

2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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United States information pertaining to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

2010

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) entered into force on March 5, 1970. In 1995, the Parties indefinitely extended the Treaty, and in doing so also provided for a conference to review the operation of the Treaty every five years, with a view to assuring that the purposes and provisions of the NPT are being realized. From 3-28 May 2010, the NPT Parties convene the Treaty's Eighth Review Conference.

The NPT is the only legally binding agreement that provides on a global basis a barrier to the spread of nuclear weapons and has the broadest support of any arms control agreement in history. The Treaty has three interrelated and interdependent objectives:

- To stop the further spread of nuclear weapons;
- To provide a sound basis for international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy; and
- To commit all Parties to undertake negotiations in good faith on disarmament.

These objectives are embedded in the Treaty's three mutually reinforcing pillars.

This paper records U.S. actions in support of its obligation under the NPT, as well as U.S. efforts to strengthen the Treaty in all its aspects, during the period from 2000 to 2010. The United States has prepared this paper to assist the 2010 Review Conference in its efforts to review the operation of the NPT and to strengthen the Treaty.

I. Preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons

Articles I and II of the NPT seek to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons, thereby strengthening the security of all states. Article I requires each nuclear weapon State Party not to transfer nuclear weapons or other explosive devices to any other recipient and not in any way to assist, encourage or induce non-nuclear



weapon states to manufacture or otherwise acquire such devices. Article II requires each non-nuclear weapon State Party not to acquire or exercise control over nuclear weapons or other explosive devices and not to seek or receive assistance in the manufacture of such devices.

Article III requires the non-nuclear weapon States Parties to enter into an agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) setting out safeguards to be applied to the nuclear material in all peaceful nuclear activities. These “comprehensive safeguards” are intended to provide necessary assurance that nuclear materials in non-nuclear weapon states are not diverted from peaceful purposes to the development of nuclear explosive devices. In September 1997 the IAEA Board of Governors adopted the Model Additional Protocol (AP), which provides the IAEA with additional tools to address diversion of declared as well as undeclared nuclear material. More than 120 states have signed an AP with the Agency, and almost 100 states have brought Protocols into force.

Article VII of the Treaty states: “[n]othing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.” Five such treaties have been concluded.

Article IX prescribes the steps that a state must take to accede to the Treaty.

Article X outlines the requirements for a Party to withdraw from the Treaty.

A. Article I: The Non-Proliferation Commitment by Nuclear Weapon States Party

The United States takes very seriously its Article I obligations as a Nuclear Weapon State to not transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices or to assist or encourage any non-nuclear weapon state to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear explosive devices. Moreover, U.S. law, policy and regulations are intended to prevent unauthorized transfers of nuclear equipment, material and technology. The United States has established and implemented a comprehensive system of export controls for both nuclear and dual-use items and technology that could be used for nuclear explosive purposes. This system of export controls is designed to provide assurance that exports from the United States of nuclear facilities, equipment, material and technology, including nuclear-related dual-use items, are not diverted or misused for nuclear weapons activities. These controls include:

- U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission controls exports of nuclear reactors, equipment, components and materials under the U.S. Atomic Energy Act, as amended (Act);
- U.S. Department of Energy controls exports of nuclear technology transfers under the Act; and
- U.S. Department of Commerce controls exports of nuclear-related dual-use commodities and technologies pursuant to the U.S. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978.

The U.S. system of export controls is an essential element of U.S. compliance with its obligations under Article I of the NPT and also under UN Security Council Resolution 1540.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004)

In April 2004, the UN Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, unanimously passed Resolution 1540. UNSCR 1540 obligates all UN Member States to develop and enforce appropriate legal and regulatory measures against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery. Specifically, Resolution 1540 requires states to refrain from providing support to non-state actors attempting to develop or in any way acquire WMD and their means of delivery; to adopt and enforce effective laws prohibiting non-state actors from engaging in such activities; and to take and enforce effective measures to establish domestic controls to prevent proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery. The resolution established a Committee to implement its measures and mandated reporting by Member States to the Committee on their implementation of the resolution. Subsequent resolutions have extended the Committee's mandate. The United States helped initiate UNSCR 1540 and has taken a number of measures to carry out its obligations under it as well as to help other states to meet their obligations.

- The United States over many years has built an extensive legal and regulatory framework addressing many 1540 requirements and continues to strengthen that framework. For example, in June 2005, U.S. Executive Order 13382 froze U.S. assets of individuals or entities designated as WMD proliferators and their supporters, and it prohibited U.S. persons from engaging in transactions with them.
- In accordance with UNSCR 1540, the United States completed its National Action Plan on May 31, 2006.
- The United States has supported other states' efforts to implement Resolution 1540 in a variety of ways, including providing technical assistance and financial support. The United States spends more than \$2 billion annually on programs designed to assist other states in developing 1540-related capacities. The United States and other States have initiated an emerging process for matching requests for assistance with donors.

UN Security Council Resolution 1887(2009)

At a summit meeting chaired by President Obama in September 2009, the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted UNSCR 1887. The Resolution reaffirms that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery are threats to international peace and security and shows agreement on a broad range of actions to address nuclear proliferation.

The Resolution has specific relevance for the 2010 Review Conference.

- It calls for NPT Parties to cooperate so that the 2010 Review Conference results in a strengthened Treaty, and it sets realistic and achievable goals in all of the NPT's three pillars.

- It supports NPT universality and calls on all states to adhere to the NPT's terms. It makes clear the Council's intent to address immediately any notice of intent to withdraw from the Treaty and affirms that states will be held responsible for any violations of the NPT committed prior to their withdrawal from the Treaty.
- The Resolution notes ongoing efforts in the NPT review process to identify mechanisms for responding collectively to any notification of withdrawal.

Nuclear Security Summit

As the President stated in his April 2009 Prague speech, nuclear terrorism is the most immediate and extreme threat to global security. He announced that he would host a Nuclear Security Summit in 2010 in Washington, D.C., with leaders of 47 states, plus the United Nations, European Union, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) participating.

The Summit Communiqué accomplishes the following:

- Endorses President Obama's call to secure all vulnerable nuclear material in four years, and pledges to work together toward this end;
- Calls for focused national efforts to improve security and accounting of nuclear materials and strengthen regulations — with a special focus on plutonium and highly enriched uranium;
- Seeks consolidation of stocks of highly enriched uranium and plutonium and reduction in the use of highly enriched uranium;
- Promotes universality of key international treaties on nuclear security and nuclear terrorism;
- Notes the positive contributions of mechanisms such as the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, to build capacity among law enforcement, industry, and technical personnel;
- Calls for the IAEA to receive the resources it needs to develop security guidelines and provide advice to its members on how to implement them;
- Seeks to ensure that bilateral and multilateral security assistance will be applied effectively; and
- Encourages the nuclear industry to share best practices for nuclear security, at the same time making sure that security measures do not prevent countries from enjoying the benefits of peaceful nuclear energy.

Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT)

The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) is an international partnership of 79 partner nations and 4 official observers and is co-chaired by the United States and Russia. All partners have endorsed a set of core nuclear security principles encompassing the full spectrum of deterrence, prevention, detection, and response objectives.

In response to President Obama's call in his 2009 Prague speech for the GICNT to become a "durable international institution," the U.S. and Russian Co-Chairs are taking tangible steps to transform the GICNT into an action-oriented and

institutionalized program. They have proposed revisions to the Terms of Reference document to give GICNT activities new momentum and enhance partner roles and implementation mechanisms.

Amended Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM)

Beginning in the late 1990s, the United States led the initiative to expand the CPPNM to cover physical protection of nuclear material in domestic use, storage and transport and of nuclear facilities. The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), which entered into force in 1987, provides obligatory physical protection standards for the international transport of nuclear material, but it did not cover domestic, use, storage and transport unless related to international transport.

The Amendment to the CPPNM, adopted on July 8, 2005 at a conference held under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna, Austria, is the result of those efforts. The Amendment significantly expands the scope of the original CPPNM and will, in effect, globalize U.S. physical protection practices. It establishes new international norms for physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities and builds upon the penal regime provided for in the CPPNM by adding two new principal offenses — nuclear smuggling and sabotage of a nuclear facility — as well as certain ancillary offenses, which Parties must criminalize domestically. The Amendment has not yet entered into force.

The U.S. Senate provided its advice and consent to ratification in September 2008. Implementing legislation was forwarded to Congress in February 2010.

INFCIRC/225 Revision

Following the 2005 amendment to the CPPNM, the United States invited a workable number of other States (a “Core Group”) to join an effort to revise INFCIRC/225, based on the Amendment to the CPPNM. The Amendment established four objectives and 12 Fundamental Principles for a physical protection regime, but additional guidance is necessary.

In 2007, the United States and the Core States met with the Director of the IAEA Office of Nuclear Security and provided a first draft of a revised INFCIRC/225. The United States continues to play an active leadership role in a series of IAEA Consultants Meetings and a Technical Meeting for INFCIRC/225 revision. In February 2010, Member States agreed on draft text, which has been circulated for a 120-day final Member State review before publication.

B. Article II: U.S. Actions to Support Fulfillment of Article II Obligations, Including Strengthening Compliance

The United States believes it is essential that all Parties fully comply with their obligations under the Treaty. Otherwise, the confidence in their security that the Treaty provides its Parties will be undermined, with negative consequences for the maintenance of international peace and security. Nearly all NPT Parties have observed their Treaty obligations. Unfortunately, some states, including the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK) and Iran, have not complied with the Treaty’s rules. NPT Parties which violate their Treaty obligations must come

back into compliance and remain responsible under international law for violations of the NPT even if subsequently withdrawing from the Treaty. The United States is committed to working diplomatically with others to resolve such compliance challenges as those posed by the actions of the DPRK and Iran.

DPRK

The United States has worked for years toward the resolution of concerns regarding the DPRK's compliance with the NPT.

In August 2003, the United States helped to initiate the Six-Party Talks, involving China, Russia, Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK), the DPRK, and the United States. In the September 2005 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks the Six Parties unanimously reaffirmed the goal of "the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner," and the DPRK committed to returning, at an early date, to the NPT and to IAEA safeguards. In subsequent months, discussions on implementation of the Joint Statement continued, but progress was hindered by disagreements with the DPRK and a series of provocative steps by the DPRK.

In October 2006, the DPRK announced that it had conducted a nuclear test. In response, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1718, under Chapter VII, condemning the nuclear test and demanding that North Korea return to the NPT and to IAEA safeguards.

In 2007, the Six Parties reached agreement on the shut down and disablement of the DPRK's core nuclear facilities under IAEA and U.S. monitoring, respectively, and a commitment by the DPRK to submit a declaration of its nuclear programs. Disablement activities commenced in late 2007.

In April 2009, North Korea launched another Taepo Dong-2, prompting the UN Security Council to issue a Presidential Statement condemning the launch as a violation of Resolutions 1695 and 1718. North Korea subsequently expelled U.S. and IAEA monitors from the country, announced its intention to withdraw from the Six-Party Talks, and announced its intent to reactivate its core nuclear facilities. In May 2009 the DPRK announced that it had conducted a second nuclear test.

On June 12, 2009, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1874 to address the threat posed by North Korea's nuclear and missile programs, as well as its proliferation activities. The new measures under Resolution 1874 are also aimed at limiting North Korea's ability to further its nuclear, ballistic missile, and other WMD-related activities and preventing proliferation to and from North Korea.

The United States has taken concrete steps to implement Resolutions 1718 and 1874 fully and transparently and to urge all UN Member States to do the same. As part of this effort, the United States has sought to strengthen its capabilities and those of its partner states to enforce UN sanctions on North Korea. In addition to UN sanctions, the United States has a number of laws that prohibit transfers to or acquisition from North Korea of equipment and technology that could be used in its nuclear, missile or other WMD programs.

In December 2009, U.S. Special Representative for North Korea Policy Stephen Bosworth led an interagency delegation to Pyongyang for extensive talks that took place within the context of the Six-Party Talks. The United States and North Korea agreed on the importance of the Six-Party Talks and the need to implement the 2005

Joint Statement, but did not agree on when and how the DPRK would return to denuclearization talks.

The United States continues to consult closely with China, the ROK, Japan, and Russia on next steps in the Six-Party Talks. There is broad consensus among the Five Parties that irreversible denuclearization remains the core objective and essential goal of our engagement with North Korea; the Six-Party Talks is the best mechanism for achieving denuclearization; and we remain committed to the full and transparent implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions 1718 and 1874.

The United States will not accept North Korea as a nuclear weapon state. We remain committed to ensuring that the DPRK fulfills its commitments under the 2005 Joint Statement and its obligations under UN Security Council Resolutions 1718 and 1874, including returning, at an early date, to the NPT and IAEA safeguards.

Iran

The IAEA has been working to clarify the nature of Iran's nuclear program since 2002, when the existence of two nuclear sites under construction was revealed publicly. Since then, the IAEA Board of Governors has adopted ten resolutions on Iran that, among other things, have pointed to Iran's failure to report, as required, on its nuclear activities, failure to provide information to resolve questions about its past and current activities, failure to provide the IAEA full, unfettered access to information, individuals and facilities, and (after 2006) failure to suspend all enrichment-related, reprocessing and heavy water related activities, as directed by the UN Security Council and the IAEA Board of Governors. In 2005, the IAEA Board found that Iran's actions constituted non-compliance under Article XII.C of the Agency's Statute because of its "many failures and breaches of its obligations to comply with its NPT Safeguards Agreement." As requested by the Board, in 2006, the IAEA Director General reported the IAEA reports and resolutions on Iran to the UN Security Council.

In response to the IAEA Board's report of noncompliance, the UN Security Council has adopted a Presidential Statement (S/PRST/2006, March 2006) and five resolutions on Iran: UNSCR 1696 (July 2006), UNSCR 1737 (December 2006), UNSCR 1747 (March 2007), UNSCR 1803 (March 2008), and UNSCR 1835 (September 2008).

President Obama has made an unprecedented effort to engage Iran in an attempt to resolve the international community's concerns about its nuclear program. On October 1, 2009, Iran met with the P5+1 (United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, China, and Germany) to discuss its nuclear program. At the meeting Iran agreed in principle to allow the IAEA access to a recently revealed nuclear facility near Qom and to support an IAEA proposal to refuel the Teheran Research Reactor (used for production of medical isotopes). To date, however, Iran has not provided the IAEA with all requested access associated with Qom and has declined to proceed with the TRR.

From the beginning, President Obama has called on Iran to take constructive action and to fulfill its responsibilities under the NPT. He has called out two areas in particular. First, Iran must be transparent about its nuclear program and cooperate fully with the IAEA. Unfortunately, Iran's refusal to facilitate the IAEA's investigation in Iran and the revelation of a covert nuclear facility near Qom

demonstrate that Iran has not taken this step. Second, Iran must take concrete steps to build confidence in the international community that its nuclear program is exclusively peaceful. The IAEA's February 2010 report states bluntly that "while the Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran, Iran has not provided the necessary cooperation to permit the Agency to confirm that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities."

President Obama also made clear that while the United States is committed to serious and meaningful engagement with Iran on this issue, the United States will not negotiate indefinitely. The United States is prepared to increase pressure on Iran until it lives up to its international nuclear nonproliferation obligations.

C. Article III: Safeguards

1. IAEA Safeguards and the Additional Protocol

Article III requires that all non-nuclear weapon States Party to the NPT accept IAEA safeguards that are applied "to all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities" The model NPT-mandated safeguards agreement (also known as a comprehensive safeguards agreement) was established by INFCIRC/153 in 1972. The United States brought into force its voluntary NPT safeguards agreement with the IAEA in 1980.

It has become evident, however, that the comprehensive safeguards agreement, alone, is not adequate. In 1997 IAEA Member States agreed on the model Additional Protocol to comprehensive safeguards agreements (INFCIRC/540). The Additional Protocol gives the IAEA more tools for assuring the absence of undeclared activities. It is particularly important in cases of demonstrated or suspected noncompliance, but its fundamental value is that it serves as a confidence-building measure for all states that have accepted it.

The United States brought its Additional Protocol into force in January 2009 and is now implementing it. The United States believes that all NPT Parties should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol and that a comprehensive safeguards agreement together with an Additional Protocol should be considered an essential standard for IAEA safeguards.

The IAEA safeguards system is now confronting a growing imbalance between workload and resources. As the demand for the application of nuclear energy has grown, throughout the world more nuclear materials and facilities are coming under IAEA safeguards. Additionally, the IAEA has the burden of safeguards investigations in Iran and Syria.

In his 2009 Prague speech, President Obama called for "more resources" for international inspections. President Obama's message to the IAEA General Conference in September 2009 said: "We must ensure that the IAEA has the resources and authority it needs to verify that nuclear programs are peaceful, to facilitate access to a clean source of energy, and to improve the lives of citizens the world over — all without incurring new nuclear dangers."

In addition to paying its regular assessments for IAEA safeguards, the United States has made major extra-budgetary contributions. For example, since 2000, the U.S. extra-budgetary contributions have been more than \$176 million for such activities

as technical assistance to safeguards, safeguards equipment, the Safeguards Information System, safeguarding declared weapons-grade excess fissile material, environmental sample analysis, and other safeguards projects. Appendix A contains a detailed description of the U.S. Program of Technical Assistance to Safeguards.

The United States has developed several programs designed to provide support for IAEA safeguards.

- In 2008 the National Nuclear Security Administration of the Department of Energy (DOE/NNSA) launched the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) to develop the technology, concepts and expertise necessary to strengthen the international safeguards system. The focus of NGSI is primarily on revitalizing the U.S. capability to provide technical support. The five-year plan for NGSI, formulated in 2008, outlines goals, requirements, and projects for five NGSI elements: safeguards policies and authorities, advanced safeguards concepts and approaches, safeguards technology development, human resources development, and international safeguards infrastructure development.
- The International Nuclear Safeguards and Engagement Program (INSEP), operated by DOE/NNSA, collaborates with international partners to strengthen international safeguards at all stages of nuclear development. Through bilateral and regional technical engagement between DOE/NNSA, National Laboratory personnel and their counterparts abroad, INSEP strengthens international safeguards at foreign nuclear facilities and helps to build safety, security, and nonproliferation infrastructures in states with credible plans for civil nuclear power.
- The United States also has been active in diplomacy to promote adherence to IAEA safeguards, including the Additional Protocol. The United States has consistently supported strong resolutions at the IAEA General Conference that stress the importance of Agency safeguards. When the United States held the G-8 Presidency in 2004, it led the G-8 effort to deliver high-level demarches to 72 countries which had not yet signed and brought into force comprehensive safeguards agreements and Additional Protocols.

D. Article VII: Regional Arrangements

The United States has long supported properly crafted nuclear-weapons-free zones (NWFZs), because, when rigorously implemented under appropriate conditions, NWFZs can contribute to regional and international peace, security and stability. These conditions include:

- The initiative for the creation of a nuclear weapons free zones comes from the states in the region concerned;
- All states whose participation is deemed important participate in the zone;
- The zone arrangement provides for adequate verification of compliance with the zone's provisions;
- The establishment of the zone does not disturb existing security arrangements to the detriment of regional and international security;

- The zone arrangement effectively prohibits the parties from developing or otherwise processing any nuclear explosive devices for whatever purpose;
- The zone arrangement does not seek to impose restrictions on the exercise of rights recognized under international law, particularly the high seas freedom of navigation and overflight, the right of innocent passage of territorial and archipelagic seas, the right of transit passage of international straits, and the right of archipelagic sea lanes passage of archipelagic waters;
- The establishment of the zone does not affect the existing rights of its parties under international law to grant or deny transit privileges, including port calls and overflights to other states.

The United States has signed and ratified the protocols to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which created the NWFZ covering Latin America and the Caribbean. The United States has signed the protocols to the Treaty of Pelindaba, which covers Africa, and the Treaty of Rarotonga, which covers the South Pacific. In her statement to the NPT Review Conference on May 3, 2010, Secretary of State Clinton announced that the United States will seek U.S. Senate advice and consent to ratification of the protocols to the Treaties of Pelindaba and Rarotonga.

The Treaty of Bangkok, which covers Southeast Asia, and the Treaty of Semipalatinsk, which covers Central Asia, also are in force. The United States and other nuclear weapon states consulted closely with the parties to these treaties both before and after they were signed and entered into force. The United States continues to have significant concerns about both treaties, but we remain ready to discuss these concerns with the treaty parties at any time.

The United States believes that a Middle East free of all weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, as envisaged in the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference Middle East Resolution, is an achievable goal. The United States urges all states to take practical and concrete steps to remove the obstacles to accomplishing this goal.

E. Article IX: Adherence

The United States has been a Party to the NPT since the Treaty entered into force in 1970. The United States believes that all states not yet a party to the NPT should accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon states as soon as possible.

F. Article X: Withdrawal

Article X of the NPT states, “Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country.” Article X outlines how and to whom the Party shall give notice of its intention to withdraw.

The United States does not aim to amend the NPT or to limit the right to withdraw under Article X. Nonetheless, the United States, like many other NPT Parties, has grown concerned with the prospect of potential abuse of the NPT’s withdrawal provision, including by a Party which seeks to withdraw from the NPT while in

violation of its obligations. Also, like many other NPT parties, the United States has been working since the run-up to the 2005 NPT Review Conference to pursue measures, inside and outside NPT fora, to dissuade abuse of the withdrawal provision and, if necessary, to respond to a notice of withdrawal in a way that would help ensure maintenance of international peace and security.

Building on UNSC Resolution 1887 and the earlier work of concerned parties, the United States is pursuing specific measures to address withdrawal. The United States believes that the 2010 Review Conference could address four principal objectives:

- The right of return of nuclear material provided to a withdrawing NPT Party prior to withdrawal and/or the continued application of safeguards after withdrawal from the NPT;
- Consultations with a withdrawing Party prior to withdrawal;
- Verification, prior to the effective date of its withdrawal, that the withdrawing Party was in compliance with its comprehensive safeguards agreement prior to the effective date of its withdrawal; and
- Restrictions on the future supply of nuclear material to a withdrawing Party once it has withdrawn.

II. Fostering Peaceful Uses: Articles IV and V

A. Introduction: Pursuing the Peaceful Atom

On December 8, 1953 U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower delivered a landmark speech to the UN General Assembly calling for the dedicated pursuit of peaceful applications of nuclear material and technology. Eisenhower noted that “the United States knows that peaceful power from atomic energy is no dream of the future.” He called for a mobilization of experts “to apply atomic energy to the needs of agriculture, medicine, and other peaceful activities.” “A special purpose,” he noted, “would be to provide abundant electrical energy in the power-starved areas of the world.

President Eisenhower’s “Atoms for Peace” speech reflected the growing realization in the early 1950s that although nuclear material and technology can be used to create the most destructive force ever devised by mankind, it also can be used for a vast array of peaceful applications that benefit mankind. The enduring challenge for all states is to ensure that humanity can continue to benefit from the peaceful atom while minimizing the risk that nuclear materials can be used for non-peaceful explosive purposes.

Article IV of the NPT recognizes the inalienable right of NPT Parties to conduct research and pursue nuclear development for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with their nonproliferation Treaty obligations, and it calls on all Parties to “facilitate ... the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials, and scientific and technical information” for such purposes. Finally, Article IV requires Parties in a position to do so to cooperate in developing peaceful nuclear applications, especially in non-nuclear-weapon states with “due consideration for the needs of developing areas of the world.”

Over many years states have pursued nuclear cooperation pursuant to Article IV in a variety of ways. Through a vast web of bilateral arrangements states are engaged in nuclear exchange through both government-to-government agreements and also through commercial arrangements. Additional cooperation takes place at the multinational level, principally through regional arrangements and through the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). For the majority of NPT parties, the non-power applications of nuclear techniques in medicine, agriculture, basic industry, and environmental protection are priorities.

B. Bilateral Cooperation with the United States:

Agreements for Cooperation

The United States is a pioneer of civil nuclear cooperation. In the years following President Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace" address, the United States laid the foundation for civil nuclear cooperation between the United States and many other countries. By 1960, the United States had concluded nuclear cooperation agreements with more than 40 states. Currently, the United States has formal agreements that provide a framework for cooperation with nearly 50 states, plus the IAEA. In addition, U.S. technical agencies have in place cooperative arrangements with over 40 countries. The United States also has bilateral nuclear cooperation committees with Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, and the Republic of Korea. These Committees include to varying degrees exchanges on a broad range of civil nuclear policy issues and facilitate coordination projects in technology development, reactor and radioisotope safety, emergency management, security, and safeguards.

Cooperation with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)

The NRC's legislatively-mandated international responsibilities are to license the export and import of nuclear materials and equipment, and to participate in activities that support U.S. Government compliance with international treaties and agreement obligations. The NRC has bilateral technical exchange agreements with nearly 40 countries, and, considers on a case-by-case basis that is subject to the availability of funding, assistance to other countries in areas such as development of national regulatory legislation, safety, safeguards, material accounting and control, physical protection, security, radiation protection, spent fuel and waste management, decommissioning, nuclear safety research, and liability. The NRC also actively participates in the activities of multinational organizations such as the IAEA and the Nuclear Energy Agency.

International Nuclear Safeguards and Engagement Program (INSEP)

As described in Section I.C above, the International Nuclear Safeguards and Engagement Program (INSEP), operated by DOE/NNSA, collaborates with international partners to strengthen international safeguards at all stages of nuclear development. Through bilateral and regional technical engagement between DOE/NNSA, National Laboratory personnel and their counterparts abroad, INSEP strengthens international safeguards at foreign nuclear facilities and helps to build safety, security, and nonproliferation infrastructures in states with credible plans for civil nuclear power.

Partnership for Nuclear Security (PNS)

PNS, operated by the U.S. Department of State's Office of Cooperative Threat Reduction, seeks to enhance global nuclear security through cooperative activities and engagement with the global nuclear technical community.

- PNS establishes sustainable linkages between nuclear experts and counterparts at United States and international institutions;
- Engages nuclear scientists, engineers and technicians in collaborative research projects with United States and other counterparts; and
- Provides opportunities for training to nuclear professionals through workshops, conferences, fellowship and exchange programs, and related activities.

PNS seeks to raise awareness of governments and the nuclear technical community about the threat of proliferation and to encourage effective nonproliferation practices and policies, specifically as applied to nuclear expertise; and to improve nuclear security and related safety best practices.

U.S. commercial cooperation

In addition to government-to-government cooperation, a variety of different arrangements have been developed to cover other types of bilateral, generally commercial, cooperation. The U.S. nuclear industry is active in many NPT states not only in the supply of nuclear material and reactors but also in project management, logistics, engineering and design, construction, specialty equipment manufacture, fuel services, consulting, and more. According to U.S. Census Bureau statistics, in 2009, the U.S. Government facilitated nuclear activities abroad totaling \$2.4 billion and nuclear imports totaling \$4.2 billion.

Tangible Examples of Bilateral Cooperation

Through these and other avenues of bilateral cooperation, U.S. experts are working closely with their counterparts from numerous NPT Parties on peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including developing and maintaining effective regulatory frameworks related to nuclear safety, security, and safeguards. Since 2000, NPT Parties have benefited from U.S. efforts to share U.S. nuclear technology, expertise, and experience in the following ways:

- PhD training of foreign nationals from more than 100 other NPT countries in nuclear physics, nuclear chemistry and nuclear engineering since 2000;
- Certification by the American Board of Nuclear Medicine of more than 180 medical doctors from 37 NPT parties in nuclear medicine;
- The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) reception of foreign assignees and visitors from 42 countries;
- NRC staff travel to 21 countries on technical assistance missions to offer support on nuclear regulatory and safety matters;
- Visits by scientists and engineers from 116 countries to Department of Energy facilities to receive training in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy; and
- Technical assistance missions by DOE specialists in 114 countries.

C. U.S. Support for Peaceful Uses through the IAEA

In addition to extensive bilateral nuclear cooperation the United States pursues peaceful nuclear cooperation pursuant to Article IV through the Technical Cooperation program of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The United States is the largest donor to the IAEA and its Technical Cooperation program. Extensive U.S. support has enabled more than 100 developing IAEA Member States to pursue the peaceful uses of nuclear material and technology in many fields, including improving the quality of health care and nutrition, managing water resources, building food security, promoting sustainable development, and promoting nuclear safety and security.

IAEA Peaceful Uses Initiative

On May 3, 2010, Secretary of State Clinton announced a campaign to raise \$100 million over the next five years to broaden access to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The funds are to expand significantly access to projects sponsored by the IAEA that address peaceful applications of nuclear energy and important humanitarian purposes, such as cancer treatment and fighting infectious diseases, food and water security, and infrastructure development for the safe, secure use of civil nuclear power. These efforts will be aimed at assisting developing countries. The United States has pledged \$50 million to this effort and will work with others to meet the announced \$100 million target by the opening of the next NPT Review Conference, in 2015.

Technical Cooperation

The United States supports the IAEA's Technical Cooperation program in several ways. The first is through an annual voluntary pledge to the Technical Cooperation Fund (TCF), which supports the Department of Technical Cooperation's core projects. The second is through in-kind contributions in the form of services, such as fellowships and training, equipment and experts. Additionally, extra-budgetary contributions are made to Footnote A and other projects and programs. Footnote A projects are described below.

The annual TCF budget is determined by informal consultations between donor and developing IAEA Member States to reach an agreement on annual targets. The targets are apportioned among IAEA Member States, but are voluntary in nature, rather than being assessed. IAEA Member States are encouraged to pledge and pay their pledge in full. The United States provides approximately 25 percent of the total annual voluntary target. U.S. support to the TCF has been substantial, with over \$191.5 million in contributions from 2000 to 2009. U.S. pledges have had a demonstrably beneficial effect on the willingness of other Member States to support funding for the Technical Cooperation program.

The United States exercises discretion concerning the distribution of its in-kind and extra-budgetary contributions. While TCF resources can be distributed to all requesting eligible IAEA Member States, in-kind and extra-budgetary contributions support is given, on a preferential basis, to parties to the NPT and the Treaty of Tlatelolco. The United States contributions from 2000 to 2009 amounted to \$49.9 million and supported IAEA programs in the following areas:

- Footnote A projects and other non-safeguard programs;
- Training courses, technical support, and U.S.-placed IAEA fellowships; and
- Cost-free experts for Technical Cooperation and for other non-safeguard departments.

Footnote A Projects and Other Non-Safeguards Programs:

Footnote A Projects are those considered to be technically sound but are not funded by the TCF. Such projects are “footnoted” and made available for extra-budgetary funding (i.e., separate from the TCF) from donor IAEA Member States.

The United States has provided both financial contributions and in-kind assistance for new and on-going Footnote A projects during the period 2000-2009. These projects have benefited 57 countries in Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America and the Middle East. Footnote A projects range from strengthening regulatory infrastructures to spent-fuel management and disposition, from reactor conversion to the use of Sterile Insect Technique (SIT). A small sample of these projects include:

- Fully converting the TRIGA 14-MW core from HEU to LEU fuel (Romania);
- Promoting self Assessment of regulatory infrastructures for safety and networking of regulatory bodies (African countries);
- Safely removing spent fuel from the Vinca RA Research Reactor (Serbia);
- Establishing a research reactor (Jordan);
- Enhancing the capabilities of national institutions supporting nuclear power development (China); and
- Strengthening national infrastructures for the control of radiation sources (Vietnam).

In addition, the United States has supported several projects involving SIT including:

- SIT for Area-wide Tsetse and Trypanosomosis Management for countries in the African Region;
- Area-Wide Application of SIT for Medfly Control in Palestine; and
- Establishing and Maintaining Fruit Fly Free and Low Prevalence Areas in Central America, Panama and Belize, using the SIT for countries in the Latin American Region.

U.S. support has included financial contributions, the purchase of equipment, and the provision of personnel such as technical and managerial experts. The United States has contributed over \$3 million for the project to integrate SIT for tsetse fly eradication in Ethiopia. This program focuses on Ethiopia’s lower Rift Valley. It will have a major impact on cattle production and effectively raise the standard of living for a large number of families who depend upon herding for their livelihood.

In the area of cancer therapy, the United States was the leading IAEA Member State in recognizing and supporting the Program of Action for Cancer Therapy (PACT) and its model for change.

- The United States contributed \$330,000 to launch PACT and a further \$500,000 in 2006.

- The United States contributed over \$365,000 in cost-free experts to PACT from 2004 to 2006, bringing contributions from the United States to almost \$1.2 million.

The United States has also provided funds for the establishment of PACT's Regional Cancer Training Networks and a Virtual University for Cancer Control, which are regional centers for multidisciplinary cancer control training. The total cost of this project for three years is \$750,000. The first phase of implementation will include identification of training hubs and potential Centers of Excellence for Radiotherapy in Africa. This project will be implemented jointly between the PACT Program Office and the IAEA's Division of Human Health (NAHU).

Training Courses and Fellowships:

For many years the United States has hosted IAEA interregional training courses at Argonne National Laboratory near Chicago, Illinois. Over the past ten years Argonne has provided 50 courses in collaboration with the IAEA. Over 900 participants from more than 75 countries attended these courses which range in duration from two to nine weeks. Areas of training include health, energy, hydrology, waste management, entomology, safety, food science and fuel management.

Between 2000 and 2009, over 690 professionals from more than 75 countries received fellowships to train up to ten months at over 180 institutions and facilities in the United States. These fellowships were in fields as diverse as energy planning, nuclear engineering and technology, and nuclear safety and waste management. Other areas of study included nuclear applications in agriculture, medicine, industry, and the environment. The United States provides the administrative support necessary to place fellows and also provides stipends and travel expenses.

Cost-Free Experts:

In-kind contributions also support requests from the IAEA for U.S. specialists in various technical fields. These individuals are provided at no cost to the IAEA. The cost-free experts (CFE) may work full or part-time in limited appointments for up to one year with the possibility of an extension. U.S.-sponsored cost-free experts use their expertise to support IAEA programs in nuclear safeguards, health, nuclear energy, nuclear safety, emergency preparedness and institutional management.

Nuclear Safety

The United States was one of the original sponsors of the IAEA's Extraordinary Program on the Safety of Nuclear Installations in the South East Asia, Pacific and Far East Countries (EPB), providing both funding and instructional support. The goal of this program is to develop nuclear safety infrastructure and promote information exchange among countries in the region that are building or considering developing nuclear power programs. The Asian Nuclear Safety Network (ANSN) was derived from the EPB in 2002 to combine, analyze and share nuclear safety information and practical experience among the participating countries. This work is expected to facilitate sustainable regional cooperation and create networks and cyber communities among specialists in the region.

Nuclear Power Infrastructure

The United States strongly supported IAEA General Conference resolutions in 2006, 2007, and 2008, regarding the Agency's role in nuclear power development. The United States provides important financial and technical assistance to the IAEA's infrastructure development efforts and was a major supporter of the guidance document "Milestones in the Development of a National Infrastructure for Nuclear Power," which lists 19 infrastructure areas that a non-nuclear-weapon state should consider developing to facilitate its pursuit of civil nuclear power. This document now is regarded as the definitive international guidance for the development of national civil nuclear infrastructure. The United States has also supported related workshops for countries considering nuclear energy in 2008, 2009 and 2010.

D. U.S. Support of the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP)

The United States was a driving force behind the establishment of GNEP and continues to actively support its operations. GNEP provides a forum for cooperation among participating states to explore mutually beneficial approaches to ensure that the global use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes proceeds in a manner that is efficient and meets the highest standards of safety, security, non-proliferation and safeguards. Through its expert-level working groups on Infrastructure Development and on Reliable Nuclear Fuel Services, participating countries seek to explore mutually beneficial approaches that support international civil nuclear cooperation, including enhanced international collaboration on nuclear power infrastructure, and assurances of nuclear fuel supply and services for used nuclear fuel management.

E. Towards a New Framework for Civil Nuclear Cooperation, Nuclear Fuel Assurances

In his April 2009 speech at Prague, President Obama stated: "We should build a new framework for civil nuclear cooperation, including an international fuel bank, so that countries can access peaceful power without increasing the risks of proliferation. That must be the right of every nation that renounces nuclear weapons, especially developing countries embarking on peaceful programs." The President made clear at Prague his view that, "no approach will succeed if it is based on the denial of rights to nations that play by the rules."

The establishment of fuel assurance mechanisms, such as an international fuel bank designed as a last resort option to supplement the well-functioning nuclear fuel market, will increase the security of fuel supply and thereby expand access to civil nuclear power while reducing the risk of nuclear weapons proliferation.

The United States has strongly supported the development of such mechanisms. At the 2005 IAEA General Conference, the U.S. Secretary of Energy announced plans to down-blend 17.4 metric tons of highly enriched uranium (HEU) excess to U.S. defense needs to low enriched uranium (LEU) to serve as a last resort fuel reserve thereby increasing the security of fuel supply for non-nuclear weapon states.

Since 2005, about a dozen other fuel assurance mechanisms have been proposed, mostly designed to offer assurance of LEU supply — the "front end" of the nuclear fuel cycle. The United States strongly supports the decision of the IAEA Board of

Governors at its November 2009 meeting to establish the first international LEU reserve at Angarsk, Russia. On March 29, 2010, the IAEA Director General and Russian Director General of the State Atomic Energy Corporation signed the agreement. If a country with good nonproliferation credentials is being denied access to its supply of fuel for non-commercial reasons, the IAEA Director General can call for the release of fuel to that NPT-compliant state from this reserve.

In September 2007, the nongovernmental organization Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) announced a \$50 million challenge grant for the establishment of an International Nuclear Fuel Bank (INFB) under IAEA auspices. One condition for the use of NTI's challenge funds now has been met: an additional contribution of over \$100 million from over 30 IAEA Member States, including a contribution of nearly \$50 million from the United States. The second and final condition, that the IAEA Board take affirmative action to establish the INFB, remains to be completed. Only through constructive cooperation can an operational mechanism be developed that is acceptable to all.

In addition to these efforts aimed at assured supply of low-enriched uranium fuel, the United States has begun an effort to broaden the scope of fuel assurances. We envision a global framework that could include an integrated commercial approach to fuel-cycle services, including the provision of fresh nuclear fuel and the associated management of used fuel. If successfully deployed, this global framework of "cradle-to-grave" fuel services could expand access to civil nuclear power by obviating the need for states to develop and deploy costly and complex fuel-cycle technologies.

F. Article V: Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes (PNEs)

Article V of the NPT provides that under appropriate international observation and through appropriate international procedures the potential benefits from nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes will be made available to NPT non-nuclear weapon states on a non-discriminatory basis. The United States has not conducted a PNE since 1973, having determined that PNEs are not technically or economically worthwhile undertakings. In addition, the United States regards such explosions as indistinguishable from military tests.

III. Negotiations in good faith on nuclear and non-nuclear disarmament

Article VI: Ending the Nuclear Arms Race, Nuclear Disarmament, and Promoting General and Complete Disarmament

The NPT is important in two ways to efforts to conclude and implement effective measures that can lead to nuclear disarmament as well as to general and complete disarmament. First, the NPT serves as the principal legal barrier to the spread of nuclear weapons. The Treaty is a critical element in sustaining disarmament progress because continuing proliferation undermines the basis for eliminating nuclear weapons. Second, Article VI specifically calls for progress towards nuclear disarmament by stating that each of the Parties to the Treaty "undertakes to pursue

negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.”

The United States places great importance on its obligations under Article VI, recognizing also that nuclear disarmament progress which strengthens international stability and security also serves the security interests of the United States. Through negotiated agreements and through actions on its own, the United States is drawing down its deployed nuclear weapons and nuclear stockpile, reducing the role that nuclear weapons play in security policy, and removing from the stockpile excess highly enriched uranium and plutonium.

In his April 2009 speech in Prague, President Obama called the existence of thousands of nuclear weapons “the most dangerous legacy of the Cold War,” and he stated clearly that the United States is committed “to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.” He spoke of concrete steps that the United States would take towards this goal, including:

- Reducing the role of nuclear weapons in national security strategy,
- Negotiation of a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START),
- Immediate and aggressive pursuit of ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), and
- Negotiation of a treaty that will verifiably end the production of fissile materials intended for use in weapons (FMCT).

At the Sixth NPT Review Conference, in 2000, the United States, together with the other four NPT nuclear weapon states, reaffirmed its Article VI commitment to the elimination of nuclear weapons. President Obama’s ambitious disarmament agenda has reinvigorated this commitment. In his Prague speech, President Obama acknowledged the responsibility of the United States to act, but he also noted the responsibility of others. “We cannot succeed in this endeavor alone,” he said, “but we can lead it, we can start it.”

We have started.

A. Strategic and Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons

Treaties

Incorporating the vision of the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, the United States and the Russian Federation in 2002 concluded and brought into force the **Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty** (Moscow Treaty). According to Article I of this Treaty, by December 31, 2012 the United States and the Russian Federation will reduce and limit operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 1700-2200 for each side. As of December 31, 2009 the United States had 1,968 operationally deployed strategic warheads. The Treaty remains in force until December 31, 2012 or until it is superseded by the New START Treaty.

Under the **Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START)**, which entered into force in December 1994, U.S. and Russian deployed strategic warheads were reduced from well over 10,000 each to 6,000 accountable warheads, with full reductions implemented, on schedule, at the end of 2001. START expired in December 2009.

On April 8, 2010 Presidents Obama and Medvedev signed a **New START Treaty** on strategic weapons to replace the previously expired START Treaty. When the New START Treaty is ratified by both sides and enters into force it will supersede the 2002 Moscow Treaty, which then will terminate. The Treaty's duration is ten years.

- The New START Treaty will limit each side to 1,550 deployed strategic warheads, which is approximately 30 percent lower than the upper limit of the 2002 Moscow Treaty and 74 percent lower than the limit of START.
- There will be a combined limit of 800 deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and nuclear-capable heavy bombers.
- In addition, there is a separate limit of 700 deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed nuclear-capable heavy bombers; this limit is less than half the corresponding strategic nuclear delivery vehicle limit of START.
- The New START treaty includes an effective verification regime that will help the United States and Russia build trust and reduce the risks of misunderstanding or surprise. Measures under the Treaty include on-site inspections and exhibitions, data exchanges and notifications related to strategic offensive arms and facilities covered by the Treaty, and provisions to facilitate the use of national technical means for treaty monitoring. To increase confidence and transparency, the Treaty also provides for the exchange of telemetry.

At the signing ceremony in Prague, President Obama noted that the conclusion of the New START Treaty “demonstrates the determination of the United States and Russia — the two nations that hold over 90 percent of the world’s nuclear weapons — to pursue responsible global leadership. Together, we are keeping our commitments under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which must be the foundation for global nonproliferation.” As the President observed, the New START Treaty “will set the stage for further cuts.”

Nuclear Posture Review

The United States recently concluded the third Congressionally mandated Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). It is a key element of the U.S. Government’s comprehensive approach to advancing the President’s Prague agenda for reducing nuclear dangers and pursuing the peace and security of a world free of nuclear weapons. The NPR addressed the United States’ nuclear deterrence policy and strategy, and analyzed the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy, including the size and composition of nuclear forces necessary to support that strategy. The NPR outlined the U.S. approach for reducing the potential for nuclear conflict, enhancing strategic stability worldwide, ensuring the security of our friends and allies and strengthening the global nuclear nonproliferation regime with the objective of creating the conditions that will allow us further to reduce numbers of nuclear weapons. As a result of the NPR, the United States will continue to take concrete steps to reduce the role and numbers of nuclear weapons in its national security strategy, in accordance with our long-term goal of a world free of nuclear weapons.

For the first time, the NPR places preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism atop the U.S. agenda. It renews the U.S. commitment to hold fully accountable any state, terrorist group, or other non-state actor that supports or enables terrorist efforts to obtain or use weapons of mass destruction, whether by facilitating, financing, or providing expertise or safe haven for such efforts.

Regarding nuclear weapons, the NPR makes clear that the United States will not develop new nuclear warheads. There will be no nuclear testing. There will be no new military missions or new military capabilities for nuclear weapons.

The NPR strengthens the long-standing U.S. negative security assurance by stating: “The United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nonproliferation obligations.”

Stockpile and Weapons Reductions

In addition to implementing and seeking new agreements on nuclear weapons and fissile material, the United States continues to make extraordinary progress in reducing its stockpile of nuclear weapons, strategic delivery systems, fissile materials for use in weapons, and the associated nuclear weapons infrastructure.

Weapons and Delivery System Reductions

- By 2012, or earlier, the U.S. stockpile of strategic nuclear warheads will be reduced to nearly one-half from its 2001 level — and three-quarters from its 1990 level — resulting in the smallest stockpile since the 1950s.
- Since 1988 the United States has dismantled more than 13,000 nuclear warheads. The United States has reduced the number of operationally deployed nuclear weapons from approximately 10,000 in 1991 to approximately 2,000 as of December 31, 2009.
- The United States is already below the dramatic reductions in active stockpile levels that it had planned for the year 2010, and we now will retire an additional 15 percent of the U.S. stockpile below originally planned levels.
- The United States also has retired over 1,000 strategic ballistic missiles, including the most modern ICBM (the Peacekeeper), the Minuteman III ICBM, 350 heavy bombers, and 28 ballistic missile submarines. The reductions in heavy bombers include all 91 B1-B heavy bombers, which now are equipped solely for non-nuclear weapons.
- Twenty-eight ballistic missile submarines have been eliminated. Four modern Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines have been taken out of strategic service, carrying a total of 96 Trident missiles.
- The most dramatic U.S. stockpile reductions, in proportional terms, have been in non-strategic nuclear weapons. These reductions amount to nearly 90 percent of non-strategic nuclear weapons in NATO. The types of non-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe have been reduced from five to one, and storage sites in Europe have been reduced by 80 percent.
- Since 1992, the United States has cooperated with Russia and other states of the former Soviet Union through its Cooperative Threat Reduction program to eliminate a large amount of strategic offensive arms that had been accumulated by the Soviet Union.
- On May 3, 2010, the U.S. Government released newly declassified information on the U.S. nuclear warhead stockpile. Increasing transparency of global nuclear stockpiles is important to nonproliferation efforts, and to pursuing

follow-on negotiations after the ratification and entry into force of the New START Treaty that cover all nuclear weapons: deployed and non-deployed, strategic and non-strategic.

Fissile Material Reductions

- In November 2005, the United States announced that in future decades it would remove an additional 200 metric tons (MT) of HEU from further use as fissile material in nuclear weapons. This is above and beyond the 174 MT of HEU removed from defense stocks in 1994. These HEU removals together will amount to the equivalent of approximately 11,500 nuclear weapons worth of material (according to IAEA equivalency figures).
- The United States and Russia have committed to down-blending more than 500 MT of HEU from Russia's dismantled nuclear weapons for use in U.S. civil power plants. More than 382 MT of this material has been downblended to date, enough for approximately 15,000 nuclear weapons.
- More than 17 metric tons of down-blended HEU is being set aside for a nuclear fuel reserve to support international efforts to provide states with a viable alternative to pursuing their own enrichment and reprocessing programs. Based on the IAEA definition of significant quantities of nuclear materials, this is enough material to produce more than 500 nuclear weapons.
- The United States has removed 61.5 MT of plutonium from defense stockpiles, of which at least 34 MT will be disposed under the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement (PMDA) by irradiating it as fuel in civil nuclear power plants. The United States also is cooperating with Russia to permanently dispose of 34 MT of Russian surplus weapon-grade plutonium similarly by irradiating it as fuel in nuclear reactors. On April 13, 2010 Secretary Clinton and Foreign Minister Lavrov signed a Protocol that amends and updates the 2000 Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement in light of current conditions and nuclear power programs in each country. The monitoring and nonproliferation conditions of the Protocol contribute to the irreversibility of arms reductions and ensure that the United States and Russia will transparently dispose of such weapon-grade plutonium from their respective defense programs in a safe and transparent manner.

Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty

As President Obama stated in his speech in Prague in 2009, the United States supports the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and will "immediately and aggressively pursue" its ratification. The United States believes that the CTBT contributes to the global nonproliferation regime, strengthening the prospects for a peaceful, stable, and secure world.

The United States has not conducted a nuclear explosive test since September 1992. While working toward the entry into force of the CTBT, the United States reaffirms its nearly two-decade long moratorium on nuclear explosive testing and continues to call on all states publicly to declare similar moratoria of their own.

Since signing the CTBT in 1996, the United States has supported the development and deployment of the International Monitoring System, the infrastructure to support the operation and maintenance of these stations, and the infrastructure for

transmitting, analyzing, and storing the data collected by the monitoring stations. Since early 2009, the United States has re-engaged in other activities of the CTBT Organization Preparatory Commission, such as activities related to developing its On-Site Inspection Program.

Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty

President Obama said in Prague last year that one of the concrete steps the United States will take toward a world without nuclear weapons is to seek a new treaty that verifiably ends the production of fissile materials intended for use in nuclear weapons, a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT). Last year, for the first time since 1998, the Conference on Disarmament reached consensus on a program of work that included a mandate for the negotiation of an FMCT. To date, however, the Conference on Disarmament has been unable to move forward on FMCT negotiations because of procedural obstacles. The United States will continue to seek ways of making progress on FMCT in the Conference on Disarmament and to begin negotiations on the basis agreed to in 2009.

Pending the successful negotiation and entry-into-force of an FMCT, the United States reaffirms its decades-long unilateral moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear warheads, and we continue to call on other states which have yet to do so publicly to join us in this moratorium.

B. Non-Nuclear Weapons

Biological Weapons

The United States ratified the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) in 1972; it entered into force in 1975. The United States continues to work for the universalization of the BWC, and for full implementation and compliance by all Treaty Parties. The United States supported the 2006 decision by the Sixth BWC Review Conference to establish a BWC Implementation Support Unit to facilitate the work of BWC Parties in various mandated activities.

The United States has contributed actively to the BWC Intersessional Work Program, initiated in 2002 following the Fifth BWC Review Conference, and extended and enhanced by the Sixth BWC Review Conference in 2006. Such work has focused on practical steps that BWC States Party can take to enhance BWC implementation and stem the threat from biological weapons.

During 2009, the Work Program focused on assistance related to disease surveillance capacity-building. Disease, regardless of its cause, does not respect national borders. The United States has provided more than \$317 million in direct support, and an additional \$260 million in indirect support, to activities related to the implementation of the World Health Organization's International Health Regulations (IHRs), as revised in 2005.

At the December 2009 meeting of BWC Parties, the United States launched a far-reaching Presidential policy initiative, the *National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats*. While the *Strategy* envisages comprehensive action by the United States and the other BWC Parties to mitigate the shared threat of biological weapons, its hallmark is that it reflects the first Government-wide effort by the United States aimed at *preventing* bio-threats.

Chemical Weapons

The United States has been a Party to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which established a global ban on chemical weapons, since its entry into force in 1997. The United States and 187 other States Party continue to work for universal membership in the CWC, and for full implementation and compliance by all CWC States Parties.

The United States is actively encouraging the seven remaining non-States Parties to adhere to the Convention as soon as possible. U.S. experts provide advice and technical assistance to other States Party in the areas of CWC-related legislation, setting up a National Authority, and Treaty implementation. The U.S. National Authority works closely with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), and bilaterally with States Parties, to provide training in these areas. The United States remains fully committed to the CWC and is in compliance with its Treaty obligations. The U.S. continues destruction of its national CW stockpile. As part of our overall CW destruction effort, we expect to spend a total of \$32-34 billion dollars, which includes helping other possessor States Party to eliminate their CW stockpiles.

Conventional Armed Forces

Under the 1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), over 69,000 Cold War-era battle tanks, combat aircraft, and other major weapons have been eliminated in 30 countries from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains in the Russian Federation. More than 6,000 on-site inspections have helped to build politico-military cooperation and openness in Europe. In 1999, the 30 CFE States Party concluded an "Agreement on Adaptation" to update the 1990 Treaty, in line with the current security environment in Europe. The United States and the great majority of Treaty Parties have made clear that we can ratify the adapted CFE Treaty, once Russia fulfills all of the commitments that it made at the time of signature, but some of those commitments remain unfulfilled. On December 12, 2007, Russia "suspended" its implementation of the current CFE Treaty; the United States and NATO Allies since have engaged Russia in an intensive dialogue to address Moscow's concerns and the concerns of all other States Party.

A more detailed report of U.S. information pertaining to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons will be posted at <http://www.state.gov/t/isn/npt/index.htm>.
