, but true Arab nationalism did not recognize aggressive designs, bloodshed, subversion or the sowing of the seeds of discord and confusion among the ranks of a nation. Jordan had continued to deal with the varied forms of aggression coming from the United Arab Republic until it had recently been faced with an imminent threat to its safety and integrity, of dimensions such that Jordan could not cope with it unaided. It had been faced with the danger of events similar to those in Lebanon and Iraq. There had been movements of United Arab Republic troops from Syria along its northern borders. A number of Jordan army officers had been arrested the previous week, and investigation had disclosed their intention to destroy Jordan's independence and integrity. Faced with such a threat to its integrity and independence through imminent foreign armed aggression, and an attempt by the United Arab Republic to create internal disorder and to overthrow the existing régime, the Jordan Government, with the King's approval, and basing itself upon the unanimous decision of the Jordan National Assembly, and in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the United

Nations Charter, had requested the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States to come to its immediate aid. British troops had been landing on Jordan territory since early that morning in a generous response to that request.

22. The representative of the United Kingdom said that his Government had no doubt whatever of the preparation of a fresh attempt to overthrow the régime in Jordan and to create internal disorder. In the light of that knowledge, the movements of Syrian forces towards the northern frontier of Jordan had been ominous developments. The information available to his Government had been confirmed that day by the Baghdad radio, which had repeatedly declared that a revolution had started in Iraq and one in Lebanon, and that on the following day another revolution would start in Jordan which would wipe out the monarchy. The appeal of the Government of Jordan for assistance from free Governments in maintaining the country's independence was natural and entirely justified in the circumstances. The Government of Jordan had been entitled to make it under international law just as the United Kingdom Government had been entitled to respond. There was nothing either in the Charter or in the established rules of international law to inhibit a Government from asking a friendly Government for military assistance as a defensive measure when it considered itself to be in danger. Nor was there anything to inhibit the Government thus appealed to from responding. The United Kingdom Government had decided to accede to the request and was accordingly dispatching forces by air to Amman. Those British forces were in Jordan for the purpose of helping the King and Government of that country to preserve its political independence and territorial integrity. They were not there for any military purpose of their own and their presence did not constitute a threat to any other country. If arrangements could be made by the Security Council to protect the lawful Government of Jordan from external threat and so maintain peace and security, the action which his Government had felt obliged to take would be brought to an end. The appeal had been made to the United Kingdom Government in circumstances of extreme urgency, and action had to be taken without delay; the Security Council had been informed at the first possible opportunity. The factor of indirect aggression was the common one linking the situation in Jordan and Lebanon. Aggression by fomenting civil strife in the interest of a foreign Power was one of the gravest offences against peace and security. His delegation was confident that the United Nations would continue to recognize the principles which it had formulated and adopted in General Assembly resolution 380 (V) entitled "Peace through deeds".

23. The representative of the United States said that his Government supported the action of the United Kingdom Government in responding affirmatively to the urgent appeal of Jordan for assistance in the defence of Jordanian independence and integrity. He introduced the following revision of the United States draft resolution in regard to the situation in Lebanon (S/4050/Rev.1):

"The Security Council,

"Recalling its resolution of 11 June 1958 establishing an Observation Group 'to ensure that there is no illegal infiltration of personnel or supply of arms or other matériel across the Lebanese borders',

"Commending the efforts of the Secretary-General and noting with satisfaction the progress made to date

and the encouraging achievements reported by the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon,

"Recalling that, in its resolution 290 (IV) of 1 December 1949 on 'Essentials of peace', the General Assembly called upon States to 'refrain from any threats or acts, direct or indirect, aimed at impairing the freedom, independence or integrity of any State, or at fomenting civil strife and subverting the will of the people in any State',

"Recalling that in its resolution 380 (V) of 17 November 1950 on 'Peace through deeds', the General Assembly condemned 'intervention of a State in the internal affairs of another State for the purpose of changing its legally established government by the threat or use of force' and solemnly reaffirmed that 'whatever weapons used, any aggression, whether committed openly, or by fomenting civil strife in the interest of a foreign Power, or otherwise, is the gravest of all crimes against peace and security throughout the world',

"Noting the statement of the representative of Lebanon that infiltration of arms and personnel is continuing and the territorial integrity and independence of Lebanon are being threatened, that the Government of Lebanon in the exercise of the right of self-defence had temporarily requested direct assistance of friendly countries, and that the Government of Lebanon requested further assistance from the Security Council to uphold its integrity and independence,

"Noting the statement of the representative of the United States of America regarding the provision of assistance by the United States to the Government of Lebanon at its request to help maintain the territorial and political independence of Lebanon.

"Noting further the statement of the United States representative that United States forces will remain in Lebanon 'only until the United Nations itself is able to assume the necessary responsibility to ensure the continued independence of Lebanon' or the danger is otherwise terminated,

"1. Invites the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon to continue to develop its activities pursuant to the Security Council resolution of 11 June 1958;

"2. Requests the Secretary-General immediately to consult the Government of Lebanon and other Member States as appropriate with a view to making arrangements for additional measures, including the contribution and use of contingents, as may be necessary to protect the territorial integrity and independence of Lebanon and to ensure that there is no illegal infiltration of personnel or supply of arms or other matériel across the Lebanese borders;

"3. Calls upon all Governments concerned to co-operate fully in the implementation of the present resolution;

"4. Calls for the immediate cessation of all illegal infiltration of personnel or supply of arms or other matériel across the Lebanese borders, as well as attacks upon the Government of Lebanon by government-controlled radio and other information media calculated to stimulate disorders;

"5. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council as appropriate."

24. The United States representative said that his

delegation regretted the suggestion of the representative of Sweden that the Observation Group might have to suspend its activities and considered that the situation demanded instead its prompt expansion and intensification, as well as an increase of the United Nations role through the contingents mentioned in the United States draft resolution. He noted that the Observation Group's report, which advocated the establishment of further stations and an increase in the number of observers, made it clear that the Group did not think it should suspend its activities. Pointing out that the Observation Group had not made a final report, he declared that it was fallacious to assume that because the Group had not reported a certain event, that event had not occurred. The Group undoubtedly possessed a great deal of information which it had not yet reported or had time to evaluate. The Government of Lebanon, which was after all primarily responsible for the security of the country, had clearly felt that the sharpened intensity of violent events in the Middle East threatened its security in a new way. Obviously, that was a type of evaluation which was beyond the scope of the Observation Group.

25. Turning to the general question of Arab nationalism, he stated that the United States believed in change and constructive revolution for itself and for others; it wanted to help those who had not governed themselves to become self-governing. But those things should be done peacefully and without causing an international convulsion. It did not believe in assassination, violence, mob rule or subversion. The brutal fact confronting the United Nations was indirect aggression. If it did not meet that challenge, it would invite subversion all over the world.

26. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, citing reports concerning the movement of United States forces, declared that their concentration in the south-western part of Turkey represented a direct threat of invasion to the Syrian area of the United Arab Republic. Now the Council was confronted by the armed intervention of the United Kingdom in Jordan. The ostensible reason for that intervention was the invitation received from King Hussein, but the reality was revealed by Western Press reports making it clear that the intervention was designed to help King Hussein overthrow the revolutionary movement in Iraq. It was quite obvious that the explanations of the United Kingdom Government regarding the purpose of sending British troops to Jordan were untrue. Jordan was not threatened by anyone. The invasion of Jordan by British troops, which followed upon the American invasion of Lebanon, showed that there was a conspiracy between the United Kingdom and the United States against the peace-loving peoples of the Near and Middle East, and particularly against the liberation movement of the Arab peoples. The landing of British troops in Jordan was a desperate attempt of obsolete British imperialism to retain its positions in the Near and Middle East and to take revenge for the failure of the aggression against Egypt in 1956.

27. The actions of the American imperialists and their partners, he continued, constituted a serious threat to peace and security throughout the world. That threat was growing and the Council must act forthwith and resolutely. He introduced the following revision of the USSR draft resolution (S/4047/Rev.1), stating that if the Council were not able to adopt it, his Government would demand the immediate calling of an emergency session of the General Assembly:

"The Security Council,

"Having heard the United States representative's announcement concerning the introduction of United States armed forces within the confines of Lebanon and also the United Kingdom representative's announcement concerning the introduction of United Kingdom armed forces into Jordan,

"Recognizing that such actions constitute gross intervention in the domestic affairs of the peoples of the Arab countries and are consequently contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations as set forth in its Charter and, in particular, in Article 2, paragraph 7, which prohibits intervention in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State,

"Considering that the actions of the United States and the United Kingdom constitute a serious threat to international peace and security,

"Calls upon the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom to cease armed intervention in the domestic affairs of the Arab States and to remove their troops from the territories of Lebanon and Jordan immediately."

28. The representative of China, dealing with the various comments made upon the work of the Observation Group in Lebanon, noted that the Group had not been able to go into the critical areas, namely those controlled by the rebels. It had so far been able to visit less than one-tenth of the frontier between Lebanon and Syria. Consequently, its reports proved nothing one way or another. There was no justification for arguing that that meant that what did not exist in the reports did not exist at all, and the evidence submitted to the Council by Lebanon remained impressive. In addition, the United States had produced vital supplementary evidence and the tragic events in Iraq had thrown a flood of light on the developments in Lebanon. The Council would be unrealistic if it continued to view the crisis in Lebanon in isolation from events in Iraq. It should take additional measures for the protection of the independence and integrity of Lebanon and should not brush aside the Lebanese Government's judgement as to the dangers it faced. The Council did not have the right to restrict itself to observation. Article 1 of the Charter, the representative of China stated, was not restricted to cases of direct aggression. His country knew as well as any that indirect aggression was quite as dangerous as direct aggression.

29. With regard to Jordan, he felt that the Jordanian appeal to the United Kingdom for military aid was a legitimate exercise of Jordan's right of self-defence and that the United Kingdom response was completely proper.

30. The representative of the United Arab Republic said that the Jordanian complaint was not sufficiently substantiated and noted that it was not even accompanied by an explanatory memorandum. The facts were vague and related to events which had taken place more than a year before. It was clear that the complaint was a pretext for the British intervention in Jordan. The decision of the Head of the Jordanian State to request the return of British troops to his country must be regretted. Nobody threatened Jordan. The intervention had been decided upon long before the broadcasts of radio Baghdad which had been invoked as evidence of a threat. There was no need for such empty charges if the United Kingdom Government sincerely believed its intervention in Jordan to be justified by virtue of inter-

national law and the Charter. The truth was that the United Kingdom wished to revert to colonial or imperialist policies.

31. Reiterating his position on the Lebanese complaint, he stated that unsubstantiated intelligence reports could not be the basis of a decision of the Council. Indeed, the Council, in its resolution of 11 June, had clearly stated that it was far from being convinced by the information submitted to it. The latest report of the Observation Group confirmed the thesis that there had been no motive for the United States to land troops in Lebanon, where the observers now had access to all areas. In that respect, he supported the statement made by the representative of Sweden. What applied to the United States intervention in Lebanon also applied to the United Kingdom intervention in Jordan. That intervention had unfortunately made the international situation far more grave and seemed to be a clear attempt to interfere in the domestic affairs of Iraq, where, by all accounts, the situation was now stable. The aggressive actions taken by the United Kingdom and the United States could only be a threat to peace and security in that part of the world.

32. On 17 July, the representative of Sweden submitted the following draft resolution (S/4054) :

"The Security Council,

"Noting the communication from the United States Government regarding its decision to comply with a request by the Government of Lebanon for military assistance,

"Noting further that United States troops have subsequently arrived in Lebanon,

"Recognizing that the United Nations, according to the Charter, is not authorized to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State,

"Considering that the action now taken by the United States Government has substantially altered the conditions under which the Security Council decided on 11 June 1958 to send observers to Lebanon,

"Requests the Secretary-General to suspend the activities of the observers in Lebanon until further notice,

"Decides to keep the item on its agenda."

33. At the 832nd meeting on 17 July, the representative of France said that his Government considered that, like the United States intervention in Lebanon at the request of the Lebanese Government, the United Kingdom initiative with regard to Jordan was justified. In both cases, the Council was faced with tactics designed to overthrow the legitimate Government of a country and to replace it by a régime more in line with the purposes and interests of another State. Reiterating the position adopted by his delegation concerning the Lebanese complaint, he noted that the Observation Group had not been able, at least until recently, efficiently to carry out the mission entrusted to it by the Council. His Government wished the efficiency of the Group to be increased. The need for improvement was recognized by the Group itself. If the provisions of the resolution of 11 June were inadequate to enable the Group to fulfil its assignment, his Government was prepared to study with the Government of Lebanon and the members of the Security Council, as well as the General Assembly, the additional arrangements which were referred to in the United States draft resolution (S/4050/Rev.1). There was no reason to suspend the activities of the Group since the United States inter-

vention was not in any way supposed to replace the action of the United Nations and was to come to an end as soon as the United Nations was able to make the necessary arrangements to ensure the closing of the Lebanese frontier to all infiltration.

34. The representative of Sweden, recalling the statement he had made at the 829th meeting on 16 July (see paragraph 13 above), stated, with reference to the Swedish draft resolution (S/4054), that should a plan be worked out which would, *inter alia*, lead to the withdrawal of the United States troops, the whole question would appear in a new light. It was in view of that possibility that the Swedish draft resolution mentioned only the suspension of the activities of the Observation Group until further notice.

35. The representative of Japan reiterated his country's hope that the stationing of United States troops in Lebanon would come to an end as soon as possible. A solution to the Lebanese question should be sought only through the machinery of the United Nations which should alone determine the question of the existence of infiltration into Lebanon or of a threat to that country's security and the measures that might be taken as a result. It was not desirable that one country should take, on its own judgement, specific measures on those matters without waiting for such determination by the United Nations. It was therefore necessary that the United Nations should promptly take such practical measures as would enable an early withdrawal of the United States forces. It should seriously examine the circumstances which had made it necessary to dispatch those forces and should take such measures as were appropriate to cope with the situation. Mere disapproval would not contribute to a solution.

36. The representative of the United Kingdom said that he was not surprised that the USSR representative had suggested that British action in Jordan was intervention made for selfish purposes over the heads of the Government of Jordan. The United Kingdom Government, faced by an appeal of that kind from any friendly Government, would of course give it the most serious consideration. The urgency of the appeal by the Government of Jordan had been so apparent that his Government had felt that it could neither refuse to respond to the appeal nor hesitate in its action. The USSR and the United Kingdom, he continued, evidently approached those great issues in international conduct from opposite poles. His Government wanted stability and peace and abhorred revolution and incitement to revolution, which the USSR representative appeared to consider the natural state of affairs for the world. Thus that representative entirely overlooked the original interference from outside Lebanon, the basis from which the Council's resolution of 11 June implicitly proceeded, and accordingly branded as aggression the steps taken by the United States to supplement the efforts of the United Nations in response to an appeal of the Head of the Lebanese State and the Lebanese Government. Declaring that his delegation supported the United States draft resolution (S/4050/Rev.1), he welcomed the information that the Observation Group was now in a position to have access to the frontier areas and planned an expansion of its activities.

37. The representative of Jordan emphasized that British troops had landed in Jordan at the request of the Government of Jordan, with the approval of the King, and in accordance with the unanimous decision of the Jordanian National Assembly. The attempted *coups d'état* that had occurred in Jordan, together with

the movement of the United Arab Republic troops on the northern borders of Jordan, were sufficient to prove the threat that had forced Jordan to seek aid urgently from the United Kingdom and the United States, using the right embodied in Article 51 of the Charter. It had been forced to do so by the attempts of the United Arab Republic to create a situation in Jordan not dissimilar to the situations in Lebanon and in Iraq.

38. The representative of the United States observed that the USSR representative had failed to refer to the repeatedly expressed desire of the United States to withdraw from Lebanon as soon as the United Nations could take over.

39. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that the sanction of the United Nations had not been requested for the introduction of American troops into Lebanon. They scarcely needed that sanction to withdraw. It was fallacious to suggest, as the United States draft resolution did, that the United Nations had not assumed any responsibility about Lebanon up to that time. The Council had considered the Lebanese complaint, and, without deciding anything with regard to its substance, had assumed the responsibility for the situation in Lebanon by sending a group of observers there. The United States had voted in favour of the relevant resolution. The trouble was that the United States had chosen to ignore that responsibility of the United Nations and had taken unilateral action which not only ran counter to the Council's decision but was also a flagrant violation of the Charter. The Swedish draft resolution was completely justified and the retention of observers would represent a tacit covering up of United States armed intervention in the domestic affairs of Lebanon. His delegation considered that the Secretary-General would also have to draw appropriate conclusions regarding the activities of the Observation Group following the arrival of the United States troops in Lebanon.

40. The representative of the United Kingdom declared unequivocally that the United Kingdom would withdraw its troops if the legally constituted Government of Jordan requested it to do so.

41. The representative of Panama expressed his delegation's regret that the very grave situation in the Near East had required an urgent measure to be taken by a friendly Power. His delegation felt that the United States draft resolution would place the United Nations in a position of being able to take efficient measures for the establishment of peace in the Middle East. It would lead to an immediate withdrawal of United States troops and leave the situation fully in the hands of the United Nations.

42. At the 833rd meeting on 18 July, the representative of Lebanon informed the Council of comments made by his Government on the second interim report of the Observation Group (S/4052). These comments emphasized the limitations to which the operations of the Group had been and continued to be subject. They were not, the Lebanese representative said, criticisms of the Group, with which his Government wished fully to co-operate and to which it wished to lend the necessary assistance so that the Group might successfully carry out its assignment. In reply to various observations that had been made by the representative of the USSR, he said that the USSR position was based on denial of the Lebanese complaint. But nobody would deny that the Government of Lebanon was the legitimate Government of the country and that it was entitled, and had

the duty, to request assistance from the United Nations if it judged that the independence of Lebanon was really threatened by foreign intervention. Some delegations, however, seemed to dispute his Government's right to request assistance from free countries pending assistance from the United Nations on the ground that the right could be invoked under Article 51 of the Charter only in the case of direct armed attack from the outside. But Article 51 referred merely to armed attack and was intended to cover all cases of armed attack, whether direct or indirect. The basic question, therefore, was whether there were or were not in Lebanon examples of armed attack including the infiltration of armed men and the shipment of arms and war *matériel*. The USSR representative simply denied that there was any such intervention. It must be recalled, however, that it was the facts submitted to the Council by his Government, as well as the information available to the members of the Council, which had convinced that body of the gravity of the situation in Lebanon and had prompted it to send the Observation Group with the assignment to see to it that there was no illegal infiltration of men or shipment of weapons over the Lebanese borders. Dealing with the reports of the Group, he emphasized that it felt that it could report to the Council only the incidents which it had itself directly observed. On the other hand, the reports submitted by the Lebanese Government to the Observation Group contained for the most part facts observed by that Government's agents and often reached the Group only after the facts were no longer observable. Moreover, the duty of the Group was to put an end to infiltration rather than to tell the Council whether there was any infiltration. In any case, the conclusions so far submitted by the observers certainly did not justify the view that there was no infiltration of men and *matériel* into Lebanon. It was significant that the rebels held, with very few exceptions, only those areas of Lebanon bordering on Syria. It was also significant that they had attempted to prevent the observers from entering their territory. If the Observation Group were convinced that there was no infiltration, as the USSR representative claimed, why did it ask for additional means to carry out the task assigned to it? It must also be asked where the rebels received the vast amounts of weapons and ammunition by means of which they had been able to hold off the regular army of Lebanon for the last two months, particularly since those weapons included heavy weapons which only Governments could supply and which the rebels never claimed to have captured from the Lebanese army forces. It must also be asked where the rebels obtained the vast sums of money necessary to sustain such a rebellion, whereas the Government of Lebanon had had to ask for financial assistance from the United States to meet the budgetary deficit caused by the rebellion. He cited the report of a statement made by a leader of the Lebanese opposition to the effect that the rebels were receiving assistance from the United Arab Republic and that their numbers included a few thousand armed men from Syria. The action of the Lebanese Government was thus fully justified, in contrast to the attempt of those who wished to deprive Lebanon of its inherent right to self-defence and to prevent it from receiving the assistance necessary to uphold its independence.

43. The representative of the United Arab Republic informed the Security Council that on the previous day the United States Ambassador in Cairo had communicated to his Government a note stating that the need to lend assistance to Lebanon was brought about by

the change of Government in Iraq, and that the United Arab Republic must understand that if American troops were attacked by troops of the United Arab Republic or by elements under its control or carrying out its instructions, there was a danger that the problem would grow and acquire major proportions. The important and serious part of that note, he said, was that the United States wished to be the judge as to the elements under the control, or accepting the directives, of the United Arab Republic. In so doing, the United States would base itself on the unilateral reports received from its own information services, as it had done despite the report of the Observation Group, in the case of its intervention in Lebanon. That note gave an idea of the real intentions of the United States Government and its policy in the Middle East in general. The threat inherent in that position was fraught with grave consequences. Thus the King of Jordan still spoke of the liberation of Iraq although the Arab Union had ceased to exist.

44. The representative of the United States said that forces of the United States were in Lebanon at the specific request of the lawfully constituted Government of Lebanon and would not remain if their withdrawal were requested by that Government.

45. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that the representative illegally occupying the seat of the representative of Iraq had affirmed that the union of Iraq and Jordan continued in being. The reality was, however, that the Government of Iraq had announced its immediate withdrawal from the Federation. Why was it necessary, then, to state that the Federation continued to exist? The United States and the United Kingdom also considered that the union continued to exist. That political fiction was necessary to justify the re-establishment in Iraq of the *status quo ante* that had existed before 14 July. Citing reports broadcast by the Jordan radio to the effect that the Jordanian Government would take action to "liberate" Iraq, he asked the representative of Jordan whether the reports were true. If aggression against the new Government of Iraq was not being prepared, the fact should be stated openly.

46. The threat contained in the United States note to the Government of the United Arab Republic, he continued, could not be passed over in silence by the Security Council. The time had come for the Council to demand that the United States and the United Kingdom withdraw their troops from Lebanon and Jordan forthwith since they constituted a serious threat to peace not only in the Middle East but throughout the world.

47. At the 834th meeting on 18 July, the Secretary-General submitted a report to the Council (S/4060), in accordance with rule 15 of the provisional rules of procedure, on the credentials of the representative of Iraq. The question of the representation of Iraq was then discussed by the Council.

48. Following that discussion, the President, speaking as the representative of Colombia, said that his delegation shared the concern felt by other delegations over the events taking place in the Middle East. It sincerely appreciated the sadness with which the United States had had to send its armed forces to the territory of foreign countries. No matter what decision the Council might adopt, he continued, none of the proposals before it would basically solve the substantive problem that had acutely and deeply convulsed that important part of the world. At most, one of the alarming symp-

toms would be alleviated. The Council must decide to study the root of the problem so as to eradicate once and for all the sources of unhappiness, disorder and rebellion that disturbed and troubled those countries. His delegation would vote in favour of the United States draft resolution but reserved its position concerning any provision of troops by Colombia.

49. After some consideration of the procedure to be followed the Council voted upon the various draft resolutions before it.

Decision: *The USSR draft resolution (S/4047/Rev.1) was rejected by 8 votes to 1 (USSR) with 2 abstentions (Japan, Sweden).*

Decision: *The United States draft resolution (S/4050/Rev.1.) received 9 votes in favour and 1 against (USSR), with 1 abstention (Sweden). The negative vote being that of a permanent member of the Council, the draft resolution was not adopted.*

Decision: *The Swedish draft resolution (S/4054) was rejected by 9 votes to 2 (Sweden, USSR).*

50. The representative of the United States regretted the USSR veto of the United States draft resolution. Once again the Council had been frustrated in its effort to mitigate the present threat to the peace of the world. The United States, however, believed that all available United Nations remedies must be exhausted. He submitted the following draft resolution (S/4056) but, noting that the representative of Japan intended to submit a new draft resolution to the Council, he stated his willingness to withhold the new United States proposal:

"The Security Council,

"Having considered the 'Complaint by Lebanon in respect of a situation arising from the intervention of the United Arab Republic in the internal affairs of Lebanon, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security',

"Taking into account that the lack of unanimity of its permanent members at the 834th meeting of the Security Council has prevented it from exercising its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security,

"Decides to call an emergency special session of the General Assembly, as provided in General Assembly resolution 377 (V), in order to make appropriate recommendations concerning the Lebanon complaint."

51. The representative of the United Kingdom also expressed regret that the exercise of the veto by the USSR had prevented the Council from following the approach embodied in the United States draft resolution. The USSR draft resolution which ignored the problem under consideration by the Council and would have had the Council decide that the assistance given by the United States to the Government of Lebanon should be withdrawn without anything being put in its place, had been quite unacceptable to his Government. As regards the Swedish draft resolution, his Government saw no incompatibility between the presence in the territory of the forces of a friendly Power and of a United Nations agency. It would have been particularly unfortunate to suspend the activities of the Observation Group at the very moment when the Council had been informed of their success in opening the frontier regions to their inspection and of their plans for increasing the efficiency of the operations.

52. Repeating his Government's position on the ques-

tion of the dispatch of British troops to Jordan, he emphasized that the sole purpose of the forces sent there by the United Kingdom was to secure the stability of the Government against external aggression or against a *coup* so created, and that that was the sole role that such a force would be allowed to undertake. The Agreement of Association of the Arab Union made it clear that each member State of the Union would retain its international status and its existing system of government. It was to the Kingdom of Jordan that the United Kingdom was sending its help. There was no question of the United Kingdom using the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, and its action did not conflict with Article 2, paragraph 4, or any other provision of the Charter.

53. The representative of Japan expressed his conviction that the Observation Group would continue to develop its activities, if unhindered. His delegation, which shared the views of the Swedish delegation on many points of the latter's draft resolution, regretted that the provision of that proposal for suspension of the activities of the observers was not acceptable. It firmly believed that the solution of the problem should be sought within the framework of the United Nations.

54. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that he had voted against the United States draft resolution because it would have endorsed the armed incursion of United States forces into Lebanon, and would thereby have constituted a mockery of the fundamental principles of the Organization and a slap in the face of world public opinion; and because it envisaged the establishment of United Nations armed forces to be sent to Lebanon, the functions and purposes of which would have been contrary to the basic provisions of the Charter. The presence of United Nations forces in the territory of Lebanon in the absence of a threat from outside would constitute United Nations intervention in the domestic affairs of the Lebanese people. The professed desire of the United States to withdraw its forces was belied by the fact that they were constantly being reinforced. No one prevented the United States from withdrawing its forces from Lebanon forthwith. In voting against the United States draft resolution, the USSR delegation had acted in complete accord with the Charter. By not upholding the USSR draft resolution, the Council had made that day a dark one in the annals of the Organization and had failed to carry out its duties under the Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security. Those members of the Council who had failed to support the USSR draft resolution had thereby shared the responsibility assumed by the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom. The Soviet Union demanded the immediate calling of a special session of the General Assembly to consider the matter of the intervention of the United States and the United Kingdom in Lebanon and Jordan. He submitted the following draft resolution (S/4057):

"The Security Council,

"Having considered the situation in the Near and Middle East resulting from the introduction of United States armed forces into Lebanon and of United Kingdom armed forces into Jordan,

"Taking into account that these actions of the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland constitute a serious threat to international peace and security,

"Noting that the Security Council at its 834th

meeting proved unable to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security,

"Decides to call an emergency special session of the General Assembly in order to consider the question of the intervention of the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in Lebanon and Jordan."

55. The representative of Canada explained that he had been forced to vote against the Swedish draft resolution because, in his delegation's view, the time was one for strengthening rather than weakening the direct action of the United Nations in Lebanon. It believed that it was a more profitable approach to regard the action of the United States as not inconsistent with the work of the Observation Group, an opinion reinforced by the repeated assurances given by the United States representative.

56. The representative of Lebanon expressed his Government's regret that the necessary assistance which it had requested of the Council to help it uphold the independence and integrity of Lebanon had not been granted because of the negative attitude of the USSR to the United States draft resolution, the adoption of which would have achieved that purpose.

57. On 19 July, the following draft resolution was submitted by Japan (S/4055):

"The Security Council,

"Having further heard the charges of the representative of Lebanon concerning interference by the United Arab Republic in the internal affairs of Lebanon and the reply of the representative of the United Arab Republic,

"1. Invites the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon to continue to develop its activities pursuant to the Security Council resolution of 11 June 1958;

"2. Requests the Secretary-General to make arrangements forthwith for such measures, in addition to those envisaged by the resolution of 11 June 1958, as he may consider necessary in the light of the present circumstances, with a view to enabling the United Nations to fulfil the general purposes established in that resolution, and which will, in accordance with the Charter, serve to ensure the territorial integrity and political independence of Lebanon, so as to make possible the withdrawal of United States forces from Lebanon;

"3. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the arrangements made;

"4. Calls upon the Governments concerned to cooperate fully in the implementation of the present resolution."

58. At the 835th meeting on 21 July, the representative of Japan stressed the heavy responsibility of the Council in the crisis confronting it. His delegation felt that it was particularly important at such a time to develop an atmosphere in which the meeting of minds would be possible. The intention of the draft resolution submitted by his delegation was to uphold the United Nations and the principles and purposes of the Charter. It was not the intention to empower the Secretary-General to create a United Nations Emergency Force in Lebanon nor to create a type of United Nations force such as was stationed in Korea nor to create a police force of any kind. Of course, the Secretary-General could not perform such functions unless a resolution

of the Security Council specifically and explicitly authorized him to do so. The draft resolution sought a strengthened United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon, which he was sure would meet adequately the needs of the situation. He submitted the following revised text of that draft resolution (S/4055/Rev.1):

"The Security Council,

"Having further heard the charges of the representative of Lebanon concerning interference by the United Arab Republic in the internal affairs of Lebanon and the reply of the representative of the United Arab Republic,

"1. Requests the Secretary-General to make arrangements forthwith for such measures, in addition to those envisaged by the resolution of 11 June 1958, as he may consider necessary in the light of the present circumstances, with a view to enabling the United Nations to fulfil the general purposes established in that resolution, and which will, in accordance with the Charter, serve to ensure the territorial integrity and political independence of Lebanon, so as to make possible the withdrawal of United States forces from Lebanon;

"2. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the arrangements made;

"3. Calls upon the Governments concerned to cooperate fully in the implementation of the present resolution."

59. The representative of the United States said that the constructive proposal of the representative of Japan represented the indispensable minimum action which the United Nations should take in Lebanon at that time and could lead to conditions which would make possible the withdrawal of United States forces from Lebanon.

60. The representative of the United Kingdom said that he would support the Japanese draft resolution under which the Secretary-General would be enabled, doubtless in consultation with the Government of Lebanon, to increase the effort of the United Nations in Lebanon and to extend its responsibility, with the object of taking over in due course from the United States forces responsibility for ensuring the continued integrity and independence of Lebanon. Turning to the complaint of Jordan, and to the way in which his Government proposed to follow up its statement of readiness to withdraw British forces from the territory of Jordan, if and when the United Nations could make effective arrangements for the protection of Jordan from external threat, that the United Kingdom proposed, as a first step, to explore urgently with the Secretary-General the possibility of such action by the United Nations. That would be done in consultation with the Government of Jordan and with other Governments concerned. The object of the consultations would be to work out proposals under which assistance could be given by the United Nations to the Government of Jordan to ensure the preservation of its territorial integrity and political independence.

61. The representative of Canada reiterated that the Council should address itself not to the events of the past but to the positive task of achieving through the United Nations the stability in the Middle East which was essential to a lasting solution. The Lebanese situation should be dealt with as it was and should be dealt with through the United Nations. The Japanese draft resolution, which sought to use and strengthen the United Nations machinery which was in existence and looked to a situation in which the United States forces

could be withdrawn from Lebanon, was a positive approach. It gave a role of key importance to the Secretary-General for its successful implementation.

62. The Secretary-General, in response to a question from the representative of Canada as to how he envisaged the implementation of the Japanese draft resolution, said that he found it difficult to foresee that, if the Observation Group operation were to be continued and strengthened as envisaged in that proposal, the Council would also find it acceptable to use other means, and these of a military nature, for the very same end. The present planning for a development of the observation operation would seem to make the Observation Group itself a wholly adequate instrument, at the border, for its intended purposes. In line with the plans of the Group itself and with his own intentions, and on the basis of the Council resolution of 11 June—reinforced by the new decision of the Council should the Japanese draft resolution be adopted—he would take immediate steps for the continued development of the Group up to the maximum capacity rendered possible in the circumstances. In his view, a strengthened and expanded Observation Group such as he had described could meet adequately the responsibilities properly falling upon the United Nations as indicated in the Japanese draft resolution. It was his hope that that would equally be recognized by the parties concerned, thus providing the basis for the early withdrawal from Lebanon of United States forces.

63. The representative of France felt that there was no reason why the Council could not adopt the Japanese draft resolution. The United States troops sent to Lebanon on a provisional basis in no way detracted from the responsibility of the United Nations to act in that part of the world. The support given to the proposal by the United States constituted further proof of that country's good faith and of its constant respect for the decisions of the United Nations.

64. The representative of Sweden said that the proposal submitted by his delegation which had led to the Council decision of 11 June had been based on a desire to try to obtain an impartial exposition of the situation on the borders of Lebanon. His delegation had also hoped that the decision would lead to a general relaxation of the tense situation in that country. Accordingly, Sweden had been among the countries furnishing observers and equipment. In the view of the Swedish Government the situation in Lebanon had been in the process of being gradually stabilized. The landing of American troops had altered the conditions on which the activities of the observers had been based and the continued activities of the observers in that new situation could, in his Government's opinion, have become a political handicap to the United Nations. The proposal of his delegation that those activities be suspended until further notice had not meant that the Council should cease to pay attention to the situation or discontinue efforts to reach agreement on appropriate measures to serve the interests of peace and security in the area. The Swedish draft resolution had thus provided that the Lebanese question should be kept on the Council's agenda. Operative paragraph 1 of the revised Japanese draft resolution provided a suitable starting-point for the continued effort which should be made. It was the understanding of the Swedish delegation that the plans which the Secretary-General was requested to work out should involve concrete measures on the part of the United Nations to protect the territorial integrity and political independence of Lebanon as well

as anticipate the successive withdrawal of the foreign troops. As for the precise nature of the steps to be taken, his delegation did not exclude the possibility of continued and expanded activities of the Observation Group as well as the dispatch of military United Nations contingents, or both. It could therefore support the Japanese draft resolution.

65. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, reviewing the development of the situation, emphasized that American and British troops in Lebanon and Jordan were constantly being reinforced and that the armed forces of the United States and the United Kingdom were carrying out various other movements in the area. Feverish preparations of public opinion were proceeding for the further broadening of military activities against the Arab peoples in the vicinity of Lebanon and Jordan. The United States note to the United Arab Republic was in essence a threat to take armed action against the latter. Such threats were also addressed to the Government of the young Iraqi republic. However, those planning the danger of a new world war would fail. The USSR felt that it was possible and necessary to find a solution consistent with the vital interests of the peoples of the Near and Middle East and which would ensure the observance of their sovereign rights, taking into account the interests of all States. The peoples of these countries did not deny the interests of the Governments of the Western Powers in the use of the oil and other resources of the area but wished only that relations be on a footing of equality and on the basis of mutual interests.

66. Turning to the Japanese draft resolution, he said that it gave rise to many questions. In the first place it proposed not only to continue but also to expand the activities of the Observation Group. Thus it ignored fully the new situation which had arisen after the introduction of the United States forces which had come to Lebanon to intervene in the internal affairs of the Lebanese people who were shortly to hold presidential elections. Moreover, according to the Japanese proposal the Group was to ensure the territorial integrity and the political independence of Lebanon. But it was not said who was threatening Lebanon. If the reference was to the United Arab Republic, as implied in the preamble, that was not consistent with the reality, for the Council had not made any such determination and indeed there was no basis for such a decision. He also noted that there was no indication in the proposal of the nature of the additional steps to be taken by the Secretary-General. The draft resolution said nothing, concerning the main point, namely the illegal presence of United States forces for the purpose of intervening in the domestic affairs of the Lebanese people. For the United Nations to create conditions for the withdrawal of such interventionist forces meant that it would become a participant in the intervention. Furthermore, there was no indication in the proposal as to when those forces would be withdrawn, and it was clear that the decision as to whether the conditions were present for withdrawal would be decided by the United States. The Security Council had already rejected a proposal for the establishment of a United Nations international army. Therefore, his delegation could not support the Japanese draft resolution, although his delegation in no way questioned the motives of the Japanese delegation.

67. The Soviet Government, he continued, had proposed a meeting of the Heads of Government, with the participation of the Secretary-General, which could make concrete recommendations to the Council for stopping the armed conflict in the Middle East. That

was the way to extinguish the flames of an incipient conflict. But there was another way if the Council, as the past week seemed to indicate, was unable to devise fire-fighting measures on its own initiative. The General Assembly could act to devise such measures at a special session to deal with the question of the United States and the United Kingdom intervention in the internal affairs of Lebanon and Jordan.

68. The representative of China, expressing doubts as to the adequacy of the Japanese draft resolution, emphasized that the Council must give careful consideration to the judgement in that respect of the Government of Lebanon.

69. The representative of Canada said that every opportunity should be explored to discuss the causes of tension in the interest of heading off the possibility of war. In view of recent developments in the Middle East, the problem of that region should be discussed at the highest level as soon as possible. In the interest of assuring that the international temperature was not increased his Government would expect that the *status quo* be maintained in the region of the Middle East and would welcome from all countries concerned assurances such as those given by the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom on 17 July.

70. The representative of Lebanon communicated to the Council excerpts from a statement made on 18 July by the Lebanese Commission in charge of relations with the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon concerning interference by the United Arab Republic in the internal affairs of Lebanon. Since the adoption of the Council resolution of 11 June, large-scale infiltration of men, arms and ammunition had continued unabated from Syria towards rebel districts. After reviewing numerous specific instances, he listed the general observations made by the Commission of liaison, in which it was stated that the Lebanese Government felt that various obstacles encountered by the observers had prevented them from carrying out their mission in an effective and satisfactory manner in accordance with the Council's resolution. The Lebanese Government could authoritatively state, based on reliable information, that interference by the United Arab Republic in the internal affairs of Lebanon had not stopped at any time, that the continued attacks by the Egyptian and Syrian Press and the State-controlled radio had not abated their vilifying of the Lebanese Government and their encouraging and supporting armed subversive activities by the Lebanese rebels and their Syrian and Egyptian partners on Lebanese territory.

71. The representative of the United Arab Republic said that there was nothing new in the accusations made by the representative of Lebanon which were based on information from the intelligence services of Lebanon and were not supported by any proof. The true motive which led the Lebanese delegation to attempt to prolong the debate was the fact that the Lebanese Government wished to justify before Lebanese and world public opinion that the landings of American forces had been at their request. The Lebanese Government knew the unfavourable reaction in Lebanon to the position of President Chamoun, even among the latter's partisans. Many had pronounced themselves against the grave decision taken by him. The inhabitants of Lebanon were not at all pleased by the presence of United States forces. The true motive for the intervention was the revolution in Iraq, without which there would probably have been no landings even if Mr. Chamoun had asked for them. The armed intervention had been condemned

throughout the world. Unfortunately, the Government of Jordan continued to speak of the "liberation" of Iraq. Any attempt of that kind could lead to a general conflagration.

72. The representative of Panama noted that the Japanese draft resolution completed and strengthened the provisions of the Council's resolution of 11 June. It represented an attempt to make every possible effort to achieve a solution through the Security Council which was the origin of the United Nations bearing the principal responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. He would vote in favour of that proposal.

73. At the 836th meeting on 22 July, the representative of Lebanon said that his Government, although it had doubts concerning the effectiveness of the action called for in the Japanese draft resolution in coping with the situation as it existed in Lebanon, considered that text an improvement over the original one adopted by the Council on 11 June in that, while providing for the necessary measures to achieve the general purposes of the resolution of 11 June, it also envisaged the necessary measures to assure the territorial integrity and political independence of Lebanon. Since that proposal gave great latitude to the Secretary-General, his delegation hoped that the Secretary-General would be in a position to use any method allowed to him under the Charter to achieve those goals. His Government would not be prepared to abandon the application of Article 51 nor to deprive itself of assistance from friendly countries unless the action taken by the United Nations was adequate to achieve the goals stated in the resolution.

74. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that the adoption by the Council of a solution like the one suggested by the delegation of Japan would enable the Western Powers to obtain the sanction of the Security Council and the United Nations for their occupation of Lebanon and Jordan and also for the preparation of the occupation of other countries, in particular of Iraq. He submitted the following amendments (S/4063) to the Japanese draft resolution:

"1. Restore operative paragraph 1 as set forth in document S/4055.

"2. Renumber operative paragraph 1 of the revised Japanese draft resolution paragraph 2, and redraft it as follows:

" '2. Requests the Secretary-General to carry out, in addition to the measures envisaged by the resolution of 11 June 1958, the plan submitted by the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon in its second report, with a view to enabling the United Nations to fulfil the general purposes established in that resolution, which will, in accordance with the Charter, serve to ensure the territorial integrity and political independence of Lebanon'.

"3. Add a new paragraph 3 as follows:

" '3. Considering that the landing of United States troops in Lebanon constitutes intervention in the domestic affairs of that country and is therefore contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations, calls upon the United States of America to withdraw its armed forces from Lebanon immediately'.

"4. Renumber paragraph 2 of the revised Japanese draft resolution paragraph 4, and add at the end of the paragraph the words 'not later than 30 July 1958'.

"5. Renumber paragraph 3 of the revised Japanese draft resolution paragraph 5."

75. At the 837th meeting on 22 July, the representative of the United Kingdom, pointing out that the Japanese draft resolution was in effect a compromise in that it had been carefully drafted to take into account the views expressed by the USSR representative, opposed the USSR amendments which would amount to a restoration of the central thought in the USSR draft resolution which had been rejected by an overwhelming majority of the Council. The amendments also sought to circumscribe the efforts which the Secretary-General would be making with a view to ensuring the territorial integrity and political independence of Lebanon.

Decision: *The USSR amendments (S/4063) to the revised Japanese draft resolution were rejected by 8 votes to 1 (USSR) with 2 abstentions (Japan, Sweden).*

Decision: *The revised Japanese draft resolution (S/4055/Rev.1) received 10 votes in favour to 1 against (USSR). The negative vote being that of a permanent member of the Council, the draft resolution was not adopted.*

76. The Secretary-General said that although the Council had failed to take additional action in the grave emergency facing it, the responsibility of the United Nations to make all efforts to live up to the purposes and principles of the Charter remained. Whatever the outcome of the further consideration in the Council, there was need for practical steps to be taken without any delay. In that connexion, he recalled his statement to the Council on 31 October 1956 to the effect that the discretion and impartiality imposed on the Secretary-General by the character of his immediate task must not degenerate into a policy of expediency, as well as his statement of 26 September 1957 to the General Assembly that he believed it to be the duty of the Secretary-General to use his office and, indeed, the machinery of the Organization to its utmost capacity and to the full extent permitted at each stage by practical circumstances and that it was in keeping with the philosophy of the Charter that the Secretary-General also should be expected to act without any guidance from the Assembly or the Council should that appear to him necessary towards helping to fill any vacuum that might appear in the systems which the Charter and traditional diplomacy provided for the safeguarding of peace and security. He felt that, in the circumstances, what he had stated on those occasions now had full application. He was sure that he would be acting in accordance with the wishes of the members of the Council if he therefore used all opportunities offered to him, within the limits set by the Charter and towards developing the United Nations effort, so as to help prevent a further deterioration of the situation in the Middle East and to assist in finding a road away from the dangerous point at which they now found themselves. The continued operation of the Observation Group being acceptable to all members of the Council, that would mean the further development of the Group so as to give it all the significance it could have, consistent with its basic character as determined by the Council resolution of 11 June and the purposes and principles of the Charter. The Council would of course be kept fully informed on the steps taken. Were its members to disapprove of the way those intentions were translated into practical steps, he would of course accept the consequences of their judgement.

77. The President said that the Council must consider four fundamental points. The Secretary-General had established that the United Nations could not re-

main passive in the face of such an emergency. Another factor was that the Parliament of Lebanon was to elect a new President at the end of the week. The selection of a new President, which might be the result of a patriotic agreement between the Government Party and the Opposition, would certainly clarify to a great extent that difficult and complex situation. The third point was that the President of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union had invited various Heads of State to meet with him and the Secretary-General to seek a solution that could be recommended to the Council. Several replies had already been made known. Finally, the United States and USSR delegations had presented similar proposals calling for the convening of a special emergency session of the General Assembly. He concluded that the United Nations must continue to act effectively in the Middle East and appealed to all peoples, especially those concerned in the conflict in the Middle East, in the hope that nothing would be done to worsen the complex situation in that part of the world. He proposed the adjournment of the meeting in accordance with rule 33 of the provisional rules of procedure.

78. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics felt that for the Council to adjourn as proposed would put it in a difficult position. It had before it a concrete proposal as to how the United Nations should act now that the Council had proved itself unable to perform its functions. Noting that the President had referred to the forthcoming presidential elections in Lebanon, he pointed out that they would be held in the presence of foreign troops. That aspect of the case should prompt the Council to act decisively. Moreover, the USSR proposal for a meeting of the Heads of Government of various States, with the participation of the Secretary-General, far from being designed to impede the action of the United Nations, was designed to accelerate a solution which would satisfy the national interests of the peoples of the Near and Middle East and would lead to eliminating the threat which weighed heavily on the whole world. The negative votes of the United States and the United Kingdom on the USSR amendments to the Japanese draft resolution had made the Council impotent to act as its responsibilities called upon it to act under the Charter. The peoples of the world expected the Council to consider the proposals before it and take action on them.

79. The representative of Lebanon expressed his Government's regret that the efforts of the Council had not led to a positive and concrete result which would assist his Government in overcoming and dispelling the threat to its independence and integrity. He also regretted the references made to the presidential elections in Lebanon, a question which was a domestic concern of his country.

Decision: *The President's proposal to adjourn the meeting under rule 33 of the provisional rules of procedure was adopted by 10 votes to 1 (USSR).*

C. Security Council resolution of 7 August 1958

80. On 30 July, the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon submitted, through the Secretary-General, its second report to the Security Council (S/4069), covering its activities and observations from 2 to 15 July. In the report, it was stated that the impact of the landing of United States armed forces in the Beirut area on 15 July on the inhabitants of opposition-held areas where observers were operating had occasioned difficulties and caused setbacks to the task of

observation. The efforts of the Group to solve the new problems were meeting with some success. The Group stated that it had received no reports from its observers subsequent to 15 July which would tend to alter the general nature of its evaluations it had made in that report. In the conclusion to the report, it was stated that the infiltration which might be taking place could not be on anything more than a limited scale and was largely confined to small arms and ammunition. In conditions of civil conflict, when the frontier was open and unguarded practically throughout its length, some movement of that kind might well be expected. As regards the question of the illegal infiltration of personnel, the nature of the frontier, the existence of traditional tribal and other bonds on both sides of it, the free movement of produce in both directions, were among the factors which must be taken into account in making an evaluation. In no case, however, had United Nations observers who had been vigilantly patrolling the opposition held areas and had frequently observed the armed bands there, been able to detect the presence of persons who had indubitably entered from across the border for the purpose of fighting. From the observations made of the arms and organization obtaining in the opposition-held areas, the fighting strength of opposition elements was not such as to be able successfully to cope with hostilities against a well armed regular military force.

81. In a letter dated 5 August (S/4078), the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics requested the President of the Security Council to call an immediate emergency meeting of the Council to consider the USSR draft resolution (S/4057).

82. In a letter dated 5 August (S/4081) from the permanent delegation of Iraq addressed to the Secretary-General, Mr. Abbas said that with the declaration by the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan on the termination of the Arab Union as from 1 August 1958, his mission as permanent representative of Iraq, accredited as such by the Government of the Arab Union, was ended.

83. On 6 August, the Secretary-General submitted a report (S/4080) to the Council concerning the credentials of the representative of Iraq, in which, after stating that he had been officially notified by the Government of Jordan that it considered the Constitution of the Arab Union as in abeyance and inapplicable, he referred to the letter dated 15 July 1958 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Government of Iraq (S/4060, section 3) appointing Mr. Hashim Jawad as the Iraqi representative on the Council. In his opinion, those credentials were in order.

84. In a letter dated 7 August (S/4082), addressed to the President of the Security Council, the representative of Jordan listed details of various incidents in Jordan between 10 and 30 July 1958.

85. At the 838th meeting of the Council on 7 August, the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics declared that the Council, as a consequence of its present membership and the policies which were engaged in by the United States disrupting its effectiveness as an instrument of peace, had been incapable of adopting the measures that would lead to the immediate end of aggression and the withdrawal of American and British troops from Lebanon and Jordan. The Government of the Soviet Union had accordingly called for an urgent meeting of the Heads of various Governments, with the participation of the Secretary-General. That proposal, however, had not fitted into the plans of

the United States Government, which had invented various pretexts to prevent the meeting. Meanwhile, the United States and the United Kingdom were increasing their forces in Lebanon and Jordan and other forces were being deployed in the area. Thus the world had not been freed of the threat of a still greater deterioration. Attempts had been made to justify the incursion of Anglo-American troops into the Arab countries by reference to the recent events in Iraq. All knew, however, that those events, like those in Lebanon, had been strictly of a domestic nature and had been the expression of the anger of the peoples of the Arab countries against the régimes foisted upon them by the foreign imperialistic colonialists. The tactics of obstruction used by the United States and the United Kingdom against the Republic of Iraq in the Security Council and the attempts to lower an iron curtain around Iraq had failed dismally. The attempts of the United States and the United Kingdom to justify their action by alluding to the so-called intervention of the United Arab Republic had been demolished by the two reports of the Observation Group, the second of which clearly stated that the landing of United States troops in Lebanon had impeded the work of the Group.

86. The demands of the peoples for the immediate calling of a meeting of the Heads of Governments, he continued, and the determination of peace-loving States to put an end to the armed intervention in Lebanon and Jordan and to aggression in the Near and Middle East, had compelled the authors of that intervention to refrain at that stage from an extension of the aggression to other countries, in particular the Republic of Iraq and the United Arab Republic. However, the formal recognition by the Western Powers of the Republic of Iraq did not mean that the danger of the extension of the conflict had been fully eliminated at that time and that the security of Iraq and other Arab countries had been assured. The presence of foreign troops in Lebanon and Jordan constituted a permanent threat to peace and security and was a flagrant violation of the Charter. The USSR therefore demanded an emergency special session of the General Assembly to consider the question of the withdrawal of United States troops from Lebanon and of United Kingdom troops from Jordan. He introduced the following revised text of the USSR draft resolution (S/4057/Rev.1) :

"The Security Council,

"Having considered the situation in the Near and Middle East resulting from the introduction of United States armed forces into Lebanon and of United Kingdom armed forces into Jordan,

"Taking into account that these actions of the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland constitute a threat to international peace and security,

"Noting that the Security Council has proved unable to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security,

"Decides to call an emergency special session of the General Assembly in order to consider the question of the immediate withdrawal of United States troops from Lebanon and of United Kingdom troops from Jordan."

87. The representative of the United States challenged the USSR representative's account of events in the Middle East and in the Security Council, reiterating that the troops of the United States had been sent to Lebanon at the express request of the Government of Lebanon to assist that country to retain its territorial integrity and political independence. By vetoing the

United States and the Japanese draft resolutions, the USSR had twice prevented the Security Council from helping to maintain Lebanon's independence and integrity. Fortunately, the Secretary-General, realizing that it was important that practical steps be taken without delay, had promptly begun to increase the effectiveness of United Nations action in Lebanon. The Secretary-General's statement had been an event of great importance and had received the full support of the United States. Taking into account the appeal made by the President of the Security Council and the exchange of letters concerning high level meetings, the United States had refrained at the previous meeting from pressing its request for an emergency special session of the General Assembly, hoping for an end to Soviet intransigence. At one point it had appeared that the USSR had again recognized the responsibility of the Security Council and had been prepared to attend a high-level meeting in the Council. Mr. Khrushchev, however, had changed his mind following his trip to Peking. The Soviet Union had again denounced the Security Council, which was prevented from acting solely by the Soviet Union and had requested a meeting of the General Assembly.

88. The United States had regretfully concluded that because of the USSR's recent and arbitrary change of mind, the Council could not continue to fulfil its responsibilities. The argument that the Council was not an acceptable forum because in it the United States had a mechanical majority could not be sustained and it insulted the dignity of all members of the Council. He requested a prompt vote on the revised United States draft resolution, which clearly had priority over the USSR draft resolution. Dealing with the latter, he declared that the true Soviet aim was, by condemning the United States, to prevent constructive effort to maintain the independence and integrity of small nations. The United Nations Observation Group and the United States forces in Lebanon had both, though in different ways, made valuable contributions towards improving the situation in Lebanon where peaceful, democratic elections had been held, something which the USSR representative had regarded as impossible. There was also the added probability that the presence of the Group and of the United States forces might have very materially mitigated the dangerous effects of illegal infiltration. The reports of the Observation Group were basically of an interim nature, and did not deal with the particularly dangerous form of indirect aggression represented by violence stimulated and directed from abroad. He introduced the following revised text of the United States draft resolution (S/4056/Rev.1):

"The Security Council,

"Having considered the complaints of Lebanon and of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan,

"Taking into account that the lack of unanimity of its permanent members at the 834th and 837th meetings of the Council has prevented it from exercising its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security,

"Decides to call an emergency special session of the General Assembly, as provided in Assembly resolution 377(V)."

89. The representative of the United Kingdom, reviewing his Government's attempts to secure a periodic meeting of the Council under Article 28, paragraph 2, expressed regret that the USSR Government, which had previously agreed to a special meeting of the Coun-

cil, now rejected the idea. The USSR criticisms of the Security Council could find no justification in fact or practice. The composition of the Council was determined not by the wishes of any one State or group of States, but by the provisions of Article 23 of the Charter. The USSR was proposing in effect to disregard a legally constituted organ of the United Nations merely on the grounds that it did not agree with the political views which it supposed the members of that organ to hold. It appeared to have ignored the efforts made consistently by the United Kingdom Government during the recent exchanges to reassure the USSR that the object of the special meeting of the Council would be to reach fruitful agreements rather than register differences by votes.

90. The USSR now asked, he continued, for the convening of an emergency special session of the Assembly to discuss the question of the withdrawal of United States forces from Lebanon and United Kingdom forces from Jordan. The assumption behind that request was the same as the one behind the USSR draft resolution which had been decisively rejected by the Council, namely that the United Kingdom and the United States had in some way been guilty of aggression when they had responded to the appeals of the Governments of Jordan and Lebanon for assistance. There was clearly a vital difference of principle between his Government and that of the USSR regarding the method by which change in the Middle East was to be achieved. If the legitimate Government of a country believed that it was faced by a danger to its very existence by the use against it of techniques of interference short of direct armed aggression, it had in international law the right to ask assistance from its friends, and such an appeal and the response to it was in conformity with the Charter. It was that right which the Government of Jordan had exercised and which the USSR sought to deny. He wondered how many Members of the United Nations would be prepared on calm reflection to deny themselves the right to make the same appeal or to respond to an appeal made by their friends. The United Kingdom was not opposed to a discussion in the General Assembly of the situation in Lebanon and Jordan provided that that was arranged in a way which did not prejudge the issue. His Government had instructed him to ask the United States delegation to revise its draft resolution so as to bring the Jordanian complaint within the scope of the proposed emergency special session.

91. The representative of Iraq said that the Lebanese complaint had been dealt with in the Council's resolution as well as in the reports of the Observation Group, which showed that the charges against the United Arab Republic could not be substantiated. The question had taken a completely new turn since the landing of the American armed forces in Lebanon in contradiction to the 11 June resolution as well as to the Charter. The crisis had been further aggravated by the simultaneous introduction of armed forces of the United Kingdom into Jordan. The situation remained a threat to international peace and security and the Council had so far been unable to lay down the basis for its solution. It was not proposed to make use of the machinery provided for by General Assembly resolution 377 (V) and he hoped that that would prove as effective as on a previous occasion when Egypt had been the target of aggression. It was essential that the emergency special session of the Assembly should deal primarily with the introduction of United States and United Kingdom forces into Lebanon and Jordan with a view to finding

a rapid and appropriate solution to the situation thus created. Since the complaints of Lebanon and Jordan had in effect been proved without substance, there was no valid purpose to be served by their discussion in the Assembly. His delegation, therefore, could not support the United States draft resolution in its existing form although it agreed with its purposes regarding the convening of an emergency special session.

92. The representative of Canada said that his delegation deeply regretted that it had not proved possible for the Council to advance in the direction of a special meeting of the Council owing to the position adopted by the USSR Government. Although he felt that the Council had not come to the end of its capacity for making a fruitful contribution to the substance of the questions before it, for the moment they must seek an alternative way of finding a medium for discussion in the United Nations which would diminish the tensions in the Middle East. His delegation supported the United States draft resolution and the statement of the President of the United States that the intention was to discuss the general problems of the Middle East with their underlying causes.

93. The representative of Lebanon said that his Government and people resented and protested the USSR representative's reference to the Government of Lebanon as one imposed upon it by the colonial Powers. His people enjoyed their freedom and independence in a manner which made them wish that many other peoples in other countries, including big countries, might enjoy the same freedom and might elect their governments as freely. Dealing with the USSR representative's reference to the second report of the Observation Group, he emphasized that, as the report itself made plain, that document must be read as a whole. The report indicated clearly that in the main areas held by the rebels, free movement of the observers had not so far been possible. The report thus could not add anything to the conclusions of the first report.

94. The representative of the United Arab Republic associated himself with the statement made by the representative of Iraq. The preamble of the United States draft resolution mentioned the complaints of Lebanon and Jordan but ignored the fact that those complaints had not been confirmed. It followed from the conclusion of the second report of the Observation Group that there was nothing involving the responsibility of the United Arab Republic. The new situation which had arisen because of the landing of foreign troops in that part of the world should be dealt with by the Assembly at length because it might constitute a threat to the peace and security in that area.

95. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, reiterating the position of his delegation, emphasized that it was the presence of the United States forces in Lebanon which had created the perilous situation in the Near and Middle East. That was why the USSR draft resolution made it clear that the purpose of the special session of the Assembly was to deal with the question of the immediate withdrawal of those troops. On the other hand, the United States draft resolution gave no indication of the purpose for which the special session was to be convened.

96. In the course of further discussion, the President, speaking as the representative of France, said that his delegation had associated itself with all proposals designed to provide a constructive solution to the problems before the Council. It considered that it was for

the competent organ, namely the Security Council, to find a solution and not to frustrate the hopes of those who had appealed to it. If, unfortunately, the Council were unable to act, and in that case only, the French Government would agree to participate in a conference of Heads of Government of the principal Powers concerned on the question of the Middle East, provided that that conference had been carefully prepared and was held in an objective and calm atmosphere. That attitude remained unchanged. The USSR Government, which had previously supported the formula of a special session of the Security Council, now called for an emergency special session of the General Assembly. The French Government, while still convinced that a meeting of the Heads of Governments on the question of the Middle East was consonant with the interests of the world community, and that no efforts should be spared to strive to bring about the necessary conditions for such a meeting of the Council, would not oppose the convening of a special session of the Assembly if that was the wish of the members of the Council.

97. As a result of discussion on the wording of the United States draft resolution, the representative of the United States introduced the following revised text (S/4083):

"The Security Council,

"Having considered items 2 and 3 on its agenda as contained in document S/Agenda/838,

"Taking into account that the lack of unanimity of its permanent members at the 834th and 837th meetings of the Security Council has prevented it from exercising its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security,

"Decides to call an emergency special session of the General Assembly."

Decision: *The United States draft resolution (S/4083), as modified, was adopted unanimously.*

98. The representative of Japan expressed the hope that the General Assembly would find means to effect a permanent settlement which would assure stability and peace in the Middle East and would have due regard for the sound nationalistic aspirations of the peoples concerned. He added that the session would also help create the conditions conducive to the withdrawal of United States and British troops from the area. He further stated that as the discussion of Jordan had not been exhausted in the Security Council, the question of Jordan, from a procedural viewpoint, did not have the same status as the question of Lebanon. Accordingly, he accepted the amended United States draft resolution with the understanding that this should not constitute a precedent for the future.

D. Further reports of the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon and withdrawal of the Group

99. On 14 August, the third report (S/4085) of the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon was submitted to the Council through the Secretary-General. In this report, the Group reproduced the text of an announcement made by it on 16 July to the effect, *inter alia*, that it alone was in Lebanon in pursuance of the mandate contained in the Security Council resolution of 11 June and that it represented the only action taken by the Council. By dint of their perseverance and tact in dealing with difficult and often dangerous situations, the observers had won back the ground lost after 15 July. Most of the permanent stations in opposition-

held areas envisaged in the Group's second interim report had already been established and other stations were expected to be established shortly. The election of General Chehab as the next President of Lebanon had taken place on 31 July. During the period immediately preceding the election, there had been a noticeable reduction in tension practically throughout the country and a comparative absence of armed clashes between Government and opposition forces. Since 31 July there had been a virtual nation-wide truce with only occasional reports of sporadic firing in some areas.

100. In its fourth report (S/4100) circulated on 29 September 1958, and covering the activities of the Group from 11 August to 20 September, the Group stated that, during the period under review, military observers had not only been able to re-establish confidence in the independent nature of their activities, but had won for themselves the trust and understanding of all sections of the population among whom they worked. Despite the presence of a considerable number of men under arms, there had been no significant clashes between the Lebanese armed forces and organized opposition forces. No cases of infiltration had been detected, and if any infiltration was still taking place its extent must be regarded as insignificant.

101. In a letter dated 16 November 1958 (S/4113), addressed to the President of the Security Council, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Lebanon said that the Security Council would be pleased to learn that cordial and close relations between Lebanon and the United Arab Republic had resumed their normal course. Conscious of the higher interests of the Lebanese people and the need to safeguard peace and security in the area, and in the spirit which had led to the unanimous adoption of the decision taken by the General Assembly at its third emergency special session on 21 August, his Government intended in the future to strengthen still further its co-operation with the United Arab Republic and other Arab States. For that reason, and in order to dispel any misunderstanding which might hamper the development of such relations, the Lebanese Government requested the Council to delete the Lebanese complaint of 22 May 1958 from the list of matters before it and to ask the Secretary-General to communicate its decision to the General Assembly.

102. In its fifth report (S/4114), circulated on 17 November, the Observation Group stated that the evacuation of United States troops from Lebanon had been completed without incident on 25 October. Organized opposition forces had been disbanded and the

Government was in process of extending its authority over the whole country. In view of the absence for some time of any reports of infiltration of personnel or smuggling of arms and of the recent marked improvement in the general security situation in Lebanon and in the relations between Lebanon and its eastern neighbour, the Group had come to the conclusion that its task under the 11 June resolution of the Council might now be regarded as completed and recommended that the withdrawal of the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon should be undertaken.

103. In a letter dated 17 November 1958 (S/4115), addressed to the President of the Security Council, the Secretary-General referred both to the letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Lebanon and to the recommendation of the Observation Group and stated that he had instructed the Group to present, in consultation with the Government of Lebanon, a detailed plan for the withdrawal. He had taken that step under the authorization given to him in the Council resolution of 11 June. The instruction he had given to the Observation Group implied that he considered its task as completed and that his remaining duty under the resolution thus covered only the necessary measures for the liquidation of the operation.

104. On 21 November 1958, the Secretary-General submitted a report (S/4116) on a plan for withdrawal formulated by the Observation Group, which was acceptable to the Government of Lebanon, and stated that it had his approval.

E. Removal of the Lebanese complaint from the list of matters of which the Security Council is seized

105. At the 840th meeting of the Security Council on 25 November 1958, the President, having referred to documents S/4113, /4114 and S/4115 (see paragraphs 101 to 103 above), indicated that he had engaged in consultations with the members of the Council, and that they appeared agreeable to a decision being taken to delete the complaint submitted to the Council on 22 May 1958 by the Government of Lebanon (S/4007) from the list of matters of which the Council was seized. If he heard no objection, he would place on the record that the Council had so agreed.

Decision: *The Council agreed without objection to delete the complaint submitted to it on 22 May 1958 by the Government of Lebanon (S/4007) from the list of matters of which it was seized.*

THE PALESTINE QUESTION

A. Complaint by Israel against the United Arab Republic concerning an incident of 3 December 1958 in the Huleh area

106. In a letter dated 4 December 1958 (S/4123), the representative of Israel requested the President of the Security Council to convene an urgent meeting of the Council to consider a grave act of aggression committed on 3 December 1958 by the armed forces of the United Arab Republic against Israel territory in the Huleh area in north-east Galilee.

107. At its 841st meeting on 8 December 1958, the Council included the Israel complaint in its agenda and invited the representatives of Israel and the United Arab Republic to take places at the Council table.

108. The representative of Israel said that the Syrian army post at Darbashiya and other military positions in that area had opened fire on 3 December, first on Israel shepherds grazing their herds south of Gonen, and then on a security patrol which had come to their rescue. The engagement had taken place on Israel territory in the area to which the demilitarization provisions of the 1949 General Armistice Agreement did not apply. In a later development defensive fire had been directed by Israel exclusively towards and against the posts from which the Syrian attack was being conducted. At that stage, the Syrian forces had opened a heavy artillery barrage on seven villages, along a front of more than seventeen kilometres. The effect of the bombardment had been to enlarge the original incident and to prevent any localization or restriction of its effects. The Syrian attacks of 3 December had caused Israel one death and three injuries, while damage to property was estimated at 1 million Israel pounds. He emphasized that Israel had taken the initiative of requesting the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) to call for an immediate cease-fire, which had been set by UNTSO for 1700 hours on 3 December. He stated that by the confession and avowal of the United Arab Republic authorities themselves, no casualties or damage had been inflicted on Syrian farms or villages. The Council, he said, was faced with an act of international aggression, flagrant and unprovoked, involving a breach of the central provisions of the Charter and of article I of the General Armistice Agreement.

109. He noted that it was the third occasion that year on which Israel villages had been attacked by Syrian artillery; but the intensity of the attacks exceeded any previously recorded. Both the number of Syrian guns and the number of shells fired had been greater than at any time since 1948. After having described the topographical features of the area, he stated that geography accorded great strategic advantage to the Syrians. Israel's civilian targets were numerous, easily visible and well within range. This did not mean, however, that it was beyond Israel's technical capacity, in the exercise of its inherent right of self-defence, to silence Syrian artillery attack. He turned to the Security Council for peaceful redress, and still more for vigorous deterrence. There were reasons to apprehend that unless a strong influence was brought to bear by the

Council those bombardments might be repeated, with repercussions far beyond those which had attended the bombardment of 3 December. The United Arab Republic authorities seemed to have convinced themselves that they might be able in the future to utilize an advantage of geography with impunity in order to inflict injury upon his people and territory while they themselves were immune from response. It was vitally urgent for the Council to impress the United Arab Republic with the gravity of that position. It was his duty to inform the United Arab Republic that the bombardment of Israel villages by Syrian artillery must be regarded as an act of war. In conclusion, he stated that faced by acts the continuance and repetition of which would threaten international peace and security, his Government, strongly desiring the maintenance and strengthening of peace in the Middle East, turned to the Security Council to ensure an immediate end to such aggressive acts.

110. The representative of the United Arab Republic noted, among other things, that it was not the first time that Israel was using the Security Council for tendentious propaganda in order to distort the truth and agitate public opinion so as to serve well known purposes. The position of Israel could not but damage the prestige of the Council.

111. He declared that Israel seemed to forget the number of times which it had been condemned by the Council for its premeditated armed aggressions. The Israel complaint should be placed within the framework of Israel provocations and daily violations of the provisions of the General Armistice Agreement.

112. Illicit activities of a varied character, committed either within the demilitarized area or on Arab property, included: military activities, violations of Syrian air space, the presence of Israel police, damage to Arab lands, penetration within the frontiers of Syrian areas and expulsion of the Arab population.

113. Israel civilian activities, he stressed, were always accompanied by military activities which were prohibited by the General Armistice Agreement, and were designed in most cases to provoke incidents for Israel propaganda purposes and to make possible extravagant Israel claims inspired by an expansionist policy. It was within that framework that the incident of 3 December should be examined by the Council.

114. He pointed out that, according to the report of UNTSO, the initiative for the action had been taken by the Israelis and that the Syrians had replied in legitimate defence. That was the only thing that he had been able to find in the report. The firing had stopped on the Syrian side when the cease-fire order had been given by UNTSO.

115. He was surprised to note that the Council had been seized of the matter before the Mixed Armistice Commission had had an opportunity to examine it. In accordance with the provisions of article VII, paragraph 7, of the Israel-Syrian General Armistice Agreement it was for that Commission to consider complaints of this type. That principle had been implemented when

more important questions had been discussed in the Council, such as complaints of aggression against Gaza, Qibya, Nahhalin and so on.

116. In conclusion, he reminded the Council that the Arab countries had never been condemned by the Security Council for violations of armistice conventions and that Israel, in spite of many condemnations, continued its aggressive expansionist policy, which was a threat to peace and security in that part of the world. If it was desired that peace and security reign in that part of the world, it was necessary that the provisions of the armistice conventions be implemented. For his part, his country would continue to do so.

117. The representative of Israel said that the representative of the United Arab Republic had not denied the central fact that its artillery had bombarded the seven villages in question. Referring to the report of the Chief of Staff, he said that it bore out every single one of the salient features in the development of that situation which he had submitted to the Council. He concluded that what stood for international discussion and judgement was the action on 3 December, beginning with the attack on Israel civilians of Gonen, and culminating in an artillery bombardment which bore the classic impress of a characteristic act of war.

118. Replying to the statement of the representative of Israel, the representative of the United Arab Republic stated that he had never said that Syrian artillery had bombarded the Israel localities. What he had said was that Syrian artillery had replied to the fire of Israel artillery. There was a major difference between those two views—and the responsibility fell on the party which started the incident.

119. On 8 December 1958, the Secretary-General circulated a report (S/4124), by Major-General Carl Carlsson von Horn, Chief of Staff of UNTSO, concerning the incident. The report consisted of three parts: part I dealt with the sequence of events as witnessed by United Nations observers, complaints by the parties, and investigations of the complaints by UNTSO; part II dealt with phases of the 3 December incident; part III dealt with the major incidents since the beginning of 1958.

120. The Chief of Staff noted that there had been two distinct phases in the 3 December incident: first, the small-arms firing during which an Israel shepherd had been killed, and secondly, the subsequent extensive artillery fire directed at military positions or villages. He observed that the incident in which the shepherd had been killed had followed a series of Israel complaints alleging illegal grazing or, in one case, the stealing of cattle.

121. United Nations observers on the spot had witnessed such crossings of the Demarcation Line by Syrian herds. The Chief of Staff emphasized that this was a matter which the Israel-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission should deal with, under all its aspects, if the provisions of the General Armistice Agreement were observed, and if the Mixed Armistice Commission were convened to consider claims or complaints by either party, as provided in article VII, paragraph 7, of the General Armistice Agreement. Successive Chiefs of Staff of UNTSO had explained how and why complaints were being lodged with or without a request for investigation and without a request for a meeting of the Mixed Armistice Commission.

122. The Chief of Staff stated that as a result of the failure of the Israel-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission to hold regular sessions since June 1951 and to

hold emergency meetings, save in very exceptional circumstances, the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission and the Chief of Staff of UNTSO could not speak on behalf of the Mixed Armistice Commission when they asked for the implementation of the General Armistice Agreement. In the case of the demilitarized zone they relied, in some cases successfully, on the special powers conferred on the Chairman under article V of the General Armistice Agreement. When they could not invoke article V, the representations and suggestions they were asked by one party to make to the other were usually met by counter-complaints. That situation had created a state of mind contrary to the letter and spirit of the General Armistice Agreement. That state of mind explained the second phase of the 3 December incident, namely, the resort to artillery after a first phase in which small arms had been used. The pattern for the 3 December incident had been set on 6 November when resort to artillery had followed the use of small arms.

123. He concluded that it was that pattern—use of artillery after the use of small arms—which might endanger the peace, already threatened by the tension which had developed in the growing disrespect for the obligations agreed to in 1949 when the General Armistice Agreement had been concluded.

124. At its 844th meeting, held on 15 December 1958, the Council resumed its consideration of the Israel complaint. The Secretary-General stated that it had always been his firm view that no military action in contravention of the cease-fire clauses of the General Armistice Agreements, as reconfirmed in the undertakings of 1956, could be justified, even by prior military action from the other side, except in the case of obvious self-defence, in the most accurate sense of the word, and even then limited to what the actual defence need might reasonably be considered as having warranted. He warned that any wavering by the United Nations in the application of that principle would lead to a situation characterized by military actions and counter-actions in a cumulative series. The danger implicit in such a development was only too well known from past experience.

125. The Secretary-General observed that one matter was the consideration of the principles to be maintained and the judgements which they might call for in the case which was before the Council. Another matter, to which as Secretary-General he had to give most serious attention, was the underlying problems which had led to the present state of tension and to the use of force. Whatever those problems, if they were not considered as justifying the use of force, they called, on the other hand, for serious efforts towards a peaceful solution eliminating the cause of friction. In his opinion, the Chief of Staff had already made commendable efforts to come to grips with those underlying problems. He was convinced that his continuing work in that direction had the fullest support of the Council. It was his hope that the parties, likewise, would co-operate with him fully, in a spirit of frankness and reconciliation and guided by the necessity to restore and maintain peaceful conditions.

126. The Secretary-General expressed his concern about the deterioration in conditions around the Huleh region and the northern demilitarized zone which had taken place over the year and had led to serious incidents in November and December. He was even more concerned about symptoms indicating that the deterioration was continuing. Although he might understand the

security reasons which prompted a nation to proceed with measures, like a military build-up, in an area which had proved to be explosive, he knew from experience that in actuality such steps, in such a situation as the present one, tended to increase the insecurity. What had happened, therefore, must be the starting point for a turn of developments in a more favourable direction. It could not be permitted to continue as a chain-reaction, involving steadily increasing risks.

127. He drew the attention of the Council to his plan to visit the countries concerned within the near future. It was his intention while there to take up the situation to which he had referred, for most serious consideration by the authorities of Israel and the United Arab Republic, in the hope of breaking the present trend and soliciting their full support for his efforts to attack the underlying problems which were at the source of the tension.

128. Finally, he informed the Council that letters had been addressed to the Israel and Syrian authorities by the Chief of Staff on 11 December 1958, requesting that arrangements be made as early as possible for visits by United Nations military observers to areas within the north-eastern region, which in that case were of interest and which were specifically mentioned in article V of the General Armistice Agreement. Positive replies had been received from the Syrian and the Israel authorities, and inspections had started that morning.

129. The representative of the United States thought that it was appropriate for the Council to address itself to the matter under discussion. He recalled his Government's position when the Council met on 28 May 1957 to consider developments in the area, and pointed to the need for greater respect for the provisions of the Israel-Syrian Armistice Agreement and for greater resort to the machinery provided for by that Agreement. It was due to neglect of the Armistice Agreement by the parties themselves that incidents along the demarcation line had assumed serious proportions.

130. He concluded by saying that the Council would do well if it encouraged caution to prevail, thus allowing the Secretary-General an opportunity to address himself directly to the points at issue during his forthcoming trip to that part of the world.

131. The representative of the United Kingdom said that it was disturbing to read, in paragraph 28 of the report of the Chief of Staff, that the number of complaints lodged by Israel and the United Arab Republic had been substantially higher since July than during the first six months of 1958. He was disturbed by one particular feature of the latest incident: the use of artillery, and especially its employment against centres of civilian population.

132. Referring to the fatal shooting there last month of the wife of the British Air Attaché in Israel, Mrs. Doran, he stated that his Government had studied a factual report made by a military observer of UNTSO on 20 November. In the circumstances, and in the absence of any satisfactory explanation, his Government must therefore hold the Government of the United Arab Republic responsible, and they were taking appropriate action to raise the matter with that Government.

133. He was sure that the Council would prefer, rather than discussing the problem in detail here, to assure the Secretary-General of its full support in the efforts he intended to make to reverse the trend towards increasing violence.

134. The representative of France expressed the grave concern of his Government. He noted that while

it was incumbent on the Security Council solemnly to draw attention to the exceptional gravity of the event, such incidents, by their very nature, in principle and in the first instance fell within the competence of the Mixed Armistice Commission. He shared the views of the Secretary-General that no effort should be spared to put an end to the situation, the gravity of which had been demonstrated by the incident of 3 December.

135. The representative of Panama referred to the last resolution adopted by the Security Council on 22 January 1958 on the Palestine question (S/3942), and expressed the hope that, by means of the machinery provided by the Charter and the General Armistice Agreement, conciliation might be arrived at between those two neighbouring countries in the Middle East, who were the parties to the controversy, for the benefit of universal peace and security.

136. The representative of Iraq felt that a strict implementation of the General Armistice Agreement and the use of the machinery provided thereunder would prevent the recurrence of conflicts and incidents. In his view the incident must be looked upon as the latest in a series calculated to bring about the annexation of the demilitarized zone by Israel, in violation of the General Armistice Agreement. The direct reference of the question to the Security Council, without first seeking a decision from the Mixed Armistice Commission, was the result of Israel's illegal boycott of the Mixed Armistice Commission. If the incident had assumed a serious character, it was because the Israelis had prevented the United Nations investigation on the scene and resorted to artillery fire, to which the other side had been compelled to reply.

137. The representative of Canada deeply regretted the incident which had disturbed the peace and had taken lives and destroyed property. He was also gravely concerned at the manifestation of increased tension in that unsettled area of the Middle East. He associated his delegation with the Secretary-General's remarks.

138. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics observed that the main characteristic of the incident was the use of artillery fire, and that was what made it so serious. He drew attention to the Chief of Staff's conclusion that the pattern for the incident of 3 December had been set by the incident of 6 November. In both cases, as could be clearly seen from the report of the Chief of Staff, the initiator of the serious incidents, and therefore the guilty party, was Israel.

139. His delegation believed that the trip which the Secretary-General planned to take to the area could serve a useful purpose with a view to ensuring conditions for full implementation of the Armistice Agreement and full utilization of the machinery established for assisting in the implementation of the Armistice Agreement.

140. The representative of Colombia deeply deplored the incident of 3 December. His delegation associated itself with all the other members of the Council in expressing the hope that the two parties involved in the situation would abstain completely from recourse to armed force in their frontier differences since they had available to them suitable means to solve those differences peacefully.

141. The representative of Israel stated that by every one of the standards referred to by the Secretary-General and by six of the previous speakers, such acts as the shooting of Israel shepherds of Gonen and the

bombardment of seven villages in the Huleh valley stood clearly condemned. He declared that the object in seeking recourse to the Security Council had been to make a psychological impact far beyond that available to the Mixed Armistice Commission. Every Member of the United Nations had the right of unconditional recourse to the Security Council, and that right of recourse to the Council was not lost by any Member State by reason of other agreements into which it might have entered. He considered that even if the Syrian-Israel armistice machinery had been working in perfect order, he could not regard an event of that scope as being appropriate for an international instance falling so far short of the maximal authority which the Security Council, and it alone, could mobilize in the name of the international community.

142. The representative of the United Arab Republic said that the precedents of which Israel had been guilty obliged the forces on the demarcation lines to take all the necessary precautions, for one could never know what would be the intensity of the shooting or what would be the scope of the aggression which Israel planned to carry out. Referring to the incident which had taken place in connexion with Mrs. Doran, the wife of the British Air Attaché, he stated that it had never been discussed by the Mixed Armistice Commission and that the circumstances in which Mrs. Doran had been killed were still, in his opinion, rather mysterious.

143. He remarked that, in refusing to co-operate with the Mixed Armistice Commission and the Truce Supervision Organization, and in constantly violating the provisions of the General Armistice Agreement, Israel was creating the state of tension referred to in the report of the Chief of Staff. For its part, the United Arab Republic would not fail to assist UNTSO to regain its authority, and, as in the past, it would co-operate with the Mixed Armistice Commission, the United Nations and the Secretary-General in carrying out the General Armistice Agreement.

144. Summing up the debate, the President felt certain that the Council agreed that incidents of the nature it had been discussing were regrettable, but also that they could be effectively dealt with by the Chief of Staff and his organization. He fully recognized the gravity of the action about which Israel had complained. The Council would, he felt confident, agree that the authority of the United Nations should be respected and that the parties should continue their co-operation with the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in the spirit of the Armistice Agreement.

145. He took note of the Secretary-General's intention to visit the countries concerned, and there to take up the present situation for most serious consideration by the authorities of Israel and the United Arab Republic, in the hope of breaking the present trend and soliciting their full support for the Council's efforts to attack the underlying problems which were at the source of the tension.

B. Complaint by Israel against the United Arab Republic concerning an incident of 23 January 1959 at Ma'ale Habashan

146. By a letter dated 26 January 1959 (S/4151), the representative of Israel requested that an urgent meeting of the Council should be convened to consider the renewal of aggression by United Arab Republic armed forces on the Israel-Syrian border. It was stated

that, on 23 January 1959, automatic fire had been opened by Syrian soldiers on two shepherds who had led their flocks from the village of Ma'ale Habashan in Galilee to their usual grazing ground situated inside Israel territory. One of them had been killed. Machine-gun fire from a Syrian military position had interfered with the search for the victim, but no fire had been returned from Israel territory. It was further stated that the border in the area was clearly marked by a stone fence about one kilometre in length, and that no possible confusion in respect of its position could arise.

147. On 29 January 1959, the Secretary-General circulated a report (S/4154), by Major-General Carl Carlsson von Horn, Chief of Staff of UNTSO, concerning the incident of 23 January 1959.

148. The Chief of Staff stated that the two versions given to the Mixed Armistice Commission by Israel and Syria apparently agreed on the following point: the Israel shepherd had been mortally wounded by a shot or shots fired from Syrian territory while he was with his herd in the vicinity of the armistice demarcation line, which in that area followed the international boundary between Syria and Palestine. The two versions differed on the question of who had opened fire: according to the Israel complaint, Syrian military positions had opened machine-gun fire on the Israel herd; according to the Syrian complaint, the Israel shepherds had fired the first shots in the direction of Arab villagers and fire had been returned.

149. At its 845th meeting, on 30 January 1959, the Council included the Israel complaint in its agenda, and the representatives of Israel and the United Arab Republic were invited to take places at the Council table.

150. The representative of Israel listed main events which had taken place on the Israel-Syrian frontier since he last had addressed the Council, in December 1958. All those incidents, he said, had occurred outside the demilitarized zone. Following each of them Israel had lodged a complaint with the Mixed Armistice Commission. Thus, the attack on the shepherds near Ma'ale Habashan on 23 January had not been an isolated incident. It had been a climax, not a beginning.

151. The report of UNTSO, he stated, made it clear that the mortal attack had come from "shots fired from Syrian territory." The body had been found in Israel territory where the entire engagement had taken place. His government could not avoid the impression that the Syrian forces, which maintained machine-gun and artillery positions right up to the frontier, were acting under a policy of opening fire whenever anyone came into view on the Israel side.

152. He declared that what was needed was no longer, therefore, a clarification of technical facts, but an impact of international opinion to prevent a further deterioration of the situation. For there were only three possible courses of action once a complaint on an attack had been made to the Mixed Armistice Commission and UNTSO had reported on it. One was to suffer the repetition of such attacks. That was clearly inconceivable. Another was to withstand such aggression by direct action in self-defence. That could be effectively done, but it was a last, not a first resort. The third one was to seek the aid of the organ on which the Members of the United Nations had conferred responsibility for international security, in the hope that its members would exercise their influence in support of the cease-fire provisions of the General Armistice Agreement. The Israel forces had been operating under instructions not to open fire unless they were fired at.

153. Referring to Articles 34 and 35 of the Charter, he stated that to deny the preventive element in the responsibility of the Security Council would be an injury both to Middle Eastern peace and to the utility and prestige of the United Nations system. He therefore sought to engage the attention and responsibility of the Council to the end that the cease-fire be restored as an injunction rigorously binding on the Syrian forces. There were, of course, many intricate problems which had their scene on the Syrian-Israel frontier. Those were matters which could be discussed and negotiated. Indeed article VIII of the Israel-Syrian Armistice Agreement laid down the procedure for such discussion.

154. The representative of the United Arab Republic said that the Council was faced with an incident of the nature of those which generally took place along the frontier. It was a local incident which, far from justifying a meeting of the Security Council, fell within the competence of the Mixed Armistice Commission. The Council had not even all the elements which would make it possible for it to take any decision whatever on the subject. The objective pursued by Israel in raising the complaint in the Council had nothing in common with the provisions of the Charter or even with the practices of the Council itself. It was not the first time that Israel had made use of that kind of contrivance, and the Council must not be converted into a sort of summary tribunal.

155. He considered that it was for the Mixed Armistice Commission to solve the matter in accordance with article VII of the General Armistice Agreement. He noted that the representative of Israel had drawn the attention to Articles 34 and 35 of the Charter. Those Articles gave certain powers to the Security Council, but when there was a body which had been created by the agreement of both parties, under the auspices of the Council, it seemed to him that, first of all, the parties must go through that body, particularly when faced with an incident such as the one under consideration.

156. It was in that spirit and in order to comply with the opinions that were expressed at the last meeting that his Government had decided quite recently to seize the Mixed Armistice Commission of two cases of a serious nature which certainly could have been submitted to the Security Council, particularly if he were to compare the facts with the latest Israel complaint. He referred to a complaint of the United Arab Republic against the flying of Israel aircraft over its territory on 20 November 1958 and 8 January 1959. The Council would see that in those incidents which had taken place following the last meetings of the Security Council, Israel had been condemned twice. He recalled that on 17 November 1950, the Security Council had decided to refer the examination of the Egyptian complaint to the Mixed Armistice Commission, even when the Egyptian complaint involved a far more important complaint than the frontier incidents of a local character contained in the complaint by Israel.

157. He considered that incidents of that kind were not likely to be reduced in number if the Truce Supervision Organization was not capable of obtaining the co-operation of Israel and obtaining respect for the terms of the Armistice Agreement.

158. The representatives of the United Kingdom, the United States, Japan, France, Italy, Canada, China and Panama expressed basically the views that both parties should observe strictly the provisions of the General Armistice Agreement, show good faith and respect for

the Agreement by proper resort to the Mixed Armistice Commission and full co-operation with UNTSO, and issue orders to the military commanders on both sides to prohibit all firing except in cases of obvious self-defence.

159. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics stated that not one of Israel's accusations against the United Arab Republic was incontrovertible and that Israel was disregarding the procedure laid down in the Armistice Agreement. The Security Council should recommend both sides to refrain from any action which might lead to border incidents and conflicts and indicate to the Government of Israel the need to abide strictly by the provisions of the Armistice Agreement.

160. The representative of Japan added the suggestion that if the Council's injunctions were not respected and if the peace machinery in the area did not work properly, the Council might find ways to strengthen, revise or review the whole structure of the peace machinery.

161. The representative of France, stressing that the recurrence of incidents in the region was due to the prevailing atmosphere of nervousness and tension, hoped that calm would gradually be restored, aside from measures which might eventually be studied, such as those suggested by the representative of Japan.

162. The representative of Israel stated that the central issue which the Security Council had faced had been that of human life. He pointed out that the period of greatest relative tranquillity had until now been the period during which the current procedures had been adopted by both sides, namely, submission to the Mixed Armistice Commission, investigation by UNTSO and reference to the Security Council in such cases where isolated instances merged into a serious and cumulative trend.

163. The representative of the United Arab Republic asked whether Israel, which gave as its reason for turning to the Security Council the fact that the latter commanded more influence and greater prestige, had itself respected the resolutions of the Council concerning the situation on the demarcation line, and had forgotten the aggression for which it had been condemned by the Council on numerous occasions. He reiterated his country's willingness to implement the armistice agreements. At the same time he was certain that the instructions given to the troops on the demarcation line included respect for those agreements.

C. Other communications

(i) ADDITIONAL REPORT OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF RELATING TO THE MOUNT SCOPUS INCIDENT

164. On 28 July 1958, the Secretary-General circulated an addendum (S/4030/Add.1) to the report of the Chief of Staff dated 17 June 1958 (S/4030),⁶ concerning the firing incident of 26 May 1958 on Mount Scopus, near Jerusalem. The addendum consisted of two sections. The first was a summary of the results of a ballistic examination; the second was a report on the problem of the road between Issawiya village, on Mount Scopus, and Jerusalem.

165. The examination had revealed that the bullet which had killed Lieutenant Colonel Flint had been a direct shot. It was thus to be considered as established

⁶ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirteenth Session, Supplement No. 2*, paras. 46-52.

that Lieutenant Colonel Flint had been shot by a bullet fired from Jordanian controlled territory, and that at least one of the Israeli policemen killed had been shot by a bullet fired by a rifle of the same type as that with which the fatal shot at Lieutenant Colonel Flint had been fired.

166. In the second section of the report, it was stated that Mr. Andrew W. Cordier, as specially-designated representative of the Secretary-General, and the Chief of Staff, had both engaged in a careful investigation of the road in question. It was difficult to see, as the Israel authorities alleged, that security and safety factors were considerations in the closing of the road, and such a policy could in no sense be regarded as contributing to the tranquillity of the area. In consultations with Israel authorities, the specially-designated representative had requested an immediate opening of the road to normal vehicular and pedestrian traffic in its own right and as a contribution to an atmosphere of general improvement in the various tensions current on Mount Scopus. Before his departure from Jerusalem, he had been informed by the Israel Foreign Office that the road would be open during the daylight hours as from 23 June. The specially-designated representative had maintained that there was no reason why the road should not be open twenty-four hours a day. The Chief of Staff had reported the matter to the Secretary-General, who had since brought the question to the attention of the Government of Israel.

(ii) COMPLAINT BY THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC AGAINST ISRAEL CONCERNING AN INCIDENT OF 4 FEBRUARY 1959 AT RAFAH

167. In a letter dated 5 February 1959 (S/4156), the representative of the United Arab Republic complained to the President of the Security Council of an act of aggression by an armed Israeli patrol composed of four soldiers. It was stated that on 4 February 1959 the patrol had crossed the international frontier between Palestine and Egypt, south of Rafah, and had attacked a bedouin camp with small arms fire. A woman, together with her child, had been killed and another woman had been seriously wounded.

168. In another letter, dated 7 February (S/4160),

the representative of the United Arab Republic requested the circulation as a Security Council document of a resolution condemning Israel, adopted on that date by the Egyptian-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission in regard to the incident.

(iii) COMPLAINT BY THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC AGAINST ISRAEL CONCERNING AN INCIDENT OF 17 FEBRUARY 1959 IN THE SOUTHERN PART OF SINAI

169. In a letter dated 19 February 1959 (S/4164), the representative of the United Arab Republic complained to the President of the Security Council that Israel soldiers had committed another grave act of aggression, on 17 February, in the southern part of Sinai. It was stated that an armed Israel patrol had ambushed four citizens of the United Arab Republic three kilometres inside United Arab Republic territory and had fired upon them with small-arms fire, killing two of them and wounding one.

170. In another letter dated 23 February (S/4167), the representative of the United Arab Republic requested the circulation as a Security Council document of a resolution regarding the 17 February incident, adopted by the Egyptian-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission on 21 February, also condemning Israel.

(iv) COMPLAINT BY ISRAEL AGAINST THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC OF INTERFERENCE WITH THE FREEDOM OF PASSAGE THROUGH THE SUEZ CANAL

171. In a letter dated 17 March 1959 (S/4173), the representative of Israel complained to the President of the Security Council of two acts by the United Arab Republic of unlawful and unjustified interference with the freedom of passage through the Suez Canal. It was stated that on 26 February 1959, the S.S. *Capetan Manolis*, flying the Liberian flag had been detained by the United Arab Republic authorities and its cargo impounded. In the second case, on 17 March, the United Arab Republic authorities had issued instructions to unload and seize the cargo of the S.S. *Leglott*, flying the flag of the Federal Republic of Germany. Both vessels had been en route from Israel to ports of call in South-East Asia.

PART II

Other matters considered by the Council

Chapter 3

THE DATE OF ELECTION TO FILL A VACANCY IN THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

172. At its 840th meeting, held on 25 November 1958, the Security Council noted that a vacancy in the International Court of Justice had occurred as a result of the death on 25 October 1958 of Judge José G. Guerrero, and decided (S/4118), in accordance with Article 14 of the Statute of the Court, that an election to fill the vacancy for the remainder of Judge Guerrero's term, i.e., until 5 February 1964, should take place during the fourteenth session of the General Assembly or during a special session before the fourteenth session.

Chapter 4

ADMISSION OF NEW MEMBERS

A. Application of the Republic of Guinea

173. In a letter dated 3 December 1958 (S/4122), the Ambassador of the Republic of Guinea submitted his country's application for admission to membership in the United Nations, together with a declaration of acceptance of the obligations contained in the Charter. He also transmitted a proclamation of the national independence of Guinea and an act adopting the Constitution of the Republic.

174. The Security Council considered the application at its 842nd meeting on 9 December. The following draft resolution was submitted by Iraq and Japan (S/4131):

"The Security Council,

"Having examined the application of the Republic of Guinea for membership in the United Nations,

"Recommends to the General Assembly that the Republic of Guinea be admitted to membership in the United Nations."

175. The representatives of Japan, Iraq, the United Kingdom, China, the United States, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Colombia, Panama and Canada, and the President, speaking as the representative of Sweden, welcomed the application of the Republic of Guinea, which they regarded as fully qualified for membership, and supported the joint draft resolution.

176. The representative of France said that his delegation felt that too many questions remained unanswered, with regard to the future status of Guinea in relation to France and the Community and in relation to other African countries, for the Security Council to be in a position to take a formal decision now. In the

circumstances, and without rejecting any possibility for the future, it would abstain in the vote.

Decision: *The draft resolution submitted by Iraq and Japan (S/4131) was adopted by 10 votes in favour, with 1 abstention (France).*

B. Consideration of proposals relating to the applications of the Republic of Korea, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Viet-Nam

177. After completing its consideration of the application of the Republic of Guinea, the Security Council, at its 842nd meeting on 9 December, proceeded to consider, as sub-items (b) and (c) of its agenda, General Assembly resolutions 1144 A and B (XII) concerning the applications of the Republic of Korea and the Republic of Viet-Nam respectively. The inclusion of these two sub-items had been requested in letters (S/4127 and S/4128) addressed to the President of the Council on 8 December by the representative of the United States.

178. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, at the time of the adoption of the agenda, objected to the inclusion of those questions in the agenda of the meeting at which the Council was to take up the application of the Republic of Guinea.

Decision: *The Security Council decided, by 9 votes to 1 (USSR), with 1 abstention (Iraq), to include sub-items (b) and (c) in the agenda.*

179. The Council had before it the following two joint draft resolutions (S/4129/Rev.1 and S/4130/Rev.1) submitted by France, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States.

"The Security Council,

"Noting the General Assembly's reaffirmation at its twelfth session that the Republic of Korea is fully qualified for admission to membership in the United Nations and should be admitted,

"Having again examined the application of the Republic of Korea for membership in the United Nations,

"Recommends to the General Assembly that the Republic of Korea be admitted to membership in the United Nations."

"The Security Council,

"Noting the General Assembly's reaffirmation at its twelfth session that Viet-Nam is fully qualified for admission to membership in the United Nations and should be admitted,

"Having again examined the application of Viet-Nam for membership in the United Nations,

"Recommends to the General Assembly that Viet-Nam be admitted to membership in the United Nations."

130. The representative of the United States noted that the General Assembly had repeatedly asserted that the Republic of Korea should be admitted to membership in the United Nations. Citing the close links between the Republic of Korea and the United Nations, under whose auspices that Republic was established and through whose assistance its independence had been maintained, he noted that the growth of democratic government and economic progress were reviewed annually by the General Assembly on the basis of reports submitted by United Nations organs in that country. In view of its full qualification for membership he declared that the Council had a clear responsibility to approve the application of the Republic of Korea for membership in the United Nations.

181. The representative of China said that the fact that the northern part of Korea had been subjected to the aggression of international communism constituted an additional reason for conferring the privileges and rights of membership on the Republic of Korea.

182. The representative of the United Kingdom hoped that the obstruction which had so often been placed in the way of the membership of Korea in the United Nations would be removed and that the joint draft resolution would receive the unanimous support of the Council.

183. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that two mutually exclusive approaches were adopted concerning the resolution of the problem of the admission of Viet-Nam and Korea: one, outlined in the decisions adopted at the tenth session of the Assembly, calling for the adoption of measures to promote the peaceful unification of those countries; the other consisting in the efforts of the United States and the Western Powers supporting it to confirm and consolidate the division of Viet-Nam and Korea. Guided by its desire to maintain South Korea as its military bridgehead, the United States sought by all means to encourage Syngman Rhee in a policy of military provocation against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. While the most appropriate solution would be to admit a peacefully unified Korea, in the circumstances admission of both halves of the country on an equal footing would definitely promote unification on a democratic basis. He therefore submitted the following amendments (S/4132) to the joint draft

resolution concerning the Republic of Korea (S/4129/Rev.1):

"1. Delete the first paragraph of the draft resolution.

"2. In the second paragraph, replace the word 'application' by the word 'applications' and insert the words 'the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and' before the words 'the Republic of Korea'.

"3. In the third paragraph, insert the words 'the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and' before the words 'the Republic of Korea' and the word 'simultaneously' after the words 'be admitted'."

184. The duty of the Council was to use all its authority to hasten the implementation of the Geneva agreement of 1954 on the reunification of Viet-Nam, which was an indispensable condition for the admission of a unified Viet-Nam to membership in the United Nations. He would therefore vote against the joint draft resolution concerning Viet-Nam. He also declared that the time had come to put an end to the discriminatory policy of the Western Powers in respect to the Mongolian People's Republic and to solve positively the question of its admission into the United Nations.

185. At the 843rd meeting on 9 December, the representative of France emphasized that a prompt decision should be taken by the Council to recommend the admission of the Republic of Korea.

186. The representative of Canada said that the Republic of Korea had for far too long been unjustifiably prevented from assuming its rightful place in the Organization.

187. The representative of the United States opposed the USSR amendments, declaring that the North Korean régime had never been found qualified for membership by the United Nations. He reiterated his delegation's opposition to the admission of Outer Mongolia.

188. The representative of Iraq, referring to the principle of universality of membership, said that the applications of Korea and Viet-Nam should not be divorced from other pending applications.

189. The representative of Panama said that he would vote in favour of the joint draft resolution relating to the application of the Republic of Korea, and against the USSR amendments.

Decision: *The USSR amendments (S/4132) to the first joint draft resolution (S/4129/Rev.1) were rejected by 8 votes to 1 (USSR), with 2 abstentions (Iraq, Sweden).*

Decision: *The joint draft resolution (S/4129/Rev.1) relating to the application of the Republic of Korea received 9 votes in favour and 1 against (USSR), with 1 abstention (Iraq). It was not adopted, the negative vote being that of a permanent member of the Council.*

190. The representative of the United States said that there was no doubt that Viet-Nam fulfilled the conditions laid down in Article 4 of the Charter, and he noted that since 1952 the General Assembly had many times found that country to be qualified for membership. He hoped that the Council would be able to fulfil its responsibility by recommending the admission of Viet-Nam.

191. The representative of China fully supported the joint draft resolution concerning Viet-Nam.

192. The representative of the United Kingdom expressed regret that it had not, so far, been possible to

carry out the measures for the reunification of Viet-Nam provided for in the Geneva agreement. But that was no reason for delaying admission of a State which was fully qualified for membership.

193. The representative of France reiterated his Government's support of admission of Viet-Nam, which had been delayed far too long.

194. The representative of Canada indicated that he would abstain in the vote on the second joint draft

resolution in view of the impartiality required by his country's membership in the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Viet-Nam.

Decision: *The joint draft resolution (S/4130/Rev.1) relating to the application of Viet-Nam received 8 votes in favour and 1 against (USSR), with 2 abstentions (Canada, Iraq). It was not adopted, the negative vote being that of a permanent member of the Council.*

PART III

The Military Staff Committee

Chapter 5

WORK OF THE MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE

195. The Military Staff Committee has been functioning continuously under the draft rules of procedure during the period under review and has held a total of twenty-six meetings without making further progress on matters of substance.

PART IV

Matters brought to the attention of the Security Council but not discussed in the Council

Chapter 6

COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING THE INDIA-PAKISTAN QUESTION

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

196. The thirteenth annual report of the Security Council⁷ contains, in chapter 2, a summary account of the proceedings of the Council on the India-Pakistan question that took place at fourteen meetings held between 24 September and 2 December 1957. It also contains a summary of the report (S/3984) submitted on 28 March 1958 by the United Nations representative for India and Pakistan on his discussions with the two Governments in pursuance of the Security Council resolution of 2 December 1957 (S/3922).

197. The India-Pakistan question has not been discussed by the Security Council since its 808th meeting on 2 December 1957. A number of communications have, however, been received by the Council from the two Governments bearing on this question.

COMMUNICATIONS FROM THE GOVERNMENTS OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN

198. In a letter dated 30 July 1958 (S/4070), the representative of Pakistan, referring to India's communication of 6 July 1958,⁸ stated that in the face of the obligations arising from the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) resolutions, which had been accepted by both parties, India's invocation of Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter was a provocative act and reflected an aggressive colonialist position. In fact, India's assertions in that respect had been contradicted by statements of its Prime Minister which were on public record. Moreover, it was a basic rule of international law that no State should advance the provisions of its domestic constitution as a reason for its failure to discharge any obligation arising from an international treaty or agreement. Thus, India's assertions had brought into grave question its compliance with the rules and norms of international behaviour and its ability and willingness to discharge the obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, particularly with reference to Article 2, paragraphs 2 and 3, Article 4, paragraph 1, and Article 25.

199. In a letter dated 15 August 1958 (S/4086), the representative of India referred to the Pakistan communication of 15 July 1958 (S/4048)⁹ and stated that according to a report published in the *Pakistan Times* of 29 July 1958, Sardar Mohammed Ibrahim, President of the Azad Kashmir Government, had contradicted the exaggerated reports regarding the so-called liberation

movement, particularly reports about the number of persons arrested by the Government of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. After quoting from the *Pakistan Times*, the representative of India added that it was obvious that the campaign started by Mr. Ghulam Abbas was being sustained by Pakistan's own policy and encouragement and that the much publicized assertions of the Government of Pakistan "condemning" that campaign had stood clearly exposed.

200. In another letter dated 18 August 1958 (S/4088), and in reply to Pakistan's communication of 30 July 1958 (S/4070), the representative of India said that his Government considered it extraordinary that Pakistan should take exception to India sustaining its position by reference to the Charter of the United Nations. Apparently Pakistan had found provocation not only in India's reference to the Charter but also in the fact that Jammu and Kashmir had acceded to the Indian Union in accordance with the procedures laid down by an act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom—the Government of India Act 1935—as adapted under India (Provisional Constitution) Order 1957, issued under the Indian Independence Act 1947, which was also an enactment of the British Parliament. Pakistan's letter could be construed only as its repudiation of fundamental international agreements which had been arrived at at the time of the establishment of the two independent States of India and Pakistan. As regards Kashmir, the basic international obligations of Pakistan arose out of the inter-governmental agreements entered into when the British authority had been withdrawn. To them had been added Pakistan's obligations under the Charter and its commitments under the Security Council resolution of 17 January 1948 and the resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan.

201. By a letter dated 27 August 1958 (S/4092), the representative of Pakistan, in reply to India's communication of 18 August 1958 (S/4088), stated that the fact that the Security Council had not entertained India's contention was evident from all of its resolutions generally and from the one adopted on 24 January 1957 in particular. The decision of the Council to continue consideration of the dispute was in itself a conclusive proof of the fact that at no stage had it ever considered the dispute to fall within the domestic jurisdiction of either India or Pakistan. The representative of Pakistan also submitted extracts from various statements of the Prime Minister of India, as an appendix to his letter, to show that the Prime Minister of India

⁷ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirteenth Session, Supplement No. 2.*

⁸ *Ibid.*, para. 215.

⁹ *Ibid.*, para. 217.

had hitherto regarded the Kashmir question as an international problem.

202. In another letter dated 10 September 1958 (S/4095), the representative of Pakistan said that the representative of India in his communication of 15 August (S/4086) had adduced no evidence to contradict the facts contained in Pakistan's letter of 15 July (S/4048) but, on the contrary, had relied solely on one news report. That report had referred not to the scope and character of the movement itself but to the happenings of one particular day. In an appendix attached to his letter, the representative of Pakistan submitted extracts from foreign press reports to show the extent of the "Kashmir Liberation Movement" and the steps taken by the Pakistan Government in that respect.

203. By a letter dated 24 October 1958 (S/4107), the representative of India, in reply to Pakistan's communication of 27 August 1958 (S/4092), stated that there was not a single provision in the Security Council resolution of 17 January 1948 or the UNCIP resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 which gave Pakistan any *locus standi* in Jammu and Kashmir. Furthermore, Sir Owen Dixon, a former United Nations representative, had stated that the Pakistan invasion of Jammu and Kashmir was inconsistent with international law. Neither the Security Council nor the Commission had at any time questioned the legality of the accession to India of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, or the lawful presence of Indian troops in Jammu and Kashmir which was Indian territory. In submitting extracts from the statements of the Prime Minister of India, the representative of Pakistan had torn them out of their context and had withheld mentioning the crucial fact which the Prime Minister had repeatedly emphasized that the (Kashmir) problem had been created by Pakistan's aggression which still continued and without the ending of which it was futile to look for a lasting solution.

204. Referring in the same letter also to Pakistan's communication of 10 September 1958 (S/4095), the representative of India considered that communication to be baseless and tendentious.

205. In a letter dated 10 November 1958 (S/4110), the representative of Pakistan stated that his Government wished to draw the attention of the Security Council to the grave conditions being created in the India-occupied part of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. According to Press reports, Sheikh Abdullah, along with other prominent Kashmir leaders, was being brought to a stage-managed trial for alleged conspiracy against the State with the aim of facilitating its annexation by Pakistan. The extraordinary nature of that trial and the international implications of the charge were obvious from two facts. First, according to the international agreement between Pakistan and India on the one hand, and between them and the United Nations on the other, the question as to whether the territory of the State of Jammu and Kashmir should form part of India or of Pakistan was open to decision by the people of the State themselves. Secondly, the Kashmir leaders now under trial, were demanding the implementation of that agreement. From those facts, it was obvious that that trial was a political manoeuvre and an attempt to suppress and intimidate those within the State who continued to demand the implementation of the Security Council's resolutions.

206. By a letter dated 15 December 1958 (S/4138), the representative of India said that members of the Security Council were aware of the nature of the pre-

vious statements made by successive representatives of Pakistan in the Security Council about Sheikh Abdullah. Those were on record in Council documents. It was quite clear, therefore, that the Pakistan communication of 10 November 1958 was merely for the purpose of making propagandist use of the forum of the United Nations. The legal proceedings in regard to Sheikh Abdullah were *sub judice*, and it would, therefore, not be proper for the Government of India to comment on them.

207. In a letter dated 17 December 1958 (S/4139), the representative of Pakistan recalled that the representative of India, in his letter of 24 October 1958 (S/4107), had said that the Security Council resolution of 17 January 1948 and the UNCIP resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, had not given Pakistan any *locus standi* in Jammu and Kashmir. He stated that an assertion of that kind could only be made by effecting a severance of words and meanings. Nothing was more evident in the form, language, purpose and spirit of those resolutions than that they had embodied an agreement between India and Pakistan to take certain measures in order to enable the people of Jammu and Kashmir freely to decide the question of accession. In fact, the resolution of 17 January 1948 had addressed an appeal equally to both India and Pakistan as being "parties" to the dispute. Similarly, the two UNCIP resolutions had proposed a cease-fire, a co-ordinated withdrawal of armies and a plebiscite equally to both parties and had not recognized any juridical right as belonging to one party and lacking by the other. It was a matter of the highest importance that neither the Security Council nor the Commission had recognized the legality of Jammu and Kashmir's accession to India or of the presence of Indian troops in Jammu and Kashmir. If they had done so, the question could not have arisen even of proposing the withdrawal of Indian troops from Kashmir or a plebiscite to determine the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, far less of such proposals being accepted by India itself.

208. The representative of India had also referred to Sir Owen Dixon as having said that the Pakistan invasion of Jammu and Kashmir was inconsistent with international law. This was a deliberate misconception of Sir Owen's report. As he had himself said, Sir Owen had not attempted to deliver a verdict; he had indicated his willingness to make a certain assumption only to remove the impediments, of India's own making, in the withdrawal of Indian forces from Kashmir.

209. The representative of Pakistan further stated that the purpose of submitting certain passages from the statements of the Indian Prime Minister was merely to adduce evidence that the commitments invoked by Pakistan had been accepted by the Prime Minister of India. For that reason only passages relevant to that point had been cited.

210. In continuation of his Government's letter of 10 November 1958 (S/4110), the representative of Pakistan sent another letter on 30 December 1958 (S/4143), stating that Pakistan wished further to draw the attention of the Security Council to the sudden and mysterious death of Mr. Ghulam Mohammad Shaikh, a co-accused with Sheikh Abdullah. That event had aroused a deep resentment throughout Kashmir and Pakistan. Events of that nature should not be allowed to go unnoticed as they offered a true glimpse of the pitiable plight of political prisoners in areas under Indian occupation in Kashmir.

211. In a letter dated 27 January 1959 (S/4152), the representative of Pakistan stated that his Government's letter of 10 November 1958 had sought to bring a grave development in Jammu and Kashmir to the knowledge of the Security Council and it was astonishing that India, in its communication of 15 December 1958 (S/4138), should construe that as making a propagandist use of the forum of the United Nations. Since the question of Jammu and Kashmir continued to be a matter under the consideration of the United Nations, it was Pakistan's duty to keep the Security Council informed of all pertinent and developing facts. The fact that Sheikh Abdullah was being brought to a stage-managed trial, solely because he had been demanding the implementation of the Security Council resolution, was a fact of ominous significance and a matter of immediate concern to the United Nations. The sheer political motivation of India's action being evident, it was not possible to accept India's plea that the so-called legal proceedings in that regard were *sub-judice* and, therefore, precluded any comment at the present stage.

212. In a letter dated 5 February 1959 (S/4157), the representative of Pakistan stated that the apprehension expressed in his letter of 30 December 1958 (S/4143) about the inquiry into the cause of the death of Mr. Ghulam Mohammad Shaikh had been justified by later events. It seemed that a mock inquiry had been conducted by the Indian-sponsored régime in Kashmir, and the convenient finding had been obtained that Mr. Shaikh had died of natural cause. The sombreness and gravity of that event had been further deepened by reports that the health of prominent Kashmir leaders in jail was deteriorating steadily and that one of them had died soon after his release. Moreover, the Indian-sponsored régime of Kashmir had withdrawn the detention order of Sheikh Abdullah. As a result of that, Sheikh Abdullah was being treated as an ordinary criminal defendant and was deprived of the special treatment to which he was entitled under the law. It would not only jeopardize the safety of the veteran leader of Kashmir but would also hamper his defence.

213. By a letter dated 4 March 1959 (S/4169), the representative of India rejected the arguments advanced in Pakistan's communication of 17 December 1958 (S/4139), to the effect that Pakistan had *locus standi* in Jammu and Kashmir. That Pakistan had no such *locus standi*, he stated, had been made indisputably clear not only in the three resolutions cited in his delegation's letter of 24 October 1958 (S/4107) but also in the various assurances that the United Nations Commission had given to the Prime Minister of India and which had been included in the Security Council records. One of the essential attributes of sovereignty was the right to maintain an army and Pakistan had never been authorized to maintain any army in Kashmir under any of the United Nations resolutions. On the other hand, those resolutions had recognized India's right to maintain its army in Kashmir for its security and the maintenance of law and order. Moreover, the Council was aware that the issue of Kashmir was not a territorial dispute between India and Pakistan; it was a

"situation" which had arisen out of Pakistan's aggression against which India had complained to the Security Council. The Council had described it as such in its resolution of 17 January 1948 and the United Nations Commission had also adopted the same description in its resolution of 13 August 1948.

214. In another letter dated 5 March 1959 (S/4170), the representative of India, with reference to Pakistan's communication of 27 January 1959 (S/4152), stated that Sheikh Abdullah's trial was an internal matter to be dealt with by the Government of Jammu and Kashmir in the discharge of their responsibility for the maintenance of law and order and that the Government of Pakistan had no *locus standi* in that matter. The representative of India added that while Pakistan in its letter of 6 May 1958 (S/4003) had objected to Sheikh Abdullah's being detained without trial, it had now taken exception to Sheikh Abdullah's trial under ordinary law of the State. Those contradictory positions showed that the object of Pakistan's communications regarding the arrest of Sheikh Abdullah was propagandist through the forum of the United Nations.

215. In a communication dated 31 March 1959 (S/4177), the representative of India stated that the death of Mr. Ghulam Mohammad Shaikh referred to in Pakistan's communication of 30 December 1958 had been due to heart failure, that Pakistan's allegations in that respect were baseless, and that Pakistan had once again sought to interfere in the internal affairs of the State of Jammu and Kashmir.

216. In a letter dated 7 May 1959 (S/4185), the representative of Pakistan referred to India's communications of 4 March (S/4169) and 5 March 1959 (S/4170), and stated that the arguments advanced by India in its letter of 4 March were precisely those which had been repeatedly submitted by India and rejected by the Security Council. The Council's own records, therefore, provided the most effective reply to all the Indian accusations. Moreover, those arguments were based entirely on India's own interpretation of the jointly accepted UNCIP resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949. That interpretation was opposed to the sense of the resolutions as it had been read and construed by all mediators appointed by the Security Council. However, an impartial arbitration could very well establish its truth or falsehood, but India had already rejected three proposals for arbitration in that respect. There was no possible explanation of those rejections except that India knew that its interpretation of the international agreement about Kashmir was wrong and incapable of conveying conviction to any impartial authority.

217. As regards India's letter of 5 March 1959 (S/4170), Pakistan trusted that the Council would take full note of the aggravating effect which Sheikh Abdullah's imprisonment had unavoidably created on the situation in Kashmir. As that situation constituted the subject of an international dispute of which the United Nations was cognizant, Pakistan was confident that the Council could not regard the imprisonment of Sheikh Abdullah as an internal matter.

REPORTS ON THE STRATEGIC TRUST TERRITORY OF THE PACIFIC ISLANDS

218. The report of the Trusteeship Council to the Security Council on the strategic Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, covering the period from 13 July 1957 to 1 August 1958 (S/4076), was transmitted to the Council on 4 August 1958.

219. On 2 June 1959, the Secretary-General transmitted to the Security Council the report (S/4191) received from the representative of the United States of America on the administration of the Trust Territory for the period 1 July 1957 to 30 June 1958.

Chapter 8

COMMUNICATIONS FROM THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES

220. On 28 July 1958, a letter was circulated (S/4066), by which the Secretary-General of the Organization of American States, on 2 July, had transmitted to the Secretary-General for the information of the Security Council the text of a resolution adopted by the Council of the Organization on 27 June 1958, following recommendations of the *Ad Hoc* Committee established on 17 May 1957 by that Council acting provisionally as Organ of Consultation. Under the resolution the Council cancelled the convocation of a meeting of consultation of Ministers for Foreign Affairs and terminated that Council's provisional functions as Organ of Consultation in connection with the case submitted to it in May 1957 by the Governments of Honduras and Nicaragua.¹⁰ A report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee, dated 26 June 1958, was also included, in which it was stated, *inter alia*, that Honduras would present to the International Court of Justice, on 1 July 1958, its note instituting proceedings and requesting compliance with the Arbitral Award handed down on 23 December 1906 by the King of Spain. The differences between the two countries were on the way to final settlement, and the Committee recommended therefore the measures embodied in the above-mentioned resolution.

221. In a letter dated 2 May 1959 (S/4184), the Assistant Secretary-General of the Organization of American States transmitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, for the information of the Security Council, copies of resolutions adopted on 28 and 30 April by the Council of the Organization acting provisionally as Organ of Consultation, in response to a request of the Government of Panama. According to the terms of the resolutions, the Council of the Organization, taking cognizance of charges made by Panama that the inviolability of Panamanian territory had been affected by an invasion composed almost entirely of foreign elements, decided to convoke the Organ of Consultation, the date and seat of its meeting to be fixed in due course. It further authorized the Chairman of the Council to appoint a committee to investigate the pertinent facts on the spot, and requested any Government

that had reason to believe that there were persons in zones under its jurisdiction who were deliberately participating in the preparation or organization of activities directed against the territorial integrity of Panama, to use all measures at its disposal to prevent such activities, in accordance with the provisions of existing inter-American conventions. Among other provisions, the resolutions also requested American Governments capable of doing so to place airplanes at the disposal of the Investigating Committee for making peaceful observation flights over Panamanian territory and adjacent high seas, as well as surface vessels for the observation and identification of vessels in those areas.

222. By a letter dated 14 May 1959 (S/4188), the Assistant Secretary-General of the Organization of American States transmitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations for the information of the Security Council the text of a resolution adopted on 2 May by the Council of the Organization acting provisionally as the Organ of Consultation, in response to the request of Panama dealt with in the previous paragraph. Under the resolution, the Council recommended to the Government of Panama and to the Governments which had furnished, or might furnish patrol boats, that they reach agreement that those boats be authorized to detain any vessel in Panamanian territorial seas that attempted to approach Panmanian shores for purposes that might constitute another invasion.

223. By a letter dated 23 June 1959 (S/4194), the Secretary-General of the Organization of American States transmitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, for the information of the Security Council, copies of a resolution adopted on 4 June by the Council of the Organization in response to a request of the Government of Nicaragua. Under the terms of the resolution, the Council, having taken cognizance of a note of the Ambassador of Nicaragua in which it was stated that Nicaraguan territory had been affected by an air-borne invasion by individuals of various nationalities, decided to convoke the Organ of Consultation, to constitute itself and act provisionally as Organ of Consultation, and to authorize the Chairman of the Council to appoint a committee to gather additional information on the situation.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, paras. 494-495.

COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING THE SITUATION IN THE SOUTHERN PART OF THE ARABIAN PENINSULA

224. In a letter dated 18 July 1958 (S/4058/Rev.1), the representative of Yemen stated that the incident of 8 July 1958, referred to in the United Kingdom letter of 9 July 1958 (S/4044),¹¹ had, in fact, constituted an unprovoked attack by the British Royal Air Force against life and property of the inhabitants of the town of Harib and a violation of Yemeni air space. The United Kingdom Government had failed to show a justifiable reason for sending its aircraft to Harib. It could not claim that the firing had come from that town which was over twenty-two miles away from the border, as there were no machine-guns in existence which could fire such a distance. The representative of Yemen also charged that the period 6 through 8 May 1958 had marked three days of bombing, ground and artillery attacks against the Yemeni town of Qataba by the United Kingdom forces, causing destruction of a school, a customs house and many other neighbouring houses,

as well as a number of casualties among soldiers and the civilian population.

225. In a letter dated 10 September 1958 (S/4096 and Corr. 1), the representative of the United Kingdom stated that on two occasions on 6 September, a supply convoy in the territory of the Aden Protectorate had been attacked by fire from heavy machine-guns located in Yemen. The British forces, in exercise of their right of self-defence, had taken measures to silence those machine-guns by counter-battery action from the air.

226. In a letter dated 7 October (S/4103), the representative of the United Kingdom stated that the Yemeni town of Harib was situated approximately one mile from the frontier and not twenty-two miles as claimed by the representative of Yemen in his communication of 18 July (S/4058/Rev.1). With regard to the Qataba incident, the British aircraft had taken action when fired upon by heavy machine-guns situated in and near the fortified Yemeni barracks near that town, and no other building except the barracks had been involved in that counter action.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, para. 511.

Chapter 10

COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING PROPOSALS FOR THE CONVENING OF A MEETING OF HEADS OF GOVERNMENTS

227. By a letter dated 20 July 1958 (S/4059), the permanent representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics transmitted to the Secretary-General the texts of messages which the Head of the Government of the USSR had addressed on 19 July to the Heads of the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, France and India, in which it was proposed that a meeting of those five Heads of State be called on 22 July at Geneva in connexion with the conflict which had broken out in the Near and Middle East. The letter expressed the hope that the Secretary-General would support the proposal, would take part in the meeting, and would contribute to the positive solution of the problem.

228. In a reply dated 21 July (S/4062) to the USSR representative's letter, the Secretary-General, while expressing no personal opinion on any of the questions of substance raised, and leaving to the Heads of Governments to judge whether a high-level meeting would provide the best means of improving on the disturbing situation, declared that should they agree on the desirability of such a meeting with the participation of the Secretary-General, he would consider it to be within his rights and duties to accept and would gladly do so.

229. The representative of the USSR transmitted a further series of messages from the Head of Government of the USSR, on 23 July (S/4064), addressed to the same four Heads of Governments, on 28 July (S/4067), addressed to the Heads of the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and France, and on 5 August (S/4079), also addressed to the Heads of the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and France.

230. On 1 August, the representatives of the United Kingdom (S/4071), the United States (S/4074) and France (S/4075) transmitted to the Secretary-General copies of the communications which the Heads of their respective Governments had addressed to the Head of the Government of the USSR in reply to the latter's communications which had been transmitted by the USSR representative.

231. Also on 1 August, the representatives of the United Kingdom (S/4072), Canada (S/4073) and the United States (S/4074), requested that a special meeting of the Security Council be convened on or about 12 August, pursuant to Article 28, paragraph 2, of the Charter, to discuss certain problems of the Middle East. It was further proposed that early consultations be held among the permanent representatives of the members of the Security Council, with the assistance of the Secretary-General, in order to reach agreement on the formulation of the item which the Council would discuss and on other pertinent matters of procedure.

232. No further action was taken in the Security Council with regard to the above proposals, inasmuch as the Head of the Government of the USSR, in his messages dated 5 August (S/4079), had indicated that his Government considered that the Security Council had shown itself unable to achieve a peaceful solution of the problem of the Near and Middle East, and had therefore instructed its representative at the United Nations to request the convening of a special session of the General Assembly to discuss the problem. (see also chapter 1 above).

**LETTER DATED 25 JULY 1958 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL**

233. In a letter dated 25 July 1958 (S/4065), the representative of the United Arab Republic complained that during the preceding few days, United States aircraft had continuously intercepted and tried to attack the civilian and commercial aircraft of the United Arab Republic during their normal flights between the two

regions of the Republic. Moreover, United States aircraft had daily violated the air space of the United Arab Republic in its northern region. The Government of the United Arab Republic reserved its rights to take any action which it might deem necessary.

Chapter 12

**REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE OF EXPERTS TO STUDY THE POSSIBILITY OF DETECTING
VIOLATIONS OF A POSSIBLE AGREEMENT ON THE SUSPENSION OF NUCLEAR TESTS**

234. In accordance with requests of the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, the Secretary-General, on 28 August 1958, circulated for the information of the

members of the Security Council the report of the Conference of Experts to Study the Possibility of Detecting Violations of a Possible Agreement on the Suspension of Nuclear Tests (S/4091).

Chapter 13

**COMMUNICATIONS FROM THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF
THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC RELATING TO THE SUEZ CANAL**

235. By a letter dated 10 August 1958 (S/4089), the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Republic transmitted to the Secretary-General the text of the Final Agreement signed on 13 July 1958 by the representatives of the United Arab Republic and the Compagnie financière de Suez, with the assistance of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. In this connexion, he referred to his communica-

tion of 20 May 1958 relating to the text of Heads of Agreement in connexion with compensation of the Suez Stockholders,¹² and expressed to the Secretary-General and to the International Bank appreciation for all the help and co-operation which had been given.

¹² *Ibid.*, para. 497.

Chapter 14

**LETTER DATED 29 SEPTEMBER 1958 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF LIBYA
ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL**

236. In a letter dated 29 September 1958 (S/4101), the representative of Libya requested the Secretary-General to draw the attention of the Security Council and the Members of the United Nations to the complaint by his delegation regarding an alleged attack by French military aircraft on 25 September 1958, on a village in the south-west of Libya near the Algerian-Libyan frontier. It was stated that this was not the first French attack against Libyan territory, and that the establish-

ment of a joint Libyan-French commission to investigate these frontier attacks, which had been proposed by Libya, had met with no co-operation on the part of the French authorities. The representative of Libya conveyed the deep concern of his Government regarding such acts of aggression against the integrity of Libyan territory, its air space and the security of its people.

COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING THE SITUATION ON THE CAMBODIAN-THAI FRONTIER

237. In a letter to the Secretary-General dated 29 November 1958 (S/4121), the representative of Cambodia charged that troops on a war footing and large amounts of military equipment were being concentrated on the Cambodian frontier by the Government of Thailand. His Government considered that unjustified action a threat to the peace which should be brought to the attention of all Members of the United Nations. An attached communication from the Government of Cambodia complained that since 1953, a series of events had occurred which had caused a progressive deterioration in relations between the two countries. Efforts to settle outstanding differences by negotiation had been unsuccessful, owing, in Cambodia's view, to the application by the Thai Government of various forms of intimidation against Cambodia, including a continuing press campaign inspired by official or semi-official sources in Thailand. In the face of such a situation, Cambodia had felt compelled to recall its ambassador and embassy staff temporarily from Bangkok in order to preserve its national dignity. Its desire was to maintain friendly relations with Thailand and it would never refuse to re-establish normal relations when the time was ripe for doing so.

238. The representative of Thailand replied to the Cambodian charges in a letter to the Secretary-General dated 8 December (S/4126). On the instructions of his Government, he declared that the allegations that Thailand had concentrated troops and military equipment on the Cambodian frontier were completely untrue. He stated that Thailand was prepared to welcome any United Nations representative to observe the situation in the border area, and that if, for instance, the Secretary-General should consider the case as falling within the purview of Article 99 of the Charter, his Government would be happy to welcome his representative and to afford him every possible facility to inspect the border area. He added that Thailand had increased police reinforcements along the border in order to prevent unwarrantable entry and armed raids conducted by Cambodia, particularly infiltrations into Thailand by undesirable elements. An attached memorandum from the Government of Thailand replied to a series of allegations made in the communication of the Government of Cambodia, and went on to charge that Cambo-

dian gangs had conducted border raids resulting in suffering by Thai nationals and damage to their property. On 20 November, it was charged, thirty-two Thai nationals had been forcibly taken into Cambodia by Cambodian police, and had not been returned, while on 27 November, fourteen more Thais had been taken into Cambodia but subsequently had been permitted to return. Thailand considered that normal diplomatic relations with Cambodia should be resumed at the ambassadorial level, rather than at the *chargé d'affaires* level, as proposed by Cambodia. Thailand had, however, informed the Cambodian Government that the release and return of the thirty-two Thai nationals forcibly taken into Cambodia and detained by the authorities there were essential for the restoration of normal relationships. Finally, Thailand assured the Government of Cambodia that once those steps had been taken, the Thai authorities would promptly consider the withdrawal of the precautionary measures which had been taken to ensure the protection of the Thai people.

239. In a United Nations press release issued on 22 December 1958, it was stated that following an exchange of letters regarding difficulties which had arisen between Cambodia and Thailand, the two Governments had invited the Secretary-General to send a representative to assist them in efforts to find a solution. In response to that invitation, the Secretary-General had designated Ambassador Johan Beck-Friis of Sweden as his representative for that purpose.

240. In letters dated 6 and 9 February 1959 respectively (S/4158 and S/4161), the representatives of Thailand and Cambodia transmitted to the Secretary-General the text of a joint *communiqué* issued on 6 February at Bangkok and Phnom-Penh announcing that the two Governments, at the suggestion of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, had resolved to re-establish diplomatic relations between the two countries and to return the former ambassadors to their respective posts on 20 February 1959. Both representatives expressed to the Secretary-General the gratitude and appreciation of their Governments for the assistance given by the Secretary-General and his Special Representative which had led to the solution of the difficulty between the two countries.

Chapter 16

QUESTION OF MEASURES TO PREVENT SURPRISE ATTACK

241. In accordance with requests of the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and of the United States of America, the Secretary-General, on 5 January 1959, circulated the report of the Conference of Experts for the study of possible measures which might be helpful in preventing surprise attack and for the preparation of a report thereon to Governments (A/4078, S/4145).

242. By a letter dated 16 January 1959 (S/4149), the permanent representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics transmitted the text of a note of

10 January 1959 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR to the United States Embassy in the USSR concerning the resumption of the Geneva Conference of experts. The letter added that similar notes had been addressed to the Governments of the United Kingdom, France, Italy and Canada.¹³

¹³ By a letter dated 22 January 1959 (A/4091), the representative of the United States transmitted the text of a note of 15 January from the United States Embassy in the USSR to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR concerning the problem of minimizing the possibility of surprise attack.

COMMUNICATIONS FROM THE REPRESENTATIVES OF TUNISIA AND FRANCE

243. In a letter dated 16 February 1959 (S/4163), addressed to the President of the Security Council, the representative of Tunisia stated that, on 14 February, three French aircraft from Algeria had machine-gunned a group of Tunisians participating in a locust control campaign at Alb Arritma, eight kilometres from the Algerian-Tunisian frontier. It was further stated that French military raids from Algeria had been unceasing both before and since the Sakiet-Sidi-Youssef incident on 8 February 1958,¹⁴ and that the latest incident constituted a flagrant violation of Tunisian air space and a serious infringement of Tunisian sovereignty which threatened peace and security in that part of the world.

244. In a letter dated 23 February 1959 (S/4166), the representative of France explained that a detailed inquiry had shown that no air operations had been car-

ried out by the French forces over Tunisian territory on 14 February. However, a convoy of rebels coming from Tunisia had been intercepted on that day by three French aircraft, ten kilometres inside Algeria. The wounded shown to journalists by Tunisian authorities on 16 February could therefore not have been victims of an incident in Tunisian territory. Moreover, they were all of the male sex, while the collecting of locust eggs was normally undertaken by women in the area in question. The French Government rejected the Tunisian accusation, as well as the accusations of systematic and repeated attacks on Tunisia by French forces from Algeria. On the other hand, it felt that the incident was a further proof of the aid found by the Algerian rebels in Tunisia.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, Supplement No. 2, chapter 3.

Chapter 18

**COMMUNICATIONS FROM SAUDI ARABIA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM
OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND**

245. In a letter dated 27 November 1958 (S/4119) addressed to the President of the Security Council, the representative of Saudi Arabia submitted for the consideration of the members of the Council charges of violation of Saudi Arabian territorial integrity by armed aggression planned, organized and effected by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. He alleged that early in November, detachments of several hundred United Kingdom colonial forces operating from the Sheikhdum of Abu Dhabi and led by British military officers had occupied the area of Khor al Odaid, south of the Persian Gulf. Despite its policy of seeking peaceful solutions to any international dispute, he declared, Saudi Arabia would not hesitate to take all necessary measures provided for in the Charter to protect and preserve its territorial integrity vis-à-vis British colonialism in the area. The United Kingdom, by virtue of its Charter commitment, was

under the clear obligation to notify the Security Council of the immediate withdrawal of its armed colonial forces from Saudi Arabian territory.

246. On 10 December, the representative of the United Kingdom addressed a letter (S/4134) to the President of the Security Council expressing regret that the Saudi Arabian Government should have made inaccurate statements about the situation in the Khor al Odaid area, which was part of the territories of the Sheikhdum of Abu Dhabi, a State under the protection of Her Majesty's Government. The letter emphasized that the Saudi Arabian Government had already been informed on 19 November that the ruler of Abu Dhabi had re-established a police post at Khor al Odaid for the supervision of fishing in the area, but that there were no British officers nor British personnel in the Abu Dhabi police.

Chapter 19

COMMUNICATION RELATING TO THE KOREAN QUESTION

247. On 22 April 1959, the representative of the United States informed the Council (S/4181) that, effective 1 July 1959, General Carter B. Magruder would replace General George H. Decker as the Com-

manding General of the military forces made available to the Unified Command by Members of the United Nations pursuant to the Council's resolution of 7 July 1950 (S/1588).

LETTER DATED 10 JULY 1959 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVES OF AFGHANISTAN, BURMA, CEYLON, ETHIOPIA, THE FEDERATION OF MALAYA, GHANA, GUINEA, INDONESIA, IRAN, IRAQ, JORDAN, LEBANON, LIBERIA, LIBYA, MOROCCO, NEPAL, PAKISTAN, SAUDI ARABIA, SUDAN, TUNISIA, THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC AND YEMEN CONCERNING ALGERIA

248. By a letter dated 10 July 1959 (S/4195 and Add. 1), the representatives of Afghanistan, Burma, Ceylon, Ethiopia, the Federation of Malaya, Ghana, Guinea, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, Nepal, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia, the United Arab Republic and Yemen, under Article 35 paragraph 1, of the Charter, submitted a memorandum in which, *inter alia*, they expressed the opinion that the United Nations could not remain indifferent to the situation in Algeria which constituted a threat to international peace and security, involved the

infringement of the basic right of self-determination and constituted a flagrant violation of other fundamental human rights.

249. In a letter dated 13 July 1959 (S/4197), the representative of France stated that under Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter, the United Nations was not competent to deal with a matter relating to French national sovereignty, and recalled that on 26 June 1956 the Council had rejected a request that it should include in its agenda an item concerning Algeria.

APPENDICES

I. Representatives and deputy, alternate and acting representatives accredited to the Security Council

The following representatives and deputy, alternate and acting representatives were accredited to the Security Council during the period covered by the present report:

Argentina^a

Dr. Mario Amadeo
Dr. Constantino Ramos
Dr. Raúl Quijano

Canada

Mr. C. S. A. Ritchie
Mr. John W. Holmes
Mr. John G. H. Halstead

China

Dr. Tingfu F. Tsiang
Mr. Chiping H. C. Kiang
Mr. Yu-chi Hsueh
Dr. Chun-ming Chang

Colombia^b

Dr. Alfonso Araújo
Dr. Alberto Zuleta Angel

France

Mr. Guillaume Georges-Picot
Mr. Armand Bérard
Mr. Pierre de Vaucelles

Iraq^b

Mr. Mohamed Fadhil Jamali
Mr. Abdul Majid Abbas
Mr. Hashim Jawad
Mr. Kadhim M. Khalaf
Mr. Ismat T. Kittani

Italy^a

Mr. Egidio Ortona
Mr. Eugenio Plaia

Japan

Mr. Koto Matsudaira
Mr. Masayoshi Kakitsubo

Panama

Dr. Jorge Illueca
Mr. Ernesto de la Ossa

Sweden^b

Mr. Gunnar V. Jarring
Mr. Claes Carbonnier

Tunisia^a

Mr. Mongi Slim
Mr. Mahmoud Mestiri

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Mr. Arkady Aleksandrovich Sobolev
Mr. Georgy Petrovich Arkadev
Mr. Kliment Danilovich Levychkin

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Sir Pierson Dixon
Mr. Harold Beeley

United States of America

Mr. Henry Cabot Lodge
Mr. James J. Wadsworth
Mr. James W. Barco

^a Term of office began on 1 January 1959.

^b Term of office ended on 31 December 1958.

II. Presidents of the Security Council

The following representatives held the office of President of the Security Council during the period covered by the present report:

Colombia

Dr. Alfonso Araújo (16 to 31 July 1958)

France

Mr. Guillaume Georges-Picot (1 to 31 August 1958)

Iraq

Mr. Hashim Jawad (1 to 30 September 1958)

Japan

Mr. Koto Matsudaira (1 to 31 October 1958)

Panama

Dr. Jorge Illueca (1 to 30 November 1958)

Sweden

Mr. Gunnar V. Jarring (1 to 31 December 1958)

Tunisia

Mr. Mongi Slim (1 to 31 January 1959)

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Mr. Arkady Aleksandrovich Sobolev (1 to 28 February 1959)

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Sir Pierson Dixon (1 to 31 March 1959)

United States of America

Mr. Henry Cabot Lodge (1 to 30 April 1959)

Argentina

Dr. Mario Amadeo (1 to 31 May 1959)

Canada

Mr. C. S. A. Ritchie (1 to 30 June 1959)

China

Dr. Tingfu F. Tsiang (1 to 15 July 1959)

III. Meetings of the Security Council during the period from 16 July 1958 to 15 July 1959

<i>Meeting</i>	<i>Subject</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Meeting</i>	<i>Subject</i>	<i>Date</i>
829th	Letter dated 22 May 1958 from the representative of Lebanon addressed to the President of the Security Council concerning: "Complaint by Lebanon of a situation arising from the intervention of the United Arab Republic in the internal affairs of Lebanon, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security"	July 1958 16		the Security Council concerning: "Complaint by the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan of interference in its domestic affairs by the United Arab Republic"	
			832nd	Ditto	17
			833rd	Ditto	18
			834th	Ditto	18
			835th	Ditto	21
			836th	Ditto	21
			837th	Ditto	22
830th	Ditto	16			August 1958
831st	Letter dated 22 May 1958 from the representative of Lebanon addressed to the President of the Security Council concerning: "Complaint by Lebanon of a situation arising from the intervention of the United Arab Republic in the internal affairs of Lebanon, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security"	17	838th	Ditto	7
	Letter dated 17 July 1958 from the representative of Jordan addressed to the President of		839th (private)	Report of the Security Council to the General Assembly	28
					November 1958
			840th	The date of election to fill a vacancy in the International Court of Justice	25
					December 1958
			841st	The Palestine question	8
			842nd	Admission of new Members	9
			843rd	Admission of new Members	9
			844th	The Palestine question	15
					January 1959
			845th	The Palestine question	30

IV. Representatives, Chairmen and Principal Secretaries of the Military Staff Committee

(16 July 1958 to 15 July 1959)

A. REPRESENTATIVE OF EACH SERVICE

	<i>Period of service from 16 July 1958</i>
CHINA	
Lieutenant Gen. Ho Shai-lai, Chinese Army	16 July 1958 to present time
Captain Wu Chia-hsun, Chinese Navy	16 July 1958 to present time
FRANCE	
Général de Brigade J. B. de Bary, French Army	16 July 1958 to 14 March 1959
Lieutenant Colonel H. Houel, French Army	14 March 1959 to present time
Capitaine de Corvette S. Petrochilo, French Navy	16 July 1958 to 11 August 1958
Contre-Amiral P. Poncet, French Navy	11 August 1958 to present time
Général de Division Aérienne J. Bézy, French Air Force	11 August 1958 to present time
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS	
Major General I. M. Saraev, Soviet Army	16 July 1958 to 11 August 1958
Lieutenant General V. A. Dubovik, Soviet Army	11 August 1958 to present time
Colonel A. M. Kuchumov, USSR Air Force	16 July 1958 to present time
Lieutenant Commander Y. D. Kvashnin, USSR Navy	16 July 1958 to present time
UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND	
Vice-Admiral Sir Robert Elkins, Royal Navy	16 July 1958 to 30 September 1958
Vice-Admiral G. Thistleton-Smith, Royal Navy	30 September 1958 to present time
Air Vice-Marshal W. C. Sheen, Royal Air Force	16 July 1958 to present time
Major General J. N. Carter, British Army	16 July 1958 to present time
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	
Lieutenant General B. M. Bryan, US Army	16 July 1958 to present time
Vice-Admiral F. W. McMahon, US Navy	16 July 1958 to 31 December 1958
Vice-Admiral T. S. Combs, US Navy	1 January 1959 to present time
Lieutenant General W. E. Hall, US Air Force	16 July 1958 to present time

B. LIST OF CHAIRMEN
(16 July 1958 to 15 July 1959)

<i>Meeting</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Chairman</i>	<i>Delegation</i>
343rd	17 July 1958	Major General I. M. Saraev, Soviet Army	USSR
344th	31 July 1958	Major General I. M. Saraev, Soviet Army	USSR
345th	14 Aug. 1958	Vice-Admiral Sir Robert Elkins, Royal Navy	United Kingdom
346th	28 Aug. 1958	Air Vice-Marshal W. C. Sheen, Royal Air Force	United Kingdom
347th	11 Sept. 1958	Lieutenant General B. M. Bryan, US Army	United States
348th	25 Sept. 1958	Lieutenant General B. M. Bryan, US Army	United States
349th	9 Oct. 1958	Captain Wu Chia-hsun, Chinese Navy	China
350th	23 Oct. 1958	Captain Wu Chia-hsun, Chinese Navy	China
351st	6 Nov. 1958	Général de Brigade J. B. de Bary, French Army	France
352nd	20 Nov. 1958	Général de Division Aérienne J. Bézy, French Air Force	France
353rd	4 Dec. 1958	Lieutenant General V. A. Dubovik, Soviet Army	USSR
354th	18 Dec. 1958	Lieutenant General V. A. Dubovik, Soviet Army	USSR
355th	31 Dec. 1958	Lieutenant General V. A. Dubovik, Soviet Army	USSR
356th	15 Jan. 1959	Vice-Admiral G. Thistleton-Smith, Royal Navy	United Kingdom
357th	29 Jan. 1959	Air Vice-Marshal W. C. Sheen, Royal Air Force	United Kingdom
358th	12 Feb. 1959	Lieutenant General B. M. Bryan, US Army	United States
359th	26 Feb. 1959	Vice-Admiral T. S. Combs, US Navy	United States
360th	12 Mar. 1959	Captain Wu Chia-hsun, Chinese Navy	China
361st	26 Mar. 1959	Captain Wu Chia-hsun, Chinese Navy	China
362nd	9 Apr. 1959	Contre-Amiral P. Poncet, French Navy	France
363rd	23 Apr. 1959	Contre-Amiral P. Poncet, French Navy	France
364th	7 May 1959	Lieutenant General V. A. Dubovik, Soviet Army	USSR
365th	21 May 1959	Lieutenant General V. A. Dubovik, Soviet Army	USSR
366th	4 June 1959	Vice-Admiral G. Thistleton-Smith, Royal Navy	United Kingdom
367th	18 June 1959	Major General J. N. Carter, British Army	United Kingdom
368th	2 July 1959	Vice-Admiral T. S. Combs, US Navy	United States

C. LIST OF PRINCIPAL SECRETARIES
(16 July 1958 to 15 July 1959)

<i>Meeting</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Principal Secretary</i>	<i>Delegation</i>
343rd	17 July 1958	Colonel V. A. Sazhin, Soviet Army	USSR
344th	31 July 1958	Colonel V. A. Sazhin, Soviet Army	USSR
345th	14 Aug. 1958	Captain I. G. Mason, Royal Navy	United Kingdom
346th	28 Aug. 1958	Captain I. G. Mason, Royal Navy	United Kingdom
347th	11 Sept. 1958	Colonel A. J. Stuart, USMC	United States
348th	25 Sept. 1958	Colonel A. J. Stuart, USMC	United States
349th	9 Oct. 1958	Lieutenant Colonel J. Soong, Chinese Army	China
350th	23 Oct. 1958	Lieutenant Colonel J. Soong, Chinese Army	China
351st	6 Nov. 1958	Capitaine de Corvette S. Petrochilo, French Navy	France
352nd	20 Nov. 1958	Capitaine de Corvette S. Petrochilo, French Navy	France
353rd	4 Dec. 1958	Colonel V. A. Sazhin, Soviet Army	USSR
354th	18 Dec. 1958	Colonel V. A. Sazhin, Soviet Army	USSR
355th	31 Dec. 1958	Colonel V. A. Sazhin, Soviet Army	USSR
356th	15 Jan. 1959	Lieutenant Colonel R. B. Penford, British Army	United Kingdom
357th	29 Jan. 1959	Captain I. G. Mason, Royal Navy	United Kingdom
358th	12 Feb. 1959	Colonel P. Shepley, US Air Force	United States
359th	26 Feb. 1959	Colonel P. Shepley, US Air Force	United States
360th	12 Mar. 1959	Lieutenant Colonel J. Soong, Chinese Army	China
361st	26 Mar. 1959	Lieutenant Colonel J. Soong, Chinese Army	China
362nd	9 Apr. 1959	Capitaine de Corvette S. Petrochilo, French Navy	France
363rd	23 Apr. 1959	Capitaine de Corvette S. Petrochilo, French Navy	France
364th	7 May 1959	Colonel V. A. Sazhin, Soviet Army	USSR
365th	21 May 1959	Colonel V. A. Sazhin, Soviet Army	USSR
366th	4 June 1959	Captain I. G. Mason, Royal Navy	United Kingdom
367th	18 June 1959	Captain I. G. Mason, Royal Navy	United Kingdom
368th	2 July 1959	Colonel P. Shepley, US Air Force	United States