

FINAL RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-FIRST PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 14 August 1984, at 10.30 a.m.

President: Mr. R.I.T. Cromartie (United Kingdom)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria:

Mr. A. TAFFAR

Mr. A. BELAID

Argentina:

Mr. J. CARSALES

Mr. R. GARCIA MORTAN

Australia:

Mr. R. BUTLER

Mr. R. ROWE

Ms. J. COURTNEY

Belgium:

Mr. M. DEPASSE

Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE

Brazil:

Mr. C.A. de SOUZA e SILVA

Mr. S. QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria:

Mr. B. KONSTANTINOV

Mr. N. MIKHAILOV

Mr. C. PRAMOV

Mr. K. STANKOV

Burma:

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

U HLA MYINT

U PE THEIN TIN

Canada:

Mr. J.A. BEESLEY

Mr. R.G. SUTHERLAND

China:

Mr. QIAN JIADONG

Ms. WANG ZHIYUN

Mr. LIN CHENG

Mr. YANG MINGLIANG

Mr. SUO KAIMING

Mr. LU MINGJUN

Cuba:

Mr. P. NUÑEZ MOSQUERA

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. M. VEJVODA

Mr. A. CIMA

Mr. J. MATOUSEK

Egypt:

Mr. I.A. HASSAN

Mr. M. BADR

Ms. W. BASSIM

Ethiopia:

Ms. K. SINEGIORGIS

France:

Mr. F. de la GORCE

Mr. G. MONTIASSIER

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. H. ROSE

Mr. H. THELLICKE

Mr. F. SAYATZ

Mr. W. KUBICZEK

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. H. WEGENER

Mr. F. ELBE

Mr. M. GEDTS

Mr. W.E. von dem HAGEN

Hungary:

Mr. F. GAJDA

Mr. T. TCH

India:

Mr. S. KANT SHARMA

Indonesia:

Mr. S. SUTOWARDOYO

Mr. I.M. DAMANIK

Mr. I. WIRANATAATMADJA

Mr. HARYOMATARAM

Islamic Republic of Iran:

Mr. N. KAZEMI KAMYAB

Mr. M. TALE

Italy:

Mr. M. ALLSSI

Mr. B. CARRAS

Mr. G. ADORNI BRACCESI

Mr. M. PAVESE

Japan:

Mr. R. IMAI

Mr. M. KONISHI

Mr. T. KAWAKITA

Mr. T. ISHIGURI

Kenya:

Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
Ms. S. GONZALES y REYNERO
Mr. F. MACEDO RIBA

Mongolia:

Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG
Mr. S.O. BOLD
Mr. T. ZORIGTBAATAR

Morocco:

Mr. O. HILALE

Netherlands:

Mr. R.J. van SCHAIK
Mr. J. RAMAKER

Nigeria:

Mr. C. UDEDIBIA

Pakistan:

Mr. K. NIAZ

Peru:

Mr. C. CASTILLO RAMIREZ

Poland:

Mr. S. TURBANSKI
Mr. T. STROJWAS
Mr. J. RYCHLAK

Romania:

Mr. T. MELESCANU

Sri Lanka:

Mr. J. DHANAPALA

Sweden:

Mr. R. EKEUS
Mr. L.E. WINGREN
Mrs. E. BONNIER
Mr. H. BERGLUND

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. V.I. ISSRAELIAN
Mr. R.M. TIMERBAEV
Mr. P.Y. SKOMOROKHIN
Mr. G.V. BERDENNIKOV
Mr. B.P. KRASULIN
Mr. N.V. NEILAND
Mr. V.F. PRIAKHIN

United Kingdom:

Mr. R.I.T. CROMARTIE
Mr. L.J. MIDDLETON
Mr. D.A. SLINN

United States of America:

Mr. L.G. FIELDS
Mr. N. CLYNE
Mr. P.S. CORDEN
Mr. H.W. DAVIDSON
Mr. J. MISKEL
Mr. A. LIEBOWITZ
Mr. J. MCATEER
Mr. B. MORTON
Mr. J.J. TIERNEY
Ms. M. WINSTON

Venezuela:

-

Yugoslavia:

Mr. K. VIDAS
Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC

Zaire:

Mrs. E. EKANGA KABEYA
Mr. O. GNOK

Secretary-General of the Conference on
Disarmament and Personal Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary-General of the
Conference on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The PRESIDENT: The 281st plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is called to order.

The Conference starts today its consideration of Reports of ad hoc subsidiary bodies; organizational questions; consideration and adoption of the Annual Report to the General Assembly of the United Nations. However, in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

In accordance with the time-table of meetings to be held during this week, I intend to suspend the plenary meeting once the list of speakers is exhausted and to convene an informal meeting of the Conference to consider proposals for draft mandates for subsidiary bodies under items 2 and 5 of our agenda. Immediately afterwards, we will resume the plenary meeting and take the relevant decisions. I also wish to note that, after the plenary meeting is adjourned, we should have another informal meeting to start our consideration of the technical parts of the draft Annual Report to the General Assembly of the United Nations.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany.

I give the floor to the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador Wegener.

Mr. WEGENER (Federal Republic of Germany): Mr. President, it gives me particular pleasure to take the floor while you are presiding the Conference, the representative of a very closely allied country. The great diplomatic tradition of the United Kingdom, which you so effectively epitomize, is welcome and needed in this very difficult month of our annual session. With your permission, I would like to devote this statement to item 3 on our agenda, "Prevention of nuclear war including all related matters".

My delegation, as colleagues will remember, has regularly addressed the subject both during the 1983 and the 1984 session of the Conference. I would also like to recall that my delegation, together with the delegations of the Netherlands and Japan, introduced a Working Paper entitled "Prevention of War, in particular Nuclear War" at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament in 1982, and that that document had constituted one of the principal subjects of discussion in the final stages of the special session.

I would like to use the present occasion to restate the views of my delegation on the subject. From the time when the proposal was first put to the then Committee on Disarmament to include in its work assignment what is now formulated in our agenda item 3, my delegation has welcomed the proposal and supported the view that the vital subject of the prevention of nuclear war and all other armed conflict needed urgent consideration, and that the Conference on Disarmament is uniquely suited to take action in this field. Weapons by themselves do not cause wars; States and their leaders do. Disarmament in its narrowest sense, as a reduction of military hardware, is highly desirable and even vital, but remains a mechanical process if the behaviour of States is left out of consideration. In the proud name which this body has adopted, the word disarmament also figures, but my delegation understands it in a much broader sense, as a call for the co-operative management and control of armaments designed

(Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic of Germany)

to guarantee peace and prevent the outbreak of war. The prevention of war, including nuclear war, constitutes by necessity an attempt to regulate and reshape over-all State behaviour, reshape it in a more peaceful fashion, in order to minimize and if possible eliminate the chances of outbreak of war (and thereby of nuclear war). Thus by its very nature the prevention of nuclear war constitutes a comprehensive challenge. My delegation is gratified that the comprehensive and extremely complex nature of this task is increasingly stressed also by other delegations in this room. The distinguished Ambassador of Burma has, in a recent statement of his, testified to this growing awareness among the members of the Conference. In a detailed Working Paper -- CD/357 of 28 March 1983 -- my delegation laid out its views on the subject, intending to provide a broad frame of reference for the treatment of the agenda item, and pin-pointing especially those areas in which States can make a meaningful contribution to the prevention of war, in particular a nuclear war. The Working Paper was designed to facilitate the identification of possible, practical and appropriate, ultimately negotiable measures for the attainment of our goal. In the same vein, the Belgian delegation, in its Working Paper CD/380, systematized and further amplified one of the several chapters of document CD/357, Confidence-building measures, including those related to nuclear matters. While I remain extremely critical of the point of departure from which the group of socialist States approaches the subject of war prevention -- and I shall certainly substantiate some of my objections in the present statement -- I must recognize that the Group has made an interesting effort in document CD/434 to flesh out its former, more rudimentary presentations, thereby recognizing the comprehensive and complex nature of the subject. These various Working Papers show that delegations have recognized the degree to which the subject calls for a co-operative intellectual effort, revealing the many facets of the problem.

The Group of 21 has presented its views early on in Working Paper CD/341. However, I note with some regret that the Group has not taken the opportunity to elaborate further on its views and to do justice, on its part, to the complexity of the subject and the efforts offered by the other Groups. Is it really an adequate response to the gravity of the issue -- as some delegations have a tendency to do -- to limit oneself to pointing the accusing finger at the present holders of nuclear weapons, and to multiply the calls, in an almost ritual fashion, for the return to a pre-atomic world which, alas, none of us can recreate?

The vital importance of the subject and the acknowledgement that the topic is immensely complex both point to the same conclusion: that an appropriate work format in this Conference should be found to enable a dense and argumentative process in which subjects for suitable action by the Conference be identified, and the modalities for such action be discussed.

In his statement of 31 July, Ambassador Dubey has retraced our efforts over the last months to set in motion such an argumentative process within the framework of an ad hoc committee of the Conference. My delegation fully shares his bitterness that these attempts have been unsuccessful and that so much effort and goodwill -- very largely on the part of Ambassador Dubey himself -- have gone for naught. It is tempting and at the same time sad to imagine how much useful debate we could have accomplished in the course of the past year and a half, how much we could have progressed in a mutual understanding of our respective views. It is true that the subject of prevention of nuclear war comprises a great number of controversial aspects. But whoever believes that rational dialogue and the sober clarification of problems are the most likely tools to bring about a meeting

(Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic of Germany)

of minds, or at least mutual respect for one's well-considered positions, must also accept that the more controversial the subject, the more necessary debate and argument. Polemical exchanges are most likely when the knowledge about the views of others is incomplete, and they fade away as reciprocal knowledge is enhanced and counterarguments are recognized to carry weight.

It is in this spirit that my delegation could have joined in the creation of a committee on agenda item 3 with a mandate acceptable to all. In the view of my delegation the draft mandate proposed by the Group of 21 and contained in document CD/515 continues to represent an interesting and promising approach. Its very general nature accommodates the perspective of many delegations and, with some further consultations, might come to exert an even wider appeal. I share Ambassador Dubey's regret that a positive decision on the draft has eluded us at this time. However, the importance of the subject matter and the need to embark on an in-depth consideration of the item remain undiminished. We should therefore maintain our dialogue on this institutional issue, preserve the proximity of views that has already been reached and continue our work in a patient, persuasive manner in the hope for a final consensus.

There may be a lesson involved in our failure to create a committee at this time. In April 1983, when we first thought about an appropriate work format for dealing with agenda item 3, a group of Western States proposed that a structured debate be held in the course of a clustered series of informal plenary meetings. My delegation was among the co-sponsors of Working Paper CD/411, outlining a possible structure for a comprehensive, analytical exploration of the subject in the course of a series of meetings. Other groups rejected that institutional format as insufficient, although the suggestion had been maintained through the summer part of the session of 1983 and the beginning of this year's annual meeting period. It may be that informal meetings would have offered less of an opportunity for an in-depth debate, although the practical difference between the various formats of our work is slight. But why was the lesser format, which should at least have allowed the initiation of a fruitful debate, rejected at the time? As so often in the disarmament field, a less satisfactory solution was spurned in the quest for a perfect one. In the end, those who wanted everything found themselves with nothing. If this structured debate had taken place at the suggested time, if it had offered an exciting and rewarding approach to the subject, perhaps the transition to a normal subsidiary organ would have been easier and a sense of accomplishment would be ours, that is now replaced by disappointment and frustration.

Unfortunately, the failure of the Conference to provide a suitable framework for the consideration of agenda item 3 has made our debate so far somewhat disorderly. We have heard a lot about the unimaginable horrors of a full-scale nuclear conflagration. But too often delegations that have cited these horrible consequences have omitted the necessary preceding step: to make realistic assumptions about how such horrors could come about, and what the likelihood of their occurrence is. However, a call for measures designed to prevent nuclear war can only be meaningful if these measures are adapted to specific conflict scenarios. Indeed, the presentations of some delegations remind one of a physician who prescribes a potent medicine without bothering to diagnose the

(Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic of Germany)

disease. In Working Paper CD/411, of which my delegation is a co-author, it was suggested that the first logical step of any action of the Conference under agenda item 3 must be the "Assessment of the risk of an outbreak of armed conflict in general and nuclear war in particular". I would like to use this opportunity to restate the views of my delegation on this point, and, in particular, to take issue with certain views of the socialist countries.

Various working papers and statements of the countries of the Warsaw Pact suggest that they are solely predicated upon one form of conflict: a nuclear "bolt out of the blue", an all-encompassing nuclear surprise strike visited upon the Soviet Union and others by the United States of America. The entire vocabulary of the present Soviet disarmament stance -- e.g. "increasing threat of nuclear war", "imminent catastrophe for the peoples of Europe and the whole world" -- apparently relates to such a scenario. Other more realistic scenarios of conflict -- such as aggression (by whomever) with conventional arms, degeneration of a conventional conflict into a nuclear exchange -- are not even mentioned. Accordingly, the usefulness of the measures recommended by the socialist countries must be judged by the degree of realism inherent in the underlying scenario.

I will not dwell upon the distasteful nature of the open accusations which the Soviet Union and some of her allies formulate in this connection against the United States in many of their working documents and statements, but would rather undertake to examine the likelihood of this conflict scenario both from a political and a technical angle.

From the side of political argument, it is obvious for everybody who follows world events in good faith that there are no facts to which such an accusation can be attached. In the West, and especially in the United States, there is an open discussion of strategy. Military doctrine and political intentions are openly debated and they are part of an alliance credo that musters an overwhelming consensus in the countries members of the Atlantic Alliance. The Alliance has an excellent, irrefutable record as a group of countries that are pledged to never using any weapon, nuclear or other, except in the case of armed attack. NATO's strategy is exclusively defensive, aimed at the prevention of conflict. Force structure, defence planning and logistics correspond to these aims. The West is technically incapable of attack. There are repeated and unambiguous statements from the highest representatives of the Alliance countries, including the United States, that nuclear war is not winnable and that first-strike scenarios or "launch-on-warning" policies remain categorically eliminated from the range of defence options for which the Alliance prepares.

From a more technical viewpoint, a "bolt out of the blue" scenario is lacking in both probability and feasibility. It is disturbing in this connection that the socialist countries, in imputing a first-strike strategy to the United States, use a vague and distorted definition of what a first strike really is. Conceptually, a first strike is defined as a surprise attack using the essential part of the nuclear arsenals on one side, aiming at the elimination in one stroke of the entire strategic nuclear long-range potential and the command installations of the adversary, so that for all practical purposes the adversary loses its technical means to respond by an effective retaliatory nuclear strike. A first strike would therefore suppose that the attacking country has an adequate number of nuclear missiles for an assured targeting

(Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic of Germany)

of all essential targets of the enemy, that would enable retaliation and that these weapons are sufficient in range, reliability, high-precision targeting ability and throw-weight. Does any of the two major Powers presently or for the foreseeable future dispose of such an ability? The technical answer must be: no.

Despite certain technological changes, a great number of the existing stationary strategic systems on each side still remain invulnerable to attack. In addition, the percentage of sea- and air-borne targets of a strategic nature which by their very nature could not be comprised in the first-strike attack is such that under any realistic assumption a considerable second-strike potential will be retained by the other side. On the part of the United States, roughly 90 per cent of the strategic systems are thus outside of the purview of a first strike; for the Soviet Union, roughly 60 per cent. Recent inquiries into the atmospheric and biological consequences of a nuclear exchange of the proportions which a first strike would by definition require show even more clearly than before that the attacker cannot shield himself from the consequences of his own nuclear attack. That would even be true if a first strike would, as a theoretical proposition, succeed and an actual nuclear exchange is not produced; it would a fortiori be true if the addressee reacts with his remaining nuclear potential. Details about the consequences of such an exchange are not required in the present context. There is no way to escape the conclusion that any first strike in the precise technical definition of the term would spell suicide for the attacker. That holds true for either of the Great Powers. A first strike therefore is outside of the purview of rational politics. If a first strike was a real possibility, it would be totally meaningless to sit in this Conference to discuss disarmament. He who imputes to an adversary State plans for a -- totally irrational -- first-strike attack at the same time destroys the basis for a rational discourse with that State and for the co-operative search for policies to prevent war.

The gist of my brief analysis is that the scenario on which the Group of Socialist States has exclusively based its conclusions relating to agenda item 3 has no place in our debate. In this context I would recall what the Minister of State in the Federal German Foreign Office, Mr. Mertes, said in this room as recently as 9 July: "If one is to believe some public declarations and speculations over the last months, tensions in the world have reached a new ominous dimension. The outbreak of nuclear war is depicted as having reached a degree of risk higher than ever before. My Government does not share these exaggerated apprehensions because we do not think that any nuclear-weapon State wants to commit suicide. They all ... behave most rationally and cautiously in the face of the nuclear-war risk since it affects their own survival. Indeed, they have developed a system of co-operative arrangements shielding them and their allies from the risk inherent in modern military machinery".

My delegation particularly regrets the approach which the Group of socialist countries favours since it is fraught with a number of unfortunate consequences for our work.

In the first place, we are led away from the really important, realistic conflict scenarios, those against which we have to devise appropriate strategies in our work. Many, if not most, of the strategies proposed by the socialist group are flawed by the fallacies of their underlying scenario.

(Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic of Germany)

Secondly, we are diverted from the task of also assessing the growth process and military strength of the Soviet Union and her allies. However, behind the smoke screen of nuclear-war psychosis and first-strike phobias there exists an intensive, almost unharnessed growth process on the Soviet side, largely beyond Soviet defensive needs, a process which deliberately employs all modern technologies, the same technologies which the Soviet Union criticizes as dangerous and destabilizing when used by the United States. All these potentials, however, must be assessed in an impartial and sober comparative analysis when we seek to attain a realistic basis for the construction of strategies for the prevention of war, including nuclear war.

Thirdly, another, very unfortunate consequence of the alarmist scenario propagated by the socialist countries is the resulting psychotic fears and emotions which make it more difficult to develop a rational approach to the real security problems which are in need of solution.

And finally, there is another even more regrettable consequence. Scenarios such as the socialist countries put in the foreground of their approach deform our thinking, they lead us to concentrate on scenarios of warfare while in reality, in the nuclear field, both super-Powers have come to think, in their own shared and vital interest in terms of war prevention, which is also our task.

The purpose of my analysis has so far been to cut out unrealistic and even dangerous, irrational scenarios from our consideration of agenda item 3. If my deduction is accepted, we could finally concentrate in our further work on the real, important conflict possibilities that deserve rational examination. They are three in number.

First, there is the possibility of an accidental outbreak of nuclear war as a consequence of technical failure. I intend to examine in a separate statement, from the viewpoint of a non-nuclear-weapon State, the degree to which real danger would seem to emanate from technical or human failures leading to such accidental occurrences, but I would like to pre-empt my conclusions already at this point by stating that these dangers are minimal if not non-existent. The very sophisticated national control systems for nuclear potentials, the existing systems of international crisis communication, and a comprehensive body of already existing confidence-building measures in the nuclear field must lead to that conclusion. The co-operative relationship of the nuclear-weapon States, even in times of crisis, is far advanced. In this connection it is to be regretted that the recently concluded Soviet-American agreement on the improvement of the hot-line agreement has not been sufficiently appreciated by the international community as a reassuring sign for the functioning security dialogue of nuclear-weapon States in one important field.

The two remaining risks that exist in reality are, firstly, that a conventional armed conflict erupts which by a fatal sequence of events might degenerate into nuclear confrontation; and, secondly, that the existence of nuclear weapons and the overpowering stance which a State or a group of States could gain from nuclear superiority could, in conjunction with expansionist, non-peaceful policies lead to political subjugation as a result of the permanence

(Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic of Germany)

and dimension of the threat -- a scenario that forcefully underlines the need for nuclear disarmament negotiations and balance at the lowest possible level of nuclear weaponry. Both these frightening possibilities point us back to the causes of conflicts. He who wants to prevent war, including nuclear war, must eliminate the causes for the accumulation of arsenals and for their potential political and military use. This is the cogent point of logic why our Conference should look at the prevention of nuclear war in the framework of broader policies of war prevention in general.

On that level of argument -- and here I would like to recall what I said at the beginning of my statement -- we are referred back to the behaviour of States and to the essential insight that an effective strategy aimed at the prevention of war must be a strategy to reshape State behaviour in terms of more co-operative relationships. On 6 August, Foreign Minister Genscher addressed problems of the prevention of conflict, of co-operation and of a more stable peace order in the East-West framework. While relating to the situation in Europe -- a crucial, a tension-ridden region -- the principles of State behaviour the Minister has enunciated are, in the view of the Federal Republic of Germany, fully applicable to the relationship between States in the wider world community, and especially for the North-South relationship. The following reflections of the Minister are therefore highly pertinent for the agenda item here under consideration: "Proceeding from the foundations that have been laid so far, new ways of fostering security, co-operation and stability in Europe will have to be sought. The West will be best able to live up to their responsibility if all can pursue this goal consistently and undisturbed by internal fluctuations. The fact that the two sides have differences should induce them to redouble their efforts to improve the climate. Attempts by either side to impose its standpoint on the other by refusing to resume negotiations can lead to nothing. The right approach to the task of finding a way out of the present difficult situation is to look for common interests and mutually acceptable principles. Both sides wish under all circumstances to avoid armed conflict with each other, no matter what the weapons may be. They must both want to reduce the burden of military spending. Neither of them will accept the military superiority of the other. Both, therefore, can only gain from dialogue and co-operation... The task of giving substance to the renunciation of force can also play a prominent part in efforts to ease the present strain on East-West relations. Promising not to use force does not imply renunciation of convictions, principles and standards or positions on contentious issues. It concerns the manner in which nations deal with one another, and the means they use, in trying to reconcile the differing, often contrary, interests. Renunciation of force must be the fundamental principle for ensuring orderly relationships among the nations of Europe. It requires that relations among all members of the European community of nations, without exception, be based on dialogue, co-operation and the reconciliation of interests and not on coercion or the superiority of one country over another, on hegemonic aspirations or security privileges ... This development must culminate in a peace order in Europe in which nations with different social systems can live together peacefully without fear and in mutual confidence, strictly observing their commitments under the Final Act of Helsinki."

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany for his statement and for his kind words addressed to the Chair.

That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to speak?

Mr. EKEUS (Sweden): Mr. President, I would just like to inform delegates through you that a drafting meeting within the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons will be held this afternoon, at 3.30 p.m., in Room I.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Sweden for his statement. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor? If that is not the case, as announced at the opening of this meeting, I intend now to suspend the plenary meeting of the Conference and to convene, in five minutes' time, an informal meeting to consider proposals for draft mandates of subsidiary bodies under item 2 and 5 of the agenda.

The plenary meeting is suspended.

The meeting was suspended at 11.20 a.m. and reconvened at 12.25 p.m.

The PRESIDENT: The 281st plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is reconvened.

The Conference has before it proposals containing draft mandates for ad hoc committees under items 2 and 5 of our agenda. We shall take up first those proposals dealing with item 2 on the agenda, entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament".

The first proposal is contained in document CD/523 submitted by a group of socialist countries. Is there any objection?

I give the floor to the representative of Japan.

Mr. IMAI (Japan): Thank you, Mr. President. In view of the importance of the subject matter covered under agenda item 2, a group of western countries gave very serious thoughts to the mandate proposed. They have, however, not been convinced that creation of a subsidiary body at this time would contribute to the cause of nuclear disarmament and they, therefore, are not in a position to join in the consensus with regard to the proposed mandate.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Japan for his statement.

In view of the statement just made, I have to note that there is no consensus at present on the proposal contained in document CD/523.

I give the floor to the distinguished representative of the German Democratic Republic.

Mr. ROSE (German Democratic Republic): Thank you Mr. President. Much to the regret of a group of socialist countries, no consensus has been reached on our draft mandate contained in document CD/523 because of the negative attitude of one group. I wish to state here and now that the socialist countries will not relent in their efforts to ensure that the Conference devotes to the matter the attention it deserves.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the German Democratic Republic for his statement.

I suggest that we now turn to paragraph 7 of document CD/526, also on item 2 of the agenda, which contains a draft mandate submitted by the Group of 21.

Is there any objection to this proposal?

I give the floor to the representative of the German Democratic Republic.

Mr. ROSE (German Democratic Republic): On behalf of the Group of Socialist Countries I would like to reaffirm our support for the draft mandate submitted by the Group of 21 and contained in document CD/526, paragraph 7. That document outlines in a very convincing manner the reasons why this draft mandate was presented. We would go along with the request that multilateral negotiations be initiated at the beginning of the 1985 session of the Conference, and we also support the idea of a step-by-step approach.

Mr. IMAI (Japan): I regret to say that the statement that I made with regard to document CD/523 also applies to paragraph 7 of document CD/526... We are not, as I have said, convinced that the creation of a subsidiary body would contribute to the cause of disarmament, and therefore we are not in a position to associate ourselves with the consensus on this proposed mandate.

Mr. QIAN JIADONG (China): China has always attached great importance to the question of the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and disarmament. Since the time when it took part in the Conference on Disarmament, the Chinese delegation has consistently supported the idea of establishing a subsidiary body on this item and of starting substantive negotiations immediately.

The Chinese delegation believes that the statement made by the Group of 21 on 26 July is of positive significance. The statement welcomes the Joint Declaration of the Heads of State or Government of Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden and Tanzania issued on 22 May 1984, and states that "as a first step, the Group considers it necessary to halt all testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems to be immediately followed by substantial reductions in nuclear forces". We believe that this idea coincides with our proposal on nuclear disarmament put forward time and again, that is, cessation of testing, development and production of nuclear weapons as well as reduction of nuclear weapons. We call it "three cessations and one reduction". We have a common objective. Only we, China, pursuant to the spirit of paragraph 48 of the Final Document of the first first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, maintain that at the present stage, the United States and the Soviet Union, which possess more than 95 per cent of the world's nuclear weapons, should take the lead in taking actions to be followed by the other nuclear States.

In paragraph 7 of its document, the Group of 21 presented concrete proposals concerning the establishment of an ad hoc committee on this item and its mandate. The Chinese delegation endorses this proposal in principle. We earnestly hope that the parties concerned will, in the few remaining days of this session, seek as soon as possible a solution by consensus based on this proposal and in the spirit of mutual co-operation and accommodation, in order to enable the Conference to start substantive negotiations on this item at the beginning of the 1985 session.

Mr. NÚÑEZ MOSQUERA (Cuba) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, it seems that you will be obliged to announce that there is no consensus for the creation of a subsidiary body on item 2 of our agenda. My delegation, and other delegations, will therefore ensure that the treatment which this item received in the Conference on Disarmament is reflected in the report we must submit to the General Assembly.

I should simply like to draw your attention to the argument which was advanced in order not to accept the documents we have considered. It was stated that at this time the creation of a subsidiary body on item 2 would not contribute to the cause of nuclear disarmament. I should like to recall that at this time military expenditures amount to some 800,000 million dollars, a high percentage of which is devoted to the nuclear arms race, and that at this time the number of needy, starving and ill people who are watching the resources which could relieve their suffering wasted on military expenditures is increasing. Throughout this 1984 session we have heard brilliant and elegant speeches on disarmament; but when the time comes to take a concrete decision, once again the Conference is prevented from beginning concrete negotiations on the priority items on its agenda.

The PRESIDENT: In view of the statements that we have heard I have to note that there is no consensus at present on the proposal contained in paragraph 7 of document CD/526.

We have concluded our consideration of the proposals made for draft mandates under item 2 on the agenda. I suggest that we now take up those proposals submitted under item 5 entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space". The first proposal before the Conference is contained in document CD/329/Rev.2, submitted by the Group of 21. Is there any objection to this proposal?

I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Italy, Ambassador Alessi.

Mr. ALESSI (Italy) (translated from French): Mr. President, the Group of Western Countries has considered the draft mandate contained in document CD/329/Rev.2 with all the attention it deserves. I regret to have to state that the Group is not in a position to join in a consensus on the document for the reasons which were advanced during the consultations which you and your predecessors have held on this subject as well as in the plenary meetings of the Conference.

Mr. ERDEMBILEG (Mongolia) (translated from Russian): I should like to state on behalf of a group of socialist countries that our Group endorses the ideas contained in document CD/329/Rev.2, submitted by the Group of 21.

Mr. QIAN JIADONG (China) (translated from Chinese): Mr. President, since the commencement of the spring part of this session, the parties concerned have been engaged in prolonged and frequent consultations on the question of establishing a subsidiary body on the prevention of arms race in outer space. The Group of 21 presented, at the outset, its draft mandate, which the Chinese delegation has consistently considered could serve as a basis for reaching agreement. However, because of broad differences of view, it has not been able to break through the deadlock so far, although various solutions have been proposed by some delegations.

(Mr. Qian Jiadong, China)

We are disappointed at this. It is indeed quite ironic, especially considering that the Soviet Union and the United States are talking bombastically about holding bilateral talks in Vienna on the question of outer space, while we here in this forum are unable to establish a subsidiary body on the subject which has been on our agenda for so many years.

As is well known, thanks to the accommodation and the co-operative efforts of the parties, the United Nations General Assembly, in its consideration of this subject last year, succeeded eventually in combining the three proposals into one and adopted resolution 38/70 by an overwhelming majority. This was a great success. We look forward to the development of this co-operative spirit here in this Conference too, so that the Conference may establish the relevant subsidiary bodies soon after the beginning of next year's session in order to start substantive work.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of China for his statement.

If there are no other speakers wishing to take the floor at this point, may I now turn to document CD/529, also submitted under agenda item 5, which contains a proposal made by a group of socialist States?

Is there any objection to this proposal?

I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Italy.

Mr. ALESSI (Italy) (translated from French): The group of western countries on behalf of which I am taking the floor has examined document CD/529 and does not consider that it provides a basis for an agreement. Therefore, it cannot join in a consensus on this document.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): My delegation regrets what has occurred at this session of the Conference on Disarmament, which proves the truth of what the General Assembly stated in the penultimate paragraph of its resolution 38/62 of 15 December 1983. As you will recall, in that resolution the General Assembly deplored the fact that "due to the persistent obstruction of a very small number of its members", the then Committee and now Conference on Disarmament has been unable to initiate the negotiations on items of the utmost urgency and importance which are among the tasks which the General Assembly had in view when it established the Committee on Disarmament in 1978.

Today we have had two further examples: the case of agenda item 5, perhaps the most pressing item at the moment, the prevention of an arms race in outer space, and that of item 2, perhaps the most important item in the long term, cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. Earlier, there were two others: the case of agenda item 1, nuclear test ban, and that of item 3, prevention of nuclear war. This strengthens my delegation's belief that at the beginning of next year this Conference should give all due attention to the proposal submitted by the Group of 21 on 13 September 1982 in document CD/330, which is drafted in the following very brief manner: "The rule of consensus shall not be used either in such a way as to prevent the establishment of subsidiary bodies for the effective functioning of the Committee in accordance with the priorities established in the Final Document and in conformity with the provisions of rule 23."

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): The history of the Conference on Disarmament in recent years is generally lack-lustre, but, clearly 26 July and 14 August are dates which will enter the black pages of this history. On 26 July, because of the position of the Western States, the possibility of holding negotiations in 1984 on such priority issues of contemporary peace politics as a nuclear-weapon-test ban and the prevention of nuclear war was blocked or, to put it bluntly, killed. Why was this done? Only because in the mandates which were submitted by a group of socialist countries and the Group of 21 it was proposed to begin negotiations, reference was made clearly and precisely to the need to conduct negotiations in our multilateral disarmament body. Today the same Group of Western countries has killed the possibility of holding negotiations on two other agenda items of no lower priority and no less urgency than those to which I referred earlier: namely, on the limitation of nuclear weapons and nuclear disarmament, and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. I ask you the following, Mr. President: why did the Group of Western States kill this mandate? Only because these mandates contain the sacrosanct word "negotiations". That is precisely why the mandates proposed by the majority of member States of the Conference were not adopted. I hope that the General Assembly will devote its attention chiefly to these very issues and not to issues of procedure, including the question of increasing the membership of the Conference. The Conference will be asked not why it did not resolve organizational and procedural questions, but why it did not begin negotiations on four priority items on its agenda. The Conference will also have to reply to the question of who is to blame for the fact that the negotiations on the priority disarmament issues did not begin in the Conference. In the light of what has occurred, I was to say the least astonished by the request addressed to the Soviet Union to resume negotiations which was made by Ambassador Wegener of the Federal Republic of Germany in his statement today. We hear these appeals time after time, and they sometimes remind us of the gypsy ballad, "Come back, come back, all is forgiven". We will not return to negotiations which are used as a smoke screen, as a way of distracting attention from the military plans of some States. But this is another question, and when we receive the text of the statement of the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany, we will naturally consider a reply to it. We wish to ask why a group of States, a large group of States, which is asking us to return to negotiations which have been killed, although we did not cause them to collapse, is itself hindering the start of negotiations. What is the meaning of this? Why has the Conference over the last few years been unable to begin negotiations on priority agenda items? It is to this question that we wish to receive a reply in the light of what occurred on 26 July and 14 August.

Mr. CARSALES (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): I shall be very brief. The Conference has just taken a decision, or is about to conclude doing so, on various drafts relating to the establishment of an ad hoc committee of this Conference on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, with their respective mandates. Unfortunately, the outcome is negative.

In this connection, we are all aware, through the press, and I emphasize through the press, that there is a kind of bilateral dialogue going on between the two space Powers. The coexistence of bilateral and multilateral efforts in disarmament may be accepted, but it is undeniable that such efforts are complementary and not contradictory or utterly separated one from the other. It is essential

(Mr. Carasales, Argentina)

that there should be some type of link between the two. My delegation has therefore considered, and continues to consider, that the Conference has the right to expect that the two Powers concerned should provide it as rapidly as possible with some information on the progress of the dialogue between them, especially taking into account that this is a question specifically included in the agenda of the Conference, on which very intense efforts have been made for some time to reach agreement on a suitable manner in which to undertake the substantive consideration of the issue.

This multilateral approach cannot reasonably be agreed upon in an appropriate manner in utter ignorance of what is or is not happening on the same topic in the bilateral sphere.

Mr. FIELDS (United States of America): Mr. President, I have listened with interest to this debate and I was intrigued by the intervention of the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union. He added two dates to what he called "black pages" in the history of this Conference. May I add, Sir, two dates which will live in infamy for disarmament throughout the world. Those dates are, first, 23 November 1983, the day that the intermediate nuclear forces talks were abandoned by the Soviet Union. The second date is 8 December 1983. Negotiations were being undertaken for the first time by the two major possessors of nuclear weapons, not to limit those weapons but to reduce them, the start of the process toward nuclear disarmament. Those talks were walked away from by the Soviet Union on 8 December 1983.

As to the question of outer space, the one of our immediate concern; the Soviet Union invited the United States to negotiations to begin 18 September 1984 in Vienna. We shall be there! My question is, will the Soviet Union have a delegation there, or will that also go into the ledger book of days which shall be remembered forever as another lost opportunity for disarmament.

Mr. ALESSI (Italy) (translated from French): It is with great regret that we must note the absence of any agreement on the subject of the prevention of an arms race in outer space, a matter of undisputed importance, and thus an agreement which during the intersessional period appeared within reach is escaping us. The best has once again been the enemy of the good, and the desire to obtain a more ambitious mandate has played against the possibility of beginning our work immediately on a realistic and perhaps acceptable basis.

We now note the lack of consensus on the draft mandates contained in document CD/329/Rev.2 and CD/529. A third draft mandate submitted by 10 countries of the Western Group is contained in CD/527. As I had occasion to say when introducing it, this draft reflects, rather than the view of its co-sponsors, a stage, I would now say the last stage, in our long consultations. We would have wished that it could have received a better welcome, for it represents a serious and constructive effort. The co-sponsors consider that it should remain available to the Conference in the hope that it may be a useful basis for pursuing our work on this subject. That is why they are not asking for a decision to be taken on the draft mandate at this stage in our work. My delegation, as well as all the delegations on behalf of which I am speaking, remain ready to resume work on this subject as rapidly as possible, in a consultative spirit, until we can achieve the agreement which we all desire.

Mr. ERDEMBILEG (Mongolia) (translated from Russian): During the last few years in this multilateral negotiating body the socialist countries have continuously made consistent efforts to achieve agreement on the top-priority issue of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. We have firmly advocated and continue to advocate the setting up as rapidly as possible of an ad hoc committee to conduct negotiations on the conclusion of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in outer space in all its aspects, taking account of all relevant proposals, including the proposal concerning a treaty on the prohibition of the use of force in outer space and from space against the Earth. The Conference on Disarmament has clearly made up its mind to take an official decision on document CD/529, submitted by a group of socialist countries, and intends to note the lack of consensus on that document because of the negative position of a group of countries. The socialist countries therefore have no other choice but to express their deep disappointment. We shall in future continue to deploy our efforts and co-operate closely with interested delegations to achieve a mutually acceptable agreement on this issue.

Mr. ISSRAELIAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): I apologize for taking the floor a second time, but I should like to note with satisfaction that the representative of the United States agreed with me that 26 July and 14 August were black pages in the history of the Conference. I have already given the reasons for this in my earlier statement. For my part I am ready to agree with him that the breaking-off of the talks on the limitation of nuclear arms in Europe and on strategic arms limitation and reduction between the Soviet Union and the United States was truly deplorable. However, Ambassador Fields has made a mistake in one respect-- on the dates. The talks were interrupted not on 23 November and 8 December, but some days earlier, in mid-November, with the start of the deployment of American intermediate-range missiles on the European continent -- in the Federal Republic of Germany, Great Britain and Italy. That is the date when the important bilateral Soviet-United States negotiations were broken off.

Mr. FIELDS (United States of America): My apologies for prolonging this, as we are well into our luncheon hour. I can only say, and I would trust that my distinguished colleague from the Soviet Union will recall, that I merely noted that he had specified these as "black days", and I wished to record in the ledger book other "black days". But let me remind our distinguished colleague about his error in the dates of the interruption of the INF and START negotiations. The dates I gave are the correct dates. I would remind him that, throughout the time in which we engaged his Government on the question of INF, his Government deployed one intermediate-range missile each week during the entire period of those negotiations, and we did not choose to break them off because they were too important to us, to them, to the security of mankind. I wish the record, Sir, to be straight.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of the United States for his statement. If no other delegation wishes to take the floor, at this point I have to note that in view of the statements we have heard there is no consensus at the moment on the proposals contained in document CD/529.

(The President)

Before we adjourn I should like to recall that at our next plenary meeting on Thursday we should take up the question of the improved and effective functioning of the Conference, in particular document CD/WP.100/Rev.1. On that occasion we will listen to the views of members in connection with that question and will then take note of the document. At the same plenary meeting, the progress report of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to consider international co-operative measures to detect and identify seismic events will be introduced by its Chairman. The Ad Hoc Group concluded its session last Friday and once the progress report is introduced on Thursday we should adopt its recommendations at the following plenary meeting on Tuesday, next week.

We shall also consider, at an informal meeting on Thursday, the question of the expansion of the membership of the Conference.

You will recall that the Conference is also due to hold another informal meeting today, to start consideration of the technical parts of the draft annual report to the General Assembly of the United Nations contained in document CD/WP.133. I intend to convene this meeting at 3.15 p.m. this afternoon.

As there is no other business, I now intend to adjourn this plenary meeting.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 16 August 1984, at 10.30 a.m. The plenary meeting is adjourned.

The meeting rose at 1.05 p.m.