

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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26 July 1984
ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-SIXTH PLENARY MEETING
held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 26 July 1984, at 10.30 a.m.

President: Mr. V.L. Issraelyan (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)

GE.84-64430

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria:

Mr. B. OULD-ROUIS

Mr. A. TAFFAR

Argentina:

Mr. J. CARASALES

Mr. R. GARCIA MORITAN

Mr. R. VILLAMBROSA

Australia:

Mr. R. BUTLER

Mr. R. ROWE

Ms. J. COURTNEY

Belgium:

Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE

Brazil:

Mr. C.A. de SOUZA e SILVA

Mr. S. de QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria:

Mr. B. KONSTANTINOV

Mr. P. POPTCHEV

Mr. K. STANKOV

Mr. N. MIHAILOV

Mr. C. PRAMOV

Burma:

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

U HLA MYINT

U PE THEIN TIN

Canada:

Mr. G.B. SKINNER

Mr. R.G. SUTHERLAND

Mr. R. VANIER

Mr. G.K. VACHON

China:

Mr. QIAN JIADONG

Ms. WANG ZHIYUN

Mr. LIN CHENG

Mr. YANG MINGLIANG

Mr. SUO KAIMING

Cuba:

Mr. P. NUÑEZ MOSQUERA .

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. M. VEJVODA

Mr. A. CIMA

Mr. J. MATOUSEK

Egypt:

Mr. S. ALFARARGI

Mr. I.A. HASSAN

Mr. M. BADR

Mr. F. MONIB

Mr. A.M. ABBAS

Ms. W. BASSIM

Ethiopia:

Mr. F. YOHANNES

France:

Mr. G. MONTASSIER

Mr. H. RENIE

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. H. ROSE

Mr. H. THIELICKE

Mr. F. SAYATZ

Mr. W. KUBICZEK

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. H. WEGENER

Mr. F. ELBE

Mr. M. GERDTS

Mr. W.E. von dem HAGEN

Hungary:

Mr. F. GAJDA

Mr. T. TOTH

India:

Mr. M. DUBEY

Mr. S. KANT SHARMA

Indonesia:

Mr. S. SUTOWARDOYO

Mr. I.M. DAMANIK

Mr. I. WIRANATAATMADJA

Islamic Republic of Iran:

Mr. F.S. SIRJANI

Mr. M. TALE

Italy:

Mr. M. ALESSI

Mr. G. ADORNI BRACCESI

Mr. M. PAVESE

Japan:

Mr. M. IMAI

Mr. T. ISHIGURI

Mr. T. KAWAKITA

Kenya:Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES

Ms. S. GONZALEZ y REYNERO

Mr. F. MACEDO RIBA

Mongolia:

Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG

Mr. S.O. BOLD

Morocco:

Mr. O. HILALE

Netherlands:

Mr. R.J. VAN SCHAİK

Mr. J. RAMAKER

Mr. J. AKKERMAN

Nigeria:

Mr. O.O. GEORGE

Mr. J.O. OBOH

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Mr. C. CASTILLO RAMIREZ

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Mr. J. MISKEL

Mr. B. MORTON

Mr. A. HOROWITZ

Mr. A. LIEBOWITZ

Mr. J. WOODWORTH

Mr. J.E. MCATEER

Venezuela:

Mr. A. LOPEZ OLIVER
Mr. T. LABRADOR RUBIO
Mr. O. GARCIA GARCIA

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC

Zaire:

Mrs. E. EKANGA KABEYA

Secretary-General of the Conference on
Disarmament and Personal
Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary-General of the
Conference on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): The 276th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is called to order. With your permission, I should like first of all to welcome on behalf of all those present Mrs. I. Thorsson of Sweden, whom we all know and respect.

Today the Conference continues consideration of agenda item 6, "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons". However, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference. In accordance with the Conference's time-table of work for this week, I intend to suspend the plenary meeting after the list of speakers is concluded and convene an informal meeting to consider the following questions: (a) proposals concerning the improved and effective functioning of the Conference; (b) date of closure of the 1984 session; and (c) invitation of the Preparatory Committee for the Third Review Conference of the non-proliferation treaty.

I would remind you that at the last informal meeting of the Conference a draft mandate for an ad hoc committee on agenda item 1, "nuclear test ban", was tabled by the representative of the Group of 21. As you will recall, at the plenary meeting that day the representative of Algeria, on behalf of the Group of 21, agreed to postpone the adoption of a decision on this draft mandate at the request of the representative of Australia. I shall continue my consultations with interested delegations and, if there are no new developments, after all statements have been made I then intend to invite a decision on the draft mandate of the Group of 21 contained in document CD/520.

My list of speakers for today includes the representatives of Viet Nam, Brazil, Austria, Japan, the United Kingdom, Italy and Algeria.

In accordance with the decision taken by the Conference at its 273rd plenary meeting, I now give the floor to the Ambassador of Viet Nam, Comrade Nguyen Thuong.

Mr. NGUYEN THUONG (Viet Nam) (translated from French): Thank you, Mr. President, for your understanding, and my thanks to the Conference for having given me the opportunity to take the floor. Mr. President, as I am taking the floor for the first time during this summer part of our session, I wish first of all to extend to you my fraternal congratulations on your assumption of the Presidency of this important Conference on Disarmament, as the eminent and experienced representative of the great Soviet Union, bastion of peace and peaceful co-existence, with which the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam is developing its trusting friendship and co-operation in all spheres, in the interests of peace and stability in the region. I should also like to extend my warm congratulations to your predecessor, the distinguished representative of Sweden, with which Viet Nam enjoys fruitful relations.

I have chosen to address the Conference on the item of the comprehensive programme of disarmament because my Government has always attached great importance to this issue, in the belief that there are organic links and interactions between the various spheres and successive stages of disarmament, and that the elaboration of such a comprehensive, long-term programme will make it possible to mobilize all the forces of peace, and to organize and guide the work of this Conference, as well as the struggle of the peoples of the world, towards precise goals, aiming at our final objective which is general and complete disarmament.

(Mr. Nguyen Thuong, Viet Nam)

This global view is all the more necessary in that in recent years the world situation has become very complex and extremely tense, because of the intensification of the arms race, the terrifying threat of an enormous nuclear arsenal weighing on the life of mankind as a whole, in which a new stage was recently opened with the deployment of United States missiles in Western Europe; and also because of the revival of the policy of use and threat of use of force in many regions of the world, and of provocation and intimidation, intervention and aggression against the independence and sovereignty of nations.

In this situation, disarmament has an increasing significance and role in the effort to prevent war and to maintain international peace and security. The documents unanimously adopted at the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament remain fully valid and up to date. In carrying out the recommendations of the second special session, the Working Group under the experienced chairmanship of Ambassador Robles of Mexico, produced the draft texts for the comprehensive programme of disarmament annexed to the last report of the Committee on Disarmament to the United Nations General Assembly on 1 September last year (document CD/421). We pay tribute to this result, which has all the more merit in that it was achieved in circumstances with which we are all familiar; for our part, we should like to make some modest contributions to it.

Firstly, with regard to goals and objectives, my delegation believes that since world peace is indivisible, and we aspire to firm and lasting peace, to international security as well as security for every nation, large or small, we should work towards the prevention of nuclear war as the key task of the highest priority for which all States and all peoples should be mobilized. At the same time, we are also working for the prevention and elimination of hotbeds of tension created in many regions of the world by imperialism and hegemonism in the form of local wars, special wars, wars using intermediaries, wars of attrition in its many forms, undeclared war, war using mercenaries ... against the right to self-determination of peoples, and the independence and sovereignty of States.

When seeking realistically to achieve partial, just and equitable disarmament measures, it is important not to lose sight of the final goal which is general and complete disarmament, and continuously to consolidate and develop the results achieved in each sphere and in general. Those who, by their dream of supremacy, force us to draw back from results already agreed upon must bear an international responsibility. The process of arms limitation and disarmament should be continuous and all States should refrain from any act which could jeopardize or hinder the efforts to make uninterrupted progress, and should display a serious and constructive attitude of sincere co-operation with a view to achieving agreements which are acceptable to all.

The countries with a major military capability, and above all the nuclear-weapon Powers, primarily the Soviet Union and the United States, of course, bear the greatest responsibility, but all countries, large and small, also must work for peace and make their contribution to disarmament efforts.

(Mr. Nguyen Thuong, Viet Nam)

Secondly, with regard to priorities, my delegation is essentially in agreement with the text of the comprehensive programme of disarmament and with the current practice in the Conference on Disarmament.

Following the Non-Aligned Summit, we consider that "the greatest peril facing the world today is the threat to the very survival of mankind as a result of nuclear war". Highest priority must be given to the prevention of nuclear war and the various spheres of nuclear disarmament, which are of key importance for international peace and security. It is necessary to stop and reverse the nuclear-arms race, the development of the so-called strategic arms triad, star wars and other frenzied projects aimed at gaining military and strategic supremacy, as well as the set of doctrines aimed at legitimizing so-called "limited", preventive or other forms of nuclear war. In order to prevent nuclear war, many wise proposals have been made in this Conference on Disarmament and in the United Nations by the socialist countries, the non-aligned countries and other countries, including the freezing of existing nuclear arsenals, the undertaking not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, the strict and total prohibition of testing in order to prevent the production of new generations of such weapons, an agreement for the total prohibition of the militarization of outer space, and above all the prohibition of the deployment of nuclear weapons in outer space, as well as on the sea bed and in the ocean floor, and rules of conduct which all nuclear-weapon States should undertake to observe. One of the immediate tasks in Europe will be to return to the situation which existed before the deployment of the United States missiles, so that bilateral negotiations on nuclear weapons can be resumed. Furthermore, in the face of the imperialists' and reactionaries' practice of waging war by proxy and of arming with nuclear weapons such of their allies as Israel, South Africa and other aspirants, the non-nuclear-weapon States have a paramount interest in the introduction of effective security assurances and the strict implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Viet Nam is all the more attached to that Treaty from having been in the past more than once threatened with attack by tactical nuclear weapons, and still remains under the permanent threat of a large neighbour which is a nuclear-weapon Power whose behaviour is often unpredictable.

Following nuclear disarmament in these various respects, the greatest efforts should be deployed for arms limitation and disarmament measures concerning other weapons of mass destruction. Overcoming demagogical, vacillating manoeuvres, the Conference on Disarmament must press towards the finalization of the convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons, among which binary weapons are the subject of a resolution adopted by the United Nations General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session. As the victim of the biggest chemical war in recent decades, Viet Nam is particularly interested in this issue and informed the Committee on Disarmament of its experience last year. Similarly, we believe that without being a matter of the highest priority, the chapters on conventional weapons and armed forces and military budgets should receive the consideration they deserve, **particularly** in view of the theories of "zones of vital interest" and programmes for "the projection of force", and in order to limit and progressively eliminate so-called local wars carried out against peoples with all the sophisticated and constantly developing weaponry, as occurred yesterday in Viet Nam and recently in Lebanon, and which is willingly shared with new partners for the same purposes.

(Mr. Nguyen Thuong, Viet Nam)

Mr. President, allow me to submit to you, among the measures envisaged in the relevant chapter of CD/421, our views on a measure which is of the highest importance to us: the establishment of a zone of peace in South-East Asia.

South-East Asia is the only region of the planet never to have enjoyed peace over the past four decades. Wars and crises have followed one another, including the biggest war since the Second World War, which appalled the conscience of progressive mankind during the 1960s and 1970s.

The events of these 40 years show **that** imperialist and reactionary forces outside the region constitute the real threat to the independence and peace of the countries of South-East Asia, and that they are the factor sabotaging peace and stability in the region. The political collusion and growing military co-operation between the biggest western Power and the most populated Asian Power not only arouse justified concern in the region but constitute a real threat to the security of the smaller countries and the stability of South-East Asia.

The events of these decades also show that these imperialist and reactionary forces have always resorted to their traditional policy of "divide and rule", of encouraging confrontation between different countries or groups of countries in the region. Any solution for a lasting and firm peace in South-East Asia must take due account of these lessons of history.

Among the countries of South-East Asia differences remain concerning the causes of the present situation and the measures to be taken to restore peace and stability in South-East Asia. However, these differences are minimal in comparison with the outside threat and alone cannot lead to explosive situations. That danger could arise if incorrect solutions, unilaterally imposed, played into the hands of outside forces.

The countries of Indo-China and the ASEAN countries have the same common, fundamental and lasting interest, that of maintaining peace and stability in the region, and the same aspiration for coexistence in peace and good neighbourliness, in the interests of the prosperity of each of them.

The countries of Europe have taken 30 years to build the Helsinki system. My delegation considers that the countries of South-East Asia urgently need peace and co-operation in order to contribute to the national construction of each country and immediately to establish a zone of peace in South-East Asia, eliminating for all time all aggression and intervention from abroad. Despite the vicissitudes, my country is persevering in this long-term policy which it has advocated since 1976 and enshrined in 1978 by joint ~~communiqués~~ signed with all the ASEAN countries, because for Viet Nam this policy is not a matter of circumstance but responds to the higher, fundamental interests of all the peoples and all the countries of the region.

There is no shortage of ideas which could serve as a basis for consultations on an equal footing, without the imposition of any point of view. They can be found in the spirit of the historic principles of Bandung, in the paragraphs concerning South-East Asia of the Final Document of the New Delhi Summit of the Non-aligned Countries, in the seven points submitted on behalf of the three Indo-Chinese countries at the thirty-sixth session of the United Nations General Assembly, and in the 1971 Declaration of the ASEAN countries on a zone of

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peace, freedom and neutrality. The experience of the last five years proves that the sole correct solution is that of dialogue between the two groups of countries on an equal footing, with reciprocal respect for the legitimate interests of both sides. That is the sole path towards a reduction of tension and the gradual narrowing of differences, progressively leading to peace and stability in the region. The very recent Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the three countries of Indo-China renewed its invitation to the ASEAN countries to follow this path. It is regrettable that the latest ministerial communiqué of the ASEAN countries appears not to go in this direction, but rather to follow the line of the forces from outside the region. My Government is nevertheless serenely pursuing its consistent policy for a zone of peace in South-East Asia. We consider that long-term interests and common sense will ultimately prevail, for all aware and responsible statesmen; a dialogue on an equal footing will certainly prevail.

In the same spirit of peaceful coexistence and stability, Viet Nam supports the establishment of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean, and calls for the immediate cessation of all dilatory manoeuvres and the convening as rapidly as possible of an international conference for this purpose. Similarly, my country supports the initiative of the Mongolian People's Republic for the exclusion of the use and threat of use of force in relations between countries of Asia and the Pacific.

The text of the draft comprehensive programme of disarmament contained in document CD/421 still contains many brackets. It is too rich a subject to be exhausted by a modest commentary on my part.

The work of disarmament, like the cause of peace, is a great undertaking to which the entire international community must harness itself, and this Conference bears a particular responsibility. As a negotiating body, its membership must be held to a rational number. In the interests of efficiency, its composition, and any possible and necessarily limited increase in its membership, should in my opinion, firmly comply with the principle of the political balance of its three components. As is well known, Viet Nam has put forward its candidacy. It hopes that, by consensus on the basis of these principles, its candidacy will be upheld, for which it would be most grateful to the Conference.

The enterprise of disarmament, like any great social undertaking, is a complex and long-term matter, fraught with vicissitudes, but certainly tending towards real progress, as the forces of peace now have the upper hand over the forces of war and aggression.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): I thank the representative of Viet Nam for his statement and for the kind words addressed to my country and to myself. I now give the floor to the representative of Brazil, Ambassador de Souza e Silva.

Mr. de SOUZA e SILVA (Brazil): Mr. President, as a former Ambassador to your country it is with special pleasure that I welcome you to the Chair of our Conference during the current month and as an old friend I am happy to see the statesmanlike manner with which you are conducting our business.

My statement today will be devoted to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

The reason is a simple one. The process for the third review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty is already under way and a second meeting this year of its Preparatory Committee will be held soon.

(Mr. de Souza e Silva Brazil)

In the course of this process, appeals to non-signatories to join it are more constantly heard both in this hall and elsewhere. Not being a Party, Brazil feels therefore that it is in order to state, as comprehensively as possible, the reasons why it did not sign the NPT and will not sign it. Furthermore, contrary to what was once stated in this Chamber, Brazil considers itself fully qualified to express its views on that instrument. First, because non-proliferation is a general concern, and not the exclusive property of Parties to the NPT; secondly, because non-nuclear countries, like my own, which took steps, nationally and regionally, to prevent proliferation, must be considered at least more qualified to speak on that matter than those which, although Parties to the NPT, still condone the deployment of nuclear weapons in their own territories; thirdly, because Brazil's record on non-proliferation is unambiguous and unimpeachable.

In my statement today, therefore, I intend to present a historical summary of the efforts within the United Nations system to achieve a universal regime on non-proliferation as well as a brief reference to the Brazilian record on this subject, and finally to peruse the text and operation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The first significant United Nations decision on the matter was the adoption by consensus, on 4 December 1961, of resolution 1576 (XV), commonly referred to as the "Irish Resolution", which was the result of several years of discussion in the First Committee of the General Assembly. The resolution called upon all States to secure the conclusion of an international agreement which would prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons by the States that did not have them.

During the subsequent years, the debate continued in the General Assembly and the basic resolution dealing specifically with that question was adopted in 1965, and came to be known as resolution 2028 (XX). It was drafted and presented on the initiative of the so-called "Group of Eight" of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, one of the predecessor bodies to this Conference. The text of the resolution, adopted without any dissenting vote, but with five abstentions, and the support of the super-Powers, spelled out the five principles upon which the negotiation of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons should be based.

Such principles are:

"(a) the treaty should be void of any loop-holes which might permit nuclear or non-nuclear Powers to proliferate, directly or indirectly, nuclear weapons in any form;

(b) the treaty should embody an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers;

(c) the treaty should be a step towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament and, more particularly, nuclear disarmament;

(d) there should be acceptable and workable provisions to ensure the effectiveness of the treaty;

(e) nothing in the treaty should adversely affect the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their territories."

(Mr. de Souza e Silva, Brazil)

One and a half years later, on 24 August 1967, the Soviet Union and the United States submitted to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee two separate and identical treaty drafts on non-proliferation. They were followed, on 18 January 1968, by the presentation by the two co-Chairmen of that Committee of a joint revised text. Many comments, suggestions and proposals were made in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee on both documents of 1967 and 1968. The co-Chairmen attached their joint draft to the report they prepared for the resumed twenty-second session of the General Assembly, which convened on 24 April 1968. During the debate at the resumed session, a few minor changes were introduced in the final text, and on 12 June 1968 the General Assembly passed a resolution, which took the number 2373, by 95 votes in favour, 4 against and 21 abstentions, among which those of three members of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee: Brazil, Burma and India.

The resolution commended the draft and requested the Secretary-General to open the Treaty for signature. Two years later it had received enough ratifications to enter into force.

Let me now briefly recall the record of Brazil on the question of non-proliferation.

Brazil participated in the consensus on the "Irish Resolution" and, at about the same time, our representative to the United Nations submitted a proposal calling for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America. From 1962 to 1965 Brazil participated actively in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee and the General Assembly on the discussions on disarmament and proliferation. In 1963 Brazil signed the Partial Test Ban Treaty and in 1964 ratified it. In 1965 Brazil co-sponsored resolution 2028, in which the five principles to orient and guide the future treaty were embodied.

Meanwhile, in 1963, the Presidents of Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador and Mexico issued a joint declaration which stated that "their Governments are prepared to sign a multilateral Latin American agreement whereby their countries would undertake not to manufacture, receive, store or test nuclear weapons or nuclear launching devices ...". By 1965, Brazil was engaged in the preparatory work for the elaboration of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, which it signed in May 1967 and ratified in January 1968, two years before the NPT entered into force.

The Brazilian Delegation to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee in 1968, composed of our former foreign minister, Ambassador Araujo Castro, and myself, was equally involved in the negotiations on the draft texts of the NPT presented by the co-Chairmen. On 8 February, the representative of Brazil commented on the revised draft in the light of the five principles adopted by the General Assembly in resolution 2028. His statement is recorded in ENDC/PV.363.

On principle (a), according to which the treaty should not permit proliferation in any form, the Brazilian delegate stated that "the revised drafts contain no measure whatsoever aimed at preventing nuclear-weapon States from vertically proliferating, directly or indirectly".

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On principle (b), which envisaged a balance of responsibilities and obligations, the Brazilian representative recalled that while the proposed text asked non-nuclear-weapon States to accept "a blank system of control yet to be formulated, it did not include a commitment to the effect that the nuclear-weapon Powers will likewise be subject to some kind of control over their nuclear activities, so that the gap of obligations might be narrowed".

On principle (c), directed to the goal of general and complete disarmament, and more particularly nuclear disarmament, it was noted that the proposed text only envisaged a commitment by each Party, and not specifically by the nuclear Powers, to pursue negotiations in good faith. In that connection, he mentioned the proposal for a minimum period of twenty-five years for the duration of that instrument, and wondered whether a committee such as the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, with a mandate to negotiate a treaty on general and complete disarmament, could endorse a provision based on the assumption that "nuclear-weapon arsenals may increase and proliferate for a minimum initial period of 25 years and that vertical proliferation may go on unchecked? Is it not", he continued, "a premature and uncalled-for admission that in 1993 the ENDC, or some other body in Geneva or in another city, will still be groping for agreement on this vital issue of nuclear disarmament?" Sixteen years later, these words sound oddly familiar.

On principle (d), the Brazilian delegate stressed that universality was a prerequisite to the effectiveness of the treaty. He also remarked that among the nuclear-weapon Powers, two were not likely to become signatories, while among the non-nuclear-weapon countries, 40 ratifications did not seem to warrant a sign of universality.

Finally, on principle (e), concerning regional treaties, the Brazilian position was stated as follows: "My delegation welcomes the acknowledgement, in the operative part of the draft, of the existence of regional treaties aimed at ensuring the absence of nuclear weapons from the territories of the nations which are parties to such agreements, as is the case in Latin America. It would, however, be more satisfactory to us, and to other Latin American countries, if the draft specifically recognized the rights and obligations entered into by nations which have already concluded regional treaties of that kind".

After concluding the analysis of the co-Chairmen's draft, as compared to the five principles of resolution 2028, the Brazilian delegate said: "We have tried to point out some of the discrepancies between the revised draft and the principles set forth by the General Assembly as guidance and orientation for our proceedings."

Those observations, as well as suggestions and amendments presented by my delegation and by other members of the ENDC, were not, unfortunately taken into consideration by the co-Chairmen, who had decided to stick to their original proposals. It is thus not surprising that Brazil could not support the resolution of the General Assembly that adopted and commended the draft treaty for signature.

May I now proceed to examine in some detail the provisions of the NPT as they now stand, bearing in mind the five principles agreed upon by the General Assembly.

(Mr. de Souza e Silva, Brazil)

As is customary in international treaties, the preamble states the general aims and intentions of the Parties while operative paragraphs specify their rights and duties.

In the case of the NPT, the preamble starts with two paragraphs on the prevention of nuclear war. The first one expresses the concern of the Parties with the consequences of a nuclear war and their recognition of the "need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples". The second goes on to identify proliferation as a development which would "seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war". Sixteen years have elapsed and the international community still awaits any meaningful action on the part of the nuclear Powers to effectively avert the danger of nuclear war. Despite their professed belief that proliferation enhances that danger, their nuclear arsenals continue to increase and their policies are based on the premise that nuclear weapons should be credited for the absence of a general conflict since the end of World War II.

The third paragraph states the "conformity" of the treaty with the resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the "conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons". As we noted before, and as I intend to demonstrate further, the treaty is at stark variance with the five principles agreed upon in resolution 2028, which was supposed to have provided its guidance and orientation.

The next four paragraphs address the question of peaceful nuclear activities and the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, and set the stage for the operative articles which spell out the safeguards system. Reading the fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh paragraphs, one would think that the principles they uphold apply to all Parties; but in the operative provision on safeguards (Article III), it becomes clear that only non-nuclear Parties have to accept controls over their peaceful activities. The principle of the availability of the benefits of nuclear technology, as contained in the preamble, provides the basis for the legitimization of the system by which only nuclear Powers have the right to the full development of nuclear technology and which they have expanded, in practice, to encompass military technology as well.

Resolution 2028 requires "an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers.". With regard to the freedom of technological research and the application of its benefits, all rights and privileges in the NPT are reserved for the nuclear Powers, while the non-nuclear nations become the sole bearers of obligations. The seventh paragraph recognizes that "all Parties are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in co-operation with other States to, the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes". That recognition, however, although repeated verbatim in Article IV, has no corresponding operative obligations for the nuclear Powers. Instead, stringent barriers have been devised to prevent non-nuclear countries from developing their own peaceful industry.

Paragraphs 8, 9, 10 and 11 are related to the fundamental issues of cessation of the arms race, nuclear disarmament, prohibition of test explosions of nuclear weapons and general and complete disarmament under effective international control. All four paragraphs express the "determination", or the "desire", or the "intention" of the Parties to achieve those objectives. Also, in the case of

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these four paragraphs, not a single concrete obligation for the nuclear Powers is derived from the preamble into the operative articles, except for the vague reference to "good faith" inserted in article VI. It is worthwhile noting that the tenth paragraph recalls the "determination" of the Parties to the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty "to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to that end". As we all have witnessed for the past few years in this Conference, two of the nuclear-weapon Powers Parties to the NPT have successfully prevented any negotiations conducive to the fulfilment of that commitment. Is it possible, in such circumstances, to accept at face value the expression of "good faith" mentioned in Article VI?

Finally, the last preambular paragraph recognizes "the need for States to refrain from the threat or use of force in international relations, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations". Notwithstanding these aims and intentions, intervention, suppression of political independence, disrespect for territorial integrity continue to be everyday events committed overtly and covertly by one or the other of the nuclear Powers in disregard for the purposes and principles of the Charter.

The operative part should be examined in the light of its provisions and the manner they have been implemented and utilized by the nuclear Powers in order to achieve the aims and intentions of the Treaty as stated in the preamble. The main rights and duties of the Parties are contained therein.

Article I spells out the obligations of the nuclear Powers with a view to preventing non-nuclear States from manufacturing or acquiring nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices. The question which has been asked over the past 16 years is simple and remains unanswered: how can proliferation be prevented if some Powers, Parties or non-Parties to the Treaty, retain and utilize their right to continue developing, stockpiling and disseminating their nuclear weapons all over the world? Resolution 2028 stated that "the treaty should be void of any loop-holes which might permit nuclear and non-nuclear Powers, to proliferate, directly or indirectly, nuclear weapons in any form" (stress added). What became of that principle, which was once supported by all, including the nuclear Powers which are now Parties to the treaty? Furthermore, is the non-transfer of weapons, or the transfer of their control, verifiable in any way? What became of the principle of an acceptable balance of responsibilities and obligations in relation to verification? Verification of compliance with the main objective of the treaty is non-existent when it touches on the actions and interests of the nuclear Powers, which are not, in any way, accountable to the other Parties. Concerning the transfer of nuclear weapons, one cannot but evoke their massive deployment in Europe by the super-Powers outside their own boundaries. To corroborate the conformity of such deployment with the provisions of the Treaty, the Parties must count only on unilateral declarations of the nuclear Powers concerned, to the effect that it retains the control over those weapons. By contrast, even the mere transfer of equipment for research reactors for civil purposes to a non-nuclear Party is covered by a stringent system of verification. In other words, nuclear weapons are freely transported and deployed wherever and whenever the super-Powers so decide, while the search for nuclear technology for peaceful purposes by any other country is severely scrutinized.

The super-Powers went even further into their unconstrained freedom to dispose of their nuclear arsenals and, through unilateral interpretations, they will be prepared, if necessary, to relinquish control of nuclear weapons to

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their allies in case of conflict. In "Hearings on Executive H", before the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate, in 1968, connected with the military implications of the NPT, one finds the interpretation that Articles I and II do "not deal with arrangements for deployment of nuclear weapons within allied territory, as these do not involve any transfer of nuclear weapons or control over them unless and until a decision were made to go to war, at which time the treaty would no longer be controlling". Since we have no comparable access to similar publications in the Soviet Union, we do not know how the other super-Power views the situation with regard to a corresponding automatic suspension of its obligations under the Treaty.

The second operative article, which is the obverse, or the mirror-image of the first, spells out the obligations of the non-nuclear countries under the system of verification provided for in the following article.

Two of the nuclear Powers have unilaterally and voluntarily placed their peaceful facilities under the safeguards system of the IAEA. It is difficult to understand why the remaining nuclear Party has so far chosen not to do so, although such a decision is well within its rights according to the Treaty. Confidence in its provisions and purposes would be better served by an attitude of openness with regard to peaceful nuclear activities, the same ones which are subject to a close scrutiny when related to non-nuclear Parties.

The objectives of article IV are most commendable. It clearly upholds the "inalienable right" of all Parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes "without discrimination". Both provisions, however, are qualified by specific references to articles I and II, which contain the fundamental discrimination on which the Treaty was conceived and drafted. Put in plain terms, the Treaty states that there should be no discrimination among its Parties, except, of course, when it is a built-in feature. Thus, it gives legal status to the distinction between nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States, regardless to the military level attained by the nuclear Powers and of the technological level attained by the non-nuclear States. Such a distinction, being forever inscribed in the Treaty, can only disappear when nuclear weapons are wiped out from the face of the Earth, an outcome devoutly to be wished but at best unlikely.

On the contrary, experience has shown that the nuclear Powers needed further reinforcement of the distinction between the two categories of nations. The creation of the so-called "London Suppliers' Club" in February 1975 complemented the provisions of the NPT by a practice of agreed constraints and safeguards. In the words of a commentator of the NPT, "the creation of such a group highlights and sharpens also the division of States into two new categories, i.e., suppliers and recipients, a division that will be later explored with regard to the NPT provisions relating to the promotion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy". The legitimate interests of the developing countries are not appropriately taken into account in such a system, as experience has demonstrated.

Article IV also introduces the subjective element of "purpose" with regard to the use of nuclear energy. Advocates of the Treaty, and especially those which are technologically advanced, have forcefully argued that peaceful technology is inherently indistinguishable from military applications, and that therefore any "sensitive" knowledge must be safely kept in the hands of those which already possess it, for the good of all. The Treaty fails, however, to

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develop further the concept of "purpose". It establishes an absolute distinction between peaceful and warlike applications of nuclear energy, as long as it applies to non-nuclear Parties. The Treaty of Tlatelolco, which predates the NPT, devised an ingenious solution to that complicated problem. Its safeguards system is at least as stringent as the NPT's, and yet it is not discriminatory. A parallel can also be drawn between the NPT and the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons currently under negotiation. In the latter, there is no dispute on the merits of and on the need for the so-called "general purpose criterion". In both cases, technology which has wide applications for civil purposes can also be utilized for hostile ends. In both cases, such hostile ends entail the danger of mass destruction. One can argue that in the case of nuclear weapons, the dangers may be greater; but that is precisely the argument in favour of the priority for nuclear disarmament.

Article V further strengthens the division of the world into two categories of nations, since some designated Parties retain forever the means required to perform the services prescribed therein and so remain as the sole possessors, dispensers and controllers of the full range of nuclear technology. Article V also provides for "special international agreement or agreements" under which such potential benefits from peaceful applications on nuclear explosions would be made available to non-nuclear Parties, and states that "negotiations on this subject shall commence as soon as possible after the Treaty enters into force". Non-nuclear Parties which so desire may also obtain such benefits pursuant to bilateral agreements. It would be useful to know which of the several provisions contained in Article V has ever been implemented. Have "special international agreements" been concluded, or negotiations on them started? Have there been any "bilateral arrangements" established on the subject? Has the envisaged "appropriate international body" been set up?

The provisions of Article VI are the most commented upon since the inception of negotiations on the NPT. Two of the principles of resolution 2028 are particularly pertinent: the Treaty should constitute a step towards nuclear disarmament and contain an acceptable balance of responsibilities and obligations. As I stressed, the preamble expresses the "determination", the "desire" and the "intention" of the Parties to achieve three main objectives: first, the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament; secondly, the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, and thirdly, the elimination from national arsenals of such weapons and the means of their delivery, pursuant to a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control. It would be expected that both resolution 2028 and the stated objectives of the Parties, as expressed in the preamble, would have permitted agreement on operative articles establishing precise and unambiguous commitments to that effect. Instead, the Treaty merely provides for an undertaking by all Parties to those objectives.

Nuclear Powers have never denied their special responsibilities in the field of disarmament; more recently, they have explicitly recognized them, notably in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, which states that "while disarmament is the responsibility of all

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States, the nuclear-weapon States have the primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament". Incidentally, "good faith" is a normal assumption in any international negotiation. In the face, however, of the contractual obligation contained in Article VI, what account can the nuclear Powers give to the other Parties, and to the world at large, on the conduct and on the results of their on-again, off-again negotiations? The most recent example, the INF and START talks, have been discontinued, and their only visible consequence is a new deployment of more deadly weapons of mass destruction.

All efforts designed to bring about the start of multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament have also met with failure, due to the inflexible attitude of the nuclear Powers. Therefore, non-nuclear States, Parties and non-Parties to the NPT, are fully entitled to demand from the nuclear Parties to comply with their obligations forthwith under Article VI, even if this obligation is couched in the most non-committal terms possible. The question is simple and straightforward: after 14 years of existence of the Treaty, what is the status of the negotiations, first for the cessation of the nuclear-arms race, secondly for nuclear disarmament, and thirdly for general and complete disarmament under effective international control? What results, if any, have they produced?

Article VII is of great interest to the Latin American countries which, like Brazil, have successfully negotiated a treaty on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone and which are committed to assuring the total absence of nuclear weapons in their territories and in the zone as a whole. Such a commitment, as well as the consequences it entails, are disregarded by the NPT. The concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones cannot be confined to one or a few regions of the world, while in others proliferation is freely permitted. Nor can this concept be dissociated from an effective system of verification, especially with regard to compliance, by the nuclear Powers, with their obligations toward the zone. But their stated policy of not disclosing the whereabouts of the nuclear weapons they disseminate at will on land, sea and air, is a major impediment to the effectiveness of the nuclear-weapon-free zones. In order "to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons from the territories of States that conclude regional agreements", according to Article VII, nuclear Powers must accept and respect a strict and workable verification system. The lack of such a system undermines the very foundations of the regional arrangements.

Article VIII contains the rules on amendments to and review of the NPT. It starts by democratically giving to all Parties the right to propose amendments. Then, one third or more of the Parties may request the convening of a Conference to consider them. The process for their approval, nevertheless, is as selective as it is discriminatory. A few privileged Parties, of course the nuclear Parties, have the right to veto any proposed amendment, even if all other Parties agree to it. One might, at the limit, envisage a situation in which all 120 or so members of the Treaty, except one nuclear Power, may approve an amendment. That one blocking voice would suffice to prevent its adoption.

Article IX defines a nuclear State for the purposes of the instrument. The objective of such definition appears to be twofold: first, to leave the door open for accession to the Treaty by the two nuclear Powers which so far have not joined it; second, to perpetuate the present structure of power, by sanctioning the nuclear-weapon status of those five countries, whether or not they are Parties to

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the Treaty. The only comment that can be offered is perhaps that all previous attempts at freezing history, especially when based on injustice and privilege, have not withstood the test of time. There seems to be no exception in the case of this new attempt, the roots of which can be found in the system of five permanent members of the Security Council of the United Nations. For 39 years now, the veto power has paralysed all United Nations efforts toward peace and security; likewise, the balance of terror, as condoned by the NPT, has paralysed all efforts toward disarmament.

Article X established the conditions under which Parties may withdraw from the Treaty, and also provides the mechanism aimed at extending its duration indefinitely, after 25 years from its entry into force. Already the question of the indefinite extension of the Treaty appears to be in the forefront of the preoccupations of the Third Review Conference, as the Head of the Swedish Delegation, Mrs. Theoran, reminded us at the start of the summer part of our session. But this is a problem that the Parties themselves are entitled to solve by simple majority. As for the withdrawal clause in Article X, it reads as follows, in its relevant part: "Each State Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of the Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country". Let me simply confront that text with the declaration read at the 268th plenary meeting of this Conference, on 28 June in the name of the Group of 21 by Ambassador Vidas of Yugoslavia, which contains the following statement: "... the existence of nuclear weapons in the arsenals of a handful of States and the quantitative and qualitative development of such weapons directly and fundamentally jeopardize the vital security interests of both nuclear and non-nuclear States alike". The comparison of the two texts speaks for itself.

After an analysis of the NPT and its operation, one can only ask: what does it offer besides discrimination for most and privilege for a few? If the possession of nuclear weapons is a legitimate right of a few, it must necessarily be the legitimate right of all. If nuclear weapons are not legitimate, they can only be banned and eliminated.

The countries which decided not to join the NPT have not exercised, to our knowledge, the nuclear military option, and many, including Brazil, have either joined other instruments by which they renounced nuclear weapons or made official declarations to that effect. Such countries are, nevertheless, subject to a continuing campaign of suspicion and mistrust. Conversely, proliferation by the nuclear Powers continues at an accelerated pace, be it in numbers, quality or in the geographical dimension, justified and legitimized by the very instrument that purports to prevent it. One can only be surprised that, under a regime that offers so many incentives to proliferation, the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries has not yet become a generalized phenomenon.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): I thank the representative of Brazil for his statement and for his kind words addressed to my country and to myself. In accordance with the decision taken by the Conference at its 249th meeting, I now give the floor to the representative of Austria, Mr. Birbaum.

Mr. BIRBAUM (Austria): Mr. President, allow me at the outset to convey my country's gratitude to be given, as a State not member of this Conference, the opportunity to express some views on the subject matter of disarmament. We feel privileged to do this under the presidency of the representative of a country with which Austria enjoys stable and friendly relations and which, as a great country, has a special weight and a special responsibility in the field of disarmament. We pay tribute to Ambassador Issraelyan's renowned diplomatic qualities, his great skill and vast experience, which are important assets in carrying out the functions of the presidency.

Against the backdrop of a high level of tensions in international relations, urgent and important tasks are incumbent upon this distinguished group, the Conference on Disarmament. It has reacted to world-wide expectations by raising its status from that of a committee to a Conference. As far as substance is concerned this change still has to bear fruit.

The Conference can, however, produce only those results that the instructions given to individual delegations permit. And judging by the progress of work over the past few years, the instructions of some at least appear to reflect a preponderance of distrust over the will to co-operate, a reliance on security through arms build-up rather than through co-operative disarmament undertakings and diplomacy. Yet, disarmament diplomacy should not be allowed to degenerate into a mere mechanism for handling public opinion. It has an ever more important, a truly vital role to fulfil, and the more so as important bilateral talks remain suspended and vast areas of arms efforts are, for all practical purposes, not covered by any dialogue forum.

We deeply deplore this deficit in dialogue and diplomacy. The underlying view that security can be really enhanced by building on military strength, disregarding the need for downward stabilization and the security benefits of an enlightened diplomacy may well turn out to be a major error in political judgment. Today's strategic means of destruction and the technological potential to refine, diversify, intensify and multiply this potential through unilateral decisions renders, at a minimum, some regulation through dialogue and co-operative arrangements a condition for real security in the longer run. The over-arching common interest in avoiding nuclear war, the necessity of establishing rules, managing disputes about alleged violations of such rules and institutionalizing points of contacts at many levels is getting more obvious, more urgent every day. We hope that the leading nuclear Powers will spare no efforts to reopen a dialogue on the whole range of arms and to look for ways and means to constrain their arms efforts so as to embark on a course of disarmament.

Austria, a small country in the midst of the most highly armed region of the world, has chosen to seek security not by joining one of the two military alliances, but by adopting the status of permanent neutrality. Buttressing that status by an active foreign policy and by military defence efforts within its reach, the country is particularly sensitive to degradations in the canvas of international relations as well as to a rising arms level in the region.

Thus, Austria contributed actively, within the Madrid follow-up meeting to the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, to bring about the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe which will report to the next CSCE follow-up meeting in Vienna in 1986. The Stockholm Conference, whilst still being short of the necessary procedural

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decisions to enable it to carry out its mandate, has the potential of creating, albeit on a regional level, measures which contribute effectively to strengthening the basic constitutional foundation of all disarmament efforts, namely, the principle of refraining from the threat or use of force in international relations. Hence we consider the work done at Stockholm as an important complement to the efforts of a global reach pursued here at Geneva.

Equally the Vienna Conference on the Reduction of Conventional Arms and Armed Forces in Central Europe, fulfils an important function, even in the absence of agreed texts, as it enhances mutual knowledge and understanding between the Alliance countries participating. Its political role as a working East-West disarmament forum is obvious.

Let me now add a few comments on specific items on the agenda of this Conference. Among the items regularly addressed in this room, there is none more important than the task to arrive at a comprehensive arrangement on ending all nuclear-weapon testing. The Ad Hoc Group of seismological experts, in which Austria has been participating actively for many years, has achieved notable progress in preparing a mechanism to exchange seismological data to help verify underground tests. The recent proposal by the Japanese delegation to prohibit, as an interim measure, those tests that are securely verifiable under the given state of the art seems to us a promising avenue well worth exploring. Another possibility for a decisive slowdown of the testing programmes short of a comprehensive solution might be an arrangement under which the two leading nuclear-weapon Powers would commit themselves on a voluntary basis, for three successive years, to halving the numbers of tests in each year over the preceding year, taking as a common point of departure the arithmetic middle figure between the United States and the Soviet yearly averages over the preceding 20 years. According to our preliminary computations based on the figures published by SIPRI, this would result in a reduction down to between two and three for each of the two at the end of the three-year period. Such an arrangement might be complemented by a declaration of other nuclear-weapon States not to exceed these limits of any given year.

The need to prevent the spreading of the arms competition to outer space is another priority concern which we share with many delegations here. Exploration and use of outer space have been reserved for the benefit and interests of all countries by the Outer Space Treaty. Its peaceful use is already yielding significant results. Satellites used for reconnaissance purposes can contribute to stability and achieve confidence-building effects by verifying compliance with arms-control agreements or diminishing the chances of military surprise moves, thus playing an essential role in the existing arms control set-up.

These gains must be preserved. Building upon them, international co-operation in the peaceful use of space will undoubtedly intensify, in the interest of all countries. In order to protect these common interests, the network of treaties concerning space needs to be strengthened and complemented with a view to preventing the introduction of weapons into space. We hope that the repeated efforts, within this Conference, to tackle this problem will be successful in the near future. The proposals introduced, in this field, by the French delegation on 12 June of this year, commend serious study, as the subject matter calls essentially for multilateral negotiations, even though the solution of some questions in bilateral negotiations would be a welcome achievement.

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Much work has been done by this Conference in the field of chemical weapons, whose topicality was sadly spotlighted by recent events. Austria is formally bound not to possess nor acquire nor test chemical weapons under any circumstances. It is thus greatly interested that this category of weapons be banned altogether. We trust that under the able guidance of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons the momentum achieved can be carried further. We take the readiness in principle to accept permanent on-site verification of destruction of chemical weapons expressed by the Soviet delegation on 21 February 1984, and the tabling of a full treaty text by the United States in April, as good signs that in this difficult area real progress can be achieved.

Let me, Mr. President, briefly turn to the item of negative security assurances. The upcoming Third Review Conference of the NPT reminds us that the commitments undertaken by the vast number of non-nuclear-weapon States in joining the NPT have not yet been adequately balanced, inter alia by satisfactory assurances against nuclear attacks or the threat of such attacks. Meanwhile, the number of nuclear warheads on some categories of vehicles is growing and the danger that the sovereign territory of a country fulfilling all possible conditions to receive negative security assurances might be violated has significantly risen. In this context, it must be entirely clear that the use of such a country's sovereign air space by nuclear armed planes or missiles, be they ballistic or non-ballistic, is not only illegal, but must be included in explicit comprehensive security assurances in the same way as direct attacks. The point has been thoroughly presented by the Finnish delegation here on 26 April 1984, and we find ourselves in full agreement with their statement on this point.

At the upcoming annual session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, expressions of impatience at the slow pace of work of the Conference on Disarmament will no doubt be voiced again. We not only understand, we share that impatience. And yet, this Conference, designated as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum by the Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, is practically irreplaceable. It has assembled a unique political and technical expertise which can be trusted carefully to draft relevant agreements when political circumstances so permit. We hope that that time will come soon, in the interest of all.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): I thank the representative of Austria for his statement and for the kind words addressed to my country and to myself. I now give the floor to the representative of Japan, Ambassador Imai.

Mr. IMAI (Japan): Mr. President, I would like to start by welcoming you, Sir, to the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. We have been observing demonstrations of your outstanding leadership throughout the month, and are convinced that you will continue to guide the Conference during the remaining few days of July with your well-known diplomatic skill and experience. I would also like to take this opportunity to express our appreciation to the Swedish delegation, Mrs. Theorin and Ambassador Ekéus, for their dedication and leadership displayed as the President for the previous month.

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Today, I would like to follow up one of the items which my Foreign Minister discussed in his speech at this Conference on 12 June, to which a number of delegations made reference in this Conference, namely, the question of what is the most practical and effective approach to achieve a nuclear test ban. As he repeatedly said, there should be no doubt that the long-standing objective of Japan is the realization of a complete test ban at an earliest possible date. It is toward this goal that we, together with our colleagues in this forum, have been exerting our utmost efforts. In fact, I am aware that even before Japan joined this forum, the test ban negotiations had been going on in this forum, while throughout the quarter of century of its existence it has changed its names and expanded its membership a number of times. One might be allowed to call the nuclear test ban the most important post-war Geneva item.

In spite of these efforts, it is regrettable that no conspicuous progress in the form of signed and ratified treaties has emerged since the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty. I say this because the Conference on Disarmament is the forum for multilateral disarmament negotiations. I am, of course, aware that there have been products such as the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, but in addition to the unratified status of these Treaties, they do not fall into the category of multilateral arrangements. I wonder, as undoubtedly many others do, what the causes of this lack of progress may be. Here, I have no intention of giving our distinguished colleagues the analysis of the international situation today, or of their history. Many factors which form patterns of complicated interdependence in international politics as well as the vast so-called "advances" in the weapons technology have somehow led to the current situation in which not only are nuclear weapon tests being continued on a considerable scale, but as a consequence, the world is full of nuclear weapons, large and small, of very sophisticated design. It is the common desire of mankind, and certainly of the Japanese people, that something be done urgently to halt this proliferation.

In the deliberations on the subject, verification has always been the central point in establishing the credibility of the test ban. I have no intention of quoting myself, but I recall that on a number of occasions I have discussed political, legal and technical aspects of verification as a very important element in disarmament arrangements. Verification is an instrument of effective deterrence against violation of disarmament agreements by providing timely and credible detection of such violations. Verification is also a means of confidence-building through which parties to an agreement can assure themselves that the agreement is in fact binding, and thus contribute to their national security.

I would like to emphasize that in the context of negotiations in this forum, we are looking at multilateral verification institutions and capabilities. There is a number of factors that need to be considered in this context. The capabilities of such a multilateral system are determined by who the participants are, as well as what they would contribute to this system. Its effectiveness will be governed by the institutional arrangements to collect data, process them, make an appropriate analysis and take necessary actions. With regard to underground nuclear explosions, there are different opinions about the detection capabilities. The difference

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comes from what assumptions one makes. If one is talking about known test sites with the emplacement of numerous so-called "black boxes" around them, the detection capabilities will be very high, whereas if one is talking about underground nuclear explosions that might take place in any part of the world, including possible tests under the sea-bed, there is much to be desired before meaningful capabilities can be achieved.

The Working Paper CD/524 which I am introducing today describes a very simple and practical idea, which my Foreign Minister called the next-best, but a very practical approach. We shall start with the prohibition of nuclear testing within the existing multilateral verification capabilities. In other words, rather than waiting for the perfection of technology as well as considerable expenditure to complete a world-wide ideal network, we may start with what we have already got. In this regard, my delegation hopes to see an ad hoc Committee established under a mandate such as the one contained in document CD/521, introduced by the distinguished delegate of Australia, which would include in its deliberation the following. The first is the need to identify the existing and available detection system based on the contribution by the parties indicating willingness to participate in such a system. We can then proceed to make an assessment and make recommendations about the manner in which the system can be improved. We can thereby start a process of continuously lowering the threshold of the actual test ban, hopefully eventually to zero. The speed and efficiency with which we can reach this goal will entirely depend on our joint efforts. In order to ensure the effective administration of the available verification capabilities and their improvement, discussion should start simultaneously on the institutional arrangements pertinent to this purpose.

I would hasten to add that these procedures are by no means intended to discourage the development and exercise of national technical means by individual countries or to exclude possibilities of countries' undertaking actions based on the findings of their national technical means. In fact, what is proposed here is an attempt to pay tribute to the multilateral nature of this Conference and to do everything possible to advance the cause of a complete test ban agreement. In this sense, the development and use of national technical means should be encouraged with the hope that they will eventually be incorporated into the multilateral verification system envisaged above.

In presenting this Working Paper, I wish to address briefly some of the problems concerning our idea which people may point out and which we ourselves are aware of.

First, it may be objected that our idea would further delay a comprehensive test ban.

Let me reiterate here again that Japan would very much like to see a complete test ban worked out and agreed upon immediately. History, however, seems to indicate that this, unfortunately, is not a very practical idea. We can see from the prolonged debate on a mandate for the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban which took up a good part of this year's session that some patience and a

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step-by-step approach could be more rewarding than repeated declaratory statements. I would also point out that our proposal contains a built-in mechanism to arrive at a comprehensive test ban.

Secondly, it may be argued that our idea would in effect imply legalizing nuclear explosions whose yield is below the threshold and which may now be considered to be militarily significant.

To this argument I can only respond by pointing out that, however desirable a comprehensive test ban may be, we know only too well that what is not adequately verifiable cannot be effectively prohibited or credibly adhered to. Provision that arrangements and actions based on national technical means will in fact be encouraged means that the situation will, at least, be an improvement of what it is today. I would also like to take this opportunity to point out that even a combination of currently conceivable and advanced verification methods would still leave some lower limit below which detection and identification is in doubt as far as the technology as such is concerned. This is one phase of the "scope" issue which needs to be addressed in any event.

Thirdly, it may further be argued that it would be difficult to decide whether an explosion is below the threshold or not. In this context, the difficult question also arises as to how to avoid possible cheating.

These are indeed difficult questions. Here, I may merely state that as we lack necessary information and data in this regard, we can only count upon the forward-looking co-operation on the part of nuclear-weapon States. With their help I hope we can improve our multilateral verification capabilities to such an extent as not to tolerate the existence of any loopholes within the range of our interest. It is possible, in our view, that the initial identification of multilateral capabilities will be a band, rather than a number, especially when we think about the different detection and identification capabilities regarding underground explosions in different parts of the world. In the meantime, as I have mentioned above, a special bilateral arrangement could be worked out within the framework of our multilateral agreement, among States wishing to make the most of their national technical means.

There are certainly other questions to be addressed in a substantive manner, and we welcome a discussion in the ad hoc committee when it is established. While waiting for an in-depth discussion on our proposal, I would like to put forward for your consideration some of the concrete steps which my delegation thinks indispensable for its implementation.

First, it is necessary to define the existing multilateral verification capabilities with regard to both detection and identification. We need this because we have to be very clear about what it is that can be multilaterally verified and therefore can be effectively prohibited. We all know that a valuable report has been presented to this Conference by the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts on the basis of its intensive research concerning international co-operative measures to detect and identify seismic events. And I wish to suggest that the Ad Hoc Group should be entrusted with this new assignment, hopefully within a specified time-limit, to look for and establish a range or a group of seismic events about which

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we can tell, with a certain degree of confidence, on the basis of existing technical capabilities, that they are really nuclear explosions. The results of an experimental exercise should be brought to bear upon these technical findings. Also from the point of view of facilitating this new task of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts, my delegation would like to make an appeal to the nuclear-weapon States to publish the data about their nuclear explosions to the extent possible — their time, location, yield, etc. This would greatly assist the Ad Hoc Group in their work of calibration and enhance the credibility of their findings. Besides being a great help, the publication of nuclear explosions data could also serve as a confidence-building measure — an indication of willingness on the part of the publishing States to accelerate the process for an effective mutual test ban.

Secondly, parallel to our work of defining the existing verification capabilities we should decide on ways and means for their improvement. Only concentrated international efforts to make steady improvements of our ability can justify this approach, which we have called a next-best approach, of starting out by outlawing nuclear explosions at a level corresponding to our present capacity to verify. Thus, enhancing our ability is an integral part of our gradual approach. It is out of this consideration that Japan is working on another Working Paper which tries to examine the relevant technical steps as well as the costs involved in upgrading the current seismic network and the associated communication system to a somewhat more efficient one as indicated by the Ad Hoc Group of Seismic Experts in the past. I hope that we shall be in a position to present such a paper in due course.

These two exercises, in our view, will simultaneously call for an in-depth examination of institutional arrangements to supervise all these and other related activities. The sort of mechanism for the administration of such arrangements which should be set up, in terms of its function and composition, will also have to be discussed and agreed upon. In the event of the establishment of such a mechanism, it would be appropriate to provide for a review of its work and to formulate its future plans at a certain period of time in order to pave the way for an effective zero threshold.

It is our hope that once we have worked out a scheme with the combination of these steps — the determination of existing verification capabilities and means for their improvement as well as effective administration of an international verification organ — we will be in a much clearer position to make the necessary judgement as to the steps required to realize a more comprehensive test ban. In presenting our proposal my delegation wishes that it could be of some help in disengaging ourselves from the present impasse, and would thus make a contribution to reactivating the substantive discussion on a nuclear test ban with a view to its early conclusion.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): I thank the representative of Japan for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President. I now give the floor to the representative of the United Kingdom, Ambassador Cromartie.

Mr. CROMARTIE (United Kingdom): Mr. President, my statement on 12 July was devoted to chemical weapons. This morning I wish to anticipate next week's agenda item by devoting my statement principally to New Weapons of Mass Destruction and Radiological Weapons. I intend, however, also to touch upon some other items on our agenda for this session.

My Government's view on the question of new weapons of mass destruction is well known. We have repeatedly stated, both here and at the United Nations, that the British Government believes that it would be most serious and regrettable if any new kinds of weapons of mass destruction were invented and deployed for use. But my delegation has noted, as others will have done, that although this subject has been on our agenda for many years no substantial evidence of any kind has been put forward to indicate that there are new types of weapons of mass destruction in prospect. There has been no solidly-based proposal for the prohibition of any specific kind of new weapon of mass destruction. In the absence of such a proposal, my delegation continues to oppose the negotiation of a comprehensive agreement on what would still be a hypothetical subject matter. Disarmament treaties need to be specific in scope and susceptible of verification if they are to command international confidence. A comprehensive agreement dealing with unspecified new weapons of mass destruction could not fulfil these requirements. Furthermore, the United Kingdom delegation made clear, as long ago as 1980 (CD/PV.81) that they saw no justification for the establishment of an expert group on this subject, in the absence of the identification of any new weapons of mass destruction or of the principles on which any new weapon of mass destruction might be based. No evidence has been produced since that time which inclines us to change this view. Many other delegations hold similar views.

It was therefore a matter of surprise to us that a group of socialist States should propose at the beginning of this year, in document CD/434, that an Ad Hoc Committee should be set up to deal not only with radiological weapons, according to well-established precedent, but also to negotiate with a view to preparing a draft comprehensive agreement in this field. Nothing, to our knowledge, had occurred which could lead any delegation to believe that such a proposal was more acceptable now than it had been in earlier years. The only result of this manoeuvre was to delay the setting up of the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons until it was too late to embark on substantive work in the first half of our 1984 session. The responsibility for this delay must clearly rest with those delegations who made, and persisted with, this proposal to enlarge a hitherto uncontroversial mandate.

When I spoke on 26 August last year, I made clear the disappointment of my delegation at the lack of progress in the negotiations on radiological weapons during 1983. The intensive negotiations which were conducted in the Working Group last year did not result in an agreement on what we have to come to call the "traditional" radiological weapons treaty; and the discussion of the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities made no sensible progress towards any agreement on the general principles of which a future legal instrument might be based. We had hoped that the Conference would give guidance, as the Working Group's report put it, on "how best to make progress on the subject matter". This guidance was not, however, provided by the Conference, and our hopes of making systematic progress were further dashed by the procedural wrangle which marred the start of the Ad Hoc Committee's work. This procedural difficulty was emphasized by the introduction by the Swedish delegation of a draft treaty which once more concentrated attention on the question

(Mr. Cromartie, United Kingdom)

of the linkage between the traditional radiological weapons treaty and the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities. Work was consequently delayed while one group of delegates argued that we should continue our work on the previously accepted lines, with a clear division between the two subjects, and others called for them to be treated together. My delegation, with others, pleaded for a practical, not an ideological, approach. We were ready to accept whatever the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, Ambassador Vejvoda, thought most appropriate. The programme of work finally adopted, is however, in our view, an unhappy compromise which, as has become only too evident, renders it difficult to conduct a systematic discussion of the problems before the Ad Hoc Committee. The Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons has so far this year concentrated very largely on the questions of definition and scope. As one delegation has ruefully remarked, the passage of time has not eased our difficulties. Much of the discussion has repeated views put forward in earlier years, and there has been little evidence of readiness to seek pragmatic solutions. The Swedish draft treaty has been presented by its authors as "an honest attempt to find compromise solutions which could be acceptable to all". But it is already clear that many delegations do not see a draft whose basic approach is to set the two tracks firmly in the context of a single legal instrument as a basis for compromise. The Swedish delegation has proposed a single criterion -- that of so-called "mass destruction" -- for the selection of nuclear facilities to be covered by any prohibition and in setting lower limits to the size of these facilities. Members of the Group of 21 have supported the general approach of the Swedish draft, but they have not shown themselves ready to support the draft in detail. For example some have continued to argue that "all nuclear facilities" should be included in the scope of any prohibition. As I said last year the all-embracing prohibition which such a statement implies could neither be practically implemented nor theoretically justified.

We cannot expect a great deal of progress in the limited time that now remains to us this year. But in my delegation's view the time would be well spent, and we could have something worthwhile to report, if we could firstly reach agreement in principle on the criteria which would apply in determining which facilities should be protected from attack; and, secondly, on the basis of those criteria, a list of the categories of facilities which might fall within the scope of any prohibition. My delegation is ready to join in such discussions without prejudice to our basic position as set out in earlier working papers (CD/374, CD/RW/WP.47). As a model for the type of definition which is needed my delegation has already drawn attention to the Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy (CD/RW/WP.53).

Agreement on these two basic points could provide a foundation for further work but many other problems remain. The Swedish draft treaty proposes, by implication, that attacks on all nuclear facilities falling within their definition should be prohibited even if these facilities are used for military purposes. Other delegations have continued to argue that only civil facilities should be covered; in this connection there is no consensus on the role which the IAEA might play. The Swedish draft treaty does not deal with the question of the physical marking of facilities or delimitation of zones of protection, to which some delegations have

(Mr. Cromartie, United Kingdom)

attached importance. Indeed in this respect the Swedish draft treaty amounts to little more than an extension to a wider range of installations of the prohibitions already contained in the Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions.

My delegation continues to doubt whether it is either practical or desirable to continue to attempt to combine the two subjects of radiological weapons in the traditional sense and prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities in a single legal instrument. We set out the reasons for these doubts fully in an earlier paper (CD/374), and no arguments to the contrary have been advanced since then which seem to us convincing. But continuing argument over form will not promote a solution to our difficulties. We should instead concentrate on the building blocks both of a treaty to ban radiological weapons and or a possible prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities. Only by systematic stage-by-stage examination of each element, untrammelled by preconceptions as to the final form, can we expect to make progress.

I should now like to turn to another item on our agenda, a nuclear test ban. My delegation has been disappointed this year at our failure to set up an ad hoc committee on this subject to continue the work of the Working Group we had last year. As Mr. Luce, the Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, said on 14 February, we supported the formation of the Working Group to concentrate on a detailed examination of issues relating to verification, the major point of difficulty which has frustrated all attempts at negotiation so far. We believed, and we continue to believe, that unless a measure of agreement is reached on this fundamental point negotiations on a comprehensive test ban treaty will not be successful and that changing the mandate would not help to find a solution to this basic problem. Nevertheless, in spite of these firmly held views, my delegation joined willingly with other Western delegations in the search for compromise language which could go some way to satisfying those delegations which felt that the mandate under which we had hitherto worked was too limited. We examined carefully the text of the existing mandate, of General Assembly resolutions on the subject and of other draft mandates which had been put forward. We were glad to join in a consensus amongst Western delegations on a revised draft mandate which was circulated informally to other groups, as a basis for the establishment of an ad hoc committee. We were disappointed at the lack of response to this informal initiative. The draft has now been tabled formally as CD/521 in the name of nine Western delegations including the United Kingdom. We believe that this mandate would be acceptable to a large number of delegations, not only those which have sponsored it. It is still not too late to reach agreement on it and thus to provide a basis for systematic discussion of this important issue.

A similar procedural difficulty has prevented the opening of substantive discussion on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Western delegations have proposed a draft mandate for an ad hoc committee to enable the Conference to begin the essential work of identifying the areas where negotiation of an agreement might be possible. We still hope that this proposal can provide a basis for starting at last to tackle in detail this urgent and important subject.

(Mr. Cromartie, United Kingdom)

We have agreed that the time is not ripe for further detailed negotiation on the comprehensive programme of disarmament, and no new ideas have been produced which would enable us to make progress on negative security assurances. Each delegation will have its own explanation for our failure to achieve anything in these different areas, but all will agree that one factor casting a shadow over all our activities is the absence of negotiations on nuclear arms between those States possessing the largest nuclear arsenals. The absence of such negotiations is a matter of the greatest concern to my Government. As the British Prime Minister, Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, said at the Guildhall, London, on 11 July, "Nuclear arms control talks must start again and the United States has said it will talk any time, anywhere. Let us at least start talking; this is not time for empty chairs". I am sure these sentiments will have wide support in this Conference.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): I thank the representative of the United Kingdom for his statement. Distinguished delegates, at today's meeting we have to hear all the speakers on the list and take a number of decisions. Unfortunately we have been unable to do so at this morning's meeting. The representatives of Italy and Algeria, who are included in the list of speakers, have kindly agreed to take the floor after lunch. A number of delegations have asked me to allow a little time to hold consultations immediately after lunch. I therefore intend to resume today's plenary meeting at 4 p.m. in this room, when I shall give the floor to Ambassador Alessi. In addition, at the plenary meeting we are to take a decision on the draft mandate in document CD/520, after which we shall suspend the plenary meeting and discuss the three questions tabled for consideration at today's informal meeting. That is my intention, and if I hear no objection, I shall now suspend the meeting which will be resumed at 4 p.m. The meeting is suspended.

The meeting was suspended at 12.55 p.m. and reconvened at 4 p.m.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): The 276th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is resumed. I have on my list of speakers the representative of Italy, Ambassador Alessi, and the representative of Algeria, Ambassador Ould-Rouis. I now give the floor to the representative of Italy, Ambassador Alessi.

Mr. ALESSI (Italy) (translated from French): Mr. President, in accordance with our programme of work, I should like to speak today on agenda item 6, negative security assurances.

The essential reason for such assurances lies in the requirement that non-nuclear-weapon States must be protected against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. They have a wider significance, however, because they help to safeguard peace in a framework of security and stability. Negative security assurances are therefore an objective in the general interest towards which the efforts of all countries, regardless of political or military status, must be deployed. Consequently, although my country enjoys a "positive assurance" as a member of an alliance, it remains deeply interested in taking part in all efforts to make real progress in this field. In view of the forthcoming Third Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, we hope that our negotiations can lead to a joint approach for a common formula. Resolution 36/68, which received such broad support in the United Nations General Assembly, is a valid starting-point for undertaking this task.

(Mr. Alessi, Italy)

Traditionally there have been two main tendencies in this field: one seeks to associate negative assurances with the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and the other views such measures as a first step towards nuclear disarmament. These tendencies may appear to be in conflict with each other. Some fear that negative security assurances, by becoming a counterpart to accession to the NPT or equivalent international legal instruments, may become a means of bringing pressure to bear in order to strengthen the current non-proliferation regime. On the other hand, others consider that security assurances cannot only be the fruit of an agreement among the nuclear-weapon Powers but that the beneficiary countries must for their part ensure that their status as non-nuclear-weapon States is maintained.

The contrast is in fact one of appearance, as one of the objectives of the NPT is nuclear disarmament, the achievement of which will in turn make security assurances superfluous. There cannot be any contradiction, therefore.

Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that, because of the complexity of the negotiations and the security implications, nuclear disarmament can only be achieved gradually over time periods which it is difficult to foresee.

In this context, negative security assurances become particularly important, as they could constitute an objective that could be achieved in the short term, provided they are drawn up on a realistic basis acceptable to all the parties concerned.

While they cannot replace nuclear disarmament measures, they play a positive role in reducing the factors of uncertainty and risk inherent in the international situation. There is therefore a link between agenda item 6 and agenda item 3, on the prevention of nuclear war including all related matters.

We cannot overlook the difficulties which have arisen on this issue during the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament, as the Ad Hoc Committee recently re-established under the experienced chairmanship of the distinguished representative of Bulgaria, Ambassador Konstantinov, has once again had to recognize.

The problems to be resolved concern the conditions which States must satisfy in order to benefit from security assurances, and the circumstances which may limit the scope of the assurances in relation to the security requirements of the nuclear-weapon Powers and their allies.

With regard to the first problem, we consider that the status of non-nuclear-weapon States enjoying the assurances in question must be clearly identifiable. It should not reflect a mere factual situation, of precarious validity, but should correspond to an undertaking which is internationally binding on the States concerned. With regard to the specific form of this undertaking, several possibilities have been indicated and negotiations could explore this aspect in greater depth. We are, however, convinced that some flexibility is required to resolve this problem and smooth the way for governments opposed to the idea of assuming undertakings of this kind.

(Mr. Alessi, Italy)

With regard to the second problem, the only restriction which we consider acceptable in the application of the security assurances is that of an attack carried out by a State associated with or allied to a nuclear-weapon State and directed against another nuclear-weapon State or one of its allies.

It is necessary to distinguish between a static definition of a State enjoying a negative security assurance and a definition of the conditions in relation to which such assurances should be designed, with a view to the circumstances in which hostilities might take place. It is in such circumstances -- and precisely in such circumstances -- that the non-nuclear-weapon States have the assurance that they will not be attacked or threatened with nuclear weapons. Furthermore, it is hard to believe that the territory of a non-nuclear-weapon State which has engaged in an attack on the side of a nuclear-weapon State will remain unscathed. The non-attack clause is, in our opinion, based on reality and therefore gives credibility to the security assurance.

Looking at the matter from a dynamic point of view, such a clause would cover all the situations which might concern us. The non-stationing clause, on the contrary, reflects a static view and responds to political concerns which have nothing to do with the question of negative assurances. It has been designed to meet a specific regional situation in which the lack of symmetry between the two alliances is heightened by the fact that one of the two is a homogeneous geographical entity and therefore enjoys a definite strategic advantage.

Recent events, in which States members of the Warsaw Pact have officially agreed to the deployment of nuclear weapons on their territory, confirm that this issue is governed by other considerations than those which are the object of negotiations under agenda item 6.

The negotiations on the reduction or elimination of nuclear weapons in conditions of undiminished security are of the greatest importance. Our voice is constantly raised in favour of an immediate resumption of talks between two major nuclear-weapon States. However, agenda item 6 has its own scope: issues belonging to other contexts should not be included in it.

The "common formula" which we are endeavouring to find, without success for the time being, should allow the broadest application of the security assurances -- in fact, their universal application -- without thereby upsetting or altering the balance of power between the two alliances. That balance of power should be brought to the lowest possible level in conditions of undiminished security by means of negotiations on the various elements of the over-all balance.

The common formula should in our opinion cover the two above-mentioned elements, in other words, an appropriate definition of the status of a non-nuclear-weapon State and the non-attack clause.

(Mr. Alessi, Italy)

Even if they were universal, such assurances could not be considered credible if they could be unilaterally revoked. We are therefore in favour of the adoption of an internationally binding instrument in which a common formula can be included. A Security Council resolution whose preamble would define the framework, in terms of principles and objectives, in which the security assurances are set would appear to offer the desired solution. The procedure should be the same as the one followed by the Security Council when it has had to deal with issues on which the viewpoints on substantive issues were close although not identical.

Among the precedents which could be mentioned are Security Council resolution 255 of 19 June 1968, adopted on the eve of the opening for signature of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which refers explicitly to that Treaty. Of course, this is only a model, as the wording of the resolution which we advocate should be more specific and precise.

Before concluding, I should like to touch briefly on the question of the nuclear test ban.

In my statement of 14 June I referred once again to the importance which the Italian Government attaches to the resumption of the work of a subsidiary body on the first item of our agenda, which should be given a broader mandate.

A proposal aimed at achieving this goal was submitted on 20 July by nine Western delegations, including that of Italy, under symbol CD/521. It was eloquently introduced at our plenary meeting on 24 July by the distinguished representative of Australia, and my delegation fully endorses the remarks expressed by Ambassador Butler.

This proposal is the result of a serious compromise effort; it has been drafted in order to go as far as possible in the direction of the requirements of the other groups and at the same time to give impetus and substance to our work on so important an issue.

My delegation hopes that it will be fully understood for what it is, a serious and realistic offer, and that it may form the basis for an agreement. This is an opportunity which the Conference must seize.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): I thank the representative of Italy for his statement, and I now give the floor to the representative of Algeria, Ambassador Ould-Rouis.

Mr. OULD-ROUIS (Algeria) (translated from French): Mr. President, I am taking the floor today in my capacity as Co-ordinator of the Group of 21 to introduce two documents.

The first is a statement by the Group of 21 on item 2 of the agenda of the Conference, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". It will shortly be distributed by the secretariat under the symbol CD/526.

The second contains a draft mandate by the Group of 21 for an ad hoc committee on agenda item 5, "Prevention of an arms race in outer space", which has been circulated in document CD/329/Rev.2.

I shall begin by reading out in English the statement on agenda item 2, which is as follows: [spoke in English]

"The Group of 21 is convinced of the paramount need for urgent multilateral negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament through the adoption of concrete measures. The Group of 21 reiterates the views contained in documents CD/116 and CD/180 of 9 July 1980 and 6 August 1980 respectively. In its opinion, multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament have been long overdue and in any event bilateral negotiations, because of their limited scope and the number of parties involved, can never replace or nullify the genuinely multilateral search for concrete disarmament measures. The Conference on Disarmament as the sole multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament should play its role in regard to the urgent question of nuclear disarmament.

"The Group of 21 fully shares the view stated in the Final Document of the First Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament that the nuclear arms race, far from contributing to the strengthening of the security of all States, on the contrary weakens it, and increases the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear war. In addition, the nuclear arms race thwarts efforts towards a greater relaxation of international tensions. On the other hand progress in the sphere of nuclear disarmament would help ensure international peace and security and improve the international climate, which would in turn facilitate further progress. All nations have a vital interest in negotiations on nuclear disarmament because the existence of nuclear weapons in the arsenals of a handful of States and the quantitative and qualitative development of such weapons directly and fundamentally jeopardize the vital security interests of both nuclear and non-nuclear weapon States alike.

"The Group of 21 is further convinced that doctrines of nuclear deterrence, far from being responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security, lie at the root of the continuing escalation of the quantitative and qualitative development of nuclear armaments and lead to greater insecurity and instability in international relations. Moreover, such doctrines, which in the ultimate analysis are predicated upon the willingness to use nuclear weapons, cannot be the basis for preventing the outbreak of a nuclear war, a war which would affect belligerents and non-belligerents alike. The competitive

(Mr. Ould-Rouis, Algeria)

accumulation of nuclear arms by the nuclear-weapon States cannot be condoned on grounds that it is indispensable to their security. Moreover, the Group of 21 rejects as politically and morally unjustifiable that the security of the whole world should be made to depend on the state of relations existing among nuclear-weapon States.

"The Group of 21 is firmly convinced that the greatest peril facing the world today is the threat to the survival of mankind from a nuclear war. It reiterates the message issued by the VIIth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-aligned countries held in New Delhi in March 1983 which, inter alia, expressed 'the renewed escalation in the nuclear arms race, both in its quantitative and qualitative dimensions, as well as reliance on doctrines of nuclear deterrence, has heightened the risk of the outbreak of nuclear war and led to greater insecurity and instability in international relations. Nuclear weapons are more than weapons of war. They are instruments of mass annihilation. The Heads of State or Governments therefore find it unacceptable that the security of all States and the very survival of mankind should be held hostage to the security interests of a handful of nuclear-weapon States. Measures for the prevention of nuclear war and of nuclear disarmament must take into account the security interests of nuclear and non-nuclear weapon States alike and ensure that the survival of mankind is not endangered. They rejected all theories and concepts pertaining to the possession of nuclear weapons and their use under any circumstances.'

"The Group of 21 is convinced of the need to take constructive action towards halting and reversing the nuclear arms race and in this context it recalls once again paragraph 50 of the Final Document which sets out the stages of nuclear disarmament. To this end, as a first step, the Group considers it necessary to halt all testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems to be immediately followed by substantial reductions in nuclear forces. In this regard the Group of 21 welcomes the Joint Declaration issued on 22 May 1984 by the Heads of States or Governments of Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden and Tanzania contained in document CD/502.

"The Group of 21 believes, in accordance with its considered view already expressed in documents CD/64, CD/116 and CD/180, that the immediate objective of the consideration of item 2 by the Conference should be the establishment of an ad hoc committee to elaborate on paragraph 50 of the Final Document and to identify substantive issues for multilateral negotiations, as suggested in document CD/116 and CD/180.

"In the light of this assessment, the Group of 21 submits the following mandate: 'In the discharge of its responsibility as the only multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, in accordance with paragraph 120 of the Final Document of SSOD-I, the Conference on Disarmament decides to establish an ad hoc Committee under agenda item 2.

"The Conference requests the ad hoc Committee to elaborate on paragraph 50 of the Final Document of SSOD-I and to submit recommendations to the Conference as to how it could best initiate, at the beginning of its 1985 session, multilateral negotiations of agreements, with adequate measures of verification, in appropriate stages for:

(Mr. Ould-Rouis, Algeria)

(a) Cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear weapons systems;

(b) Cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery and the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes;

(c) Substantial reduction in the existing nuclear weapons with a view to their ultimate elimination.

"The ad hoc Committee will take into account all existing proposals and future initiatives and report on its work to the Conference on Disarmament before the end of its 1984 session."

[resumed in French]: Allow me now to go on to introduce document CD/329/Rev.2.

At the request of the Group of 21, the secretariat has kindly circulated document CD/329/Rev.2, entitled "Draft mandate for an ad hoc committee on agenda item 5: Prevention of an arms race in outer space".

As you will certainly have noted, this draft mandate is substantively identical to that contained in document CD/329 submitted by the Group of 21 on 14 September 1982.

The changes, purely of form, to be found in document CD/329/Rev.1, circulated on 29 February 1984, and document CD/329/Rev.2, which we are considering today, have been made necessary only because of the change in the title of the single multilateral disarmament negotiating body and its subsidiary organs.

In my capacity as co-ordinator, I have been requested by the Group of 21 to ask you kindly to submit document CD/329/Rev.2 to the Conference on Disarmament for consideration and decision as soon as possible.

This new initiative by the Group of 21 stems from our deep concern at the impasse reached by consultations on the mandate for an ad hoc committee on agenda item 5, a situation which contrasts with the recognition on the part of all delegations of the urgent and overriding need to prevent an arms race in outer space before it is too late.

The Group of 21 has asked for a decision to be taken on this draft because it continues to consider the creation of an ad hoc committee with an appropriate mandate to be the best means available to the Conference to discharge its responsibilities with regard to this agenda item.

Furthermore, in view of the incalculable risks to the security of all States which would arise from an arms race in outer space, the common heritage of mankind which must be preserved for exclusively peaceful purposes, the Group of 21 remains firmly convinced of the eminently multilateral nature of this issue, and reaffirms that the Conference on Disarmament is the most appropriate forum for carrying out negotiations on this item.

On the basis of this position of principle, the Group of 21 considers that any negotiations on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in a framework other than that of the Conference should in no way prevent the Conference from discharging its mandate as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum

(Mr. Ould, Rouis, Algeria)

or from undertaking negotiations as rapidly as possible in order to achieve an agreement or agreements to prevent an arms race in outer space, which is the goal of the mandate proposed in document CD/329/Rev.2.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): I thank the representative of Algeria for his statement, and I give the floor to the representative of China, Ambassador Qian Jiadong.

Mr. QIAN JIADONG (China) (translated from Chinese): Mr. President, I am not on the list of speakers for today's plenary meeting. The reason I requested the floor now is that a representative of a non-member country implicitly attacked China in his statement this morning.

His request to make a statement on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament was granted after discussions at the 273rd plenary meeting. The Chinese delegation, in a consistent spirit of reasonableness and fairness, and in view of precedents set last year and in the first half of this year, also consented to this request.

It was hoped that the statement by the representative of this non-member country would be positive and constructive, and would contribute to furthering the work of our Conference. But in fact it turned out to be just the opposite.

In his speech, the representative launched a vicious accusation against what he called a neighbouring nuclear country. The accusation is not only groundless but also a reversal of truth and a falsehood. I do not want to waste our time in detailed repudiation of the accusation, because it is absolutely clear as to who has sent over a hundred thousand troops to a neighbouring sovereign country and occupied it even to this day, who has constantly carried out armed provocations against its neighbours, who is committing aggression and threatening the peace and security of South-East Asia. The Chinese delegation resolutely rejects the slanders and false accusations of this representative. If he really wants to present the country he represents as a peace-loving one, the best and simplest way to do so would be the withdrawal of its more than one hundred thousand troops from its neighbour at the earliest date possible.

This Conference is a forum for serious negotiations. It is a demonstration of our goodwill when we adopt a resolution granting a non-member country the opportunity to speak at our plenary meeting. We cannot allow this expression of goodwill to be abused and trampled upon.

Mr. President, I have not yet congratulated you on your assumption of the chair for this month. Please allow me to take this opportunity to do so. Your experience, ability and dedication are so well known that I have nothing further to add. I would like to extend to you my best wishes and hopes for your success.

Thank you, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): I thank the representative of China for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President. The list of speakers for today is now concluded. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor? I give the floor to the representative of the United States.

Mr. FIELDS (United States of America): Mr. President, I had planned to exercise my right of reply with regard to the same subject matter addressed by our distinguished colleague from China. He has so eloquently stated the case that I feel it not much in my interest other than to reject the claims, the calumnious claims, with respect to my own Government, and to join the distinguished representative of China in his view concerning the way in which non-member States are extended the courtesy of making interventions relating to the work of this Conference and which will lend a constructive character to our work. I think this morning's statement, however, represented quite the contrary. It contained very little of substance and quite a lot of political rhetoric which is in bad taste and in violation of the invitation extended by members of this body. Moreover, the hypocrisy of the statement was eloquently referred to by the distinguished representative of China and I fully associate myself with those remarks.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): I thank the representative of the United States for his statement. Does any one else wish to take the floor? That does not appear to be the case. In accordance with the request of the Group of 21 I would now like to go on to the adoption of a decision on document CD/520. I give the floor to the representative of Algeria, Ambassador Ould-Rouis.

Mr. OULD-ROUIS (Algeria) (translated from French): Mr. President, as you have just announced, the Conference has today to take a decision on document CD/520 entitled "Draft mandate for the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban" submitted by the Group of 21 at the plenary meeting on 17 July 1984.

When introducing this draft as Co-ordinator, I explained the reasons for the action taken by the Group of 21 and stressed the need for the Conference to begin without delay negotiations on a treaty for the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

The commitment of the Group of 21 to this objective is well known to all, and so there is no need to recall in detail our position on this issue. I shall therefore confine myself to a few remarks before the Conference takes a decision on document CD/520.

This session is drawing to a close, and we must unfortunately recognize the fact that in the absence of agreement on the setting up of an ad hoc committee with a suitable mandate the Conference will once again this year have devoted in all only four plenary meetings to this issue which, however, is included in its agenda with highest priority.

Clearly, such treatment is in keeping neither with the importance of the issue and its possible impact on a nuclear disarmament process nor with the urgency of the matter.

In 1982, concerned at the continuing lack of negotiations on this agenda item, the Group of 21, in a display of a spirit of compromise, agreed to participate in a consensus on the setting up of an ad hoc working group with a mandate which it nevertheless considered inadequate. In doing so, the Group of 21 was inspired by the will to overcome the impasse and make it possible to set up a working group on a nuclear test ban.

In a further display of flexibility, the Group of 21 did not oppose the renewed setting up of the Working Group with the same mandate in 1983, although it considered that the Working Group had exhausted the consideration of the issue of verification and compliance.

(Mr. Ould-Rouis, Algeria)

Meanwhile, the consultations on the extension of that mandate did not lead to any agreement in 1983. These consultations, resumed at the beginning of this session in a contact group and subsequently directed by yourself, Mr. President, consultations in which the Group of 21 has played an active part, in particular in giving serious and responsible consideration to all proposals put forward, have not given the results counted on by the Group of 21. In the light of this, the Group of 21 considers that the time has come for the Conference to take a responsible decision and engage without delay in negotiations on a nuclear-test-ban treaty in an ad hoc committee set up for that purpose.

The terms of reference proposed in document CD/520 seem to us quite appropriate to enable the Conference to discharge its mandate on this issue. This draft mandate is, furthermore, entirely in keeping with resolution 38/62, in which the General Assembly reiterates its appeal to all States members of the Conference on Disarmament to "initiate immediately the multilateral negotiation of a treaty for the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests".

The Group of 21 hopes that this draft mandate will be favourably received by all members of the Conference, so that the latter may at once set itself to the task of negotiating a treaty for the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): I thank the representative of Algeria for his statement, and in accordance with the request made by the Group of 21 at the 275th plenary meeting I now intend to invite the Conference to take a decision on the draft mandate for a subsidiary body on agenda item 1, "Nuclear test ban", submitted by the Group of 21 in document CD/520. I would remind delegates that we considered this question at the informal meeting on 24 July. Are there any objections to the adoption of the draft mandate for a subsidiary body on agenda item 1, "Nuclear test ban", contained in document CD/520? I give the floor to the representative of Australia.

Mr. BUTLER (Australia): Mr. President, if you will permit me to make these few remarks, I will not purport to address directly the question you have just put, that is, are there any objections? Rather, I want to put a question on behalf of my delegation and, I believe, on behalf of the other eight delegations for whom I spoke two days ago when another draft mandate under item 1 was tabled by that group. It is a question about consultations. It is the impression of my delegation and, I believe, the nine delegations involved, that sufficient consultations have still not been held on this matter, and, in particular, on the draft mandate which these nine delegations submitted.

I recall that when that draft mandate was submitted at the conclusion of our discussions that day, you said, and I believe you did so in order to facilitate our work, that consultations would take place. I think you said both multilaterally and bilaterally. I believe some consultations have taken place but I am putting the question of whether or not they have been sufficient. I would remind you, Mr. President, that this morning you indicated that it was your impression, from the consultations which you undertook to hold, that there was no agreement. I am not sure, Mr. President, that those consultations -- which you yourself intended to initiate -- have been sufficient so I am really asking the question, "Have we consulted sufficiently on this matter?" Of course, I am implying that it is the belief of my delegation that we have not, and I wonder whether we should not take some more time before answering your direct question of whether or not this proposal from the Group of 21 is acceptable.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): Does any other delegation wish to take the floor concerning the draft mandate in document CD/520? I give the floor to the representative of the German Democratic Republic.

Mr. ROSE (German Democratic Republic): Comrade President, before dealing with document CD/520, may I be permitted to make just one remark. I would like to say that my delegation welcomes very much the contributions made by the non-member States to our debate this morning and we are of the opinion that every country participating in this debate has the right to explain its positions to us.

Now, in dealing with document CD/520, Comrade President, as early as Tuesday I stated on behalf of the Group of Socialist States that we support the proposal in document CD/520 for a mandate of a committee to be set up in connection with item 1 of the agenda. Our Group has presented a draft mandate of its own to the Conference; this draft is contained in document CD/522. The two texts are not identical; however, the proposal tabled by the Group of 21 also calls emphatically for negotiations on a treaty to ban all nuclear-weapon tests. This is what we consider the crucial element. Only a clear negotiating mandate would enable the Committee to achieve real progress. Therefore we advocate the adoption of document CD/520 by the Conference and I would like to reaffirm that, if the draft mandate proposed by the Group of 21 is adopted, we will not press for a decision on our draft contained in document CD/522.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): I thank the representative of the German Democratic Republic. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor? I give the floor to the representative of Algeria.

Mr. OULD-ROUIS (Algeria) (translated from French): I wish merely to reply very briefly to the remarks just made by the distinguished representative of Australia on behalf of the Group of Western Countries who has asked if there have been enough consultations on this item. I think that that is the case. I explained this on behalf of my Group quite fully in my statement. As an indication, simply as a reminder, I would say that the proposals made by the Western Group have in fact been discussed for several weeks, in fact I think for a month and a half unless I am mistaken. I therefore believe that there have been enough consultations and, in view of the urgency and priority of this problem, my Group insists that a decision be taken today.

The PRESIDENT: (translated from Russian): I thank the representative of Algeria. May I again repeat my question? Is there any objection to the adoption of document CD/520? I give the floor to the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Mr. WEGENER (Federal Republic of Germany): Mr. President, I am responding to your question on behalf of the Group for which I am the Co-ordinator during the current month.

I regret to inform you, and through you, the delegation, that it has not been possible, in the ongoing consultation process, to unite all delegations in the Group of Western Countries, behind the mandate contained in document CD/520. We cannot, therefore, join in a consensus on this mandate. My regret and that of my colleagues, Mr. President, that I have to go on record with this statement, is enhanced by the fact that in the view of the Group the consultation possibilities have not been fully utilized, and that a mandate, rashly, has been put forward, in the full knowledge that it would not be acceptable to all members of this group. The grave consequences of such procedure, the grave consequences of demanding too

(Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic of Germany)

much at an arbitrarily chosen time, in a Conference that is based on consensus, are evident: that we will not be able to tackle a subject of such vital importance at all, and that the delegations of the Group of Western Countries, like all other delegations, will be prevented from doing useful, constructive work in the field of nuclear testing.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): I thank the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor concerning the mandate? I give the floor to the representative of Mexico.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): As I did not intend to speak at this meeting, I beg my colleagues to forgive me if they find my statement today at times somewhat ill-contrived, as always occurs when one is speaking off the cuff. I believe, however, that what the distinguished representative of the Federal Republic of Germany has just said in his capacity as Co-ordinator of the Group of Western Countries cannot remain without a reply, and preferably an immediate reply which will appear in the same verbatim record as his words.

As a member of the Group of 21, I consider that all the members of that Group, all the members of the Group of Socialist States, and the great majority of the members of the Group of Western and Other Countries (which, if they could have acted quite freely and were not subject to the rules which unfortunately do exist and which often tie the hands of delegations so that they cannot express their feelings quite spontaneously) all those members, I repeat, which must number roughly 37 or 38 member States of this Conference on Disarmament, of this single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, believe that the time has come for us to do honour to what the General Assembly decided by consensus in 1978 and, in the terms of 1982, categorically and unanimously reaffirmed two years ago, in other words: that this is the single multilateral disarmament negotiating body, that the question of the complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon testing has been included for over a quarter of a century in the agenda of the United Nations, and that until some **three** or four years ago, without any delegation dissenting, nemine discrepante as the old Latin schoolmen would have said, it was always agreed that it was the item which must receive highest priority. I think that all those delegations, if they were to carry out an objective examination of events and an introspective examination of their own spontaneous conclusions, would agree with me that there has been no arbitrariness, far from it, as the distinguished representative of the Federal Republic of Germany said, nor indeed any undue haste. Really, if after a quarter of a century it is still possible to talk of haste, that would be the height of irony, it would be sarcasm, Mr. President. I therefore repeat that my delegation has a very clear conscience, as I think all the other representatives to whom I have referred must also have. And I think that the time must now come when we must decide if this Conference on Disarmament will outdo the Security Council at its worst moments, because the Security Council in recent times has occasionally functioned with considerable efficiency, perhaps not in results but certainly in procedure. Consequently, in my opinion the time will come when we must ask ourselves whether there is a desire to put an end to this organ, to "kill it" as was recently stated by one of the members of this Conference in a trip he made to the capital of the United States, whether that is what is desired, or whether it is desired that we should try to enable it to function in such a way as to be able to present concrete results on the issues for which it was established.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): I thank the representative of Mexico for his statement. Does any other speaker wish to take the floor? That does not appear to be the case. In view of the statements just made, I am obliged to declare that for the time being there is no consensus for the adoption of the draft mandate contained in document CD/520. I give the floor to the representative of Algeria, Ambassador Ould-Rouis.

Mr. OULD-ROUIS (Algeria) (translated from French): In my capacity as Co-ordinator, I wish to express the deep disappointment of the Group of 21 to note that the Conference on Disarmament has once again been prevented from setting up the structural framework to enable it to undertake negotiations on a question which again enjoys the highest priority on its agenda, namely, the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

The continuing unwillingness of some delegations, to which the distinguished representative of Mexico has just referred, to engage in a process of multilateral negotiation on a nuclear-weapon-test ban is a symptom of the size of the impasse which prevents the Conference from carrying out its mandate as the single multilateral organ in the disarmament field.

While regretting the lack of consensus on its proposal, the Group of 21 is determined to persevere in its search for a suitable solution which would make it possible for the Conference to undertake as rapidly as possible a negotiating process on agenda item 1. In seeking to attain this objective the Group of 21 will continue to display flexibility.

We can only hope that the delegations which once again have not been in a position to join in a consensus on the setting up of an ad hoc committee with an appropriate mandate on a nuclear-test ban will take advantage of the period between sessions to reflect on the seriousness of the situation and revise their position so as to bring it into line with the appeals of the international community.

At the plenary meeting on 24 July 1984 two draft mandates for the ad hoc committee on agenda item 1 were submitted to the Conference.

The first, distributed under symbol CD/521, was submitted by nine States members of the Western Group. The second, contained in document CD/522, was submitted on behalf of a group of socialist States.

Both these draft mandates have been studied with the greatest attention and in a spirit of compromise by the Group of 21. I must, however, unfortunately state that the Group of 21 is not in a position to endorse the draft submitted by the Group of Western States in document CD/521.

While recognizing the great efforts deployed by some delegations in the Western Group to draw closer to our position, the Group of 21 considers that the mandate of the ad hoc committee must be in keeping with the urgent need for the multilateral negotiation of a nuclear-weapon-test-ban treaty.

With regard to the mandate of a group of socialist States contained in document CD/522, the Group of 21 is prepared to adopt it inasmuch as it responds to our main concern, which is to engage in a multilateral negotiating process on a treaty for the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

X The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): I thank the representative of Algeria, and I now give the floor to Ambassador Butler of Australia.

X Mr. BUTLER (Australia): Thank you Mr. President. Very briefly, and speaking for the Australian delegation, may I express to our distinguished colleague from Algeria my appreciation of that part of the statement he has just made in which he made a commitment to a further search for a solution to this problem. I can certainly give the same commitment on the part of my delegation.

X The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): I thank the representative of Australia. I now intend to suspend the plenary meeting and in a few minutes' time convene an informal meeting of the Conference in accordance with the time-table, as I explained this morning. The meeting is suspended.

The meeting was suspended at 5.10 p.m. and reconvened at 6.10 p.m.

X The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): The 276th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is resumed. In accordance with the request of a group of socialist countries presented by the representative of the German Democratic Republic, Ambassador Harald Rose, at the 275th plenary meeting, I now intend to invite the Conference to consider and adopt a decision on the draft mandate for a subsidiary body on agenda item 1, "Nuclear test ban", submitted by a group of socialist States in document CD/522. Is there any objection to this document?
x I give the floor to Ambassador Wegener.

X Mr. WEGENER (Federal Republic of Germany): Mr. President, speaking as the Co-ordinator of the Group of Western Countries, in view of the position of certain delegations I cannot join in a consensus on this draft text. I would like to refer, in addition, to the statement I gave on behalf of the Group, relating to document CD/520.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): I thank the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany and I give the floor to the representative of Algeria.

X Mr. OULD-ROUIS (Algeria) (translated from French): We are now about to take a decision on this document, and I should simply like to reiterate the viewpoint of my Group, which is that we are ready to adopt the draft mandate of the Group of Socialist Countries in document CD/522 because it responds to our concern, as I said at the previous plenary meeting, which is to engage in a multilateral negotiating process for a treaty on the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.
X

The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): I thank the representative of Algeria for his statement. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor on this subject? If not, then in light of the statement just made on behalf of a group of countries, I must declare that for the time being there is no consensus for the adoption of the draft mandate contained in document CD/522. Does anyone wish to take the floor in this connection? I give the floor to Ambassador Rose of the German Democratic Republic.

X Mr. ROSE (German Democratic Republic): We regret very much that, due to the position of one of the countries, no consensus was reached on document CD/522. Our Group, however, will not cease its efforts to achieve an agreement which allows the commencement of negotiations on a treaty banning all nuclear-weapon tests.

X We have always considered, and still consider, such a treaty as a very important instrument to stop the nuclear-arms race, diminish the danger of nuclear war and build confidence among States. I would like, on behalf of the Group of Socialist Countries, to thank the Group of 21 for the support they have given to our draft mandate.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): I thank the representative of the German Democratic Republic. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor? That does not appear to be the case. I shall now go on to the consideration of the question of the date of the closing of the present session of the Conference on Disarmament. This question has just been considered at the informal meeting. May I therefore take it that the Conference on Disarmament is agreed to fix the date of the closure of its 1984 session as 31 August. If there is no objection, it is so decided.

It was so decided.

X The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): At my request the secretariat today distributed a time-table of meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies next week. The time-table has been drawn up in consultation with the Chairmen of the Ad Hoc Committees of the Conference. As usual, the time-table is purely indicative and may be altered. If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the time-table. I should like to remind you that on Monday the President's consultation will continue from 10 a.m. to 1 p.m.; unfortunately, I must point out that this will be the last time.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): As we have now concluded our work for today, I intend to close the plenary meeting. I give the floor to the representative of Mongolia, Ambassador Erdembileg.

X Mr. ERDEMBILEG (Mongolia) (translated from Russian): Comrade President, with your permission I should like to express our concern at the statements made today by the representatives of China and the United States of America in exercise of the right of reply; they tried to cast doubt upon the sincerity of the efforts of the representative of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, who delivered a statement full of substance at our plenary meeting this morning.

X I should like to remind members of the Conference that there have been cases when in this forum the representatives of some NATO member States not members of the Conference have, in their statements at plenary meetings, made attacks against the socialist States and their foreign policy, which is aimed at achieving real measures in the field of limiting the arms race and disarmament, and at preserving international peace and the security of peoples.

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

I wish to stress that the countries of the socialist community place highly esteem the great contribution made by the representatives of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam to the work of the Conference on Disarmament. We are firmly convinced that the representatives of socialist Viet Nam, of a heroic people which has won the deep respect of all peace-loving countries and peoples for its valour in its struggle against repeated foreign aggression and for freedom and peace, will continue to make their contribution to the work of this forum.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): I thank the representative of the Mongolian People's Republic, Ambassador Erdembileg. Does any other speaker wish to take the floor? That does not appear to be the case, and I therefore declare the meeting closed. The next plenary meeting will be held on Tuesday, 31 July 1984, at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting rose at 6.20 p.m.