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REPORT BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LEOPOLDVILLE AREA

Note verbale dated 7 March 1961 addressed to the Secretary-General by the
delegation of the Republic of the Congo transmitting a statement regarding
the incidents at Banana, Matadi and Boma

The Permanent Delegation of the Republic of the Congo presents its compliments to the Secretary-General and has the honour to transmit to him herewith, upon the instructions of its Government, a statement regarding the incidents at Banana, Matadi and Boma in which elements of the Congolese National Army clashed with United Nations Forces.

The Permanent Delegation would be glad if the Secretary-General would kindly bring this document to the attention of the Members of the General Assembly.

The Government of the Republic of the Congo sent a mission to the spot to investigate the origin of these regrettable incidents. The Mission, under the leadership of Mr. DELVAUX, compromised Major KIEMBE, Chief of Staff of the Congolese National Army, and Mr. EBEYA, Commanding Officer of the 2nd Group. The Mission collected the following information:

At about 3 p.m. on Friday, 3 March 1961, a United Nations aircraft landed a civilian passenger at Moanda who had no identity papers. On account of this the six Congolese soldiers who were guarding the airfield refused him permission to land. However, at the request of a United Nations official who was there, these soldiers allowed the civilian passenger to go to the Mangrove Hotel for a meal. From that hotel a civilian official of the United Nations telephoned the headquarters at Kitona to ask for reinforcements. A little later a contingent of about a dozen men, all Sudanese, arrived at the hotel. They were equipped with four Jeeps and a lorry. After contacting the United Nations civilians inside the hotel, they moved off towards the Moanda plain. There they surrounded the six soldiers of the Congolese National Army and tried to disarm them. One sergeant and one soldier managed to escape. As they were fleeing, the sergeant was wounded in the thigh but he managed nevertheless to get to the hospital in a civilian lorry. The soldier managed to get back to the camp, where he reported the matter to the commanding officer, who gave the alarm. Meanwhile, a Sudanese officer went to the camp to return the Congolese soldiers who had been arrested on the Moanda plain. A Congolese soldier, who had heard the alarm sounded, came running up to take up his post but he was killed by the Sudanese soldiers. This incident at Moanda gave the signal for the opening of the hostilities at Banana and Matadi.

At 9 a.m. on Saturday, 4 March, a number of Sudanese soldiers arrived at Matadi to protect the building occupied by the Canadian signal unit. A discussion arose between the soldiers of the Congolese National Army and the Canadian soldiers on why the building was being protected. While the discussion was in progress, the United Nations soldiers fired on the building. The Congolese officer escaped and gave the alarm at the camp. The ANC soldiers, who were engaged in mortar practice, fired several rounds in the direction of the United Nations soldiers. This misunderstanding set off the hostilities at Matadi. A telephone conversation with Mr. Dayal resulted in a cease-fire. The latter did not take effect until

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after the Sudanese soldiers had fired on an ambulance of the Congolese National Army, at about 2 p.m.

At 7.45 a.m. on Sunday, 5 March, Sudanese soldiers opened fire in the direction of the Congolese military camp. Returning the fire, the Congolese National Army destroyed the Palace cinema, near which the Sudanese soldiers were deployed. A cease-fire was arranged at the initiative of Minister DELVAUX and Major INGILA, the local commanding officer. Negotiations were held between the two commanding officers. While they were under way, a further engagement took place between the ANC troops and the Sudanese soldiers, who had opened fire on the Congolese troops while the latter were in their camp.

Their patience exhausted, the Congolese soldiers took the offensive and, after a twenty-minute engagement, disarmed the United Nations forces. An agreement was then reached by the competent authorities on both sides. The terms of the agreement were as follows:

1. The Sudanese troops shall leave the town of Matadi this day by train for Leopoldville, taking with them their arms, ammunition and other equipment;
2. With a view to ensuring security at the time of departure, the Minister himself, together with a staff officer of the National Army and a United Nations officer, shall be present when the said troops board the train;
3. The Minister shall dispatch a staff officer of the National Army to ensure the security of the troops during the journey from Matadi to Leopoldville. Furthermore, he shall establish personal contact with the various units of the National Army with a view to ensuring security and assistance during the journey;
4. Full security shall be provided while the troops are being transported from their base to the station where they will board the train.

The Minister undertakes to report to his Government on the precise circumstances of the Matadi incidents, while for his part the Sudanese Army captain shall submit his report to the United Nations at Leopoldville.

(Signed) S.A. HAFIZ
Sudanese captain

For the Congolese Government:

(Signed) A. DELVAUX
Resident Minister
Minister of the Interior, FF.

Witnesses

For the United Nations:
(Signed) ECUFFARD, C.L.

For the National Army:
(Signed) KIEMBE

The Permanent Mission has been authorized to bring the following information to the attention of the members of the General Assembly.

The deplorable incidents in which elements of the Congolese National Army clashed with United Nations forces seem to be an outgrowth of the continuing uncertainty of the Congolese National Army concerning the intentions of the United Nations forces. These misunderstandings could be dispelled if it was clearly apparent that the responsible civil and military authorities intend to implement the resolution of 21 February 1961 only in consultation with the legitimate authorities of the Republic of the Congo and in agreement with them. With regard to the interpretation to be given to this resolution, it should be emphasized that the Bulletin issued by the Headquarters of the Congolese National Army to which reference is made in document S/4758 cannot be regarded as reflecting in any way the views or policy of the Head of State or the Government of the Republic of the Congo.

The Permanent Mission is, furthermore, authorized to state that the Congolese authorities have no objection to the presence of the United Nations forces at Matadi and that they have no prejudice against the forces made available to the United Nations by the Sudan, whose people are friends of the Congolese people. The Republic of the Congo deeply regrets the fact that misunderstandings caused a temporary clash between troops of the Congolese National Army and members of the Canadian and Sudanese forces.

