

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND SIXTIETH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 26 April 1988, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Dávid Meiszter (Hungary)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 460th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

In conformity with its programme of work, the Conference continues its consideration of the reports of the ad hoc subsidiary bodies, as well as of the special report to the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. However, in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any member who wishes to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

As announced at previous plenary meetings, I intend to put before the Conference for adoption, once the list of speakers is exhausted, the reports of the ad hoc committees on radiological weapons and on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, which are contained in documents CD/820 and CD/825. As agreed in the timetable for the present week, we shall then suspend the plenary meeting and hold an informal meeting to proceed to the second reading of the technical parts of the special report of the Conference to the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, contained in document CD/WP.336. We shall also, on that occasion, discuss the problem of the closing date for the first part of the session, as unfortunately our work on substantive questions has not advanced as had been hoped, and we are facing a problem of time. In the light of our exchange of views on this question, we shall resume the plenary and take the relevant decisions.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Brazil, Mongolia, Pakistan, Poland, Finland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, India and Bulgaria. I now give the floor to the representative of Brazil, Ambassador Azambuja.

Mr. AZAMBUJA (Brazil): Mr. President, may I first of all congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference for this and the next two months. Under your very able guidance we have prepared ourselves very thoroughly for the forthcoming third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. As I am addressing the plenary of the Conference for the first time in a while, may I also take this opportunity to congratulate and thank very warmly your immediate predecessor, Ambassador Harald Rose of the German Democratic Republic, and Ambassador von Stülpnagel of the Federal Republic of Germany. I wish to welcome to this forum some recently arrived colleagues, the representatives of Poland, Ambassador Sujka, Canada, Ambassador Montigny Marchand, Iran, Ambassador Nasser, the United Kingdom, Ambassador Solesby, and lastly Nigeria, Ambassador Azikiwe.

My delegation would like to address today the issue of chemical weapons.

First of all, let me say that the recent and confirmed reports on the use of chemical weapons in the Gulf war remind us once more, if we need reminding, that chemical weapons are not spectres of a bygone era, irrelevant in a period when high technology has thoroughly changed methods of warfare. The reports

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stressed the capacity of these weapons to bring destruction, suffering and death in a cruel and massive way, mainly upon civilian populations. The urgency and priority of this item on our agenda was thus underlined in a most regrettable manner.

During its last regular session, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted resolution 42/37 A on the complete and effective prohibition of chemical weapons, the first single consensus resolution on this matter. In it, the General Assembly again urged the Conference on Disarmament, as a matter of high priority, to intensify negotiations with a view to the final elaboration of a convention at the earliest possible date.

The Group of 21, in the statement made on its behalf by Ambassador Ekeús on 8 March, reiterated its commitment to this resolution. At the beginning of the 1988 session, most of us cherished well-founded hopes of speedy progress. Unhappily on the eve of the General Assembly's third special session on disarmament, our feeling is one of disappointment. We certainly made progress, but it was neither so fast nor so far-reaching as expected, nor will it be enough to make us particularly proud when presenting our report on this item to this major forthcoming international conference.

We should not, however, be blamed for idleness, for we completed a significant work-load under the very able guidance of the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Sujka of Poland and his dedicated group co-ordinators. Nevertheless, those of us who kept attending the formal meetings now and again had the sensation that negotiations might be taking place elsewhere, thus depriving the collective effort of much of its thrust and meaning. Multilateral and bilateral processes can and should reinforce each other, but they cannot, even temporarily, replace one another.

Signs of protractedness multiply in our day-to-day discussions. Brackets and footnotes seem to increase in number rather than diminish. A scholastic exercise of this sort can go on for ever, if there is no political will to reach a conclusion. The views of delegations with respect to the central points of the future convention are already in our view quite well known. Neither the mere reiteration of these positions, nor the sheer course of time, will solve the outstanding problems. Only a spirit of mutual concession, of real and mature compromise, can overcome the last differences and make us take that final sprint to the finish line, if I may borrow half of the very apt metaphor of the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom, Ambassador Solesby. As stated by the Minister of External Relations of Brazil, Dr. Roberto de Abreu Sodré, addressing this forum on 18 February last, "we are prepared to support, be it in substance or in procedure, any practical initiatives that might further intensify the rhythm of our work and the pace of our consultations. We are not in a hurry. We simply refuse to waste time".

Our readiness to accept a universal ban on chemical weapons is easy to understand. Brazil does not possess chemical weapons and does not intend to develop, produce or stockpile any. Brazil has unfailingly recognized and supported the Geneva Protocol of 1925. As such, we think that the first priority of a ban on chemical weapons should be the destruction of all chemical weapon stocks and all chemical weapon production facilities, allowing

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no exceptions for any alleged security reasons. We consider that the slower the pace of the destruction of chemical weapon stocks during the 10-year period, assuming this time-frame is retained in the final text, the more discriminatory the transition régime will be towards those countries that have no chemical weapons.

The paramount goal of the future convention - the complete and universal prohibition of chemical methods of warfare - must be secured without jeopardizing other equally legitimate objectives, namely those related to making the basic achievements in the field of chemistry accessible to all mankind, on a universal and non-discriminatory basis. The prohibition of chemical weapons should not in any way hamper the economic and technological development of the parties to the convention, or curb international co-operation in the field of peaceful chemical activities. Universality and non-discrimination are concepts closely linked. A text which imposes permanently unequal rights and responsibilities on member States will not earn a universal adherence.

We are confronted with the opportunity not only of negotiating one of the most relevant disarmament multilateral agreements ever - one that will free humankind of a fearsome and tragic weapon of mass destruction - we have the occasion to shape a model relationship between the interwoven areas of science, technology, industry, disarmament and development. It has become a truism to say that science and technology are the most wondrous productive factors man ever had to assist him in his struggle for a better life. They help produce more and better, they alleviate physical labour, they inform and teach faster and more precisely. We all know, however, that they can also assist men in killing other men with a speed and range never imagined by our ancestors. Science and technology are, in essence, dual-purpose activities. These two faces of scientific and technological progress are, to some extent, inextricable. We cannot ban or limit science and technology, for we cannot, in the end, ban or limit human intelligence and achievement. We may, however, and ultimately must, ban or limit all types of arms race set in motion by developments in science and technology, and prevent their extension to new areas.

Each welcome regulation of the use of scientific and technological advances for weapons purposes must not result in limitations on the access of developing countries to higher levels of technical capacity and better living conditions for their populations. I think we can strike an acceptable balance between the security concerns we all share and other national interests most of us have, including the free capacity to import and export chemical products not prohibited by the future convention; the right to research, develop, produce and use chemicals for peaceful purposes; and the right to promote and participate in the fullest possible international scientific and technological co-operation in the field of chemistry.

I am confident that the difficulties some delegations have expressed about seeing co-operation-related rights and obligations included in a security agreement will be overcome in the course of our negotiations. Other international disarmament agreements - a denomination we feel is more adequate

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than that of "security agreements" when applied to treaties in this category - have already embodied similar dispositions, most recently the biological weapons Convention.

We welcome, in this context, progress made in the current session on language for article XI. We have put forward our own ideas on this subject in document CD/CW/WP.176. Even if we consider that the wording so far arrived at falls short of what we deem indispensable for the final text of the convention, we feel very encouraged by the exchange of views we have had and consider we have a firm basis for future work. In this context I wish to congratulate Mr. Cima of Czechoslovakia for the hard work done in Group A under his chairmanship. May I also thank Ambassador Ekéus, from Sweden, who, as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee for the last session, had already presented to us a very useful paper for discussion on article XI, from which some ideas should still be drawn for our future article on economic and technological development.

Another question of great relevance to Brazil is the matter contained in article X, on assistance, and here again we must welcome the advances made during the present session, under the competent chairmanship of Mr. Pablo Macedo of Mexico, in Group B. Let me only stress again the point made by many delegations from the Group of 21, that it is only natural and logical that States willing to accept the obligation to renounce the acquisition of chemical weapons for ever should strongly insist on having clearly stated in the convention the symmetrical right to assistance in the event of the use or threat of use of such weapons.

Verification will undoubtedly be the crucial subject of disarmament negotiations, multilateral or bilateral, from now to the end of this century. As with other areas of international relations, as they evolve nowadays, it will bring broad changes to relations between States, between States and international organizations, and to the concept of sovereignty itself. Even if in principle my delegation favours verification mechanisms tailored to each specific treaty, it is arguable that we will be establishing a significant precedent in presenting our convention. We shall therefore be very prudent and careful in dealing with the verification régime and the new ideas that it will introduce.

As a general principle, verification should be efficient, practicable, non-intrusive and cost-effective. Pushed to its logical limits, the verification concept could block progress in any disarmament negotiations, if applied with uncompromising rigidity. Absolute verification being an unattainable goal, we should stress mainly the deterrent effect of the inspection machinery on would-be violators. The cost of future verification procedures in all sectors should stop short of absorbing a large share of the financial resources to be hopefully liberated with the cut in military expenses provided by disarmament agreements and now wasted in the multiple arenas of military competition.

In the case of our convention, Brazil would like to see a verification régime as strict as possible, but with adequate safeguards against excessive intrusiveness and political mis-utilization. We view verification, on the

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other hand, as a two-track process. No one can reasonably equate the threat posed to the convention by chemical weapon stocks and chemical weapon production facilities with the risk allegedly presented by toxic chemicals produced commercially by the civilian chemical industry. The first and utmost priority of the verification system must be to control the former category of threats. May I quote here my distinguished colleague Ambassador Clerckx of Belgium, who, speaking about the risks embodied in supervision of the civilian chemical sector, stressed that "the enemy is not private chemical industry, the enemy is the State acting in bad faith".

Some ideas have been put forward on the need to give the Technical Secretariat the power to decide to carry out ad hoc inspections at short notice, on its own initiative. While sympathizing with the aim of enhancing the verification mechanisms of the convention we consider, in principle, that this proposal would place a very heavy responsibility on the technical skills of the future organization for the prohibition of chemical weapons, allowing for the raising of suspicions about its independence and objectivity and thus possibly endangering the inspectorate's role in other crucial areas, and in particular that of challenge inspections.

Coming to this central and essential feature of our future convention, my delegation holds that it should so be structured that it would preclude misuse or abuse of this right not only by depending on the international opprobrium likely to be brought upon the misuser or abuser, but also by giving a strong role to the Executive Council in one or more of the phases of the challenge inspection procedure. The role of the Technical Secretariat will be crucial in that area too. We can quite understand, in principle, the reasons put forward against filters between the request and the conduct of the inspection: the need for speedy action to prevent a cover-up at the site to be inspected obviously requires automaticity. We favour, however, the establishment of very strict conditions for the receivability of the request - details of the site to be inspected, the matters on which assurance is required, the circumstances and the nature of the suspected non-compliance and the exact provisions thought to have been violated. The Technical Secretariat should make sure that each such request meets these requirements as appropriate.

Coming to the stage of consideration of the report by the inspection team, my delegation is of the opinion that the Executive Council should meet immediately after receiving such a report and establish on a factual basis whether a violation of the convention has taken place or not. The same body should also decide on further steps to be taken if a violation has been confirmed. It would be rather awkward to give the requesting State a party to the controversy, the final say on the report on that controversy. If we have a decision-making procedure based on the need for a two-thirds majority, the Executive Council could settle this kind of issue without allowing any one political or geographical group alone to influence unduly the decisions to be made. The role thus given to the Executive Council would be effective to a very large extent in preventing misuses or abuses of the challenge inspection procedure. A State is likely to weigh carefully the pros and cons of resort to this mechanism once the Executive Council's authority and competence are clearly established.

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Some countries have expressed their misgivings about what they have called the "judicial power" of the Executive Council. My delegation thinks that, while we should allow bilateral controversies to be settled outside the framework of our convention, if a dispute persists once the convention procedures have been set in motion it should be treated multilaterally, according to the rules and procedures established in the convention itself. The fact that we want the Executive Council to play an important role in the verification system makes us even more sensitive to the questions of its composition, procedures and decision-making powers. We would like to see a strong, efficient and representative Executive Council, with a membership in the range between 20 and 30, neither too small to be tempted by visions of oligarchy, nor large enough to be unwieldy and cumbersome.

In the name of efficiency it has been suggested that a few seats should be attributed on a permanent basis. My delegation considers that this would constitute unacceptable discrimination, which would be clearly anachronistic at a moment when we are designing a significant element of the new international order for the next century. Three criteria, in our view, could be merged in the definition of eligibility for the Executive Council: geographical, political and industrial capacity. In a more perfect world we would like to see the pre-eminence or even the exclusiveness of the geographical factor, on the model of the United Nations. For the time being, we are prepared to accept the realistic approach of devising imaginative and balanced ways of combining the three criteria. One of the possible formulations would be to take the CD as a model and repeat approximately the same ratios. This decisive aspect of our future Organization has greatly benefited, if I may say so, from the preliminary discussion presided over by Mr. Numata of Japan, Chairman of Group C, during the current session.

Serious and good work was accomplished in the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons last year under the chairmanship of my distinguished friend and colleague Ambassador Rolf Ekéus. Ambassador Sujka has assumed this heavy burden for the present session, and I sincerely congratulate him and wish him further success through the year 1988. Some say, probably with wisdom, but certainly with scepticism, that disarmament measures are only feasible in relation either to weapons on the way to obsolescence or to weapons still in the research and development stage, far from deployment. If this is true, let us strive to have a complete ban on chemical weapons in force before new types of those devices provoke another arms race, bringing unforeseen consequences to all mankind. Let us tackle all unresolved issues with the clear awareness that for every human enterprise there is a right time, and that if procrastination prevails, an historic opportunity can be lost forever.

The Conference on Disarmament, as the sole multilateral negotiating forum on disarmament, has to live up to the expectations of the international community and fulfil the mandate received from the General Assembly. This is a unique chance for multilateralism to prove its effectiveness on disarmament matters, and it is within reach. A positive outcome of our present negotiations on chemical weapons would underwrite our bid for a constructive role in future negotiations on the so-called nuclear items of our agenda, as well as some other significant subjects, like outer space. You can count on the Brazilian delegation, Mr. President, to work in good faith and with diligence towards the attainment of this common goal.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Brazil for his statement and for his kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Mongolia, Ambassador Bayart.

Mr. BAYART (Mongolia) (translated from Russian): Mr. President, first of all allow me on behalf of my delegation to extend sincere congratulations to you on your occupation of the post of President of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of April. We have a deep feeling of satisfaction at seeing in this post the representative of Hungary, with which my country maintains relations of sincere friendship and co-operation. We are happy to see that at this important time, when the Conference is to prepare a special report to the third special session of the United Nations General Assembly on disarmament, our work is being guided by such a wise and erudite person as yourself, who also possesses great knowledge and experience in questions of disarmament. My delegation wishes to express gratitude to your predecessor in the post of President, the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, for his contribution to the work of the Conference.

As everybody recognizes, negotiations on the complete and general prohibition of chemical weapons, which have been under way now for a number of years, have reached a decisive stage. This may be seen from the fact that the special report of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons to the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (CD/CW/WP.200) has practically taken on the look of a treaty. It is now particularly important to intensify our negotiations, particularly by increasing the amount of time devoted to these negotiations during the year, and to put forward practical and constructive proposals, not new concepts which would complicate work on the convention.

In its statement today, my delegation would like once again to dwell briefly on one of the basic unsolved problems, the question of the order of destruction of chemical weapons, because animated discussions took place on this point during the preparation of the special report. I have already had an opportunity to say that my country does not possess chemical weapons and does not intend to develop, produce or acquire them. In participating in the negotiations on chemical weapons my delegation has been guided by a desire to contribute, as its capabilities allow, to the rapid finalization of the future convention. The working papers submitted by our delegation have been the result of precisely this kind of activity.

We realize that the question of the order of destruction of chemical weapons is not only important from the point of view of military strategy, but also has very obvious political and moral aspects. Careful drafting of the provisions of the convention on this subject and scrupulous implementation by the parties after its entry into force will to a large extent determine the viability of the future convention. It is encouraging that the basic approaches to this question are now moving together, and we hope that it will soon be possible to turn them into agreements, because the solution of this problem will be of substantial importance for the rapid conclusion of the convention. A significant amount of work has already been done on the basis of principles already agreed, such as the principle of undiminished security for all States during the entire destruction stage, confidence-building in the

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early part of the destruction stage, the gradual acquisition of experience in the course of destroying chemical weapon stocks and the applicability of this order of destruction irrespective of the actual composition and size of the stockpiles and the method chosen for the destruction of the chemical weapons.

There is general agreement that all stockpiles should be destroyed by the end of the tenth year after the convention enters into force. We are happy to see that definite progress has been registered at the negotiations on this question in recent months. An example is the agreement reached that the process of destruction of chemical weapons in category 3 must be completed not later than five years after the convention enters into force. Taking into account the positions of the various delegations, the Mongolian delegation put forward in its working paper CD/CW/WP.182 the principle of levelling-out, whereby States possessing chemical weapons would be left, by the end of the eighth year of application of the convention, with approximately equal quantities of such weapons, to be destroyed by the end of the tenth year after the entry into force of the convention. And this principle is now recognized by the participants in the negotiations. As to the level of the remaining stockpiles and the period over which this levelling-out will be possible, these questions await further discussion. Of course, on this question too the socialist countries are prepared to co-operate constructively with all interested delegations.

We are in favour of a simple, practical, effective order of destruction of chemical weapons. As we have repeatedly emphasized, this order of destruction should provide for the complete destruction of all stockpiles, the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, and, above all, the immediate cessation of production, the declaration of the precise size and location of all chemical weapon stockpiles by all those possessing them not later than 30 days after the convention enters into force, verification of the trustworthiness of such declarations, and the institution of international monitoring of stockpiles.

Allow me to comment briefly on the working paper submitted by the delegations of the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy (CD/CW/WP.197). We have studied with interest the ideas put forward in this document, and our preliminary comments may be summarized as follows. We do not quite understand why such an early deadline (five years) has been set for levelling-out, as it will almost automatically lead to the establishment of a high threshold of chemical weapon stocks in the hands of the "States parties with large stocks". What we would like - and this will be closely connected with the fundamental aim of the convention - is for all of the States parties to the convention which possess chemical weapons, without any exceptions, and whatever the size of the stocks they possess, to start destroying them simultaneously. Obviously the rates of destruction will vary from one chemical-weapon State to another, and remain to be determined. One can think of various levels to be aimed at by the States parties which possess these weapons, depending on the size of their stocks.

Since the course and process of destruction of chemical weapon stocks is a very important problem for the fate of the convention, we consider that this question should be included in the agenda of each regular session of the

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General Conference of the future Organization. Meanwhile a provision concerning the convening of special sessions, whatever the issues that may be discussed at them, will be set out clearly in article VIII of the convention.

The question of the order of destruction is also broached in document CD/CW/WP.199. We have outlined our attitude to it in previous statements. Our delegation shares the view of many other delegations that the position reflected in this document is in no way conducive to progress in the elaboration of the convention and the rapid destruction of chemical weapons in order that they should never reappear under any pretext. There is no doubt that the early declaration of possession of chemical weapons by States which have not yet made such a declaration, as well as of the level of their stockpiles of these weapons, would effectively promote finalization of work on the order of destruction during the summer part of the 1988 session.

In conclusion, I would like to say a few words about the urgent need to deal with the question of irritants. The use of weapons containing harmful chemicals against developing countries which do not possess a proper level of protection may constitute an extremely serious blow to their security. The principal victims will be the civilian population and peaceful activities in these countries. The use of herbicides for military purposes is another problem which requires solution. The time has now come to incorporate appropriate provisions on this subject in the "rolling text".

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Mongolia for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Pakistan, Ambassador Ahmad.

Mr. AHMAD (Pakistan): Mr. President, may I begin by expressing our happiness at seeing you in the Chair, the representative of a country which has always played an active role in this forum and made a useful contribution to its work. Earlier in this session, we were honoured by the presence in our midst of your Foreign Minister, His Excellency Dr. Péter Várkonyi. The important statement delivered by him testifies to the interest taken by your country in multilateral disarmament efforts. Our deliberations this month have been of particular importance in view of the special report that the Conference will be submitting to the third special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. We are confident that, given your diplomatic skill and experience, you will be able to bring our work to a successful conclusion. I would also like to take this opportunity to express the sincere appreciation of my delegation for the efficient and able stewardship of the Conference last month by Ambassador von Stülpnagel of the Federal Republic of Germany, and in February by Ambassador Rose of the German Democratic Republic.

I should also like to extend a warm welcome to our new colleagues who have joined us since I last took the floor - Ambassador Marchand of Canada, Ambassador Elaraby of Egypt, Ambassador Nasser of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ambassador Azikiwe of Nigeria, Ambassador Sujka of Poland and Ambassador Solesby of the United Kingdom - and to wish those of our colleagues who have recently left Geneva every success in their new assignments.

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Ten years ago at SSOD-I the Committee on Disarmament was established with its present composition and working methods. When the General Assembly meets next month at its third special session devoted to disarmament, it will also take a look at the work done by us during the last decade. None of us can claim that the achievements of the Conference during this period have come up to the expectations of the international community, nor has its potential as the single multilateral negotiating forum in the field of disarmament been fully realized. Our session this year, however, commenced on a more auspicious note than for several previous years. The signature in December last of the United States-Soviet Treaty on the elimination of their intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles created a favourable atmosphere for our work here. The Treaty demonstrates that the nuclear arms race can be stopped and indeed reversed, and that nuclear disarmament is a realistic objective. The figure of two and a half thousand or so missiles that the super-Powers have agreed to eliminate is not large, but the significance of the agreement goes beyond these numbers. It is the first disarmament agreement which envisages the elimination of an entire class of nuclear weapons, rather than limiting numbers. The detailed and intrusive verification provisions and the principle of asymmetrical reductions that the Treaty embodies are important precedents which will be of relevance in the negotiation of future disarmament agreements, not only between the super-Powers or at the global level but also in a regional context. It shows that mandatory on-site inspections are desirable and feasible and can be carried out without compromising sovereignty and national security. The Treaty also reinforces the principle that in any disarmament agreement he who possesses superiority must also reduce by a larger number.

Of course the INF Treaty will be a true watershed only if it is the precursor of further disarmament measures. The international community expects that it will be followed by agreements on a drastic reduction in strategic offensive weapons as well as tactical weapons, leading to their complete elimination, and by agreements for the prevention of an arms race in outer space. On the other hand, the significance of the Treaty will be greatly reduced if the elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range nuclear weapons comes to be offset by a build-up, whether quantitative or qualitative, of other nuclear weapons.

Non-proliferation is an integral part of the nuclear disarmament process. States which have voluntarily renounced the nuclear weapon option did so in the larger interest of contributing to the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons, and in the expectation that the nuclear-weapon States would also come to abjure them. This understanding is enshrined in the non-proliferation Treaty. To deny the non-nuclear-weapon States the right to participate in the elaboration of measures for nuclear disarmament and for the prevention of nuclear war would therefore be morally indefensible as well as legally incorrect. It would also be a short-sighted policy, for the viability of any measures in an area which impinges so profoundly on the security and survival of every State depends on such measures being in accord with the security interests of all.

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The Conference on Disarmament, as the single multilateral negotiating forum in this field, cannot, therefore, be denied its due role in the negotiation of nuclear disarmament measures. It is thus a matter of regret that, because of the opposition of the Western group of countries, it was not possible for the Conference to adopt the draft mandate on item 2 of our agenda (CD/819) submitted by the Group of 21 earlier in the session for the establishment of an ad hoc committee to elaborate upon paragraph 50 of the Final Document and identify substantive issues for multilateral negotiations. We must similarly express our deep disappointment over the fact that, because of the position taken by the Western group, the Conference has been unable to address in a meaningful way the question of prevention of nuclear war since its inclusion in our agenda in 1984, and that this year once again the draft mandate introduced by the Group of 21 (CD/515/Rev.4) for consideration of all relevant proposals in an ad hoc committee has not been accepted.

I would now like to turn to the question of a nuclear test ban, an item of the highest priority on the multilateral disarmament agenda. Twenty-five years ago, the parties to the partial test-ban Treaty pledged themselves to seek to achieve the conclusion of a treaty resulting in the permanent banning of all nuclear test explosions, including all such explosions underground. Five years later, in the non-proliferation Treaty, this determination was reiterated together with the commitment to take effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament. The urgency of a nuclear test ban has been repeatedly emphasized by the United Nations General Assembly, the Non-Aligned Movement, the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the Heads of State or Government of the South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation, most recently in the Kathmandu Declaration of November 1987.

For a long time, negotiations on a test ban apparently foundered on the question of verification. However, it is now clear that a test ban would not be acceptable to some nuclear-weapon States even with an absolutely foolproof verification system. In these circumstances, my delegation finds little comfort in the commencement of full-scale stage-by-stage negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States on nuclear testing. We evaluate these talks in the light of the criteria indicated in paragraph 51 of the Final Document of SSOD-I, which stated that the cessation of nuclear weapon testing would make a significant contribution to the aim of ending the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and the development of new types of such weapons, and preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The ongoing negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union are aimed in the first place at improved verification measures for the threshold test-ban Treaty and the peaceful nuclear explosions Treaty, which provide for a 150-kiloton yield threshold. These restrictions have not, however, placed any real restraints on the nuclear weapon development programme of either signatory. An agreement to verify these thresholds would not, therefore, interfere with the development of new weapon designs or end the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons, as envisaged by the Final Document. What the world expects is not that the existing high thresholds be verified, but rather that such tests not be carried out at all. Intermediate limits on the number and yield of nuclear tests will be

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meaningful only if they serve to curb the qualitative development of nuclear weapons and are adopted in the context of a legally binding commitment to a comprehensive ban within a short and predetermined time-limit.

The objective of prohibiting all nuclear explosions in all environments by all States for all time cannot be achieved by bilateral talks. A multilateral approach to the question of a nuclear test ban is, therefore, indispensable. Negotiations on this subject in the Conference on Disarmament should not be delayed any further. It is regrettable that because of a lack of agreement on an adequate mandate for an ad hoc committee, the Conference has not been able to undertake any substantive work on a test ban for the last five years. Earlier this month, the Group of 21, in a spirit of compromise and in a further demonstration of its flexibility, introduced a draft mandate (CD/829) for the establishment of an ad hoc committee with the objective of carrying out the multilateral negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty. We hope that this proposal will come to be adopted, and would urge those countries which regard a test ban as a long-term objective to consider carefully the effects that any further delay in the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty would have on efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to additional States.

I should also like to inform the Conference in this context of the proposal made last year by the Prime Minister of Pakistan to the Prime Minister of India that the two countries should conclude a bilateral nuclear test-ban treaty. We are looking forward to a positive response to this proposal. We believe that the conclusion of such a bilateral agreement between Pakistan and India would serve to assure the two countries and the world that neither has any intention of pursuing the nuclear weapon option.

My delegation has always attached particular importance to item 6 of our agenda, relating to negative security assurances. We are gratified that an Ad hoc Committee on this item was established at the commencement of the session, and would like to express our appreciation for the determined manner in which Ambassador Tellalov of Bulgaria has been presiding over this body. Once again negotiations on this subject, which the Conference on Disarmament has been dealing with for 10 years, have made little headway. The legitimate demand of the non-nuclear-weapon States that their renunciation of the nuclear weapon option should be reciprocated by the nuclear-weapon States by an assurance in an international instrument with binding legal effect not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against those who do not possess these weapons has not been heeded. Such an attitude on the part of the concerned nuclear-weapon States regrettably can only weaken the non-proliferation régime.

The prevention of an arms race in outer space is another subject of urgent priority for our Conference. We welcome the fact that the Ad hoc Committee on this item commenced its substantive work last month, though somewhat belatedly, and would like to assure Ambassador Taylhardat of Venezuela of our full co-operation in the accomplishment of his difficult task. Since its establishment in 1985, the Ad hoc Committee has carried out a detailed examination of issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, and of existing agreements. We must now focus our attention on

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

the third item of its programme of work, relating to existing proposals and future initiatives, with a view to reaching agreement on concrete measures for the prevention of an arms race in outer space. We hope that the Committee will be enabled to address this task meaningfully this year.

It cannot be seriously disputed that the current legal régime governing the activities of States in outer space, comprising customary law, the Charter of the United Nations and several international agreements pertaining specifically to outer space, is not adequate to the task of preventing an arms race in this environment. Several shortcomings in the existing law have been identified in the course of discussions in the Ad hoc Committee. It has already been overtaken by technological developments not foreseen by those who drew up the existing treaties. The rapid pace at which space technology is advancing threatens to make the existing space law a tenuous fabric.

A wide variety of military activities is already taking place in space, and space support systems have become an important part of the military machine of space Powers. However, present military activities do not involve the use of weapons in space or of weapons directed against objects in space. It is still not too late to adopt measures that would permanently preclude an expensive and highly dangerous arms race in space. A comprehensive new international régime which ensures that our last frontier does not become an arena of armed conflict is urgently needed. There should be a strict and universal ban on the development, testing, production and deployment of any weapons in outer space. This régime should, in addition, aim at making the beneficial and stabilizing uses of outer space available to all nations on a basis of equality.

Greater transparency in the military activities of space Powers in outer space would serve an important confidence-building function. We therefore invite countries engaged in the research, development and testing of space weapons to inform the Conference on Disarmament of these activities in an open and detailed manner, pending a complete ban on such weapons. The proposal for strengthening the registration Convention has been supported by many delegations. Information on the general function of space objects at present given under article IV of the convention is not provided in a timely manner, is not sufficient to give a clear picture of the military activities of space Powers, and is not subject to verification. To overcome these shortcomings, it would be necessary to amend the registration Convention or to conclude a new agreement providing for the furnishing, before launch, of detailed information, inter alia on the precise function of the space vehicle, and for the verification of this information at the launching site by an international agency. In this connection, I should like to refer to the proposal made by the Soviet Union for the establishment of an international inspectorate to verify the non-deployment of weapons in space. We feel that, as a first step, such an institution could be set up for the purpose of verifying data concerning the function of space objects with a view to providing the international community with reliable information on activities in space, especially those of a military nature.

My delegation has on previous occasions voiced its support for the proposal for the establishment of an international space monitoring agency.

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

Such an organization would provide the international community with the means of verifying compliance with disarmament agreements on the basis of the remote sensing and surveillance techniques now available to only a few. It would contribute to confidence-building and transparency and thus strengthen international peace and security. We view with concern the large-scale programmes currently under way in a few countries aimed at developing space-based ballistic missile defences. We believe that the deployment of such systems, if technically feasible, would lead to unending competition in strategic defences, a host of countermeasures that can be arrayed against them, and the deployment of more numerous and more sophisticated offensive weapons. Such an arms race, affecting the Earth as well as outer space, would be futile, costly and highly destabilizing.

The dangerous consequences of a competition in ballistic missile defences have been appreciated since the 1960s. Strict limits were therefore placed on such systems in the 1972 ABM Treaty. The philosophy underlying the Treaty, that limits on offensive nuclear weapons are possible only if strict constraints are placed on anti-missile systems, remains valid and is of universal application. There is therefore a need to supplement and reinforce this bilateral treaty through the conclusion of a multilateral agreement of unlimited duration. I would like to recall in this connection a proposal to this effect made by my delegation in 1986.

The importance of a ban on ASAT weapons is widely recognized. Needless to say, such a ban should give protection only to satellites performing peaceful functions, and not those which threaten the security of other States. An ASAT ban, therefore, presupposes an agreed definition of peaceful functions and a verification system aimed at determining whether objects launched into space fulfil this criterion. These are issues which must be addressed urgently. Effective verification is an indispensable element of any international disarmament agreement. This is true also for agreements concerning outer space. The difficulties associated with verifying compliance with outer space agreements, in view of the vast extent of this environment, are sometimes exaggerated. Perfect verification cannot be achieved and should not be aimed at. All space objects are launched from the ground and are not unlimited in number. The location of launching sites is known, and satellites can easily be inspected before launch. Moreover, outer space itself is open to inspection, as considerations of national sovereignty do not apply.

Full compliance with the existing legal régime governing outer space, insufficient and incomplete as it is, is of fundamental importance. The ABM Treaty is one of its essential components. It should be strictly observed and its provisions maintained and further strengthened. My delegation welcomes the ongoing bilateral negotiations between the two super-Powers on space matters, and urges the two parties to bring them to an early conclusion which would also be in keeping with the wider interests of the international community.

I have addressed items 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 of our agenda in my statement this morning. I hope to take up items 4, 7 and 8 in a later intervention.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Pakistan for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair, and especially to my country. I now give the floor to the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Sujka, who will introduce the report of the Committee, contained in document CD/831.

Mr. SUJKA (Poland): Comrade President, let me begin by extending my warm congratulations to you on presiding over our Conference for the month of April. You have been performing your duties with great skill and high efficiency over a difficult period involving reporting to SSOD-III. I also wish to take this opportunity to thank those distinguished Ambassadors who have addressed words of welcome to me.

The report I am introducing today, contained in document CD/831, was adopted in its entirety by the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons on 20 April. It reflects the results of the negotiations since SSOD-II, including those achieved during the spring session. In keeping with the requirements for SSOD-III, it reflects the present stage of elaboration of a convention on a chemical weapons ban.

The document now before us follows, in general, the well-established pattern of previous years. It consists of three parts: the so-called technical part, which briefly recalls the history of the negotiations within this body and its subsidiary organ, appendix I and appendix II.

Let me briefly comment on their contents. Appendix I, which contains the current version of the "rolling text" of the draft convention, is a fundamental part of the report. Appendix II contains texts of papers which reflect the result of work undertaken to date on relevant issues. These papers are part of the report, as it has been agreed that they are to serve as a basis for further work. For the time being, they are not developed enough to be included in appendix I.

The report as presented reflects a further step forward in our process of negotiations. It encompasses the results achieved during the spring part of the session. The time we had at our disposal was shorter than usual during the spring session. This time was, however, used very intensively in a business-like manner. Nevertheless, I would share the opinion that the results seem to have fallen short of generally expressed hopes and expectations. However, we have before us the summer part of the session, which could bring us much closer to the common goals.

Briefly taking stock of the present state of affairs as reflected in appendices I and II, I would say that in some areas we were able to develop existing texts towards mutually acceptable solutions. In others we have worked out a common basis for future work. We have also had, however, to register a clearer picture of differences of position on some fundamental issues. I hope this will bring us closer to overcoming these divergences in the future.

I would like to draw the attention of the delegations to a very important aspect of the Committee's work which I consider very helpful for the

(Mr. Sujka, Poland)

negotiating process. I have in mind the increased openness and confidence among delegations, demonstrated by numerous declarations made by the participating States on Chemical Weapons and related matters, as well as various visits to military chemical facilities, and the exchange of data both on a bilateral and on a multilateral basis.

At the first meeting of the Ad hoc Committee it was agreed that the Committee should deal with all the articles of the draft convention while focusing its attention, in the first instance, on articles III, IV, V and X (dealt with in working group B), articles VI and XI (dealt with in group A) and articles VII, VIII and IX (dealt with in group C). Accordingly the Committee concentrated its work on these areas. In addition I have held a number of open-ended consultations on articles XII to XVI of the draft convention - which have not, so far, been subject to full-scale negotiations. We did not succeed, however, in making substantial progress with articles I and II, though they too have been updated so as to reflect the current state of affairs.

To sum up, I would like to say that the present report is a fair and detailed reflection of what has been done and what still remains to be negotiated and agreed upon. It shows that the process of working out a convention has reached a very advanced stage. The existing point of departure for dealing with outstanding issues gives ground for optimism, especially if delegations would use the coming recess to prepare thoroughly for the summer session so that our work can be intensified.

I should like to take this opportunity to express my gratitude to the chairmen of the working groups, namely Mr. Cima of Czechoslovakia, Mr. Macedo of Mexico and Mr. Numata of Japan, as well as the Secretary of the Committee Mr. Bensmail, and his assistant Miss Darby.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Sujka, the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons for introducing the report of that Committee, and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. In accordance with a decision taken by the Conference at its 436th plenary meeting, I now give the floor to the representative of Finland, Ambassador Mennander.

Mr. MENNANDER (Finland): Mr. President, may I begin by expressing my satisfaction at seeing you as President of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of April. Your diplomatic skills are well known and much appreciated by my delegation.

I am taking the floor today to draw the attention of the Conference to a note verbale circulated by Finland to all delegations participating in the Conference on Disarmament, whether members or non-members. The note, which was placed in delegations' pigeon-holes next to room III on Monday, sets out the views of the Government of Finland concerning the question of the expansion of the membership of this Conference. We are gratified to note that there is again growing interest in this question, as evinced by the number of comments in the plenary in the course of the spring session of the Conference. Just last Thursday, the distinguished representative of Belgium, Ambassador Clerckx, pointed out that the question of membership has been

(Mr. Mennander, Finland)

deadlocked for many years, and expressed Belgium's support for a rapid enlargement of the Conference, perhaps by more than four new members. He went on to address an urgent appeal for initiatives to break the present deadlock on this issue. We for our part, find his remarks most appropriate.

Following up on the remarks by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Finland, Mr. Kalevi Sorsa, to this Conference on 18 February, the Finnish note reiterates our interest in becoming a member of this Conference at the earliest opportunity. It also points out that the forthcoming third special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament provides a timely opportunity to take a fresh look at the membership issue in its entirety so as to assist the Conference in bringing its consultations on the subject to a successful conclusion at an early date.

In our view, looking at the question of membership afresh should involve consideration of all options conducive to an early agreement on expansion. We believe that a step-by-step but limited expansion over time is one option which merits serious consideration. We are convinced that, if approached in the spirit of good will and compromise, the successful resolution of the question of membership at an early date cannot remain beyond reach. We are ready to engage in consultations on this issue with all interested delegations.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Finland for his statement and for his kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Ambassador Nazarkin.

Mr. NAZARKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): At their meeting in Moscow on 21 and 22 April, E.A. Shevardnadze, member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, and George Shultz, United States Secretary of State, reviewed among other important issues the status of bilateral and multilateral negotiations in Geneva towards a comprehensive and effectively verifiable chemical weapons ban encompassing all chemical-weapon-capable States. The joint statement by the Ministers says that they "instructed their delegations to undertake further constructive work, including in such areas as confidence-building, openness, verification and the security of States parties, to contribute to the elaboration of a multilateral convention banning chemical weapons." The Ministers also recorded their concern over the growing problem of the proliferation and use of chemical weapons.

Today I would like to touch upon the issues of confidence-building and openness. On 18 February this year the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, V.F. Petrovsky, submitted for consideration by the Conference a memorandum on multilateral data exchange in connection with the elaboration of a convention on the complete and general prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons. The memorandum set out our ideas regarding the purpose of such an exchange and the volume of information which, in our view, it would be appropriate to exchange. On 15 March the Soviet delegation provided some additional clarification concerning the memorandum, and also presented information falling within the scope of the first stage of data exchange that we propose.

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

The statement of 18 February also contained a proposal for the voluntary designation of one facility per country where a specially established international group of experts could test the procedures being worked out at the negotiations for systematic international verification of the non-production of chemical weapons in commercial industry. These two proposals have, we understand, generated a certain interest. Comments, ideas and requests for clarification have been made. It seems to us appropriate, now that the spring part of the 1988 session is drawing to an end, to sum up the preliminary results of both the data exchange, which has in fact already begun, and the exchange of views which has taken place on our proposals. Let me turn to this issue.

We note with satisfaction that important steps have recently been made towards greater openness in the field of chemical weapons. More than 20 States have declared that they do not possess chemical weapons, and we have heard similar statements at today's meeting. The distinguished representative of Brazil, Ambassador Azambuja, has made such a statement, and he was followed by the distinguished representative of Mongolia, Ambassador Bayart. A number of countries have provided data showing that they produce chemicals covered by the Convention. The practice of visiting chemical-weapons-related facilities is becoming more widespread. We hope that this practice of confidence-building will continue. In particular we consider that those possessing chemical weapons should provide information on the size of their stockpiles. The provision of such information not only dispels suspicions and builds trust, but is also necessary from the point of view of practical requirements for the elaboration of the convention, particularly of the order of destruction of chemical weapon stocks. As you know, the Soviet Union has already provided such data.

There was, however, particularly in the United States delegation's statement, a shadow of mistrust regarding the figure we declared, although it was not substantiated by any arguments. It seems that on similar grounds, following the "logic of mistrust" and nothing more, we too might question the reliability of the information provided by the United States regarding its chemical arsenal. However, we will not do so, because we do not want data exchange and openness to lead in a direction which would diminish confidence. Furthermore, the statement made on 19 April by the distinguished representative of the United States, Ambassador M. Friedersdorf, contained a reproach that the Soviet Union is allegedly seeking to learn "almost everything" about American chemical weapons, by inviting the United States to declare the overall size of its stockpile, while Soviet stocks would "continue to be largely shrouded in secrecy". The United States delegation asserts that data on the number and location of chemical weapon production and storage facilities are "much more significant". Such data are certainly important. But what for? Obviously, for verification, which will take place after the convention has entered into force. Then, of course, the locations of all storage facilities will have to be declared, including those on foreign territory. Yet I do not know where American chemical weapons are located, for example, in the Federal Republic of Germany. Since it is not proposed to conduct checks in respect of the multilateral exchange of data before the signature of the convention, it is not clear what use data on the location of facilities can be at this stage.

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

The volume of stocks is another matter, as I have already said earlier. The United States does not want to provide that figure, saying that in combination with the data it has previously declared, including those on the percentage breakdown of the overall stockpile, it will reveal, as Ambassador Friedersdorf put it, "almost everything about the United States chemical weapon stockpile". But one can look at this from the other angle as well. If, in addition to the figure it has declared regarding the size of its stockpile, the Soviet Union provides the data the United States has published, we will find ourselves in the same situation that the United States is trying to avoid. Is there a way out of this situation? We believe one can be found if we take as a starting-point the fact that certain data are needed for the preparation of the convention, rather than asking which data have already been made public at one time or another, for reasons unrelated to the negotiations. This is a matter for each individual State.

The distinguished representative of the United Kingdom, Ambassador Solesby, said on 19 April, apparently referring to her statement of 8 March this year, that "some initial disclosures of information will give rise to further questions or may not tally with the assessments of others". On 8 March she had expressed doubts concerning both the figure we had declared for our stockpile and the completeness of the presentation of our arsenal at Shikhany. I have already said earlier that anything can be questioned. The monstrously overstated assessments of our chemical weapon stockpile which are published in the West can only be left to the consciences of their authors. We cannot understand why we should have to prove the truthfulness of our declaration for the sole reason that someone in the West has had wild fantasies regarding the size of our stockpile. Proof of the truthfulness of our declaration will be provided no later than 30 days after the convention enters into force. For the moment I wish to recall our statement that chemical weapon stocks in the Soviet Union do not exceed 50,000 tons of CW agents. Under chemical weapons, we include both chemical munitions and CW agents in containers. As for the presentation at Shikhany, as the command of the Soviet chemical forces stated at the press conference following the presentation, it included all the Soviet Union's CW agents and standard munitions.

I think that on the whole we can state that substantial headway has been made at this part of the session on the issue of the multilateral exchange of data on chemical weapons prior to the signing of the convention. We look forward to further progress on this matter at the summer part of the session.

Now I should like to turn to another issue, which to a certain extent is linked to the first. I refer to the proposal made at the Conference by the delegation of the Soviet Union on 18 February regarding an experiment to test the procedures being worked out at the negotiations for systematic international verification of the non-production of chemical weapons in commercial industry. We are encouraged by the interest that many delegations have shown in this idea. Some initial assessments of our proposal have already been made. Taking into account the discussion that has taken place, we would like today to provide the following additional clarifications as regards our understanding of its organizational aspects.

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

First, we believe that the experiment should include the measures envisaged in the draft convention for the types of enterprises from which facilities for the experiment will be selected, including the relevant declarations. Secondly, the experiment may be carried out in stages. In the first stage, a national experiment (conducted by inspectors of that State) would be carried out at the designated enterprise. The Government would submit a report to the Conference on Disarmament on the results of the experiment, containing conclusions and possibly suggestions as regards the international verification procedures being worked out at the negotiations. Thirdly, a specially established group of experts from the States hosting the experiment would analyse the reports and draw general conclusions from them. In the second stage the group would also test the systematic verification procedures at the enterprises designated by the States. Additional procedures which the experts consider desirable might be tested during these international inspections (with the agreement of the host States). The international group of experts will submit its conclusions and recommendations to the Conference on Disarmament. Fourthly, the costs of the experiment, including the costs of inviting the experts, would be borne by the national Government. These are our additional observations. We await with interest the reactions of other delegations.

In conclusion, permit me to express the hope that the forthcoming summer break will be used by all delegations to think over the results of the session now ending, and to study the possibility of further progress in elaborating the draft convention. Allow me also to thank you for your successful and wise guidance of the work of the Conference in the past month, during which it had the important task of preparing the Conference's report to the third special session of the United Nations General Assembly on disarmament.

I should now like to touch upon a sad circumstance. Today's meeting is the last at which our colleague Ambassador Konstantin Tellalov, the representative of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, will be present. He is leaving Geneva on completing his mission here, having done so with great skill and dignity. We will miss his sharp wit, his great political and diplomatic experience, his great personal charm. I am sure that Konstantin Tellalov's remarkable qualities will be used in future for the good of his country. On behalf of the Soviet delegation and on my own behalf, I would like to extend to Konstantin Tellalov and his wife Youlia my warmest wishes for happiness, good health and success.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for his statement. I now give the floor to the representative of India, Ambassador Teja.

Mr. TEJA (India): Mr. President, at the beginning of this month, my delegation expressed its satisfaction at seeing you in the Chair during the crucial month of April. Today, as we approach the end of our work in the spring session of this year, I would like to compliment you on the effective and capable manner in which you have guided our work, especially with regard to the finalization of the special report of the Conference on Disarmament for the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

(Mr. Teja, India)

Between now and the resumption of our work in the summer session, a major disarmament event will have occurred. SSOD-III is scheduled to take place in New York from 30 May to 25 June 1988. Whatever the exact nature of the relationship between the CD and the United Nations, it will undoubtedly have immense significance for our work. In my statement today, I would like to focus on some of the issues related to SSOD-III.

The forthcoming special session presents us with a unique opportunity to revive and strengthen multilateralism in disarmament. The options are before us, and it is up to us to take advantage of the unique circumstances and engage in constructive and peaceful dialogue. We believe that SSOD-III should neither be a mere replay of earlier sessions nor should it try to change or redraft what has already been agreed upon. An attempt to undermine or weaken the authority or validity of the Final Document, to which all of us were parties a decade ago and which we all reaffirmed unanimously and categorically in 1982, would only lead us astray and direct our efforts into futile debates. We should, therefore, try to make the special session forward-looking and pragmatic in order to build upon what has already been agreed to and strive towards our general objective of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

We are all committed to making SSOD-III a successful session. The differences arise because of the varying interpretations of what constitutes a success. The first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, held in 1978, was an event of historic significance. It was convened in response to growing concern among the peoples of the world that the arms race, especially the nuclear arms race, represented an increasing threat to humanity and to the survival of mankind. At that session, the international community of nations achieved, for the first time in the history of disarmament negotiations, a consensus on an international disarmament strategy. The immediate goal of the strategy was the elimination of the danger of nuclear war and implementation of measures to halt and reverse the arms race. The final objective was to achieve, as I mentioned earlier, general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

The conviction that all people had a legitimate right to participate in disarmament and a vital interest in its success led to the United Nations being given a central role and primary responsibility in this field. The success embodied in the Final Document of SSOD-I was founded on a common awareness. A similar common awareness has to be developed to make SSOD-III a landmark in multilateral disarmament efforts. The consensus text arising out of SSOD-III should, in our opinion, be a meaningful and positive one. It should also be relatively brief and address itself to major problems of common concern. It would be desirable not to burden it with issues that can be discussed elsewhere. We visualize it as a concise document, concrete in its contents, future-oriented and yet realistic. It should take stock of where we stand at the moment, develop the principles already accepted by the international community and chart a path for multilateral disarmament efforts to follow. It should indicate in what areas and by what means multilateral disarmament efforts are likely to command wider support. In short, it should be balanced in nature and constructive in its approach. This does not mean that genuine differences of principles and approach cannot be reflected in such a document, or that consensus should be turned into the power of veto.

(Mr. Teja, India)

We perceive a general feeling of optimism, which is understandable, as SSOD-III is taking place in a propitious international climate. In the bilateral sphere, the recent conclusion of the INF Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union is a positive development. It broke new ground in nuclear disarmament. It is even more significant for the new avenues that it has opened up for a 50 per cent cut in the strategic weapons of the two most significant military States. In the regional context, the successful outcome of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures in Europe is also an encouraging sign. At the multilateral level, we have the increasing pace of CW negotiations. All these reflect new attitudes and new policies. These need to be reflected in our concept of security. In the nuclear age, only with coexistence can there be existence; and only with collective security can there be security. Security is not viable unless perceived to be valid for all countries and all peoples. It is true that different countries in the world are at different stages of economic, social and cultural development; some countries are much more powerful than others, yet the international community has to develop an understanding of security in the present age, for it can no longer be tackled in terms of military power alone. Common security has to be based on a sense of common destiny for all peoples. Allowing for existing differences in the level of development, the concept must contain a common awareness of the goal of ridding the world of the threat of a nuclear holocaust and the use of other weapons of mass destruction.

Security is an overriding priority for all nations. A broader understanding of security, which would include not just the military dimension but also the political, economic, social and humanitarian dimensions, would imply that a unilateralist search for security on the basis of sheer accumulation of more and better weapons is a self-defeating exercise. The enhancement of global security needs progress in the interrelated fields of disarmament, development, multilateral organizations for resolution of conflicts and greater movement towards an equitable world order. A multilateralist approach can on the one hand create conditions conducive to disarmament and on the other provide the confidence for successful pursuit of development. The development process, by overcoming non-military factors which undermine security and contributing to a more suitable and sustainable international system, can enhance security and further promote disarmament. Disarmament would enhance security both directly and indirectly. A process of disarmament that provides for undiminished security at progressively lower levels of armaments could allow additional resources to be devoted to addressing non-military challenges to security, and thus result in enhanced overall security.

In the field of disarmament, we have the organizational resources of multilateral machinery: we have the Conference on Disarmament, which is the sole multilateral negotiating body; we have the globally multilateral Disarmament Commission, a deliberative body, and in the General Assembly we have the First Committee. The CD is unique in that all five nuclear-weapon States are members. Its rules of procedure are fundamentally sound, and flexible enough to accommodate a certain degree of variation in the approaches to issues. Suggestions have already been made about a realistic disarmament agenda. While we would welcome a constructive approach, the established

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priorities cannot be overturned in the name of realism. The criterion for inclusion of items on the agenda of a multilateral body is not merely feasibility or the ease with which progress can be made, but whether an issue touches the very survival of mankind. Even if progress is not possible in the short term on such a subject, it is necessary that it be included and kept alive on the agenda of a multilateral body and that we persist in our efforts to resolve it in the most widely acceptable fashion. This criterion justifies the priority accorded to the issue of nuclear disarmament.

Modern science-based technology has done more than anything else to bring about the present shape of the world. While technology has provided us with a number of benefits, it has also made our problems more complex by globalizing them. No longer can we deal with problems of poverty, development, disarmament, security, pollution and ecology in isolation. Growing interdependence among nations, interrelations among global issues, mutuality of interests, all demand a collective approach and a multilateral framework within which these issues can be explored and resolved. In the previous decades our attempts were primarily focused on the quantitative aspects of the arms race. Efforts have been made to try and control numbers while technological developments have continued, leading to the designing of more lethal and accurate weapon systems. It is now clear that the dynamics of the arms race have been led by technological innovation. The emergence of military R and D as the major stimulant of the arms race is a relatively recent phenomenon, primarily due to the increasingly dominant role of science and technology in our lives. It is estimated that 90 per cent of all scientists who ever lived are alive today, and if measured by the volume of research publications, our knowledge doubles every 15 years. About 1.5 million scientists, engineers and technical experts devote their efforts to designing, developing and testing new weapon systems. Regrettably, the growth of military R and D has been even sharper, and it has come to occupy the predominant position in global R and D. Today, the world spends approximately \$100 billion annually on military R and D, accounting for a third of all world spending on science and technology R and D.

Today we stand on the threshold of a new arms race, which seeks to combine the most recent developments in the field of electronics with those of nuclear explosive powers. Significant improvements have taken place in delivery systems with the development of precision guidance systems just as weapon systems have become more compact and versatile. While similar warheads can be used on more than one launch system, missiles can now be fitted with conventional and/or nuclear warheads. These developments also threaten to extend the dimensions of the existing arms race into outer space. Increasing computerization and sophistication in weapon systems can only create an illusion of stability. Increased decentralization and reduced time for decision-making, a blurring of the distinction between nuclear and conventional weapons, between tactical and strategic weapons, erodes the thresholds. These technological developments are affecting not only nuclear weapon systems but also conventional weapons. For both these areas, the issue needs to be looked at in a global framework.

Technology by itself is neutral. Its applications could, however, contribute to increasing stability or stabilize existing balances. Our

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efforts should enable us to look at this problem and analyse it in all its implications, so that the technological developments can be channelled into a stabilizing mode. Such an analysis would require considerable technical inputs. A number of these technologies also have significant applications in arms limitation and disarmament. Before the arms race can be reversed it has to be halted, and before it is halted it has to be slowed down. In the past technology has been used to escalate the pace of competition and create uncertainty; today we need to dampen the pace and create confidence. SSOD-III should give us the means with which to keep this subject under continuous monitoring so that periodic assessments can be made. Channelling technological developments into areas of verification and confidence-building would also help in slowing down the arms race with a view to halting it and eventually reversing it. The solution is a long-term one, but a beginning has to be made. SSOD-III provides us with an opportunity to take a first step in this direction.

Verification of compliance with disarmament agreements is an issue of concern to all nations. We all want to be certain that agreements to destroy weapons or to refrain from their development are strictly complied with. Inadequacy of verification measures has been used in the past as a justification for lack of progress in disarmament. For this reason, the Stockholm Declaration issued by the leaders of the Six-nation Initiative strongly emphasized "the need for the establishment of an integrated multilateral verification system within the United Nations, as an integral part of a strengthened multilateral framework required to ensure peace and security during the process of disarmament as well as in a nuclear-weapon-free world".

SSOD-III is a time for reflection and deliberation. It is an opportunity for setting out a common agenda for multilateral disarmament which will stand us in good stead till the turn of the century. It is a time for building upon the foundations laid down by the Final Document in 1978. It is a time to ensure that existing negotiations, particularly on a chemical weapons convention, are accelerated and concluded at the earliest. It is my conviction that an awareness of our common goals, tempered with a sense of realism, will hold the key to a successful SSOD-III.

Before I conclude my statement, let me say how sad we are to see our long-term colleague Ambassador Tellalov of Bulgaria leaving us. I would like to convey to him our best wishes; his contributions have been numerous, and he will certainly be missed by all of us.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of India for his statement and for his kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Bulgaria, Ambassador Tellalov.

Mr. TELLALOV (Bulgaria): It is not without emotion that I take the floor today. A little more than six years ago I started my work in the Conference on Disarmament - in this same corner of the chamber, actually in the chair on the right. Today my delegation is to be found in the same place. In other words, I have had the opportunity to sit on all 40 chairs around this table and observe and participate in the work of the Conference from every possible

(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

angle, including the high post which you, comrade President, now have the honour of holding. Nevertheless, I do not intend today to analyse and assess the activities of the Conference during the past six years. It is not necessary for me to remind you of the position of my country, which I have stated and defended in the Conference on Disarmament; my Minister for Foreign Affairs spoke here only 12 days ago. Allow me to say only a few words.

When I began my work in the Conference on Disarmament in 1982, cold winds blew in international relations. The atmosphere was not very favourable for fruitful work. The records registered a lot of sharp statements and retorts in exercising the right of reply. We used to blame each other and shift the responsibility for the arms race from one to another. Stated desires to achieve real steps towards disarmament were not matched by political will and practical work. Some years later, the sun's rays began to find their way into this chamber as well. Close to our negotiating body, here in Geneva, the first Gorbachev-Reagan summit took place, and for the first time the world heard the joint statement of the two super-Powers that "nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought". There followed a second summit, a third, and we are on the eve of a fourth Gorbachev-Reagan summit. The first real disarmament agreement was signed, a second one is on the way, and for us here the chemical weapons negotiations have gained solid momentum, with a view to agreeing on the text of a future convention banning chemical weapons.

One way or another, however, I leave my post without having the personal satisfaction that one could derive from a task accomplished - the achievement of at least one multilateral agreement on disarmament. That is why I sincerely wish success to all my colleagues in their future efforts, which I hope will be stimulated by the decisions of the third special session on disarmament.

In terms of personal experience I would like to assure you that I will preserve the best of memories of all the colleagues I worked with in the Conference. Some of them, like Ambassador Kőmíves of Hungary, Ambassador Lowitz of the United States of America and Ambassador Cromartie of the United Kingdom, have left us for ever. Others have retired. Still others have taken up important new assignments. I am really pleased that such veterans as Ambassador García Robles of Mexico and the Deputy Secretary-General of the Conference, Ambassador Berasategui, continue to perform their duties in the interest of the noble cause of disarmament as energetically as when I met them in 1982.

I should like to express my gratitude and thanks to all of you, dear colleagues, for your co-operation and friendship. I would also like to convey warm words of gratitude to all members of the secretariat, and personally to the Secretary-General, Ambassador Komatina, who is a good friend of mine, to the interpreters, who have tried to translate my bad English into other languages - in other words to all those without whom it is difficult to imagine the functioning of this Conference.

It is a mere chance, comrade President, that I am winding up my duties in this Conference at a time when you, with your inherent diplomatic skill, are presiding over its work. But every chance gives rise to a possibility of some

(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

kind, and I would not like to miss it. I cannot conclude without noting the excellent co-operation which has existed between you and me, not only in the Conference, but also in our general activities as permanent representatives, co-operation which is worthy of the fraternal relations between our two countries.

I would like to assure you, dear friends, that wherever I may be I will keep alive my interest in the work of the Conference and that I shall be particularly happy if, as soon as possible, your efforts are crowned with concrete results. I wish to all of you good health, a lot of happiness and success in your work hereafter.

The PRESIDENT: I wish to thank the representative of Bulgaria, Ambassador Tellalov, for his statement, and especially for the kind words he addressed to me in my capacity as President of the Conference on Disarmament, and as a colleague. Ambassador Tellalov is one of the most experienced representatives in the Conference, as he has been with us since January 1982. He has played an important role in the work of the Conference, of which he was President during the month of June 1986. Under his presidency, he developed organizational arrangements to deal with agenda item 2, relating to the question of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. He also acted as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on negative security assurances during the first part of this session. I am sure that we all appreciate his contribution to our work, which was possible due to his friendly personality and professional competence. May I for a moment drop my somewhat rigid presidential stand and add to this appreciation my personal one? I was privileged to follow Ambassador Tellalov's performance not only in the field of disarmament but in very different areas, in the Conference on Disarmament as well as in his role as Permanent Representative, and I found it to be a very remarkable performance characterized by a deep feeling of responsibility and sense of co-operation. May I, on behalf of you all, wish him and also his family the very best, and a successful continuation of his activity in the field of international relations.

That brings us to the end of my list of speakers for today. Does any other member wish to take the floor? I recognize the representative of Mongolia, to whom I give the floor.

Mr. BAYART (Mongolia) (translated from Russian): Our great friend, Ambassador Konstantin Tellalov, the representative of the People's Republic of Bulgaria to the Conference on Disarmament, has completed his work in that post and will soon be leaving Geneva. In expressing the feelings of my colleagues in the Group of Socialist States and my own personal feelings, I would like to emphasize that Ambassador Konstantin Tellalov, who headed the Bulgarian delegation to the Conference on Disarmament for a long time, has just told us that he has completed a big circle round this very prestigious negotiating table, and has made an outstanding contribution to the work of the Conference on Disarmament. Leaving aside the personal charm of Ambassador Tellalov, whom it has been extremely pleasant to associate with, his customary calm together with his wisdom, his perceptiveness and his benevolent attention to the views of others, his business-like and constructive approach to the problems being examined at the Conference, his firm conviction of the need for and

(Mr. Bayart, Mongolia)

possibility of reaching solutions for the good of all States and peoples, all these have won him deserved authority here. We will miss him very much, this fine person and friend, who could always be depended on; we will miss his great knowledge and experience. We wish Ambassador Tellalov every success in his further activities, we wish him good health, we wish happiness and success to his wife, Youlia, and his children. In taking our leave of him, we wish to say au revoir, until we meet again.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Mongolia for his statement. I now give the floor to the representative of the United States of America.

Mr. GRANGER (United States of America): The distinguished representative of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Nazarkin, has apprised the Conference of the instructions our two delegations have received from their Governments as a result of the recent ministerials in Moscow. The United States delegation will, of course, comply with those instructions, and indeed we have already begun to do so. You will note, if you review the statements of Ambassador Friedersdorf on 14 and 19 April, that the issues mentioned in the joint statement that Ambassador Nazarkin mentioned today, that is, confidence-building, openness, verification and security, are precisely issues my delegation considered important and considered further work is needed on. There are, of course, others that we also discussed in those two statements, and we are prepared for constructive work in all these areas. We will return during the next session when we convene again in the summer and discuss the joint statement further because, of course, it covered many areas other than chemical weapons.

Regarding multilateral data exchange, my delegation has noted with interest the Soviet proposal, and we are considering it carefully, along with other proposals such as the one recently submitted by several Western States. Our preliminary assessment is that the latter proposal offers more prospects for progress in our negotiations, because it seems to call for more useful information to be presented when it would be most valuable. The Soviet proposal appears to us to be unbalanced. We have an open mind, however, as to the approach the CD should take, and we look forward to consideration of all options, as well any others that we may have in addition to those two when we resume in the summer. As for the reservations my delegation and others have expressed regarding some of the recent Soviet revelations, Ambassador Friedersdorf stated last week that, given the unhappy experiences of the past, declarations cannot always be accepted at face value. You all know about these unhappy experiences, and I do not intend to go into them again here today. We have discussed them before in our statements over the past two or three years. I will only say now that these unhappy experiences are not wild fantasies. These past unhappy experiences, however, have not dampened our enthusiasm for multilateral data exchange. Indeed, to the contrary, these experiences make it clear that such an exercise is very important to our efforts.

Regarding the Soviet proposal for multilateral efforts to develop and test inspection methods for commercial facilities, we have welcomed that proposal in the past. We do not think it unreasonable, however, to do our

(Mr. Granger, United States)

homework before we begin such an experiment. First, of course, as Ambassador Friedersdorf mentioned last week, we needed to know more precisely what the Soviet Union had in mind, and in that regard we certainly appreciate the clarification that the Soviet Ambassador has given with regard to the Soviet proposal, and particularly his remark that national development of verification procedures must be the first step of development of this experiment. That was the proposal we made last week. As the Soviet proposal itself recognizes, the inspectors would use procedures being worked out here in the CD. Our reservation expressed last week simply recognized that we should better develop those procedures before we take our chemical experts away from their negotiations for the time-consuming, albeit valuable, task of touring these facilities. We look forward to our summer session, where these and other important issues can be addressed again and, hopefully, resolved. My delegation would add its regrets to those expressed by other delegations, that we will soon lose the valuable services of an able diplomat, Ambassador Tellalov of Bulgaria.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the United States of America for his statement. I now give the floor to the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Mr. MASHHADI (Islamic Republic of Iran): In the report of the mission despatched by the Secretary-General to investigate the use of chemical weapons, as documented in S/18852 of 8 May 1987, the specialists, while saying chemical weapons had again been used against Iranian forces by Iraqi forces, also causing injuries to civilians in the Islamic Republic of Iran, concluded:

"We all firmly believe that, at the specialist level, we have done all that we can to identify the types of chemicals and chemical weapons being used in Iran-Iraq conflict ... In our view, only concerted efforts at the political level can be effective in ensuring that all the signatories of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 abide by their obligations".

The specialists warned the international community of their forebodings for the future, saying that indifference "may lead, in the future, to the world facing the spectre of the threat of biological weapons". It is unfortunate that not only has this strongly recommended concerted effort at the political level not materialized, but on the contrary we have been witnesses to a degree of acquiescence to such crimes.

We are now faced with an unprecedented escalation of the use of chemical weapons against civilians, which was highlighted in the Halabja holocaust. Ironically, our request for the dispatch of a team took more than two weeks to meet, and yet the team was incomplete and - worse - the scene of the crime was not visited. What we have to bear in mind is that when the genie is out, nobody will be able to put it back in the bottle. When chemical weapons become a warfare agent in every conflict in the world and the negative effects on the environment come to the threshold of many countries, then it may be too late even to feel sorry for this self-inflicted state. Now the lack of response to the Security Council has made use of chemical weapons by Iraq a fait accompli, which has become normal practice in every operation in a war started by Iraq on 22 September 1980. On 21 April 1988 the township of

(Mr. Mashhadi, Islamic Republic of Iran)

Darkhovein as well as the surroundings of Susangerd in the southern Iranian province of Khugistan were subject to extensive chemical bombardment by Iraqi forces. This deployment, like the previous one in Halabja, was directed against unprotected civilians, leaving a number of casualties. The Islamic Republic of Iran, through its Permanent Mission in New York, immediately submitted a request to the United Nations Secretary-General for the dispatch of an investigation team to the area to once again verify the established facts.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran for his statement. Are there any other delegations wishing to take the floor at this moment? I see none.

I shall now turn to another question. As I announced at the opening of this plenary meeting, I intend now to put before the Conference for adoption the reports of the ad hoc committees on radiological weapons and on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, as contained in documents CD/820 and CD/825.

I now take up the report of the Ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons. If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the report contained in document CD/820.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I should like to extend to Ambassador Tessa Solesby of the United Kingdom our congratulations for the successful conclusion of the work of the Ad hoc Committee. I should like now to deal with the report of the Ad hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, contained in document CD/825. If there is no objection, I shall consider that the Conference adopts it.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I should also like to extend to Ambassador Konstantin Tellalov of Bulgaria our congratulations for the successful outcome of the deliberations of the Ad hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons.

I now intend to suspend the plenary meeting and to convene, in five minutes' time, an informal meeting of the Conference to proceed to the second reading of the special report to the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

The meeting was suspended at 12.25 p.m. and resumed at 12.40 p.m.

The PRESIDENT: The 460th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is resumed.

(The President)

In the light of the exchange of views we had at the informal meeting, I suggest that the Conference should agree to close the first part of the 1988 session at a plenary meeting to be held on Friday 29 April at 5 p.m. The Conference will also hold its regular plenary meeting on Thursday 28 April at 10 a.m., which will be followed by an informal meeting to conclude consideration of the draft substantive paragraphs under various agenda items. If I see no objections, it is so decided.

It was so decided.

The meeting rose at 12.45 p.m.