

FINAL RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND FORTY-EIGHTH PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva  
on Thursday, 8 March 1984, at 10.30 a.m.

President:

Mr. I. Datcu

(Romania)

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

<u>Algeria:</u>	MR. A. TAFFAR
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<u>Belgium:</u>	MR. M. DEPASSE MR. J.M. NOIRFALISSE MLLE. M. DE BECKER
<u>Brazil:</u>	MR. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA
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<u>Cuba:</u>	MR. A.V. GONZALEZ

Czechoslovakia:

MR. M. VEJVODA  
MR. A. CIMA  
MR. J. FIEDLER  
MR. J. KALAVSKY  
MS. L. VRBOVA

Egypt:

MR. S. ALFARARGI  
MR. I. HASSAN  
MR. A. MAHER ABBAS  
MS. W. BASSIM

Ethiopia:

MR. F. YOHANNES

France:

MR. F. DE LA GORCE  
MR. H. RENIE  
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German Democratic Republic:

MR. H. ROSE  
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Germany, Federal Republic of:

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MR. M. GERDTS

Hungary:

MR. D. MEISZTER  
MR. F. GADJA

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Indonesia:

MR. S. SUTOWARDOYO  
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Islamic Republic of Iran:

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MR. R. IMAI  
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Kenya:

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Mexico:

MR. A. GARCIA ROBLES  
MR. P. MACEDO RIBA

Mongolia:

MR. D. ERDEMBILEG  
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Morocco:

MR. M. CHRAIBI  
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Sweden:

MR. R. EKEUS  
MR. J. LUNDIN  
MRS. E. BONNIER  
MR. H. BERGLUND  
MR. L.E. WINGREN

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

MR. V.L. ISSRAELYAN  
MR. B.P. PROKOFIEV  
MR. G.V. BERDENNIKOV  
MR. P.Y. SKOMOROKHIN  
MR. S.V. KOBYSH  
MR. G. ANTSIFEROV  
MR. V. VASHADZE

United Kingdom:

MR. R.I.T. CROMMARTIE  
MR. L. MIDDLETON  
MR. B.P. NOBLE  
MR. I.R. KENYON  
MR. F.H. GRAVES  
MR. J.F. GORDON  
MR. D.A. SLINN

United States of America:

MR. L.G. FIELDS  
MS. K.C. CRITTENBERGER  
MR. R. HORNE  
MR. L. MADSEN  
MR. R. WATERS  
MR. H. CALHOUN  
MR. J. DOESBERG  
MR. P. CORDEN

Venezuela:

MR. A. LOPEZ OLIVER

Yugoslavia:

MR. K. VIDAS  
MR. M. MIHAJLOVIC

Zaire:

MS. E. EKANGA KABEYA

Secretary-General of the Conference  
on Disarmament and Personal  
Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

MR. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary-General of the  
Conference on Disarmament:

MR. V. BERASATEGUI

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I declare open the plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament. The Conference today continues its consideration of agenda item 3, entitled, "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters".

However, in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any member who wishes to do so may raise any matter relevant to the work of the Conference.

As you know, today is International Women's Day, and I should therefore like on this occasion to express our congratulations to all the women taking part in the work of the Conference on Disarmament, as well as to all those who have expressed their interest in our work.

I should also like to mention the presence in the public gallery of the participants in the Conference on "Women and the World Disarmament Campaign" currently taking place in the Palais des Nations. I greatly appreciate their interest in the work of our Conference, as reflected in the message addressed to us, copies of which will be circulated to all members for information. At the same time, I should like to request our distinguished Secretary-General, Ambassador Rikhi Jaipal, to read out that message.

Mr. JAIPAL (Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General): The message is the following:

"On this International Women's Day, we women from different countries who have met in Geneva to examine how we can contribute most effectively to the World Disarmament Campaign wish to address a message to you, the members of the Conference on Disarmament.

We turn to you in our conviction that the Conference on Disarmament — the only multilateral disarmament negotiating forum — must urgently take steps to help free humanity from the threat of nuclear annihilation and from the dangerous consequences of the continuing arms build-up including the horrific effects of the nuclear tests and the suffering and deprivation caused by misuse of resources on armaments. We are angry that the amount which could feed humankind for one year is now spent on the arms race in one day.

The prevention of nuclear war and progress in the negotiations for arms control agreements leading to general and complete disarmament have become the primary concerns of women the world over. Women have marched thousands of kilometers, have organized mass rallies, peace camps, conferences and mass campaigns to manifest their opposition to the arms race and to raise awareness of people to the danger this has for our globe.

We expect our governments to take concrete measures for disarmament that will reverse the dangerous situation we are in. We expect the Conference on Disarmament to negotiate vigorously in the coming months to conclude agreements that will curb the arms build-up and, for the first time, lead to true disarmament.

Although we consider that all items on the agenda of the Conference are of great importance, we urge the Members to concentrate their efforts on reaching agreements in the following areas which we consider to be the most urgent tasks facing humankind today:

(Mr. Jaipal, Secretary-General of the Conference)

1. The prevention of nuclear war — to negotiate on the basis of the papers put forth in the last year's session of the Committee on Disarmament by the Non-Aligned, Socialist and Western groups.

2. A comprehensive test ban — to conclude a treaty on the prohibition of testing nuclear weapons in all environments by the end of this session given the fact that negotiations had already reached a very advanced stage in the tripartite negotiations. This treaty should be signed by all States possessing nuclear capacity.

3. The prevention of an arms race in outer space — to negotiate a treaty or treaties preventing an arms race in outer space and to call on the governments mostly concerned to observe a moratorium on all research, development and testing until such a treaty or treaties is/are concluded.

4. The conclusion of a treaty banning the production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, and the destruction of existing stockpiles.

We come from organizations which together represent millions of women the world over. We demand that you, Members of the Conference on Disarmament, exercise the needed political will to negotiate and reach agreements that will remove the threat of the destruction of all life now hanging over us all."

This message has been sent from the participants in the Conference entitled "Women and the World Disarmament Campaign", which was held in Geneva from 6 to 9 March 1984.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank Ambassador Jaipal for having read out the important message addressed to our Conference. I am sure that all members will have listened to it with particular attention.

I have on my list of speakers for today the distinguished representatives of Czechoslovakia, the United States, China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Czechoslovakia.

Mr. VEJVODA (Czechoslovakia): Comrade President, in the first place allow me to welcome you, the representative of socialist Romania bound with my country in alliance and friendship, in the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. Having known you for quite some time from various disarmament fora, I realize that we are all in good hands for the month of March. In view of the results of our work in February, we expect further progress soon in organizing our work. Here our thanks go to the representative of the Polish People's Republic, Ambassador Turbarski, who, in spite of a number of difficulties, repeatedly tried to launch this year's session as soon as possible and, finally, succeeded.

Allow me also, Comrade President, to join you in welcoming among us today the participants in the seminar "Women and the World Disarmament Campaign", which met in Geneva to exchange views on a possible contribution of women and their organizations to the world disarmament campaign, and on co-operation of their respective organizations for the mobilization of women for the struggle for peace against nuclear war. It also gives me the opportunity to extend greetings to all women in this room on the occasion of International Women's Day.



(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

Today I intend to address two priority items of our agenda — item 1, nuclear test ban, and item 3, prevention of nuclear war.

The prohibition of underground nuclear testing has been focussed upon by this negotiating body and its predecessors for a long time. But, unfortunately, in spite of having it sharply in focus we were not in a position to take any meaningful action aimed at negotiating the required treaty. First, the creation of a relevant working body had been blocked for a number of years. Later, outright opposition gave way to a more flexible, but nevertheless negative approach — imposition of an arbitrarily limited, unworkable mandate. The activity of the former working group on a nuclear-test ban, which had been unsuccessfully trying to overcome its own terms of reference for almost two years, proved this beyond any doubt.

The representative of the United States, Ambassador Fields, said in his statement of 23 February, "those who say that the original mandate has been exhausted cannot produce one major element of agreement on a comprehensive verification regime for a potential nuclear test ban treaty." Let it be noted, that in this respect we fully agree with Ambassador Fields. No problem has been solved in last year's working group. But, after all, it could not have been, since no verification provision can be decided in isolation from other basic provisions of the treaty, namely the scope, duration, participation etc. That is what we had been saying in April 1982 when confronted with the limited mandate. And that is what we consider today, strengthened in our opinion by that sad experience. It seems clear that the majority of delegations around this table have come to the same conclusion. Let us hope that the minority, formed in this case by a couple of delegations, will not let this experience pass by unnoticed.

The year 1983 was, if I may say so, exceptionally fertile as far as proposals for a nuclear-test ban are concerned. The USSR submitted to the Committee on Disarmament the "Basic provisions of the treaty on complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests," a document which was also submitted to the thirty-seventh session of the United Nations General Assembly. This proposal is far from a mere restatement of the position of the Soviet Union on this problem. Taking into account the positions of other countries, including the Western States, it could, in the opinion of my delegation, create a basis for negotiating the treaty. This proposal was followed several months later by the draft nuclear-test-ban treaty proposed by Sweden. We welcomed this draft since its tabling stressed once again the importance and urgency of the prohibition of nuclear-weapon testing. We could also subscribe to many of its basic provisions. At the same time it contains some that we perhaps do not consider necessary. I could, certainly, go into details and put some questions to the delegation of Sweden and then wait for a couple of weeks for an answer. I could also seek clarification through bilateral contacts.

However, the best procedure for this type of activity and especially for negotiating the treaty itself, remains the establishment of a relevant working body, as provided for in our rules of procedure. And item 1 of our agenda belongs to those which have all necessary ingredients for the undertaking of businesslike, streamlined negotiations directed not at a specific aspect of the treaty, but at drafting the treaty as a whole. For this reason my delegation wholeheartedly supports the establishment of a subsidiary body with a mandate calling for the negotiation of a treaty prohibiting all nuclear-weapon tests. Together with other socialist countries we proposed such a mandate in document CD/434.

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

Much has also been done by the group of seismic experts, which is already now in the process of adopting by consensus its third report. This report represents a project for the creation of a reliable international system for the exchange of seismic data on the global scale. It provides in the first place for the exchange of level I data, which are sufficient for the identification and localization of the overwhelming majority of seismic events by national centres having at their disposal data from a global network. Only in some exceptional cases could level II data be required from some stations so situated as to be in a position to make a clear record of a seismic event. This could apply, for example, to parallel recording of several seismic events by a number of stations of the network. Another case might be an attempt to make use of a strong earthquake to mask nuclear explosion. It may also happen that in exceptional situations the depth of a seismic event could not be clearly estimated on the basis of level I data: level II data would then be required as well.

The proposed system for the exchange of seismic data is designed to ensure the full participation of technically less developed countries also which do not possess own seismic means of verification and of countries with small territories not having a global network of seismic stations. At the same time the system proposed in the third report is, to some extent, only supplementary for countries having their own, national global system, consisting of seismic as well as non-seismic means. For example the United States receives level II data from its own global network of seismic stations through the transmission by satellite. In view of this fact, it was not very difficult for the United States to abandon its original requirement for the exchange of level II data only.

It is well known that the United States "specializes" now mainly in carrying out "weak" nuclear explosions. This type of nuclear explosions of about one kiloton of TNT, is necessary first of all for the development of tactical and operational nuclear weapons and for nuclear weapons with diminished destruction effect, e.g. neutron weapons. It is therefore clear, that the United States is actively developing this type of weapon now, in the improvement and deployment of which it is eminently interested. That is one of the main reasons as we heard here from the United States delegation previously, why a nuclear-test ban has become only a "long-term objective".

Some 20 years ago, nuclear-weapon tests were usually much stronger than today. Hence, if a nuclear-test-ban treaty had been adopted then, ensuring compliance with it would be easier. The postponement of the conclusion of the treaty can only unnecessarily complicate the problem further.

Last year the activity of the working group on a nuclear-test ban was greatly complicated by futile discussions on so-called peaceful nuclear explosions. It is true that under some circumstances this type of explosion could be misused for nuclear-weapons purposes. The Soviet "Basic Provisions", as well as the Swedish draft treaty, propose in fact, that peaceful nuclear explosions be stopped until a mutually acceptable regime for their carrying out is agreed upon. Some very useful provisions to this effect are contained in the 1976 Soviet-American Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes.

We consider it safe to conclude that the group of seismic experts through its three reports suggests the creation of a reliable system for the exchange of seismic data which could contribute highly to ensuring compliance with the desired nuclear-test-ban treaty.

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

Positive steps might be undertaken even before the treaty is negotiated. The Soviet Union proposes that nuclear-weapon States agree on a moratorium on nuclear-weapon testing until the treaty is concluded. We consider such a moratorium not only highly desirable but also quite feasible. Anyone who is at least basically acquainted with the history of negotiations aimed at limiting and prohibiting tests of nuclear weapons will recall that preceding the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty of 1963 the Soviet Union and the United States found it possible to observe a bilateral moratorium on nuclear-weapon testing for several years until, unfortunately, a new nuclear-weapon State of Western Europe gave this bilateral moratorium a new, trilateral dimension.

Before turning to item 3 of the agenda, I would like to draw the attention of the distinguished representatives to one more aspect of this problem. On the first plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament, the Head of the Swedish delegation distributed a paper counting nuclear explosions between 1945 and 1983. I will not express the views of my delegation either on methods applied or on numbers arrived at. But I would like to share with the distinguished representatives the opinion that simply counting explosions is not enough, and may sometimes be misleading. Indeed, the arms race, if provoked, will continue unabated and that is exactly why we firmly advocate its cessation. However, distinguished colleagues, you cannot have it both ways. You cannot have the United States administration unilaterally breaking trilateral negotiations despite the serious progress achieved, not ratifying, and undermining, the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, doubling resources for nuclear-weapon testing in three years and blocking any negotiations on a nuclear-test ban in the Conference on Disarmament, and, at the same time, expect a general or unilateral decline in nuclear-weapon tests. I am strongly convinced that this reality should not escape our view.

The discussions at United Nations General Assembly sessions in recent years clearly testify to the fact that the problem of the prevention of nuclear war is considered by the overwhelming majority of States as a most important global problem of the world today, common to all peoples, irrespective of differences in their social order, way of life or ideology. It was also widely discussed at the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, where a special working group was established for the consideration of this priority problem.

The thirty-eighth session of the United Nations General Assembly urgently called for the adoption of practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war. Let me mention just the Declaration on the condemnation of nuclear war, the resolutions on non-first-use of nuclear weapons and on the freeze of nuclear weapons, resolutions calling for the commencement of negotiations on nuclear disarmament and on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, and the resolution on the prevention of nuclear war.

The urgent appeals of the thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly were more than justified at the close of last year, when the first Pershing II and Cruise missiles became operational in the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom. Thus the process of the creation of the material basis in Europe for a new, aggressive, militarist policy aimed at achieving military superiority over the Soviet Union and other socialist countries was started. This move, which disrupted the bilateral Soviet-American negotiations under way, is now interpreted by some would-be military experts as a necessary response to the so-called surface-to-surface SS-20 missiles in the Soviet Union. This is a dangerous myth, created by those who decided on deployment regardless of the existing military

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

balance in Europe. I dealt with this problem at some length in my statement of 21 February of this year. I will now therefore limit myself to recalling opinions expressed by some well-known analysts. First among them is Raymond Garthoff of the Brookings Institution, who also served as Deputy Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs in the State Department. He said: "There was a compelling military technical rationale for the SS-20 deployment, including a desire to target United States aircraft and submarines based in England, Scotland and Spain, as well as British and French nuclear forces and a variety of short-range nuclear weapons deployed around the continent. And the Soviet decision was almost certainly made on those grounds."

Another myth, according to which the decision to deploy new American missiles had been brought about by independent European desires for a technological riposte to the SS-20, has been set straight by authoritative sources in the January issue of the American magazine Science. According to the article in Science, "a close review of the decision reveals that it was actually far more routine. Some military officials desired newer, more capable weapons; military contractors desired more business; and conservative United States weapons analysts developed the appropriate strategic rationale." Thus, one may think that everybody in the United States is satisfied: strategic planners in the Pentagon, blinded by their obsession for a crusade against socialism, as well as the Martin Marietta Corporation, the principal contractor for the Pershing II, and Boeing, McDonnell Douglas, General Dynamics and Lockheed, which earned millions of dollars in government contracts for the development of cruise missiles.

It appears, however, that satisfaction is far from reached. We can still hear voices which are not quite content even with the prospect of deploying 572 new United States missiles in Europe. According to information published in The Sunday Times the United States plans to build further bases for cruise missiles in Scotland, the Federal Republic of Germany, Denmark, Norway, Turkey, Greenland, Japan, South Korea and Iceland. They should, allegedly, be armed with conventional weapons, but launching devices could also be used for nuclear weapons. Serious consideration of these plans has been admitted by officials in Washington. The mission assigned to the new United States missiles is no secret. William Arkin, the United States military expert, in an article published by the West German magazine Stern, described the Pentagon's plans to use Pershing II as a first-strike weapon against the Soviet command centres. General Miles Fulwyler, former Pentagon director for nuclear weapons, underlined that "Pershing II missiles give us a possibility to hit many decisive targets in the western military region of the Soviet Union which we couldn't hit until now." For the time being the United States is to deploy 108 Pershing IIs in Western Europe. But there are serious grounds to fear that that is not the final number, since about a year ago it was discovered that the Pentagon had ordered more than 380 nuclear missiles -- as supplementary capacity.

It is also urged that Western Europe should substantially strengthen its conventional forces. These calls are sometimes masked by various strategic theories about the necessary redeployment of United States forces, the responsibilities of the Europeans, and so on. But, all the different theories put aside, the goal remains always the same -- the NATO member States in Europe should substantially increase their conventional forces and their over-all military expenditures. An appalling example of such an approach is given in the article by Henry Kissinger in the latest issue of Time. What is striking in that article is Mr. Kissinger's handling of the danger of aggression from the East. Apparently, in his understanding, it is difficult to find a single thing that would not cause such aggression. Should NATO increase its conventional forces, this might cause aggression since the other side would conclude that nuclear weapons would not necessarily be used. Should NATO do

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

otherwise, and possibly withdraw some American troops from Europe, this could also cause aggression since doubts about its unity may emerge. Let me recall in this context that it is the Warsaw Treaty Organization which again proposed on Monday this week to NATO the holding of preparatory consultations on a mutual non-increase of military expenditures and on their further reduction.

The massive build-up of the United States strategic potential, total militarization of Europe and the promotion of offensive military doctrines by the present United States Government — all this compels us to look for practical measures to decrease the danger of nuclear war and to prevent it. These efforts should stand at the centre of the activity of this Conference. The establishment of a relevant subsidiary body with the mandate to negotiate, as stipulated in resolution 38/183 G, "with a view to achieving agreement on appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war", is indispensable for any serious treatment of this problem.

The representatives of several Western countries expressed the view, both at official and informal meetings, that it was not clear what specific items could be taken up by the proposed subsidiary body. The answer to this question can easily be found in a number of documents; allow me to quote some of them — CD/355, submitted by a group of socialist countries, CD/406, submitted by the German Democratic Republic, CD/357, submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany and CD/380 submitted by Belgium. Though the papers presented by the Federal Republic of Germany and Belgium are certainly less specific than those of the socialist countries, even their serious consideration, if the authors meant them to be considered, would require the establishment of a working organ.

To be more specific, I should like to indicate what concrete measures could be negotiated in order to elaborate relevant international agreements: Non-first-use of nuclear weapons; convention on the prohibition of use of nuclear weapons with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States; qualitative and quantitative freeze on nuclear weapons, including relevant verification measures; moratorium on nuclear-weapon tests until a nuclear-test-ban treaty is concluded; conclusion of a treaty on non-use of force and on maintaining peaceful relations between member States of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO; measures to prevent an accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons and to avoid the possibility of surprise attacks and other confidence-building measures as specified in the CD/406. I welcome the spirit of the statement made by Ambassador García Robles of Mexico on this problem just two days ago. We realize that the position of his delegation is very close to ours. I should also like to stress that, besides the suggestions I just enumerated, we are ready to consider any other constructive proposals that may appear in the course of the subsidiary body's work. We would like to hope that other delegations will also display similar flexibility in their approach to this highest priority agenda item which is of vital importance to us all.

Before I conclude allow me, Comrade President, to contribute briefly to the establishment of the "methodological rules of procedure" for our Conference launched by the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany. In his statement of 28 February, he expressed a dislike of the use by some delegations of quotations from literature, newspapers or politicians. This comes as a surprise to us, since through such quotations we often become acquainted with very interesting ideas and statements, coming mainly from highly influential, authoritative and knowledgeable persons. For our part we would like to suggest that in our deliberations delegations abstain from uttering assertions which can be substantiated by nothing. These include, among others, continual assertions by a couple of delegations about the alleged great military superiority of the Warsaw Treaty Organization in Europe, or descriptions of a danger of aggression from the East, which is taken for granted by some of our most zealous colleagues. Such unfounded distortions always remind me of an American policeman I was confronted with a couple of years ago. Doubting his explanation of a traffic problem I asked "Why?" and he answered, "Because I said so". Let me assure the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany that this kind of argument did not convince me.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Czechoslovakia for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the President.

I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of the United States of America, Ambassador Fields.

Mr. FIELDS (United States of America): Thank you Mr. President. I wish to congratulate you, Sir, on your Presidency of our Conference and pledge to you the co-operation of my delegation in the discharge of your important responsibilities. Our pleasure in seeing you in the Chair is enhanced by the warm and friendly relations which exist between our two countries. We also wish to pay tribute to the skill of our distinguished colleague from Poland, Ambassador Turbanski, in inaugurating our Conference and getting our work so skillfully under way. We join you also, Mr. President, today, in recognizing and welcoming the women for the World Disarmament Campaign. My Government shares their interest and hopes for the World Disarmament Campaign. It is altogether fitting that women have a special interest in disarmament, for they have borne the anxiety over the centuries as their husbands and sons have gone off to war, and indeed they have been the symbol of sorrow for the casualties of conflict. May we be faithful to their expectations of us in achieving meaningful and practical measures to ensure international peace and security.

Mr. President, during these past two weeks the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events has been meeting here in Geneva. This is the seventeenth session of the Group of Scientific Experts since its inception, and the ninth session since it began the work which will be described to us in its third report. We appreciate the patient and determined efforts by the Group of Scientific Experts in preparing this report, and I am certain that the work of our Conference on the nuclear-test ban will benefit from it. The United States has committed significant resources in support of the work of the Group of Scientific Experts since the beginning, because of the important contribution we believe it can make to the verification arrangements for an eventual comprehensive nuclear-test ban. I think our belief is well-founded, and that the Group has made considerable progress. We note that in their recent work the Group of Scientific Experts has further developed some of the detailed procedures required for international exchange of seismic data. In addition, they have gained practical experience in testing these procedures. These practical tests are essential for determining if the procedures actually work as they are expected to.

(Mr. Fields, United States)

Clearly, the solution of the difficult problems relating to verification and compliance of a nuclear-test ban is a crucial task. This has been the focus of the work of the Group of Scientific Experts and, in my delegation's view, it has made real and measurable progress in a vital aspect of the verification problem.

The Group of Scientific Experts has been addressing one of the key problems — that of specifying an international network of seismic stations, and the associated data exchange system, in support of the detection and identification of seismic events. It is well known that the task of world-wide detection and identification of seismic events under a nuclear-test-ban treaty would be a difficult one. National technical means would be important, as would co-operative arrangements between two or more parties. But multilateral co-operative arrangements would also be an important part of the overall arrangements, and this is where the contributions of the Group of Scientific Experts are brought to bear.

In my statement before this Conference on 23 February of this year, I noted that the Group of Scientific Experts has begun preparations for a more extensive follow-on technical test of certain elements of the proposed global system. This test is planned for the second half of the year in co-operation with the World Meteorological Organization. The test will take advantage of the availability of the WMO Global Telecommunication System to exchange Level I seismic data. At the request of the Committee on Disarmament, WMO last year granted the Group of Scientific Experts authority to make regular use of its Global Telecommunication System. My delegation very much appreciates the co-operation of WMO in helping the Group of Scientific Experts to develop a global seismic data exchange system.

The 1984 technical test is planned by the Group of Scientific Experts to give useful experience in handling and exchanging seismic data, building up on the results of previous experiments. As planned, it will develop and test procedures for regular transmission of Level I data over the Global Telecommunication System, passing the data from national facilities to experimental international data centres. It will allow tests of procedures for extracting Level I parameters at seismic stations and for transmitting them to the national facilities. We anticipate that it will allow the testing of procedures at the experimental international data centres for preparation of seismic event bulletins. In addition, in comparison with the previous technical test of the Global Telecommunication System, this test offers the opportunity for increased participation by all States. States that have not yet participated could offer data for the first time. If they have participated previously, they could make data available from additional stations. I am happy to note that over 20 States have thus far indicated their intention to participate in the planned technical test. This number includes the United States and the Soviet Union, and I am gratified that we will both be engaging in this important effort.

(Mr. Fields, United States)

I should like now to say a few words regarding the work that needs to be done — that by a subsidiary body under our agenda item on the nuclear-test ban. The mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear-Test Ban in 1982 and 1983 called for examination of issues relating to verification and compliance. We supported, and we continue to support, that mandate for the same reason we have supported the work of the scientific experts — because resolution of these issues is crucial if we are eventually to succeed in attaining a nuclear-test ban. The position of my Government has been completely consistent on this point, and there remain many issues on which a detailed and thorough discussion was hardly begun in the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear-Test Ban last year. As I pointed out in my statement on 30 August of last year, "little substantive work has been accomplished" by the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear-Test Ban. We have all read the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group, CD/412, on its efforts during the 1983 session of the Committee on Disarmament. We know that, as the report put it, "the Ad Hoc Working Group conducted an examination of the substance of all the items contained in the programme." But we also recognize that no agreements were reached on the items. The report contains, throughout, phrases like "some delegations noted," "other delegations maintained," and so on. How can we, based on such a report, possibly accept the view that the work has been completed, and that it is now time to move on to other issues? No, Mr. President, I think rather that it is time to realize the importance of fulfilling the mandate already given to the Ad Hoc Working Group last year, and to pursue this Working Group's unfinished business.

In this connection, I wish to make the position of my Government crystal clear. My Government is committed to a comprehensive nuclear-test ban. Such a ban is now — as it has been as long as I have been in this Conference — the ultimate objective of my Government. The point of departure for my delegation and others is the question of timing, not the principle. My Government is firmly committed to significant and verifiable arms reductions, expanded confidence-building measures, and effective verification capabilities. Until my Government is persuaded that these policy objectives are not only being seriously addressed, but well along the road to being satisfied, my delegation is not prepared to agree to a mandate that provides for negotiations in the subsidiary body on a nuclear-test ban. However, this does not mean that we, along with the Group of Scientific Experts, cannot make a true contribution toward the eventual achievement of a test ban. The important area of verification and compliance provides a fertile field in which we may labour. Let it be well understood that only with effective verification arrangements can there be a nuclear-test-ban treaty. I believe we should move promptly to re-establish the nuclear-test ban subsidiary body under its former mandate, and then get down to the serious business of work at hand.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of the United States of America for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the President, and I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of China, Ambassador Qian Jiadong.



Mr. QIAN JIADONG (China) (translated from Chinese): Mr. President, First of all, allow me, on behalf of the Chinese delegation as well as in my own name, to congratulate you warmly on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament for this month. I need not emphasize here the most friendly relations between China and Romania, and your rich experience, wisdom and skill as a diplomat are also known to all. I am confident that under your guidance, further headway will be made on the basis laid down by your predecessor, Ambassador Turbanski of Poland, in the work of our Conference. In performing your duties, you can count on the full co-operation and support of my delegation.

The prohibition of chemical weapons is the item on the agenda under which the first subsidiary body was set up by the Conference and has already started its work. That is why I have chosen this subject today to present some of our observations.

Five years have elapsed since the Working Group on Chemical Weapons was first set up in 1980. In this period, hundreds of documents have been filed, and countless meetings and discussions held at all the plenary, working group and contact group levels. Thanks to the joint efforts of the successive chairmen of the Working Groups, the Co-ordinators as well as the delegations, understanding has been enhanced on quite a number of issues; divergences on others have been narrowed and some measure of agreement has been found. Among the many items on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament, the prohibition of chemical weapons is the one which has registered more progress and has therefore been widely hailed as a field offering relatively promising prospects. However, this is no reason for complacency, as the task facing us is still arduous. Serious differences remain on some of the major issues, and we have still a long way to go before we can finally reach the goal of concluding a convention on the total prohibition of chemical weapons. We should speed up our work and enter into rigorous negotiations in order to live up to people's expectations.

The urgency of concluding a convention on the total prohibition of chemical weapons lies, first and foremost, in the ever intensifying chemical weapons arms race and the increasing threat of chemical warfare. According to materials released by eminent international research institutions, a total of more than 400,000 tons of chemical warfare agents are in the stockpiles of the two Superpowers, and research has been conducted continuously to improve and renew these chemical weapons. The destructive power of modern-day chemical weapons is far beyond comparison with that of the older generation of such weapons during World War I. It can well be imagined how infinitely greater the menace of chemical warfare to mankind will be if such a chemical-weapons arms race is to follow its course.

The urgency of a convention on the total prohibition of chemical weapons lies also in the fact that with the development of science and technology, the longer such a prohibition is delayed, the more difficult it will be to achieve it. The advancement of science and technology will not only enhance the military value of chemical weapons, but also bring with it new peaceful uses for chemical warfare agents and their precursors which at present have no peaceful uses, thus making questions of verification and prohibition even more complex and hard to settle.

Furthermore, the harsh reality of frequent reports on the use of chemical weapons in areas of conflict decades after the entry into force of the Geneva Protocol has also made the conclusion of a convention on the total prohibition of chemical weapons a matter of great urgency.

(Mr. Qian Jiadong, China)

During the previous round of three additional weeks of discussions, Sweden, Finland, Canada, the United Kingdom and other countries have tabled a number of working documents in which they have further clarified their respective positions and put forward a good number of proposals. We are studying these documents carefully. We are also glad to note the positive statements made by the United States and the USSR. The United States has announced that it will submit in March a draft treaty on the prohibition of chemical weapons, while the USSR has expressed its willingness to accept in principle on-site inspection on a continuous basis during the destruction of chemical-weapon stockpiles. The United States and the USSR are the two countries with the largest chemical-weapon arsenals and bear special responsibilities towards the prohibition of chemical weapons. We hope that they will make further efforts to bring their positions closer.

The Chinese delegation has consistently stood for the complete prohibition and total destruction of chemical weapons. Ever since we joined the work of the Committee on Disarmament in 1980, we have always taken an earnest and serious attitude in the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons and tabled some working documents. The Chinese delegation has just submitted another working document (CD/443) in which we have summarized our proposals on the major elements of a future convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. In the preparation of this document, we have drawn on the reasonable proposals of other delegations and we hope that consideration will be given to it in future negotiations.

To draw up a chemical weapons convention, the first thing we have to do is to settle the scope of prohibition. China has all along maintained that the scope of prohibition should be comprehensive in nature, that is, it should include not only all types of chemical weapons but also all activities related to research, production and use of chemical weapons. We note with satisfaction that the idea of including use in the scope of prohibition has already gained wide support and that it is now commonly held that this will only further strengthen and not weaken the 1925 Geneva Protocol. We believe that through concerted effort, we will be able to work out a formulation acceptable to all parties and thus settle this question in a satisfactory manner. We are also in favour of the proposal for banning the deployment of chemical weapons on the territories of other countries. We would also like to give our positive consideration to the proposal put forward by the Swedish delegation recently regarding the prohibition of making military preparations for the use of chemical weapons.

Closely related to the scope of prohibition is the question of definition. In the absence of precise and scientific definitions, it is impossible to decide on the exact scope of prohibition. In our working document, a number of definitions on chemical weapons, chemical-weapon agents, precursors, key precursors, etc. have therefore been suggested. We have laid particular stress on the concept of "chemical warfare agent". This is because we believe that such a concept can most precisely indicate the property of the toxic substances we want to ban and reflect in the best way the combination of general-purpose criteria and toxicity criteria. Furthermore, with the help of this concept, a clear-cut distinction between toxic chemical substances which should be prohibited and toxic chemical substances for permitted purposes which should not be prohibited can be drawn and unnecessary confusion and ambiguity avoided. We have noted that Yugoslavia, Indonesia, Belgium, and France have also used the concept of "chemical warfare agent" and submitted their own definitions. We are ready to consider all the constructive proposals of other delegations so as to work out a commonly acceptable definition in this regard.

(Mr. Qian Jiadong, China)

Destruction of the existing stockpiles of chemical weapons constitutes one of the most important provisions of the convention. Once the huge stockpile of existing chemical weapons is indeed totally destroyed, the threat of chemical warfare will fundamentally be removed. This in turn is closely linked to the issue of declaration and verification. Taking into account the time required to draw up plans for destruction, etc., we favour the idea that initial declarations should be made within 30 days of adherence to or entry into force of the Convention, whereas detailed declarations may be made within a period of three months. As to the question of how to proceed with the destruction of stockpiles we think that consideration should not be given unduly to parity and balance between the countries possessing chemical weapons, but should centre, first and foremost, on the speedy and early elimination of the threat of chemical warfare. With this in mind, we propose that the countries concerned should destroy in the first place those chemical weapons in their arsenals which are the most toxic and dangerous and not those which are out-dated or inoperative.

Verification is one of the key elements of the convention. We have always held that a chemical weapons convention must contain such provisions for verification as to ensure strict and effective implementation of verification, on the one hand, and minimize intrusiveness as much as possible on the other. Emphasis should be put on international verification with necessary on-site inspection. Such on-site inspection should cover destruction of chemical weapon stockpiles, destruction and dismantlement of production or filling facilities for chemical weapons, small-scale production of super-lethal agents used for protective purposes, and alleged use of chemical weapons, etc. As to the method of verification, proposals have been made for on-site inspection on a continuous basis, routine or periodic or random on-site inspection, on-site inspection by challenge and on-site inspection on the basis of quota. We think all these methods can be considered and that different methods of verification can be used for different verification purposes. It is our hope that on this key issue, a solution acceptable to all parties will eventually be found.

We are very happy that within a relatively short time we have already re-established the subsidiary body on chemical weapons, formulated a mandate with the elaboration of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons as its main target, and designated the highly experienced Head of the Swedish delegation, Ambassador Ekeus, as its Chairman. People throughout the world are watching our work here with great expectations. Let us respond with tangible results.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of China for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the President and to my country. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Ambassador Victor Issraelyan.

Mr. ISSRAELIAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Comrade President, allow me on behalf of the delegation of the Soviet Union to congratulate you, the representative of Socialist Romania, on assuming the important and responsible office of President of the Conference on Disarmament, and to wish you success. This year has seen the thirty-sixth anniversary of the signature of the first Soviet-Romanian treaty of friendship, co-operation and mutual aid. Coming into being in the difficult years after the War, the treaty played an historic role in the emergence of relations of a new type between our States. Co-operation between fraternal socialist countries on the international scene is conducted in the

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

spirit of the Prague Political Declaration of States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty and the statement issued by Party and State leaders of the socialist countries in Moscow in the summer of 1983. I should also like to express sincere thanks to Comrade Turbanski, the representative of the Polish People's Republic, for his excellent presidency in the month of February.

The Soviet delegation wishes to take the opportunity to express warm greetings to the women participants in the work of our Conference and also to the participants in the international conference on "Women and the World Disarmament Campaign" present at our meeting today. The women of the entire planet, mothers and wives, sisters and daughters, well know the incalculable disasters and irreparable woes caused by war. My country's soil and that of many other countries is abundantly watered with their tears. We admire their noble impulse to save the world from thermonuclear catastrophe, from a war in which all will perish -- women, men and our great mother, the mother of all living things, our beautiful planet itself. The Soviet delegation wishes success to all women throughout the world in their struggle for peace.

We shall, of course, attentively study the document of the Conference on "Women and the World Disarmament Campaign", but we can already say that we fully share the views expressed by that forum. We regard such tasks as the prevention of nuclear war and a comprehensive nuclear test ban as the most urgent tasks. We fully agree with the point concerning a comprehensive test ban, which states "To conclude a treaty on the prohibition of testing nuclear weapons in all environments by the end of this session given the fact that negotiations have already reached a very advanced state in the tripartite negotiations. This treaty should be signed by all States possessing nuclear capacity". We are prepared to underwrite this demand by the conference on "Women and the World Disarmament Campaign". The Soviet delegation also shares the view that the prevention of an arms race in outer space and a comprehensive and complete ban on chemical weapons are central tasks which should not be put off from year to year under a variety of artificial, false pretexts. Once again, we wish success to all women -- those present here and those outside this conference room -- in their struggle to prevent nuclear disaster.

We have also asked for the floor today in order to introduce the official conference document CD/444, circulated at the request of the Soviet delegation, containing the section on international affairs of a speech made by Comrade Chernenko, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, at a meeting with voters of the Kuibyshev district of Moscow on 2 March 1984. In this section of his speech, Comrade Chernenko outlined the Soviet Union's approach of principle to the central problems of present-day world politics and puts forward new major proposals by the Soviet Union, inter alia on disarmament matters. The General Secretary of the Central Committee

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union said that it would be difficult to recall a problem of importance to strengthening peace on which the Soviet Union and other socialist countries have not put forward concrete and realistic proposals in the past few years. The initiatives of our countries are winning ever broader support from other States. This has been forcefully confirmed by the latest session of the United Nations General Assembly. Comrade Chernenko stated that intensive militarization and the aggravation of the international situation have not brought nor are going to bring the United States military superiority and political achievements. Everywhere in the world, they only lead to the escalation of criticism of Washington's belligerent course. People want peace and tranquillity, not war hysteria. The General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union said that all this inspires the hope that eventually developments will once more take a direction towards peace, the limitation of the arms race and the development of international co-operation. Détente has struck deep roots. This is evidenced, in particular, by the convocation of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe. Comrade Chernenko said that the Soviet Union's position on questions relating to the halting of the nuclear arms race is clear. We are against rivalry in building up nuclear arms arsenals. We were and remain, said the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, proponents of the prohibition and elimination of all types of those weapons.

Referring to the problem of the limitation of the arms race and disarmament, Comrade Chernenko devoted particular attention to the norms by which relations between nuclear Powers should be governed. Among other disarmament issues, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union singled out such matters as the drawing up of a treaty on the general and complete prohibition of nuclear weapons tests, an agreement on the renunciation of the militarization of outer space, and a mutual freeze on American and Soviet nuclear weapons. He emphasized that to deliver mankind from the possible uses of chemical weapons is a very important task. The Soviet Union is in favour of effective control over the implementation of an agreement on the complete and general prohibition of the use of chemical weapons, their development and production and the destruction of all their stockpiles, and believes that such control should cover the whole process of destruction of chemical weapons from beginning to end. It is not ruled out, Comrade Chernenko said, that reaching an agreement on the above-mentioned issues would signal the start of a real and drastic change in Soviet-United States relations and in the international situation as a whole.

I should like to express the hope that all delegations will study Comrade Chernenko's statement with care.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union for his statement, and for his kind words addressed to the President, to my country and to the close relations between our countries.

Does any other delegation wish to take the floor?

Mr. SIRJANI (Islamic Republic of Iran): Mr. President, I congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency for this month and welcome the women participants in the Conference on "Women and the World Disarmament Campaign". I would like to make a brief statement.

Yesterday, the International Committee of the Red Cross, after an undue delay, ascertained the use of chemical weapons on a large scale by the Iraqi Government. We regret that after two years, the ICRC now comes to this conclusion, and we also regret the undue delay by the Secretary-General of the United Nations regarding our request on the relevant General Assembly resolution, 37/98D.

I want to put on record what has been said by the Minister of Defence of the Iraqi Government.

[Speaking in French] "However, the Minister of Defence at no time clearly and unequivocally denied Teheran's accusations. Pressed by questions from the many American journalists asking for a categorical denial, he replied: 'Why should we wash our dirty linen in public? To reveal what Iraq has in store would be contrary to the interests of our security. You know that, in any event, the conventional weapons in our possession are quite enough to achieve our successes. Besides, you can go to the battlefields and ask for the autopsy of a body you think looks suspicious'". (Le Monde, 8 March 1984)

[Resuming in English] I want to take advantage of the presence of the women of the World Disarmament Campaign, I want to make an appeal to them for a total ban on chemical weapons. I want to make an appeal to the Conference on Disarmament not to remain silent about this crime -- when you remain silent, it means that you disregard every norm of international law, you disregard the Geneva Protocol, you disregard everything.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the distinguished representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran for his statement. Does any other delegation wish to speak? That does not seem to be the case.

As was agreed when the programme of work for this week was adopted, I shall now suspend the plenary meeting and in five minutes' time convene an informal meeting of the Conference to continue our exchange of views on some organizational questions. The plenary meeting is suspended.

The meeting was suspended at 12.15 p.m. and resumed at 12.40 p.m.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): the plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is resumed.

The Conference has before it an informal document, dated 6 March 1984, containing a draft decision on the designation of the subsidiary bodies of the Conference on Disarmament. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the draft decision.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): With regard to the decision which the Conference has just taken on the naming of its subsidiary bodies, I should like to make the following statement which I shall read out in English.

[Speaking in English]:

1. This decision has been taken in accordance with the understanding of the Conference read by the President at the 245th plenary meeting of 28 February 1984 at the time of the re-establishment of the ad hoc subsidiary bodies, to the effect that the same designation would be given to all the subsidiary bodies established directly under respective agenda items unless the Conference, in specific cases, decides otherwise.
2. The adoption of the name "Ad Hoc Committee" for subsidiary bodies of the Conference stems from the change of name from "Committee on Disarmament" to "Conference on Disarmament". That designation for subsidiary bodies is adopted under Rule 23 of the Rules of Procedure of the Conference. It has no financial or structural implications; it implies no change in the working procedures of the Conference or in its Rules of Procedure; and it has no bearing on the views of members of the Conference on the substance of matters under consideration.
3. Subsidiary bodies may be set up within the framework of Ad Hoc Committees, their designation being determined by the respective Ad Hoc Committees in accordance with established practice.

(The President)

May I now turn to another subject. The Secretariat has circulated today, at my request, an informal paper containing a time-table for meetings to be held by the Conference and the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons during the coming week. As usual, the time-table is merely indicative and subject to change if necessary. Of course, the time-table does not include the informal consultations being carried out by several groups on items of our agenda. The actual scheduling of the meetings of those groups will be decided by them, depending on the circumstances. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference agrees to that time-table.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I should now like to turn to the request made by the Permanent Representative of Turkey in Geneva to address the plenary meeting of the Conference. If there is no objection, I will inform him accordingly.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: May I now take up the request made by the Holy See to address the plenary meeting of the Conference on 15 March. If there is no objection, I shall inform the Holy See accordingly.

It was so decided.

Mr. ELBE (Federal Republic of Germany): Thank you, Mr. President. I apologize for taking the floor at this late stage. My delegation will express its appreciation of your assumption of the office of the presidency at a later stage.

Mr. President, the distinguished representative of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic has referred to a statement of my delegation of 28 February of this year. I fear that his interpretation of Ambassador Wegener's statement is not quite correct. It was not my delegation's aim to raise any objection to the use of quotations. On the contrary, we acknowledge the necessity of expressing views in the most diverse manner. We said that they are part of the broad opinion-shaping process where decisions are taken by responsible citizens in a well-regulated process of democratic decision-making. Ambassador Wegener also said (and that was the nucleus of the statement in this respect) I quote, "Here again, it would be a necessity of argumentative fairness, but also proof of the ability of the speaker to discern the real relevance of political processes to provide a more balanced comprehensive picture of opinion."

Mr. President, my delegation's intention was a constructive one. It was a plea for more argumentative rational discourse among ourselves. I shall abstain from any further comment on the way that this statement was recently handled.



(Mr. Elbe, Federal Republic of Germany)

I notice that the distinguished Ambassador of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic had some difficulties in using an abbreviation of the name of my State; allow me to be helpful in this matter, Mr. President. I should like to remind the Conference on Disarmament that my Government decided a long time ago not to use any abbreviation of the name of its State. We prefer to be called by our full name, which is the Federal Republic of Germany. We would appreciate it if a sovereign decision of my country was met with due respect in an international Conference.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany for his statement. May I take it that there are no more speakers? The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 13 March, at 10.30 a.m. The meeting is adjourned.

The meeting rose at 12.50 p.m.