
2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

4 May 2010
English
Original: Russian

New York, 3-28 May 2010

Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Report of Kazakhstan

1. Since gaining independence, Kazakhstan has consistently spoken out against the production, testing and deployment of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. In 15 years of strict adherence to the global non-proliferation regime, Kazakhstan has achieved definite results that have been welcomed by the international community.
2. Today there is a real threat that terrorist organizations might acquire nuclear weapons; the world must take the necessary measures to ensure the non-proliferation of such weapons.

Need for reform of the international security system

3. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is the foundation and cornerstone of the current nuclear non-proliferation regime.
4. The constituent elements of the non-proliferation regime are: the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, nuclear-weapon-free zones, nuclear export control mechanisms (the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee), the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
5. At present there are two serious problems with respect to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty:
 - Universality: not all countries have signed the Treaty; and
 - Compliance: not all States comply with the provisions of the Treaty.
6. Nevertheless, the Treaty is necessary because it ensures a mechanism for cooperation, a guarantee of international stability and security, and a balance of mutual obligations.
7. The contradictions within the Treaty serve as a motivation for some States that still aspire to possess nuclear weapons, which is unacceptable.



8. There is a serious need for reform of the international security system along the following lines:

Strengthening of the non-proliferation regime:

- Ensure universal accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;
- Enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the IAEA safeguards system;
- Establish new nuclear-weapon-free zones.

Progress towards disarmament:

- Achieve reductions in and halt the upgrading of nuclear weapons;
- Ensure the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty;
- Agree on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons;
- Move towards the complete elimination of nuclear arsenals.

Cooperative Threat Reduction programme

9. International cooperation programmes to support the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States in the safe dismantling of nuclear weapons and related infrastructure, as well as the protection of nuclear facilities and materials, have played a crucial role in strengthening the global nuclear non-proliferation regime.

10. The Cooperative Threat Reduction programme coordinates efforts to reduce the military threat and is one of the main instruments for addressing that danger.

11. In December 1993, Kazakhstan and the United States of America signed a framework agreement on the dismantling of intercontinental ballistic missile launch facilities, environmental rehabilitation and prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. At the same time, pursuant to that framework agreement, five agreements on the practical implementation of specific areas of cooperation were signed. From 1995 to 2000, the programme details were developed and the scope of cooperative action was broadened. Some 10 implementing agreements are currently in effect between the United States and Kazakhstan under the framework agreement. During the same period, the Russian Federation participated in the work being performed at the former Semipalatinsk nuclear test site.

12. The dismantling of nuclear-testing infrastructure is particularly important. This work, which is being carried out at the former Semipalatinsk test site, is of great socio-economic significance as it involves the clean-up of all contamination resulting from nuclear tests, which is a prerequisite for the rehabilitation of the test site itself and of the region as a whole.

13. It should be recalled that between 1949 and 1989 all types of nuclear tests — atmospheric, above-ground, underground, high-altitude and in space — were conducted in the territory of Kazakhstan. In other words, virtually all its territory was a testing range for nuclear explosions. More specifically, of the 715 nuclear explosions conducted in the Soviet Union, 489 explosions — or 68.4 per cent — were in Kazakhstan, and 456 at the Semipalatinsk test site. Explosions were also

conducted in the territory of seven provinces: Aktyubinsk, Akmolinsk, Aktau, Atyrau, Qostanay, Uralsk and Shymkent.

14. As a consequence of the work carried out from 1996 to 2001 to dismantle the nuclear-testing infrastructure at the Semipalatinsk test site, 181 tunnels, 13 unused boreholes and a complex made up of 12 launch facilities were destroyed. The results of radioecological testing carried out before and after the elimination of the tunnels, boreholes and launch facilities showed that, on the whole, radiation levels at the test site had improved.

15. The range of joint projects for the exchange of scientific information and technologies used in civilian activities was also expanded. The secure storage of spent fuel from the BN-350 reactor and the safe decommissioning of the reactor were thus added to the programme.

16. The work performed in this area under Cooperative Threat Reduction projects was facilitated by an agreement on the long-term disposition of nuclear material from the BN-350 reactor concluded between the United States Department of Energy and the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources of Kazakhstan on 17 November 1997, which provides for the long-term storage of spent fuel from the BN-350 reactor.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes

17. Issues relating to the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and their relationship with the Non-Proliferation Treaty are highly relevant to Kazakhstan.

18. Clearly, continued development of nuclear energy is inevitable. With the Treaty now in effect, IAEA has an even greater role to play. IAEA has two principal functions: monitoring and cooperation.

19. IAEA discharges its monitoring function by implementing a system of technical verification measures in order to obtain assurances that a State party to the Treaty is not using nuclear material, facilities or equipment for undeclared purposes related to the development of nuclear weapons. These measures apply to non-nuclear-weapon States parties, which are subject to comprehensive safeguards.

20. Nuclear-weapon States do not place under IAEA safeguards the nuclear material, equipment or facilities they use in the military nuclear cycle. Safeguards for these countries take the form of voluntary assurances. Hence the fundamental asymmetry of the Treaty, since no one can reliably assure the international community that the five nuclear-weapon States will fulfil their Treaty obligations. We believe that the time has come to develop an international safeguards mechanism that also covers nuclear-weapon States. This could consist of a special Security Council committee that would issue an annual report on the implementation by the five nuclear-weapon States of their obligations under the Treaty, similar to the annual safeguards implementation report prepared by IAEA.

21. IAEA control activities, or safeguards, have evolved substantially over time. The events in Iraq and Korea in the early 1990s demonstrated to the world the serious shortcomings of the existing safeguards system, which did not enable IAEA to detect undeclared, secret nuclear activities. IAEA therefore began to enhance the

safeguards system in 1993, and by 1997 the additional protocol had been developed to substantially strengthen the Agency's capability to detect undeclared nuclear material and activities by providing it with greater access to information, nuclear facilities and other sites at which material is located.

22. It must be understood, however, that the IAEA safeguards system cannot physically prevent the diversion of nuclear material from peaceful to military uses, but merely makes it possible to detect the diversion of material under safeguards or the improper use of facilities that have been placed under safeguards, and to initiate an investigation. To some extent, then, the practical significance and effectiveness of IAEA controls depend on how States — and in particular States that may intend to engage in diversion in the future — assess the Agency's capability to detect such illicit activity.

23. Many countries advocate the further enhancement of the IAEA controls system, as the Non-Proliferation Treaty has, unfortunately, undergone a crisis of compliance in recent times. This calls for thorough consideration by the international community of how to tighten controls to prevent the diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to military uses. A number of States have made accusations that a number of non-nuclear-weapon States parties are using their participation in the Treaty as a cover for developing military nuclear programmes while declaring that they are strictly peaceful in nature.

24. As the largest producer of uranium, and given its experience and capabilities in reprocessing highly enriched uranium into low-enriched form, Kazakhstan is prepared to make its contribution to the development of civilian nuclear power. That is why we proposed to IAEA that an international nuclear fuel bank should be located in Kazakhstan. The idea is that the bank would store a guaranteed reserve of low-enriched uranium for the production of fuel assemblies for nuclear power plants which IAEA member States could access in the event that they encounter problems with nuclear fuel deliveries for non-commercial reasons. The initiative to establish a nuclear fuel bank would in no way affect the legal and inalienable right of every State party to the Treaty, under article IV, to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, provided that it fully meets IAEA requirements.

The establishment in the Republic of Kazakhstan of a system to monitor radioactive fallout from nuclear explosions

25. One means of implementing the Treaty is to monitor radionuclide air pollution from nuclear tests or other nuclear activity. Such monitoring would make it possible both to detect undeclared nuclear activity and to identify it using the radionuclide composition. In order to conduct such monitoring in Asia, we believe that it is necessary to establish a system in Kazakhstan to monitor the radioactive aerosol content in the atmosphere. The network of air sampling stations could be located alongside the existing network of seismic monitoring stations of the Geophysics Research Institute of Kazakhstan's National Nuclear Centre, thus allowing existing infrastructure to be used and reducing the cost of implementing the project. The results of analyses of radionuclide content in samples of airborne aerosols would be transmitted to the information collection centre through existing communication channels.

26. The monitoring system could be housed in Kazakhstan's National Nuclear Centre, which has experience in radiation research as well as existing analytical facilities and qualified personnel.

Nuclear disarmament: the example of Kazakhstan

27. The process of nuclear disarmament in Kazakhstan can serve as a global model for the creation of a peaceful world.

28. After the break-up of the Soviet Union, the Republic of Kazakhstan inherited a significant portion of its nuclear potential. In December 1991, when the Republic declared independence, there were 1,040 nuclear warheads mounted on 104 land-based SS-18 intercontinental ballistic missiles, as well as a group of Tu-95 strategic bombers equipped with cruise missiles, in the territory of Kazakhstan. The nuclear facilities of the military-industrial complex included the Baikonur test centre for nuclear weapon launchers and the production facilities at Kurchatov in the territory of the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site. The site itself was closed in August 1991 by decree of President Nursultan Nazarbayev of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

29. Taking into account domestic and foreign political factors as well as geostrategic considerations, and based on his vision for achieving national and international security, President Nazarbayev chose the only valid course of action when he decided to rid the country of nuclear weapons in the shortest possible time frame.

30. Having made that highly responsible decision, Kazakhstan adhered strictly to the commitments made. As early as December 1993, the Supreme Council ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and Kazakhstan became a non-nuclear-weapon party to the Treaty. Having become a party, as a successor State of the former Soviet Union, to the Treaties between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles and on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START I), Kazakhstan participates in all meetings of the special commissions for verification of compliance with the provisions of these treaties and undergoes regular inspections.

31. Below is a chronology setting out the milestones in Kazakhstan's path towards nuclear disarmament and in its support for the international regime for the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

29 August 1991 — By decree of President Nursultan Nazarbayev of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic, the Semipalatinsk Nuclear Test Site is closed four months before the break-up of the Soviet Union.

16 December 1991 — Kazakhstan declares independence.

30 December 1991 — The Soviet Union officially ceases to exist. Kazakhstan inherits the fourth largest nuclear arsenal in the world.

23 May 1992 — Kazakhstan signs the Lisbon Protocol to the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START I Treaty), setting out its undertaking not to possess nuclear weapons and its obligations with respect to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

2 July 1992 — The Parliament of Kazakhstan ratifies the START I Treaty.

14 January 1993 — Kazakhstan signs the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction.

13 December 1993 — The Parliament of Kazakhstan ratifies the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. On the same day, in Almaty, President Nursultan Nazarbayev and Vice-President Al Gore of the United States of America sign a framework agreement that opens the way for implementation of the (Nunn-Lugar) Cooperative Threat Reduction Programme in Kazakhstan (agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the United States of America on the dismantling of intercontinental ballistic missile launch facilities, environmental rehabilitation and prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons).

14 February 1994 — In Washington, President Nazarbayev presents the ratification documents to President Clinton, thereby officially making Kazakhstan a non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

February 1994 — Kazakhstan becomes a member of IAEA. All 40 Tu-95 strategic bombers are withdrawn from Kazakhstan to the Russian Federation.

November 1994 — Under Project Sapphire, a joint Kazakhstan-United States project, highly enriched uranium is transported from the Ulbinsk metallurgical plant to the United States.

December 1994 — The United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Russian Federation, the depositaries of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, sign Memorandums on Security Assurances with Kazakhstan, Belarus and Ukraine, which are non-nuclear-weapon States. Shortly afterwards, Kazakhstan is given similar assurances by France and China, the two other nuclear-weapon Powers.

April 1995 — All 1,040 nuclear warheads for intercontinental ballistic missiles and 370 warheads for cruise missiles are removed from Kazakhstan to the Russian Federation.

May 1995 — The last nuclear explosive remaining at the Semipalatinsk test site since 1990 is destroyed.

September 1996 — Kazakhstan becomes one of the first signatories of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

September 1996 — All 104 intercontinental ballistic missiles are transported from Kazakhstan to the Russian Federation for subsequent dismantling, three years ahead of the deadline under the START I Treaty.

September 1999 — All 148 intercontinental ballistic missile launch facilities in four districts of Kazakhstan are destroyed, including 61 launch facilities in the Derzhavinsk district, 61 launch facilities in the Zhangiz-Tobe district, 14 test launch facilities at the Semipalatinsk test site and 12 test launch facilities in the Leninsk district.

March 2000 — Kazakhstan ratifies the Chemical Weapons Convention. On 22 April, Kazakhstan becomes the 132nd State party to the Convention after depositing its instrument of ratification with the United Nations Secretary-General.

July 2000 — The entrance to the last tunnel in the Degelen Mountains at the former Semipalatinsk test site is destroyed. In total, 181 tunnels and 13 unused testing boreholes are destroyed at the site.

September 2000 — In Stepnogorsk, the production capability of the world's largest anthrax production plant is dismantled. The plant had the capability to produce 300 metric tons of anthrax within a seven-month period of military mobilization.

July 2001 — Implementation of a joint Kazakhstan-United States project to secure the weapons-grade plutonium at the BN-350 fast neutron reactor in Aktau is completed. The reactor was halted in 1999.

January 2002 — Implementation begins of a joint Kazakhstan-United States project at the Ulbinsk metallurgical plant using unique technology to separate low-enriched uranium from uranium concentrate for subsequent commercialization.

February 2002 — Implementation begins of a joint project of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, Kazatomprom (a State-owned nuclear company), the Ulbinsk metallurgical plant and the Centre for Non-proliferation Support for the safe transfer of fresh highly enriched uranium fuel from the BN-350 reactor to the Ulbinsk metallurgical plant for reprocessing into low-enriched uranium.

May 2002 — Kazakhstan becomes a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, which has 40 member States and establishes guidelines on export controls for nuclear trade.

6 February 2004 — Kazakhstan signs the Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement with IAEA with respect to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

September 2005 — Following its adherence to all 12 United Nations counter-terrorism instruments, Kazakhstan becomes a State party to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.

February 2006 — The project of the Nuclear Threat Initiative and Kazatomprom for the safe transfer of fresh highly enriched uranium fuel from the BN-350 reactor and its reprocessing into low-enriched uranium at the Ulbinsk metallurgical plant is completed. Almost three tons of highly enriched uranium — enough to produce more than 20 nuclear bombs — are diluted and converted into low-enriched uranium to be used solely for peaceful purposes.

May 2006 — Kazakhstan and the United States sign an agreement under the Second Line of Defense programme of the United States Department of Energy providing for broader cooperation on the prevention of illicit trade in nuclear and radioactive material through the delivery and installation of special radiation detection equipment.

July 2006 — Kazakhstan supports the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism launched by the Russian Federation and the United States.

8 September 2006 — Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan sign the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia in Semipalatinsk.

19 February 2007 — Kazakhstan ratifies the Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement with IAEA with respect to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

32. The foregoing chronology amply demonstrates an important outcome of Kazakhstan's nuclear policy: the Republic, having taken a clear position on the problem of nuclear non-proliferation, has made a substantial contribution to nuclear disarmament. The world community's favourable reaction to the country's actions is reflected by the international assistance being provided to Kazakhstan by nuclear-weapon States, particularly with respect to the dismantling of nuclear-weapon infrastructure.
