



# General Assembly

Sixty-second session

## First Committee

**11**th meeting

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New York

*Official Records*

*Chairperson:* Mr. Badji . . . . . (Senegal)

*The meeting was called to order at 3.15 p.m.*

### **Agenda items 88 to 105 (continued)**

#### **Thematic discussion on item subjects and introduction and consideration of draft resolutions submitted under disarmament and international security agenda items**

**Mr. Gumbi** (South Africa): As already stated during the general debate, South Africa remains deeply concerned over the huge number of nuclear weapons that continue to be deployed and stockpiled around the world, and security doctrines that envisage the actual use of such weapons.

Recent developments in the area of nuclear weapons systems, including decisions on the modernization of such systems and the development of new types of nuclear weapons, are incompatible with the integrity and sustainability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and with the broader goal of the maintenance of international peace and security. Any presumption of the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons will, in our view, only lead to increasing insecurity and a continuing arms race. Continuous and irreversible progress in nuclear disarmament and other related nuclear arms control measures remains fundamental to the promotion of nuclear non-proliferation.

Turning to a related matter, South Africa shares the view of others that the illicit network in nuclear technology to manufacture nuclear weapons presents a

serious challenge to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). In that context, South Africa announced in September 2004 that an investigation had been undertaken with regard to the contravention of South Africa's non-proliferation legislation, as well as with regard to information obtained following Libya's announcement of the abandonment of its nuclear weapons programme. That illicit network apparently operated in more than 30 countries and was comprised of several entities and individuals of different nationalities.

I am glad to inform Member States that, on 4 September 2007, one of the accused, Mr. Gerhard Wisser, a German national, entered into a plea and sentence agreement with the South African National Prosecuting Authority, by the terms of which he was convicted on seven counts relating to his activities with both Libya and Pakistan. He was sentenced to three years' correctional supervision as well as a total of 18 years' imprisonment, suspended for five years on conditions which, inter alia, require him to cooperate fully with the authorities as far as further investigations into the network's activities are concerned. A confiscatory order was also made in respect of his proceeds of crime to the amount of €2.8 million and R6 million. The case against the other accused, Mr. Daniel Geiges, a Swiss national, was separated and postponed.

South Africa is highly appreciative of the contribution of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to bringing the case against Mr. Wisser to a close. We also wish to recognize the cooperation

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received from Governments involved in the investigation. What is now required from all countries affected by the illicit network is enhanced efforts by the respective authorities, in close cooperation with the IAEA. A concerted effort to achieve the successful prosecution of all the actors involved in order to realize the complete elimination of the network is needed.

Having prosecuted the first successful case against those involved in the so-called A.Q. Khan network, South Africa's experience has illustrated the value of the IAEA and of effective information-sharing. We believe that this type of cooperation will contribute to the prevention, combating and eradication of such illicit activities.

The IAEA remains the only internationally recognized competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring compliance with safeguards agreements with a view to preventing the diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. That authority should not be undermined. Any concerns regarding non-compliance with safeguards agreements should be directed to the IAEA for consideration of any action that may be required in accordance with the IAEA's mandate.

Inadequate safeguards arrangements between the Agency and IAEA member States are yet another factor with direct bearing on the verification capacity of the Agency that requires our serious attention. South Africa is very concerned that there are some States that have yet to take the first basic step required by the NPT to put comprehensive safeguards agreements into force with the Agency. We call on those States to fulfil their obligations under article III of the NPT as soon as possible.

The Agency's safeguards are not a static system, but one that needs to be adapted to changing circumstances. It is for that reason that South Africa supported attempts at the recent IAEA General Conference aimed at strengthening the safeguards system through the incorporation into the safeguards resolution text directly derived from the IAEA Statute, as well as additional language that supports step 10 of the 13 practical steps towards nuclear disarmament agreed to at the 2000 NPT Review Conference. Regrettably, that proposal was rejected. Its rejection is a cause of concern to my delegation and seems to represent a tendency by some Member States to renege

on commitments made when joining the Agency and on their solemn undertakings agreed to in the context of the NPT. We also wonder if those negative developments are not a manifestation of complacency and the false belief that the safeguards system has been perfected.

South Africa recognizes the indispensable role that the Additional Protocol can play as an additional measure to provide the necessary confidence and the desired assurances that Member States will utilize nuclear technology solely for peaceful purposes and that no declared or undeclared material is diverted to weapons programmes. South Africa believes that countries with access to advanced technologies bear a greater responsibility for providing such assurances and for building confidence in the peaceful nature of their nuclear programmes.

In the context of the nuclear fuel cycle, a number of proposals have been made during the last few years regarding the reliable supply of nuclear fuel, including proposals for the establishment of new fuel supply mechanisms. Unfortunately, some of those proposals are geared towards restricting the right of countries to develop domestic capabilities. Such conditionalities not only contradict the inalienable right of States to pursue nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, as provided for in the NPT, but also exacerbate existing inequalities, including through the creation of another kind of cartel that would exclude full participation, particularly by States in full compliance with their safeguards obligations.

In recognizing the potential role that nuclear energy can play as an alternative renewable source of energy, it is our duty to ensure that no unwarranted restrictions are imposed. Further modalities for preventing the diversion of those sensitive technologies to nuclear weapons may be required in order to ensure that we can pursue such activities without fear and with the necessary assurances. However, what is required is a non-discriminatory approach that would assure the reliable supply of nuclear fuel whilst fully respecting the choices of States and protecting their inalienable right to pursue peaceful nuclear programmes, consistent with their non-proliferation obligations.

In concluding, allow me to state the obvious — the systematic and progressive elimination of all nuclear weapons and the assurance that they will never

be produced again remain the only assurance against their use. That should firmly remain our goal.

**Mr. Perazza** (Uruguay) (*spoke in Spanish*): As my delegation is speaking for the first time at this session of the First Committee, I should like to congratulate you, Sir, on your election as Chairman of this important Committee. We also congratulate the other members of the Bureau.

I am speaking on behalf of the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR) and its associated States — Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Venezuela and my country, Uruguay.

MERCOSUR and its associated States reaffirm our strong and ongoing commitment to the international community's objectives in nuclear disarmament, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in accordance with international law, ensuring the right of all States to research, produce and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

As States that have renounced the nuclear option and with solid non-proliferation credentials, MERCOSUR and its associated States affirm our concern over the paralysis of the disarmament machinery within the multilateral system. It is particularly distressing that, in 2007 and for the past 11 years, the Conference on Disarmament, the sole multilateral forum for disarmament negotiations, has failed to agree on a programme of work. Consequently, it has been impossible to begin negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty. Moreover, due to lack of agreement, we have been unable to establish an adequate subsidiary organ mandated to address nuclear disarmament. Negotiations are the *raison d'être* for the Conference on Disarmament, and all good negotiations require political will and flexibility on the part of all parties involved.

Our regional group is also concerned about the prospects for the prompt entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). The Treaty is one of the basic pillars of nuclear disarmament and efforts to stem the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In prohibiting experimental nuclear tests and establishing an effective verification system, it sets up effective obstacles to the development of new nuclear weapons. MERCOSUR and its associated States therefore express our concern that some

countries with nuclear capabilities and others that have already conducted nuclear tests have not ratified that instrument. We therefore call upon the countries that are listed in annex II of the Treaty and that have not yet done so to take the necessary urgent steps to join the international community's efforts to ban nuclear testing once and for all.

We also recognize the joint efforts of the Provisional Technical Secretariat of the CTBT Organization and those countries that, while endorsing the spirit and the letter of the Treaty, continue to have trouble ratifying it. We urge all States to maintain the moratorium on nuclear testing until the CTBT enters into force.

It has been more than 10 years since the International Court of Justice issued its advisory opinion that

“there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control”.

Regrettably, we continue to see a lack of compliance with the disarmament objectives enshrined in article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

MERCOSUR and its associated States continue to be firmly committed to the NPT regime. The Treaty is the cornerstone of the international security system, and its States parties should continue to strictly abide by each and every one of the obligations and commitments made within its framework. We reiterate the need for compliance with the commitments undertaken at the 1995 and 2000 NPT Review Conferences, in particular the 13 practical steps agreed upon in 2000. We call upon all States that have not yet done so to become parties to the Treaty, without conditions, as non-nuclear-weapon States.

We have repeatedly heard nuclear-weapon States stress that they are in compliance with the obligations enshrined in article VI of the NPT. Although we would prefer that the progress achieved in the field of nuclear disarmament be achieved in multilateral disarmament forums, we welcome all progress in the reduction of arsenals, including that achieved bilaterally. We hope that more information will be made available to the international community on the measures undertaken towards the complete elimination of those arsenals.

In that regard, MERCOSUR and its associated States view positively Brazil's proposal, presented at the first session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 NPT Review Conference, held in May 2007, that the secretariat, on the basis of available information, put together a comparative table of disarmament measures. Such an initiative would provide States parties with the means to better evaluate the progress achieved in the field of nuclear disarmament.

We welcome the fortieth anniversary of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean — the Treaty of Tlatelolco — through which our region has become the first densely populated zone free from nuclear weapons. MERCOSUR and its associated States have expressed, in various multilateral forums, our support for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in other regions.

We continue to support the strengthening of the legal regimes of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba, and the status of Mongolia as a State free from nuclear weapons. We also support greater coordination and cooperation among those zones, given their significant contribution to the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. Furthermore, we favour the early entry into force of the Semipalatinsk Treaty, which established a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia.

The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones contributes to the strengthening of regional security and to the security of the States parties to those zones, through the prohibition of the use and threat of use of such weapons within the area of application of each Treaty. That represents a step towards general and complete disarmament. It also requires the unequivocal commitment of the nuclear-weapon States to grant the relevant negative security assurances to such zones. MERCOSUR and its associated States will continue to strive for a Southern Hemisphere and adjacent area free of nuclear weapons.

We are convinced that a collective security system capable of establishing, maintaining and consolidating international peace and security cannot be built on the basis of strategic security doctrines that contemplate the accumulation, use or development of nuclear weapons. We reiterate our opinion that the only effective guarantee against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is their complete elimination.

In conclusion, MERCOSUR and its associated States call for the restoration of the political role of the First Committee, in accordance with its mandate under the Charter of the United Nations. At the same time, we continue to look for imaginative solutions that will contribute to the strengthening of the international disarmament and non-proliferation machinery.

**Mr. Maclachlan** (Australia): Australia regards the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as the foundation of the global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime. We were therefore greatly encouraged by the positive and cooperative atmosphere fostered by the overwhelming majority of delegations participating in the first session of the Preparatory Committee of the 2007-2010 NPT review cycle, held in Vienna earlier this year. That meeting, in reaffirming the vital significance of the NPT, has gone some distance towards overcoming the disappointment of the most recent Review Conference. However, continued cooperation and determination on the part of all States will be required in order to ensure that the NPT continues to make progress towards ensuring a world free of nuclear weapons.

Australia is committed to achieving the goal of nuclear disarmament through balanced, progressive and reinforcing steps. We look to the nuclear-weapon States to take the lead through lasting reductions in the number of their nuclear weapons. Australia is encouraged by the steps that some nuclear-weapon States have taken in that direction, and we urge them to continue. But the non-nuclear-weapon States must also play their part in creating the environment of confidence and stability in which nuclear disarmament can take place.

We also welcome the increased transparency of some nuclear-weapon States, including through statements to the recent session of the NPT Preparatory Committee and the Conference on Disarmament's focused debate on nuclear disarmament. We encourage all States possessing nuclear weapons to undertake such transparency efforts to the fullest extent possible.

We also look to all States possessing nuclear weapons to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in their security policies, thereby lowering the risk that those weapons might ever be used and advancing their eventual elimination. We urge those States to reduce further the operational status of their nuclear weapons in ways that promote global security and stability.

Non-nuclear-weapon States have a fundamental interest and duty to support practical steps that will facilitate nuclear disarmament. Australia is a committed party to the South Pacific Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). It is regrettable that, after a decade, there remain 10 annex 2 States still to become parties to the CTBT. We call on those States to act without delay, thereby strengthening the multilateral nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime.

We actively support the negotiation of a legally binding, non-discriminatory fissile material cut-off treaty that provides for appropriate measures to verify compliance. In this regard, the proposal of the President of the Conference on Disarmament (CD/2007/L.1) is a fair basis for proceeding with substantive work within the Conference, including negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty. We urge all Conference members to seize this opportunity so that we can get on with that urgent task.

Australia also adheres strictly to the NPT-based non-proliferation regime through domestic controls and support for global measures such as the additional protocols, strengthened nuclear security and efforts against nuclear terrorism. Such measures are essential, for without complete and permanent assurances of non-proliferation, there will not be a world free of nuclear weapons.

We should be clear — States that challenge the non-proliferation regime not only threaten global security but also undermine the international confidence and stability essential to achieving nuclear disarmament.

We welcome Iran's stated intent to work with the International Atomic Energy Agency to resolve long-outstanding issues, but it should follow through on that by suspending its uranium enrichment programme, as required by the Security Council, and cooperate fully with the Agency. Such actions are essential if the international community is to be assured that Iran's nuclear programme is indeed for peaceful purposes.

Australia welcomes the progress on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea nuclear issue, most recently the 3 October agreement on second-phase action under the 2005 Joint Statement. We look to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and other Six-Party Talks participants to implement their

commitments and maintain the positive momentum they have now established.

Australia welcomes the steps taken on nuclear disarmament, but seeks further progress towards that vital goal. We remain gravely concerned about the nuclear proliferation threat to global security, yet encouraged that the overwhelming majority of States remain committed to fulfilling their non-proliferation obligations, and we are certain that progress on non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament are fundamental to enduring global peace and security.

**Mr. Wu Haitao** (China) (*spoke in Chinese*): Today, the international security situation continues to undergo complex and profound changes. In that context, it is important to advance the nuclear disarmament process and steadily to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in international politics and national security policies in order to improve the international security environment and promote nuclear non-proliferation.

The preparatory process for the eighth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) has begun. The international community should make joint efforts to analyse objectively the problems and challenges faced by the Treaty, to promote the three main objectives of the Treaty and to explore feasible ways to enhance the universality, authority and effectiveness of the Treaty.

On the issue of nuclear disarmament, China maintains that the nuclear-weapon States should commit to the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons and to the negotiation and conclusion of international legal instruments in that regard at an early date. Nuclear disarmament should be a just and reasonable process of gradual reduction towards a downward balance. The two States with the largest nuclear arsenals bear special and primary responsibilities for nuclear disarmament. They should further and significantly reduce their nuclear armaments in a verifiable and irreversible manner so as to create conditions for other nuclear-weapon States to take part in the nuclear disarmament process and to achieve the ultimate goal of complete and thorough nuclear disarmament.

The 13 practical steps agreed at the 2000 NPT Review Conference have provided important guidance in promoting the nuclear disarmament process. The

international community should take full consideration of the current situation and effectively and faithfully implement those steps, based on the principles and guidelines of promoting global strategic balance and stability, and undiminished security for all.

Before the goal of the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons is achieved, the nuclear-weapon States should commit themselves not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, undertake unconditionally not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon-free zones, and negotiate and conclude an international legal instrument in that respect.

The Conference on Disarmament in Geneva should, on the basis of extensive consultations, reach a consensus on its programme of work as soon as possible and start negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty at an early date.

As a nuclear-weapon State, China has always stood for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons and has never evaded its responsibilities and obligations in nuclear disarmament. China has persistently exercised the utmost restraint on the scale and development of its nuclear weapons. China has not and will not take part in a nuclear arms race. China has always pursued a policy of unconditional no-first-use of nuclear weapons and no use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weapon-free zones.

China actively promotes the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Before the Treaty enters into force, China will honour its commitment to the moratorium on nuclear testing. China respects and supports the efforts made by relevant States and regions in establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the regions concerned. China has signed the relevant protocols of various nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties that have been open for signature.

China supports the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva in its efforts to reach a comprehensive and balanced programme of work and to launch negotiations on a multilateral, non-discriminatory, and internationally verifiable fissile material cut-off treaty.

China attaches great importance to the new cycle of the NPT review process and is ready to actively and constructively participate in the preparatory and review process. China is willing to work with other States parties to help the 2010 NPT Review Conference achieve a positive outcome.

Nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation are complementary and mutually reinforcing. Currently, the risk of nuclear weapons proliferation is a prominent issue in the field of international security, in which global and regional peace and stability are at stake. Because the causes of nuclear proliferation are complex, it is necessary to address both the root causes and the symptoms comprehensively.

The security interests of all States should be respected and efforts made to create a peaceful and stable international environment of comprehensive security so as to eliminate the motivation to seek nuclear weapons. The purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter and other universally recognized norms of international law should be abided by and nuclear proliferation addressed through dialogue and negotiation.

The international nuclear non-proliferation regime should be strengthened and the defects and deficiencies of the existing international nuclear non-proliferation regime remedied so as to ensure the impartiality and non-discriminatory nature of international nuclear non-proliferation efforts.

Non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of science and technology should be addressed in a balanced manner to ensure every country's legitimate right to use nuclear energy peacefully and to prevent any country from engaging in proliferation activities under the pretext of peaceful use.

It is a genuine and urgent task of the international community to continuously promote nuclear disarmament and the nuclear non-proliferation process. China is willing to work tirelessly with other countries to achieve that goal.

**Ms. Alowais** (United Arab Emirates) (*spoke in Arabic*): It has been shown through worldwide experience that the policy of nuclear deterrence and the acquisition of nuclear arsenals are not the appropriate means to maintain the security and stability of any country at the regional or international level. In fact,

they are a means to exacerbate tensions and escalate the strategic arms race, leading to a world beset with insecurity and lack of tranquillity. Many States and nations are enduring just such a situation.

In spite of the substantial efforts of the international community to date to strengthen the universality of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the non-proliferation system so as to turn them into a tangible reality and avoid potential military confrontation, we regret to note that the present international reality is completely inconsistent with past achievements in that area. Indeed, disarmament efforts have suffered a serious setback, as manifested in the following developments.

First, some nuclear States have improved and developed nuclear weapons and their delivery systems quantitatively and qualitatively with a view to making them more effective, while other States have introduced new types of offensive weapons in contravention of the non-proliferation system and in flagrant and clear violation of the consensus reached within the international community in favour of diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in security policies.

Secondly, nuclear material and technology, including nuclear know-how, have been acquired by certain States that are not parties to the non-proliferation system through bilateral cooperation with some nuclear-weapon States, beyond the control of the International Atomic Energy Agency and contrary to the spirit and letter of the NPT.

Thirdly, certain nuclear States have sought to develop a new concept for strategic defence doctrines based on an offensive rather than a defensive strategy, arrogating to themselves the right to use nuclear weapons in violation of international law and international humanitarian law. We therefore call for the following measures.

First, there must be a recommitment to the principles of international law and to multilateralism in implementing disarmament treaties and conventions, without resort to double standards.

Second, all provisions of the NPT, including the equilibrium between disarmament and non-proliferation, must be implemented in a comprehensive and balanced manner. In that context, we stress the need to implement article VI of the NPT, which

requires the priority engagement of nuclear States in immediate and serious negotiations with a view to the gradual reduction of existing nuclear arsenals and a shift in their use towards peaceful purposes within a specific time frame.

Third, the universality and inclusiveness of the NPT must be reaffirmed. That will require the international community to exert pressure on countries that have not yet acceded to the Treaty to do so very soon.

Fourth, the importance of the implementation of article IV of the NPT must be reaffirmed. The inalienable right of all States parties to the Treaty without exception to conduct peaceful nuclear activities and to develop, research, produce and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes must not be reinterpreted. The international community must reject any attempt by any State party to the Treaty to use the technical cooperation programme of the International Atomic Energy Agency as a political instrument for violating the statute of the Agency.

Fifth, an unconditional international instrument should be developed to provide the necessary safeguards for non-nuclear States against any threat or danger that might result from the use of existing nuclear arsenals against them.

Sixth, the lead role of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the only international entity empowered to monitor and police the nuclear activities and programmes of States and especially to resolve related outstanding issues, must be reaffirmed.

Seventh, States that have not yet acceded to the comprehensive NPT must be urged to do so as soon as possible so that the Treaty can enter into force.

In conclusion, we hope that all States will demonstrate the necessary flexibility and political will to reach a consensus on relevant pending matters, and that the sessions of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 NPT Review Conference will lead to the success of the Conference and strengthen the universality and full implementation of the NPT. We also look forward to convening the special session of the General Assembly on disarmament without further delay in order to highlight disarmament issues and revive global interest in them. The success of that effort will depend on the resolve of the five nuclear-weapon States to

fulfil their commitments in order to avoid the collapse of the NPT.

**Mr. Landman** (Netherlands): I am taking the floor for the first time at this session of the First Committee, so I would like to congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of your high office. I wish to express my appreciation for the terrific way in which you are chairing this meeting. I thank you for your great efficiency.

Yesterday, the Presidency of the European Union made a statement on nuclear weapons. The Netherlands fully endorses the intervention by the Presidency. From a national point of view, we would like to add the following observations.

Early this year, an article appeared in the *Wall Street Journal*, written by George Schultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger and Sam Nunn — names that need no introduction across the globe. They reignited the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons and underlined the need to reinitiate efforts on practical steps towards disarmament and the final objective of a world free of nuclear weapons.

After the series of setbacks we all know, a new élan — a new beginning — would be more than welcome. Indeed, decisive steps should be taken towards nuclear disarmament. The existing system of international treaties and legislation in the field of disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation provides the framework for action. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) should be further strengthened in the interest of the international community, and the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty has become, increasingly so, a matter of the highest urgency. International legal instruments, such as a treaty prohibiting the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, would also benefit our disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation efforts. They would facilitate full implementation of the NPT and strengthen our common non-proliferation regime.

Negotiations on such a fissile material cut-off treaty could and should start in the Conference on Disarmament without further ado, without preconditions, and in the understanding that no issues are precluded from the negotiations. That has been stated on many occasions by the European Union as a

whole and the Netherlands as one of its constituent parts.

The Netherlands expressed appreciation for the illustrative treaty text officially submitted at the Conference on Disarmament by the United States in May 2006. At least three model drafts for such a treaty have already been produced by the scientific community and civil society to assist and inspire us. We are ready and consider it high time to establish the appropriate legal framework allowing us to engage in discussions with an open mind and respecting the positions of our partners in that endeavour. We count on all other members of the Conference on Disarmament, early next year, to express similar readiness and flexibility to start concrete and target-oriented negotiations.

It is, in fact, of the utmost importance that we move forward in Geneva. Although specifics of a fissile material cut-off treaty need further consideration, we do have to recognize that not moving forward on that subject will have serious consequences for disarmament in general, for the ongoing preparations towards the Review Conference of the NPT in 2010, and ultimately for the Treaty itself, not to mention the future of the Conference on Disarmament as the sole negotiating body of the international community for disarmament and arms control.

Merely reflecting on a fissile material cut-off treaty will no longer do the job because if we are still not able to show that we really mean business on that subject, we as negotiating parties would definitely lose all our credibility and the Conference on Disarmament its legitimacy. In other words, we must start negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty early next year. Countries which have not yet agreed to a moratorium on the production of fissile materials for weapons use should be strongly encouraged by all of us to do so in the meantime.

The past two years in the Conference on Disarmament have been very productive. As a matter of fact, they have been productive enough to allow for such a quick start, since solid and thorough groundwork has been laid for a comprehensive package — the package we are all familiar with. We are ready to move forward and to be effective with regard to the proposal on the table. We trust that we are not alone in our interest in a much safer world and in our readiness to take concrete action on that score.



I would like to end my intervention where I began, with the remarkable vision expressed in the *Wall Street Journal* this spring on a world without nuclear weapons and on which leadership and what steps are thereto required. I do so this time by quoting a great European of almost one and a half centuries ago — Victor Hugo. Hugo wrote in his time that the day would come when canons and — excuse me for this extrapolation — weapons of mass destruction would be on show in museums in the same way as, in his age, one could visit and inspect instruments of torture fashionable in the Middle Ages and thereafter, and that we would all be wondering that such weapons had existed and that their use had even been contemplated.

**Mr. MacKay** (New Zealand): As we noted in our general debate statement, it is clear that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) requires a sense of renewed ownership and energy from all of its States parties in support of its full implementation. We need to look for positive outcomes across the Treaty's remit to ensure that the constructive start to the Treaty's review process, commenced in Vienna last April, will proceed to the achievement of concrete, measurable progress at the next Review Conference in 2010.

New Zealand, together with Chile, Nigeria, Sweden and Switzerland, has introduced a new draft resolution this year, contained in document A/C.1/62/L.29, on decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems. We would welcome co-sponsorship by additional States. The draft resolution deserves wide support because, as highlighted by the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission last year, one of the greatest risks of nuclear catastrophe comes from the estimated thousands of nuclear weapons which remain on high alert decades after the end of the cold war. Such weapons could be launched in minutes in response to the perception of an attack, which might in fact be the result of something caused by technical malfunction, accident or act of terrorism. De-alerting would certainly reduce the risk of nuclear conflict by allowing more time for communication and avoidance of misunderstanding or miscalculation.

The draft resolution welcomes the steps already taken to decrease the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems and calls for the taking of further such practical steps. It is obvious, of course, that

reductions in deployment and operational status cannot substitute for irreversible cuts in the numbers of nuclear weapons possessed, but ensuring that all nuclear weapons are removed from high alert in the interim as we work towards the total elimination of nuclear arsenals would be a significant improvement for our collective security.

The voting records of this Committee illustrate overwhelming support for the elimination of nuclear weapons, and we are disappointed that the rate of progress towards that goal overall remains slow. Certainly, we welcome the fact that there has been a sharp reduction in nuclear weapons from their peak at the time of the cold war. However, the estimated 27,000 nuclear warheads that remain still pose the risk of catastrophic consequences if used. That risk is increased with the proliferation of nuclear weapons capability to further countries. That is why New Zealand will continue its efforts on both the disarmament and the non-proliferation fronts.

Just as the nuclear-weapon States made an unequivocal commitment under the NPT to eliminate their nuclear arsenals, non-nuclear-weapon States undertook a parallel obligation never to acquire or facilitate the proliferation of such weapons. New Zealand takes that obligation very solemnly and continues to be active on a number of fronts to guard against nuclear proliferation. Through the G8 Global Partnership, New Zealand has contributed to a project to shut down Russia's last plutonium-producing nuclear reactor, as well as a project on the Russia/Ukraine border to combat the smuggling of nuclear and radioactive materials. Through the Proliferation Security Initiative, we are working with a network of States to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems and related materials. We are also implementing changes to our domestic export-control legislation to incorporate the facility for catch-all controls. Those examples illustrate some of the practical ways in which New Zealand is implementing its non-proliferation commitments.

I have already introduced draft resolution A/C.1/62/L.29 on decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear arsenals. I would like to take this opportunity to introduce two other draft resolutions which New Zealand will present with others during this year's session.

New Zealand, working with Brazil, will put forward a draft resolution, contained in document A/C.1/62/L.27, calling for a nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas. A powerful symbol for demonstrating the renunciation of weapons of mass destruction is the reach, and potential reach, of nuclear-weapon-free zones over the land masses of the globe. Nuclear-weapon-free zones can act as disarmament measures, providing an incentive for nuclear-armed or aspiring States to pull back from the nuclear option, as well as contributing to non-proliferation efforts. Such draft resolutions have been adopted by overwhelming majorities in past years, and we hope that this will once again be the case. We again invite other delegations to also sponsor the draft resolution.

*Mr. Hunger (Switzerland), Vice-Chairperson, took the Chair.*

We have listened carefully to the reservations of those few States in opposition to the text. They are concerned that their freedom of navigation on the high seas could be undermined by the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone encompassing the entire Southern Hemisphere. Let me reiterate that this draft resolution specifically acknowledges the relevant rights and obligations under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. We would be happy to be even more explicit in this respect if that would help the States in question, but the reality is that, as a matter of law, it is simply not possible for a General Assembly resolution to change the law of the sea, as feared, nor is it our wish that it would ever do so.

New Zealand will also put forward draft resolution A/C.1/62/L.28, a draft resolution on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), along with Australia and Mexico. Again, we would invite and welcome other sponsors for that draft resolution. Eleven years have now passed since the CTBT was opened for adoption in 1996. As many States stressed at the article XIV conference held in September 2007, it is imperative that the Treaty enter into force as soon as possible. Universalization of the CTBT should be a collective goal of the international community. In particular, those annex 2 States that have signed but not ratified the Treaty should make the ultimate expression of support for the Treaty by ratifying it without delay. We hope that States will again demonstrate their strong support for the CTBT by voting in favour of this draft resolution.

**Mr. Buzhinskiy** (Russian Federation) (*spoke in Russian*): Nuclear disarmament is one of the most important elements for strengthening international security and strategic stability. The last 15 years have seen a dramatic reduction in nuclear weapons. Since 1991, there has been a fivefold reduction in the Russian nuclear arsenal and a 75 per cent reduction in the total stockpiles of non-strategic nuclear weapons. The Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions — the Moscow Treaty — is being implemented. We estimate that, by 2012, the Russian Federation will have many fewer nuclear weapons than it has today.

At the United Nations we often hear about the need to continue with further nuclear arms reductions. We are in favour of a gradual, step-by-step solution to that problem in accordance with article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). On the basis of that, we have conducted a dialogue with the United States regarding a new arrangement to replace the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START I). In our view, that new arrangement must be legally binding. The essence of our approach to the issue would be to ensure that the process of strategic nuclear arms reduction and limitation continues and that we are therefore able to preserve what is useful and effective in the START regime in any successor agreement.

The Treaty between the United States of America and Russia on the elimination of their intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles remains in force and is important for maintaining strategic stability. But it is hardly acceptable that, while the Russian Federation and the United States have eliminated that class of missiles, other States have started to develop them actively. We call on all countries, in particular those with missile capabilities, to consider jointly making the Treaty into a universal arrangement open for broad international accession.

From our experience in implementing START I, we know that reducing strategic offensive arms is a complicated process that requires a great deal of labour, time and resources. The President of the Russian Federation, Mr. Vladimir Putin, has repeatedly expressed our country's willingness to reduce our nuclear arsenal to a much lower level, in keeping with

the notion of minimum sufficiency, a concept that has been talked about a great deal recently. That, of course, could be carried out only in conditions of sustained strategic stability.

At the same time, nuclear disarmament requires that we take into account the link between strategic offensive and defensive missile armaments. The implementation of unilateral plans for a global anti-ballistic missile defence system, together with the idea of a global nuclear or conventional flash strike, would upset strategic stability. We are convinced that the implementation of the United States global anti-ballistic missile system in Europe would have a negative impact on the maintenance of strategic stability.

In order to avoid the cold war “action/counter-action” scenario, the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, has proposed an alternative that provides for collective interaction, namely, that we analyse potential missile threats for the period until 2020 and consider establishing a system to monitor the strategic situation.

I want to stress the fact that Russian nuclear weapons are kept under reliable control. The effectiveness of that control is enhanced through organizational and technical measures. For example, since 1991, the number of nuclear weapons storage facilities has been reduced by a factor of four. All non-strategic nuclear weapons have been moved to the central storage facilities of the Russian Ministry of Defence. Those measures have enabled us to reallocate financial resources to ensure the safety and reliable protection of the reduced number of nuclear munitions storage facilities, using state-of-the-art technical means for security and physical protection.

The Russian Federation has developed and introduced a set of measures to counter terrorist acts. Those measures envisage regular comprehensive checks of all facilities that pose nuclear or radiation risks. In March 2007, we completed an exercise, initiated by the Russian Federation and subsequently carried out in Russia, France, the United Kingdom and the United States, to demonstrate to countries of the world what the real situation is regarding the secure storage and transportation of nuclear weapons. All of the exercises confirmed the high level of readiness of emergency units that could take immediate action in the event of unforeseen nuclear weapons incidents.

There are a few other important points that I would like to make. We attach particular importance to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). The Russian Federation ratified the CTBT as early as 2000. We are pursuing a principled policy that aims at ensuring the earliest possible entry into force of the Treaty. We are deeply concerned by the situation regarding the entry into force of the CTBT. To date, not all countries whose ratification is required for its entry into force have ratified it.

We are aware that additional measures are now required to strengthen the security assurances provided to non-nuclear States. We do not object to the formulation of a global arrangement on providing assurances to the non-nuclear States that would exclude the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons — and which would take into account exceptional cases as provided for in the military doctrines of the nuclear Powers determining when such weapons can be used.

The non-proliferation regime should be strengthened through enhancing the verification activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and ensuring the universalization of the additional protocol to the IAEA safeguards agreements. We call on all the States that have not yet ratified an additional protocol to do so as soon as possible.

It should be noted too that our steps towards nuclear disarmament are accompanied by relevant structural changes in the Russian Federation’s nuclear weapons sector. We have halved our production capacity in areas where it is excessive for defensive purposes. The Russian Federation is working towards shutting down industrial uranium-graphite reactors for weapons-grade plutonium production. The material produced by those facilities is not used for military purposes. Moreover, the production of uranium in Russia for manufacturing nuclear weapons was terminated long ago.

We attach great importance to the provisions for Russia and the United States respectively to dispose of 34 tons of weapons-grade plutonium that is no longer required for defensive purposes. That would ensure the irreversible transformation of excessive amounts of weapons-grade plutonium into forms unusable for manufacturing nuclear weapons.

While we note the progress made in nuclear disarmament and, accordingly, in the fulfilment of the obligations under article VI of the NPT, the Russian

side believes that the complete elimination of nuclear weapons can be achieved only through a gradual, phased movement towards the ultimate goal on the basis of a comprehensive approach and with the participation of all nuclear Powers and, certainly, in conditions of sustained strategic stability.

**Mr. Langeland** (Norway): In our general statement last week my delegation highlighted the need to restore international consensus on a comprehensive approach where the three pillars of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) mutually support each other. It is the firm view of my delegation that we can forge a new international consensus. The initiative by Australia, Chile, Indonesia, Norway, Romania, South Africa and the United Kingdom — the seven-nation initiative — has demonstrated that countries with different perspectives can develop a common understanding on how to move the disarmament and non-proliferation agenda forward.

We must make full use of the 2010 NPT review process. The first meeting of the Preparatory Committee, held in Vienna this spring, provided us with a good start. We expect that the next preparatory meetings will sustain and even strengthen a positive momentum up to 2010.

Both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation are essential in order to achieve our common objective of a nuclear-weapon-free world. Yet, we must refrain from artificial links. Necessary non-proliferation measures cannot be delayed due to a perceived lack of progress in the disarmament area. At the same time, a diminished role for nuclear weapons in security policies will contribute to reducing the attractiveness of acquiring such weapons. From a Norwegian perspective, there are a number of steps that should be taken to promote a robust non-proliferation regime and to create an environment conducive to disarmament. I will address some of these important steps before returning to nuclear disarmament.

First, we must resolve current proliferation challenges by diplomatic means. We find recent development in the Six-Party Talks to dismantle the nuclear weapons programme of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to be very encouraging. We urge the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to make full use of this window of opportunity.

Secondly, we must likewise intensify efforts to make progress on the Iran dossier. To that end, we urge

Iran to meet the demands of the international community in order to facilitate the process of reaching a diplomatic solution.

Thirdly, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) comprehensive safeguards and the additional protocols constitute the verification standard. Only through additional protocols will the IAEA be able to determine whether nuclear activities in a given country exist only for peaceful purposes. We call upon all States to ratify and implement an additional protocol without delay.

Fourthly, Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) underlines the need for each Member State to adopt and implement adequate national non-proliferation measures. It is vital that we all do our homework in this field. Norway has financially supported regional workshops organized by the United Nations to promote the implementation of Council resolution 1540 (2004).

Fifthly, a broader nuclear security and non-proliferation architecture must also cover credible efforts to combat nuclear terrorism. Norway fully supports the revised Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. Likewise, we must intensify efforts to minimize the use of highly enriched uranium in the civilian sector.

It is the firm conviction of my delegation that nuclear disarmament on the basis of irreversibility, transparency and verification is essential to remove the availability of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons which are dismantled cannot end up in the wrong hands. We need an incremental disarmament agenda.

First, we need further reductions in the nuclear arsenals. Some days ago the United States delegation made a comprehensive presentation on steps taken to meet its article VI obligations under the NPT. Norway welcomes the considerable reductions which have taken place since the end of the cold war. The Treaty on Strategic Offensive Arms (START I) will expire in 2009 and the Moscow Treaty on strategic offensive reductions will expire in 2012. It is vital that these treaties be replaced by new agreements and lead to deeper and irreversible reductions. It is encouraging that consultations between the United States and the Russian Federation have already started. Likewise, we hope it will be possible to move forward on sub-strategic nuclear weapons.

Second, the United States demonstrated that steps are being taken towards disarmament. Transparency on disarmament measures is essential to foster confidence that we are moving towards further reductions in nuclear weapons stocks. We encourage all nuclear-weapon States to exercise the fullest transparency possible.

Third, we cannot attain the total elimination of nuclear weapons unless we are able to prevent a new arms race. Norway attaches great importance to existing bilateral arms control treaties. But we also need multilateral treaties such as the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) in order to cap any new arms race. My delegation reiterates the importance of the CTBT. We welcome the unilateral test moratoriums in place, but they cannot replace the fundamental value of a global and legally binding treaty. Norway urges full universalization of the CTBT.

It is high time to start negotiations on an FMCT. We were close to an agreement on a programme of work in the Conference on Disarmament earlier this year. My delegation was deeply disappointed that some countries blocked such an agreement. Our view is that FMCT negotiations should be commenced without preconditions. However, during such negotiations, we hope that a common understanding will emerge that credible verification both is feasible and serves the cause of international security.

We also expect that the question of existing stocks will be addressed. Already today important steps are being taken to remove stocks of fissile material that no longer serve military purposes and converting them to civilian use.

Fourth, we consider nuclear-weapon-free zones as both important disarmament and non-proliferation instruments. Such zones, based on guidelines of the Disarmament Commission, provide an important avenue for attaining legally binding negative security assurances. More efforts should be mobilized to promote regional zones, enabling the nuclear-weapon States to sign and ratify the supporting protocols.

Fifth, we remain convinced that continued efforts to reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons, as agreed at the most recent NPT Review Conference, will generate more confidence and security. We welcome efforts taken so far, and encourage further steps.

Sixth, all nations have a responsibility to contribute to disarmament. Norway, for its part, allocates considerable financial resources for nuclear security and the dismantlement of nuclear submarines in North-Western Russia. Seventh, we must engage civil society in promoting nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

This year's session of the First Committee will consider a number of draft resolutions on nuclear weapons. Prior to the session, our hope was that consultations such as the one we are holding today would allow for fruitful deliberations and for moving positions closer together, thus contributing to consensus-building.

**Mr. Ali (Malaysia):** On behalf of my delegation, I have the honour to introduce to the Committee for the eleventh consecutive year a draft resolution on follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*, which this year appears in document A/C.1/62/L.36.

My delegation wishes to express its appreciation to the Secretary-General for his report contained in document A/62/165, submitted under item 98 (w) of the agenda of the General Assembly. My delegation also extends its appreciation to those delegations that have submitted the information requested pursuant to resolution 61/83 of 2006.

International efforts aimed at addressing the threats posed by nuclear weapons have thus far been premised on two mutually reinforcing approaches: disarmament, with the ultimate goal of the elimination of such weapons, and arms control, aimed at reducing or mitigating the risks inherent to such weapons, including stemming the proliferation of sensitive goods, materials and technology. However, in light of the current impasse currently afflicting international disarmament and arms control negotiations, my delegation is of the view that the international community must not lose its focus on achieving the total elimination of nuclear weapons, whilst at the same time curbing the spread or proliferation of sensitive goods, materials and technology.

In that connection, my delegation remains convinced that the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality and threat or use of nuclear weapons constitutes a significant milestone in international efforts aimed at achieving nuclear

disarmament and non-proliferation by providing a powerful moral argument for the total elimination of such weapons. Furthermore, my delegation wishes to reiterate the unambiguous exhortation of the opinion that all Member States are obliged to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.

Given the multitude of complexities surrounding international disarmament negotiations at present, it is imperative that we muster the requisite political will and moral courage to break through the current impasse with a view to achieving the goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Thus, with a view to achieving the broadest support possible, the important decisions of the International Court of Justice have been retained in their existing form, specifically in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the draft resolution, accompanied by the necessary technical updates.

On a related note, my delegation is of the view that, in supporting the draft resolution, Member States would also be reaffirming their continued commitment to the multilateral processes in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation and that such expressions of commitment would go a long way towards dispelling the notion that nuclear disarmament can best be achieved through unilateral or bilateral efforts alone.

In concluding, my delegation reiterates its conviction that the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons remains a significant contribution in the field of nuclear disarmament and lends much weight to the moral argument calling for the total elimination of such heinous weapons. We believe that Member States share that same conviction and we are confident that the draft resolution will continue to receive the support of a wide majority of delegations assembled here.

**Mr. Da Silva** (Canada): The ledger of progress on nuclear non-proliferation, disarmament and arms control over the past year shows mixed results. Major developments on the positive side include the Six-Party Talks announcement that a deal has been struck that would see the Democratic People's Republic of Korea shut down its nuclear facilities and make a complete

declaration of its nuclear programme by the end of the year. Other positive signs include the bold vision outlined by the United Kingdom on concrete steps required to achieve nuclear disarmament, as well as the announcement by the United States that its dismantlement efforts are well ahead of schedule. However, on the negative side of the ledger this year, a small number of countries continued to block agreement on a programme of work at the Conference on Disarmament, and great concerns remain over Iranian compliance with its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Together, those have sent strong negative signals to the global community.

Though it may seem elusive at times, building a stronger and more robust non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament regime does not require magic spells or lucky charms. Hard work and political will are the key ingredients needed to build a safer and more secure world free of nuclear weapons. I will now elaborate on some of the building blocks that Canada sees as essential to that process.

Canada continues to place the NPT squarely at the centre of the international nuclear non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament regime, as well as our own nuclear non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament policy. Contrary to the opinions of those who claim that the Treaty has become ineffective, the NPT is the most widely adhered-to non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament instrument in history and has been successful in containing the spread of nuclear weapons. It remains a powerful statement for peace, made in a unified voice by virtually every State represented here in this room today.

However, serious challenges to the Treaty exist and must be addressed sooner rather than later. Many of those challenges, such as concerns regarding Iranian compliance, the issue of State withdrawal from the NPT, the continued lack of universality and the problems caused by procedural delays at NPT meetings — as once again spectacularly witnessed at this year's session of the Preparatory Committee in Vienna — all point to the crucial need to reinforce the strength and the authority of the Treaty. While the Treaty remains relevant in today's world, failure to act on reforms could make it less relevant and less effective in the world of tomorrow.

*(spoke in French)*

Canada recognizes the steps that several nuclear-weapon States have made over the past year in reducing their arsenals. However, there continue to be worrying signs as certain States demonstrate increased reluctance to consider further reductions, new doctrines have been mooted that would assert a role for nuclear weapons as war-fighting, as opposed to strategic tools, and plans for new nuclear weapons are even being discussed in some current press reports. Those developments directly challenge our nuclear disarmament efforts. We encourage all countries with nuclear weapons not only to reduce and dismantle their nuclear weapons in a secure, irreversible and verifiable manner, but also to take advantage of every possible opportunity to accelerate the process. Confidence- and security-building measures can play constructive roles in further advancing such efforts. We also urge non-NPT States to sign and ratify the Treaty, and fully to adopt all international nuclear non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament norms.

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty remains a key piece of unfinished business on the agenda of the international community. While progress continues to be made in gaining more signatures and ratifications, 10 States whose ratifications are required for the Treaty's entry into force have yet to fully commit to prohibiting nuclear tests worldwide. Canada reiterates its call on those States to ratify the Treaty as soon as possible.

*(spoke in English)*

A fissile material cut-off treaty remains a key step on the road to complete nuclear disarmament. This year, the Conference on Disarmament was tantalizingly close to breaking the deadlock that has existed since 1998 regarding agreement on a programme of work that included negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty. It is regrettable that the opposition of only a few States continues to prevent the Conference from resuming substantive work. Canada is further disappointed that we were unable to submit a First Committee decision on that topic this year due to a lack of consensus here in New York. Nonetheless, negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty remains Canada's top priority in the Conference on Disarmament. We reiterate our call on all States to support the presidential draft decision that was jointly tabled by this year's group of six Presidents of the

Conference on Disarmament (P6), and we urge States to support the efforts of the incoming P6 States next year.

In conclusion, Mario Cuomo, a former Governor of this fine State, once remarked that good public administration is composed of equal parts poetry and plumbing. That analysis applies just as well to our work here. Diplomatic poetry — that is, policy debate, setting a proper tone and building consensus — is important; but so is the plumbing of the international disarmament regime — the nitty-gritty work of negotiating treaties, bringing them into force, and then respecting them both in letter and in spirit. While the international community has made significant and commendable progress on diplomatic poetry in recent months, the diplomatic plumbing remains clogged and urgently needs our attention. It is time we rolled up our sleeves and got to work.

**Mr. Khan** (Pakistan): The High Representative, in his remarks to the First Committee on 8 October, gave a terrifying assessment that over half of humanity lives in countries that possess nuclear weapons and that more than 26,000 nuclear weapons exist, though their exact number is not known.

We agree with the High Representative that both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation are important to international peace and security. Only through their simultaneous pursuit can we erect effective barriers against the risks of proliferation and the acquisition of nuclear technology by terrorists. Vertical proliferation, or improvement in nuclear weapons systems, compounds uncertainties and instabilities and spurs newer strategic competitions.

Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, in his opening statement to the General Assembly last month, expressed optimism about the renewed interest of the international community in multilateralism and in the United Nations to address global issues. Genuine multilateralism should enable nations to take decisions in concert.

The principle of equal security for all States, established by the Charter and upheld at the General Assembly's first special session on disarmament, should remain paramount in our quest for security, nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. The existing consensus on international arms control and non-proliferation structures has been eroding. We have therefore called for a new consensus on nuclear

disarmament and non-proliferation. That new consensus should address contemporary issues related to underlying motives and causes that impel States to acquire weapons of mass destruction; nuclear disarmament within a reasonable time frame; the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear technology under appropriate safeguards; the prevention of acquisition of weapons of mass destruction technology by terrorists; missile and anti-ballistic missile systems; and security arrangements for sensitive regions such as South Asia, the Middle East and North-East Asia. We have called on Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to consider convening a special conference to build new consensus on disarmament and non-proliferation.

What we need to agree to is to revise the process of disarmament and non-proliferation while evolving a universally agreed basis for the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy under globally agreed conditions. Nuclear science, technology and applications contribute to peace and socio-economic human development. It is therefore important that we ensure equitable access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. That will also enhance the credibility and effectiveness of the non-proliferation regime.

A fissile material cut-off treaty should be tied to the twin objectives of non-proliferation and disarmament. The prevention of the vertical and horizontal spread of nuclear weapons technology will ensure non-proliferation; cuts into existing stocks will move disarmament forward. A fissile material cut-off treaty without verification would amount only to a unilateral moratorium — nothing more. Similarly, one can only presume that, over time, fissile material stocks would be transformed into nuclear weapons. A fissile material cut-off treaty that freezes or accentuates asymmetries will accelerate proliferation, not arrest it.

It is therefore important that a fissile material cut-off treaty provide a schedule for a progressive transfer of existing stockpiles to civilian use and place those stockpiles under safeguards so that the unsafeguarded stocks are equalized at the lowest possible level. In order to have full effect, it ought also to be accompanied by a mandatory programme for the elimination of asymmetries in the possession of fissile material stockpiles by various States.

Some delegations say that those issues are preconditions. We are of the view that insistence on

dropping the agreed basis for negotiations is a precondition. There are agreed principles that underlie the discourse on the fissile material cut-off treaty, developed by the first special session on disarmament, the General Assembly resolution in 1993, and the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The objective has been to draft a fissile material cut-off treaty that would strengthen the security of all States, irrespective of their size and status.

The Shannon report of 1995 reflected consensus on two bases for a fissile material cut-off treaty: first, an agreement to begin negotiations on a universal, non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable fissile material treaty; and secondly, the open, non-limiting scope of negotiations captured in the affirmation that the mandate for the establishment of an ad hoc committee does not preclude delegations from raising for consideration the issues of past and future production, as well as management of fissile material. That is not a precondition, but built-in latitude to raise any issue — cut-off, existing stocks, management and verifiability.

Some well-meaning representatives say that we should raise all those issues when the actual negotiations commence, if they commence. Of course, we will do that, but one has to be sure about what is sacrosanct and what is not sacrosanct. The Shannon mandate was agreed, and now there are moves to shelve it. Verification was a goal and now non-verification seems to be the objective for some.

It is being posited that, over time, global reliance on nuclear power will supplement fossil fuels and gas. If that is the case, it is important that we evolve an agreed basis for the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy on a non-discriminatory basis, under appropriate international safeguards and in accordance with the international obligations of States. Pakistan supports efforts to expand nuclear cooperation for civilian uses, while taking into account safety and security aspects and addressing proliferation concerns.

Pakistan has a legitimate requirement for nuclear-power generation to meet the energy needs of our expanding economy. We will continue to develop nuclear power technology under international safeguards.

The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) is considering new demands for exceptionalism. In the



coming months, the NSG States will have a heavy responsibility, as any endorsement of a selective or discriminatory approach could fatally undermine efforts to promote disarmament and non-proliferation. We trust that the NSG will adopt a non-discriminatory, criteria-based approach that will, on the one hand, arrest horizontal or vertical proliferation and, on the other, offer equal opportunities for access to civilian nuclear technology under the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

We are assessing the full impact of the incipient United States-India nuclear deal on fissile material production in our region. That deal has already influenced our position on the fissile material treaty. The international community and the NSG should build firewalls that prevent the spillover of nuclear technology obtained for peaceful purposes into military applications.

**Mr. Gal** (Mongolia): As in previous years, many delegations during the general debate noted the insufficient progress on nuclear disarmament. They also pointed out the challenges that are facing the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Indeed, despite significant reductions in nuclear arsenals since the end of the cold war, the number of remaining nuclear warheads is unacceptably high. The historic balance between nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, struck when the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) came into being, is perceived by many to have shifted excessively towards non-proliferation.

The 13 practical steps to implement article VI of the NPT are yet to be realized. The start of negotiations on an instrument of negative security assurances that is unconditional and legally-binding and on a universal and verifiable fissile materials cut-off treaty is long overdue. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), in the decade of its existence, has not been able to enter into force. Mongolia agrees that this state of affairs needs to be reviewed. That notwithstanding, my delegation also believes that we must avoid yielding to pessimism and welcomes the new sense of optimism registered in this room this year.

The Conference on Disarmament gives us hope for a good start in 2008 thanks to the cohesion and continuity in its leadership. We look forward to a successful 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT. The constructive spirit that prevailed at the

first session of the Preparatory Committee held in Vienna should be maintained throughout.

I should also like once again to reiterate Mongolia's support for the Six-Party Talks on the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and welcome the progress achieved therein.

Perception change is essential in order to close the gap between the priorities of the nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States. We must work strenuously in order to further strengthen the existing nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation, safety and verification regimes. In doing so, we must bear in mind that the modern global nuclear non-proliferation regime stands on three equally important pillars — non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament, and the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

In relation to the energy needs of some and the concerns about proliferation of others, Mongolia attaches importance to the right of States parties to the peaceful application of nuclear technology in accordance with the NPT. However, proof of compliance with a treaty regime is imperative if one is to enjoy fully the privileges and rights conferred by the relevant legal instruments. Mongolia reaffirms, therefore, its commitment to the comprehensive safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Additional Protocols thereto. My country ratified its Additional Protocol to the IAEA Safeguards Agreement in 2003 and supports their universal application so that the combination of a comprehensive safeguards agreement and the Additional Protocols may be adopted as the norm for the international verification of peaceful nuclear activities.

My delegation notes with interest the recent establishment of an international centre for uranium enrichment in Angarsk and welcomes the centre's intention to meet the needs of other countries for nuclear fuel. While welcoming the latest signature by Montenegro and ratification by the Dominican Republic of the CTBT, Mongolia reiterates its call on all States, especially annex 2 States that have not done so, to sign or ratify the Treaty in order to ensure its early entry into force.

Mongolia also attaches importance to implementing Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), which we consider to be a very practical non-proliferation measure. It is with great satisfaction

to note that, within the framework of that resolution, Mongolia is going to implement a project to strengthen its export and import controls over nuclear and other radioactive materials, with the financial assistance of the United States Government.

Nuclear-weapon-free zones are a crucial element of the global non-proliferation regime and an important confidence-building measure in various regions and beyond. Mongolia has been consistent in its support for the existing nuclear-weapon-free zones under the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba. We have welcomed the establishment of the nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia and continue to support the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East.

Mongolia declared its territory nuclear-weapon free in 1992, and this year marks the fifteenth anniversary of our nuclear-weapon-free status. That status strengthened Mongolia's international security by political and diplomatic means and contributed to promoting nuclear non-proliferation in the region. It was not a new idea, but a further development of a single-State nuclear-weapon-free-zone theory, the possibility of which was provided by the General Assembly-mandated comprehensive study on nuclear-weapon-free zones in 1976.

The past 15 years have been marked by success in regard to advancing Mongolia's unique status. Concrete achievements in the institutionalization of the status have been repeatedly noted by the Secretary-General in his reports. Today, an international norm on Mongolia's status is emerging. Every two years, the General Assembly, through its relevant resolution, reiterates its full support for Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status and invites Member States to continue to cooperate with my country on that issue. Reference to the status at the bilateral, multilateral and international levels is rising. The Non-Aligned Movement, for example, continuously supports Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status at its highest level, and the First Conference of the States Parties and Signatories to Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, held in 2005 in Mexico, recognized and supported Mongolia's international nuclear-weapon-free status.

Recognition of our status and negative security assurances for Mongolia by all the five nuclear-weapon States in their 2000 joint statement was a major step in

the institutionalization of our status. Building on that statement, a legally binding commitment by the five nuclear-weapon States could be a desirable option for Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status.

My country is working to achieve a legally binding nuclear-weapon-free status. We earnestly hope that the consultations on a relevant draft trilateral treaty, which was recently submitted to the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation, will commence in the near future and produce concrete results. It is our view that a legally institutionalized nuclear-weapon-free status for Mongolia will have a positive effect on the current progress in the denuclearization of North-East Asia and contribute to the establishment of a multilateral security cooperation mechanism in the subregion, which is advocated by my country.

In conclusion, my delegation expresses its deep appreciation to Member States for their continued support for Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status over the past 15 years, and reaffirms its readiness to cooperate with all Member States and relevant United Nations bodies in enhancing the effectiveness, strengthening the credibility and achieving the full institutionalization of its status with a view to contributing to peace and stability in the North-East Asia region and beyond.

**Mr. Ruddyard** (Indonesia): The existence of nuclear weapons continues to pose a grave threat to humanity. The danger of the use of such weapons is unthinkable because of the incalculable risk of miscalculations and accidents. Hence, the best assurance against that threat is the complete eradication of nuclear weapons.

We are of the view that nuclear weapons should be eliminated in a systematic and comprehensive manner. The responsibility for eliminating those weapons lies in the hands of the nuclear-weapon States, and we urge all nuclear-weapon States, particularly those that have the largest nuclear arsenals, to expedite their disarmament efforts.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) continues to be the cornerstone of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. Adhering to both ends of the central bargain under the NPT — non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament — is critical to the survival of the NPT.

It continues to concern us, however, that while the non-nuclear-weapon States have agreed to renounce the nuclear option under the NPT, some nuclear-weapon States, contrary to their disarmament obligations pursuant to the Treaty, are retaining their nuclear arsenals and even continue to develop new capabilities in that area.

The focus of the United Nations remains mostly on the challenge of non-proliferation, while the challenge of disarmament is largely ignored. It is unfair and untenable to demand that the non-nuclear-weapon States comply with their obligations when the nuclear-weapon States have failed to live up to their obligations and commitments. This imbalance in attention will never adequately address the danger of nuclear weapons. We believe that both non-proliferation and disarmament should be advanced in a mutually reinforcing and non-discriminatory manner; one should not take precedence over the other.

Nuclear disarmament is possible and realistic. It could be achieved through practical, sensible and careful measures. At the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the nuclear-weapon States made an unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the elimination of their nuclear arsenals and to move towards complete nuclear disarmament. That undertaking should be implemented immediately, through full implementation of the 13 practical steps in pursuit of a nuclear-weapon-free world, as agreed upon by all States parties at the 2000 Review Conference.

The nuclear-weapon States should move away from rhetoric and begin to make concrete disarmament efforts. There is no reason to linger over discussions of how to pursue nuclear disarmament. Failure to fulfil obligations under the multilaterally agreed disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation agenda will threaten the continued existence of the NPT and will threaten the disarmament regime as a whole. Nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States alike have an equal responsibility to fully implement all provisions of the NPT and to realize its universality.

Along those lines, we are of the view that the States parties to the NPT should encourage all countries outside the regime to join the Treaty. It is also very important that the rights of its member States to pursue the peaceful uses of nuclear energy be acknowledged. Regrettably, the current situation

reveals just the opposite. Nuclear cooperation between States parties and States outside the Treaty will undermine universalization efforts and further weaken the non-proliferation regime. That situation is also exacerbated by the difficulties being experienced by non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT in their pursuit of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. We believe that nuclear cooperation should be provided exclusively to NPT States parties, as that will serve as an incentive for States that have renounced their nuclear option.

We note with interest the convening of the first meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 NPT Review Conference. We very much hope that the next meeting will consolidate a positive path towards a successful NPT Review Conference. It is important that the NPT review mechanism be able to agree beforehand on procedural issues and to focus on substantive issues. NPT meetings should be able to strengthen commitments and produce concrete steps towards achieving the goals of disarmament and non-proliferation, while fostering the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

I would like to take this opportunity, on behalf of the 10 States parties to the Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, also known as the Bangkok Treaty — Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Viet Nam — to introduce, under agenda item 98, a draft resolution entitled "Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (Bangkok Treaty)", which will be available shortly as document A/C.1/62/L.19.

The Treaty sets out the following objectives: to contribute effectively to regional efforts in the area of nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation; to reassert the right of countries in the region to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes; to ensure that the region is protected from environmental pollution and the hazards posed by radioactive or nuclear materials or waste; and to seek negative security assurances from nuclear-weapon States.

Despite the fact that it has been in force for 10 years, the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone remains the only treaty zone that has not yet been the subject of a General Assembly resolution. As a part of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Security

Community, the Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone contributes directly to the strengthening of regional peace and security. In order to attain the objectives of the Treaty, early accession by nuclear-weapon States and cooperation among nuclear-weapon-free zones are essential.

The objectives of the draft resolution are as follows: first, to seek universal support for the Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone; secondly, to encourage ongoing consultation with nuclear-weapon States with a view to early accession by nuclear-weapon States; thirdly, to enhance and explore additional ways and means for cooperation between the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone and other nuclear-weapon-free zones; and, lastly, to further contribute to global efforts to achieve a nuclear-weapon-free Southern Hemisphere and adjacent areas.

We are hopeful that the draft resolution will be supported by Member States as a concrete sign of their commitment to advance regional as well as international peace and security. We are continuing to work with delegations to ensure that it has the broadest possible support.

**Mr. Prasad (India):** I am happy to recognize in the Chair Vice-Chairperson Roman Hunger, a former co-worker of mine from the Geneva disarmament family. Allow me also to commend Ambassador Badji for conducting our proceedings in an exemplary way. Please, Sir, convey our compliments to him. We would also like to thank in particular the High Representative of the Secretary-General and the other high-level officials who have briefed us on the current state of global arms control and disarmament activities, as well as the panellists on nuclear disarmament.

The startling transformation of the global security landscape since the end of the cold war has spurred significant reductions in the nuclear arsenals of the Russian Federation and the United States. We welcome the steps taken by those two countries to reduce their weapons stockpiles and their affirmation that they will meet their nuclear disarmament obligations. We would like to see further and deeper reductions in their stockpiles of nuclear weapons with a view to achieving the goal of global nuclear disarmament. We would also like to see all United Nations Member States, including the other nuclear-weapon States, contributing to the process of nuclear disarmament.

From what we are hearing from the experts who have spoken here and from the security-policy pundits outside the United Nations, it appears that, while the objective factors that contributed to the increasing militarization of international relations no longer exist — and we have had 62 years of the non-use of nuclear weapons — the global outlook for disarmament, in particular nuclear disarmament, appears to be dominated by our perception of new threats and uncertainties. Those contingent factors have clouded our vision of the future, so much so that there has been a regression of disarmament in the contemporary political lexicon, as well as of global disarmament forums.

At the same time, however, the discussions over the past 10 days, both during the general debate and during the thematic discussions on nuclear disarmament, have reflected the resolve of almost all United Nations Member States to accord the highest priority to the goal of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

While India has maintained a credible minimum nuclear deterrent, there has been no dilution in our commitment to nuclear disarmament; indeed, this remains a core concern of India's foreign policy. India is not seeking a nuclear arms race with any other nuclear Power and believes that the security of India and that of the entire world will be considerably enhanced in a world free of nuclear weapons, to be achieved through global, verifiable and non-discriminatory nuclear disarmament. India's nuclear doctrine, enunciated during the course of the general debate, is marked by restraint, responsibility, transparency, predictability and a defensive orientation.

The ability of the international community to move towards the goal of nuclear disarmament presupposes a reaffirmation of the unequivocal commitment of all States, including the nuclear-weapon States, to the goal of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. And until such time as nuclear weapons cease to exist, there are several measures that can be taken meanwhile to prevent the threat of nuclear war.

An important collateral measure in that regard, as a precursor to a convention on prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and transfer of nuclear weapons and on their destruction, could be a global compact on the prohibition of the use of nuclear

weapons. By delegitimizing the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, such an instrument could contribute to reducing the danger of nuclear war. As Patricia Lewis of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research reminded us yesterday, the international community took a similar step in 1925 in respect of chemical and biological weapons. That example applies to the remaining weapon of mass destruction — nuclear weapons — which we are addressing today.

India has a long-standing proposal for the Conference on Disarmament to commence negotiations in order to reach agreement on an international convention preventing the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances. Another valuable suggestion, articulated from several quarters in the First Committee, has been to pursue specific measures that would significantly reduce the risks of nuclear war, while awaiting a global compact to eliminate nuclear weapons. These measures range from promoting an international dialogue on cooperative security to the de-alerting of nuclear weapons. These measures are pragmatic and feasible, especially in the improved international atmosphere since the end of the cold war, when the nuclear-weapon States are no longer in adversarial relations towards each other.

When we address the question of nuclear disarmament, we subsume within it nuclear non-proliferation. These matters are not dichotomous polar opposites, but two ends of the same continuum. In this context, the representative of South Africa mentioned that the illicit network in nuclear technology to manufacture nuclear weapons constitutes a particular challenge. We commend States for taking purposive action to check these clandestine networks, some of which involve individuals from within State or Government structures.

As for a fissile material cut-off treaty, very briefly, at this stage, India is happy to count itself as one of its original proponents. The General Assembly, in its resolution 48/75 L of 1993, sponsored by India, expressed its unambiguous conviction that a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices would be a significant contribution to nuclear non-proliferation in all its aspects, and recommended the negotiation of such a treaty in the most appropriate forum — which is the Conference on Disarmament. We believe that such a treaty must ban

the future production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

India continues to believe that any such treaty should be non-discriminatory. It must stipulate the same obligations and responsibilities for all States. While the nature, extent and mechanisms for verification will no doubt be determined during negotiations, we believe that a cut-off treaty should incorporate a verification mechanism in order to provide the assurance that all States party to it are complying with their obligations under the treaty. Full compliance by all States with their obligations under international instruments to which they are party is critical to achieving the goals envisaged in those instruments. When a State consents to adhere to an instrument, it wants to be assured that other States parties to that instrument are also complying with their obligations thereunder. Verification, which serves the dual purpose of detection and deterrence, provides that assurance. Absence of verification may engender lack of confidence in compliance with the treaty, encourage wilful non-compliance and lead to allegations and counter-allegations of non-compliance.

We hope to address the issues I mentioned in my statement in the Conference on Disarmament by nurturing the ongoing dialogue on its programme of work in a manner that addresses the concerns of all its constituents, big or small, developing or developed, nuclear-weapon States or non-nuclear-weapon States, within or outside military alliances and privileged security relationships. We shall then be able to bridge the present gap between contemporary reality and the political action required for achieving nuclear disarmament.

**Mr. Lwin** (Myanmar): I have the honour and privilege of introducing the draft resolution entitled “Nuclear disarmament”, with Myanmar as main sponsor, which will be distributed shortly as document A/C.1/62/L.40. The draft resolution’s other sponsors are Algeria, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, the Central African Republic, the Congo, Cuba, Guinea, Haiti, Indonesia, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Jordan, Kenya, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mongolia, Namibia, Nepal, the Philippines, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Thailand, Uganda, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Viet Nam, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Draft resolutions on this subject have been submitted

annually since 1994 and this year's text enjoys the broad support of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and many other countries.

The present draft resolution retains most of the elements contained in the other draft resolutions that have been submitted annually: the goals of the total elimination of nuclear weapons and the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free world, and the affirmation that disarmament remains the highest priority for us in the area of arms control and disarmament. The draft resolution reiterates its call upon the Conference on Disarmament to establish on a priority basis an ad hoc committee to deal with nuclear disarmament early in 2008.

We once again urge the nuclear-weapon States to immediately stop the qualitative improvement, development, production and stockpiling of nuclear warheads and their delivery systems. In this respect, we would like to stress the importance of the 13 measures for the systematic and progressive efforts to achieve the objectives of nuclear disarmament leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons, as agreed to by the States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference.

Draft resolution A/C.1/62/L.40 is a comprehensive text on nuclear disarmament that reflects the vital role of multilateralism in the field of arms control and disarmament. I wish to invite member States to continue to lend their support, as they have done in previous years, and vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/62/L.40.

**Mr. Paranhos** (Brazil): We fully associate ourselves with the statement made by the representative of Uruguay on behalf of the countries of the Common Market of the South on the nuclear disarmament issue. At this time, I would like to make additional comments regarding a Brazilian proposal on the issue of nuclear disarmament.

It was the intention of the Brazilian Government to present to this session of the General Assembly a draft resolution on the global state of nuclear disarmament. The objective was to commence a modest, non-confrontational exercise in transparency, requesting certain countries to provide the Secretary-General, on a voluntary basis, with factual information on the effective measures that they have undertaken relating to nuclear disarmament.

We started consultations with several delegations in the framework of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. Those informal consultations continued during the current session of the First Committee. The draft resolution received broad support, and some delegations were willing to join in sponsoring the initiative. We thank those delegations for their backing and for the helpful suggestions they have made. We intend to continue working with those delegations on this issue.

There were, however, some delegations, including a few from developing countries, that conveyed to us their discomfort with some provisions of the draft resolution. We believe this initiative should be based on the widest possible support from member countries, and thus further consultations would be helpful. In this context, Brazil has decided not to submit the draft resolution at this moment and to continue working on the issue in this Committee and in the framework of the preparatory process of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, where the idea was originally put forward by the Brazilian delegation.

Brazil thinks that progress in the NPT review process is largely dependant on concrete steps on the implementation of the Treaty's article VI through, inter alia, the enhancement of mechanisms in the fields of transparency and accountability.

**Ms. García Jordán** (Cuba) (*spoke in Spanish*): Cuba considers that the use of nuclear weapons is illegal and totally immoral and that it cannot be justified under any security doctrine or concept. Cuba continues to firmly advocate for the total elimination of all weapons of mass destruction, in particular nuclear weapons. Like the Non-Aligned Movement, Cuba has always given and will continue to give absolute priority to nuclear disarmament.

Despite the end of the cold war, there are still some 30,000 nuclear weapons in the world; more than 12,000 of them are ready for immediate use. The use of these weapons would have a devastating effect on all life on Earth. Such use would also be a flagrant violation of international norms relating to the prevention of genocide. Furthermore, new and more sophisticated nuclear weapons are continually being developed; these pose a grave threat to all humankind. The existence of strategic defence doctrines that are increasingly based on the possession and use of such

weapons is unacceptable and represents a serious danger to international peace and security.

The belief that security can be guaranteed only by possessing nuclear weapons is totally false. To achieve the security of a State through the threat of mass destruction is a corruption of the most fundamental principles of human coexistence. The continued possession of nuclear weapons irresponsibly encourages proliferation, which in turn increases the global nuclear danger.

The lack of progress by nuclear-weapon States in reaching unequivocal agreement at the 2000 NPT Review Conference with respect to achieving the total elimination of nuclear weapons is unacceptable. The commitments already made must be fully honoured, including the 13 practical steps agreed at the sixth NPT Review Conference, in 2000. I must reiterate that for Cuba, the NPT is not an end in itself, but rather a step towards achieving nuclear disarmament.

Cuba strongly reiterates its rejection of the selective application of the NPT and the use of double standards. At the same time, we emphasize that nuclear disarmament and the peaceful use of nuclear energy cannot be deferred while horizontal non-proliferation is given priority.

The inalienable right of States to the peaceful use of nuclear energy must be completely respected. We cannot continue to delay the start of multilateral negotiations to conclude an unconditional and legally binding universal instrument committing nuclear-weapon States not to use or threaten to use this type of weapon against non-nuclear-weapon States.

Nuclear weapons and their technical infrastructure are extremely costly. The nuclear weapons industry wastes resources that could be used for valuable programmes, such as development assistance, that could be true contributions to international peace and security.

Cuba underlines the imperative need to start multilateral negotiations leading to the prompt conclusion of a convention that prohibits the development, production, deployment, stockpiling, transfer and the threat or use of nuclear weapons and stipulating the elimination of those weapons.

**Mr. Robotjazi** (Islamic Republic of Iran): I am taking the floor today to introduce a draft decision and a draft resolution. First is a draft decision that will be

issued as document A/C.1/62/L.20 entitled "Missiles". Egypt, Indonesia and Iran are the sponsors of this draft decision. Since the introduction of this item into the agenda of the General Assembly in 1999, increasing support has been given to addressing the issue of missiles in all its aspects within the framework of the United Nations.

The first Panel of Governmental Experts was able to adopt a report (A/57/229) — the very first such report in the history of the United Nations — in which the issue of missiles in all its aspects was examined thoroughly. However, given the complexity of the issue at hand, the second Panel of Governmental Experts ended its work having fallen short of the success of the first Panel.

Therefore, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General, with the support of qualified consultants and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), to prepare a report for submission in 2006 and to establish a third Panel of Governmental Experts in 2007 with a more specific mandate to further explore ways and means to address within the United Nations the issue of missiles in all its aspects, including identifying areas where consensus can be reached. Thanks to the efforts of UNIDIR and the Secretariat, the report was submitted to the General Assembly, and subsequently the third Panel began its work.

We are pleased that at its first session the third Panel had a very constructive and serious discussion on the complex issue of missiles in all its aspects. Since the Panel will have two more sessions in 2008, and in keeping with the General Assembly's recommendations on improving methods of work, the resolution's sponsors have decided this year to present a draft decision instead of a draft resolution, in which the inclusion of an item entitled "Missiles" in the provisional agenda of the sixty-third session of the General Assembly is requested. Last year's resolution (resolution 61/59) was supported by 115 Member States; we hope that delegations will be able to support the present draft decision, as they have already supported the relevant resolutions in previous years.

I would now like to introduce to the Committee, as I did at the sixtieth session, a draft resolution entitled "Follow-up to nuclear disarmament obligations agreed to at the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of

Nuclear Weapons”, which will be issued as document A/C.1/62/L.8.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), as the cornerstone of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in all its aspects, was originally intended to be in force for 25 years. At the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, the Treaty was extended through a package of agreements and commitments, including, in particular, the obligation of nuclear-weapon States to undertake systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating such weapons. A resolution on the Middle East was also adopted at the Conference.

As a follow-up to nuclear disarmament obligations, the participants in the 2000 NPT Review Conference agreed by consensus on 13 practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to implement article VI of the NPT and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 decision on principles and objectives for nuclear proliferation and disarmament.

However, 12 years after the indefinite extension of the Treaty and 37 years after its entry into force, the nuclear disarmament obligations have yet to be implemented. On many occasions, the international community has expressed its concern about the lack of progress by the nuclear-weapon States in accomplishing the elimination of their nuclear arsenals with a view to achieving nuclear disarmament. Serious concerns are also being expressed over the development of new types and generations of nuclear weapons, in contravention of the undertaking made by the nuclear-weapon States at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) that the Treaty would prevent the improvement of existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons.

Considering the fact that the NPT Review Conferences provide good opportunities to hold the nuclear-weapon States accountable with respect to fulfilling their nuclear disarmament commitments, the present draft resolution urges States parties to follow up on the implementation of nuclear disarmament obligations under the Treaty agreed to at the 1995 and 2000 NPT Review Conferences within the framework of the 2010 Review Conference and its Preparatory Committee. In that connection, the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 NPT Review Conference held

a successful first meeting in Vienna in 2007. Indeed, we are satisfied at the fact that compliance with all provisions of the NPT, including article VI of the Treaty, on nuclear disarmament, is now on the agenda of the review process.

The provisions of the draft resolution are self-explanatory and have mostly been taken from the consensus documents of the NPT Review Conferences. The text of this year’s draft resolution is similar to the previous one, except for technical updating and the last preambular paragraph, which takes note of the first meeting of the Preparatory Committee in 2007.

We are confident that, as was the case last time, this draft resolution will be supported by the majority of Member States that are sincere in promoting the credibility and integrity of the NPT.

**Mr. Prasad** (India): While awaiting the publication of documents A/C.1/62/L.21 and A/C.1/62/L.23, which are scheduled to appear on 22 October, I am taking the floor to introduce those two draft resolutions, submitted by India under the cluster on nuclear disarmament. Their texts were transmitted earlier today to the New York-based Missions of all Member States.

First, on behalf of the sponsors, I would like to introduce the draft resolution entitled “Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons” which will be issued as document A/C.1/62/L.23. The draft resolution underlines that the use of nuclear weapons poses the most serious threat to the survival of mankind. At the most recent Non-Aligned Movement Summit, the participating heads of State or Government stressed their concern at the threat to humanity posed by the continued existence of nuclear weapons and of their possible use or threat of use.

The draft resolution reflects the belief of the sponsors that a multilateral, universal and legally binding instrument prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons will contribute to the mitigation of the nuclear threat and create a climate for negotiations for an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear weapons. It will thus serve as an important interim measure until we reach agreement on a step-by-step process for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. The proposed convention will also serve to diminish the salience of nuclear weapons in maintaining international security and will contribute



to the changes in doctrines, policies, attitudes and institutions required for a nuclear-weapon-free world.

The operative part of the draft resolution reiterates the request to the Conference on Disarmament to commence negotiations in order to reach agreement on an international convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances. A positive vote for this draft resolution will be a vote by the international community in favour of a decisive step towards the elimination of nuclear weapons.

I also have the honour to introduce the draft resolution on reducing nuclear danger, which will be issued as document A/C.1/62/L.21. All constituents of the United Nations unanimously agreed in 1978 that nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind. Member States also agreed that effective measures aimed at nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war have the highest priority.

As the international consensus regarding a ban on nuclear weapons gains greater momentum, we have been advocating measures to mitigate the dangers posed by such weapons, in order to safeguard the collective security interests of all United Nations Member States.

The draft resolution offers quite modest and pragmatic proposals for the safety and security of mankind pending the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. The operative part of the draft resolution calls for a review of nuclear doctrines, as well as immediate steps to reduce the risk of the unintentional or accidental use of nuclear weapons, including through their de-alerting and de-targeting, and requests the nuclear-weapon States to take measures to implement the suggested steps.

The draft resolution manifests the conviction of the sponsors that the hair-trigger posture of nuclear forces carries the unacceptable risk of the unintentional or accidental use of nuclear weapons, which could have catastrophic consequences. The threat posed by the increased risk of nuclear weapons or their components falling into the hands of non-State actors, including terrorists, has further aggravated the existing dangers.

A positive vote for this draft resolution will be a reaffirmation by the international community of its resolve to take decisive steps towards reducing nuclear danger, as well as the unnecessary risk of accidental nuclear war.

**The Acting Chairperson:** We have heard the last speaker in the thematic debate for this meeting.

*The meeting rose at 5.50 p.m.*