

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND NINETY-SEVENTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 17 March 1987, at 10 a.m.

President:

Mr. Lechuga Hevia

(Cuba)

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I declare open the 397th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament. In accordance with its programme of work, the Conference today begins the consideration of agenda item 3, "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters". However, in conformity with rule 3 of the rules of procedure, any member wishing to do so may raise any other matter related to the work of the Conference.

I should like to recall that Saturday, 14 March, three days ago, marked the twenty-fifth anniversary of uninterrupted multilateral negotiations on disarmament and arms limitation. On 14 March 1962, the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament began its work, at the level of foreign ministers. Since then, a number of major agreements have been concluded in the negotiating body. Despite all the hopes that could be placed in a negotiating process that would set mankind on the path towards the objective of general and complete disarmament under effective international control, the arms race has continued unchecked. New systems of nuclear weapons have been developed, and the arsenals of such weapons have attained such dimensions that in the event of a nuclear conflict the annihilation of mankind would be inevitable. It is no accident, then, that today we are beginning the consideration precisely of agenda item 3.

Conventional forces have acquired a destructive capability previously unknown, and military expenditures have reached astronomical heights which were unthinkable 25 years ago. Nevertheless, it should be recognized that the world would be an even more dangerous place to live in had it not been for the conclusion of the agreements negotiated in this Council chamber during the period in question. In any event, despite those agreements and all the efforts made in negotiations, no one can say that today we are nearer our objective than in 1962. But precisely because of the universal nature of the danger facing us and the variety of threats to which we are subjected, in the present circumstances there can be no giving way to despair or frustration. The sheer scale of the risk posed by the arms race and of the task facing us mean that there is no valid alternative to the existence of a single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, as stated in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, and therefore it is to be hoped that this anniversary will lead us to pursue actively our search for agreements on effective disarmament measures.

I have on the list of speakers for today the representatives of Norway, Bulgaria, Spain, the German Democratic Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

In accordance with the decision adopted by the Conference at its 387th plenary meeting, I now give the floor to the personal adviser to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Norway, Dr. Bakkevig. In doing so I should like to recall that the Conference had been expecting the visit of His Excellency The Minister for Foreign Affairs, who sadly passed away a few days ago. I have already had occasion to convey to the representative of Norway the sincere condolences of the Conference on this sad loss. I now give the floor to Dr. Bakkevig.

Mr. BAKKEVIG (Norway): Mr. President, first of all let me express my satisfaction at the honour and privilege of addressing the Conference on Disarmament. May I also extend to you, Ambassador Lechuga Hevia, the distinguished representative of Cuba, my congratulations on your assumption of the Presidency of the Conference for the month of March. I thank you also for the kind welcome you extended to me. Allow me also, through you, Mr. President, to express the gratitude of the Norwegian Government for the expressions of condolences in this Conference occasioned by the sudden death of the Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Knut Frydenlund, who was scheduled to address the Conference. May I also express my profound condolences and sympathy over the sudden death of Ambassador Donald Lowitz of the United States. Ambassador Lowitz took part in the CD Workshop on Seismological Verification of a Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban in Oslo in June 1985, and had plans to visit our country again in May of this year.

It is the profound belief of my Government that the nations of the world cannot, in the era of nuclear weapons, obtain real security at the expense of each other. They must explore the areas of mutual interest and, on the basis of such common ground as may be found, create alternatives to a situation dominated by distrust and arms build-up. Collective security must be based on confidence-building measures, arms-control agreements and co-operation across the international divides of security arrangements.

Recently there have been hopeful signals of new momentum in the nuclear as well as in the conventional field of arms control. We are pleased to observe that developments in a positive direction are taking place. Thus the Stockholm Conference last year succeeded in reaching an agreement on security and confidence-building measures in Europe. If properly implemented these measures will in our view serve to enhance security on this continent.

Furthermore, new negotiations are now about to start in Vienna with a view to eliminating existing disparities and establishing conventional stability at lower levels of forces.

The Reykjavik meeting last autumn between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev signalled willingness to deal with the important problems of arms control in a constructive manner. We welcome the latest developments concerning the bilateral United States-Soviet negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear missiles. An agreement to eliminate these weapons from Europe will have the full support of the Norwegian Government. We do hope that the initiatives taken by the United States and the Soviet Union will lead to the early signing of an agreement. The parties must, of course, take appropriate steps to secure adequate verification and agree on parallel limitations of short-range intermediate-range nuclear missiles in order to prevent a possible circumvention of an INF agreement.

It is our hope that recent developments in the East/West context will have a positive impact on the disarmament efforts on the multilateral level as well.

A global, comprehensive and effective ban on chemical weapons is urgently needed. Norway has taken active part in the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a convention on the prohibition of the development, production

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stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction. Under the able chairmanship of Ambassador Cromartie of the United Kingdom, the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons made significant progress on important questions in 1986.

Difficult problems still remain to be resolved, particularly in the field of verification. However, the momentum in the negotiations has been sustained, and we are pleased to note the progress achieved so far during the 1987 session.

We feel assured that the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons in 1987, Ambassador Ekéus of Sweden, will spare no efforts in trying to find early and satisfactory solutions to the outstanding problems. In particular, it is necessary to work out details for verification régimes, including routine and on-site inspection on challenge of all facilities and sites where violations could occur. No doubt, solving these questions represents a difficult and complex task. We noted in this regard the statement of Ambassador Nazarkin of the Soviet Union at the plenary meeting on 5 March, when he said that "chemical weapons and the production base for their manufacture are to be destroyed by all States possessing such weapons, including both the Soviet Union and the United States".

The Norwegian Government attaches importance as well to the bilateral consultations between the United States and the Soviet Union on an effective and verifiable global convention on chemical weapons. These consultations have already contributed positively to the negotiating process within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament.

A basic and still unresolved question is the elaboration of modalities for handling requests for on-site inspection on challenge. Norway is of the opinion that the provisions concerning routine on-site inspections should be supplemented by a stringent system for on-site inspections to verify allegations of non-compliance. This would provide the ultimate source of confidence in the convention. Such a system has to satisfy certain criteria, of which the following three are the most essential: firstly, the challenged State must be under the obligation to demonstrate to other States, and especially the challenging State, that it complies with the provisions of the convention. Secondly, an inspection would have to be undertaken immediately after the issue of a challenge. Thirdly, the investigation should be detailed and comprehensive.

Whereas Norway takes part in all aspects of the negotiations on a chemical-weapons ban in the Conference on Disarmament, we have put special emphasis on the question of verification of alleged use of these weapons. In 1981 the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs initiated a comprehensive research programme concerning verification of alleged use of chemical weapons. This research programme is carried out by the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment. It is based on field experiments in order to make sure that the findings are as realistic as possible.

We have developed procedures for identification of the contaminated area, sampling, field analysis, transportation and final analysis in a laboratory in order to determine whether chemical weapons have been used. These procedures,

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which can be used on an all-year basis, are now being tested in field exercises. The results of these tests will be presented in a new research report, which will be submitted to the Conference on Disarmament during the second part of this year's session. We intend also to submit a working paper outlining more detailed proposals concerning procedures for verification of alleged use, which would be relevant to the effective implementation of the convention.

As a further contribution to the work of the Conference on Disarmament, the Norwegian Council on Arms Control and Disarmament will hold a symposium on the Chemical Weapons Convention in Oslo from 26 to 27 May. Representatives from the three groups and China in the Conference on Disarmament have been invited to present their views on the chemical weapons negotiations.

It is the firm view of the Norwegian Government that efforts should be intensified with a view to an early conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, which is one of the most important issues on the international disarmament agenda. A comprehensive nuclear-test ban would play a key role in promoting the nuclear disarmament process. In addition, it would be essential for the prevention of further proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The fourth session of discussions between the United States and the Soviet Union on nuclear testing has just resumed. Norway hopes that an agenda for the initiation of negotiations on a step-by-step programme towards a test-ban treaty can be agreed during this resumed session. The ratification of the 1974 Threshold Test-Ban Treaty and the 1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty would be a desirable first step in such a programme.

Being the sole negotiating forum for global disarmament questions, the Conference on Disarmament should resume its work on issues relevant to a nuclear-test ban. In our view the Conference did useful work in 1982 and 1983 in the field of compliance and verification. Norway regrets that disagreement over its mandate for three years has prevented the establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear-Test Ban. Through an in-depth and interrelated deliberation of such issues as scope, compliance and verification, the Conference on Disarmament can resolve questions which in any case need to be addressed prior to the conclusion of a test-ban treaty.

The Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts completed last week its twenty-third session under the able chairmanship of Dr. Dahlman of Sweden. The Group has made remarkable progress in achieving consensus on the concepts for a modern international seismic data exchange system under a future comprehensive test-ban treaty.

We are particularly pleased with this development, as Norway for many years has strongly advocated many of the ideas that are now coming to fruition. Let me recall the demonstration of data exchange here at the Palais des Nations in 1982, the CD Workshop in Oslo in 1985, as well as recent Working Papers presented to the Conference.

Looking to the future, the Ad Hoc Group is currently planning a large-scale international experiment for the exchange and processing of so-called Level II seismic data, or seismic waveforms, using the most advanced

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data communication methods available, including satellite transmissions. Norway will take an active part in the planning, carrying out and evaluation of this experiment. To this end, we shall make available data from the existing seismic installations in Norway, the NORSAR and NORESS observatories.

During the second part of this year's session, Norway plans to table a working paper dealing with methods and procedures for seismic Level II data exchange. This working paper will place particular emphasis on seismic data transmission by satellite. In this connection, let me draw attention to the transatlantic satellite transmission facilities of the NORESS array, which has provided us with considerable technical experience in this field. We believe that our experience could be helpful inter alia in relation to the international data exchange experiment. This experiment will be an important step in the development of an effective international system for verification of a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

Outer space should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. The exploration and use of outer space should be carried out for the benefit of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic and scientific development. The efforts to prevent an arms race in outer space must be pursued both on a bilateral and a multilateral basis. Consequently, the Conference on Disarmament has a central role to play in this field. In 1986 the Conference was able to examine relevant conventions and to initiate identification of effective ways to prevent an arms race in outer space. This work needs to be continued. Norway therefore welcomes the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee. In view of the complexity of the questions involved, the work of the Committee no doubt could profit from the participation of scientific experts.

The third special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, which is scheduled to take place in 1988, will be an important event in the multilateral disarmament field. For the sake of the multilateral disarmament efforts, as well as the role of the United Nations in this area, we should strive to make this a constructive session. Norway hopes that the Conference on Disarmament will be able to finalize the elaboration of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament prior to the third special session. In fact, the forty-first session of the General Assembly requested the Conference to submit a complete draft of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament to its forty-second session. Norway will continue to give support to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, the distinguished representative of Mexico, Ambassador García Robles, in his efforts to complete the elaboration of this programme, which would be a useful roadmap for future disarmament negotiations.

Norway is actively involved in the preparation of the forthcoming International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development. In our view this Conference offers a valuable opportunity to elaborate guidelines for future activities on the national and international level. It is our hope that the Conference will give fresh impetus to both the disarmament and the development processes.

I cannot conclude my statement without mentioning the question of the expansion of the membership of the Conference on Disarmament. Norway holds the view that the Conference on Disarmament, prior to the third special

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session on disarmament, should implement its decision to increase its membership by not more than four States. Being the official candidate of the Western Group for membership, Norway will follow with keen interest the consultations with a view to implementing the decision of the Conference.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Norway for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President. I now give the floor to the representative of Bulgaria, Ambassadaor Tellalov.

Mr. TELLALOV (Bulgaria): Mr. President, allow me to extend my most cordial congratulations and best wishes to you, the distinguished representative of socialist Cuba, presiding over the work of the Conference on Disarmament. The Bulgarian delegation is very pleased to see in the chair a very skilful and experienced diplomat of a country with which Bulgaria enjoys relations of friendship and co-operation in all spheres. Being aware of the great importance that Cuba attaches to the cause of disarmament and your personal dedication to the goals of this Conference, I wish to assure you, Comrade Lechuga, of the full support and assistance of my delegation in the discharge of your responsibilities. May I also express our gratitude to Ambassador Fan Guoxiang of the People's Republic of China, under whose active and competent guidance the Conference has taken a very good start at the beginning of its 1987 session.

Today, I would like to deal briefly with item 1 and item 2, though in reverse order; of course, not as an attempt to revise the priorities of the Conference agenda. This is simply an expression of my delegation's opinion that such an approach is warranted by important developments taking place at the Soviet-American negotiations in Geneva.

On 28 February, General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev made a proposal to decouple the issue of medium-range missiles from the issues of strategic and outer space weapons and conclude a separate agreement on it, based on the understanding reached at the Reykjavik Summit. This initiative is a new manifestation of the goodwill of the USSR to find ways and means of solving an issue of nuclear disarmament which is of paramount importance both for Europe and for the world. In commenting on the Soviet proposal, the President of the State Council of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, Todor Zhivkov, stated:

"The people and Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria wholeheartedly welcome and support the proposal by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as yet further evidence of the sincerity, foresight and dynamism characterizing Soviet foreign policy, as an example of fresh political thinking and a new approach".

The official response of the United States Government to the Soviet proposal was quick and encouraging. The reaction in all corners of the world was a favourable one. It is gratifying to note that optimism prevails now both in Moscow and Washington, new great expectations are rising.

In our submission, if the Soviet and American negotiators in Geneva succeed in elaborating and agreeing upon a treaty on medium-range missiles, it would be an event of historical importance in the field of nuclear disarmament.

(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

Politically, such a treaty would close a deep wound in Europe, would contribute to building up confidence among States and strengthening international security. In terms of disarmament, such a treaty would be tantamount to significantly reducing nuclear arsenals and, as a consequence, the nuclear threat both to Europe and Asia. Such a treaty would be the most eloquent proof that if there is a good political will one may find compromise solutions to the most difficult and complex problems. Psychologically, such a treaty would contribute to surmounting the misconception that the modern world is doomed to live as a hostage to nuclear weapons, in a state of constant fear of nuclear catastrophe. And, last but not least, such a treaty would be the first agreement for a significant reduction of nuclear weapons. It would be a big stride on the road to nuclear disarmament.

My delegation cannot but warmly welcome the developments which are taking place and express the hope that the negotiations on medium-range missiles will be crowned by success. At the same time we would like to see the USSR and the United States find common ground also for agreement on strategic and space weapons which are intrinsically linked.

It is, perhaps, a truism to say that the USSR and the United States bear a special responsibility for the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and the achievement of nuclear disarmament. Unfortunately, some members of this Conference tend to interpret this truism to the effect that the Conference ought to remain idle on its agenda item 2, since there are Soviet-American negotiations going on. We do not and cannot share this view. We believe that during this session, as the minimum *minorum*, the Conference must have an in-depth and structured discussion on all important aspects of item 2, "Cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament". In our submission the Conference should, for instance, examine such important issues as the principles and stages of a nuclear disarmament process, the relationship between bilateral and multilateral negotiations, the responsibilities of all nuclear-weapon States for nuclear disarmament, including the conditions for their adherence to the efforts aimed at ending the nuclear-arms race and achieving nuclear disarmament. Of course, we realize that it is no problem for some delegations to argue that no list of issues can be exhaustive in the field of nuclear disarmament, that the list of issues can be structured in one way or another. As a matter of record, some delegations have proved in the past and, presumably, they may prove it again, that in a Conference working on the basis of a consensus one does not need a lot of imagination or effort to find pretexts for blocking its proceedings.

It is largely recognized that bilateral and multilateral negotiations do not exclude each other. On the contrary, it is generally believed that they could and should complement each other. Therefore, it seems to us that the Conference should examine some important nuclear disarmament issues with a view to searching for a sort of framework understanding which may open up the road leading to negotiations. In other words, it is high time for the Conference to start doing something meaningful on item 2.

Turning to item 1 of our agenda, I would like to state once again that my delegation cannot agree with the view that a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing should be a long-term objective.

(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

The purpose of nuclear disarmament is to limit and finally remove the nuclear threat. To achieve this goal parallel steps are needed to curb both the quantitative and the qualitative nuclear-arms race. If the nuclear disarmament process is restricted to numerical cuts only, new nuclear weapons with greater effectiveness could be introduced, thus leaving the nuclear threat intact. A CTB has long been recognized as the most effective measure to prevent this. Cessation of nuclear testing is, therefore, of immediate concern. As the distinguished Ambassador of Sweden, Mrs. Theorin, rightly recalled "nuclear weapon development is taking place now, and to halt it a test ban is a necessity now".

The Conference on Disarmament has once again been told that a CTB should be viewed in the context of a time when certain States will not need to depend on nuclear deterrence. We doubt the rationale of such a linkage.

In the technical community, there is a strong consensus that stockpile reliability maintenance does not require nuclear testing. Alternative simulation methods are available and offer equally precise but safer results. Scientists maintain that two generations of nuclear weapons -- the atomic and hydrogen warheads -- have matured to the point where, because of basic scientific limitations, no major new qualitative advances in nuclear warheads are in prospect.

In the United States Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist, Volume 42, No. 9, page 11, the November 1986 issue, it is emphasized that: "From a national security standpoint, nuclear warheads innovations and nuclear tests are entirely dispensable ... The precise combination of yield accuracy and radiation effect from a nuclear warhead is insignificant, compared to the overall consequences of a nuclear attack. Deterrence, independent as it is, of the details of nuclear warhead design, will persist, whether or not nuclear tests are conducted. An abrupt adoption of a CTB would interrupt the United States nuclear weapons development program without harming the nation's ability to maintain a safe and reliable deterrence".

In this context, we share the concern expressed by Ambassador Alfarargi of Egypt about "the insistence of some nuclear-weapon States to persevere in nuclear testing, using as a pretext the arguments of maintaining their capacity of nuclear deterrence, to ensure the worthiness of their nuclear-weapon stocks". Like him, we believe that "all these arguments are not valid". It seems to us that they, indeed, are "merely used to justify the continuation of nuclear tests".

Available information indicates that such tests are currently used for the creation of a "third generation" of nuclear weapons. Development of such weapons is, however, something else which, as scientists believe, may need further extensive nuclear testing in a non-foreseeable future. Nuclear weapons of this type such as nuclear-pump X-ray lasers are part of the SDI programme. Again according to the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist, the "only real reason for continued nuclear testing is to design new weapons systems".

As for the traditional reference to "the need of substantially improved verification capabilities", today it is more evident than ever before that there are no technical obstacles to a conclusion of an adequately and effectively verifiable NTB treaty.

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It is very unfortunate that the historic chance offered by the unilateral moratorium of the Soviet Union on all nuclear-test explosions has not been seized. A bilateral moratorium could have greatly facilitated negotiation of a CTB treaty. We all understand the compelling security reasons why a unilateral moratorium cannot be indefinitely extended in the absence of a positive response from the other side. My delegation welcomes the Soviet readiness to halt, on a reciprocal basis, its own programme of nuclear testing, at any time, if the United States does likewise.

The delegation of Bulgaria favours the approach of seeking to establish an ad hoc committee which would carry out the necessary substantive work on a NTB treaty, in accordance with the negotiating responsibilities of the Conference on Disarmament. Convergence of views on the major tasks of such a subsidiary body does exist. It emerged at the forty-first United Nations General Assembly session, and continues to exist in the Conference. The socialist countries expressed their position on this aspect in their joint document CD/743, which my delegation co-sponsored. The ad hoc committee on item 1 would proceed with an examination of all issues relevant to the elaboration and eventual conclusion of a NTB treaty, and search for solutions to this end. Document CD/701 contains our specific observations on a possible structure of the substantive work on item 1, which could be done in two working groups.

In conclusion, my delegation deems it necessary to reiterate its considered view that the time is long overdue for the Conference to match words with deeds in respect of the nuclear disarmament issues on its agenda.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Bulgaria for his statement and for his kind words to the Chair and about my country. In accordance with the decision adopted by the Conference at its 387th plenary meeting, I now call on the representative of Spain, Ambassador Lacleta.

Mr. LACLETA (Spain) (translated from Spanish): Thank you, Mr. President. May I, since I am taking the floor for the first time at this session of the Conference, most cordially salute you and wish you every success in your functions. I shall be very brief in my statement, since in the context of agenda items 1 and 2 I wish only to inform the Conference of the decision announced by the President of the Government of Spain to begin the internal procedures required to formalize Spain's accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Over a long period, my country has unilaterally proclaimed its firm decision not to produce nuclear weapons, and agreed to submit all its nuclear facilities to the safeguards machinery of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Thus far, however, it has not become one of the contracting parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The reasons for this are sufficiently well known, and we certainly continue to feel that the Treaty does have some negative aspects, not only because of its unequal nature but also because so far it has not been able to prevent vertical proliferation, despite the provisions of article 6. Nevertheless, the Spanish Government, in carrying out its peace and security programme, began more than two years ago a process of reconsideration of its

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attitude to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and this has ended with the decision to adhere to that Treaty, bearing in mind that its negative aspects today are greatly outweighed by other positive aspects.

The Spanish Government considers that Spain's accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty will consolidate the country's security and disarmament policy and enhance that policy's credibility both internally and internationally. Furthermore, this accession will confirm the determination of the Government to carry out its commitment to the non-nuclearization of Spain, a decision which has been sanctioned by a popular referendum, and it again underscores that Spain is not now and never will be a nuclear threat to anyone.

The Spanish Government considers that new international prospects have been opened up that are favourable to an effective policy of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. The Third Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, held in 1985, in which 132 countries renewed their support for the Treaty, politically strengthened its value and validity. This significant and verifiable confidence-building measures adopted at the Stockholm CSDE Conference are also an important factor in reducing existing tensions and improving the necessary climate of co-operation and understanding for determined progress in the broad field of disarmament. The agreements on the notification of nuclear accidents signed in the IAEA have also helped to create a new climate as regards the benefits and risks of nuclear energy. Finally, the Reykjavik Summit and the talks going on in Geneva between the two major nuclear Powers prompt us to hope for practical substantive results in the field of nuclear disarmament, in particular the elimination of medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe and the sharp reduction of strategic nuclear arsenals. Against the favourable background which all these elements appear to offer, and reaffirming its conviction that the ultimate aim of negotiations to control and reduce weapons must include the elimination of nuclear weapons, the Spanish Government has decided to associate itself formally (since materially it was already a party to them) with the international efforts to secure non-proliferation by acceding to the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1 July 1968.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Spain for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President. I now give the floor to the representative of the German Democratic Republic, Ambassador Rose.

Mr. ROSE (German Democratic Republic): Comrade President, today my delegation would like to present its views on agenda item 1, nuclear-test ban. Many initiatives launched of late testify to the sincere desire to bring about a comprehensive cessation of nuclear tests at long last.

The Soviet moratorium, extended several times, offered a fair chance of resolving the problem. Unfortunately, the chance was not seized. For reasons, we all know, the Soviet Union was forced to end the moratorium. Yet, the door to an agreement remains wide open. The call for the other side to take a long overdue, constructive step will not subside, as some may be hoping, but grow stronger. The fact is hardly ever disputed these days that the principal purpose of tests is to make nuclear means of mass destruction,

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including components of the so-called SDI, more sophisticated. Such tests are thus setting the pace in increasing the nuclear threat. That is why the solution of the problem is so urgent and why the overwhelming majority at the Conference is demanding that this issue be given the highest priority.

Although the Soviet moratorium has not brought the desired concrete results, it has nevertheless proved in a very practical and convincing way that a complete cessation of tests could be agreed rather quickly, provided the political will to do so exists. This should encourage the Conference to work with even more determination to achieve that goal.

Our perceptions as to how that aim can be achieved are contained in document CD/743, submitted by a group of socialist countries. At this point, there are some observations I wish to make on two particular aspects, namely, the relative independence and the international character of the task before us, on the one hand, and on the necessity for an integrated approach to the drafting of an NTBT on the other.

It is a widely recognized assumption that the cessation of all nuclear-weapons testing would be an effective step to halt the qualitative nuclear-arms race and to reduce and eventually eliminate nuclear arsenals. This is precisely what is acknowledged even by those who invoke alleged security interests to oppose an agreement and negotiations leading up to such a ban. Paragraph 51 of the Final Document of SSOD I touches upon this interrelationship, in that it makes reference to ending the "qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and the development of new types of such weapons and of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons". In other words, discontinuance of nuclear tests would create auspicious conditions for nuclear disarmament, with the elimination of all nuclear arms being the ultimate goal, as proposed by the USSR on 15 January 1986 and in Reykjavik, in keeping with the Final Document of SSOD I. What was once recognized as correct and accepted by consensus in 1978 has lost nothing of its truth in 1987. In his statement on 12 March, Ambassador van Schaik of the Netherlands reminded us that a "CTB remains ... an important tool to slow down the nuclear-arms race".

In the context of a comprehensive treaty, interim measures are possible if they further the overall objective and if they are conceived under a clear commitment to a comprehensive ban. A radical solution would still be preferable, one of the reasons being that it would entail fewer problems in terms of verification. Even so, interim measures could have a confidence-building effect, as they would signal, over and above their actual purpose, the intention to seek the eventual cessation of tests and proceed to reductions in nuclear weapons and their complete elimination.

Thus, the interrelationship between a comprehensive test ban, interim measures and nuclear disarmament is obvious. What is altogether different is the strategy of establishing an artificial linkage to the effect that nuclear disarmament becomes a prerequisite for the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests. Under that approach, a comprehensive nuclear-test ban is possible only after all nuclear weapons are eliminated. This runs counter to the very purpose of a test ban, as agreed in the Final Document of SSOD I.

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

* Linking the two issues in that way means putting the cart before the horse. Such an attitude is out of tune with specific obligations under international law. What is a lot more negative even is the circumstance that this linkage allows the arms race to continue qualitatively, thus fostering the destabilizing drive for unilateral military advantages. If the reduction of nuclear arsenals is accompanied by the creation of a new generation of nuclear weapons, we would end up with a situation where we have considerably less security than we had before. A sort of mathematical equation, like fewer nuclear weapons equals fewer nuclear tests, does not appear to us to reflect the real and very complex situation.

The general and complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests needs to be tackled as a task in its own right so that the process of nuclear disarmament may be comprehensively initiated and furthered. The subject of an NTBT is easier to grasp and more clearly definable than nuclear disarmament in its entirety.

The policy of linking nuclear disarmament steps with partial measures for a test ban prompts the question whether the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests is to be the exclusive domain of bilateral negotiations or whether it remains a multilateral task as well. As for ourselves, we prefer a flexible approach. Negotiations should be conducted wherever they may prove useful. However, what we are talking about is a case where it is particularly important that the various negotiating fora complement and stimulate each other. To put it differently, the competence of the Conference to work out a treaty on the complete cessation of nuclear-weapon tests must not be called into question.

The international, multilateral nature of the problem springs above all from the following:

(a) If nuclear-weapon tests continue, the nuclear-arms race continues and the risk of a nuclear inferno increases. With the security and survival of all peoples at stake, world-wide interest in a global solution is all too legitimate.

(b) A comprehensive test ban is, by definition, a step that all nuclear-weapon Powers will ultimately have to take. Therefore, they should be afforded an opportunity to participate as early as possible in the drafting of a treaty.

(c) The non-proliferation régime for nuclear arms should be strengthened. Hence, the international obligation to arrive at the universal prohibition of nuclear tests.

(d) A large majority of nations is opposed to the testing of a new generation of nuclear weapons and its deployment in outer space.

That is why the Conference should no longer procrastinate in starting work on an NTBT.

In view of the fact that the components of such a ban will be intimately interrelated, the content of the treaty must be discussed in an integrated manner. Our feeling is that any selective approach would render the

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conclusion of an accord more difficult. The resolutions which the United Nations General Assembly adopted on the test-ban issue at its forty-first session take that aspect into account and may very well serve to guide our work. Most countries find it possible to support them. Although not identical in every detail, the resolutions have important traits in common in that they: first, call for a comprehensive test ban as a task of fundamental urgency; second, reaffirm the CD's negotiating role in bringing about such a treaty; third, endorse the idea of starting practical work on a test-ban right at the beginning of the 1987 session of the Conference; fourth, call on all nuclear-weapon States to participate actively in the drafting of the treaty; and fifth, demand additional measures to encourage the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban.

This enables us to address content and scope of the treaty and verification and compliance as subjects that interact with each other.

Working Paper CD/743 advocates that a prospective committee should set up appropriate working groups.

As for the content and scope of the accord, all States should be prohibited from carrying out test explosions of nuclear weapons in all environments and at all times. The order in which the nuclear-weapon Powers would have to become parties to the treaty should be discussed and determined. Other steps conducive to the conclusion of a treaty could also be contemplated in one of the groups, for example, the idea of phasing out all tests under a specific time-frame.

Appropriate measures would have to be devised to ensure that the ban is not circumvented through peaceful nuclear explosions.

As far as compliance with an NTBT is concerned, a host of ideas and suggestions have already been advanced in regard to possible means of verification, such as national means, including remote sensing, as well as on-site inspection and international seismic data exchanges. My delegation endorses the objective of having an international verification system in place when the treaty enters into effect.

Apart from having this subject treated by a working group of a committee, we should encourage the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to pursue its activities in a goal-oriented fashion and, among other things, prepare the international experiment envisaged for the exchange of seismic level-II data in 1988.

All these issues require in-depth consideration. There are many topics which require that matters of substance be dealt with in thorough and systematic deliberations and negotiations. No effort should be spared to find common ground for agreement. What is essential now is to set up the committee as quickly as possible.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of the German Democratic Republic for his statement and I now give the floor to the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Ambassador Nazarkin.

Mr. NAZARKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): At the beginning of today's meeting, Comrade President, you very appropriately reminded us that 14 March 1962 was the date when, here, in this Council chamber, the first meeting of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament took place. That meeting marked the initiation of multilateral disarmament negotiations, now in their twenty-sixth year, in which the socialist, non-aligned neutral and Western States participate. The membership of this forum has grown considerably since then. All the nuclear-weapon States have joined it. Its organization of work has changed, but its function has remained the same: to conduct multilateral negotiations in the field of arms limitation and disarmament.

The international agreements which were developed here and concluded, and which are now in effect, have constituted an important contribution to disarmament by this multilateral negotiating forum. We cannot, however, ignore the fact that not a single international agreement has been developed here in the last decade. Of course, the work of the Conference is influenced by the international situation and the positions of States, but the Conference itself can also influence the situation in the world and the positions of States blocking or obstructing the negotiations.

The Conference, in our view, should make maximum use of its potential in order to overcome the obstacles to the initiation of negotiations and to conduct them in an intensified and more productive way. The tasks involved are of crucial importance for they concern human survival.

The activities of the forum for multilateral negotiations over the 25 years of its existence demonstrate the great importance attached throughout the world to finding, with the participation of a sufficiently large number of States, solutions to the urgent disarmament issues. This fact gives us hope that the Conference will be able fully to live up to what is expected of it; to develop, through negotiations multilateral agreements in the field of arms limitation and disarmament.

And now, Comrade President, let me turn to item 5 on the agenda of the Conference, prevention of an arms race in outer space.

The Soviet delegation welcomes the fact that the consultations have led to agreement on the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee on agenda item 5. We, as well as many other delegations, have argued for a mandate for the Ad Hoc Committee which would provide for the holding of negotiations, in the belief that the stage of exploring the problem of preventing an arms race in space has now been passed and it is necessary to proceed to a more practical phase. We therefore noted with satisfaction the statement by the President of the Conference at the time of the adoption of the mandate. In referring to last year's report of the Conference he stated that "consideration of proposals for measures aimed at the prevention of an arms race in outer space is covered by the mandate" contained in Working Paper CD/WP.268, in other words, the mandate adopted.

The Soviet delegation welcomes the calls for the prevention of an arms race in space contained in the statements made by the delegations of Sri Lanka, Egypt, Sweden, the German Democratic Republic, Bulgaria, Hungary, Mongolia,

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Czechoslovakia, France and other countries. We share the concern expressed in this connection by many delegations which emphasized the importance of finding a solution to this urgent problem.

Concrete proposals on how a barrier could be erected to keep weapons out of space undoubtedly merit attention. This year they have come from Romania, on the conclusion of a general treaty on the use of space exclusively for peaceful purposes; from France, referring to its proposal on the establishment of an international satellite monitoring agency and the development of a code of conduct for States in outer space; from Egypt, which advocated a ban on the deployment of new weapon systems in space and the strengthening of the international legal basis for the use of outer space; and from the Netherlands, which supported the idea of protecting high-orbit satellites and expanding the information provided to the United Nations in accordance with the 1975 Convention.

The Conference has accumulated a wealth of ideas and proposals and a fairly good basis has been established for concrete, businesslike and result-oriented work in the Ad Hoc Committee. We are prepared to discuss all these proposals.

The Soviet delegation, for its part, intends to seek agreements on the prevention of an arms race in space. I would like to present some ideas on this subject.

The Soviet Union has on many occasions put forward peace initiatives in the field of outer space. Our proposals for the conclusion of a treaty prohibiting the deployment in space of any kind of weapon and for a treaty banning the use of force in outer space and from space against the Earth still stand.

We consider it possible to agree also on partial measures leading to the prevention of the deployment of arms in space. For example, the Conference could begin elaborating an international agreement aimed at ensuring the immunity of artificial earth satellites not carrying any kind of weapon on board. In so doing, it would also be important to explore the possibility of banning the development of new anti-satellite systems and eliminating the existing ASAT systems.

A multilateral agreement containing international legal immunity safeguards for space objects would contribute to confidence-building among States in the field of space activities and strengthen security and strategic stability. A withdrawal of existing anti-satellite weapons from the arsenals of States and a decision not to test or develop new systems of such weapons would represent a real disarmament measure. Such a measure is aimed at maintaining the existing military balance and is justified by the principle of equality and equal security.

It is our hope that our proposal which was made in the statement by the First Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Y.M. Vorontsov, on 3 February of this year, to take measures to ban space-to-space, space-to-Earth and Earth-to-space weapon systems, will be discussed in a business-like manner.

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During the previous session of the Conference the question of a definition of space strike weapons was actively discussed. A number of delegations presented their proposals on the subject. These proposals seem to be of definite interest and represent a fair basis for further work in this field. In this connection, I should like to recall that the Soviet delegation understands space strike arms to mean the following: firstly, space-based ABM systems of any principle of action; secondly, space-based systems of any principle of action designed to strike from space targets in the atmosphere or on the surface of the Earth; and thirdly, systems of any principle of action and however based designed to strike targets in space.

Non-deployment of any weapons in outer space should be effectively verified. The Soviet Union is in favour of such verification. You may recall that the Soviet Union has already proposed that a future world space organization should also have verification functions with regard to compliance with agreements on the prevention of an arms race in space and that it be endowed with its own technical means to that end.

In order to move the discussion of the question of prevention of an arms race in space from a standstill already now, we propose consideration of the possibility of establishing an international verification of non-deployment of any weapons in outer space, a system which provides for the establishment of an international inspectorate. Such an inspectorate, for example, would be given right of access, for the purpose of on-site inspections, to all objects destined to be launched and stationed in space, and to their corresponding launch vehicles. Inspectors could monitor any launching of space objects.

In presenting this proposal, we are aware of its far-reaching nature. It is another indication that verification will not be a problem for the Soviet Union if the goal is really to prevent the arms race from spreading to space.

The Conference on Disarmament has a great responsibility. We are expected to take practical action and measures such as to avert the deadly threat of an arms race in space once and for all, and to preserve space for our own as well as future generations for peaceful exploration, and then, as the great Russian scientist, Konstantin Tsiolkovski, eloquently put it: "Humanity will be rewarded with the ocean of the Universe, as though it were expressly offered to it in order to bring people together to form a single whole, to form one family".

Our agenda includes the item of a ban on radiological weapons. Decisions to establish an Ad Hoc Committee on the subject are taken every year, but the search for an international agreement on the subject unfortunately sees no progress. This year, the Conference has again decided to re-establish an Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons, with a view to reaching agreement on a convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons. Agreement on the subject is hampered by the fact that some States link a ban on radiological weapons to the prevention of attacks on nuclear facilities, while others, willing to agree to a ban on radiological weapons, for some reason or other are reluctant to work towards the elaboration of obligations with regard to the prevention of deliberate destruction of facilities for peaceful nuclear activities.

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Meanwhile, in Europe alone there are over 150 nuclear reactors with a capacity similar to that of the Chernobyl nuclear power station. One can easily imagine the possible consequences if even one of those reactors were to be destroyed. The Chernobyl tragedy has been a vivid demonstration of the indisputable fact that if nuclear power goes out of control there is no escaping it and no one will be spared. To envisage in military planning the destruction of nuclear facilities would therefore mean to plan and programme a catastrophe tantamount in its consequences to a massive use of nuclear weapons.

The Soviet Union, as is known, in its programme for the safe development of nuclear energy proposed last autumn, inter alia, the consideration of the possibility of a ban on attacks against nuclear facilities. At the special session of the IAEA General Conference some States expressed the view that the Vienna-based agency is not an appropriate forum for discussing such proposals. We were told there that this proposal belongs to the area of disarmament, and that the Conference on Disarmament would be a more appropriate place for it. This view was re-affirmed at the 12 March plenary of the Conference by Ambassador van Schaik of the Netherlands.

We believe it is necessary to start elaborating an appropriate international agreement under which States would undertake not to attack peaceful nuclear facilities, with a view to covering nuclear facilities, in the first instance those under IAEA safeguards, by an eventual system of international legal protection. At the same time we would not object to such a system of protection covering nuclear facilities not covered by those safeguards, provided that these facilities are used for peaceful purposes. To ensure physical identification of facilities to be protected from attack, one could also envisage marking them with a special symbol to be agreed upon. In the framework of the convention, one could also provide for facilitating the elaboration of protection measures against dangerous consequences of radiation.

Thus, this year, the issue of preventing attacks on nuclear facilities appears to be even more urgent, requiring negotiations to be started without delay. We call upon the member States of the Conference to approach this problem seriously and to take practical steps to resolve it. The Soviet delegation believes that both questions, a ban on radiological weapons, and the prevention of attacks on nuclear facilities, could be resolved separately. We have a basis for a solution to the first question -- the 1979 Soviet-United States draft. Of course, the views of other States should also be reflected.

While favouring separate solutions to the questions of a ban on radiological weapons and prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities, we have nevertheless supported the proposal to address them as a package. Unfortunately, the exchange of views on the subject in 1985 and 1986 has shown that today such an approach raises more problems than it resolves. Today we remain ready to adopt either option. A compromise solution might also be sought, but what is important is to initiate progress, to take practical steps. We believe that this year the Ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons will be able to make headway in the implementation of its mandate from the present standstill.

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We are facing important and crucial problems. We are expected to achieve real agreements in the area of arms limitation and disarmament. The Soviet delegation intends to pursue this objective further.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for his statement. I have no further speakers on my list today. Does any other representative wish to take the floor? I see none. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 19 March, at 10 a.m. The meeting is adjourned.

The meeting rose at 11.30 a.m.