

**UNITED NATIONS  
FOREIGN SERVICE  
TRAINING COURSE**

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**PINE, BARBADOS**

**4 November to 12 December 1963**



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## INTRODUCTION

1. A Foreign Service Training Course was organized by the United Nations from 4 November to 12 December 1963 to study the problems in this field which might be experienced by the Caribbean countries. Participation was limited to candidates from Barbados, British Guiana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. The University of the West Indies co-operated in the venture by making available the premises of the Extra-Mural Department of the University at Pine, Barbados. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace made available a number of information brochures and other publications.
2. Mr. James Keen, Regional Representative of the Technical Assistance Board and Director of Special Fund Programmes in the Caribbean, was the Director of the Course, and Mr. Fred Phillips, Assistant Registrar at the University of the West Indies, was Co-Director. Mr. A. Alagappan of the United Nations Secretariat was the Substantive Secretary. The Training Course was attended by thirty-six participants. A list of the lecturers is given in annex III.
3. The Foreign Service Training Course was inaugurated by the Premier of Barbados, the Honourable Mr. Errol W. Barrow. The Premier stressed the need for developing foreign services for the countries in the region which would prove to be effective instruments in promoting their objectives. His Excellency, Sir John Stow, who was present at the inauguration, made reference to the importance of diplomacy to the countries from which the participants had been selected.
4. Mr. James Keen, the Director of the Course, read a message from Dr. Victor Hoo, the United Nations Commissioner for Technical Assistance,<sup>1/</sup> and expressed the hope that the Course would help the participants to acquire knowledge, skill, experience and understanding which would be useful to them in their later tasks.
5. Mr. Fred Phillips, the Co-Director, proposed a vote of thanks for the inaugural meeting.
6. In the following report, an attempt is made to provide some idea of the substance of the lectures and discussions which covered the main subjects.

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<sup>1/</sup> For the text of this speech, see annex IV.



## I. CONCEPTS OF DIPLOMACY

### The Evolution of Diplomacy

7. The concept of diplomacy has many usages, making it necessary to be explicit about which meaning of the word is being used on any particular occasion. The most quoted writer on diplomacy, Sir Harold Nicolson, points out that it is used as a synonym for foreign policy, to refer to the process and machinery by which a foreign policy is executed, and to designate an abstract quality or skill in human relations. Nicolson prefers to use it to mean "the management of international relations by negotiation; the method by which these relations are adjusted and managed by ambassadors and envoys; the business or art of the diplomatist."<sup>2/</sup> Another authority on diplomacy, Sir Ernst Satow, defines diplomacy as:

"The application of intelligence and tact to the conduct of official relations between the governments of independent states, extending sometimes also to their relations with vassal states; or, more briefly still, the conduct of business between states by peaceful means."<sup>3/</sup>

Negotiation appears in virtually all definitions of diplomacy, but there is a tendency to indicate that the negotiations of diplomats require extreme skill and shrewdness.

8. The limitation of diplomacy to negotiation is too restrictive. The word diplomacy may be said to mean the activities of national officials who are in direct communication with national officials from other nations. This communication is often, but not always, face to face.

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<sup>2/</sup> Harold Nicolson, Diplomacy (2nd ed.; New York: Oxford, 1950), p. 15.

<sup>3/</sup> Sir Ernst Satow, A Guide to Diplomatic Practice (4th ed.; London: Longmans, Green, 1957), p. 1.

9. Often diplomats are looked upon as persons who are engaged in activities that are completely unlike the tasks of other professions, but this is not actually the case. Diplomats are negotiators, but so are labour leaders. Diplomats observe what is going on in a foreign nation and report home, but so do overseas representatives of private corporations. Similar analogues could be cited in other professions. Nonetheless, though the tasks of diplomats are not entirely different from those of other professions, there are characteristics of their roles that merit attention:

- (a) They are separated from the main body of the governmental organization of which they are a part. This requires greater capacity for independent decision and action than is the case for civil servants at home.
- (b) They are continually immersed in an alien culture. This requires ~~the~~ capacity not only to tolerate a variety of customs and values, but also the ability to move sensitively among people who espouse ideas far different from their own.
- (c) Much of the work of diplomats is done through face-to-face contact with other officials. The ability quickly to establish rapport and trust with other people can facilitate the conduct of these personal relationships.

10. It is not necessary to enumerate the changes taking place in the world in which the diplomat works, though it might be useful to summarize some of the major dimensions of change. First, there is the tremendous growth in the number of independent nation units. Second, there is a tendency towards the development of an inclusive, or universal, international system. Third, there are changes in communications, both in the movement of people and messages, which have dramatically altered the relations between diplomats and their home governments. Fourth, these same changes in communications have brought national populations into more direct contact with foreign affairs and with the formulation of foreign policy. Fifth, the substantive interests of diplomats have greatly broadened with the expansion of international trade, the creation of economic aid and information programmes and the involvement of diplomats in scientific information exchange. Sixth, there has been a phenomenal growth in the number of international organizations. Seventh, there has been a great increase in the amount of private international relations - through trade, travel and overseas business activities.

11. Some of these changes intensify the difficulties that a new nation encounters in trying to create a foreign service. For example, the increasing need for specialists, in contrast to the traditional diplomatic generalist, brings severe difficulties for the small foreign service. Even the established foreign services are having difficulty in adapting to change. Though a country such as the United States may have a supply of needed specialists, Michael Cardozo points out how difficult it is for them to break into a service that has been almost the exclusive preserve of the generalist. He shows how difficult it is for an established diplomatic corps to adapt to the demands brought on by participation in international organizations.<sup>4/</sup> Though the problems of the new foreign service are many, they can start afresh, less encumbered by tradition and the vested interests of people with long tenure but outmoded skills.

12. It may be useful to remember four admonitions when one begins to think about a career in diplomacy. Any preconceived ideas one has about what a "diplomat" is should be forgotten. Second, one should consider the diplomat as a part of a network of individuals that links a nation with the outside world. In this framework, one must try to maximize every opportunity whether or not it conforms to preconceived notions about diplomacy. Third, initiative should be exerted to acquire the skills or specialized knowledge which can improve one's effectiveness. Fourth, it should be remembered that diplomatic communities are going through revolutionary changes which are as significant as those within new nations. Modern diplomats should not be overawed by the traditionalists, but should endeavour to develop new norms that will serve the coming age.

A. The effect of international organizations on diplomatic practice

13. The establishment of international organizations has consequences for the practice of diplomacy that go far beyond what we mean when we describe diplomacy within them as "public" or "multilateral diplomacy."<sup>5/</sup>

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<sup>4/</sup> Michael H. Cardozo, Diplomats in International Co-operation: Step-children of the Foreign Service (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1962), pp. 119-122.

<sup>5/</sup> The points summarized here are more fully developed in Chadwick F. Alger, "Inter-governmental relations in organizations and their significance for international conflict" (to be published in Elton B. McNeil, ed., Special Science and Human Conflict. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965).

14. First, the establishment of an international organization in any international system brings the continual access of more nations to each other. There are a few large nations that have representation in virtually all independent nations and in whose capitals are to be found representatives from most other nations. Smaller nations may have representatives in countries which are geographically close, which have a similar posture in international affairs, or with which they have important commercial relationships. Very small nations may only have diplomatic relations with a few other states. Quite noticeable in the traditional pattern of diplomatic representation is the great number of smaller nations who do not exchange diplomatic representatives. In an international organization, however, all nations which are members can easily establish direct contact with all other member states.

15. Second, participation in international organizations brings about the direct access of more officials of each nation to officials from other nations. The United Nations provides a dramatic example of the way in which linkages between national governments are increased. About sixty foreign ministers gather during the General Assembly each fall and conduct an extensive round of talks. Assembly delegations also include numerous foreign office officials, diplomats from overseas posts, officials from other government departments, over one hundred national parliamentarians and distinguished private citizens. Furthermore, the continual round of meetings throughout the year, particularly the subsidiary bodies of the Economic and Social Council, involve members of national governments and private experts from many fields of knowledge.

16. Third, diplomacy in international organizations is practised in a setting in which there are diminished restraints on day-to-day inter-governmental contact. This is largely because so much diplomacy in international organizations is carried out at the organization headquarters, which is neutral territory. Attendance at a continuous schedule of meetings constantly throws members of the diplomatic community together. Participation in parliamentary-like activity requires each diplomat to establish wide contacts in other delegations, and the pressure of business encourages informal working relationships. The establishment of informal rapport is also encouraged by the sharing of common headquarters facilities, such as lounges and dining rooms. As a result, there are continual opportunities for inter-governmental contact, often without the need for prior arrangement.

17. Fourth, international organizations have, as participants, officials who have primary concern for the welfare of the total system. This is the task of secretariats which are not encumbered by the need to seek the interests of a particular nation, but are charged to monitor the health of the total community. Performing this task are not only high officials whose work is so much publicized during times of crisis, but also hundreds of secretariat officials who tend to the health of the community in small daily tasks. Also engaged in the work of advancing the interests of the total community are national officials who serve the organization temporarily as officers in assemblies and councils, as members of visiting missions, and as members of expert bodies.

18. Fifth, the creation of international organizations has brought extended contact between practitioners of diplomacy and the outside world. Diplomats in international organizations must, like national parliamentarians, carry on public debates as well as private discussions. They may speak to one audience in the public debate and to another in private. This complicates the task of the diplomat and may make inter-governmental communication more difficult. In carrying on public debate and other activity related to parliamentary-like diplomacy, the diplomat must carry on relations with press and non-governmental organizations that are more like those of a legislator than those of the traditional diplomat.

19. Sixth, learning experiences of participants in international organizations are significantly different from the experiences of diplomats in national capital diplomacy. Interviews with General Assembly delegates, both before and after their experience, have provided concrete evidence of this assertion.<sup>6/</sup> Participation in the United Nations expands the range of issues and nations of which the diplomat is aware and in which he has some involvement. After public debate and private conversations with representatives from many nations on a variety of issues, it is not quite so easy to divide the world into "good guys" and "bad guys". In addition, diplomats in international organizations are learning the new skills required for the conduct of diplomacy in parliamentary-like settings and many find the lengthy procedures of public assemblies somewhat chaotic. Through participation, however,

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<sup>6/</sup> The results of these interviews are fully reported in Chadwick F. Alger, "United Nations participation as a learning experience", Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 27 (1963), pp. 411-426.

many diplomats are merging the skills normally expected of the diplomat with those possessed by the successful parliamentarian. The combined skills are essential for operating the political processes necessary for the development of consensus in international organizations.

B. Potential effects of change in the diplomatic system on the development of international communities 7/

20. Over fifty years ago, Eugen Ehrlich asked in his Fundamental Principles of the Sociology of Law: "Whence comes the rule of law and who breathes life and efficacy into it?" He answered his own question by asserting:

"At the present as well as at any other time, the centre of gravity of legal development lies not in legislation, nor in juristic science, nor in judicial decision, but in society itself." 8/

Percy Corbett has written in similar vein:

"Legal institutions only evolve with a consensus on ends and means that is deeply rooted in the slow and often unconscious processes of social integration." 9/

21. Richard Schwartz provides a dramatic example of how certain patterns of inter-group relationships can perform the same function as legal institutions.<sup>10/</sup> He compared two small communities and found them both orderly, but only one had specialized legal institutions. Only the one without the legal institutions, however, had a co-operative form of organization in which inhabitants ate together and shared common facilities. He concluded that order in this community was a consequence of informal controls that functioned through the variety of inter-relationships in which the people engaged.

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7/ Some of the points summarized here are more fully developed in Chadwick F. Alger, "Hypotheses on relationships between the organization of international society and international order". Proceedings of the American Society of International Law (1963), pp. 35-46, and Chadwick F. Alger, "Non-resolution consequences of the United Nations and their effect on international conflict", Journal of Conflict Resolution, (Vol. 5, No. 2, June 1961), pp. 128-145.

8/ Eugen Ehrlich, Fundamental Principles of the Sociology of Law, translated by Walter L. Moll (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963), p. xv.

9/ Percy E. Corbett, The Study of International Law (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1955), p. 49.

10/ Richard Schwartz, "Social factors in the development of legal control: A case study of two Israeli settlements", The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 68 (1953-1954), pp. 471-491.

22. International organizations may also provide some of the social organization required for greater order. They encourage more extensive inter-governmental relationships and provide common facilities for participating governments within the walls of a common institution. It may be useful to illustrate ways in which institutions, such as the United Nations, may be contributing to the development of a more orderly world in order to understand the influence that the activity of international organization diplomats might have.

23. First, a number of sociologists have pointed out the importance of overlapping group memberships in the development of peaceful social relations between groups. Max Gluckman asserts that even very small tribes seem "unable to hold together as a political unit unless they [have] cross-cutting systems of alliance, so that a man's opponents in one system [are] his friends in another".<sup>11/</sup> A universal organization such as the United Nations provides opportunity for the development of groups of nations that overlap traditional divisions. For example, the common interests of the less-developed countries have brought co-operative effort in the United Nations of a group of nations that span the globe. Some of these nations had no contact whatsoever before, and some are engaged in conflicts on other issues. Another interest group that overlaps groups of longer duration is an "international group" that works for the extension of the activities of the United Nations.

24. Second, some scholars have pointed out the importance of the aggregation of diverse interests to the development of a mature political system.<sup>12/</sup> A policy remains fragmented unless there are organizations which make it possible for a variety of more specific interests to be moulded together into interests with sufficient support to undertake political action. This requires opportunity for individual interests to bargain and compromise, with each specific interest giving up some of its desires in return for receiving part of what it wants. The develop-

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<sup>11/</sup> Max Gluckman, "Political institutions", in The Institutions of Primitive Society (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1956), p. 74.

<sup>12/</sup> Gabriel Almond and James S. Coleman (eds.), The Politics of Developing Areas (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1960), pp. 38-45, 551-556.

ment of a United Nations policy on a problem such as the Congo, is only possible through aggregating interests with a variety of purposes behind a common policy. These interests include such things as anti-colonialism, the prevention of war, strengthening the United Nations, and protecting foreign investments. All may be served by a common policy, but the definition of this policy and generation of support require an elaborate political process that an international organization is uniquely able to provide.

25. Third, both sociologists and political scientists have drawn our attention to the fact that conflicts are intensified by the fact that different groups may have different perceptions of reality.<sup>13/</sup> These differing perceptions are sometimes caused by the difference in information received by various groups. This is particularly true in some international conflict situations where there are great restraints on the flow of information between disputing nations and where countries learn about particular problems through entirely different channels. Interviews of members of permanent diplomatic missions at the United Nations have revealed that communications between nations at the United Nations is much more extensive than it is at more traditional national capital diplomatic sites.<sup>14/</sup> Because of extensive informal contact, it is particularly easy to exchange "off the record" kinds of background information. In particular, diplomats state that it is easier for unfriendly nations to have contact at the United Nations than in national capitals. It would be expected that the more extensive inter-governmental communications at the United Nations would erode some of the disagreement about what the facts are in certain problem areas. The extensive documentation provided by the Secretariat, a common source of information for all, would also tend to have the same effect.

26. Fourth, it is important to keep in mind that even very mature nations cannot hope to eliminate internal conflict. They instead develop procedures for waging conflict that will serve as substitutes for violence. The importance of international organizations as arenas for non-violent conflict is not always understood.

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<sup>13/</sup> James March and Herbert Simon with Harold Guetzkow, Organizations (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1963), p. 128.

<sup>14/</sup> Gary Best, Diplomacy in the United Nations, Ph. D. dissertation, Northwestern University, 1960, pp. 106-147.



Such was the case of a journalist at the United Nations who complained during a particularly acrimonious debate: "There they go fighting again. I thought this was the United Nations." A great challenge for creative diplomacy is the development of alternatives to violence that are satisfying to officials and populations and that leave as few scars as possible to inhibit co-operation between conflicting parties on other issues. This does not necessarily require the elimination of strenuous verbal combat. It may, however, require a more self-conscious effort in waging this combat so that the emotions will not obscure the larger setting in which a specific battle takes place. It may also require diplomats who are able to participate in conflict with a professional sense of detachment.

27. These few examples may help to place the tasks of the international organization diplomat in a broader setting than is customary. He not only gives speeches, negotiates, and sponsors resolutions, but also is engaged in the development of an inter-governmental community of diplomats whose nature may have an important bearing on what can be achieved by future speeches, negotiations and resolutions. The dimensions of this community may be important to the long-term interests of his nation. The diplomat can only keep his government informed of how such interests may be affected if he has a broad and sophisticated understanding of the operation of the complex diplomatic communities to be found in large international organizations.

C. The conduct of diplomacy in international organizations

28. It has been emphasized that diplomacy in international organizations does not consist merely of making speeches in public bodies. The public sessions, as Hadwen and Kaufmann point out, are only the iceberg that can be observed above the surface.<sup>15/</sup> Preparation for these sessions, the conduct of more private negotiations, and carrying on relations with his home government give the conscientious international organization diplomat more responsibilities than he can ever find time to handle.

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<sup>15/</sup> John G. Hadwen and Johan Kaufmann, How United Nations Decisions are made (Leyden, the Netherlands: A.W. Sythoff, 1960), p. 55.

29. For example, before a public meeting in the morning, a United Nations diplomat must crowd in many tasks. This will include consultation with other members of his mission, reading instructions and other documents from home, and reading the daily supply of United Nations documents relevant to his responsibilities. It may also include phone calls to other missions to learn if they have new instructions that will be relevant to the day's activities. If a speech is to be given in a United Nations body, it must be prepared. From mid-morning until early evening may be spent at United Nations Headquarters. There are not only public sessions to be attended, but smaller negotiating sessions for the drafting of resolutions and for arranging a compromise between resolutions. There are also occasional bloc meetings. During and before the lunch hour and during and after meetings, there is the never-ending task of finding out what is going on in the other delegations and in the Secretariat. The necessary information is gathered at luncheons, in corridors and lounges. Roving journalists must be told enough to facilitate achievement of objectives, but not so much that the press intrudes on the more confidential aspects of United Nations politics.

30. At the end of the day there may be one or more receptions given by other missions at which a diplomat is obliged to appear. These too may provide an opportunity for collecting information on the day's developments. Finally, time must be found to return to the mission and send cables reporting important events back home. At times speed in home reporting is essential so that new instructions can be obtained that will enable a delegation to keep up with the fast pace of parliamentary diplomacy.

31. Though national foreign services are only slowly adjusting to the changes in diplomacy brought on by the tremendous growth in the number and size of international organizations, the foregoing suggests that the skills required for traditional diplomacy may not be identical to those required of the international organization diplomat. It might be useful to summarize what appear to be the essential abilities of an international organization diplomat.

32. First, he cannot perform effectively without certain kinds of knowledge. He must have knowledge of the rules of procedure and unwritten norms of the international organization. Also required is background information on issues under consideration in the organization. Many issues have been debated over a period of years, making it imperative that current proposals be made in the light of past mistakes and achievements. Specialized knowledge is also required. Depending on the area of individual responsibility, that could mean knowledge in the fields of economics, disarmament or international law. In addition, an international organization diplomat must have an unquenchable thirst for what is going on and must be continually gathering information on the interests, feelings and plans of other delegations.

33. Second, an international organization diplomat requires a range of intellectual skills. Both in public and in private meetings, he must be able to explain clearly and succinctly his government's position as well as that of others. He should also, when appropriate, be able to listen and ferret out the essential elements in the arguments of others. In addition, there is a need for the degree of creativity that is possessed by those who provide the ideas that enable a committee or council to take a new course out of a seemingly hopeless situation.

34. Third, since there are presently no foreign service courses that teach international organization diplomacy, a period of experience is required. It is said by experienced diplomats at the United Nations that a minimum of one year's experience is required for a man to be useful to his mission. Some say that it takes even longer. It takes this time to develop a sense of when and where to take what kind of action. When should you speak? When should you submit a resolution? What is a realistic objective in the United Nations setting? Some would say that these things could never be learned without a period of personal experience in the United Nations.

35. Fourth, important in international organization diplomacy is an array of social skills that makes it possible to carry on the necessary personal relationships for operating parliamentary-like bodies and collecting and disseminating information. It is crucial that diplomats be able easily to establish rapport with a variety of personality types and with persons from different cultures. It is useful if one is quickly perceived as a trustworthy individual. In discussions with United Nations diplomats, I find that the judgement of whether an individual is to be trusted often

is made quite apart from what is thought of his nation or its policies. A diplomat is more effective if he does not become too emotionally involved in the success or failure of his goals. Also important in large international bodies is patience in the face of slow progress and disappointments. Particularly under trying conditions, it is of great importance to have diplomats in a group with a sense of humour that enables them to relieve tension, perhaps by laughing at themselves.

36. Fifth, as in all other professions, a diplomat can have all of the above skills yet not be successful if he does not have the appropriate attitude towards the job. He must be highly motivated to be well prepared on the contents of United Nations documents, to know the specifics and broad context of his government's policy, and to have the same knowledge of the policies of other nations. He will also be more effective in achieving policy goals if his primary motivation is towards these goals rather than towards personal fame. The willingness to tolerate anonymity often facilitates the achievement of goals, since the most effective way of obtaining acceptance of your ideas is not always to advance them yourself. As is often the case in national parliaments, some of the most effective United Nations diplomats never make the headlines.

D. Problems in the representation of small nations in the United Nations

37. In some respects, international organizations are of considerable value to the small nations that can afford to send diplomatic missions to only a few nations. In an organization such as the United Nations, a small nation can have direct access to virtually all of the nations of the world. The international organization, particularly the Secretariat, is a source of a variety of information that would be costly for the small nation to collect in other ways. The United Nations also provides the small nation with an opportunity to participate in co-operative international projects that are beyond the capability of any but large nations.

38. On the other hand, the small nation has great difficulty in adequately representing itself in the numerous bodies of the United Nations. It does not have enough manpower for maintaining continual representation in all bodies in which it is entitled to sit, and there is also the problem of having adequate specialists for vital participation in technical questions when common sense dictates that the very small mission be staffed by generalists,

39. There may be no completely satisfactory solution to the representational problems of very small nations other than the amalgamation of some very small nations into larger nations. But there are ways of working creatively within the context of present limitations. This requires that the small nation first realize that it cannot do everything well. An attempt to cover everything and participate in everything spreads manpower too thin and permits little more than voting in public bodies with little opportunity to shape the political process that determines on which items there shall be votes. Thus, an alternate course for a small nation is to choose to be effective in one substantive area. Another is to concentrate on performing some of the unique functions of the generalist. For example, leaving the technical details to others, the generalist who is covering more than one committee can help one committee see how their work relates to that of another. In addition, a delegate from a nation with limited interests can perform a valuable function in providing disinterested judgements on certain issues and can take the initiative in suggesting creative alternatives that parties directly involved in the issues cannot see.

40. There may also be ways in which small nations can pool their efforts in United Nations representation. This would seem to be a particularly appropriate alternative for the small nations of the Caribbean area. Pooling of efforts would not necessarily require that all interests be shared in common or that co-operating nations would even vote the same way. It would simply mean that there would be an informal division of labour in performing the many tasks required of United Nations missions.

41. For example, since it is impossible for one small nation to have in its mission all of the experts required for United Nations representation, each Caribbean nation might make an effort to have one kind of expert, but one that does not duplicate the expertise offered by another Caribbean nation. Therefore, one mission might have an economist, another a lawyer and another an expert on United Nations organizational matters. Somewhat in accordance with the availability of expertise, it may be desirable to have different nations closely monitor specific issues or specific bodies. In this way, one nation could alert all others to crucial issues on the horizon and inform them when votes are expected. Each nation might also be assigned the task of gathering information on specific issues and passing it on to other nations, which would be gathering information on different subjects.

42. It might also be possible for the Caribbean nations to band together in performing certain of the more formal representational functions, such as diplomatic receptions. In so doing, they might provide an example for some larger nations which are barely able to provide the financial resources and personnel time necessary for carrying on the extensive round of diplomatic receptions. In this regard, it is important to remember that scarce resources, including both time and money, may be squandered on pretentious displays of sovereignty which could be more effectively employed for wielding influence in other ways in the United Nations.

43. It is sometimes thought that the influence of the very small nation is so slight in the global international system that there is little that a diplomat from one of these nations can do to have an impact on some of the big issues that are of greatest concern. In many cases this is true, but it also is true that international organizations offer small nations the opportunity for direct participation in the problems of the world community that they have not had in the past. United Nations achievements in economic development and the elimination of colonialism have been partially due to creative leadership by small nations. Influence in parliamentary diplomacy is not exclusively determined by a nation's population, wealth or military strength. Also important are the capacity for intelligently merging national interests with those of others in collective pursuit of goals, a broad knowledge of the procedures of international organizations, a deep understanding of the basic interests of other nations, and a command of the technical knowledge relevant to a particular problem. Finally, most important in determining the influence of any nation, large or small, in an international organization is the willingness of its diplomats to engage in long hours of hard work.

## II. DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR PRACTICES

### A. The qualities of the profession

44. The professional diplomat - the foreign service as distinct from the diplomacy of governments - is a distinction between career civil servants and politicians which is preserved largely in countries of our tradition. The diplomat has been the subject of caricature since the time of Sir Henry Wotton, for he is libelled as a man always in striped pants or a reactionary warmonger. However, diplomacy is a craft, a technical skill, an art - a great and honourable profession, more important now than it ever was. In a diplomat, there is a need both for idealism and scepticism, above all a sense of proportion, because the most important quality is objectivity. It is a kind of monastic discipline and the diplomat is denied the ordinary rights of the citizen; he must accept the fact that he is a kind of "non-citizen" with a special moral code. He must obey instructions whether he likes them or not. He can, of course, resign if his conscience is offended, but he should not thus deprive his country of his training and experience unless the cause is grave. He must remove himself from national politics but, nevertheless, be sensitive to their currents and take them into consideration in the proposals he makes. It is the politician's role to consider public opinion, of course, and it is the obligation of the professional to point out to the politician the consequences of policy regardless of political advantage.

45. Diplomacy is no place for a crusader, useful though such people are in the life of a country. The diplomat ought never to be a reactionary, however, because he must recognize the facts of life in the world and the pressures for change. He must take an historical view and practice the art of the possible. He must be prepared to deal with people he despises (a fact confused lately by the unfortunate tendency to equate diplomatic recognition of a country with approval of its government).

46. As for the personal qualification, a diplomat needs a sound education and personal charm. His class background is relatively unimportant, although he must be able to adapt easily to the manners and customs of diplomatic society. Adaptability of temperament is much more important than early training. Sociability, energy, and dedication are important. It is not a job for "eggheads", although

intellectual eminence is required. A diplomat today must be free of social and racial prejudices, interested in foreigners and foreign art and customs, and curious to learn. These qualities are important for the wife of a diplomat as well, not only because they ensure good relations, but also such a person enjoys the variety of an otherwise intolerable life. In general, a diplomat should be representative of the character of his country and have an affectionate regard for it, but it is foolish to look for the typical citizen, because diplomats are rare. No one should be a diplomat because he can't stand living in his own country. The most important qualification of all is that a diplomat be able to accept the appellation 'Your Excellency' without letting it go to his head.

B. The nature of lesser-power diplomacy

47. The nature of diplomacy is changing, but ambassadors have not been superseded by personal diplomacy and by the speed of communications, as often stated. Speedier communications mean not only that the ambassador is tied to instructions; they also mean that he is able to play a more active part in the formulation of his own instructions. As for personal diplomacy of heads of government or foreign ministers, this is nothing new; they always have played leading roles at conferences, as, for example, the Congress of Vienna. Policy is and always was the business of governments, not diplomats. The role of the professional is supplementary and complementary. Personal diplomacy by heads of governments is not a substitute for but an extension of the diplomacy of the professional.

48. There is more than one might think to be said for the conservative traditions of diplomacy. Even those governments which came to power in a revolutionary spirit tend to adapt the customs of diplomacy because they are a useful framework. The rules found in Sir Ernest Satow's classic book may sound archaic, and some of them are, but these formulae have for centuries kept relationships "on the rails". For a peaceful world, countries must treat each other with respect and courtesy whatever their differences. Language should be bridled to calm rather than inflame. It is futile to rupture diplomatic relations with a country in a huff, because one is then working in the dark. It is important that countries in anger remain talking to each other and eventually negotiate. This is more important than ever in the nuclear age, as it is essential for co-existence.



49. This is the age when relations between states are conceived of in a United Nations framework. The fact that the Charter considers all Member States equal does give significance to the diplomacy of lesser countries, even though they have little real power. The strength of world public opinion and the assumption that there should be democracy in the relations among states increases the significance of the United Nations and also of states of all sizes which are effective in its councils. The results of this relationship are not in themselves good, but they can be put to good use. Paradoxically, it is the nuclear stalemate which makes diplomacy possible at all; it also means that the great powers are held at bay and there are much more useful roles for the relatively powerless. This is why it is important for smaller but strategically placed countries like those in the Caribbean not to underestimate what they can achieve. They have a peculiar position of influence, because they are multi-racial, because they have high standards of education and administration, racial ties with the developing countries, education and political tradition.

50. It is necessary to bear in mind, however, that the diplomacy of lesser powers is a diplomacy not of pressure, but of influence, with certain rules:

- (a) They need negotiators of first-class personal stature;
- (b) They achieve more by quiet influence in the corridors than by loud voices;
- (c) They should be committed to their friends, but not to any blocs, Eastern, Western, or Neutral;
- (d) There are advantages in being hard to get, that is, not being a docile satellite of anyone, even of those who are "docile neutralists";
- (e) Respect for them will not last long unless in their proposals they indicate concern for world order, the delicate balance of power and precedents, rather than for their country's narrow interests or their own glorification.

51. Small powers have a distinct role in diplomacy, which is not the same as that of a great power, but which ought not to be considered as inherently antagonistic to that of the great power.

### C. Organization of a foreign service

52. Foreign and Commonwealth relations: Although in Britain these are dealt with in separate departments, it is customary in other Commonwealth countries to have a single Ministry of External Affairs, possibly with a special section devoted to Commonwealth relations.

53. Diplomatic and Consular functions: Diplomatic representatives, ambassadors and embassy staff are representatives of the head of state, whereas consuls are agents of the government. In the past the services were usually separate, but in most services now personnel are interchangeable. The qualities of a good consul are different from those of a good ambassador but by no means inferior. Most embassies have members of their staff who also hold consular rank. As all diplomatic personnel are required at times to deal with consular matters, they should all have consular training. For technical legalistic reasons, consuls are not exchanged within the Commonwealth, but their functions are often performed by so-called 'trade commissioners' or 'information officers'. Many countries maintain a special trade service, which is usually separate from that of the foreign service, although trade commissioners abroad are often assimilated with embassy staff.

54. Home and Foreign Service: These are now usually combined in a single service for all ranks, except some administrators who stay at home. A service in which postings at home are alternated with those abroad is better for morale. Tensions can be relieved, good and bad posts shared, and a diplomat can have a more varied training for senior responsibility. Postings should last from two to four years depending on the political and natural climate. Special postings to conferences, including the United Nations General Assembly, are increasing and interrupt regular planning. The question of whether personnel should specialize in an area is always a debatable point, but this is a luxury largely for great powers with considerable staff. Even for smaller countries, however, it will be necessary to assign people to special functions (protocol, administration, international trade, United Nations), so that they acquire the necessary expertise. It is advisable to establish regular classifications of promotion which are apart from the ranks of Counsellor, First Secretary, etc., at missions abroad. It is essential to maintain an adequate staff at home to service those abroad, whose work would otherwise be wasted; a proportion of 50/50 may be recommended.

55. Even though in theory all relations with other countries should pass through the foreign office, as other government departments become more and more involved in dealing with other countries, this is hard to insist on. The foreign office should, however, be kept informed of all relations with other countries and feel responsible for keeping these in a consistent pattern. Inter-departmental committees on which the foreign office is represented are useful instruments of co-ordination.

56. The jobs of a foreign office are well summed up by Lord Strang: "First, the protection of British subjects and British interests abroad; secondly, the conduct of relations between the British Government and foreign governments; thirdly, and this is essentially a means to the fulfilment of the first two functions - the supply of information to the government on the situation in foreign countries."

57. In Commonwealth countries, the head of the foreign office is not the Minister, but a permanent civil servant called a Permanent Secretary or Under-secretary or something similar. In larger departments there are usually assistant under-secretaries with broad supervisory functions and the work is dealt with in functional divisions, each under a 'Head of Division'. Papers should move upwards. The initiative rests with the junior officer to prepare a draft which is then sent forward through his head of division. Not everything should go to the Head of the Department or the Minister, as the latter may have given broad instructions covering the action to be taken. Communications are normally drafted for signature by the Minister or a senior officer for signature in his name. Communications should always be official, and in the name of the Minister or Head; private communication by officers with other missions leads to confusion, although personal comments can be useful as supplements. Policy is the responsibility of the Minister and the Government; the job of permanent officials is to render information and advice and carry out instructions.

58. It is of interest to know how departments in the larger countries are organized as officials from the smaller nations have to deal with them abroad. Twenty years ago, the Canadian Department of External Affairs had only three or four divisions, but it now has an ever increasing number. These are functional, viz. Legal,

Protocol, Supplies and Properties, Consular, United Nations, Economic, or they might be regional, viz. European, Commonwealth, Far Eastern, African and Middle Eastern. Each has a head, a deputy head and 'desk' officers.

59. In this context, the group studied the structure of foreign ministries and diplomatic practices in some of the countries in the world. Since published material on diplomatic practices in the USSR was not available, the group was especially interested to learn the institutional and other arrangements in that country.

60. The fifteen union republics which comprise the Soviet Union have their own right to have foreign relations with other countries. The foreign ministry in the Soviet Union, which is responsible for the implementation of the foreign policy of the Government, has at its head a collective body called the Collegium of the Ministry, headed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Collegium, which meets on an average of twice a month, is a policy-making body in foreign affairs, with the exception of major issues, when reference to the Presidium is necessary. Immediately below the Collegium in the organizational structure, the Foreign Office is divided into two groups namely, territorial and specialized departments.

61. Territorial Departments are the following: five European Departments, Scandinavian Department, two Asian Departments, two African Departments, two Middle Eastern Departments and two American Departments.

62. The specialized Departments are the following: Legal and Treaties Department, History and Archives Department, Protocol Department, Consular Affairs Department, International Organizations Department (United Nations) and Department of International Economic Organizations.

63. The Soviet Union, as any other country, has diplomatic missions abroad at the level of Ambassadors and Ministers (embassies and missions). In a number of countries there are also separate consular offices, headed by Consuls-General or Consuls. The Soviet Union follows the usual practices in the appointment of ministers and the sending of consuls to other countries.

64. The Foreign Office of the Soviet Union follows established norms of protocol in receiving foreign ambassadors. Before the appointment of a new ambassador, the country sends an agrément, a request for the appointment of that particular person, which is usually granted. Upon arrival, the new ambassador is met by the Chief of

Protocol and in a few days is granted an audience with the Foreign Minister, after which the date is appointed for the presentation of credentials to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet (to its Chairman or one of the Vice-Chairmen).

65. The Foreign Service has its own College of Foreign Relations. There is no discrimination on the basis of sex, and selection is based on competitive examination. At the college, the course lasts for five years and the curriculum includes the following subjects: world history, history of diplomacy, international law, state laws of the major countries of the world, languages and international economics. Particular emphasis is placed on languages. Students must pass an examination in at least one foreign language to be eligible for appointment to the foreign service. In addition, trainees are often sent abroad to learn particular languages of countries in which they would be posted.

66. At present, almost every new recruit in the Foreign Service must have attended the College. Sometimes, however, a brilliant person employed in another Soviet Ministry, say an excellent "salesman type" from the Ministry of Foreign Trade may be noticed by an ambassador and recommended for appointment to the diplomatic service. Not all the graduates of the College are appointed to the Foreign Service.

67. An ambassador is allowed a choice of personnel for his mission, but he must make his selections from graduates of the Foreign Office College. This is done by personal interviews. When an ambassador is appointed to a new post, he is usually anxious to keep his experienced staff, even though he has powers to recommend transfer of existing staff and appointment of other staff. When an officer's tour of service expires, the ambassador can request a change if he so desires.

68. There is usually no inter-changeability of staff among the different Departments of the Foreign Office. The Departments try to keep the staff assigned to them. As elsewhere, the Soviet Union sometimes has personnel problems with regard to the filling of certain categories of the posts.

69. Nationals of a receiving country are employed on the embassy staff in such sections as the translation bureau, information service and office of the cultural attachés.

70. Conditions of Service: (a) All medical expenses of diplomats and their families are paid by the Soviet Union, because by Soviet Union law, medical attention is free for all Soviet citizens. (b) Specific entertainment and housing allowances

are not attached to diplomatic posts. An entertainment allowance is allocated to each embassy and its disbursement is controlled by the ambassador. In regard to housing, due account is taken of prevailing prices in the determination of salary, and the Finance Department makes a rigid and periodic survey in order to ascertain whether adjustments should be made to meet fluctuations in prices. (Salary is adjusted to meet changes in the cost of living generally.) There is not a fixed policy which compels diplomats to live in proximity to each other or in any prescribed area. A diplomat sometimes has to find accommodation on his own.

(c) The Soviet Union forbids its Foreign Service officers to marry aliens. (d) An officer is given several choices of transfer on completion of his tour of service, which is normally two to three years in difficult climates and up to four years in others. He usually returns for home leave before his transfer is effected. At least six months' notice of any impending transfer is given, though in cases of emergency shorter periods of notice are given.

71. Ambassadors and Ministers are appointed, from the ranks of career diplomats, by the Presidium after having been approved by the Collegium and the Council of Ministers. No honorary Consuls are appointed. An ambassador is generally responsible for all activities concerning the Soviet Union, so that an officer of the Ministry of Foreign Trade, for example, is subject to his general surveillance.

72. As in other countries, every ambassador is bound by instructions. The extent of the flexibility which he has in negotiating is determined by the nature of his instructions and by his own personal experience. Even so, his flexibility is largely circumscribed.

73. General guide lines of the actual policy are given at Party Congresses where the matters are fully discussed. The decisions are subsequently published and made available to the public. Changes in policy in relation to any country do not depend on the actual presence in Moscow of the relevant ambassador, but he may be called in to ascertain his views regarding any intended change of policy.

74. As a rule, two Soviet Ambassadors do not communicate officially with each other. The office of the Secretary-General of the Foreign Office is the main distribution centre of information, and is in charge of all incoming information,

which is distributed to the embassies concerned. In this way, embassies which have common interests in problems are kept informed of developments.

75. Impact of Soviet Diplomacy: The methods of Soviet diplomacy have had some impact on new nations. The USSR adopts a more business-like approach, but they do not neglect the traditional courtesies of the profession. Some of the practices have been simplified and the example of the Soviet Union is being followed by other nations. Essentially, however, such significant changes as have been made are more of a political rather than diplomatic character.

#### D. The mission abroad

76. Missions abroad can have many titles, including the High Commissioner's office, embassy, legation, consulate (general), or missions to the United Nations.

Staff. The High Commissioner or Ambassador is master of his domain and responsible for all his country's activities in the country to which he is accredited. In a large mission, he may have a deputy (or several) with the rank of Minister or Deputy High Commissioner. Other officers in order of rank are Counsellor, First, Second and Third Secretary. It is not necessary to have one of each, but a well-balanced staff of juniors and seniors is advisable. In a large mission, it is well to have a single administrative officer, but often administration can be done by one of the secretaries or a consular officer. An able private secretary to the ambassador can handle protocol and social relations in a small mission. Staff is often supplemented by attachés of various kinds who are usually not career diplomats, e.g. military attachés, labour or immigration, information attachés, etc. These usually report to their own ministries at home, but are under the direction of the ambassador in the field. Parkinson's law should be resisted, as there are many advantages in as small a staff as possible on the other hand, there is no point having so small a staff that it is

entirely involved in administration and produces nothing. An ambassador has the right to increase his staff without permission of the host government, which can, however, by delaying visas or in other ways, seek to control the size of a mission if it is suspicious of the reasons. Embassy personnel are more likely to mingle with the natives if the staff is small. In the absence of an ambassador from the country, his place is taken by a chargé d'affaires ad interim who is

usually the second senior diplomatic officer in the mission. Sometimes missions are more or less permanently headed by a chargé d'affaires if relations with the country concerned are not very close or if they are cool. Some division of functions (legal, consular, political, information, etc.) is advisable among staff of a mission abroad as at home. All communications are normally sent to the foreign office or to the ministry at home in the name of the head of mission, even though they are usually drafted or even signed by members of his staff.

#### Relations

(a) With the local Foreign Office: The Ambassador has the right to communicate with the Foreign Minister, and other officers in the Embassy with their local counterparts of approximate rank. However, this should be very flexible, depending on rank-consciousness of the local Foreign Office. A wise ambassador will recognize the pressures on the time of a Foreign Minister, especially of a large power, and will not insist on seeing him on a matter which could be dealt with at a lower level, thereby destroying his credit. Officers should make a point of establishing good social relations with useful members of the local Foreign Office; it is for this purpose and not for their private pleasure that they are provided with entertainment allowances.

(b) With other missions: There is great value in candid relations with a wide variety of other missions, especially in capitals where the government is secretive and information is difficult to obtain. A small power which has a very knowledgeable ambassador can influence a great power's policy by his interpretations. There is a grave danger, however, of diplomats seeing too much of other diplomats and neglecting the people to whom they are accredited.

(c) With local government and parliament: It is important to have good contacts in departments, such as trade or finance, with which one must deal, remembering always that the foreign office will be suspicious of your seeming to by-pass it. In countries where the principle of a 'loyal opposition' is accepted, there is advantage in cultivating politicians in opposition who may some day be in power, but it is advisable to explore local attitudes before cultivating opposition elements in countries where change tends to be by violent methods. Junior officers



can be less restricted than ambassadors and should, with due caution, try to understand what is going on in circles less official.

(d) With the general public: In nations where opinion is more or less free, diplomats should try to visit all parts of the country and give lectures, cultivate newspaper editors and local government officials, and keep in touch with journals of various kinds - although this kind of activity can conflict with the work to be done negotiating in the capital.

#### Functions

(a) Protection: The protection of commercial and financial interests and the good reputation of one's country are a major obligation as well. If relations are broken, the interests of one's country are usually handed over to another country. Switzerland assumes this role often. The right of asylum in an embassy is not fixed, and customs vary.

(b) Representation: It is valuable to keep local Foreign Offices posted on attitudes and policies of one's own country and offer confidential information if one desires to get confidences in return. Interests can be protected best by warning the Foreign Offices when trouble is seen looming. A good diplomat must know his own country and its culture well. If at all possible, he should speak the language of the country in which he is stationed or at least the foreign language most frequently used in countries where the local language or languages would be too difficult to master. It is advisable to insist on an interpreter, however, in delicate negotiations. Ceremonial obligations are a strain, and one must listen to endless speeches and praise dubious art. Junior officers should bear in mind that they are invited to diplomatic parties to work, not to enjoy themselves. There are standard forms of communication with the local government, note verbale, agreed minute and aide mémoire, which should be carefully chosen for the particular purpose. There are informal methods also of making a point, such as leaving a copy of one's instructions.

(c) Negotiation: The preparation of instructions is a two-way affair, and the ambassador should advise his minister on what to ask for before he is told what to do; often these points are settled informally in advance with the local officials. Preliminary negotiation is often on a junior level. It is important to get

agreements in writing, getting agreement to one's own interpretation of a discussion, making notes of phone calls, etc. Treaties are signed by heads of government or by a plenipotentiary given full powers for the purpose.

#### E. Protocol

77. The word Protocol has two meanings:

(a) It can be a diplomatic document, either an agreement between parties less formal than a treaty or a declaratory or explanatory statement; or

(b) Ceremony or behaviour; title of bureau or office in a foreign office responsible for diplomatic forms and ceremonies, reception and presentation of ambassadors, precedence, privileges, immunities, preparation of diplomatic documents, reception and hospitality of V.I.P's.

78. It is the second definition which will be dealt with here. The value of protocol is that it provides a framework to reduce tensions. The rules can be found in guides like that of Sir Ernest Satow, but they must always be tempered by good sense. It saves much trouble to have established rules for seating diplomats and officials, but these should keep enemies apart. Relations between states and their representatives are best conducted in dignity.

79. Each foreign office needs a Chief of Protocol with a staff to arrange ceremonies and serve the Diplomatic Corps. There should be a Social Secretary in a mission abroad. Each foreign service should compile a formal and informal guide covering all possible situations and instructing officers about diplomatic procedure, i.e., sending of cards, calls, etiquette, etc., and, if possible, there should be a guide for wives as well. Post reports should be kept on each mission abroad containing information on local customs as well as questions of clothes, etc. The Chief of Protocol is normally available for consultation by local diplomats about procedures, precedence, etc.

80. The corpus of ambassadors, ministers, and high commissioners in a capital constitutes the Diplomatic Corps, and members normally rank in accordance with the date of their accreditation. The Foreign Office usually publishes a list of members of the Corps with addresses and names of staff. The doyen or dean of the Diplomatic Corps is the ambassador or high commissioner longest in the post. His function

is purely procedural and is concerned with the rights and privileges of the Corps, not their views on matters of substance. He is "supreme guardian of the immunities of the whole corps ... but in all other matters his authority is limited." He often represents the Corps on ceremonial occasions and presents their grievances and requests. It is an arduous job in an important post, and it is well to avoid it unless there is adequate staff.

81. The appointment of an ambassador varies in accordance with procedures of the country.

82. Diplomatic privileges and immunities provide for the inviolability of diplomats. The justification is now based on the function of the diplomat rather than, as at one time, on theories of extra-territoriality or the idea that embassy territory was that of the state represented by the ambassador. The principal immunities are inviolability from arrest, freedom of communication and movement, immunity from local jurisdiction and exemption from taxation. These should not be regarded as the prerequisites of a privileged caste, but as provisions essential to allow diplomats to work more effectively. They should be tempered by common sense. Local laws and customs should be respected, and traffic rules obeyed. Diplomats who flout traffic rules and abuse their right to tax-free imports in order to sell at a profit serve only to discredit their countries. Privileges are normally on a basis of reciprocity. Countries which restrict the movement of diplomats, for example, have suffered retaliation in the countries whose representatives are affected.

#### F. Consular work

83. It would be impossible to review consular instructions, as these cover an enormous variety of subjects and situations. It is advisable for a foreign service to compile a loose-leaf book containing rules and regulations to meet all situations and enquiries so that instructions need be requested as seldom as possible from the home office.

84. A consular officer will be asked for all kinds of information and assistance and he should be as well-informed as possible. He should be helpful, but always conscious of the limits to which he should go as the representative of a state.

He should not give legal advice, but should put the enquirer in touch with sources of legal aid, nor should he perform marriages or have them in the consulate, for example, lest he thereby give a sanction they may not deserve. He should not provide certificates of character. He should assist his own nationals, but not act as a bank or tourist agency. If he is asked, for instance, to trace a missing person in his own country, he should address the enquirer to the Red Cross or police or Bureau of Missing Persons, but he has no right to reveal the whereabouts of someone who may not want to be put in touch with the enquirer. He must be careful about getting involved in family quarrels, legal proceedings, or cases of non-support, and he should be wary of accepting custody of funds or valuables. Nevertheless, he should always try to do everything possible to meet a legitimate request.

85. A principal function of consular officers is the issuing of passports and visas, regulations for which should be set out in a reference book. Most foreign services have special 'diplomatic passports' as distinct from ordinary passports and these entitle the bearer to special treatment. Some countries make provision for 'emergency certificates' for citizens who must return urgently to their country, and these must be immediately surrendered. Some also issue 'certificates of identity' to stateless residents or those who, as refugees, will not seek passports from their own embassy.

86. The consular officer's obligation is to protect the rights and interests of his fellow citizens abroad. He should intervene, for example, to see that they are not wrongfully arrested and that they have a fair trial, but he cannot, of course, claim for them immunity from local justice. A major problem arises in cases of dual nationality. A consul should insist on access to a citizen who is under custody and the right to talk to him privately. He should also help citizens in distress and, if necessary, advance them funds to return home. He is obliged also to protect the interests of corporations from his own country and seek advantages for its commerce.

87. A major responsibility of the modern consul, especially in the large cities of the United States, for instance, is the distribution of information and promotion

of tourism. He must make many speeches, cultivate leaders of business and the professions, and seek to correct distortions which might appear in the press or on the air.

#### G. Political reporting

88. It is a well known fact that members of diplomatic missions have as one of their duties to report to their Governments on political and other developments in the countries to which they are accredited. Sometimes, this gives rise to the suspicion that a diplomat is a sort of respectable spy who gathers, by dubious means, information to which he is not entitled and relays it to his Government through privileged channels, such as the diplomatic pouch. In the early days of diplomacy, ambassadors and other diplomats were regarded with the deepest suspicion and treated virtually as spies. Sometimes, they were even kept in special buildings under constant surveillance. And there was some reason for this, in that in those days, before there were any up-to-date newspapers, their main function was probably the collection and reporting of information, rather than the conduct of negotiations between governments. We are, of course, always hearing of diplomats being expelled on the pretext of abusing their position for the purpose of spying. Many of these complaints are undoubtedly genuine, but it is important not to let them obscure the fact that a diplomat is not - or should not be - a spy, and that fair and accurate reporting on important developments, events, trends, and personalities in the country in which he serves, is a legitimate and important part of his duty; and that, if properly carried out, it can contribute greatly to the ultimate purpose of diplomacy, which Sir Ernest Satow defined as "the conduct of business between states by peaceful means". The subject of reporting may be considered under the following headings:

- (a) Its functions in diplomacy;
- (b) The proper scope of political reporting;
- (c) Faults to avoid;
- (d) The characteristics of good reporting;
- (e) Methods and techniques;
- (f) Conclusions.

The function of political reporting

89. It might be suggested that modern news media have largely removed the need for diplomatic representatives to keep their governments informed of events and developments in countries in which they serve. There is some truth in this, of course and modern techniques have certainly rather changed the scope and methods of political reporting. For example, today's diplomat can safely assume that his government will hear through press, radio and television about any really important event in his country as anywhere else in the world, probably sooner than he himself can report it. Why then should he add his own version to the bewildering mass of "news" already assailing the ears of harassed Cabinet Ministers and officials at home?

90. This raises the question of what diplomatic political reporting is for, particularly in the circumstances of the mid-twentieth century. To answer this, we have to remember what diplomacy itself is for. The establishment and conduct of peaceful relations between states is clearly impossible if they are not reasonably well informed of each other's political, social and economic conditions, policy objectives, difficulties, strengths and weaknesses. No sound foreign policy can be built up on incomplete or inaccurate information.

91. But news in the press and radio is neither selected nor presented with the particular purpose of forming the basis for determining policy. It caters to a broad public and, however well done, is bound to include some details which are useless or irrelevant and to omit others in the formulation of a government's policy. Newspapers and radio commentators have a natural tendency to over-dramatize certain aspects of international affairs, and if they are proved wrong by events, the consequences are not particularly serious. Moreover, in order to formulate policy, a Government naturally expects its representative on the spot to make informed forecasts of future trends and recommendations on policy. This is not a necessary function of journalism. The purpose of useful political reporting should always be assistance in the formulation and execution of policy. This is accomplished by increasing the Government's understanding of the host country. A trained diplomatic representative should be able to identify and select those aspects of

the life of the country in which he serves which most closely affect his own Government's interests and policies, and to assess their likely impact on those interests and policies. All his reporting should be directed to this end, and it follows that he should avoid reporting matters which are irrelevant. To do it successfully, he must cultivate an honest, objective, fair and open mind. And we all know that this is one of the hardest things in the world to achieve.

92. Political reporting has further value in that it is (or should be) based partly, at least, on accurate and confidential information carefully collected and checked, and transmitted by diplomatic bag or cypher telegram to preserve its confidential nature. It can thus contain material which is not available to press or radio reporters and which may suggest quite different conclusions from those to which public sources of information would lead.

#### Scope

93. In any given post, the main emphasis in political reporting should constantly be on those events, trends and personalities which are most germane to the consideration and formulation of policy by one's own Government. This may sometimes even mean paying relatively little attention to some matters which attract considerable attention in the world press. Thus, if one's own country has extensive and growing trade interests with the country in which one is serving, but only few important political or strategic preoccupations, most of the so-called political reporting will be in fact of an economic rather than purely political nature. Attention then will be given to the prospects for industrial and commercial development and investment, budgetary and fiscal policy, tariffs and quotas, economic stability and so on. In these circumstances, political events and personalities would be of interest primarily for their economic effects and repercussions. On the other hand, one could be serving in a country with which one's Government has little or no trade, but which, by reason of its geographical position, ideology or alignment with other powers, is of major importance to the realization of one's Government's objectives and interests. In that case, political reporting must be primarily concerned with the stability of the Government, possible military alignments or re-alignments, and the extent and influence of other states friendly or

hostile to one's country. There is, of course, an infinite number of variations and combinations of these factors, but, in every case, political reporting must, if it is to be useful, concentrate on those aspects and features of the host country which most directly affect and influence one's Government's interests and policy. It is therefore essential to preserve this order of priority, and not overload the home Government with a mass of detailed reporting on matters which, however interesting, may be of little or no interest to them. This emphasizes the need for judgement and selectivity. The home Government must feel confident that it can, if necessary, call at short notice for information and advice on any matter concerning the country in which the official is posted. The good diplomatic reporter is more like a dictionary which his Government can consult, than a loud-speaker which keeps up a barrage of unwanted and irrelevant information.

Things to avoid

94. Some of the principal "don't's" may be mentioned:

(a) It should not be assumed that the country in which one is posted is the centre of the universe. It is essential to resist the tendency to pretend that the host country is vital diplomatically, and to try to keep in mind a realistic assessment of the importance to the Government at home of the place in which one is serving. Events which may seem world-shaking in some small place thousands of miles from home, may look very different to the outside world;

(b) Reporting should not be for the sake of reporting, and irrelevance must be avoided at all costs.

(c) Long-windedness must also be avoided. Most of those at home who read the reports are busy and have a lot of material to absorb. It must be remembered that the more senior and important the person who will read such reports, the less time he has to read them. If much detailed information is to be reported, as much of it as possible must be put into an annex to the main report and its main features and conclusions summarized in the body of the report. A long report should in any case always be accompanied by a very short summary.

(d) It is tempting to display one's knowledge and insight into local conditions, the number and importance of one's personal contacts, and the high regard in which



one is held locally. If one has such knowledge and insight, it is only because one is paid to do the job, and if this is paraded, people will be all the more pleased when one is proved wrong, as is bound to happen sooner or later.

(e) Disreputable means must not be used to gain information. Apart from its immorality, it never pays in the long run, because one is almost sure to be exposed or at least suspected, and, once that happens, the local contacts will lose their trust. Harold Nicholson, in his book on diplomatic practice, puts honesty as the first quality of the ideal diplomat. Confidence in one's integrity is an essential part of successful diplomacy and it just isn't worth sacrificing to gain a short-term advantage. Once a person gets a reputation for using dishonest methods, it will follow him wherever he goes, because the diplomatic grapevine is very efficient. A good diplomatic representative can get all the information he really needs by establishing reliable and varied contacts, so that he can check and counter-check his facts without resorting to dubious methods or playing people off against each other.

(f) A diplomat should seek to establish and maintain as wide a range of contacts as he possibly can, but the purpose of this is two-fold. One of his main functions is to put across, in the host country, the point of view, objectives and achievements of his own country. For this purpose alone, he needs to know as many people as possible in important positions in all walks of life. If he has these contacts, his discussion with them will, of course, be a two-way affair, and he will naturally, in his turn, acquire and absorb the ideas and points of view of those with whom he speaks. This is surely not only legitimate, but indeed thoroughly desirable as a contribution to mutual understanding and co-operation. But it is naturally important to avoid overdoing either the giving or receiving elements in such intercourse. A diplomat who is constantly "pumping" people, even on social occasions, soon becomes not only suspect but - perhaps worse - a thorough bore. So contacts should be used tactfully and sparingly, and one should always avoid giving the impression that one is interested in such contacts only for the information to be gained. For nothing will "dry up the source" more quickly.

(g) Rash prophesies must not be made. One's own judgement must be trusted but one should not be over-confident in the prediction of future events or trends.

This may seriously mislead the Government at home, since there is such an element of change and incalculability in international affairs. On the other hand, one should also not be over-cautious. The Government at home has a right to expect some assessment from diplomats of probable trends and developments, without which it cannot make any forward projection of policy. No one expects the diplomats to be infallible, but a well-reasoned forecast supported by reliable information and argument, and qualified where necessary, is much better than a report which is non-committal. Even if a person is sometimes proved wrong, this is better than never being proved right.

#### Characteristics of good reporting

95. To approach the matter more positively, what are the marks of the good diplomatic political reporter? Largely, they are, of course, the opposites of the "don'ts" mentioned earlier. In other words, reporting of what is relevant and only what is relevant, the main essentials of which are brevity, objectivity and fairness, scrupulousness in the methods of acquiring information, and backing up of assessments and forecasts by sound fact and argument. But to these must be added reporting carefully, clearly and accurately, so that someone at home will not misunderstand. There is no reason why a diplomatic report should be dull or prolix, and some of the most successful diplomats have been fine writers. Timing is also very important. Careful thought and judgement must be exercised concerning the most appropriate moment to report on a particular subject, and the timing should be early enough to be useful in the formulation of policy, not so early that it has to omit vital facts, or so late that developments might alter the whole picture. Connected with this is the question of how often one should report on a given subject, which will of course depend on the nature of the event and the the Government's "need to know". There will be some matters on which, at least for a period, weekly or even daily short reports are necessary, while on others, a review at yearly or even longer intervals may be sufficient. In any case, it will be found that even when one is reporting at short intervals - and indeed especially under those circumstances - it is desirable from time to time to make a "round-up" of events over a longer period, in order that one can identify and

assess the long-term trends and major policy questions involved. From the point of view of those at the receiving end, regular political summaries at fixed intervals have the value of providing a running record of events in the country concerned, which is useful for reference purposes and for checking dates and other facts. One may therefore find that one is expected to produce a fortnightly, monthly or even annual summary covering all major political and economic events. Although this is laborious, it has the advantage of reviewing matters over the period in question in a systematic and orderly way, and of fixing the events of that period more clearly and firmly in one's mind.

96. Both excessive liking and excessive disliking can colour or distort political reporting unless one is conscious of them and can keep them carefully in check. And the longer one stays in a post, the longer one tends to see local events and personalities through local eyes, thus gradually losing objectivity. This is, of course, one reason why Governments move diplomats around so often. Even so, one has to be constantly on guard against letting one's own predilections cloud one's judgement, and so mislead those who are to be advised. On the other hand, if political reporting is to be useful, it must also be frank and honest. Many diplomats in the past have committed the serious and even dangerous mistake of only reporting what they thought their Government wished to know, and avoided the reporting of unpleasant facts or the giving of unpalatable advice. At its worst, this can have tragic consequences, as, for example, in the case of Herr Von Ribbentrop's reports on Britain to the Nazi Government before the last war, which led his Government grossly to underestimate British determination in the last resort to resist further Nazi expansion by force.

#### Methods and techniques

97. It is a common problem of all diplomatic officers to decide how and when to employ such varying means of communication as the formal despatch, telegram, or semi-official letter. In general, it is obvious that telegrams (quite apart from their high cost) are unsuitable for regular or detailed political reporting, and should only be used when some particular event or situation must be reported urgently and briefly, in order to influence consideration of policy at home.

Otherwise, the need for brevity and compression in telegrams is likely to obscure the finer points and nuances of meaning and to exclude detail and comment which is relevant to a balanced assessment. The formal dispatch is, of course, becoming less and less used, if only because events today move so quickly, that there is an increasing need for brief and rapid communication. But nevertheless, it still has a real value as a vehicle in which broader and longer-term issues and trends can be reported and weighed, and detailed recommendations for future policy and action made. It is common practice today to put much of the detailed information and argument in an annex to the dispatch, and confine the dispatch itself to a summary of the main facts and arguments in a suitably brief form for digestion by senior Ministers and officials at home.

98. The semi-official letter is a very useful medium for reporting to one's opposite number at home or in another post, items of an ephemeral interest, or indulging in speculation and argument which might be insufficiently important or otherwise unsuitable for telegrams and dispatches and which one would not necessarily wish to be brought to the attention of senior officers. It is, however, not suitable for material which should be widely seen and circulated within one's own Government.

#### H. The purpose of inspection

99. It is obvious enough that any Government spending large sums of tax-money on overseas representation is going to have to ensure periodically that the money is being well spent. From the rather negative point of view of preventing waste or fraud, inspections would be necessary even if they had no other constructive purpose. Embassy inspection can be highly constructive on the principle that the onlooker sees most of the game. One has to admit that there is a lot to be said from time to time for getting an experienced person to take an objective look at the work of a post and the living conditions of its members. And provided that there is always the possibility of producing positive suggestions for improvement, rather than merely negative criticism, and making recommendations for better material conditions for the officers concerned, it seems that one need not approach an inspection with fear, but perhaps even in the spirit of hope. There is no doubt

that being inspected does make a lot of extra work for all concerned, and it is only worth-while if both the public interest and the personal interests of the officers concerned are given full and fair consideration.

100. A great deal will, of course, depend on the quality and experience of the individual officers conducting an inspection. It is obviously essential that those who carry out this difficult and important duty should themselves command respect. It follows that they should be scrupulously fair and honest with the widest possible experience and with a reasonably pleasant personality.

101. There is a natural tendency to become somewhat nervous at the prospect of an inspection and in those services where an inspector's remarks may "make or break" a career, there are no doubt some grounds of nervousness. Obviously, in any service, a good inspection report redounds to the credit of the officers concerned in the post, and a bad one to their discredit. An inspector's report, based on a stay of only a week or two in a post, is not likely to be a decisive factor in one's career, though it will no doubt be taken into account. So far as personal accomplishments are concerned, the reports of the heads of the mission, based on knowledge of one's work over a long period, will count for at least as much, and probably much more. The way to approach an inspection is in a spirit of confidence, but not complacency. What the inspectors want to see is the normal functioning of a post. They do not expect a special "set piece" and, indeed, if they are efficient, they will easily detect anything of the kind and become suspicious. They know - or should know - the difficulties of operating overseas and do not expect perfection; and, if such faults as they uncover are frankly admitted and quickly remedied, they are far more likely to take a more favourable view than if elaborate and hasty attempts are made to deny or conceal them. Moreover, if criticism of faults is accepted in a reasonable spirit, it is far more likely that it would be balanced by sincere praise for good points.

102. As part of this question of how to receive inspectors, there is a difference of opinion whether one should entertain them lavishly in the hope of buying their goodwill or, at the other extreme, whether one should receive them in conditions of the utmost squalor, offering them frugal meals and little to drink

to convince them of the penury in which one is compelled to live. There may be exceptions and some inspectors may be gullible, but most of them are fairly shrewd and observant and the best thing to do is to receive them without putting on a special act of any kind. Similarly, in their inspection of the functioning of an office, they will not expect to see the staff dressed in their best suits and lined up in serried ranks to receive them. What they want is to see the office functioning normally and to interview members of the staff separately.

103. One useful purpose served by a system of regular, sympathetic and intelligent inspections is that it provides a human link between the head office and its branches overseas. This will, of course, only be so if the inspectors themselves are suitably chosen, and if they approach their work in a constructive and helpful spirit. But it also depends on the willingness of those they inspect to receive them in a similar spirit. Given this positive attitude on both sides, inspectors can do most valuable work, both by passing on as much as possible about the latest thinking and planning at home, and by helping those at home to understand and sympathize with the practical difficulties and way of life of those serving abroad.

#### The scope of inspections

104. The matters normally investigated and reported on by inspectors fall broadly into seven groups:

- (a) The work of the post and the effectiveness with which it is carried out;
- (b) Staffing and equipment;
- (c) Accounts and other financial matters;
- (d) Security;
- (e) Office administration;
- (f) Pay and allowances, and living conditions;
- (g) Office premises and housing.

#### J. The work of the post

105. This covers all aspects of the work of a post including effectiveness in negotiation, relations with the Government to which it is accredited, relations with other important local organizations and individuals, political reporting, trade promotion and other economic work, consular section, and its informative work.

The inspectors also have to consider, in relation to all these activities, whether the post is correctly graded (e.g. as an Embassy, legation, Consulate-General or Trade Commission), and sometimes whether its continued existence is necessary at all. Posts have been closed down altogether (and others opened or up-graded) as a result of inspectors' reports.

106. Before they leave home, inspectors will have formed some impression of the scope and value of the post's work by reading at least a cross-section of the reports produced. On the spot, they check this both by talking individually to members of the staff and also by talking to local people on whom the post might be expected to make an impression. For example, the value of a post's trade promotion work can be partly assessed by frank discussions with local businessmen or government officials concerned with trade and industry.

#### Staffing and equipment

107. The inspectors' functions under this heading are fairly obvious. They have to see that the post is suitably staffed with respect to number, seniority and personnel qualifications. They must see that it is neither over-staffed nor under-staffed, and check that the staffing has been adjusted to any changes that may have taken place since the last inspection with respect to local circumstances or in their own government's interests and policy towards the country concerned. While always having an eye to economy, they must see that the post has enough staff to cope with periods of leave and sickness, and also in case of sudden additions to its work (since diplomatic work is always unpredictable in its volume and intensity).

108. Similarly, inspectors have the rather prosaic job of seeing that the post is looking after its equipment properly, and this includes office buildings, typewriters, duplicators, cars, stationery - all the paraphernalia of a modern office. They will also consider whether, by introducing more mechanization (such as dictaphones, or photostat machines) staff and money can be saved.

### Accounts and finance

109. Even a small diplomatic mission handles quite large amounts of public money for items such as staff pay and rent. Inspectors have to check that the accounts are properly maintained and that there is no waste.

### Security

110. This is one of the most important aspects of an embassy inspection. All governments have rather strict rules and regulations about security. It is, however, the inspectors' job to see that these rules are being properly enforced. For this purpose, they must check not only the physical security of cypher rooms, registries and strong-rooms, but also the personal security of members of the staff. It is easy, particularly in a friendly country, for individuals to become a little careless about their contacts and their observance of the basic principles of good security. An experienced inspector can judge whether there are any signs of laxity and check them before any serious harm is done. He will also have to consider whether the threat or potential threat to security has increased since the last inspection and recommend any further measures that may be necessary to deal with it.

### Office administration

111. This covers such points as the organization of work within the registries, archives, and physical lay out - rather pedestrian but necessary things. It is easy for rather slack and inefficient methods to appear in a long-established post and it is surprising how much work can be saved, and efficiency gained, by some quite simple rearrangements, such as where people sit and the routes of the messenger services.

112. The care of official papers is a particularly important aspect of any diplomatic mission, and a competent archivist operating a registry system can add greatly to the efficiency of the post. This is particularly so because the individual officers are constantly being moved, and the registry system may be the only real means of ensuring continuity.



Office accommodation

113. Inspectors have to see that the premises of the post are suitable to its functions, which means that there are neither too large nor too small, too lavish or too mean and that they are reasonably secure and suitably placed for access by the public.

Pay and allowances, and living conditions

114. One of the functions of inspectors is to check that overseas staff are neither receiving over-generous allowances nor getting into debt. In the British foreign service, and in many others, staff receive their pay in three forms: the basic salary of their rank and seniority; an allowance to cover local living costs; and (in the case of those of diplomatic rank) an allowance for official entertainment. Inspectors cannot do much about basic salaries, but they can and do investigate and report on the overseas and entertainment allowances. Each officer in the post is asked to produce a personal budget, covering all of his family's living expenses. This is carefully considered by the inspectors, who also interview the officer (and, if necessary, his wife), and check his budget to see whether there has been any significant change in local living costs since the last inspection. In considering whether the allowances are adequate, inspectors will, of course, take into account local conditions, the way of life, and the nature of the officer's job, as well as family and educational commitments. Obviously, no government wants its overseas representatives to live in squalor or in debt, but, on the other hand, they should not be living in an otiose or extravagant style. Either extreme would be damaging to the government's "image".

115. In the British service, the government pays an officer's rent for furnished accommodation when he is serving overseas, provided that he is housed suitably for his rank and family circumstances which is ensured by the Head of the Mission. So, inspectors must check that staff are suitably housed with a proper regard for economy, yet in reasonable comfort and, where necessary with adequate facilities for official entertainment.

116. Finally, inspectors must check that this official entertainment is suitable to local conditions, that is, neither excessive in scale or lavishness on the one hand, nor too stingy on the other, and that the right people and not merely officers or personal friends are being entertained.

### III. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

117. Strictly speaking, one cannot study the international relations of any historical period before 1648 because that year marks the birth of the nation-state. It is difficult to pinpoint the start of any historical

epoch, but the Peace of Westphalia in that year did mark the acceptance by all the known powers of the concept of independent nations separate and distinct from the "Universal Holy Roman Empire": the dream of one church and one state had proved illusory. Even so, it still waited upon the eighteenth century for Jeremy Bentham to coin the word international to distinguish the law among so-called sovereign nations from the Roman ius gentium.

118. These developments make it clear that the substance and theory inherent in the word international are recent and make it somewhat less surprising that the study of international relations itself is really a twentieth century phenomenon. It is in fact a consequence of World War I and the advent of the League of Nations, for these events convinced many scholars that the old way of doing things was clearly inadequate if they could lead to such large-scale wars. They hoped that the League of Nations offered a promising substitute for international conflict - namely, multilateral diplomacy. Both in England and the United States, scholars turned their attention to the behaviour of states and to the growth of international institutions as a substitute for international conflict.

119. The easy optimism of the post-war period led to what has been criticized as "sentimental, idealistic, and Utopian" teaching about international relations; then to a cynical view of world affairs by way of a reaction; and ultimately, to attempts (after World War II) to make the teaching about international relations more scientific. Essentially, what many scholars and practitioners wanted was to bring to the study of world affairs the precision and exactness hitherto associated with the physical sciences.

120. The essence of science is predictability - that is, the ability to forecast specific results from specific actions. But the ability to identify the elements of international relations and to predict the way they would interact with one another had not gotten very far by the 1950s, although everyone recognized certain

early attempts at prediction. Polybius had warned the people of Rome against the fate of Greece. Marie Antoinette had said: "Après nous, le déluge", and she was right. Nevertheless, highly erroneous predictions about international relations were also quite common, e.g., although many people expected the French Revolution during the reign of Louis XV, they also thought that the danger had passed in the reign of Louis XVI. Comparable errors are being made today.

121. The major difficulty in predicting events, of course, lies in the ambiguity of the material one deals with and in the uniqueness of most historical events. The problem of deciding whether history is ever repeating itself often baffles the best political observers. Other difficulties arise because the substance and limits of the subject are not well defined. Some people consider international relations one field of political science; others see it as a distinct subject and still others see it as a hybrid study, incorporating the international elements of all the social sciences. In any case, everyone agrees that one cannot expect to study international relations without paying considerable attention to such subjects as sociology, history, economics, law and politics. Practitioners of international relations, future foreign service officers, cannot know too much about these matters. Nor as George Kennan has urged so persuasively, can they know too much about the lives and letters of the people with whom they deal. In short, the more one knows about everything, the better qualified he is to represent his country abroad or to advise his government at home about international questions.

122. To give this advice a scientific base continues to excite many political scientists, especially in the United States, where "capability analysis", "equilibrium theory", "game theory", "field theory", "content analysis", and all the tools of mathematics are being mobilized in an effort to make international relations a more disciplined subject. In this connexion, the recent writings of Harold Sprout, George Lisks, Morton Kaplan, Karl Deutsch, Richard Snyder and Quincy Wright are opposite. One of the most recent efforts along these lines is the Cross-Polity Survey by Arthur Banks and Rober Textor (M.I.T. Press, 1963), which claims to adapt the cross-cultural methods of anthropology to comparative politics; and to use social science data prepared by computers. These attempts at making international relations scientific must be measured again at the criticisms

of Bernard Crick, whose American Science of Politics maintains that the really significant political judgement remain to be made by intuition, and that the "scientists" are really substituting the study of what is statistically measurable for what is socially significant.

A. Sources of power and tension

123. The sources of power among states are found in the traditional "elements of national power", tangible matters like geography, natural resources, population, technology and military forces, and such intangibles as leadership, character, diplomacy, and ideals. All these elements are important, and the better one can estimate them (scientifically or otherwise), the more accurate will be one's predictions in world affairs.

124. So far, it is still hard to estimate even the tangible elements, and it is incomparably more difficult to estimate the intangibles. But we do know enough, at least, to guard against making certain gross errors in dealing with the elements of national power. We must not, for instance, assume that any particular element makes any specific historical development "inevitable". The geo-politicians made this error, especially in Germany under Hitler, and their pseudo-science did much to contribute to the false illusions of the Nazis. Nor must we assume that because a state is powerful (or weak) at one stage of history, it must always stay the same. The Russia of 1917 is not the Soviet Union of 1940 or of 1963; China in the nineteenth century is not the China today; the British Empire under Victoria is not the same constellation of power under Elizabeth II. And we must also avoid over-emphasizing one element of power at the expense of the others: to concentrate on military force, for instance, and to ignore economic development may be to mistake the illusion of power for its substance.

125. Political analysts have made these mistakes in the past at their expense, because policy-making depends on how the policy-maker sees things, whereas results depend on how things really are. When the discrepancy between the two is too great, serious errors occur. Thus, the United States, by mistaking Japanese intentions, suffered the catastrophe of Pearl Harbour; the British, by wrongly estimating the reaction of the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Nations to their undertaking in Suez in 1956 precipitated a world crisis and a change of government

at home; and both the United States and the Soviet Union have, in recent years, made errors in developing their Cuban policies - much to their mutual embarrassment at different times.

126. The efforts of political scientists to make these estimates more precise take considerable impetus from these unhappy experiences, but we cannot yet say that policy-makers can always have the precise evidence they need to guide them. For the moment, they must be content to try to avoid the gross errors, which, in itself, is not always easy to do.

127. The quest for more and more of the elements of national power has often been a source of conflict among states. This fact has led many observers of the world scene to urge non-national, or supra-national control of the world's critical resources to remove the causes of tension. But, control of resources would not in itself always suffice to eliminate tension, because the causes of conflict are almost as various as the number of conflicts. It is doubtful, for instance, that the overweening ambition of a man like Hitler or Napoleon, could have been appeased by any specific concessions. In fact, the record of history would seem to show quite the opposite - namely, that there are psychological reasons for some tensions which lead quite naturally to the preamble to the UNESCO Constitution that proclaims that since it is in the minds of men that wars are made, it is in their minds also that the defences of peace must be constructed.

128. Unfortunately, erecting the defences of peace is a slow and painful task. In world affairs, as in others, it is much harder to build than to destroy. Fortunately, it is a task that commands the loyalty of many men of goodwill everywhere, and such institutional developments as the United Nations and the European Economic Community continue in our own time to hold out some hope that it is not beyond the wit of man to devise new institutions to help resolve age-old tensions.

#### B. Responsibilities of new states

129. New nations have responsibilities both to themselves and to others. To themselves, they have the responsibility of putting economic development highest on their list of priorities. As easy as this sounds, it is difficult to make a sound plan for development and even more difficult, once it is made, to carry it out.

All sorts of erroneous considerations may get in the way: the desire for prestige, which may lead people to crave airfields instead of schools; or the dictates of politics, which may lead officials to develop their own "back gardens" instead of those places where development would most aid the new state.

130. The problems of developing states are not, however, limited to wise planning and sound execution. Some considerable psychological adjustment may be necessary as well, because planners may find that the persons most in a position to help them represent the nations of the metropolitan powers whom they have spent years trying to expel from positions of power, or are exponents of a philosophy (e.g. of private enterprise) which they do not find congenial or appropriate. In such a situation, economic and social development may require the leaders of a new state to swallow a considerable amount of pride - one hopes it is a false pride and easily expendable - in the real interest of the state and nation.

131. Of course, it would be wrong to imply that concomitant obligations do not devolve upon the developed states as well. Donors of aid have matching responsibilities to use their economic and social power to speed the development of the new states and not to use it for any incidental objectives, like promoting their own trade, cementing military alliances, or winning cold wars. If, in fact, both donors and recipients of aid could concentrate on development itself, they might be able to bring into being a new science, which would leave ideology aside and tell all state planners what, at any given point in their history, is the best policy to follow next.

132. To the world outside, the new state has the considerable responsibility of justifying the doctrine of one state - one vote, which is the hallmark of sovereignty and of participation in the United Nations, but which has now been applied in ways never anticipated by the established powers. In order not to bring the whole edifice of international politics crashing down (and recognizing the impracticability at the present time of such schemes as those developed by Grenville Clark and Louis Sohn in World Peace through World Law), the new nations must make their policies justify the faith that their more eloquent spokesmen have in their capacity to offer the world something unique.

133. Thus, if it should prove true, as some statesmen have alleged, that small states have a distinct contribution to make/<sup>to</sup> world peace and security, the case for giving small states a considerable voice in the councils of nations can be made. If they should prove themselves disinterested and impartial in international conflicts, if they should prove useful as mediators among the great powers, if they do identify more with the purposes of the United Nations Charter than do other Members, if they remain free from the commitments and complexities of the great powers and use their positions for the benefit of all mankind, they may well demonstrate a moral superiority that will command universal respect.

134. Some evidence exists that new states can play this role: the constant reminder the new and small states have issued to the Nuclear Powers that all the world has a stake in the negotiations to regulate armaments, and that Geneva talks must go on regardless of differences between the United States and the Soviet Union, is a case in point. So is the initiative the new states took in urging U Thant, Secretary-General of the United Nations, to offer his good offices in the Cuban crisis of 1962. It is in fact demonstrable, as in the way that the African nations in the United Nations have managed to alter the voting of the United States on the South African problem of apartheid, that by giving voice to moral considerations, the new states have already helped to raise the quality of international debate and negotiations.

C. Nationalism and the viability of the state system

135. Using the generally accepted definitions of nation and state, it is quite easy to see that nationalism still has a great deal to offer peoples eager to enjoy independence. On the other hand, they need to be aware of the dangers inherent in the system - namely the extreme nationalism exemplified by Nazi Germany and which, with its racist doctrines and authoritarian trappings, is the exact antithesis of the objectives new states have had in mind in attempting to achieve a status in the councils of nations.

136. They should also be aware of the possible transitory nature of the state system. Man has organized communities in the past along religious, monarchical and cosmopolitan lines, and the nation-state is a recent international phenomenon. We must, therefore, acknowledge the possibility that the nation-state can eventually disappear from the realm of human institutions.



137. There is a variety of suggestions about how best to supplant this institution, which many people now consider obsolete and ill-suited to the inter-dependent world of the twentieth century. One may concentrate on building stronger international institutions, e.g., by amending the United Nations Charter; one may build entirely new super-national institutions, like those of the European Economic Community; or one might dismantle the state system and give a new status to local, autonomous and cultural groups as Geoffrey Gorer has recently suggested.

138. All of this concern for new institutions arises from a realization that the nation-state no longer provides the security for the individual that it was created to supply. No state is so self-sufficient or independent as to justify the attribute "sovereign" to which they cling so stubbornly. The world would, in fact, be much better off if the word "sovereignty" could disappear from the language if, instead of worrying about its mystic qualities, statesmen could concentrate on questions of substance - namely how much authority they need to carry out their functions and how much they might better transfer to super-national institutions in the common interest.

139. In the meantime, of course, one must admit the validity of the national concept for peoples emerging from colonialism. One may well wish even to be governed badly by himself than governed well by others and to feel that he must first enjoy independence before he can be expected to give it up for inter-dependence. But many will continue to hope that the new nations may come quickly to realize the limitations in the state system itself and work effectively in the years to come for international or super-national solutions to world problems that hold still greater promise of world peace and security.

140. Some of the specific subjects considered by the group in the field of international relations were:

- (a) Regional organizations, particularly the Organization of American States, and the Organization of African Unity;
- (b) A comparison of the membership of India and Canada in the Commonwealth;
- (c) Non-alignment in a changing world;
- (d) Indians overseas;
- (e) The strategic position of the Caribbean and a review of the United States dispositions in this area;
- (f) Significance of Latin America to the Caribbean;
- (g) The next generation in the Caribbean.

D. Regional organizations, particularly the Organization of American States, and the Organization of African Unity

141. It was noted that at the time of the drafting of the United Nations Charter, the inter-American attachment to hemisphere solidarity resulted in the admission by the big powers that regional arrangements would be integrated in the United Nations system by permitting regional pacific settlement organs to handle disputes under their jurisdiction prior to submitting them to the United Nations. The provisions relating to regional arrangements were contained in articles 52, 53 and 54 of the Charter.

142. The ancestry of the Organization of American States was traced to the first Inter-American Conference held in Washington in 1889-1890, when the "International Union of American Republics" (1890) was established for purposes of non-political co-operation, such as the promotion of commerce, the improvement of inter-American communications, cultural exchanges, etc. The Havana resolution of 1928 specifically forbade the exercise of political functions. But, at the Buenos Aires Conference of 1936, the American nations began to give the inter-American system the attributes of a security system in the form of agreements to regard the threat to security of one American State as a threat to all and to consult together on the means of meeting such a threat. An organ of consultation was created two years later and the meetings of American Ministers for Foreign Affairs were devised.

143. Another regional organ of recent creation is the Organization of African Unity, established by the Heads of thirty-two African States convened at Addis Ababa from 22 to 25 May 1963. At this Conference, a charter establishing a regional organization was adopted. Various permanent organs, including an Assembly of Heads of States, which is an innovation, a Council of Ministers, a Secretariat and a Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration were established. The Heads of States defined their principles of policy and action. Emphasis was placed on the removal of colonialism from Africa and swift replacement by African governments, as well as co-operation among African governments at various levels. While reaffirming "its dedication to the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter", the Conference invited African governments to take all possible steps to achieve a more equitable representation of Africa in the United Nations and the specialized agencies. At the summit conference, it was also resolved to declare Africa "a de-nuclearized zone".

E. Membership of India and Canada in the Commonwealth

144. A comparative study of the membership of India and Canada in the Commonwealth reveals that the supremacy of the United Kingdom in naval, financial and industrial matters had helped both these countries, particularly during the earlier stages of their development. The structure of the Commonwealth had changed with the receding into the background of the supremacy of imperial interests of the United Kingdom. After the First World War, decision-making shifted steadily to the member nations. Members of the Commonwealth also became responsible for their external relations after the passing of the Statute of Westminster in 1931. India, with her different background, has had a unique status in the Commonwealth and altered the status of this political union in 1949 by becoming the first Republic to be admitted to the association.

145. An examination of the bonds that unite the Commonwealth, such as those based on sentiments, institutions and practices unifying the Commonwealth, economic relations and different ties, shows that these ties, while of value, were not essential to the continued existence of the Commonwealth. It was suggested that freedom exercised by members in external relations, in internal policies, and in intra-Commonwealth matters had been basic to the continued membership of India and Canada in the Commonwealth. It was also noted that the bilateral relations of many members of the Commonwealth with the United States had been growing both in defence and in economic matters

F. Non-alignment in a changing world

146. The post-war world saw an independent India initiating the concept of non-alignment in the field of foreign relations. Essentially, this policy reflected India's deep desire to retain independence of judgement and freedom of action in a world which had just emerged from a catastrophic war and which passionately desired peace so necessary for its rehabilitation and development. Disturbing signs were evident of the beginnings of a cold war based on ideological differences, military alignments and a nuclear threat in the background. It was, in essence, an effort to find a new way in the search for a stable peace in conditions where national interests of countries could be sought in harmony, and not in conflict, with the larger interests of mankind.

147. While non-alignment was a concept essentially applicable to a state of war, non-alignment had positive significance mainly in times of peace, but also valid in times of war. A neutral country declares in advance that it will not be an ally of either belligerent in case of war. A non-aligned country, on the contrary, retains the freedom to take its own position at the appropriate time, which may even be to participate in a war. Non-alignment, though seeking peace, does not preclude participation in a war or even neutrality, but is more positive and retains the freedom of decision. Developing through various stages and spheres, including outstanding landmarks like the Bandung Conference of 1955 and the establishment of the Afro-Asian group in the United Nations, and rendering a modest but useful and effective service to international peace on the occasions of crises such as Korea in 1950, Indo-China in 1954, Suez in 1956, and the Congo in 1960, the policy was affirmed by twenty-five countries at the Conference held in Belgrade in September 1961. The policy of non-alignment has made a modest but effective contribution to stability and the maintenance of peace. This policy has also helped emerging nations maintain their sovereignty in conditions of dignity, and has generally helped prevent differences among nations from reaching explosive proportions and has extended the area of peace and co-operation.

#### G. Indians overseas

148. Accurate and up-to-date statistics about the people of Indian descent abroad are not available, but their number is estimated to be about 6 or 7 million, which is less than 1.5 per cent of the population of India. They are scattered over fifty countries and territories, more than one-half of which are in the Commonwealth. The principal concentrations are in Ceylon, Malaysia and Burma. Other areas where Indian settlers are present in comparatively large numbers include the West Indies area, including British Guiana and Surinam, Mauritius, Fiji, the Union of South Africa and East Africa. The majority are the descendents of indentured labourers who were recruited during the period from 1830 to 1917. They have made a significant contribution to the building up of the economies of these areas. They remained essentially a rural population engaged largely in agriculture and have not made much of an impact in government employment, particularly in the higher echelons of the civil service. They have introduced Hinduism and the religion of Islam, languages, and other elements of an ancient and traditional culture.

149. Since India became independent, it has been possible for the Indians abroad to renew their contacts with the mother culture. The policy of the Government of India and advice to people of Indian descent abroad has always been that the people of Indian descent must identify themselves with the fortunes and interests of their adopted homelands, live in harmony with their co-citizens of different origins, and use their Indian heritage in cultural and other fields for the development of their new homelands.

H. The strategic position of the Caribbean and a review of the United States dispositions in this area

150. The Caribbean represents one of the great highways of oceanic communications in the world. The sea lanes through and around the Caribbean constitute the life-lines of the commerce of the United States. Hence, it is of critical importance and looms large in the foreign policy of the United States. The natural resources of the area include petroleum, bauxite, sugar, and coffee. Supplementing the commercial flow connecting the area, there has arisen, especially since the Second World War, an international flow of capital, which has financed exceptional public expenditures in the Latin States, and has entered to a much greater degree into developmental enterprises of local resources. The relationships between the United States and the Caribbean are so intimate that only in a technical sense can they be spoken of as "foreign relations". In this context, one of the objectives of the United States naval operations is to keep open the sea lanes of communications and, specifically, to assign priority to the sea approaches to the continental land mass and thereby contribute to the defence of the country.

I. The significance of Latin America to the Caribbean

151. The term Latin America is a geographic expression, in a sense, since all the countries have had separate histories, a separate development, they differ in size and significance and have few transport links, which makes it extremely difficult to generalize in any useful way about the area as a whole. Spain, the metropolitan power associated with the continent, was not interested in the economic development of its colonies, except insofar as they served as suppliers of raw materials and as markets for metropolitan produce. However, Latin American countries in the

nineteenth century, like the United States in the same period, excited the fancy of European financiers, especially from England and, to a lesser extent, from France and Germany. In the scramble to share in the wealth of Latin America, the peasants, who constituted the bulk of the population, were ignored. The case of Argentina provides a good example. In Mexico, revolutions in the nineteenth century had very little effect on the conditions of the people. Yet, the country became a haven for numerous foreign investors. This situation was remedied with the Madero revolution of 1910. The peasants without rights in Peru and the depressed conditions of mine workers in Bolivia promoted popular movements for political rights.

152. The role of the United States in Latin America has been predominantly conservative and stems from its interest in national security. President Roosevelt's "good neighbour policy" was based on non-intervention in the affairs of the Latin American States.

153. There are several points in the Latin American experience which are of relevance to the West Indies. Among these is the fact of political independence and the extent of its real significance when it stands alone. Some of the constitutional forms and the role of the military in Latin American politics provoke considerable thinking. A point of interest in the Latin American experience is that foreign investors have not always solved the economic problems of the countries and, frequently, they created others in the wake of their investment, such as those which produced the Mexican revolution and the social and political unrest in Argentina in the 1920's and 1930's. In any event, with the shrinking of communications, developments in Latin America would more intimately affect the West Indies.

J. The next generation in the Caribbean

154. The Caribbean has been often described as the Mediterranean of the West. However, the Caribbean community is characterized by insularity. One of the main causes for this has been the large number of small island units. Ninety per cent of the population live on four big islands and the rest on forty-seven small ones.

It has become difficult to differ without bitterness and in such an environment. The islands are in different stages of development and it is not easy to form a cohesive society. The introduction of sugar as a major crop in the West Indies has led to the creation of a plantation economy introducing divisions of class and colour. The educational system further consolidated the divisions in the society. In this respect, the University of the West Indies has attempted to develop common standards and provide educational facilities throughout the region. The regional institutions and commodity agreements have also helped to promote unity. It is also fortunate that common cultural bonds, notably in literature have developed. Sports, especially cricket, have also been useful in breaking down the barriers. It was essential to promote unity in diversity. The existing framework of society would be sufficiently tolerant to accommodate various groups and prevent social disruption.

#### IV. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

##### A. Historical and theoretical introduction to international organization

155. General international organization in the twentieth century may be regarded as a fabric woven from three threads which can be traced to nineteenth-century origins. The Concert of Europe, which emerged from the settlement of the Napoleonic Wars represented the creation of a Great Power directorate in international affairs; it is identified as the prototype of the League Council, and later the United Nations Security Council. The Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 were broad assemblies of spokesmen for both great and small states, initiating multilateral deliberations on a wide range of international questions; as such, they anticipated the League Assembly and the United Nations General Assembly. Various public international unions created during the nineteenth century promoted multilateral collaboration in dealing with economic, social, technical, and humanitarian problems, and thus served as precedents for the "non-political" machinery of the League and the specialized agencies of the United Nations system. In the twentieth century, first the League and now the United Nations have brought together, rationalized, and given further development to the emergent institutional trends of the previous era; these institutions have themselves continued steadily to evolve in structure, procedure, and functional emphasis.

156. A knowledge of this history is essential to an understanding of the fact that the United Nations experiment is not merely an "idealistic gimmick" or an optional experiment imposed upon the multistate system, but is rather an evolved and evolving response to the growing needs posed by increasing interdependence among states. International organization represents a set of pragmatically developed adaptations of the system of international relations, devised by statesmen in order to facilitate their conduct of foreign affairs. It is a device for modernizing and improving the functioning of the multistate system, not for undermining or changing the fundamental character of that system. It does not demand that statesmen abandon their pursuit of the national interest, but provides a new context within which - and new methods by which - the national interest may be promoted, and it encourages the possibility that statesmen may be stimulated to redefine the interests of their states in the light of the realities of interdependence.



157. One must be cautious in assessing the "purposes" of the United Nations. The goals proclaimed in the Charter are not necessarily accurate indicators of the operative purposes of the United Nations at any given point in time. In fact, the United Nations is owned and operated by its Member States; it is an instrument which they have created and placed at their own disposal and, like any instrument, it is susceptible of various uses. The operative purposes of the United Nations are those injected into its operations by Member States. Different states wish to use the United Nations for different purposes, and a given state may change, from time to time, the objectives which it wishes the United Nations to promote. The struggle for control over the purposes of the United Nations is the essence of the political process which takes place within the organs of the organization. In the final analysis, the purposes which the United Nations serves are not dictated by the words of the Charter, but are determined by the policies of Member States.

B. The political role of the United Nations

Limits

158. It is often alleged that international organization rests upon an "idealistic" conception of international relations, which ignores or minimizes the conflicting, struggle-for-power aspect of international politics, and regards the relations of states as essentially harmonious. From this point of view, international organizations are adequately described as agencies of international co-operation. On the contrary, international organization actually reflects a dualistic conception of international relations, one which sees states as engaging in both conflicting and co-operative relations. Ideally, international organization represents an attempt to minimize the discordant aspects and maximize the co-operative aspects of international relations. In fact, some states are primarily interested in using the United Nations and other agencies for promoting constructive collaboration, while others may be more concerned with using the organization to prevent or solve conflicts. Indeed, the United Nations may serve either as a "peace conference" or as a "battle ground" - in practice it has both roles. It is not alarming that conflicts are visible in the United Nations. What would be alarming would be a United Nations which so misrepresented the realities of the world that no conflicts were visible within it. The United Nations is built on the premise that there will be conflicts in the world, but that it is important to try to control and minimize the impact of those conflicts.

159. Both the League of Nations and the United Nations were created at the end of major wars, with a view to preventing the repetition of such international disasters. In general, international organization had been legitimized as an anti-war device. The standard conception of the ideal political role of an institution such as the United Nations is that it should enforce peace and order. The League was designed to pursue this end through the operation of a system of collective security. The initial idea in the creation of the United Nations was that it should be made a more effective collective security system than the League had proved to be. However, the Charter in fact reflected a profound pessimism about the possibility of effectuating the principle of collective security in any general sense. The veto rule gave expression to the view that it would be futile and even dangerous to attempt to institutionalize collective security against aggression launched or supported by a great power. Hence, the Charter represented an effort to institutionalize collective security only to a modest degree. In practice, not even the limited collective security system envisaged in the Charter has been established, a failure which is symbolized by the fact that Article 43 has become a "dead letter". Collective security has remained a popular ideal in abstract terms, but there seems to be little prospect of serious effort to translate it into reality.

160. Some attention has been given to the idea of equipping the United Nations with an international army of its own, capable of restraining aggressors, but this does not seem a realistic project. Here, the problem of the power-base is fundamental; a United Nations army would actually represent borrowed national power, not independent international power.

161. The conclusion is inescapable that states must rely upon their own power and that of allies for security against attack. The United Nations is not equipped, nor does it seem likely to become equipped, to defend states in the military sense. It can and does contribute to peace and security -- but not by implementing the idea of collective security.

#### Positive responsibilities

162. States are the focal points of power in international relations. The United Nations cannot realistically be expected to exercise independent power, subordinating states to its coercive control and thus, literally, enforcing the peace. What, then, can the United Nations do with regard to the problem of peace and security?

163. A classical political function of international institutions is to encourage and facilitate the peaceful settlement of international disputes, helping states to find alternatives to violence, or to settle their difficulties before they reach the stage of military conflict. In carrying out this function, international organizations tend to treat the parties as equals, rather than to judge between a "guilty" and an "innocent" party (as in the case of collective security); they provide some form of "third party" to separate the parties involved in incipient violence and to bring them together in negotiation, to elucidate the facts, to encourage restraint, to suggest compromise or other face-saving solutions, and to assist in the implementation of agreed settlements once they may have been adopted. The United Nations, building upon the experience of the League, has developed a variety of instrumentalities and procedures which are constantly available to states for these purposes. It provides a neutral ground for diplomacy and a varied staff of personnel for investigatory and mediatory functions. The record of the United Nations in promoting peaceful settlement shows both successes and failures -- as well as cases which cannot readily be classified under either heading, such as the phenomena of "the peaceful perpetuation" and of "the almost-peaceful settlement" of disputes. The United Nations, in playing this role, has the delicate task of finding the most effective mixture of "open diplomacy" and of "quiet diplomacy", but states parties to, or interested in disputes sometimes abuse the facilities of the United Nations rather than attempting to promote their most effective utilization. In any case, peaceful settlement techniques are not always capable of solving international disputes.

164. The nearest thing to an innovation developed by the United Nations in the political-security sphere is the technique known as preventive diplomacy. The late Secretary-General Hammarskjöld formulated the theory of preventive diplomacy on the basis of the United Nations pragmatic role in the Suez dispute of 1956 and the Congo case of 1960. While Hammarskjöld believed that the United Nations could not intervene directly in the cold war struggle, he developed the view that it could help to "contain" the cold war; by intervening in a neutral way in trouble spots outside the cold war arena, it could assist the major antagonists to avoid the direct confrontation in such areas which might produce a military showdown.

The United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) and the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) involved the use of military personnel voluntarily supplied by Members other than the great powers as agents of the United Nations, to serve the common

interest in "keeping the cold war cold." Essentially, preventive diplomacy requires that both of the cold war blocs acknowledge their vital interest in the performance of this function, and have confidence in the impartiality of the United Nations in this performance. It is a service which may be rendered for the great powers, not an action which can be taken against them. Contrary to the expectations of the founders of the United Nations, it excludes the great powers from an active role in supplying the forces which the United Nations requires, and assigns this responsibility to the smaller states.

165. Experience shows that preventive diplomacy involves serious difficulties and risks, and the future development of this function is subject to great uncertainty. Nevertheless, preventive diplomacy may represent the best opportunity available to the United Nations to contribute significantly to the stabilization of international relations in this dangerous age.

166. In a broader sense, the role of the United Nations in providing a forum for "parliamentary diplomacy" is most important. The organization may be described as an educational institution for statesmen, which helps them to understand the nature of the global context within which their states must live, develop their foreign policies, pursue their national interests, and protect their security.

#### C. The economic and social role of the United Nations

167. In this realm, the United Nations is primarily concerned with the co-operative rather than the conflicting aspect of international relations; it provides machinery for the promotion of welfare rather than the prevention of warfare. Actually, there is a working assumption that the two problems are intimately related. Following the functional theory of international organization, the United Nations activity in the economic and social sphere is regarded as an indirect approach to the problem of war, a means of developing conditions conducive to a peaceful world.

168. The history of international organization reveals a steady growth of emphasis upon programmes in the economic and social area. The Charter of the United Nations indicated that the new organization was conceived as having a major commitment to this kind of activity, with a new stress on promoting the economic development of under-developed countries rather than simply fostering co-ordination of advanced economic systems. In operation, the United Nations has continually increased its emphasis on this kind of function, and has produced a complex network of agencies and programmes (including the autonomous specialized agencies, working in co-operation with the United Nations) devoted to this purpose. For the most part, United Nations economic programmes, which have stressed technical assistance and moved

towards assistance in economic development, have relied on voluntary financial contributions of governments, and have stimulated mixed patterns of self-help and external aid for developing countries.

169. The issue of the United Nations role in this sphere has been a major issue in the politics of the organization. The "revolution of rising expectations" has been reflected in the rising political demand for United Nations economic activity; as the membership of the organization has expanded, this demand has been increasingly vocal and effective. The long campaign for the creation of the Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development is symbolic of this political demand, and the opposition to this project reflects the reluctance of some of the more developed states to allow the determination of the purposes of the United Nations to be dominated by states in the early stages of economic development. Voting power has been confronted by financial power, and both sides have shown a tendency towards realistic adjustment to the situation. This case provides a significant example of the role of international organization in bringing about the accommodation of the viewpoints and policy positions of states having different conceptions of priority.

170. In objective terms, the United Nations has accomplished very little of what needs to be done in the economic sphere; it has hardly begun to close the gap between the rich and the poor states, or to alleviate the pressing problems of poverty and misery. However, some fundamental progress has been made. The propriety of the United Nations' undertaking a role in economic development has been established and the principle of collective economic security can no longer be denied. The commitment of international organization to operation in this field is probably irreversible, and one can expect the trend towards increased emphasis on this kind of function to persist indefinitely. Beyond this, the United Nations has engaged in an important learning and "tooling-up" process, an essential preparatory phase for the long-term effort of helping states to help themselves and each other in the work of economic development.

#### D. The role of Representatives of new States in the United Nations

171. It is essential that personnel of new States, who may expect to participate in the management of the foreign policy of governments and in their representation at the United Nations, should develop a balanced view and mature understanding of the United Nations. On the one hand, the United Nations is not a panacea for either the problem of warfare or that of welfare. It provides no substitute for

statesmanship, nor does it relieve governments of their basic responsibilities for the security and welfare of their countries. On the other hand, to say that the United Nations cannot do everything that needs to be done is not to say that it can do nothing that is valuable and essential. For limited purposes, the United Nations is a useful -- even indispensable -- instrument of states, singly and collectively. The task is to work intelligently within the limits of the organization's possibilities, while trying to expand those limits. The United Nations is, above all, flexible and adaptable; it has changed, and will continue to change, and all its Member States have an opportunity to contribute to the determination of its future development.

172. Participation in multilateral agencies is inherently a "give and take" affair, and statesmen must learn to live with this fact. Wins and losses must be balanced against each other, and it is important to remember that these are relative concepts. The results of formal votes are not always what they seem; a voting victory may be an empty and meaningless triumph, while a voting defeat may, in real diplomatic terms, be an actual victory. One should look for solutions, not resolutions per se. Indeed, the abuse of the capacity to achieve parliamentary victories in the United Nations may so weaken the actual effectiveness of the organization that it becomes a self-defeating enterprise.

173. New States should ask what they can get from membership in the United Nations. The major tangible gain is perhaps assistance towards their economic development. The United Nations can also contribute to their security, by contributing to international stability in the general sense, and by mobilizing political restraint in cases where they may be threatened. While the United Nations cannot be expected to match the power of aggressors, it may be able to influence the policy of potential aggressors, by bringing diplomatic pressure to bear upon them. The "platform value" of the United Nations for new States is of considerable importance; the United Nations provides them with the opportunity to make their national voices heard, thus enhancing their influence in the world, and it also gives them a valuable listening-post. The "shop-talk" aspect of the United Nations is of no small value. More generally, the United Nations serves as a vital diplomatic centre, having particular value for states which find it difficult or impossible to establish a comprehensive network of diplomatic posts throughout the world. It should not be forgotten that the United Nations is the focus of bilateral diplomatic activity, as well as of multilateral diplomacy.

174. Finally, new states should also ask what they can give, what contributions they can make to the world through their participation in the United Nations. They have unique opportunities to play a neutral, mediatory role in world affairs. The peaceful settlement role of the United Nations, and more especially its function of preventive diplomacy, pose challenging demands for peace-promoting service by the smaller states. They are the indispensable agents of the United Nations in its most vital political activities. International organizations have long afforded spokesmen for small states the chance to contribute useful ideas and initiative in international affairs; the constructive statesman from a small and weak country can achieve a position of influence in the United Nations despite the relative insignificance of his country in world affairs -- or perhaps even because of that fact. Finally, spokesmen for new states can help the world to see itself "in the round" -- to formulate the agenda of humanity, to confront the big problems, to realize the possibilities of progress, and to set the priorities for action.

175. One can serve his country best at the United Nations if one understands and acts upon the principle that in serving the general interest in world order and the progressive development of peoples, one also serves the national interest of his particular state.

#### E. General

176. The Group studied intensively the status of the United Nations General Assembly, its responsibilities and functions in accordance with the appropriate articles of the Charter. The work of the plenary sessions of the General Assembly, its rules of procedure, its relations with the other main bodies of the United Nations, councils and committees, were also examined.

177. Another subject of interest was technical assistance and its place in the programmes of the United Nations and the specialized agencies. The growth in financial value of the various programmes, the emphasis in the provision of experts and fellowships, and the recent growth of important projects financed by the Special Fund, were also studied.

178. There was great interest in the World Food Programme, particularly since it was used for hurricane relief in the Caribbean countries.

179. The role of the United Nations Resident Representatives of the Technical Assistance Board in ensuring that these programmes served to meet high-priority requests was discussed. It was noted that the office of the United Nations Resident Representative implied the presence of the United Nations and helped to serve as a channel through which the specialized knowledge and expertise from the United Nations

family was brought to the developing nations. It was noted that even though, in comparison with bilateral aid programmes, the United Nations programmes were relatively modest, they filled an important gap by securing available talent at the right time.



## V. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DIPLOMACY

### A. Assumptions of the diplomatic system

180. International law is related to diplomacy in four ways. It defines the assumptions of the inter-group community within which it functions. It defines the status of diplomatic agents permitting them to perform their functions. It provides instruments useful to diplomats in performing their functions. It defines the functions of diplomats under the changing conditions of the inter-group community.

181. The preamble of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations signed on 18 April 1961, suggests these four relations, but in different order. It declares:

"The States Parties to the present Convention,

Recalling that peoples of all nations from ancient times have recognized the status of diplomatic agents;

Having in mind the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations concerning the sovereign equality of states, the maintenance of international peace and security, and the promotion of friendly relations among nations;

Believing that an international convention on diplomatic intercourse privileges and immunities would contribute to the development of friendly relations among nations, irrespective of their differing constitutional and social systems;

Realizing that the purpose of such privileges and immunities is not to benefit individuals, but to ensure the efficient performance of the functions of diplomatic missions as representing states;

Affirming that the rules of customary international law should continue to govern questions not expressly regulated by the provisions of the present Convention;

Have agreed as follows:"

182. The first and last paragraphs indicate that the status of diplomats has always been recognized and defined by customary international law; the second suggests the major assumptions of the international community today; the third suggests the major function of diplomacy under these assumptions; and the fourth suggests that suitable privileges and immunities are one of the instruments of diplomacy.

183. Though diplomacy has existed among independent human groups, whether primitive societies, ancient city states or empires, medieval feudal kingdoms, or national states, whenever they have come into contact with one another, the assumptions underlying these inter-group communities have differed greatly in different stages of history.

184. Diplomacy has been defined as "the art of negotiation in order to achieve the maximum of group objectives with a minimum of costs, within a system of politics in which war is a possibility"<sup>16/</sup>. This definition implies by use of the word negotiation that there is general recognition of a rule that agreements, the hoped for fruit of negotiations, will be observed. Without this assumption, negotiation would be idle. Thus, diplomacy implies that the inter-group system is not a "state of nature" in the Hobbesian sense, but a society whose members accept certain fundamental rules of inter-group law. The definition also implies that the groups involved are guided by self-interest, that they have little or no conception of the interests of the inter-group community of which they and their people are all members other than its interest in supporting the agreements which they may make, and that, if negotiation fails, war is likely to result. The definition, therefore, assumes, as did General Clausewitz, that "war is nothing but a continuance of political intercourse (diplomacy) with a mixture of other means".<sup>17/</sup> The threat of war if not war itself, was therefore, a major instrument of diplomacy, and the function of diplomacy was to realize national interests against the opposition of other groups.

185. This assumption about the nature of the inter-group community, is very different from that stated in the second paragraph of the Vienna Convention which, citing the United Nations Charter, assumed peaceful coexistence and friendly relations among equal sovereign states.

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<sup>16/</sup> See article by Quincy Wright in S.D. Kertesz and M.A. Fitzsimons, Diplomacy in a Changing World, (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1959), p.35.

<sup>17/</sup> Karl von Clausewitz (translated by Col. J.J. Graham), On War (London: K. Paul, Trench, and Trubner, 1911), vol. 3, p. 121.

186. Some of the assumptions about the inter-group community have existed among primitive peoples in ancient civilization and in the middle ages, but there have been changes in these assumptions since the renaissance. Attention should be given to the differing views of such renaissance writers as Machiavelli, Erasmus, Francis of Victoria, Alberico Gentili, Grotius and Emeric Cruce; and to the changing conceptions of international law with the emergence of territorial states in the fifteenth century, with the Peace of Westphalia ending the religious wars in the seventeenth century, with the Peace of Vienna establishing the Concert of Europe in the nineteenth century, and with the League of Nations and the United Nations in the twentieth century.

187. There are differences in the objectives, methods, and status of diplomats theoretically flowing from these changing assumptions, and the actual continuance of power-building objectives, threats of war, and the suspicions of duplicity and espionage incompatible with the contemporary legal assumptions indicate a lag of practice behind theory. Though the law assumes, as did Benjamin Franklin, that honesty is the best policy, Machiavellism is not a forgotten practice.

B. The status of diplomatic agents

188. The existing law of diplomatic privileges and immunities has been set forth in the Vienna Convention of 1961 with some reference to the historic development of this law. It may be noted that the problems of rank, precedence and prerogative drew attention and was of considerable practical importance as the hierarchical system of the middle ages merged into the system of equal territorial states, and as the system of absolute monarchy merged into the system of democratically-organized states. The claims to a "right of legation" and the relation of diplomatic intercourse to recognition, the procedures for initiating and ending missions, and the relations of temporary and permanent missions deserve to be noted.

189. Consideration should be given to the immunities of place, person and action, and the different suggested bases of these immunities in ex-territoriality, sovereignty of the sending state, and functional necessity. The immunity of the seat of the mission, of diplomatic residence, and of means of travel are recognized. Also important are personal immunities involving the difference between special and permanent missions, between diplomatic agents and the administrative and

service staff, between nationals and non-nationals, of the sending state, between diplomatic agents and representatives to international organizations, consuls, military personnel, and other state agents abroad. The extent of immunities in respect to criminal and civil jurisdiction, taxation, services, supervision and other claims of the receiving state should be considered, as should immunities in respect of official acts, communications and archives, and the functions of diplomats in their states.

190. The obligations of the receiving state, are not only to respect immunities, but to protect the mission and its personnel. The obligation of the sending state is to see that its mission respects the law of the receiving state, especially in such matters as traffic regulations, asylum to refugees, and espionage. The procedures for sanctioning these obligations should be examined, such as appeal to the diplomatic corps, diplomatic protest, dismissal of a delinquent agent as persona non grata, and breaking of diplomatic relations.

#### C. The instruments of diplomacy

191. The instruments of diplomacy have been numerous and varied. The essence of diplomacy has been flexibility in adapting means to the conditions and objectives of a particular negotiation. International law, however, provides certain indispensable instruments. It provides, as the preamble to the Vienna treaty asserts, the diplomatic agent with a status protected by international law, not for his personal benefit, but to protect him from coercion by the receiving state so that he can represent the sending state, and perform his function. He thus becomes a functionary, not only of the sending state, but also of the international community.

192. International law also provides formal procedures for negotiation of treaties, through the stages of exchange of full powers, signature and exchange of ratifications in the case of bilateral treaties, and more elaborate procedures for the making of multilateral treaties. It provides rights and principles to determine whether agreements are valid and what they mean. It provides a technical vocabulary assisting diplomats with differing linguistic background to communicate. It provides arguments useful to diplomats in defending claims not only in negotiations, but in the forum of world opinion and the United Nations.

193. There is now a requirement in international law that after ratification of a treaty, it should be registered with the Secretariat of the United Nations and published, provision for which is made in Article 102 of the Charter. The effect of non-registration is not to take away the validity of the treaty, but that it may not be invoked before any organ of the United Nations. As the International Court of Justice is one of these organs, non-registration of a treaty may give rise to the Court's not recognizing obligations created by such treaty.

194. International law also distinguishes forms of pressure which may properly be used in diplomacy. While in the past, war was a sovereign attribute, threats of force were permissible, and it was assumed that negotiation would be assisted if a state had a position of strength. The United Nations Charter prohibits the threat or use of force in international relations except in defence against armed attack, in conformity with a United Nations decision or recommendation, or in accord with an agreement with the state in whose territory force is used. The continued existence of rival armaments and the express or implied threat to use them in diplomatic situations like those of Berlin and Cuba, and the actual use of them in situations such as Suez and Hungary, indicates that the legal limitations upon proper means of diplomacy is imperfectly reflected in the practice of states. Diplomacy is still, to a considerable extent, conducted by the mailed fist in the gloved hand.

195. Treaties obtained under duress would not be recognized in international law. Thus a peace treaty entered into as a result of the violation of the Kellogg-Brand Pact by an aggressor state would perhaps be considered invalid. So long as the view obtained that war was a legitimate instrument of policy, duress did not have the effect of rendering any treaty null and void. However, if duress were used on the negotiator, a different consideration used to be applied. The change in attitude towards war, as embodied in the League of Nations resolution and the Pact of Paris, has given rise to the concept that jus ea injuria non oritur, and that an aggressor state would not be permitted to enjoy its fruits of aggression. In international law, if force is used by a state in violation of its international obligations, then a treaty entered into by this state would not be recognized.

196. Upon exchange of ratification, a foreign Government is entitled to assume that municipal and constitutional laws of the territory have been complied with, and that the ratification of the treaty was obtained by observance of all the procedures for that purpose which exist in the territory.

197. In international law, the rule pacta sunt servanda has been clearly established and treaties are not terminable unilaterally simply because one of the signatory states no longer wants to respect obligations created by the treaty. Under the circumstances, if the United States Congress passes legislation which is in violation of treaty obligations, while the local courts may find it necessary to give due effect to local legislation, the foreign country is entitled to rely on the treaty and to disregard the act of Congress.

198. The doctrine of rebus sic stantibus is a restricted attempt to introduce into international law the doctrine of frustration of contracts. It has given rise to much controversy as to its true applicability and seeks to connote that treaty obligations terminate if conditions which motivated the making of the treaty have completely changed, these conditions being basic to the continuing validity of the treaty.

199. While several attempts have been made to terminate treaties unilaterally by invoking the doctrine (none of which have been successful), the accepted principle seems to be that a party to a treaty does not have the right to terminate it unilaterally, merely because it believes that the conditions motivating the making of the treaty have completely changed so that the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus is applicable.

200. The rise in foreign investments in territories presents for consideration the problem of how far a state should regard itself capable of protecting the interests of its nationals abroad, and the extent to which it will go in this direction on the one hand, and, on the other, how much respect it should have for the sovereignty of the state in which the interests are held. Since states are sovereigns to their nationals and territories, international law is confronted with a major problem in trying to reconcile the need for protection, on the one hand, and the respect for sovereignty on the other.

201. The concept has taken root in modern international law, that compensation should be paid for the acquisition of property of nationals abroad, and with the impact of the stressing of the rule of sovereignty by the Soviet Union, it is conceivable that states would be more vigilant about the interests of their nationals abroad. The elimination of this interest, however, becomes more remote if full effect is to be given to the growing declarations on human rights.

202. International law does, however, permit the use of formal protest, of the publicizing of positions through communications media, of certain types of economic pressure, and of appeal to international agencies, especially the Security Council and General Assembly of the United Nations, with the possibility that these agencies may authorize the use of force.

203. The limits which international law imposes in the use of subversive propaganda, infiltration, stimulation of civil strife, and other forms of intervention are not clearly defined. The line between legitimate means of influence or persuasion and illegitimate means of intervention and coercion should be more clearly defined.

#### D. The functions of diplomacy

204. The Vienna convention defines the functions of a diplomatic mission, among others, as representation of the sending state, protection of its interest and those of its nationals, negotiation with the receiving state, ascertainment of information about the receiving state "by all lawful means", and promotion of friendly economic, cultural, and scientific relations. These functions are to be performed without violating the law of the receiving state.

205. The diplomat cannot, therefore, exercise jurisdiction over offences, even if committed within the diplomatic premises (other than disciplinary jurisdiction over minor transgression of members of the mission) as was sometimes done in the past. He cannot engage in espionage or penetrate areas forbidden by local law, nor can he interfere in the domestic politics of the receiving state or appeal to the people or parties over the head of the government of the receiving state. If these things are done, the receiving state can protect itself by asking that he be recalled, and if the sending state does not respond, he can be compelled to leave the country as persona non grata.

206. The line between proper means of acquiring information and illegal espionage, bribery, or infiltration of organizations, and the line between proper cultivation of relations with cultural, economic, educational and scientific institutions of the receiving state and interference in the domestic affairs of that state, is not always easy to draw. The importance of this line has increased with the growth of democracy, the increased importance of public opinion in diplomacy, and of people-to-people relations.

207. So, also, the immunity of the administrative and service staff of a mission and of other agencies of a state abroad for acts in pursuance of official functions, raises the question of how such functions are to be determined. Clearly the sending state cannot declare that acts in violation of local law of the receiving state, such as assassination, burglary, espionage, or sabotage are official functions, and thereby confer immunity on its agent, though this claim has at times been made. The definition of official functions must be found in international law, customary, conventional, or implicit, thus manifesting consent of the receiving state, express, tacit or inferential.

208. The functions of diplomacy have been affected by the development of means of communications, making possible contact by telephone between foreign offices, summit meetings of heads of state, and formal or informal conferences of international organizations. These functions have also been affected by the closer integration of the states of the world, making many issues multilateral rather than bilateral. While multilateral conferences have been held since the rise of modern diplomacy in such gatherings as Westphalia (1648), Utrecht (1713) and Vienna (1815), they became much more numerous in the nineteenth century, which witnessed the creation of many public international unions ensuring periodic general conferences on particular subjects, such as postal and telegraphic communication and the prevention of epidemic diseases. With the Hague Conference, the League of Nations and the United Nations and its specialized agencies, and regional and defence organizations, such conferences have become much more frequent, giving a new orientation to diplomacy in developing and codifying international law, in promoting co-operation for social and economic welfare, and in preserving peace. The term "parliamentary diplomacy" has been used to describe the developing procedural law of such international conferences.



209. The expansion of the international community from Europe to the world, bringing in states of varied cultural, economic development and ideology, has influenced the functions of diplomacy. The new states often have objectives different from those customary among European states of the earlier period. Diplomacy has new functions in connexion with economic assistance, educational exchange, ideological accommodation, and maintenance of respect for human rights, racial equality, and self-determination. Some of these matters were on the diplomatic agenda in the nineteenth century, but they have become matters of major diplomatic concern since World War II.

210. The changes in the community of nations and the legal assumptions about its character and future, have tended to shift the functions of diplomacy from serving the immediate national interests and necessities of sovereign states in a more or less jungle world, to serving the community of nations to achieve peace, stability and progress. The latter functions, implicit in the United Nations Charter, are asserted in the preamble of the Vienna Convention. The states have formally accepted these international objectives in their national interests. In practice, the maintenance of balance between the immediate interests of states in security, power, prestige, and prosperity and their long-run interest in a stable, peaceful just and progressive world will often be difficult among the public and governments not accustomed to thinking of any source of political values greater than the nation. The development of a world of universal and rapid communications, and universal and rapid vulnerability to nuclear destruction, may induce diplomats, governments and the general public to broaden their horizons. Diplomats, both within and outside of the United Nations, may become, in greater degree, agents of the world community as well as of their particular nations.

211. The term "civilized nations" as used in the statutes of the International Court of Justice in respect of the application of general principles of law in the settlement of disputes, needs drastically to be rephrased, in order to meet requirements of new states entering the international community. For example, it could not be said that independent states which have emerged from colonial status have tacitly submitted to the legal concepts of their ruler powers. Moreover, are not new states civilized in the sense that their laws should have equal status with

those concepts which may have been propounded during their term of subjugation? Similarly, the rules or customs practised by the older states may be out of tune with the modern concepts which the deeds of an expanding world community demand, and therefore these should be reconsidered in the light of those needs.

212. The Calvo doctrine stresses the importance of sovereignty and postulates that nationals of a foreign state should voluntarily submit to local jurisdiction. The doctrine was aimed at preventing the institution of diplomatic protection from being used as a weapon of strong aggressive states against the weak. States, however, are not easily induced to renounce the right of protecting their nationals abroad.

#### E. Extradition

213. Extradition may be defined as the delivery on the part of one state to another of those whom it is desired to deal with for crimes of which they have been accused or convicted and which are justifiable in the courts of the requesting country. The subject is of importance not only to a country which has achieved a full state of independence, but also to countries like Barbados and British Guiana, which are on the verge of achieving full international personality.

214. Extradition appeared prima facie to be more the concern of municipal than of international law. A study of the subject, however, enabled the international lawyer to recognize the close relationship between international and municipal law. The constitutions of many states today have made provision for the incorporation of international law into the laws of their countries.

215. The history of the subject makes it clear that there was no general rule of international law which placed on states a duty to extradite. The presence of extradition treaties and the plethora of provisions on the subject in the laws of states enabled international lawyers to formulate certain general principles on the subject.

216. The first principle was that the diplomatic channel was the normal and appropriate method of communication through which a request for extradition should be placed. Secondly, before such a request was placed, there must have been an extraditable person. The practices were different among states with regard to the

extradition of their own nationals. Thirdly, the extraditable person need not, at the time of the commission of the offence, have been physically present in the country seeking his extradition. This rule was of special significance in view of the increase in the opportunities for committing acts of subversion and treason from outside the borders of states.

217. The fourth principle was that of double criminality, which demanded that no person be extradited unless the crime for which he was being extradited was punishable under the law of the state of exile and of the requesting state. This creates a special problem for federal states.

218. The fifth general principle was that of speciality, by which the requesting state is obliged not to try or punish the surrendered individual for any other offence than that for which his extradition was requested and granted.

219. Modern international law established beyond doubt the principle that persons were not extraditable if the offence concerned were "political". The difficulty was really to define a political offence. The bi-polarization of power in the world today and the new technique of political brain-washing, as well as the new concepts of crimes, such as treason and subversion, and the proliferation of new states, meant a wider definition of "political offences".

220. The practice in the Commonwealth was that mutual arrangements were made for the rendering of fugitive offenders. Mutual arrangements of non-extradition of military and naval deserters existed, but seamen who desert merchant ships are usually extraditable. In this connexion, it may be noted that an individual had no right, as such, to asylum.

#### F. Domicile

221. In various countries, a person's personal status, capacity to make a will, to marry, and many other matters are governed not by the law of his nationality, but according to the law of his domicile. The distinction between nationality (origo) and domicile, as conceived by the Roman jurists, influenced this branch of law. There was a change in Europe during the nineteenth century. In 1803, the Napoleonic Code stated that the laws concerning a man's personal status should

apply to his nationality rather than to his domicile. In England, the United States and the South American States, it is specified that the lex domicilii has always been practised.

222. The rules of general application in connexion with domicile are: every man must have an operative domicile; no man may have more than one domicile at a time; and domicile denotes a relation with a territorial system of law.

## VI. INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS AND DEVELOPMENT

223. It may well be asked why a programme of international economics and development should be included in a course of training for foreign service officers. The answer lies in the observation that the diplomat, as the representative of his country, must be thoroughly familiar with the problems of his country, particularly in the social and economic fields. He has to interpret his country to the rest of the world, and he must be able to identify quickly, often without specific instructions from home, where the interests of his country lie in developments taking place abroad.

224. In order to perform these functions efficiently, he must also have a thorough and up-to-date knowledge of neighbouring countries, of nations with which his government has extensive trade and economic ties, and of the world as a whole, both developed and developing. The emphasis of the course was therefore placed on recent changes and developments in the British Caribbean, in other selected developing countries, and in the world as a whole.

### A. Problems of development in the British Caribbean

225. The two main problems which face all of the territories of the British Caribbean are population pressure and under-development.

226. All of the territories in the British Caribbean are confronted with the problem of population pressure. Their crude densities of population are among the highest in the world. In addition, they are all faced with rapid rates of population increase. Current rates of natural increase range between 2 per cent to 3 per cent per annum.

227. If one takes a long view of population trends, one can detect two distinct phases of population change. Up to 1921, the growth of the population was relatively slow because of high rates of mortality. Improvements in public health and hygiene began to show their effects after 1921, when the populations of the area entered a rapidly-expanding phase, there were high birth rates and falling death rates.

228. In trying to estimate future trends, one should look separately at the two components of natural increase - births and deaths. There is evidence that a future decline in fertility can be anticipated. In fact, the results of the 1960

Census indicate a decline in the average number of children among females bearing children. The effects of this decline were neutralized by a decline in the proportion of childless females. Given this situation, it is difficult to predict whether future declines in fertility will exercise any significant restraining influence on population growth.

229. As far as mortality trends are concerned, it is very likely that death rates will continue to fall over the next few decades. It has already been noted that there has been an impressive increase in the life expectancy of Caribbean populations. In Barbados, for example, the average length of life of females has more than doubled over the past forty years.

230. Current and prospective rates of population growth in the British Caribbean pose several problems of an economic and social nature. From the standpoint of income, a growth rate of 2 per cent or 3 per cent per annum challenges the economy to achieve an annual growth rate in gross national product of 5 per cent or 6 per cent, if a significant advance in per capita income is to be attained. From the point of view of employment, it requires an increase in employment opportunities commensurate with the annual rate of increase in the labour force. By the end of the century, the number of males entering the labour force in the British Caribbean as a whole, may amount to nearly 90,000 annually, as compared with 35,000 at the present time.

231. The inter-relationships between population growth and economic development are, however, extremely complex, since they tend to influence one another. Early writers on the subject tended to take an excessively Malthusian view of the problem, while more recent statements have suggested several ways in which an increase in population may accelerate growth.

232. On the social side, it is observed that rapid population growth makes mounting demands on social services, such as education and health. In respect of education, it is estimated that by the end of the century, the British Caribbean may have to provide some 270,000 school places per year, a figure which exceeds the current school population of Trinidad and Tobago.

233. With respect to policies of population control, the British Caribbean has relied for the most part on external migration for controlling increases in population. The recent flow of emigrants to the United Kingdom was examined, and it was noted that external migration might slow down in the future because of the introduction of immigration restrictions by the United Kingdom in 1962.

234. Barbados is the only territory in the area which has adopted an official policy of family planning. Much doubt was expressed as to the possibility of the other territories following the example set by Barbados.

#### Structure and dynamics of Caribbean economies

235. A brief outline is provided in the following paragraphs of some of the common characteristics of the Caribbean economies, and of their recent experiences of economic growth.

236. All of the economies of the British Caribbean share the common feature of smallness. This applies even to the mainland territories of British Guiana and British Honduras, since the best prospects for development lie within the narrow coastal belts of these regions. Smallness has exercised a profound effect on economic conditions within each territory. First, it has meant that each territory has had to achieve a high degree of specialization in production, and thus a high dependence on trade with the rest of the world. Second, it has limited the possibilities of industrialization within each territory, because of the tiny size of individual domestic markets. And third, it has prevented the achievement of economies of scale in government and administration. The fact of smallness has constituted the most powerful argument for regional co-operation, especially in the economic field.

237. Another uniform feature is unemployment. One finds in all of the territories, rates of open unemployment ranging between 6 per cent and 15 per cent of the male labour force. This is coupled with under-employment, and seasonal unemployment. Partly because of these high levels of unemployment, there is considerable net migration of workers. Emigration tends to be a mixed blessing, since it attracts the more highly-skilled persons in the labour force, and has led to a very high ratio of non-working to working population.

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238. Similarities were also observed in the structure of agriculture in the different territories. They are all 'dual' agricultural economies, with an estate (plantation) sector and a peasant sector. Over the past two decades, there have been a diminution in the number of estates and an increase in peasant holdings. It was suggested that agriculture may become even more peasant-oriented in the future, especially in the smaller islands.

239. With respect to their stage of development, they can all be classified as under-developed, but not undeveloped, in the sense that there are few natural resources which remain untapped. In addition, the contribution of agriculture to total production is much smaller than in other developing regions. Agriculture accounts for more than 19 per cent of the gross domestic product in few territories in the area, whereas corresponding percentages for countries in Latin America, Africa, and Asia, range all the way from 25 per cent to 50 per cent.

240. Another relevant indicator of their stage of development is the importance of the money economy. Subsistence output accounts for only 2 per cent of the gross domestic product in Barbados, and some 12 per cent in the Windward Islands. This contrasts sharply with the experience of other developing countries, particularly in Africa. The banking habit is also relatively well developed, as the ratio of bank deposits to the total money supply is much higher than in other parts of the under-developed world.

241. Finally, the territories of the British Caribbean occupy an intermediate position in the scale of world incomes. Subject to the qualifications inherent in international comparisons of national income, per capita incomes in the British Caribbean are much higher than those of most countries in Latin America, Africa, and Asia. The range within the area itself, however, is very great. For example, in 1962 the gross domestic product per capita in Trinidad was \$1,180 (B.W.I.), while for most of the Windward and Leeward Islands the corresponding figure was below \$350 (B.W.I.).

242. Looking at the dynamic trends in these economies, one finds a more varied picture. It may be better, therefore, to review the processes of change by individual territories.



## Jamaica

243. After several decades of relatively little economic growth in Jamaica, there was a sudden upsurge in the 1950's. Between 1954 and 1961, the Jamaican economy achieved one of the highest growth rates in the world, with the gross national product (measured at 1956 prices) increasing at an average rate of nearly 8 per cent per annum. On a per capita basis, it increased by almost 6 per cent per annum.

244. This rapid increase in real product was closely associated with the expansion of exports, particularly exports of bauxite and alumina. Exports grew faster than the other demand components (at an average annual rate of 12 per cent), so that whereas in 1953 exports were equivalent to some 27 per cent of GNP, by 1961 it represented about 41 per cent of GNP. In the meanwhile, the contribution of exports of bauxite and alumina to total exports had grown from insignificant proportions in 1952 to nearly 50 per cent of total exports in 1960-1962.

245. Other sectors which registered significant advances were manufacturing, tourism, and construction. In the case of agriculture, its contribution to gross domestic product declined from 27 per cent to 12 per cent.

246. One should note, however, that after 1957, the rate of growth of the GNP tended to decline. Between 1954 and 1957, the GNP grew at an average annual rate of over 10 per cent, while between 1958 and 1961 the average rate of growth dropped to under 5 per cent. This decline in growth rate was mainly due to a slight fall in the rate of growth of exports and an adverse movement in the terms of trade. While the average annual rate of growth of exports was only one percentage point less in the latter period than in the former, the average rate of growth in the purchasing power of exports fell from 13.3 per cent in 1954-1957 to 7.4 per cent in 1958-1961.

247. Since 1961, the rate of growth of the GNP in real terms has tended to decline even more, because of the levelling-off of the boom in bauxite and tourism. Much lower rates of growth are therefore anticipated in the 1960's and 1970's. For instance, the Jamaican Government has projected a growth rate of

5 per cent for the GDP between 1963 and 1967, and this growth rate is predicated upon rather optimistic assumptions about the rate of advance of domestic agriculture and about foreign aid. It is estimated that foreign loans and grants will finance some 60 per cent of capital expenditures by the public sector within this period.

#### Trinidad and Tobago

248. The experience of Trinidad was very similar to that of Jamaica. Between 1951 and 1961 the gross domestic product at constant prices grew at an average rate of 8.5 per cent per annum. Here again, exports led the way, though in this case the leading commodity was petroleum.

249. As in Jamaica, 'domestic' sectors, such as manufacturing, services, and construction, also achieved important advances, while the relative importance of agriculture tended to decline. In addition, the rate of growth of the economy began to slacken by the end of the 1950's, and current projections indicate a continued slowing-down during the sixties and seventies. Here again, this is because of the weakening of the world petroleum situation.

#### British Guiana

250. The rate of growth in British Guiana during the 1950's was much lower than either Jamaica or Trinidad. Up to 1956, the economy was growing at an annual rate of about 3 per cent in real terms. But, since 1956, there has been evidence of stagnation and even of decline.

251. There has been much less structural change in the economy of British Guiana than in the other two discussed above. There was only a slight decline in the relative importance of agriculture, and the share of the mining sector in GDP remained more or less constant.

252. Future projections of growth give no particular cause for optimism. Until the political situation becomes more clear, there is little hope for an acceleration of economic activity in British Guiana.

#### Barbados

253. There was little evidence of growth in Barbados during the 1950's. Between 1955 and 1960 the gross domestic product hardly increased on a constant price basis.

One of the main reasons for this is the heavy dependence of the economy on sugar, the expansion of which is restricted by the adherence of Barbados to the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement.

254. There is, however, some hope for an improvement in the future, because of the expansion of tourism and other sectors, such as manufacturing and services.

#### Leeward and Windward Islands

255. Within this group of islands, there was evidence of both rapid growth and stagnation. Antigua is an example of the former, as the gross domestic product increased at about 3 per cent per annum under the impact of an expanding tourist trade.

256. In some of the Windward Islands, some advance was achieved in the latter part of the 1950's, because of the growth in exports of bananas. But taking the islands as a whole, very little economic progress was achieved. Economic stagnation was particularly noticeable in St. Kitts, St. Vincent, and Grenada.

257. The prospects of these islands may be viewed with moderate optimism. If they can increase their earnings of foreign exchange, through an expansion of commodity exports and tourism, a faster rate of economic progress may be achieved in the sixties and seventies. A substantial increase in foreign earnings, however, will require massive capital expenditures by their public sectors in the improvement of their infrastructures. The central problem is therefore a budgetary one. At present, none of these territories has a surplus on current account, which can be devoted to capital expenditures. Indeed, the balance between current expenditures and receipts is being currently met by grants-in-aid from the United Kingdom.

258. An acceleration of public investment may therefore require an increase in foreign aid. However, the islands may also be able to achieve economies in expenditure, if the proposed Eastern Caribbean Federation is formed.

#### British Honduras

259. There is also little evidence of any significant advance in British Honduras, although it has a higher per capita GDP than most of the Windward and Leeward Islands, and has considerable agricultural potential. One of the major needs of British Honduras is an increase in population.

260. There are insufficient people for exploiting the agricultural potential of the hinterland, for providing a market for local manufacturing, or for achieving economies of scale in government and administration. One can argue that the two greatest priorities in British Honduras are an immigration policy and a policy of regional economic co-operation. Without such extensions of the market, the economic prospects for the future seem no better than the current and past situation.

B. Role of Government in accelerated development

261. Accelerated development leading towards higher forms of social and economic life is a salient feature of our times. The startling upsurge of world population (the "population explosion") and the popular aspiration for better living conditions are the principal causes which make this development imperative, whereas achievements of modern science and technology are among the factors which make it possible.

262. It is, however, a disquieting fact that despite the steady growth of world production and, on the whole, better distribution of basic commodities and services, misery and want have not been eradicated and the gap between the affluent and low-income societies has not been narrowed.

263. Development is growth plus change. It is a complex phenomenon comprising almost all the aspects of the economic and social activities of a nation, all closely inter-related and inter-dependent.

264. Conceived in this way, development requires a concerted effort of all those involved, a function usually described as administration. The intervention of government administration in national development has become a controversial problem, dependent on the prevailing philosophy of free market economy, centrally planned economy or mixed economy.

265. Government intervention manifests itself, even in the so-called free market economies, by way of utilizing instruments such as taxes, tariffs, credits, monetary regulation and price and wage controls. Moreover, the public sector is in itself a powerful factor, which can be used to regulate or stimulate the market.

266. The planning and implementation of development objectives require special machinery, or at least far-reaching adjustments of the existing machinery. This does not imply a separate, self-sufficient development administration. It merely

indicates the need for a comprehensive system in which all the branches and agencies of the government have their role clearly stated in the over-all process of development.

267. Schematically three main stages can be distinguished in the development drive:

- (a) The elaboration and approval of the plan;
- (b) The mobilization of resources (human and material, national and external);
- (c) The implementation of individual projects.

268. In many countries, a Central Planning Agency has been established with functions varying from plan elaboration to final responsibility for the implementation of projects. It has been increasingly realized, however, that an undertaking of such a scope requires a great degree of decentralization and devolution of authority. Participation of all those concerned in the central, provincial and local government, and collaboration with interest groups from outside the government, are not only useful for better elaboration of plans, but may also ensure acceptance and full implementation of projects.

269. The crucial factor of human resources requires a concentration on education and training, both for public and private enterprises, with crash programmes to meet urgent needs.

270. Developing countries will for a long while be dependent on foreign aid for the supply of their financial and human resources. The best utilization of this aid requires that it be nationally co-ordinated and closely related to the development plan.

### C. Comparisons with other developing countries

271. In the Foreign Service Training Course, the experiences of the British Caribbean were related to those of some other developing countries. First, the situation in two other small economies was examined, and then compared to the experiences of Latin America.

#### Two small economies: Puerto Rico and Nepal

272. Over the past one and a half decades, Puerto Rico has been one of the fastest growing economies in the under-developed world. The upsurge began after

the Second World War, when systematic programmes were introduced to reduce the dependence of Puerto Rico on a few primary products, and to transform the economy into a manufacturing centre.

273. These programmes were labelled "Operation Bootstrap". They involved massive expenditures by the public sector on the infrastructure, and the introduction of a comprehensive scheme of incentives for private investment. Because of Puerto Rico's political relationship with the United States, she had the twin advantages of receiving budgetary outlays from the United States Government for expenditure on the infrastructure, and of being part of the United States customs area, which meant that Puerto Rican exports to the United States were admitted duty free.

274. As a result of intensive promotional work, the introduction of fiscal incentives, and lower wage costs than mainland manufacturers, Puerto Rico managed to attract substantial American investment in light manufacturing on the island. For the most part, manufacturing activity has been geared to exporting to the United States.

275. It was felt that the Puerto Rican experience had some relevance for the British Caribbean, for although these territories do not have the same political relationships as Puerto Rico, her experience does indicate the possibilities for rapid economic progress in other Caribbean territories through dynamic governmental action.

276. Nepal, on the other hand, though much larger than the Caribbean territories, illustrated the problems of development in a country which is experiencing rapid population growth, and which is heavily dependent on agriculture. For instance, some 95 per cent of the working population in Nepal earns a living from agriculture, while the main source of foreign exchange is the export of rice. Economic planning in Nepal has concentrated, therefore, on the raising of productivity in agriculture, and on making additions to the country's social overhead capital.

277. Nepal has tried to overcome some of her problems of smallness by maintaining close economic and military ties with India.

The economies of Latin America

278. Latin America and the Caribbean share certain common characteristics. Among these are high population growth rates, the drive for economic development, and the dependence on primary production. But there are as well, important differences between these two areas. On the cultural level, the dominant influences in Latin America have been Spanish and Portuguese, while in the British Caribbean they have been British and French. Economically, Latin America consists of continental economies, while the British Caribbean is mainly composed of island economies.

279. There are also important differences among the Latin American countries themselves. Besides the difference between Portuguese and Spanish America, there are differences in levels of development, in racial and social composition, and in political philosophy.

280. In terms of economic development, the picture in Latin America has been quite varied, with countries, such as Brazil and Mexico, showing fast rates of growth, while a country such as Argentina has been stagnating. The central problem throughout Latin America has been inflation, which has been at a higher rate than practically any other region of the world. This has led many to wonder whether there are any special Latin American characteristics which make the region more prone to inflation.

281. Two schools of thought have emerged, the monetarists and the structuralists. The monetarists contend that inflation has resulted from the over-expansion of the money supply in Latin America, and that there is nothing unique in the structure of Latin American economies which makes them more susceptible to inflation than anywhere else. The structuralists argue that a special theory is needed, because of structural rigidities during the process of growth, and because of the peculiar social and psychological forces working within these societies.

282. The actual evidence of inflation and growth is difficult to disentangle. In Brazil, there seems to have been some correlation between inflation and growth, while the opposite holds true for Argentina and Bolivia, where inflation was accompanied by stagnation. In the case of Peru, rapid growth has been accompanied

by relative price stability. In general, it was argued that something could be said for both the monetarist and structuralist points of view, though neither of them provided a complete explanation for Latin America's experience with inflation.

283. During the discussion of Latin America's economic problems, the growth of regionalism in the area was studied. Both the Latin American Free Trade Association and the Central American Common Market constituted attempts to cope with the problems of smallness in Latin America. It was felt that these experiments in regional economic co-operation were of particular interest to the Caribbean, where the problems of smallness predominate among the obstacles to development in the region.

#### D. Trade and payments in the British Caribbean

284. Problems of foreign trade and payments recurred throughout the discussion of economic development in the British Caribbean and in the other developing countries mentioned above. In order to sharpen the focus on these problems, a section of the course was devoted to trade and payments in the British Caribbean, and another section to recent changes in the pattern of world trade and payments.

#### What every diplomat should know about his country's foreign trade and payments

285. As a preface to the study of problems of Caribbean trade, there was a practical discussion of the types of information which a diplomat requires in order to serve as a trade envoy for his country.

286. First, the diplomat must be able to interpret statistical information about his country's transactions with the rest of the world. The foreign transactions of a country are recorded in the statistics of its balance of payments. A diplomat must therefore be able to interpret his country's balance of payments statistics.

287. Statistics of balance of payments of the Caribbean are arranged in much the same way as that of other countries. Foreign transactions are usually divided into current and capital transactions. The former embrace the sale and purchase of goods and services, the payment and receipt of investment income from abroad, and the disbursement and receipt of transfers, such as gifts, and emigrant immigrant remittances. In the Caribbean, transfers are an important item in the current account, because of the large number of West Indians living abroad.



288. Capital transactions cover the borrowing and lending activities of the country, whether on private or public account. One should distinguish, however, between "autonomous" capital flows and "accommodating" or "compensatory" capital movements. Autonomous flows relate to ordinary commercial flows of capital, such as direct investment by foreigners in the home country, or borrowing by the home country to finance a development programme. Accommodating flows refer to movements of capital, which are promoted by the monetary authorities, in order to fill the gap between ordinary commercial payments (both current and capital) and ordinary commercial receipts. In cases where payments exceed receipts, these movements may take the form of a running down of the country's foreign exchange reserves, or of borrowing by the Central Bank of the home country from foreign Central Banks or from the International Monetary Fund.

289. One can therefore detect whether there is a deficit or surplus in a country's balance of payments, by seeing if there were an inward or outward movement of accommodating finance. And usually this is reflected in changes in the foreign exchange reserves of the country. There is, however, an important difference in the British Caribbean. One finds that some of the territories, such as Jamaica, have been complaining about balance of payments deficits, but there has been no diminution in the stock of foreign currencies held by their Central Banks or Currency Boards, neither has there been any borrowing from other Central Banks or international financial institutions.

290. The answer to this novel situation lies in the peculiar position of the commercial banks. The main commercial banks are branches of international banking concerns whose head offices are either in London or Canada. These banks look to their head offices as 'lenders of last resort', so that whenever the demands of their customers for foreign exchange exceed their existing balances abroad, they turn to their head offices to satisfy the excess demand. One finds therefore that in all of the Caribbean territories, any gap between ordinary payments and receipts is usually reflected in changes in the external liquidity of the commercial banking system, rather than in that of the monetary authority. A Caribbean diplomat must therefore pay particular attention to changes in the external position of the

commercial banks, since they give a fairly accurate indication of the variations taking place in the external position of the territory as a whole.

291. Apart from this, the diplomat should be able to interpret changes taking place in the individual items recorded in the balance of payments. For instance, he should be able to detect the forces underlying changes in the value of his country's merchandise exports. He should know whether a particular increase or decrease in the value of exports is due to changes in the quantity of goods exported, or to changes in the prices received from sales abroad. And he should be able to compare this with variations taking place on the import side. Such information is usually summarized in a series of index numbers covering both the volume and unit value of exports and imports. The relationship between unit values for exports and imports is called the terms of trade, and this is usually calculated by dividing the export unit value index by the import unit value index. This produces an index of the terms of trade. An increase in the index, comparing one year with another, means an improvement in the terms of trade; a decline denotes an adverse movement. A diplomat must therefore keep changes in the terms of trade of his country under constant review.

292. Another type of information which a diplomat should have concerns methods of trade promotion. He should always be watching for changes in his country's competitive position abroad, and must constantly be seeking new trading opportunities. A diplomat must know therefore what kind of policy measures can encourage producers in his country to sell more abroad, and, perhaps more important, how foreigners can be encouraged to buy more of his country's products.

293. In respect of the former, he has a unique role in advising his government, since, as their foreign representative, he has to assess which policies are likely to be acceptable to the rest of the world. If other countries dislike the inducements which a government is extending to its exporters, they may retaliate by discriminating against the country. For example, if the country devalues its currency or gives direct subsidies to its exporters, other countries may impose higher tariffs or import quotas on the country's exports, or may even devalue and extend subsidies to their own exporters as well. It follows therefore

that the diplomat must be familiar with the whole range of policy instruments, so that he can advise which should be put into effect. Exchange rate changes and fiscal incentives are only two among several policy alternatives. Among other possible instruments are expenditure directed towards quality control and standards, or directed towards reducing the risks facing exporters, such as schemes of credit insurance.

294. A diplomat has perhaps an even greater role to play with regard to his country's products. He must know what pleases the foreign customer. Competitive prices and good-quality products are only part of the answer. The foreign customer likes price lists and quotations in his own language and specifications, and he likes early delivery dates. In these respects, the Caribbean diplomat has a great deal of ground-work to do both at home and abroad. The Caribbean does not have the best reputation for pleasing foreign customers, and some of the territories have been described as 'countries of samples and vague quotations'. Caribbean diplomats have to work towards erasing this impression abroad, and creating a favourable image of the ability of their countries to do business with the rest of the world.

295. Another area in which the diplomat has to operate relates to keeping his country's products before the foreign consumer. He must ensure that his country's products are being effectively advertised in overseas markets, whether through the usual communications media, or through trade fairs and exhibitions. Yet another area is the field of patents. He must familiarize himself with the laws relating to patents both in his country and in the rest of the world. He has to act to protect his country's patent rights in overseas countries, and must also look for situations where the patent rights do not prevent his country from marketing a particular product abroad.

296. Finally, he must be familiar with the conditions for trading with countries which have different economic and social systems. This applies particularly to expanding trade with the centrally-planned economies. The diplomat must be familiar with all the problems connected with bilateral exchange, so that he can assist in promoting trade with a minimum of misunderstanding.

Characteristics of Caribbean trade and trade policy

297. Since the diplomat has to place all of the above generalizations within the context of the specific trading problems which are facing his country, an account of the characteristics of Caribbean trade is presented below.

298. International trade is perhaps the most important feature of economic activity in the Caribbean. Because of their small size and narrow range of natural resources, the territories of the British Caribbean depend heavily on the rest of the world for a market for their production, and as a source of supply for the varied goods which are required for home consumption. One indication of this dependence is the high ratio of exports and imports to the gross domestic product. To take exports as an example, exports do not represent less than 25 per cent of GDP in any territory in the British Caribbean. In territories such as Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados, and the Leeward Islands, exports are equivalent to around 40 per cent to 60 per cent of the GDP. Another indicator is the proportion of the labour force engaged in activities connected with foreign trade. Although precise estimates are not available, it would be surprising if less than 50 per cent of the labour force of any Caribbean territory were engaged in occupations connected directly with the export and import trade. A third indicator is the contribution of duties on foreign trade to total government revenue. In hardly any territory, do foreign trade duties contribute less than one-third of the total revenue.

299. The high export dependence of the British Caribbean is coupled with a high degree of commodity and geographical concentration in their export trades. Each of the territories depend on one or two products for the bulk of their export receipts. In Jamaica, those products are bauxite and sugar, in Trinidad and Tobago, petroleum and sugar, in Barbados and the Leewards, sugar alone, and in the Windward Islands, the main product is bananas. As far as market concentration is concerned, all of the Caribbean territories divide their exports, albeit in different proportions, between the United Kingdom, the United States and Canada. Trade with other countries, including intra-regional trade, accounts for hardly more than 10 per cent of their total merchandise exports.

300. The high degree of market concentration has partly arisen from the weak competitive position of Caribbean exports. The territories of the British Caribbean are high-cost producers of most of the products which they export. British Caribbean sugar is higher-cost than the sugar of Cuba, Hawaii, or the Philippines. Caribbean bananas are higher-cost than those of Ecuador, Colombia, or the Central American Republics. Trinidad's petroleum is higher-cost than petroleum from the Middle East or Latin America.

301. The result of this is that exports of primary products from the Caribbean have been geared to those markets where they are given some form of protection against competing suppliers. From the earliest days of settlement, the Caribbean colonies were exporting to protected markets. And except for an interval in the mid-nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when Britain adopted a free trade policy, they have continued to receive discriminatory treatment.

302. At present, Caribbean exports of primary products qualify for preferential treatment in both Britain and Canada. The arrangements range from tariff preferences alone (in the case of Canada), to bulk purchase arrangements (in the case of sugar marketed in the United Kingdom), and quantitative restrictions (in the case of exports of bananas and citrus to Britain). It is generally recognized that the British Caribbean has the major stake in the system of Commonwealth preference.

303. The main problem for the British Caribbean relates to the length of time special preferences will continue. For one thing, world opinion is becoming increasingly opposed to the discriminatory treatment of primary products by consuming countries. For another, the General Agreement of Tariff and Trade (GATT) has set a definite time limit on the import restrictions which Britain currently applies against some non-Commonwealth suppliers of bananas and citrus. In fact, these restrictions were registered under Article XII of GATT, and are due to expire in 1964. Yet another factor is the disappearance of the post-war dollar problem, which was the main reason why the United Kingdom persisted after the Second World War with a discriminatory policy in favour of Commonwealth primary products, especially sugar. Other factors are the possible entry of Britain into the European Economic Community, which may reduce the protection which the Caribbean

receives on bananas and citrus, and the shift in Canada's trade away from the Commonwealth and towards the United States and Latin America - countries which are opposed to Commonwealth preferences.

304. A further problem is that Commonwealth preference restrains the Caribbean from adopting a more flexible trade policy. It separates the Caribbean from the other developing countries in the Western Hemisphere, with which they have several problems and objectives in common and upon which they may need to rely for markets for some of their new manufacturing industries. It may even be argued that Commonwealth preference keeps the Caribbean territories from themselves, as trade policy in each territory is oriented almost exclusively to London and Ottawa, with little attention being paid to Kingston, Port-of-Spain, Georgetown, or Bridgetown.

E. Recent changes in world trade and payments

305. In the final section of the course, the trading problems of the Caribbean were placed in a world perspective by an examination of some of the recent trends in world trade and payments.

306. Since international trade consists mainly of an exchange of goods between countries, one can approach the study of recent changes in the structure of world trade by looking at the performance of different classes of commodities. For this purpose, one can divide traded products into two broad groups, namely, primary products and manufactured goods. The question is therefore, how has trade in primary products fared in comparison with manufactures, and what have been the main characteristics of trade in these two groups of commodities?

307. The most pronounced feature of international trade over the past decade has been the tendency for exports of primary products to lag behind those of manufactured goods. For example, in 1953 exports of primary products accounted for around 55 per cent of the total value of world trade, while by 1961 its percentage share had fallen to some 46 per cent.

308. Now the value of trade is compounded of two elements, quantity and price. Looking first at quantity, one finds that the volume of exports of primary products grew more slowly than that of manufactured goods. Taking 1953 as 100, world exports of all commodities was 173 in 1961, while world exports of manufactured goods had risen to 186.

309. A relative price decline accompanied this slower rate of growth in the volume of exports of primary products. Again taking 1953 as 100, in 1961 the unit value of world exports of all commodities had fallen to 98, while the unit value of world exports of manufactures had risen to 109.

310. Before an attempt is made to account for these trends, it must be noted that there were considerable variations in the performance of individual primary products and in the export experiences of individual primary producing countries. On the whole, exporters of tropical products did rather better than exporters of temperate-zone foodstuffs. And exporters of petroleum and bauxite did better than exporters of other raw materials and metals. In addition, countries exporting to sheltered markets (notably the African and Caribbean countries, which have special ties with Western Europe), did better than exporters to non-sheltered markets.

311. This does not mean that these past trends will continue in the future. The bauxite and petroleum booms are over, and the rate of expansion in world trade in these commodities has tended to slow down. Moreover, there have been recent indications of an improvement in the market situation for some primary products, notably sugar and coffee. However, it is still of interest to probe behind the changes which took place in the 1950's.

312. Explanations for the lag in world exports of primary products must be sought from the standpoint of both supply and demand. From the viewpoint of supply, production of primary products in some countries was affected by depletion of resources, by population growth, and industrialization. Population increase and industrial development have meant, in some cases, that supplies of food and raw materials which were hitherto exported, were now being consumed at home. The effects of these two factors were particularly evident in Asia, where some countries shifted from being net exporters to being net importers of primary products.

313. From the standpoint of demand, the following influences were of importance:

- (a) The growth of incomes in importing countries did not lead to a corresponding increase in the demand for foodstuffs. As people become richer, they tend to spend smaller proportions of their income on food;
- (b) The expansion in the output of some consuming countries was concentrated in sectors such as services, which do not use many primary products;
- (c) Technological changes tended to have two effects:
  - (i) They encouraged the introduction of synthetic substitutes: man-made fibres to compete with cotton and other apparel fibres, synthetic rubber to compete with natural rubber, and artificial food flavourings to compete with nutmeg and pimento;
  - (ii) They led to economies in the use of raw materials, such as the re-processing of scrap metals;
- (d) The growth of production in importing countries, as they recovered from the effects of the Second World War, was aided by a rise in productivity originating in North America, and spreading to Western Europe;
- (e) Production in importing countries was further stimulated by protective policies in the form of high tariffs against imports, and/or by support prices to domestic producers. This did not always lead to a fall in imports by the countries concerned, but it led to an accumulation of stocks, which these countries tried to place on world markets. This had a dampening effect on international prices.

314. Apart from a slower rate of growth, world trade in primary products continued to fluctuate more than that of manufactured goods. Fluctuations in the exports of primary producers was by no means a unique phenomenon of the 1950's,



since the problem was very evident during the 1930's and 1940's. Indeed, the fluctuations which took place in the 1950's were generally less severe than those in respect of previous decades. However, the problem was still an important one for exporters of primary products, especially those countries which export commodities like sugar, cocoa, coffee, rubber, copper, zinc and lead.

315. What about the trends for manufactured goods? Over the past decade, world trade in manufactures underwent three important shifts. The first related to the composition of trade, the second to the relative importance of particular countries as exporters of manufactures, and the third to the trade in manufactures between developed and developing countries.

316. As far as the composition of trade was concerned, the tendency in recent years has been for exports of capital goods, especially machinery, to grow much faster than those of consumer goods. For instance, in 1938, machinery accounted for around 16 per cent of total world exports of manufactures; in 1961, it accounted for 23 per cent. The relatively faster expansion of capital goods vis-a-vis consumer goods may be explained by some of the following factors:

- (a) Economic growth in both the developed and under-developed world has meant that investment expenditure has tended to claim a larger proportion of total expenditure than it has done in the past;
- (b) The efforts of developing countries to industrialize has led them to concentrate on producing their requirements of consumer goods at home, because they are the easiest things for an infant manufacturing country to produce;
- (c) Because of a shortage of foreign exchange, some developing countries, have had to restrain imports of consumer goods, in order to finance their requirements of capital goods for the purpose of development;
- (d) Mainly because of rising labour costs at home, some developed countries have experienced difficulties in competing with other countries in the international market for consumer goods. They have tended therefore to place restrictions on imports of consumer goods in order to protect their own producers.

317. The classic case here is textiles. Almost every country in the world is trying to produce its own requirements of textiles, partly because they are the easiest products with which to start a programme of industrialization. Africa is perhaps the only continent where the textile revolution has not been completed. As a result of the development of textiles in the developing countries, some of them have emerged as low-cost suppliers of textiles to the world market. Among these are Hong Kong, India and Pakistan. These countries joined with Japan in capturing markets in North America and Western Europe. But this trend was checked recently by the introduction of restrictions by countries in both of these regions. World trade in textiles is now governed by an elaborate system of quotas, which are mainly designed to prevent 'market disruption' in North America and Western Europe.

318. Turning to the second feature of world trade in manufactures, it must be noted that there were significant shifts in the importance of individual countries as exporters of manufactured goods. Between 1953 and 1962, the Federal Republic of Germany jumped from third to first place among exporting countries, with her percentage share of world exports of manufactures rising from 13.4 per cent to 20.1 per cent. The United States slipped from first to second place, with her percentage share declining from 26.2 per cent to 19.9 per cent, while Britain fell from second to third place, with her share falling from 20.9 per cent to 15.2 per cent. Besides the Federal Republic of Germany, other countries, such as Japan and Italy, registered impressive increases in their percentage shares of world exports of manufactured goods.

319. Approached in another way, the changes which took place in the period discussed above meant that the combined share of the two traditional centres of the world economy, the United States and Britain, fell by about 12 percentage points. In large part, the losses of the 'centre' countries were concentrated on automobiles, iron and steel, and industrial machinery, where their prices tended to rise more rapidly than the prices of European and Japanese suppliers. While this was evidence of healthy international competition, it poses a serious question for the functioning of the international economy.

320. Finally, in recent years, international trade in manufactures has been characterized by a tendency for the industrial countries to trade more intensively among themselves than in past decades. The traditional pattern, which was established in the nineteenth century, tended to be rather the reverse, with industrial countries trading more intensively with non-industrial countries. In other words, one finds that in the 1950's trade has tended to become more "horizontal", with the exchange of manufactures against manufactures growing faster than "vertical" trade - the exchange of manufactures against primary products. This tendency has been particularly noticeable in Western Europe, and reflects partly the discriminatory arrangements which were introduced in Europe to promote intra-regional trade.

321. What are the implications of these trends for the world economy? As far as the changes in world trade in primary products are concerned, the following implications can be noted:

- (a) Because of the lag in the exports of primary products, the rate of exports of the developing countries was much slower than that of the developed countries. Between 1950 and 1960, the average annual rate of growth in the volume of exports from the developing countries was hardly more than 4 per cent, while the growth rate for the developed countries approximated 7 per cent. At the same time, the volume of imports of the developing countries was rising faster than the volume of their exports;
- (b) The downward trend in the prices of primary products meant that the terms of trade swung against the developing countries. It has been estimated that between 1950 and 1961, the developing countries suffered terms of trade losses equivalent to some (US) \$15 billion;
- (c) The combined effect of the two sets of forces mentioned above was reflected in the persistent balance of payments difficulties which the developing countries experienced during the past decade. The gap in their balance of payments was partly filled by the running down of foreign exchange reserves, and partly by inflows of capital on private and public account;

- (d) As far as the inflow of capital was concerned, there was a marked shift from inflows of private capital to inflows of public capital. This stood in marked contrast to the 1920's, when inflows of private capital were much more important than inflows of public capital;
- (e) Official capital took the form of donations and loans. But in recent years the proportion of official capital going to the developing countries in the form of donations, has tended to decline. Between 1953 and 1959, this proportion fell from 73 per cent to 63 per cent. This has led to a sharp increase in the external indebtedness of the developing countries. By 1960/1961, the developing countries were using about 13 per cent of their total receipts of merchandise exports to finance interest and dividend payments to foreign creditors.

322. The general implication of the foregoing is that in the future, some means must be found of permitting a more rapid rate of growth in the foreign exchange earnings of the developing countries, whether from the sale of primary products or from manufactures.

323. Turning to world trade in manufactures, the main implication of recent trends is the growth in the importance of Western Europe as a 'centre' of the world economy. The increase in the share of Western Europe in world trade in manufactures was just one indication of the improvement in the region's external position. In 1948, continental Western Europe held total reserves of gold and foreign exchange amounting to some (US) \$6 billion and by 1962 the figure had reached \$25 billion. For the same period, the reserves of the United States fell from \$24 billion to \$16 billion. At present, therefore, Europe holds the largest stock of gold and foreign exchange among the regions of the world.

324. Traditionally, the world economy has functioned on the basis of the regions with the strongest external position acting as 'banker' to the rest of the world. This Britain did up to the First World War, and the United States after the Second World War. Acting as banker to the world implies certain responsibilities,

among which is that the country or area must be willing to run a deficit in its balance of payments, by lending to the rest of the world, so that the rest of the world can get its currency to finance their payments. Although gold is the major means of international payments, the stock of gold has not increased in step with the expansion of world trade. Thus, gold has had to be supplemented by the currency of 'centre' countries.

325. Barring a change in the current system of making international payments, the favourable change in the position of Western Europe seems to indicate that this region should assume some of the banking responsibilities of 'centre' countries. This can be achieved by more liberal import policies, and by increased lending and aid to the rest of the world.

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### ANNEX I

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ANNEX II

LIST OF LECTURERS AND SUBJECTS

First Week

- 4 - 11 Nov. - Prof. Chadwick F. Alger - Northwestern University  
"Theory and practice of diplomacy"

Second Week

- 11 - 15 Nov. - Mr. John W. Holmes - President, Canadian Institute of  
International Affairs - "Diplomatic and consular practices"
- Mr. J. Leger - Former Ambassador of Haiti  
"Diplomatic and consular practices"

Third Week

- 18 - 22 Nov. - Prof. Richard N. Swift - Head, Department of Government and  
International Relations, New York University (Report by Maurice Kung)
- Mr. A. Alagappan - Substantive Secretary  
"Indian and Canadian membership in the Commonwealth"
- Mr. L. Wiltshire - "Latin America and the Caribbean"
- Mr. Kulanath Lohani - United Nations Deputy Regional Representative,  
Trinidad and Tobago - "The problems of a developing country using  
Nepal as a model"
- Mr. V. Lessiovski - Personal Assistant to the Secretary General of  
the United Nations - "The structure of the Soviet Foreign Service"

Fourth Week

- 25 - 29 Nov. - Prof. Inis L. Claude, Jr. - "International organizations"
- Mr. V. Lessiovski - "The organization of the United Nations  
General Assembly"
- Mr. A. Attir - Division for Public Administration, United Nations  
Secretariat - "Some aspects of public administration for developing  
countries"
- Sir Hugh Wooding - Chief Justice of Trinidad and Tobago  
"The rule of law"
- Mr. James Keen - Director - "The specialized agencies"  
(Report by Bestie Bacchus)
- Mr. A. Alagappan - "Evolution of international organizations"
- Mr. Ramos - Puerto Rico - "The development of Puerto Rico"

Fifth Week

- 2 - 12 Dec.
- Mr. Fred A. Phillips - Senior Assistant Registrar, University of the West Indies - Domicile
  - Prof. Quincy Wright - University of Virginia International law
  - Mr. Henry Ford - Extradition
  - Mr. E. Diggines - Acting United Kingdom High Commissioner in Jamaica-"Embassy inspection, political reporting, life at the United Nations"
  - Capt. Deneene - Commander, United States Base, Chagaramus-"Strategic concepts of the Caribbean"
  - His Excellency K.C. Nair - High Commissioner of India to the Caribbean - "Non-alignment, Indians overseas"

Sixth Week

- 9 - 13 Dec.
- Dr. O'Laughlin - "Structure and dynamics of West Indies economies"
  - His Excellency Eliashiv Ben-Horin - Ambassador of Israel to Venezuela-"Diplomatic experiences"(Report by Hugh George)
  - Mr. Alister McIntyre - Lecturer, University of the West Indies- "International trade"
  - Mr. George Roberts - Senior Lecturer, University of the West Indies - "Problems of population growth"
  - Dr. Phillip Sherlock - Vice-Principal, University of the West Indies - "The Caribbean in the next generation"(Report by Harold Sahades)
  - His Excellency Roberto Campos - Ambassador of Brazil to the United States - "International Economics" (Report by Harry Dyeth)

ANNEX III

List of Participants

From Barbados

Corbin, S.C.  
Cozier, F.L.  
Greaves, P.M.  
King, M.A.

Maynard, Miss N.E.  
Mellowes, Miss A.J.  
Springer, C.R.C.  
Ward, A.

From British Guiana

Ali, A.R.  
Bacchus, B.G.  
Bhagwaaidin, K.  
Dyett, H.E.  
Von Eeden, H.A.  
George, H.K.  
Harisingh, K.  
Insanally, S.R.  
Jackson, R.E.

Johnson, L.E.  
Josiah, H.W.  
Kirton, R.F.  
Mansell, Miss E.A.  
Ramlall, K.  
Sahadeo, H.  
Storey, N.  
Worrell, J.S.M.  
Wyatt, W.D.

From Jamaica

Carey, Mrs. P.  
Christian, Miss M.

Phillpotts, B.

From Trinidad and Tobago

Ablack, R.K.  
Belle, J.F.  
Bishop, Miss C.E.  
Cherrie, E.S.

Henri, C.L.  
Seemuncal, S.  
Wiltshire, L.A.

ANNEX IV

TEXT OF MESSAGE FROM DR. VICTOR HOO  
UNITED NATIONS COMMISSIONER FOR TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

"On behalf of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, I wish to extend a hearty welcome to the participants in this United Nations Foreign Service Training Course.

"As its name indicates, its purpose is to provide the necessary background for the conduct of foreign service activities of the participating countries. I am sure that you will take full advantage of these six weeks to meet, both in formal and in informal sessions, those who have made distinguished careers as diplomats and those who have a special competence in the subjects and problems which one must know to be able to cope with the varied responsibilities of the present-day diplomats.

"The concepts of diplomacy and diplomatic practices have been undergoing continuous transformation in the twentieth century. Apart from the growth of multilateral diplomacy and institutional arrangements necessitating the development of new skills and specializations, the role of diplomats has now acquired a new dimension. With the emergence of so many newly independent countries in the world, the pursuit of their accelerated economic development has become a goal of crucial importance in the attainment of which properly trained diplomats can be of the greatest service.

"This is also a goal of the United Nations and it is the endeavour of the Organization to develop the necessary response to the needs of the times. While you are here, you will, therefore, be able to familiarize yourself with the work of the United Nations so that you may readily draw upon it for the purpose of development in your own countries.

"Before closing I should like to express, on behalf of the United Nations, our high appreciation of the host facilities offered by the Government of Barbados."