

**Preparatory Committee for the 2010  
Review Conference of the Parties to  
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation  
of Nuclear Weapons**

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Second session  
Geneva, 28 April-9 May 2008

SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 1st MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Monday, 28 April 2008, at 10 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. YELCHENKO (Ukraine)

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The meeting was called to order at 10.20 a.m.

OPENING OF THE SESSION (agenda item 1)

1. The CHAIRMAN declared open the second session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Statement by the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs

2. Mr. DUARTE (High Representative for Disarmament Affairs) said that the 2010 Review Conference would be a watershed event for the Treaty, and stressed the importance of it being a success, as well as the need to avoid a repetition of the disappointing setback in 2005.

3. Fortunately, there had been positive developments in many treaty-related areas, such as the nuclear disarmament initiative known as the “Hoover plan” and recent statements made by the leaders of France and the United Kingdom announcing reductions in their nuclear arsenals. While steps had been taken towards elimination of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, there had also been some setbacks since 2005, most notably the nuclear test conducted by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in October 2006; nevertheless, the de facto international moratorium on nuclear tests had otherwise been maintained, and efforts were continuing worldwide to bring the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty into force, which would hopefully be achieved before the Review Conference. He also hoped that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea would attend the 2010 Review Conference as a non-nuclear-weapon State, and that a diplomatic solution could be found to persisting international concerns over nuclear activities in the Islamic Republic of Iran before 2010, which combined full compliance by the Government with the relevant Security Council resolutions and full respect for the country’s legitimate right to pursue peaceful uses of nuclear energy, consistent with the Treaty.

4. In the period leading up to 2010, the establishment of a zone free from weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the Middle East must be further explored. Nuclear-weapon States in particular should recognize the importance of pursuing that goal, as well as the importance of ratifying the protocols to treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones in other regions, such as the Pelindaba Treaty and the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia. The achievement of all those objectives by 2010 would mark a significant step forward in advancing the goals of article VII of the Treaty.

5. He stressed the importance of agreeing on common purposes and a dynamic review process to assess how well the States parties were performing in achieving those purposes. While there would always be differences of opinion, it was to be hoped that all parties would agree that the Committee must work together to achieve the three primary goals of the NPT with the highest possible levels of accountability and transparency; the Committee needed to consider how it could continue to strengthen the process in subsequent years. In contrast to the first session, it was hoped that deliberations at the second session would allow for more in-depth examination of key issues related to those three primary goals. Some common ground on substantive issues should be established and key procedural and administrative issues resolved, including agreement on an agenda, before the opening of the Review Conference.

6. Accountability and transparency were also integral to the important issue of financing of the Preparatory Committee sessions and the review conferences. It was the States parties - and certainly not the United Nations - which were responsible for ensuring that adequate funding was available to support conference events. Some last-minute funding commitments had allowed the opening of the second session of the Preparatory Committee, but such another financial crisis might not be so easily resolved in future. States parties should therefore view the payment of outstanding dues as a matter of some priority, and assessed dues should be paid well in advance for the remaining session of the Preparatory Committee and the Conference itself, in accordance with the deadline communicated by the Secretary-General. Delayed payments and non-payments not only affected the multi-year review process, but raised questions over the priority that States parties accorded to the Treaty.

#### Opening statement by the Chairman

7. The CHAIRMAN, recalling that 40 years had passed since the NPT was opened for signature, said that the Treaty had played a vital role in containing the spread of nuclear weapons worldwide. Its immense contribution to international peace and security would be felt for many years. Nevertheless, tremendous challenges were facing the NPT and global security, which would best be tackled through a multilateralist approach. The Preparatory Committee should find ways to combat current challenges and to achieve the fuller implementation of the road map charted in the resolution of the 1995 Review Conference and the final document from the 2000 Review Conference. The second session of the Preparatory Committee should be focused on seeking solutions to substantive issues, leaving behind the feeling of pessimism that was a hangover from the previous review cycle. While only some past review conferences had been able to reach agreement on substantive issues, the newly started review cycle should be viewed positively, and work by the Committee should build upon current positive trends in non-proliferation. While he would do his utmost to ensure smooth and fruitful proceedings, the results of the session largely depended on delegations' readiness to compromise and their eagerness to reach a specific goal. He therefore sought their support and a constructive approach in order to build consensus on the outstanding procedural and substantive issues and produce a qualitative result laying a solid basis for the rest of the review cycle.

#### Organization of work

8. The CHAIRMAN recalled that the agenda for all sessions of the Preparatory Committee had been adopted at the Committee's first session in 2007 and issued as document NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/15. The agenda was also reproduced in the Committee's report on its first session (NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/22, para. 9).

9. He drew attention to the indicative timetable (NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/INF.2), which he took it the Committee wished to follow.

10. It was so decided.

11. The CHAIRMAN recalled that, with regard to participation at the sessions of the Preparatory Committee by representatives of States other than States parties, representatives of specialized agencies and intergovernmental organizations, as well as representatives of non-governmental organizations, in accordance with the rules of procedure of the 2005 NPT

Review Conference, which were applied *mutatis mutandis* to the work of the Committee, the representatives of the United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency were entitled to attend the meetings of the Committee, and to submit material, both orally and in writing.

12. He further recalled that at its first session the Committee had adopted the following decision, based on the relevant rules of procedure of the 2005 NPT Review Conference:

“Representatives of States not parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) should be allowed, upon request, to attend as observers the meetings of the Committee other than those designated closed meetings, to be seated in the Committee behind their countries’ nameplates and to receive documents of the Committee. They should also be entitled to submit documents to the participants in the Committee.

“Representatives of specialized agencies and international and regional intergovernmental organizations should be allowed, upon request, to attend as observers the meetings of the Committee other than those designated closed meetings, to be seated in the Committee behind their organizations’ nameplates and to receive documents of the Committee. They should also be entitled to submit, in writing, their views and comments on questions within their competence, which may be circulated as documents of the Committee. Furthermore, the Committee decides, based on the agreement at the third session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 NPT Review Conference, which would be applied *mutatis mutandis*, that specialized agencies and international and regional intergovernmental organizations be invited to make oral presentations to the Committee upon the decision of the Committee, on a case-by-case basis.

“Representatives of non-governmental organizations should be allowed, upon request, to attend the meetings of the Committee other than those designated closed, to be seated in the designated area, to receive documents of the Committee and, at their own expense, to make written material available to the participants in the Committee. The Committee shall also allocate a meeting to non-governmental organizations to address each session of the Committee.”

13. He said that the following specialized agencies and intergovernmental organizations had asked to attend meetings of the Preparatory Committee: Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials, European Commission, League of Arab States, Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty; as well as 64 non-governmental organizations, listed in document NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/INF.4/Rev.1.

14. He took it that the Committee wished to take note of those requests.

15. It was so decided.

16. The CHAIRMAN drew attention to document NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/1 on the estimated cost of the 2010 Review Conference, prepared by the secretariat at the request of the Committee. Paragraphs 17 and 18 of the document recalled the provisions of the oral statement issued in connection with General Assembly resolution 61/70 of 6 December 2006 to the effect that costs associated with the preparation and holding of the 2010 Review Conference and the sessions of its Preparatory Committee would be borne by the States parties to the Treaty and that there

would be no financial implications for the regular budget of the United Nations. Such activities would be undertaken by the secretariat only after sufficient funding had been received, in advance. He planned to make time available later in the session to return to the issue, once delegations had considered the contents of document NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/1.

17. He also drew attention to document NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/INF.1, in particular paragraphs 9 and 10 on documentation, recalling that the Committee must conform to the guidelines for the submission of documentation as mandated by the General Assembly in order to ensure timely translation and distribution. To expedite proceedings and the issuing of in-session documents, it was strongly recommended that documents did not exceed five pages. In order to comply with those requirements, delegations were encouraged to provide only new information when submitting reports. Furthermore, working papers and proposals already submitted in the review cycle need not be resubmitted. At the Committee's first session in 2007, there had been an almost threefold increase in documentation in comparison to the first session in the previous review cycle. Producing official documentation in six languages was one of the most expensive budget items and a major factor in escalating costs.

#### GENERAL DEBATE ON ISSUES RELATED TO ALL ASPECTS OF THE WORK OF THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE (agenda item 4)

18. Mr. OH Joon (Republic of Korea) said that the NPT should continue to be the cornerstone of global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. The three pillars of the Treaty should be promoted in a mutually reinforcing manner, as preserving their delicate balance was vital to the credibility of the NPT regime. Significant challenges to the NPT, including proliferation risks from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Islamic Republic of Iran, insufficient progress in nuclear disarmament, and the threat from a possible combination of nuclear weapons and terrorism, continued unchecked and required the sustained engagement of the States parties. In meeting such challenges, the problems and weaknesses of the NPT regime needed to be faced with a determination to fix and overcome them. The significance of IAEA safeguards in ensuring States' compliance with their non-proliferation obligations could not be overestimated, and the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol - which his country particularly supported - should be universalized.

19. The Republic of Korea attached importance to the right to peaceful uses of nuclear power, as that right was indispensable to sustainable development. At the same time, there should be effective safeguards against abuse of that right by potential proliferators; it should be made subject to full compliance with the non-proliferation obligations set out in articles I, II and III.

20. He reaffirmed support for the goal of nuclear disarmament in realizing a world free of nuclear arms. It was imperative to ensure the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), and he therefore called on States listed in annex 2 to ratify the Treaty as soon as possible. He further called for an early start to negotiations for a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT). He also urged the three States not party to the NPT to accede thereto as non-nuclear-weapon States without further delay.

21. In view of the withdrawal of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea from the NPT, consideration of an effective and collective response mechanism to withdrawal from the Treaty would be timely. Another important task was mobilization of the political will necessary to

preserve and shore up the NPT regime, as a favourable political environment was crucial to achieving specific results during the review cycle. To that end, public diplomacy to alert the people of the world to the dangers of nuclear proliferation and the benefits of nuclear disarmament should be strengthened, so that more States would opt for and remain on the path of disarmament and non-proliferation.

22. Mr. ANTONOV (Russian Federation) said that emerging challenges and problems facing nuclear non-proliferation must be addressed first and foremost within the NPT framework. The Treaty should thus be made universal, more efficient and more viable, as well as reinforced, and States not legally bound by it should be brought under the Treaty regime.

23. One of the priorities in the ongoing review process should be creating conditions to allow all parties to the NPT to fully and freely benefit from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, while not undermining nuclear non-proliferation. While every country could establish its own facilities to enrich uranium, produce fuel and further reprocess it, that was a very complicated process not only in terms of funds, but also in terms of intellectual, scientific, physical and technical resources, which would delay implementation of national atomic energy projects for many years, given the time needed to build such facilities. As States legitimately feared that they could not depend entirely on the market or the political will of certain States, multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle - in which IAEA would play a central role - could be adopted. In that context, the Russian Federation had established the International Uranium Enrichment Centre; those cooperating with the Centre would have guaranteed access to enrichment services to meet their nuclear fuel needs without developing their own production facilities. The Russian Federation had also proposed to stockpile low-enriched uranium at the Centre under IAEA management, so that materials could be supplied by decision of the Agency to third countries if they had been denied fuel for political reasons.

24. Improving the efficiency of IAEA verification activities was an important aspect of reinforcing nuclear non-proliferation, including through the opportunities provided by the Additional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement, an instrument ratified by the Russian Federation. The Russian Federation had also completed all reductions in strategic offensive weapons provided for in the START Treaty as early as in 2001, and was continuing to reduce numbers of strategic delivery vehicles and warheads. It continued to fulfil its obligations under the Russian Federation-United States Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions and had strictly complied with the Treaty on the Elimination of the Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles. In October 2007, the President of the Russian Federation had launched an initiative, supported by the United States, to make the obligations set forth in that Treaty truly universal.

25. As strategic offensive and defensive arms were interlinked, hasty deployment of the global anti-ballistic-missile defence system without due consideration of other States' security interests could cause those States to build up their own missile armaments, thus giving impetus to the spread of those weapons throughout the world and affecting the overall process of nuclear disarmament.

26. He advocated further efforts to promote the entry into force of the CTBT, welcoming the recent ratification of the Treaty by Colombia, and urged all States whose accession would bring the CTBT into force to ratify it as soon as possible. He reaffirmed support for the elaboration of

an FMCT, and said that strengthening security assurances provided to the non-nuclear-weapon States was still a topical issue. There was a need for a global agreement on providing non-nuclear-weapon States with security assurances that would rule out the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

27. Establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones contributed greatly to strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime and enhancing regional and international security. He noted the 2006 Treaty signed by five Central Asian States to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia and called upon all the nuclear-weapon States to support it. He also drew attention to the continued relevance of the Russian initiative to concentrate nuclear weapons within the national territories of the nuclear-weapon States, the implementation of which would maximize the number of countries completely free from nuclear weapons.

28. He reaffirmed Russia's commitment to the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review Conference, stating its readiness to engage in a meaningful dialogue with all the countries involved and discuss constructive proposals aimed at the implementation of the resolution and the elaboration of appropriate recommendations by the 2010 Review Conference.

29. Despite the progress in the implementation of the arrangement reached between Tehran and IAEA in clarifying outstanding issues related to past nuclear activities, further action by the Islamic Republic of Iran was necessary to restore confidence in the peaceful nature of its nuclear programme. The situation should, however, be settled exclusively through political and diplomatic means, meaning further efforts were needed to seek ways to begin a negotiation process.

30. Noting the positive developments in settling the nuclear problem on the Korean peninsula, he advocated further proactive diplomatic efforts within the framework of the six-party talks aimed at finding mutually acceptable solutions which would ensure, inter alia, the return of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the NPT.

31. An essential factor in ensuring the overall security of all States and the international community was a capacity to counter the nuclear terrorist threat in an efficient and timely manner. The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism announced by the Presidents of the United States and the Russian Federation in 2006 promoted efforts to find a solution and had proved its relevance.

32. Mr. LOGAR (Slovenia), speaking on behalf of the European Union, said that the Union was committed to strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime and preserving its integrity, as underlined in its Common Position of 25 April 2005. Its Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, agreed in December 2003, was based on the conviction that a multilateral approach to security, including disarmament and non-proliferation, provided the best way to maintain international order.

33. The possession of nuclear weapons by States outside the NPT and non-compliance with the Treaty's provisions by States parties to the Treaty undermined non-proliferation and disarmament efforts. He called on all States that had not already done so to become parties to the

NPT as non-nuclear-weapon States. The three mutually reinforcing pillars of the Treaty - non-proliferation, disarmament and the peaceful use of nuclear energy - were essential for global peace and security.

34. The illicit trade in highly sensitive nuclear equipment and technology necessitated strong nationally and internationally coordinated export controls. The Nuclear Suppliers Group specified that transfers of trigger list items could be made only to States that had a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with IAEA. European Union member States met that requirement and were working within the Nuclear Suppliers Group to ensure that the ratification of the Additional Protocol became a condition for the export of controlled nuclear and nuclear-related items and technology. Security Council resolution 1540 explicitly addressed illicit trafficking and procurement networks, and in particular the involvement of non-State actors in the proliferation of WMD technology. He urged States to implement the provisions of that resolution, welcoming the extension of the 1540 Committee mandate for a further two years by Security Council resolution 1673, and supported its further extension in 2008. To implement the resolution, the European Union had adopted a Joint Action in 2006 and was preparing a second one, which would include a series of thematic workshops in several regions on enhancing export controls.

35. With regard to the growing risk of nuclear terrorism, he supported the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and the Proliferation Security Initiative. The European Union's efforts to strengthen nuclear security on a global scale to prevent terrorists from gaining access to nuclear and radioactive materials included the adoption of several Joint Actions in support of the IAEA nuclear security fund, in addition to the contributions of individual member States.

36. The IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols were an essential part of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime because they raised the standard for compliance and made it easier to detect violations. He called on all States that had not yet done so to conclude Additional Protocols with IAEA.

37. Measures should be adopted to discourage withdrawal from the NPT and to deal with the consequences of a State's withdrawal, including the suspension of nuclear cooperation.

38. By adopting resolution 1803 on the Islamic Republic of Iran's nuclear programme, the Security Council had for the fourth time sent a strong message of international resolve. He deplored the Islamic Republic of Iran's continuing failure to comply with the requirements of the Security Council and the IAEA Board of Governors, by refusing to allow access to IAEA inspectors, come clean about its past activities and suspend its enrichment and reprocessing activities. He noted the progress made in implementing the Work Plan drawn up with IAEA and called on Tehran to comply with Security Council resolutions 1737, 1747 and 1803 and fulfil the IAEA requirements. The European Union remained committed to an early negotiated solution to the Iranian nuclear issue and a dual-track approach. He reaffirmed support for the proposals presented to the Islamic Republic of Iran in June 2006 by the Secretary-General and the High Representative of the European Union, which could be developed further. While recognizing the Islamic Republic of Iran's right to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, the European Union would ensure the implementation of the measures contained in the



Security Council resolutions, and he called on all countries to do likewise. The European Union was united in its resolve not to allow the Islamic Republic of Iran to acquire military nuclear capabilities and to remove any proliferation risks posed by the Iranian nuclear programme.

39. As to the concerns regarding the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, he attached great importance to the common goal of the six parties to achieve the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula in a peaceful manner. It was important to fulfil the commitments contained in the joint statement of 19 September 2005, which would result in the full disablement and dismantling of the country's nuclear weapons programme in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner. He called on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to comply with Security Council resolutions 1695 and 1718 and its obligations under the NPT, including the implementation of its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. He recalled the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's obligation not to enter into any proliferation-sensitive exports. The European Union supported IAEA monitoring and verification activities in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and had adopted a Joint Action to make a financial contribution to that end.

40. He welcomed the reduction of strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons and their delivery systems since the end of the cold war, including significant reductions by two European Union member States. There was a need for an overall reduction of the global stockpiles of nuclear weapons, in particular by those with the largest arsenals. The principle of irreversibility should guide all measures in the field of nuclear disarmament and arms control. Some nuclear-weapon States had recently become more transparent regarding their holdings of nuclear weapons, and he encouraged all States to do likewise. He noted the declarations made by the Presidents of the Russian Federation and the United States in 1991 and 1992 on unilateral reductions in their stocks of non-strategic nuclear weapons and called on all States with non-strategic nuclear weapons to include them in their general arms control and disarmament processes. The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) was due to expire in 2009 and the United States-Russia Moscow Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions would expire on 31 December 2012. He welcomed the reductions in nuclear weapons that those treaties had brought about and the discussions on the development of a post-START arrangement, including the recent announcement that the two countries would work towards a legally binding agreement. They had also reaffirmed their continuing support for the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in their joint statement at the sixty-second session of the General Assembly and had suggested discussing the global elimination of all short-range and intermediate-range ground-to-ground missiles. European Union member States and the European Community had deactivated thousands of nuclear warheads and converted military stockpiles of fissile material so that it could no longer be used in nuclear weapons.

41. He called on States, particularly those listed in annex 2, to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) without delay and without conditions and, pending its entry into force, to abide by a moratorium on nuclear testing and to refrain from any action contrary to its provisions. The recent ratifications gave a strong signal to the nine States that still needed to ratify the Treaty for it to enter into force. He called on States that had signed or ratified the CTBT to pay their contributions to the Preparatory Commission on time. He urged all States to dismantle their nuclear testing sites in a manner that was transparent and open to the international community.

42. He advocated the negotiation without preconditions of an FMCT in the Conference on Disarmament, which was the single multilateral forum available to the international community for disarmament negotiations.

43. He recognized the high value of the existing legally binding security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, as provided for by the protocols to the treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones and in unilateral declarations by nuclear-weapon States. Positive and negative assurances could serve as an incentive to forgo the acquisition of WMD.

44. Nuclear-weapon-free zones enhanced regional and global peace and security and were a means to promote nuclear disarmament, stability and confidence. He welcomed the signature and ratification by the nuclear-weapon States of the relevant protocols to the treaties establishing such zones. He called on the States in the Middle East to establish a verifiable zone free of nuclear weapons and other WMD, to accede to the NPT and the Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions and to conclude IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols, if they had not already done so.

45. He reaffirmed support for the inalienable right of all parties to the NPT to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I, II and III of the Treaty. A growing number of States parties had shown interest in developing civil nuclear programmes to address their long-term energy requirements. The European Union would promote the responsible development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy within a framework ensuring that sensitive technologies and goods for non-peaceful purposes were not disseminated. He welcomed the initiative of the Director General of IAEA to discuss the multilateralization of the nuclear fuel cycle to develop mechanisms for access to nuclear power. Pragmatic solutions had to reflect economic reality and the real needs of the recipient countries, while conforming to the most stringent safety and security requirements and responsible waste management. He recalled the importance of continuing international cooperation and the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources in that regard.

46. Ms. SWORDS (Canada) said that the outcome of the 2005 Review Conference had been disappointing and that it was critical for States parties to underline the Treaty's continuing relevance, uphold the 1995 bargain of "permanence with accountability", and respond to the serious challenges that had arisen.

47. The nuclear test carried out by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in October 2006 had been a brazen act of defiance against the will of the international community. Since then, the Security Council had acted and progress had been made within the framework of the six-party talks. She called on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to comply with Security Council resolutions, meet its six-party talks commitments and recommit itself to the NPT. As to recent information possibly pointing to illicit nuclear cooperation between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Syrian Arab Republic, she called on both countries to cooperate with IAEA to clarify the situation.

48. The Islamic Republic of Iran presented another challenge to non-proliferation. While the country had the right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, that right came with obligations. Tehran had lost the confidence of the IAEA Board of Governors and the Security Council by concealing its nuclear activities. She called on the Government to comply with Security Council resolutions and encouraged it to accept the package of incentives proposed by the EU3+3.

49. She called on all non-nuclear-weapon States that had not already done so to conclude a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with IAEA, and all States with such an agreement to conclude an Additional Protocol. Together, those instruments should constitute the verification standard pursuant to article III of the NPT and should become a condition for the supply of nuclear equipment, material and technology to all non-nuclear-weapon States. She encouraged the implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 by all States.

50. On nuclear disarmament, she welcomed the reductions made by some of the nuclear-weapon States. However, there were still too many intact nuclear warheads, and the pathway for further reductions was not adequately clear or fully irreversible. She encouraged the nuclear-weapon States parties to pursue negotiations on effective measures towards nuclear disarmament and to implement commitments that had been made at the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences.

51. The CTBT had still not entered into force, and she urged all States that had not yet done so to ratify it and work to complete its International Monitoring System.

52. While the Conference on Disarmament had made some modest progress, the long-awaited resumption of the FMCT negotiations had still not occurred. She supported discussions to codify negative security assurances on a legally binding basis and to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones.

53. Peaceful nuclear applications could help to increase prosperity, contribute to sustainable development, limit greenhouse gas emissions and reduce the disparities between developed and developing countries. However, the right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy was conditional on the fulfilment of non-proliferation obligations under the NPT. She supported new international fuel cycle initiatives which addressed both peaceful uses and non-proliferation concerns, did not unduly interfere with the free market, and were based on criteria that recognized and rewarded the non-proliferation credentials of a State.

54. The NPT was a near-universal legal instrument, and she called on the States which had not yet done so to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States.

55. Enhancing the NPT's overall credibility and effectiveness was another key Canadian objective, and in 2005, Canada had submitted a working paper advocating certain institutional improvements, for example, setting up a small standing bureau to provide stewardship and continuity.

56. Mr. CHENG JINGYE (China) said that since its entry into force, the NPT had played an irreplaceable role in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, advancing the nuclear disarmament process and promoting peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and had thus effectively

enhanced international peace and security. However, addressing issues such as the uncertainties in the security situation, non-traditional security threats, the link between terrorism and the proliferation of WMD, unresolved regional nuclear issues and the growing global demand for nuclear energy was important to the universality, authority and effectiveness of the NPT.

57. Tackling the proliferation of nuclear weapons required a holistic approach. First, a new security outlook featuring mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and coordination must be developed. Second, proliferation concerns should be addressed through dialogue and negotiation because exerting pressure, imposing sanctions or resorting to force alone were not effective solutions; they would merely aggravate the situation. Third, the impartial and non-discriminatory nature of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime should be ensured.

58. The Chinese Government took an active role in international efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation: it had joined all the relevant international treaties, signed all the relevant protocols to nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties, reached an agreement with ASEAN countries on the Protocol to the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone and strictly implemented Security Council resolution 1540 and other resolutions relating to non-proliferation. It had established a comprehensive system of laws and regulations on nuclear export control and continued to take effective measures to ensure their implementation.

59. With China's involvement, the six-party talks on denuclearization of the Korean peninsula had produced substantive results, and China was working hard with other parties to continue that progress.

60. On the Iranian nuclear issue, a solution should be sought through diplomatic negotiations. At a meeting in Shanghai two weeks previously, EU3+3 representatives had discussed a package proposal for resuming those negotiations. If the Islamic Republic of Iran complied with its NPT obligations, its right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy should be respected.

61. To meet the objective of a world free of nuclear weapons, all nuclear-weapon States should undertake to destroy their nuclear weapons, refrain from developing new types of nuclear weapons and reduce the role of nuclear weapons in their national security policies. The two countries possessing the largest nuclear arsenals should take the lead in nuclear disarmament. The 13 practical steps agreed on at the 2000 Review Conference were still relevant and the spirit and principles underpinning them should continue to be upheld, while new proposals, taking into account the latest developments, should be put forward.

62. The international community needed to conclude an international legal instrument on the provision of security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States as soon as possible. All nuclear-weapon States should commit, as China had, to a "no first use" policy and undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States.

63. China exercised utmost restraint with regard to nuclear weapons development, supported the early entry into force of the CTBT and would continue to honour the nuclear test moratorium. The Conference on Disarmament should begin negotiations on the fissile material treaty and substantive work on preventing the weaponization of outer space and other issues.

64. The right of non-nuclear-weapon States to the peaceful use of nuclear energy should not be constrained or denied in the name of non-proliferation. The international community needed to find an approach that guaranteed that right, prevented nuclear proliferation and promoted international cooperation. In that regard, he noted the proposal to establish multilateral nuclear fuel cycle mechanisms. He acknowledged the work of IAEA in promoting peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and supported its efforts to provide more assistance to the developing countries. China had cooperated in various ways with other countries, including developing countries, on peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and would continue to do so.

65. Ms. MILLAR (Australia) said that the declaration made in 2005 by the Seven-Nation Initiative, of which Australia was a member, had highlighted a consensus within a diverse group of States, including nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States, and it was in that spirit of partnership that Australia would work with all States to advance the common goals of non-proliferation and disarmament.

66. The 2010 Review Conference must deliver results for each of the three pillars of the Treaty. The ultimate objective of a world free of nuclear weapons would never be realized without sustained and creative efforts by all nations to uphold and strengthen the NPT.

67. All nuclear-weapon States should make irreversible reductions in nuclear weapons of every kind. They should sign and ratify the CTBT as a matter of urgency. In particular, the United States and the Russian Federation should conclude a new, binding agreement to reduce the numbers of their nuclear weapons, in a systematic and verifiable manner. Strong leadership from the two countries that held the vast majority of the world's nuclear weapons would significantly advance the cause of nuclear disarmament. Non-nuclear-weapon States, meanwhile, should accede to the Treaty and give their full support to commencing FMCT negotiations. The will to negotiate was currently being thwarted by the smallest of minorities.

68. She was concerned that there had been little improvement in the nuclear non-proliferation situation since the previous session of the Committee. The Islamic Republic of Iran continued to undermine the international non-proliferation regime through its pursuit of a uranium enrichment capability without a convincing peaceful justification and its failure to comply with decisions of IAEA or the Security Council. No one wished to deny the country's legitimate right to peaceful nuclear energy; but such rights were not unconditional: they must be in conformity with articles I, II and III of the Treaty.

69. She expressed disappointment at the continuing failure by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to meet its commitment under the six-party agreement to provide a complete and correct declaration of its nuclear programmes. The country should seize the opportunity to rejoin the international community by making a declaration without further delay.

70. As a major uranium supplier, Australia recognized the important role played by suppliers in nuclear non-proliferation. It made accession to the Additional Protocol a condition of supply to non-nuclear-weapon States, which should also be required to enter into comprehensive safeguards agreements with IAEA. Thanks to IAEA, developing countries were able to use

nuclear technology peacefully. Australia supported a number of regional cooperative agreements in the Asia-Pacific region and was a key player in international mechanisms to ensure that the international nuclear market reinforced non-proliferation without restricting peaceful access to nuclear technology.

71. Mr. MACKAY (New Zealand), speaking on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition (Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden), said that experience from the failed 2005 Review Conference showed that, unless the international community achieved a shared framework for approaching the 2010 Review Conference, the prospects for a successful result were compromised. The present session of the Preparatory Committee provided an opportunity to explore where common ground might emerge and be built upon over the next two years. The Coalition would shortly submit a further working paper on seven areas requiring urgent attention: universality, nuclear doctrines, reductions in nuclear forces, security assurances, nuclear-weapon-free zones, negotiation of a treaty on fissile material and a prohibition on the testing of nuclear weapons.

72. Some progress had been made over the past year in making the Treaty more transparent. Greater efforts by some nuclear-weapon States to provide information in compliance with article VI should make a positive contribution to the way in which nuclear disarmament obligations were approached. The Coalition welcomed indications from some nuclear-weapon States that further cuts in nuclear arsenals were envisaged. It was, however, a matter of serious concern that the intention to modernize other nuclear forces seemed to persist. States should not develop new nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons with new military capabilities; nor should they replace or modernize their nuclear weapon systems. Moreover, some nuclear-weapon States had continued to advocate the doctrine of nuclear deterrence. The consistent attempt to treat nuclear weapons as a unique security enhancer perpetuated the mistaken perception that they were an essential component of a modern military force. The Treaty's implementation would be strengthened by universal accession. No efforts should be spared to that end, and the Coalition urged India, Israel and Pakistan to accede to the Treaty promptly and without conditions. All States should abide by the commitments they had previously undertaken.

73. The Coalition continued to support the immediate commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on an FMCT, which should, if it was to be effective, include a verification mechanism and cover existing stocks. It was a matter of concern that work on the issue had not yet commenced. All members of the Conference on Disarmament should exercise the flexibility required.

74. Mr. PORTALES (Chile), speaking also on behalf of Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru and Venezuela - Latin American and Caribbean States parties to the Treaty - said that the three pillars of the Treaty were mutually reinforcing and all had the same purpose: to achieve international peace and security. Any move to change the balance of requirements under the Treaty would serve only to undermine it. International disarmament and non-proliferation were crucial. A system to monitor not only horizontal but also vertical proliferation should be adopted. Complete and general nuclear disarmament was a commitment under the Treaty, particularly for nuclear-weapon States. It was unacceptable that some countries insisted on

retaining the option to use nuclear weapons. A legally binding instrument should be drawn up in which nuclear-weapon States undertook unconditionally not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. Such an instrument would not replace article VI of the Treaty, but would be complementary to it.

75. The conditions existed, in his view, to start negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Such a treaty should have a verification mechanism and should cover existing stocks, if it was to contribute effectively to disarmament and non-proliferation. He welcomed the fact that the CTBT had been ratified by Colombia, one of the 44 States whose ratification was required for the Treaty's entry into force, and called on other States to follow suit. He also called for universal ratification of the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation. The placement of WMD in outer space was expressly prohibited under the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, which should be implemented in full.

76. States Parties to the NPT had an inalienable right to the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, without discrimination, and to cooperate in the exchange of materials, equipment and technology, with special emphasis on sustainable economic development.

77. He reiterated the support of the Latin American and Caribbean countries for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, which contributed significantly to international peace and security. Existing zones should engage in greater coordination and cooperation, and a second conference on nuclear-weapon-free zones should be held. Nuclear-weapon States, meanwhile, should give full assurances that they would respect such zones and refrain from using nuclear weapons against their members.

78. Multilateralism was essential to disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation, since it involved the adoption of universal mechanisms that would be open to participation by all States. The NPT itself would be strengthened if all States became party to it, submitted their nuclear installations to the IAEA comprehensive safeguards system and conducted nuclear activities with due regard to disarmament and non-proliferation.

79. Mr. PUJA (Indonesia), speaking on behalf of the States parties to the Treaty which were members of the Non-Aligned Movement, said that, regrettably, unilateralism and non-compliance with the Treaty had threatened the nuclear disarmament agenda. Yet, as the Non-Aligned Movement had frequently said, multilateralism provided the only sustainable method of addressing international security issues. The 2010 Review Conference provided the opportunity for a multilateral framework of which States should take full advantage. Working papers submitted by the Non-Aligned Movement at the first session of the Preparatory Committee contained recommendations that would strengthen the review process, which should focus equally on the three pillars of the Treaty. The current lack of balance in the implementation of the Treaty threatened to unravel the whole regime. Nuclear-weapon States unfortunately continued to believe in the importance of nuclear weapons, although there was overwhelming evidence that universal reliance on such weapons could not assure security. Rather, they created the conditions for an arms race. Recent developments, particularly in the Middle East, illustrated a trend of vertical proliferation and non-compliance by nuclear-weapon States with their

commitments under article VI of the Treaty. It was a matter of particular concern that one nuclear-weapon State had added a new nuclear-armed ballistic-missile submarine to its arsenal. The Review Conference should call for a specific time frame for the implementation of article VI.

80. The 2005 Review Conference had failed to produce a final document, partially owing to disagreement over procedural matters, which had taken precious time away from matters of substance. The Committee should learn from previous mistakes and move towards an early consensus on the remaining procedural issues so that it could effectively undertake the review of the operation of the Treaty and the outcomes of the 1995 and 2000 Conferences.

81. The Treaty sought to strike a balance between the obligations and responsibilities of the nuclear-weapon States and the non-nuclear-weapon States, which had an inalienable right to develop, research, produce and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, without discrimination. The indefinite extension of the Treaty did not, however, imply the right to indefinite possession of nuclear weapons by nuclear-weapon States. In view of the possibility of accidents, theft or the acquisition by terrorists of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices, the nuclear-weapon States must be prepared to accept that the total elimination of nuclear weapons was the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of such weapons.

82. Pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, the conclusion of a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument on security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty should be a matter of priority. Nuclear-weapon States should, as stated in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, respect each country's choices and decisions in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The provisions of article IV of the Treaty were explicit in that regard, leaving no room for reinterpretation of the Treaty or setting conditions for the peaceful use of nuclear energy by non-nuclear-weapon States. Nuclear-weapon States, meanwhile, should refrain from sharing nuclear know-how for military purposes. There should also be a complete prohibition on the transfer of nuclear-related equipment, information, material, resources or devices to States not party to the Treaty. Such transfers violated article III, paragraph 2, of the Treaty.

83. Another important component of the Treaty was the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, which contributed to the objective of global disarmament. The Non-Aligned Movement therefore welcomed the establishment of such a zone in central Asia and reiterated its support for the establishment of a similar zone in the Middle East, in accordance with Security Council resolution 487 (1981). The 2000 Review Conference had reaffirmed the importance of Israel's accession to the NPT and the placing of all its nuclear facilities under IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreements in the interests of universal adherence to the Treaty in the Middle East. He reiterated the call for the establishment of a subsidiary body to Main Committee II of the 2010 Review Conference that would consider and recommend proposals on the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference. As for the right to withdraw under article X, the Non-Aligned Movement believed that the right of withdrawal of States from treaties or conventions should be governed by international treaty law.



84. Mr. HOSSEINI (Islamic Republic of Iran), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, expressed regret that a number of delegations, notably Slovenia, speaking on behalf of the European Union, had distorted the truth in condemning his country's programme for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. A lengthy and exaggerated statement criticizing the Islamic Republic of Iran had made no mention of the nuclear regime in Israel, which posed a threat to the peace of the region and the security of the entire international community. Moreover, two members of the European Union were nuclear-weapon States and the rest were under their nuclear umbrella. It was hard to see how other States could have confidence in their pronouncements. His country, meanwhile, complied fully with its commitments under the Treaty. The Islamic Republic of Iran did not recognize the right of any State to place obstacles in the way of its use of nuclear energy.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.