

# CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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ENGLISH

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## FINAL RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND SIXTY-SIXTH PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva  
on Thursday, 21 June 1984, at 10.30 a.m.

President:

Mr. R. Ekéus

(Sweden)

GE.84-62609

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

<u>Algeria:</u>	Mr. A. TAFFAR
<u>Argentina:</u>	Mr. J.C. CARASALES Mr. R. GARCIA MORITAN
<u>Australia:</u>	Mr. R. ROWE
<u>Belgium:</u>	Mr. M. DEPASSE Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE
<u>Brazil:</u>	Mr. C.A. de SOUZA e SILVA Mr. S. de QUEIROZ DUARTE
<u>Bulgaria:</u>	Mr. K. TELLALOV Mr. P. POPTCHEV Mr. C. PRAMOV Mr. N. MIHAILOV
<u>Burma:</u>	U MAUNG MAUNG GYI U HLA MYINT
<u>Canada:</u>	Mr. J.A. BEESLEY Mr. G.R. SKINNER Mr. M.C. HAMBLIN
<u>China:</u>	Mr. QIAN JIADONG Ms. WANG ZHIYUN Mr. SUO KAIMING Mr. LU MINGJUN Mr. ZHANG WEIDONG
<u>Cuba:</u>	Mr. C. LECHUGA HEVIA Mr. E. de la CRUZ Mr. A. CURBELO
<u>Czechoslovakia</u>	Mr. M. VEJVODA Mr. A. CIMA

Egypt:

Mr. A.M. ABBAS

Ms. W. BASSIM

Ethiopia:

Mr. F. YOHANNES

France:

Mr. F. de la GORCE

Mr. H. RENIE

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. H. THIELICKE

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. H. WEGENER

Mr. F. ELBE

Mr. M. GERDTS

Hungary:

Mr. T. TOTH

India:

Mr. S. KANT SHARMA

Indonesia:

Mr. S. SUTOWARDOYO

Mr. I.M. DAMANIK

Mrs. P. RAMADHAN

Mr. F. QASIM

Mr. I. WIRANATAATMADJA

Islamic Republic of Iran:

Mr. N.K. KAMYAB

Mr. F.S. SIRJANI

Italy:

Mr. M. ALESSI

Mr. M. PAVESE

Mr. B. CABRAS

Mr. G. ADORNI BRACCESI

Japan:

Mr. M. IMAI

Mr. M. KONISHI

Mr. T. ISHIGURI

Mr. K. TANAKA

Mr. I. AKIYAMA

Mr. N. YAMAMOTO

Kenya:

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Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES  
Ms. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO  
Mr. P. MACEDO RIBA

Mongolia:

Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG  
Mr. S.O. BOLD

Morocco:

Mr. O. HILALE

Netherlands:

Mr. R.J. Van SCHAIK  
Mr. J. RAMAKER  
Mr. R.J. AKKERMAN

Nigeria:

Mr. J.O. OBOH  
Mr. F.O. ADESHIDA

Pakistan:

Mr. K. NIAZ

Peru:

Mr. C. CASTILLO RAMIREZ

Poland:

Mr. S. TURBANSKI  
Mr. G. CZEMPINSKI  
Mr. J. CIALOWICZ  
Mr. T. STROJWAS

Romania:

Mr. I. DATCU  
Mr. T. MELESCANU  
Mr. P. BALOIU  
Mr. V. TUDOR

Sri Lanka:

Mr. H.M.G.S. PAKTHAKKARA

Sweden:

Mr. R. EKEUS  
Ms. E. BONNIER  
Mr. H. BERGLUND  
Mr. J. LUNDIN  
Mrs. A.M. LAU

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELIAN  
Mr. G.V. BERDENNIKOV  
Mr. P.Y. SKOMOROKHIN  
Mr. V.F. PRIAKHIN

United Kingdom:

Mr. R.I.T. CROMARTIE  
Mr. G.H. COOPER  
Mr. J.F. GORDON  
Mr. D.A. SLINN

United States of America:

Mr. L. FIELDS  
Mr. R. SCOTT  
Mr. J. MISKEL  
Ms. M.A. WINSTON  
Mr. R. MIKULAK  
Mr. M.G. MacDONALD  
Mr. A. HOROWITZ  
Mr. J. McATEER  
Mr. B. MORTON  
Mr. P. WATERS  
Mr. P.C. LEMBESI

Venezuela:Yugoslavia:

Mr. K. VIDAS  
Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC  
Mr. D. MINIC

Zaire:

Mrs. ESAKI KABEYA

Secretary-General of the Conference  
on Disarmament and Personal  
Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. J. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary-General of the  
Conference on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The PRESIDENT: The plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is called to order.

The Conference continues its consideration of item 1 on its agenda entitled "Nuclear test ban". However, in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of the United States of America and Bulgaria.

I now give the floor to the representative of the United States of America, Ambassador Fields.

Mr. FIELDS (United States of America): Thank you, Mr. President. May I express to you the pleasure that I and my delegation have in seeing you at the helm of our Conference at the outset of our summer session. We have admired and benefited from your skilful direction of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, and thus we know that the Conference will have excellent leadership as we take up our work for the summer. We are, of course, indebted to our distinguished colleague, Ambassador Dhanapala of Sri Lanka, for his able guidance of our Conference last April. His effective leadership left us in good shape as we recessed in May, and enabled us to pick up our work expeditiously on our return to Geneva.

On 18 April of this year, the Vice-President of the United States, the Honourable George Bush, introduced in this conference a draft convention for the prohibition of chemical weapons, contained in document CD/500. This draft convention contains the United States proposals for the contents of an agreement that would provide a complete and verifiable ban on chemical weapons. It was introduced in order to help accelerate the work of the Conference on Disarmament in achieving such a ban. The introduction of this text is the most recent in a long series of United States efforts and initiatives towards the achievement of this goal. Our draft is intended as a contribution to the Conference's work and will provide the basis for other papers to be presented by the United States delegation on specific issues as they are discussed. But, as I indicated in my statement of 26 April, my delegation does not have a monopoly on creativity. We are ready and willing to consider any alternative approaches as long as they would satisfy our fundamental objective, and that is an effective ban on chemical weapons.

The efforts of many interested delegations have gone into the process of this important undertaking, and much more remains to be done. A week ago today, many now in this Chamber had just returned from the chemical weapons workshop sponsored by the Federal Republic of Germany. The workshop was a significant contribution to our work on a chemical weapons ban, and all of those in attendance have a

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better understanding of the complexity of the problems associated with the destruction of chemical weapons. Moreover, they have clearer insights into the verifiability of this process and the importance of on-site verification of destruction of chemical weapons to the effectiveness of a convention. We are indebted to the Federal Republic of Germany for this excellent manifestation of its continuing support of this critical negotiation.

Today I want to emphasize our readiness to continue to work intensively and constructively to reach a ban on chemical weapons. Not only is my delegation here in full force, but we have brought with us several experts, including a lawyer, who will work full-time on the Conference's effort to conclude a chemical weapons ban so that such a ban can be a reality as soon as possible.

Today I would like to begin a review of the current status of the issues involved in a chemical weapons ban, and explain how the United States draft convention approaches each of these issues. Basically, a ban on chemical weapons must deal with four types of issues: first, what a party to the convention is prohibited from doing, that is, what it must not do; second, what a party may do; third, what a party must do; and fourth, the verification measures that will be necessary to provide confidence that States are complying with their obligations.

Today I will discuss the first set of issues -- what a party must not do under a chemical weapons ban. In this area agreement appears to have been reached on the key issues, although a number of secondary issues remain. You will notice that in this area the United States draft draws extensively from the results of the Conference on Disarmament's past work.

A statement of what must be prohibited by a chemical weapons ban can be summarized in a single phrase -- a party should not have anything -- anything at all -- to do with chemical weapons. This basic prohibition is expressed in the first article of the United States draft convention. The parties must not develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain, or transfer chemical weapons. To understand the scope of this prohibition, however, it is necessary to understand what is meant by the term "chemical weapons". This term is defined by article II. "Chemical weapons" are defined as, first, "super-toxic lethal, other lethal, and other harmful chemicals and their precursors" of types or in quantities not justified for permitted purposes. Thus, the definition of "chemical weapons" incorporates a general "purpose" criterion.

"Super-toxic lethal chemicals" are extremely dangerous and toxic chemicals, such as mustard gas and the nerve gases, that have little or no use other than in chemical warfare. "Other lethal chemicals" are chemicals

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that are somewhat less dangerous and less toxic, chemicals such as hydrogen cyanide or phosgene, that can be used in chemical warfare but also have uses in the chemical industry. "Other harmful chemicals" are chemicals that are less toxic still, and therefore less dangerous, but which nevertheless have potential uses in chemical warfare and which need to be regulated. The term "precursors" includes any chemical which may be used in production of these chemicals. I emphasize again that all of these chemicals -- "super-toxic lethal", "other lethal", "other harmful", and "precursors" -- are included in the definition of chemical weapons.

There are also certain chemicals which are specifically excluded by this definition, namely less toxic chemicals that are used for domestic law-enforcement and domestic riot control purposes. Also excluded are less toxic chemicals used as herbicides. The hostile use of such chemicals as herbicides, however, is already effectively banned by international law. We recognize that many advocate the inclusion of such chemicals in a chemical weapons ban. In view of the widespread development, production, and use of these chemicals for permitted purposes, we have not been persuaded that including them would increase the effectiveness of the convention.

But the scope of the definition of "chemical weapons" in the United States draft does not stop with toxic chemicals. Also included are munitions or devices specifically designed to cause death or harm through the release of the various chemicals I have discussed. Thus, not only are chemicals included in the definition of "chemical weapons", but also any type of munitions or devices used to release them on the battlefield. Finally, the definition of "chemical weapons" includes any equipment or chemical specifically designed to be used in conjunction with such munitions or devices. Thus, for example, a chemical specifically designed to make a gas mask ineffective by neutralizing its charcoal filter is considered to be a chemical weapon.

The basic prohibition contained in article I goes beyond the obligation that I have discussed thus far -- this article also provides an obligation not to conduct other activities in preparation for the use of chemical weapons. This reflects an idea proposed in this forum by the delegation of Sweden, that such activities as the training of troops to use chemical weapons be banned along with the chemical weapons themselves. Further refinement of this concept is necessary to make it more precise and to ensure that legitimate protective activities are not hampered.

Subparagraph (c) of article I would prohibit the use of chemical weapons in any armed conflict. This provision was incorporated in recognition of the importance attached by States to a provision banning use of chemical weapons. The language proposed by the United States provides for a



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comprehensive ban without undermining the 1925 Geneva Protocol. The prohibition in the United States draft is similar to, but distinct from, the prohibition contained in the Protocol. The Protocol bans the use of chemical weapons in war, although many Parties have explicitly reserved the right to retaliatory use.

Article I must be read in conjunction with article XIV, which stipulates that nothing in this Convention shall detract from the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which would continue in full force. Thus, in effect, the proposed chemical weapons convention would broaden a State's obligation but not replace the Protocol. If for any reason a party to the convention should withdraw from the chemical weapons convention, the 1925 Protocol would still be in place -- as a sort of "safety net" -- to continue to regulate that party's actions. However, as I suggested moments earlier, the proposed prohibition on use has several important differences from that now in existence pursuant to the Geneva Protocol. For one thing, combined with the prohibition on possession, there would be effectively no right of retaliatory use of chemical weapons after the existing stocks of a State have been destroyed. Second, the proposed provision prohibits use in any "armed conflict" rather than in "war". The concept of "armed conflict" is well-defined in the laws of war; the most recent revisions to the laws of war contained in the 1977 Protocols additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, for example, have taken great pains to emphasize that they will be applicable in all "armed conflicts" rather than only in "wars of national liberation" where some have argued that international law pertaining to "war" does not apply.

Finally, sub-paragraph (d) of article I of the United States draft is an undertaking not to assist, encourage, or induce, directly or indirectly, anyone to engage in activities prohibited to the parties. This, in essence, is a non-circumvention clause, if you will. It means that no party could circumvent the convention by aiding any other States, organizations, or individuals in doing something that it could not do itself under the convention.

Thus, we can see that article I contains a comprehensive set of provisions designed to prevent chemical warfare. The situation once the treaty becomes effective would be in sharp contrast to the current situation. States would not have the capacity to wage war with chemical weapons, whereas today the most common way of deterring chemical warfare is by threatening retaliation in kind. By seeking to eliminate the capacity to wage chemical warfare and not merely to deter the use of such a capability, we are seeking a more stable international situation and enhanced security for all.

Today I have outlined what in our view should be prohibited under a chemical weapons ban. This area is perhaps less controversial than others, but it is fundamental to a sound convention. As I have mentioned, I will return to our draft convention in later interventions to address other aspects of the United States approach.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the United States for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President.

I now give the floor to the representative of Bulgaria, Ambassador Tellalov.

Mr. TELLALOV (Bulgaria): Mr. President, allow me to congratulate you on the assumption of this important post, and to pay tribute to the active stance and contribution of Sweden to the cause of disarmament.

To your predecessor, Ambassador Dhanapala, goes our gratitude for his consistent efforts for expediting the negotiations during the last month of the spring part of our session.

It is a pleasure for me to welcome in our midst Ambassador Van Schaik of the Netherlands and to wish him a fruitful mandate.

The opening of the summer part of the session of the Conference on Disarmament coincides with the publication of the results of the Meeting of top Party and State leaders of the Member States of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance.

The decisions adopted at this Meeting, especially the Declaration entitled: "Safeguarding Peace and International Economic Co-operation" constitute a new landmark in the active and responsible attitude of the socialist countries vis-à-vis all fundamental problems of today's world. May I quote just one paragraph of this Declaration which, in my view, has a particular bearing on our Conference:

"Today there is no task more important than that of preserving peace on the Earth and preventing a nuclear catastrophe. Of primary importance are the cessation of the arms race, the transition towards reduction of armaments, and the maintenance of the military-strategic balance at ever lower levels. This represents the most important condition for improving the world economic situation.

The participants in this Meeting are confident that given a strict observance of the principle of equality and equal security, the arms race can be halted and countries can begin to implement real measures for nuclear disarmament. This requires political will, and honest, equitable and constructive dialogue which would take into consideration the security interests of all countries."

There are a number of other provisions in the Declaration of CMEA Member States pertaining concretely to the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament. This Declaration is yet another confirmation of the readiness of the socialist countries to press forward negotiations in this important forum.

But, as is well-known, for this multilateral body to move on, the goodwill of all delegations is required.

The policies of the United States and their allies are having a telling effect upon the work of the Conference on Disarmament. Two months before the end of the 1984 session we have only one Ad Hoc Committee working, that on chemical weapons. The other one, on radiological weapons, is starting to discuss organizational matters, while the Ad Hoc Committees on the strengthening of security guarantees of non-nuclear-weapon States and on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament still have not elected their chairmen and are not supposed to enter into thorough discussions in the near future.

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In this connection, I should like to reiterate our disappointment with the results so far achieved in the consultations, initiated by the President, on drafting a mandate for an ad hoc committee on prevention of nuclear war. Last Monday the efforts were renewed, but it would seem that those countries which were responsible for the failure in April, still lack the political will to reach an agreement. If the intention of these delegations is to engage the participants in the consultations in a futile exercise once again, until the end of the session, they should realize that they cannot hope to deceive the international community indefinitely.

The imperative need to avert the nuclear threat, to check the nuclear arms race and to close all channels for the militarization of outer space has been rightly pointed out in the opening speech of the President, Madame Theorin of Sweden.

The socialist countries, including the People's Republic of Bulgaria, have not only repeatedly stated unambiguously their positions on these issues but have also tabled a great number of concrete proposals on all of them. They have often warned that the United States Administration, in pursuing its policies, is drawing the world into a new dangerous nuclear arms race. By commencing the stationing of its new medium-range missiles in Europe, the United States has impaired the military balance and created an additional threat to the socialist countries, which are responding in an adequate way. Today, nuclear balance is being restored, naturally, at a higher level. The quantities of warheads targeted against both sides have increased. Confidence among States has been undermined. As a result of the appearance in Europe of the new United States nuclear missiles designed for a first-strike, the probability of a nuclear conflict has grown.

The plans for rearmament with strategic nuclear-weapon systems, such as the MX missiles, and the plans for new outer space weapon systems, are also leading in this disastrous direction.

If there is anything encouraging against the backdrop of this gloomy picture, it is the growing number of States, with different social systems at that, which see in the immediate cessation of the nuclear arms race and in the nuclear disarmament a realistic way for normalizing international relations. Recently, the highest leaders of Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden and Tanzania came out with such ideas, as reflected in document CD/502. We understand and fully share the motivations for this initiative, which, in the words of the Joint Declaration is ... "the belief in détente, and mutual understanding with broad international co-operation and respect for the right of each State to a peaceful, secure and independent existence and the right of each people to organize its life according to its own aspirations. There can be no assurance of safety for one side only. That is why we attach such importance to a halt in the nuclear arms race that allows for renewed talks on nuclear disarmament".

As to the concrete appeal contained in the Joint Declaration, addressed to the five nuclear-weapon Powers, for the cessation of any further increase of nuclear weapons and the freezing of nuclear arsenals, to be immediately followed by a tangible reduction of nuclear forces, the position of my delegation is a positive one, and this is well-known. We advocate the achievement of an agreement on the cessation of the qualitative increase of all components and parts of nuclear arsenals, including all delivery means of nuclear weapons and their munitions, the

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establishment of a moratorium on all nuclear-weapon tests, and the cessation of the production of fissionable materials which serve to manufacture nuclear munitions. The implementation of such a concrete programme of measures to freeze nuclear weapons would become an efficient step towards a radical lowering of the nuclear confrontation, a goal in favour of which the socialist countries have been speaking in a most explicit way.

The immediate goal of all these measures has to be the prevention of nuclear war, which requires, inter alia, the renunciation by all nuclear-weapon States of the first use of nuclear weapons, and the non-admissibility of an arms race in outer space.

One cannot fail to note that the appeal launched by the six States from various continents has been positively answered so far only by one of the nuclear-weapon States -- the Soviet Union, as reflected in document CD/504. The positive reply of the Soviet Union is quite demonstrative of the consistent policy of the socialist countries in favour of the prevention of nuclear war and for nuclear disarmament. Governments and nations throughout the world are now expecting the other nuclear-weapon Powers to make known their stands on the topical issues raised in the appeal of the six States.

There are other areas of our agenda which are closely linked to the impediments mentioned above, for example, the question of strengthening the security guarantees of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

The delegation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria fully shares the concern emanating from the statements of other delegations with respect to the absence of progress on item 6 of our agenda. My delegation has stated on numerous occasions that the achievement of an international agreement for strengthening the security guarantees of non-nuclear-weapon States remains an important task of this Conference. Its solution is subject to the readiness of nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States to take definite obligations. Of particular relevance in the current situation is that nuclear-weapon Powers should agree to work out norms which would govern relations among them. One such norm, which would have a direct impact on the security of non-nuclear-weapon States, is formulated in document CD/444, submitted by the delegation of the Soviet Union, and I quote:

"Not to use nuclear weapons under any circumstances against non-nuclear countries in whose territory there are no such weapons. To respect the status of a nuclear-free zone already created and to encourage the creation of new nuclear-free zones in various areas of the world."

The People's Republic of Bulgaria, which is working steadfastly and actively for the setting up of a zone free from nuclear weapons on the Balkans, is particularly interested in the transformation of this proposal into a legally binding norm of international relations.

I should like to address briefly certain aspects of the prohibition of chemical weapons, the working body of which is under your guidance.

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The proposals you tabled in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, in document CD/CW/WP.81 reflect a purposeful approach towards the implementation of the Committee's mandate. It is positive that these proposals have the form of draft articles of a future convention. We regard the texts in document CD/CW/WP.81 as an example of the significant work carried out in the working body on the prohibition of chemical weapons. The continuity in the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons is a much needed element, conducive to the creation of a businesslike atmosphere.

A case in point is the issue of diversion of chemical weapon stocks for permitted purposes. The formulations on this issue contained in your document reflect the continuity in the positions of participating delegations -- with regard to both the applicability of this method and to its technical definition. The delegation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, which has made its own modest contribution to the elaboration of this definition, considers the parts of document CD/CW/WP.81 which deal with the issue of diversion as a very positive development. The participants in the negotiations have made known that they are convinced in principle of the technical feasibility of this form of destruction, which is laid down in numerous documents.

Scientific circles are also unanimous with respect to the possibilities of converting chemicals from chemical weapons into useful products. In the course of the negotiations, many examples have been given on the application which toxic chemicals have in the civil industries.

And yet one delegation has now departed from this understanding, indeed from its previous position. In the draft convention on the banning of chemical weapons, proposed by the United States (document CD/500) the issue of diversion of chemical weapons has been disregarded.

We look upon the issue of diversion in a larger socio-economic aspect. The conversion of part of the current chemical-weapon stockpiles, to be accomplished as a result of the application of a future convention, will materialize the long-standing yearning of United Nations Member States to divert for peaceful purposes the means and resources released as a result of disarmament.

Finally, Mr. President, I would like to assure you once again of the readiness of the Bulgarian delegation to participate in the work of the summer part of our session in an openminded and constructive spirit. Our aim is to assist in the solution of the numerous outstanding issues, above all the priority items on the agenda.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Bulgaria for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President.

That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor? That does not seem to be the case.

(The President)

May I now turn to another subject? I understand that some consultations have been proceeding in connection with the appointment of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. It seems that there is consensus to appoint the representative of Mexico, Ambassador García Robles, as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee. Accordingly, I wish to put before the Conference for decision the appointment of Ambassador García Robles as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: May I extend my congratulations, and those of the members, to Ambassador García Robles on his appointment, and I am sure that all of us wish him success in his important endeavours.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, I should like to thank you for the good wishes you have just expressed, and all the members of the Conference who have kindly appointed me once again as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee. Naturally, as we all know the success of its work will depend on each and every one of us. This appointment encourages me to hope that I shall be able to continue to rely upon the full co-operation of its members.

The PRESIDENT: The Secretariat has circulated today a time-table for meetings to be held by the Conference on Disarmament and its subsidiary bodies during the coming week. As usual, the time-table is merely indicative and subject to change, if necessary. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the time-

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: As there is no other business, I intend now to adjourn the plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 26 June, at 10.30 a.m. The plenary meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 11.30 a.m.