

# CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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Appendix III/Vol.II  
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ENGLISH

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## REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

### APPENDIX III

#### VOLUME II

Index by subject and country of the  
Verbatim Records of the Conference  
on Disarmament in 1984

GE.84-65449



# CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.246  
1 March 1984  
ENGLISH

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## FINAL RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND FORTY-SIXTH PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva  
on Thursday, 1 March 1984, at 10.30 a.m.

President:

Mr. I. Datcu

(Romania)

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria:

Mr. A. TAFFAR

Argentina:

Mr. J. J. CARASALES

Mr. R. GARCIA MORITAN

Mr. R. VILLAMBROSA

Australia:

Mr. R. BUTLER

Mr. R. ROWE

Ms. J. COURTNEY

Belgium:

Mr. M. DEPASSE

Mr. J. M. NOIRFALISSE

Brazil:

Mr. C. A. DE SOUZA E SILVA

Mr. S. DE QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria:

Mr. K. TELLALOV

Mr. P. POPTCHEV

Mr. C. PRAMOV

Burma:

U THAN TUN

Canada:

Mr. G. SKINNER

Mr. P. W. BASHAM

China:

Mr. QIAN JIADONG

Ms. WANG SHIYUN

Mr. LI WEIMIN

Mr. ZHANG WEIDONG

Cuba:

Mr. A. V. GONZALEZ

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. M. VEJVODA

Mr. A. CIMA

Egypt:

Mr. I. HASSAN

Mr. A. MAHER ABBAS



Ethiopia:

Mr. F. YOHANNES

France:

Mr. F. DE LA GORCE

Mr. G. MONTASSIER

Mr. H. RENIE

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. H. ROSE

Mr. H. THIELICKE

Mr. J. DEMBSKI

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. W. E. VON DEM HAGEN

Mr. M. GERDTS

Hungary:

Mr. D. MEISZTER

Mr. F. GADJA

Mr. T. TOTH

India:

Mr. M. DUBEY

Mr. S. K. SHARMA

Indonesia:

Mr. S. SUTOWARDOYO

Ms. P. RAMADHAN

Mr. ANDRADJATI

Mr. HARYOMATARAM

Ms. BOEDIMAN

Islamic Republic of Iran:

Mr. N. K. KAMYAB

Mr. F. S. SIRJANI

Italy:

Mr. M. ALESSI

Mr. B. CABRAS

Mr. G. ADORNI BRACCESI

Japan:

Mr. R. IMAI

Mr. M. KONISHI

Mr. T. ISHIGURI

Kenya:

Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES  
Mr. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO  
Mr. P. MACEDO RIBA

Mongolia:

Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG  
Mr. S-O. BOLD

Morocco:

Mr. M. CHRAIBI  
Mr. O. HILAIE

Netherlands:

Mr. J. RAMAKER

Nigeria:

Mr. J. O. OBOH  
Mr. L. O. AKINDELE  
Mr. C. V. UDEDIBIA

Pakistan:

Mr. K. NIAZ

Peru:

Mr. C. CATILLO RAMIREZ

Poland:

Mr. S. TURBANSKI  
Mr. T. STROJWAS  
Mr. J. CIALOWICZ  
Mr. G. CZEMPINSKI

Romania:

Mr. I. DATCU  
Mr. T. MELESCANU  
Mr. A. POPESCU  
Mr. A. CRETU

Sri Lanka:

Mr. J. DHANAPALA  
Mr. P. KARIYAWASAM

Sweden:

Mr. R. EKEUS  
Mr. J. LUNDIN  
Mrs. E. BONNIER  
Mrs. A. M. LAU  
Mr. H. BERGLUND

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. V. L. ISSRAELYAN  
Mr. B. P. PROKOFEEV  
Mr. G. V. BERDENNIKOV  
Mr. P. Y. SKOMOROKHIN  
Mr. S. V. KOBYSH  
Mr. G. ANTSEFEROV  
Mr. G. VASHADZE

United Kingdom:

Mr. R. I. T. CROMARTIE  
Mr. J. F. GORDON  
Mr. D. A. SLINN

United States of America:

Mr. D. EMERY  
Mr. L. G. FIELDS  
Mr. P. CORDEN  
Ms. K. C. CRITTENBERGER  
Mr. R. HORNE  
Mr. L. MADSEN  
Mr. R. WATERS

Venezuela:

Mr. A. LOPEZ OLIVER

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC

Zaire:

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Secretary-General of the Conference  
on Disarmament and Personal  
Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary-General of  
the Conference on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): The plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is called to order.

The Conference continues today the consideration of item 2 of its agenda, "Cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament". However, members wishing to make statements on any other subject relevant to the work of the Conference may do so, in conformity with rule 30 of the rules of procedure of the Conference.

I have on my list of speakers for today Ambassador Dubey of India. Before giving him the floor, I should like to make a brief statement of how I view the role which the President, in this case Romania, should play during this month.

The Romanian delegation assumes as of today the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of March; it is fully alive both to the honour thus falling to Romania, and to the responsibilities deriving from this office. I should like to stress at the outset that this task has been made easier for us by the dynamic and tireless activity of my esteemed predecessor, Ambassador Turbanski of Poland, to whom I should like to convey the cordial congratulations of the Romanian delegation and at the same time our warm thanks and sincere admiration.

The principle of rotation and chance have combined to give Romania the presidency of the Conference for the month of March, which, in our hemisphere, is the month of spring, of the thaw, of hope renewed. I should like to see this as a good omen; and I hope that the work of the Conference may demonstrate that we are capable of making headway, of achieving positive, concrete results, in the direction of halting the arms race and of disarmament.

I should like to assure you, dear colleagues, that my sole ambition is to serve the Conference well, complying strictly with the rules of procedure, and that I shall do everything within my power to further dialogue and negotiations. Needless to say, the results of our negotiations depend on the contribution of every delegation, on the collective will of us all to make progress.

It has often proved in the past -- and the positive experience of my predecessor confirms it -- that in the performance of the duties entrusted to the President, especially in the case of a body such as ours which works on the basis of consensus, formal and informal consultations are a very useful instrument, one of the most important means of action. You may rest assured that my delegation will spare no effort to ensure that the ideas and positions of every delegation are duly taken into account before any substantive or procedural decision is taken. We are firmly convinced that the sole viable basis for progress in our work lies in the patient search for solutions which are unanimously acceptable to all delegations.

I should also like to take this opportunity to ensure the representatives of countries not members of the Conference that the President is entirely at their disposal with regard to problems stemming from their participation in the work of our Conference, as disarmament questions are obviously of concern to all countries.

(The President)

Without wishing to take stock at any length of the situation within the Conference, I think that I may say that we are in a better position than we were a year ago here, in the month of March 1983. The agenda and programme of work were already adopted some time ago, and some progress has been made on the setting up of subsidiary bodies.

This is certainly encouraging, but of course we are nevertheless far from saying that we are satisfied. On the contrary, the alarming lag in negotiations in comparison with the ever more threatening pace of the arms race cannot be denied.

It is the firm intention of the President to continue and, if possible, accelerate all consultations, both individual and collective, within a constructive working atmosphere, with a view to resolving all pending problems, of which there are many, and above all the question of the creation of subsidiary bodies on all the agenda items and the commencement of their work.

A common conclusion to be drawn from all the statements made so far in the Conference is that we are all obliged to make a special effort in order to go on from the -- often sterile -- discussions on the terms of reference and titles of working bodies to genuine negotiations on the problems on the agenda. It has often been repeated here, quite rightly, that organizational and procedural matters must be viewed as a means of achieving our essential objective, and not as an end in themselves.

I hope that we shall put all our energy and all our trust into multilateral disarmament negotiations and into this unique body, the Conference on Disarmament, and demonstrate the political will and the spirit of reciprocal compromise and goodwill needed to negotiate and adopt disarmament measures in order to abate and eliminate the threat of a devastating nuclear war.

The responsibility borne by the Conference on Disarmament has never been so great; the possibility offered to us of reacting together in a rational and imaginative manner to this life-or-death challenge may well never arise again.

It is a challenge which we must accept; we have no choice.

We must act before it is too late.

Distinguished representatives, thank you for your attention.

Mr. DUBEY (India): Since I am the only speaker in the general debate this morning, I presume an important responsibility devolves upon me. I shall try my best to give the distinguished delegates their money's worth, at least quantitatively if not qualitatively. Mr. President, Allow me, first of all, to extend to you the warm felicitations of my delegation on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of March. The Conference has still to sort out a number of initial problems before it can settle down to serious negotiations this year. We are convinced that under your able guidance, it will be able to move ahead with speed, purpose and determination. We are very glad to see in the chair this month the representative of a country with whom we have the friendliest of relations and a diplomat of your experience and skill. On behalf of the delegation of India, I offer you our full and sincere co-operation in the discharge of your onerous responsibilities.

(Mr. Dubey, India)

I would also like to take this opportunity to express our gratitude to Ambassador Stanislaw Turbanski of Poland who was the first President of the newly-christened Conference on Disarmament. Thanks to his persistent effort, sincerity of purpose and undoubted abilities, the Conference has been able to resolve some of the procedural problems which had paralysed its predecessor, the Committee on Disarmament, for a full three months last year.

May I also, on this occasion, express our deep appreciation to Ambassador Jorge Morelli Pando of Peru under whose chairmanship, the Committee on Disarmament concluded its work of the 1983 session. We have all greatly admired the manner in which he carried out his task of consultations during the intervening months.

We have in our midst colleagues who have joined the Conference only this year. Although I have already had the pleasure and privilege of meeting and welcoming them and even working with some of them, allow me to take advantage of the forum of this Conference to extend once again our warm welcome to the Ambassadors of Australia, Belgium, Canada, Cuba, Egypt, Ethiopia, Hungary, Indonesia and Sri Lanka. I would like to assure them of the full co-operation of the Indian delegation in the pursuit of our common cause through this Conference during their tenure here.

The Conference on Disarmament has commenced its session in a very turbulent and uncertain situation. A global crisis of an unprecedented dimension is affecting both the political and economic aspects of international relations. The world political situation is characterized by grave tension, a perilous state of East-West relations and the recrudescence of the cold war. The new cold war has further fuelled the arms race, particularly the nuclear-arms race; and the nuclear-arms race in turn has led to the deepening of the global crisis and the heightening of world tension. Disarmament negotiations which, of late, had, in any case, lost their momentum, have now come to a virtual standstill. In her inaugural address to the Meeting of the Commonwealth Heads of Government in New Delhi in November, 1983, Prime Minister Shrimati Indira Gandhi described the present situation in the following words: "...today's deepening crises are far more serious than anything we had envisaged before. Peace is in peril. The arms race is very nearly out of hand ....". In a recent speech, Prime Minister Trudeau spoke about the "brutalization of international relations".

We are also facing today a crisis of international economic co-operation and of the international economic system. The virtual collapse of disarmament negotiations has coincided with a stagnation in the North-South dialogue. The direct relationship between the astronomical sums of military expenditure, now running at \$US 800 billion per annum, and the world economic crises is now being more clearly and widely perceived. Massive diversion of resources for military purposes has

(Mr. Dubey, India)

resulted in the introduction of many distortions in the economic structures of the countries incurring such expenditures. These are reflected in huge budget deficits of a structural nature, higher rates of interest, intensification of protectionist measures and the erosion and endangering of the international monetary and trade systems. The Governments of developed countries, which have been upbraiding developing countries for interfering with the free play of market forces in their economy for the purpose of securing social justice and protecting the interest of the weaker sections of their population, are themselves engaged, in the name of national security, in massive interventions in their economies. This has seriously undermined the economic fortunes and prospects of developing countries as well as other developed countries. The underlying motives behind the suspension of arms-limitation talks and the new hectic phase of nuclear arms build up on the other hand and the atrophy of the North-South dialogue on the other, are basically the same. In the former case, it is a quest for military superiority. In the latter case, it is a desire to impose the will and ideology of the economically more powerful nations on the weaker ones.

As the Conference on Disarmament settles down to its serious business for the 1984 session, it is difficult to resist the temptation of comparing the year of 1984 with its well-known counterpart satirized in the famous novel of George Orwell. In no other field of international relations is the similarity between what is happening in 1984 and what was prophesied in George Orwell's political fiction more striking than in the field of the nuclear-arms race and the so-called security doctrines invoked to justify it. The nuclear-arms race today imperils not only freedom, so dear to Orwell's generation, but the very fabric of human civilization - nay, the very survival of the human species. Mankind is trembling in terror before the present-day equivalent of the Orwellian Big Brother, that is, a Doomsday Machine, supported by all-powerful, autonomous and self-serving military industry and technology. It is again in the context of the nuclear-arms race and disarmament that one is confronted with the most refined and pernicious form of Doublethink, that is, the doctrine of nuclear deterrence. And finally, in no other area is Doublespeak practised in a more systematic and persistent manner. It is in the field of the nuclear-arms race that we hear the talk of countries preparing for nuclear war in order to avert it; nations amassing nuclear-weapon stockpiles in order to eliminate them, and the Doomsday machine being credited with the achievement of having prevented war. It is again in this realm of make-believe and Doublespeak that a nuclear-weapons stockpile of eighteen to twenty thousand warheads is kept in readiness with the avowed purpose of deterring their use.

Mr. President, 1983 may very well be regarded as the lowest point in the recent history of disarmament negotiations. A new phase of the nuclear-arms race started during that year with the deployment of Pershing II and Cruise missiles in

(Mr. Dubey, India)

Europe and the countermeasures against it in the form of the deployment of more missiles of other types. We also saw during that year the breakdown of even the very limited framework of negotiations on nuclear disarmament. This situation was naturally reflected in the discussions and the decisions on disarmament matters at the last session of the United Nations General Assembly. On the one hand, the great public concern and frustration with what was happening in the world, and particularly with the growing complexity and uncertainty of the international security environment, was reflected in the adoption of a larger number of resolutions, as many as 66, that year than in the previous years. On the other hand, the General Assembly remained sharply divided on practically all the critical issues of disarmament. The division was so deep that it seemed difficult to believe that just about five years ago, the same body had arrived at the consensus embodied in the Final Document of the tenth special session. The Assembly could reach consensus on only a few peripheral and non-serious disarmament matters. Due to the totally apathetic attitude of some of the nuclear-weapon States, the Assembly failed to reach a consensus of any operational significance on the most immediate and critical questions before it, that is, prevention of nuclear war, halting of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament in general.

What we have been witnessing in the Conference on Disarmament during the last few weeks is a mirror image of what happened in the General Assembly. The situation here is even more frustrating and further divorced from the realities of the world because of the consensus method of decision taking in this body, and because of the systematic manner in which some of the nuclear-weapon States have used this method to block progress on the really important issues in the field of disarmament. Whereas the single largest group of resolutions adopted by the General Assembly relates to the prevention of nuclear war, the halting of the arms race and nuclear disarmament in general, here in this Conference for the last five years not even a beginning has been made towards undertaking negotiations on these issues. The persistent efforts of the non-aligned and neutral countries to get working groups established on these subjects have been of no avail. The mandate of the Working Group on the only nuclear disarmament item, i.e. nuclear-test ban, has deliberately been kept confined to the aspect of verification. The greatest irony is that the non-aligned and neutral countries members of the Conference are castigated in strong terms for even drawing attention to these critical issues and for merely trying to seek serious negotiations on them. They are blamed for saying or doing anything which could have the effect of upsetting the game-plan of some of these countries to mislead world public opinion about the functioning of the Conference on Disarmament, by exaggerating the importance of and concentrating on relatively minor and less urgent issues.

No doubt, the Conference on Disarmament has great potentialities which have never been realized. The doctrine which has mainly been responsible for



(Mr. Dubey, India)

fuelling the arms race in the most insidious manner is also responsible for the paralysis of the Conference. Each time a particular nuclear-weapon State has perceived that it has to acquire military superiority over the other nuclear-weapon States, it has decided to suspend arms limitation talks or to give only an appearance of engaging in such talks during the period it has been in the process of acquiring military superiority. And by the time it has felt that it has acquired military superiority and is, therefore, ready to talk from its position of strength, the other nuclear-weapon State has come to the conclusion that arms-limitation talks are not in its interest until it has been able to catch up. The net result has, therefore, been no arms limitation, let alone measures of genuine disarmament, but only the spiralling of nuclear arsenals.

The doctrine of nuclear deterrence has been invoked as a justification for acquiring military superiority and thereby perpetuating influence and domination in the world and preserving the existing world order. In my general statement to the Committee on Disarmament last year, I stated that this doctrine of deterrence or balance or parity was the ultimate illusion. The concept of parity or balance is subjective, arbitrary and self-serving. Parity is what is subjectively perceived and not what can be objectively determined. Among other things, the complex nature of contemporary armement, with its broad range of weapons system, makes it impossible to judge whether any shift has taken place in the military balance. It also leaves tremendous scope for creating confusion in terms of numbers, accuracy, etc., and thus justifying new rounds of nuclear arms build-up. There can be no balance when an equilibrium is inherently unstable. In fact, nuclear deterrence is not even a doctrine of security, but a doctrine for maintaining dominance, influence, hegemony and the status quo. Security is only camouflage to be able to mobilize and maintain popular support for this doctrine.

The doctrine becomes even more deceptive when ideological factors are introduced into it. For example, it is stated that the maintenance of parity or balance is necessary in order to preserve and protect the free world or democracy or other forms of government and socio-economic systems. It is forgotten that the best protection for societies and socio-economic systems comes from within themselves. Besides, nothing has greater potential for destroying these systems and tearing apart their social and economic fabrics than the massive arms expenditure and the piling up of nuclear arsenals.

The present developments in nuclear-arms build-up clearly demonstrate the hollowness of this doctrine and the thinly disguised nature of its purpose. Solly Zuckerman, in his book "Nuclear Illusion and Reality", has demonstrated that the armouries of both the Superpowers have long since passed the level that would be necessary to assure overwhelming mutual destruction. He has stated: "There is no sense in the belief that the enormous increase that has been made in the size of the nuclear arsenals on both sides, has reinforced the state of mutual deterrence". He has very aptly said: "Adding more would be akin to doubling the dose of poison for which there is no antidote."

Mr. SHARMA (India): Ambassador Dubey had to leave the Chair because he was not feeling well and he has asked me to continue his statement. Solly Zuckerman has, therefore, suggested that nothing will be lost if the size of the nuclear arsenals of both sides are significantly reduced. According to him, "... with every delay in reaching an agreement on the control of nuclear arms, nuclear weapons change and build up so fast that the best that could be achieved later is worse than the worst that might have been concluded a year or two before."

He also argues that if one is to believe the claim of Britain and France that the nuclear armaments which they are going to deploy and which are only a fraction of the size of those of the United States and the USSR, are adequate to constitute an independent deterrent force, then the entire nuclear arsenals of the United States and those of the USSR above the level proposed to be built by the United Kingdom or France, are redundant.

Finally, while the nuclear-weapon States are, on the one hand, swearing their allegiance to nuclear deterrence, some of them, at the same time, are carrying out research for developing futuristic weapons which would make deterrence obsolete.

It is important to make it clear in this context that the non-aligned movement has never agreed to confine its objectives in the field of nuclear disarmament to nuclear-arms control. The non-aligned countries are in favour of the elimination of nuclear weapons altogether. We are not for determining the level of nuclear armament which would ensure deterrence, but for jettisoning the entire concept of nuclear deterrence, which is based on fear and suspicion, which has been deliberately vested with a significance entirely different from its real character and which is perhaps the biggest conceptual deception devised by mankind in all its history. We do not believe that mankind ought to be condemned to co-exist with nuclear weapons. This legitimization of weapons of mass destruction constitutes a standing threat to the survival of mankind, and is designed to perpetuate the dominance and hegemony of the nuclear-weapon Powers.

More and more evidence is coming which demonstrates the disastrous dimensions of the holocaust that will follow a nuclear war. Early last year, a study prepared by a group of experts appointed by WHO concluded that the entire medical profession and services in the world would be quite helpless in meeting the challenge of treating the survivors of such a war, let alone reviving the medical services and infrastructure disrupted by it. Subsequently, the results of extensive scientific studies conducted over the past two years on the climatic and biological consequences of nuclear war were publicly announced at a conference in Washington in October-November, 1983, and later on published in an article by Carl Sagan in the Winter 1983-84 issue of the journal Foreign Affairs. The central point of the new findings is that the long-term consequences of a nuclear war could constitute a global climatic catastrophe. Carl Sagan in his article concludes that "... the prospect of nuclear war now clearly and visibly threatens every nation and every person on the planet" and that "now it seems more likely that nations having no part in the conflict -- even nations entirely neutral in the global confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union -- might be reduced to prehistoric population levels and economies, or worse". Finally, Carl Sagan has warned that "a first strike is tantamount to a national suicide for the aggressor, even if the attacked nation does not lift a finger to retaliate. Within a few days, the prevailing winds will carry the nuclear winter to the aggressor nation ...".

(Mr. Sharma, India)

Those of us here who have seen the much-discussed United States film "The Day After" may perhaps recall, inter alia, the depiction of how, due to the electromagnetic pulse, the entire society affected by nuclear attack is thrown back to an age prior to the advent of electricity, telephones, radios and automobiles.

One of the disquieting developments recently has been that some of the nuclear-weapon States do not even want the horrors of nuclear war to be brought home to their peoples. In fact, they are busy preaching doctrines and disseminating information which would have the effect of inuring their peoples to the presence of nuclear arsenals. There is even an attempt to silence and give short shrift to the public opinion which is agitating for nuclear disarmament. Genuine, conscientious and eminent people run the risk of being branded as naive, misguided or anti-nationalist.

The current mental state of the policy-makers in these nuclear-weapon States has been very aptly described by Carl Sagan as a practice called "denial" by psychiatrists. According to this behaviour, these people keep agonizing problems out of their heads partly because there seems to be nothing that they can do about them and also because of the fear of attracting, in the words of Carl Sagan, "retroactive rebuke to those responsible actively or passively in the past or in the present for the global nuclear-arms race." A guilt complex of this nature often becomes cumulative. It makes the persons concerned immune to the dangers of their decisions and actions and it provides incentive to them to go on doing the same thing, that is, stockpiling more and more nuclear arms in justification of their past decisions for having joined the nuclear-arms race.

In an article published in the International Herald Tribune on 27 September 1983, Barbara Tuchman, the famous United States historian, stated: "Today, the widespread fear of nuclear war may be a new element that will make the difference. It is the only motive power that could compel us towards the control of war that all the efforts of the last eighty odd years have not succeeded. It is an instrument, moreover, in the hands of the public." The popular movements against the nuclear-arms race lend credence to what has been stated by Barbara Tuchman. However, it is a tragic irony that the governments, instead of taking conscious, well-planned and preventive action for halting the nuclear-arms race and for nuclear disarmament, are expected to act only under the pressure of their peoples armed by the fear of a nuclear holocaust. Fear is hardly the right basis for triggering rational action. For it breeds hatred and resentment which cannot but cloud judgement and rational thinking. However, the saving grace in this case is that it is not the fear of one section of human population directed against the other, but the fear of mankind as a whole arising out of a commonly perceived catastrophe.

Recently, reports have been published insinuating that after the deployment of Pershing-II and Cruise missiles in Europe, the peace movements have lost their appeal and popularity and are on way to declining. Nothing can be further from the truth. The peace movements have grown out of a genuine concern for human survival shared by people all over the world, across the divides of continents, races, socio-economic systems and stages of social and economic development. In fact, because of the horrifying predictions of the recent studies on the consequences of nuclear war, there has, in fact been a sharp increase in the popular awareness of the dangerous implications of the continuing nuclear arms race. A recent survey in one of the capitals of the nuclear-weapon States indicated that a majority of the younger people in their teens were concerned about their survival in the event of a nuclear war. They had no doubt that the nuclear war would come; the only question for them was as to when it would come. Given this fundamental nature of the motivations of the peace movements, it is idle to believe that they can be forced underground. As our

(Mr. Tharma, India)

Foreign Minister stated in his recent Convocation address at Bangalore University: "... From now on to the end of this century, the tussle between the forces of human survival and those who, for whatever reasons, are pushing the world to the brink of disaster, seems to be inevitable".

It is our hope that this upsurge of enlightened popular sentiment against nuclear weapons would ultimately force the governments to halt the nuclear-arms race and take steps for the elimination of nuclear weapons. In recognition of the role that the United Nations can play in arousing and strengthening world-wide concern at the grass-roots level for nuclear disarmament, the United Nations General Assembly decided to launch the World Disarmament Campaign. India fully supports the activities under the Campaign and sets great store by its success. I would like to take this opportunity to announce that my country has decided to make a further contribution of one million Rupees to the United Nations World Disarmament Campaign. There are very few causes as important today as the cause of what our Foreign Minister, in the address I have cited before, called "education for survival". India would do everything possible to contribute to the advancement of this cause.

We in this Conference on Disarmament still have it within our competence to salvage this critical situation by negotiating concrete and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war and for nuclear disarmament. For this purpose, the Conference on Disarmament will have to gear itself in the coming weeks to take purposeful and tangible decisions to commence the negotiating process on these burning questions. My delegation is convinced that the only way of enhancing the prestige, status and effectiveness of the Conference on Disarmament and making it relevant to contemporary realities is to make the nuclear disarmament issues, including the question of an arms race in the outer space, the principal theme this year and from now onwards.

In particular, in 1984 we cannot afford to view the question of prevention of nuclear war from the standpoint of the previous years because the developments in 1983 indicate that the situation is well on the way to reaching the point of no return. Among other developments, the latest round of nuclear-missile deployments in Europe has reduced the warning time between launch and destruction to a mere five minutes. One very clear consequence of these deployments — and here I do not intend to go into the justification or otherwise thereof — is to precipitate the adoption and operation of the strategy of launch-on-warning. To live with nuclear weapons is in itself an enormously precarious global predicament: but to live with launch-on-warning verily amounts to cliff-hanging. In a situation where the mere rising of the moon or flocks of Canadian geese can occasionally lead to misjudgement regarding an attack by nuclear missiles in spite of the presence of the most sophisticated warning systems in the world, where in a period of a mere 18 months, 147 false alarms can be sounded, who can say with certainty that with developments compelling the adoption of launch-on-warning, doomsday is not already knocking at our doors?

Among the measures for the prevention of nuclear war, we think that the recent developments impart added urgency to our seriously taking up the Indian proposal for negotiating a convention on the non-use of nuclear weapons. The conclusion of such a convention will dramatically improve the climate of international relations. It will reduce the level of fear and bring immense relief and a ray of hope to this anguished and frightened world. Moreover, it will give us the confidence to tackle the formidable task of negotiating agreements for halting the nuclear-arms race and for nuclear disarmament. It will be worthwhile to complete this exercise just for this, if for no other purpose.

(Mr. Sharma, India)

The first essential step towards dealing seriously with the problem of prevention of nuclear war is to implement General Assembly resolution 38/183 G which calls upon us to "negotiate with a view to achieving agreement on appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war" and to establish an ad hoc working group for this purpose. We sincerely hope that Western countries represented in the Conference will withdraw their objection to setting in motion the negotiating process. It is our earnest hope that, equally concerned as they ought to be by the common destiny of mankind, this year they will adopt a constructive approach.

My delegation attaches equal importance to setting up an ad hoc working group of the Conference on nuclear disarmament, and conducting negotiations on this subject without losing further time. We have already lost as much as five years without doing anything in this critical area.

We obviously do not agree with the delegations of the Western countries that all that is required to be done at present in the field of nuclear disarmament is for the two Superpowers to resume their negotiations. I can hardly over-emphasize the fact that the very basis of these negotiations goes against our fundamental position on this subject. The assumption behind these negotiations is that we have to get reconciled to co-existing with nuclear weapons. Our position is that they must be eliminated and, therefore, we want immediate commencement of negotiations with a view to attaining this objective. Without going into the merits of the perplexing variety of proposals that have been made in these negotiations, we would like to point out that each of these proposals permits the retention of nuclear weapons and the continuation of the nuclear-arms race. Moreover, the course and outcome of even these limited negotiations are dependent on the vicissitudes of bilateral relations between the Superpowers and their allies. Depending upon the climate of their relations, they are discontinued, suspended and resumed again. This Conference, as a minimum, has the responsibility of ensuring the continuity of these negotiations.

Finally, this Conference must take up immediately and in all seriousness the question of an arms race in outer space. Recent developments would indicate that such an arms race is no longer a part of science fiction and is fast becoming a reality. Besides, these developments are fraught with grave consequences. First and foremost, they would involve ruinous expenditure involving hundreds of billions of dollars; some estimates put it at 500 billion dollars. Diversion of this magnitude of resources is bound to disrupt the economic structures of even the economically most powerful countries and would have disastrous consequences for the global economy, particularly for the economies of developing countries. This can make the entire North-South dialogue devoid of any significance for a long time to come.

Some of the weapon systems taken up for development will alter the basic concept of international security and strategic doctrines, and transform the very character and structure of power relations. If the countries concerned indeed succeed in developing what is being described as the ultimate weapon, or the weapon to destroy all weapons, there would be no incentive for disarmament. The world would perpetually live with nuclear arsenals and limited nuclear warfare would become a distinct possibility. However, the greatest danger of all lies in the very process of the development of such weapons triggering a nuclear war.

My delegation is constrained to point out with a sense of deep dismay that there is a tendency among some delegations to ignore these developments of catastrophic implications on the ground that what has been taken up now is only research and development. I do not want, at this stage, to go into the details of what is actually happening, how far the governments concerned are committed to developing such weapons

(Mr. Sharma, India)

systems and to what extent these weapons systems have already been developed. I would only like to point out that technological developments have a momentum of their own that creates a forward drive for the deployment of weapons once they become technically feasible. Besides, it is always easier to stop an arms race before, rather than after, the deployment of the bulk of the new weapons systems.

In the statements made so far in the Conference, a number of references have been made to the manner in which recent developments would affect existing treaties. While this is relevant, we do not think that the real challenge is merely legal or juridical. It is a more fundamental challenge, having a bearing on the very fate of mankind.

What I have stated about the gravity and seriousness of these developments would warrant our undertaking without delay serious negotiations on the subject with a view to reaching an agreement or agreements, to borrow the wording of the last year's General Assembly resolution on this subject. This resolution was adopted by the overwhelming majority of 147 in favour, 1 against and 1 abstention. The Assembly could hardly have been more unequivocal on what needs to be done on this subject.

We are really intrigued that the Western countries, which voted for this resolution, are now not prepared to accept the terms of reference for a working group on this subject as laid down in the resolution. They want to go back to the mandate discussed at the last session of the Committee on Disarmament. In justification of this position, they are giving the argument that what is required at this stage is to undertake the preliminary work of identifying the problem and determining the priorities and to find out what is actually happening. Mr. President, by taking this position, these countries are not only going back on the position they took at the General Assembly, but are also underestimating the grave implications of the developments in this area and the urgent need of taking action before it is too late. If indeed, during the next year or two, we find that we have reached a point of no return, these countries will have to bear the responsibility of the fate that may befall mankind then. These are strong words, but I am using them advisedly because of our belief that on a matter of such importance, there is no scope or justification for equivocation or for a wait-and-see attitude.

Before I conclude, I would like to express my delegation's fullest interest in the negotiations for the elaboration of a chemicals weapons convention during the 1984 session itself of the Conference, if that is possible.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the distinguished representative of India for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to my country and to the President of the Conference.

I would request the Indian delegation to convey to Ambassador Dubey our sincere hope that he is suffering from a purely temporary indisposition.

I have no more speakers on my list for today. Would any delegation like to take the floor? That does not seem to be the case.

At my request, the secretariat today distributed an informal document containing a programme of meetings of the Conference and of its subsidiary bodies for the coming week. As usual, according to normal practice, this is purely an indicative schedule and may be modified if necessary. If I hear no objections, I shall take it that the Conference adopts this programme.

It was so decided.

(Mr. Sharma, India)

Dear colleagues, as you know we are faced with a large number of organizational problems which must be settled quite urgently in the interests of the work of our Conference. In order to make the best possible use of the little time available to us, I intend to convene an informal meeting of the Conference devoted to organizational problems on Friday, 2 March, at 10.30 a.m. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference agrees that we should meet tomorrow in an informal meeting.

It was so decided.

In order to take advantage of the time remaining to us this morning, I intend to invite those delegations which wish to do so to participate in an informal exchange of views in Room C.108 at 12.15 p.m. I intend to take advantage of the opinions of those delegations which wish to help me in the subsequent conduct of our work, and in particular to listen to opinions on the priorities now facing us, especially organizational problems.

Before concluding, I should like to inform you that the next plenary meeting will take place on Tuesday, 6 March, at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting rose at 12 noon





FINAL RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND FORTY-SEVENTH PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva  
on Tuesday, 6 March 1984, at 10.30 a.m.

President:

Mr. I. Datcu

(Romania)

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

<u>Algeria:</u>	Mr. A. TAFFAR
<u>Argentina:</u>	Mr. J.J. CARASALES Mr. R. GARCIA MORITAN
<u>Australia:</u>	Mr. R. BUTLER Mr. R. ROWE Ms. J. COURTNEY
<u>Belgium:</u>	Mr. M. DEPASSE Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE Mlle. M. DE BECKER
<u>Brazil:</u>	Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA Mr. S. DE QUEIROZ DUARTE
<u>Bulgaria:</u>	Mr. K. TELLALOV Mr. P. POPTCHEV Mr. C. PRAMOV
<u>Burma:</u>	U MAUNG MAUNG GYI U THAN TUN
<u>Canada:</u>	Mr. J.A. BEESLEY Mr. G. SKINNER Mr. P.W. BASHAM Mr. R. NORTH Mr. D. MUNTON Mr. J. KIRTON Mr. G. BOEHNERT Mr. R. HAYCOCK Mr. B. MCGRATH Mr. J. ENGLISH Mr. J. BAYER Mr. T. KEETING Mr. J. NEF Mr. E. MAHANT Mr. A. DONNEUR

China:

Mr. QIAN JIADONG  
Ms. WANG SHIYUN  
Mr. YANG MINGLIANG  
Mr. ZHANG WEIDONG

Cuba:

Mr. A.V. GONZALES

Czechslovakia:

Mr. M. VEJVODA  
Mr. A. CIMA

Egypt:

Mr. S. ALFARARGI  
Mr. I. HASSAN  
Mr. A. MAHER ABBAS  
Mlle. W. BASSIM  
Mr. F. MONIB

Ethiopia:

Mr. F. YOHANNES

France:

Mr. F. DE LA GORCE  
Mr. H. RENIE

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. H. ROSE  
Mr. J. DEMBSKI

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. H. WEGENER  
Mr. W.E. VON DEM HAGEN

Hungary:

Mr. D. MEISZTER  
Mr. F. GADJA  
Mr. T. TOTH

India:

Mr. S.K. SHARMA

Indonesia:

Mr. S. SUTOWARDOYO  
Ms. P. RAMADHAN  
Mr. ANDRADJATI  
Mr. HARYOMATARAM  
Ms. BOEDIMAN

Islamic Republic of Iran:

Mr. F.S. SIRJANI

Italy:

Mr. M. ALESSI  
Mr. B. CABRAS  
Mr. M. PAVESE

Japan:

Mr. R. IMAI  
Mr. M. KONISHI  
Mr. T. ISHIGURI  
Mr. K. TANAKA  
Mr. T. KAWAKITA

Kenya:Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES  
Mr. P. MACEDO RIBA

Mongolia:

Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG  
Mr. S-O. BOLD

Morocco:

Mr. A. SKALLI  
Mr. M. CHRAIBI  
Mr. O. HILALE

Netherlands:

Mr. J. RAMAKER

Nigeria:

Mr. J.O. OBON--  
Mr. L.O. AKINDELE  
Mr. C.V. UDEDIBIA  
Mr. F. ADESHIDA

Pakistan:

Mr. M. AHMAD  
Mr. K. NIAZ

Peru:

Mr. P. CANNOCK  
Mr. C. CASTILLO RAMIREZ

Poland:

Mr. S. TURBANSKI  
Mr. T. STROJWAS  
Mr. G. CZEMPINSKI

Romania:

Mr. I. DATCU  
Mr. T. MELESCANU  
Mr. A. POPESCU  
Mr. A. CRETU

Sri Lanka:

Mr. J. DHANAPALA  
Mr. P. KARIYAWASAM

Sweden:

Mr. R. EKEUS  
Mr. J. LUNDIN  
Mrs. E. BONNIER  
Mr. H. BERGLUND  
Mr. L.E. WINGREN

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELIAN  
Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV  
Mr. G.V. BERDENNIKOV  
Mr. P.Y. SKOMOROKHIN  
Mr. S.V. KOBYSH  
Mr. G. ANTSIFEROV  
Mr. V. VASHADZE

United Kingdom:

Mr. R.I.T. CROMARTIE  
Mr. L. MIDDLETON  
Mr. J.F. GORDON  
Mr. D.A. SLINN

United States of America:

Mr. L.G. FIELDS  
Ms. K.C. CRITTENBERGER  
Mr. R. HORNE  
Mr. L. MADSEN  
Mr. R. WATERS  
Mr. H. CALHOUN  
Mr. J. DOESBERG

Venezuela:

Mr. A. LOPEZ OLIVER

Yugoslavia:

Mr. K. VIDAS

Zaire:

Ms. E. EKANGA KABEYA

Secretary-General of the Conference on  
Disarmament and Personal  
Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary-General of the  
Conference on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I declare open the meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

The Conference on Disarmament today begins consideration of item 3 of its agenda, entitled "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters". As usual, however, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference, in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure.

I have on my list of speakers for today the distinguished representatives of France, Morocco and Mexico, and I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of France, Ambassador François de la Gorce.

Mr. DE LA GORCE (France) (translated from French): Mr. President, the French delegation would like first of all to present to you its congratulations and best wishes for success in your duties. My delegation is happy to greet you as the representative of Romania, a country linked with France by long-standing ties of friendship and precious affinities in thought. Your talent and experience make us confident that you will accomplish your task in the best manner.

The French delegation also wishes to express its entire gratitude to our distinguished colleague from Poland for his efforts during the first month of our session. Those efforts led to substantial results; they have made it possible now to resume our work on a particularly important item of the agenda. I should also like on this occasion to draw attention to the long-standing ties of friendship that unite Poland and France and the unceasing admiration of my fellow-countrymen for the heroism of the Polish nation during its glorious and dramatic history.

I should also like, on behalf of the French delegation, to renew our wishes of welcome to our new colleagues, the Ambassadors of Australia, Belgium, Canada, Cuba, Egypt, Ethiopia, Hungary, Indonesia and Sri Lanka. I shall be happy to continue with them the friendly co-operation that characterized our relations with their predecessors.

Those of my colleagues who have spoken before me have in the main stressed the deterioration of the international situation and the dangers which that implied. The French delegation shares to a great extent this concern but would not agree that the situation is in all respects as bad as some members of the Conference have claimed. We are, of course, aware of the persistence of tension and polemics. We deplore the continued resort to force: the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, the war between Iraq and Iran, the crisis that threatens the independence and integrity of Lebanon, and the use of violence in South-East Asia, Africa and Central America. We also regret the breaking-off of the extremely important bilateral negotiations on nuclear issues that had opened in Geneva.

However, there is no visible desire anywhere to make a complete break; each side affirms its desire to continue the dialogue. The Stockholm Conference, which opened last month, expresses the resolve of the Europeans to define amongst themselves the means of restoring confidence and promoting security with the goal -- which we hope will not be far off -- of reducing armaments. The Vienna negotiations on balanced force reductions will resume. Here, our annual session has begun better than it did last year; the outlook for the negotiation of a convention on chemical weapons seems encouraging, and we hope that, with an open-minded approach on all sides, the Conference will be able profitably to deal

(Mr. de la Gorce, France)

with all the items on its agenda, taking best advantage of the albeit very diverse conditions characterizing the various questions before us.

Several of us have stressed the risks associated with the accumulation of weapons and especially of nuclear arms. We do not deny the existence of security risks that can in fact be produced by imbalance and destabilization; but it seems excessively negative to present the current situation as one marked by serious dangers of a nuclear disaster, and even less so as one marked by an imminent danger of such a disaster.

Furthermore, nowhere can we detect the nuclear panic that some movements are still trying to create in the Western countries. Where would the disaster come from? The countries of the Atlantic Alliance reaffirmed last year that none of their weapons would ever be used otherwise than in response to aggression. This commitment is in conformity with the obligation set forth in the United Nations Charter relating to the non-use of force. In addition, the member countries of the Warsaw Pact have affirmed their desire for peace as well and we take note of their statements.

We should consider, therefore, calmly and objectively, the present facts relating to the problem of peace and the problem of security, as those facts determine the very conditions of the disarmament enterprise.

The President of the French Republic, speaking to the General Assembly of the United Nations last September, said the following on that subject:

"Peace among nations can last only if it is based on a genuine balance. This is the lesson of history. It is in respecting this golden rule that the rights of all to independence and security will be reconciled. The approach should be to establish such a balance, or re-establish it if it no longer exists, and guarantee stability, reduce forces progressively to lower and lower levels, and verify at all times the information supplied; that is the only possible approach to the problems before us".

This statement expresses in the clearest terms the principles underlying French policy.

The conditions for peace and for security are therefore the very conditions of disarmament. For this reason we have introduced in the list of the main goals for the enterprise of disarmament -- our Decalogue -- a heading entitled "Disarmament and international security". That, in the view of the French delegation, justifies the inclusion in our agenda of an item entitled "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters".

The French delegation willingly agreed to establishing this as a separate item. It highlights the fact that the prevention of nuclear war cannot be isolated from other matters. It is not a specifically nuclear item. It is, of course, linked to nuclear disarmament to the extent that the achievement of nuclear disarmament would, by definition, exclude the use of nuclear arms. But in the current situation, which is sure to last some time, the item deals primarily with the prevention of war in general, i.e. conventional war which could by escalation lead to a crossing of the nuclear threshold. The problem to resolve is, therefore, one of security and the conditions underlying security: from a political point of view, a state of international relations that ensures a sufficient level of



(Mr. de la Gorce, France)

confidence, in particular through the respect of the principle of the Charter that prohibits the use or threat of force; from a military point of view, the maintenance of the necessary balance and the rebuilding of confidence by appropriate measures. The proposals submitted in Stockholm by the Western Powers provide an example of that approach.

Other measures have been proposed that seek specifically to prevent a nuclear war by prohibiting the use of nuclear arms or their first use. The French delegation has on many occasions, in this body and in the First Committee of the General Assembly, presented the reasons why such measures, which are declaratory and unverifiable, would seriously harm the cause that they claim to serve, as they would destroy in one area the balance needed for security and would thereby provoke political and strategic destabilization with incalculable consequences that would affect the entire world.

The discussions that we are to have on new agenda item 3 will serve as an occasion for the French delegation to deal with this fundamental problem in greater depth.

I have tried to situate the "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters" in the very broad context given by the wording of our agenda. It proposes an ambitious, but in our view necessary, task, with which the Conference on Disarmament alone is able to deal at the international level. We must, through in-depth discussions, explore and identify the conditions for security in the nuclear age, and study the conditions, means and commitments that could preserve that security.

Will this study indicate issues suitable for negotiations of a concrete and specific nature? The French delegation does not exclude this a priori; it does not think that such negotiations can bear on aspects that are within the proper competence of the nuclear-weapon Powers. But it shares without reservation the legitimate concerns of the international community with regard to the matters covered by item 3 of the agenda, which are of major interest to all of humanity. France recognizes therefore the right of all States to participate in a joint effort on such matters. The French delegation will therefore make a full contribution to this effort to the greatest extent possible.

I shall only devote a few brief comments to other items on the agenda.

The French delegation remains ready to participate here in substantive discussions on agenda item 2, cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. It has on many occasions explained the reasons underlying its approach to nuclear disarmament and the conditions in which the French Government could accept undertakings. It feels that in the present conditions such negotiations are within the competence of the two main nuclear-weapon Powers. The French Government therefore hopes that the negotiations interrupted last year by the Soviet Union will resume as soon as possible.

Chemical disarmament remains the main goal of our negotiations. Recent weeks have been marked by two very positive elements: the announcement by the United States Secretary of State of the forthcoming presentation of a draft treaty and the statement by the representative of the Soviet Union on continuous verification of the destruction of stocks. Furthermore, the subsidiary body has

(Mr. de la Gorce, France)

resumed its work with a broader mandate that authorizes the drafting of provisions of a treaty. The method proposed by its chairman seems to us to be well-suited to the negotiating conditions. We would hope, however, that matters relating to the prohibition of use and verification would receive more prominence. The recent allegations relating to the use of chemical weapons -- allegations recently submitted to the Conference -- call for further vigilance on the part of the international community with regard to the observance of that prohibition.

Broadly speaking, the necessary conditions seem present for the current session to make significant, and we hope decisive, progress in the negotiations on chemical disarmament.

Radiological weapons have also been the subject of negotiations for some years. We hope that these negotiations will focus on their proper goal, which is the condition for a successful outcome that is within our reach. In that connection, we do not think that new weapons of mass destruction should be dealt with within the same subsidiary body. The negotiation of a general agreement aimed at preventing the development of unidentified weapons does not seem practical to us. We prefer, therefore, resuming the method already used of informal meetings with experts, which has made a useful contribution to exploring the subject.

The French delegation has stressed on many occasions the capital importance of preventing an arms race in outer space. Such an arms race could in fact lead to dangerous destabilization of the necessary strategic balances. Agreement was reached last year on the establishment of a working group, but not on its mandate. Several of us, basing our position on the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly last December seek a general negotiating mandate, which others cannot accept. The French delegation has an open position on this problem but believes that the extreme complexity of the subject requires, at least for the duration of one session, the exploratory work envisaged in the draft mandate presented last year. In the view of my delegation it would therefore be wiser at once to devote to essential preparatory work the time we risk losing in a possibly fruitless discussion in an effort to attain a more ambitious text.

Finally, the French delegation maintains all its interest in the agenda items relating to negative security assurances and the comprehensive programme of disarmament; the conditions of which we are all aware, the lack of the necessary time, will no doubt not permit much progress this year.

But on the first of these items we continue to believe that the solution of giving Security Council endorsement to the declarations of the nuclear-weapon Powers, if possible in a single formulation, could provide substantial protection to the vast majority of non-nuclear-weapon States and is therefore worth considering in fresh discussions.

The French delegation will deal more substantially with some of the matters that I have raised in future statements, as well as with the very pressing, but so imperfectly resolved, problem of our methods and procedures.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of France for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to my country and myself.

I now give the floor to the representative of Morocco, Ambassador Skalli.

Mr. SKALLI (Morocco) (translated from French): Mr. President, first of all I have the great pleasure, on behalf of the Moroccan delegation and myself, of proffering our warm congratulations on your accession to the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of March.

We are particularly pleased to have the conduct of our work entrusted to the distinguished representative of Romania, with which Morocco has the most exemplary links of friendship and co-operation. We are convinced that your wealth of experience, and your qualities as a shrewd and sagacious diplomat, will enable you to carry out your responsibilities with great ability and competence.

The work carried out by your predecessor, Ambassador Turbanski of Poland, deserves the highest praise. We should like to express our sincere thanks and appreciation to him for the brilliant and efficient manner in which he directed the work of the Conference during his presidency.

I should like to take this opportunity cordially to welcome our new colleagues, the distinguished representatives of Australia, Belgium, Canada, Cuba, Egypt, Ethiopia, Hungary, Indonesia and Sri Lanka. I should like to assure them of the full co-operation of the Moroccan delegation.

Since the end of our last session, international peace and security in the world have been put to a severe test. The many conflicts which rock our planet only increase international tension which has already reached an alarming level. The breaking off of the bilateral negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces and the postponement of the strategic arms talks testify to the current impasse in international relations. These events make our task in this Conference today both arduous and imperative.

We had agreed, however, that 1983 would be a crucial year for the renewal of disarmament negotiations. Although a unanimous desire to take action in the right direction was clearly expressed, we must recognize how small were the results we achieved.

There are few exercises more edifying in this connection than to note, in the statements at the start of a session, the expressions of hope for progress in our work and, in the statements at the close of the session, the expressions of regret and frustration because of the total lack of progress. For more than five years now, the Committee on Disarmament, now the Conference on Disarmament, has been entrusted with the task of negotiating in the sphere of disarmament; and never have so many wishes been expressed, but never have so many obstacles arisen to prevent any headway from being made. This backsliding is a source of profound concern for us, all the greater because a latent and insidious cold war is spreading to all levels of international relations, while its adverse effects are increasingly felt within our Conference.

(Mr. Skalli, Morocco)

Let us hope, admittedly without any great conviction, that the change in the title of this single multilateral disarmament negotiating organ will be an opportunity for an enhanced awareness of the dangers of the present situation and will induce us to take measures which could constitute the start of a genuine disarmament process; for no one is unaware of the risks to the world of the increasingly vast and ever more devastating arsenal of weapons.

In his message to the Conference, the Secretary-General of the United Nations asked why, when there is such broad agreement on the objective of disarmament, it is still so remote. He was right to say that the answer should be sought, and I quote, "in the apprehension among nations, most importantly among the most powerful, of possible jeopardy to national security, an apprehension which detracts attention from the grave threat to global security which a continuing arms race poses".

The delegation of Morocco has often had occasion to draw attention to the fact that the arms race in our times has grown out of all proportion to the security needs of the States responsible for it.

We think that the accumulation of increasingly sophisticated and destructive weapons, far from conferring security on one or the other party, only increases suspicion and aggravates tension. Consequently, unless it is stopped, it can hardly fail to produce a conflictive situation of extreme gravity. The impressive number of resolutions adopted on the subject by the last United Nations General Assembly is in itself rather revealing. It illustrates the major concern of the international community to see the Powers which practically hold all mankind hostage, envisaging relations based on something other than mistrust and confrontation, and committing themselves firmly to a process of genuine disarmament which would benefit all nations of the world.

The time seems to have come when, on pain of being totally discredited in the eyes of public opinion throughout the world, we should undertake serious and constructive action in our Conference. Our agenda comprises issues whose urgency and importance need no further illustration.

My delegation wishes to express its satisfaction on the decision which we have taken to include the issue of the prevention of nuclear war as a separate item on our agenda. We have in this form recognized the priority which this problem merits, and its acuteness.

For our part, we can only welcome this, since the major problem confronting mankind to date -- if we need to be reminded -- is that of its own survival. As General Assembly resolution 38/183 G so rightly says, removal of the threat of nuclear war is the most acute and urgent task of the present day.

(Mr. Skalli, Morocco)

It is encouraging to note that all the delegations here present agree in admitting that the genuine threat of the annihilation of all life on earth following a nuclear war is the greatest peril our world must face. We thus find it difficult to understand the reasons which prevent the Conference from beginning substantive work on so crucial and fundamental a matter.

The General Assembly resolution which I have just quoted, after noting with concern that the Committee on Disarmament was not able to start negotiations on the question during its 1983 session, requests the Conference on Disarmament to undertake, as a matter of the highest priority, negotiations with a view to achieving agreement on appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war.

The Moroccan delegation considers that it is high time to act and to follow up the General Assembly's recommendation. Specific negotiations on the subject should begin without delay, preferably within a subsidiary organ, the creation of which was recommended by the Group of 21 in document CD/341, which we consider to be the most suitable means of considering the issue.

It is clear that the best means of preventing the outbreak of nuclear war is to stop the nuclear-arms race and promote nuclear disarmament, since it is a fact that it is nuclear weapons which most seriously threaten the existence of civilization as a whole. We would like to recall here the particular responsibility which the nuclear-weapon States bear where disarmament is concerned. We can never sufficiently stress the political and moral duty of such States to respect the undertakings into which they have entered and to permit the implementation of the provisions of paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

Next year the Third Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons will be held at Geneva. This underlines the importance, on the eve of this event, of the work of the present session of the Conference on agenda item 1 on the nuclear-test ban.

We have unfailingly asserted the urgent and imperative nature of the negotiation and conclusion of a treaty completely banning the testing of nuclear weapons. We have unceasingly stressed the positive effects of concluding such a treaty on non-proliferation. The efforts undertaken to date, however, do not, it must be confessed, meet our concerns and expectations, despite the numerous appeals by the General Assembly and despite the undertakings under the Partial Test Ban Treaty and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

The Working Group which we set up two years ago on agenda item 1 initially concerned itself with the important question of verification. From now on it would be advisable to concentrate on preparing a draft treaty, the conclusion of which will most certainly constitute an important stage in nuclear disarmament.

(Mr. Skalli, Morocco)

The prevention of an arms race in outer space is another issue to which the General Assembly has given high priority. We ourselves are fully aware of this. The extension of the arms race to outer space has become a new motive and a new reason for concern on the part of the international community.

Instead of being regarded as the common heritage of mankind and a domain for peaceful activity benefiting all the nations of the world, outer space has become an area of competition between the Great Powers. Each day that passes brings its quota of news on the development of or experimentation in some weapon whose field of action will be outer space. The launching of anti-satellite weapons or other missiles is no longer considered a futuristic scenario but a very real and threatening reality.

In view of the need to explore and use outer space for the good and in the interests of all, we must take the necessary measures to dispel the danger which an arms race in outer space would create for mankind.

Last year, there was unanimity on the subject of the creation of a subsidiary organ for that purpose. Unfortunately, we were unable to agree on the terms of its mandate.

At its latest session, the General Assembly, in resolution 38/70, called upon all States, in particular those with major space capabilities, to contribute actively to the objective of the peaceful use of outer space and to take immediate measures to prevent an arms race in outer space.

This resolution also requests the Conference to establish an ad hoc working group with a view to undertaking negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in all its aspects in outer space. We hope that this appeal will be heard and that we can set to work without delay.

The prohibition of chemical weapons is one of the issues to which we all attach high priority. It is good to note that work in this sphere is well advanced. Each session which passes brings us closer to the drafting of a convention which we hope to be able to conclude during this session. That would most certainly be a major contribution to the objective of general and complete disarmament which we are pursuing.

We welcome the fact that the mandate adopted for the subsidiary organ responsible for negotiating on this question adequately reflects the state of progress of our work.

Our optimism is justified and reinforced by the recent statements of the United States and the Soviet Union whose proposals will not fail, we are sure, to give a new impetus to our negotiations.

(Mr. Skalli, Morocco)

In the statement he made at the opening of this session, the distinguished representative of Mexico, Ambassador García Robles, judiciously drew a parallel between the main results obtained by the various multinational negotiating bodies on disarmament.

He also recalled that both the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament had achieved tangible results in the sphere of the elimination of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. As for the record of the Committee on Disarmament since its inception in 1978, it is, and I quote, "from all standpoints unjustifiably barren". It is to be hoped that the Conference on Disarmament will pull our work out of the present morass, so that this multilateral negotiating body can in its turn make progress towards general and complete disarmament.

We consider that it is time for us to act and show sufficient political will to respond to the expectations which the international community has placed in us.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Morocco for his statement, and especially for his kind words addressed to my country and to the President.

I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Mexico, Ambassador García Robles.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, those of us who have had the opportunity, as I have, not only of appreciating your efficiency and discretion at work in the Committee on Disarmament, but also of having witnessed the distinguished and skilful manner in which you discharged your important responsibilities as representative of Romania to the United Nations, must congratulate ourselves on the fact that it has fallen to you to direct the work of the Conference on Disarmament in the month of March which, together with the month of February, is one of the most important months for launching the work of this multilateral negotiating organ on a sound course. The delegation of Mexico is pleased to offer you its unqualified co-operation.

We would also like to renew the expression of our high appreciation to your predecessor, the distinguished representative of Poland, Ambassador Turbansky, whose skill and acumen in guiding the initial stage of our work this year were truly exemplary.

In accordance with the programme of work which we adopted for this week, this plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is devoted to item 3 of its agenda, entitled "prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters".

(Mr. García Robles, Mexico)

To appreciate the importance of this item, suffice it to recall two paragraphs of the Final Document of 1978. In the first of these, paragraph 8, the United Nations General Assembly stressed that "while the final objective of the efforts of all States should continue to be general and complete disarmament under effective international control, the immediate goal is that of the elimination of the danger of a nuclear war"; and in paragraph 18 it added that "removing the threat of a world war -- a nuclear war -- is the most acute and urgent task of the present day".

We therefore venture to hope that this year nothing will happen of the kind which occurred in 1983, when two months of painstaking effort -- which I may illustrate by referring to the statements made by the delegation of Mexico at the 197th, 198th, 202nd, 203rd and 216th plenary meetings of the Committee -- had to be deployed to overcome the resistance, as stubborn as it was incomprehensible, of some States to the mere inclusion of the item in the agenda. We would like to believe that during the coming week the Conference will be able to reach agreement on acceding to the request addressed to it by the General Assembly on 20 December last year, in paragraph 2 of its resolution 38/183 G, to establish "an ad hoc working group on the subject at the beginning of its 1984 session"; and will entrust to the subsidiary body thus established a suitable mandate to enable it immediately to undertake "negotiations with a view to achieving agreement on appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war", as explicitly stated in that same resolution.

In this connection, I should like to point out that, as I said on an earlier occasion in this same chamber, that these "appropriate and practical measures" to the negotiation of which the General Assembly requested that "the highest priority" should be attached, should be "measures commensurate with the gravity and imminence of the dangers which are to be averted". It is essential to bear in mind that, as the United Nations stated by consensus in the Final Document, in order to avert the danger of nuclear war "it is necessary to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race in all its aspects", without ever losing sight of the fact that "the ultimate goal in this context is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons". Furthermore, this elimination obviously cannot be achieved all at once, and nuclear disarmament will only be possible through a gradual programme providing, among other measures, "progressive and balanced reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery".

Viewed in this way, which seems to us the correct way, the prevention of nuclear war obviously embraces a very wide range of measures. Nevertheless, from this range it is necessary to select those measures which appear to be the most "appropriate and practical", to use the terms employed by the General Assembly, in order to ensure that the Conference on Disarmament, or the ad hoc subsidiary body which it sets up to deal specifically with agenda item 3, or any other relevant subsidiary body, gives priority to such measures in their negotiations.



(Mr. García Robles, Mexico)

Pride of place among these measures should perhaps be given to the nuclear-weapon-test ban, which has been at the top of the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament since it was established in 1978 with a membership of 40 States. As an ad hoc Working Group was already working on this item last year, it will suffice, when re-establishing it under whatever title is decided upon, to give it an appropriate mandate such as that proposed in the draft submitted by the delegation of Mexico and reproduced in document CD/438: in other words, "to initiate immediately the multilateral negotiation of a treaty for the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests and to exert its best endeavours in order that the Conference may transmit to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session the complete draft of such a treaty". This mandate, furthermore, corresponds faithfully to the mandate adopted by the General Assembly by an overwhelming majority in resolutions 37/72 of 9 December 1982 and 38/62 of 15 December 1983.

With regard to the agenda item that has since 1979 occupied second place on the agenda of the Committee and now the Conference on Disarmament, and is perhaps the item most closely linked with the prevention of nuclear war, it would be most advisable at last to heed the proposals repeatedly put forward by the Group of 21 and the group of socialist States for the setting up of an ad hoc subsidiary body with a view to the practical implementation of paragraph 50 of the Final Document, by undertaking urgent negotiations.

Item 5 on our agenda, entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space", is of similar importance and urgency, since it is clear that here we are facing a problem which does not admit of delay and concerning which it is important not to repeat the error which was made in the case of the missiles with multiple independently targetable warheads, commonly known as MIRVs. As was recently stated by a large number of scientists who are specialists in this field: "If space weapons are ever to be banned, this may be close to the last moment in which it could be done". It is therefore imperative for the Conference to set up without further delay an ad hoc subsidiary body for the purpose -- as recommended by the General Assembly in resolution 38/70 of 15 December 1983 -- of "undertaking negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in all its aspects in outer space".

If, as we hope, these three subsidiary bodies were in a position effectively to carry out mandates such as those which I have just summarized, the ad hoc subsidiary body to be set up on the third item of the agenda -- the prevention of nuclear war -- could devote itself to seeking to reach agreement, in the course of 1984, on a small number of measures which could be described as "short-term measures". These measures should include first of all three of those which I already had occasion to discuss last year at the 234th plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament held on 16 August 1983. They are the following:

Firstly, an immediate freeze of the nuclear weapons of the United States and the Soviet Union, to be followed, it would be hoped, within five years at most by a freeze of the nuclear arms of the other three nuclear-weapon States; this is a question on which the General Assembly has adopted two successive resolutions at its thirty-seventh and thirty-eighth sessions, explicitly or implicitly emphasizing some points of special importance such as the following:

A nuclear arms freeze is not, of course, an end in itself. It would, however, constitute the most effective first step that can at present be taken both to prevent any further increase in the vast nuclear arsenals of the two Superpowers and to expedite the negotiations aimed at a substantial reduction and qualitative limitation of existing nuclear weaponry.

(Mr. García Robles, Mexico)

There are no grounds whatsoever for concern about the observance of the undertakings involved in the freeze, as the General Assembly provided expressly in its resolution that the freeze would be subject, not only to the relevant measures and procedures of verification already agreed on by the parties in the case of the SALT I and SALT II Treaties — which posed verification problems far more complicated than those that might arise in the case of the proposed freeze — but also to those agreed on in principle by the same parties during the preparatory trilateral negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban held at Geneva between 1977 and 1980. The foregoing, combined with the fact that "the freeze would mean halting all activities under any arms programme" has led someone so well-versed in the matter as Herbert Scoville, former Deputy Director of the United States CIA, to declare that "verification can no longer legitimately be invoked as an excuse for not proceeding towards an agreement on a freeze".

Furthermore, at present the conditions are most propitious for such a freeze since the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics are now equivalent in nuclear military power and it seems evident that there exists between them an over-all rough parity.

A second measure which, although apparently modest, could certainly be described as "appropriate and practical" to contribute to the prevention of nuclear war would be the undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States not to be the first to use those terrible instruments of mass destruction.

In my statement last year to which I have already referred I ventured to suggest that this could be done in two stages: in the first stage, the United States, France and the United Kingdom could solemnly undertake, through unilateral declarations — like those made by China in 1964 and by the Soviet Union in 1982 — not to take the initiative in the use of nuclear weapons. In the second stage, the five nuclear-weapon Powers would give a multilateral character to their unilateral undertakings by incorporating them in a negotiated multilateral instrument. Since so far none of the events which we had proposed for the first stage has occurred, we believe that it would be best to proceed without further delay to the second stage.

In this connection, the subsidiary body which will have on its agenda the question of the prevention of nuclear war would, in our opinion, offer an excellent forum for the urgent undertaking of the negotiations needed to conclude a treaty, convention or protocol on the question.

The third "short-term measure" which we consider appropriate and practical for negotiations in the subsidiary body to which I have been referring is institutional in nature. It is a measure which my delegation proposed in the same statement made last August to which I have already referred, and which received the honour of endorsement by the General Assembly in resolution 38/183 N of 20 December 1983. In that resolution, the General Assembly urged "the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the United States of America to examine immediately, as a way out from the present impasse, the possibility of combining into a single forum the two series of negotiations which they have been carrying out and of broadening their scope so as to embrace also the 'tactical' or 'battlefield' nuclear weapons".

(Mr. García Robles, Mexico)

This appeal by the General Assembly is all the more pressing today if it is borne in mind that bilateral negotiations on nuclear weapons have been broken off or suspended, according to how one prefers to describe it. Furthermore, a multilateral body such as that which would deal with the prevention of nuclear war would provide the most suitable forum for the combined negotiations envisaged in the General Assembly's appeal, as in that same resolution the General Assembly reiterated "its request to the two negotiating parties that they bear constantly in mind that not only their national interests but also the vital interests of all the peoples of the world are at stake in this question".

The undertaking of the negotiations needed to achieve agreements on the three measures which I have just reviewed, which I described as "short-term measures", namely, a freeze of the nuclear weapons of the two Superpowers, the conclusion of an agreement making legally binding an undertaking by all nuclear-weapon States not to be the first to use those terrible instruments of mass destruction, and the combining into a single forum of the various negotiations which have been carried out on nuclear weapons, I repeat, the undertaking of such measures would constitute the best baptism by fire of the new subsidiary body established to contribute to the prevention of nuclear war. For all of them, besides their inherent importance, are fully in keeping with the General Assembly's requirement that they should be "appropriate and practical" measures; they would all serve to strengthen international peace, which is currently so seriously threatened, and which, as the Group of 21 stated a year ago, "must be based on a commitment by all States to joint survival rather than a threat of mutual annihilation".

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Mexico for his statement and especially for the kind words he addressed to the President.

I have no more speakers on my list for today, and I should like to ask the Conference if any other delegation wishes to take the floor this morning? That does not seem to be the case.

Distinguished representatives, in accordance with the programme of work for this week I now have the intention of closing the plenary meeting and convening in five minutes' time an informal meeting of the Conference to continue consideration of some questions relating to the organization of work. I will inform you then of the results of the consultations which have taken place.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 8 March 1984 at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting rose at 12.05 p.m.



FINAL RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND FORTY-EIGHTH PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva  
on Thursday, 8 March 1984, at 10.30 a.m.

President:

Mr. I. Datcu

(Romania)

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

<u>Algeria:</u>	MR. A. TAFFAR
<u>Argentina:</u>	MR. J.J. CARASALES MR. R. GARCIA MORITAN
<u>Australia:</u>	MR. R. BUTLER MR. R. ROWE MS. J. COURTNEY
<u>Belgium:</u>	MR. M. DEPASSE MR. J.M. NOIRFALISSE MLLE. M. DE BECKER
<u>Brazil:</u>	MR. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA
<u>Bulgaria:</u>	MR. K. TELLALOV MR. P. POPTCHEV MR. C. PRAMOV
<u>Burma:</u>	U MAUNG MAUNG GYI U THAN TUN
<u>Canada:</u>	MR. G. SKINNER MR. P.W. BASHAM MR. R. NORTH
<u>China:</u>	MR. QIAN JIADONG MR. LIANG DEFENG MR. LI WEIMIN MR. LIN CHENG MR. SOU KAINING MR. LU MINGJUN
<u>Cuba:</u>	MR. A.V. GONZALEZ

Czechoslovakia:

MR. M. VEJVODA  
MR. A. CIMA  
MR. J. FIEDLER  
MR. J. KALAVSKY  
MS. L. VRBOVA

Egypt:

MR. S. ALFARARGI  
MR. I. HASSAN  
MR. A. MAHER ABBAS  
MS. W. BASSIM

Ethiopia:

MR. F. YOHANNES

France:

MR. F. DE LA GORCE  
MR. H. RENIE  
MR. G. MONTASSIER

German Democratic Republic:

MR. H. ROSE  
MR. J. DEMBSKI

Germany, Federal Republic of:

MR. F. ELBE  
MR. M. GERDTS

Hungary:

MR. D. MEISZTER  
MR. F. GADJA

India:

MR. M. DUBEY  
MR. S.K. SHARMA

Indonesia:

MR. S. SUTOWARDOYO  
MR. ANDRADJATI  
MR. HARYOMATARAM  
MR. BOEDILMAN

Islamic Republic of Iran:

MR. N.K. KAMYAB  
MR. F.S. SIRJANI

Italy:

MR. M. ALLESSI  
MR. M. PAVESE  
MR. G. ADORNI BRACCESI

Japan:

MR. R. IMAI  
MR. M. KONISHI  
MR. T. ISHIGURI  
MR. K. TANAKA  
MR. T. KAWAKITA

Kenya:

-

Mexico:

MR. A. GARCIA ROBLES  
MR. P. MACEDO RIBA

Mongolia:

MR. D. ERDEMBILEG  
MR. S-O. BOLD

Morocco:

MR. M. CHRAIBI  
MR. O. HILALE

Netherlands:

MR. J. RAMAKER

Nigeria:

MR. J.O. OBOH  
MR. L.O. AKINDELE  
MR. C.V. UDEIDIBIA

Pakistan:

MR. K. NIAZ

Peru:

MR. P. CANNOCK  
MR. C. CASTILLO RAMIREZ

Poland:

MR. S. TURBANSKI  
MR. T. STROJWAS  
MR. J. CIALOWICZ

Romania:

MR. I. DATCU  
MR. T. MELESCANU  
MR. A. POPESCU  
MR. A. CREȚU

Sri Lanka:

MR. P. KARIYAWASAM



Sweden:

MR. R. EKEUS  
MR. J. LUNDIN  
MRS. E. BONNIER  
MR. H. BERGLUND  
MR. L.E. WINGREN

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

MR. V.L. ISSRAELYAN  
MR. B.P. PROKOFIEV  
MR. G.V. BERDENNIKOV  
MR. P.Y. SKOMOROKHIN  
MR. S.V. KOBYSH  
MR. G. ANTSEFEROV  
MR. V. VASHADZE

United Kingdom:

MR. R.I.T. CROMARTIE  
MR. L. MIDDLETON  
MR. B.P. NOBLE  
MR. I.R. KENYON  
MR. F.H. GRAVES  
MR. J.F. GORDON  
MR. D.A. SLINN

United States of America:

MR. L.G. FIELDS  
MS. K.C. CRITTENBERGER  
MR. R. HORNE  
MR. L. MADSEN  
MR. R. WATERS  
MR. H. CALHOUN  
MR. J. DOESBERG  
MR. P. CORDEN

Venezuela:

MR. A. LOPEZ OLIVER

Yugoslavia:

MR. K. VIDAS  
MR. M. MIHAJLOVIC

Zaire:

MS. E. EKANGA KABEYA

Secretary-General of the Conference  
on Disarmament and Personal  
Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

MR. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary-General of the  
Conference on Disarmament:

MR. V. BERASATEGUI

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I declare open the plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament. The Conference today continues its consideration of agenda item 3, entitled, "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters".

However, in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any member who wishes to do so may raise any matter relevant to the work of the Conference.

As you know, today is International Women's Day, and I should therefore like on this occasion to express our congratulations to all the women taking part in the work of the Conference on Disarmament, as well as to all those who have expressed their interest in our work.

I should also like to mention the presence in the public gallery of the participants in the Conference on "Women and the World Disarmament Campaign" currently taking place in the Palais des Nations. I greatly appreciate their interest in the work of our Conference, as reflected in the message addressed to us, copies of which will be circulated to all members for information. At the same time, I should like to request our distinguished Secretary-General, Ambassador Rikhi Jaipal, to read out that message.

Mr. JAIPAL (Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General): The message is the following:

"On this International Women's Day, we women from different countries who have met in Geneva to examine how we can contribute most effectively to the World Disarmament Campaign wish to address a message to you, the members of the Conference on Disarmament.

We turn to you in our conviction that the Conference on Disarmament — the only multilateral disarmament negotiating forum — must urgently take steps to help free humanity from the threat of nuclear annihilation and from the dangerous consequences of the continuing arms build-up including the horrific effects of the nuclear tests and the suffering and deprivation caused by misuse of resources on armaments. We are angry that the amount which could feed humankind for one year is now spent on the arms race in one day.

The prevention of nuclear war and progress in the negotiations for arms control agreements leading to general and complete disarmament have become the primary concerns of women the world over. Women have marched thousands of kilometers, have organized mass rallies, peace camps, conferences and mass campaigns to manifest their opposition to the arms race and to raise awareness of people to the danger this has for our globe.

We expect our governments to take concrete measures for disarmament that will reverse the dangerous situation we are in. We expect the Conference on Disarmament to negotiate vigorously in the coming months to conclude agreements that will curb the arms build-up and, for the first time, lead to true disarmament.

Although we consider that all items on the agenda of the Conference are of great importance, we urge the Members to concentrate their efforts on reaching agreements in the following areas which we consider to be the most urgent tasks facing humankind today:

(Mr. Jaipal, Secretary-General of the Conference)

1. The prevention of nuclear war — to negotiate on the basis of the papers put forth in the last year's session of the Committee on Disarmament by the Non-Aligned, Socialist and Western groups.
2. A comprehensive test ban — to conclude a treaty on the prohibition of testing nuclear weapons in all environments by the end of this session given the fact that negotiations had already reached a very advanced stage in the tripartite negotiations. This treaty should be signed by all States possessing nuclear capacity.
3. The prevention of an arms race in outer space — to negotiate a treaty or treaties preventing an arms race in outer space and to call on the governments mostly concerned to observe a moratorium on all research, development and testing until such a treaty or treaties is/are concluded.
4. The conclusion of a treaty banning the production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, and the destruction of existing stockpiles.

We come from organizations which together represent millions of women the world over. We demand that you, Members of the Conference on Disarmament, exercise the needed political will to negotiate and reach agreements that will remove the threat of the destruction of all life now hanging over us all."

This message has been sent from the participants in the Conference entitled "Women and the World Disarmament Campaign", which was held in Geneva from 6 to 9 March 1984.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank Ambassador Jaipal for having read out the important message addressed to our Conference. I am sure that all members will have listened to it with particular attention.

I have on my list of speakers for today the distinguished representatives of Czechoslovakia, the United States, China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Czechoslovakia.

Mr. VEJVODA (Czechoslovakia): Comrade President, in the first place allow me to welcome you, the representative of socialist Romania bound with my country in alliance and friendship, in the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. Having known you for quite some time from various disarmament fora, I realize that we are all in good hands for the month of March. In view of the results of our work in February, we expect further progress soon in organizing our work. Here our thanks go to the representative of the Polish People's Republic, Ambassador Turbarski, who, in spite of a number of difficulties, repeatedly tried to launch this year's session as soon as possible and, finally, succeeded.

Allow me also, Comrade President, to join you in welcoming among us today the participants in the seminar "Women and the World Disarmament Campaign", which met in Geneva to exchange views on a possible contribution of women and their organizations to the world disarmament campaign, and on co-operation of their respective organizations for the mobilization of women for the struggle for peace against nuclear war. It also gives me the opportunity to extend greetings to all women in this room on the occasion of International Women's Day.

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

Today I intend to address two priority items of our agenda — item 1, nuclear test ban, and item 3, prevention of nuclear war.

The prohibition of underground nuclear testing has been focussed upon by this negotiating body and its predecessors for a long time. But, unfortunately, in spite of having it sharply in focus we were not in a position to take any meaningful action aimed at negotiating the required treaty. First, the creation of a relevant working body had been blocked for a number of years. Later, outright opposition gave way to a more flexible, but nevertheless negative approach — imposition of an arbitrarily limited, unworkable mandate. The activity of the former working group on a nuclear-test ban, which had been unsuccessfully trying to overcome its own terms of reference for almost two years, proved this beyond any doubt.

The representative of the United States, Ambassador Fields, said in his statement of 23 February, "those who say that the original mandate has been exhausted cannot produce one major element of agreement on a comprehensive verification regime for a potential nuclear test ban treaty." Let it be noted, that in this respect we fully agree with Ambassador Fields. No problem has been solved in last year's working group. But, after all, it could not have been, since no verification provision can be decided in isolation from other basic provisions of the treaty, namely the scope, duration, participation etc. That is what we had been saying in April 1982 when confronted with the limited mandate. And that is what we consider today, strengthened in our opinion by that sad experience. It seems clear that the majority of delegations around this table have come to the same conclusion. Let us hope that the minority, formed in this case by a couple of delegations, will not let this experience pass by unnoticed.

The year 1983 was, if I may say so, exceptionally fertile as far as proposals for a nuclear-test ban are concerned. The USSR submitted to the Committee on Disarmament the "Basic provisions of the treaty on complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests," a document which was also submitted to the thirty-seventh session of the United Nations General Assembly. This proposal is far from a mere restatement of the position of the Soviet Union on this problem. Taking into account the positions of other countries, including the Western States, it could, in the opinion of my delegation, create a basis for negotiating the treaty. This proposal was followed several months later by the draft nuclear-test-ban treaty proposed by Sweden. We welcomed this draft since its tabling stressed once again the importance and urgency of the prohibition of nuclear-weapon testing. We could also subscribe to many of its basic provisions. At the same time it contains some that we perhaps do not consider necessary. I could, certainly, go into details and put some questions to the delegation of Sweden and then wait for a couple of weeks for an answer. I could also seek clarification through bilateral contacts.

However, the best procedure for this type of activity and especially for negotiating the treaty itself, remains the establishment of a relevant working body, as provided for in our rules of procedure. And item 1 of our agenda belongs to those which have all necessary ingredients for the undertaking of businesslike, streamlined negotiations directed not at a specific aspect of the treaty, but at drafting the treaty as a whole. For this reason my delegation wholeheartedly supports the establishment of a subsidiary body with a mandate calling for the negotiation of a treaty prohibiting all nuclear-weapon tests. Together with other socialist countries we proposed such a mandate in document CD/434.

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

Much has also been done by the group of seismic experts, which is already now in the process of adopting by consensus its third report. This report represents a project for the creation of a reliable international system for the exchange of seismic data on the global scale. It provides in the first place for the exchange of level I data, which are sufficient for the identification and localization of the overwhelming majority of seismic events by national centres having at their disposal data from a global network. Only in some exceptional cases could level II data be required from some stations so situated as to be in a position to make a clear record of a seismic event. This could apply, for example, to parallel recording of several seismic events by a number of stations of the network. Another case might be an attempt to make use of a strong earthquake to mask nuclear explosion. It may also happen that in exceptional situations the depth of a seismic event could not be clearly estimated on the basis of level I data: level II data would then be required as well.

The proposed system for the exchange of seismic data is designed to ensure the full participation of technically less developed countries also which do not possess own seismic means of verification and of countries with small territories not having a global network of seismic stations. At the same time the system proposed in the third report is, to some extent, only supplementary for countries having their own, national global system, consisting of seismic as well as non-seismic means. For example the United States receives level II data from its own global network of seismic stations through the transmission by satellite. In view of this fact, it was not very difficult for the United States to abandon its original requirement for the exchange of level II data only.

It is well known that the United States "specializes" now mainly in carrying out "weak" nuclear explosions. This type of nuclear explosions of about one kiloton of TNT, is necessary first of all for the development of tactical and operational nuclear weapons and for nuclear weapons with diminished destruction effect, e.g. neutron weapons. It is therefore clear, that the United States is actively developing this type of weapon now, in the improvement and deployment of which it is eminently interested. That is one of the main reasons as we heard here from the United States delegation previously, why a nuclear-test ban has become only a "long-term objective".

Some 20 years ago, nuclear-weapon tests were usually much stronger than today. Hence, if a nuclear-test-ban treaty had been adopted then, ensuring compliance with it would be easier. The postponement of the conclusion of the treaty can only unnecessarily complicate the problem further.

Last year the activity of the working group on a nuclear-test ban was greatly complicated by futile discussions on so-called peaceful nuclear explosions. It is true that under some circumstances this type of explosion could be misused for nuclear-weapons purposes. The Soviet "Basic Provisions", as well as the Swedish draft treaty, propose in fact, that peaceful nuclear explosions be stopped until a mutually acceptable regime for their carrying out is agreed upon. Some very useful provisions to this effect are contained in the 1976 Soviet-American Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes.

We consider it safe to conclude that the group of seismic experts through its three reports suggests the creation of a reliable system for the exchange of seismic data which could contribute highly to ensuring compliance with the desired nuclear-test-ban treaty.

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

Positive steps might be undertaken even before the treaty is negotiated. The Soviet Union proposes that nuclear-weapon States agree on a moratorium on nuclear-weapon testing until the treaty is concluded. We consider such a moratorium not only highly desirable but also quite feasible. Anyone who is at least basically acquainted with the history of negotiations aimed at limiting and prohibiting tests of nuclear weapons will recall that preceding the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty of 1963 the Soviet Union and the United States found it possible to observe a bilateral moratorium on nuclear-weapon testing for several years until, unfortunately, a new nuclear-weapon State of Western Europe gave this bilateral moratorium a new, trilateral dimension.

Before turning to item 3 of the agenda, I would like to draw the attention of the distinguished representatives to one more aspect of this problem. On the first plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament, the Head of the Swedish delegation distributed a paper counting nuclear explosions between 1945 and 1983. I will not express the views of my delegation either on methods applied or on numbers arrived at. But I would like to share with the distinguished representatives the opinion that simply counting explosions is not enough, and may sometimes be misleading. Indeed, the arms race, if provoked, will continue unabated and that is exactly why we firmly advocate its cessation. However, distinguished colleagues, you cannot have it both ways. You cannot have the United States administration unilaterally breaking trilateral negotiations despite the serious progress achieved, not ratifying, and undermining, the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, doubling resources for nuclear-weapon testing in three years and blocking any negotiations on a nuclear-test ban in the Conference on Disarmament, and, at the same time, expect a general or unilateral decline in nuclear-weapon tests. I am strongly convinced that this reality should not escape our view.

The discussions at United Nations General Assembly sessions in recent years clearly testify to the fact that the problem of the prevention of nuclear war is considered by the overwhelming majority of States as a most important global problem of the world today, common to all peoples, irrespective of differences in their social order, way of life or ideology. It was also widely discussed at the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, where a special working group was established for the consideration of this priority problem.

The thirty-eighth session of the United Nations General Assembly urgently called for the adoption of practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war. Let me mention just the Declaration on the condemnation of nuclear war, the resolutions on non-first-use of nuclear weapons and on the freeze of nuclear weapons, resolutions calling for the commencement of negotiations on nuclear disarmament and on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, and the resolution on the prevention of nuclear war.

The urgent appeals of the thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly were more than justified at the close of last year, when the first Pershing II and Cruise missiles became operational in the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom. Thus the process of the creation of the material basis in Europe for a new, aggressive, militarist policy aimed at achieving military superiority over the Soviet Union and other socialist countries was started. This move, which disrupted the bilateral Soviet-American negotiations under way, is now interpreted by some would-be military experts as a necessary response to the so-called surface-to-surface SS-20 missiles in the Soviet Union. This is a dangerous myth, created by those who decided on deployment regardless of the existing military

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

balance in Europe. I dealt with this problem at some length in my statement of 21 February of this year. I will now therefore limit myself to recalling opinions expressed by some well-known analysts. First among them is Raymond Garthoff of the Brookings Institution, who also served as Deputy Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs in the State Department. He said: "There was a compelling military technical rationale for the SS-20 deployment, including a desire to target United States aircraft and submarines based in England, Scotland and Spain, as well as British and French nuclear forces and a variety of short-range nuclear weapons deployed around the continent. And the Soviet decision was almost certainly made on those grounds."

Another myth, according to which the decision to deploy new American missiles had been brought about by independent European desires for a technological riposte to the SS-20, has been set straight by authoritative sources in the January issue of the American magazine Science. According to the article in Science, "a close review of the decision reveals that it was actually far more routine. Some military officials desired newer, more capable weapons; military contractors desired more business; and conservative United States weapons analysts developed the appropriate strategic rationale." Thus, one may think that everybody in the United States is satisfied: strategic planners in the Pentagon, blinded by their obsession for a crusade against socialism, as well as the Martin Marietta Corporation, the principal contractor for the Pershing II, and Boeing, McDonnell Douglas, General Dynamics and Lockheed, which earned millions of dollars in government contracts for the development of cruise missiles.

It appears, however, that satisfaction is far from reached. We can still hear voices which are not quite content even with the prospect of deploying 572 new United States missiles in Europe. According to information published in The Sunday Times the United States plans to build further bases for cruise missiles in Scotland, the Federal Republic of Germany, Denmark, Norway, Turkey, Greenland, Japan, South Korea and Iceland. They should, allegedly, be armed with conventional weapons, but launching devices could also be used for nuclear weapons. Serious consideration of these plans has been admitted by officials in Washington. The mission assigned to the new United States missiles is no secret. William Arkin, the United States military expert, in an article published by the West German magazine Stern, described the Pentagon's plans to use Pershing II as a first-strike weapon against the Soviet command centres. General Miles Fulwyler, former Pentagon director for nuclear weapons, underlined that "Pershing II missiles give us a possibility to hit many decisive targets in the western military region of the Soviet Union which we couldn't hit until now." For the time being the United States is to deploy 108 Pershing IIs in Western Europe. But there are serious grounds to fear that that is not the final number, since about a year ago it was discovered that the Pentagon had ordered more than 380 nuclear missiles -- as supplementary capacity.

It is also urged that Western Europe should substantially strengthen its conventional forces. These calls are sometimes masked by various strategic theories about the necessary redeployment of United States forces, the responsibilities of the Europeans, and so on. But, all the different theories put aside, the goal remains always the same -- the NATO member States in Europe should substantially increase their conventional forces and their over-all military expenditures. An appalling example of such an approach is given in the article by Henry Kissinger in the latest issue of Time. What is striking in that article is Mr. Kissinger's handling of the danger of aggression from the East. Apparently, in his understanding, it is difficult to find a single thing that would not cause such aggression. Should NATO increase its conventional forces, this might cause aggression since the other side would conclude that nuclear weapons would not necessarily be used. Should NATO do



(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

otherwise, and possibly withdraw some American troops from Europe, this could also cause aggression since doubts about its unity may emerge. Let me recall in this context that it is the Warsaw Treaty Organization which again proposed on Monday this week to NATO the holding of preparatory consultations on a mutual non-increase of military expenditures and on their further reduction.

The massive build-up of the United States strategic potential, total militarization of Europe and the promotion of offensive military doctrines by the present United States Government — all this compels us to look for practical measures to decrease the danger of nuclear war and to prevent it. These efforts should stand at the centre of the activity of this Conference. The establishment of a relevant subsidiary body with the mandate to negotiate, as stipulated in resolution 38/183 G, "with a view to achieving agreement on appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war", is indispensable for any serious treatment of this problem.

The representatives of several Western countries expressed the view, both at official and informal meetings, that it was not clear what specific items could be taken up by the proposed subsidiary body. The answer to this question can easily be found in a number of documents; allow me to quote some of them — CD/355, submitted by a group of socialist countries, CD/406, submitted by the German Democratic Republic, CD/357, submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany and CD/380 submitted by Belgium. Though the papers presented by the Federal Republic of Germany and Belgium are certainly less specific than those of the socialist countries, even their serious consideration, if the authors meant them to be considered, would require the establishment of a working organ.

To be more specific, I should like to indicate what concrete measures could be negotiated in order to elaborate relevant international agreements: Non-first-use of nuclear weapons; convention on the prohibition of use of nuclear weapons with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States; qualitative and quantitative freeze on nuclear weapons, including relevant verification measures; moratorium on nuclear-weapon tests until a nuclear-test-ban treaty is concluded; conclusion of a treaty on non-use of force and on maintaining peaceful relations between member States of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO; measures to prevent an accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons and to avoid the possibility of surprise attacks and other confidence-building measures as specified in the CD/406. I welcome the spirit of the statement made by Ambassador García Robles of Mexico on this problem just two days ago. We realize that the position of his delegation is very close to ours. I should also like to stress that, besides the suggestions I just enumerated, we are ready to consider any other constructive proposals that may appear in the course of the subsidiary body's work. We would like to hope that other delegations will also display similar flexibility in their approach to this highest priority agenda item which is of vital importance to us all.

Before I conclude allow me, Comrade President, to contribute briefly to the establishment of the "methodological rules of procedure" for our Conference launched by the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany. In his statement of 28 February, he expressed a dislike of the use by some delegations of quotations from literature, newspapers or politicians. This comes as a surprise to us, since through such quotations we often become acquainted with very interesting ideas and statements, coming mainly from highly influential, authoritative and knowledgeable persons. For our part we would like to suggest that in our deliberations delegations abstain from uttering assertions which can be substantiated by nothing. These include, among others, continual assertions by a couple of delegations about the alleged great military superiority of the Warsaw Treaty Organization in Europe, or descriptions of a danger of aggression from the East, which is taken for granted by some of our most zealous colleagues. Such unfounded distortions always remind me of an American policeman I was confronted with a couple of years ago. Doubting his explanation of a traffic problem I asked "Why?" and he answered, "Because I said so". Let me assure the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany that this kind of argument did not convince me.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Czechoslovakia for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the President.

I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of the United States of America, Ambassador Fields.

Mr. FIELDS (United States of America): Thank you Mr. President. I wish to congratulate you, Sir, on your Presidency of our Conference and pledge to you the co-operation of my delegation in the discharge of your important responsibilities. Our pleasure in seeing you in the Chair is enhanced by the warm and friendly relations which exist between our two countries. We also wish to pay tribute to the skill of our distinguished colleague from Poland, Ambassador Turbanski, in inaugurating our Conference and getting our work so skillfully under way. We join you also, Mr. President, today, in recognizing and welcoming the women for the World Disarmament Campaign. My Government shares their interest and hopes for the World Disarmament Campaign. It is altogether fitting that women have a special interest in disarmament, for they have borne the anxiety over the centuries as their husbands and sons have gone off to war, and indeed they have been the symbol of sorrow for the casualties of conflict. May we be faithful to their expectations of us in achieving meaningful and practical measures to ensure international peace and security.

Mr. President, during these past two weeks the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events has been meeting here in Geneva. This is the seventeenth session of the Group of Scientific Experts since its inception, and the ninth session since it began the work which will be described to us in its third report. We appreciate the patient and determined efforts by the Group of Scientific Experts in preparing this report, and I am certain that the work of our Conference on the nuclear-test ban will benefit from it. The United States has committed significant resources in support of the work of the Group of Scientific Experts since the beginning, because of the important contribution we believe it can make to the verification arrangements for an eventual comprehensive nuclear-test ban. I think our belief is well-founded, and that the Group has made considerable progress. We note that in their recent work the Group of Scientific Experts has further developed some of the detailed procedures required for international exchange of seismic data. In addition, they have gained practical experience in testing these procedures. These practical tests are essential for determining if the procedures actually work as they are expected to.

(Mr. Fields, United States)

Clearly, the solution of the difficult problems relating to verification and compliance of a nuclear-test ban is a crucial task. This has been the focus of the work of the Group of Scientific Experts and, in my delegation's view, it has made real and measurable progress in a vital aspect of the verification problem.

The Group of Scientific Experts has been addressing one of the key problems — that of specifying an international network of seismic stations, and the associated data exchange system, in support of the detection and identification of seismic events. It is well known that the task of world-wide detection and identification of seismic events under a nuclear-test-ban treaty would be a difficult one. National technical means would be important, as would co-operative arrangements between two or more parties. But multilateral co-operative arrangements would also be an important part of the overall arrangements, and this is where the contributions of the Group of Scientific Experts are brought to bear.

In my statement before this Conference on 23 February of this year, I noted that the Group of Scientific Experts has begun preparations for a more extensive follow-on technical test of certain elements of the proposed global system. This test is planned for the second half of the year in co-operation with the World Meteorological Organization. The test will take advantage of the availability of the WMO Global Telecommunication System to exchange Level I seismic data. At the request of the Committee on Disarmament, WMO last year granted the Group of Scientific Experts authority to make regular use of its Global Telecommunication System. My delegation very much appreciates the co-operation of WMO in helping the Group of Scientific Experts to develop a global seismic data exchange system.

The 1984 technical test is planned by the Group of Scientific Experts to give useful experience in handling and exchanging seismic data, building up on the results of previous experiments. As planned, it will develop and test procedures for regular transmission of Level I data over the Global Telecommunication System, passing the data from national facilities to experimental international data centres. It will allow tests of procedures for extracting Level I parameters at seismic stations and for transmitting them to the national facilities. We anticipate that it will allow the testing of procedures at the experimental international data centres for preparation of seismic event bulletins. In addition, in comparison with the previous technical test of the Global Telecommunication System, this test offers the opportunity for increased participation by all States. States that have not yet participated could offer data for the first time. If they have participated previously, they could make data available from additional stations. I am happy to note that over 20 States have thus far indicated their intention to participate in the planned technical test. This number includes the United States and the Soviet Union, and I am gratified that we will both be engaging in this important effort.

(Mr. Fields, United States)

I should like now to say a few words regarding the work that needs to be done — that by a subsidiary body under our agenda item on the nuclear-test ban. The mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear-Test Ban in 1982 and 1983 called for examination of issues relating to verification and compliance. We supported, and we continue to support, that mandate for the same reason we have supported the work of the scientific experts — because resolution of these issues is crucial if we are eventually to succeed in attaining a nuclear-test ban. The position of my Government has been completely consistent on this point, and there remain many issues on which a detailed and thorough discussion was hardly begun in the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear-Test Ban last year. As I pointed out in my statement on 30 August of last year, "little substantive work has been accomplished" by the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear-Test Ban. We have all read the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group, CD/412, on its efforts during the 1983 session of the Committee on Disarmament. We know that, as the report put it, "the Ad Hoc Working Group conducted an examination of the substance of all the items contained in the programme." But we also recognize that no agreements were reached on the items. The report contains, throughout, phrases like "some delegations noted," "other delegations maintained," and so on. How can we, based on such a report, possibly accept the view that the work has been completed, and that it is now time to move on to other issues? No, Mr. President, I think rather that it is time to realize the importance of fulfilling the mandate already given to the Ad Hoc Working Group last year, and to pursue this Working Group's unfinished business.

In this connection, I wish to make the position of my Government crystal clear. My Government is committed to a comprehensive nuclear-test ban. Such a ban is now — as it has been as long as I have been in this Conference — the ultimate objective of my Government. The point of departure for my delegation and others is the question of timing, not the principle. My Government is firmly committed to significant and verifiable arms reductions, expanded confidence-building measures, and effective verification capabilities. Until my Government is persuaded that these policy objectives are not only being seriously addressed, but well along the road to being satisfied, my delegation is not prepared to agree to a mandate that provides for negotiations in the subsidiary body on a nuclear-test ban. However, this does not mean that we, along with the Group of Scientific Experts, cannot make a true contribution toward the eventual achievement of a test ban. The important area of verification and compliance provides a fertile field in which we may labour. Let it be well understood that only with effective verification arrangements can there be a nuclear-test-ban treaty. I believe we should move promptly to re-establish the nuclear-test ban subsidiary body under its former mandate, and then get down to the serious business of work at hand.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of the United States of America for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the President, and I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of China, Ambassador Qian Jiadong.

Mr. QIAN JIADONG (China) (translated from Chinese): Mr. President, First of all, allow me, on behalf of the Chinese delegation as well as in my own name, to congratulate you warmly on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament for this month. I need not emphasize here the most friendly relations between China and Romania, and your rich experience, wisdom and skill as a diplomat are also known to all. I am confident that under your guidance, further headway will be made on the basis laid down by your predecessor, Ambassador Turbanski of Poland, in the work of our Conference. In performing your duties, you can count on the full co-operation and support of my delegation.

The prohibition of chemical weapons is the item on the agenda under which the first subsidiary body was set up by the Conference and has already started its work. That is why I have chosen this subject today to present some of our observations.

Five years have elapsed since the Working Group on Chemical Weapons was first set up in 1980. In this period, hundreds of documents have been filed, and countless meetings and discussions held at all the plenary, working group and contact group levels. Thanks to the joint efforts of the successive chairmen of the Working Groups, the Co-ordinators as well as the delegations, understanding has been enhanced on quite a number of issues; divergences on others have been narrowed and some measure of agreement has been found. Among the many items on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament, the prohibition of chemical weapons is the one which has registered more progress and has therefore been widely hailed as a field offering relatively promising prospects. However, this is no reason for complacency, as the task facing us is still arduous. Serious differences remain on some of the major issues, and we have still a long way to go before we can finally reach the goal of concluding a convention on the total prohibition of chemical weapons. We should speed up our work and enter into rigorous negotiations in order to live up to people's expectations.

The urgency of concluding a convention on the total prohibition of chemical weapons lies, first and foremost, in the ever intensifying chemical weapons arms race and the increasing threat of chemical warfare. According to materials released by eminent international research institutions, a total of more than 400,000 tons of chemical warfare agents are in the stockpiles of the two Superpowers, and research has been conducted continuously to improve and renew these chemical weapons. The destructive power of modern-day chemical weapons is far beyond comparison with that of the older generation of such weapons during World War I. It can well be imagined how infinitely greater the menace of chemical warfare to mankind will be if such a chemical-weapons arms race is to follow its course.

The urgency of a convention on the total prohibition of chemical weapons lies also in the fact that with the development of science and technology, the longer such a prohibition is delayed, the more difficult it will be to achieve it. The advancement of science and technology will not only enhance the military value of chemical weapons, but also bring with it new peaceful uses for chemical warfare agents and their precursors which at present have no peaceful uses, thus making questions of verification and prohibition even more complex and hard to settle.

Furthermore, the harsh reality of frequent reports on the use of chemical weapons in areas of conflict decades after the entry into force of the Geneva Protocol has also made the conclusion of a convention on the total prohibition of chemical weapons a matter of great urgency.

(Mr. Qian Jiadong, China)

During the previous round of three additional weeks of discussions, Sweden, Finland, Canada, the United Kingdom and other countries have tabled a number of working documents in which they have further clarified their respective positions and put forward a good number of proposals. We are studying these documents carefully. We are also glad to note the positive statements made by the United States and the USSR. The United States has announced that it will submit in March a draft treaty on the prohibition of chemical weapons, while the USSR has expressed its willingness to accept in principle on-site inspection on a continuous basis during the destruction of chemical-weapon stockpiles. The United States and the USSR are the two countries with the largest chemical-weapon arsenals and bear special responsibilities towards the prohibition of chemical weapons. We hope that they will make further efforts to bring their positions closer.

The Chinese delegation has consistently stood for the complete prohibition and total destruction of chemical weapons. Ever since we joined the work of the Committee on Disarmament in 1980, we have always taken an earnest and serious attitude in the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons and tabled some working documents. The Chinese delegation has just submitted another working document (CD/443) in which we have summarized our proposals on the major elements of a future convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. In the preparation of this document, we have drawn on the reasonable proposals of other delegations and we hope that consideration will be given to it in future negotiations.

To draw up a chemical weapons convention, the first thing we have to do is to settle the scope of prohibition. China has all along maintained that the scope of prohibition should be comprehensive in nature, that is, it should include not only all types of chemical weapons but also all activities related to research, production and use of chemical weapons. We note with satisfaction that the idea of including use in the scope of prohibition has already gained wide support and that it is now commonly held that this will only further strengthen and not weaken the 1925 Geneva Protocol. We believe that through concerted effort, we will be able to work out a formulation acceptable to all parties and thus settle this question in a satisfactory manner. We are also in favour of the proposal for banning the deployment of chemical weapons on the territories of other countries. We would also like to give our positive consideration to the proposal put forward by the Swedish delegation recently regarding the prohibition of making military preparations for the use of chemical weapons.

Closely related to the scope of prohibition is the question of definition. In the absence of precise and scientific definitions, it is impossible to decide on the exact scope of prohibition. In our working document, a number of definitions on chemical weapons, chemical-weapon agents, precursors, key precursors, etc. have therefore been suggested. We have laid particular stress on the concept of "chemical warfare agent". This is because we believe that such a concept can most precisely indicate the property of the toxic substances we want to ban and reflect in the best way the combination of general-purpose criteria and toxicity criteria. Furthermore, with the help of this concept, a clear-cut distinction between toxic chemical substances which should be prohibited and toxic chemical substances for permitted purposes which should not be prohibited can be drawn and unnecessary confusion and ambiguity avoided. We have noted that Yugoslavia, Indonesia, Belgium, and France have also used the concept of "chemical warfare agent" and submitted their own definitions. We are ready to consider all the constructive proposals of other delegations so as to work out a commonly acceptable definition in this regard.

(Mr. Qian Jiadong, China)

Destruction of the existing stockpiles of chemical weapons constitutes one of the most important provisions of the convention. Once the huge stockpile of existing chemical weapons is indeed totally destroyed, the threat of chemical warfare will fundamentally be removed. This in turn is closely linked to the issue of declaration and verification. Taking into account the time required to draw up plans for destruction, etc., we favour the idea that initial declarations should be made within 30 days of adherence to or entry into force of the Convention, whereas detailed declarations may be made within a period of three months. As to the question of how to proceed with the destruction of stockpiles we think that consideration should not be given unduly to parity and balance between the countries possessing chemical weapons, but should centre, first and foremost, on the speedy and early elimination of the threat of chemical warfare. With this in mind, we propose that the countries concerned should destroy in the first place those chemical weapons in their arsenals which are the most toxic and dangerous and not those which are out-dated or inoperative.

Verification is one of the key elements of the convention. We have always held that a chemical weapons convention must contain such provisions for verification as to ensure strict and effective implementation of verification, on the one hand, and minimize intrusiveness as much as possible on the other. Emphasis should be put on international verification with necessary on-site inspection. Such on-site inspection should cover destruction of chemical weapon stockpiles, destruction and dismantlement of production or filling facilities for chemical weapons, small-scale production of super-lethal agents used for protective purposes, and alleged use of chemical weapons, etc. As to the method of verification, proposals have been made for on-site inspection on a continuous basis, routine or periodic or random on-site inspection, on-site inspection by challenge and on-site inspection on the basis of quota. We think all these methods can be considered and that different methods of verification can be used for different verification purposes. It is our hope that on this key issue, a solution acceptable to all parties will eventually be found.

We are very happy that within a relatively short time we have already re-established the subsidiary body on chemical weapons, formulated a mandate with the elaboration of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons as its main target, and designated the highly experienced Head of the Swedish delegation, Ambassador Ekeus, as its Chairman. People throughout the world are watching our work here with great expectations. Let us respond with tangible results.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of China for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the President and to my country. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Ambassador Victor Issraelyan.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Comrade President, allow me on behalf of the delegation of the Soviet Union to congratulate you, the representative of Socialist Romania, on assuming the important and responsible office of President of the Conference on Disarmament, and to wish you success. This year has seen the thirty-sixth anniversary of the signature of the first Soviet-Romanian treaty of friendship, co-operation and mutual aid. Coming into being in the difficult years after the War, the treaty played an historic role in the emergence of relations of a new type between our States. Co-operation between fraternal socialist countries on the international scene is conducted in the

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

spirit of the Prague Political Declaration of States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty and the statement issued by Party and State leaders of the socialist countries in Moscow in the summer of 1983. I should also like to express sincere thanks to Comrade Turbanski, the representative of the Polish People's Republic, for his excellent presidency in the month of February.

The Soviet delegation wishes to take the opportunity to express warm greetings to the women participants in the work of our Conference and also to the participants in the international conference on "Women and the World Disarmament Campaign" present at our meeting today. The women of the entire planet, mothers and wives, sisters and daughters, well know the incalculable disasters and irreparable woes caused by war. My country's soil and that of many other countries is abundantly watered with their tears. We admire their noble impulse to save the world from thermonuclear catastrophe, from a war in which all will perish -- women, men and our great mother, the mother of all living things, our beautiful planet itself. The Soviet delegation wishes success to all women throughout the world in their struggle for peace.

We shall, of course, attentively study the document of the Conference on "Women and the World Disarmament Campaign", but we can already say that we fully share the views expressed by that forum. We regard such tasks as the prevention of nuclear war and a comprehensive nuclear test ban as the most urgent tasks. We fully agree with the point concerning a comprehensive test ban, which states "To conclude a treaty on the prohibition of testing nuclear weapons in all environments by the end of this session given the fact that negotiations have already reached a very advanced state in the tripartite negotiations. This treaty should be signed by all States possessing nuclear capacity". We are prepared to underwrite this demand by the conference on "Women and the World Disarmament Campaign". The Soviet delegation also shares the view that the prevention of an arms race in outer space and a comprehensive and complete ban on chemical weapons are central tasks which should not be put off from year to year under a variety of artificial, false pretexts. Once again, we wish success to all women -- those present here and those outside this conference room -- in their struggle to prevent nuclear disaster.

We have also asked for the floor today in order to introduce the official conference document CD/444, circulated at the request of the Soviet delegation, containing the section on international affairs of a speech made by Comrade Chernenko, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, at a meeting with voters of the Kuibyshev district of Moscow on 2 March 1984. In this section of his speech, Comrade Chernenko outlined the Soviet Union's approach of principle to the central problems of present-day world politics and puts forward new major proposals by the Soviet Union, inter alia on disarmament matters. The General Secretary of the Central Committee



(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union said that it would be difficult to recall a problem of importance to strengthening peace on which the Soviet Union and other socialist countries have not put forward concrete and realistic proposals in the past few years. The initiatives of our countries are winning ever broader support from other States. This has been forcefully confirmed by the latest session of the United Nations General Assembly. Comrade Chernenko stated that intensive militarization and the aggravation of the international situation have not brought nor are going to bring the United States military superiority and political achievements. Everywhere in the world, they only lead to the escalation of criticism of Washington's belligerent course. People want peace and tranquillity, not war hysteria. The General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union said that all this inspires the hope that eventually developments will once more take a direction towards peace, the limitation of the arms race and the development of international co-operation. Détente has struck deep roots. This is evidenced, in particular, by the convocation of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe. Comrade Chernenko said that the Soviet Union's position on questions relating to the halting of the nuclear arms race is clear. We are against rivalry in building up nuclear arms arsenals. We were and remain, said the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, proponents of the prohibition and elimination of all types of those weapons.

Referring to the problem of the limitation of the arms race and disarmament, Comrade Chernenko devoted particular attention to the norms by which relations between nuclear Powers should be governed. Among other disarmament issues, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union singled out such matters as the drawing up of a treaty on the general and complete prohibition of nuclear weapons tests, an agreement on the renunciation of the militarization of outer space, and a mutual freeze on American and Soviet nuclear weapons. He emphasized that to deliver mankind from the possible uses of chemical weapons is a very important task. The Soviet Union is in favour of effective control over the implementation of an agreement on the complete and general prohibition of the use of chemical weapons, their development and production and the destruction of all their stockpiles, and believes that such control should cover the whole process of destruction of chemical weapons from beginning to end. It is not ruled out, Comrade Chernenko said, that reaching an agreement on the above-mentioned issues would signal the start of a real and drastic change in Soviet-United States relations and in the international situation as a whole.

I should like to express the hope that all delegations will study Comrade Chernenko's statement with care.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union for his statement, and for his kind words addressed to the President, to my country and to the close relations between our countries.

Does any other delegation wish to take the floor?

Mr. SIRJANI (Islamic Republic of Iran): Mr. President, I congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency for this month and welcome the women participants in the Conference on "Women and the World Disarmament Campaign". I would like to make a brief statement.

Yesterday, the International Committee of the Red Cross, after an undue delay, ascertained the use of chemical weapons on a large scale by the Iraqi Government. We regret that after two years, the ICRC now comes to this conclusion, and we also regret the undue delay by the Secretary-General of the United Nations regarding our request on the relevant General Assembly resolution, 37/98D.

I want to put on record what has been said by the Minister of Defence of the Iraqi Government.

[Speaking in French] "However, the Minister of Defence at no time clearly and unequivocally denied Teheran's accusations. Pressed by questions from the many American journalists asking for a categorical denial, he replied: 'Why should we wash our dirty linen in public? To reveal what Iraq has in store would be contrary to the interests of our security. You know that, in any event, the conventional weapons in our possession are quite enough to achieve our successes. Besides, you can go to the battlefields and ask for the autopsy of a body you think looks suspicious'". (Le Monde, 8 March 1984)

[Resuming in English] I want to take advantage of the presence of the women of the World Disarmament Campaign, I want to make an appeal to them for a total ban on chemical weapons. I want to make an appeal to the Conference on Disarmament not to remain silent about this crime -- when you remain silent, it means that you disregard every norm of international law, you disregard the Geneva Protocol, you disregard everything.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the distinguished representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran for his statement. Does any other delegation wish to speak? That does not seem to be the case.

As was agreed when the programme of work for this week was adopted, I shall now suspend the plenary meeting and in five minutes' time convene an informal meeting of the Conference to continue our exchange of views on some organizational questions. The plenary meeting is suspended.

The meeting was suspended at 12.15 p.m. and resumed at 12.40 p.m.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): the plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is resumed.

The Conference has before it an informal document, dated 6 March 1984, containing a draft decision on the designation of the subsidiary bodies of the Conference on Disarmament. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the draft decision.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): With regard to the decision which the Conference has just taken on the naming of its subsidiary bodies, I should like to make the following statement which I shall read out in English.

[Speaking in English]:

1. This decision has been taken in accordance with the understanding of the Conference read by the President at the 245th plenary meeting of 28 February 1984 at the time of the re-establishment of the ad hoc subsidiary bodies, to the effect that the same designation would be given to all the subsidiary bodies established directly under respective agenda items unless the Conference, in specific cases, decides otherwise.
2. The adoption of the name "Ad Hoc Committee" for subsidiary bodies of the Conference stems from the change of name from "Committee on Disarmament" to "Conference on Disarmament". That designation for subsidiary bodies is adopted under Rule 23 of the Rules of Procedure of the Conference. It has no financial or structural implications; it implies no change in the working procedures of the Conference or in its Rules of Procedure; and it has no bearing on the views of members of the Conference on the substance of matters under consideration.
3. Subsidiary bodies may be set up within the framework of Ad Hoc Committees, their designation being determined by the respective Ad Hoc Committees in accordance with established practice.

(The President)

May I now turn to another subject. The Secretariat has circulated today, at my request, an informal paper containing a time-table for meetings to be held by the Conference and the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons during the coming week. As usual, the time-table is merely indicative and subject to change if necessary. Of course, the time-table does not include the informal consultations being carried out by several groups on items of our agenda. The actual scheduling of the meetings of those groups will be decided by them, depending on the circumstances. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference agrees to that time-table.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I should now like to turn to the request made by the Permanent Representative of Turkey in Geneva to address the plenary meeting of the Conference. If there is no objection, I will inform him accordingly.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: May I now take up the request made by the Holy See to address the plenary meeting of the Conference on 15 March. If there is no objection, I shall inform the Holy See accordingly.

It was so decided.

Mr. ELBE (Federal Republic of Germany): Thank you, Mr. President. I apologize for taking the floor at this late stage. My delegation will express its appreciation of your assumption of the office of the presidency at a later stage.

Mr. President, the distinguished representative of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic has referred to a statement of my delegation of 28 February of this year. I fear that his interpretation of Ambassador Wegener's statement is not quite correct. It was not my delegation's aim to raise any objection to the use of quotations. On the contrary, we acknowledge the necessity of expressing views in the most diverse manner. We said that they are part of the broad opinion-shaping process where decisions are taken by responsible citizens in a well-regulated process of democratic decision-making. Ambassador Wegener also said (and that was the nucleus of the statement in this respect) I quote, "Here again, it would be a necessity of argumentative fairness, but also proof of the ability of the speaker to discern the real relevance of political processes to provide a more balanced comprehensive picture of opinion."

Mr. President, my delegation's intention was a constructive one. It was a plea for more argumentative rational discourse among ourselves. I shall abstain from any further comment on the way that this statement was recently handled.

(Mr. Elbe, Federal Republic of Germany)

I notice that the distinguished Ambassador of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic had some difficulties in using an abbreviation of the name of my State; allow me to be helpful in this matter, Mr. President. I should like to remind the Conference on Disarmament that my Government decided a long time ago not to use any abbreviation of the name of its State. We prefer to be called by our full name, which is the Federal Republic of Germany. We would appreciate it if a sovereign decision of my country was met with due respect in an international Conference.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany for his statement. May I take it that there are no more speakers? The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 13 March, at 10.30 a.m. The meeting is adjourned.

The meeting rose at 12.50 p.m.



# CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.249  
13 March 1984  
ENGLISH

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## FINAL RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND FORTY-NINTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Tuesday, 13 March 1984, at 10.30 a.m.

President:

Mr. I. Datcu

(Romania)

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

<u>Algeria:</u>	Mr. A. TAFFAR
<u>Argentina:</u>	Mr. J.J. CARASALES Mr. R. GARCIA MORITAN
<u>Australia:</u>	Mr. R. BUTLER Mr. R. ROWE Ms. J. COURTNEY
<u>Belgium:</u>	Mr. M. DEPASSE Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE
<u>Brazil:</u>	Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA Mr. S. QUEIROZ DUARTE
<u>Bulgaria:</u>	Mr. K. TELLALOV Mr. P. POPTCHEV Mr. C. PRAMOV
<u>Burma:</u>	U MAUNG MAUNG GYI
<u>Canada:</u>	Mr. G. SKINNER
<u>China:</u>	Mr. QIAN JIADONG Ms. WANG ZHIYUN Mr. LI WEIMIN Mr. LIN CHENG Ms. CRE YIYUN Mr. LU MINGJUN Mr. ZHANG WEIDANG
<u>Cuba:</u>	Mr. P. NUNEZ MOSQUERA



<u>Czechoslovakia:</u>	Mr. M. VEJVODA Mr. A. CIMA
<u>Egypt:</u>	Ms. W. BASSIM
<u>Ethiopia:</u>	Mr. F. YOHANNES
<u>France:</u>	Mr. F. DE LA GORCE Mr. H. RENIE Mr. G. MONTASSIER Mr. GESBERT
<u>German Democratic Republic:</u>	Mr. H. ROSE Mr. J. DEMBSKI
<u>Germany, Federal Republic of:</u>	Mr. H. WEGENER Mr. F. ELBE
<u>Hungary:</u>	Mr. D. MEISZTER Mr. F. GAJDA Mr. T. TOTH
<u>India:</u>	Mr. S. KANT SHARMA
<u>Indonesia:</u>	Mr. S. SUTOWARDOYO Mr. ANDRADJATI Ms. P. RAMADAAN Mr. HARYOMATARAM Mr. BOEDIMAN
<u>Islamic Republic of Iran:</u>	Mr. N.K. DAMYAB Mr. F.S. SIRJANI
<u>Italy:</u>	Mr. M. ALESSI Mr. M. PAVESE Mr. G. ADORNI BRACCESI
<u>Japan:</u>	Mr. R. IMAI Mr. M. KONISHI Mr. T. ISHIGURI Mr. K. TANAKA Mr. T. KAWAKITA

Kenya:

Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCÍA ROBLES  
Mr. P. MACEDO RIBA  
Ms. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO

Mongolia:

Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG  
Mr. S.O. BOLD

Morocco:

Mr. A. SKALLI  
Mr. M. CHRAIBI  
Mr. O. HILALE

Netherlands:

Mr. J. RAMAKER  
Mr. R.J. AKKERMAN

Nigeria:

Mr. O.O. GEORGE  
Mr. J.O. OBOH  
Mr. L.O. AKINDELE  
Mr. C.V. UDEDIBIA

Pakistan:

Mr. K. NIAZ

Peru:

Mr. C. CASTILLO RAMIREZ

Poland:

Mr. S. TURBANSKI  
Mr. J. CIALOWICZ  
Mr. G. CZEMPINSKI

Romania:

Mr. I. DATCU  
Mr. T. MELESCANU  
Mr. A. POPESCU  
Mr. A. CRETU  
Mr. O. IONESCU

Sri Lanka:

Mr. J. DHANAPALA  
Mr. P. KARIYAWASAM

Sweden:

Mr. R. EKEUS  
Mr. J. LUNDIN  
Ms. E. BONNIER  
Mr. H. BERGLUND  
Mr. L.E. WINGREN  
Ms. A. M. LAU

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN  
Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV  
Mr. G.V. BERDENNIKOV  
Mr. P.Y. SKOMOROKHIN  
Mr. S.V. KOBYSH  
Mr. G. ANTSIFEROV  
Mr. G. VASHADZE

United Kingdom:

Mr. R.I.T. CROMARTIE  
Mr. J.F. GORDON  
Mr. J.W.B. RICHARDS  
Mr. D.A. SLINN

United States of America:

Mr. L.G. FIELDS  
Ms. K.C. CRITTENBERGER  
Mr. R. HORNE  
Mr. L. MADSEN  
Mr. R. WATERS  
Mr. H. CALHOUN  
Mr. J. DOESBERG  
Mr. P. CORDEN  
Mr. R. NORMAN  
Mr. J. PUCKETT  
Mr. C. PEARCY

Venezuela:

Mr. O. GARCÍA GARCÍA

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC

Mr. D. MINIC

Zaire:

Ms. E. ESAKI KABEYA

Secretary-General of the Conference  
on Disarmament and Personal  
Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary-General of the  
Conference on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I declare open the plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament. The Conference today begins its consideration of agenda item 4, "Chemical weapons". However, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure.

You will recall that according to the programme of work for this week this afternoon at 3 p.m. the Conference will hold an informal meeting on organizational matters. On that occasion I intend to bring to your attention several requests received from non-member States. So far the secretariat has received 12 letters from non-member States containing clarifications with regard to their request to participate. Furthermore, we have received a request from Switzerland to participate in the meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. All these communications will be circulated informally by the secretariat.

I have on my list of speakers for today the distinguished representatives of Nigeria, the Netherlands, Bulgaria, Turkey and the United States of America.

I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Nigeria, Mr. George.

Mr. GEORGE (Nigeria): Mr. President, please allow me to express my delegation's pleasure at seeing you, the representative of friendly Romania, presiding over the work of our Conference for the month of March. Nigeria is proud of the excellent ties, both bilateral and multilateral, existing between our two countries and which continue to expand and strengthen. I wish you a fruitful and successful tenure of the presidency.

I would also like to place on record my delegation's gratitude and appreciation to Ambassador Turbanski, the distinguished representative of Poland, for the wealth of experience and diplomatic skill with which he guided the work of the Conference during the opening and usually difficult month of February. May I also extend a warm welcome to the new ambassadors of Australia, Belgium, Canada, Cuba, Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia and Sri Lanka who have recently joined us in the joint pursuit of the search for a safer world for mankind. I pledge my delegation's readiness to co-operate fully with their various delegations.

Mr. President, our Conference was able to adopt its agenda and programme of work for 1984 in a "record" two weeks as against seven weeks in 1983, thanks to the willingness, and co-operation, of all the delegations to adopt a new spirit of compromise and flexibility which, if maintained will, I hope, certainly yield fruitful results in 1984. It is heartening to my delegation and indeed a welcome development that for the first time prevention of nuclear war, an item of utmost concern to mankind, has been inscribed as a separate item on our agenda. As is well known, this Conference, apart from being the single multilateral negotiating body on disarmament matters, also happens to be the only forum where serious negotiations between States, both the Superpowers and other nuclear-weapon States, are going on at present after the break up of the INF and START talks late last year. My delegation is of the opinion that it will not serve any useful purpose at this stage to apportion blame to any side on the reasons for breaking off these talks. We can only appeal to both sides, in the interest of humanity, to find an

(Mr. George, Nigeria)

acceptable and just way of resuming these negotiations. Although all disarmament issues are important, my delegation however attaches great importance to the question of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. It is our considered view that a ban on the testing of new weapons is fundamental for halting the arms race and the on-going proliferation of nuclear weapons. The statistics on nuclear tests carried out by the nuclear Powers in 1983, recently given by the head of the Swedish delegation, are as startling as they are disturbing. According to Ambassador Theorin, 50 nuclear tests were carried out in the past year with the two Superpowers competing for pride of place. This trend is dangerous. My delegation believes that the completion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty with the minimum of delay will be a far-reaching objective in the efforts to curtail the arms race and achieve nuclear disarmament. The present mandate which is only restricted to the verification issue must be broadened or, alternatively, a new mandate should be drawn up. A new mandate or a broadened one should allow an in-depth penetration of all areas of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Here, I must express my delegation's indignation regarding the inability or, perhaps, unwillingness of a certain group of delegations to show the much-needed political will to negotiate. In spite of the seeming lull in this area, my delegation urges the three nuclear-weapon Powers, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States, which are depositories of the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty, to resume suspended trilateral talks on a nuclear-test ban. It believes that this forum can provide a valuable platform for reaching agreement on this important item which forms the cornerstone of any disarmament effort. We again urge the remaining nuclear-weapon States, China and France, who have long abstained from the negotiations, to work out a plan and join the talks this year. This will generate hope as well as confidence in us all, particularly the non-nuclear-weapon States, as well as demonstrate the genuineness of the various statements and oral commitments given by the nuclear-weapon States regarding either their desire to see a world free of nuclear weapons or their intention not to be the first to engage in a nuclear war.

As my delegation made abundantly clear in the First Committee during the thirty-eighth session of the United Nations General Assembly, it can no longer be regarded as a figment of imagination to suggest that the most urgent task facing humanity today is the prevention of nuclear war. Dangerous doctrines of limited, winnable or survivable nuclear war or of flexible response have not only lowered the nuclear threshold, but have made the outbreak of nuclear war a threatening reality. We cannot run away from that stark reality. My delegation is gratified to know that we are all now convinced that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. We are however unable to understand why there should be accelerated preparations for the same nuclear war that is not winnable and must not be fought. How can one rationalize the elaborate preparations being made to attain military advantage, as well as the trillions of dollars being appropriated to modernize nuclear arsenals in order to negotiate from a so-called position of strength? If I may quote the distinguished Ambassador Dubey of India, in his statement before this Conference on 1 March 1984, "It is in the field of the nuclear-arms race that we hear the talk of countries preparing for nuclear war in order to avert it; nations amassing nuclear weapons stockpiles in order to eliminate them; and the Doomsday machine being credited with the achievement of having prevented war."

(Mr. George, Nigeria)

My mind goes to the on-going wrangle in this Conference regarding the item "Prevention of nuclear war including all related matters". I have already paid tribute to the Western group in joining in the consensus on the inscription of that item on our agenda. It was a great turn around on their part. I would like to appeal to them to bear in mind that inscribing the item on the agenda is only a first step. We all know that the most effective way to discuss an agenda item in this Conference is to create a subsidiary body charged with a specific mandate in dealing with that problem.

My delegation finds it difficult to accept the attitude of the Western group of countries that this matter be dealt with along the lines of our deliberations in 1983, that is, by continuously trying to define the issues in order to find out if there is sufficient consensus. By such insistence, that group of States is only impairing the setting in motion of the negotiating process. United Nations General Assembly resolution 38/183 G prescribes a formula for dealing with this important problem when it recommended that the Conference on Disarmament should negotiate with a view to achieving agreement on appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war. We feel that the Western group should no longer withhold their agreement to enable the Conference on Disarmament to set up a subsidiary body on this all-important agenda item whose responsibility, among other things, would be to identify and define the areas of consensus which seem to be the main concern of the Western group. My delegation also urges that group to draw up a mandate that reflects their views for submission to the Conference, so that it can then be properly discussed by us all.

The question of the prevention of nuclear war or nuclear disarmament cannot be treated with complacency. No one put it more eloquently than the distinguished Foreign Minister of Argentina, His Excellency Mr. Dante Caputo, when he addressed this body on 28 February 1984. On that occasion he said, "It is true that the complex nuclear question is particularly intricate and difficult to tackle and naturally to solve. Besides, we have been told this over and over again. What we cannot accept is that those considerations should justify inaction and negative positions. The peoples of the world clamour for, more than clamour, they demand the complete removal of the threat of annihilation from their horizon and from their future. No demand is more just or more legitimate than that."

Another axiom which my delegation finds unacceptable is the notion among certain delegations that since the two Superpowers possess between them over three-fourths of the world's nuclear weapons, the rest of us should fold our hands and wait for them to take the initiative to reduce their arsenals. Inasmuch as this amounts to stating the obvious, my delegation wants such delegations to realize that disarmament is an international responsibility and therefore requires international, collective and multilateral efforts to succeed. The Superpowers cannot do it alone, and they alone cannot take care of the security interests of the rest of the world. Indeed, it will be dangerous if they aspire to do this alone. The remaining 38 members of this Conference must therefore be able to justify their *raison d'être*. The whole world looks up to this Conference.

My delegation warmly welcomes the re-establishment of the subsidiary body on chemical weapons and is happy to note that the body has already begun its work under the efficient and thorough Swedish delegation headed by Ambassador Ekéus. We also express our sincere appreciation and thanks to Ambassador McPhail of Canada for the leadership role he played in guiding the group to sincere and meaningful

(Mr. George, Nigeria)

negotiations in 1983. We welcome the announcement that the United States delegation is to submit a draft treaty during the 1984 session of the Conference on Disarmament. Equally pleasing to my delegation is the announcement by the head of the Soviet delegation, Ambassador Issraelyan, on 21 February 1984 that his country is now ready to allow on-site inspection of the destruction of chemical weapons in its territory. We congratulate the Soviet Union on this important "breakthrough" which now almost sets the stage for meaningful and perhaps honest and final concrete negotiations which should lead to a chemical-weapons treaty in the very near future. This is the time to seize the bull by the horns. We should not allow the momentum to subside. My delegation hopes that the anticipated convention would, among other things, provide a commitment concerning the non-production of chemical weapons, chemical agents and their precursors as well as the destruction of existing stockpiles of such weapons and their agents. With the drawing up of the convention now in sight, my delegation urges States which already possess these weapons or who intended to manufacture, deploy or stockpile such weapons on the basis of the technology and facilities available to them, to exercise the maximum of self-restraint, including a moratorium on such activities.

With regards to the comprehensive programme of disarmament, my delegation is grateful to Ambassador García Robles of Mexico for the work his group did in the 1983 session and we hope the distinguished ambassador will be able to continue on the job this year. A new opportunity has arisen with the General Assembly having given a revised text which looks less ambitious and less ambiguous than the 1982 text, which also constitutes an acceptable basis.

Another area of serious importance to my delegation is negative security guarantees. We commend the untiring and magnificent efforts of Ambassador Amhad of Pakistan for a job well done last year, but regret that he will be unable to lead the body when it is eventually re-established this year. Whomever the mantle falls on this year, it is the hope and prayer of my delegation that meaningful negotiations will be conducted to assure non-nuclear-weapon States, in a legally binding instrument, that they will not be victims of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The majority of these States who have undertaken to be parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968 have legitimately forfeited their right to produce, stockpile or acquire nuclear weapons and it is only reasonable that they be assured of their security. As my delegation has repeatedly said, such declarations and assurances should be given without conditions.

Finally, Mr. President, my delegation appeals to you to work strenuously for the establishment or re-establishment of subsidiary bodies on the remaining items of our agenda. The spring part of the session of our Conference is almost half over, and it is not pleasant that only the subsidiary body on chemical weapons has resumed its work. We should bear in mind that the General Assembly has recommended that the Conference submit its report and recommendations on several agenda items to the thirty-ninth session of the General Assembly. Since a large part of the summer part of the session is always preoccupied with preparation of reports, it is my delegation's humble opinion that it would be beneficial if serious work could be done in this spring part of the session so that the Conference can save itself the agonizing experience of rushing to complete its work in September.



The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the distinguished representative of Nigeria for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the President.

I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of the Netherlands, Mr. Ramaker.

Mr. RAMAKER (Netherlands): Mr. President, permit me first of all to extend to you the warmest congratulations on behalf of my delegation, as well as on my personal behalf, on your assumption of the Presidency of the Conference on Disarmament this month. My delegation was most gratified to see the energetic way in which you took up the pending problems of the Conference. I am convinced that your determined guidance will yield the desired results and I wish to assure you of my delegation's full co-operation. My delegation wishes to take this opportunity to pay tribute to Ambassador Turbanski who, as the first President of the Conference on Disarmament, set the Conference's work in motion in a way which could hardly be over-estimated. We owe it not least to his skill, and the very personal way in which he directed our work, that it has proved possible to make an early start with part of our substantive work.

In the first months of existence of the new-born Conference on Disarmament I have difficulty in resisting the temptation to paraphrase a well-known old adage in saying: "Le Comité est mort, vive la Conférence du Désarmement!" -- "The Committee is dead, long live the Conference on Disarmament!". Such a statement could lend itself to many different interpretations. One way of looking at it would be to say that the Committee ceased to exist before its initials came to stand for "Cemetery of Disarmament", as one delegation in this hall has occasionally put it. In this view, upgrading the single multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament to the level of a conference would certainly have beneficial effects and thus give rise to optimism about the future of disarmament. An opposing view, however, is equally possible. It could be briefly described in the words: "All problems remain unchanged, business as usual".

The Netherlands delegation to the Committee on Disarmament, for its part, has in the past, whenever it brought forward its views on the possibilities and the limitations of the Committee, attempted to marry reason to optimism, realism as to what could be done to ambition as to what should be done. In this vein my delegation readily admits that the Committee could not take pride in the achievement of any disarmament agreement.

On the other hand, we feel that the Committee should not enter history being blamed that it achieved nothing at all. The Committee's agenda, for one thing, throughout the years of its existence, came to cover wider and wider areas. Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters, is one example. The prevention of an arms race in outer space is another. My delegation welcomed the inclusion of these new spheres of action, not only because of their inherent importance, but also because it considered this to be a clear proof of the fact that the Committee did not exist in isolation from the political reality surrounding it. The outside world appealed to the Committee on Disarmament and it responded as, I am sure, the Conference will continue to do. Moreover, contributions by delegations under these agenda items, both oral and in writing, already greatly helped to identify the parameters of the problem areas concerned. And to my delegation all this is indispensable if one wishes to facilitate future substantive negotiations.

(Mr. Ramaker, Netherlands)

A great deal of progress could be made in the Committee as well on some of the issues contained in the older agenda items. The continuing efforts to bring about a comprehensive chemical-weapons ban can be cited as an example. I shall revert to this subject-matter, which will be the main subject of my statement of today, in a few minutes. Suffice it to say for the moment that in my delegation's view, too negative an opinion on the Committee's achievements during the years of its existence does not seem to be justified. Before devoting some attention to our work on the completion of a comprehensive chemical-weapons ban, Mr. President, allow me to make a few observations of a more general nature on some organizational aspects of the task facing us.

As the Committee was rechristened a Conference it was gratifying for my delegation to note that the new Conference, in its dealing with procedural matters, did not repeat its predecessor's very disappointing performance of last year. This year it took exactly three weeks to start up, so to speak, its first substantive work in re-establishing a subsidiary body of the Conference on chemical weapons. Yet, three weeks to us is still too long, particularly if one takes into account that the foundations for an early resumption of the substantive work on the subject were already laid in advance, at the end of the prolonged 1983 session of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons. My delegation therefore deems it timely to recall the proposals made last year by the delegations of Kenya, Argentina and Yugoslavia -- and the distinguished Ambassador of Yugoslavia once again drew our attention to this the other day -- aimed at smoothing out our working methods and procedures. Careful consideration of their ideas could help us considerably to avoid delays in the resumption of our substantive work by removing procedural hurdles which in essence are quite unnecessary.

Many of the problems recurring each year at the outset of the session have to do with different interpretations among delegations of the consequences, for the practice of our day-to-day work, of the negotiating character of the Conference. Some delegations feel that this negotiating character calls right away for the creation of subsidiary bodies provided with negotiating mandates for all items on the agenda. Maybe from a merely theoretical and conceptual point of view something can be said in favour of such an approach. Let us avoid, however, allowing the best to become the enemy of the good. In some instances, and indeed the most vital yet most complicated ones, for instance, prevention of nuclear war and of an arms race in outer space, a great deal of serious preparatory work can and should be undertaken before the negotiating phase in the proper sense of the word will come in sight. My delegation sees no reason why we should not insert a note of realism in our work. It rejects the contention that what in its view amounts to looking reality in the face, has the ulterior motive of hiding an unwillingness to come at some point to terms on substance. There is no reason whatsoever why this should be the inevitable outcome. Quite the contrary is true.

If I may use a metaphor: a clearer picture of the article to be purchased can often whet the appetite of the customer and as a result cause a growing desire on his part to participate in moulding the article's ultimate design.

In other words, Mr. President, let us try to "demythologise" the concept of negotiations as it is so often used in the Committee on Disarmament.

(Mr. Ramaker, Netherlands)

Very often the desire to formulate right away the mandates of subsidiary bodies in terms of negotiations has tempted delegations to apply, in one way or the other, forms of totally artificial linkage between greatly differing subject-items. Let me state in all clarity that this practice harms the orderly progress of our substantive work. The victims are often those cases in which all the material and tools are available for fruitful work. It seems to me that where substantive progress can be made, we should seize the opportunity and reject artificial barriers.

Let me stress at the same time that our opposition to any form of linkage should not be mistaken for a lack of interest for those subjects on which no consensus yet exists, while their urgency is contested by no delegation. The emphasis we placed, for instance, on the earliest possible continuation of our substantive work with regard to a chemical-weapons ban is solely to be attributed to the relatively advanced stage we feel this subject-matter has reached. This is a pragmatic assessment which in no way diminishes our full support for an early substantive consideration of any measure relevant to the prevention of a nuclear war. A thorough consideration of this should be taken up without delay. We have material to that end at our disposal, such as, for example, the suggestions contained in a working document presented by the delegation of Belgium in document CD/380. The urgency of the matter also prompts my delegation to recall today that it sees the early conclusion of a genuinely comprehensive test ban as being of vital importance, as an end not only in itself but also in the wider context of nuclear arms control and disarmament and non-proliferation. Moreover, and more specifically, progress towards a CTB would enhance the prospects for a successful outcome of the forthcoming Third Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

My delegation furthermore notes that the more narrowly defined subject of prevention of an arms race in outer space derives a great deal of its vital importance equally from the fact that many of its elements have a direct bearing on the issue of the prevention of nuclear war. The continued validity of the ABM treaty concluded between the two major Powers and its underlying philosophy should be mentioned in this context.

Mr. President, allow me to return now to the subject of a comprehensive chemical-weapons ban, the agenda item that our programme of work identifies for plenary discussion this week, to which the remainder of my statement of today will be devoted.

The efforts of the international community to render impossible the use of chemical weapons and remove these weapons entirely from the face of the earth have indeed a long history. The employment of poison or poisoned weapons was explicitly proscribed as long ago as in 1874, the year in which the Brussels Conference adopted its International Declaration on the matter. This prohibition has since been repeated in various forms (when, for example, the development of asphyxiating gases had to be taken into account), in a variety of international instruments of which the 1925 Geneva Protocol stands out as the one most widely adhered to.

Efforts to reach a complete ban on chemical weapons continued in the League of Nations Disarmament Conference. Success at one point seemed imminent. In 1933 the United Kingdom submitted a draft disarmament convention containing elaborate provisions for an extensive prohibition of chemical and biological weapons. The draft included a ban on preparations for chemical and biological warfare in times of peace as well as of war, an approach followed in recent years in the Committee on Disarmament by the delegation of Sweden.

(Mr. Ramaker, Netherlands)

As over the years negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons and their use went on, issues of verification received increasing attention. The Disarmament Conference of the League of Nations intensively examined proposals for investigating violations of the prohibition on use, for an international information and documentation service for protection against chemical weapons and even for the establishment of an international cartel of chemical industries to ensure that the civilian chemical industry would not be used for concealing production for weapons purposes.

In the post-World-War-II period renewed attention for a chemical-weapons ban followed reports on the effects of chemical and biological weapons published by the United Nations Secretary-General and by the World Health Organization. After the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee was enlarged in 1969 and carried on as the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, agreement was reached in the CCD in 1971 to consider the problem of biological weapons in itself and to submit a separate convention thereon to the General Assembly.

Ever since the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and its, now two, successors have been negotiating in order to complete the remainder of the task left to it with the adoption of the Convention on Biological Weapons. The Netherlands has been actively participating in the elaboration of a Chemical Weapons Convention since 1969.

The recent negotiating history on chemical weapons has demonstrated a tendency to place this subject more and more in the context of East-West relations. It is true of course that chemical weapons do have their share in the arsenals of East and West. It should be stressed, however, that notwithstanding the definition of chemical weapons as weapons of mass destruction in 1948 the balance of terror between the two sides has never been essentially dependent on these weapons. Case-histories of proven and alleged uses of chemical weapons in the developing world, moreover, make it abundantly clear that countries in the latter part of the world have compelling reasons to be as concerned as those in the Northern hemisphere and also to put as much effort as possible in the early conclusion of a truly comprehensive chemical-weapons ban.

My delegation feels more strongly than ever before that the conclusion of such a ban has come within reach and the time is now ripe to take up the final stages of our work with reasonable confidence in a successful outcome in the foreseeable future.

My delegation was led to this belief by, amongst other things, the recent announcement of the Secretary of State of the United States, Mr. Shultz, to the effect that his country intends to submit, in the very near future, a complete draft convention. The Netherlands welcomed this announcement at the time as a significant step forward, and I wish to repeat this today, though no delegation should of course underestimate the time and effort that remains to be invested in the negotiations of a consensus text.

The Netherlands welcomes as well the statement delivered by the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Issraelyan, on 21 February last, announcing a significant change in the position of his country on some aspects of the question of verifying compliance with the future chemical-weapons ban. In the view of my delegation, Ambassador Issraelyan's statement on that point constitutes an important step towards general agreement on a complex set of issues related to

(Mr. Ramaker, Netherlands)

stockpile destruction, including initial declarations and verification thereof. My delegation is convinced that it will be possible to reach a comprehensive agreement on the question of stockpiles during the 1984 session of the Conference in a process of mutual rapprochement and a spirit of understanding for each other's problems.

It is hard to think of a more propitious setting for the introduction of document CD/445, entitled "Size and structure of a chemical disarmament inspectorate", which my delegation intends to submit to the consideration of this Conference today. This Working Paper aims at addressing for the first time some of the practical, mainly administrative, implications of the verification schemes in the framework of the future chemical weapons convention as envisaged by the Netherlands and other members of the Western Group. It may be interesting to note that these include the administrative consequences of a continuous on-site inspection by representatives of the projected international inspectorate as referred to by the head of the Soviet delegation on 21 February.

After some general introductory remarks on the verification needs of the future convention, the document proceeds to a categorization of the different kinds of verification which the various undertakings foreseen in the convention will make necessary. The document uses a number of general assumptions basically relating to the function of an international inspectorate, as well as a number of more specific assumptions with regard to the various categories of verification the convention will necessitate.

On the basis of these assumptions the document seeks to demonstrate that the administrative consequences of our ideas on the matter of verification remain safely within manageable confines.

One of the key assumptions we had to make had to do with the "output" of an international inspector. The evident example was the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna which proved to be a highly useful frame of reference. As the nature of activities that need inspection under a chemical weapons convention differ from those the IAEA has to deal with, a number of adjustments had to be made. Amongst the various problem areas with respect to the verification of a chemical weapons convention, the one on verification of non-production is dealt with in relative detail. This is admittedly an area fraught with mines and traps. As we all realize, verification of non-production should not intrude unduly in the functioning of the civilian industry and its commercial operations.

Nevertheless, a minimum of confidence concerning non-production as well will be essential to the survival of the convention. Possibilities for circumvention that would be all too readily available, let alone loopholes, could well be extremely harmful to such confidence if left without any regulation. The slumbering capabilities inherent in the very nature of the means of production for permitted non-chemical-weapon purposes cannot be left out of consideration. One of the conclusions of the present document is that the size of the inspectorate is to a rather large degree determined by this category of verification.

The main conclusion of the document is that our assumptions indicate that the future international inspectorate will be relatively limited in size. The assumptions suggest a number of 355 inspectors and supporting staff for the duration of the period of destruction and elimination, estimated, as we know, to last about 10 years. After this initial period in the life of the future convention, this total will decrease to an approximate maximum number of 140 officials, a smaller number than the comparable part of the IAEA secretariat.

(Mr. Ramaker, Netherlands)

In concluding my intervention of today, I wish to turn briefly to the specific subject of non-use. In the view of the Netherlands, the verification-system to be created by the future chemical weapons convention must be a comprehensive one and therefore include a prohibition of use. It is all very well, and indeed essential, to aim at the full verifiability of the prohibition of development, of production, of stockpiling, of retention and of transfer of chemical weapons. But I daresay that through the years we all have gained a greater awareness of the practical limitations that may well prevent us from achieving perfection. The need to take into account legitimate security interests as well as the need to avoid undue intrusiveness of the inspection of the chemical industry can be cited in this context to illustrate what we have in mind. It is clear that indications of use, in violation of international law, would imply eo ipso that treaty obligations as to destruction and non-production etc. had possibly been violated. Thus, use can constitute the verifiable summit of a huge undetected, largely submerged, iceberg of violations. I therefore wish to stress that the inspectorate, roughly outlined earlier in my statement, is duly tailored to ensure verification of non-use.

The requirement of an adequate provision on non-use in the scope of the convention is not intended to -- and should in no way -- prejudice the importance of assuring continued authority for the 1925 Geneva Protocol. This international instrument will be of particular relevance in the initial phase after the entry into force of the convention, when all stocks and means of production will not yet have been eliminated.

What I just stated on the verification of use is equally relevant for reports on alleged use, such as that recently heard from the Foreign Minister of Iran, Mr. Velayati, in this very Conference. Reports like his must never be underestimated. Meanwhile reports, such as those obtained through impartial independent observers, pointing to recent use of chemical weapons have become increasingly convincing. This situation prompts the Government of the Netherlands to express its gravest concern, a concern that it evidently shares with the world community. Use of chemical weapons by whomever and wherever in the world demands condemnation in categorical terms.

The Netherlands expresses its satisfaction about the decision of the Secretary-General of the United Nations to conduct an investigation into possible violations of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 in the conflict in the Gulf area. This decision is fully in keeping with the role of the United Nations in maintaining international peace and security in general and can be seen in particular as a further effort on the part of the Organization to bring that war, so devastating in terms of human life and material resources, to an end. The Netherlands appeals once again to both parties fully to co-operate with these efforts.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of the Netherlands for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the President.

I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Bulgaria, Ambassador Tellalov.

Mr. TELLALOV (Bulgaria) Comrade President, I would like to avail myself of this opportunity to congratulate you once again most cordially on the assumption of the presidency for the month of March, and to wish you further success in the discharge of your responsible duties. For me, it is a particular pleasure to welcome you, Comrade Datcu, the representative of our good neighbour, socialist Romania, and to reiterate our satisfaction with the excellent co-operation which exists between our peoples and countries in all spheres of life.

I would like also to express my delegation's acknowledgement of the excellent work done by the President for the month of February, Ambassador Turbanski of Poland.

Today, the delegation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria would like to take the floor on agenda item 3, "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters."

I shall not conceal that one of my motives in speaking is my country's disappointment with the unsatisfactory results of the work of the Conference on the issue of preventing nuclear war. It would be sufficient to point out that in the course of the period since the adoption of resolution 36/81 B in the autumn of 1981 -- which marked the beginning of a series of General Assembly resolutions calling for practical steps to prevent nuclear war -- until the present day, the only "real success" is the inclusion of a separate item on this issue in the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament. Such a state of affairs is quite disappointing. At a time when the problem of the prevention of nuclear war has become a primary concern for millions of people around the world, the Conference on Disarmament, entrusted with the task of conducting negotiations for the purpose of achieving a practical solution to this issue, is actually idle.

Meanwhile, the danger of a thermonuclear conflict is on the increase. New nuclear-weapon systems have appeared, the characteristics of which make them more suitable for carrying out a first, so-called "pre-emptive", strike. Doctrines have been elaborated which admit the idea of waging and winning a nuclear war.

His recently published book "Life after nuclear war", Arthur Katz, the American specialist on the economic and social consequences of a nuclear war, formulates the following assessment:

"The influence of technology and its ability to enhance the credibility of nuclear 'war fighting' was evident in the change in United States strategic policy represented by Presidential Directive 59 issued in 1980. Although characterized as extending deterrence to blunt the impacts of sophisticated small-scale nuclear attacks, it nevertheless reflects a changed technological reality, that brings us closer to a model of low-level nuclear war ....."

For the peoples of Europe and the whole world the danger of a nuclear catastrophe has risen, particularly in connection with the deployment of new United States medium-range missiles in Western Europe.

(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

My delegation, as well as all others which share the concern about a "low-level nuclear war", to borrow the phrase from Dr. Katz, have already spoken about the various aspects of this menace to international peace and security.

A new dangerous element in the arms race is the Pentagon's endeavour to place new weapon-systems in outer space. The implementation of these designs would not remove the threat from existing nuclear arsenals. It would rather make their use more probable. The arms race in outer space carries with it a manifold increase of the risk of a nuclear war.

To draw attention to the growing danger of a nuclear conflict is not enough from the point of view of the requirements stemming from the specifics of the Conference on Disarmament. What is needed is a comprehensive practical approach towards the issue of elaborating measures for preventing nuclear war. That is the approach of the socialist countries, including the People's Republic of Bulgaria, and it is reflected in a number of documents, in particular CD/355, CD/406, submitted by the German Democratic Republic, and CD/434.

My delegation has often dwelled on the merits of such measures as the non-first-use of nuclear weapons and the freeze of nuclear arsenals. The effectiveness and applicability of these two measures are receiving increasingly active support from a number of governments, as is evident from relevant resolutions of the thirty-eighth session of the United Nations General Assembly.

Out of the spectrum of measures for the prevention of nuclear war proposed by the socialist countries, some are designed to settle, on a priority basis, the political task of removing the immediate threat of a nuclear conflict hanging over mankind; others of these measures seek to shape an international legal form for international obligations to be assumed in this field. A third group of measures is aimed at the non-admissibility of creating a material basis for new weapon-systems, including in outer space -- **systems which could** destabilize the strategic situation and thus enhance the risks of a nuclear war.

In this connection the Bulgarian delegation welcomes the further development of this approach in the speech delivered by K.U. Chernenko, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on 2 March. The Soviet leader mapped out the main norms which should govern relations among the nuclear-weapon States, and proposed that these norms be mutually recognized and be made of mandatory character. A major focal point of this idea is the singling out, as a primary goal, of the prevention of nuclear war, as well as the readiness to press step-by-step, on the basis of the principle of equal security, for the reduction of nuclear arms up to their complete liquidation in all their varieties. Furthermore, the proposals envisage the solution of additional issues related to nuclear weapons, something which will give the measures on the prevention of nuclear war a comprehensive and lasting character.



(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

I should like to add that my delegation regards the proposals on the obligations of the nuclear-weapon States as being entirely consistent with paragraph 58 and other relevant paragraphs of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

Naturally, the ideas contained in the speech of the Soviet leader, Mr. Chernenko, have a much wider scope and importance. They have been welcomed by responsible circles throughout the world as a reiteration of the peaceful course of the Soviet Union. It is now for the West to respond in a positive manner to the constructive approach of the USSR.

One of the areas in which the Conference on Disarmament should make its own contribution to reversing the negative developments in international affairs is the solution of the prevention of nuclear war. In order for the efforts of the States which are interested in the elaboration of appropriate practical measures on the prevention of nuclear war to be conducive to reaching decisions, the whole process of elaboration and agreement upon such measures ought to be channelled in a subsidiary negotiating body. As stated in document CD/434, a group of socialist countries has proposed a formula for the mandate of such a body. The mandate proposed by us is sufficiently flexible and provides a margin for taking into consideration all ideas and viewpoints. In practical terms this means that in a future working body the necessary attention will be devoted to all suggestions submitted so far by the socialist countries, the Group of 21 and the Western countries. On the other hand we ought to allow for a certain graduation of the measures from the point of view of their scope and effectiveness. Finding precise and mutually acceptable criteria to determine priorities among individual measures can be feasible, of course, only as a result of harmonizing the ideas of the various delegations. As for my delegation, it is ready to share some of its considerations in this respect now.

It is interesting to note that resolutions 37/78 and 38/133 G make a distinction between the issue of the prevention of nuclear war as such, and the issue of the reduction of the risks of nuclear war. Both issues are "of the highest priority and of vital interest to all the peoples of the world". Therefore, measures have to be adopted in these two spheres.

It is the considered view of the Bulgarian delegation that the successful solution of the issue of reducing the risks of nuclear war, though desirable, would not eliminate the real causes of the threat of nuclear war. Consequently, the adoption of measures in this area without implementing measures to prevent nuclear war would not be sufficient.

Proceeding from these premises and having in mind the relevant proposals put forward by different countries, the Bulgarian delegation would suggest the following structure of measures:

- A. Priority measures to prevent nuclear war;
- B. Legal measures for the prevention of nuclear war and the strengthening of the regime of non-use of force in international relations;
- C. Measures aimed at reducing the risks of nuclear war.

(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

An analysis of the positions taken by a number of delegations on the issue of prevention of nuclear war would indicate a generally-shared conviction that the immediate danger of an outbreak of nuclear war in present-day circumstances emanates above all from the creation by certain countries of a nuclear first-strike potential, based on qualitatively new nuclear-weapon systems, the promotion of doctrines permitting the use of nuclear weapons etc., as well as the concept of minimizing the distinction between nuclear and conventional weapons.

Therefore, measures aimed at the renunciation by all nuclear-weapon States of the first-use of nuclear weapons, at a freeze on their nuclear arsenals, both quantitatively and qualitatively, and at the declaration by all nuclear-weapon States of a moratorium on all nuclear explosions, pending the conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, have a distinct priority over all other measures.

Measures aimed at limiting the scope of the arms race -- particularly in those areas in which it is most likely that destabilizing effects would arise -- could also be included in this group. Here I have in mind measures aimed inter alia at preventing an arms race in outer space.

The above-mentioned considerations are without prejudice to proposals such as the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, a treaty on the non-use of force in international relations, as well as a treaty between the countries of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the countries of NATO on the mutual renunciation of the use of military force and on the maintenance of peaceful relations.

Bearing in mind that there are further possibilities for perfecting the system for preventing the outbreak of an accidental nuclear war, steps such as preventing accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons, avoiding the possibility of surprise attacks etc., should also be elaborated.

In suggesting this structure of measures, the Bulgarian delegation wishes to draw the attention of the Conference to an organizational framework which is consonant with the urgency of the task of preventing nuclear war, takes into account the widely acknowledged priorities in this field and is based on a legal concept for the ultimate solution of the problem of prevention of nuclear war.

The suggested approach is not prejudicial to the discussion, provided it is held in a subsidiary body, of "all related matters", on which emphasis is placed in documents CD/357, submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany, and CD/411, submitted by a group of Western countries. However, my delegation disagrees with the obvious tendency in those documents to substitute the negotiation of measures by the idea of "developing a view of the full scope of the subject-matter (of prevention of nuclear war) by considering an indicative list of sub-items."

Comrade President, in conclusion my delegation wishes to express its readiness to participate in the consultations taking place under your presidency with a view to achieving a common understanding regarding the setting up of a subsidiary body on the prevention of nuclear war and on its appropriate mandate. While my delegation pledges its support for this method, it wishes, at the same time, to appeal to all interested delegations to intensify efforts so that a mutually acceptable solution may be found as quickly as possible, in accordance with the urgency and the importance of the issue of preventing nuclear war.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Bulgaria for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the President.

In accordance with the decision taken by the Conference at its 248th plenary meeting, I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Turkey, Ambassador Türkmen.

Mr. TÜRKMEN (Turkey): Mr. President, I wish to thank the members of the Conference for this opportunity to make a statement. It is extremely gratifying that I take the floor at a time when the representative of Romania is in the Chair. Indeed, not only do Turkey and Romania enjoy close and fruitful ties of friendly and neighbourly co-operation, but you happen to be an old colleague and friend for whom I have the greatest esteem.

My Government has welcomed the renaming of the Committee on Disarmament as the Conference on Disarmament. We hope that this more appropriate name for the only world-wide multilateral negotiating body on disarmament matters will also signal a renewed effort for progress on vital issues confronting the Conference.

The Conference is meeting this year at a time when the international situation is causing grave concern for all countries of the world. The crucial negotiations on the reduction of strategic and intermediate-range nuclear forces between the United States and the Soviet Union have been suspended amidst increased tension and a disturbing level of mutual recrimination and mistrust. The international situation has been further darkened by the ominous developments in the Middle East. We all realize that no progress can be achieved without determined and persistent efforts by both countries to resume the dialogue and to recreate a minimum degree of confidence between them.

Because of its geographical situation Turkey, a developing country, has to devote substantial resources to its defence. Our country is, on the other hand, adjoining an area which has become the focal point of tension and instability and, where a devastating and increasingly cruel war has been going on for more than three years without any immediate prospect of peace. We therefore share intensely the aspirations for an improvement in the international climate, an end to bloodshed in regional conflicts, a real detente between East and West and concrete progress in the field of disarmament, in order to promote peace and enhance security.

In this present climate of international relations, we have seen a ray of hope in the convening in Stockholm of the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe. This Conference can greatly contribute to detente and arms control and disarmament, if it succeeds in adopting measures which will increase mutual confidence and security. The Stockholm Conference, following the satisfactory conclusion of the Madrid Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, has demonstrated the existence of a firm intention to pursue the dialogue notwithstanding adverse international circumstances. We intend to take an active part in the Stockholm Conference, as we did in the other fora which have preceded it and to contribute to the aim of working out militarily significant, politically binding and verifiable confidence-building measures which could be implemented throughout Europe.

(Mr. Türkmen, Turkey)

We equally feel satisfaction over the expected resumption of the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) talks in Vienna. Conscious of the dangers of the arms race, not only in the nuclear field but also in the conventional field, we attach great importance to the MBFR talks between the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries. We are convinced that the reduction of forces in Central Europe will constitute a step forward in the direction of establishing equilibrium between the two military alliances at a lower level of armaments than the present one, provided that guarantees for the security of flank countries like Turkey are included.

At the present stage, where deep anxiety is mingled with uncertain hope, the work of the Conference on Disarmament acquires great significance. A breakthrough on even one of the issues coming within the purview of this Conference will generate a feeling of trust and exert constructive influence on other arms control and disarmament negotiations and on East-West relations in general. In this context, we share the view that priority should be given to an agreement on chemical weapons. Turkey, which signed the 1925 Geneva Protocol as long ago as 1929, looks forward to a broader agreement complementing it.

An agreement on the destruction of chemical weapons and the banning of their development, production and stockpiling requires an effective verification system. There have been remarkable developments in the procedures and techniques for the verification of non-production. Turkey, like so many countries, also welcomes the constructive approach of the representative of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Issraelyan, on 21 February regarding a permanent presence of representatives of international control agencies at the facilities where destruction of these weapons will take place.

This approach and the positive reaction it has elicited will, we hope, give a new impetus to the work of the Conference in the field of chemical weapons. We anticipate that the draft convention which will soon be submitted by the United States will be instrumental in channelling the discussion towards a concrete and positive conclusion.

As far as the proposal for a chemical weapon-free zone in Europe is concerned, we hold the view that a regional approach to the problem of banning chemical weapons will not be appropriate. If there can be an agreement on the substance of a convention on chemical weapons in Europe, there is no reason why such a convention should not be global in its scope and we are all deeply aware of the urgent need for an effective global ban.

A comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty has long been considered as a fundamental element in restraining the arms race and preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. It would not be a disarmament measure in itself, but would constitute an important step forward. Needless to say, to be effective such a treaty would have to be binding on all countries possessing nuclear weapons. Further delays would in our view also endanger the cause of non-proliferation. This Conference has been rightly reminded by many speakers that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has established a link between the obligations of the States possessing nuclear weapons and of the non-nuclear-weapon States.

(Mr. Türkmen, Turkey)

We hope that the nuclear-weapon States, in their approach to the nuclear test-ban treaty, as well as to other areas of nuclear-arms control and disarmament, will bear in mind this fundamental relationship.

We are fully aware of the potential horrors of a nuclear conflict and of the importance and urgency of the item concerning the prevention of nuclear war and all its related aspects. There is no doubt that every effort should be made to eliminate the possibilities of a nuclear war, but it would be illusory to think that this could be achieved by focusing our attention exclusively on nuclear weapons. What is necessary is to try to prevent war, whether it is nuclear or conventional. It is in this context that we would like to point out that we find it very difficult to reconcile with existing political and strategic realities the idea that some geographical areas in Europe could become non-nuclear havens during a nuclear exchange.

A potential arms race in outer space is a cause of deep anxiety since we know that already some systems are being tested and new weapons developed. We hope that an agreement could rapidly evolve in the Conference as to the best manner this problem could be tackled.

Much work has been done in the Conference on radiological weapons and it is the hope of my Government that the difficulties which have emerged in this area could be surmounted. An agreement on this issue will surely have a positive influence on other multilateral disarmament negotiations.

Before concluding, I should like to address myself to the question of the enlargement of the Conference. As many of the member States are aware, my country has since 1978 consistently played a leading role in all efforts aiming at the enlargement of the Committee on Disarmament. We have welcomed the decision in favour of a limited enlargement as a step in the right direction, and we have put forward our candidacy for membership. We believe that a periodic review of the composition of the Conference on Disarmament, as envisaged in its rules of procedure, needs to be made in order to enable "militarily-significant" States to be admitted, as is called for by the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. I can assure you, Mr. President, that if my country should become a member, it will not fail to bring to the Conference a contribution commensurate with its long-standing commitment to peace, international security and disarmament.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Turkey for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the President.

I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of the United States of America, Ambassador Fields.

Mr. FIELDS (United States of America): Mr. President, tomorrow the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum celebrates its twenty-second birthday. Over those 22 years since the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee first met, the body has undergone change and growth: we are now 40 members. We have changed our name several times, most recently this year. We have a few achievements to our credit, including our contributions to the first measure designed to prevent nuclear war — the "hot line" agreement; to the first nuclear test ban — the limited test-ban treaty; to the first prohibition on the development, production and stockpiling of an entire class of weapons — the biological weapons convention; and to the landmark disarmament and arms control agreement — the non-proliferation treaty. Mr. President, that is not too bad for only a 22-year old!

I must say, however, that we must not rest on our laurels. There are many challenges to be met, many areas of urgent need to be addressed. Our agenda is far from over.

One of the great issues which confronts us today is the unfinished agenda with respect to chemical weapons.

It is on this item that I take the floor today. In my statement of 23 February, I reiterated the importance which the United States attaches to the negotiation of a complete and verifiable ban on chemical weapons. Such a ban would complement existing international agreements and customary international law, including the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, commonly referred to as the Geneva Protocol of 1925.

As members of the Conference are aware, the United States has expressed concern over the use of chemical weapons in various regions of the world. The United States strongly condemns the use of chemical weapons — whenever or wherever it occurs. Consistent with this position, the United States has supported efforts by the United Nations to investigate reports of the use of chemical weapons. The United States has also supported the efforts of the United Nations, pending eventual formal arrangements, to establish procedures to make possible the prompt and impartial investigation of information concerning possible violations of the provisions of the Geneva Protocol of 1925. It has done so because we believe that the legal and moral authority of this instrument is vital, not only on its own terms, but because the Geneva Protocol is an important basis for our own work in the field of disarmament.

Accordingly, the United States has noted with deep concern reports that chemical weapons have been used in the tragic ongoing conflict between Iraq and Iran. As all members of the Conference are by now no doubt aware, the United States Department of State issued a statement on this matter on 5 March. The statement makes clear that the United States has concluded that available evidence indicates that Iraq has used lethal chemical weapons in this conflict and that such a use of chemical weapons constitutes a serious breach of the Protocol and of related rules of customary international law. This situation requires the urgent attention of the world community. In this regard, we note the decision on 8 March by the United Nations Secretary-General, Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar, to "send experts to Iran to ascertain the facts with reference to allegations of chemical warfare." We understand that these experts have, in fact, been dispatched to Teheran, and are as we meet today at work on their important mission.

(Mr. Fields, United States)

The United States has been working with other nations for many years to establish a treaty banning production, development and stockpiling of chemical weapons. Secretary of State George Shultz announced in Stockholm that we will be presenting a draft treaty for the complete and verifiable elimination of chemical weapons, on a global basis. The use of chemical weapons in violation of international agreements and customary international law in recent conflicts, including the Iran-Iraq war, adds to the urgency of this undertaking. It underscores the pressing need for a global ban on chemical weapons.

International legal constraints, based upon humanitarian concerns, guide us in our efforts to stop any use of chemical weapons, hopefully before it starts, as well as in our desire to ban such weapons from the face of the earth. In the same vein, we all deplore the tragic and needless loss of both Iranian and Iraqi lives, especially those suffered through attacks on civilian populations. We urge both States to respect their obligations under international conventions designed to mitigate the human suffering resulting from warfare and to accept the good offices offered by a number of countries and international organizations to put an end to the bloodshed. We note that the Secretary-General of the United Nations has cited the use of children by Iran as combat soldiers in this brutal conflict in violation of its obligations under the Geneva conventions. Thus we find that the Gulf war is marked by flagrant and appalling disregard not only of human life but of international law and accepted norms of behaviour among nations.

As we blow out the 22 candles on our birthday cake tomorrow, let us collectively make the wish that all conflict — but especially this sordid and bloody war in the Gulf — will soon be at an end, and let each of us resolve anew that we shall pursue with vigour and conviction the achievement of an effective and verifiable chemical weapons ban so that mankind will never again have to fear these abhorrent weapons.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of the United States of America for his statement.

That was the last speaker on my list for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor? If not, I now intend to suspend this plenary meeting, which will be resumed after this afternoon's informal meeting on organizational matters. The informal meeting will be held in this room at 3.30 p.m.

The meeting was suspended at 12.20 p.m. and resumed at 4.p.m.

The PRESIDENT (speaking in English): The plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is resumed.

I intend now to put before the Conference for decision Working Papers Nos. 107 to 119, which have been circulated by the secretariat in response to requests for participation and further clarifications received from 13 non-members. As usual, we will take up the draft decisions one by one, in the order in which the original requests were received from non-members. The first request came from

(The President)

Norway, and the relevant decision is contained in Working Paper No. 107. 1/ If there is no objection, I will take it that the Conference adopts the draft decision.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I shall now take the request of Finland, and the relevant decision is contained in Working Paper No. 108. 2/ If there is no objection I will take it that the Conference adopts the draft decision.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I shall now take the request of Denmark, and the relevant decision is contained in Working Paper No. 109. 3/ If there is no objection I will take it that the Conference adopts the draft decision.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I shall now take the request of New Zealand, and the relevant decision is contained in Working Paper No. 110. 4/ If there is no objection I will take it that the Conference adopts the draft decision.

It was so decided.

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1/ "In response to the request of Norway (CD/450 and CD/451) and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of its rules of procedure, the Conference decides for the present to invite the representative of Norway to participate during 1984 in the plenary meetings of the Conference and in the subsidiary bodies established under items 4, 6 and 8 of its agenda."

2/ "In response to the request of Finland (CD/452 and CD/453) and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of its rules of procedure, the Conference decides for the present to invite the representative of Finland to participate during 1984 in the plenary meetings of the Conference and in the subsidiary bodies established under items 4 and 6 of its agenda."

3/ "In response to the request of Denmark (CD/454 and CD/455) and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of its rules of procedure, the Conference decides for the present to invite the representative of Denmark to participate during 1984 in the plenary meetings of the Conference and in the subsidiary body established under item 4 of its agenda."

4/ "In response to the request of New Zealand (CD/456 and CD/457) and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of its rules of procedure, the Conference decides for the present to invite the representative of New Zealand to participate during 1984 in the plenary meetings of the Conference and in the subsidiary body established under item 4 of its agenda."



The PRESIDENT: I shall now take the request of Turkey, and the relevant decision is contained in Working Paper No. 111. 5/ If there is no objection I will take it that the Conference adopts the draft decision.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I shall now take the request of Bangladesh, and the relevant decision is contained in Working Paper No. 112. 6/ If there is no objection I will take it that the Conference adopts the draft decision.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I shall now take the request of Austria, and the relevant decision is contained in Working Paper No. 113. 7/ If there is no objection I will take it that the Conference adopts the draft decision.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I shall now take the request of Viet Nam, and the relevant decision is contained in Working Paper No. 114. 8/ If there is no objection I will take it that the Conference adopts the draft decision.

It was so decided.

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5/ "In response to the request of Turkey (CD/458 and CD/459) and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of its rules of procedure, the Conference decides for the present to invite the representative of Turkey to participate during 1984 in the plenary meetings of the Conference and in the subsidiary body established under item 4 of its agenda."

6/ "In response to the request of Bangladesh (CD/460 and CD/461) and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of its rules of procedure, the Conference decides for the present to invite the representative of Bangladesh to participate during 1984 in the plenary meetings of the Conference and in the subsidiary body established under item 8 of its agenda."

7/ "In response to the request of Austria (CD/462 and CD/463) and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of its rules of procedure, the Conference decides for the present to invite the representative of Austria to participate during 1984 in the plenary meetings of the Conference and in the subsidiary body established under item 4 of its agenda."

8/ "In response to the request of Viet Nam (CD/464 and CD/465) and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of its rules of procedure, the Conference decides for the present to invite the representative of Viet Nam to address its plenary meeting on 27 March on item 6 of its agenda."

The PRESIDENT: I shall now take the request of Portugal, and the relevant decision is contained in Working Paper No. 115. 9/ If there is no objection I will take it that the Conference adopts the draft decision.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I shall now take the request of Spain, and the relevant decision is contained in Working Paper No. 116. 10/ If there is no objection I will take it that the Conference adopts the draft decision.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I shall now take the request of Colombia, and the relevant decision is contained in Working Paper No. 117. 11/ If there is no objection I will take it that the Conference adopts the draft decision.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I shall now take the request of Senegal, and the relevant decision is contained in Working Paper No. 118. 12/ If there is no objection I will take it that the Conference adopts the draft decision.

It was so decided.

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9/ "In response to the request of Portugal (CD/466 and CD/467) and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of its rules of procedure, the Conference decides for the present to invite the representative of Portugal to participate during 1984 in the plenary meetings of the Conference and in the subsidiary bodies established under items 4 and 8 of its agenda."

10/ "In response to the request of Spain (CD/468 and CD/469) and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of its rules of procedure, the Conference decides for the present to invite the representative of Spain to participate during 1984 in the plenary meetings of the Conference and in the subsidiary bodies established under items 4, 6 and 8 of its agenda."

11/ "In response to the request of Colombia (CD/470 and CD/471) and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of its rules of procedure, the Conference decides for the present to invite the representative of Colombia to participate during 1984 in the plenary meetings of the Conference and in the subsidiary bodies established under items 4, 6 and 8 of its agenda."

12/ "In response to the request of Senegal (CD/472 and CD/473) and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of its rules of procedure, the Conference decides for the present to invite the representative of Senegal to participate during 1984 in the plenary meetings of the Conference and in the subsidiary bodies established under items 4, 6 and 8 of its agenda."

The PRESIDENT: I shall now take the request of Switzerland, and the relevant decision is contained in Working Paper No. 119. 13/ If there is no objection I will take it that the Conference adopts the draft decision.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I already have two delegations on my list and I now give the floor to Ambassador Meiszter of Hungary.

Mr. MEISZTER (Hungary): Comrade President, allow me to begin by congratulating you on your succession to the Presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. It is more than a simple pleasure to see you, the representative of a neighbouring socialist country in the Chair. As I have had the chance to admire your diplomatic skill at another multilateral forum, I feel not only pleased but also confident that you will continue to lead our Conference towards meaningful and businesslike negotiations, as did your predecessor, Ambassador Turbanski of Poland, during the usually difficult opening month of our yearly session.

With your permission, Comrade President, I wish to express the satisfaction of the Hungarian delegation over the fact that the Conference has once again succeeded in overcoming another obstacle of a purely procedural nature. Such simple problems, however, when left unsolved for long may tend to grow in weight and importance, and after a while may acquire the power of creating unwelcome trends and precedents. We hope that the solution of the problem of the orderly and unhindered participation of non-member States in the work of the Conference on Disarmament will also set a good precedent for the future.

The Hungarian delegation, like the other socialist delegations, or I should rather say, the great majority of delegations present, has always been eager to create favourable conditions for every non-member State that feels ready to contribute to the efforts of this body. We believe sincerely that all peoples have a vital interest in the success of what this Conference is called upon to do -- that is, to negotiate concrete and practical measures of disarmament. Consequently, the representatives of those peoples have the duty to contribute to our common efforts, but they must also have the right to participate in our work whenever they feel that the negotiations here have a direct bearing on their national security.

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13/ "In response to the request from Switzerland (CD/474) and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of its rules of procedure, the Conference decides for the present to invite the representative of Switzerland to participate during 1984 in the subsidiary body established under item 4 of its agenda."

(Mr. Meiszter, Hungary)

This principle has long been embodied in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, and in a somewhat more practical manner, in our rules of procedure. In most cases the rules have been applied properly and usually with great flexibility. Whenever it came to the participation of non-member States, my delegation was always guided by the desire to treat the application of the representatives of every sovereign State on an equal footing, without any discrimination whatsoever.

That has been the practice of the Hungarian delegation in previous years, and we intend to stick to it also in the future. We know very well that discrepancies between the rules and certain individual aspirations may appear from time to time. However, the Conference as a whole and all the delegations should always be guided by one overwhelming interest: the promotion of the cause of disarmament. And whenever rules and practice are not fully in harmony, it is always safe to find refuge in the rules.

In conclusion, Comrade President, let me once again say simply that the Hungarian delegation welcomes the solution of another procedural problem, and while complimenting non-member States on their readiness to contribute to our negotiations, I would like to hope that similar will and readiness will characterize the delegations of all the member States in our search for solutions to all the other outstanding problems.

Mr. DE SOUZA E SILVA (Brazil): Mr. President, I would like to state for the record the position of the Brazilian delegation on the question of participation by non-member States in the work of the Conference. I wish to do so because the long-awaited decision that the Conference has just taken was made possible by imposing a procedure that implies restrictions on the modalities of the participation by those who applied for it.

Perhaps because of the poor record of achievement of our Conference and its predecessors, the work carried out here does not seem to raise considerable interest from all members of the United Nations and its observers. Nevertheless, the Final Document recognizes the vital interest of all peoples in the success of disarmament negotiations and the duty of all States to contribute to efforts in this field. That in itself should constitute reason enough for this Conference to adopt, as a matter of course, an open and non-discriminatory attitude with regard to requests for participation, particularly in the case of States Members of the United Nations.

(Mr. de Souza e Silva, Brazil)

There is more to be said, however. Membership in the United Nations is one of the ways by which, in modern international law, a State is recognized as a member of the international community, or by which a Government receives recognition by other Governments. To sit alongside the representative of a government at the General Assembly of the United Nations or in an international organization or conference, particularly those within the United Nations system, amounts to tacit recognition of the legitimacy of such a representation.

There is no valid reason why the same rule should not apply here, irrespective of how one regards the relationship between this Conference and the United Nations. All 40 governments represented in this Chamber are part of the United Nations as are all of the current applicants for participation, be they members or observers in the international organization. Denial or restriction of participation under our rules of procedure to a State member of the United Nations is therefore illegal, illegitimate and undemocratic.

It is illegal because the recognized principles and practices of international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, uphold the equality of States and allow no distinctions among those which are members of the Organization. The rule must apply to all.

It is illegitimate because such denials or restrictions are commonly based on regional rivalry or local bickering, motives that do not seem to fit in the context of the responsibilities and duties assigned to all States with regard to disarmament in a document of no less standing than the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

Last, but not least, it is undemocratic because it discriminates among equals. One of the basic principles of modern democracies, responsible for the outbreak of liberation movements in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, is the principle of "no taxation without representation". This Conference, even if regarded by some as completely independent from the United Nations, is serviced and funded by the world organization, out of its regular budget, to which all States members of the United Nations contribute. One cannot deny or restrict a contributor from participating in a body to whose maintenance and functioning it pays its agreed share.

Parochial interests related to the dislike of individual countries for the governments or the policies of other States, at least when such States are members of the United Nations, must not interfere with the higher interest of co-operation towards the common goal of disarmament. All 40 members of this Conference should adhere to the principle that all requests for participation be automatically accepted whenever the applicant is a fully recognized Member State of the United Nations or enjoys the status of Observer. The use of artificial procedural devices in order to veto individual States' applications or to restrict their participation is but another instance of how the rivalry and confrontation between major Powers continue to be an obstacle to fruitful multilateral co-operation in the field of disarmament.

Mr. CARASALES (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, in the past, when the problem of the participation of non-member States in the work of this Conference was discussed at informal meetings of the Conference, my delegation had the opportunity to make its views known. If I do so again now, it is to place them on record. My delegation's point of view is that over and above the provisions of our rules of procedure, the Conference must take a specific decision on this issue: there must be a formula for the automatic acceptance of any request for participation in our work by any Member State of the United Nations. The procedures to which non-member States wishing with good reason to participate in our work have been subjected on this occasion, as also in the past, are not the most desirable in my delegation's opinion, because they restrict our Conference, nor do they respect what should be universally valid principles. Without wishing to go into the grounds for this view in any greater detail, I shall confine myself to placing on record my delegation's position, which is wholly favourable to the automatic acceptance of any request for the participation in our work; and to expressing the hope that suitable rules will be adopted so that this wish may become a reality in our procedures. Thank you.

Mr. GARCÍA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, as I have had the opportunity of recalling on other occasions in our informal meetings, in July 1980, or more than three years ago, the Mexican delegation submitted a Working Paper under the symbol CD/129. That Working Paper contained, and still contains, draft amendments to section IX of the rules of procedure of the Committee on Disarmament, concerning participation by States not members of the Committee. What has occurred this year can certainly not be compared with what happened in 1980, when we wasted several months discussing this question. However, it is now mid-March, and it is only now that it has been possible to take a decision on requests for participation dated last December or January. I therefore believe that at the first opportune moment whatever group is considered best qualified to consider procedural matters, whether the "Group of Wise Men" or any other, should be asked to study those draft amendments. Their purpose is very simple, namely, to put down on paper explicitly what in my opinion is already expressly or explicitly very clear in paragraph 120 of the Final Document. In other words, the Committee is not doing a favour to those States which request to participate in its discussions on questions of interest to them. It is not doing them a favour in replying in the affirmative to their requests. Those States have the right to participate. I do not wish to dwell on this matter now. The amendments are crystal clear, and are followed by an explanatory commentary. My delegation is gratified that we have today been able to take an affirmative decision without the delay which had to be tolerated in 1980, and in good measure thanks to the dignified manner in which you guided the informal consultations. I repeat, however, that without waiting until difficulties arise with regard to a specific request, when everything would become more difficult, my delegation would suggest that at an opportune time this issue should be tackled in a general manner and given a general and permanent solution.

Mr. ISSRAELIAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Thank you, Comrade President. The Soviet delegation attaches great importance to the question of broad participation by States in the consideration of disarmament issues. The Soviet Union is the State which in fact brought to the attention of the international community the question of the convening of a universal organ

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

for disarmament negotiations: a World Disarmament Conference, with the participation of all States without exception. In his letter to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, dated 6 September 1971, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, Mr. A.A. Gromyko, stated that "the genuine universality of such a conference is a major earnest of its success. All States must be represented at this world disarmament forum on an equal footing".

The Soviet Union continues to hold this view, and it is not through any fault of ours that agreement has not so far been reached on the convening of a world disarmament conference with the participation of all States without exception. Needless to say, the Soviet Union also supports the provision of the Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament to the effect that "all States have the right to participate in disarmament negotiations. They have the right to participate on an equal footing in those multilateral disarmament negotiations which have a direct bearing on their national security".

Proceeding from this position, which is one of principle, the Soviet Union welcomes the desire of States which are not members of the Conference on Disarmament to participate actively in its work, and to make their contribution to the solution of the urgent problems before the Conference. We consider that the wider the circle of States which participates in a serious and effective manner in our negotiations, the more solid will be the results of our work, and the greater the support it will enjoy from the entire world community. Thus, the Soviet delegation supported the requests of (and I list the States in Russian alphabetical order) Austria, Bangladesh, Viet Nam, Denmark, Spain, Colombia, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Senegal, Turkey, Finland and Switzerland. It goes without saying that when the delegations of Greece, Ireland, Cameroon and Ecuador submit their clarificatory letters, we will be ready to support their requests too. In other words, we advocate that all States which have expressed the wish to do so should have the possibility of participating in the work of the Conference and its subsidiary bodies without any exception or any type of discrimination whatsoever. Discrimination in this sphere is absolutely inadmissible, and contrary to the rules of procedure of the Conference on Disarmament and the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament as well as to the goals and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. The efforts of States seeking to make their contribution to a major form of strengthening peace and security through disarmament must not be hindered. We have condemned, and shall continue to condemn, such discrimination. Moreover, the Soviet Union will not tolerate discrimination.

We are in favour of resolving the difficulties which have arisen in the past, and we are therefore ready to take a positive approach to the proposal of Mexico submitted in 1980, to which Ambassador García Robles has just referred.

Needless to say, the participation of non-members in the work of the Conference must be in accordance with the rules of procedure. Compliance with these rules is an earnest of the fruitfulness of such participation and it is in the interests of the member States of the Conference themselves. In this connection, we are gratified that the States which are not members of the Conference took into consideration the observations expressed by a group of socialist countries, and we wish them success in their participation in the work of the Conference.

Mr. QIAN JIADONG (China) (translated from Chinese): Mr. President, the participation of non-member States in the work of the Conference has been settled at last, due to the efforts undertaken by all sides. Although there was a delay, fortunately it was not too long.

The Chinese delegation is very pleased that this year so many countries have expressed their interest in the Conference on Disarmament and have applied for participation in its work. This shows once again that disarmament is indeed a question of great importance and concern to all the governments and peoples of the world. The Chinese delegation agrees to accept the requests of Norway, Finland, Denmark, New Zealand, Turkey, Bangladesh, Austria, Portugal, Spain, Colombia, Senegal and Switzerland, and extends its welcome to them. We believe that their participation as non-members will contribute to the work of the Conference. In the same way as the Conference accepted, before the question of participation of non-members was taken up, the requests to address the Conference by the distinguished Undersecretary of State of Finland, the distinguished Secretary of State of Norway, and the distinguished ambassador of Turkey, we also agree to the request of Viet Nam to make a statement on agenda item 6 on 27 March.

With the bitter experience of last year in mind, many of us here have expressed the desire that this year we should not again spend too much time on organizational matters of the Conference. The Chinese delegation shares this view. In our opinion, the question of participation of non-member States could be settled very easily if only the rules of procedure of the Conference and the practice established over the years are followed. It is stipulated very clearly in the rules of procedure that applications from non-member States are subject to consideration by the Conference before decisions are taken thereon. It is my understanding that, generally speaking, or in most cases, such applications should not only be accepted as a matter of course, but even welcomed. However, this can in no way be interpreted as ruling out individual exceptions. Since applications have to be considered, then it follows in principle that more than one conclusion stemming from such consideration should be allowed.

Some delegates are of the view that there should be no reason for the Conference on Disarmament to reject a request for participation in the work of the Conference by any United Nations Member State. Such a view as I have just said is in general tenable, although the Conference is not a body under the United Nations. My understanding is that, by accepting the participation of a United Nations Member State in the work of the Conference, we are showing respect not only for that particular State, but also for the United Nations Organization. As far as the very great majority of United Nations Member States is concerned, there is indeed no reason to reject them, if they should submit applications for participation in the work of the Conference as non-members. However, if there is a State that acts in violation of the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter and refuses to implement the resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly, or in other words, itself shows no respect for the United Nations, must we also be obliged to accept its application? If so, would that not amount to failing ourselves to show respect for the United Nations? In such a case, it is probably only by rejecting the application of that State that we can show our respect for and defence of the United Nations, the United Nations Charter and United Nations resolutions. Instances in the past show that there have been cases in which



(Mr. Qian Jiadong, China)

applications from more than one United Nations Member State were not accepted by the Conference. And it is known to all that some States that advocate non-discrimination against any application by non-member States have themselves discriminated against at least one United Nations Member State. One may even ask hypothetically: if the racist regime of South Africa or a State such as Israel also comes and requests to participate in the work of the Conference, what will we do? What kind of decision should we take?

We are very glad that the participation by non-member States in the work of the Conference on Disarmament has been settled. We think that all parties concerned will be pleased with the outcome, or should feel pleased. Under these circumstances, we think there is no further need for statements. However, since some delegates have deemed it necessary to make statements, I have also made the above brief remarks in the hope of achieving a better understanding of the position of the Chinese delegation and benefiting the work of the Conference on Disarmament in the days to come.

Thank you, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of China. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor? That does not seem to be the case.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 15 March, at 10.30 a.m. The meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 4.45 p.m.



# CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.250  
15 March 1984  
ENGLISH

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## FINAL RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND FIFTIETH PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva  
on Thursday, 15 March 1984, at 10.30 a.m.

President:

Mr. I. Datcu

(Romania)

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

<u>Algeria:</u>	Mr. A. TAFFAR
<u>Argentina:</u>	Mr. J.J. CARASALES Mr. R. GARCIA MORITAN
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<u>Belgium:</u>	Mr. M. DEPASSE Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE
<u>Brazil:</u>	Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA Mr. S. QUEIROZ DUARTE
<u>Bulgaria:</u>	Mr. K. TELLALOV. Mr. P. POPTCHEV Mr. C. PRAMOV
<u>Burma:</u>	U MAUNG MAUNG GYI U PE THEIN TIN
<u>Canada:</u>	Mr. G. SKINNER
<u>China:</u>	Mr. QIAN JIADONG Ms. WANG ZHIYUN Mr. LI WEIMIN Mr. LIANG DEFENG
<u>Cuba:</u>	Mr. P. NUNEZ MOSQUERA
<u>Czechoslovakia:</u>	Mr. M. VEJVODA Mr. A. CIMA
<u>Egypt:</u>	Ms. W. BASSIM
<u>Ethiopia:</u>	Mr. F. YOHANNES

France:

Mr. F. DE LA GORCE  
Mr. G. MONTASSIER  
Mr. GESBERT

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. H. ROSE  
Mr. J. DEMBSKI

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. H. WEGENER  
Mr. F. ELBE  
Mr. M. GERDTS  
Mr. W. VON DEM HAGEN

Hungary:

Mr. D. MEISZTER  
Mr. F. GAJDA

India:

Mr. M. DUBEY  
Mr. S. KANT SHARMA

Indonesia:

Mr. S. SUTOWARDOYO  
Mr. ANDRADJATI  
Ms. P. RAMADAAN  
Mr. HARYOMATARAM  
Mr. BOEDIMAN

Islamic Republic of Iran:

Mr. F.S. SIRJANI

Italy:

Mr. M. ALESSI  
Mr. M. PAVESE  
Mr. G. ADORNI BRACCESI

Japan:

Mr. R. IMAI  
Mr. M. KONISHI  
Mr. T. ISHIGURI  
Mr. K. TANAKA  
Mr. T. KAWAKITA

Kenya:

Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES  
Mr. P. MACEDO RIBA  
Ms. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO

Mongolia:

Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG  
Mr. S.O. BOLD

Morocco:

Mr. O. HILALE

Netherlands:

Mr. J. RAMAKER  
Mr. R. J. AKKERMAN

Nigeria:

Mr. J.O. OBOH  
Mr. L.O. AKINDELE  
Mr. C.V. UDEDIBIA

Pakistan:

Mr. K. NIAZ

Peru:

Mr. A. THORNBERRY

Poland:

Mr. S. TURBANSKI  
Mr. J. CIALOWICZ  
Mr. G. CZEMPINSKI  
Mr. T. STROJWAS

Romania:

Mr. I. DATCU  
Mr. T. MELESCANU  
Mr. A. POPESCU  
Mr. A. CRETU  
Mr. O. IONESCU

Sri Lanka:

Mr. J. DHANAPALA  
Mr. P. KARIYAWASAM

Sweden:

Mr. R. EKEUS  
Mr. J. LUNDIN  
Ms. E. BONNIER  
Mr. H. BERGLUND  
Mr. L.E. WINGREN  
Ms. A. LAU

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN  
Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV  
Mr. G.V. BERDENNIKOV  
Mr. P.Y. SKOMOROKHIN  
Mr. S.V. KOBYSH  
Mr. G. ANTSIFEROV  
Mr. G. VASHADZE

United Kingdom:

Mr. R.I.T. CROMARTIE  
Mr. J.F. GORDON  
Mr. J.W.B. RICHARDS  
Mr. D.A. SLINN

United States of America:

Mr. L.G. FIELDS  
Ms. K.C. CRITTENBERGER  
Mr. R. HORNE  
Mr. L. MADSEN  
Mr. R. WATERS  
Mr. H. CALHOUN  
Mr. J. DOESBERG  
Mr. P. CORDEN  
Mr. R. NORMAN  
Mr. J. PUCKETT  
Mr. C. PEARCY

Venezuela:

Mr. O. GARCIA GARCIA  
Mr. T. LABRADOR RUBIO

Yugoslavia:

Mr. K. VIDAS  
Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC  
Mr. D. MINIC

Zaire:

Mr. M. KADIATA-NZEMBA  
Ms. E. ESAKI KABEYA

Secretary-General of the Conference on  
Disarmament and Personal Representative  
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary-General of the  
Conference on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I declare open the plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament. The Conference will continue today its consideration of item 4 of its agenda, chemical weapons. However, in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any member who so wishes may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

Distinguished delegates, it is with great pleasure that I extend a warm welcome to his Excellency Archbishop Achille Silvestrini, who currently occupies the very important post of Secretary of the Council for Public Affairs of the Church. I am sure that the Conference appreciates the interest shown in its work by the Holy See.

I have on the list of speakers for today the representatives of the Holy See, Hungary, Poland, Sweden, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Japan and Zaire, as well as the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, who will introduce the report of that Group.

In accordance with the decision taken by the Conference on Disarmament at its 248th plenary meeting, I now have great pleasure in giving the floor to the representative of the Holy See, His Excellency Archbishop Achille Silvestrini.

Archbishop SILVESTRINI (Holy See) (translated from French): Mr. President, I am honoured and happy to have the opportunity this morning of addressing such a highly qualified and competent gathering as that comprising the participants in this 1984 session of the Conference on Disarmament, the only "multilateral negotiating forum" having as its objective the achievement of consensus on aspects of vital importance for peace and collaboration among peoples.

I should like to extend special greetings to Mr. Datcu, Ambassador of Romania, and to wish him every success in the discharge of his duties as President for the month of March. At the same time, I should like to thank Mr. Turbanski, Ambassador of Poland, for the competence and efficiency with which he assumed the same responsibility as the first President of the Conference.

By its very mandate, the promotion of general and complete disarmament under effective international control, this meeting is of special importance. The long development of the Conference on Disarmament has made possible the elaboration of a draft international treaty concerning the prohibition of nuclear-weapons tests and a draft international convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, manufacture and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction.

That is a far-reaching task and one of which the Holy See realizes the significance and value. Pope John Paul II, the indefatigable apostle of peace, has expressly entrusted me with bearing witness before this Conference to the interest he takes in its work and the esteem in which he holds each of its members, who, by reason of their lofty responsibilities, are desirous of playing a part in enabling modern man to develop his marvellous talents far from the haunting spectre of what might well be irreparable conflicts.



(Archbishop Silvestrini, Holy See)

The Pope is, moreover, aware, that in encouraging the efforts of all those who are striving to build genuine peace and by issuing frequent reminders that peace is the duty of all, he is, as it were, the spokesman of millions of men and women, young and old, from near or far, who refuse to live in a world where war is seemingly staved off only by a precarious balance of power.

To tell the truth, this year's work has, despite the continuing tension, begun under what might be considered encouraging omens: on the one hand, the Stockholm Conference is striving to mark out a course that would promote mutual confidence in Europe and, on the other, there is hope of the rapid resumption in Vienna of the negotiations on the reduction of conventional weapons.

Far more remains, however, to be done as regards the determination of measures to avert the peril of nuclear war to which the Pope referred in the speech he made on 25 February 1981 in Hiroshima, at the very place where there was revealed in all its horror the terrifying reality of what a nuclear holocaust could mean. As he said, "In the face of the man-made disaster that each and every war represents, it must be asserted and reasserted, time after time, that recourse to war is neither an ineluctable nor an inevitable necessity ... Clashes of ideologies, aspirations and real needs can and must be resolved by means other than war or violence". Thanks to the good offices of the delegation of Venezuela, that text has been included among the official documents of this Conference, for which it will, I trust, remain a point of reference.

In this context, the Holy See, without wishing to pronounce on the technical aspects of the work and discussions, would, in a spirit of solidarity and service, like to share a number of its convictions, the inspiration for which is the message of Christ that so specifically enlightens the human conscience.

It is unquestionably one of the fundamental objectives of this session to deal with the prevention of nuclear war and with all related matters.

That is, beyond all doubt, a prime necessity. More and more of our fellow human beings are haunted by a terrible feeling of being on top of a volcano that might at any moment become active and unleash its destructive force, spread its mantle of death over our planet and bring to a definitive end the history of humanity.

Just think how much frustration such a feeling can engender, particularly among the young. In this world in danger of death, it brings those who wish to live, understand, love and build to ask themselves what meaning existence and what use human activity can have if total war must more and more be considered as an inevitability. Not even paternal and maternal sentiment, which carries within itself the seed of creative hope for humanity and the future, is spared by this "crisis of meaning": young couples even come to the point of wondering about the future of their offspring, terrified as they are by the thought that their children might, sooner or later, be destined to be sacrificed.

(Archbishop Silvestrini, Holy See)

Public opinion, tired of rhetoric about peace, is heedful of the least initiative, however modest, that might be, as it were, the seed of a more reassuring world and give many people the hope of a brighter tomorrow.

That is why the conclusion of a treaty banning nuclear tests would without doubt constitute a guarantee of the willingness of all States to take a new direction.

It is regrettable that the draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, to which the Holy See adhered in 1971, has not yet been able to deploy all of the dynamism underlying its provisions, partly because it has not gained the universal support that could justifiably have been expected and partly because we are far from the realization of the commitments solemnly made by the nuclear Powers which promoted it, namely to stop the arms race and ensure the gradual reduction of arms, under appropriate control, until complete disarmament was achieved.

Quite the contrary, not only has it not been possible to achieve agreed "balances" at the lowest possible level, but the door has been left open to an unbridled and highly dangerous arms race. Pope John Paul II, in his message on the occasion of the World Day of Peace, 1984, emphasized how the leaders of the nations ought to be convinced that "war is in itself irrational and that the ethical principal of the peaceful settlement of disputes is the only way worthy of man". And, as he went on to say, "... the dreadful risks of weapons of mass destruction must lead to the elaboration of processes of co-operation and disarmament that will in practice make war unthinkable".

Simultaneous and progressive disarmament, with the acceptance and organization of real international controls, would create a new climate, a climate of confidence that would have beneficial effects not only as regards strategies, but also in the social and economic domain.

As Pope John Paul II said in his homily of 1 January of this year for the World Day of Peace, "Today's world is ever more marked by contrasts, caught in a web of tensions whose agonizing and interwoven effects manifest themselves both in the relations between East and West and in those between North and South". It is precisely in this North-South context, went on the Pope, that "the most worrisome feature is the differences that the situation occasions in the human condition. In the rich countries, health and nourishment are improving, whereas in the poor countries the food necessary for survival is lacking and the mortality rate is soaring, especially among infants".

Several concomitant factors lie at the origin of this gap between the poor and the rich countries. But there is no doubt that that gap is being widened by the waste on expensive weapons of economic resources which should be used to assist the least advantaged peoples. In this situation, it is not surprising, as the Holy Father emphasized, that on the horizon of world peace there should appear, simultaneously and as terrifying as the horseman of the Apocalypse, the threat of nuclear catastrophe and the scourge of hunger in many countries.

(Archbishop Silvestrini, Holy See)

In the face of this complex reality, of whose seriousness the Holy See is, without wishing to minimize the competence with which this Conference is tackling the matter, fully aware, I should now like to stress a number of priorities capable of leading to effective disarmament and so to more stable peace.

First of all, never renounce negotiation. In the absence of a supranational authority, negotiation with a view to progressive, simultaneous and internationally controlled arms reduction remains an imperative necessity that cannot be ignored. Any agreement on even the modest immediate measures would help to reduce considerably the risk of conflict.

Next, restore trust. In order to promote a sincere and fruitful dialogue, the communication and evaluation of information must always be characterized by honesty and mutual esteem.

Finally, strive to place science and technology at the service of life, and not of war. You have in your hands the "Statement on the consequences of the use of nuclear weapons" issued by the Pontifical Academy of Sciences, copies of which Pope John Paul wished to be handed to the Heads of the nuclear-weapon States in person in 1981. This document sets out vividly the horrible consequences that the use of certain weapons would have for civilians and the environment. It is now more urgent than ever to remind ourselves that scientific research is at the service of humanity. How could anyone not share the wish expressed by the Pope that "a significant percentage of the funds devoted to arms technology and science should be reserved for the development of machinery and arrangements to guarantee human life and welfare" (Message to the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, 11 June 1982, para. 10)?

This aspect of the relationship between "science" and "weapons" seems to me particularly important with reference to weapons in outer space, radiological weapons or chemical weapons. Regarding the latter, with which this Conference is dealing at this very moment, it is highly desirable and urgent that the agreements which already exist with a view to their total prohibition should be completed and become a reality. An adequate and effective system of verification must be carefully worked out. The Holy See, which is a party to the 1925 Geneva Protocol on the prohibition of bacteriological and chemical weapons, will continue to lend its moral support to any initiative that would help to eliminate for all time the horrors of total war; it will do so in accordance with the solemn declaration of the Second Vatican Council, which renewed in this respect the expressions of condemnation already made by recent Popes. The Council stated explicitly: "Any act of war aimed indiscriminately at the destruction of entire cities or of extensive areas along with their population is a crime against God and man himself. It merits unequivocal and unhesitating condemnation" (Constitution "Gaudium et Spes", para. 80).

(Archbishop Silvestrini, Holy See)

Disarmament is a priority objective for the entire international community. Promoting peace, educating for peace, saving peace, so to speak — that is really a sphere in which the Church can make a specific contribution.

The Church unceasingly invites all people, without any distinction whatsoever, to commit themselves to ethical choices capable of ensuring lasting peace. The present situation remains a distressing one. Peace cannot be merely non-war. It is more than a technique. It is a spirit. It presupposes the putting into practice of spiritual values such as truth, freedom, justice, solidarity. It is a task for which each individual must feel personally responsible.

Recently, the Episcopates of a number of countries have made statements on the problem of weapons. It is revealing to read the titles of some of these documents intended for the formation of the Christian conscience: Justice builds peace (German Episcopate); The challenge of peace (United States Episcopate); Winning peace (French Episcopate); Disarming in order to build peace (Belgian Episcopate); Peace in justice (Dutch Episcopate); The aspiration to peace (Japanese Episcopate).

All those appeals are expressions of the same desire: to awaken minds and to assist in the "catharsis" of aggressiveness, in order to learn to show greater solidarity and love one another better.

This is to say that the world-wide Catholic Church wishes to be a leaven of peace, for she is convinced that, as Pope Paul VI said to the United Nations in 1965, if we proceed "one against the other" we go to our destruction, while if we proceed "one with the other" we plant peace in the heart of our world!

During his pilgrimage to Hiroshima, Pope John Paul II expressed the hope that the international community would succeed in giving itself "a system of laws which will regulate international relations and maintain peace just as the rule of law protects national order".

That may be considered a utopia. It may also be considered a first step towards effective disarmament. It would in any event be proof that one can always believe in human beings, in their capacity to rise above themselves, to conquer their warlike instincts and to put themselves at the service of the "civilization of love"!

In concluding, I should like to emphasize that, even where disarmament is concerned, reasons must be given for struggling! The people of our time, especially the younger generation, need great causes if they are to feel mobilized. They need to be confirmed in their reasons for living and hoping. Unity, justice, concord and the struggle against hunger, poverty and underdevelopment are certainly values

(Archbishop Silvestrini, Holy See)

that exist, but ideological confrontations or artificial divisions threaten to obscure them. For her part, the Church cannot but feel responsible for all men and women of goodwill — and they are legion throughout the world — who believe that humanity is not merely a juxtaposition of individuals and who aspire with all their being to form one universal family!

To disarm in order to live together! In this arduous task, which must always be begun anew, the Holy See is aware of being a voice that reminds people that the victory of disarmament is finally the victory of peace.

Thank you, Sir, for having given me the opportunity to make that voice heard in this assembly.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the distinguished representative of the Holy See, His Excellency Archbishop Achille Silvestrini, for the important statement he has just made. I am sure that all members of the Conference will study it with the greatest interest. Thank you, Sir.

I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Hungary, Ambassador David Meiszter.

Mr. MEISZTER (Hungarian People's Republic): Mr. President, by fortunate coincidence just the other day, an international conference of scientists of Marxist and other persuasions (Catholic, Protestant and other philosophers) took place in Hungary. The main conclusion of several days' debate was that even radical differences in their philosophies should not prevent them, believers and non-believers, from joining in common actions with a view to safeguarding the future of human kind, aimed first of all at preventing a nuclear war. It is in this spirit that my delegation welcomes the presence of His Excellency Archbishop Silvestrini at our Conference and appreciates the contribution of the Holy See to the efforts of this body. Another pleasant coincidence is also symbolic, namely that my delegation is addressing today the same subject which H.E. Archbishop Silvestrini has put at the top of the priority preoccupations of the Holy See and so eloquently expounded.

In conformity with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, today I wish to address item 3 of our agenda, entitled "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters".

The Hungarian delegation is firmly convinced that any evaluation of the objectives pursued by a nuclear war and its possible outcome proves that the initiation of a nuclear war or even the threat of it can serve no rational objective whatsoever, be it political, military, economic or otherwise.

Considering that a single thermonuclear bomb can have a destructive capacity greater than that of all the explosives used in all wars since gunpowder was invented, and bearing in mind that the use of such weapons would endanger not only presumed military targets but even the very existence of the human race as a whole, there is and there can be no task more urgent for mankind than the prevention of nuclear war by taking appropriate measures and creating the necessary political and legal environment to that effect. That is an absolute priority in the foreign policy of the Hungarian People's Republic and the basic aim of the activities of the political-military alliance to which my country belongs.

(Mr. Meiszter, Hungarian People's Republic)

It is an unfortunate fact, indeed, that all the endeavours to eliminate the threat of a nuclear war have so far failed to bring about the expected results. Quite the contrary, sizeable efforts are still being made to vindicate the right of initiating a nuclear conflict, or to legitimize what is called in the jargon of its protagonists the "nuclear option".

That is why the Hungarian delegation urges Western delegations to recognize the pressing need for real and substantive negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on the question of the prevention of nuclear war.

In our opinion, negotiations on the prevention of nuclear war could touch upon proposals like the renunciation by all the nuclear-weapon States of the first use of nuclear weapons, the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, the qualitative and quantitative freezing by all the nuclear-weapon States of all the nuclear weapons at their disposal, and a moratorium on all nuclear explosions.---

In a statement on 18 August 1983, the Hungarian delegation — in a spirit of "rational, argumentative discourse" urged recently by one of the delegations here — tried to address some of the objections raised against assuming obligations not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. That statement contained several arguments showing that the assuming of no-first-use obligations is in conformity with normal practice in international law, and with the letter and spirit of existing international treaties and agreements, including the Charter of the United Nations. Although, in the absence of reactions, "intellectual honesty" would not seem to obviate any need for a new presentation, I wish to put forward further arguments to prove from a legal point of view that — even though the use of nuclear weapons is incompatible with existing rules of international law (with the sole exception of self-defence against an aggression carried out by the same type of weapon) — there is a definite necessity to impose an explicit prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons in the form of no-first-use commitments.

The use of nuclear weapons is incompatible with existing rules of international customary and conventional law as well as with legal principles underlying the international laws of war, because it amounts, as for some of its effects, to the use of poison and poisoned weapons, because it inflicts unnecessary suffering, because it constitutes crime against humanity, and finally because it amounts to genocide.

Formal prescriptions of law bear witness to the fact that the use of nuclear weapons constitutes a breach of several rules and principles of conventional and customary international law. Those rules and principles are formalized in such legal instruments as the St. Petersburg Declaration of 1868, the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, the Geneva Protocol of 1925, the Geneva Red Cross Conventions of 1929 and 1949, Additional Protocol (I) of 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and the 1948 Genocide Convention.

(Mr. Meiszter, Hungarian People's Republic)

Any one of the breaches might in itself be sufficient to support the assertion that the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is illegal. However, the cumulative incompatibility of such an act with the rules and principles cited earlier strengthens that conclusion even more.

If one accepts the validity of that conclusion, it may then seem logical to question the necessity of taking any further contractual legal steps for the prevention of the use of nuclear weapons, that is, for the prevention of nuclear war. However, while conventional and customary international law has a definite bearing on the use of nuclear weapons, the relevant rules and principles were formulated in a pre-nuclear political and legal environment. It is a basic paradox of the twentieth century that there are no conventional rules specifically prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons, even though such a prohibition would be of paramount political, legal and humanitarian value. The existence of that basic paradox explains why it is not at all contradictory to assert, on the one hand, that the use of nuclear weapons is illegitimate as being incompatible with several rules and principles of conventional and customary international law and to affirm, on the other hand, the necessity of an explicit regulation.

There are, however, some further arguments that substantiate such a necessity.

It is well known that there exists a positive prohibition on the use of weapons with analogous destructive effects and capacity. In the case of incendiary, chemical and biological weapons, conventional and customary international law could not allow any compromise for the sake of military necessity at the expense of the needs of humanity. Because of their extremely cruel and indiscriminate effects the use of such weapons is, partially or generally, prohibited. The strange legal and moral logic applied by certain States to nuclear weapons when trying to make them a case of exception should not in any way prevent legal regulation. Positive prohibition is to be placed on the first use of nuclear weapons having analogous destructive effects — analogous, that is, to the effects of those weapons already prohibited — such as the heat effect and the poisonous effect caused by the absorption of radio-active fall-out; and having a destructive capacity which is several orders of magnitude greater than that of those weapons already prohibited.

Developments related to nuclear-weapons technology and doctrines put an increasing premium on a disarming first strike. Developments in military technology, such as the advances in missile accuracy, warhead efficiencies, the appearance of MIRV-, and later MARV-warheads, cruise missiles and technologies like Stealth, all initiated by one of the nuclear-weapon Powers during the last 10-15 years, could

(Mr. Meiszter, Hungarian People's Republic)

easily be identified as a conscious effort to improve nuclear warfighting capabilities. Those developments have been coupled with a doctrinal evolution along the lines of a strategic counterforce posture producing concepts like limited and protracted nuclear war and pre-emptive first strike. Those developments constantly challenge the technological, political and normative brakes on the use of nuclear weapons.

Furthermore, there is a need for explicit regulation because, in spite of the incompatibility of the use of nuclear weapons with existing rules of international customary and conventional law, certain States assert that such use is legal. Article 613 of the United States Law of Naval Warfare states: "There is at present no rule of international law expressly prohibiting States from the use of nuclear weapons in warfare. In the absence of express prohibition, the use of such weapons against enemy combatants and other military objectives is permitted." An analogous opinion is expressed in paragraph 35 of the United States Army's Rules of Land Warfare, as well as in other documents concerning nuclear weapons.

The group of States emphasizing that, given the Charter of the United Nations, there is no need to prohibit explicitly the use of nuclear weapons, refuses to renounce the "nuclear option", alluding to an alleged conventional superiority of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. Even if there was not an over-all conventional balance in Europe, and even if the Warsaw Treaty member States had not made numerous proposals on a mutual commitment not to be the first to use either nuclear or conventional weapons, the whole notion of the "nuclear option" would be irreconcilable with the legal principle of proportionality, according to which actions taken in self-defence or as reprisals for an alleged breach of international law must be proportional in scale to the quantum of the threat or of the force used.

The last argument testifying to the urgent necessity of explicitly prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons is the fact that, twice in the history of mankind, existing rules and principles of conventional and customary international law have failed to prevent the use of nuclear weapons.

All this makes it urgent and imperative to prohibit the use of nuclear weapons by the formalization in an explicit legal contractual rule, of renunciation of the first use of nuclear weapons. The substantive contribution such an explicit regulation might make to lessening the danger of a nuclear war cannot be challenged on the basis that no-first-use commitments are declaratory and not verifiable. As these assertions are frequently repeated even in such an authoritative disarmament negotiating body as the Conference on Disarmament, and are echoed in official statements and declarations, I would like to make a few short remarks on that score.



(Mr. Meiszter, Hungarian People's Republic)

It is often said that a no-first-use commitment is of a declaratory character. Probably it is proper to remind the Conference at this point that commitments formalized in a contractual legal form are of a binding, mandatory character. At the same time there is nothing wrong about a treaty being declaratory in a legal sense. There are several treaties from the laws of warfare which are considered to be declaratory of international customary law, such as the Genocide Convention of 1948 or the Geneva Protocol of 1925, codifying generally accepted rules of customary law. The Geneva Protocol, for example, has long been considered to be declaratory of two rules of international customary law prohibiting since the nineteenth century the use of poison and poisoned weapons. If the term declaratory is used here in that legal sense, signifying an emerging general recognition that nuclear weapons are not legitimate means of warfare, we would welcome such a development in the position of the group of States which has been reluctant to assume a commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. But if the term is used in a pejorative sense, the arguments all together contained in the present statement are aimed at refuting such endeavours.

The no-first-use commitments are not verifiable, it is stated, because they express intentions, and intentions are by their nature not verifiable.

International treaties express some kind of an intention of the parties to them to have certain aspects of their relationship regulated. As soon as intentions are formalized in an international treaty form, those intentions cease to be intentions in a legal sense as they are transformed into legally binding commitments. These are the legally binding commitments and not intentions that are subject to verification. The member States of the Warsaw Treaty Organization have proposed a treaty, that is, a legally binding instrument, to be concluded on the global non-use of military force, be it with nuclear or conventional weapons. It is quite unfortunate that NATO member States, questioning the validity of intentions, have failed to agree to transforming the vague declarations made on their non-aggressive intentions into such a legally binding commitment.

As to the intrinsic impossibility of adequate verification I should like to say the following: the no-first-use commitment is, of course, not a disarmament measure, which can be quantitatively measured and verified. It is a legally binding commitment prohibiting a certain activity. If we assume that legally binding commitments of a prohibitive character are intrinsically unverifiable and, therefore, unwanted, one can easily question the practicability of a whole set of treaties prohibiting different types of military activities. The *raison d'être* of the Geneva Protocol, the Antarctic Treaty, the Partial Test-Ban Treaty, the Outer Space Treaty, the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Sea-Bed Treaty, the ENMOD Convention and the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, that is, nearly all major multilateral disarmament treaties and conventions in fact could be called into question.

(Mr. Meiszter, Hungarian People's Republic)

A no-first-use commitment, once assumed, entails adequate changes in the military hardware, doctrine and posture. Nuclear weapons with clear first-strike capabilities, technological efforts to improve first-strike capabilities, nuclear warfighting doctrine, counterforce and first-strike postures, and concepts like that of a pre-emptive first strike must be renounced. The practical implementation of such a renouncement with all the changes it entails cannot go unnoticed, it is positively verifiable. At the same time a contemplated use of nuclear weapons necessitates adequate preparations and a return to the status ante, which is identifiable and verifiable as well, leaving ample room for the necessary counter-measures.

All in all, it is a grim reality of the nuclear age that until more far-reaching nuclear disarmament proposals, such as, for example, the one that the Soviet Union put forward in 1981 on the elimination of all nuclear weapons from Europe, until such disarmament proposals are implemented, there is no political or contractual-legal measure whatsoever which could form a 100 per cent guarantee against the use of nuclear weapons. Pending the implementation of such proposed measures, however, the world would be a much safer place to live in, with no-first-use commitments creating confidence, transparency and calculability. Without such a commitment, fear and suspicion will continue to prevail and to feed the nuclear arms race.

Mr. EKEUS (Sweden): Mr. President, allow me first of all to say how pleased I am to see you in the chair for the month of March. Now already we are half way through the month, we have had ample opportunities to benefit from your wisdom, experience and skill, and I am confident that your constructive approach to the difficult problems still pending will bring the work of the Conference a good deal forward. May I also take this opportunity to thank your predecessor, Ambassador Turbanski of Poland, for his never-failing patience, good humour, and skillfulness which were of crucial importance for the good outcome of the month of February. Mr. President, may I also associate myself with your words of welcome directed to His Excellency Archbishop Achille Silvestrini and thank him for his important address to the Conference. I also wish to express my thanks to the Conference for entrusting me with the chairmanship of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. Honoured by this confidence, I can only pledge to do my utmost to advance the work on a convention on chemical weapons as far as possible and appeal to all delegations for their co-operation, on which I depend.

Ambassador Sujka of Poland made substantial improvements in our method of work by introducing and establishing so-called contact groups, which now have developed into working groups under the Committee. Ambassador McPhail of Canada contributed to our work by managing to get an agreed report on the status for the negotiations on chemical weapons. The method of working through working groups and the results presented in document CD/416 will constitute a good basis for our work this year in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. CD/416 also shows that to a large extent

(Mr. Ekéus, Sweden)

a common view already exists on the comprehensiveness of the convention. This was reflected already in CD/220, the report of the Working Group in 1981 under Ambassador Lidgard, who was then head of the Swedish delegation, and in Ambassador Okawa of Japan's report in CD/131. The fact that some differences still exist with regard to the scope should not overshadow the broad support for a comprehensive convention. As Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, I will try to bring the work further forward in the same spirit that guided my predecessors.

The method of establishing working groups under an ad hoc committee of the conference and under chairmanships distributed between groups of delegations is intended to be a helpful and practical device in order to smooth negotiations and further the work. I am therefore pleased that the Ad Hoc Committee has now accepted the establishment of three working groups and the distribution of chairmanships as well as an outline and a time-table for the Ad Hoc Committee's work.

However, it took a considerable time before all delegations could accept the organizational arrangements. In spite of this rather slow process, there have also been reasons for a certain degree of optimism. In her speech to the Conference on 7 February, Ambassador Theorin touched upon some recent encouraging developments. One such development is the statement by the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Shultz, to the Stockholm Conference in which he announced that the United States Government would present a draft treaty on chemical weapons to this Conference. This reflects the earnest approach of the United States delegation to continued negotiations on chemical weapons. However, in this context I would like to stress the importance of continued work in the Conference on Disarmament on chemical weapons. There is no reason to take a passive position in these negotiations because of the still pending United States draft.

We appreciate the new initiatives taken by the USSR delegation with respect to the question of verification of destruction of stockpiles. We have during the last year witnessed a more or less continuous development on this matter. The Soviet delegation expressed during informal meetings of the working group in January some interesting ideas on how to approach the problem. I will revert to this later in my statement

Last week, on 8 March, the delegation of China presented proposals on major elements of a chemical weapons convention in working paper CD/443. The Swedish delegation welcomes this comprehensive contribution. I also note with satisfaction the support that Ambassador Qian gave in his statement to the Swedish proposal to prohibit preparations for use of chemical weapons. Other significant contributions have also been made during this session. I have in mind inter alia the contributions by the United Kingdom, Finland, the Federal Republic of Germany and the Netherlands. These delegations have all addressed important problems which remain to be solved. Time does not permit a close analysis of the ideas presented in these papers now, but my delegation will revert to them during the course of the negotiations.

(Mr. Ekéus, Sweden)

All these initiatives help promote the work on a chemical weapons convention. But, Mr. President, it is necessary that constructive proposals and concessions are met in kind with accommodations from other parties so that there may be created a dialogue conducive to tangible and substantial progress.

As the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, I have presented an outline for the work of that body in document CD/CW/WP.70. Following this outline, it is my intention to provide the working groups with proposed texts to be negotiated. During the negotiations in the working groups, views and agreements will be reported to the Chairman of the Committee, who will thereafter present revised versions of the proposed texts containing also the Chairman's suggestions for possible compromise language. This should serve as a basis on which delegations may seek instructions, together with all relevant initial basic material upon which the proposals rest.

By allowing time for Governments to study these proposals before we revert to them later during the session, I hope for an effective working process, and that we need not wait unduly long for new governmental instructions to appear. This year the Ad Hoc Committee should present a set of texts, agreed concepts, and, of course, views by the individual delegations in a unanimously agreed report. If we make headway, we would by then be close to a convention.

One of the areas where progress has been made is that of the elimination of chemical weapons and verification thereof. Constructive proposals have been put forward, in particular with regard to the methods of verification under a future Convention. Thus, there now seems to be a general understanding that the destruction of the most dangerous chemical weapons should be verified by continuous on-site inspection during the destruction periods. Although even this rather straightforward approach implies many unsolved problems, I think it constitutes a necessary basis for the further work.

It might be useful to, in this context analyse some ideas put forward informally earlier this year concerning different conditions which might influence the level of verification. Thus, could the extent of verification be decided by the degree of the danger of certain types of chemical weapons? Could the military value of the weapons be decisive? Other factors influencing the extent of verification could perhaps be the amount of weapons to be destroyed, or such a variable as whether they contain dual-purpose chemicals. Although no general recognition exists that all of these aspects should determine the level of verification, a thorough analysis of these problems could be useful in our work. In this connection I would like to refer to the Swedish working paper CD/425 on the verification of the destruction of stockpiles of chemical weapons.

Another problem is the question of a possible prohibition of use in the convention. After many years of divided opinions, there now appears to be an understanding that the prohibition of use should in some way be expressed or referred to in the convention. This would imply the possibility of investigations of allegations of use under the provisions of the convention.

Regrettably, the question of prohibition of use has become of immediate importance in the last few weeks. Reports of use of chemical weapons in the Gulf area remind us of the necessity not only to uphold the prohibition of use in the Geneva Protocol, but also to get as soon as possible a convention which allows adequate means for investigation and verification of such allegations. We are gratified that the Secretary-General of the United Nations has appointed a group of experts to investigate the matter at hand.

(Mr. Ekéus, Sweden)

The German Democratic Republic has suggested, at the Conference on Disarmament in Europe in Stockholm, that, in order to increase confidence between States in Europe, States should declare the existence or non-existence of chemical weapons on their territories and also renounce the stationing of chemical weapons where there are none at present; i.e. -- and this is somewhat ambiguous language -- on the territory of those participating States which have declared the non-possession of chemical weapons as well as their intention not to acquire them. We regard this proposal as a confidence-building measure with relevance for the work on a comprehensive chemical weapons convention.

The Swedish delegation put forward some similar ideas in Working Paper CD/279 of 14 April 1982, aimed at facilitating the work on the convention.

It was in the same confidence-building spirit that Sweden in January this year introduced Working Paper CD/426 proposing that all preparations for waging chemical warfare should be prohibited, not only the development and production of chemical weapons. When that Working Paper was introduced, we expressed the hope that delegations would give their reactions and views on the subject. Some have already done so. Our ambition is to find a pragmatic and effective way to increase confidence in the future chemical weapons convention.

Finally, speaking again as the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, I wish to conclude by expressing my hope that confidence, co-operation and efficiency will mark the work of the Committee so that a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons may be agreed upon.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Sweden for his statement and for his kind words for the President and I should also like to wish him great success in his important functions as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons.

I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Poland, Ambassador Stanislaw Turbanski.

Mr. TURBANSKI (Poland): Mr. President, I join with great pleasure all the distinguished speakers who have taken the floor before me under your presidency to congratulate you most warmly, on behalf of my delegation, and on my own behalf, on the assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament during this month of March. I do not want to repeat all the good wishes I offered you when concluding my own presidency but, seeing your admirable performance, I wish you further success in discharging your responsible duties and pledge to you, the representative of socialist Romania, full support and co-operation in their fulfilment. Allow me also, Mr. President, to thank once again all my distinguished colleagues around this table for their kind words on my presidency in February.

I also join the previous speakers in warmly welcoming among us His Excellency Archbishop Achille Silvestrini, Secretary of the Council for Public Affairs of the Church and representative of the Holy See. Poland highly values all the efforts the Holy See and His Holiness Pope John Paul II persistently, strenuously undertake for the maintenance of peace. The important statement we have heard today is regarded by my delegation as another telling example of these efforts by the Holy See.

(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

In the course of our debates in recent years, we have constantly and persistently referred to the international situation, rightly describing it as "serious" and "deteriorating". At the beginning of this year's session, unfortunately, perhaps even more rightly than ever before, alarming words on further deterioration in international relations have been repeatedly voiced in this chamber. A policy of rejection of the principle of equality and equal security is under way; the plans for gaining military superiority here, in the European theatre, are being implemented. Frequent interference in the internal affairs both of socialist and of many other States has become all too familiar news in mass media all over the world. Many mutually beneficial economic links have been broken. The socialist countries -- my country, Poland, is not the only example -- are subjected to all sorts of hostile pressure and calumnious campaigns.

My delegation is in full agreement with the comprehensive, factual analysis of the developments that have led to the present situation which has been already presented in the course of this year's session of the Conference on Disarmament by the representatives of the socialist countries and which has also been reflected in a number of statements by the representatives of non-aligned States.

The responsibility for the dire state of international relations, for the aggravation of world tensions, and for the fuelling of the arms race rests entirely on one State which wants to lead the other States throughout the world in a subjectively chosen direction, which wants to use its indisputable technological achievements for "outpacing" all other States and which has adopted as the exclusive tenet of its policy "negotiation from the position of strength". It is just this drive of the United States of America to reassure itself of its position of superiority over the Soviet Union, to show to its allies the resolve to sustain its position of leadership, to influence the political developments in many regions of the world through the use of power, that has put the world on its present, dangerous path. One cannot read the facts otherwise. It would be difficult to exhaust the list of them. The unprecedented growth of the United States military budget, equalling over a five-year period some 1.5 billion dollars, may be taken as the predominant factor. Moreover, the launching of several major military production and development programmes, each of importance for the strategic balance of forces, such as the new strategic bomber, MX and Midgetman ballistic missiles, new manoeuvrable nuclear re-entry vehicles, air-land- and sea-launched cruise missiles, and rapid expansion of the ocean-going fleet, are the unequivocal, material examples of the plans in being. The preparation of a rapidly deployable force numbering over 200,000 soldiers and equipped with modern means of transport cannot but serve as an indication of the intentions of the State organizing such a force. Yet another avenue of the arms race, so far restricted only to the supportive, though vital, military systems with no offensive capabilities, will be opened if the plans of the present United States administration to create anti-satellite and space-based anti-ballistic weapon systems materialize. These facts are ample evidence that an intensified strategic and theatre nuclear arms race, as well as the conventional one, is under way. This is but one side of the coin. The other is the United States' attitude towards the efforts in favour of arms control and disarmament. Again, the list of the indicative facts is long. First, there is the failure to ratify the bilateral threshold and peaceful nuclear explosions treaties. One officially-given reason for this was the inadequacy of the verification system envisaged in these legal instruments. In fact, these instruments were the first in which a sort of in situ verification was agreed between the Soviet Union and the United States.

(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

The actual reason, as it has been in the case of the trilateral talks on a complete nuclear-test ban from which the United States has withdrawn, was the pressure of the nuclear weapons designers and the military, who consider the tests indispensable for the development of new nuclear warheads and for checking the reliability of existing stocks of nuclear weapons. Another telling fact is the withholding from the ratification of the SALT II Treaty. Again, the official reasons given for this policy were less than convincing. The first to be put forward was the inappropriateness of the verification. Later on, the theory of "linkage" gave the opponents of the Treaty a more convenient excuse. It is interesting to note, however, that despite the criticism raised during the SALT II ratification debate, the basic provisions of this not-yet-legally-binding agreement are being observed and, moreover, that there are voices inside the United States arguing that the country would be better off with the treaty in force than without it. It is the irony of life that the United States broke off the discussions with the Soviet Union on anti-satellite systems in the final stage of those talks, at a time when neither side had the technology for an operational anti-satellite system at hand, only to complain that after four years the over-all situation has changed to such an extent as to require the United States to launch a large programme for space warfare as a security edge against a strategic surprise. It is already visible how much more complex, due to the technological developments, the issue has become from the point of view of future space arms limitation measures. And, last but not least, the history of INF negotiations shows that the political and military considerations, among them the wish to gain military advantages over the opponent and to strengthen the United States position within the NATO alliance, prevailed. The intransigence of the United States negotiating position, despite the pressure of European public opinion and against the efforts of the other side to prevent yet another round of the nuclear arms race in Europe, destroyed the chances for an agreement.

As the on-going debate during this session of the Conference indicates, there exists a general conviction that the biggest threat to world security is the existence of nuclear weapons and the threat of their unintentional or unauthorized use. The most striking feature of the present nuclear arsenals is no longer the fact of their numerical growth. In fact, despite such processes as the mirving of nuclear warheads on ballistic missiles and the introduction of numerous cruise missiles into the arsenals, the over-all stock of nuclear warheads is growing slowly, if at all.

What matters now is the development of nuclear weapon systems that are more capable of an offensive strike and, at the same time, are less vulnerable to the opponent's retaliation. This is the crux of the on-going modernization of the United States strategic forces making them more and more technically prepared to launch a nuclear first strike, a situation which threatens the stability of strategic relations in time of a future crisis. A similarly dangerous trend can be traced in the development of small-calibre nuclear weapons, delivered by ever more accurate missiles, with warheads tailor-made to specific military requirements. This technical jargon means that these weapons are more and more useful for the military commanders, who may be therefore much more prone to use them, according to the conditions on the battlefield. In parallel with the technological sophistication of strategic, theatre, and tactical nuclear weapons goes the military doctrine of their use. This is the foundation of the belief, expressed in some countries at the highest political levels, that nuclear war can be

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restricted geographically, contained to a low level of nuclear conflict, or -- worse still -- that it can be won. No one knows how the potential nuclear conflict might look. It is, however, a certainty that even the lowest and the most restricted level of nuclear war would be a catastrophe, especially in such heavily urbanized and populated areas as Europe. There is, therefore, no need to argue too long about the need for international action to lessen or, preferably, to avert the danger of nuclear war. It is in our common interest, irrespective of ideological or political convictions. Such is the rational premise of the position of the socialist States. The important characteristic of the approach of socialist States is the conviction that efforts directed at the prevention of nuclear war should be paralleled in the political, psychological, moral and material domains. Pursuit of the common goal in one only of these domains is doomed to failure. Material disarmament cannot succeed without growth of confidence, without restraint in the realization of egoistic States' interests, without the acceptance of the existence of different political systems and without respect for the general rules of international law. And the confidence and other general political and psychological circumstances conducive to disarmament cannot be created in the presence of ever-expanding arsenals.

I hope that, in view of these facts, the allegations made here by some delegations that it is the Soviet Union and other socialist countries that are responsible for the increase of a nuclear arms race and for aggravating the international climate appear in much more clear perspective. For instance, the distinguished Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany, without considering it useful -- in his own words -- to go over the INF controversy before this Conference, devoted several solid pages of his statement on 28 February to putting the blame on the Soviet Union and other members of the Warsaw Treaty while depicting the NATO States as the ones which unilaterally -- and generously -- may I add, do nothing but decide to withdraw hundreds of nuclear warheads from European soil ... I can still hear Ambassador Wegener's appeals not to oversimplify matters before, as he put it, a "mature audience like the one around this table".

Very often in the interventions of Western delegations at this Conference and in political writings in the West, allegations are being advanced that the expenditures on conventional armaments are higher than those on nuclear arms and that conventional wars are much more dangerous because they are real. We do not minimize either the dangers of conventional war or the sufferings it brings. An undeniable truth, however, is that we are living today in an increasingly turbulent and insecure world because of escalation in the nuclear arms race, both in its quantitative and qualitative dimensions, because of blind reliance on doctrines of nuclear deterrence which, by their very nature, heighten the risk of the outbreak of nuclear war -- and nuclear war means today a threat to the survival of mankind.

That is why this Conference should, to start with, decide as early as possible on the establishment of the proper negotiating forum for the achievement of agreement on appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war, as requested in United Nations General Assembly resolutions 38/183 G and 37/78 I. We do hope that



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this Conference, having earlier decided to inscribe on its agenda, as an independent item, the question of the prevention of nuclear war, will now make a logical step and establish an ad hoc committee, where the appropriate and practical measures should be negotiated. Among such measures could be the following:

The renunciation by all nuclear-weapon States of the first use of nuclear weapons. We are convinced that if all the nuclear Powers pledged not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, as the Soviet Union and China have done, it would constitute a significant step towards the prevention of nuclear war;

A freeze by all nuclear-weapon States on the production and deployment of nuclear weapons. This proposal of the Soviet Union was presented here in detail last year and hardly needs any further development on my part. We fully support this proposal, the more so as it enjoys broad support all over the world, being regarded as one of the most important links in the chain of efforts leading to the halt of the arms race;

The declaration by all nuclear-weapon States of a moratorium on all nuclear explosions until a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests is concluded.

In such a way, Mr. President, this Conference would, indeed, contribute to this great cause, in line with the millions of appeals all over the world. Exactly one week ago, we witnessed in this very chamber a kind of a moving manifestation by women who, in their message to this Conference, appealed once again for serious negotiations for arms control agreements, for the prevention of nuclear war.

Some delegations, unfortunately, are not prepared to go along this direction, regarding an overwhelming opinion. The distinguished Ambassador of the United States, Mr. Fields, called in his intervention on 23 February last: "... to join our colleagues in serious work on the question of the prevention of nuclear war ...". But we fail then to understand why the United States delegation is opposing serious discussion on the measures just mentioned by me.

Only recently, on 2 March last, in an address by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Comrade Chernenko, excerpts of which have been circulated here as document CD/444, the essence of the United States policy in this respect was clearly exposed. Indeed, why should the United States, in a gesture of goodwill, not ratify the treaties with the Soviet Union, which were signed almost 10 years ago? Very many high ranking officials of Western governments, including the distinguished delegates sitting around this table, pronounce themselves and make appeals for the resumption of the INF dialogue. We by no means neglect these very important talks. But we do also remember that the United States has broken off the talks on other issues, including the very issue of a general and complete ban on nuclear-weapon tests. Why not demonstrate goodwill and resume serious talks on this first item on the agenda of this Conference, either in their trilateral dimension or in the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, or in both?

With regard to the nuclear test ban, we are witnessing in this chamber a huge operation of tendentious interpretations. Certain delegations strongly advise

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continuation of the NTB Ad Hoc Committee on the basis of the old mandate, as the resolution of the verification issues is -- to use again the words of the distinguished Ambassador of the United States -- "... crucial if we are eventually to succeed in attaining a nuclear test ban ...". For our part, we would like to reiterate once more that we do not neglect any of these complex issues of verification. Neither do we diminish their importance. But we have a firm feeling that it is neither a matter of verification nor a matter of its negotiation. To put it straight, it is a question of political will, or a lack of it, to conduct serious negotiations on this burning problem, which is now more than a quarter of a century old, and is, indeed, ripe for a final solution. Very many scientific authorities affirm that there are no insurmountable obstacles to conclusive negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test ban treaty. Therefore my delegation, in accordance with the provisions of General Assembly resolutions 38/62 and 38/63 and many other resolutions adopted by the General Assembly in this respect, calls for urgent substantial consultations in the framework of this Conference on the NTB Ad Hoc Committee's new mandate and subsequently on a serious process of negotiations concerning the formulation and elaboration of a comprehensive test ban treaty. Furthermore, one cannot but share the fear voiced here by some at the beginning of this session that all the beneficial results of the Non-Proliferation Treaty may end with further aggravation of the situation, with the application of all the technological developments in the military sphere or, not the least, with the aspirations of certain States. It is good to remember and to speak on these factors today, before the third Review Conference of the NPT, and particularly before the session of the Preparatory Committee to that Conference, the first of which is to be convened soon. My delegation strongly supports the view that the success of the coming Review Conference will depend on the progress in the implementation of articles VI and VII of the NPT. The success of our discussions and, possibly, negotiations on the nuclear-test ban would thus greatly contribute to the success of the NPT Review Conference.

I would like now to turn to the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons. As you are aware, and as the distinguished Ambassador of Sweden just mentioned, after intensive discussions on procedural matters, perhaps unavoidable ones, although unreasonably prolonged, we have finally agreed on the organizational structure of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. A new, extended mandate makes it possible to conduct full-scale negotiations on the formulation and the elaboration of a future convention. We consider that as an important result of our work opening a new stage, a result of which we should take full advantage.

Quite a lot of important questions will have to be agreed upon in the course of our future elaboration and formulation of specific provisions of the draft convention. Many governments pronounce themselves for an immediate and total ban on chemical weapons and numerous delegations participating in this Conference, have already supported their positions with specific documents in the course of the present session. This has been recently done by the delegations of the United Kingdom, Sweden, the Federal Republic of Germany, China and the Netherlands. In his important statement, to which I have already referred, the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Comrade Konstantin Chernenko stated

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among other things that certain prerequisites for negotiating a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons are appearing. Achievement of an agreement in this and some other regards could constitute a beginning of a real breakthrough in Soviet-American relations and a turn in the international situation.

A strong positive impulse in our debate on the prohibition of chemical weapons were new proposals of the Soviet Union on the question of verification presented by the distinguished Ambassador Victor Issraelyan on 21 February last. In the framework of systematic international on-site inspections considered so far, the Soviet Union expressed its readiness to accept in certain cases a permanent presence of the representatives of international control at a special facility for the destruction of chemical weapons. This new step by the Soviet Union has to be seen as another measure towards compromise and the successful resolution of the tasks still ahead of us. My delegation highly appreciates this Soviet undertaking. It indicates once again that the socialist States approach the negotiations in a flexible and constructive way. The proposals put forward by the socialist States with regard to chemical weapons during this and the previous session of the Conference have indicated willingness to accept a wide range of verification procedures, including systematic international control, and opened the way to the intensification of negotiations on the chemical weapons convention. The recent proposal of the Soviet Union just referred to promises a possibility of bringing to fruition the work on the vast and weighty problem of the verification of stockpile destruction.

Provisions of a future convention on chemical weapons, like all the provisions of international treaties, must be implemented in goodwill, in accordance with the objectives and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and in application of wisely and adequately formulated mechanisms of international control. The term "adequacy" can be characterized as technical feasibility and practicality, together with capability for effective detection of violation and minimum interference with the life of individual nations.

One may suggest many theoretical requirements for disarmament verification systems, such as, to name only a few: high detectability of objects and activities related to the scope and subject-matter of an agreement, practical feasibility and technical sufficiency of the verification means, continuity of the verification process, timeliness of the fact-finding and of the assessment processes, flexibility of the methods adopted, economic acceptability of the verification system, etc.

But our main task is, I would say, to stay with these considerations on solid, real ground, that is, to confront always theoretical desires with practical possibilities.

It is conceivable, for example, that when the highest detectability is demanded from the verification system, it may render it too expensive or procedurally too complicated or, in the extreme case, too intrusive for many of the parties concerned. Furthermore, certain features of the so-called "adequate" verification may become contradictory to each other: in maximizing one aspect of the "adequate" verification, another one, not less important, may suffer. In short,

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every verification system is a compromise between various technical, economic and political factors. To find the best of compromise solutions is a task to be tackled in the course of our negotiations. We must remember, however, that the basic prerequisite for the achievement of such "best compromise" solutions is political goodwill. We would like to hope that it does exist in this chamber, among us, but can we really say that it has been sufficiently demonstrated?

I would also wish to express my delegation's conviction that no verification, however intrusive and elaborate, can provide us with a 100 per cent certainty that no violation, even the least meaningful, occurs. The ideal verification system would, in my opinion, be one that would ensure States' security through a high probability of detecting violation, could provide a convenient channel of communication between parties, and would help in building confidence between them. The convention we are negotiating here may become the first authentic disarmament treaty, but it is for that very reason that it is so politically sensitive. Entering into such agreements, States are, understandably, eager to gain reassurance that the agreements are mutually upheld by all.

Speaking on the organization of a most reasonable system of control, it is worth recalling also that living up to a future convention will be guaranteed through, inter alia, the moral prestige of future States parties. For their moral prestige, so to say, will be at stake. We should remember in this connection that future States parties will be most interested not to stain their reputation before the whole international community by possible offences against provisions agreed and signed by themselves. In other words, we should assume that they will apply national means of control also in good faith. Unfortunately, this means of control is rarely valued here and, even worse, its importance is often diminished. We would like to hope that, in further developing and specifying their positions in future working documents, the respective delegations will take these considerations into account. It is hard to believe that the process of elaborating a future convention will proceed smoothly if at the root of this process is a lack of confidence among the majority of the most interested partners.

Many factors indicate, on the other hand, that the elaboration of the chemical weapons convention now is in the interest of the community of all nations. Political and technical realities speak for the same. Let us then join this process in a most effective way and assure a good pace of work on the convention. Let us not stay and wait in abeyance. As you all so very well know, distinguished delegates, many important problems regarding the future convention require a negotiated solution. It is high time to undertake, on a working level and in a working spirit, a substantial and mutually accommodating negotiation process in order to achieve mutually acceptable solutions.

Remembering all the historical circumstances of the use of chemical weapons on a massive scale in Europe, Poland attaches great importance to the question of final and total prohibition of chemical weapons. We therefore work hard, and we shall continue to do so, trying to co-ordinate the agenda item on chemical weapons among the delegations of socialist countries in the framework of this Conference and to contribute, as far as possible, to this important topic of our negotiations.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Poland for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the President. I now give the floor to the next speaker on my list, who is the distinguished representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Ambassador Victor Issraelyan.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Comrade President, the USSR delegation would like today to make some comments in connection with the third report to the Conference on Disarmament of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts which has been distributed here.

The activity of the Group is directly linked with the problem of a complete and general nuclear-weapon test ban. In his statement of 2 March of this year, the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Comrade K.U. Chernenko, stressed that the achievement of agreement on the problem of a nuclear-weapon test ban as well as on a number of other disarmament questions would mark the start of a real and radical change in the international situation as a whole. The Soviet delegation will have the opportunity later to state its opinion on the question of a nuclear test ban. Now we would like to emphasize once again the extreme importance and urgency of this question, which incidentally has recently been reaffirmed in the message of the Conference entitled "Women and the World Disarmament Campaign" to the Conference on Disarmament.

The third report reflects the results of work conducted by the Group of Scientific Experts since 1979 in accordance with the instructions of the Committee on Disarmament.

The reports prepared by the Group -- CCD/558 of 1978, CD/43 of 1979 and the third report submitted to the Conference now -- represent a good basis for the furtherance of the elaboration of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. Naturally, the system for the international exchange of seismic data could be established only after such a treaty entered into force.

In its first report, CCD/558, the Group of Scientific Experts dealt with the elaboration of an international system for the exchange of Level I seismic data with the use for data transmission to international data centres of the telecommunications network of the World Meteorological Organization (WMO). The second report, CD/43, points out that the Group of Scientific Experts initiated the elaboration of scientific and methodological principles of a possible comprehensive experimental test of the seismic data exchange system to be conducted after the conclusion and entry into force of a treaty. Finally, the third report circulated today notes that the Group of Scientific Experts has elaborated on the basis of the two previous reports, preliminary technical instructions and operations manual for a comprehensive experimental testing of all the elements of a global exchange system.

Thus, the experts have performed significant and useful work which shows that international operational seismic data exchange within the context of implementation of the future treaty can be organized on a global basis. To this end, the seismic stations that could be used within the global system have been provisionally identified. It has become clear that the telecommunications system of the World Meteorological Organization fully meets the requirements for the prompt transmission of seismic data. Definitions have been made of equipment and automated procedures for seismic data processing at stations and the future international data centres.

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All this is evidence that the Group has fulfilled its functions under its current mandate and prepared the necessary technical basis for the elaboration of the relevant provisions of a treaty on complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests and of the protocol covering peaceful nuclear explosions that would form an integral part of such a treaty.

There has thus been devised quite a good technical basis involving the use of methods of acquiring and exchanging seismic data that are accessible to a wide range of States. This has been repeatedly confirmed by the overwhelming majority of States participating in the Conference on Disarmament. The recommendations of the Group of Experts laid down in all three reports and based on the actual state of affairs represent a definite basis for creating a real seismic data exchange system. The improvement of such a system taking into account the newest technology could be dealt with, inter alia, by the consultative committee, the establishment of which is envisaged within the framework of the future treaty.

Comrade President, I should like to draw particular attention to the fact that almost five years were needed for the preparation of the third report of the Group of Scientific Experts. It must be said that the tempo of the Group's work has been considerably reduced and that some delegations have attempted to place artificial obstacles in the way of agreement on a final report.

The Group's activity was at its most successful in the period when negotiations were being conducted between the USSR, the United States of America and the United Kingdom on the conclusion of a treaty on complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, negotiations that were suspended, as is known, in 1980 through no fault of ours.

Some States' lack of political will to conclude the treaty, which they regard only as their "long term", "long-standing" goal, has the most direct influence on progress on any aspect of this problem, including the scientific and technical aspects. Hence the dubiousness of some States' desire, at a time when there are no practical talks under way on the elaboration of all aspects of the treaty, to engage in endless refinement of the seismic data exchange system. Such imitation of activity, rejection of the new in order to replace it by the newest, is used as a cover, as a far-fetched pretext in order to justify before world public opinion the impasse created at the Conference through their fault.

For its part, the Soviet Union maintains its principled approach to the question of the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. The "basic provisions of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests" put forward by the USSR in 1982 provide a good basis for the solution of this urgent problem. The draft treaty submitted by Sweden last year also merits careful study. We are strongly in favour of revising the mandate of the relevant subsidiary body of the Conference so as to enable it to start without delay the elaboration of all the provisions of such a treaty, including provisions on the control and verification of its implementation. Our aspirations in this

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matter coincide with those of the overwhelming majority of the participants in the Conference, who are interested in the complete and universal ending of nuclear-weapon tests.

In conclusion, Comrade President, we should like to state that we are not, in principle, opposed to the proposal by the Group of Scientific Experts for the conduct at the end of 1984 of a technical test of Level I data exchange and analysis with the first use on a regular basis of the WMO telecommunications system. We believe that such a test with the participation of a wide range of States from various regions of the world would be a logical conclusion of the work of the scientific experts on their third report.

The conclusion of the Group's work on the third report and the preliminary agreement on the procedure for the conduct of an experiment on the basis of the recommendations contained in that report naturally raise the question of the Group's future. In this connection, we should like to state that continuation of the work of the Group of Scientific Experts would make sense only in case if the United States of America does not prevent the Conference from conducting practical negotiations on a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

For its part the Soviet delegation will make every effort to ensure that the Conference on Disarmament is able to fulfil the extremely important task of achieving the earliest possible solution of the problem of the complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

Mr. IMAI (Japan): Mr. President, since this is the first time I take the floor this month, I would first of all like to express the pleasure of my delegation in welcoming you to the chair of this Conference for the month of March and assure you the full co-operation of my delegation during your tenure as our President. At the same time, I wish to state our appreciation of the energetic and skillful manner in which your predecessor, Ambassador Turbanski of Poland, presided over our Conference and set our work in motion at the always difficult initial stage of our session.

We are receiving today, as is apparent from the list of speakers and the documents already distributed, the third report of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events as well as the progress report on the seventeenth session of that Group. While we shall have to wait some moments more for formal introduction of the paper, we should like to say that we very much welcome the submission of these reports, in particular, the long awaited third report to this session of the Conference on Disarmament. My delegation would like to thank the Chairman of the Group in advance for introducing them, and wishes to express our warm appreciation to Dr. Dahlman himself as well as to the previous Chairman, the late Dr. Ericsson, both of whom so ably guided the Group's work to its success.

(Mr. Imai, Japan)

It would be appropriate, under the circumstances, to reserve our detailed views on the third report until some proper occasion at a later date when we have made a thorough examination of its contents as well as of the wealth of information contained in the Appendices. Thus I would like to limit myself today to some brief remarks. My delegation has taken note with great appreciation of the comprehensive nature of the report, which includes descriptions of the global system for international seismic data exchange already proposed in the previous reports of the Group, as well as of the international data centres on the basis of further in-depth examination and some newly-gained experiences, both individual and collective. It is indeed gratifying to see that the Ad Hoc Group is now in a position to make more concrete proposals for the comprehensive experimental exercise proposed already by the Group in its first report in document CCD/558. Such an exercise indeed constitutes an indispensable step towards the realization of a global system of data exchange which would not only assist national verification efforts but is, with others, a necessary instrument for effective multilateral verification of a nuclear test ban.

In this regard, we welcome with particular satisfaction the fact that the Group has agreed to conduct for two months toward the end of this year a technical test concerning the exchange and analysis of Level I data using the WMO/GTS under new formal arrangements between the Conference on Disarmament and WMO for regular use of the GTS. This will be the first such test, and certainly a very important one for further refinement of the proposed global system. I would like to point out at this juncture some of the important factors to be borne in mind in undertaking this test this fall.

Firstly, this exercise must be well prepared and organized so that not only data exchange will lead to a useful result in itself, but also various possible practical problems, such as reduction of data and as their communication and assessment, will be clarified for future improvement. The Ad Hoc Group, in its progress report, indicates that a preliminary plan for this technical test has already been worked out and suggests that its next session be held in July-August to finalize the plan. My delegation certainly welcomes and endorses such a suggestion.

Secondly, my delegation expresses once again, as it has done on previous occasions in connection with the trial data exchanges conducted by the Group, our strong hope and belief that the participation of as many countries as possible would be essential for the purpose of obtaining the maximum meaningful outcome from the test, so that as many scientifically meaningful data points as practical will eventually form parts of the system. It would also promote a sense of participation by many in this important exercise. In this respect, I note that 23 countries have already indicated their intention to participate, including Japan, and we expect that more countries will follow that example.



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Thirdly, it goes without saying that a proper assessment of the results should be made as a joint effort, so that full advantage is taken of the advancement in seismic science, and a proper incorporation of Level II data may be worked out for the future. Here again I notice that the Progress Report mentions that "It is expected that the results of the test will be discussed in the Group and reported to the Conference on Disarmament in 1985". My delegation expects that the Group's report on the results of the test and on the Group's assessment will be presented to this Conference as quickly as possible after the test, so that full use will be made of it by the Conference, as well as, of course, by all the interested States.

My delegation, which took the initiative for formalizing the arrangements with WMO for regular use of the GTS, and which took an active part in the Group's work as a co-convenor of the third sub-group of GSE on the format and procedures for the exchange of Level I data through the GTS system, will continue to do its best for the success of the forthcoming test, as well as future ones.

As we recognize the importance of this year's experiment as another important step forward in realizing the comprehensive and global system of international seismic data exchange, we also know only too well that further questions relating to verification of a nuclear-test ban still remain to be addressed. Here, I would like to merely remind the distinguished delegates of Working Paper CD/389 which I presented to the Committee on Disarmament during its session last year. It is the view of my delegation that many of the points enumerated in that document need further elaboration by the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts, while some other important features thereof need clarification by the Conference itself. In this regard we hope that the Group of Scientific Experts will be able to continue its activities in the future, in order to clarify points, as already proposed in the final Chapter of the Third Report, entitled "Conclusions and recommendations".

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Japan for his statement and for his kind words concerning the President. In view of the hour and of the fact that we have three more speakers for today, I am now going to suspend this plenary meeting to resume it this afternoon, in this room at 3.30 p.m. The meeting is suspended.

The meeting was suspended at 1 p.m. and reconvened at 3.50 p.m.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I declare the meeting open. We shall resume the work of the plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament. I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Zaire, Ambassador Mukamba.

Mr. MUKAMBA (Zaire) (translated from French): Mr. President, in this, my first statement on behalf of the Zairian delegation, it gives me very great pleasure to extend to you the warmest congratulations on your accession to the Presidency of our Conference for the month of March.

I am firmly convinced that, under your enlightened guidance, the Conference will achieve positive and concrete results in the spheres of disarmament with which we are all so deeply concerned, namely, the elaboration of treaties or agreements on a nuclear-test ban, the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, radiological weapons, negative security guarantees and outer space, with a view to attaining our ultimate goal, which is none other than general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

I should also like to take this opportunity to express our deep gratitude to the outgoing President, Ambassador Turbanski of Poland, for the dynamism and skill with which he directed our work during the month of February.

Our warmest appreciation also goes to the Secretary-General of the Conference, Ambassador Jaipal, and to the Deputy Secretary-General of the Conference, Mr. Berasategui, for the outstanding tact, wisdom and energy with which they discharge their weighty responsibilities and for the judicious advice that they so unsparingly give us in our delicate enterprise.

Since I am participating for the first time in the work of this Conference, I should like to express my deepest gratitude to the distinguished representatives of member countries here present for their kind words of welcome. It is with deep and sincere pleasure that I, in my turn, welcome among us my colleagues the representatives of Australia, Belgium, Canada, Cuba, Egypt, Ethiopia, Hungary, Indonesia and Sri Lanka.

With the spring part of our session, we are beginning a new period, that in which our forum for disarmament negotiations has become the Conference on Disarmament.

My delegation welcomes this important change and hopes that, under its new title, this forum, which has been unable for almost five years to achieve any major progress on substantive questions relating to disarmament, will make vigorous efforts to attain the disarmament objectives to which the international community and all peace-loving peoples so ardently aspire.

(Mr. Mukamba, Zaire)

I shall use the opportunity offered to me to address the Conference today to speak on agenda items 1, 2, 3 and 4, concerning respectively a nuclear-test ban, cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament, prevention of nuclear war and chemical weapons.

The work of this session begins at a crucial moment, when the climate of tension and armed conflict in the world and the acceleration of the nuclear-arms race are growing steadily more marked, creating an unstable situation and total insecurity for the international community.

These tensions and, above all, this acceleration in the accumulation of ever more sophisticated weapons constitute a grave danger to international peace and security and will unquestionably lead us towards a nuclear disaster of unforeseeable and incalculable consequences.

In the light of what I have just said, of the alarming proportions being assumed by the nuclear arms race and, in particular, of the intensive manufacture of nuclear weapons, the role of the Conference on Disarmament, the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, takes on its full significance: this unique forum must turn its attention as a matter of urgency to all the priority questions of disarmament and make good use of the abundance of working papers and the valuable time placed at its disposal to institute genuine consultations and negotiations on real disarmament measures without wasting any time in long and sterile discussions on procedural matters.

In this respect, I wish to express my delegation's gratitude to the outgoing President, Ambassador Turbanski of Poland, for the skill and diplomacy with which he conducted our discussions, so enabling us to adopt the agenda of the Conference without delay.

My delegation is entirely satisfied with the Conference's consensus decision to examine as a separate agenda item the question of the prevention of nuclear war, which was previously combined with the question of the cessation of the nuclear-arms race.

The danger of a nuclear conflagration has never been so great, thanks to the development of new and increasingly sophisticated weapons systems.

Furthermore, the military build-up at the world level has the effect of destabilizing the international situation and causing crises in various parts of the world, thus creating very difficult social and economic conditions for all peoples.

Furthermore, the destructive power of nuclear weaponry is such that it can eliminate any possibility of highly-developed life on earth. Consequently, if the

(Mr. Mikamba, Zaire)

accumulation of nuclear weapons continues at the present pace, a nuclear war would signify the end of mankind, despite the assurances given by some nuclear-weapon Powers who claim that, as a result of the great progress made in this sphere, targeting accuracy has allegedly become so great that only the military or economic installations aimed at would be destroyed, without any human victims.

What is more, it is well known to all that at a time when the under-developed Third World contains over a billion people living in the most complete penury, some nations annually spend hundreds of billions of dollars on their military defence, thus pursuing the dangerous game of the nuclear-arms race with as yet unknown consequences.

My delegation is firmly convinced that these colossal sums devoted to the production and stockpiling of nuclear weapons would suffice to reactivate the international economy, the results of which would tend to alleviate many of the evils afflicting some parts of the world.

In the face of this uncertainty as to the consequences of the nuclear-arms race, my delegation believes that the current monstrously high level of nuclear weapons deployment must be reduced as rapidly as possible, and that a freeze on nuclear arsenals seems an effective way of beginning the essential process of nuclear disarmament.

While disarmament is the concern of all the countries of the world, the nuclear-weapon Powers primarily bear a special responsibility in this sphere.

My delegation considers that a nuclear-test ban and the cessation of the nuclear-arms race can only take place effectively with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States.

My delegation therefore fervently appeals to them to demonstrate a genuine political will to achieve the conclusion of concrete agreements on agenda items 1 and 2, which must be considered in appropriate subsidiary bodies having negotiating mandates.

My delegation is happy to note in this connection that several relevant resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly bear witness to the importance which the international community attaches to agenda items 1 and 2. These include resolution 38/183 D, in which the General Assembly calls upon the Conference on Disarmament to proceed without delay to negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament in accordance with paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, and especially to elaborate a nuclear-disarmament programme, and to establish for this purpose an ad hoc working group on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and on nuclear disarmament; and resolution 38/72, which urges the Conference on Disarmament to proceed promptly to negotiations with a view to elaborating a multilateral treaty on the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests by all States as a matter of the highest priority, taking into account all existing drafts and proposals and future initiatives, and for that purpose to assign to its subsidiary body a negotiating mandate under an appropriate item of its agenda.

(Mr. Mukamba, Zaire)

It is clear from United Nations General Assembly resolutions 38/183 D and 38/72 that one of the pressing tasks entrusted to the Conference is the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament.

The Conference on Disarmament now has better tools at its disposal, in the form of a wealth of basic documentation, and can undertake without further delay substantive negotiations on a treaty for the complete prohibition of nuclear tests.

My delegation entirely agrees with the members of this Conference who consider the terms of reference of the ad hoc working group on a nuclear-test ban too restrictive and advocate the widening of its mandate in order to enable us to advance in our work on this major issue.

The dangers for the survival of mankind arising from the spiralling arms race and the perilous confrontation between its main antagonists have become more alarming in recent years.

The world continues to head at an ever-faster pace towards the final crisis, from which it will not rise up again.

It is therefore with great bitterness that we note that the nuclear-weapon Powers do not display the political will to engage in a disarmament process and remain deaf to the most pressing appeals to avert the nuclear holocaust for all time.

When expressing his concern on this subject in his statement in the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly on 27 October 1983, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Co-operation of Zaire, citizen Umba Di Lutete said: "Even a cursory analysis of the general debate in the General Assembly shows that our Organization, and through it mankind as a whole, has never advanced so far in science or technology; and alas, it must also be recognized that never has mankind also been so far removed from the search for peace and solidarity, and from the triumph of the ideals of law.

"My delegation therefore considers that it is high time that we became alive to this danger and shouldered our real responsibilities in order to find the appropriate measures to safeguard peace and the future of mankind for, by continually playing with fire, one day we will surely burn ourselves.

"... In my delegation's opinion, the only solution lies in complete disarmament, in the condemnation of aggression, which must be proscribed, and in the establishment of an effective monitoring system. For as long as there are wars of aggression, there will always be legitimate self-defence. And to avoid self-defence, aggressors will always tend to use their major means of destruction ...".

(Mr. Mukamba, Zaire)

It follows from the foregoing that to avert the possibility of nuclear war, complete nuclear disarmament must remain our principal goal, and in the meantime we should seek to establish an effective barrier, universally accepted and adopted, against any actual use of nuclear weapons.

All nations of the world, and particularly the nuclear-weapon Powers, must recognize and admit that the use of nuclear weapons in a conflict is suicidal folly which may perfectly well signify the extermination of the antagonists as well as of a large part of the world.

Hence the search for a comprehensive international agreement for the elimination of the risk of nuclear war is, in my delegation's opinion, a matter of extreme urgency and priority.

Mr. President, you will therefore understand our satisfaction at seeing the question of the prevention of nuclear war, in view of its importance, becoming an agenda item separate from the previous agenda item 2 on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race.

Together with the members of the Group of 21, we believe that a constructive dialogue, taking concrete form in the creation of a subsidiary body in accordance with General Assembly resolution 38/183 G, is utterly essential.

According to that resolution, the Conference on Disarmament should undertake, as a matter of the highest priority, negotiations with a view to achieving agreement on appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war; and establish for that purpose an ad hoc working group on the subject at the beginning of its 1984 session.

My delegation's position is clear. In complete accord with General Assembly resolution 38/75, we condemn nuclear war as "contrary to human conscience and reason, as the most monstrous crime against peoples and as a violation of the foremost human right — the right to life".

All States should unite and redouble their efforts aimed at removing the threat of nuclear war.

My delegation therefore urges the countries which have difficulties with regard to the setting up of a subsidiary body on the prevention of nuclear war to review their positions so as to enable the Conference immediately to begin multilateral negotiations on this matter of the highest priority, especially as several negotiating proposals, contained in documents CD/355, CD/406 and CD/431, can provide an important basis for such work.

Another disarmament problem which is in my delegation's view, of special urgency and priority, and therefore deserves to be resolved without delay, is that of chemical weapons.

Everyone is aware of the devastating effects of this type of weapon of mass destruction both during earlier wars and during the struggles currently raging in some parts of the world and pitilessly causing countless victims among the population.

All our efforts should therefore be directed towards the elimination and prohibition of chemical weapons and, in order to attain this objective, my

(Mr. Mukamba, Zaire)

delegation considers that the preparation of a treaty completely prohibiting chemical weapons, in accordance with paragraph 75 of the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly and with General Assembly resolution 38/187 A and B, is one of the most pressing disarmament measures to be undertaken.

My delegation wishes to express its satisfaction at the positive results achieved so far in this sphere, and on the decision taken by the Conference to re-establish a subsidiary body which has already begun its work under the chairmanship of Ambassador Ekéus of Sweden.

We hope that this subsidiary organ will pursue and intensify the negotiations on this priority issue in order to elaborate a chemical weapons convention.

It is also with great pleasure that, like other delegations, we welcome the announcement by the United States that it firmly intends to submit during this session a draft treaty on the prohibition of chemical weapons, as well as the statement by the head of the Soviet delegation, Ambassador Issraelyan, on 21 February 1984, to the effect that: "The Soviet Union would be prepared, during the elaboration of the procedures for verification of the destruction of chemical weapons at a special facility, to agree to such a solution when the efficiency of the verification, from the beginning of the destruction process up to its completion, would be ensured by the permanent presence at the special facility of the representatives of international control, as well as by a combination of systematic international verifications at the facility, including also the storage of the stocks of weapons at it, with the use of instruments".

My delegation wishes to congratulate these two nuclear-weapon Powers on the positive contribution which they have thus just made to the crucial problem of the chemical weapons threat.

In view of these efforts, which represent a major milestone in our work, we are sure that the Conference on Disarmament will this year succeed in elaborating an international convention for the general and complete prohibition of chemical weapons. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Zaire for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the President. I now wish to draw the attention of the Conference to the fact that the secretariat today circulated documents CD/448 and CD/449 concerning the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events. Document CD/448 contains the Third Report of the Ad Hoc Group, prepared pursuant to the decision adopted by the Committee on Disarmament on 7 August 1979. Document CD/449 contains a Progress Report on the seventeenth session of the Ad Hoc Group. In this connection, I should like to draw the attention of members of the Conference to paragraph 10 of the progress report which contains the Ad Hoc Group's recommendations concerning its future work. I now give the floor to Dr. Ola Dahlman of Sweden to introduce the report of the Ad Hoc Group.

Mr. DAHLMAN (Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events):  
Mr. President, I appreciate this opportunity to address this distinguished Conference and to report to you on the recent work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events.

The Ad Hoc Group met from 27 February to 9 March 1984, and experts from 21 countries and a representative from the World Meteorological Organization took part in the session. The Group enjoyed throughout its session a most co-operative and constructive spirit, and was able to finalize its Third Report and to work out a preliminary plan for a technical test concerning the exchange and analysis of Level I data using the WMO/GTS.

I am thus pleased to introduce to you today the Third Report of the Ad Hoc Group, contained in document CD/448, which was adopted unanimously. Consensus was reached on the main part of the report and on those appendices, annexed to the reports, containing recommendations and preliminary technical instructions. Other appendices contain factual information on technical matters and summaries of national investigations; they reflect the viewpoint of individual countries on various technical problems. I will also introduce a Progress Report on the recent meeting, contained in document CD/449.

The Third Report is prepared pursuant to the decision of the Committee on Disarmament of 7 August 1979, in which the Ad Hoc Group was given the task of pursuing its work "on such measures, which might be established in the future for the international exchange of seismological data under a treaty prohibiting nuclear-weapon tests covering nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes in a protocol which would be an integral part of the treaty".

The Ad Hoc Group has been working on its third report since February 1980 and has held nine meetings. This is a long period and much work has been carried out. The report is based on more than 200 national contributions submitted to the Ad Hoc Group as informal working papers, some of them of considerable impact and volume.

These contributions are the results of national research programmes, which in several countries are of considerable scope.

Experts from 30 States have participated in the work on the Third Report. The Ad Hoc Group has also enjoyed excellent co-operation with the WMO and its representatives to the Group.

Five open-ended study groups, headed by a convener and a co-convener, have assisted in the compilation and the assessment of the presented material. The contributions by the conveners and the co-conveners are most significant for the compilation of the Ad Hoc Group's Third Report.

The Group has throughout its existence enjoyed the services of Dr. Frode Ringdal of Norway as its Scientific Secretary. I would like to draw the attention of the Conference on Disarmament to the highly important work carried out by Dr. Ringdal in drafting the Ad Hoc Group's Third Report and to the skill and dedication he has offered to the Group throughout the preparation of this Report.



(Mr. Dahlman, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events)

Dr. Ulf Ericsson of Sweden served as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group from 1976 until his death in November 1982. The significant results that the Ad Hoc Group has achieved must to a large extent be attributed to the chairmanship of Dr. Ericsson.

I would also like to express my appreciation to the Secretariat of the United Nations for the assistance provided to the Ad Hoc Group and for the most able way it has handled our technical material.

The proposed global system, as specified in the Ad Hoc Group's earlier reports CCD/558 and CD/43, has three main elements:

- a network of more than 50 existing or planned seismological stations around the globe, with improved equipment and upgraded procedures for the extraction of data;
- an international exchange of these data over the Global Telecommunication System of the World Meteorological Organization;
- processing of the data at special International Data Centres for the use of participating States.

The data to be reported and exchanged would be of two kinds: so-called Level I data, which are to be routinely and promptly reported for all detected events and which contain basic parameters extracted at each station from the recorded signals; and so-called Level II data, which are copies of the originally recorded waveform data and which are to be exchanged in response to request for additional information.

The Third Report considers in great detail these various components of a Global System, and I will now try to summarize some of these considerations.

Significant technical developments have taken place in the past few years with regard to world-wide seismograph facilities. The many advantages of digitally recording seismograph systems are now widely recognized, and many such systems have been installed. A significant number of stations of interest for the global network are, however, still of the analog recording type, and the Ad Hoc Group therefore recommends that conversion of such analog stations to the digital system be given high priority.

Already in the first report of the Ad Hoc Group it was noted that the large majority of high-quality seismic stations were located in the northern hemisphere. The situation is essentially unchanged today. The Ad Hoc Group considers it essential that more high-quality stations be established in the southern hemisphere, especially in Africa and South America.

With regard to Level I data extraction at the seismograph stations of the global network, national investigations have shown that existing methods for obtaining such parameters can impose a heavy work load on participants in an

(Mr. Dahlman, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events)

international data exchange. The Ad Hoc Group notes that promising results, which might lead to a reduction in the work load, have been achieved using automatic procedures. The Ad Hoc Group recognizes, however, that this is a difficult problem and that further research in this area is needed.

Two trial exchanges of abbreviated Level I data using the WMO/GTS have been conducted with broad participation of countries represented in the Ad Hoc Group and in co-operation with the WMO. Although some technical problems have been encountered, the results from the experiments have shown that the WMO/GTS has the potential of fully satisfying the aims of rapid and undistorted transmission of Level I data for the proposed global system. At many remote places, the WMO/GTS offers the only practical communication mechanism for rapid transmission of Level I data.

The Ad Hoc Group noted with appreciation the recent decision by the WMO Ninth Congress that the WMO/GTS may be used for regular transmission of Level I data from 1 December 1983. The Group sees the need to conduct further technical tests, in co-operation with WMO, to establish the operational performance of the WMO/GTS for seismic data exchange on a global basis. As no significant experience has so far been obtained regarding transmission from Africa, Antarctica and South America, the Ad Hoc Group considers it important that additional experiments should include participation from these continents.

The Ad Hoc Group has noted the advice of WMO that significant improvements in transmission can be expected only if the GTS is used on a more regular basis. The Ad Hoc Group therefore considers it essential that up-to-date information on improvements and changes to the GTS be readily available; therefore, it is recommended that the secretariat of the Conference on Disarmament should make arrangements with the WMO Secretariat to receive regular advice on these matters.

In the proposed global system, Level II data will be exchanged, upon request, between government-authorized national facilities through International Data Centres. Some national investigations have shown that rapid exchange of Level II data in digital form can be achieved using modern telecommunications facilities without any particular restriction on the amount of such data that might be requested.

The Ad Hoc Group agrees that a precise estimate of the amount of Level II data that might be requested can be given only after sufficient experience has been acquired from a comprehensive experimental exercise as proposed in CCD/558.

A number of national investigations have been conducted regarding the organization of International Data Centres and the data processing that would be performed. Experimental data centres have been established by some countries and some large-scale experiments have been conducted to test and develop procedures for data handling and analysis. A "Preliminary Operations Manual for International Data Centres" has been developed, giving a detailed outline of the operational procedures to be followed at such centres. The manual is annexed as an integral part of the report. Certain aspects of these procedures, especially the automatic processing, should be further developed and tested.

(Mr. Dahlman, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of  
Scientific Experts to Consider International  
Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify  
Seismic Events)

National investigations carried out by some countries have shown the effectiveness of the use of Level II data at national centres in obtaining more accurate focal parameters of interesting events.

Further research efforts are needed to improve the accuracy of epicentre location and, most urgently, of event-depth estimation. An increased use of depth phases seems to be the most important step here.

Certain national investigations have also shown that the more detailed analysis of information at stations of the global network (Level II data), provides greater effectiveness in the identification of such depth phases:

The Ad Hoc Group has also worked out detailed preliminary instructions for a comprehensive experimental exercise of the proposed global system. These instructions are annexed to the report as an appendix.

In conclusion, the Ad Hoc Group notes that significant and rapid developments have taken place in recent years regarding seismology and data processing techniques, and that these developments are continuing. The Ad Hoc Group notes that these results can turn out to be useful and thus could be considered for the further development of the scientific and technical aspects of the co-operative global system as well as for the further elaboration of a comprehensive experimental exercise of that system.

This concludes my introduction of the Ad Hoc Group's Third Report, and I am now going to touch briefly upon the Ad Hoc Group's Progress Report, contained in document CD/449. This report deals mainly with the envisaged technical test concerning the exchange and analysis of Level I data using the WMO/GTS. This technical test would be the first one conducted by the Ad Hoc Group under new formal arrangements provided by WMO for regular use of the WMO/GTS, and should result in the further elaboration of operational procedures for Level I seismic data exchange and of operational procedures at the envisaged International Data Centres. The test is scheduled for the period 15 October to 14 December 1984, including preparatory operations for about one week. It is expected that the results of the test will be discussed in the Ad Hoc Group and reported to the Conference on Disarmament in 1985. Preliminary detailed instructions for the test were worked out in consultation with the WMO representative. Dr. P. McGregor (Australia), Convener for the Study Group on Level I data exchange, is serving as the Co-ordinator for this technical test.

The Ad Hoc Group expressed the hope that the technical test will enjoy the widest possible participation and noted that, thus far, 23 countries from various regions of the world have indicated their intention to participate. More extended participation is, however, highly desirable from a technical point of view.

The Ad Hoc Group also discussed the schedule for its further work and suggests that its next session, subject to approval by the Conference on Disarmament, should be convened from 30 July to 10 August 1984, in Geneva, to finalize the instructions for the technical test and to review additional national investigations into relevant matters.

(Mr. Dahlman, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events)

Mr. President, I thank you for this opportunity to introduce the Third Report of the Ad Hoc Group and the Progress Report of its recent meeting, and I am prepared to try to answer questions that the distinguished members of this Conference might have. Thank you, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank Dr. Dahlman, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group, for introducing the Report. I should also like to extend to him my congratulations on his work and above all for his success in his major responsibilities. I should like to note that, bearing in mind that the Third Report contained in document CD/448 calls for careful study before a decision can be taken by the Conference, the President intends to propose that the two reports be considered at the plenary meeting on 10 April. I therefore suggest that members who wish to deal with this subject in a more detailed manner should do so on that occasion. However, as was also the case this morning, if any delegation wishes to speak on this subject today, it may do so. I already have on my list the distinguished representative of Australia, to whom I give the floor.

Mr. BUTLER (Australia): Thank you Mr. President. This is the first occasion on which I have sought the floor at the Conference since you assumed the Presidency, and it gives me great pleasure therefore to express my delegation's confidence that you will guide us well in this work, and a special pleasure to recall and to note the very clear and very fruitful relationship you have had in the past with my country.

Mr. President, I heard you say a moment ago that there would be an opportunity shortly to consider this report in detail and I take note of that, but on this occasion I would like to make a few general remarks, and I will be brief.

My delegation welcomes the Third Report to the Conference of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, and the Progress Report on the seventeenth session of the Ad Hoc Group which have been presented today by the Chairman, Dr. Dahlman.

We are very pleased to note that, as the Progress Report indicates, the recently-concluded session was a very productive one. The Ad Hoc Group's Third Report on the work carried out by the Group since 1979 was adopted unanimously. It reflects the spirit of purposefulness and co-operation which has been a feature of the Ad Hoc Group's work. Consensus was reached on the entire main part and on the important appendices containing recommendations and preliminary technical instructions.

The Third Report is an important document.

We note, in particular, the conclusion that significant and rapid developments have taken place in recent years regarding seismology and data processing techniques and these developments are continuing.

(Mr. Butler, Australia)

There is a need for additional scientific and technical progress in a number of areas. We endorse the recommendations in Chapter 8 of the Report which are intended to achieve just this.

In our view, important work remains to be done, particularly in the area of exchange of Level II data.

The Third Report clearly demonstrates the valuable contribution the Ad Hoc Group has made and can continue to make to facilitating the verification of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty.

The specification of an international network of seismic stations, and the associated data exchange system, in support of the detection and identification of seismic events, is an integral part of a verification system for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, and for that reason is an important activity and set of technical developments. The success of such a system will depend not only on national technical means but also on multilateral co-operative arrangements.

In this regard we are particularly pleased to note in the Progress Report presented by Dr. Dahlman that the Ad Hoc Group, at its recent session, worked out a preliminary plan for a technical test to be conducted later this year concerning the exchange and analysis of Level I data using the World Meteorological Organization/Global Telecommunications System on a regular basis.

This will be the first such technical test conducted by the Group under the new formal arrangements provided by WMO. We share the hope mentioned in the Report that this test will enjoy the widest possible participation from countries of all regions of the world.

We have been pleased that Australia has been able to make a constructive contribution to the work of the Ad Hoc Group, in particular the planning for this new experimental exercise, and Dr. Peter McGregor of Australia who is convener of the Study Group on Level I data exchange, will be the co-ordinator for the technical test.

My delegation warmly commends Dr. Dahlman for the work he has guided. We would in fact have expected no less from a Swede; Sweden's commitment to this task and to a test-ban treaty is well known. We commend the work of those who worked under Dr. Dahlman. We assure them and the other members of the Ad Hoc Group that Australia will continue to make an active and constructive contribution towards ensuring that the success which the Ad Hoc Group has attained in its work to date is followed up.

We consider that the Ad Hoc Group will continue to have important responsibilities in the future in relation both to finalising the arrangements for the technical test to be conducted later this year and in assessing the results of that test, as well as to giving effect to the recommendations contained in the final chapter of its Third Report.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Australia for his statement. I also thank him for his kind words for the President, and I should like to tell him that I am touched by the fact that he recalled my modest contribution in the past to relations between Romania and Australia. Does any other member wish to take the floor on this or any other matter? That does not appear to be the case.

Distinguished delegates, as you know, the secretariat has circulated a programme of work for the meetings of the Conference and its subsidiary body on chemical weapons for the coming week. As usual, the programme is provisional and may be changed if necessary. If I see no objection, I shall take it that the Conference wishes to adopt the programme.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): At the request of the distinguished representative of Sri Lanka, I should now like to inform the members of the Group of 21 that a meeting of the Group will be held on Friday, 16 March 1984, at 3.30 p.m. in this room with interpretation services.

Before adjourning the meeting, I should like to announce the programme of meetings of the informal consultation groups on agenda items 1, 2, 3, 5 and 7 for this week and for next week. These meetings will take place in room C.108. The programme is as follows: tomorrow, Friday 16 March, at 9.30 a.m., on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament; the meeting planned for Friday at 10.30 a.m. on outer space is postponed to next week at the request of several delegations; on Monday, 19 March 1984 at 10.30 a.m. the group on new weapons of mass destruction and radiological weapons; on Tuesday 20 March at 9.30 a.m. on outer space; on the same day, Tuesday 20 March, at 3.30 p.m. on the prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters; on Thursday 22 March at 9.30 a.m. on a nuclear-test ban.

In this connection, I wish to thank warmly all delegations which have expressed their interest and have participated in these informal consultations, and I hope that they will be useful. Thank you. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will take place on Tuesday 20 March at 10.30 a.m. The plenary meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 4.50 p.m.

# CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.251  
20 March 1984  
ENGLISH

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## FINAL RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND FIFTY-FIRST PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Tuesday, 20 March 1984, at 10.30 a.m.

President:

Mr. I. Datcu

(Romania)

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

<u>Algeria:</u>	Ms. F.-Z. KSENTINI
<u>Argentina:</u>	Mr. J.J. CARASALES Mr. R. GARCÍA MORITAN Mr. R. VILLAMBROSA
<u>Australia:</u>	Mr. R. BUTLER Mr. R. ROWE Ms. J. COURTNEY
<u>Belgium:</u>	Mr. M. DÉPASSE Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE
<u>Brazil:</u>	Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA Mr. S. QUEIROZ DUARTE
<u>Bulgaria:</u>	Mr. P. POPTCHEV Mr. C. PRAMOV
<u>Burma:</u>	U MAUNG MAUNG GYI U THAN TUN
<u>Canada:</u>	Mr. G. SKINNER
<u>China:</u>	Mr. QIAN JIADONG Ms. WANG ZHIYUN Mr. LIN CHENG Mr. ZHANG WEIDONG
<u>Cuba:</u>	Mr. P. NUNEZ MOSQUERA
<u>Czechoslovakia:</u>	Mr. M. VEJVODA Mr. A. CIMA Mr. J. MATOUŠEK
<u>Egypt:</u>	Mr. F. MONIB



Ethiopia:France:

Mr. H. RENIE  
Mr. G. MONTASSIER

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. H. ROSE  
Mr. H. THIELICKE  
Mr. F. SAYATZ  
Mr. J. DEMBSKI

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. H. WEGENER  
Mr. M. GERDTS  
Mr. W.-E. VON DEM HAGEN

Hungary:

Mr. D. MEISZTER  
Mr. F. GAJDA  
Mr. T. TOTH

India:

Mr. S. KANT SHARMA

Indonesia:

Mr. S. SUTOWARDOYO  
Mr. ANDRADJATI  
Mr. HARYOMATARAM

Islamic Republic of Iran:

Mr. N.K. KAMYAB  
Mr. F.S. SIRJANI

Italy:

Mr. M. ALESSI  
Mr. M. PAVESE  
Mr. G. ADORNI BRACCESI

Japan:

Mr. R. IMAI  
Mr. M. KONISHI  
Mr. T. ISHIGURI

Kenya:Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCÍA ROBLES  
Mr. P. MACEDO RIBA  
Ms. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO

Mongolia:

Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG

Mr. S.O. BOLD

Morocco:

Mr. A. SKALLI

Mr. O. HILALE

Netherlands:

Mr. J. RAMAKER

Mr. R.J. AKKERMAN

Nigeria:

Mr. J.O. OBOH

Mr. L.O. AKINDELE

Mr. C.V. UDEDIBIA

Pakistan:

Mr. K. NIAZ

Peru:

Mr. C. CASTILLO RAMIREZ

Poland:

Mr. S. TURBANSKI

Mr. J. CIALOWICZ

Mr. G. CZEMPINSKI

Mr. T. STROJWAS

Romania:

Mr. I. DATCU

Mr. T. MELESCANU

Mr. O. IONESCU

Mr. A. POPESCU

Mr. A. CRETU

Sri Lanka:

Mr. J. DHANAPALA

Mr. P. KARIYAWASAM

Sweden:

Mr. R. EKEUS

Mr. J. LUNDIN

Ms. E. BONNIER

Mr. H. BERGLUND

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV

Mr. P.Y. SKOMOROKHIN

Mr. S.V. KOBYSH

Mr. G. VASHADZE

Mr. V. USTINOV

United Kingdom:

Mr. L.J. MIDDLETON  
Mr. J.F. GORDON  
Dr. G.H. COOPER  
Mr. D.A. SLINN

United States of America:

Mr. L.G. FIELDS  
Mr. N. CARRERA  
Ms. K.C. CRITTENBERGER  
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Venezuela:

Mr. LOPEZ OLIVER  
Mr. T. LABRADOR

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC  
Mr. D. MINIC

Zaire:

Ms. E. ESAKI KABEYA

Secretary-General of the Conference on  
Disarmament and Personal Representative  
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary-General of the  
Conference on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): The plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is called to order.

The Conference today begins the consideration of agenda item 5 entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space". However, in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any member wishing to do so may raise any matter relevant to the work of the Conference.

Distinguished representatives, you will recall that at its last plenary meeting the Conference decided to hold an informal meeting this morning to consider the organizational matters which are ripe for decision. After having heard the speakers on my list for today, I intend to suspend the plenary meeting and to convene an informal meeting to consider the requests for participation by non-member States in the work of the Conference. We shall then resume the plenary meeting to take the appropriate decisions.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Mongolia and the German Democratic Republic, and I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Mongolia, Ambassador Erdembileg.

Mr. ERDEMBILEG (Mongolia) (translated from Russian): Comrade President, the Mongolian delegation would like to devote its statement today to agenda item 5, prevention of an arms race in outer space, a topic which the Conference on Disarmament began considering early this week.

Before doing so, I should like to extend to you, Comrade President, our sincere congratulations and wish you, the representative of fraternal socialist Romania, all success in carrying out your responsibilities as President of the Conference for this month.

The Mongolian delegation would like to express its gratitude to the Ambassador of Poland, Stanislaw Turbanski, for his great contribution to the work of the Conference at the beginning stage of its work.

The subject of the prevention of an arms race in outer space occupies a special place in the gamut of disarmament problems. It is an extremely urgent and timely matter. What is involved is primarily the prevention of a new and still more dangerous turn in the arms race and the elimination of potential opportunities for using space technology for military purposes.

It is well known that the most powerful and destructive modern weapon, the strategic nuclear missile, makes use of near space. There has been, furthermore, an increasing number of disturbing reports in the world press about other forms and means of using space technology for military purposes. In particular, such reports have referred to the development in the United States of space devices intended for carrying out military operations, including the development and testing of space components for anti-ballistic missile or anti-aircraft defence systems, orbiting attack systems and so forth. Such unprecedented plans and projects for extending the arms race to outer space and for the use of military force from space against the Earth are aimed at achieving military and strategic superiority, at obtaining a unilateral advantage and, ultimately, at gaining a first-strike potential.

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

The idea of establishing an anti-ballistic system in space, put forward by the President of the United States on 23 March 1983, was aimed precisely at achieving those goals. Under the pretext of "defence" the United States is attempting to undermine the strategic balance, which is an important factor in averting the threat of nuclear war. Washington is seeking to protect its territory from the threat of a nuclear-missile response, thus maintaining for itself the freedom to use nuclear weapons in other areas. It is clear that the United States expects that no one will be able to match it in this field and that it will be able to have complete dominion in space.

The steps taken by the Pentagon to establish a unified space command covering all branches of the armed forces of the United States are aimed at this same goal. These steps are clearly aimed at gaining mastery in space for the United States. In the President's State-of-the-Union Message the establishment of a manned military space station is described literally as increasing American superiority and the building of new frontiers. United States National Security Directive No. 119, signed by the President on 6 January 1984, sets the same goals, calling for a multi-billion dollar programme of development of new space weapons and other sophisticated types of weapons.

The danger of the arms race spreading to outer space is quite obvious. The agreed completion-time targets in the Pentagon's plans relating to building up the strategic strike forces and deploying anti-ballistic defence systems on Earth and in space show that the aim is to complete the establishment of a so-called first-strike potential in the 1980s. The United States magazine "BusinessWeek" describes with extreme clarity the future plans and activities of the United States in space: whoever manages to gain control of space, the main theatre for future wars, will be able to change the balance of forces decisively and this will amount to the establishment of world dominion.

The transformation of outer space into a theatre for the arms race is a matter of great concern to the world, which firmly and decisively calls for the peaceful use of outer space for the benefit of all States and in the interests of the development of friendly relations and mutual understanding among States.

This is the main reason for the urgent need to direct the space activities of States to peaceful purposes and to conclude effective international agreements that would place reliable barriers in the way of any attempts to turn space into a theatre for the arms race. This position on the prevention of an arms race in outer space is that of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, including the Mongolian People's Republic.

In his speech of 2 March 1984, K.U. Chernenko, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, referred inter alia to the importance of not transferring the nuclear-arms race to new areas, including space.

In that context, we should like to dwell in greater detail on the important new proposal of the Soviet Union to conclude a treaty on the prohibition of the use of force in outer space and from space against the Earth, a draft that was introduced at the previous, thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly and received broad support and high praise from many States, including those represented at the Conference on Disarmament.

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

As is known, the Soviet Union presented a proposal in 1981 for the conclusion of an agreement on banning the deployment of weapons of any kind in outer space. This proposal was endorsed by the General Assembly and a draft treaty on the subject was submitted later to the Committee on Disarmament. However, as is known to members of this body, it was not possible to begin negotiations aimed at preparing the appropriate treaty, owing to the negative position of some delegations, in particular the NATO countries.

It is our view that the new Soviet proposal effectively combines the political and legal obligations of States not to use force against each other in space and from space with measures of a substantive nature aimed at preventing the militarization of space. In specific terms, the Soviet Union proposes the following:

Firstly, to prohibit the use or threat of force in outer space, in the atmosphere, and on Earth through the utilization, as instruments of destruction, of space objects in orbit around the Earth, on celestial bodies or stationed in space in any other manner, and to prohibit the use or threat of force against space objects in orbit around the Earth.

Secondly, to undertake not to test or deploy in space any space-based weapons for the destruction of targets on the Earth, in the atmosphere or in outer space.

Thirdly, to undertake not to test or develop new anti-satellite systems and to destroy existing anti-satellite systems.

Fourthly, not to destroy, damage or disturb the normal functioning or change the flight trajectory of space objects of other countries.

Fifthly, not to use space objects in orbit around the Earth or on celestial bodies as means to destroy any targets on the Earth, in the atmosphere or in outer space.

And finally, to prohibit the testing and use of manned spacecraft for military, including anti-satellite, purposes.

The proposal provides also for the appropriate control measures and a system of consultations and co-operation aimed at the implementation of the provisions of the future treaty.

Looking at the above-mentioned prohibitions as a whole, it is not difficult, in our view, to see that they constitute specific proposals aimed at a radical solution of a broad range of complex matters linked to the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

In addition to its new proposals the Soviet Union took an extremely important decision in committing itself not to be the first to launch anti-satellite weapons of any type into space and, in so doing, it established a unilateral moratorium on such launchings for as long as other States, including the United States, refrain from launching anti-satellite weapons of any type into space. That decision is yet another clear demonstration of the Soviet Union's determination to conduct negotiations aimed at arriving at the appropriate agreements and its willingness to take effective measures in order to prevent the arms race from spreading to outer space.

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

There have been on several occasions broad exchanges of views on this subject in sessions of the General Assembly and the Committee on Disarmament, and it is now necessary to begin active negotiations without further delay. We feel that the time has come to establish a subsidiary working body of the Conference that would immediately begin negotiations on the conclusion of an agreement or agreements, appropriate to prevent an arms race in all its aspects in outer space, taking into account all existing proposals, including of course the Soviet proposal on a treaty on the prohibition on the use of force in outer space and from space against the Earth. This is the very task envisaged in the General Assembly's recommendation in resolution 38/70, which was adopted by 147 Member States of the United Nations.

Owing to the negative position taken by the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom and some other delegations of Western States, the establishment of a subsidiary body on agenda item 5 continues, unfortunately, to be delayed, as does agreement on its mandate. Those countries bear the entire responsibility, therefore, for the fact that the Conference has up to now been unable to begin negotiations on this important and priority topic.

In this connection we simply cannot understand the position of those Governments that were in favour of the adoption by the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session of the single resolution on the prevention of an arms race in outer space but do not, at the session of the Conference on Disarmament, seem willing to undertake negotiations aimed at the preparation of an agreement on the subject.

The negative experience of the work in this forum, when its subsidiary body was set up with a deliberately restricted and narrow mandate, must not be repeated. If some delegations of the Western countries again insist on their obstructionist position, such an approach can only be seen as a pretext to avoid a businesslike solution of the problems facing the Conference.

The Mongolian delegation, like many others, calls for the speedy establishment of an ad hoc committee on the prevention of an arms race in outer space with a mandate that would include the undertaking of negotiations aimed at the conclusion of an important agreement on one of the priority items on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament, and not general discussions and studies.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Mongolia for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the President. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of the German Democratic Republic, Ambassador Rose.

Mr. ROSE (German Democratic Republic): Comrade President: At the outset of my statement I would like to congratulate you, the representative of socialist Romania, on your assumption of the Presidency for the month of March. As the first weeks have already shown, your long experience in the disarmament field is indeed of great value for the work of our Conference. We appreciate your efforts to continue our work in a dedicated manner with the aim of achieving tangible results, and it is indeed a great pleasure to see you presiding over our Conference, all the more so at a time when from your country's capital, Bucharest, a new important common initiative has been submitted by the member States of the Warsaw Treaty to the NATO countries concerning negotiations on the non-increase and the reduction of military budgets. Permit me, Comrade President to express once again our appreciation to Ambassador Turbanski for the effective manner in which he guided our Conference through the first month of this session.

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

I would like to deal with agenda item 3 concerning the prevention of nuclear war. The debate in this Conference has reflected the deep concern about the aggravation of the international situation and the growing danger of nuclear war. Actually, all delegations demand that a nuclear war must be avoided. However, at the same time it has become obvious that there are different views on the concrete approach to the substantial and procedural matters involved.

Obviously, there already exist different assessments as to the danger of nuclear war. Most countries share our view that this danger has grown considerably during the past years.

In the 1960s and 1970s, the first positive results in curbing the nuclear-arms race were achieved. I would like to recall the SALT agreements and the 1973 Soviet-United States agreement on the prevention of nuclear war. These and other bilateral and multilateral steps raised hopes for further more comprehensive measures.

However, this development was brought to a standstill as a result of the course of superarmament and confrontation adopted by the United States.

As a result of this:

First, the number of nuclear weapons has further increased and the nuclear-arms race is characterized by higher efficiency of nuclear weapons; qualitative improvement has become the main trend.

Second, the so-called doctrine of nuclear deterrence and other concepts for the use of nuclear weapons to a growing extent turn out to be guidelines for the preparation of a nuclear war. To materialize them, precedence is given in military planning to the creation of a nuclear first-strike potential.

Third, the deployment areas for nuclear weapons are being expanded. More and more vessels, aircraft and military bases are being equipped with such weapons. Nuclear first-strike weapons are being moved closer to the borders of other States. The deployment of Pershing 2 and Cruise missiles in Western Europe demonstrate the extraordinarily dangerous nature of this development.

The extension of the arms race to outer space is being pressed by certain circles which are devoting enormous efforts and funds to that purpose.

This proliferation of nuclear weapons at the same time drastically increases the risk of an accidental outbreak of nuclear war.

Fourth, during the past few years important negotiations have been broken off by the United States, while the basis for other negotiations has been removed by a policy of strength. Here, at this Conference, we daily witness efforts to complicate or even block serious steps on urgent measures for preventing nuclear war.

Fifth, attempts are being made to belittle the devastating consequences of a nuclear catastrophe, in spite of the fact that scientific findings prove the contrary and give clear evidence that the destiny of mankind is at stake.



(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

All these facts are incontestable and lead to the cogent conclusion that the danger of nuclear war has grown considerably. These facts directly concern the sphere of competence of our Conference.

Furthermore, we have to take into consideration the growing tendency of certain forces to solve political issues by replacing the search for the accommodation of interests by the dictate of weapons.

To avert the danger of nuclear war has become a matter that deeply concerns all peoples in our times. Indeed, it is the most important international task.

With your permission, Comrade President, I would like to refer to the statement made by His Excellency Archbishop Achille Silvestrini on 15 March, who stressed that more and more numerous are our brothers and sisters who are haunted by the terrible sensation of living on top of a volcano that at any moment could become active and unleash devastating forces and spread its mantle of death over our planet and put a final end to the story of our history. This is, indeed, a very unambiguous description of the reality.

Nevertheless, certain governments deny that there is a growing danger of nuclear war. They try to avoid the discussion of its consequences and seek to continue unhindered the arms race to obtain military superiority. They maintain that their own security has to be guaranteed by increasing stocks of evermore sophisticated nuclear weapons.

Obsessed by their armaments hysteria, ruling imperialist circles of NATO are blind and deaf to the threat to international security as a whole. They ignore the fact that movements for peace and disarmament and sober-minded politicians all over the world have emphatically stressed this acute threat to mankind. To recall their demands is not only fully legitimate but also serves that cause.

The different assessment of the danger of nuclear war finds its expression accordingly in a different approach to the elaboration of measures to avert that danger. This applies to both the urgency and the concrete substance.

Thus, at this Conference too the majority of States is in favour of making the solution of this problem the central task which should be tackled immediately. Others, however, try to push this question into the background.

Whereas the majority of delegations demands the elaboration of effective measures, the suggestions made by other delegations rather look like cosmetic surgery. One cannot but gain the impression that they are intended to be tactical instruments rather than considerations on how mankind's survival can be guaranteed by effective measures to prevent nuclear war. However that may be, if their authors are convinced of their proposals they should put them to the test in businesslike negotiations.

The differences in substance are necessarily reflected in the discussions on procedural matters. It is logical that those who stand for swift and effective steps against the danger of nuclear war also urge specific negotiations and the establishment of an appropriate subsidiary body. Those, however, who would like to

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

ward off anything that might impede their armaments programmes, would prefer to evade the consideration of these questions, and at most are ready to keep repeating their negative attitude in non-committal debates. This leads away from the factual consideration of the matters and delays or prevents any progress as far as their solution is concerned.

It cannot be denied that the procedural debates have their roots in the general approach to item 3 of our agenda. To offer mere methodological advice to diplomats who have long years of conference experience and who have substantially contributed to working out important international agreements cannot replace the lack of political will on the part of certain delegations.

There is hardly another subject at this Conference that would be more apt to prove the unity between words about peace and deeds to maintain it than the elaboration of practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war. As long as such deeds are missing, we shall be compelled to tell the world why the Conference fails to make any progress.

What some delegations sometimes call reality in fact turns out to be the subjective negative position of some nuclear-weapon Powers, which is in contradiction with world-wide public demands.

We, therefore, urge the States concerned to reconsider their position and help lead the activities of this Conference onto the path of businesslike and fruitful negotiations. The security interests of all States and the existence of mankind can only be guaranteed by taking swift and concrete steps. It is inadmissible for a State, no matter how powerful it may be or may feel to be, to use its own arbitrarily defined security interests as a tool to act counter to the security interests of other States.

Our delegation is ready to study all proposals very carefully, point by point. Nobody underestimates the hard work necessary to reach agreement. However, it is indispensable to begin to look for and agree upon common ground through businesslike negotiations. We are convinced that, given readiness in principle to take part in elaborating measures against nuclear war, all arguments put forward in favour of the establishment of a Committee with an appropriate working mandate will be accepted.

I have especially in mind the following:

First, the United Nations General Assembly adopted at its thirty-eighth session several resolutions reflecting the concern of the peoples about the growing danger of nuclear war and requesting this Conference to undertake as a matter of the highest priority -- I underline: highest priority -- negotiations with a view to achieving agreement on appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war.

Second, we now have a corresponding separate item on our agenda. Those who accepted this should not refuse the consequences. We cannot agree with arguments to the effect that the establishment of a Committee would be "premature". As everyone knows, in the past working groups were set up on questions where differences of opinion existed concerning detailed issues. No one can say that the issues connected with the prevention of nuclear war are unknown. Extensive deliberations have already taken place in the United Nations and the Committee on Disarmament.

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

Third, important as it is, the establishment of a Committee can only be one step. What is equally required is a mandate that makes it possible to negotiate and agree upon concrete measures. A mere stating of positions will not do to make headway.

Fourth, there are concrete proposals on the table constituting a good basis for negotiations. Working papers have been submitted by different sides, and during the debate valuable suggestions were made. Every delegation is requested to render its contribution to achieving further progress.

The negotiating process makes possible what is urgently required now: the careful consideration of the proposals with a view to agreeing on practical measures.

The establishment of a Committee with a negotiating mandate would put an immediate stop to the procedural debates and create the preconditions making it possible to turn to substantive issues.

My delegation reserves the right to give the details of its position on the substantive questions at a later stage of our deliberations in plenary. At this moment, I would like to reaffirm our stance in favour of such measures which would create real obstacles to the outbreak of nuclear war.

The socialist countries have undertaken many concrete initiatives in this respect. Earlier this month, Comrade Chernenko, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, put forward proposals of both political and military character. They range from the ratification of the treaties on the limitation of underground nuclear-weapon tests and nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes by the United States to the prohibition of propaganda for nuclear war, to the obligation to be undertaken by all nuclear-weapon States not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, to a freeze of nuclear weapons and their reduction and final complete elimination through negotiations on the basis of equality and equal security. The Conference has these proposals before it in document CD/444 of 6 March 1984.

This is, in the view of the German Democratic Republic, the road that must and can be followed.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of the German Democratic Republic for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President. The list of speakers for today is exhausted: does any other representative wish to take the floor? If not, I now intend to suspend the plenary meeting and to convene an informal meeting of the Conference, immediately after which we shall resume the plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament. The plenary meeting is suspended.

The meeting was suspended at 11.35 a.m. and resumed at 11.45 a.m.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): The plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is called to order. The Conference has before it two draft decisions which have been circulated by the secretariat following the requests for participation and subsequent clarifications received from Greece and Ireland. We shall consider the draft decisions in the order in which the initial requests were received from the non-members. The first draft decision refers to the request by Greece and is contained in Working Paper No. 120. 1/ If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the draft decision.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): The second draft decision is contained in Working Paper No. 121. 2/ If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the draft decision.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): We have now concluded our work for today, and if no other member wishes to take the floor at this stage I now intend to adjourn the plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 22 March, at 10.30 a.m. The meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 11.55 a.m.

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1/ "In response to the request of Greece (CD/477 and CD/478) and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of its rules of procedure, the Conference decides for the present to invite the representative of Greece to participate during 1984 in the plenary meetings of the Conference and in the subsidiary body established under item 4 of its agenda."

2/ "In response to the request of Ireland (CD/479 and CD/480) and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of its rules of procedure, the Conference decides for the present to invite the representative of Ireland to participate during 1984 in the plenary meetings of the Conference and in the subsidiary body established under item 4 of its agenda."

# CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.252  
22 March 1984  
ENGLISH

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## FINAL RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND FIFTY-SECOND PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Thursday, 22 March 1984, at 10.30 a.m.

President:

Mr. I. Datcu

(Romania)

GE.84-61103

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

<u>Algeria:</u>	Mr. A. TAFFAR Mr. A. BOUBAZINE
<u>Argentina:</u>	Mr. J.J. CARSALES Mr. R. GARCÍA MORITAN Mr. R. VILLAMBROSA
<u>Australia:</u>	Mr. R. BUTLER Mr. R. ROWE Ms. J. COURTNEY
<u>Belgium:</u>	Mr. M. DEPASSE Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE
<u>Brazil:</u>	Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA Mr. S. QUEIROZ DUARTE
<u>Bulgaria:</u>	Mr. P. POPTCHEV Mr. C. PRAMOV
<u>Burma:</u>	U MAUNG MAUNG GY U THAN TUN
<u>Canada:</u>	Mr. G. SKINNER
<u>China:</u>	Mr. QIAN JIADONG Ms. WANG ZHIYUN Mr. LIN CHENG Mr. LIANG DEFENG
<u>Cuba:</u>	Mr. P. NUÑEZ MOSQUERA
<u>Czechoslovakia:</u>	Mr. M. VEJVODA Mr. J. JIROSEK
<u>Egypt:</u>	Mr. S. ALFARARGI Mr. I.I. HASSAN Mr. A.M. ABBAS Mr. R. MONIB

Ethiopia:France:

Mr. F. DE LA GORCE

Mr. H. RENIE

Mr. G. MONTASSIER

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. H. ROSE

Mr. J. DEMBSKI

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. H. WEGENER

Mr. F. ELBE

Mr. M. GERDTS

Mr. W-E. VON DEM HAGEN

Hungary:

Mr. D. MEISZTER

Mr. F. GAJDA

Mr. T. TOTH

India:

Mr. M. DUBEY

Mr. S. KANT SHARMA

Indonesia:

Mr. S. SUTOWARDOYO

Mr. ANDRADJATI

Mr. HARYOMATARAM

Mrs. P. RAMADHAN

Islamic Republic of Iran:

Mr. N.K. KAMYAB

Mr. F.S. SIRJANI

Italy:

Mr. M. ALESSI

Mr. M. PAVESE

Mr. G. ADORNI BRACCESI

Japan:

Mr. R. IMAI

Mr. K. TANAKA

Mr. T. KAWAKITA

Mr. T. ISHIGURI

Kenya:

Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCÍA ROBLES  
Mr. P. MACEDO RIBA  
Ms. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO

Mongolia:

Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG  
Mr. S.O. BOLD

Morocco:

Mr. A. SKALLI  
Mr. O. HILALE

Netherlands:

Mr. J. RAMAKER  
Mr. R.J. AKKERMAN

Nigeria:

Mr. J.O. OBOH  
Mr. L.O. AKINDELE  
Mr. C.V. UDEDIBIA  
Mr. F.O. ADESHIDA

Pakistan:

Mr. M. AHMAD  
Mr. K. NIAZ

Peru:

Mr. P. CANNOCK  
Mr. C. CASTILLO RAMIREZ

Poland:

Mr. G. CZEMPINSKI  
Mr. T. STROJWAS

Romania:

Mr. I. DATCU  
Mr. T. MELESCANU  
Mr. O. IONESCU  
Mr. A. POPESCU  
Mr. A. CRETU

Sri Lanka:

Mr. J. DHANAPALA  
Mr. P. KARIYAWASAM

Sweden:

Mr. R. EKEUS  
Mr. J. LUNDIN  
Ms. E. BONNIER  
Mr. H. BERGLUND  
Mr. L.E. WINGREN  
Ms. A.M. LAU



Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELIAN  
Mr. P.Y. SKOMOROKHIN  
Mr. S.V. KOBYSH  
Mr. G. VASHADZE  
Mr. V. USTINOV

United Kingdom:

Mr. L.J. MIDDLETON  
Mr. B.P. NOBLE  
Mr. J.F. GORDON  
Mr. G.H. COOPER  
Mr. D.A. SLINN

United States of America:

Mr. L.G. FIELDS  
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Mr. R. HORNE  
Mr. P. LEMBESIS  
Mr. J. DOESBERG  
Mr. J. PUCKETT  
Mr. H. CALHOUN

Venezuela:

Mr. LOPEZ OLIVER  
Mr. T. LABRADOR

Yugoslavia:

Mr. K. VIDAS  
Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC  
Mr. D. MINIC

Zaire:

Ms. E. ESAKI KABEYA

Secretary-General of the Conference  
on Disarmament and Personal  
Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary-General of the  
Conference on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): The plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is called to order.

The Conference will today continue the consideration of agenda item 5, entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space". However, in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any member wishing to do so may raise any matter relevant to the work of the Conference.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Pakistan and Sweden, and I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of the USSR, Ambassador Victor Issraelyan.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Comrade President, today the delegation of the Soviet Union would like to dwell upon a question of extreme importance -- the great and real danger of spreading the arms race to outer space. The importance of this problem is determined by the fact that if urgent and effective measures are not developed to prevent the arms race in outer space, mankind will face a new threat on a scale which it is difficult even to imagine now.

During the current session of the Conference on Disarmament many delegations have already expressed their serious concern at the extremely dangerous consequences of the saturation of outer space with lethal weapons. The Soviet delegation fully shares this concern. We are convinced that the prevention of the militarization of outer space is one of the priority problems facing mankind, and here on Earth much depends on whether it is solved.

The Soviet Union has consistently advocated, and continues to advocate that the peaceful future of space should be ensured. We would like to stress this today too.

The beginning of the space age in the history of mankind is inseparably linked with the name of a citizen of the Soviet Union -- Yuri Gagarin. On 9 March, the 50th birthday of the first man to fly in space was celebrated. There are people in world history whose names embody an entire epoch, the beginning of a new direction, the outstanding achievements of their time, Yuri Gagarin is one of these in our century. His name symbolizes the space age, which started with the launching of the first man-made satellite of the Earth.

The Message of 12 April 1961 of the CPSU Central Committee, Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the Government of the Soviet Union in connection with the first flight of man to outer space pointed out: "We believe that the victories in the exploration of outer space represent the achievements not of our people alone, but of all mankind as well. We are glad to put them at service of all peoples, in the name of the progress, happiness and wellbeing of all peoples on the Earth. We place our achievements and discoveries not at the service of war, but at the service of the peace and security of peoples".

Guided by precisely those goals, from the first days of the space age the USSR advocated the development of concrete international co-operation in space and on 15 March 1958 put forward a detailed programme for the prohibition of the use of outer space for military purposes.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

The experience of international negotiations confirms that in those cases when realism and responsibility to mankind have prevailed over other considerations in the policies of States it has been possible to achieve mutually acceptable agreements aimed at preventing the militarization of outer space. The important list of such agreements is a valuable achievement by mankind, which should be preserved and multiplied.

However, the continuation of such co-operation at present and, what is most important, of the entire policy of using space in the interests of peace and preventing its transformation into a testing ground of military preparations, has been jeopardized.

That is why the task preventing the arms race in outer space has become particularly urgent. Moreover, a crucial moment has now been reached, and as matters now stand either the States concerned will sit down without delay at the negotiating table to work out an agreement or agreements prohibiting the stationing in outer space of weapons of any kind, or else the arms race will spread on outer space. The overwhelming majority of States is seriously concerned at the real increase in the danger of the arms race spreading to outer space.

The principled approach of the USSR to the solution of this problem was reaffirmed in the statement of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, K.U. Chernenko, of 2 March 1984, the foreign policy chapter of which has been distributed as Conference document CD/444. He firmly spoke in favour of "not spreading the nuclear arms race to new spheres, including outer space". The Soviet leader stressed that the United States can also make a major contribution to strengthening peace by coming to an agreement on the renunciation of the militarization of outer space.

It is not by chance that the United States is mentioned in this context, if we take into account that, as recent events show, United States strategic planning, as proclaimed, inter alia, at the highest level, ascribes a growing role to the use of military space technology. It is in the United States that official plans and programmes have been announced for developing and using weapon systems in outer space and from it against the Earth. This is a question not of some abstract "star wars", but of a lethal danger absolutely relevant to the Earth, the creation of systems designed to destroy not only space-based, but also ground, sea and air targets.

The dangerous character of such a policy has been convincingly proved by scientists and experts of various countries. The Soviet scientists E. Velikhov, G. Arbatov, M. Sagdeev and others discuss it in their works. Many scientists and public figures in the United States also emphasize that the testing and stationing of any weapons in outer space considerably increase the possibility of unleashing war on Earth. The statements on this score made by former United States Secretaries of Defence Brown and McNamara, as well as by the eminent scientists Ch. Towns, I. Raby, R. Garwin, H. York, G. Bethe, are well known. In connection with the development in the United States of one of the most sophisticated anti-satellite systems, a group of eminent United States scientists and public figures has warned that once such systems have appeared in the arsenals of countries it will be very difficult to remove them. One cannot but agree with the conclusion of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute that space technology promotes not only a qualitative nuclear arms race, but also the formulation of doctrines for conducting wars with the use of such weapons.

The United States is making tremendous efforts in order to achieve the goals of military superiority in outer space. According to the data of the United States National Science Foundation, United States aerospace companies employ more scientists for research and development work than the chemical, health, petroleum, automobile, rubber and engineering industries taken together.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

The United States is completing the design and has already started the testing of an ASAT system based on F-15 fighters equipped with intercepting missiles with self-guided warheads. At the same time the United States continues to develop weapons on the basis of new physical principles, including the laser. An important role in United States military plans is assigned to the reusable "Space Shuttle". It is envisaged to use it to launch military satellites, orbital command posts, and new types of space weapons.

The plan for the development of a "large-scale and highly efficient anti-ballistic missile defence" proclaimed by the United States Administration in March 1983 is particularly dangerous.

Implementation of the United States programme for the creation of space-based ABMs could disrupt the linkage between strategic offensive and defensive armaments fixed in the Soviet-United States agreements of 1972. In fact, it would result in opening the lock-gates for a new round in the strategic arms race. The attempts to create the impression that the space-based ABM system conceived in the United States will be defensive are beneath criticism. This programme is designed to destroy early-warning space systems and the command and communication centres of the other side, and thus to render the latter as vulnerable as possible to the United States nuclear "disarming" strike. Hope is placed in impunity, in being able to make a nuclear first strike while being secure against a retaliatory one. The new United States military space conception can only bring the world closer to the nuclear abyss.

As far as the economic side of the space arms race imposed by the United States is concerned, it involves tremendous resources. It should be noted that in accordance with Directive 119 concerning the beginning of a vast research programme to create new space weapon systems signed by the President of the United States on 6 January 1984, the allocations for development of laser space systems will grow by 12 times by 1988. Washington plans to spend \$27 billion during the next five years and \$95 billion by the year 2000 for the creation of the space-based ABM systems.

The programmes for the creation of space armaments determine in many respects the political actions of the United States and other NATO countries in the international scene. It was at the end of the 1970s that the United States suspended bilateral talks with the USSR on anti-satellite weapons. We have repeatedly, including from the rostrum of the United Nations, referred to the need to resume those negotiations, but the United States continues to avoid them.

In connection with this position taken by the United States, I should like to draw the attention of delegations to an item in today's issue of the International Herald Tribune which cannot fail to be of interest. I shall quote some extracts from the newspaper in the original: "Senior Pentagon officials, led by Assistant Defence Secretary, Richard N. Perle, are fighting to delay or prevent Administration initiatives in several secondary areas of arms control". I quote from further in the report: "Mr. Perle ... has managed to block any United States initiative on anti-satellite weapons and ratification of the threshold treaty, citing difficulties in verifying Soviet compliance. He has slowed movement on the chemical treaty and in development of a new United States position at the Vienna talks on conventional troop reductions in Europe".

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

With regard to the delays in the submission by the United States of its widely publicised draft comprehensive treaty on the prohibition of chemical weapons and the possible consequences of those delays for the negotiations at the Conference, the Soviet delegation reserves the right to return to this question at the opportune time. Today we should like to point out that as a result of this activity by the Pentagon, and I quote once again from the newspaper item, "the Administration is not expected to propose negotiations to ban these [anti-satellite] weapons at this time".

The Western countries are also thwarting the beginning of practical negotiations on preventing the arms race in outer space on a multilateral basis. This is being done, however, somewhat more subtly. The United States and its allies do not explicitly say "no" to the negotiations, but try to shelve the matter by making different proposals about the need "to study the existing norms of international law concerning the use of outer space for peaceful purposes", as it was stated, in particular, at the Brussels session of the NATO Council. It is difficult to say which is greater in this position: the expectation that the negotiating partners are naive, or a lack of respect for them. It should be clear to anyone that there is no need to conduct international negotiations merely to study the existing norms of international law. It would be enough for that purpose to assign one of the experts of the legal department of any foreign ministry, delegation or secretariat of an international organization and one could count on obtaining sound information on this problem. If that is not enough, an appropriate research institute could be requested to deal with it and perhaps a scientific symposium could be held on the subject. To involve in this study such an important disarmament negotiating body as the Conference on Disarmament is unreasonable, to say the least. The Soviet Union, for example, knows full well its obligations under existing agreements concerning the use of outer space for peaceful purposes.

We are convinced that it is necessary reliably to bar the ways in which the arms race and military confrontation can spread to outer space, which has been peaceful up to now. This is precisely why the Soviet Union put forward in 1983, at the thirty-eighth session of the United Nations General Assembly, a draft treaty on the prohibition of the use of force in outer space and from outer space against the Earth, which on our request has been distributed as a document of the Conference on Disarmament (CD/476).

In accordance with General Assembly resolution 38/70, this draft was transmitted to our Conference for consideration.

The Soviet initiative -- I have in mind our draft treaty -- has been favourably received in the United Nations and has given rise to a wide political response all over the world.

The Soviet delegation would like briefly to describe the basic provisions of the draft treaty on the prohibition of use of force in outer space and from outer space against the Earth, having in mind that within the subsidiary body of the Conference on the prevention of arms race in outer space and with the assistance of appropriate experts we shall be able to give more detailed explanations.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

In our draft we propose to prohibit the testing and deployment in outer space of any space-based weapons, to solve completely and radically the problem of anti-satellite weapons and to ban the testing and use of manned spacecraft for military, including anti-satellite, purposes. Taking into account these new provisions, our initiative goes considerably further than our proposal of 1981 on the non-stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space. Its salient feature consists in the fact that it takes into account in many respects the positions of other, including Western, countries, and the considerations they have put forward in the United Nations and in the Committee on Disarmament.

The important feature of the document submitted by us consists in the combination of political and legal obligations of States not to allow the use of force against each other in and from outer space with measures of a material nature aimed at preventing the militarization of outer space. It prohibits resorting to the use or threat of force in outer space and the atmosphere as well as on the Earth through the utilization, as instruments of destruction, of space objects in orbit around the Earth, on celestial bodies or stationed in outer space in any other manner. At the same time it prohibits resorting to the use or threat of force against space objects.

The Treaty envisages the complete prohibition of the testing and deployment in outer space of any space-based weapons for the destruction of targets on the Earth, in the atmosphere or in outer space.

We propose also a radical solution to the question of anti-satellite weapons: the complete renunciation by States of the creation of new anti-satellite systems and the destruction of any such systems which they already possess. The parties to the Treaty would also undertake not to destroy, damage, disturb the normal functioning or change the flight trajectory of space objects of other States in any other manner.

In addition, it is proposed to ban the testing and use of manned spacecraft for military, including anti-satellite, purposes; they should be entirely dedicated to the solution of various scientific, technological and economic tasks.

The draft envisages the obligations of each party to take internal measures to prohibit activity contrary to the provisions of the Treaty.

The provisions on verification of compliance with the future Treaty deserve particular attention. The verification system envisaged in the USSR draft is quite extensive and far-reaching.

In our view, the control provisions provide for reliable implementation of the obligations by the parties to the Treaty. They are based on an effective combination of national and international verification measures. At the same time, the USSR is prepared to elaborate and agree upon some additional measures concerning mutual assurance of States parties in its implementation.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Along with the presentation of the draft comprehensive international treaty, the Soviet Union has made important steps aimed at creating a more favourable situation for the prevention of the militarization of outer space.

The Soviet leadership has adopted an extremely important decision: the USSR undertakes not to be the first to launch into outer space any kind of anti-satellite weapons, in other words, declares a unilateral moratorium on such launchings for the entire period of time when other States, including the United States, refrain from launching anti-satellite weapons of any kind into outer space. Such a decision is another concrete demonstration of the good will of the Soviet Union, of its readiness genuinely to strengthen the peace and security of peoples. We would like to hope that the United States will follow this example.

Moreover, the Soviet Union displayed a readiness also to achieve an agreement on implementing the measures proposed by it on a bilateral basis with the United States, as we declared at the thirty-eighth session of the United Nations General Assembly. In particular, we are ready to conduct separate negotiations on anti-satellite systems and to resume bilateral negotiations with the United States as a step towards a solution of the common task of prohibiting the use of force in and from outer space.

We are convinced that the Conference on Disarmament can do much to prevent the arms race in outer space on the basis of the draft treaty proposed by the Soviet Union. The USSR, together with other socialist States, has already spoken (in document CD/434) in favour of the establishment of an ad hoc committee of the Conference on the item "Prevention of the arms race in outer space". In advocating the creation of such a body, we believe that it should have a mandate which would provide the possibility of conducting negotiations aimed at concluding an agreement on this important and urgent question.

What is most important now is immediately to find ways to ensure in practice the earliest adoption of the range of political, legal and material measures which would reliably secure outer space from a military threat. If space weapons are ever to be prohibited we have apparently reached the time limit when it is still possible to do so.

We express our firm conviction that the elaboration of measures to prevent the arms race in outer space can already be initiated during the current session of the Conference on Disarmament. To this end it is necessary for all the States represented at the Conference to display political good will.

The task facing the Conference is absolutely clear, and our duty is to move from words to deeds, to the elaboration of concrete measures to prevent the arms race in outer space.

We should always remember that military preparations involving outer space are fraught with the appearance of weapon systems which will make arms limitation and the implementation of control measures in the field of disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, more difficult.

As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, our country shall continue to deploy every effort so that the ominous plans to spread the arms race to outer space do not become a reality.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for his statement and I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Pakistan, Ambassador Mansour Ahmad.

Mr. AHMAD (Pakistan): Mr. President, may I begin by extending to you the warm and cordial felicitations of my delegation on your assumption of the Presidency of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of March and at the adept manner with which you have been conducting the business of this forum. Our pleasure at seeing a diplomat of your ability at the helm of the Conference on Disarmament is heightened by the fact that you, Mr. President, represent a country which by virtue of its principled policies has earned a position of respect in the community of nations. My Government deeply values the close and mutually beneficial ties of friendship and co-operation that exist between our two countries. May I assure you of the full co-operation and support of my delegation in the discharge of your responsibilities.

I would also like to avail myself of this opportunity to place on record the Pakistan delegation's admiration for the skill and sincerity with which Ambassador Turbanski of Poland presided over this body in its crucial first month. It was in no small measure due to his unflagging efforts that we can now look back to the previous month with some satisfaction.

I have taken the floor for the first time during our present session; may I extend a warm welcome to the Ambassadors of Australia, Belgium, Canada, Cuba, Egypt, Ethiopia, Hungary, Indonesia and Sri Lanka who have joined us since the conclusion of our 1983 session. My delegation looks forward to working with them in close concert and I am confident that they will contribute richly to our deliberations.

We have convened this year under the more impressive title of "Conference on Disarmament". My delegation sincerely hopes that this change in nomenclature will prove to be more than a mere exercise in superficial image-building and impart to our deliberations a more urgent sense of purpose.

Recent years have seen the emergence of two distinct trends: at the level of governments, a sharp escalation of the arms race, which threatens to erode the restraints, albeit limited, of the past, and the ensuing deterioration in East-West relations; and at the popular level, a heightened world-wide awareness of the urgent and compelling need for effective nuclear disarmament measures. Both these factors were responsible for the record number of disarmament-related resolutions adopted by the United Nations General Assembly at its sessions last year and the year before, reflecting acutely the despair and concern of the world community. The many dimensions and repercussions of the new spiral in the arms race and the ever-increasing global expenditures on armaments have already been pointed out here with great clarity and precision during the past few weeks. I would, therefore, desist from repeating what my distinguished colleagues have already said eloquently and convincingly. But the fact that the two Superpowers and their alliance systems are primarily responsible for the state of affairs bears repetition. The two between them have accumulated the most awesome inventory of weapons that human history has ever known. It is said that something like five per cent of their nuclear arsenals is enough to wipe out human civilization from the face of this earth. It was, therefore, only natural that the whole world



(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

watched with keen interest and with hope and expectation while these two Superpowers conducted two sets of nuclear arms limitation talks. The suspension of these negotiations has not only come as a serious blow to these hopes but has also placed the future of mankind in greater jeopardy.

My delegation joins all those who have urged an early resumption of the dialogue between the Superpowers, because what is at stake is the very survival of the human race. We are convinced that the negotiations on "intermediate" and "strategic" nuclear weapons should be combined and conducted in a single forum. The distinction between them is an artificial one. The two are organically related. We believe that dealing with them separately can only enhance difficulties, not help resolve them, whereas a unified approach could offer greater possibilities to all negotiators.

It has been argued, and not entirely without reason, that the issue of nuclear disarmament can best be left to bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union. However, the existing indefinite hiatus in their dialogue is too dangerous to be accepted with complacency. Thus, taking into account the over-riding importance of the subject of nuclear disarmament and given the fact that the Stockholm Conference is unlikely to offer an opportunity for a resumed nuclear dialogue, as well as the fact that Prime Minister Trudeau's initiative for talks among the five nuclear-weapon Powers will take time and considerable effort to mature, my delegation is of the view that the Conference must accord due priority to the agenda item "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". It is not beyond the ingenuity of the Conference, with its flexible rules of procedure, to improvise or to innovate a format in which the nuclear-weapon Powers would be enabled to set aside their present inhibitions and to resume their nuclear dialogue in this multilateral negotiating forum. We believe that such an approach can bring forth many advantages and possibly even concrete results.

I need hardly emphasize that the issue of nuclear disarmament and that of prevention of nuclear war are closely linked. Those who have the greatest authority to speak on the subject agree that a nuclear war is not winnable and therefore must never be fought. The dreadful consequences of even a limited nuclear war, if such an eventuality is at all possible, are not lost upon anyone, much less upon the governments of the States represented here. Why then this continued insensitivity on the part of a handful of States to the pleas of an overwhelming majority of the nations of the world, as embodied in United Nations General Assembly resolution 38/183 G? How long must we continue to live under the ominous and ever-lengthening shadow of strategic doctrines which attempt to redress conventional imbalances with nuclear suicide?

It is our fervent hope that the Conference will find it possible to establish a working group to negotiate concrete measures on the prevention of nuclear war. This would not, indeed it cannot, preclude a discussion of the security perceptions of the two alliances. We are convinced that an airing of their security concerns and the doctrines that these have spawned can only do good.

Central to the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament is a nuclear-weapon-test ban. In fact, agreement to negotiate a test ban is for us the litmus test of the good intentions of the nuclear-weapon States. The insistence of some nuclear-weapon Powers on a continued discussion of the issue of verification to the exclusion of a discussion on what is to be verified and

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

their opposition to an expanded mandate for the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban is difficult to comprehend. In our view a more meaningful mandate for the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban would in no way rule out or suppress an exhaustive exploration of the verification issue. In fact, as a large majority of delegations would agree, the verification provisions of any disarmament agreement have to relate to its purposes and scope. A negotiating mandate for the Ad Hoc Committee for the NTB would facilitate rather than obstruct an examination of the verification issue. We hope, therefore, that the present difficulties over the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee for the NTB would be resolved in a manner which is forward-looking rather than static.

May I now turn briefly to the question of radiological weapons. I would like to state first of all that my delegation is not opposed to the conclusion of a legally binding international instrument prohibiting the so-called radiological weapons. Having said that, I must express my delegation's perplexity at the pre-eminence being accorded to this subject at the expense of such questions as the NTB, cessation of the nuclear-arms race and prevention of nuclear war. A distinguished colleague, while informing us of the significance attached by his delegation to the prohibition of radiological weapons, stated inter alia, "if we can but save one future life by taking what to some may appear to be an unimportant step now, are we not thereby being faithful to our duty"? I fully share this sentiment. For me it encompasses first and foremost the abolition of nuclear weapons and the prevention of mass death and destruction from radiation. My delegation's position on the question of radiological weapons rests on the premise, uncontested so far, that for the present, attacks on nuclear facilities constitute the only concrete form that radiological warfare can take and that the issue of eliminating the possibility of such attacks must, therefore, be settled within or along with a future radiological weapons convention.

Before I conclude, may I comment very briefly on chemical weapons. We agree with the assessment that at present the subject of chemical weapons holds the greatest promise. In this context my delegation wishes to place on record its appreciation for the painstaking and imaginative work done by Ambassador McPhail of Canada in his capacity as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons last year, and the astute manner in which Ambassador Rolf Ekéus of Sweden is now conducting the business of the subsidiary body on this subject. My delegation eagerly awaits the promised United States draft of a chemical weapons convention which would provide an added impetus to the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. We value very highly the spirit of compromise demonstrated by the delegation of the Soviet Union in indicating its acceptance of the concept of permanent on-site inspection and technical monitoring for the destruction process of chemical weapons stockpiles. My delegation fully supports the earliest possible conclusion of a balanced and adequately verifiable comprehensive chemical weapons convention.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Pakistan for his statement and for his kind words for my country and for the President.

I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Sweden, Ambassador Rolf Ekéus.

Mr. EKEUS (Sweden): Mr. President, the General Assembly of the United Nations in its Resolution on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space last year directed a strong appeal to the Conference to intensify its consideration of the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. My delegation welcomes this resolution. The overwhelming support for it should be understood as an expression of concern of the international community that the Conference on Disarmament, as the multilateral negotiating body, has so far not been able to start negotiations on the question of the arms race in outer space.

An arms race in outer space could have far-reaching implications for international peace and security and the over-all stability in the world. It could also have negative effects on civilian activities in outer space. The application of space technology has already brought considerable benefits for various civilian uses such as telecommunications, weather forecasting and earth resources surveys. An arms race in outer space would pose a serious risk and obstacle for States which are, or contemplate being, engaged in peaceful space activities.

Outer space has up to now been an area free from arms. As time goes by efforts to keep it so will become more difficult and more complicated. We have all learned from our experience of the arms race on Earth how very difficult it is to reverse a process which has already received large financial and political investments. Therefore, action must be prompt.

Preventing an arms race in outer space is already a complex task. Problems have to be addressed concerning the distinction between civilian and military applications. Another distinction between categories is, for instance, the one between stabilizing or destabilizing systems, like, for instance, satellites for arms control verification on the one hand, or so-called killer satellites on the other hand.

Military use of space technology goes back to the early days of the Space Age. However, what we are facing at this juncture is a new turn in developments.

Space systems used for military purposes have in general been of a passive nature. By "passive" I mean in this case that they are not meant as weapons or as weapons platforms. Passive systems are mainly for intelligence gathering purposes such as early warning, reconnaissance, etc. Some of these systems are important to disarmament and arms control, as means of verification of disarmament agreements and confidence-building measures and for the control of weapons testing. Other passive space systems could, however, be of direct relevance for the execution of war or warlike actions. This includes navigation and communication satellites. Some of them could be considered to be dual-purpose systems, although normally used for peaceful purposes.

Now, however, we are facing the threat of the emergence of active space systems, inter alia, weapons with direct destructive effects, mainly for anti-ballistic and anti-satellite warfare.

The Soviet Union has for several years tested an anti-satellite (ASAT) system which attacks its target, after hunting it during a couple of orbits, by exploding close to it. The United States has recently carried out a test of a new ASAT system, a direct ascent system which destroys the target by colliding with it without using explosives.

(Mr. Ekéus, Sweden)

The ASAT systems in existence or under development today have a limited capacity. We understand that they can hit targets only in relatively low earth orbits. Even so they threaten important military satellites, such as surveillance satellites used for the verification of arms-control agreements. With the development of new space technology the situation might become even more serious. ASAT weapons could then reach targets in higher orbits, eventually even the geostationary orbit, where we find communication and early-warning satellites. The destruction of such satellites could have serious repercussions. Such a development would be looked upon with the greatest concern by the potential opponent and would trigger off some similar and even more destabilizing measures. Furthermore, the blinding of an early-warning satellite could be understood by the other side as nothing less than as a preparation for, or part of, a nuclear strike.

The ASAT systems have even further implications. An important part of an ASAT weapon is the so-called homing device. Once such a device is fully developed and tested for ASAT purposes, it could with some modifications be used for the purpose of targeting the opponent's ballistic missiles, thus constituting an Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) system. An advanced ASAT system could imply a dual capacity of both anti-satellite and anti-ballistic missile capability. A disturbing consequence could be that testing of ASAT weapons could in fact be used as a cover for ABM weapons testing.

Consequently there is a potential risk that the development of ASAT weapons could already erode one of the most important treaties in the area of arms control, namely, the Anti-Ballistic-Missile Treaty of 1972.

With this development we might in fact be facing a quantum leap in the arms race. But the possible developments do not stop here.

Increased resources are spent for research on and development of beam weapons. If developed, such weapons could be used for ASAT purposes. However, what has attracted more attention is their possible use for ABM purposes.

The leading military Powers build their national security on a policy of deterrence and their mutual security relations on a functional balance of deterrence. The balance of nuclear deterrence is based upon the threat that if one Superpower attacked the other Superpower with nuclear weapons, the attacking party would bring a nuclear attack upon itself. The consequence of the policy of nuclear deterrence is that if it fails, catastrophe is inevitable. Sweden questions nuclear deterrence policies and philosophies as such. I will come back in more detail to this problem later during the session. This being said, we still have to recognize that deterrence is the guiding doctrine against which the present development must be analysed. Thus, the balance of nuclear deterrence would be disturbed if one side acquired a first-strike capacity. If one of the major Powers succeeded in developing an effective anti-ballistic system, this would give it a possibility of striking at the opponent and at the same time avoiding destruction of its own territory. The mutual deterrence would be undermined and likewise the international security situation. There is therefore reason for serious concern if any of the major Powers devotes further resources to research and development on systems which, if transformed into deployment, would not be in conformity with the ABM Treaty. Such a new phase in weapons development would be detrimental to stability in international security relations.

(Mr. Ekéus, Sweden)

Although much less than is necessary has been achieved in the field of disarmament and to prevent an arms race in outer space, some significant measures have been taken. I will mention some of them.

The provisions relevant to the use of weapons in space are both of a general and a specific nature. We have the United Nations Charter, and we have provisions which apply to space activities. Specific rules can be found in multilateral instruments and in bilateral treaties between the Soviet Union and the United States.

To start with, Article 2:4 of the Charter of the United Nations prohibits the use of force or the threat of use of force. A first attack on a space object belonging to another country is thus clearly outlawed according to the United Nations Charter. In certain cases some might argue that an attack on a space object is a measure of self-defence, in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter. It is, however, inconceivable that this Article could be interpreted as permitting an attack on non-military space objects.

As far as the military systems are concerned, some of them, e.g. surveillance satellites used for verification, are protected as national technical means of verification under the bilateral SALT Agreements. Early-warning satellites are likewise protected under the United States-Soviet Accident Measures Agreement. Thus an important sanctuary is provided for certain satellites. For other military space systems the situation might not be so clear.

Among specific multilateral treaties the 1963 Partial Test-Ban Treaty was the first treaty to contain provisions relating to the use of weapons in outer space. This treaty bans the testing of nuclear weapons inter alia, in outer space.

In 1967 the United Nations adopted the Outer Space Treaty containing the fundamental principles for space activities. It marked an important step in that it bans certain arms from outer space. However, others are not covered by this treaty. It is generally stated in the Outer Space Treaty that space activities shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interest of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development and in accordance with international law, including the United Nations Charter. Article 4 prohibits the placing of nuclear weapons and other kinds of weapons of mass destruction in earth orbits and on celestial bodies. This provision does not, however, impose restrictions on conventional weapons or on military space systems. The moon and other celestial bodies are to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and all kinds of military activities are prohibited on those bodies. The Outer Space Treaty also contains provisions against potentially harmful interference with peaceful space activities and provisions of interest for verification, but they do not contain any clear obligations to provide information or about inspection.

Since radio communications are vital for space activities the International Telecommunication Convention deserves special mention. Its Article 35 prohibits harmful interference with radio services which are operated in accordance with the Radio Regulations of the ITU.

The 1975 Registration Convention deals with notification of space activities. However, the information supplied is so general that it can only be guessed what purpose a space mission has, and sometimes considerable time passes between launch and notification.

(Mr. Ekéus, Sweden)

The latest of the international space agreements which have been elaborated by the United Nations is the 1979 Moon Agreement.

From its provisions it can be concluded that the Moon Agreement would demilitarize all of outer space except the proximity of the Earth, or more precisely orbits around the Earth. But this Agreement has not yet entered into force.

As mentioned earlier, some provisions in the bilateral arms control agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union relate to space activities.

The two SALT Agreements, of 1972 and of 1979, to the last of which the Soviet Union and the United States abide unilaterally, while awaiting ratification or new negotiations, contain similar provisions about verification (Articles V and XV, respectively). According to these provisions the Contracting Parties shall use "national technical means of verification" to monitor the adherence to the provisions of the Agreements. These national "means of verification" must not be disturbed or "interfered with". It is assumed that surveillance satellites are among those "means". The SALT II Agreement (Article IX) includes a relatively unnoticed expansion of the Outer Space Treaty in that it forbids development, testing and deployment of systems for placing in orbit nuclear weapons, etc. It also prohibits testing, development and deployment of Fractional Orbital Bombardment Systems (FOBS).

According to the ABM Treaty of 1972 the two Superpowers undertake not to develop, test or deploy ABM systems or components which are "sea-based, air-based, space-based or mobile land-based". It is clear as earlier touched upon, that the placing of ABM systems in outer space would be a breach of this bilateral treaty, as would also be the development and testing of such systems.

The "Accident Measures" Agreement (1971) and the Prevention of Nuclear War Agreement (1974) together oblige the Soviet Union and the United States to refrain from interfering with or attacking early-warning systems of either side, including satellites which are components of such warning systems.

The fact that most of the financial and technical investments in space development takes place in two countries may imply that bilateral agreements are sufficient to regulate international relations in this field. However, according to my delegation, this is to seriously underestimate the technological developments outside the two Superpowers. As a matter of principle, as well as with long-term practical and technical considerations in view, it is important that the aspects mentioned with regard to the militarization of outer space be subject to multilateral negotiations and agreements. The principle aspect is, of course, founded on the general acceptance of the fundamental idea that the exploration and use of outer space shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interest of all countries.

It is clear that some significant measures relating to the risks of an arms race in outer space have been taken. However, the existing body of international law contains too many loopholes to effectively prevent an arms race in outer space. What we have learned about the testing and development of anti-satellite weapons confirms that additional measures urgently need to be taken.

(Mr. Eke us, Sweden)

The main task ahead of us should be to negotiate an international treaty banning all space weapons, including weapons directed against targets in space. Such a ban should cover the development, testing and deployment of ASAT weapons on earth, in the atmosphere and in outer space and must include the destruction of all existing ASAT systems.

Furthermore, damage, disturbance and harmful interference in the normal functioning of permitted space objects should be forbidden in international agreements in order to strengthen the Outer Space Treaty and confirm the International Telecommunication Convention.

The banning of the development, testing and deployment of space-based ABM systems, as agreed upon in the 1972 ABM Treaty between the Soviet Union and the United States, should also be reiterated in a multilateral treaty.

A prohibition of Fractional Orbital Bombardment Systems (FOBS) should likewise be included, in line with SALT II.

In addition, efficient measures should be adopted regarding the verification of the compliance with such a treaty or treaties. At the present stage of technical development it appears inescapable that some sort of international direct inspection be applied, including on-site inspection whenever feasible.

In the process of creating an international legal system prohibiting an arms race in outer space, military space systems which could have particularly destabilizing characteristics must be identified. It would also be essential to recognize that certain military space systems can have a stabilizing effect and that they can be a valuable contribution to disarmament measures.

The international use of satellites for the monitoring of disarmament agreements should be considered in the context of the proposal of France to establish an International Satellite Monitoring Agency (ISMA).

The notification procedures in the 1975 Registration Convention could be further developed to serve as a collateral measure to strengthen disarmament agreements related to space. Such a measure, and other similar confidence-building measures, would be helpful in the efforts to create a system of international agreements to curb an arms race in outer space.

Three proposals have been presented in intergovernmental fora containing draft agreements relating to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The first was presented by Italy in 1979 in the Committee on Disarmament. The two latest were presented to the United Nations by the Soviet Union in 1981 and in 1983, the latest of which has been distributed today as document CD/476.

The two first proposals demonstrated constructive attempts to come to grips with the problems in this area. They did, however, contain important shortcomings, inter alia, in that they did not cover the ASAT systems as they are conceived today.

(Mr. Ekéus, Sweden)

The latest proposal of the Soviet Union introduced today also by Ambassador Issraelyan contains a draft treaty on the prohibition of the use of force in outer space and from space against the Earth. When the Conference has been able to establish an ad hoc committee on the arms race in outer space, my delegation will come back with detailed comments on this draft treaty. However, already now I note a welcome improvement compared to the 1981 proposal in that it covers ASAT weapons as known today and contains a ban on some specific activities directed against space objects.

The Soviet proposal addressed a number of important issues that need to be solved. Some proposed clauses, however, are ambiguous and would have to be clarified. Such solutions and clarifications could only be made through a substantive examination by the Conference on Disarmament.

Let me conclude by reiterating that the Conference on Disarmament must now actively engage itself in dealing with the growing threat of an arms race in outer space. An ad hoc committee should be established without further delay for this purpose. As a negotiating forum the Conference should of course aim at negotiating an agreement or agreements to prevent the extension of the arms race into outer space.

The Swedish delegation is prepared to consider all constructive proposals which mean that a substantive examination can be promptly initiated. An analysis of lacunae in international agreements against the background of existing and potential military applications of space technology seems to be a natural first task for an ad hoc committee. I have in this statement tried to contribute to this.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Sweden for his statement. The list of speakers for today is now exhausted. Does any other representative wish to take the floor? That does not seem to be the case.

As you will have noted, the secretariat today distributed the programme of meetings of the Conference and its subsidiary bodies for next week. The programme is purely indicative, and may be changed if necessary, in accordance with our practice. If I hear no objection, I will take it that the Conference wishes to adopt the programme.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): Distinguished representatives, in our programme of meetings for this week we had allowed for an informal meeting this afternoon, if necessary, to consider organizational matters. I think that since informal consultations are taking place at present, there is no need to hold that informal meeting today. We have concluded our work for today. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will take place on Tuesday, 27 March, at 10.30 a.m. The meeting is adjourned.

The meeting rose at 12.15 p.m.



# CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.253  
27 March 1984  
ENGLISH

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## FINAL RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND FIFTY-THIRD PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva  
on Thursday, 27 March 1984, at 10.30 a.m.

President:

Mr. I. Datcu

(Romania)

PRESENT AT THE TABLEAlgeria:

Mr. A. TAFTAR

Mr. A. BOUBAZINE

Argentina:

Mr. J.J. CARASALES

Mr. R. GARCIA MORITAN

Mr. R. VILLAMBROSA

Australia:

Mr. R. ROWE

Ms. J. COURTNEY

Belgium:

Mr. M. DEPASSE

Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE

Brazil:

Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA

Bulgaria:

Mr. P. POPTCHEV

Mr. C. PRAMOV

Mr. N. MICHAÏLOV

Burma:

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

U PE THEIN TIN

U THAN TUN

Canada:

Mr. J.A. BEESLEY

Mr. G. SKINNER

China:

Mr. QIAN JIADONG

Ms. WANG ZHIYUN

Mr. LIN CHENG

Ms. GE YIYUN

Mr. YANG MINGLIANG

Cuba:

Mr. P. NUNEZ MOSQUERA

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. M. VEJVODA  
Mr. A. CIMA  
Mr. J. MATOUŠEK

Egypt:

Mr. S. ALFARARGI  
Mr. I.I. HASSAN  
Mr. A.M. ABBAS

Ethiopia:

Mr. F. YOHANNES

France:

Mr. F. DE LA GORCE  
Mr. H. RENIE  
Mr. G. MONTASSIER

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. H. ROSE  
Mr. J. DEMBSKI

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. H. WEGENER  
Mr. M. GERDTS  
Mr. W-E. VON DEM HAGEN

Hungary:

Mr. D. MEISZTER  
Mr. F. GAJDA  
Mr. H. TOTH

India:

Mr. S. KANT SHARMA

Indonesia:

Mr. S. SUTOWARDOYO  
Mr. ANDRADJATI  
Mr. HARYOMATARAM  
Mrs. P. RAMADHAN

Islamic Republic of Iran:

Mr. F.S. SIRJANI

Italy:

Mr. M. ALESSI  
Mr. M. PAVESE  
Mr. G. ADORNI BRACCESI  
Mr. L. FERRARI BRAVO

Japan:

Mr. R. IMAI  
Mr. M. KONISHI  
Mr. K. TANAKA  
Mr. T. KAWAKITA  
Mr. T. ISHIGURI

Kenya:Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES  
Mr. P. MACEDO RIBA  
Ms. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO

Mongolia:

Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG  
Mr. S.O. BOLD

Morocco:

Mr. O. HILALE

Netherlands:

Mr. J. RAMAKER  
Mr. R.J. AKKERMAN

Nigeria:

Mr. J.O. OBOH  
Mr. L.O. AKINDELE  
Mr. C.V. UDEDIBIA

Pakistan:

Mr. K. NIAZ

Peru:

Mr. P. CANNOCK  
Mr. C. CASTILLO RAMIREZ

Poland:

Mr. S. TURBANSKI  
Mr. G. CZEMPINSKI  
Mr. J. CIALOWICZ

Romania:

Mr. I. DATCU  
Mr. T. MELESCANU  
Mr. O. IONESCU  
Mr. A. POPTCHEV  
Mr. A. CRETU

Sri Lanka:

Mr. J. DHANAPALA  
Mr. P. KARTYAWASAM  
Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA

Sweden:

Mr. R. EKEUS  
Ms. E. BONNIER  
Mr. H. BERGLUND  
Ms. A.M. LAU

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELIAN  
Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV  
Mr. R.M. TIMERBAEV  
Mr. G.V. BERDENNIKOV  
Mr. P.Y. SKOMOROKHIN

United Kingdom:

Mr. R.I.T. CROMARTIE  
Mr. G.H. COOPER  
Mr. D.A. SLINN

United States of America:

Mr. N. CLYNE  
Mr. N. CARRERA  
Ms. K.C. CRITTENBERGER  
Mr. R. HORNE  
Mr. P. LEMBESIS  
Mr. J. DOESBERG  
Mr. J. PUCKETT  
Mr. H. CALHOUN  
Mr. R. NORMAN

Venezuela:

Mr. LOPEZ OLIVER  
Mr. T. LABRADOR

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC

Mr. D. MINIC

Zaire:

Mrs. E. ESAKI KABEYA

Secretary-General of the Conference on  
Disarmament and Personal  
Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary-General of the  
Conference on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): The plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is called to order.

I begin by giving the floor to the distinguished representative of Egypt, Ambassador Alfarargi.

Mr. ALFARARGI (Egypt) (translated from Arabic): Thank you, Mr. President. This morning we have learnt with deep sorrow and grief of the death of one of Africa's great leaders and statesmen, President Ahmed Sekou Touré. Now, as I mourn the death of the late Guinean leader, on behalf of the Group of African countries, including both members of the Conference on Disarmament and participating non-members, I wish to pay a glowing tribute to the tenacious freedom fighter he represented in his struggle on behalf of liberation causes throughout the world, and particularly in Africa. I hail in him a hero who struggled for the observance of the principles of the non-aligned movement, a leader who truly upheld the principles and the provisions of the United Nations Charter and struggled to establish the rights of the peoples of the Third World to development and progress. On this occasion, we wish to extend to the fraternal people of Guinea, in the name of the African Group at the Conference on Disarmament, including both members and participating non-members, our heartfelt condolences and sincere sympathy on this great loss.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the distinguished representative of Egypt for his statement, and I am sure that all the members of the Conference will concur in expressing their deep regret at the death of Ahmed Sekou Touré, a great leader of his country and at the same time an outstanding figure in Africa and in the non-aligned movement; and also in conveying our sorrow and condolences to the people and Government of the Revolutionary People's Republic of Guinea.

The Conference on Disarmament today begins consideration of agenda item 6, entitled "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons". However, in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any member wishing to do so may raise any matter relevant to the work of the Conference.

You will recall that we had agreed to hold an informal meeting this morning to consider organizational problems, if necessary. I have received further clarification from non-member States wishing to participate in our work, as well as an additional request from another non-member State. I suggest that after having heard the speakers on my list, we should suspend the plenary meeting and hold an informal meeting to consider the communications received from non-members. I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Czechoslovakia, Viet Nam, Italy and Argentina, and I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Czechoslovakia, Ambassador Milos Vejvoda.

Mr. VEJVODA (Czechoslovakia): Thank you Comrade President. Allow me first to express on behalf of my delegation, and also on behalf of the Socialist Group, deep sorrow on the passing away of the great African politician, Sekou Touré, so well known in the world for his fight against colonialism, and for the freedom and independence of African and all other nations under the colonial yoke, and so well known for his great merits in the non-aligned movement.

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

In this statement I would like to explain why my delegation asked for the inclusion of the item on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in our agenda and what it expects from it. I will also deal with reasons behind our proposal to establish a relevant subsidiary body with a mandate, suggested in the document (CD/434) submitted by a group of socialist countries.

The importance and urgency of the problem of the prevention of an arms race in outer space are determined by the fact that in recent years the real danger of the creation and deployment of various systems of space weapons, leading to the saturation of outer space with weapons capable of destroying objects both in outer space and on the Earth, has sharply increased. For this reason we do not feel any need simply to discuss this problem or to deal with it in any general way whatsoever. We believe that this has already been successfully done in other fora. In fact, the problem of securing outer space from military threat and its various aspects have for a number of years been generally discussed in the First Committee of the General Assembly, in the United Nations Disarmament Commission, in the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and at UNISPACE 2.

Unfortunately, we should also add that even this body, which aspires to be a single multilateral negotiating forum on disarmament, dedicated several years to activities of this kind in dealing with the problem of outer space. Indeed, going through the records of our meetings of recent years one finds a great number of statements addressing the problem of outer space. In these statements we have all exhaustively evaluated the existing treaties, which put up some barriers to the spreading of arms into outer space. We have generally come to a concordance of views on what the positive aspects of these treaties are, as well as on the remaining loopholes. In virtually all statements the conclusion is reached that further measures are necessary. At least as far as our delegation is concerned, we have not found a single statement that explicitly or implicitly denies the urgent need for such additional measures.

A considerable part of the statements on outer space dealt with the technical aspects of the development of new weapons and systems of weapons to be used in outer space or from space against the Earth. The "leading role" of the United States in this field has been impressively demonstrated, especially with regard to the March 1983 "initiative" of President Reagan to create a space-based defence system. It was convincingly argued that one attempt to misuse one of the above mentioned loopholes in the existing military regime for outer space is under way, namely, the accelerated efforts to develop and put into practice laser and other directed-energy weapons. Though some delegations tried to raise doubts about the feasibility of these weapons, it did not escape the attention of others that in May and June of last year the United States Air Force undertook a test of a laser weapon. At a testing ground in California, this weapon, placed on board a C-135 aircraft, succeeded in destroying the navigational systems of five Sidewinder anti-aircraft missiles.

Due attention was paid also to the economic side of the problem. No type of weapons and no field of their application would consume as many resources as the development and emplacement of weapons in outer space. With the adoption, last January, of Directive 119 in the United States, for the remaining years of this century alone almost a hundred billion United States dollars are involved, without counting vast, indirect human and material resources taken from various civilian sectors.



(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

Much of what has been said around this table could undoubtedly also be qualified as an identification of problems which could be addressed in negotiations on practical measures to prevent an arms race in outer space. Drawing a conclusion from the views offered to the Conference on Disarmament, my delegation considers that a whole range of political, legal and material measures should be negotiated in the relevant subsidiary body. Anti-satellite systems are one of these, although not the only one. My country, a relatively small one, with no adequate defence against an attack "from above", is concerned mainly with possible danger coming from weapons emplaced on objects capable of overflying our territory at an altitude of some tens of kilometres.

Thus, it would seem to us that the time has come to close this "general" and "exploratory" chapter in our dealing with the prevention of an arms race in outer space and to open a new one which should bring us to the elaboration and adoption of the relevant practical and effective measures. The best way to enter this new chapter would be the creation of an ad hoc committee of the Conference on Disarmament on the item "Prevention of an arms race in outer space", with terms of reference calling for the undertaking of negotiations aimed at concluding an agreement on this urgent question.

We maintain that certain recent developments fully justify this demand. Firstly, we have the Soviet draft treaty on the prohibition of the use of force in outer space and from space against the Earth, submitted to the United Nations at its thirty-eighth session and tabled last week in the Conference on Disarmament. Since this draft was distributed last fall in New York, we presume that all delegations had a chance to study it in detail. As far as my delegation is concerned, it considers that the main virtue of the draft is that it deals with the problem of securing outer space from the arms race in a comprehensive way, encompassing measures of a political, legal and material nature. At the same time, it is yet another example of the Soviet Union's constructive approach and readiness to compromise in order to make it possible to move ahead, since the draft treaty takes into account in a number of its provisions the positions and views of other countries, including Western countries. This important move also reminds us that expressions of good will, in order to bring positive results, must be reciprocated. In this respect I would like to note that it is exactly in this field that the United States lags behind, and by a large margin. This was most obviously demonstrated by the fact that the United States leadership failed to respond positively to the commitment assumed by the USSR last August not to be the first to put into outer space any type of anti-satellite weapon, thus imposing a unilateral moratorium on such launchings for the entire period during which the other States, including the United States, refrain from stationing anti-satellite weapons of any type in outer space. This initiative creates a significant potential for the solution of the problem of ASAT systems and convincingly demonstrates the readiness of the Soviet Union to do away with this type of weapon. But in its approach to this problem the present United States leadership is acting not only contrary to the interests and requirements of the international community, but also against the vital interest of its own people. This was again confirmed last summer, when more than 100 American Congressmen and scientists addressed an appeal to President Reagan to declare, simultaneously with the Soviet Union, a moratorium on anti-satellite-weapon testing.

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

Since I have touched upon the problem of ASAT systems let me add, Comrade President, that arguments about the need for the United States to catch up in this kind of weapon can't be taken seriously. It is well-known that already 20 years ago the United States developed the manoeuvrable SAINT (Satellite Inspector Technique) spacecraft. In the course of the 1960s two ground-based anti-satellite systems were developed -- in 1963 on the basis of Nike Zeus anti-missile missiles on Kwajalein Island and in 1964 on Johnston Island using various modifications of the Thor missile. And recently, a sophisticated ASAT system based on F-15 aircrafts equipped with intercepting missiles with self-guided warheads has already been tested. Thus, after breaking bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union on anti-satellite weapons in 1978 it indeed requires a peculiar kind of logic for the United States seriously to play the role of an inferior in this field. Echoing this, distortion, to put it mildly, a limited number of Western delegations is rendering invaluable service to the United States but acting clearly against the vital interest of the peoples of their own countries.

Another positive development testifying to the growing comprehension of the urgent need to adopt specific measures for the prevention of an arms race in outer space was the adoption last fall of the United Nations General Assembly resolution 38/70. Mere comparison of this resolution with, for instance, resolutions 36/97 C and 36/99 of 1981 clearly shows that the majority of States speaking in favour of specific action has further grown, while the minority has reached its limit-- that of a single country.

The ad hoc committee on outer space, if established, would certainly not suffer from a lack of specific proposals or material to work on. Besides the Soviet draft treaty I have already mentioned, which the committee could consider in detail, some delegations have advanced ideas which could be dealt with as well. I may mention just the statement of Ambassador Ekéus of last Thursday, in which he put forward a whole set of measures which could be looked at in the ad hoc committee. It is therefore particularly regrettable that there are still delegations which keep on blocking the adoption of a meaningful mandate for the subsidiary body on outer space. It is our strong feeling that the Mexican amendment to the draft mandate considered last week by no means deserved the treatment it received, the more so since it only reflected the provision of the United Nations General Assembly resolution adopted by a vote extremely close to a consensus.

The problem of securing outer space from the arms race is not a new one. The relevant peaceful initiatives of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries go back to the 1950s. But some recent developments in the space policy of the United States and the ensuing accelerated development of space weaponry render the problem of the prevention of an arms race in outer space extremely urgent. Let me, before concluding my statement, point out just some of these dangerous developments.

In President Reagan's statement of 4 July 1982, priority in United States space activity is, for the first time, given openly to its military aspects. The relevant presidential decree on policy in the exploration and use of outer space clearly assigns priority to military purposes. Previously United States leaders used peaceful rhetoric to cover the military aspects of their space policy. Now this has become not only unnecessary but practically impossible, since the military nature of the recent programmes for outer space is only too obvious.

This applies, in the first place, to the United States plan to build a space-based defence system. Since this plan was heralded in March last year, much thought has been given to its possible implications, especially with regard to the

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

Soviet-United States ABM Treaty of 1972. It was virtually unanimously concluded that the development of such a system would constitute a flagrant breach of the Treaty. Some dissenting voices were heard, naturally, from the United States. Thus, referring to the plan, the White House spokesman, Larry Speakes, said: "you can go a considerable distance in research and development without conflicting with the ABM Treaty". We would appreciate if the United States delegation could enlighten us on what is meant by the "considerable distance" and how it can be reconciled with Article V of the ABM Treaty. Let it also be noted that, as far as we know, this treaty is of unlimited duration.

Another disquieting phenomenon is the application of the so-called "bargaining chips" policy. Last year a United States interagency report resulting from months of study by scientists and policy analysts stated that the demonstration of United States technology would strengthen military and "negotiating stances". We have a very sad experience of such an approach which shows that all kinds of bargaining chips have always served only as catalysts and accelerators of the arms race. They have always led to qualitatively new spirals of the arms race despite the clear fact that neither side can achieve permanent superiority in arms technology. A parallel could be drawn here with the problem of MIRV's. Looking back, Henry Kissinger said last year: "I wish I had thought through the implications of a MIRVed world".

Just a few days ago, from 8 through 11 March, the Disarmament Committee of the World Federation of Scientific Workers met in Prague. Prominent scientists from five socialist countries, as well as from the United States, Great Britain, France, Denmark and the Federal Republic of Germany came to the conclusion in their joint statement that "the United States decision to embark on a massive research and development programme for the militarization of space has introduced a new qualitative factor to the arms race" and called for the establishment of "a moratorium on the testing and deploying of ASATs and other space weapons, and the establishment of a policy of the non-use of force in and from outer space". Let us listen more carefully to the impartial and informed opinion of scientists from various countries, lest our beautiful blue planet, which has too many problems of its own, face a new threat, as immense and limitless as space itself.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Czechoslovakia for his statement.

In accordance with the decision taken by the Conference at its 249th plenary meeting, I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Viet Nam, Ambassador Nguyen Thuong.

Mr. NGUYEN THUONG (Socialist Republic of Viet Nam) (translated from French): Thank you Mr. President. Mr. President, allow me first of all to convey the very profound condolences of my country, the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, and of my delegation to our sister Republic of Guinea and the fraternal African countries on the death of President Ahmed Sekou Touré, a great figure in the non-aligned movement and in the struggle of peoples for peace, national independence, freedom and social progress.

(Mr. Nguyen Thuong, Socialist Republic of Viet Nam)

Mr. President, I should like to begin by extending to you my warm congratulations on seeing the Presidency of the Conference on Disarmament occupied by the representative of a country with which Viet Nam has long enjoyed very good relations of friendship and co-operation, whose experience and diplomatic expertise will without any doubt help to ensure that this session proceeds efficiently.

I should also like to thank the President, the Secretary-General and all the members of the Conference on Disarmament for having given me this opportunity to address the Conference in plenary in order to impart our thoughts on matters of special interest to my country. In asking to participate as a non-member in the work of the Conference on Disarmament, Viet Nam has not been inspired by narrow political, opportunistic or egoistic considerations, but has been guided both by the interests of its own security and by the wider interests of the great cause to which this august institution is devoted, namely, world peace through disarmament, a matter of life or death for all mankind and human civilization, a noble enterprise and a weighty undertaking in which no people can fail to take an interest. Viet Nam participates with an acute sense of responsibility, seriousness and constructive goodwill, and always has in view the smooth functioning and the success of the Conference itself. It is in this spirit that my delegation will endeavour to make its very modest contribution, and assures you, Mr. President, and all the members of the Conference on Disarmament, of its co-operation on a basis of reciprocal equality and sincerity.

If I have chosen to address the Conference on agenda item 6, it is because, as the representative of Viet Nam stated at the twelfth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament in 1982, "the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam is a country which does not possess nuclear weapons and which has been and remains the victim of serious threat on the part of certain nuclear weapon Powers"; and it is also because Viet Nam constantly feels an active and responsible solidarity with the great movement of peoples struggling for peace, national independence and international security.

Imperialist policy, particularly in recent years, has appreciably increased the danger of a nuclear holocaust, and more than ever raises what is now the major task facing mankind as a whole, namely, the prevention of a nuclear world war. Furthermore, imperialism is stepping up and multiplying its armed intervention in many regions of the world. The four decades since the Second World War demonstrate the greater possibilities of preserving world peace, but they have also witnessed many so-called local wars which have been no less death-dealing. In this context, the threat of the use of nuclear weapons in so-called local wars is not a purely theoretical matter. It may be recalled that in the two wars in Indo-China, some strategists, who were fortunately not heeded, put forward plans for the use of the atomic bomb or of tactical nuclear weapons, in 1954 to free Dien Bien Phu and, in the 1960s and 1970s, to escalate the war and achieve victory. The fact that currently some imperialistic circles are advocating theories of the so-called admissibility of nuclear war, of limited or creeping nuclear war, and the fact that in some countries "tailor-made" nuclear weapons are being developed, which are perfectly adapted to the requirements of so-called limited wars, and also the fact that more or less deliberately nuclear weapons have been placed within the reach of certain so-called strategic allies, such as Israel, the Republic of South Africa and other aspirants, all these facts indicate that the question of international arrangements to ensure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States is more pressing than ever. The deployment of intermediate-range missiles in Europe is a matter of increasing concern, as these missiles, stationed on a certain island off a NATO member country in the

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Mediterranean, for example, are allegedly targeted on the southern flank of the Soviet Union, but who can guarantee that they cannot easily be turned against one or another nationally-independent country of the Balkans, the Middle East or North Africa?

It should be added that, through the inherent logic of the escalation carried out by irresponsible statesmen, the danger that the use of nuclear weapons in such local wars will bring about a more widespread war remains very great and certainly unforeseeable. Thus, at their seventh summit meeting at New Delhi the Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Countries reiterated their demand that nuclear-weapon States have the obligation to guarantee that non-nuclear-weapon States are not threatened or attacked with nuclear weapons. Resolutions of the thirty-eighth session of the United Nations General Assembly explicitly recognize the need to allay the legitimate concern of States with regard to ensuring lasting security for their peoples and also that the independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of non-nuclear-weapon States need to be safeguarded against the threat of use of force, including the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The resolutions 38/67 and 38/68 both stress in virtually identical terms that there is an urgent need to reach agreement on effective international arrangements for that purpose.

My delegation has studied the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group (CD/SA/CRP.12) and read with interest the statements of many delegations on this subject, as well as the working papers of various groups, in particular documents CD/SA/CRP.3 and CD/53 of Pakistan and Bulgaria, respectively. After this review, my delegation does not underestimate the difficulties which remain to be surmounted. In the face of the increasing, pressing need to guarantee the security of non-nuclear-weapon States, it urges all members of the Conference on Disarmament, and in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to deploy more urgent efforts, inter alia to make good the lack of political will on the part of some of them which, in the view of the Group of 21, is the major element in the current difficulties.

Such efforts remain to be made in two directions, as suggested by the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session.

The first, and principal, direction would be, as recommended in operative paragraph 4 of resolution 38/67, that the Conference on Disarmament "should continue to explore ways and means to overcome the difficulties ... to reach an appropriate agreement ... in the form of an international instrument of a legally binding character, such as an international convention on this subject...". Some grounds for cautious optimism would appear to continue to exist, since, as stated in both the resolution and the report of the Ad hoc Working Group, "there is no objection in principle to the idea of an international convention on this subject" and there is "widespread international support for the conclusion of such a convention". It is also encouraging that at the latest session of the General Assembly, a single draft resolution (38/67) was submitted and adopted rather than two parallel drafts as in the previous session. The last preambular paragraph of resolution 38/67 seems to suggest an idea: if the security of all non-nuclear-weapon States is to be guaranteed in some way or another, "in the search for a solution to the problem of security assurances, priority should be given to the legitimate security zones of the non-nuclear-weapon States which, by virtue of their forgoing the nuclear option and of not allowing nuclear weapons to be stationed on their territories, have every right to expect to be most effectively guaranteed against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons". These countries include virtually all the non-aligned countries, including Viet Nam.

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One possibility might therefore be to have a full security assurance regime for the above-mentioned countries, with a somewhat reduced regime for the other countries, including some elements whose entry into force would be suspended as long as nuclear weapons of their allies or of other countries remained on their territory. Such arrangements would not be contrary to the desire to guarantee the security of all non-nuclear-weapon countries, for those countries which lend their territory to the stockpiling of nuclear weapons are no longer entirely non-nuclear-weapon countries. In so doing they constitute elements in the strategies which oppose the nuclear-weapon Powers, and also a real, if potential, danger for their neighbours which are genuinely non-nuclear-weapon States. Finally, for the Convention to be able to enter into force, we consider that it is essential that all nuclear-weapon countries which are permanent members of the Security Council should be signatories.

While the efforts to achieve this Convention or more exactly, an "approach acceptable to all", are being pursued, the second direction is that all other parallel or interim measures which could further these efforts to conclude a convention should be considered. Many highly valuable ideas have been put forward during the discussions of the Working Group, and some have been mentioned in the various relevant resolutions of the General Assembly.

In the first place, resolution 38/67 welcomed once again the solemn declarations made by some nuclear-weapon States concerning the non-first-use of nuclear weapons; in particular, we welcome the undertaking made at the highest political level by the Soviet Union not to be the first to use such weapons. The resolution rightly points out that if all nuclear-weapon States were to assume obligations not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, that would be tantamount, in practice, to banning the use of nuclear weapons against all States, including all non-nuclear-weapon States. Along the same lines, operative paragraph 5 of resolution 37/80 called upon all nuclear-weapon States to make solemn unilateral declarations, identical in substance, concerning the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States having no such weapons on their territories; it recommends that the Security Council should adopt an appropriate resolution approving such declarations.

Another idea, connected with the previous one, could stem from the initiative of the Soviet Union which declared that it was ready to make a binding undertaking to provide security assurances to the Northern European States parties to a nuclear weapon free-zone in that region (reply given by President Brezhnev to a Finnish magazine on 26 June 1981). Such a guarantee on the part of the Soviet Union could be extended to other non-nuclear-weapon countries in the form either of a multilateral agreement to which the USSR would be one of the parties, or of a bilateral agreement between the USSR and each of the countries belonging to such a zone. In his electoral speech of 2 March 1984, the Secretary-General of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mr. K.U. Chernenko, again proposed

(Mr. Nguyen Thuong, Socialist Republic of Viet Nam)

among the norms governing the conduct of nuclear-weapon Powers: "not to use nuclear weapons under any circumstances against non-nuclear countries in whose territory there are no such weapons. To respect the status of nuclear-free zones already created and to encourage the creation of new nuclear free zones in various areas of the world" (document CD/444 of 6 March 1984). It is hoped that other nuclear-weapon Powers will follow a similar course of action and subscribe to these norms. As a country neighbouring on Southern Asia and the Indian Ocean, Viet Nam supports the efforts of India and other non-aligned countries of the region to make the Indian Ocean and the coastal States a zone of peace from which nuclear weapons inter alia, would be eliminated. It is to be hoped that all nuclear-weapon Powers which have been called upon will respond positively to this praiseworthy effort by India, which will greatly benefit the security of the States of the region and its surroundings.

Obviously, the absolute, as it were, positive assurance for non-nuclear-weapon countries against the use or threat of use of such weapons would stem from radical and comprehensive nuclear disarmament; all the so-called negative assurance measures cannot replace this. Viet Nam therefore joins with all the forces for peace throughout the world in the struggle and efforts of many kinds to prevent nuclear war, and for nuclear disarmament under effective control. For the present, Viet Nam, for its own security as a non-nuclear-weapon country and in the interests of world peace, supports the proposals of the non-aligned countries and the socialist countries, inter alia, for the freeze of nuclear weapons, for the complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon testing, for the prevention of the arms race in outer space, and for the strengthening of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. In particular, we hope that all the nuclear-weapon Powers will accept without delay and without conditions the freeze urged by world public opinion; and that the two Powers which remain reticent will join in the work aimed at the complete prohibition of all forms of nuclear-weapon testing.

Mr. President, my delegation thanks you and thanks the Conference for your attention in listening to my modest statement. Viet Nam may perhaps lack experience but it does not lack goodwill and a sense of responsibility. Last year, my delegation was able to inform the Committee on Disarmament of the results of the Symposium of Ho Chi Minh Ville on the consequences of the use of defoliants in the second war in Indo-China.

In the near future my delegation would like to address the Conference at a suitable date on another problem in which we are most interested, namely, the comprehensive programme of disarmament, including among other things the establishment through the joint efforts of all the countries of the region, of a zone of peace in South-East Asia.

My delegation will spare no effort to continue to seek to improve and extend its participation in the work of our negotiating organ of such great importance for the entire future of mankind. Viet Nam has put forward its candidacy should

(Mr. Nguyen Thuong, Socialist Republic of Viet Nam)

the Conference decide to increase its membership. My delegation renews its expression of gratitude to the Conference and to all its members which give it understanding, support and encouragement.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Viet Nam for his statement and his kind words for the President. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Italy, Ambassador Alessi.

Mr. ALESSI (Italy) (translated from French): Thank you, Mr. President. First of all, I should like to associate my delegation, and in so doing I am sure that I interpret the feelings of the other members of the Western Group, with the words of condolence which have been spoken in connection with the death of President Sekou Touré. Because of his personality and the role he played on the international scene, the mourning in which Guinea and the continent of Africa are now plunged also extends to the entire community of nations. Mr. President, the millennial bonds of history, culture and friendship linking the country you so worthily represent with my own prompt me to address you in particularly warm terms. I wish to express my delegation's great appreciation at the courteous and efficient manner in which you have guided our work and for the untiring efforts you have made to ensure progress. At the same time I should like to pay tribute once again to your predecessor, Ambassador Turbanski, who has the merit of having ensured that our present session made a constructive and promising start.

I intend to devote my statement today to a problem to which my Government attaches particular importance. I refer to the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

I deeply regret that, in spite of all your personal efforts, item 5 of our agenda still lacks a framework to make structured substantive discussions possible.

Meanwhile, we have no choice other than to use the plenary meetings to continue our exchanges of views. I do not wish today to dwell on matters relating to the establishment of a subsidiary body; the unofficial meetings and consultations which you have held have provided my delegation with an opportunity to express at some length its views on the subject. I would rather wish to put forward a few ideas on the basic questions which we are called upon to consider under item 5.

I believe there is agreement on the fact that the discussions to be held, once the subsidiary body is created, should be of a comprehensive character. The question of the prevention of an arms race in space should therefore be thoroughly considered in all its aspects, with neither preconditions nor limitations.

It is clear that such an exercise should be carried out in a rational manner and, in the opinion of my delegation, an analysis of relevant international agreements; both multilateral and bilateral, could constitute a useful starting point.



(Mr. Alessi, Italy)

In his statement of 22 March 1984, the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union held that such suggestions would merely be an astute means of avoiding true negotiation.

I would see in them, much more modestly common sense suggestions aimed at beginning our basic work without further delay. The analysis of existing agreements provides a starting point; I do not claim that it would be the only one but it seems to me to be logical to start by looking at what already exists if we wish to discuss what is to be added. This first step would be an aid to identifying the different questions related to the prevention of an arms race in space and would, moreover, allow us to spot loopholes in the existing legal system: we would then be able to decide on remedial measures.

Progress in this area, which is so important for international security and stability, calls for difficult and complex substantive decisions on the part of our governments. My delegation, which is of the opinion that it is still bound by paragraph 80 of the Final Document (the wording of which was submitted by my country for the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament), remains convinced of the considerable urgency of the problem. It is also aware that such decisions can only be taken on the basis of thorough preliminary work, which brings to light all possible data and solutions.

A collection of extracts from relevant agreements, both multilateral and bilateral, might constitute the documentary basis for the work to which I referred. I also note that the documents presented by Canada (CD/320) and France (CD/375) contain a list of such agreements as well as comments of a preliminary nature. Similarly, the statement by the distinguished representative of Sweden, Ambassador Ekéus, on 22 March 1984, broadly covers the same problems and places emphasis on a series of major questions concerning the interpretation and application of existing agreements.

An analysis of these agreements would also be useful in connection with the draft treaty presented by the delegation of the Soviet Union in document CD/476, to which the distinguished representative of Czechoslovakia referred today. The title of the treaty, its preamble and article 1, relate to the prohibition of the use of force in outer space and from space against Earth. A preliminary study of Article 2, paragraph 4, of the United Nations Charter and its implications for activities in outer space seems to me to be called for. Moreover, other clauses of this draft treaty -- in particular certain subparagraphs of article 2 -- deal with questions which have already been covered, at least partly, by existing treaties. Here again, a preliminary study of those instruments would be useful.

My delegation remains willing to make detailed comments on the Soviet draft treaty at the appropriate place and time. Its introduction by the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union in a plenary meeting provides us with other elements which are worthy of reflection: I will merely mention here the readiness to envisage additional measures of verification.

(Mr. Alessi, Italy)

The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, which entered into force in 1967, is certainly the most important of these agreements: in addition to the fact that it has been ratified by a considerable number of States, the general opinion is that it contains the basic principles of international law in relation to space. This Treaty is important because it establishes certain specific prohibitions (particularly article IV, paragraph 1) and for the principles which it sets forth and which it recalls (particularly in the preamble). However, also evident in this Treaty are its "silences" and "loopholes", which allow States a large amount of freedom.

This freedom is at the basis of a number of subsequent agreements which, as in the case of the bilateral Soviet-United States agreements concluded within the framework of the SALT negotiations, also cover the use of space.

The idea of developing space law in the direction of a kind of demilitarization or "sanctuarization" has been advanced several times in the past. We ourselves raised the question of a review of the Outer Space Treaty in 1968 (document A/7221 of 9 September 1968). The Treaty, it should be recalled, does not contain a clause providing for periodic review. Subsequently, we presented a draft additional protocol aimed at extending the scope of the 1967 Treaty (documents A/AC.187/97 of 1 February and CD/9 of 26 March 1979).

It must be admitted that this direction was hardly promising. Gone are the times when the President of a Superpower could propose, at the fifteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly, that the principles established for the Antarctic should be applied to outer space.

The characteristics of the space environment, rapid technological progress in this field, the multi-faceted nature of spacecraft and the established and now irreversible link between civil and military uses of space hardly make it practicable to have recourse to formulae or concepts which have been applied in other contexts. The mere transposition to outer space of concepts such as "hostile act", "measure of a military nature", "offensive or defensive deployment", "exclusively peaceful aims", etc., comes up against a reality which does not lend itself to clear classification. The varying interpretations which the space Powers themselves give these concepts and the ambiguity which hangs over the lawfulness of certain activities in space confirms this state of affairs. It would seem to me to be extremely useful to be able to record the positions of the different delegations on these fundamental matters and, to the extent possible, clarify them. The working document presented by France (CD/375) contains, in section III, a series of relevant and delicate questions which deserve further consideration.

To take account of this evolution it seems to us to be preferable to adopt another approach: in 1981, in the General Assembly, Italy co-sponsored resolution 36/97 C. This resolution, like the one co-sponsored the following year, proposed a gradual approach focused on the need, first of all, to ensure the immunity of satellites and prohibit ASAT systems.

Even from this point of view, a study of existing legal instruments remains an essential exercise in our opinion. By way of example, reference can be made to the question of the links between a possible agreement on ASAT systems — whatever its contents — and the 1967 Outer Space Treaty; in addition to the basic obligation by which activities in the exploration and use of space should be carried out

(Mr. Alessi, Italy)

"in accordance with international law", the most significant clause in this respect is article 9 of the Treaty. This article, which provides for appropriate international consultation in the event of activities in space likely to cause a potentially harmful disturbance to others, seems to me to offer the basis for the efforts which we must make.

Other agreements, to a certain extent, cover acts of interference against satellites.

Article III of the bilateral Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Nuclear War (1971) envisages inter alia, cases of interference in rapid warning systems when liable to create a danger of nuclear war. Satellites are naturally a part of rapid warning systems. It might also be considered that reference could likewise be made to the bilateral Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War of 1973. The SALT agreements also provide for subsequent limitations on acts of interference with satellites: in relation to verification, parties to these agreements rely on "national technical means", a concept of a general nature which includes a whole range of methods for data collection and which, in the context of the SALT agreements, includes reconnaissance satellites. Moreover, the parties undertake to refrain from recourse to methods of dissimulation which might hamper verification of the application of agreements, including, naturally, verification from space.

As a result of bilateral agreements, satellites thus benefit from the beginnings of legal protection. Our main task in this respect is to study the content and limits of such protection in order subsequently to study the way to extend it beyond non-interference with national means of verification and to make it general.

There are 16 years between now and the year 2000; the answers which we can give to the challenge of arms control in space may have serious consequences on the way in which mankind will enter the next century. It has been said that the control of space weapons must inevitably become the number one problem of disarmament in the twenty-first century. It may be wondered if it is not already that.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Italy for his statement and his kind words for the President. I was particularly touched by his warm references to the millennial common history of Romania and Italy. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Argentina, Ambassador Carasales.

Mr. CARASALES (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): Thank you, Mr. President. I should like first to associate my delegation with the words spoken this morning in tribute to the memory of President Sekou Touré. A little over 10 years ago I had the opportunity of personally meeting this distinguished African leader when I travelled to the Republic of Guinea and spent several days there while on a mission entrusted to me by the United Nations Security Council. On that occasion, in the course of various working meetings, I was able to appreciate directly the personality of President Sekou Touré and his deep concern for his people's welfare and development. I was therefore particularly saddened to learn today of his untimely death.

On behalf of the Argentine delegation I join my voice to the expressions of condolence addressed to the Government and people of the Republic of Guinea and to the family of the distinguished leader who has passed away,

(Mr. Carasales, Argentina)

Mr. President, it is customary at our meetings to begin statements with a few words of tribute to the incumbent President, Ambassador Datcu. Rarely are such words more justified than in the present case. We are all without exception witnesses of his daily and tireless efforts to expedite the work of this Conference. It is certainly to be hoped that his efforts will be crowned with success, and I sincerely congratulate him on the dedication and efficiency with which he is discharging his important responsibilities.

It would be an injustice not to mention in this introduction the skill and efficiency deployed by his distinguished predecessor, Ambassador Turbanski, to whom I convey my appreciation, as well as to forget the long and fruitful efforts of Ambassador Morelli Pando, whom we recall with affection and with the hope of seeing him return in the future.

Last week, in accordance with the programme of work for the spring part of its session, the Conference on Disarmament devoted two plenary meetings to the consideration of agenda item 5, entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space".

The outcome of these two plenary meetings consists of some statements, certainly valuable and interesting, but also very few in number. This morning they have been followed by the statements of the distinguished Ambassadors of Czechoslovakia and Italy. This does not alter the fact, however, that this exercise has been repeated along similar lines since early 1982 when the then Committee on Disarmament decided to include in its agenda the question of the military use of outer space.

It may legitimately be asked if the single multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament, the Conference on Disarmament, is even remotely performing its duties when it devotes to the consideration of a problem whose scale and urgency are universally recognized barely two weeks a year, or four meetings a year—I repeat, four meetings a year. There can be no doubt as to the answer to this question. It may therefore also legitimately be asserted that the Conference on Disarmament cannot continue this abnormal state of affairs much longer without undermining its prestige and its mission, I might even say its *raison d'être*.

We must not forget that in 1982 the Committee on Disarmament agreed to include in its agenda -- not without difficulties, it should be added -- the present agenda item 5 in response to a clear concern on the part of the international community which was expressed in General Assembly resolutions 36/97 C and 36/99 of 9 December 1981. A few years earlier the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament had recognized, in paragraph 80 of the Final Document, the implicit need to take "further measures" and hold "appropriate international negotiations" -- and I stress the word "negotiations" -- "in order to prevent an arms race in outer space".

It is not my intention to begin listing all the steps taken by the international community with a view to regulating the use of outer space since the launching of the first Sputnik in 1957 marked the dawning of the Space Age. Furthermore, the excellent statement made by Ambassador Ekéus on 22 March provides a very useful summary of the instruments negotiated on the question.

We must agree, however, that those instruments are insufficient. Otherwise, there would be no sense in the various resolutions adopted every year by the United Nations General Assembly, with widespread support from all sectors.

(Mr. Carasales, Argentina)

For some years there has been growing concern at the discovery of the existence of loopholes in the legal regime governing outer space, a concern which has heightened in line with the discovery of the intensification of space operations which the Superpowers are studying, planning, preparing and even carrying out:

It is not easy for those who still consider that space activities belong to the realm of science fiction to understand fully all the aspects and consequences of what is at stake. Whatever judgement may be made on the statements and prospects opened up by the much-quoted speech of President Reagan on 23 March 1983, there can be no doubt that it aroused interest, and I would add, concern, among large sectors of world public opinion with regard to issues having tremendous implications for their future, which until then had been confined to specialized magazines and institutions.

Since then there has been extensive spoken and written comment on the possible military use of outer space, and the least that can be said in this connection is that the situation that is described is alarming. The wars of the future appear to be drawing closer at a dizzy pace.

The development of a military space race is today a reality. No one can reasonably dispute this statement, and no one can claim to be unaware of it, because there is a wealth of literature on the subject. An overview of the articles and publications appearing increasingly frequently shows general agreement on the frantic activity on which the Superpowers have embarked, far beyond what is indicated by the newspaper headlines. The sums invested in research and development are on an overwhelming scale, and a source of concern in view of their ultimate military destination, as well as a source of dismay when compared with the economic and social needs which are daily left unmet.

For some time now the Pentagon's budget for space activities has been greater than that of NASA, and the gap between the two is tending to increase. Furthermore, it is considered that at least a quarter of the NASA budget itself really has military applications. The information on the expenditures of the other Superpower is, as always, scanty, but it may justifiably be presumed that they too are enormous.

The description of the various activities planned and underway generally includes the same projects: anti-satellite systems of various types (launched from Earth or from F-15 aircraft), killer satellites with various characteristics, use of the space shuttle for military purposes, development of laser beams and particle beams, anti-missile defence systems, and so forth. Attempts have been made to classify the different types of space weapons: conventional and non-traditional direct weapons, indirect weapons of an informational or military kind, each of which may be in turn broken into a number of sub-categories.

I shall not embark on even a summary account of everything that is currently, right now, being done, and everything that is shortly to come. I repeat, the information on this subject is no longer confined to specialized magazines and may be found in publications on international politics and even in the daily press. There have even been cases of the use outer space for military purposes, directly experienced by my own country itself.

(Mr. Carasales, Argentina)

There are two possibilities as regards this state of affairs: either all these activities are being carried out in violation of the multilateral or bilateral agreements existing in this field, or else these international instruments are utterly inadequate to prevent an arms race in outer space.

We would like to believe that the former alternative is wrong, and we are therefore left with the second: the international agreements governing activities in space are incomplete and present many gaps and loopholes which must necessarily be filled if we sincerely wish to preserve outer space for exclusively peaceful uses for the benefit of mankind.

Any analysis of the instruments in force, and even of those which have not yet come into force, clearly reveals that indeed they are not comprehensive and leave out many activities of a dangerous nature, perhaps because when they were drafted the technological advances which today open up vast prospects did not exist.

What is even more alarming is that some basic concepts included in some of the existing treaties have been interpreted in differing manners. This has not so far been very obvious because the treaties have not yet been in force for long, relatively speaking, and because the number of States with a space presence is extremely limited. However, the intensification of the space race suggests that this lack of legal clarity will not last much longer.

I shall give some examples. The very idea of "the peaceful use of outer space" has a different meaning for the main protagonists. On the one hand, it is argued that it is synonymous with the non-military use of outer space, as provided in the Antarctic Treaty, which makes an express exception solely to enable the use of military personnel in scientific research (article 1, paragraph 2). It should be pointed out that the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 contained a similar provision in article IV, as does the Treaty relating to the activities of States on the Moon of 1979, article 3, paragraph 4.

On the other hand, according to the other interpretation, "peaceful" use should be understood as "non-aggressive" use; in other words, space may be used for defensive purposes or, what is much more serious, also for deterrent purposes, on the ground that the maintenance of peace is thus ensured. If we recall a famous statement made on 23 June 1982 at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, in which it was asserted that nuclear weapons were the best guarantee of the preservation of peace, we may easily imagine that the logical corollary would be that to extend the doctrine of nuclear deterrence to outer space would guarantee its use for exclusively peaceful purposes.

Without reaching these extremes, however, merely to open the possibility of the existence of "defensive" but not "aggressive" weapons in space is to reproduce in outer space a dichotomy which has already proved insurmountable.

Another example of the differences in interpretation to which I referred a moment ago may be found in the expression "weapon of mass destruction", words which lie at the core of the 1967 Treaty. Not only do some ongoing space activities clearly escape the rules contained in that Treaty, but also it does not appear clear, in the thinking of some governments, exactly what is prohibited, as the meaning of the term "weapon of mass destruction" does not appear to be the same for all. Whether or not laser beams or anti-satellite weapons are weapons of mass destruction, for example, appears a moot point, and one that has been argued.

(Mr. Carasales, Argentina)

It may even be wondered if the very concept of "weapons" does not present particular problems in the context of outer space, in view of the ambivalent, both peaceful and military, characteristics which devices capable of operating in space have or may have.

Everything I have said so far -- and I could certainly say much more -- reveals in my opinion a self-evident truth: there is much that needs to be done in this field, and it must be done as soon as possible. My delegation cannot accept the argument that it is first necessary to determine whether or not it is necessary to do something. This standpoint is now indefensible. The question of where to begin may be discussed, but not the need to resume without further delay international activity in this field.

While we remain unjustifiably immobile, the world continues to advance and reality continues to change. The world of science and technology is increasingly far removed from that of negotiations, and political decisions appear to keep step more with the former than with the latter.

At present the possibility of a nuclear catastrophe appears threatening, and the prevention of nuclear war is anxiously called for. However, if the world is today in a state of precarious balance which may at any moment be broken, we can imagine what the situation would be once space has been invaded by weapon systems of all kinds, regardless of whether they are considered defensive or aggressive, weapons of mass destruction or not. The factors of destabilization will have multiplied and it would be both a childish and a fatal delusion to believe that a space war would leave our planet untouched. The protagonists will act from the Earth and it is precisely to gain mastery over the Earth that attempts are made to control space, as in the past the aim was to control the seas in order to have dominion over the continents.

A comprehensive legal regime governing the space race in order to keep it entirely free from military implications is now a pressing necessity. At the request of the General Assembly, the Conference on Disarmament has taken up this task by including it, by consensus, in its agenda. This Conference is an organ which, through its competence, the status of its members, and the wealth of experience acquired over long years of negotiation of international disarmament instruments, has all the necessary conditions to undertake effective and fruitful work. The flexibility provided by its rules of procedure has not yet been fully exploited, and in my opinion there are possible formulas which would make it possible to hold within it, for example, bilateral informal meetings, if necessary, to enable the work of the Conference to advance. There is already an abundant basis for work, including draft treaties which deserve most careful consideration.

All this is open to our Conference. All that is lacking is the decision finally to begin substantive consideration of the item included in its agenda for two years. It is no secret that the great majority of delegations have long been prepared to undertake this task. This was called for once again a few months ago in resolution 38/70, adopted by the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session by a truly outstanding number of votes.

We cannot, we must not postpone this decision any further. Let us establish once and for all a body, an ad hoc committee, for this purpose and give it a meaningful mandate with a concrete content; and let us set to work, as too much time has already been lost.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Argentina for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President. My list of speakers for today is concluded. Does any other representative wish to take the floor at this stage in our work? That does not seem to be the case, and I therefore now intend to suspend the plenary meeting and convene an informal meeting of the Conference in five minutes to consider some organizational matters. The plenary meeting is suspended.

The meeting was suspended at 12.30 and reconvened at 12.40 p.m.

The PRESIDENT (speaking in English): The plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is resumed.

I now put before the Conference for consideration three draft decisions, contained in Working Papers 122 to 124, concerning participation by non-members in our discussions. We will take them up one by one, in the order in which the original requests from non-members were received. The first draft decision deals with the request received from Ecuador and is contained in Working Paper No. 123. 1/ If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the draft decision.

It was so decided.

The second request was received from Cameroon and the relevant draft decision is contained in Working Paper No. 124. 2/ If there is no objection, I shall consider that the Conference adopts the draft decision.

It was so decided.

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1/ "In response to the request of Ecuador (CD/485, CD/486 and CD/487) and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of its rules of procedure, the Conference decides for the present to invite the representative of Ecuador to participate during 1984 in the plenary meetings of the Conference and in the subsidiary body established under item 4 of the agenda."

2/ "In response to the request of Cameroon (CD/488 and CD/489) and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of its rules of procedure, the Conference decides for the present to invite the representative of Cameroon to participate during 1984 in the plenary meetings of the Conference and in the subsidiary body established under item 4 of the agenda."



(The President)

The third request was received from Democratic Yemen and the relevant draft decision appears in Working Paper No. 122. 3/ If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the draft decision.

It was so decided.

That concludes our business for today. If there is no other member wishing to take the floor at this stage, I shall now proceed to adjourn the plenary meeting, but before doing that, I will announce that the next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 29 March, at 10.30 a.m. The meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 12.45 p.m.

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3/ "In response to the request of Democratic Yemen (CD/490) and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of its rules of procedure, the Conference decides for the present to invite the representative of Democratic Yemen to participate during 1984 in the plenary meetings of the Conference and in the subsidiary bodies established under items 4, 6 and 8 of its agenda."



# CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.254  
29 March 1984  
ENGLISH

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## FINAL RECORD OF THE TWO-HUNDRED AND FIFTY-FOURTH PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Thursday, 29 March 1984, at 10.30 a.m.

President:

Mr. I. Datcu

(Romania)

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria:

Mr. A. TAFFAR  
Mr. A. BOUBAZINE

Argentina:

Mr. J.J. CARSALES  
Mr. R. GARCÍA MORITAN  
Mr. R. VILLAMBROSA

Australia:

Mr. R. ROWE  
Ms. J. COURTNEY

Belgium:

Mr. M. DEPASSE  
Mr. J. NOIRFALISSE

Brazil:

Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA  
Mr. S. DE QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria:

Mr. P. POPTCHEV  
Mr. C. PRAMOV  
Mr. N. MICHAÏLOV

Burma:

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI  
U PE THEIN TIN  
U THAN TUN

Canada:

Mr. G. SKINNER

China:

Mr. QIAN JIADONG  
Ms. WANG ZHIYUN  
Mr. LIANG DEFENG  
Ms. GE YIYUN  
Mr. SUO KAIMING  
Mr. JIANG ZHENXI  
Mr. ZHANG WEIDONG

Cuba:

Mr. P. NUÑEZ MOSQUERA

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. M. VEJVODA  
Mr. J. MATOUSEK

Egypt:

Mr. S. ALFARARGI  
Mr. I.I. HASSAN  
Mr. A.M. ABBAS

Ethiopia:

Mr. F. YOHANNES

France:

Mr. F. DE LA GORCE  
Mr. H. RENIE  
Mr. G. MONTASSIER

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. J. DEMBSKI  
Mr. H. THIELICKE

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. H. WEGENER  
Mr. M. GERDTS  
Mr. W-E. VON DEM HAGEN  
Mr. F. ELBE  
Mr. J. PFIRSCHKE

Hungary:

Mr. D. MEISZTER  
Mr. F. GAJDA  
Mr. H. TOTH

India:

Mr. S. KANT SHARMA

Indonesia:

Mr. S. SUTOWARDOYO  
Mr. ANDRADJATI  
Mr. HARYOMATARAM

Islamic Republic of Iran:

Mr. N. KAZEMI KAMYAB  
Mr. F.S. SIRJANI

Italy:

Mr. M. ALESSI  
Mr. M. PAVESE  
Mr. L. FERRARI BRAVO  
Mr. B. CABRAS

Japan:

Mr. R. IMAI  
Mr. M. KONISHI  
Mr. K. TANAKA  
Mr. T. KAWAKITA  
Mr. T. ISHIGURI

Kenya:Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCÍA ROBLES  
Mr. P. MACEDO RIBA  
Ms. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO

Mongolia:

Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG  
Mr. S.O. BOLD

Morocco:

Mr. A. SKALLI  
Mr. O. HILLALE

Netherlands:

Mr. J. RAMAKER  
Mr. R.J. AKKERMAN

Nigeria:

Mr. J.O. OBOH  
Mr. L.O. AKINDELE  
Mr. C.V. UDEDIBIA

Pakistan:

Mr. K. NIAZ

Peru:

Mr. C. CASTILLO RAMIREZ

Poland:

Mr. S. TURBANSKI  
Mr. G. CZEMPINSKI  
Mr. J. CIALOWICZ  
Mr. T. STROJWAS

Romania:

Mr. I. DATCU  
Mr. T. MELESCANU  
Mr. O. IONESCU  
Mr. P. BALOIU  
Mr. A. CRETU  
Mr. A. POPESCU

Sri Lanka:

Mr. J. DHANAPALA  
Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA  
Mr. P. KARIYAWASAM

Sweden:

Mr. R. EKEUS  
Ms. E. BONNIER  
Mr. H. BERGLUND  
Ms. A.M. LAU  
Mr. J. LUNDIN  
Mrs. I. THORSSON  
Mr. L-A. WINGREN

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELIAN  
Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV  
Mr. R.M. TIMERBAEV  
Mr. G.V. BERDENNIKOV  
Mr. P.Y. SKOMOROKHIN  
Mr. S.V. KOBYSH  
Mr. G.V. ANTSIFEROV

United Kingdom:

Mr. R.I.T. CROMARTIE  
Mr. G.H. COOPER  
Mr. D.A. SLINN  
Mr. J. RICHARDS  
Mr. J-F. GORDON

United States of America:

Mr. N. CLYNE  
Mr. N. CARRERA  
Ms. K.C. CRITTENBERGER  
Mr. R. HORNE  
Mr. R. NORMAN  
Mr. P. CORDEN

Venezuela:

Mr. LOPEZ OLIVER  
Mr. T. LABRADOR

Yugoslavia:

Mr. K. VIDAS

Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC

Mr. D. MINIC

Zaire:

Mrs. E. ESAKI KABEYA

Secretary-General of the Conference  
on Disarmament and Personal  
Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary-General of the  
Conference on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI



The PRESIDENT (translated from French): The plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is called to order. The Conference today continues the consideration of agenda item 6, entitled "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons". However, in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Sri Lanka, Burma, Egypt, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Islamic Republic of Iran and Yugoslavia. Before giving the floor to the distinguished representative of Sri Lanka, Ambassador Dhanapala, to introduce document CD/492 which has just been circulated, I should like cordially to welcome the presence here among us of Mrs. Inga Thorsson, Ambassador and Secretary of State, who was for several years the distinguished leader of the Swedish delegation. Mrs. Thorsson's tireless and impressive work for disarmament and peace is well known too, and is appreciated by us all. I should like to thank her warmly for the interest she takes in the work of our Conference.

I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Sri Lanka.

Mr. DHANAPALA (Sri Lanka): Thank you, Mr. President. Before I commence, I would like to associate my delegation with your sentiments in welcoming the presence of Mrs. Inga Thorsson with us this morning.

Mr. President, with your permission I would like to make a brief statement on behalf of the Group of 21 in order to introduce document CD/492, entitled "Draft Mandate for the Ad Hoc Subsidiary Body on a Nuclear Test Ban", which the secretariat has kindly distributed today.

The substance of document CD/492 is identical to that of CD/438, which the delegation of Mexico presented to the Conference on 24 February 1984. The draft mandate contained in document CD/492 has been endorsed unanimously by the Group of 21. I have been mandated by the Group to request you, Mr. President, to place document CD/492 before the Conference for consideration and decision at its plenary meeting scheduled for Tuesday, 3 April 1984.

You will recall, Mr. President, that at the commencement of our work this month you initiated open-ended and informal consultations on the creation of subsidiary bodies under various items of the agenda, including item 1. Approximately four weeks have elapsed since then with no progress achieved despite the hard work you have put in. Without going into details I would like to emphasize that the action of the Group of 21 in submitting CD/492 for a decision reflects its concern over the inability of the Conference to make any progress on this highest priority item, despite your efforts and the efforts of a large number of delegations. It also reflects the great importance the Group attaches to the continuation of the efforts to find ways and means to discharge the responsibilities of the Conference relating to this highest priority item on its agenda.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank you very much for introducing this working paper, and I now ask the head of the delegation of Sri Lanka to deliver his statement.

Mr. DHANAPALA (Sri Lanka): Mr. President, the Sri Lanka delegation takes the floor for the first time during your Presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. We would therefore like to express our sincere admiration of your experienced and skilful diplomacy, leavened as it is by your inherent and infectious charm which has been so much in evidence as you conducted the affairs of the Conference this month. The successful resolution of some of the organizational problems that confronted us when you took over the Presidency is ample proof of the service you have rendered this Conference.

May I also take this opportunity of thanking Ambassador Turbanski, our President for the month of February, for his successful steering of the Conference during the initial month of our current session.

Mr. President, in my statement of 14 February 1984, I indicated that my delegation would be addressing itself later in the session more specifically to the various items of our agenda. I propose to deal today with item 5, the prevention of an arms race in outer space, a subject in which my delegation has had a sustained interest, dedicated as we are to preventing an extension of our terrestrial arms race into another part of our universe -- outer space. Sri Lanka's lack of a space capability does not diminish our profound concern over recent trends in this field which enhance the risk of armed conflict. Since the dawn of the space age in 1957 with the launching by the USSR of the Sputnik, we have witnessed the incorporation of satellites in modern weapon systems. The increasing allocations for space-related activities in the military budgets of nations having a space capability have underlined the military significance of space. History has taught us that the prevention of militarization is self-evidently easier to achieve than demilitarization. While we do believe that world security is indivisible, we would like to preserve and seal off outer space as a zone of peace for the use of mankind's progress rather than its destruction. Sri Lanka's role in the still unfulfilled task of making the Indian Ocean a zone of peace again stemmed from a basic desire to prevent the militarization of an area of the world's surface where Great Power competition was in 1971 only incipient.

The undeniable technical complexity of this aspect of our work in the Conference should not be an argument to postpone or avoid its urgent consideration. Complexity can be unravelled through collective study and analysis. But we must embark on such an endeavour. The complexities of this issue, as my delegation sees it, lie more in the political sphere than in the technical. Where no international law covers the myriad possibilities posed by space technology we must create law through international agreements. It is not enough to say that the existing agreements are inadequate.

Taking cognizance of the need to continue to take preventive action in this regard, the Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations devoted to disarmament declared by consensus that -- and I quote:

"In order to prevent an arms race in outer space, further measures should be taken and appropriate international negotiations held in accordance with the spirit of the Treaty on the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies."

(Mr. Dhanapala, Sri Lanka)

My delegation considers that the inscription, in 1982, of this item in the agenda of this sole multilateral negotiating body was symbolic of the importance and urgency attaching to this question and the manner in which the international community wanted it treated by this forum. Even while we in the Committee, and Conference, on Disarmament have been seized of the problem, we have been witnessing disturbing and accelerated trends relating to space-weapon developments. Last year and the year before, the international community quite rightly urged this body, which has primary responsibility for dealing with this issue, to make haste in averting the imminent danger of launching an arms race into outer space. And yet while we appear to be paralysed in a state of inaction over the modalities of dealing with the question, the dynamics of the arms race seems to proceed on its own momentum. ASAT competition has begun. One ASAT system has probably reached operational capability and its rival system has recently made its test appearance. The major nations with a space capability seem to be poised to embark upon the development of space-based defensive weapons. High energy laser, particle-beam weapons and outer-space ballistic missile defences are being developed. The investment of resources thus involved is enormous. My delegation makes no apology for quoting the following from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute publication "Outer Space - a New Dimension of the Arms Race" because of its striking relevance. I quote --

"During the time it takes to read this sentence, the United States will spend some \$2,000 on its military space programme. Assuming that the Soviet budget is the same, then the amount spent every 10 seconds amounts to over \$4,000. The military space effort includes the launch of one military satellite every third day, the prime aim of these being to increase the fighting efficiency of the military forces on Earth."

The figures quoted are two years old. They would be much higher today. An arms race in outer space is as unwinnable as on earth. And yet the spiral has entered outer space, threatening cosmic chaos.

What we see as disturbing is the gradual but inexorable process of integrating space capabilities to the strategies and doctrines associated with nuclear weapons. Here on earth we are told that nuclear brinkmanship rather than common security could preserve peace. Even if one were to agree that there is a correlation between the doctrines practised by the nuclear-weapon Powers and the preservation of peace since World War II, which assertion has been questioned by the international community, it is an irrefutable fact that this method of peace-keeping has correspondingly increased instability in terms of ever-increasing levels of armaments. If the consequences of the arms race on earth are any indication, further refinement and sophistication of these doctrines through space capabilities would only lead to greater instability. If the research and development effort on military-related space activities currently under way in the major countries with a space capability are brought to their logical conclusion, which is the testing and deploying of space-based defensive weapons, it would gravely undermine, if not totally negate, whatever credibility there is in the current doctrines which have ostensibly kept

(Mr. Dhanapala, Sri Lanka)

peace since World War II. The past experience with regard to the technological momentum of the arms race does not make us believe that the results will be otherwise. This is perhaps the point, as the United Nations Study on Nuclear Weapons puts it, at which history might disprove the theory of keeping peace through nuclear terror. Moreover, if these developments culminate in actual testing and deployment they will have serious repercussions on the viability, let alone the spirit, of such existing treaties as the ABM treaty and the Outer Space Treaty of 1967. These are perhaps the paradoxes of the nuclear age. But we cannot afford to be awed into silence or inaction by the complexities of these developments, because the consequences of the dangers inherent in these developments will be far reaching.

The importance and the urgency of dealing with this question is therefore clear. However, as I mentioned earlier, this Conference continues to debate the modalities of dealing with the question. We have a very practical and important basis for work on this question in the recommendation contained in General Assembly resolution 38/70 which has been hailed by many delegations here as a substantial achievement. This resolution is very important, not only because it is the only resolution on this question that emerged from the last session of the United Nations General Assembly, but more importantly because it reflects the widest agreement achieved so far amongst the Member States of the United Nations as to how the international community should handle this question. Other bodies, in addition to concerned citizens, look to this Conference to deal with this subject on a priority basis in acknowledgement of our primary role. My delegation would like to address itself as to how these expectations can realistically be fulfilled.

My delegation does not harbour the illusion that the exhortations for the peaceful use of outer space and the prevention of an arms race in outer space contained in resolution 38/70 -- worthy as they are -- can be translated into instantaneous reality. We are aware that this Conference -- unlike the United Nations General Assembly -- has to work by consensus. I would therefore like to dwell upon the common elements of various approaches adopted by the delegations in this Conference rather than dealing with the differences that seem to exist. Last year my delegation had occasion to identify and examine in detail the various approaches adopted by delegations on this question. We did so with a view to delineating the common elements of these approaches which could provide a basis for our work in accordance with the mandate of this body. We pursued this at the last session of the United Nations General Assembly and the resolution which I referred to earlier reflects the results of this work. There is a broad general agreement in this Conference on the principle that a subsidiary body should be set up to deal with this question, in accordance with the mandate of the Conference. The mandate of this Conference is that it should undertake negotiations on disarmament issues. It is also clear from the documents submitted by all three groups in this Conference (namely CD/329/Rev.1, CD/413 and CD/434) that they explicitly or implicitly acknowledge the negotiating responsibilities of this body in relation to this agenda item, prevention of an arms race in outer space.

(Mr. Dhanapala, Sri Lanka)

Quite apart from this technical and legalistic approach it seems to my delegation that the only way of preventing an arms race in outer space would be to negotiate on and conclude an agreement or agreements on this question which could be acceptable to all. What is at issue, however, seems to be how we should frame the stages of our work leading to negotiations. It is clear that if we are to negotiate, any work preparatory to negotiations should be oriented towards that end.

The position of the Group of 21, with which my delegation is fully associated, indicates a great degree of flexibility about this aspect, whilst setting forth clearly the objective, which is negotiations on this question. It is also clear that to give the subsidiary body a mandate which accepts the objective of conducting negotiations does not prejudice the substantive position of any delegation. My delegation for one does acknowledge that identification and study of the issues are an integral part of any meaningful negotiations. But this is only a part of the negotiating process. Without a proper linkage to negotiations, this exercise could not have an intrinsic value of its own as far as the mandate of this forum is concerned. The exercise, therefore, should be given a time-frame and conducted within a framework of an all-inclusive and comprehensive approach leading to negotiations and should take account of the complexities and interrelationships involved. It does not, however, mean that the examination of issues per se should be an end in itself, since it would not be in line with the final objective to which I referred earlier. If however, in the process of this examination, there is agreement that any particular issue or an aspect of the issue should be dealt with and negotiated on a priority basis, then the Conference could deal with that issue or issues accordingly. My delegation, for example, would be willing to discuss and negotiate separately on anti-satellite systems or on other military-related space applications if there is agreement in the Conference to do so. What my delegation cannot understand is how the recognition of the logical and explicitly stated link between preparatory work and negotiations could prejudice the substantive positions of any delegation.

Having said this, I must add that we should not lose time in obtaining a clear comprehension of the fundamental issue. Are we here to come to grips with the problem of an emerging arms race in outer space or to keep on examining issues until the problems become unmanageable or insurmountable, with the attendant complexities getting compounded? As I have explained earlier this has occurred in other areas of disarmament effort in the past, for reasons known to all of us.

There have been many contributions towards negotiating agreements on this issue, the earliest in the Committee on Disarmament being the additional protocol to the 1967 Outer Space Treaty submitted by the delegation of Italy (CD/9) in 1979. The most recent contribution of the USSR in submitting a draft treaty on the prohibition of the use of force in outer space and from outer space against Earth, as reflected in document CD/476, is another constructive effort in this regard. In the same spirit my own delegation outlined possible areas of work on this subject in its

(Mr. Dhanapala, Sri Lanka)

statement of 14 April 1983. Our concept of the scope and objectives of an Ad Hoc Committee is a comprehensive one which would even include a formulation of confidence-building measures through greater international co-operation. Just as the absence of war is not peace, my delegation does not believe that the absence of an arms race in space will ipso facto result in a stable peace among the stars. Consideration must be given to incorporating some of the worthwhile features of existing agreements. For example, Article 5 of the Moon Agreement and Article 11 of the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 prescribe procedures concerning information to be provided on activities concerned with the exploration and use of the moon and outer space. This is a practical recognition of the concept that outer space is a province of all mankind, requiring a free flow of information on the subject. The introduction of secrecy into the development of science and technology in space denies the people of the world the right to know, and creates suspicion and distrust.

My delegation acknowledges the valuable statement made by the Swedish delegation on 22 March, particularly as regards the useful survey of existing agreements for the prevention of an arms race in outer space highlighting some of their inadequacies. This contribution only served to underline the vital necessity of embarking on a serious and structured study of the problem within the framework of an ad hoc committee as a means of negotiating an agreement or agreements banning an arms race in outer space which would effectively plug the loopholes. The vital necessity of creating an ad hoc committee on Item 5 of our agenda was also stressed in the valuable statements made by the ambassadors of Mongolia, the USSR, Czechoslovakia, Italy and Argentina in our current session.

It is therefore the hope of my delegation that the position put forward by the Group of 21, which does not prejudice the substantive position of any delegation, would be understood in that light. Bearing these considerations in mind, my delegation hopes that the Conference, through the consultations which are currently being held on this subject, would be able to come to an agreement on a formulation for the mandate of the subsidiary body to be set up on this question without further delay.

May I conclude by adapting the dictum made famous in mankind's exploration of space to state that one inch forward by creating an ad hoc committee in consonance with the mandate of this Conference would be a giant step in the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Sri Lanka for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the President. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Burma, Ambassador U Maung Maung Gyi.

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI (Burma): Mr. President, From the time I first had the pleasure of knowing you on your arrival here, I have a growing esteem of your human qualities and your diplomatic skills. It therefore gives me particular pleasure and confidence to participate in the work of the Conference under your Presidency. May I also say how very appreciative we are of the work that has been accomplished during the first month of the session under the able guidance of Ambassador Turbanski of Poland.

It has been repeatedly emphasized in the United Nations and in this multilateral body that the gravest problem that confronts mankind today is to avert the threat of a nuclear catastrophe which continues to grow relentlessly despite all the efforts that are being made, and the main objective of this Conference should therefore be directed towards nuclear disarmament and the prevention of a nuclear war. When we speak of nuclear-war prevention in a broader sense than some of the measures that are being envisaged under item 3 of our agenda, the consideration of measures under items 1 and 2 relating to the cessation of the nuclear-arms race, nuclear disarmament and a comprehensive test-ban treaty embraces the whole spectrum of concrete measures that have a bearing on nuclear-war prevention. Then again, it does not appear conceivable that effective steps towards nuclear disarmament can be taken until a comprehensive banning of nuclear test explosions in all environments is achieved.

The present situation, under which negotiations on a comprehensive banning of nuclear tests are being kept in abeyance, is contrary to all efforts that have been made in the past, for no other disarmament issue has been so much discussed, debated and negotiated as the banning of nuclear-weapon tests. Since the early 1950s it has been the subject of multilateral, bilateral and trilateral negotiations. The priority concern given to the test-ban issue by the international community is reflected in the number of resolutions that has been adopted by the General Assembly from the time of its treatment, since 1951, as a separate item; the total now exceeds 40 resolutions, which is a greater number than on any other disarmament item.

In spite of the fact that so much effort is being devoted to this priority issue, the result so far achieved is a Partial Test Ban Treaty of over two decades ago, which continues to remain partial in the full sense of the word and will remain so until the loophole is closed by the banning of nuclear-weapon tests in all environments.

The Partial Test Ban Treaty has been considered a doubtful measure of disarmament for it has not inhibited the testing and development of nuclear warheads, thus making it possible for the continued competition in the nuclear-arms race between the Superpowers. However, there are also positive aspects of the partial test ban, for it was the first international agreement of world-wide scope, and is proof of the fact that disarmament agreements can contribute towards the relaxation of international tension and stimulate further agreements. However, the Treaty has scarcely placed any inhibitions on the further testing of nuclear weapons by the two Great Powers, for they have carried out more tests after the entry into force of the Treaty than in the period preceding it.

The principle of an effective verification system in a comprehensive test-ban treaty has been accepted by all States and it does not appear that we need to re-emphasize this over and over again. In view of this universal commitment, and confirmation by qualified authorities that all technical aspects have been defined

(U Maung Maung Gyi, Burma)

regarding the verification of a test ban, as has been said many times in the past, what is now required for the elaboration of a comprehensive test-ban treaty is the political will of States. This has been re-emphasized by the United Nations Secretary-General in the foreword to his Report in 1980, which stated that: "In my first statement to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in 1972, I stated the belief that all the technical and scientific aspects of the problem had been so fully explored that only a political decision was necessary in order to achieve agreement. I still hold that belief."

A comprehensive test-ban is considered as an essential first step towards the halting of the nuclear-arms race, for the competition on the qualitative aspects of nuclear warheads is considered to be the most destabilizing factor of such a race. Continued research and development of nuclear weapons, like research in other fields of weapons development, is a self-generating process which should be curbed by the banning of all nuclear test explosions. The objective of agreements under effective control on disarmament measures is to enhance the security of States at the international level. The principle that is valid for disarmament measures in general should also be valid for a comprehensive test-ban. No doubt a comprehensive test-ban treaty cannot in the technical sense be considered a disarmament measure, as it involves no reduction of armaments, but in a more generic sense applied to arms limitation measures it is an effective first step in the process of nuclear disarmament. For a test ban under effective control would impose equal and non-discriminatory obligations that would enhance the security of all States. This principle has been accepted over the years, for the traditional stance of the major nuclear-weapon Powers had been to conduct negotiations on their own merits. A recommitment to negotiate a test ban on this principle could avoid the possibility of postponing negotiations to an indefinite future.

The third report of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events was submitted to this Conference on 15 March. It is not the intention of my delegation to make observations on the report itself. However, we consider it appropriate to comment on the work in this Conference in relation to the progress that is being made by the Ad Hoc Group of Experts. The Ad Hoc Group was first established by this Conference's predecessor, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, in 1976 and its existence is older than this Conference itself. The terms of reference of the Ad Hoc Group was to consider and report on international co-operative measures for the identification of seismic events so as to assist in the verification of a comprehensive test ban. Accordingly, in the previous phase of its work, the Ad Hoc Group has drawn up the elements of an international exchange of global data in order to facilitate international co-operation and verification of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. The work of the Ad Hoc Group in its third report has reached a stage where detailed preliminary plans for a comprehensive experimental testing of the global system are being drawn up. Considerable progress has now been made by the Ad Hoc Group to assist, as the terms of reference explicitly state, in the verification of a comprehensive test ban. However, no substantive work has yet begun in this Conference on the elaboration of an international co-operative system. The mandate was given to the Ad Hoc Group on the basis of a broad agreement on the capabilities of a world-wide system for the detection of seismic events, and bearing this in mind, the opinion of my delegation is that it is now propitious for this Conference to define and elaborate the elements of international co-operative measures on verification in parallel with the work that is being conducted by the Ad Hoc Group. For this purpose, Protocol I annexed to the Swedish draft treaty on the banning of nuclear test explosions in any environment could serve as a basis for our work.



(U Maung Maung Gyi, Burma)

In this connection, we might recall the situation that developed after the signing of the Partial Test Ban Treaty if we do not wish to repeat what happened at that time. As was envisaged in the Partial Test Ban Treaty, talks on a comprehensive test ban resumed after the former's entry into force. But considerations focusing solely on technical issues, instead of contributing to negotiations, served to replace them.

This multilateral body has now been in existence for five years, and since its inception three years were spent on trying to reach a consensus on the establishment of an ad hoc working group on a nuclear test ban. It was only during the 1982 session that it was possible to establish a working group. An overwhelming majority of members who favoured a broad negotiating mandate had in the spirit of compromise accepted a limited mandate with the expectations that it would serve as an initiating process for the holding of negotiations. Practical experience in conducting the work on a nuclear test ban under such a mandate has shown that there are little prospects for achieving further progress.

During the course of last year, the Committee devoted the whole of the 209th plenary meeting in April, and also parts of some other meetings as well, to the question of the mandate of the working group, during which my delegation joined other delegations in expressing the need to revise the mandate to enable negotiations to take place. In spite of the fact that an overwhelming majority of the delegations were in favour of broadening the scope of the mandate, the Ad Hoc Working Group continued to function under the same mandate on the basis of the Chairman's statement, which was not in accordance with the usual practice of the adoption of an agreed text by the Committee.

In the consideration of further work for this year, my delegation's views are that an assessment of the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban for last year should serve as the point of departure. As is mentioned in the report, proposals were made and working papers presented to the Committee, but a structured discussion to arrive at a consensus approach on issues has not been possible, which could be attributed to the fact that delegations would not be forthcoming to commit themselves to reaching a compromise which would require a certain process of negotiation but which does not appear to be possible under a non-negotiating mandate.

The situation is reflected in paragraph 13 of the report, in which it was stated that the Working Group could only recognize generally the principal elements of a verification system. And it should be noted that the elements of such a system have already been the basic premise on which negotiations were conducted in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and which were also the Agreed Conclusions of the Tripartite Report. With regard to detailed discussions on the elements of a verification system, an agreed approach was not possible on any of the issues for work if the Group went no further than expressing views of individual delegations or groups of delegations. My delegation can share the views of other delegations who have stated that the mandate of the subsidiary body on a nuclear test ban has not been exhausted in so far as the scope of the discussions is concerned. However, the views of individual delegations and groups of delegations can only be structured to arrive at agreed conclusions under a mandate that would make it possible for the initiation of a negotiating process.

(U Maung Maung Gyi, Burma)

This morning the distinguished Ambassador of Sri Lanka has introduced, on behalf of the Group of 21, a paper on the draft mandate for the Ad Hoc Subsidiary Body on a Nuclear Test Ban. My delegation has joined in the unanimous support of this paper by the Group, and my statement today reflects our support for this paper. We therefore wish to welcome its presentation today to the Conference.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the Ambassador of Burma for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the President. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Egypt, Ambassador Alfarargi.

Mr. ALFARARGI (Egypt) (translated from Arabic): Mr. President, allow me today, as I am taking the floor for the first time in the Conference on Disarmament, to express my pleasure at seeing the work of the Conference throughout this month, guided by you, the representative of a friendly people to which the Egyptian people is attached by the bonds of warmth and affection. The relations between our two countries are currently blossoming, and your experience and ability have been confirmed by your constructive handling of the work during the previous week, which has given it fresh impetus and led to the solution of many problems which have arisen.

I should also like to take this opportunity to convey to your predecessor, Ambassador Turbanski of Poland, who presided over the work of the Conference last month, my thanks and appreciation for all that he achieved during that period, which is a confirmation of his profound sensitivity to issues and his inestimable knowledge.

I should also like to address my thanks to all those who welcomed me to this circle; my immediate reaction is a real desire to pursue the co-operation between my delegation and all others in order to achieve our objectives. I should also like to take this opportunity in turn to welcome our new colleagues, the Ambassadors of Australia, Belgium, Canada, Cuba, Ethiopia, Hungary, Indonesia and Sri Lanka, and wish them every success.

Mr. President, allow me to begin my statement by inviting you to share with me some personal feelings: the feelings of a newcomer who believes in the cause of disarmament and its necessity, and who has worked to that end for several years. In returning today among you to resume our efforts to achieve disarmament objectives, I entertain many feelings of concern and incomprehension: concern at the faltering efforts made by this first-rank negotiating forum; and incomprehension, even questioning, concerning the real reasons for this failure.

A quarter of a century has now passed since the adoption of resolution 1378 (XIV) by the General Assembly on 20 November 1959, which affirmed that "general and complete disarmament" was the most important issue facing the world. Nevertheless, despite the international community's insistence and its continual urgings to achieve that objective, and despite the large number of resolutions adopted by the General Assembly on Disarmament, over sixty at the latest session alone, which reflects both a negative and a positive trend, despite all this, the fact is that what has been achieved is very slight and limited, in most cases never going beyond the level of modest, partial activities.

(Mr. Alfarargi, Egypt)

Given this state of affairs, do we not have the right to wonder what has led us to this situation and try together to face up to it, in a common effort to overcome the obstacles and fulfil mankind's aspirations for peace, security and stability? Reference has often been made in this connection to the "lack of political will", particularly on the part of the major Powers who bear the chief responsibility in connection with disarmament, in that they have vast military arsenals. However, if we accept this fact, we are nevertheless convinced that the lack of such will is only the natural result of the "lack of trust" existing in international relations in general, and particularly in the relations between the two major Powers, with the result that doubt has ended by replacing trust, the cold war has replaced understanding, and the world has witnessed stubborn policies based on force in international relations and a lack of respect for the principles set forth in the United Nations Charter which represent the foundation-stone of this Organization; and it has also witnessed an unbridled arms race and the stockpiling of weapons in arsenals.

If we recognize that there is a link and a reciprocal influence between the international climate on the one hand and disarmament negotiations on the other, in that stability in international life would necessarily create a more propitious climate for negotiations and allow progress in disarmament matters, and that success in that field would subsequently be reflected in the international context whose stability would increase, it seems clear that it is of paramount importance to restore the trust that has been lost in international relations and to seek to obtain all guarantees for mutual understanding and co-operation; this can only be done by respecting the principles of the United Nations Charter and the rules of international law, by explicitly refraining from violating the sovereignty of other States and the integrity of their territories, by respecting the right of peoples to freedom, independence and self-determination, and by rejecting the arms race and the intensive production of destructive and devastating weapons likely to constitute a real threat to international peace and security.

The first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, held in 1978, was for us a guiding light; its Final Document contained a comprehensive framework of principles and objectives for general and complete disarmament, in particular by establishing in paragraph 45 the high priority which must be attached to nuclear disarmament. That session set up the Committee, now the Conference, on Disarmament, and entrusted to it some vital responsibilities as the sole international multilateral body for disarmament negotiations. Today, although six years have passed since we began our work, we are still unable to reach our goals. Nor has anything been done to achieve the objectives and aspirations of the international community formulated by the second special session. One may even wonder if these goals and aspirations have become more difficult to achieve now than six years ago. Thus, while it is really regrettable that the Committee on Disarmament passed away without achieving anything concrete, I hope at least that the Conference will have more success in this field.

The responsibility of the nuclear-weapon States -- especially the two major Powers who have the largest nuclear weapons arsenal -- is a paramount one for achieving nuclear disarmament. Under the Non-Proliferation Treaty those States have undertaken to pursue negotiations on effective measures for the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. The non-nuclear-weapon States, for their part, have undertaken not to seek to join the nuclear club nor to seek to acquire

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nuclear weapons; and whereas the latter have respected their undertakings, the nuclear-weapon States have continued to build up a multitude of nuclear weapons in their arsenals, while developing new types of weapons, and their armaments expenditures have reached astronomic heights.

Today, on the eve of the preparatory meetings for the Third Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, we have the right to ask what has become of all these undertakings, and when do the nuclear-weapon States intend to respect their undertakings with regard to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.

A ray of hope glimmered when, more than two years ago, the bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe and on the reduction of strategic arms began in Geneva. On that occasion, Egypt stated in an official communiqué that it welcomed these negotiations, stressing their importance for a country like Egypt which is a Mediterranean country whose security is firmly linked with that of Europe. It also stated that "any success obtained for security and stability in Europe would have a positive effect on the efforts of the countries of the Middle East to create a nuclear-weapon-free zone".

From this standpoint, we have closely followed the progress of these negotiations; we felt considerable concern when noting their stalemate, and indeed regret when their suspension was announced. All that we can say in this connection is that we hope that the two countries will very soon resume their places at the negotiating table and strive to create the necessary climate to establish a constructive dialogue and agree upon the necessary guarantees for their success.

We believe also that the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, as well as the resumption of the negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions a few days ago in Vienna will inspire us to take hope, and will prove that there is a will to continue and deepen the dialogue.

If, on the one hand, we regret the present state of the Geneva negotiations, perhaps this will encourage those delegations which still entertain doubts as to the importance of the consideration of nuclear disarmament by our Conference to review their position, as experience has unquestionably proved that there is no connection between the obstacles in bilateral negotiations and the consideration, or non-consideration, of the issue of nuclear disarmament by the Conference. On the contrary, the efforts made by the Conference on Disarmament in this connection may represent a constructive contribution to bilateral efforts, in that they reflect the opinion of large sectors of the population of countries other than those of the negotiators, which have the right to participate in the drafting of resolutions and conventions which affect nuclear-weapon countries and non-nuclear-weapon States alike. Indeed, this point is made in the Final Document of the latest Summit Conference of Non-Aligned Countries, held at New Delhi, in which it was stated that: "Nuclear weapons are more than weapons of war. They are instruments of mass annihilation. The Heads of State or Government therefore find it unacceptable that the security of all States and the very survival of mankind should be held hostage to the security interests of a handful of nuclear-weapon States."

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I hope, therefore, as we prepare to hold the Third Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in a year and a half, that we will not then be in the same position as we are today; to that end, I invite you all to redouble your efforts, in good faith, to achieve tangible progress in this sphere.

Every day that passes without anything being achieved in this area increases the difficulty of carrying out nuclear disarmament, and if the nuclear-arms race continues at its present rate without any genuine measures being undertaken to halt it, we will not have long to wait before this objective becomes unreachable.

We are all agreed on the urgent need for the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament, and that the attainment of this objective lies through a number of important stages, beginning with a treaty for the complete prohibition of nuclear tests.

The Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and the subsequent resolutions of the General Assembly have always stressed the priority of this issue which, while it is not an objective in itself, is nevertheless a necessity and a major step towards bringing about the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament.

When the Committee on Disarmament began studying the first item on its agenda, on a nuclear-test ban, in an Ad Hoc Working Group with a restricted mandate, we were sure that the Ad Hoc Group's task, relating to the study of inspection and control measures, was a temporary one, and that the issue would be brought to the negotiating stage in order to draft a comprehensive convention on a comprehensive nuclear-test ban.

However, while recognizing the importance of providing for inspection and control measures in a comprehensive nuclear-weapon-test-ban convention, we believe that such measures can be studied side by side with other questions relating to the draft treaty. We still hope to find in the Conference that "political will" to which the Secretary-General referred in his statement of 1972, when he said that "all the technical and scientific aspects of the problem have been so fully explored that only a political decision is now necessary in order to achieve final agreement".

Undoubtedly, the results of the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Experts on Seismic Events, to the thirteenth session of which Egypt sent one of its scientists, are of great usefulness in this field. We take this opportunity to express our satisfaction with regard to the Third Report which the Ad Hoc Group adopted and submitted to the Conference, and we hope that the Ad Hoc Group will pursue its work with success.

The question of the prevention of nuclear war, as an immediate measure, is of capital importance pending the achievement of nuclear disarmament. President Hosni Mubarak stressed its importance in his address to the

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United Nations General Assembly on 28 September 1983, when he said that "at the top of our agenda stands the question of the elimination of the threat of nuclear war, on which we should concentrate our attention. Such a war might well annihilate human civilization and all its achievements since the dawn of time. There would be neither winner nor loser. The human race would be deprived simultaneously of its past, its present and its future."

When the United Nations General Assembly at its recent sessions adopted resolutions on the prevention of nuclear war, its intention was to demonstrate that the elimination of the danger of nuclear war is its highest priority and most immediate task, and that to safeguard mankind from a catastrophe on such a scale is a joint responsibility for all of us.

These resolutions, and particularly the recent resolution 38/183, stressed that the Conference on Disarmament should take "appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war", and requested the Conference to undertake, as a matter of the highest priority, negotiations with a view to achieving agreement on such measures, with the assistance of an ad hoc working group on the item.

Obviously, the Conference's approval of the inclusion of the prevention of nuclear war as a separate agenda item reflects the importance and the priority attached to the question. It therefore remains for us only to accept this challenge and rise to the level of our responsibilities by undertaking at once serious negotiations to establish the necessary measures for the prevention of nuclear war. We, for our part, reaffirm the position which we adopted in the group of 21 as set forth in document CD/PV.341, which centres on the need to set up a subsidiary body to undertake that work, in accordance with the many documents, initiatives and studies and the various proposals which have been put forward, or which may be formulated in future, on this issue.

Mr. President, allow me now to change the subject and go on to a matter concerning the immediate and temporary measures to be taken pending the achievement of nuclear disarmament; I have in mind the question of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

My country's delegation attaches particular interest to this question, and it is convinced that as long as the nuclear-weapon States maintain their nuclear arsenals the non-nuclear-weapon States have the right to obtain effective assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

It is true that the real and definitive guarantee against the use of nuclear weapons lies only in the achievement of nuclear disarmament. Nevertheless, the above-mentioned assurances, which must be legally binding, would for the time being constitute a legitimate counterpart for the non-nuclear-weapon States which have voluntarily renounced the acquisition of nuclear weapons.

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We have repeatedly had occasion to state our belief that Security Council resolution 255 is inadequate as far as guarantees are concerned, just as we have shown that the conditions included in the unilateral declarations of the nuclear-weapon States, with the exception of China, have emptied those declarations of their content. We hope that the efforts vainly deployed so far within the Ad Hoc Working Group will finally lead to a compromise on a draft "standard formula" setting forth the legal obligation to provide the necessary assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States; in this connection, we have no doubt that the undertaking not to use nuclear weapons is a constructive step in this field.

Although Egypt recognizes that primary responsibility for the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament rests essentially with the nuclear-weapon States in general and the two major Powers in particular, it has made every possible effort to participate effectively in the adoption of measures undertaken by the international community to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In this spirit, it was one of the first countries to sign the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty, which it ratified in 1981, and its nuclear facilities are subject to International Atomic Energy Agency control.

Egypt has not stopped there. In 1974 it also took the initiative of advocating the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in an important and explosive region of the world, the Middle East, and since then it has taken part in all the draft resolutions subsequently adopted by the General Assembly, the latest being resolution 38/64. That resolution invited the countries of the region, inter alia, pending the establishment of such a zone, not to develop, produce, test or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or permit the stationing on their territories of such weapons, and also to place all their nuclear activities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards.

We believe that respect by all countries of the region for the contents of that resolution and their declarations to that effect, with the deposit of those declarations with the Security Council as indicated in that resolution, would represent a major step towards the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Furthermore, if the nuclear-weapon States and all other States refrained from any action that ran counter to both the letter and the spirit of that resolution and undertook to render their assistance in the establishment of the zone, that would be of great help for the establishment of peace and security in the Middle East.

If all men have an equal right to the exploration of outer space and its use for peaceful purposes, as well as a common interest in exploiting the benefits of that exploration to promote well-being, they also have the right, as they expect benefits from man's expansion into space, to be profoundly

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concerned at the increasing competition, particularly among the countries possessing sophisticated technological means, in the field of the deployment of weapons in outer space.

It has been argued that this competition has not yet begun; whether this statement is true or false, that has not prevented the most optimistic scientists from saying that they have no doubt that today the world is on the brink of a perilous age. That opinion is strongly confirmed by the constant increase in military budgets for space programmes and research and by the statistics which show that eight out of ten spacecraft are part of nuclear or conventional forces.

Today, the militarization of outer space is no longer confined to the qualitative development of the arms race; it also contributes to the elaboration of new military theories which take account of the possibility of using outer space in future wars. The policy of the militarization of outer space now goes beyond the deployment of missiles intended to attack enemy satellites and extends as far as the use of satellites to support land forces. It is as if mankind, not content with the destructive and devastating armaments accumulated on earth, which would suffice to destroy the world several times over, also needed outer space to set up new systems of destruction.

The Second United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space held in Vienna in 1982 stressed the gravity of this situation and noted that the extension of the arms race into outer space would be a source of profound concern to the international community. It appealed to all countries, particularly those having major space capabilities, to contribute actively to preventing an extension of the arms race into outer space and to refrain from any act contrary to that objective. It also strongly recommended the Committee, now the Conference, on Disarmament to give priority to this question.

Subsequently, General Assembly resolution 38/70 reaffirmed that the utilization of outer space should serve exclusively peaceful purposes. It stressed that "further effective measures to prevent an arms race in outer space should be adopted by the international community" and called on all States, particularly those with major space capabilities, "to contribute actively to the objective of the peaceful use of outer space and to take immediate measures to prevent an arms race in outer space". It also called on the Conference on Disarmament to set up an ad hoc working group on the question.

Aware of the disastrous consequences if the world embarked on an arms race in outer space, Egypt has from the start urged and invited the international community to shoulder its responsibilities and halt all attempts at the militarization of outer space and to ensure the use of outer space exclusively for peaceful purposes.



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Attempts to study this matter within the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space met with fierce opposition from some countries which claimed that the Committee was not competent to deal with that subject, and that the Conference on Disarmament was the sole body empowered to do so.

What is obvious to everyone is that the Conference has never undertaken any serious work on the item although it is included in its agenda, and that even the efforts made to set up a working group have been vain, despite agreement in principle on the creation of such a group, because of disagreement on an appropriate formula for its terms of reference.

We are all agreed that it is unthinkable to speak two languages at the same time, and it is also unthinkable for our Conference to wait any longer before responding to the aspirations of the entire international community as reflected by the General Assembly at its latest session.

The Group of 21, in which Egypt participated, stressed in document CD/329/Rev.1 the importance of the creation of a subsidiary body for the negotiation of an agreement or agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space; in fact, this is the wish of 147 Member States of the United Nations Organization which have willingly accepted the latest General Assembly resolution.

We are deeply concerned at the lack of results of our efforts in this field, and fear that one day mankind may regret its exploration of outer space, a magnificent exploit in which it initially rejoiced, on which it based dreams of prosperity, and which it never considered as a new dimension for the forces of evil.

Mr. President, before concluding my statement, allow me to express my satisfaction at the resumption of work by the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons under the chairmanship of my colleague and friend, Rolf Ekéus, the Ambassador of Sweden; I have no doubt that the work of that Committee is of particular importance at this stage, and that the Committee will succeed in overcoming whatever obstacles arise and finally draft appropriate formulas for the agreed points in the draft convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

In expressing my satisfaction at the encouraging statement by the United States to the effect that it will shortly submit a draft treaty in this field, as well as at the positive step taken by the Soviet delegation which would accept a permanent presence of international observers at destruction facilities for chemical-weapon stockpiles, I hope that these constructive initiatives will have the effect of furthering the work of the Ad Hoc Committee, so as to enable it to arrive at the goal for which we have waited so long, the preparation of a draft treaty on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Egypt for his kind words for my country and for the President of the Conference. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador Wegener.

Mr. WEGENER (Federal Republic of Germany): Mr. President, this is the first time I take the floor under your Presidency, and a welcome opportunity for me to express the pleasure of my delegation to see you in that eminent position. In your present role you have demonstrated the same qualities of understanding and fairness, and the same faculty of dialogue, that have allowed our two Governments — and specifically, our two present Ministers of Foreign Affairs — to maintain an excellent working relationship even in periods of difficulty and strain.

Our plenary meetings this week are devoted to agenda item 6, "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons"; we have come to shorten this complicated caption to "Negative security assurances". Agenda item 6 is a separate element of our comprehensive work assignment; but its relevance to agenda item 3, the prevention of war, and in particular nuclear war, is evident. In that vein, my delegation, in Working Paper CD/357, had listed negative security arrangements as one of those areas in which States are called upon to make a meaningful contribution to war prevention. As one of the delegations that has concurred in General Assembly resolution 38/68 of last year, I would like to take this opportunity to stress our continued interest in the subject. My delegation hopes for a vigorous new effort at negotiations devoted to the search for a common approach or common formula, later to be embodied in a consolidated instrument of an appropriately binding character. Resolution 38/68, in our view, should provide an excellent starting point for this new round of negotiation. One should feel entitled to predict that our new attempts at fashioning a common formula or common approach will be facilitated by recent political events, regrettable as these events by themselves may be. In General Assembly resolution 38/67 of which the principal author was one of the members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, the view was still propagated that negative security guarantees should, as a priority matter, attach to those non-nuclear-weapon States which had foregone the nuclear option and not allowed nuclear weapons to be stationed on their territories, reiterating the view of the Warsaw Pact States that non-deployment should be the principal criterion for the availability of negative security assurances. In the meantime, other member States of the Warsaw Treaty have publicly announced that they were in the process of stationing nuclear weapons on their territory and have already, for all we know, proceeded to a very substantial deployment of new nuclear-weapon systems. We may thus assume that the Warsaw Pact countries, by effective action, have removed the non-stationing criterion from their catalogue of prerequisites for negative security assurances. I am certain that this will facilitate our search for a common formula when the newly re-established Ad Hoc Committee on Negative Security Assurances embarks on its work.

While the Conference is still groping for an appropriate work format in which to deal with agenda item 3 on the prevention of nuclear war, and it is the hope of my delegation that this search will be crowned by success in the next few days, another event of immediate relevance to the prevention of war, and nuclear war in particular, will take place in Geneva as of Monday next week: The Preparatory Committee of the Third Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty will be convened for its first session. The distinguished representative of Egypt has just made reference to it. It will undoubtedly be incumbent upon many of us in this room

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to represent their countries at that meeting. The first session of the Preparatory Committee may, by itself, be of limited newsworthiness. And yet, the parties to the ~~Non~~-Proliferation Treaty and the international community at large find themselves at an important juncture when the preparatory process for the third NPT Review Conference gets under way. I would therefore like to dwell briefly upon the significance of the NPT and of an effective non-proliferation regime, recalling that my delegation, (again in working paper CD/357), had brought to bear its view that an effective policy of nuclear non-proliferation has a key role to play, together with other strategies, in the prevention of nuclear war. Right at the beginning of the preparatory process for the impending NPT Review Conference the unfortunate fact will be brought into sharp focus that some particularly prominent and well-intentioned members of the international community have not yet seen fit to put their signature to the Treaty. In some cases it is exactly those countries which are most eloquent in denouncing nuclear weapons which have thus failed to avail themselves of the potential of the NPT to limit the further spread of these weapons. It is the hope of my delegation that the NPT Review Conference and its preparatory process will impress upon an even larger number of States that no member of the international community would be served by the acquisition of nuclear weapons outside of the present group of nuclear-weapon States, and that, in fact, every attempt at such acquisition, let alone the actual realization of a nuclear arsenal, will have a grave, destabilizing influence from which all of us will suffer. Our own participation in the NPT review process will provide us with a constant opportunity to appeal to all States which have not yet become parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to do so in order to give the Treaty universal application. In thus stressing the high value of horizontal non-proliferation of nuclear arms, my Government is keenly aware of the relationship between horizontal and vertical non-proliferation. It is in a perspective of checking both manifestations of non-proliferation that my Government attaches priority significance to a positive, successful outcome of the Review Conference in 1985, an outcome which would add momentum to the Treaty for the remainder of its present period of validity, as well as for a further temporal extension.

Two problems are likely to be in the very centre of debates at the NPT Review, and both of them are of direct relevance to this Conference: nuclear disarmament, and the perspectives for a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Obviously, the obligations under article VI of the Treaty concerning nuclear disarmament are of fundamental importance. The NPT is the only existing international document under which the major nuclear-weapon Powers are legally committed to nuclear disarmament, in the sense that they have undertaken to pursue negotiations to that end in good faith. The present situation in which one major nuclear-weapon State has one-sidedly left the negotiating table of two crucial negotiating fora devoted to nuclear disarmament, indicating its unwillingness to return to these negotiations without preconditions, is therefore clearly at variance with the stipulations of the NPT, and this unfortunate situation, should it still prevail at the time of the NPT review or during substantive consideration of the articles of the NPT during the preparatory process, will have to be brought up by the Parties to the Treaty. They, the Parties; are of course, the ones who have legal status to invoke the treaty commitment by nuclear-weapon States under article VI; others, non-Parties, lack that qualification. This simple fact should certainly not be overlooked by those States outside of the NPT community when they weigh the appeals addressed to them to join.

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The other major disarmament issue, the comprehensive test-ban treaty, as referred to in the preamble of the NPT, is of no lesser significance. My Government attaches great importance to the early establishment of a comprehensive test-ban treaty and leaders of my country have not failed to avail themselves of every major opportunity to go on record in that sense. In our view, a comprehensive test ban is a basic element in the balance between the responsibilities and obligations of the Parties to the NPT.

At the same time, we feel strongly — and we are aware that this is a shared view of this Conference — that the crucial part of a nuclear test-ban treaty is the elaboration of a verification and compliance system which allows parties concerned to rest confident that possible attempts at circumvention would not remain undetected. This is the rationale behind the existing mandate of our subsidiary organ on nuclear testing. From the perspective of my delegation, the progress from an adequate solution of verification problems — both in their technical and their political-institutional aspects — to full treaty negotiation appears logical. Having contributed to the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban last year we regret that a comprehensive consideration of the inherent problems has not yet taken place. This task, however, still looms, and it is the hope of my delegation that the pace of our work in this field can be accelerated and that the discussions be made more substantial and complete. The work format to be chosen for that assignment should certainly be similar to last year's, but some flexibility on the part of all participants in arriving at a reworded mandate would be helpful to instill a forward-looking perspective into the exercise. It would indeed befit the Conference to show an ongoing work process on nuclear testing at the time when the preparatory phase for the NPT review gets under way.

Our shared conviction that verification of a nuclear test ban is as essential as it is technically complicated has also been the guiding consideration in the establishment and operation of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events. The Ad Hoc Group has just submitted its Third Report. I am aware that it is your plan, Mr. President, to put the report up for discussion at a later stage, but may I be allowed, even though prematurely, to dwell upon it. My purpose is to introduce a Working Paper entitled "Aspects of modern developments in seismic event recording techniques" (CD/491), and thereby to enrich our forthcoming debates on the Third Report of the experts, and on the future perspectives of their work.

Let me first express the appreciation of my delegation for the very comprehensive and well-crafted Third Report of the Ad Hoc Group of Seismic Experts, as equally for their progress on substantive issues under the highly qualified and efficient guidance of its Chairman, Dr. Dahlman. My delegation also notes with satisfaction the plans for a limited test run designed to confirm the functionality of some of the components of the envisaged global system. Although the test will only utilize Level I data for transmission by the global telecommunication system of the WMO, the enlarged participation in the experiment of States from all groups, and the comprehensiveness of the test, will allow real and significant progress towards a verification system of a comprehensive test ban.

It is against this background, and with the intention of further enhancing our progress on the way to the elaboration of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, that I would like to make available to colleagues today the aforementioned Working Paper. The Paper has already been circulated during the recent session of the Ad Hoc Group of Seismic Experts, but was not fully discussed and in fact transcends the present, more technical terms of reference of the Ad Hoc Group of

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Seismic Experts in opening wider perspectives for a future global seismic network. Let me recall that the most advanced model of such a global system was presented in the First Report of the Ad Hoc Group — in document CCD/558 — under the then somewhat futuristic name Network III, futuristic because at that time the model only presented the outlines of a hypothetical system. Due to developments in instrumentation — electronics, computer technology and in telecommunications, Network III has now become a distinct and concrete possibility. The Working Paper of my delegation goes beyond a Network III model in adding new components, providing an even more sophisticated outline for a global seismic network. It might therefore not be too pretentious to label this advanced model "Network IV". In presenting this Paper to you, and asking that it be distributed as an official document (CD/491) of the Conference on Disarmament, I would in particular like to draw your attention to efforts made in the Federal Republic of Germany to improve the detection capability of seismic stations in regions with unfavourable noise conditions by installing seismometers in boreholes. The concept of borehole stations in miniarrays as elements of a global network harbours great promise for the efficient monitoring of regional and local events in areas of interest. The model would allow for the setting up of a comprehensive, self-contained black box system with a high degree of automated recording and analysis of seismic data. Let me, however, emphasize that the inclusion of a number of very modern features in the model, far from placing an undue technological burden upon the parties to a future CTBT, would in fact render the monitoring network more manageable and simpler to operate. I would be pleased if, for our forthcoming debate on the Third Report of the Ad Hoc Group of Seismic Experts, delegations would see fit to include this new working paper in their examination and analysis.

Both subjects on which I have touched today belong under the wider heading of prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters. Let me touch upon yet another and even more fundamental aspect of the same problem area, and allow me to single out one particular statement which we have recently heard in plenary. I refer to the statement of my distinguished neighbour, Ambassador Meiszter of Hungary, of 15 March, which he devoted to a number of legal aspects of the use, first use and second use of nuclear weapons. While I must disagree with him on a great number of the points he broached I should like to commend him for the argumentative and detailed manner in which he laid out his views. His is one of those statements that can help us to elevate the level of our debate, and to do justice to the pivotal significance of the subject matter of war prevention, differences of view notwithstanding. Obviously, Ambassador Meiszter's statement raises more questions than it answers. Among these are issues of logical compatibility between the concepts of non-use, non-first-use and (supposedly accepted) second use of nuclear weapons. There are issues relating to the credibility of non-first-use commitments undertaken and propagated by those whose declaratory policies are inconsistent with their military doctrine, armed forces structure, chain of command, over-all capability and on-going arms procurement. There are issues relating to the scope of Articles 2 and 51 of the United Nations Charter, issues relating to the distinction and a priori distinguishability of conventional and nuclear conflict, issues, in short, where legal considerations and fundamental questions of political philosophy are

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intertwined. In other words Ambassador Meiszter, by raising a number of legal points, has put before us the whole range of complex issues that characterize the task of war prevention. I would assure him that my delegation will not fail to engage him in an in-depth discussion of all these issues, so highly relevant to the central query of our work. I am looking forward to taking up, successively, many of his propositions, be it in plenary, be it — and preferably so — in the special work format which we expect to have available shortly for the consideration of agenda item 3.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany for his statement, for his kind words concerning relations between our countries and his kind words addressed to the President of the Conference. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Ambassador Victor Issraelyan.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Today, the Soviet delegation would like, in a brief statement, to touch upon the question of the state of negotiations on one of the priority items on the agenda of the Conference — the prohibition of chemical weapons. First of all, I should like to recall that in his recent speech to the voters in the city of Moscow on 2 March 1984, K.U. Chernenko, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, stressed that freeing mankind from the possibility of the use of chemical weapons is a very important task. In accordance with its consistent policy in favour of the full and resolute destruction of chemical weapons, the Soviet Union has also submitted a number of proposals during the current year. One of them related to the monitoring of the destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles at a special facility, and another — submitted recently by the Soviet delegation in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons — to the question of challenge on-site international verification. Our proposals have received a positive evaluation at the Conference.

During the current session, several other delegations have also submitted proposals on various questions relating to a future convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons which, in our opinion, might help to ensure further progress in the elaboration of the convention. We have in mind, in particular, the proposals of Yugoslavia, China, Sweden, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom and others.

Thus, on the whole, the foundations exist for advancing rapidly towards a solution of the important task with which the Conference has been entrusted by the international community. It is no coincidence that in the speech already referred to, K.U. Chernenko said that the pre-conditions for the solution of the problem of a general and comprehensive ban on chemical weapons are now beginning to exist.

Hopes that the negotiations on the question will be businesslike and constructive have been expressed everywhere, and in this room, by representatives of nearly all States members of the Conference. Nevertheless, the situation developing today in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons gives cause for serious concern.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

With less than a month remaining before the conclusion of the spring part of our session, we have in fact not proceeded to carry out the task contained in the Ad Hoc Committee's new mandate — "to start the full and complete process of negotiations, developing and working out the convention, except for its final drafting". There is apparently no need to point out that week after week has been spent on efforts to overcome various types of artificially created organizational difficulties. We are not inclined to attribute the delay in beginning effective work to the organizational activity of Ambassador Ekéus, the current Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Nuclear Weapons. We would only wish that he made a little more use of his prerogatives as Chairman. What is the problem? Apparently, the root of the evil must be sought in the fact that someone has undertaken to stop the work of the body and not to allow the machinery of negotiations to get fully under way.

We have already had an opportunity of referring to the very enlightening statement of Mr. Perle, the Assistant Secretary of Defence of the United States who, as stated in the United States press, imposed a very hard-line position on the representatives of the United States administration at the Geneva negotiations.

There are numerous other reports from which it is clear that responsible administration officials in Washington are sowing seeds of pessimism concerning the prospects of the negotiations, are crudely distorting the position of the USSR with respect to monitoring questions, as can be seen in particular by the materials published in daily bulletin issued by the United States Mission here at Geneva, and are handling the matter in such a way as to create an atmosphere for the allocation of vast sums with a view to replenishing the United States chemical weapons arsenal.

Therefore, no one can be surprised that the United States delegation becomes allergic when it sees a text beginning with the words "The States parties to the convention ...". It is in general against any elaboration of the text, although this is provided for directly by our mandate. It views its task only as one of causing delay.

Much has been said in this room and outside it about a United States draft. Many delegations have constantly expressed enthusiasm over the intention of the United States to submit a draft. In the United States press there have been increasingly frequent reports on the content of such a draft. These reports, frankly speaking, cause us concern. Describing the various provisions of the United States draft with regard to monitoring, the authors of an article published in the issue of 2 April of the magazine "Newsweek", write, referring to authoritative sources: "Taken together, the provisions would force Moscow to let foreign inspectors take a hard look at the entire Soviet chemical industry and to poke around inside military bases. No one thinks Moscow will buy that idea — so a comprehensive ban on chemwar is a long way off".

There, distinguished delegates, is the reply to the question concerning the reasons for the standstill in the work of the Committee on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, on the prospects of the negotiations on this problem at the Conference, and at the same time on what awaits us in connection with the widely advertised United States draft. Thus, the United States draft convention, which has not yet seen the light of day, is being converted objectively into a brake on the negotiations. We have considered it necessary to express our views on this matter.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of the Soviet Union, and I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ambassador Kazem Kamyab.

Mr. KAZEMI KAMYAB (Islamic Republic of Iran): Mr. President, I would like to begin by extending to you my sincere congratulations on your election and the assurance of the support and co-operation of the delegation of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the carrying out of your responsibilities. Indeed, my Government attaches the greatest importance to the ties by which it is bound to your Government in the field of disarmament and your skill and diplomacy in handling the affairs of this forum make of you a worthy representative in this field.

Further, my delegation would like to express its deep appreciation of the work of Ambassador Turbanski during the first month of this Conference. His presidency, thanks to his untiring endeavours and undoubted integrity, contributed to the results which were achieved during his period of office.

Finally, I feel optimistic as to the future deliberations of the "Conference on Disarmament" as it is now called, and we welcome to our ranks the Ambassadors of Australia, Belgium, Canada, Ethiopia, Indonesia and Sri Lanka.

In my statement today, I would like to reflect on the very important item on the agenda of this Conference which is duly given high priority because of its undoubted significance in relation to the preservation and promotion of world peace and security, that is, the item on chemical weapons.

The era of chemical arms as a means of mass destruction really started during the First World War, with the use of chlorine released from simple barrels and phosgene, an asphyxiating gas toxic only to the respiratory tract. Mustard Gas, also used at that time, appears today a dramatic reality. This gas uses the chemical agent BIS-42 CHLORETHYL SULPHIDE and causes untold damage to the human system and often results in a painful death.

According to WHO investigations, some of the long-term effects include chronic illness caused by exposure to chemical agents, delayed effects in persons directly exposed to chemical agents, the creation of new foci of infectious disease and the effect mediated by ecological changes. The delayed effects include carcinogenesis, as mustard gas and some other agents are alkylating agents which have been known to cause cancer. There was a significant increase in the incidence of cancer among those gassed during the First World War, especially cancer of the respiratory tract. Certain chemical agents can cause damage to the developing foetus and can also cause mutations due to chromosome breakage in man.

Although no long-term effects on the environment were noted after the First World War, there is a danger that anti-plant agents may cause damage to the flora leading to a significant change in the type of animal life which may flourish and may cause predominance of a disease-carrying animal dangerous to man. Equally, the quantity and quality of food produced may be affected. The psychological effects are difficult to assess.

The use of all these chemical warfare agents, deadly or merely incapacitating, was strictly forbidden by the 1925 Geneva Protocol. This Protocol was the result of the horror felt at the use of chemical weapons during the First World War. It expresses the fundamental sentiments of the law of armed conflict: short of banning war altogether, there have to be some limits to its barbarity. This agreement, signed by around one hundred States, among them Iraq in 1931, was the first agreement prohibiting the use of weapons of mass destruction. This Protocol was confirmed by the United Nations General Assembly in the 1972 Convention and resolution No. 37/98 of December 1982 adopted by the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session.



(Mr. Kazemi Kamyab, Islamic Republic of Iran)

From the very beginning of the imposed war, we tried to bring to the attention of the international community the fact that the politics of appeasement will not pay. In the 1980 session of the Committee on Disarmament, we brought to the attention of the Committee the question of the use of chemical weapons by Iraq. Nobody was ready to listen; in all cases of use of chemical weapons we informed the responsible bodies but all our efforts were in vain; of course, it is not the first time that Iraq has used chemical weapons against a people. For instance, according to investigations made by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), page 165, Vol.I, Iraq used chemical weapons in 1965 against the Kurds of the region.

On 16 February 1984, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in a statement accompanied by irrefutable evidence, brought once again the systematic use of chemical weapons to the attention of the Conference on Disarmament. Very shortly after we asked the United Nations Secretary-General to conduct an investigation into the use of chemical weapons by Iraq and after the statement in the Conference on Disarmament Iraq used chemical weapons on an unprecedentedly large scale, the resulting victims numbering more than 2,000 persons, some of whom are under treatment both in the Islamic Republic of Iran as well as in several countries abroad, and some of whom have died. Again on 9 and 17 March 1984, Iraq used chemical weapons on a massive scale in the regions of Majnoon Island and Jofeir, which resulted in the wounding of many combatants. Those wounded suffered from nausea, running eyes, respiratory ailments and vertigo. The victims have been hospitalized.

Very recently a reputable laboratory in Belgium issued its findings on Iranian war victims and reported that the wounds were due to the use of gases containing Yperite (mustard gas) and mycotoxins (composite parts of yellow rain).

Medical authorities in several countries where Iranian combatants are being treated reported that the wounds have been caused by chemical weapons, and independent press reports abroad have time and again confirmed this fact.

The ICRC Press Release No. 1481 dated 7 March 1984 has also confirmed the use of chemical weapons by Iraq.

"The common symptoms observed by the ICRC with regard to all the wounded are 'extensive but superficial burns (first and second degree), serious respiratory problems, Kerato conjunctivitis', seeming to progress favourably. Nevertheless the clinical progress of certain patients showed, on the eighth day after exposure, severe problems of blood composition, accompanied by a considerable decrease in the number of white corpuscles. These problems, linked to respiratory and kidney deficiencies, have caused the death of several patients, two of whom died during the visits of the Delegates."

Apart from the steps that it is taking with the parties concerned, the ICRC would insist on the fact that the use of toxic substances on the battlefield is incompatible with the respect of humanitarian principles and constitutes a violation of the law of armed conflict and recognized customary law."

Upon the request of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Secretary-General of the United Nations Organization, Mr. Perez de Cuellar, undertook to investigate the use of chemical weapons by Iraq in a spirit of humanitarian concern, and accordingly sent a team of four eminent specialists to undertake a fact-finding visit to Iran.

(Mr. Kazemi Kamyab, Islamic Republic of Iran)

The specialists, picked for their expertise in chemical warfare, visited the fighting front near Ahwaz in western Iran and also examined soil samples soaked with the chemical substance. They also examined patients in hospitals in Ahwaz and Tehran and also in the coroners' mortuary in Tehran.

On their return from the Islamic Republic of Iran the specialists submitted a joint report to the Secretary General on 21 March 1984, in which they unanimously agreed that Mustard Gas and the nerve agent Tabun were used by Iraq in the war against Iran.

The Secretary-General of the United Nations deplored and condemned the act of using chemical weapons by the Iraqi regime when transmitting the report of the specialists to the Security Council for its information. (Document No. 6/16433 of 26 March 1984).

The report was signed by Dr. Gustav Andersson of Sweden, Dr. Manuel Dominguez of Spain, Dr. Peter Dunn of Australia and Col. Dr. Ulrich Imobersteg of Switzerland.

The concern of our delegation is due to the generally passive reactions of the Conference on Disarmament in the wake of the outright disregard of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 with regard to the ban on the use of chemical weapons.

This does not concern merely several innocent Iranians nor even uniquely the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, but rather it concerns the damage done to the common human conscience. The contemporary civilized human community cannot and should not tolerate such crimes.

Apart from the very limited number of delegations who share our view -- and to them we are thankful and appreciative for their concern and their condemnation of the recent inhumane act of using chemical weapons -- no positive reaction has yet been manifested in the Conference.

Of course, from the point of view of the Islamic Republic of Iran, such reaction was most discouraging; from the very beginning of the imposed war we have faced such a situation.

Unfortunately, the international community did not take a firm position with regard to the Iraqi blatant aggression against the Islamic Republic of Iran on 22 September 1980. This lack of political will on the part of the international community was reflected in Security Council resolution 279 (1980) of 28 September 1980. Contrary to the well-established precedent in that body, in this resolution there is no reference to the withdrawal of the forces to the international frontier. This situation led the then Foreign Minister of the Iraqi regime, Hammadi, to state that there is no international border between Iran and Iraq after the abrogation of the Algeria Treaty of 1975 and therefore the actual deployment of forces constitutes the international border between the two States; and there is no justification on the part of Iran to speak about aggression (Letter of Hammadi to the Secretary-General of the United Nations -- Document No. 3/14236-24 October 1980).

During the forty-two months' period of the war imposed upon the Islamic Republic of Iran, everyone has become well aware of the devastation of the Iranian cities and the indiscriminate and systematic bombardment of civilian populations in the civilian zone, sometimes as much as 400 kilometres outside the combat zones.

(Mr. Kazemi Kamyab, Islamic Republic of Iran)

More than 130 missile attacks, hundreds of air strikes and several thousand artillery shots systematically directed against the undefended Iranian cities have caused the martyrdom of 5,000 civilians and the disablement of 30,000. The report of the United Nations fact-finding mission No.5/15834 of 20 June 1983 is evidence of a part of the war crimes committed by the Iraqi ruler.

It was but recently that within a period of 40 days the number of wounded and martyred who were victims of the use of chemical weapons exceeded 2,000. However, as you have witnessed; in spite of the proof of the use of chemical weapons, the Conference did not in general show a responsible reaction, as would be expected, in connection with the violation of the 1925 Protocol. This same attitude was manifested by governments to the findings of the First Report of the Secretary-General's Mission to investigate damage to civilian areas subjected to military attacks, and it permitted Iraq to go as far as to use chemical weapons on an unprecedented level. The step taken by an international organization to investigate the use of chemical weapons is unique in this century and upon the reaction of governments to the findings of the United Nations on this occasion will depend to a large extent whether or not this report will act as a deterrent or as a green light to further violations.

History is clear, and the future will witness how those who strongly urged and advocated disarmament kept silence in the wake of the use of even a banned weapon by a feeble State.

We expect that all responsible countries of the world, regardless of their political leanings and affiliation, whether aligned or non-aligned, neutral or Superpower, will strip themselves of the shackles of their leanings and come into the open to denounce and condemn, in the strongest possible terms, any violation of international law and protocols which endangers the very existence of mankind; genuine value should be attached to humane principles and ideals. Otherwise there will be no difference in weapons for a violator, whether the weapon be nuclear or chemical.

I would like to express my sincere wish that the Convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, which is now under preparation by this forum, will be ready at the earliest possible time and that it will be fully effective and bear fruit. I believe that the position adopted by this Conference and other related organs towards the use of chemical weapons against the Islamic Republic of Iran will show in reality the degree of sincerity and the sense of responsibility regarding the newly prepared Convention, and will form an excellent criterion to determine its status and capability in the future.

In the light of my understanding that the review of the Secretary-General's Mission to investigate the use of chemical weapons against the Islamic Republic of Iran can be of great benefit to the work of the Conference, I would like to request you, Mr. President, to allocate one meeting of the Conference on Disarmament to review the report.

I would like to take this opportunity to present a working paper, CD/484, on general provisions, which in our opinion are fundamental, for consideration in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons.

These provisions deal with the two-fold responsibilities under the Convention and the question of reservations and exceptions and the rules of the protocol governing the duration to be fixed for the elimination of stocks and

(Mr. Kazemi Kamyab, Islamic Republic of Iran)

facilities. Another provision deals with the question of international co-operation in the field of protection, and the agreement of States parties to consider the use of chemical weapons as a war crime.

We hope for a constructive outcome from the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, and we expect all delegations to give full consideration to our proposal.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Iran for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the President.

It is now 10 minutes past one, we still have two speakers and, if you agree, we intend to finish at about half past one so as not to have to convene another meeting this afternoon. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Yugoslavia, Ambassador Vidas.

Mr. VIDAS (Yugoslavia): - Mr. President, today I shall deal with agenda item 5, entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space", but before doing so I would like to associate myself with your warm welcome to Mrs. Inga Thorsson, former head of the Swedish delegation to the Committee on Disarmament, with whom the Yugoslav delegation has enjoyed very fruitful co-operation in the past. This question deserves our attention, because ever since the first man-made satellite was launched into outer space, heralding the "Space Age", and in view of the rapid development of space technology since then, the inherent dangers of a potential arms race in outer space have become a matter of increasing concern. As time has gone by, this concern has increased along with the transformation of the potential into a real arms race in outer space and its far-reaching implications for international peace and security and over-all stability in the world.

Although outer space is a relatively new field of human activity, considerable results have been achieved so far in opening up the undreamed-of possibilities for its peaceful uses. The practical and very useful applications of the achievements of space technology for peaceful purposes are, for instance, in telecommunications, navigation, weather forecasting and earth resources surveys. Unfortunately, there are also many achievements, some of which are still in the process of development, which, apart from their peaceful uses, can even have a destabilizing effect, just as there are those which are designed exclusively for military offensive use.

The peaceful uses of outer space have become the constant concern of the United Nations General Assembly, which in 1959 set up the Ad Hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space as its permanent body. Over the years, as a result of its work and in other negotiating forums, a number of instruments were concluded concerning the military and peaceful aspects of the use of outer space, such as the Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, 1963, which prevented, among other things, the testing of nuclear weapons in outer space. In 1967 a further success was achieved with the elaboration of the principles governing the activities of States in the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, contained in the Treaty having the same title. The Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space (1968); the Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (1972),

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and the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space (1976) are also agreements regulating some of the important questions relative to human activities in outer space. The last of such agreements, which was endorsed in 1979 by the United Nations General Assembly and opened for signature and ratification, was the Agreement Governing Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, which elaborates, in greater detail than the 1967 Treaty, the obligation of States to ensure that the Moon and other celestial bodies within the solar system, other than the Earth, are used exclusively for peaceful purposes.

The United Nations has this far sponsored two conferences on the exploration and peaceful uses of outer space. The second United Nations Conference (UNISPACE 82), held in Vienna in 1982, primarily dealt with future developments -- including such things as space transportation systems, space manufacturing and solar power stations in space -- and their potential benefits to international co-operation and the hazards that might arise from these activities. The military aspects of the question, however, also received considerable attention. Although the question of the competence of that Conference with respect to the issues relating to the arms race in outer space did not meet with the approval of all participants, the Conference, nevertheless, examined and approved in its report three paragraphs which, in general, recognized the grave dangers presented by the extension of the arms race into outer space and urged "all nations, in particular those with major space capabilities" to contribute actively to the prevention of such an eventuality. It also called on all States to adhere to the Outer Space Treaty and strictly to observe its letter and spirit; and strongly recommended that the competent organs of the United Nations -- the General Assembly and the Committee on Disarmament in particular -- give appropriate attention and high priority to the grave concern expressed about the question.

In continuing its activities, the Legal Sub-Committee of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, which is now holding its twenty-third session here in Geneva, is considering three very important items:

Formulation of the draft principles on the legal implication of remote sensing of the earth from space. This concerns the detection and analysis of the earth's resources by sensors carried in aircraft and spacecraft;

Definition and/or delimitation of Outer Space and Geostationary Orbit; and

Consideration of the possibility of supplementing the norms of international law relevant to the use of nuclear-power sources in outer space, that is, to the procedure for notification in case of malfunctioning of a spacecraft carrying a nuclear-power source on board.

I have mentioned all these United Nations related activities and the existing body of international agreements only to point out that even the very complex problems of relations in outer space can be solved. What I particularly had in mind was to draw attention to the urgency of the problem and the existing gap in

(Mr. Vidas, Yugoslavia)

the resolution of the problems related to the arms race in outer space, and to the danger of turning outer space into an arena of armed conflict.

It is estimated that 75 per cent of all space activities are military-related. There can hardly be a day that the press does not disclose something new on the testing of weapons for use in outer space, or concerning immediate plans for their development. Although the information published in the press cannot always be considered reliable, in particular when military research or programmes are involved, we, as a negotiating forum which does not have access to such information from other sources, should be grateful to the press for giving us from time to time information, which may provide sufficient background as a warning, thus confirming the old saying: where there is smoke there is fire.

The consideration of the issues connected with the extension of the arms race into outer space is within the competence of the Conference on Disarmament. It has not, unfortunately, managed to make even the first step towards resolving these problems, that is, to establish a working body "with a view to undertaking negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in all its aspects in outer space", as called for in General Assembly resolution 38/70. The Conference has wasted much of its energy on the harmonization of views with respect to the mandate of the subsidiary working body, proceeding from different viewpoints on the scope of the mandate of such a subsidiary body, although many members of the General Assembly Committee and here at the Conference have made enormous efforts to have this problem get off the ground.

At the meeting on 22 March we had an opportunity to hear two important statements on outer space. In one of them, the distinguished representative of the USSR, Ambassador V. Issraelyan, presented the views of his Government on the problem and submitted, at the same time, the text of a draft treaty on the prohibition of the use of force in outer space and from space against the Earth. This text, in our view, deserves attention because, inter alia, it suggests the ways to resolve the question of the use of force in outer space, including the prohibition of anti-satellite systems. What should not be overlooked, however, in assessing the proposal made by Ambassador Issraelyan is the willingness of the USSR to negotiate the draft text and the readiness displayed to conduct separate negotiations on anti-satellite systems and to resume bilateral negotiations with the United States in this field. We consider this sign of goodwill to hold negotiations on outer space as very important at this moment when other channels of negotiation on some major issues of reduction of armaments and disarmament have been closed.

The statement made by the distinguished Ambassador of Sweden, Mr. R. Ekéus, offered, in a way that can hardly be improved, a very solid analysis of the existing space systems used for military purposes. He has also drawn attention to the solutions contained in the existing agreements on outer space and made a list of suggestions on what to do to amend them and make them comprehensive.

(Mr. Vidas, Yugoslavia)

This is, in our opinion, the manner in which we should approach our work, instead of wasting time on the artificial problem of the mandate of the working body.

Apart from these, several other useful documents were also submitted to the Committee on Disarmament in the past; among which I would like to mention document CD/320, submitted by the Canadian delegation, entitled "Arms control and outer space"; and document CD/375, submitted by the French delegation, entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space". It is also worth recalling in this connection the earlier French proposal for the establishment of an international satellite monitoring agency and the report of the Secretary-General entitled "Study on the implication of establishing an international satellite monitoring agency". The distinguished Ambassadors of Czechoslovakia, Italy and Argentina on 27 March, and today the distinguished Ambassador of Sri Lanka, in their speeches to the Conference, also made some useful suggestions.

All these and many other proposals which I have not mentioned represent a solid basis for the start of negotiations which would deal with a wide range of issues. In our view, a number of necessary steps should be made in that direction. Not desiring to give any priorities, we think that there is a need to identify the areas and activities which so far have not been covered by the existing international legal instruments, along the lines suggested by the distinguished Ambassador of Sweden. There is also a need to draw up, on the basis of the existing proposals, a programme of work within the competence of the Conference on Disarmament, that is to say, of the subsidiary working body, which should be established as soon as possible. The programme of work of the subsidiary working body for outer space should be the mandate of that working body: it is only in this way that we can concretely fulfil the negotiating mandate entrusted to the Conference. It would be pertinent to recall, however, that the Conference has completed the second month of its work this year, and that during that period only one of the ad hoc committees which were created is working actively -- the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. Could anyone convince the proverbial man-in-the-street that the Conference on Disarmament is unable to negotiate only because the delegations cannot agree on the mandates of individual working bodies? We have our doubts about that.

Mr. President, before concluding my statement, I would like to express to you the sincere appreciation of my delegation for your skilful guidance of the work of our Conference during this month. Your diplomatic skill and experience greatly contributed to the successful resolution of some of the organizational problems which are facing our Conference. Thank you, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Yugoslavia for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President. That concludes the list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor? I give the floor to the distinguished representative of the United States.

Mr. CLYNE (United States of America): Thank you, Mr. President. I would only like to respond briefly to the statement made by Ambassador Issraelyan this morning. First, I would like to note that the Soviet Ambassador and the Editors of Newsweek are obviously more informed as to the content of the proposed draft chemical weapons treaty than is my delegation. I would also like to note that periodicals do not set the policy of my Government, and that any attempt on the part of editors and writers of those periodicals at the interpretation of policy, once it is set, is only a manifestation of their freedom to do so. I reject and resent the personal attacks on senior officials of my Government. I note this is only the most recent in a series of personal attacks by Soviet authorities on Mr. Perle, and it follows closely upon two others that appeared in Izvestiya, yesterday I believe. I also reject the assertion that my delegation has deliberately held up work in the newly-formed Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. Such an assertion stands the facts on their head. In this regard I will not comment on the pristine nature of the conduct of some other delegations in that Ad Hoc Committee. Such comment would not be helpful.

Mr. President, I believe that the kind of statement that we witnessed this morning by Ambassador Issraelyan is particularly unuseful and unhelpful in our work. What is required in our work is the willingness to tackle the difficult issues of substance, and narrow the range of our current disagreements. I assure this Conference that my delegation is willing, and, I believe, actively attempting to participate in that work. As to Ambassador Issraelyan's statement, I would take a page from the book of a former Soviet colleague of mine, when in such cases, he used to say, "I will study your statement and give it the attention it deserves". I will do that to the Soviet statement of this morning.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): Thank you. I take it that no other delegation wishes to take the floor. The secretariat today circulated an informal document containing the programme of meetings of the Conference and its subsidiary bodies for the coming week. As usual, the programme is a tentative one and may be changed if necessary. If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Conference wishes to adopt the programme.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): At this last plenary meeting for the month of March, the month in which the Romanian delegation had the honour to assume the Presidency, I should like first of all to convey to the distinguished representatives gathered here for the work of the Conference on Disarmament our most sincere thanks for the open-mindedness and friendly co-operation they showed us, which facilitated a constructive approach to the problems connected with the work of our Conference, thus enabling the President, through their support, to discharge the functions entrusted to him in the month of March.

I should like to take this opportunity to thank all the delegations which have referred to the excellent relations of co-operation and friendship between their countries and Romania, and who have expressed their appreciation with regard to my country's policy of peace and international understanding.

In discharging the functions of the Presidency of the Conference on Disarmament, the Romanian delegation has been motivated by a sincere desire to place its abilities at the service of the Conference, in order to bring about the dialogue and negotiations which would allow us to advance in our work, and also to pass on as rapidly as possible to substantive negotiations on the problems included in our agenda.



(The President)

This year's session of the Conference is of exceptional significance under present conditions, in which the restoration and development of mutual trust, as well as the strengthening of the security of all nations, have become fundamental requirements for ensuring peace, détente and co-operation in the world.

As I had the honour to state in this forum, my country attaches particular significance to the work of the Conference on Disarmament. In our opinion, genuine security can be achieved only by initiating and constantly promoting effective disarmament measures and, in the first place, by the elimination of the danger of a fresh escalation of nuclear weapons on the continent of Europe and the prevention of a thermonuclear war which would be disastrous for mankind.

In order to achieve that end, we must undertake new, serious efforts, and set up all the appropriate organizational structures for the holding of negotiations on the matters entrusted to our Conference. At the end of March, it may be said that progress has been made in many spheres, and a good number of positions have been defined, thus enabling us to pursue the search for compromise solutions in order to embark as rapidly as possible on the beginning of negotiations on substantive problems in several bodies.

I am convinced that the establishment and start of work of subsidiary bodies on all the agenda items and, above all, on the prevention of nuclear war, must not be delayed any further.

For my part, I have considered it my duty, and I have applied myself accordingly, to use every day of this month in order to accelerate contacts with a view to improving communication among delegations, through both formal and informal consultations; I believe and hope that this will enable concrete decisions to be taken in the Conference.

As for negotiations proper within the Conference on Disarmament, the least that can be said is that we cannot consider ourselves satisfied at their pace and their results in comparison with our agenda and the tasks entrusted to our forum by the international community.

It is not our intention in this short statement to take stock of the activities of the Conference during the month of March. Such a balance-sheet would be both presumptuous and incomplete, as the work of this period is merely the continuation of that of the preceding month as well as the premise for the work to be done in the months to come. In this connection, I should like to thank once again Ambassador Stanislaw Turbanski of Poland for his excellent work and the results obtained in the month of February.

Our delegation has been guided in its approach to the responsibilities of the presidency by the same principle which underlies medicine, known as the Hippocratic Oath: primum non nocere.

Our sole desire has been to facilitate negotiation, using to that end all the tools available to our Conference, in order to ensure that we pass on as rapidly as possible to the substantive negotiations which are essential in present international circumstances.

While renewing our warm thanks to the delegations to the Conference, its Secretary-General, Mr. Rikhi Jaipal, the members of the secretariat and the interpreters, for their understanding and for the support they have given, the

(The President)

Romanian delegation firmly undertakes to work in future with the same energy and the same sense of responsibility in order to arrive at genuine negotiations which may lead us to solutions acceptable to all and, finally, to concrete disarmament measures.

I am sure that you will lend the same support to my eminent successor in the Presidency for the month of April, Ambassador Jayantha Dhanapala of Sri Lanka. We have worked together closely during this month, and I have benefited greatly from his experience, his wise understanding of the problems facing us and his friendliness towards me.

I should like to assure the future President of all possible assistance and support from the Romanian delegation in the discharge of his major responsibilities.

Today, as my term of Presidency of the Conference for the month of March reaches an end, I should like to express the hope that the month of April will be a good month for the Conference on Disarmament; even if we have lost all taste for prophecy, we should not forsake hope, which it is our duty to harbour. Thank you all.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 3 April at 10.30 a.m. The meeting is adjourned.

The meeting rose at 1.35 p.m.

# CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.255  
3 April 1984  
ENGLISH

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## FINAL RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND FIFTY-FIFTH PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva  
on Tuesday, 3 April 1984, at 10.30 a.m.

President: Mr. J. Dhanapala (Sri Lanka)

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria:

Mr. M. OULD ROUIS

Mr. A. TAFFAR

Mr. A. BOUBAZINE

Argentina:

Mr. J.J. CARASALES

Mr. R. GARCÍA MORITAN

Mr. R. VILLAMBROSA

Australia:

Mr. R. BUTLER

Mr. R. ROWE

Ms. J. COURTNEY

Belgium:

Mr. M. DEPASSE

Mr. J. NOIRFALISSE

Brazil:

Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA

Mr. S. DE QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria:

Mr. C. PRAMOV

Mr. N. MIHAILOV

Burma:

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

U PE THEIN TIN

U THAN TUN

Canada:

Mr. G.R. SKINNER

Mr. R.J. ROCHON

China:

Mr. QIAN JIADONG

Ms. WANG ZHIYUN

Mr. LIANG DEFENG

Mr. LIN CHENG

Mr. SUO KAIMING

Mr. ZHANG WEIDONG

Cuba:

Mr. A.V. GONZALES PEREZ

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. A. CIMA

Mr. J. MATOUSEK

Egypt:

Ms. W. BASSIM

Ethiopia:

Mr. F. JOHANNES

France:

Mr. F. DE LA GORCE

Mr. H. RENIE

Mr. G. MONTASSIER

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. H. ROSE

Mr. H. THIELICKE

Mr. F. SAYATZ

Mr. J. DEMBSKI

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. H. WEGENER

Mr. W-E. VON DEM HAGEN

Mr. F. ELBE

Mr. GRAFPFEIL

Hungary:

Mr. F. GAJDA

Mr. H. TOTH

India:

Mr. S. KANT SHARMA

Indonesia:

Mr. ANDRADJATI

Mr. HARYOMATARAM

Islamic Republic of Iran:

Mr. J. ZAHIRNIA

Italy:

Mr. M. ALESSI

Mr. M. PAVESE

Mr. L. FERRARI BRAVO

Mr. B. CABRAS

Japan:

Mr. M. IMAI

Mr. K. MAKITA

Mr. K. TANAKA

Mr. T. KAWAKITA

Kenya:Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCÍA ROBLES  
Mr. F. MACEDO RIBA  
Ms. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO

Mongolia:

Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG  
Mr. S.O. BOLD

Morocco:

Mr. A. SKALLI  
Mr. O. HILLALE

Netherlands:

Mr. J. RAMAKER  
Mr. R.J. AKKERMAN

Nigeria:

Mr. L.O. AKINDELE

Pakistan:

Mr. K. NIAZ

Peru:

Mr. P. CANNOCK

Poland:

Mr. S. TURBANSKI  
Mr. G. CZEMPINSKI  
Mr. J. CIALOWICZ  
Mr. T. STROJWAS

Romania:

Mr. I. DATCU  
Mr. T. MELESCANU  
Mr. P. BALOIU  
Mr. A. CRETU  
Mr. A. POPESCU

Sri Lanka:

Mr. J. DHANAPALA  
Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA  
Mr. P. KARIYAWASAM

Sweden:

Mr. R. EKEUS  
Ms. E. BONNIER  
Ms. G. JONÅNG  
Ms. A. BRAKENHIELM  
Mr. J. PARWITZ

Union of Soviet Socialist  
Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN  
Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV  
Mr. R.M. TIMERBAEV  
Mr. G.V. BERDENNIKOV  
Mr. P.Y. SKOMOROKHIN  
Mr. S.V. KOBYSH  
Mr. G.V. ANTSIFEROV

United Kingdom:

Mr. L.J. MIDDLETON  
Mr. D.A. SLINN

United States of America:

Mr. L.G. FIELDS  
Mr. N. CLUNE  
Mr. N. CARRERA  
Ms. K.C. CRITTENBERGER  
Mr. R. HORNE  
Mr. R. NORMAN  
Mr. P. CORDEN  
Mr. H. CALHOUN  
Mr. C. PEARCY

Venezuela:

Mr. O. GARCÍA GARCÍA

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC

Zaire:

Mrs. E. ESAKI KABEYA

Under Secretary-General for  
Disarmament Affairs:

Mr. J. MØRTENSON

Secretary-General of the Conference on  
Disarmament and Personal Representative  
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary-General of the  
Conference on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERSATEGUI

The PRESIDENT: The Conference on Disarmament is called to order.

The delegation of Sri Lanka, through purely fortuitous circumstance and the normal operation of the principle of rotation, finds itself in the chair of this important Conference for the month of April. We accept this responsibility towards the Conference on Disarmament and towards the international community with all humility and with the firm resolve to discharge our duties diligently and in keeping with the highest traditions of this office.

I am confident that I speak on behalf of my colleagues in expressing our deep appreciation to Ambassador Datcu of the delegation of Romania for the service he rendered this Conference as its President for the month of March. I had occasion at the plenary meeting on 29 March to express the gratitude of my delegation for his patient and skilful diplomacy laced with his effervescent good humour.

As a representative of a non-aligned country which neither is a nuclear-weapon State nor has any ambitions of becoming one I recall that it was the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament that spawned the new, democratized and interrelated group of bodies charged with the subject of disarmament in international affairs. The new machinery created by the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament rectified the lack of universality in the participation and decision-making in the disarmament deliberations and negotiations that had gone on prior to it. I wish to quote from the first statement made in this august body by my delegation. Speaking at the opening session of the Committee on Disarmament on 24 January 1979, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sri Lanka, Mr. A.C. Shahul Hameed, said:

"We are aware that among the criteria adopted for membership of the Committee on Disarmament is that of being a militarily significant State — a qualification which Sri Lanka can hardly claim to satisfy. That we were included among the eight new members of the Committee is we believe a tacit acknowledgement of the contribution which the militarily less significant can make to disarmament — a contribution which in my country's case derives from the policies and positions which the Government of Sri Lanka under the leadership of my President His Excellency J.R. Jayewardene has chosen to follow.

This Committee is meeting today as a consequence of the United Nations special session on disarmament held in May and June last year. Mr. Chairman, as a fellow-member of the Non-Aligned Movement you would know that the special session was the result of the sustained efforts of the Non-Aligned Group who as far back as 1961 first called for the convening of a special session devoted to disarmament. That objective was realized in 1978 following the resolution which my country's delegation, in our capacity as Chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement, was privileged to propose at the thirty-first session of the General Assembly on behalf of the non-aligned community."

It is five years since that time when my delegation made its advent into this negotiating body. We did so with great expectations of it but with the modest desire of listening and learning as we made our contribution. The inevitable



(The President)

question to be asked is whether those expectations have been fulfilled. Have we obtained the form or illusion of universal participation without its substance? Are we nearer to the goal of general and complete disarmament than before?

The month of April is associated in the temperate zones of the world as the month of spring. For my country, where 80 per cent of the population are rural farmers, this month is the end of the cycle when we harvest the rice we have grown in our village paddy-fields and when we celebrate the traditional New Year. To extend the metaphor, I ask myself, where are we in the Conference placed in the cycle? Five years ago we began our efforts in this single multilateral negotiating forum in quest of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. By now we should be harvesting the results of our endeavours. Instead we have to admit that we have no agreements to our credit and that we engage perennially in an extended debate through the spring and summer parts of our sessions. In this session, having adopted our agenda two weeks after we began, we established the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons with the distinguished Ambassador of Sweden as Chairman in the third week of our session together with Ad Hoc Committees on items 6 and 8. Of these, only the Ad Hoc Committee on item 4 is a functioning one, although progress remains slow. We are at various stages in the negotiation for the establishment of Ad Hoc Committees on items 1, 2, 3, 5 and 7. This, then, is the record of our achievement in the current session for eight weeks. We have to make greater progress this month so that when we reassemble for the summer part of our session we would have a clear vision of the progress we are likely to make this year. That does not leave us much time. However, as you all know the constraint hampering the work of this Conference has seldom been one of time. We have had time to deliberate when we should be negotiating. We have had time to debate when we should be drafting agreements. We have had time for polemical rhetoric when we should be engaging in the harmonization of diverse views into a constructive consensus.

It is, I fear, regarded as unfashionable and politically naive to speak today of the ethical basis of disarmament. I cannot agree with this view. It is only by a clear perception of the ethical dimension involved in disarmament — whatever systems of religious, social and cultural values we subscribe to — that we can instill a sense of urgency to our work which will produce practical results. We face a critical choice. That choice was aptly described by the Secretary-General of the United Nations in his message to this session of the Conference on Disarmament. He said:

"There can be limitation and reduction of arms and with it a better prospect of peace and global development; or there can be a continuing spiral of arms expenditures and arms technology which will entail distrust, a tragic drain on resources and the ever present threat of nuclear annihilation resulting from nuclear weaponry."

I have no doubt about the choice we in the Conference will unanimously agree on. The task before us is to demonstrate this choice in our collective actions as well as in our individual words. I seek your co-operation, distinguished delegates, in this task which we undertake for our common security and to assure a future for mankind.

(The President)

The Conference starts today its consideration of item 7 on its agenda, entitled "New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons". However, in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

I wish to note the presence among us at this plenary meeting of the Under Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs of the United Nations, Mr. Jan Martenson. I wish to welcome him again in the Conference and I hope that he will have a fruitful stay in Geneva.

I should like to inform the Conference that, in accordance with our time-table for the present week, I intend to suspend the plenary meeting once we have listened to the speakers inscribed to speak today and to convene an informal meeting to consider some pending organizational questions, including a request from a non-member to participate in plenary meetings. At the resumed plenary meeting we will take up those questions on which decisions should be taken today.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of the German Democratic Republic, Poland, Argentina, Yugoslavia and Algeria. I now give the floor to the representative of the German Democratic Republic, Ambassador Rose.

Mr. ROSE (German Democratic Republic): Mr. President, let me first of all extend to you the congratulations of my delegation on your assumption of the presidency in the month of April. We are pleased to see you, Ambassador Dhanapala, in this office, the representative of a country which is well-respected within the non-aligned movement and plays an active role in the United Nations as well as in the Conference on Disarmament.

We are convinced that your diplomatic skill and experience will help ensure effective work at this Conference. You may count on our delegation for its full co-operation.

May I also take this opportunity to express, through you, our gratitude to your predecessor, Comrade Datcu of the Socialist Republic of Romania, for the dynamic and dedicated manner in which he discharged his duties. It is to his credit that the possible progress, particularly in organizational matters, has been achieved.

We also wish to welcome the Under Secretary-General, Mr. Jan Martenson, in our midst and to him too we pledge our full co-operation.

My delegation, in its statement of 20 March, dealt with the situation in this Conference regarding item 3 of our agenda, Prevention of nuclear war, as well as with the conclusions to be drawn for our future work.

It was our hope that some delegations blocking consensus on the establishment of an appropriate ad hoc committee would change their position. Deplorably, these

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

expectations have not yet materialized. We again urgently appeal to those delegations to show the necessary political will and flexibility to elaborate and agree upon practical measures to prevent a nuclear war.

In my intervention today, I would like to concentrate on matters of substance. Last year as well as at this session, the socialist countries submitted concrete proposals to advance our work. I would like to point to Working Papers CD/355, CD/406 and CD/444.

Today, I have the honour to introduce on behalf of a group of socialist countries document CD/484, which has already been circulated. The proposals contained in this document are based on the Prague and Moscow Declarations of January and June 1983 respectively, and are aimed at stimulating international actions against the danger of nuclear war. They should be considered as elaborating on the above-mentioned Working Papers. Naturally, relevant proposals made by other States have been taken into account.

In submitting this paper the socialist countries are aware that the overwhelming majority of States of the world regard the elimination of the threat of nuclear war as an indispensable condition not only for solving the global problems of mankind but also for preserving the existence of life on our planet. Therefore, all efforts must be concentrated on negotiations with a view to achieving agreement on appropriate and practical measures to prevent a nuclear war, as demanded once again at the recent session of the United Nations General Assembly.

It stands to reason that such measures should have specific characteristics which are determined first and foremost by their urgency, by their immediate effect on the amelioration of the international situation as a whole, and by their relatively easy adoption and implementation, provided that reason and goodwill on the part of all sides prevail. Life itself dictates that we must act rapidly and not lose time in non-committal academic discussions.

Document CD/484 draws attention to the growing danger of a nuclear war in the wake of the militarist policies of the United States, the core of which is the attempt to destroy the existing military balance. In order to provide a material basis for these policies, large-scale programmes to develop strategic and other nuclear armaments have been adopted. The deployment of more and more new United States medium-range missiles in western Europe designed for a nuclear first strike is alarming. At the same time, the extension of the arms race to outer space is envisaged. The latest information from Washington shows a total disregard for the wish of peoples to avoid the dangerous militarization of outer space. In line with those strategies, the United States has broken off important negotiations or deprived them of their basis by pursuing a provocative policy of nuclear war preparations. In particular, the dispute with regard to a comprehensive test-ban treaty makes clear that one side is blocking any multilateral negotiation on reducing the danger of nuclear war and halting the nuclear-arms race. Such an attitude is incompatible with international agreements, including the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

No doubt the best way to stop this dangerous course of affairs would be the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. All member countries of this Conference have subscribed to this goal in 1978 in adopting the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. In one of the first working papers of the Committee on Disarmament — document CD/4 — the socialist countries submitted a proposal to achieve that goal step by step. Working Paper CD/484 points to that proposal which is still valid.

Insisting on the demand that this Conference turn, without any further delay, to negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and on nuclear disarmament, we advocate other ways and means conducive to lessening and finally eliminating the danger of nuclear war. We are convinced that the proposed steps, beyond their immediate positive effect, would decisively encourage the process of nuclear disarmament.

Document CD/484 provides for effective measures in a comprehensive manner. It draws attention to the fact that the vital interests of the whole of mankind require that relations between nuclear-weapon States should be governed by certain norms which they could agree among themselves to recognize and which should be given a mandatory nature.

Specifically, the Working Paper contains two categories of proposals. The first consists of measures favouring the creation of a moral and political atmosphere in which any attempt to unleash a nuclear war would be abortive. The following enumeration is for practical purposes, keeping in mind that all measures, by their nature, are closely connected one with another.

We propose, first, that all countries, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, should regard the prevention of nuclear war as the main objective of their policy, should prevent situations fraught with nuclear conflict and hold urgent consultations in the event that such a danger emerges in order to avert the outbreak of a nuclear conflagration.

Second, the document recommends that States include in appropriate unilateral or joint statements or declarations provisions condemning nuclear war and, at the same time, refrain from propagating nuclear war, including political and military doctrines tantamount to justifying it.

Third, the socialist countries reaffirm their proposal that all nuclear-weapon States should renounce the first use of nuclear weapons. This obligation could be undertaken in a unilateral declaration or also be embodied in a unified instrument of international law. We support the proposal to conclude a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States.

Fourth, document CD/484 advocates further measures to strengthen the principle of the non-use of force in international relations and to guarantee its application. The conclusion of a world treaty to that end as well as of a treaty on the mutual

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

renunciation of the use of military force and on the maintenance of peaceful relations between the member States of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO put forward by a number of socialist countries in January 1983, ought to be considered as important steps.

Fifth, all nuclear-weapon States are requested not to use nuclear weapons under any circumstances against non-nuclear countries in whose territory there are no such weapons, to respect the status of nuclear-weapon-free zones already created and to encourage the creation of new such zones.

Sixth, the socialist countries are ready to consider also measures aimed at preventing an accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons and the possibility of surprise attacks. It stands to reason that specific measures of a rather technical character can contribute to confidence-building only in conjunction with far-reaching political obligations.

It cannot contribute to confidence if one side attempts to restrict the deliberations on technical aspects and to divert attention from its unabated nuclear arms build-up.

Another category of proposals relates to measures of a material nature. We focused attention on the following:

First, one of the most effective and relatively easily applicable measures would be a freeze on nuclear weapons. Document CD/484 outlines all the components of such a step and the way to its implementation.

Furthermore, the socialist countries consider a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests conducive to the cessation of the qualitative refinement of nuclear weapons and, until the conclusion of such a treaty, a moratorium on all nuclear explosions should be proclaimed by all nuclear-weapon States.

Third, another important obligation of nuclear-weapon States would be to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons in any form.

Finally, the prevention of nuclear war would be greatly assisted by the prevention of an arms race in other dangerous areas, in particular in outer space. The Working Paper (CD/484) points to the conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of the use of force in outer space and from space against the Earth, as well as to the unilateral undertaking by the Soviet Union not to be the first to place any type of anti-satellite weapons in outer space.

The socialist countries are also prepared to consider other measures directed at the prevention of nuclear war. The time is overdue to turn to concrete deeds, namely, to constructive negotiations on the above-mentioned proposals with a view to concluding appropriate international agreements.

The socialist countries reaffirm their determination to embark upon the elaboration of urgent and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war and for the establishment, to this end, of an ad hoc committee. We would hope that the document presented will receive due consideration and strengthen the conviction that the conditions for an immediate start of negotiations do exist.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the German Democratic Republic for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President.

I now give the floor to the representative of Poland, Ambassador Turbanski.

Mr. TURBANSKI (Poland): Mr. President, allow me, first of all, to express the sincere satisfaction of my delegation and of myself in seeing you presiding over the Conference on Disarmament in the month of April. Wishing you all success in the difficult duties before you, I offer you, Mr. President, full support and co-operation on the part of my delegation in their discharge.

I should also like to take this opportunity to express once more our admiration of, and our thanks to, your predecessor Ambassador Datcu for his strenuous efforts and energy, during his Presidency in the month of March, in his countless efforts to solve various organizational matters of this Conference: matters, to be frank, which are called "organizational" but have high political importance. May I also express our pleasure at seeing the Under Secretary-General, Mr. Jan ~~Martenson~~, again with us.

Following a number of speakers in the previous plenary meetings, I propose to discuss once more the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space, a question of extreme importance for all of us living on the good old planet Earth.

The militarization of outer space, or the danger of deployment of weapons of mass destruction there, became at the beginning of the present decade more than an ominous reality. Outer space is being transformed into the arena of a large-scale arms race. Like many delegations which have spoken here on this subject, we are also of the view that the militarization of outer space is, unfortunately, only a part of a larger process which started earlier. The doctrine of military superiority in outer space gained popularity in the United States in the late 1950s. What was most important was not the exploration of outer space, but the fact that it was, indeed, the space where strategic warfare could be conducted more effectively. According to United States politicians of the late 1950s, the nation that first gained access to this new theatre of operations would inevitably become a leading Power in the world. The United States Administration's efforts in this direction had, and continue to have, an extremely negative effect on the international situation as a whole, contributing to a heightened threat of war. According to current plans and declarations of the present Administration in the United States, outer space is to be a show-place for more and more sophisticated weapons.

Directive No. 119 of 6 January 1984, which has frequently been mentioned during our debates this year, on the start of the implementation of a large-scale research programme on new systems of weapons to be deployed in outer space, capable of a retaliatory nuclear strike, is only one of the recent proofs of these plans. The "Shuttle" and "Challenger" programmes conducted by the United States space agency NASA include, among other tasks, the testing of military and intelligence systems, and the "inspection", if one may say so, of orbiting satellites or their capture. The United States mass media make no secret that the Pentagon is the main beneficiary of these programmes.

(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

When more than a quarter of a century ago, thanks to human genius and imagination, the first man, Yuri Gagarin, entered outer space, the world community certainly did not expect such ominous developments. This disarmament forum has therefore to do everything possible to ensure that the further exploration and use of outer space is carried out in the interest of all countries and all nations, for their benefit and not for their destruction.

The experience gained so far in disarmament negotiations shows that it is easier to stop an arms race before, rather than after, the deployment of new weapons systems. Accordingly, a serious attempt to reverse the present trends still has a reasonable chance of being successful. It is evident that military developments in outer space have a global impact on international security by the very nature of the circumplanetary coverage of satellites. The outer-space arms race is thus a direct prolongation of the traditional one on Earth and, as such, offers extremely disquieting threats of nuclear confrontation.

While discussing military activities in outer space, one must realize that they cannot be separated from the issue of peaceful uses of outer space. We do admit that many of the peaceful applications of outer space in fields such as telecommunications, navigation, photographic reconnaissance, have also, sometimes with only minor modifications, important military uses. Meteorological, navigations, communications and other types of satellites can be used to perform command and control functions, to conduct ground surveillance, to collect intelligence or to target intercontinental ballistic missiles, etc. The possible overlap with civilian applications — as can be seen — is quite large. But many activities are of almost exclusively military interest. It is disquieting that these are receiving more and more emphasis. On the other hand, it has often been remarked, also in this chamber, that satellites have an important verification function and, if further emphasized and accepted by all interested parties, could become effective instruments in this respect. The trend in these developments, according to specialists, is towards a higher degree of perfection in sensor technology, photographic reconnaissance, nuclear-explosion detection, etc.

The possible military use of outer space against an adversary on the Earth also signifies the development and deployment in that environment of efficient and specific direct weapons. After the so-called "Star Wars" speech by President Reagan in March 1983, a possible exploitation of outer space for specific military purposes appears to focus attention on a domain of new technology and weapon development which may have profound implications for international security. If one adds the so-called laser and directed-energy weapons, the essential components of which already exist and which offer the possibility of an almost instantaneous "kill" mechanism, the militarization of outer space and its exploitation for military purposes appear as a complex issue which is, therefore, ripe for concrete negotiations. Otherwise the 1980s may become a decade of advances in military technology for deployment in that environment. Current and future developments in this regard may bring profound changes in strategic thinking and international security issues.

(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

Quite a number of treaties concerning outer space activities already exist. They have been listed and discussed in this chamber by many speakers during this current session and in recent sessions, from the time when the problem of the arms race in the outer space was put on the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament. They were also discussed, permit me to recall, Mr. President, in my statement here on 18 August 1983. I think we all agree that if the spirit of the existing treaties and their underlying principle of making outer space a peaceful environment were followed in practice, the situation in that environment, and in different fora debating on its future, would be far better. Unfortunately, this is not so. The General Assembly, in resolution 38/70, very rightly recalls past international treaties, the Final Document of its tenth special session and its past resolutions on outer space, and notes with concern that despite the existing instruments, the extension of an arms race into outer space is taking place. Indeed, the spirit of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, whereby outer space was to be a domain of peaceful exploitation, is not respected. The effectiveness of a more specific treaty, such as the 1972 ABM Treaty, is now threatened because of new developments in direct weapons based on laser and particle beams. These two instruments are mentioned only as a minimum illustration. The only specific negotiations so far aiming to control the militarization of outer space, the bilateral talks of the late 1970s between the USSR and United States on ASAT weapons, have been broken off by the United States.

Thus, the analyses, the statements of politicians and also our statements on the subject reveal a gloomy picture of this complex problem. The only solution is to start acting now. I share the view expressed here by the distinguished representative of Czechoslovakia, Ambassador Vejvoda, in his statement of 27 March, that the time has come to bring to a close — as he put it — "general" and "exploratory" discussions regarding the prevention of an arms race in outer space. We are convinced that the time has come to start elaborating relevant practical and effective measures which by mutual agreement could prohibit deployment of any weapons in outer space. In this connection it should be recalled that in August 1981 the Soviet Union submitted to the thirty-sixth session of the United Nations General Assembly a draft treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space, showing thus its readiness to take partial steps, but excluding any upsetting of the approximate parity of forces between the main politico-military blocs. The United Nations General Assembly overwhelmingly adopted, as we remember, a resolution in which it recognized the need to take action to prevent the spreading of the arms race to outer space and requested the then Committee on Disarmament to start negotiations with a view to producing and agreeing on the text of a corresponding international treaty. That initiative, however, was opposed by the United States which tried to reduce the essence of the problem to the banning of anti-satellite systems, leaving open the question of the stationing of other types of military installations in outer space. Last year, during the thirty-eighth session of the United Nations General Assembly the Soviet Union proposed the conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of the use of force in outer space and from outer space against the Earth, which was circulated as a document of this Conference (CD/476) and introduced by the distinguished representative of the USSR, Ambassador Issraelyan, on 22 March 1984.



(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

We would like to emphasize the great political importance of both these proposals. Their main political objective is to prevent an arms race in outer space, and this is their most important, human feature. In addition, with regard to the draft treaty prohibiting the use of force in outer space, due attention should be paid to the fact that it combines political and legal obligations of States not to use force against each other in or from outer space with the implementation of far-reaching substantive measures intended to prevent the militarization of outer space. We hope that this new Soviet initiative will be favourably received by this Conference and will make a major contribution to full-scale, concrete, multilateral negotiations on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

The gravity of the problem is evident and great. It is even greater today than it was a few days ago. According to informed sources in the United States Administration, as yesterday's International Herald Tribune puts it, President Reagan signed last Saturday, 31 March, before submission to the Congress, a report according to which, "... the Reagan Administration plans to develop and test an anti-satellite weapon and does not plan to seek a comprehensive ban on such weapons with the Soviet Union...". Thus, the gravity of the problem cannot be underestimated. I therefore join all those who spoke here in favour of the early establishment of an ad hoc committee in the framework of this Conference to initiate such negotiations as soon as possible. Various proposals concerning its mandate have already been considered extensively last year and during the current session. My delegation fully shares the analyses and conclusions expressed in this respect by you, Mr. President, on 29 March last. Indeed, the problem should be approached in a comprehensive way within the framework of a future ad hoc committee. While recognizing that identification of different aspects and of multiple questions of this complex problem should be undertaken in the first instance this cannot be conducted for the sake of such identification itself and without the basic link which leads to negotiations. In other words, the future mandate of the said body cannot be limited only to the identification of issues. In the light of the latest news on the subject, what is urgently needed is concrete negotiations. There is no lack of examples from the recent past or from parallel exercises, and we are therefore in fact suspicious that the insistence by some Western delegations on the identification of issues is aimed rather to block than to advance substantive work, i.e., the undertaking of negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in all its aspects in outer space, as proposed in the course of the recent informal consultations.

We are entering the third month of this session without even having solved its basic organizational problems. Outer space free of arms and of the arms race is no longer a problem for petty tactical games. This is the problem of huge political dimensions, deserving the most serious attention on our part.

Mr. President, there is still time to prevent an arms race in outer space, but we have to act now. I hope that under your leadership this Conference will embark on successful negotiations in this direction.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Poland for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President.

I now give the floor to the representative of Argentina, Ambassador Carasales.

Mr. CARASALES (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): Thank you, Mr. President. It is gratifying for me to take the floor at today's meeting because it enables me to be among the first to extend to you my very sincere congratulations on your assuming the Presidency of our Conference. We wish you every success in the discharge of your functions, success on which we may rely after witnessing your brilliant record as co-ordinator of the Group of 21 in the month of May 1983. You may always rely on the fullest co-operation of the Argentine delegation. Following his intense and tireless work as President of the Conference during last month, it gives me great pleasure to see Ambassador Datcu on your right. He had every right to go to rest for a while at Berne. He has not done so, and this shows once again the personal commitment of Ambassador Datcu to the work of this Conference and the items under discussion at it. I wish to express to the Ambassador of Romania my delegation's appreciation and gratitude for the highly efficient and vigorous work he performed.

It also gives me pleasure to see among us the Under Secretary-General of the United Nations for Disarmament, Mr. Jan Mårtenson, whose continuing interest in the items covered by our discussions is well known, and I welcome him most cordially among us.

According to the programme of work for the first part of the 1984 session of the Conference on Disarmament, this negotiating body was to have considered last week agenda item 6, entitled "Effective international arrangements to ensure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons". I say "was to have considered" because, with the exception of the delegation of a non-member State and general references in speeches focusing on other issues, this item was not the subject of any specific statement by member delegations at the Conference.

I must confess that this refusal to deal with this issue does not surprise us, and is the clearest sign of the present state of affairs regarding an issue which the Final Document considered important, inasmuch as in paragraph 59 it urged the nuclear-weapon States to "pursue efforts to conclude" the effective arrangements referred to in the title of agenda item 6.

This item has indeed been included in our agenda, and at the beginning of our session the corresponding Ad Hoc Committee was set up, but this was virtually a mechanical act: no meetings of the subsidiary body have been planned for the present part of the session, and there is good reason to doubt that there will be any in the second part of the session.

This organizational situation indicates something of which we are all aware. The non-nuclear-weapon States, or the vast majority of the international community, the countries which have the right to receive clear and effective guarantees against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against them, have before them, supposedly as a source of such assurance, five unilateral declarations made by the nuclear-weapon Powers. These declarations are dissimilar, subject to different interpretations,

(Mr. Carasales, Argentina)

almost all of them are full of conditions and escape clauses of different kinds, and the appreciation of their implementation will be carried out exclusively by the States making them. As the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Argentina said in his statement on 28 February last, some of them rather appear to be "permissible scenarios for the use or threat of use of weapons that may end the civilization as we know it".

It is therefore not surprising that these declarations have been considered absolutely inadequate by those for whom they are intended. No State can allow its security -- something to which all States are entitled -- to be founded upon the basis of declarations such as those which have been made, or at least four out of the five of them. They certainly do not deserve to be described as "assurances".

The States which should provide such guarantees are, naturally, the nuclear-weapon States, and it is up to them to take the necessary steps to clarify and strengthen their undertakings and arrive at the conclusion of the "effective international arrangements" referred to in the Final Document and the title of agenda item 6 itself.

These necessary steps have not been taken, nor does there seem to be the slightest will to do so. What is evident, as the Group of 21 pointed out in its statement of 9 August 1983, is "the inflexibility of the nuclear-weapon States to remove the limitations, conditions and exceptions contained in their unilateral declarations" (CD/407).

Here lies the explanation of the dead end which has been reached in the consideration of item 6. And there appears to be no sign that the situation will change or that any positive developments will occur in the near future.

No State, or virtually no State, wishes to renounce the possibility of using nuclear weapons, even in this limited context. The architects of deterrence and their allies obviously wish, in the last resort, to preserve their freedom of action and it seems that all efforts made in this sphere basically hinge on this fact. It is therefore not surprising that those efforts are fruitless.

Hence the particular importance of the opinion expressed in the statement of the Group of 21 (CD/407) from which I quoted a moment ago: "The Group of 21 reiterates its belief that the most effective assurance of security against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is nuclear disarmament and prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons".

However much we consider this state of affairs from different angles, we always arrive at the same conclusion: so long as nuclear weapons exist and can be used, there will be no security for anyone.

The developments which have taken place in recent years in this field could not be more alarming. A new stage has begun in the nuclear-arms race. More sophisticated nuclear weapons are being installed on both sides, and the nuclear danger is visible in all seas and in all latitudes, in a kind of horizontal proliferation which is increasingly alarming. It may be asked, what decision-making process will govern the use of such weapons? Will the countries on whose territory such arms are stationed have any say in the matter? Will there be any increase in the number of countries with power of decision in this field, even though the number of States possessing nuclear weapons remains the same?

(Mr. Carasales, Argentina)

Do we not have to co-exist with tens of thousands of nuclear weapons deployed throughout the world? The exact figures may vary according to the sources, but have we not reached the point that to give or take a thousand nuclear warheads is no longer of any importance? Are we not faced with increasingly ominous prospects of the extension of the nuclear-arms race in outer space?

In the face of this state of affairs, which is no less alarming for being often pointed out, we heard a few days ago, to be precise on 29 March, a curious attempt to associate the prevention of nuclear war with the ratification of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and at the same time, to shift in a sense the responsibility for the alarming international situation on to the States which have not adhered to that international instrument.

Assertions of this kind call for comment by my delegation.

In the first place, the Non-Proliferation Treaty is a very unsatisfactory treaty, because it is discriminatory, because it imposes obligations which are absolutely unequal and in some cases are not even obligations, because it arbitrarily restricts the possibilities of the peaceful use of atomic energy, because it seeks to preserve without competition advanced technology in the hands of an exclusive circle of countries, and because basically it legitimates the possession of nuclear weapons.

Furthermore, besides the defects and shortcomings of the Treaty, the elements among its provisions which its authors considered to be positive have not been fulfilled. Broad international co-operation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy has not taken place, and there has been no determined attempt to carry out the negotiations for the cessation at an early date of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament. On the contrary, scientific and technological exchanges have been hindered and restricted to an increasing extent, and the prospects of major progress in nuclear disarmament and for halting and reversing the nuclear-arms race appear increasingly remote. Item 2 of our agenda, which deals with this issue, is still awaiting, not the beginning of negotiations, but even the beginning of any serious and meaningful consideration due to the opposition of some countries which are among the most fervent advocates of the NPT. This is not the occasion, nor is it my intention, to carry out a detailed analysis of the NPT and its implications. The Foreign Minister of my country, Mr. Dante Caputo, had the opportunity of explaining our views of this matter on 28 February last. In any event, there is no denying that it has essential aspects which may be the subject of justified criticism, nor the right of every sovereign State to assess those aspects and their consequences and accordingly establish its position in that connection.

Some States may have decided to overlook those shortcomings and sign and ratify the NPT. That is their right and we respect it. Perhaps when they did so those shortcomings had not yet been made clear, and who knows if today they would adopt the same attitude. Other States, on the contrary, also undeniably have the right, if the outcome of their assessment of the provisions and functioning of the Treaty is negative, to refrain from becoming parties to a regime which, from their viewpoint, is unjustly prejudicial to their interests and their development without providing any counterpart to justify the sacrifices it imposes, and without the risks of nuclear war being reduced.

(Mr. Carasales, Argentina)

On the other hand, what must be rejected is the right -- which certainly is no right -- to insinuate, even implicitly, that if a country decides not to become a party to the NPT it is because it intends, now or later, to produce or possess nuclear weapons and, at the same time, that such a country is therefore hindering the prevention of nuclear war.

This is quite gratuitously to attribute blameworthy intentions to States which do not take the same view of the worth and effectiveness of an international legal agreement to which, at least so far, it has never been considered obligatory to accede.

What matters are the facts, realities, not baseless speculation. States which are not parties to the NPT have categorically repeated ad infinitum, perhaps ad nauseam, their total and utter rejection of nuclear weapons and their intention to use the infinite possibilities offered by nuclear energy for the benefit and progress of their peoples in an exclusively peaceful manner. They intend to do so in all freedom, without mentors or guides, without having to ask permission and without being subject to the arbitrary decisions or political vicissitudes of the club of the all-powerful States.

So far not the slightest evidence, not the least objective element, has been brought forward to prove that such States are not telling the truth. Nevertheless, they are not believed, any technological advance is received with utmost distrust, and each and every one of their acts is minutely examined for hidden intentions and must be susceptible to most severe, permanent and wide-ranging control.

The champions of this distrust, the advocates of the strictest control, are precisely those who arrogate themselves every right and seek to remain outside all control, as in the NPT; those who do not accept the slightest restriction which might infringe upon their complete freedom of action to develop increasingly more sophisticated weapons of mass destruction or to receive them on their territory; those who at the same time demand that their declarations should be taken as "gospel truth" without being subject to the slightest verification, as in the case of the Tlatelolco Protocols.

These champions of paradox usually include, in their condemnation of so-called horizontal proliferation, pious statements concerning the need to curb vertical proliferation too. However, all the effort and concern they deploy concerning the former (horizontal proliferation) seem to vanish in the case of the latter (vertical proliferation), when the security perceptions of their military alliances and their underlying doctrines might be jeopardized. They do not even seem to extend to the kind of geographical proliferation which is increasing every day.

The quickest and best means of avoiding the proliferation of nuclear weapons is the rapid conclusion of a treaty for the complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, but the fact is that it is not even possible to begin negotiating such a treaty. It no longer has priority; on the other hand, the NPT does.

We are all in favour of non-proliferation, in one sense or another. Many of us are against the devices themselves which must not proliferate, nuclear weapons. If nuclear weapons did not exist, there would not be the slightest risk of proliferation. But even with the more limited objective of non-proliferation, is it right to argue as if it were a self-evident truth that the NPT is the only suitable means?

(Mr. Carasales, Argentina)

Various States do not share this opinion. To ascribe irresponsible implications and alarming consequences to the exercise of this undeniable right is to believe in the naïveté or gullibility of the people. Can anyone even imagine that the risks of a nuclear conflict would disappear, or even diminish, if the NPT were ratified in its present form by all States without exception, while the thousands of nuclear warheads with which the world is crammed, and the delivery vehicles designed to transport them to their objectives, remain intact? Where does the risk of a nuclear war lie? In the States which are not parties to the NPT? It would be advisable to keep some sense of proportion.

On 29 March it was also asserted that the NPT was "the only existing international document under which the major nuclear-weapon Powers are legally committed to nuclear disarmament, in the sense that they have undertaken to pursue negotiations to that end in good faith". This last piece of information was opportune, because in fact the sole undertaking made under the NPT by the nuclear-weapon Powers was to negotiate, not to disarm, not even to halt the nuclear-arms race. This simple undertaking, furthermore, is not subject to any control regarding the degree to which it is fulfilled, nor of course any sanction in case of violation. However, we all know how article VI of the NPT has been respected.

It is now argued that the question of the failure to fulfil the obligation, if charitably one can speak of an obligation, contained in article VI cannot be brought up by countries which are not parties to the NPT. It is denied that they have any right to do so. This is surprising, to say the least. It is thus argued, in favour of the acceptance of the NPT, that there are obligations both for the non-nuclear-weapon countries and for the nuclear-weapon States, and article VI is given as an example of the latter. But when a country which must take a sovereign decision in this sphere makes its analysis of the Treaty and reaches the conclusion that the obligations are not equal and that in any case some are fulfilled and others are not, it seems, according to the viewpoint to which I am referring, that this cannot be invoked as a reason for rejecting the Treaty. The country should in any event accede to the NPT, whatever its opinion of the Treaty, in order then to be able to bring to bear the criticism and the shortcomings which are precisely its reason for not wishing to accede to it.

I do not wish to dwell on this matter any longer, but some considerations could not be left aside. All positions deserve respect, and no international instrument is above judgement and evaluation. The intentions on which it is based, however praiseworthy they may be, are not enough. The manner in which those intentions are carried into practice is what matters.

Few documents are capable of giving rise to a kind of manicheism concerning them. In any event, the NPT is not such a document. It is simply a means, but not the only means, to an end.

Furthermore, the present and future of mankind are not bound to the future of an instrument which is increasingly called into question. The danger of the extinction of mankind today lies elsewhere, in areas which it is not worth mentioning once again. The efforts of major and active members of the international community should be channelled towards achieving progress in those areas, rather than to new variations on the eternal theme of "disarming the disarmed". Rather than chasing ghosts, it is necessary to face reality, and the reality in which we must live today is terrifying.

Virtually all the items on the agenda of this Conference call for vigorous, resolute and immediate action. Some, such as items 1, 2, 3 and 5, are of immediate importance and urgency. The great majority of the members of this forum are prepared to begin at once. The will of only a very few States remains lacking. Why do they not join up with the others, so that we may at last embark on the work expected of us?

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Argentina for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President.

I now give the floor to the representative of Yugoslavia, Mr. Mihajlović.

Mr. MIHAJLOVIC (Yugoslavia): Mr. President, the Head of the Yugoslav delegation will have the opportunity at a later date to congratulate you on the assumption of your duties as President for this month. If he was here I am sure that he would have equally greeted the distinguished Under-Secretary-General, Mr. Jan Martenson. In the meantime, allow me, Mr. President to wish you on my own behalf much success in your work.

Today I would like to introduce the Working Paper prepared by the Yugoslav delegation, document CD/482 of 26 March 1984, entitled "National verification measures", which has already been distributed to delegations. The purpose of this paper is to present some of our views which, we hope, will be useful in further negotiations on the elaboration of the Convention. They do not represent, however, the final position of the Yugoslav delegation, and can be revised in the course of negotiations.

From the outset of the consideration of banning the research, development, production and destruction of chemical weapons, it was widely acknowledged that verification should be based on a combination of appropriate national and international measures which would complement and supplement each other, thereby providing an acceptable system which would, in turn, ensure effective implementation of the prohibition.

Basically, the Working Paper proceeds from the generally accepted view that the effective implementation of the prohibition of the production, destruction or diversion of stocks and production facilities can only be assured if there is an effective system of international verification of compliance with a convention banning chemical weapons.

We consider, however, that national verification measures could also play a role in the implementation of the provisions of the convention in all its phases. It is important to emphasize, nevertheless, that from the very outset of the implementation of the convention there should be close co-operation between the international and national authorities in all activities related to the convention. It is understood of course that such mutual co-operation can only be achieved in an atmosphere of general confidence. Negotiations conducted so far have unambiguously shown that each State party is obliged to establish a national authority which should assist and support the work of the international authority in the implementation of verification measures. Also, the States parties to the convention shall be obliged to prevent, within the bounds of their administrative and legal regulations, any activity violating the convention. The existing classification of toxic chemicals into three categories: super-toxic lethal chemicals, other lethal chemicals, and other harmful chemicals, can serve as a basis for implementation of verification measures by the national authority, as well as for determining the level of verification. In this process, close co-operation with the national authority is advisable. We are of the opinion, however, that the verification of less toxic chemicals, other lethal and harmful chemicals, as well as chemical-weapon precursors can be carried out in almost all stages under control of the national authority. This form of verification of less toxic chemicals is suggested because the majority of these chemicals today

(Mr. Mihajlović, Yugoslavia)

are referred to as dual-purpose chemicals and are widely used for peaceful purposes. It goes without saying that the State party producing these chemicals must present evidence concerning the purpose of their diversion, production facilities and end-users.

However, it should be pointed out even in this case that the measures of national verification should be agreed upon in advance among all States parties, and should at all times be an unequivocal and viable basis for the maintenance of confidence among the parties. Of course, such confidence can only be achieved on the basis of the objective and reliable data furnished by every national authority through the provision of regular information to the consultative committee about the verification measures implemented.

In other words, the control of production of other lethal and harmful chemicals, dual-purpose chemicals and precursors, and their diversion for permitted purposes should be organized in such a way as to provide authentic information at all times. In order to attain an effective system of verification and to maintain confidence among the States parties, it will be necessary to agree on co-operation among future States parties already during the elaboration of the Convention, on the basis of the exchange of expert information, standardization of methods and introduction of the known and proven monitoring systems, as well as on the basis of introducing a compatible computer system.

Such co-operation will make it possible also to exercise, if necessary, control by way of the international authority. This may be the case if there is, with the passage of time, a change in the process of production of any of the dual-purpose chemicals, or if a new technological procedure is introduced, or if production capacity increases. In addition, if on the basis of information received in the form of reports which the national authority submits to the consultative committee, the conclusion is drawn that there has been a change in production, the consultative committee may suggest that the State party concerned should also organize international control for that production facility.

On the other hand, we are of the view that confidence among States parties is also achieved by the composition and structure of the national authority. Apart from being composed of representatives of different institutions of the States parties, we think that it should also, on a voluntary basis, include one representative of the State party proposed by the consultative committee in agreement with the receiving country.

The role and tasks of the national authority for verification are essentially determined by the law of that particular country. Regardless of the fact that the administrative and economic systems of many States parties to the convention are very disparate, we believe that the structure, composition and functioning of the national authority should be such as to ensure efficiency, competence, objectiveness and the necessary confidence in close co-operation with all international institutions in the implementation of the convention.

The basic ideas presented in the Yugoslav Working Paper are meant to point both to the need for and to the usefulness of, combined national and international verification for a chemical weapons ban. When there is doubt, however, that national measures are insufficient, it goes without saying that priority should be given to an agreed international verification system. We hope that this paper will contribute to the drawing up of satisfactory provisions on the verification system of a convention.



The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Yugoslavia for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President.

I now give the floor to the representative of Algeria, Ambassador Ould-Rouis.

Mr. BACHIR OULD-ROUIS (Algeria) (translated from French): Mr. President, allow me, first of all, to congratulate you on your accession to the Presidency of the Conference on Disarmament for April 1984 and to assure you of the Algerian delegations' full co-operation in the fulfilment of your task.

Our congratulations also go to Mr. Datcu for the manner in which he directed our work during March.

The Algerian delegation also associates itself with the words of welcome which you addressed to the Under-Secretary-General, Jan Martenson.

I wish today to refer briefly to a question which we consider to be of the greatest importance, and which has been given full priority in our agenda -- that of nuclear disarmament.

Because of their enormous destructive power, nuclear weapons have given rise to widespread censure, which has grown as arsenals have expanded and the nuclear danger has become increasingly threatening. What a long way people have come in their awareness of the nuclear danger, from the condemnation of nuclear weapons in a few knowledgeable circles in the immediate post-war period, to the vast protest movements we know today!

Ever since its inception, the movement of non-aligned countries has upheld the international community's demands for nuclear disarmament. Its efforts led to the convening of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, which can unquestionably be considered as a high point in the common search for solutions to the problems connected with the arms race.

The desire to eliminate the nuclear threat was given expression in the adoption by consensus of a Programme of Action in which nuclear disarmament received absolute priority.

The acceleration of the arms race has focused attention on the urgent need to eliminate the risks of nuclear war, such elimination being identified as the immediate objective, and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons as the final objective.

The first special session was also the occasion for formulating a coherent disarmament strategy around the core element of nuclear disarmament, whose stages were defined in paragraph 50 of the Final Document.

Together with the negotiations on nuclear disarmament, the Final Document envisages the implementation of two highly important measures: the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests, and so-called negative security guarantees. The partners to the trilateral negotiations on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests were thus invited to conclude their negotiations urgently and submit the result for full consideration by the single multilateral disarmament negotiating body. The nuclear-weapon Powers were further called upon to take steps to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Bachir Ould-Rouis, Algeria)

Such a reiteration of the well-known provisions of the Final Document might seem somewhat superfluous. This exercise, however, appears to us essential to any evaluation of the multilateral disarmament negotiation process. It concerns a document that was adopted by consensus and the validity of which was confirmed, also by consensus, at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

Six years after the adoption of the Programme of Action, the consensus has, unfortunately, not yet been reflected in the adoption of specific measures to halt the arms race and reverse the trend.

The trilateral negotiations have been broken off. The single multilateral disarmament negotiating body is still prevented from entering into negotiations on the priority issues, namely, the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, the cessation of the arms race and nuclear disarmament, and the prevention of nuclear war. The negotiations on negative security assurances are in an impasse. They constantly come up against a refusal on the part of certain nuclear-weapon Powers to give unconditional guarantees to the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

Without minimizing the magnitude of the task and the complexity of nuclear issues, we must recognize that the primary reasons for this stalemate is the lack of political accommodation on the part of certain nuclear-weapon Powers.

This regrettable attitude on the part of certain Powers which have a special responsibility in the nuclear disarmament process is reflected in a desire to reverse the order of priority of items on the agenda and to transform the Conference into a debating forum with no influence on the nuclear disarmament negotiations.

Among the arguments advanced to prevent the Conference on Disarmament from entering into negotiations on nuclear disarmament, there is one that we must reject categorically: the argument that nuclear issues are the exclusive domain of the nuclear-weapon Powers.

Instead of the negotiations envisaged in the Final Document, what are being proposed to us are informal meetings which would provide non-nuclear-weapon States with an opportunity to air their anxieties.

Thus, from being full partners in the search for a common solution to a question which concerns the security of all States, the non-nuclear-weapon States are relegated to the rank of mere "petitioners", whose right to express their views on the question is deigned to be recognized.

This attitude is in direct contradiction with the provisions of the Final Document of 1978, which recognizes the right of all States to participate on an equal footing in multilateral disarmament negotiations which have a direct influence on their national security.

Can it seriously be claimed that nuclear issues have no influence on the national security of non-nuclear States? To make such a claim would be to scorn the security interests of the non-nuclear-weapon States which have chosen to remain outside the two military alliances. Is it necessary to recall that the vital security interests of all States are threatened by the very existence of nuclear weapons? Many nuclear-weapon studies confirm the common fate to which we are doomed by weapons that have the peculiarity of making no distinction between belligerents and non-belligerents in nuclear war. While the possession of nuclear weapons invests the nuclear-weapon States with special responsibility in the disarmament process, that responsibility cannot be exclusive.

(Mr. Bachir Ould-Rouis, Algeria)

To establish a link between the possession of a particular category of weapon and the right to participate in negotiations on the prohibition of that category of weapon would be tantamount to excluding the vast majority of States members from the current negotiations in the Conference. That would apply to the convention on chemical weapons and the convention on radiological weapons.

There is a further argument which we cannot accept. It is that of introducing a distinction between:

On the one hand, non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty which, as such would have the right to call the nuclear-weapon States to account,

And, on the other, non-nuclear weapon States which, for well-known reasons, have not acceded to the Treaty and would be "badly placed" to criticize the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons. Such an approach springs from the desire to keep the non-nuclear-weapon States on the sidelines in the nuclear disarmament negotiations.

As for the link that it is desired to establish between non-accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the position towards the objective of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, this seems to us to be devoid of any foundation.

Such a link is based on a conception of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons which we do not share, since it takes no account of one particular aspect of such proliferation, namely, horizontal proliferation. To be credible, the notion of non-proliferation should be understood globally, in its two dimensions, vertical and horizontal. To confine the danger of proliferation of nuclear weapons to a hypothetical horizontal proliferation is to sidestep the real threat -- that of the existence of formidable nuclear arsenals.

This same discrimination between non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and those not party to that instrument is also found in certain unilateral declarations on so-called negative security assurances. This discrimination, which is reflected in an implicit threat of the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States not covered by unilateral declarations is also entirely unacceptable.

The negative security assurances must not be subject to any exception or limitation. They must, in our opinion, be unconditional and universal.

Regardless of their position towards the NPT or any other international legal instrument, the non-nuclear-weapon States outside the military blocs unanimously condemn the very existence of nuclear weapons. They have initiated many proposals aiming towards the objective of genuine non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Suffice it to refer to documents of the movement of non-aligned countries and those of the Group of 21 in order to verify this common desire to break the vicious circle of the arms-race spiral.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Algeria for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President. That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other member wish to take the floor? I intend now to suspend the plenary meeting and convene in five minutes' time an informal meeting to consider some organizational questions. The plenary meeting is suspended.

The meeting was suspended at 12.25 p.m. and resumed at 1.05 p.m.

The PRESIDENT: The plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is resumed.

As you know, we have received a request from Switzerland to participate in the plenary meetings of the Conference. The secretariat has circulated the relevant draft decision, which is contained in Working Paper No. 125. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the draft decision.

It was so decided.

You will recall that, at our last plenary meeting, the Group of 21 requested that document CD/492, submitted by that Group and entitled "Draft mandate for the ad hoc subsidiary body on a nuclear test ban", be put before the Conference for decision at this plenary meeting. Accordingly, I intend now to put that document for decision. Before doing so, however, may I ask if any member wishes to take the floor at this stage?

I give the floor to the representative of Argentina as Co-ordinator for the Group of 21.

Mr. CARASALES (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): At the plenary meeting on Thursday 29 March, you, Mr. President, in your capacity as co-ordinator of the Group of 21, introduced document CD/492 which contains a draft mandate for the ad hoc committee to be established on item 1 of our agenda, entitled "nuclear test ban". On that occasion, when setting forth the position of the Group of 21 and stressing the urgent need to begin negotiations on the issue, you requested that the Conference should adopt a decision on the text contained in document CD/492 at today's plenary meeting.

It is not my intention to embark on an analysis of the substantive reasons for our position. All the delegations of our Group have done so repeatedly. Furthermore, our attitude, and the limited work carried out in 1983 by the negotiating body, are reflected in the report of the Committee on Disarmament to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session. But I should like to stress that, taking into account the insistence of many delegations, and primarily of the Group of 21, the President of the Conference on Disarmament began a series of informal meetings in order to reach a consensus to facilitate the beginning of effective negotiations to achieve an agreement on a complete nuclear test ban, through the setting up of the corresponding subsidiary body with an appropriate mandate.

Throughout those consultations the Group of 21, through its spokesmen, displayed a broad spirit of co-operation. It recalled the existence of a draft mandate put forward by the Group in 1981 and contained in document CD/181, which provided a suitable degree of flexibility. The draft mandate (CD/438) submitted on 24 February by a member of the Group of 21, the delegation of Mexico, was also on the negotiating table. There were also other possibilities which the Group of 21 was prepared to consider.

The long period which has transpired since the talks began on this issue, and the deadlock which this effort indicates, is precisely what brings the Group of 21 to request this forum to take a decision on this matter of high priority.

(Mr. Carasales, Argentina)

The Conference on Disarmament is already in its third and final month of the first part of its 1984 session, and despite this it remains unable to set up an ad hoc committee on one of the fundamental agenda items. The treatment of the item by the Conference has been confined to two plenary meetings, at which we heard once again reiterations of interest and goodwill, attitudes and statements which are not always consistent with the attitudes reflected in the informal consultations.

There is an enormous gap between what the vast majority of the international community has been calling for for more than 30 years and the response which the single multilateral disarmament negotiating body has given to this fully justified concern. The United Nations General Assembly has adopted over the years more than 40 resolutions on the subject. The last, partial, agreement on the subject was concluded more than 20 years ago.

The members of the Group of 21 have always been at the forefront of international efforts in this field, and were the driving force behind the consideration of this issue by the Committee on Disarmament.

The time which has lapsed since then and the self-evident inability so far to begin substantive negotiation on item 1 of our agenda is a source of profound concern to the Group of 21. We firmly believe that the Conference neither can nor should continue postponing a decision. On the contrary, it should vigorously embark on work which has been put off too long.

For this purpose, the Group of 21 has submitted document CD/492 containing a draft mandate which, in our opinion, is suitable for the urgent and appropriate treatment the issue requires. I must repeat that this draft mandate is, with a few formal changes, the same as the draft mandate presented by the delegation of Mexico on 24 February, in other words, that it was submitted for the consideration of all delegations more than a month ago.

The Group of 21 hopes that this draft mandate, which provides the ad hoc committee on the item with the responsibility of initiating immediately the multilateral negotiation of a treaty for the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests, and of endeavouring to ensure that a draft of such a treaty may be transmitted to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session, deserves the approval of this Conference, as we formally requested last week. In this manner we shall be beginning to respond to a profound concern on the part of the international community which has repeatedly been expressed and never satisfied.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Argentina. I give the floor to the representative of Hungary.

Mr. GAJDA (Hungary): Thank you, Mr. President. The head of my delegation will soon pay his tribute to you at one of our forthcoming meetings. In the meantime permit me now to say how much the Hungarian delegation is delighted to see you preside over the Conference on Disarmament and also to assure you, already at this moment, of our full co-operation in all your efforts aimed at achieving measurable progress in our common endeavours.

(Mr. Gajda, Hungary)

The delegations of the socialist countries on whose behalf my delegation has the honour now to speak, wish to express their confidence that you, Mr. President, will do your best in order to bring about the establishment of an ad hoc committee on a nuclear test ban, with a mandate that can facilitate real negotiations on the relevant draft treaty. I am convinced that there can hardly be a single delegation in this chamber that can have any doubts in its mind about the aims and aspirations of the socialist countries in the context we are talking about.

Our record is clear, and thoroughly known. It need not be elaborated any further at this juncture. It may suffice only to point out that the Working Paper (CD/484) tabled this morning by the distinguished ambassador of the German Democratic Republic on behalf of the socialist countries, including therefore the Hungarian People's Republic, concerning measures necessary to prevent nuclear war, contains a clear reference to the urgent need of achieving complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests as a fundamental step towards the cessation of the qualitative improvement and refinement of nuclear weapons. The Working Paper (CD/492) of the Group of 21 concerning a draft mandate for an ad hoc subsidiary body on a nuclear test ban, clearly reflects the same aspirations, the same urgent need, which makes it possible for the socialist countries to agree fully with that view and proposal. The draft mandate of the Group of 21 is, in a sense, identical with the one presented by our delegation in the middle of February in document CD/434. The socialist countries therefore welcome this new position statement by the Group of 21 and give their full support to it. Thank you, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Hungary. I give the floor to the representative of the USSR.

Mr. PROKOFIEV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): the Soviet Union has in the past attached, and continues to attach, paramount importance to the issue of a comprehensive nuclear test ban.

The position of the Soviet Union on a nuclear test ban has been set forth repeatedly and quite clearly at very different levels. The Conference on Disarmament has before it for consideration the Soviet draft "Basic provisions of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests", which, we believe, provides a practical basis for multilateral negotiations on this question, as it takes into account the comments of a wide range of States. The Soviet Union has consistently advocated the earliest conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

On the basis of this position of principle, we, together with other socialist countries, fully support the mandate for the ad hoc committee on item 1 of the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament proposed by the Group of 21 and contained in document CD/492.

We consider that this mandate makes it possible for the ad hoc committee to work out a draft agreement on the issue on a mutually acceptable basis, if, needless to say, there is goodwill and interest in the conclusion of such an agreement. This mandate

(Mr. Prokofiev, USSR)

makes it possible to conduct negotiations on all the basic elements of the issue of a nuclear test ban, including the problems of control and verification of compliance with a future convention. We are resolutely in favour of making a nuclear test ban a practical reality. In order to be successful, all that is required is that the United States and its closest allies should at last heed the request of the overwhelming majority of States and show the political will and readiness for a positive solution of this major and pressing contemporary problem.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the USSR. I now give the floor to the representative of the United Kingdom.

Mr. MIDDLETON (United Kingdom): Thank you, Mr. President. On behalf of my delegation, I would first join those who have welcomed you to the Presidency of the Conference for the month of April.

Mr. President, the position of my delegation with respect to the substance of the question before us was set out by Mr. Luce, the Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs on 14 February, and in view of the short time available to us I will not repeat what he then said. I would only say with respect to the draft mandate that is set before us today for decision that it is only one of a number that have been the subject of informal consultations under your distinguished predecessor, Ambassador Datcu.

My delegation fully supports the proposal that these consultations should continue in order that we reach a genuine compromise proposal, a genuine consensus. Because of that we consider it premature to take a decision on one particular draft today. We are therefore unable to agree to adopt this draft decision as set before us.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the United Kingdom. Is there any other delegation wishing to take the floor? I give the floor to the representative of Australia.

Mr. BUTLER (Australia): Thank you, Mr. President. As this is the first occasion on which I, as Head of the Australian delegation, have taken the floor at a plenary meeting following your taking the Chair at our Conference, may I congratulate you on doing so. We are delighted to see a representative of Sri Lanka in the Chair, a country which is close to Australia and with which we have a long and deep association. You know well, too, Mr. Chairman, that it is a little over 17 years ago that you and I met for the first time, and to see you in this Chair gives me particular personal pleasure. We are certain that you will guide the work of this Conference with the skill, wisdom and, I think, ethical perspective that you mentioned this morning, and which is typical of Sri Lankans as I know them.

My delegation is concerned at the device that has been used here today. It is true that a draft mandate in almost identical terms to the one embodied in document CD/492 has been before the Conference for some little while. It is also true that other suggested approaches to this question have been before the Conference

(Mr. Butler, Australia)

formally and informally, for some little while. It is my delegation's clear impression that with further consultation the substantive problems that are at issue could have been and, I believe, will be solved. There are substantive problems at issue, and I would like to refer to one of them, namely, the question that normally comes under the heading "Scope". This draft mandate restricts the consideration of the ad hoc subsidiary body to nuclear-weapon tests. It is the earnest hope of my Government that the treaty that we so earnestly desire and to which we are utterly committed will be wider in scope than such a treaty, and will embrace all nuclear tests without exception.

My delegation would therefore like to see a mandate adopted which reflected that objective, an objective to which I believe most delegations that have addressed this subject in this Conference and in its predecessor Committee have repeatedly committed themselves. Yet, when that commitment is translated into a possible mandate, it is restricted in its scope. My delegation would like to see these consultations continue. As I mentioned in our informal session, there are other ideas, some of which have originated with the Australian Government.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Australia for the kind remarks addressed to my country and to me personally.

Unless there are any other representatives who wish to take the floor, I would like to conclude our discussion on this subject.

In view of the statements just made, it is obvious that there is no consensus at present on the draft mandate contained in document CD/492.

Does any member wish to take the floor at this stage? I give the floor to the representative of Argentina.

Mr. CARASALES (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): I wish to make a short statement on behalf of the Group of 21, which I hope will be the last for today. It is the following.

In the light of what has just transpired, once again the Group of 21, and indeed the Conference on Disarmament itself and the international community in general, have been frustrated or remain frustrated in their efforts to establish a suitable instrument in order to begin meaningful negotiations on a nuclear-weapon test ban treaty. Despite all the efforts and flexibility shown by the Group of 21 in order to reach agreement upon a suitable mandate for the ad hoc committee to be set up on the agenda item, the refusal or the difficulties of some delegations have demonstrated the impossibility of reaching consensus, at least for the time being, on this priority issue.

The Group of 21, nevertheless, in its constant spirit of co-operation, is prepared to consider any proposal presented by any delegation on this question, and particularly by those delegations which so far, as I stated earlier, have not made it possible for the Conference on Disarmament to begin serious negotiations on this treaty, which is the first item on our agenda.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Argentina. As there is no other business for today, I intend to adjourn the plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 5 April at 10.30 a.m. The plenary meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 1.30 p.m.



# CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.256  
5 April 1984  
ENGLISH

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## FINAL RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND FIFTY-SIXTH PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Thursday 5 April 1984, at 10.30 a.m.

President:

Mr. J. Dhanapala

(Sri Lanka)

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria:

Mr. A. TAFFAR

Mr. A. BOUBAZINE

Argentina:

Mr. J.J. CARASALES

Mr. R. GARCÍA MORITAN

Mr. R. VILLAMBROSA

Australia:

Mr. R. ROWE

Ms. J. COURTNEY

Belgium:

Mr. M. DEPASSE

Mr. J. NOIRFALISSE

Brazil:

Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA

Mr. S. DE QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria:

Mr. K. TELLALOV

Mr. P. POPTCHEV

Mr. C. PRAMOV

Mr. N. MIHAILOV

Burma:

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

U PE THEIN TIN

U THAN TUN

Canada:

Mr. G.R. SKINNER

Mr. R.J. ROCHON

China:

Mr. QIAN JIADONG

Ms. WANG ZHIYUN

Mr. LIANG DEFENG

Ms. GE YIYUN

Mr. SUO KAIMING

Mr. ZHANG WEIDONG

Cuba:

Mr. P. NÚÑEZ MOSQUERA

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. M. VEJVODA

Mr. A. CIMA

Egypt:

Mr. S. ALFARARGI  
Ms. W. BASSIM  
Mr. I. HASSAN  
Mr. A. MAHER ABBAS

Ethiopia:

Mr. F. JOHANNES

France:

Mr. F. DE LA GORCE  
Mr. H. RENIE  
Mr. G. MONTASSIER

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. H. ROSE  
Mr. F. SAYATZ  
Mr. J. DEMBSKI

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. H. WEGENER  
Mr. W.E. VON DEM HAGEN  
Mr. F. ELBE  
Mr. GRAFPFEIL  
Mr. DE GROOT

Hungary:

Mr. F. GAJDA  
Mr. H. TOTH

India:

Mr. S. KANT SHARMA  
Mrs. LAKSHMI PURI

Indonesia:

Mr. S. SUTOWARDOYO  
Mrs. P. RAMADHAN  
Mr. ANDRADJATI  
Mr. HARYOMATARAM

Islamic Republic of Iran:

Mr. N. KAMYAB  
Mr. J. ZAHIRNIA

Italy:

Mr. M. ALESSI  
Mr. M. PAVESE  
Mr. L. FERRARI BRAVO  
Mr. B. CABRAS

Japan: Mr. M. IMAI  
Mr. K. MAKITA

Kenya: -

Mexico: Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES  
Mr. P. MACEDO RIBA  
Ms. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO

Mongolia: Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG  
Mr. S.O. BOLD

Morocco: Mr. A. SKALLI  
Mr. O. HILLALE  
Mr. M. CHRAIBI

Netherlands: Mr. J. HAMAKER  
Mr. R.J. AKKERMAN

Nigeria: Mr. L.O. AKINDELE

Pakistan: Mr. K. NIAZ

Peru: Mr. C. CASTILLO RAMIREZ

Poland: Mr. S. TURBANSKI  
Mr. G. CZEMPINSKI  
Mr. J. CIALOWICZ  
Mr. T. STROJWAS

Romania: Mr. I. DATCU  
Mr. T. MELESCANU  
Mr. P. BALOIU  
Mr. A. CRETU  
Mr. A. POPESCU

Sri Lanka: Mr. J. DHANAPALA  
Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA  
Mr. P. KARIYAWASAM

Sweden:

Mr. R. EKEUS  
Ms. E. BONNIER  
Ms. G. JONÄNG  
Ms. A. BRAKENHJELM  
Mr. H. BERGLUND  
Mr. J. LUNDIN  
Mr. S. ERICSON

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELIAN  
Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV  
Mr. R.M. TIMERBAEV  
Mr. G.V. BERDENNIKOV  
Mr. P.Y. SKOMOROKHIN  
Mr. S.V. KOBYSH  
Mr. G.V. ANTSIFEROV  
Mr. T.F. DMITZITCHEV  
Mr. V.I. USTINOV

United Kingdom:

Mr. L.J. MIDDLETON  
Mr. J.W.B. RICHARDS  
Mr. D.A. SLINN

United States of America:

Mr. L.G. FIELDS  
Mr. N. CLYNE  
Mr. N. CARRERA  
Ms. K.C. CRITTENBERGER  
Mr. R. HORNE  
Mr. R. NORMAN  
Mr. P. CORDEN  
Mr. H. CALHOUN  
Mr. C. PEARCY

Venezuela:

Mr. A. LOPEZ OLIVER  
Mr. T. LABRADOR RUBIO  
Mr. G. BRICANO  
Mr. O. GARCIA GARCIA

Yugoslavia:

Mr. K. VIDAS

Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC

Mr. D. DJOKIC

Zaire:

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Secretary-General of the Conference  
on Disarmament and Personal  
Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary-General of the  
Conference on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The PRESIDENT: The Conference on Disarmament is called to order.

The Conference continues today its consideration of item 7 on its agenda, entitled "New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons". However, in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

Immediately after this plenary meeting, I intend to convene a brief informal meeting to continue our consideration of organizational matters.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Venezuela, the Federal Republic of Germany, Romania and France.

I now give the floor to the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Ambassador Issraelyan.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Mr. President, first of all allow me to congratulate you on your accession to the responsible position of President of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of April. The Soviet Union deeply respects the policy of non-alignment followed by your country. The participation of Sri Lanka in the work of the Conference on Disarmament is a confirmation of its sincere interest in the achievement of progress in the field of disarmament. We hope that the relations of mutual understanding and co-operation between the delegations of the Soviet Union and of Sri Lanka will continue to develop. The Conference faces complex problems in the month of April, and we are confident that under your wise leadership everything will be done to resolve them successfully.

We would also like to express our appreciation to the distinguished President of the Conference in March, Ambassador Datcu, who guided the work of the Conference with his characteristic ability and made it possible to resolve some major organizational issues.

Today the Soviet delegation would like to refer to the question of the prevention of nuclear war. Without exaggeration one may say that this question is not only the most important item on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament, but also the focus of attention of the entire international community and world public opinion as a whole. And this is not incidental.

If one looks the facts in the face, without attempting to deceive or reassure either oneself or others, it is necessary to recognize that the threat of nuclear war is a real danger. Moreover, this danger is increasing. It has arisen not from any misunderstanding, ill-considered step or local crisis, but from the long-term military policy of one of the biggest States of the world — the United States of America, from the very dynamics of the arms race imposed on the world by the United States military-industrial complex. Do the supporters of the arms race realize in fact that nuclear war means death for everyone when, with an astonishing obstinacy, they impose these programmes for the build-up of nuclear forces, and the development and deployment of new types and systems of weapons,

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

which so upset the existing strategic balance that the outbreak of nuclear war becomes not only "thinkable", but quite possible if no end is put to this United States course.

The deployment of the new United States first-strike nuclear missiles in Western European countries cannot but cause particular concern. This action has created an additional threat to peace and security, making it impossible to pursue the Geneva talks on nuclear arms limitation in Europe. This action, on the part of the United States and NATO, has considerably increased the danger of nuclear war.

We note that the majority of the member States of the Conference on Disarmament share this point of view. I would like to recall an important statement made on 1 March by the representative of India on this issue, which points out: "... in 1984 we cannot afford to view the question of prevention of nuclear war from the standpoint of the previous years because the developments in 1983 indicate that the situation is well on the way to reaching the point of no return. Among other developments, the latest round of nuclear missile deployments in Europe has reduced the warning time between launch and destruction to a mere five minutes". The distinguished representative of India stressed: "To live with nuclear weapons is in itself an enormously precarious global predicament: but to live with launch-on-warning verily amounts to cliff-hanging". Those who created a new threat to peace by accepting the deployment of first-strike weapons in Europe would do well to think over those words.

Along with such just remarks, it has also been alleged at the Conference that the USSR bears the responsibility for the suspension of the Geneva bilateral talks and for the fact that the efforts aimed at nuclear arms limitation and reduction made on a bilateral basis for almost one and a half decades have been stalemated. To our regret, the references to the equal responsibility of "two Superpowers", to the need to conduct an "equidistant" policy, have not ceased, in spite of the fact that the USSR consistently comes out in favour of adopting effective and radical measures for the prevention of nuclear war, while the United States is against them. Is it right to put the question in such a way? In order to answer this question correctly the following should be borne in mind.

History teaches that there are negotiations and negotiations. True negotiations are pursued by the participating sides in good faith (as is required, incidentally, by a whole range of international legal instruments, such as the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, in Article VI), all efforts are made to achieve mutually acceptable agreements and treaties leading to the goal officially established prior to the negotiations.

However, negotiations are sometimes transformed into their opposite -- into "anti-negotiations". This happens when one or several participants in the negotiations begins to conduct them insincerely, not with a view to achieving a mutually acceptable agreement but in order to stall for time in order to attain some other goal, to mislead world public opinion, to transform the negotiations



(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

into a cover for their true intentions, and so on. These "anti-negotiations" are not at all conducted in good faith. Their participants, who seek to achieve such improper goals, usually lose the capability to understand the legitimate interests of the other side, deliberately put forward unacceptable proposals and continue to insist on them, whatever arguments are produced, and in general merely "go through the motions" in some way or another.

It is exactly such anti-negotiations that we are faced with here in Geneva. It is clear therefore that the entire responsibility for the lack of negotiations now rests with those who have undertaken them not as negotiations but as anti-negotiations.

One could give examples of the use of anti-negotiation tactics by some States during the deliberations at the Conference on Disarmament. In this connection, one could refer to the attempts to replace the negotiations aiming at working out agreements with various unofficial discussions and debates, to impose limited mandates on the subsidiary bodies of the Conference which do not make it possible to start negotiations, or to the open obstruction of the work of subsidiary bodies where those countries have already agreed to conduct negotiations (we exposed in detail an example of such obstruction in our previous statement). However, the practical implementation of these anti-negotiation tactics is becoming increasingly difficult.

The record of many years of work in the Conference on Disarmament provides graphic evidence of the Soviet Union's dedication to constructive and business-like negotiations. We shall consistently reject any attempts, including at the Conference on Disarmament, to turn international disarmament forums into a tool of propaganda to camouflage the arms race and cold-war policies. One cannot adopt long-term expanded programmes of nuclear-weapon tests in order to develop new types of weapons, including space weapons, and reject at the highest political level the idea of negotiations on the prohibition of, let us say, anti-satellite weapons, and at the same time declare at the Conference on Disarmament a readiness to continue consultations on the establishment of its subsidiary bodies on a nuclear-test ban or on the prevention of the arms race in space. As the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, K.U. Chernenko, stated: "We have not participated and will not participate in this game".

The greater the threat of nuclear war looming over human civilization, the more active become the forces of self-preservation of mankind. Resistance is growing to the actions of those who sacrifice the security of peoples to their imperial ambitions. People want peace and order, not military hysteria. More and more people are coming to the conclusion that intensive militarization and the aggravation of the international situation have never brought and will not bring any dividends in world politics. The results of the thirty-eighth session of the United Nations General Assembly are the best confirmation of this.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

The aspiration of peoples for peace and disarmament raises the hope that the course of events will eventually be turned towards the strengthening of peace, the limitation of the arms race, and the development of international co-operation and dialogue between States. Detente has struck deep roots. There is no reasonable alternative to it. No one can deny this.

Having in mind this noble goal, and desiring to make a concrete contribution to the efforts of many States towards the prevention of nuclear war, the socialist countries members of the Conference on Disarmament have submitted a new Working Paper (CD/484), which was introduced by the distinguished representative of the German Democratic Republic.

First of all I would like to point out that, in the solution of the task of preventing nuclear war, the policy of States possessing nuclear weapons is of significance. The vital interests of all mankind require that relations between those States should be regulated by certain norms, which they could agree among themselves to recognize and which should be given a binding international legal nature.

Our idea of these norms is as follows:

To regard the prevention of nuclear war as the main objective of one's foreign policy. To prevent situations fraught with nuclear conflict. In the event such a danger emerges, urgent consultations should be held to prevent a nuclear conflagration from breaking out.

To renounce propaganda for nuclear war in any of its variations, either global or limited.

To undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons.

Not to use nuclear weapons under any circumstances against non-nuclear-weapon countries, in whose territory there are no such weapons. To respect the status of nuclear-free zones already created and to encourage the creation of new nuclear-free zones in various areas of the world.

To prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons in any form: not to hand over these weapons or control over them to anyone; not to deploy them on the territory of the countries, where there are no such weapons; not to spread the nuclear-arms race to new spheres, including outer space.

To press, step by step, on the basis of the principle of equal security, for the reduction of nuclear arms, up to their complete elimination in all their varieties.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

The adoption of such norms would help to create a moral and political atmosphere in which any attempt to unleash nuclear war would be doomed to failure. In addition, it is the shared opinion of the socialist countries, as a development from the provisions of the Declaration on the Condemnation of Nuclear War adopted at the thirty-eighth session of the United Nations General Assembly, that it would be necessary that all States should be recommended to consider the question of including provisions condemning nuclear war in the appropriate unilateral and joint statements or declarations of a political nature.

It would be also useful for all States, and particularly nuclear-weapon States, to refrain from the elaboration, advancement, dissemination and propagation of political and military doctrines and concepts designed to support the "rightness" of the first use of nuclear weapons and, more generally, the "permissibility" of unleashing nuclear war. We are deeply convinced that no aim whatsoever can justify the first use of nuclear weapons.

As the discussions at the Conference show, the question of renunciation by all nuclear-weapon States of the first use of such weapons becomes all the more topical. Obligations to that effect could be assumed unilaterally by each nuclear-weapon State which has not yet done so. This method, which does not involve holding special talks or reaching agreement, would help to strengthen confidence and reduce the level of nuclear danger. At the same time, the undertakings by nuclear-weapon Powers to renounce the first use of nuclear weapons could also be incorporated in a unified instrument of international law, which, in practice, would be equivalent to the complete legal prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons.

In this connection we would like to refer to the important and interesting proposals on this issue contained in the statement of Ambassador Garcia Robles of Mexico on 6 March. We support the idea expressed in his statement "to undertake immediately" the elaboration of a multilateral agreement on the non-first use of nuclear weapons, and that "the subsidiary body which will have on its agenda the question on the prevention of nuclear war would ... offer an excellent forum for the urgent undertaking of the negotiations needed to conclude a treaty, convention or protocol on the question".

In addition, we again declare our support for the proposal for the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons with the participation of all nuclear-weapon Powers.

Such measures as the renunciation of the first use of nuclear weapons and ultimately the complete prohibition of their use would be an active means of preventing nuclear war and would enshrine in concrete form, in a manner applicable to present-day conditions, the norms of international law and principles set forth in the Charter of the United Nations. Proposals by socialist countries for the

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

general exclusion of the use of force, both nuclear and non-nuclear, from international relations, pursue the same purpose. At the global level, that could be done by concluding a world treaty on the non-use of force in international relations. Another important step in the same direction is the proposal put forward by a number of socialist countries in January 1983 to conclude a treaty on the mutual non-use of military force and the maintenance of peaceful relations between Warsaw Treaty and NATO member States, whose core would be the commitment of the States members of the two alliances not to be the first to use nuclear or conventional arms against one another.

At the same time the Soviet delegation reaffirms its readiness also to consider other appropriate measures such as the prevention of an accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons, the avoidance of the possibility of surprise attacks, etc., as was proposed inter alia in document CD/406. At the same time it is necessary to stress that various confidence-building measures can contribute towards the removal of the nuclear threat only in conjunction with far-reaching political undertakings in that field. They should be on a genuinely large scale and aimed first and foremost at the prevention of nuclear war.

Of no less importance would be measures of a material nature designed to ensure that various kinds of doctrines and concepts justifying the unleashing of nuclear war should not be supplied with a material basis in the form of new armaments systems.

One of the most effective and relatively easily applicable measures towards that end could be the freezing, under appropriate verification, of nuclear weapons in quantitative and qualitative terms. This step should be taken by all nuclear-weapon Powers or, in the first instance, only by the USSR and the United States of America on the understanding that the other nuclear-weapon States would follow their example.

To agree to a freeze would mean:

- to cease the build up of all components of nuclear arsenals, including all kinds of nuclear-weapon delivery systems and all kinds of nuclear weapons;
- not to deploy nuclear weapons of new kinds and types;
- to establish a moratorium on all tests of nuclear weapons and on tests of new kinds and types of their delivery systems;
- to stop the production of fissionable materials for the purpose of creating nuclear weapons.

A nuclear-weapon freeze would significantly improve the general political atmosphere and facilitate agreement on the reduction of nuclear arsenals.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

The cessation of the qualitative refinement of nuclear weapons and the development of new models and types of such weapons would be assisted by the earliest completion of the preparation of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests and, until the conclusion of such a treaty, by the proclamation by all nuclear-weapon States of a moratorium on all nuclear explosions.

Not claiming a monopoly in putting forward peace initiatives, we are prepared also to consider other measures designed to prevent nuclear war. The time has come to proceed from general words about the threat of nuclear catastrophe to concrete deeds, namely, to constructive negotiations on the above proposals with a view to achieving appropriate international agreements.

The Soviet Union reiterates its determination to start the elaboration of urgent and practical measures on the prevention of nuclear war and to set up for this purpose an appropriate subsidiary body of the Conference on Disarmament.

As the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Comrade K.U. Chernenko, stressed in his reply to the message of the leaders of the Socialist International on 4 April, "the Soviet Union will in future too steadfastly follow a course aimed at curbing the arms race, at a return to detente, and at the strengthening of European and international security".

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President.

I now give the floor to the representative of Venezuela, Ambassador Lopez Oliver.

Mr. LOPEZ OLIVER (Venezuela) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, we would like first of all to convey to you the congratulations and greetings of the delegation of Venezuela on your nomination as President of the Conference on Disarmament. We would also like to express our thanks both to you and to your predecessors for the effort put into the difficult task which has devolved on you. I should like to reiterate our co-operation and support in the execution of your very sensitive duties.

On this occasion my delegation wishes to take advantage of the great flexibility offered by rule 30 of the rules of procedure of this body to set out briefly some considerations on aspects of our work which we consider important and on some items of the agenda of the Conference.

Firstly, the United Nations General Assembly and many distinguished delegates in this forum have expressed concern at the circumstances surrounding the present discussions of the Conference on Disarmament. To their well-grounded concern we wish to add ours, which is that of a constitutional country with an established record of dedication to peace.

(Mr. Lopez Oliver, Venezuela)

The general deterioration in the international situation cannot but cause apprehension. The economies of many countries are experiencing a serious crisis. Hotbeds of political and military conflict persist, worsen and multiply in nearly all continents. Military expenditure in the world has reached the incredible figure of 800 billion dollars. Between East and West a state of military and political tension seldom before seen has been reached. The breaking-off or suspension of the negotiations on Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) and on strategic arms (START) is accompanied by an arms race which it is apparently impossible to stop, and the gap between the industrialized countries and the developing nations is today, more than ever, the culture broth and indeed the trigger of new conflicts of a social, political and, conceivably, military nature, which in its turn could foment the ideological confrontation which seems to be the sign of our times.

This sombre picture generates a collective insecurity which serves as a pretext for the arms race to become the mainspring of security and defence, which have acquired a higher priority than the comprehensive development of the peoples of the world.

In the circumstances, and in the face of the prospects they conjure up in our minds, we believe it is right to pause and ask ourselves whether the enormous economic effort mainly devoted by the great Powers to increasing their military power should not rather be aimed at improving their own economic and social structures and those of the developing countries. Would the result of that, for any political and social system, not be greater intrinsic protection, of a more solid and lasting nature, than can stem from the continuous and costly effort to achieve a position of military supremacy?

In any case, the present ominous situation has particular repercussions on the Conference on Disarmament, enhancing its importance as the only forum, not only in multilateral terms but quite simply as the only negotiating body on disarmament, and similarly enhancing its responsibility, in so far as it lays on it obligations which are in proportion to the seriousness of the present circumstances of world tension.

We believe, as André Fontaine so rightly said, that world tension is the cause of the arms race and the arms race is its effect. As a result, if this Conference really wishes to achieve disarmament, it is by promoting, if not the disappearance, at least more modestly and realistically a reduction, of the root cause, that it will achieve that end. And this reduction will be encouraged in so far as concrete results, however modest, are obtained in the Conference on Disarmament, corresponding to its negotiating function and thus making it possible to say, in Bertrand Russell's words, that conciliation and the gradual reduction of mutual hatred and fear must replace the present mistrust and tension among nations which prevent disarmament efforts from bearing their fruit.

For this reason we cannot but concur with the statement made by the distinguished Ambassador Imai of Japan, who stated with oriental wisdom in this forum on 9 February, "We think we have no other approach but to adopt step-by-step efforts to bring about improvements in the circumstances around us. In other words, we need to take measures which are feasible and effective under the present international circumstances. By this process we should be able to bring down, if only little by little, the level of armament without introducing destabilizing elements into the over-all picture of the balance of power. Such, it seems to us, is the most realistic approach and indeed our only alternative."

(Mr. Lopez Oliver, Venezuela)

In order to put this proposal into practice, we believe, as the Group of 21 noted in document CD/64, dated 27 February 1980, that "working groups (or however they are now called) are the best available machinery for the conduct of concrete negotiations within the (then) Committee on Disarmament", and that it is necessary to intensify the efforts of the Conference in that respect in areas which, after sensible and realistic consideration, will enable these concrete negotiations to be conducted and equally concrete results to be obtained. Wherever it is least difficult to obtain the expression of political will in favour of détente, we will achieve results which will in turn nourish this political will, and enable it to be displayed in more complex and difficult areas.

Approaching our work from this standpoint therefore, we think that the best sphere for attaining such concrete results in a fairly immediate future is to conclude a treaty on prohibition of manufacture, storage and use of chemical weapons and the destruction of existing stockpiles.

Some important work has been done here, as can be seen from the report submitted by Ambassador McPhail. Very important expressions of political will have been forthcoming from the Great Powers, either in the form of the announced submission, we hope in the near future, of draft texts of a convention, or by taking a favourable position regarding basic issues such as the systematic international verification of the destruction of stockpiles of chemical weapons.

These circumstances, in addition to the uninterrupted work of the Ad Hoc Committee which is negotiating this topic, lead us to think that the Conference is faced with an opportunity which it should not allow to pass and consequently should as soon as possible go on to the phase of drawing up a draft convention, bearing in mind all the initiatives submitted in that respect.

Another area where we consider that positive results could be obtained is the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Bearing in mind that although the danger which that arms race represents has already technically materialized, it has not reached the level at which it cannot be stopped, and considering the serious strategic destabilizing effects of the development of anti-satellite systems (ASAT) or intercontinental anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems, there can be no doubt that this subject must be tackled without delay, in accordance with the spirit and the letter of General Assembly resolution 38/70, adopted on 17 January 1984. The current instruments governing the use of outer space are certainly inadequate and full of gaps, but in optimistic terms, these gaps should permit the Conference, in filling them, to complete and perfect those instruments. As a member of the Group of 21, Venezuela has expressed its support for the proposals which that Group submitted last year in the respective contact group in document CD/329; in addition, in so far as it is bound by the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, of 1967 it has a particular interest that the threat of war should not be taken into that sphere.

Also of particular importance is the topic of the nuclear test ban. We admit that in this respect we cannot be as optimistic as in others since, as is well known, since 1945 at least 1,469 nuclear explosions have taken place, and what is more

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serious, nearly 1,000 of them after the signing in 1963 of the Partial Test Ban Treaty. We consider, however, that the holding in 1985 of the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the linking of that Treaty to the Test Ban Treaty should give a renewed impetus to negotiation in that regard, on pain of discrediting the validity and efficiency of the Non-Proliferation Treaty to which Venezuela is a signatory, and is therefore committed to seeking to preserve and improve it. We therefore support the draft mandate for the ad hoc subsidiary body on a nuclear test ban submitted by the Group of 21 in document CD/492, dated 28 March, and hope that substantive progress will be made in that area, particularly bearing in mind the very important technical advances made in planning measures to identify and detect seismic events.

We also propose that a convention banning radiological weapons should be drafted as soon as possible. In this regard we would reiterate that although the definition of such weapons is unclear, and the linking of the issue of those weapons to that of the prohibition of attacks on nuclear reactors does not facilitate treatment of the question, the lack of definition would precisely make it possible for modest but concrete progress to be made; and that if in the course of negotiations the temporary postponement, which we do not wish, of the consideration of the link between the topics were justified in order to allow progress in the negotiations, we would be prepared to consent to that sacrifice.

We naturally allocate the highest importance to the items on the prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters, nuclear disarmament, the comprehensive programme of disarmament and the so-called negative security assurances. Please believe me, however, when I say regretfully that in the present circumstances my delegation regards the present situation with the utmost pessimism. On other occasions we have devoted our efforts to expressing our opinion on the theory of deterrence and we have stressed what the honourable representatives to this Conference have said and reiterated on the terrible danger of the annihilation of mankind. Today we think it is better to address ourselves to the conscience of the Great Powers, and with the utmost serenity and firmness appeal for reflection on so grave a matter. When the President of Venezuela, Dr. Jaime Lusinchi, recently took office on 2 February as head of my country's Government, he said, and I quote his words referring to the nuclear threat: "The time for adjustments cannot be postponed, and in this process of correcting our course, of providing the possibility of a better future for all nations, the responsibility is clear and rests in only a few hands. This is a dramatic fact."

But however dramatic the facts may be, they should not tie our hands. I would conclude my statement with a quotation from a blind visionary, that venerable old man, Jorge Luis Borges, who, quoting fragments from a gospel which he says is apocryphal, although it is his own, warns us that "Nothing is built upon rock and everything upon sand, but our duty is to build as if the sand were rock".

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Venezuela for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President.

I now give the floor to the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador Wegener.



Mr. WEGENER (Federal Republic of Germany): Mr. President, let me first congratulate you on the assumption of your elevated office, and allow me to contribute an anecdotic reference in order to illustrate the pleasure of my delegation to see you in that position. Your predecessor went to Bonn as Ambassador of Sri Lanka to my Government, and my own predecessor went to Colombo to represent the Federal Republic of Germany there. Both did so not only of their own free will, but because they had singled out their new positions as a matter of personal predilection and had actively sought their nomination. Both of them, as I reliably know, feel very much at ease in their new habitat. What better proof of the excellent quality of the relations between Sri Lanka and the Federal Republic of Germany?

Once again I would like to turn to the subject of chemical weapons. Our session has been rich in new constructive proposals and working papers, submitted with a view to accelerating our negotiating work, and we all know that another important comprehensive proposal is pending. My delegation wishes to add to this useful and increasingly concrete collection of specific working papers. I have the honour to introduce a Working Paper (CD/496) that contains considerations on the form in which a ban on the use of chemical weapons should be included in the convention. The Working Paper also contains a new approach to the right of withdrawal from the future convention.

Our work so far on the question of non-use, as an important part of the scope of the future treaty, has been fruitful, especially in the past year. My delegation has followed the negotiations in that field with a great interest and has particularly welcomed the fact that there is now a consensus on the necessity to complete the scope of the treaty by a non-use provision. There is hope that the remaining difficulties relating to the precise formulation of that interdiction can be sorted out quickly. My delegation wishes to further that process by placing the non-use concept in context, facilitating the choice of delegations among the various alternative formulations that have been introduced and discussed since last year.

The German Government ratified the Geneva Protocol of 1925 on the non-use of chemical weapons as early as 1929. It was among those Governments that attached no condition to their act of ratification. As is well known, the Federal Republic of Germany in 1954 completed these self-imposed restraints by a unilateral undertaking never to produce chemical as well as bacteriological and nuclear weapons. The Federal Republic of Germany is one of the most densely-populated countries on earth, situated in an equally densely-populated, critical region. The application of this barbarian weapon in such an environment would have disastrous, inconceivable effects, in particular among the unprotected civilian population. The primary interest of my Government in seeing the existing non-use regime concerning chemical weapons strengthened and effectively enforced is, under these circumstances self-evident.

I stress this at an unfortunate juncture. Recent events in another region of the world have proved that the use of chemical weapons still finds its victims on

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the battle fields and among innocent civilian populations. Now that the terrifying facts surrounding that recent new application of chemical weapons become clearer, this Conference should be even more strongly motivated in attempting to solve the remaining technical difficulties on the question of how to include a non-use provision in a future chemical weapons convention.

As readers of the Working Paper will recognize, the Paper contains a reasoned preference for the first formulation from among the several texts proposed by the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons of the Committee on Disarmament last year (document CD/416, Annex I A/2 b).

The second part of the Working Paper contains proposals relating to a rarely discussed yet important chapter of the future convention, the possibility of suspension or withdrawal in the event of violation of treaty stipulations by other States parties. The underlying consideration of this part of the Paper is that withdrawal from a convention of this nature is a particularly grave and undesirable event and that States parties should be allowed to disassociate themselves from their contractual commitments only in very exceptional circumstances. The new element in the suggestions offered is a graduated withdrawal process, under which States parties would be allowed, with regard both to the degree of withdrawal and to the point in time when it could be effected, to respond only in proportion to a breach of the treaty by another State party.

I would wish that delegations in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons would closely study this Working Paper and find it useful for their work in the forthcoming weeks and months.

Before concluding, Mr. President, let me make a brief specific comment on those statements and working papers which have recently dealt with the question and modalities of national means of verification as one important element in the comprehensive verification scheme which the future convention will have to provide. I would like to make reference both to the statement of Ambassador Turbanski of Poland of 15 March, and to the equally interesting statement by Minister Mihajlović from Yugoslavia, presented to us on 3 April, when he introduced a Working Paper by his delegation on the subject (CD/483). In a comprehensive verification framework, where the necessary place is assigned to effective international controls of requisite detail and intensity, national means of verification also have a legitimate role to play, and we should be grateful to the two aforementioned speakers for having brought out this essential fact, and for having provided guidelines for national verification measures, showing what they can accomplish within their particular domain.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President.

I now give the floor to the representative of Romania, Ambassador Datcu.

Mr. DATCU (Romania) (translated from French): Mr. President, one of the few privileges of which I deliberately made use at the end of March was to be the first to convey my congratulations to you on your accession to the Presidency of this Conference.

I should nevertheless like to take this opportunity to assure you of the wholehearted support of the Romanian delegation in the discharge of your important responsibilities. Your country, the Republic of Sri Lanka -- with which Romania enjoys excellent relations -- provides ample illustration of the importance of the active participation of the non-aligned countries, of the small and medium sized countries, to the solution of major international issues, of which disarmament is the most pressing.

The Romanian delegation wishes today to make a few preliminary remarks on our negotiations on the question of chemical weapons. But before broaching that subject, I should like to draw the attention of the Conference to document CD/493, circulated at the request of the Romanian delegation, which contains the text of the Appeal of our Parliament, the Grand National Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Romania, to the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Congress of the United States of America, the parliaments of European countries on whose territories intermediate-range missiles are installed, and the parliaments of other European countries and Canada.

The Grand National Assembly proposes the holding of a meeting of representatives of the parliaments of the European countries, as well as of the United States and Canada, to examine the extremely serious situation created on the continent and to formulate and propose ways and means and solutions for the adoption of measures opening the way to the freeing of the continent of all nuclear weapons.

The circulation of the text of the Appeal at this time, when the Inter-Parliamentary Conference is holding its seventy-first session, with the problems of security and disarmament included in its agenda, clearly demonstrates the importance which my country attaches to the negotiations, carried out in a spirit of trust and lofty responsibility, which could lead to agreements designed to avert the danger of a devastating nuclear war. The Appeal of my country's Grand National Assembly aims at concerting the efforts of the members of parliament of the countries concerned in order to work together to reduce international tension and halt the nuclear-arms race, thus opening the way for agreements for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons in Europe.

Of all the items included in the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament, the question of chemical weapons is this year in a special situation. We believe that the time has come to conclude a comprehensive agreement outlawing chemical weapons.

First of all, for a reason of principle. In the international situation of unprecedented gravity in which the world finds itself today, the adoption of genuine practical disarmament measures is more than ever necessary both for the very credibility of this Conference and to help to overcome the present deadlock in disarmament negotiations. In no other field is the military risk smaller and the political yield greater than in the elimination of the machinery of chemical warfare. That is why the Romanian delegation believes that, without

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in any way affecting the absolute priority which must be attached to the nuclear issues included in its agenda, the Conference should make a special effort in order to make it possible to present a positive balance-sheet to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session. This balance-sheet expected of us should respond to the spirit of resolutions 38/187 A and B adopted last year on the question of chemical weapons.

In this connection, we would like to express our support for the dynamic and able activities of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Rolf Ekéus of Sweden. It may be said that it is largely due to his efforts that the Ad Hoc Committee has a suitable negotiating structure. As for the substance of the negotiations, we have the major initiatives and contributions made by the delegations of the USSR, China, Yugoslavia, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, France and other delegations. We are also awaiting with interest the proposals of the United States of America on a draft convention concerning chemical weapons.

Romania has always firmly advocated the complete prohibition and total destruction of chemical weapons. On 17 July 1981 our delegation introduced Working Paper CD/197 containing proposals on definitions and criteria for the classification of chemical weapons. We note that these suggestions correspond to those put forward by other delegations. The existence of many common points suggests that the Working Group chaired by the distinguished representative of Brazil, Mr. Sergio de Queiroz-Duarte, has good chances of presenting agreed provisions for the future convention.

With regard to the object of the convention, the Romanian delegation believes that it should contain a general prohibition of all types of agents of chemical warfare, both super-toxic lethal chemicals and "incapacitants", in view of the fact that even the latter may be used in war with harmful consequences, above all for smaller countries which do not possess suitable and effective means of protection. The prohibition of the use of chemical weapons in any armed conflict must also be included in the convention. We also favour the idea of finding a suitable formula for prohibiting in future all military preparations aimed at the use of chemical weapons, and above all research, modernization and improvement activities concerning the means intended for the transport of chemical warfare agents, as well as manoeuvres, military applications and other military experiments involving the possible use of chemical weapons.

The elimination of existing chemical-weapon stocks and means of production is closely linked with the question of their declaration and of verification. In the opinion of the Romanian delegation, the initial declarations of chemical-weapon stocks should be made within 30 days following the entry into force of the convention for a State party. With regard to the rate of destruction of chemical warfare agents and of their means of utilization, we believe that a progressive, stage-by-stage programme with a precise time-table should be drawn up. The basis for the calculation of the time-table should be the time required for the destruction of the stocks of chemical weapons held by the countries with the largest quantities and the greatest potential for carrying out chemical war. The programme should begin with lethal super-toxic chemical warfare agents and conclude with incapacitants and expired and inoperative stocks.

We believe that the Working Group chaired by our colleague, Mr. Robert Jan Akkerman of the Netherlands, has all the necessary information to present a universally acceptable approach to all these problems.

(Mr. Datcu, Romania)

The verification of the substantive provisions of the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons is a fundamental element of this international instrument.

In the opinion of the Romanian delegation, verification should consist in a combination of national and international means, including an obligatory system of systematic inspection, including on-site inspection, as an important instrument for creating and maintaining a climate of trust between the States parties. We appreciate the important proposals made on this subject by the delegations of the USSR, China, United States, Sweden and the Netherlands.

We believe that every State should have the right, set forth in the convention, to adopt the necessary measures in accordance with its constitutional procedures to implement the undertakings entered into and in particular to prevent and prohibit any activity constituting a violation of the convention.

With regard to national technical means, our delegation believes that their inclusion in the convention will create no difficulty if it is stipulated that all parties have the right to free access to the information gathered.

The Working Group ably chaired by the representative of the German Democratic Republic, Dr. Hubert Thielicke, may do very important preparatory work in the field of verification.

We believe that an important part of the future Convention should consist of the transitional provisions, in particular to establish the necessary juridical links between the future Convention and the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Warfare. In this part of the Convention it would be possible to envisage, for example, the adoption of an undertaking by parties to refrain, even before the entry into force of the Convention, from any use of chemical weapons outside the reservations already expressed in the Protocol, as well as a special transitional regime during the period required for the total destruction and complete elimination of stockpiles of chemical weapons and of the facilities producing chemical warfare agents.

The preamble of the future Convention will also play an important role both in placing the instrument in its real setting of efforts aimed at the prohibition of all weapons of mass destruction, and above all nuclear weapons, as well as in resolving some questions which the parties, for one reason or another, have not been able to include in the body of the Convention itself.

I should like to conclude these observations concerning chemical weapons by referring to what the Romanian delegation expects from our negotiations during this session of the Conference on Disarmament. In our opinion, the premises exist for us to be able to submit for consideration by the General Assembly a first draft of the text of the future Convention in the areas covered by Working Groups A and B, and a first series of agreed conclusions concerning verification (Working Group C).

I should like to assure the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons of the full support of the Romanian delegation in achieving these objectives.

(Mr. Datcu, Romania)

Before concluding this statement today, I would like to make a few remarks concerning the organization of our work. The Romanian delegation wishes to stress the results achieved by the Conference this year in the adoption of the agenda and programme of work, the creation of some ad hoc committees and the solution of some organizational problems, which, as you know, it was not easy to do. We are quite familiar with the stage reached by informal consultations on the creation of subsidiary bodies for the other agenda items. In some areas progress has been made and a number of positions have become defined, thus enabling us to pursue the search for compromise solutions.

We believe that during the month of April a special effort should be made by all delegations so that we may proceed to set up subsidiary bodies on the other agenda items. We think that the creation of an ad hoc committee on radiological weapons, an ad hoc committee on the prevention of nuclear war, an ad hoc committee on the prevention of the arms race in outer space, and an ad hoc committee on a nuclear test ban is not merely desirable but also possible.

We need to set up these subsidiary bodies, and to have them begin work rapidly, as essential instruments for negotiation. As has already been universally recognized in this chamber, negotiations carried out in a spirit of mutual respect, in order to agree on disarmament measures accepted by all 40 members, remains the fundamental and essential purpose of this Conference, its raison d'être.

It may therefore be said that any subject is negotiable here except for the very reason for our presence around this table.

For our part, we remain firmly convinced that the resources and value of the many means at our disposal to carry out and promote dialogue, contacts, consultations and negotiations are far from having been exhausted.

I would like to assure the President of the Conference that our delegation is prepared to accept any procedural solution which he may propose at this stage in our work for the continuation of negotiations on these major issues. It must be stressed that a clear display of political will by every delegation is absolutely necessary for our negotiations to have any chance of success.

This month of April is a key month for the Conference. If the subsidiary bodies on high-priority issues are not set up, the very credibility of our Conference will be seriously jeopardized; we cannot allow ourselves such a failure.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Romania for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President.

I now give the floor to the representative of France, Ambassador de la Gorce.

Mr. de la GORCE (France) (translated from French): Mr. President, the French delegation wishes first of all to extend to you its congratulations and very warm wishes for success in your activities in guiding the work of the Conference during the month of April. It is happy to see the Presidency occupied by the representative of Sri Lanka, a country with which France enjoys very friendly relations and which makes a particularly active and valuable contribution to international co-operation.

(Mr. de la Gorce, France)

You have not been with us for long, but we have already appreciated your talents as a diplomat, your wisdom, your authority and your courtesy. We are sure that during your period of office you will pursue the brilliant tradition represented by your predecessors, Ambassadors Fonseka and Jayakoddy.

I should also like to express our heartfelt gratitude to your predecessor, Ambassador Datcu, for his tireless work last month. We admired the talent and patience with which he tackled the solution of particularly complex issues concerning the organization of our work. His efforts have made a very useful contribution to the progress of our consultations.

The French Government has repeatedly stressed the capital importance which it attaches to the elimination of chemical weapons. Their use is, of course, prohibited by international law, and in particular by the Protocol signed in Geneva in 1925, of which France is a depositary. The international community's concern with regard to respect for the provisions of the Protocol led the United Nations General Assembly to adopt the resolution setting out a procedure to examine allegations of the use of chemical weapons. That concern and the measures proposed to respond to it were, alas, only too justified.

The information which the delegation of Iran provided us with here led the Secretary-General to carry out an investigation. The conclusions of that investigation are known to us all. Thus, the chemical threat continues to weigh upon the world. Chemical weapons exist, and despite treaties they have been used and may be used again. Their manufacture requires a technology which is widely available.

Chemical disarmament is therefore a major task for the international community, because it alone can completely eliminate any possibility of use by the destruction of the products and of the weapons. We must pursue this task here with the utmost determination. The number and the quality of the contributions presented so far, and the contribution we are awaiting from the United States, are an earnest of that determination. The conditions therefore seem this year to exist for what we hope will be decisive progress.

The French delegation wishes to introduce today a contribution, contained in document CD/494, on the elimination of stock and of production facilities for chemical weapons. It hopes that a methodical presentation of its positions on this capital aspect of the negotiations will be useful at the present stage in our work. I shall consider the following three points successively: declaration, destruction and verification.

With regard ~~first~~ to declarations, States must declare, on their own responsibility, ~~their~~ stocks and production facilities. These declarations must be detailed ~~in the same~~, such precision will generate trust and simplify control. The document which my delegation has just submitted therefore includes a large number of ~~binding~~ provisions.

We stress the importance of the information provided unilaterally. It is our concern to keep interference to a minimum. This rule also leads us not to demand that the sites or arsenals at which the declared stocks are kept should be inspected. Finally, in the implementation of the suggested control procedures, with regard to precursors, or production facilities, we are concerned not to jeopardize the protection of industrial secrecy.

(Mr. de la Gorce, France)

Furthermore, every State party to the Convention should propose its own destruction plans and time-table, and naturally divulge any unexpectedly discovered stock. On the other hand, we consider it an unnecessary complication to seek to establish dates of manufacture or of stockpiling.

With regard to destruction, this should of course cover all chemical weapons.

Of course, we may, as a temporary derogation during the transitional period, admit that some quantities of toxic chemicals mentioned in the Convention should be used for protective purposes, or that pilot production facilities, which are therefore limited and controlled, should be maintained for that purpose. But within 10 years the stocks, production facilities and single-purpose precursors should be totally destroyed. We do not believe that conversion operations may be envisaged: this would involve the construction of facilities which might work both ways, in a reversible manner, thus maintaining a potential prohibited production capacity. Furthermore, the control of such conversion facilities would be both complicated and unsure. We simply accept that a chemical-weapon production plant should be converted into a destruction plant; but at the end of the cycle it should be destroyed. Finally, we wish to provide every possible guarantee that after 10 years there may be no possible return to the manufacture or use of chemical warfare agents.

With regard to verification, I do not wish here to go into the details of the various procedures, but shall merely recall that for each operation they will take place in three stages: prior to the operation, during the operation and, finally, after it. International on-site inspection will verify the sites for the regrouping and destruction of stocks. The destruction process will also be continuously monitored; finally, destruction should be duly verified. The same applies to production facilities: their closure will be verified, and then their destruction, both during the process and on its completion.

Finally, an effective and permanent human presence will not be necessary everywhere and in all cases. However, the technology which produces sensors and recorders, which will certainly have to be used, is not yet sufficiently advanced to make it possible to forego all human intervention, whether occasional or continuous, as the case may be.

If correctly carried out, the operations described above — declaration, destruction and verification — will lead to the desired goal of the final elimination of chemical weapons.

Some implementation modalities are of special importance during the transitional period. They should of course take into account both the rights and the obligations of States. The first of these rights is, of course, the right to security.

This implies that destruction should be carried out in a manner consonant with the size of the stocks and the facilities.

The time-table for destruction should be drawn up in such a way that a security balance may be maintained throughout the process, and that the latter will lead to the simultaneous elimination of all chemical warfare capabilities.



(Mr. de la Gorce, France)

Among the provisions aimed at ensuring the security of the parties, I should like to stress the order to be established for the elimination of the stocks and of the facilities. Details are given in the document itself.

In this connection, the French delegation suggests that production facilities should be destroyed in the following order: first the filling shops, then the toxic substance production units, and finally the precursor production units. This method, in our opinion, provides an additional guarantee. The first stop in the production line would thus be made at a point such that, from the very beginning of the process, the conservation of stocks of toxic chemicals would become useless, because those stocks could no longer be prepared for military purposes.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of France for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President.

That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor?

The Secretariat has circulated today an informal paper giving a time-table for meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary body on Chemical Weapons during the coming week. As usual, the time-table is merely indicative and subject to change if necessary. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the time-table.

It was so decided.

As indicated in the time-table, and as announced by my predecessor at the plenary meeting on 15 March, I shall put before the Conference for consideration and action at our next plenary meeting the reports of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, contained in documents CD/448 and CD/449. After listening to statements of delegations in connection with those reports, on that occasion I shall invite the Conference to take note of the Third Report of the Ad Hoc Group as contained in document CD/448 and afterwards to adopt the recommendation contained in paragraph 10 of the Progress Report appearing in document CD/449.

I now intend to adjourn the plenary meeting and convene in five minutes time a brief informal meeting to consider some pending organizational matters.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 10 April, at 10.30 a.m. The plenary meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 12.25 p.m.

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