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# **SECURITY COUNCIL OFFICIAL RECORDS**

**TWENTY-SIXTH YEAR**

***SUPPLEMENT FOR OCTOBER, NOVEMBER AND DECEMBER 1971***

**UNITED NATIONS**

11-11-84 (11) 11-11-84 (11) 11-11-84 (11) 11-11-84 (11) 11-11-84 (11)



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**UNITED NATIONS**

***New York, 1972***

## NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

Documents of the Security Council (symbol S/. . .) are normally published in quarterly *Supplements* of the *Official Records of the Security Council*. The date of the document indicates the supplement in which it appears or in which information about it is given.

The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a system adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council*. The new system, which has been applied retroactively to resolutions adopted before 1 January 1965, became fully operative on that date.

**CHECK LIST OF SECURITY COUNCIL DOCUMENTS ISSUED DURING THE PERIOD  
1 OCTOBER-31 DECEMBER 1971**

The titles of the documents printed in the present *Supplement* appear in bold type.

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Supplemental information received by the Secretary-General  
on the situation in the Middle East

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1367

[Original: English]  
[1 October 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 30 September 1971 was received on 1 October from the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine (UNTSO), Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"Observation Post (OP) reports:

"(a) OP November (MR 2316-2564): Between 0250<sup>1</sup> and 0255 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Victor (MR 2328-2668): Between 0412 and 0428 sporadic machine-gun fire and five mortar rounds by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Romeo (MR 2294-2459): Between 0612 and 0630 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(d) OP Two (MR 2306-2736): Between 1240 and 1245 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1368

[Original: English]  
[1 October 1971]

The following report on incidents in the Suez Canal sector on 30 September 1971 was received on 1 October from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

\* For documents S/7930 and Add.1-17, see *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-second Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1967*; for documents S/7930/Add.18-41, *ibid.*, *Supplement for July, August and September 1967*; for documents S/7930/Add.42-61, *ibid.*, *Supplement for October, November and December 1967*; for documents S/7930/Add.62-66, *ibid.*, *Twenty-third Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1968*; for documents S/7930/Add.67-72, *ibid.*, *Supplement for April, May and June 1968*; for documents S/7930/Add.73-92, *ibid.*, *Supplement for July, August and September 1968*; for documents S/7930/Add.93-108, *ibid.*, *Supplement for October, November and December 1968*; for documents S/7930/Add.109-146, *ibid.*, *Twenty-fourth Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1969*; for documents S/7930/Add.147-249, *ibid.*, *Supplement for April, May and June 1969*; for documents S/7930/Add.250-367, *ibid.*, *Supplement for July, August and September 1969*; for documents S/7930/Add.368-480, *ibid.*, *Supplement for October, November and December 1969*; for documents S/7930/Add.481-625, *ibid.*, *Twenty-fifth Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1970*; for documents S/7930/Add.626-808, *ibid.*, *Supplement for April, May and June 1970*; for documents S/7930/Add.809-945, *ibid.*, *Supplement for July, August and September 1970*; for documents S/7930/Add.946-1030, *ibid.*, *Supplement for October, November and December 1970*; for documents S/7930/Add.1031-1131, *ibid.*, *Twenty-sixth Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1971*; for documents S/7930/Add.1132-1242, *ibid.*, *Supplement for April, May and June 1971*; for documents S/7930/Add.1243-1366, *ibid.*, *Supplement for July, August and September 1971*.

<sup>1</sup> All times GMT.

"1. OP reports on ground activity: Nil.

"2. OP reports on air activity: OP Green (MR 7394-9401): Between 1149 and 1150 two Israel forces jet aircraft flying north to south crossed 10 kilometres marker line north-east of OP."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1369

[Original: English]  
[2 October 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 1 October 1971 was received on 2 October from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports:

"(a) OP Six (MR 2300-2847): Between 0402 and 0417 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Romeo (MR 2294-2459): Between 0412 and 0419 sporadic machine-gun fire and between 1750 and 1753 sporadic machine-gun fire and one mortar flare by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Uniform (MR 2366-2621): Between 0640 and 0642 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(d) OP Two (MR 2306-2736): Between 0807 and 0820, between 1420 and 1427 and between 1447 and 1450 sporadic machine-gun fire, all by Israel forces."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1370

[Original: English]  
[4 October 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 2 October 1971 was received on 3 October from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports:

"(a) OP Winter (MR 2320-2792): Between 0448 and 0450 sporadic machine-gun fire by Syrian forces.

"(b) OP Victor (MR 2328-2668): Between 0640 and 0644 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Romeo (MR 2294-2459): Between 0700 and 0710 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(d) OP Five (MR 2290-2787): Between 2028 and 2040 intense machine-gun fire and six mortar flares by Israel forces."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1371**

[Original: English]  
[4 October 1971]

The following report on incidents in the Israel-Syria sector on 3 October 1971 was received on 4 October from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"1. OP reports on ground activity:

"(a) OP Romeo (MR 2294-2459): Between 0347 and 0356 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Six (MR 2300-2847): Between 1945 and 1952 12 rounds of artillery fire and flares by Israel forces.

"2. OP reports on air activity:

"OP X-Ray (MR 2304-2891): Between 0345 and 0347 one Israel forces light aircraft, flying north to south, was first observed north-west of OP and recrossed the limits of the Israel forward defended localities indicating the cease-fire line on the Israel side east to west, west of OP."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1372**

[Original: English]  
[5 October 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 4 October 1971 was received on 5 October from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports:

"OP Yoke (MR 2271-2914): Between 1720 and 1724 four mortar flares by Israel forces."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1373**

[Original: English]  
[6 October 1971]

The following report on incidents in the Israel-Syria sector on 4 October 1971 was received on 6 October from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"1. OP reports:

"(a) OP X-Ray (MR 2304-2891): Between 0353 and 0354 machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Uniform (MR 2366-2621): Between 0404 and 0409 and between 1335 and 1343 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Yoke (MR 2271-2914): Between 0438 and 0532 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(d) OP Romeo (MR 2294-2459): At 0505 and at 0602 machine-gun fire, which ceased immediately, by Israel forces.

"(e) OP Two (MR 2306-2736): Between 1204 and 1213 and between 1956 and 2014 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(f) OP Three (MR 2308-2678): Between 1337 and 1419 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(g) OP Five (MR 2290-2787): Between 1409 and 1420 sporadic heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire by Israel forces.

"2. Complaints by the parties:

"The following complaints were received by the Chairman of the Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Com-

mission from the Senior Syrian Arab Delegate on 5 October:

"(a) On 30 September 1971 at about 0415 three Israeli APCs (armoured personnel carriers) situated at approximately MR 2274-2464 opened machine-gun fire into the BZ (Buffer Zone).

"(b) On 30 September 1971 at about 0725 an Israeli APC situated at approximately MR 2274-2461 opened machine-gun fire into the BZ.

"(c) On 1 October 1971 at about 1750 the Israeli military position situated at approximately MR 2287-2485 opened machine-gun fire and fired two flares into the BZ.

"(d) On 2 October 1971 at about 0720 an Israeli APC situated at approximately MR 2287-2485 opened machine-gun fire into the BZ.

"(e) On 3 October 1971 at about 1030 an Israeli bulldozer crossed the Israeli CFP (cease-fire position) at approximately MR 2355-2635.

"(f) On 5 October 1971 at approximately 0705 several Israeli aircraft crossed the Israeli and Syrian CFPs in the area of OP Uniform.

"(g) At 0715 a formation of Israeli aircraft crossed the CFP in the area of OP Victor (MR 2328-2668).

"(h) At 0722 one Israeli aircraft crossed the Israeli and Syrian CFPs in the area of OP Two.

"(i) At 0735 an Israeli helicopter crossed the Israeli and Syrian CFPs in the area of OP Uniform then flew back at 0745.

"The Senior Syrian Arab Delegate protests most strongly against these Israeli violations which constitute a violation of the resolution adopted by the Security Council at its 1357th meeting on 11 June 1967, and requests that the necessary measures should be taken to prevent the repetition of such acts in the future."

"Of the above-mentioned violations only the third complaint was confirmed by UNTSO observers (see S/7930/Add.1369, subpara. (b))."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1374**

[Original: English]  
[7 October 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 6 October 1971 was received on 7 October from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports:

"(a) OP X-Ray (MR 2304-2891): Between 0045 and 0047 three rounds of mortar fire and between 0729 and 0733 five rifle shots by Syrian forces.

"(b) OP Uniform (MR 2366-2621): Between 1010 and 1054 sporadic machine-gun fire and between 1404 and 1414 three rounds of mortar fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Three (MR 2308-2678): Between 1312 and 1321 two rounds of mortar fire by Israel forces.

"(d) OP Six (MR 2300-2847): Between 1512 and 1537 machine-gun fire and six rounds of mortar fire by Israel forces."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1375**

[Original: English]  
[7 October 1971]

The following report on incidents in the Suez Canal sector on 6 October 1971 was received on 7 October from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"1. OP reports on ground activity: Nil.

"2. OP reports on air activity: OP Copper (MR 7409-9075): At 1309 one two-engine propeller plane, nationality and type unknown, marked CFRNM and painted with blue, red and white stripes, was first observed north of OP flying low north to south over waterway. Aircraft turned west north of OP Echo (MR 7408-9005) and was last observed at 1310 over Egyptian territory. Aircraft was seen dropping leaflets. Confirmed by OP Echo.

"Note: This is believed to be peace pilot Swami Vishnu Davandanda, who advertised that he would overfly the Canal and drop peace pamphlets to the soldiers."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1376**

[Original: English]  
[8 October 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 7 October 1971 was received on 8 October from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports:

"(a) OP Sierra (MR 2312-2523): At 0454 small-arms fire, which ceased immediately, by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Romeo (MR 2294-2459): Between 0459 and 0509 machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Yoke (MR 2271-2914): Between 0538 and 0541 machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(d) OP Zodiac (MR 2253-2976): Between 0830 and 0850 machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(e) OP One (MR 2249-2960): Between 0832 and 0859 machine-gun fire by Israel forces."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1377**

[Original: English]  
[9 October 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 8 October 1971 was received on 9 October from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports:

"(a) OP Romeo (MR 2294-2459): Between 0343 and 0345 and between 0543 and 0547 machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Five (MR 2290-2787): Between 1422 and 1424 machine-gun fire by Israel forces."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1378**

[Original: English]  
[9 October 1971]

The following report on firing in the Suez Canal sector on 8 October 1971 was received on 9 October from the Chief Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"Report from OP Hotel (MR 7402-8765): At 0944 small-arms fire, which ceased immediately, by Egyptian forces."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1379**

[Original: English]  
[11 October 1971]

The following report on incidents in the Israel-Syria sector on 9 October 1971 were received on 10 October from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"1. OP reports:

"(a) OP Yoke (MR 2271-2914): Between 0535 and 0540 machine-gun fire and two rounds of light artillery fire by Israel forces. Between 1220 and 1223 machine-gun and small-arms fire by Syrian forces.

"(b) OP Five (MR 2290-2787): Between 1359 and 1403 machine-gun fire and between 1424 and 1426 two rounds of mortar fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Winter (MR 2320-2792): At 1426 one round of mortar fire by Israel forces.

"2. Complaints by the parties:

"The following written complaint was received by the Chairman of the Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission from the Senior Syrian Arab Delegate on 10 October: 'On 9 October 1971 at about 1152 an Israeli jet fighter crossed the Israeli and Syrian cease-fire positions in the area of OP Victor (MR 2328-2668). The Senior Syrian Arab Delegate protests most strongly against this provocation which forms a violation to the resolution adopted by the Security Council at its 1357th meeting on 11 June 1967, and requests that the necessary measures be taken to prevent the repetition of such actions in the future.'

"This violation was not confirmed by United Nations observers."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1380**

[Original: English]  
[11 October 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 10 October 1971 was received on 11 October from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports:

"(a) OP Romeo (MR 2294-2459): Between 0449 and 0450 machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP November (MR 2316-2564): At 1522 machine-gun fire, which ceased immediately, by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Two (MR 2306-2736): Between 1752 and 1755 machine-gun fire and two rounds of mortar fire (flares) by Israel forces."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1381**

[Original: English]  
[11 October 1971]

The following report on firing in the Suez Canal sector on 10 October 1971 was received on 11 October from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports:

"(a) OP Foxtrot (MR 7430-8674): Between 0342 and 0346 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Yellow (MR 7432-8861): Between 0656 and 0657 machine-gun fire by Egyptian forces."

## DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1382

[Original: English]  
[12 October 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 11 October 1971 was received on 12 October from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports:

"(a) OP Romeo (MR 2294-2459): Between 0443 and 0451 machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP November (MR 2316-2564): Between 1410 and 1419 machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Yoke (MR 2271-2914): Between 1525 and 1529 machine-gun fire by Israel forces."

## DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1383

[Original: English]  
[13 October 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 12 October 1971 was received on 13 October from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports:

"(a) OP Romeo (MR 2294-2459): Between 0343 and 0344 and between 0450 and 0453 machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP November (MR 2316-2564): Between 0424 and 0426 machine-gun fire, at 0446 machine-gun fire, which ceased immediately, between 1203 and 1211 machine-gun fire and at 1337 machine-gun fire, which ceased immediately, all by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Uniform (MR 2366-2621): Between 1334 and 1355 machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(d) OP Five (MR 2290-2787): Between 1339 and 1405 machine-gun and small-arms fire by Israel forces.

"(e) OP Four (MR 2327-2596) Between 1345 and 1350 machine-gun fire by Israel forces."

## DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1384

[Original: English]  
[14 October 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 13 October 1971 was received on 14 October from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports:

"(a) OP November (MR 2316-2564): At 0030 and at 0130 machine-gun fire, which ceased immediately on both occasions, and between 1816 and 1825 sporadic machine-gun fire and seven rounds of mortar fire (flares), all by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Romeo (MR 2294-2459): Between 0745 and 0747 machine-gun fire and single shots of small-arms fire by Israel forces."

[Original: English]  
[15 October 1971]

The following report on incidents in the Israel-Syria sector on 14 October 1971 was received on 15 October from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"1. OP reports:

"(a) OP Seven (MR 2203-2408): Between 0925 and 0929 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Uniform (MR 2366-2621): Between 1335 and 1345 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Four (MR 2327-2596): Between 1445 and 1448 and between 1911 and 1913 machine-gun fire by Israel forces. At 1950 machine-gun fire and two rounds of mortar fire (flares) by Israel forces and at 1958 machine-gun fire by unidentified party (United Nations Military Observers (UNMOs) could not identify firing party). Fire ceased at 1959 by Israel forces and at 2000 by unidentified party (exchange of fire). At 2025 small-arms fire by unidentified party (UNMOs could not identify firing party) and at 2032 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces. Fire ceased at 2038 by unidentified party and at 2040 by Israel forces (exchange of fire).

"(d) OP November (MR 2316-2564): Between 1512 and 1526 sporadic machine-gun fire and at 2034 machine-gun fire, which ceased immediately, by Israel forces.

"2. Complaints by the parties:

"The following complaint was received by the Chairman of the Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission from the Senior Syrian Arab Delegate on 14 October: 'On 14 October 1971 at 0633 two Israeli jet Phantoms crossed the Syrian air space across Lebanon and returned to the other side. The Senior Syrian Arab Delegate protests most strongly against this Israeli violation which constitutes a violation to the resolution adopted by the Security Council at its 1357th meeting on 11 June 1967 and requests that the necessary measures be taken to prevent the repetition of such acts in the future.'

"The above complaint was not confirmed by United Nations observers."

## DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1386

[Original: English]  
[15 October 1971]

The following report on firing in the Suez Canal sector on 14 October 1971 was received on 15 October from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"Report from OP Red (MR 7675-8125): Between 1106 and 1108 small-arms fire by Israel forces."

## DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1387

[Original: English]  
[16 October 1971]

The following report on incidents in the Israel-Syria sector on 15 October 1971 was received on 16 October from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports:

"(a) OP Victor (MR 2328-2668): Between 0432 and 0436 and between 1005 and 1006 machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Five (MR 2290-2787): Between 1314 and 1327 machine-gun fire and between 1855 and 1907 12 rounds of artillery fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Two (MR 2306-2736): Between 1523 and 1539 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(d) OP One (MR 2249-2960): At 1850 light machine-gun fire, which ceased immediately, by Syrian forces.

"(e) OP X-Ray (MR 2304-2891): Between 1856 and 1912 13 rounds of artillery fire by Israel forces."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1388**

[Original: English]  
[16 October 1971]

The following report on the observance of the cease-fire in the Suez Canal sector on 15 October 1971 was received on 16 October from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"1. OP reports on incidents: Nil.

"2. Complaints by the parties:

"The following verbal complaint was received from the Israel Defence Forces Liaison Officer: 'At 1110 an Egyptian vessel crossed the line in the northern lagoon east of OP Green (MR 7394-9401).'

"The above complaint was not confirmed by United Nations observers."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1389**

[Original: English]  
[18 October 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 16 October 1971 was received on 17 October from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports:

"(a) OP Victor (MR 2328-2668): Between 0358 and 0405 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Yoke (MR 2271-2914): Between 0703 and 0704 machine-gun fire by Israel forces."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1390**

[Original: English]  
[18 October 1971]

The following report on firing in the Suez Canal sector on 16 October 1971 was received on 17 October from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"Report from OP Yellow (MR 7432-8861): Between 1447 and 1448 machine-gun fire by Israel forces."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1391**

[Original: English]  
[18 October 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 17 October 1971 was received on 18 October from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports:

"(a) OP Romeo (MR 2294-2459): Between 0555 and 0556 machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Yoke (MR 2271-2914): Between 0647 and 0658 and between 1155 and 1209 sporadic mortar fire and at 1402 one round of mortar fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Two (MR 2306-2736): Between 1209 and 1216 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(d) OP Five (MR 2290-2787): Between 1630 and 1631 intense machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(e) OP Winter (MR 2320-2792): Between 1735 and 1801 artillery fire by Israel forces (confirmed by OP Six (MR 2300-2847))."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1392**

[Original: English]  
[19 October 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 18 October 1971 was received on 19 October from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports:

"(a) OP Winter (MR 2320-2792): Between 1410 and 1416 small-arms fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Five (MR 2290-2787): Between 1828 and 1830 machine-gun fire by Israel forces."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1393**

[Original: English]  
[20 October 1971]

The following report on firing in the Suez Canal sector on 19 October 1971 was received on 20 October from the Acting Chief of Staff of UNTSO:

"OP reports:

"(a) OP Green (MR 7394-9401): Between 1215 and 1232, between 1325 and 1335 and between 1356 and 1413 small-arms fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Charlie (MR 7396-9264): Between 1458 and 1514 and between 1539 and 1546 machine-gun fire by Israel forces."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1394**

[Original: English]  
[20 October 1971]

The following report on incidents in the Israel-Syria sector on 19 October 1971 was received on 20 October from the Acting Chief of Staff of UNTSO:

"1. OP reports:

"(a) OP Romeo (MR 2294-2459): Between 0442 and 0450 machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Yoke (MR 2271-2914): Between 0450 and 0455 and between 0624 and 0637 machine-gun fire by Israel forces. Between 1532 and 1536 machine-gun fire by Syrian forces.

“(c) OP Two (MR 2306-2736): Between 0507 and 0514 machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

“(d) OP Zodiac (MR 2253-2976): At 1532 machine-gun fire by Israel forces and at 1540 machine-gun fire by Syrian forces. At 1553 fire by Syrian forces ceased and at 1556 fire by Israel forces ceased. (Exchange of fire confirmed by OP One (MR 2249-2960).)

“(e) OP Four (MR 2327-2596): At 1538 machine-gun fire and mortars by Israel forces and at 1545 machine-gun fire by Syrian forces. Fire ceased by Syrian forces at 1546 and by Israel forces at 1550 (exchange of fire). Between 2056 and 2058 machine-gun fire and flares by Syrian forces.

“2. Complaints by the parties:

“The following written complaint was received by the Chairman of the Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission from the Senior Syrian Arab Delegate on 19 October: ‘On 17 October 1971 at about 1735 the military Israeli positions situated to the west of OP Five (MR 2290-2787) fired many mortar rounds across the Israeli cease-fire positions towards the Buffer Zone. The shooting stopped at about 1840. The fire was not returned. The Senior Syrian Arab Delegate protests most strongly against this provocative action, which forms a violation to the resolution adopted by the Security Council at its 1357th meeting on 11 June 1967, and requests that the necessary measures be taken to prevent the repetition of such action in the future.’

“The above complaint was confirmed by United Nations observers (see S/7930/Add.1391, subpara. (e)).”

#### DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1395

[Original: English]  
[21 October 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 20 October 1971 was received on 21 October from the Acting Chief of Staff of UNTSO:

“OP reports:

“(a) OP Romeo (MR 2294-2459): Between 0512 and 0520 machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

“(b) OP Three (MR 2308-2678): Between 1406 and 1420 machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

“(c) OP Two (MR 2306-2736): At 1747 one round of mortar fire by Israel forces.”

#### DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1396

[Original: English]  
[22 October 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 21 October 1971 was received on 22 October from the Acting Chief of Staff of UNTSO:

“OP reports:

“(a) OP Four (MR 2327-2596): Between 0003 and 0004 machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

“(b) OP Six (MR 2300-2847): At 0710 small-arms fire by Syrian forces and at 0726 machine-gun fire by Israel forces (exchange of fire). Fire by both parties ceased at 0730.

“(c) OP Yoke (MR 2271-2914): Between 0822 and 0824 machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

“(d) OP Seven (MR 2203-2408): Between 0855 and 0900 small-arms fire by Israel forces.”

#### DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1397

[Original: English]  
[22 October 1971]

The following report on firing in the Suez Canal sector on 21 October 1971 was received on 22 October from the Acting Chief of Staff of UNTSO:

“Report from OP Hotel (MR 7391-8718): At 0343 machine-gun fire and at 1750 small-arms fire by Egyptian forces. Firing ceased immediately on both occasions.”

#### DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1398

[Original: English]  
[23 October 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 22 October 1971 was received on 23 October from the Acting Chief of Staff of UNTSO:

“OP reports:

“(a) OP Romeo (MR 2294-2459): Between 0449 and 0500 machine-gun fire and one round mortar fire, between 0535 and 0538 and between 0725 and 0800 machine-gun fire, all by Israel forces.

“(b) OP One (MR 2249-2960): At 1220 small arms fire by Syrian forces and immediately after machine-gun fire by Israel forces and machine-gun fire by Syrian forces (exchange of fire). Fire ceased by both parties at 1235.”

#### DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1399

[Original: English]  
[25 October 1971]

The following report on incidents in the Israel-Syria sector on 23 October 1971 was received on 24 October from the Acting Chief of Staff of UNTSO:

“1. OP reports:

“(a) OP Romeo (MR 2294-2459): Between 0530 and 0600 machine-gun fire and four rounds of mortar fire, between 0617 and 0620 and between 0848 and 0852 machine-gun fire, all by Israel forces.

“(b) OP Sierra (MR 2312-2523): At 0535 machine-gun fire, which ceased immediately, by Israel forces.

“(c) OP Two (MR 2306-2736): At 0802 machine-gun fire, which ceased immediately, by Israel forces.

“(d) OP Four (MR 2327-2596): Between 1440 and 1500 four rounds of mortar fire by Israel forces.

“2. Complaints by the parties:

“The following complaint was received by the Chairman of the Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission from the Senior Syrian Arab Delegate on 24 October: ‘On 19 October 1971 at about 1535 the military Israeli positions situated at approximately MR 2251-2959 Buffer Zone opened machine-gun fire across the Syrian cease-fire positions towards Syrian position in the area. The Senior Syrian Arab Delegate protests most strongly against this Israeli provocative action which forms a violation to the resolution adopted by the Security Council at its 1357th meeting on 11 June 1967, and requests that the necessary measures be taken to prevent the repetition of such action in the future.’

“The above complaint was confirmed by United Nations observers (see S/7930/Add.1394, subpara. (d)).”

[Original: English]  
[25 October 1971]

The following report on firing in the Suez Canal sector on 23 October 1971 was received on 24 October from the Acting Chief of Staff of UNTSO:

"Report from OP Foxtrot (MR 7430-8674): Between 0827 and 0839 small-arms fire by Israel forces."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1401

[Original: English]  
[25 October 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 24 October 1971 was received on 25 October from the Acting Chief of Staff of UNTSO:

"Report from OP Two (MR 2306-2736): Between 0558 and 0604 and between 0715 and 0720 small-arms fire by Israel forces."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1402

[Original: English]  
[26 October 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 25 October 1971 was received on 26 October from the Acting Chief of Staff of UNTSO:

"OP reports:

"(a) OP Romeo (MR 2294-2459): Between 0356 and 0358 machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Seven (MR 2203-2408): At 0731 machine-gun fire, which ceased immediately, by Israel forces.

"(c) OP One (MR 2249-2960): Between 1354 and 1356 machine-gun fire by Israel forces."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1403

[Original: English]  
[27 October 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 26 October 1971 was received on 27 October from the Acting Chief of Staff of UNTSO:

"OP reports:

"(a) OP Five (MR 2290-2787): Between 0504 and 0510 small-arms and machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Zodiac (MR 2253-2976): Between 0827 and 0845 small-arms and machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Seven (MR 2203-2408): Between 1225 and 1227 machine-gun fire and between 1900 and 1910 machine-gun fire and one round of mortar fire (flare) by Israel forces.

"(d) OP Winter (MR 2320-2792): Between 1303 and 1305 machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(e) OP Three (MR 2308-2678): Between 1345 and 1400 machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(f) OP Uniform (MR 2366-2621): Between 1400 and 1448 machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(g) OP November (MR 2316-2564): Between 1453 and 1457 machine-gun fire by Israel forces."

[Original: English]  
[28 October 1971]

The following report on incidents in the Israel-Syria sector on 27 October 1971 was received on 28 October from the Acting Chief of Staff of UNTSO:

"1. OP reports on ground activity:

"(a) OP Yoke (MR 2271-2914): Between 0755 and 0855 and between 0914 and 0917 machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Five (MR 2290-2787): At 0839 Syrian air defence missile directed from north-east to south-west self-destructed at high altitude above OP. Report confirmed by OP Two (MR 2306-2736).

"(c) OP Winter (MR 2320-2792): Between 1328 and 1330 machine-gun fire and one round of mortar fire by Israel forces.

"(d) OP Uniform (MR 2366-2621): Between 1517 and 1523 machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"2. OP reports on air activity:

"(a) OP Yoke: Between 0818 and 0823 two Israel forces jet aircraft flying north-north-west to south-south-east crossed IFDL (the limits of the Israel forward defended localities indicating the cease-fire line on the Israel side) from west to east very high south of OP and recrossed IFDL several times, being last observed south-east of OP November (MR 2316-2564).

"(b) OP November: Between 0829 and 0831 two Israel forces jet aircraft flying south-south-west to north-north-east crossed IFDL south-west of OP and were last observed north-east of OP east of SFDL (the limits of the Syrian forward defended localities indicating the cease-fire line on the Syrian side).

"(c) OP Four (MR 2327-2596): Between 1116 and 1121 one Israel forces light aircraft, flying north to south crossed IFDL west to east south of OP and recrossed east to west-south-west of OP Sierra (MR 2312-2523). Confirmed by OPs November, Sierra and Romeo (MR 2294-2459)."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1405\*

[Original: English]  
[29 October 1971]

The following report on incidents in the Israel-Syria sector on 28 October 1971 was received on 29 October from the Acting Chief of Staff of UNTSO:

"1. OP reports:

"(a) OP Romeo (MR 2294-2459): Between 0528 and 0530 machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Yoke (MR 2271-2914): Between 0754 and 0756 machine-gun fire by Syrian forces.

"(c) OP Two (MR 2306-2736): Between 1130 and 1135 machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(d) OP November (MR 2316-2564): Between 2001 and 2003 machine-gun fire and flares by Israel forces."

"2. Complaints by the parties:

"The following complaints were received by the Chairman of the Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission from the Senior Syrian Arab Delegate on 29 October:

\* Incorporating document S/7930/Add.1405/Corr.1.

“(a) On 27 October 1971 at about 0825 two Israeli jet aeroplanes crossed the Israel-Syria CFPs (cease-fire positions) in OP Six area (MR 2300-2847).

“(b) On 27 October 1971 at about 0832 two Israeli jet aeroplanes crossed the Israel-Syria CFPs in OP Victor area (MR 2328-2668).

“The Senior Syrian Arab Delegate protests most strongly against these Israeli provocative actions which violate the resolution adopted by the Security Council at its 1357th meeting on 11 June 1967 and requests that the necessary measures be taken to prevent the repetition of such actions in the future.”

“The above complaints were confirmed by United Nations observers (see S/7930/Add.1404 para. 2).”

#### **DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1406**

[Original: English]  
[30 October 1971]

The following report on incidents in the Israel-Syria sector on 29 October 1971 was received on 30 October from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

“OP reports:

“(a) OP Two (MR 2306-2736): Between 0609 and 0611 machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

“(b) OP Uniform (MR 2366-2621): Between 1420 and 1422 machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

“(c) OP Five (MR 2290-2787): Between 1718 and 1720 machine-gun fire by Israel forces.”

#### **DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1407**

[Original: English]  
[30 October 1971]

The following report on incidents in the Suez Canal sector on 29 October 1971 was received on 30 October from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

“1. OP reports on ground activity: Nil.

“2. OP reports on air activity: OP Green (MR 7394-9401): At 0937 two Israel forces aircraft crossed Canal from east to west circled and recrossed from west to east.”

#### **DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1408**

[Original: English]  
[1 November 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 30 October 1971 was received on 31 October from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

“OP reports:

“(a) OP Two (MR 2306-2736): Between 0452 and 0518 and between 1305 and 1316 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

“(b) OP Five (MR 2290-2787): Between 0742 and 0745 and between 0950 and 0955 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

“(c) OP Sierra (MR 2312-2523): At 0908 machine-gun fire, which ceased immediately, by Syrian forces.

“(d) OP Winter (MR 2320-2792): Between 0951 and 0953 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

“(e) OP Six (MR 2300-2847): Between 1201 and 1207 three mortar rounds, between 1417 and 1420 sporadic machine-gun and small-arms fire and between 1614 and 1616 sporadic machine-gun fire, all by Israel forces.

“(f) OP Yoke (MR 2271-2914): Between 1313 and 1334 four mortar rounds, between 1326 and 1358 sporadic rifle fire and between 1500 and 1510 sporadic machine-gun fire, all by Israel forces.

“(g) OP X-Ray (MR 2304-2891): Between 1344 and 1346 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.”

#### **DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1409**

[Original: English]  
[1 November 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 31 October 1971 was received on 1 November from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

“OP reports:

“(a) OP Five (MR 2290-2787): Between 0920 and 0926 and between 1155 and 1210 machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

“(b) OP Six (MR 2300-2847): Between 1200 and 1202 machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

“(c) OP Winter (MR 2320-2792): Between 1204 and 1209 nine rounds of mortar fire by Israel forces.

“(d) OP Two (MR 2306-2736): Between 1255 and 1315 four rounds of mortar fire and between 1307 and 1352 machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

“(e) OP Three (MR 2308-2678): Between 1447 and 1450 machine-gun fire by Israel forces.”

#### **DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1410**

[Original: English]  
[2 November 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 1 November 1971 was received on 2 November from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

“OP reports:

“(a) OP Six (MR 2300-2847): Between 0142 and 0144 machine-gun fire and between 0222 and 0224 machine-gun fire and flares by Israel forces.

“(b) OP Two (MR 2306-2736): Between 0622 and 0630 machine-gun fire and at 2240 machine-gun fire and one round of mortar fire (flare) by Israel forces.”

#### **DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1411**

[Original: English]  
[3 November 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 2 November 1971 was received on 3 November from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

“OP reports:

“(a) OP Romeo (MR 2294-2459): Between 0525 and 0535 machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

“(b) OP Five (MR 2290-2787): Between 1048 and 1055 mortar fire and at 2020 machine-gun fire, which ceased immediately, by Israel forces.”

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1412**

[Original: English]  
[4 November 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 3 November 1971 was received on 4 November from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports:

"(a) OP Victor (MR 2328-2668): Between 0942 and 0955 machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Two (MR 2306-2736): Between 1332 and 1343 machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Romeo (MR 2294-2459): Between 1406 and 1412 and between 2021 and 2024 machine-gun and small-arms fire by Israel forces.

"(d) OP Sierra (MR 2312-2523): Between 1859 and 1904 machine-gun fire by Israel forces."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1413**

[Original: English]  
[5 November 1971]

The following report on incidents in the Israel-Syria sector on 4 November 1971 was received on 5 November from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"1. OP reports:

"OP Two (MR 2306-2736): Between 1129 and 1146 and between 1411 and 1414 machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"2. Complaints by the parties:

"The following complaint was received from the Israel Defence Forces Liaison Officer 4 November: 'I am instructed to submit a complaint concerning the following Syrian violations of the cease-fire in the Golan Heights area:

"(a) On 3 November 1971 at 1314 three herds of animals crossed from the Syrian side of the CFLs (cease-fire lines) into the no man's land east of OP Two, thus violating the cease-fire.

"(b) On 3 November 1971, at night, an armed group penetrated from the Syrian side of the CFLs into Israel-held territory south of OP Three (MR 2308-2678)."

"The above complaints were not confirmed by United Nations observers."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1414**

[Original: English]  
[5 November 1971]

The following report on incidents in the Suez Canal sector on 4 November 1971 was received on 5 November from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"1. OP reports on ground activity: Nil.

"2. OP reports on air activity: OP Pink (MR 7661-8278): Between 1042 and 1045 two Israel forces jet aircraft crossed canal east to west north of OP, turned north-north-east and recrossed west to east north of OP. Confirmed by OPs Kilo (MR 7660-8225), Lima (MR 7662-8173), Red (MR 7675-8125) and Mike (MR 7657-8037)."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1415**

[Original: English]  
[6 November 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 5 November 1971 was received on 6 November from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports:

"(a) OP Sierra (MR 2312-2523): At 1123 one single rifle shot by Syrian forces.

"(b) OP One (MR 2249-2960): Between 2005 and 2013 machine-gun fire and one round mortar fire by Syrian forces."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1416**

[Original: English]  
[8 November 1971]

The following report on the cease-fire in the Suez Canal sector on 6 November 1971 was received on 7 November from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"1. OP reports on ground activity: Nil.

"2. OP reports on air activity: Nil.

"3. Complaints by the parties:

"The following verbal complaint was received 6 November from the Assistant Israel Defence Forces Liaison Officer: 'I have been instructed to protest strongly against the following violations of the cease-fire in the Suez Canal area. On 6 November 1971 between 0915 and 0920 two MIG-23 aircraft violated the cease-fire by flying over Israeli positions from the Bardawill area through Bir Gifgafa and left to Egypt through Ras El Sudr (Suez Bay area).'

"The above complaint was not confirmed by United Nations observers. (The area of the alleged overflight is outside the range of observation of the United Nations OPs on the Suez Canal.)"

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1417**

[Original: English]  
[8 November 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 6 November 1971 was received on 7 November from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports:

"(a) OP Six (MR 2300-2847): At 0325 machine-gun fire, which ceased immediately, and between 1422 and 1427 machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Two (MR 2306-2736): At 1703 machine-gun fire, which ceased immediately, by Israel forces."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1418**

[Original: English]  
[8 November 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 7 November 1971 was received on 8 November from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports:

"(a) OP Romeo (MR 2294-2459): At 0401 machine-gun fire, which ceased immediately, by Israel forces.

"(b) OP One (MR 2249-2960): At 1426 machine-gun fire, which ceased immediately, by Israel forces."

#### DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1419

[Original: English]  
[9 November 1971]

The following report on incidents in the Israel-Syria sector on 8 November 1971 was received on 9 November from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"1. OP reports:

"(a) OP Romeo (MR 2294-2459): At 0400 machine-gun fire, which ceased immediately, by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Sierra (MR 2312-2523): Between 0640 and 0644 machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Five (MR 2290-2787): At 1048 machine-gun fire, which ceased immediately, by Israel forces.

"2. Complaints by the parties:

"The following complaint was received from the Israel Defence Forces Liaison Officer 8 November: 'I am instructed to submit a complaint concerning the following Syrian violation of the cease-fire in the Golan Heights area: On 7 November 1971 at night an armed group crossed from the Syrian side of the cease-fire lines into the no man's land north of Rafid, thus violating the cease-fire.'

"The above complaint was not confirmed by United Nations observers."

#### DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1420

[Original: English]  
[10 November 1971]

The following report on incidents in the Israel-Syria sector on 9 November 1971 was received on 10 November from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"1. OP reports:

"(a) OP Romeo (MR 2294-2459): Between 0707 and 0708 machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Two (MR 2306-2736): Between 0945 and 0955 machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Three (MR 2308-2678): Between 1336 and 1357 machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"2. Complaints by the parties:

"The following complaint was received from the Israel Defence Forces Liaison Officer on 9 November: 'I am instructed to submit a complaint concerning the following Syrian violation of the cease-fire in the Golan Heights area: On 8 November 1971 (at 1015), a herd of animals crossed from the Syrian side of the cease-fire lines into the no man's land, southwest of OP Winter (MR 2320-2792), thus violating the cease-fire.'

"The above complaint was not confirmed by United Nations observers."

#### DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1421

[Original: English]  
[11 November 1971]

The following report on incidents in the Israel-Syria sector on 10 November 1971 was received on 11 November from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"1. OP reports:

"(a) OP Six (MR 2300-2847): Between 0420 and 0426 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Winter (MR 2320-2792): Between 0708 and 0712 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Five (MR 2290-2787): At 0712 machine-gun fire, which ceased immediately, by Israel forces.

"(d) OP One (MR 2249-2960): Between 0728 and 0740 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(e) OP Two (MR 2306-2736): At 0951 one round of mortar fire and between 1126 and 1135 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"2. Complaints by the parties:

"The following verbal complaints were received from the Israel Defence Forces Liaison Officer:

"'On 9 November 1971, at night an armed group penetrated from the Syrian side of the CFLs (cease-fire lines) into Israel-held territory, north east of El Kahcanya (MR 2286-2794), thus violating the cease-fire.

"'On 10 November 1971, at 1130 two armed persons and a herd of animals crossed from the Syrian side of the CFLs into the no man's land east of OP Two, thus violating the cease-fire.

"'On 10 November 1971, at night, an armed group crossed from the Syrian side of the CFLs into the no man's land east of OP Two, thus violating the cease-fire.'

"The above complaints were not confirmed by United Nations observers."

#### DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1422

[Original: English]  
[11 November 1971]

The following report on incidents in the Suez Canal sector on 10 November 1971 was received on 11 November from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"1. OP reports on ground activity: Nil.

"2. OP reports on air activity: OP Pink (MR 7661-8278): Between 1056 and 1058 two Israel forces jet aircraft crossed the Canal east to west north of OP, turned north and recrossed west to east further north of OP. Confirmed by OPs Kilo (MR 7660-8225), Lima (MR 7662-8173) and Red (MR 7675-8125)."

#### DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1423

[Original: English]  
[12 November 1971]

The following report on incidents in the Israel-Syria sector on 11 November 1971 was received on 12 November from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"1. OP reports on ground activity:

"(a) OP Two (MR 2306-2736): Between 0508 and 0512 sporadic machine-gun fire and at 0559 three rounds of mortar fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Five (MR 2290-2787): Between 0710 and 0712 machine-gun fire and between 0735 and 0741 small-arms fire by Israel forces.

"2. OP reports on air activity:

"(a) OP Five: At 1138 one unidentified aircraft crossed the area between the limits of the forward defended localities indicating the cease-fire lines from east to west south of OP.

"(b) OP X-Ray (MR 2304-2891): Between 1140 and 1143 one unidentified aircraft was first observed south of OP and last observed approximately 15 kilometres north of OP.

"In both cases United Nations military observers could not determine type or nationality of aircraft owing to low altitude and very high speed.

"3. Complaints by the parties:

"The following verbal complaints were received from the Assistant Israel Defence Forces Liaison Officer on 11 November: 'I am instructed to submit a complaint concerning the following Syrian violations of the cease-fire in the Golan Heights:

"(a) On 11 November 1971 at 1000 three armed persons wearing Syrian Army insignia penetrated the Syrian side of the cease-fire lines into the no man's land north-west of OP Winter (MR 2320-2792), thus violating the cease-fire.

"(b) On 11 November 1971 at 1140 a Syrian aircraft violated the cease-fire by flying over Israel positions in the vicinity of Quneitra.'

"The first complaint was not confirmed by United Nations observers. The second complaint may be related to the incident mentioned in paragraph 2 (a) above."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1424**

[Original: English]  
[13 November 1971]

The following report on incidents in the Israel-Syria sector on 12 November 1971 was received on 13 November from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"1. OP reports on ground activity:

"(a) OP X-Ray (MR 2304-2891): Between 0422 and 0440 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP November (MR 2316-2564): Between 1447 and 1506 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP One (MR 2249-2960): At 0810 machine-gun fire, which ceased immediately, and one flare by Israel forces.

"2. OP reports on air activity:

"OP Winter (MR 2320-2792): At 0903 one Israel forces jet aircraft flying east to west was first observed east of OP and recrossed the limits of the Israel forward defended localities indicating the cease-fire line on the Israel side east to west, west of OP.

"3. Complaints by the parties:

"The following complaints were received from the Israel Defence Forces Liaison Officer on 12 No-

vember: 'I am instructed to submit a complaint concerning the following Syrian violations of the cease-fire in the Golan Heights area:

"(a) On 11 November 1971, an armed group penetrated from the Syrian side of the CFLs (cease-fire lines) into the no man's land, east of OP Two (MR 2306-2736), and at 0605 directed bazooka fire at Israel positions from a location east of same OP.

"(b) On 11 November 1971 at night an armed group crossed from the Syrian side of the CFLs into the no man's land, south-east of Quneitra, thus violating the cease-fire.

"(c) On 11 November 1971 at night an armed group penetrated from the Syrian side of the CFLs into Israel-held territory east of Ramat Magshimim settlement, south-west of OP Sierra (MR 2312-2523).'

"The above complaints were not confirmed by United Nations observers."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1425**

[Original: English]  
[15 November 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 13 November 1971 was received on 14 November from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports:

"(a) OP Uniform (MR 2366-2621): Between 1210 and 1245 sporadic machine-gun and small-arms fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP November (MR 2316-2564): Between 1558 and 1602 sporadic machine-gun fire and flares by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Two (MR 2306-2736): Between 2135 and 2145 sporadic mortar fire by Israel forces."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1426**

[Original: English]  
[15 November 1971]

The following report on incidents in the Suez Canal sector on 14 November 1971 was received on 15 November from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"1. OP reports on ground activity: Nil.'

"2. OP reports on air activity: Nil.

"3. Complaints by the parties:

"(a) The following complaint was received by the Acting Officer-in-Charge, Kantara Control Centre, from the Senior Israel Representative on 14 November at 1630: 'At about 1330 two rifle shots were fired from direction near kilo from west to east at our soldiers.' The Senior Israel Representative informed Kantara Control Centre at 1705: 'The shooting took place on the kilometer marker 141.' When informed, the Senior Arab Republic of Egypt Liaison Officer stated at 1720: 'No one has fired at Israel forces soldiers.'

"(b) The following complaint was received by the Officer-in-Charge, Ismailia Control Centre, from the Senior Arab Republic of Egypt Liaison Officer on 14 November at 2030: 'Egypt complains that practice shooting with mortar has taken place after

scheduled time on eastern side in three places: 4 kilometres south of Port Said (Port Fuad), 10 kilometres south of Port Said and 19 kilometres south of Port Said. Shooting took place after 1930 on eastern side.' When informed on 14 November, the Senior Israel Representative stated on 15 November 1971 at 0730: 'There was no shooting from any source.'

"(c) The above complaints were not confirmed by United Nations observers."

#### **DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1427**

[Original: English]  
[15 November 1971]

The following report on incidents in the Israel-Syria sector on 14 November 1971 was received on 15 November from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

##### **"1. OP reports:**

"(a) OP Two (MR 2306-2736): At 0846 machine-gun fire, which ceased immediately, and between 0923 and 0926 machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Sierra (MR 2312-2523): Between 2009 and 2018 intense machine-gun fire and sporadic mortar fire by Israel forces.

##### **"2. Complaints by the parties:**

"(a) The following complaints have been received from the Israel Defence Forces Liaison Officer:

'(i) On 12 November 1971, at night, an armed group crossed from the Syrian side of the CFLs (cease-fire lines) into the no man's land south-east of OP Two, thus violating the cease-fire.

'(ii) On 14 November 1971, at night, an armed group penetrated from the Syrian side of the CFLs into Israel-held territory south of Tel-A-Saki, thus violating the cease-fire.'

"The above complaints were not confirmed by United Nations observers.

"(b) The following complaint was received by the Chairman of the Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission from the Senior Syrian Arab Delegate:

'On 12 November 1971, at about 0903, an Israeli formation of jet fighters crossed the Israeli and Syrian cease-fire positions in OP One area (MR 2249-2960) and flew over Jaba Village and Tal El Harra; then they flew back to the occupied territories. The Senior Syrian Arab Delegate protests most strongly against this Israeli provocative action, which violates the resolution adopted by the Security Council at its 1357th meeting on 11 June 1967, and requests that the necessary measures be taken to prevent the repetition of such action in the future.'

"The above complaint was partially confirmed by United Nations observers (see S/7930/Add.1424, para. 2)."

#### **DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1428**

[Original: English]  
[16 November 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 15 November 1971 was received on 16 November from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"Report from OP Two (MR 2306-2736): Between 1208 and 1212 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces."

#### **DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1429**

[Original: English]  
[17 November 1971]

The following report on incidents in the Israel-Syria sector on 16 November 1971 was received on 17 November from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

##### **"1. OP reports:**

"OP Romeo (MR 2294-2459): Between 0727 and 0728 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

##### **"2. Complaints by the parties:**

"The following complaints were received by the Chairman of the Israel Syria Mixed Armistice Commission from the Senior Syrian Arab Delegate:

'(a) On 11 November 1971 at about 1044 two Israeli jets crossed the Israeli and Syrian CFPs (cease-fire positions) in the area of OP Seven (MR 2203-2408) and OP Romeo and flew over the Syrian village Maarieh, then they headed for the Jordanian territories.

'(b) On 13 November 1971 at about 1557 the Israeli military positions situated at approximately MR 2309-2557 opened machine-gun fire across the Syrian CFPs towards Syrian positions in the area. The fire was not returned.

"The Senior Syrian Arab Delegate protests most strongly against these Israeli provocative actions which violate the resolution adopted by the Security Council at its 1357th meeting on 11 June 1967, and requests that the necessary measures be taken to prevent the repetition of such actions in the future."

"The first complaint was not confirmed by United Nations observers. The second complaint was confirmed (see S/7930/Add.1425 sub-para. (b))."

#### **DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1430**

[Original: English]  
[18 November 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 17 November 1971 was received on 18 November from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"Report from OP Romeo (MR 2294-2459): At 1441 machine-gun fire, which ceased immediately, by Israel forces."

#### **DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1431**

[Original: English]  
[19 November 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 18 November 1971 was received on 19 November from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

##### **"OP reports:**

"(a) OP Romeo (MR 2294-2459): Between 0407 and 0412 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Two (MR 2306-2736): Between 0842 and 0843 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP One (MR 2249-2960): Between 1555 and 1557 machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(d) OP Four (MR 2327-2596): At 1954 machine-gun fire, which ceased immediately, by Israel forces."

#### DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1432

[Original: English]  
[20 November 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 19 November 1971 was received on 20 November from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports:

"(a) OP Victor (MR 2328-2668): Between 0425 and 0430 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Sierra (MR 2312-2523): Between 0439 and 0452 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Romeo (MR 2294-2459): Between 0447 and 0452 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(d) OP Yoke (MR 2271-2914): Between 0731 and 0735 sporadic machine-gun fire by Syrian forces.

"(e) OP Five (MR 2290-2787): Between 0836 and 0901 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(f) OP Two (MR 2306-2736): Between 1035 and 1048 and between 2240 and 2242 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces."

#### DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1433

[Original: English]  
[22 November 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 20 November 1971 was received on 21 November from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports:

"(a) OP Victor (MR 2328-2668): Between 0428 and 0439 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP X-Ray (MR 2304-2891): Between 0502 and 0503 small-arms fire by Syrian forces.

"(c) OP Yoke (MR 2271-2914): At 0926 machine-gun fire, which ceased immediately, by Syrian forces.

"(d) OP Two (MR 2306-2736): Between 1145 and 1147 machine-gun fire by Israel forces."

#### DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1434

[Original: English]  
[22 November 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 21 November 1971 was received on 22 November from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"Report from OP Victor (MR 2328-2668): between 0416 and 0420 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces."

#### DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1435

[Original: English]  
[23 November 1971]

The following report on incidents in the Israel-Syria sector on 22 November 1971 was received on 23 November from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"1. OP reports:

"(a) OP Uniform (MR 2366-2621): Between 0815 and 0820 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Two (MR 2306-2736): Between 0855 and 0900, between 0938 and 0940 and between 1012 and 1013 machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Five (MR 2290-2787): Between 1946 and 1949 artillery fire by Israel forces.

"2. Complaints by the parties:

"The following complaints have been received from the Israel Defence Forces Liaison Officer, alleging that:

"(a) On 15 November 1971, at night, an armed group crossed the SFDLS (the limits of the Syrian forward defended localities indicating the cease-fire line on the Syrian side) and IFDLS (the limits of the Israel forward defended localities indicating the cease-fire line on the Israel side) in the vicinity of OP Four (MR 2327-2596);

"(b) On 19 November 1971, at 0505, an armed person with a herd of animals crossed the SFDLS into the ABFDLS (the area between the limits of the forward defended localities indicating the cease-fire lines), 2 kilometres south-west of OP Sierra (MR 2312-2523);

"(c) On 21 November 1971, at 0730, two armed persons crossed the SFDLS into the ABFDLS, north-east of El Ma (MR 2268-2463);

"(d) On 21 November 1971, at 1420 GMT, an armed person, wearing Syrian army insignia, crossed the SFDLS into the ABFDLS, north-east of El Ma.

"The above complaints were not confirmed by United Nations observers."

#### DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1436

[Original: English]  
[24 November 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 23 November 1971 was received on 24 November from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports:

"(a) OP Romeo (MR 2294-2459): Between 0555 and 0604 and between 0635 and 0638 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP One (MR 2249-2960): Between 1805 and 1807 machine-gun fire and one flare by Israel forces."

#### DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1437

[Original: English]  
[24 November 1971]

The following report on incidents in the Suez Canal sector on 23 November 1971 was received on 24 November from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"1. OP reports on ground activity: OP Foxtrot (MR 7430-8674): Between 0704 and 0706 sporadic anti-aircraft fire by Egyptian forces.

"2. OP reports on air activity: OP Pink (MR 7661-8278): Between 0843 and 0844 two Israel forces jet aircraft, flying north to south, crossed Canal east to west 9 kilometres north of OP and recrossed west to east 1.5 kilometres north of OP. Confirmed by OPs Orange (MR 7604-8415) and Red (MR 7675-8125)."

#### **DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1438**

[Original: English]  
[25 November 1971]

The following report on incidents in the Israel-Syria sector on 24 November 1971 was received on 25 November from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

##### **"1. OP reports:**

"(a) OP Three (MR 2308-2678): Between 1158 and 1202 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Two (MR 2306-2736): Between 1233 and 1235 sporadic machine-gun fire and between 1703 and 1706 five rounds of mortar fire by Israel forces.

##### **"2. Complaints by the parties:**

"The following complaint has been received from the Israel Defence Forces Liaison Officer alleging that on 23 November at 0450 an armed person crossed the SFDLS (the limits of the Syrian forward defended localities indicating the cease-fire line on the Syrian side) into the ABFDLS (the area between the limits of the forward defended localities indicating the cease-fire lines) in the vicinity of Bir Aajam (MR 2314-2734).

"The above complaint was not confirmed by United Nations observers."

#### **DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1439**

[Original: English]  
[26 November 1971]

The following report on incidents in the Israel-Syria sector on 25 November 1971 was received on 26 November from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

##### **"1. OP reports on ground activity:**

"(a) OP Yoke (MR 2271-2914): Between 1245 and 1256 artillery fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Two (MR 2306-2736): Between 1304 and 1314 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"2. OP reports on air activity: OP November (MR 2316-2564): At 0936 two Israel forces jet aircraft flying north-east to south-west were first observed north-east of OP and recrossed IFDLS (the limits of the Israel forward defended localities indicating the cease-fire line on the Israel side) east to west, south-south-west of OP.

##### **"3. Complaints by the parties:**

"(a) A complaint has been received from the Israel Defence Forces Liaison Officer alleging that during the night of 24 November 1971 an armed

group crossed the SFDLS (the limits of the Syrian forward defended localities indicating the cease-fire on the Syrian side) into the ABFDLS (the area between the limits of the forward defended localities indicating the cease-fire lines) in the vicinity of Bir Aajam (MR 2314-2734).

"The above complaint was not confirmed by United Nations observers.

"(b) Complaints have been received from the Senior Syrian Arab Delegate alleging that (i) on 25 November 1971 at about 0945 four Israel forces jet aircraft crossed the ABFDLS in the vicinity of OPs Victor (MR 2328-2668) and Uniform (MR 2366-2621); (ii) on 25 November 1971 at about 0950 two Phantom aircraft crossed the ABFDLS in the vicinity of OPs Four (MR 2327-2596) and November.

"Complaint (i) above was not confirmed by United Nations observers. Complaint (ii) may relate to the incident reported in paragraph 2 above."

#### **DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1440**

[Original: English]  
[27 November 1971]

The following report on incidents in the Israel-Syria sector on 26 November 1971 was received on 27 November from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

##### **"1. OP reports:**

"(a) OP Victor (MR 2328-2668): Between 0429 and 0431 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Romeo (MR 2294-2459): Between 0435 and 0436 and between 0609 and 0610 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Two (MR 2306-2736): At 1338 machine-gun fire, which ceased immediately, by Israel forces.

"(d) OP Yoke (MR 2271-2914): Between 1410 and 1415 sporadic artillery fire by Israel forces.

"(e) OP Five (MR 2290-2787): At 1851 machine-gun and small-arms fire by Israel forces. At the same time machine-gun and small-arms fire by Syrian forces. At 1914 mortar flares and sporadic mortar fire by Israel forces. At 1937 fire ceased by Syrian forces and at 1947 fire ceased by Israel forces.

"(f) OP Six (MR 2300-2847): At 1909 machine-gun fire, which ceased immediately, by Israel forces.

##### **"2. Complaints by the parties:**

"Complaints have been received from the Israel Defence Forces Liaison Officer alleging that:

"(a) On 24 November, at night, an armed group crossed the area between the limits of the forward defended localities indicating the cease-fire lines in the vicinity of Quneitra (MR 2275-2815).

"(b) On 25 November at 1240 an armed person with a herd of animals crossed into the above-mentioned area from the limits of the Syrian forward defended localities indicating the cease-fire lines on the Syrian side.

"The above complaints were not confirmed by United Nations observers."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1441**

[Original: English]  
[29 November 1971]

The following report on firing in the Suez Canal sector on 27 November 1971 was received on 28 November from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"Report from OP Echo (MR 7408-9005): At 0512 small-arms fire, which ceased immediately, by Egyptian forces."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1442**

[Original: English]  
[29 November 1971]

The following report on incidents in the Israel-Syria sector on 27 November 1971 was received on 28 November from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports:

"(a) OP Six (MR 2300-2847): Between 0258 and 0310 artillery fire and between 1737 and 1739 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Victor (MR 2328-2668): Between 0521 and 0522 machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Four (MR 2327-2596): Between 1312 and 1321 sporadic artillery fire by Israel forces.

"(d) OP November (MR 2316-2564): Between 1350 and 1357 and between 1444 and 1447 sporadic artillery fire by Israel forces.

"(e) OP Winter (MR 2320-2792): Between 1707 and 1708 two rounds of mortar fire by Israel forces.

"(f) OP Yoke (MR 2271-2914): Between 1729 and 1740 sporadic artillery fire by Israel forces.

"(g) OP Five (MR 2290-2787): At 1856 one flare and between 1920 and 1937 three flares and between 2023 and 2024 five flares by Israel forces.

"(h) OP Two (MR 2306-2736): Between 1920 and 1955 sporadic machine-gun fire and flares by Israel forces."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1443**

[Original: English]  
[29 November 1971]

The following report on incidents in the Israel-Syria sector on 28 November 1971 was received on 29 November from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"1. OP reports:

"(a) OP Romeo (MR 2294-2459): Between 0622 and 0623 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP X-Ray (MR 2304-2891): Between 0716 and 0718 sporadic small-arms fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Five (MR 2290-2787): Between 0926 and 0931 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(d) OP Two (MR 2306-2736): At 1245 one round of mortar fire by Israel forces.

"2. Complaints by the parties:

"(a) Complaints have been received from the Israel Defence Forces Liaison Officer alleging that:

"(i) On 26 November, at night, an armed group crossed the SFDLs (the limits of the Syrian forward defended localities indicating the cease-fire line on the Syrian side) and the IFDLs (the limits of the Israel forward defended localities indicating the cease-fire line on the Israel side) in the vicinity of OP Two.

"(ii) On 27 November, at night, an armed group crossed the SFDLs into the ABFDLs (the area between the limits of the forward defended localities indicating the cease-fire lines) in the vicinity of Samdaniya-Arabiya, south-east of OP Six (MR 2300-2847).

"(iii) On 27 November, at night, an armed group crossed the SFDLs and the IFDLs in the vicinity of OP Five.

"(iv) On 27 November, at night, an armed group crossed the SFDLs and the IFDLs in the vicinity of OP Six.

"(v) On 27 November, at night, an armed group crossed the SFDLs and the IFDLs in the vicinity of OP Two.

"The above complaints were not confirmed by United Nations observers.

"(b) Complaints have been received from the Senior Syrian Arab Delegate alleging that:

"(i) On 22 November, at about 1930, Israeli military positions situated west of OP Five fired seven mortar rounds across the IFDLs towards the village of Bir Aajam (MR 2314-2734).

"(ii) On 23 November, at about 1015, one Israeli armoured personnel carrier crossed the IFDLs at approximately MR 2302-2777.

"(iii) On 24 November, at about 0500, one Israeli armoured personnel carrier crossed the IFDLs at approximately MR 2251-2959.

"(iv) On 24 November, at about 0720, one Israeli armoured personnel carrier crossed the IFDLs at approximately MR 2302-2777.

"(v) On 26 November, at about 0300, Israeli military positions situated at approximately MR 2263-2920 fired several mortar rounds across the SFDLs towards Syrian positions in the area. The fire was not returned.

"Complaint (i) above was confirmed by United Nations observers (see S/7930/Add.1435, para 1 (c)). The other complaints were not confirmed by United Nations observers."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1444**

[Original: English]  
[30 November 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 29 November 1971 was received on 30 November from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports:

"(a) OP Four (MR 2327-2596): Between 0140 and 0143 intense machine-gun fire and flares by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Victor (MR 2328-2668): Between 0506 and 0512 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Two (MR 2306-2736): Between 0742 and 0744 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1449**

[Original: English]  
[6 December 1971]

"(d) OP Seven (MR 2203-2408): Between 1317 and 1319 machine-gun and small-arms fire by Israel forces.

"(e) OP One (MR 2249-2960): At 1445 machine-gun fire, which ceased immediately, by Israel forces."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1445**

[Original: English]  
[2 December 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 1 December 1971 was received on 2 December from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports:

"(a) OP Sierra (MR 2312-2523): Between 0520 and 0523 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Two (MR 2306-2736): Between 0859 and 0904 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1446**

[Original: English]  
[3 December 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 2 December 1971 was received on 3 December from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports:

"(a) OP Victor (MR 2328-2668): Between 0432 and 0434 machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Six (MR 2300-2847): Between 1845 and 1847 machine-gun fire and flares by Israel forces."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1447**

[Original: English]  
[4 December 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 3 December 1971 was received on 4 December from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports:

"(a) OP Victor (MR 2328-2668): Between 0429 and 0440 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Two (MR 2306-2736): Between 0953 and 0957 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Winter (MR 2320-2792): Between 1210 and 1222 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(d) OP Four (MR 2327-2596): At 1606 three rounds mortar fire (flares) by Israel forces."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1448**

[Original: English]  
[5 December 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 4 December 1971 was received on 5 December from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports:

"(a) OP Two (MR 2306-2736): Between 1048 and 1055 machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Five (MR 2290-2787): At 1629 one round of artillery fire by Syrian forces."

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 5 December 1971 was received on 6 December from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"Report from OP Three (MR 2308-2678): Between 0500 and 0640 sporadic small-arms fire and between 0710 and 0720 artillery and sporadic small-arms fire by Syrian forces."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1450**

[Original: English]  
[8 December 1971]

The following report on incidents in the Israel-Syria sector on 7 December 1971 was received on 8 December from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"1. OP reports on ground activity: Nil.

"2. OP reports on air activity: Nil.

"3. Complaints by the parties: A complaint has been received from the Israel Defence Forces Liaison Officer, alleging that, on 4 December at 1534, an armed group crossed the limits of the Syrian forward defended localities indicating the cease-fire line on the Syrian side into the area between both limits of the forward defended localities indicating the cease-fire lines in the vicinity of OP Winter (MR 2320-2792).

"The above complaint was not confirmed by United Nations observers."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1451**

[Original: English]  
[8 December 1971]

The following report on incidents in the Suez Canal sector on 7 December 1971 was received on 8 December from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"1. OP reports on ground activity: Nil.

"2. OP reports on air activity: Nil.

"3. Complaints by the parties: A complaint was received from the Israel authorities on 8 December, alleging that, on 5 December at 0730 and at 1000, Egyptian soldiers directed small-arms fire across the Suez Canal at Israel civilians in the area north of OP Red (MR 7675-8125).

"The above complaint was not confirmed by United Nations observers."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1452**

[Original: English]  
[10 December 1971]

The following report on incidents in the Israel-Syria sector on 9 December 1971 was received on 10 December from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"1. OP reports on ground activity:

[Original: English]  
[15 December 1971]

"(a) OP Uniform (MR 2366-2621): Between 0646 and 0715 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Six (MR 2300-2847): Between 0749 and 0750 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP One (MR 2249-2960): Between 2005 and 2011 sporadic machine-gun fire and flares by Israel forces.

"2. OP reports on air activity:

"(a) OP Victor (MR 2328-2668): Between 0839 and 0844 two Israel forces jet aircraft, flying north to south, were first observed east of OP and were last observed south-west of OP Romeo (MR 2294-2459). Confirmed by OPs Uniform, Four (MR 2327-2596), November (MR 2316-2564), Sierra (MR 2312-2523) and Romeo.

"(b) OP November: Between 0846 and 0849 two Israel forces jet aircraft, flying south to north, were first observed south-south-west of OP Sierra and were last observed north-north-east of OP Winter (MR 2320-2792). Confirmed by OPs Uniform, Victor and Winter.

"3. Complaints by the parties: complaints have been received from Syria alleging that:

"(a) On 9 December, at about 0836, four Israel forces jet aircraft crossed the IFDLs (the limits of the Israel forward defended localities indicating the cease-fire line on the Israel side) and SFDLs (the limits of the Syrian forward defended localities indicating the cease-fire line on the Syrian side) in the vicinity of OP Two (MR 2306-2736).

"(b) On 9 December, at about 0840, two Israel forces jet aircraft crossed the IFDLs and SFDLs in the vicinity of OP Six and overflew the village of Khane Erennebe (approximate MR 2332-2880).

"(c) On 9 December, at about 0843, a formation of Israel forces jet aircraft crossed the IFDLs and SFDLs in the vicinity of OP Victor.

"(d) On 9 December, at about 0845, two formations of Israel forces jet aircraft crossed the IFDLs and SFDLs in the vicinity of OPs Uniform and Sierra.

"(e) On 9 December, at about 0835, a formation of Israel forces jet aircraft crossed the IFDLs and SFDLs in the vicinity of OP Victor.

"The above complaints were partially confirmed by United Nations observers (see para. 2 above)."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1453**

[Original: English]  
[13 December 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 12 December 1971 was received on 13 December from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports:

"(a) OP Victor (MR 2328-2668): Between 0444 and 0445 machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Two (MR 2306-2736): Between 0930 and 0934 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP November (MR 2316-2564): At 1437 small-arms fire, which ceased immediately, by Syrian forces."

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 14 December 1971 was received on 15 December from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports:

"(a) OP Four (MR 2327-2596): Between 1202 and 1207 sporadic small-arms fire by Syrian forces.

"(b) OP X-ray (MR 2304-2891): At 1311 small-arms fire, which ceased immediately, by Syrian forces."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1455**

[Original: English]  
[16 December 1971]

The following report on incidents in the Israel-Syria sector on 15 December 1971 was received on 16 December from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"1. OP reports:

"OP Romeo (MR 2294-2459): Between 0506 and 0509 sporadic machine-gun fire and at 0948 machine-gun fire, which ceased immediately, by Israel forces.

"2. Complaints by the parties: A complaint was received from the Israel authorities on 15 December alleging that on 14 December at 1100 three armed persons with a herd of animals crossed the limits of the Syrian forward defended localities indicating the cease-fire line on the Syrian side into the area between the limits of the forward defended localities indicating the cease-fire lines, in the vicinity of OP Winter (MR 2320-2792).

"The above complaint was confirmed by United Nations observers."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1456**

[Original: English]  
[17 December 1971]

The following report on incidents in the Israel-Syria sector on 16 December 1971 was received on 17 December from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports:

"(a) OP Winter (MR 2320-2792): Between 0901 and 0904 machine-gun fire and at 1417 small-arms fire, which ceased immediately, by Syrian forces.

"(b) OP Five (MR 2290-2787): Between 1732 and 1757 sporadic machine-gun, mortar and artillery fire, and at 1953 one round of artillery fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP X-Ray (MR 2304-2891): Between 1813 and 1906 sporadic machine-gun fire, mortar and artillery flares by Israel forces.

"(d) OP Six (MR 2300-2847): Between 1955 and 2010 sporadic machine-gun fire and mortar flares by Israel forces."

[Original: English]  
[18 December 1971]

The following report on incidents in the Israel-Syria sector on 17 December 1971 was received on 18 December from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

**"1. OP reports:**

**"(a) OP Five (MR 2290-2787):** Between 1353 and 1406 three rounds of mortar fire by Israel forces.

**"(b) OP Four (MR 2327-2596):** Between 1626 and 1627 two rounds of mortar fire (flares) by Syrian forces.

**"(c) OP Uniform (MR 2366-2621):** Between 1830 and 1833 sporadic machine-gun fire and one flare by Israel forces.

**"2. Complaints by the parties:** A complaint has been received from the Israel authorities alleging that on 16 December 1971 at night an armed group crossed the limits of the Syrian forward defended localities indicating the cease-fire line on the Syrian side into the area between the limits of the forward defended localities indicating the cease-fire lines in the vicinity of OP Winter (MR 2320-2792).

"The above complaint was not confirmed by United Nations observers."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1458**

[Original: English]  
[20 December 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 18 December 1971 was received on 19 December from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

**"OP reports:**

**"(a) OP Romeo (MR 2294-2459):** At 0434 and 0453 machine-gun fire, which ceased immediately, by Israel forces.

**"(b) OP One (MR 2249-2960):** At 2100 machine-gun fire, which ceased immediately, by Israel forces."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1459**

[Original: English]  
[20 December 1971]

The following report on firing in the Suez Canal sector on 18 December 1971 was received on 19 December from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"Report from OP Charlie (MR 7396-9264): At 1545 machine-gun fire, which ceased immediately, by Israel forces."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1460**

[Original: English]  
[20 December 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 19 December 1971 was received on 20 December from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"Report from OP Five (MR 2290-2787): At 1115 machine-gun fire, which ceased immediately, by Israel forces."

[Original: English]  
[21 December 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 20 December 1971 was received on 21 December from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

**"OP reports:**

**"(a) OP One (MR 2249-2960):** Between 1556 and 1557 sporadic machine-gun fire and one round of mortar fire (flare) by Israel forces.

**"(b) OP Uniform (MR 2366-2621):** Between 2042 and 2043 machine-gun fire and flares by Israel forces."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1462**

[Original: English]  
[22 December 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 21 December 1971 was received on 22 December from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"Report from OP Uniform (MR 2366-2621): At 1545 machine-gun fire, which ceased immediately, by Israel forces."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1463**

[Original: English]  
[23 December 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 22 December 1971 was received on 23 December from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"Report from OP Yoke (MR 2271-2914): At 0858 machine-gun and small-arms fire, which ceased immediately, by Syrian forces."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1464**

[Original: English]  
[24 December 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 23 December 1971 was received on 24 December from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"Report from OP Six (MR 2300-2847): Between 1710 and 1720 artillery fire by Israel forces."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1465**

[Original: English]  
[25 December 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 24 December 1971 was received on 25 December from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"Report from OP Victor (MR 2328-2668): Between 0940 and 1006 sporadic machine-gun fire by Syrian forces."

[Original: English]  
[27 December 1971]

The following report on incidents in the Israel-Syria sector on 26 December 1971 was received on 27 December from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

- "1. OP reports on ground activity: Nil.
- "2. OP reports on air activity: Nil.
- "3. Complaints by the parties: A complaint has been received from Israel alleging that on 23 December 1971 at night an armed group crossed the limits of the Syrian forward defended localities indicating the cease-fire line on the Syrian side into the area between the limits of the forward defended localities indicating the cease-fire lines in the vicinity of OP Five (MR 2290-2787).

"The above complaint was not confirmed by United Nations observers."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1467**

[Original: English]  
[28 December 1971]

The following report on incidents in the Israel-Syria sector on 27 December 1971 was received on 28 December from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

- "1. OP reports:  
"(a) OP Four (MR 2327-2596): Between 1229 and 1232 sporadic mortar fire by Israel forces.  
"(b) OP Five (MR 2290-2787): Between 1541 and 1548 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"2. Complaints by the parties: A complaint has been received from Israel alleging that on 26 December at 0855 an armed group crossed the limits of the Syrian forward defended localities indicating the cease-fire line on the Syrian side into the area between the limits of the forward defended localities indicating the cease-fire line in the vicinity of OP Uniform (MR 2366-2621).

"The above complaint was not confirmed by United Nations observers."

**DOCUMENT S/10349**

**Letter dated 27 September 1971 from the representative of the Khmer Republic to the President of the Security Council**

[Original: French]  
[1 October 1971]

On instructions from my Government and further to my letter of 23 August 1971 [S/10302], I have the honour to communicate the following to you for the information of the members of the Security Council.

On 24 August 1971, the Venerable Ek San, 65 years old, Head of the Krâ Ngok Méas Loeu pagoda, at Prey Kry in Kompong Chhnang, accompanied by a religious assistant named San Tuon and by two villagers named Kang Or and Kang Morn, went by motor boat to the camp of the Viet-Cong-North-Vietnamese in order to secure the release of two villagers the latter had captured the same day.

[Original: English]  
[29 December 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 28 December 1971 was received on 29 December from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports:

"(a) OP Six (MR 2300-2847): Between 1307 and 1315 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Two (MR 2306-2736): Between 1557 and 1558 intense machine-gun fire by Israel forces."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1469**

[Original: English]  
[30 December 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syrian sector on 29 December 1971 was received on 30 December from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports:

"(a) OP Five (MR 2290-2787): At 0759 machine-gun fire, which ceased immediately, by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Two (MR 2306-2736): Between 0923 and 0929 machine-gun fire by Israel forces."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1470**

[Original: English]  
[31 December 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 30 December 1971 was received on 31 December from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"Report from OP One (MR 2249-2960): At 1250 machine-gun fire, which ceased immediately, by Israel forces."

The Venerable Ek San and those accompanying him were atrociously murdered by the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese. The bodies of the four victims were found on 28 August 1971, floating with their limbs tied, near the village of Kompong Aus.

The body of the Venerable Ek San bears many wound marks, particularly about the throat. The same is true of the bodies of the other three victims, who were executed under almost identical conditions.

I wish to reiterate before international public opinion the firm and vigorous protest of the Khmer Government against these odious and extremely barbarous

crimes committed by the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese against the inherently pacifistic Khmer religious and civil population. These criminal acts constitute a flagrant violation of international laws and customs and clearly reveal the true imperialist aims of these invaders.

The Government of the Khmer Republic holds the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and the so-called Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Viet-Nam fully responsible for all the extremely grave consequences of this situation and

reserves the right to take the necessary action to protect its population and the principles of freedom recognized in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this communication circulated as a Security Council document.

(Signed) TRUONG CANG  
Permanent Representative of  
the Khmer Republic  
to the United Nations

#### DOCUMENT S/10352

Letter dated 6 October 1971 from the representative of Zambia  
to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English]  
[6 October 1971]

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to request you to convene as soon as possible a meeting of the Security Council to consider a series of serious incidents and violations of the sovereignty, air space and territorial integrity of my country, Zambia, by the forces of the fascist Government of South Africa.

For a considerable time now numerous incidents have taken place at the bordering area between Zambia and the international Territory of Namibia, where the Government of South Africa illegally maintains its military and police forces to suppress the Namibian liberation movements. It is from the same area that the South African forces have committed numerous violations against the sovereignty, air space and territorial integrity of Zambia. Only yesterday, Tuesday, 5 October 1971, South African forces illegally crossed into Zambian territory from the area, the Caprivi Strip of Namibia.

In the light of these repeated criminal acts of aggression against Zambia by the Government of South Africa, my Government has no alternative but to make the foregoing urgent request—the convening of a meeting of the Security Council. I should therefore be grateful if you would treat the request with the urgency the matter demands.

I should be grateful if you would kindly arrange for the circulation of this letter as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) VERNON J. MWAANGA  
Permanent Representative of the Republic of Zambia  
to the United Nations

#### DOCUMENT S/10354

Letter dated 6 October 1971 from the Chairman of the Special Committee on *Apartheid* to the President of the Security Council concerning the arms embargo against South Africa\*

[Original: English]  
[7 October 1971]

During the past year, the Special Committee on *Apartheid* has had to devote considerable attention to the implementation of the arms embargo against South Africa because of the failure of certain States to implement the provisions of Security Council resolution 282 (1970) and General Assembly resolution 2624 (XXV).

In a letter dated 7 May 1971 [S/10190] I transmitted to the Security Council, on behalf of the Special Committee on *Apartheid*, available information on breaches of the arms embargo and stated that "the Special Committee on *Apartheid* considers it essential

that all breaches of the arms embargo by States concerned should be stopped forthwith if the purpose of the measure is not to be defeated".

Regrettably, it has since been brought to the attention of the Special Committee that an agreement was concluded between the Armaments Development and Production Corporation of South Africa, Ltd. and a French aviation company for the manufacture in South Africa of Mirage III and F-1 aircraft. The Special Committee conveyed its concern to the Government of France through its Permanent Representative to the United Nations and emphasized that the arms embargo by the Security Council had not made any distinction between arms for internal repression and arms for external defence.

\* An identical letter addressed to the President of the General Assembly, was also circulated as document A/SPC/145.

At the request of the Special Committee I have the honour to transmit to you: (a) a statement made by the Chairman of the Special Committee on *Apartheid* at the 180th meeting of the Special Committee on 3 September 1971,<sup>2</sup> containing an oral reply received from the Chargé d'Affaires of the Permanent Mission of France; and (b) a note by the Rapporteur of the Special Committee on recent developments concerning military co-operation by France with South Africa.<sup>3</sup>

(Signed) Abdulrahim A. FARAH  
Chairman of the  
Special Committee on Apartheid

#### ANNEX

Statement made by the Chairman of the Special Committee on *Apartheid* at the 180th meeting of the Special Committee on 3 September 1971, containing an oral reply received from the Chargé d'Affaires of the Permanent Mission of France

The Chairman said that on 31 August he had had a meeting with the Chargé d'Affaires of the Permanent Mission of France, as requested by the Special Committee, to discuss the question of whether France had agreed to license the production of Mirage aircraft in South Africa. It had been hoped that the French position would be conveyed in the form of a written communication but the Permanent Mission of France had preferred to indicate its position orally. He had prepared a text of that oral communication, which read as follows:

"The French Chargé d'Affaires said that by nature and education the French people had no prejudices based on race and colour. That attitude stemmed from a secular tradition. France condemned racial discrimination and particularly *apartheid*. In conformity with that attitude the French Government had decided to prohibit the sale to South Africa of weapons which that country could use for internal police operations dictated by racist prejudices. Such prohibition was announced on 7 August 1963 by the Permanent Representative of France. The list of prohibited arms was extended on 4 December 1963 when France informed the Security Council that it would also prohibit the sale of equipment and material which could be used for the manufacture of those weapons.

"The French Chargé d'Affaires said France had been guided in the establishment of that list of prohibited arms by the fundamental distinction between arms which could be used in anti-guerrilla operations and arms which could be used for defence against external threats. Under the former category France had prohibited the sale to South Africa of light weapons which could be used in so-called police operations such as slow observation planes, slow ground-attack planes, automatic weapons, light mortars, flame throwers and ammunition for those weapons, including napalm bombs and grenades. That list, he said, had

<sup>2</sup> See annex below.  
<sup>3</sup> A/AC.115/L.313.

recently been extended by the addition of helicopters and light armoured vehicles.

"With regard to the second category of arms, i.e. arms for defence against external threats, the French Chargé d'Affaires emphasized that South Africa could purchase such arms from France under the same conditions as any other State. Such arms were suitable only for external defence and in conflict situations involving the employment of regular armies. Arms falling into that category included high-speed planes, reconnaissance planes, transport and liaison planes, air-defence systems, naval material, tanks, anti-tank weapons, heavy artillery and heavy mortars.

"The French Chargé d'Affaires stated that the distinction between the different categories of weapons according to their use was implicitly admitted by the Security Council in its resolution 181 (1963) of 7 August 1963. Four months later, he claimed, the Security Council noted with satisfaction the assurances given by Governments within the framework of resolution 181 (1963). Among the assurances was a statement by the French delegation which established a distinction between the two types of weapons.

"The French Chargé d'Affaires stated that it was on the basis of that distinction that one should assess the recent deliveries of 'Mirage' planes to South Africa. He explained that they were planes of high performance and could be used only as interceptor aircraft or for aerial combat. In view of their high minimum speed, his Government considered that they were absolutely unsuitable for use in anti-guerrilla operations. The French Chargé d'Affaires said that it was normal that the South African Government should try to organize its external defence and that it should acquire such material and equipment in France. He emphasized that the co-operation which was envisaged between the industrialists of the two countries was the result of direct agreements between interested firms and did not result, in any way, from military co-operation between the two Governments.

"The French Chargé d'Affaires was firm in his opinion that the sale of 'Mirage' planes, as well as the licensing for the production of these planes in South Africa, would not strengthen the anti-guerrilla potential of South Africa. Finally, the French Chargé d'Affaires stated that none of the deliveries made to South Africa by French companies could assist the South African Government in any possible operations of internal repression. Any criticism expressed in this regard against the French Government was, in his view, unfounded."

He had explained to the Chargé d'Affaires that the verbal communication begged the question; the Special Committee had wanted to know whether there was any truth in the report published in the international press that France had agreed to license the production of Mirage aircraft in South Africa. He had pointed out that that question had not been answered in the oral communication and had expressed the hope that it could be answered one way or the other and had said that unless there was a final denial the Special Committee would have every reason to conclude that such a licence had been given. The Chargé d'Affaires had agreed that the communication had not been clear on that point and had said he would endeavour to give a specific answer in due course.

#### DOCUMENT S/10355

Letter dated 6 October 1971 from the Acting Chairman of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English]  
[7 October 1971]

In accordance with the decision taken by the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of In-

dependence to Colonial Countries and Peoples at its 828th meeting, on 6 October 1971, I have the honour to transmit herewith, for the attention of the Security

Council, the text of two consensuses concerning Southern Rhodesia adopted by the Special Committee at that meeting.

(Signed) Rafic JOUEJATI  
Acting Chairman of the  
Special Committee on the  
Situation with regard to the  
Implementation of the Declaration  
on the Granting of Independence to  
Colonial Countries and Peoples

#### ANNEX

##### Consensus concerning the participation in the XXth Olympic Games of the so-called National Olympic Committee of Rhodesia

The Special Committee, recalling its resolution of 30 April 1971,<sup>a</sup> notes with deep regret the recent decision of the International Olympic Committee to permit the participation in the XXth Olympic Games of the so-called National Olympic

<sup>a</sup> A/AC.109/369 (See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 23*, chapter VI, para. 32).

Committee of Rhodesia. Considering that the decision of the International Olympic Committee contravenes the aims and purposes of the relevant Security Council resolutions and decisions, the Special Committee requests all States, bearing in mind the relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 253 (1968) of 29 May 1968, 277 (1970) of 18 March 1970 and 288 (1970) of 17 November 1970, to take steps to ensure the exclusion of the so-called National Olympic Committee of Rhodesia from participation in the XXth Olympic Games and to refrain from any action which might confer a semblance of legitimacy on the illegal racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia.

##### Consensus concerning the decision of the United States Senate relating to the importation of chrome to the United States of America from Southern Rhodesia

The Special Committee, noting with concern the recent decision of the United States Senate which, if confirmed, would permit the importation of chrome into the United States of America from Southern Rhodesia and thus would violate the sanctions being applied by the Security Council, urges the United States Government to take the necessary measures, in compliance with the relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 253 (1968) of 29 May 1968, 277 (1970) of 18 March 1970 and 288 (1970) of 17 November 1970, to prevent the enactment of such legislation.

#### DOCUMENT S/10356

##### Letter dated 6 October 1971 from the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English]  
[7 October 1971]

At the request of the United Nations Council for Namibia, I have the honour to transmit herewith, for the attention of the members of the Security Council, a copy of the text of a letter dated 3 September 1971 from Chief Clemens Kapuuu of Namibia to his solicitor in London.

I should be grateful if the letter, the text of which was made available to the Council for Namibia by the Reverend G. Michael Scott, could be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) E. O. OGBU  
President of the United Nations  
Council for Namibia

LETTER DATED 3 SEPTEMBER 1971 FROM CHIEF CLEMENS KAPUUU, CHIEF OF THE HERERO PEOPLES, NAMIBIA, TO MISS SARAH LEIGH OF LAW FORD AND COMPANY, LONDON

I am writing to you as the elected head of the Herero peoples of South West Africa. I am deeply concerned, and so are my peoples, with the way the natural mineral resources of this country are being removed from it with the full knowledge and permission of the South African Government. From statistics given hereunder, you will see that the future of the Herero and other indigenous peoples will be greatly affected by the present policy of the illegal South African Government. You may well know that apart from its mineral wealth which is substantial, South West Africa is a poor country. The Africans who will be brought to these mines under the contract labour system, who will work for periods of twelve to eighteen months deprived of their natural family life, unable by current laws

to negotiate their salary, and prevented under strict laws from bettering their conditions, benefit but little. This country, which is our country, is being exploited by greedy *entrepreneurs*, robbed of its wealth, and rendered barren for the future. Our fear is that when freedom finally comes to this land, it will be returned to us with no minerals left. Thus, you will see the one wonderful asset which we have for developing the land for the well-being of all its people will have been taken away from us. We deplore what the Government in Pretoria is currently allowing. We have not been consulted in all this. We wish you to take whatever action you may deem necessary to bring the matter to the highest international court of justice. Further, we appoint the Reverend Michael Scott, who has so wonderfully upheld our cause at the United Nations, to act in association with you in this respect as our agent.

We would like to make it clear that in this matter our appeal as the Herero nation does not in any sense preclude appeals by other African peoples in this Territory. At a time when the International Court has declared South Africa's continuing presence in South West Africa to be illegal,<sup>4</sup> we would urge that immediate steps be taken by the highest bodies to protect the rights of the indigenous peoples of this Territory from being exploited. We wish all foreign firms to be removed immediately; we wish to be consulted on ways and means by which our peoples can have a fairer share in benefiting from the wealth of the land of their birth.

Signed on behalf of the Herero people.

<sup>4</sup> See *Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council resolution 276 (1970)*, *Advisory Opinion*, I.C.J. Reports 1971, p. 16.

ENCLOSURE

1. The Herero peoples of South West Africa, together with their Chief and headmen, welcome the decision of the International Court of Justice in which it declares South Africa's presence in South West Africa to be illegal, and joins that body in calling for the instant withdrawal of South Africa from our country.

2. Noting the increase in the number of foreign mining organizations which have recently come to exploit the country's mineral wealth, we protest this and call for its immediate cessation for the following reasons:

(a) Africans generally benefit but little from the mining companies;

(b) Pay received by Africans varies from between 17 and 45 rand per month in the mining industry. A comparison with the pay received by white workers is immediately revealing. A white shift boss receives R385 per month and a mine captain R435. We regard this as a shocking exploitation of African peoples who cannot bargain for better pay or conditions and whose progress is being constantly retarded by a white Government in Pretoria.

3. Recent research has shown that every African who maintains an average family should receive at least R78 per month if his physical condition is not to deteriorate.

4. Figures which show the income from all sources clearly indicate that mining is the most fruitful; the figures are as follows: mining 46.8 per cent, agricul-

ture 16.8 per cent, fishing 3.2 per cent and other sectors combined 33 per cent. Only 30 per cent of the total budget for education is paid to non-whites, although there are five times as many blacks as whites. In salaries paid by the Government to teachers a white receives R5,100 p.a. as a headmaster; a black receives R792. White teachers receive R2,600; blacks R384. Sixty-nine per cent of African children are in classes below standard one with 147 students in High Schools according to figures released in the Government's Odendaal report. There has been a slight improvement over the years, but the exploitation of the economy for the whites as against the blacks continues. Old age pensions are totally inadequate and we deplore and are angry at the suffering of so many aged African people dumped in the wastelands of the reservations. Whites receive R440 p.a.; blacks receive R70. Experience time and again shows us that there are great delays even in their receiving this pittance.

5. Our final conclusion is that the whole wealth of the nation is being exploited for the benefit of the whites. We are not impressed with fine tarred roads, with huge hand-outs to the white farming community, with subsidized white houses for administration workers and others. We ask for the immediate removal of foreign mining firms; we demand that the mineral rights of this nation be protected to prevent them being totally removed before they can be applied to the building-up of this country for the well-being of all its peoples.

(Signed) C. KAPUO

DOCUMENT S/10362

Letter dated 8 October 1971 from the representative of Israel  
to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English]  
[8 October 1971]

On instructions from my Government I have the honour to submit to you enclosed herewith a copy of a letter dated 30 September 1971 from the Consul General of Israel in Montreal, in his capacity of representative of Israel to the International Civil Aviation Organization, to the President of the Council of the Organization, regarding an attempt by Arab terrorist organizations to blow up, in flight, two civilian aircraft, with their passengers and crew.

In this connexion I should like to draw your attention to the statement made by the spokesman of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine at a press conference held in Beirut on 8 September 1971. As reported by United Press International, the spokesman declared, *inter alia*: "The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine reserves its rights to hijack civil airlines. . . Hijacking is a style of action that we would follow when we feel it serves the Palestinian movement".

I have the honour to request that this letter, together with its enclosure, be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Yosef TEKOAH  
Permanent Representative of Israel  
to the United Nations

LETTER DATED 30 SEPTEMBER 1971 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF ISRAEL TO THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL OF THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION

With reference to resolution 3(i) of the Council of 10 April 1969 and to resolutions Nos. A17-1 and A17-16 adopted at the Extraordinary General Assembly of the Organization in Montreal in June 1970, I am instructed by my Government to inform you of the following facts:

Between 23 August and 3 September of this year, two Arab terrorists attempted to bring about the destruction, in flight, of an aircraft belonging to El Al, the national airline of Israel, and the consequent death of all its passengers and crew.

They beguiled two young girls, one of them a passenger from London to Lod and the other a passenger from Rome to Lod, into carrying suitcases for them on the flights to Israel, ostensibly to be delivered, in one case, to a kinswoman of the terrorist, and, in the other, to be kept until the "consignor" himself arrived.

The following articles were discovered in the suitcase consigned from Rome: a sabotage device, set up within a false bottom, consisting of two-volt batteries, an altimeter, three ordinary detonators, one electrical

detonator, two bricks of TNT, each weighing 200 grams, and a 23-metre length of fuse.

The bricks of TNT were linked to one another in a series in such a way that the altimeter would close the electrical circuit at a prearranged height, and the electrical circuit would set off the electrical detonator, which was inserted in the brick. That brick when detonated, would set off the ordinary detonator which was attached to it, and that, again, would ignite the length of fuse, and the ignited length of fuse would set off the second brick.

It should be noted that the whole chain of explosions was intended to take place simultaneously by reason of the high detonation-wave of the length of fuse.

The suitcase consigned from London contained the following: a sabotage device, placed among the personal belongings packed in the suitcase, consisting of three sabotage-bricks (ROX), each weighing 3 kilograms, an electrical detonator, and an electrical delaying device operated by a 9-volt battery.

The bricks were linked one to the other with an electrical detonator, inserted in each one. The operating device was constructed in this manner: the elec-

trical delaying device was designed, after a prearranged time, to set off the electrical detonator, and that would directly set off the explosives. ROX is explosive material of radiating force, equal, approximately, to a speed of detonation of 9,000 metres a second; that speed is almost one and a half as great again as the speed of detonation of ordinary TNT.

The Government of Israel has reason to believe that further acts of sabotage and of systematic aerial piracy, which have almost led to a total disruption of civil aviation in the recent past, and cost many innocent lives, are contemplated.

In making its notification, the Government of Israel urges the Organization to take whatever further steps it may deem necessary to prevent the recrudescence of acts of violence against international civil aviation that jeopardize the safety of persons and property, gravely affect the operation of the international air services, and that undermine public confidence in the safety of civil aviation.

(Signed) David EPHRATI  
Representative of Israel to the  
International Civil Aviation  
Organization

#### DOCUMENT S/10364

Letter dated 7 October 1971 from the representatives of Algeria, Barbados, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Democratic Republic of), Dahomey, Egypt, Ethiopia, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guyana, India, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Kenya, Liberia, Libyan Arab Republic, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, People's Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Yugoslavia and Zambia to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English/French]  
[8 October 1971]

On behalf of our respective Governments we have the honour to support the request for the urgent convening of the Security Council made by the Republic of Zambia in its letter dated 6 October 1971 [S/10352], following a series of serious incidents and violations of its sovereignty, air space and territorial integrity by the forces of the fascist Government of South Africa, culminating in the latest incident of 5 October 1971.

This latest armed incursion by the South African military authorities not only constitutes a serious threat to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Zambia but is also a threat to the peace and security of the region.

It confirms the contention of independent African States that no distinction can be made between arms purportedly restricted to internal repression and others meant for offensive purposes.

It is also pertinent to note that this aggression resulted from incidents which took place in the area bordering Zambia and the international territory of Namibia where South Africa illegally maintains its military and police forces to thwart the legitimate struggle of the Namibians for their independence. This aggression therefore underlines the fact that South Africa's continued presence in Namibia is a threat to international peace and security; and that it is incumbent on the Security Council, more than ever before, to take immediate steps to end this illegal occupation

of Namibia and the consequent violation of the territorial integrity of a Member State of the United Nations.

We believe that it is essential for the Security Council to deal decisively with this problem to avert a further deterioration of the matter.

We request you to circulate this letter as an official document of the Security Council.

Signed by the representatives of the following States  
Members of the United Nations:

Algeria	Guinea	Republic of the Congo
Barbados	Guyana	Rwanda
Botswana	India	Senegal
Burundi	Ivory Coast	Sierra Leone
Cameroon	Jamaica	Somalia
Central African Republic	Kenya	Sudan
Chad	Liberia	Syrian Arab Republic
Congo	Libyan Arab Republic	Togo
(Democratic Republic of)	Madagascar	Trinidad and Tobago
Dahomey	Malaysia	Tunisia
Egypt	Mali	Uganda
Ethiopia	Mauritania	United Republic of Tanzania
Equatorial Guinea	Mauritius	Upper Volta
Gabon	Morocco	Yugoslavia
Gambia	Niger	Zambia
Ghana	Nigeria	
	Pakistan	
	People's	

DOCUMENT S/10365

Burundi, Sierra Leone, Somalia and Syrian Arab Republic: draft resolution

[Original: English]  
[8 October 1971]

*The Security Council,*

*Having received* the letter of the representative of Zambia contained in document S/10352 and also the letter from forty-six Member States contained in document S/10364,

*Taking note* of the statement made by the Representative of Zambia at its 1590th meeting, concerning violations of the sovereignty, airspace and territorial integrity of Zambia by South Africa,

*Mindful* that violations of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of a State constitute a threat to international peace and security,

*Gravely concerned* that violations of this nature seriously undermine the independence, peace and stability of neighbouring independent African States,

*Conscious* of its responsibility under Article 24, paragraphs 1 and 2, of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Condemns* the violations of the sovereignty, airspace and territorial integrity of Zambia by South Africa;

2. *Declares* that such violations are contrary to the Charter of the United Nations;

3. *Calls upon* South Africa to respect fully the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Zambia and desist forthwith from any violation thereof;

4. *Further declares* that in the event of a refusal by South Africa to comply with this resolution, the Security Council will meet again to consider further appropriate steps or measures in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter.

DOCUMENT S/10368

Letter dated 11 October 1971 from the representative of Lesotho to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English]  
[11 October 1971]

On behalf of the Lesotho Government, I have the honour to support the request for the convening of the Security Council made by the Republic of Zambia in its letter dated 6 October 1971 [S/10352]. This request is made in the continuing belief that the Security Council has a direct responsibility for the maintenance of peace in the area and for underwriting the territorial integrity of Member States.

We request you to circulate this letter as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mooki MOLAPO  
Permanent Representative of  
Lesotho to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/10372

Burundi, Sierra Leone, Somalia and Syrian Arab Republic: draft resolution

[Original: English]  
[15 October 1971]

*The Security Council,*

*Reaffirming* the inalienable right of the people of Namibia to freedom and independence recognized in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960,

*Recognizing* that the United Nations has direct responsibility for Namibia following the adoption of General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI), and that States should conduct any relations with or involving Namibia in a manner consistent with that responsibility,

*Reaffirming* its resolutions 264 (1969), 276 (1970) and 283 (1970),

*Recalling* its resolutions 284 (1970) requesting the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion on the question:

"What are the legal consequences for States of the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia, notwithstanding Security Council resolution 276 (1970)?"

*Gravely concerned* at the refusal of the Government of South Africa to comply with the resolutions of the Security Council pertaining to Namibia,

*Taking note* of its resolution 282 (1970) of 23 July 1970 on the arms embargo against the Government of South Africa and the significance of that resolution with regard to the Territory of Namibia,

*Recognizing* the legitimacy of the movement of the people in Namibia against the illegal occupation of their Territory by the South African authorities and their right to self-determination and independence,

*Having heard* the statements by the delegation of the Organization of African Unity, led by the President of Mauritania,

*Taking note* of the statement by the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia,

*Having considered* the report of the *Ad Hoc* Sub-Committee on Namibia [S/10330],

1. *Reaffirms* that the Territory of Namibia is the direct responsibility of the United Nations and that this responsibility includes the obligation to support and promote the rights of the people of Namibia in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV);

2. *Reaffirms* the national unity and territorial integrity of Namibia;

3. *Condemns* all moves by the Government of South Africa designed to destroy that unity and territorial integrity such as through the establishment of Bantustans;

4. *Declares* that South Africa's continued illegal presence in Namibia constitutes an internationally wrongful act and a breach of international obligations and that South Africa remains accountable to the international community for any violations of its international obligations or rights of the people of the Territory of Namibia;

5. *Takes note* of the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice,<sup>5</sup> in particular the following conclusions:

"(1) That, the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia being illegal, South Africa is under obligation to withdraw its administration from Namibia immediately and thus put an end to its occupation of the Territory;

"(2) That States Members of the United Nations are under obligation to recognize the illegality of South Africa's presence in Namibia and the invalidity of its acts on behalf of or concerning Namibia, and to refrain from any acts and in particular any dealings with the Government of South Africa implying recognition of the legality of, or lending support or assistance to, such presence and administration;

"(3) That it is incumbent upon States which are not Members of the United Nations to give assistance, within the scope of subparagraph (2) above, in the action which has been taken by the United Nations with regard to Namibia."

6. *Declares* that all matters affecting the rights of the people of Namibia are of immediate concern to all Members of the United Nations and as a result

the latter should take this into account in their dealings with the Government of South Africa and in particular in any dealings implying recognition of the legality of or lending support or assistance to such illegal presence and administration;

7. *Calls once again* upon South Africa to withdraw from the Territory of Namibia;

8. *Declares* that any further refusal of the South African Government to withdraw from Namibia could create conditions detrimental to the maintenance of peace and security in the region;

9. *Reaffirms* the provisions of resolution 283 (1970) and in particular paragraphs 1 to 8 and 11;

10. *Calls upon* all States in discharge of their responsibilities towards the people of Namibia and subject to the exceptions set forth in paragraphs 122 and 125 of the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice:

(a) To abstain from entering into treaty relations with South Africa in all cases in which the Government of South Africa purports to act on behalf of or concerning Namibia;

(b) To abstain from invoking or applying those treaties or provisions of treaties concluded by South Africa on behalf of or concerning Namibia which involve active intergovernmental co-operation;

(c) To review their bilateral treaties with South Africa in order to ensure that they are not inconsistent with paragraphs 5 and 6 above;

(d) To abstain from sending diplomatic or special missions to South Africa including in their jurisdiction the Territory of Namibia;

(e) To abstain from sending consular agents to Namibia and to withdraw any such agents already there;

(f) To abstain from entering into economic and other forms of relationship or dealings with South Africa on behalf of or concerning Namibia which may trench its authority over the Territory;

11. *Declares* that franchises, rights, titles or contracts relating to Namibia granted to individuals or companies by South Africa after the adoption of General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) are not subject to protection or espousal by their States against claims of a future lawful Government of Namibia;

12. *Requests* the *Ad Hoc* Sub-Committee on Namibia to continue consideration of the question of Namibia in accordance with the tasks entrusted to it by paragraphs 14 and 15 of Security Council resolution 283 (1970) and, in particular, taking into account the need to provide for the effective protection of Namibian interest at the international level and to study appropriate measures for the fulfilment of the responsibility of the United Nations towards Namibia;

13. *Requests* that the *Ad Hoc* Sub-Committee on Namibia review multilateral treaties in order to ensure that States do not enter into agreements which recognize South Africa's authority over Namibia;

14. *Calls upon* all States to support and promote the rights of the people of Namibia and to this end to implement fully the provisions of this resolution;

15. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report periodically on the implementation of the provisions of paragraph 10 above.

<sup>5</sup> *Idem.*

DOCUMENT S/10376

Argentina: draft resolution

[Original: English]  
[20 October 1971]

*The Security Council,*

*Having examined further* the question of Namibia,

*Recognizing* the special responsibility and obligation of the United Nations towards the people and territory of Namibia,

*Reaffirming once again* the inalienable and imprescriptible right of the people of Namibia to self-determination and independence,

*Reaffirming also* the national unity and the territorial integrity of Namibia,

1. *Invites* the Secretary-General, acting on behalf of the United Nations, to take all necessary steps as soon as possible, including making contact with all parties concerned, with a view to establishing the necessary conditions so as to enable the people of that territory, freely and with strict regard to the principles of human equality, to exercise their right to self-determination and independence, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the implementation of the present resolution.

DOCUMENT S/10376/REV.1

Argentina: revised draft resolution

[Original: Spanish]  
[22 October 1971]

*The Security Council,*

*Having examined further* the question of Namibia, and without prejudice to other resolutions adopted by the Security Council on this matter,

*Recognizing* the special responsibility and obligation of the United Nations towards the people and territory of Namibia,

*Reaffirming once again* the inalienable and imprescriptible right of the people of Namibia to self-determination and independence,

*Reaffirming also* the national unity and the territorial integrity of Namibia,

1. *Invites* the Secretary-General, acting on behalf of the United Nations, to initiate as soon as possible contacts with all parties concerned, with a view to establishing the necessary conditions so as to enable the people of Namibia, freely and with strict regard to the principles of human equality, to exercise their right to self-determination and independence, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;

2. *Calls upon* the Government of South Africa to co-operate fully with the Secretary-General in the implementation of this resolution;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the implementation of this resolution not later than 30 April 1972.

DOCUMENT S/10380

Letter dated 29 October 1971 from the representative of Pakistan to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English]  
[30 October 1971]

I have been instructed by my Government to bring to the notice of the Security Council the serious violations of Pakistan's borders and air space committed by the armed forces of India in recent weeks. These violations are mentioned in the notes of protest which have been addressed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Government of Pakistan to the High Commission of India in Pakistan on 10 and 21 September, 9, 19 and 23 October relating to borders and 20 Sep-

tember and 5, 19, and 23 October relating to air space. Copies of these notes are enclosed.

I have the honour to request that this letter, along with its enclosures, be circulated as a Security Council document.

(Signed) A. SHAHI  
Permanent Representative of Pakistan  
to the United Nations

TEXT OF NOTES FROM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN  
AFFAIRS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN TO THE  
HIGH COMMISSION OF INDIA IN PAKISTAN

*Note of 10 September 1971*

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents its compliments to the High Commission of India in Pakistan and in continuation of the Ministry's note of 17 August 1971, has the honour to state the following:

(a) At 1900 hours on 6 August 1971, the Indian Army fired 80 rounds from heavy mortars on the border outpost Benapole in district Jessore;

(b) At 0100 hours on 7 August 1971, the border outpost Bhomra in district Khulna was shelled by the Indian Army without any provocation;

(c) At 0800 hours on 7 August 1971, the border outpost Kakkdanga in district Khulna was shelled by the Indian Army without any provocation;

(d) From 1300 hours to 1500 hours on 8 August 1971, the Indian Army fired approximately 200 rounds in Saldanadi area, district Comilla, from heavy mortars, as a result of which 2 persons were wounded;

(e) At 0430 hours on 8 August 1971, the Indian Army shelled the border outpost Bhomra, district Khulna;

(f) From 0500 hours to 1015 hours on 9 August 1971, the Indian Army intermittently shelled the border outpost Mandra in district Khulna. Due to this unprovoked shelling 1 person was seriously wounded;

(g) At 1130 hours on 9 August 1971, the border outpost Bhomra in district Khulna was shelled by the Indian Army;

(h) At 0430 hours on 10 August 1971, the Indian Army fired 80 rounds from heavy mortars on the border outpost Atgram in district Sylhet;

(i) At 0400 hours on 10 August 1971, the Indian Army fired 60 rounds from heavy mortars in Saldanadi area in district Comilla;

(j) At 0200 hours on 11 August 1971, border outpost Ragunathpur, district Jessore, was subjected to unprovoked shelling by the Indian Army. This post was again subjected to shelling at 0630 hours the same day;

(k) At 2000 hours on 11 August 1971, the Indian Army fired 20 rounds from heavy mortars on the border outpost Kakkdanga in district Khulna;

(l) At 0615 hours on 12 August 1971, the Indian Army fired 35 rounds from heavy mortars on the border outpost Darsana in district Kushtia;

(m) At 1430 hours on 25 August 1971, the border outpost Bhomra in district Khulna was shelled by the Indian Army and as a result of this unprovoked shelling 1 person was killed and another wounded;

(n) At 1610 hours on 14 August 1971, the Indian Army fired 88 rounds from heavy mortars on the border outpost Maslia in district Jessore;

(o) At 2345 hours on 14 August 1971, 50 rounds from heavy mortars were fired by the Indian Army on the outpost Chuttipur in district Jessore;

(p) At 0200 hours on 15 August 1971, the border outpost Basantapur in district Khulna was shelled by the Indian Army. This post was again subjected to shelling at 0600 hours the same day;

(q) At 0800 hours on 15 August 1971, the border outpost Kakkdanga in district Khulna was shelled by the Indian Army;

(r) At 0900 hours and 2315 hours on 15 August 1971, Indian Army subjected the border outpost Bhomra in district Khulna to unprovoked shelling;

(s) At 1100 hours on 16 August 1971, area Gangasagar in district Comilla was shelled by the Indian field artillery. As a result of this shelling a number of houses in the area were destroyed;

(t) At 1045 hours on 17 August 1971, the Indian Army fired 53 rounds from field guns on the border outpost Chuttipur in district Jessore;

(u) At 1815 hours on 18 August 1971, 30 rounds of 3 inch mortar were fired by the Indian Army on the border outpost Benapole in district Jessore;

(v) At 0700 hours on 18 August 1971, a platoon of the Indian Border Security Forces intruded into Pakistan territory at Kulfetipur (688997) in district Rajshahi and opened fire on the East Pakistan Civil Armed Forces;

(w) At 2000 hours on 19 August 1971, the Indian Army fired 53 rounds from field guns on the border outpost Pregpur in district Kushtia;

(x) At 0230 hours on 30 August 1971, the border outpost Kakkdanga in district Khulna was shelled by the Indian Army;

(y) At 0600 hours on 31 August 1971, 85 rounds from heavy mortars were fired by the Indian Army on the border outpost Benapole in district Jessore;

(z) At 0615 hours on 21 August 1971, the Indian Army fired 35 rounds from field guns on the border outpost Chuttipur in district Jessore;

(aa) At 0700 hours on 22 August 1971, 51 rounds from the Indian Army field guns were fired on the border outpost Dhopakhalai in district Kushtia. This unprovoked shelling resulted in injuring an innocent Pakistani national;

(bb) At 1230 hours on 22 August 1971, the border outpost Benapole in district Jessore was shelled by the Indian Army;

(cc) At 0330 hours on 23 August 1971, the Indian Army shelled the border outpost Kakkdanga in district Khulna with heavy mortars. This post was again subjected to unprovoked shelling at 1300 hours the same day;

(dd) From 0100 hours to 0600 hours on 23 August 1971, the border outpost Rahimpur in district Sylhet was shelled by the Indian Army without any provocation. Two hundred fifty rounds from field artillery and heavy mortars were estimated to have been fired. Two persons received serious injury due to this wanton act;

(ee) At 2100 hours on 24 August 1971, the border outpost Kakkdanga in district Khulna was shelled by the Indian Army;

(ff) At 0600 hours on 25 August 1971, the Indian Army shelled the border outpost Chuttipur in district Jessore with mortars; 2 persons were seriously wounded;

(gg) At 0130 hours on 26 August 1971, the Indian Army fired 100 rounds from heavy mortars and 40 from field guns on the border outpost Benapole in district Jessore. This post was subjected again to unprovoked shelling at 0630 hours;

(hh) At 0830 hours on 27 August 1971, 50 rounds from field guns and 40 from heavy mortars of the Indian Army were fired at the border outpost Benapole in district Jessore.

The Ministry lodges a strong protest against the above incidents of unprovoked shelling of Pakistan territory with artillery and heavy mortars by the Indian Army and Border Security Forces. The Government of Pakistan reserves the right to claim compensation for the loss of life and property destroyed as a result of the shelling.

*Note of 21 September 1971*

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents its compliments to the High Commission of India in Pakistan and in continuation of the Ministry's note of 10 September 1971, has the honour to state the following:

(a) At 1630 hours on 30 August 1971, the Indian Army fired 30 rounds from 3-inch mortars on our border outpost Basantapur in district Khulna without any provocation;

(b) At 2100 hours on 30 August 1971, the Indian Army shelled the border outpost Kakdanga in district Khulna;

(c) At 2100 hours on 31 August 1971, the Indian Army fired 25 rounds from 3-inch mortars on area Haraspur in district Sylhet;

(d) At 1130 hours on 3 September 1971, the Indian Army fired 65 rounds from 3-inch mortars on area Basantapur in district Khulna. As a result of this unprovoked firing 2 persons were killed and 3 fatally injured;

(e) At 0200 hours on 3 September 1971, 25 rounds from field guns were fired by the Indian Army on the border outpost Kakdanga in district Khulna without any provocation;

(f) At 0900 hours on 3 September 1971, the Indian Army fired 30 rounds from 3-inch mortars on area Benapole in district Jessore;

(g) At 1415 hours on 5 September 1971, the Indian Army fired 36 rounds from 3-inch mortars on Darsana in district Kushtia without any provocation;

(h) At 0430 hours on 5 September 1971, the border outpost Bhomra in district Khulna was subjected to 96 rounds of 3-inch mortar fire by the Indian Army;

(i) At 0530 hours on 9 September 1971, the Indian Army fired 30 rounds from 3-inch mortars on Kakdanga in district Khulna;

(j) At 0730 hours on 5 September 1971, a platoon of the Indian Border Security Forces infiltrated into Pakistan territory at Setaldangah in district Rajshahi and opened fire on the Pakistan Civil Armed Forces. Later, the platoon withdrew into Indian territory;

(k) At 0800 hours on 6 September 1971, 31 rounds from 3-inch mortars were fired by the Indian Army on the border outpost Bhomra in district Khulna. At 1900 hours 33 rounds from mortars were fired again by the Indian Army without any provocation;

(l) At 2245 hours on 8 September 1971, the Indian Army resorted to field guns and fired 11 rounds on the border outpost Mandra in district Khulna;

(m) At 1145 hours on 9 September 1971, 47 rounds from heavy mortars from the Indian Army fell on Dangmarka in district Kushtia without any provocation;

(n) At 1400 hours on 9 September 1971, the Indian Army shelled Chandala in district Comilla by firing 30 rounds with their field guns;

(o) At 2300 hours on 9 September 1971, the Indian Army again fired 40 rounds from field guns on the

areas with co-ordinates RM-2624 and RM-2626 in district Comilla;

(p) At 2300 hours on 9 September 1971, Barajal in district Comilla was subjected to 103 rounds of heavy fire with their field guns by the Indian Army without any provocation;

(q) At 2300 hours on 10 September 1971, the Indian Army fired 60 rounds with field guns on the area Benapole in district Jessore;

(r) At 1800 hours on 11 September 1971, Basantapur, the border outpost in district Khulna, was subjected to 50 rounds of 3-inch mortar fire by the Indian Army;

(s) At 1000 hours on 12 September 1971, 50 rounds from 3-inch mortars were fired on Chuttipur in district Jessore by the Indian Army without any provocation;

(t) At 0930 hours on 13 September 1971, Benapole in district Jessore was subjected to 65 rounds from 3-inch mortars by the Indian Army.

The Ministry strongly protests against these incidents of continuous and unprovoked attacks by the Indian Army and Border Security Forces on Pakistan territory in utter disregard of the Ground Rules.

The Government of Pakistan reserves the right to claim compensation for damages to life and property as a result of wanton and unprovoked attacks by Indian armed personnel on Pakistan territory.

*Note of 9 October 1971*

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents its compliments to the High Commission of India in Pakistan and in continuation of the Ministry's note dated 21 September 1971, has the honour to bring to its urgent notice the following serious border violations committed by the Indian Army:

(a) At 1300 hours on 14 September 1971, the Indian Army fired 35 rounds from field guns on our border outpost Mandra in district Khulna without any provocation;

(b) At 1800 hours on 14 September 1971, Bhomra in district Khulna was subjected to 38 rounds from 3-inch mortars by the Indian Army;

(c) From 1000 hours to 1330 hours on 14 September 1971, the Indian Army fired 175 rounds from field guns and 175 rounds from 3-inch mortars on area Bandarkata in district Mymensingh. As a result of this wanton act 1 person was killed and 3 were injured;

(d) At 0900 hours on 15 September 1971, area Pragpur in district Kushtia was subjected to 31 rounds from field guns by the Indian Army;

(e) From 1900 hours to 0400 hours on the night of 14 to 15 September 1971, area Matibandha in district Rangpur was subjected to shelling with field guns by the Indian Army. Two persons received serious injuries and one wagon was destroyed as a result of this wanton act;

(f) From 1900 hours to 0400 hours, area Barakhata in district Rangpur was shelled by the Indian Army. As a result of this unprovoked fire, 1 person was killed and another received fatal injuries;

(g) At 1145 hours on 16 September 1971, area Bhomra in district Khulna was subjected to 45 rounds from 3-inch mortars and 63 rounds from field guns by the Indian Army;

(h) At 0600 hours on 16 September 1971, 60 rounds from field guns on area Kakdanga in district Khulna were fired by the Indian Army without any provocation;

(i) At 0815 hours on 16 September 1971, 50 rounds from field guns were fired on area Kachnia in district Bogra. As a result of this wanton act by the Indian Army, 1 person was killed;

(j) At 0200 hours on 17 September 1971, border outpost Basantapur in district Khulna received 100 rounds from 3-inch mortars from the Indian Army;

(k) At 0830 hours on 17 September 1971, 50 rounds from field guns were fired by the Indian Army on the border outpost Kakdanga in district Khulna without any provocation;

(l) At 1900 hours on 17 September 1971, border outpost Mandra in district Khulna was subjected to 60 rounds from field guns by the Indian Army;

(m) At 0330 hours on 18 September 1971, area Chak Umar in district Rajshahi was shelled with 30 rounds from field guns by the Indian Army;

(n) At 1400 hours on 18 September 1971, area Pragpur in district Kushtia was subjected to 79 rounds from heavy mortars without any provocation;

(o) At 2345 hours on 18 September 1971, area Jaipur in district Sylhet came under 4.2-inch mortar fire. Ten rounds fired by the Indian Army resulted in the killing of 3 innocent persons and injuring 1 without any provocation;

(p) At 1120 hours on 19 September 1971, 9 rounds from field guns and 70 rounds from 3-inch mortars were fired on area Bhomra in district Khulna by the Indian Army;

(q) At 0615 hours on 19 September 1971, area Ichhakhali in district Kushtia was subjected to 40 rounds from 3-inch mortars by the Indian Army;

(r) At 0500 hours on 19 September 1971, area Atgram in district Sylhet, came under 3 rounds of medium gun fire. This unprovoked Indian Army firing resulted in the injuring of 3 Pakistan nationals;

(s) At 1130 hours on 20 September 1971, area Benapole in district Jessore was pounded with 50 rounds of 3-inch mortar fire by the Indian Army;

(t) At 0500 hours on 20 September 1971, 60 rounds from 4.2-inch mortars on the area Radhanagar in district Sylhet were fired by the Indian Army without any provocation;

(u) At 1400 hours on 20 September 1971, border outpost Bhomra in district Khulna received 22 rounds from field guns and 22 rounds from 3-inch mortars fired by the Indian Army;

(v) At 0330 hours on 20 September 1971, area Seranti in district Rajshahi was subjected to 50 rounds from 3-inch mortars by the Indian Army without any provocation;

(w) On 21 September 1971, 54 rounds from field guns and 67 rounds from 3-inch mortars were fired on area Marchatali in district Noakhali. One person was killed and another fatally injured as a result of this wanton act by the Indian Army;

(x) At 0800 hours on 22 September 1971, the Indian Army fired 300 rounds on the border outpost Pragpur in district Kushtia from their field guns without any provocation;

(y) At 0600 hours on 22 September 1971, 50 rounds from 3-inch mortars were fired on the area Benapole in district Jessore by the Indian Army;

(z) At 0300 hours on 22 September 1971, area Chak Umar in district Rajshahi received 30 rounds from field guns fired by the Indian Army;

(aa) At 0940 hours on 22 September 1971, area Kamalpur in district Mymensingh was subjected to 135 rounds of field gun fire by the Indian Army;

(bb) At 0945 hours on 22 September 1971, 60 rounds from 4.2-inch mortars were fired on the area Parashuram in district Noakhali by the Indian Army; as a result of this wanton act 1 person was killed and another seriously wounded;

(cc) At 0415 hours on 23 September 1971, area Saphar in district Rajshahi became the object of 43 rounds from Indian Army field guns;

(dd) At 0800 hours on 23 September 1971, 220 rounds from 3-inch mortars and 70 rounds from field guns were fired on the area Benapole in district Jessore, by the Indian Army;

(ee) At 0230 hours on 23 September 1971, area Chak Umar in district Rajshahi received 45 rounds from field guns from the Indian Army;

(ff) At 0415 hours on 23 September 1971, area Chak Umar in district Rajshahi was subjected to 45 rounds from Indian Army field guns;

(gg) At 1530 hours on 23 September 1971, the Indian Army fired 20 rounds from 3-inch mortars on the area Chuttipur in district Jessore;

(hh) At 1100 hours on 23 September 1971, area Kamalpur in district Mymensingh came under the fire of 27 rounds from field guns by the Indian Army;

(ii) At 0430 hours on 24 September 1971, the Indian Army fired 56 rounds from field guns on area Kachnia in district Bogra without any provocation;

(jj) At 1200 hours on 24 September 1971, 20 rounds of 7-inch How were fired on the area Darsana in district Kushtia by the Indian Army;

While lodging a strong protest against border violations and unprovoked shelling of Pakistan territory by the Indian armed personnel, the Ministry would like to point out that responsibility for consequences that may follow from such acts would rest entirely with the Government of India. Further, the Government of Pakistan reserves the right to claim compensation for damages caused to life and property.

#### *Note of 19 October 1971*

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents its compliments to the High Commission of India in Pakistan and in continuation of the Ministry's note of 9 October 1971, has the honour to bring to its urgent notice the following serious border violations committed by the Indian Army:

(a) At 0045 hours on 25 September 1971, the Indian Army fired 80 rounds from 3-inch mortars on area Basantapur in district Khulna without any provocation;

(b) At 0530 hours on 25 September 1971, area Pragpur in district Kushtia was subjected to 52 rounds of field gun fire by the Indian Army;

(c) At 0430 hours on 25 September 1971, area Kachnia in district Bogra was subjected to 40 rounds of Indian Army field gun fire. As a result of this wanton act 3 civilians were killed;

(d) At 2030 hours on 26 September 1971, area Basantapur in district Khulna was shelled with 400 rounds of field guns and 3-inch mortars. As a result of this unprovoked shelling by the Indian Army 1 person was killed;

(e) At 2115 hours on 26 September 1971, the Indian Army fired 75 rounds from 3-inch mortars on the area Benapole in district Jessore;

(f) At 1000 hours on 27 September 1971, 12 rounds from field guns and 18 rounds from 3-inch mortars were fired on the area Kasba in district Comilla without any provocation by the Indian Army;

(g) At 1200 hours on 27 September 1971, area Kuti in district Comilla came under 48 rounds of field gun fire by the Indian Army;

(h) At 1600 hours on 27 September 1971, the Indian Army fired 40 rounds of 3-inch mortar fire on Basantapur in district Khulna;

(i) At 0630 hours on 28 September 1971, 1,000 rounds from field guns were fired by the Indian Army on the areas detailed below without any provocation as a result of which 2 persons were killed and 11 received fatal injuries:

- (i) Dharmaghar in district Sylhet;
- (ii) Karashpur in district Sylhet;
- (iii) Jaipur in district Sylhet;
- (iv) Kamalpur in district Sylhet;
- (v) Maniala in district Sylhet;

(j) At 0700 hours on 29 September 1971, 30 rounds from field guns were fired on area Saldanadi in district Comilla by the Indian Army;

(k) At 1500 hours on 29 September 1971, 70 rounds from field guns were fired on area Chatlapur in district Dinajpur by the Indian Army without any provocation;

(l) At 0945 hours on 30 September 1971, area Rajghat in district Sylhet was subjected to fire from 4.2-inch mortars by the Indian Army. As a result of this unprovoked firing 1 person was killed and 2 received fatal injuries;

(m) At 1000 hours on 2 October 1971, 30 rounds from field guns and 3-inch mortars from the Indian Army fell on area Saldanadi in district Comilla;

(n) At 1100 hours on 4 October 1971, area Saldanadi in district Comilla became the object of 95 rounds from 3-inch mortars and 50 rounds from recoilless rifles fired by the Indian Army;

(o) At 2215 hours on 4 October 1971, area Daršana in district Kushtia was subjected to 28 rounds from 20-mm. mortars by the Indian Army.

(p) At 1300 hours on 5 October 1971, the Indian Army fired 36 rounds from 2-inch mortars on area Bhomra in district Khulna without any provocation.

The Government of Pakistan takes a serious view of these instances of continuous and unprovoked shelling on Pakistan territory by the Indian Army in gross violation of the Ground Rules. The consequences that may follow from such wanton acts of unprovoked shelling and mortaring by the Indian Army would rest entirely with the Government of India.

In conveying this protest the Government of Pakistan reserve the right to claim compensation from the Government of India for damage caused to life and property in East Pakistan.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents its compliments to the High Commission of India in Pakistan and in continuation of the Ministry's note of 19 October 1971, has the honour to bring to its urgent notice the following serious violations of Pakistan borders committed by the Indian Army:

(a) At 1300 hours on 6 October 1971, the Indian Army fired 10 rounds from 3-inch mortars on the area Chuttipur in district Jessore;

(b) From 0100 hours to 2300 hours on 6 October 1971, area Parashuram in district Noakhali was subjected to 201 rounds from heavy mortars by the Indian Army;

(c) At 1750 hours on 6 October 1971, 36 rounds from field guns were fired by the Indian Army on the area Dingapara in district Dinajpur;

(d) At 1700 hours on 6 October 1971, area Bhomra in district Khulna was shelled with 7 rounds from field guns and 7 rounds from 3-inch mortars by the Indian Army;

(e) At 2200 hours on 6 October 1971, area Kakdanga in district Khulna was subjected to 8 rounds from field guns and 12 rounds from 3-inch mortars by the Indian Army;

(f) At 0430 hours on 7 October 1971, the Indian Army fired 29 rounds from field guns on the area Benapole in district Jessore;

(g) At 1730 hours on 7 October 1971, 27 rounds from 120-mm. mortars were fired on the area Daršana in district Kushtia by the Indian Army without any provocation;

(h) At 0315 hours on 8 October 1971, border outpost Ichhakhali in district Kushtia was subjected to 25 rounds from field guns by the Indian Army without any provocation;

(i) At 1225 hours on 8 October 1971, 80 rounds from heavy mortars and 75 rounds from recoilless rifles were fired by the Indian Army on the area Saldanadi;

(j) At 1130 hours on 8 October 1971, the Indian Army fired 40 rounds from 4.2-inch mortars on area RH-2997 in district Sylhet without any provocation. As a result of this wanton act of the Indian Army 1 Pakistan national was seriously wounded;

(k) At 0200 hours on 9 October 1971, area Kakdanga in district Khulna became the object of 80 rounds fired from field guns by the Indian Armed Forces;

(l) At 1800 hours on 8 October 1971, 50 rounds from Indian Army field guns were fired on area Benapole in district Jessore;

(m) At 0700 hours on 8 October 1971, the Indian Army fired 170 rounds from field guns on area Bhomra in district Khulna without any provocation;

(n) At 0325 hours on 8 October 1971, 87 rounds from 120-mm. mortars were fired by the Indian Army on area Ichhakhali in district Kushtia without any provocation;

(o) At 1500 hours on 8 October 1971, area Benapole in district Jessore was subjected to 70 rounds from field guns fired by the Indian Army;

(p) At 1830 hours on 9 October 1971, 32 rounds from field guns were fired on area Maheshkandi in district Kushtia by the Indian Army;

(q) At 0600 hours on 10 October 1971, the Indian Army directed their field guns on area Benapole in district Jessore and fired 25 rounds without any provocation;

(r) At 1400 hours on 10 October 1971, 21 rounds from 3-inch mortars were fired by the Indian Army on the area Mustia in district Jessore;

(s) At 2100 hours on 11 October 1971, area Kakdanga in district Khulna was subjected to 15 rounds of field gun fire by the Indian Army;

(t) At 1100 hours on 11 October 1971, area RR-3297 in district Comilla was subjected to heavy mortars fired by the Indian Army. As a result of this wanton act 5 persons were killed, 39 others including 3 children and 1 woman received serious injuries;

(u) At 0945 hours on 12 October 1971, area Maslia in district Jessore was subjected to 20 rounds of field gun fire by the Indian Armed Forces. This unprovoked firing resulted in injuries to 3 innocent persons.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs lodges a strong protest against unprovoked and continuous shelling on Pakistan territory with mortars and heavy field guns by the Indian Armed Forces in utter disregard of the Ground Rules. The responsibility for consequences that may follow these wanton acts of aggression by the Indian Army would rest entirely with the Government of India.

While conveying the protest the Government of Pakistan also reserves the right to claim compensation for the damages caused to life and property in East Pakistan.

#### *Note of 20 September 1971*

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents its compliments to the High Commission of India in Pakistan and has the honour to bring to the notice of the High Commission the following instances of violation of Pakistan airspace by Indian aircraft:

(a) On 5 September 1971 at 1645F, an Indian fighter aircraft violated Pakistan airspace and flew over area Pachagarh north east of Shibganj. It penetrated 2 nautical miles inside Pakistan territory;

(b) On 6 September 1971 at 1730F, an Indian fighter aircraft violated Pakistan airspace and flew over area Pachagarh north east of Shibganj. Maximum penetration inside Pakistan territory was 6 nautical miles;

(c) On 7 September 1971 at 2030E, two Indian jet aircraft violated Pakistan airspace and flew over Lahore area. Maximum penetration into Pakistan territory was 5 nautical miles.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs strongly protests to the Government of India against the incidents and

requests the Government of India to take immediate steps to stop violations of Pakistan airspace by Indian aircraft in future.

#### *Note of 5 October 1971*

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents its compliments to the High Commission of India in Pakistan and has the honour to bring to the notice of the High Commission the following instance of violation of Pakistan airspace by Indian aircraft; on 20 September 1971 at 0955E two Indian jet aircraft violated Pakistan airspace and flew over the area north-east of Pasrur. Maximum penetration inside Pakistan territory was 10 nautical miles.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs strongly protests to the Government of India against the incident and requests the Government of India to take immediate steps to stop violation.

#### *Note of 19 October 1971*

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents its compliments to the High Commission of India in Pakistan and has the honour to bring to its attention the following serious violations of Pakistan airspace by Indian aircraft:

(a) On 28 September 1971, at 1135E an Indian light aircraft violated Pakistan airspace and flew over the area north of Lahore. Maximum penetration inside Pakistan territory was 15 nautical miles;

(b) On 1 October 1971, at 1535E two Indian jet aircraft violated Pakistan airspace and flew over the area north-east of Bahawalnagar. Maximum penetration inside Pakistan territory was 11 nautical miles;

(c) On 6 October 1971, at 1240E an Indian light aircraft violated Pakistan airspace and flew over area Bahawalnagar. Maximum penetration was 9 nautical miles;

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs strongly protests to the Government of India against these incidents and demands that such activities should stop forthwith.

#### *Note of 23 October 1971*

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents its compliments to the High Commission of India in Pakistan and has the honour to bring to its attention the following serious violation of Pakistan airspace by Indian aircraft: on 8 October 1971 at 1018E, two Indian jet aircraft violated Pakistan airspace and flew over Kasur area. Maximum penetration into Pakistan territory was 3 nautical miles.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs strongly protests to the Government of India against this incident and demands that such activities should stop forthwith.

### DOCUMENT S/10383

Letter dated 4 November 1971 from the representative of Pakistan to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English]  
[4 November 1971]

I have been instructed by the Government of Pakistan to draw the attention of the Security Council to the fact that, for the last several weeks, the Government of India has not only massed its troops and armour on the borders of Pakistan but has considerably increased its forces in the State of Jammu and Kashmir.

The latter action by India constitutes clear violation of:

(a) The agreement embodied in the resolution of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan dated 13 August 1948, paragraph B of part I of which reads:

"The High Commands of the Indian and Pakistan forces agree to refrain from taking any measures that might augment the military potential of the forces under their control in the State of Jammu and Kashmir";<sup>6</sup>

(b) The agreement regarding the establishment of a cease-fire line in the State of Jammu and Kashmir concluded on 27 July 1949, paragraph F of which reads in part:

"There shall be no increase of forces or strengthening of defences in areas where no major adjustments are involved by the determination of the cease-fire line."<sup>7</sup>

I have the honour to request that this letter may be circulated as a Security Council document.

(Signed) A. SHAHI  
Permanent Representative of Pakistan  
to the United Nations

<sup>6</sup> See *Official Records of the Security Council, Fourth Year, Special Supplement No. 7*, p. 22.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 129.

#### DOCUMENT S/10385

Letter dated 8 November 1971 from the representative of Upper Volta  
to the Secretary-General

[Original: English/French]  
[8 November 1971]

I have the honour to transmit herewith, in French and in English, the text of the statement adopted by the African Group following its meeting on Friday 5 November 1971.

I request you to have this statement circulated as an official Security Council document.

(Signed) Paul T. ROUAMBA  
Permanent Representative of the Upper Volta  
to the United Nations  
Chairman of the African Group

#### TEXT OF THE STATEMENT ADOPTED BY THE AFRICAN GROUP

The United States Congress took action on 4 November 1971 to allow chrome ore to be imported into the United States from Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) in contravention of Security Council resolution 253 (1968) of 29 May 1968 which the Government of the United States has supported and until now executed.

By that resolution, the Security Council, with the support of the United States of America, imposed mandatory sanctions against the illegal régime of Southern Rhodesia, and, in the exercise of its authority, called upon all Member States of the United Nations to observe the sanctions contained in its resolution 253 (1968), in particular and among other things, to prevent the "import into their territories of all commodities and products originating in Southern Rhodesia and exported therefrom after the date of this resolution (whether or not the commodities or products are for consumption or processing in their territories,

whether or not they are imported in bond and whether or not any special legal status with respect to the import of goods is enjoyed by the port or other place where they are imported or stored) . . .". This was an important action taken by the Security Council in support of the legitimate rights of over 5 million Africans against the oppressive action of the white minority régime which continues to inflict indignities on the Africans.

If the amendment removing the United States President's authority to ban the importing of Rhodesian chrome into the United States is implemented, it will undermine the basis for State responsibility for mandatory sanctions imposed by the Security Council, especially in the case of one of its permanent members.

The African Group at the United Nations deeply regrets this action taken by the United States Congress especially since such action would make the sanctions much more ineffective. The African Group nevertheless feels that there is still time for the United States Administration to recognize the importance of this matter and act in accordance with the degree of responsibility which such a matter demands.

The African Group views with grave concern any violation of the mandatory sanctions on Southern Rhodesia adopted by the Security Council. The African Group requests the Secretary-General to draw once again the attention of Member States to their responsibility under the Charter to adhere strictly to the decisions of the Council. In this connexion, the Group further requests the Secretary-General to use his good offices to draw the attention of the appropriate authorities of the United States to the effect of any violation of the mandatory sanctions against Southern Rhodesia.

DOCUMENT S/10388\*

Letter dated 15 November 1971 from the representative of Senegal to the President of the Security Council

[Original: French]  
[15 November 1971]

On instructions from my Government I have the honour to inform you of further incidents which occurred on the frontier between Senegal and Guinea (Bissau) in the night of 3 to 4 November 1971.

On 3 November, at about 2230 GMT, the Senegalese army had to take action against Portuguese army units who were laying mines in the village of Djibanar, compelling them to abandon their task.

During the same evening, at about 2340 GMT, the Senegalese army had to take action again, against Portuguese army units who had just entered the village of Simbandi-Balante in order to steal cattle. The thieves took 200 head of cattle with them after firing several bursts of machine-gun fire and throwing grenades. (Twelve 7.62-mm cartridge cases were found and evidence of grenade explosions was noted.)

The owner of the cattle has been identified: he is Macissé Mansaly, born in 1912 in the village of Simbandi-Balante (Sédhiou department), a farmer and stock-breeder living in that village.

On 4 November at about 2 a.m. a skirmish took place between Senegalese and Portuguese army units in the sector of the village of Kolane. In the course of this operation a Senegalese soldier was killed instantly and another, seriously wounded, was evacuated to the hospital at Ziguinchor.

\* Incorporating document S/10388/Corr.1.

The Senegalese soldier who was killed was Amath N'Diaye, born in 1951 at Fatick, private second class, registration number 6.71.01213, who was serving in the Seventh Ziguinchor Company. The wounded soldier is Mamadou N'Diaye, born on 27 December 1950, private second class, registration number 5.700.1448, serving in the Seventh Ziguinchor Company.

It should be noted that an incident had already occurred on 30 October, in which two persons were seriously injured and four slightly injured when a Senegalese military lorry struck a mine in Djibanar.

It is evident that all these incidents coming after the inquiry carried out by the Security Council mission on the frontier between Senegal and Guinea (Bissau), prove, if further proof is needed, how little heed the Portuguese authorities pay to the actions of the Security Council.

I should be grateful if you would bring these facts to the attention of the members of the Security Council and add this further material to the file on aggressive acts carried out against Senegal, a matter which is now before the Council and regarding which my Government would very much like to see the Council arrive at definitive conclusions.

I would request you to be good enough to have this letter circulated as an official Security Council document.

(Signed) Médoune FALL  
Permanent Representative of Senegal  
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/10389

Telegram dated 12 November 1971 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the German Democratic Republic to the President of the Security Council\*

[Original: English]  
[16 November 1971]

I have the honour to inform you that the Government of the German Democratic Republic welcomes and supports Security Council resolution 301 (1971) of 20 October 1971 concerning the situation in Namibia. It is, in particular, the reiterated statement that the United Nations responsibility for Namibia pursuant to the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice of 21 June 1971<sup>8</sup> is rightful and South Africa's illegal presence constitutes disregard for the Namibian people's inalienable rights to freedom and independence that has the full endorsement of the German Democratic Republic. The German Democratic Republic, which a long time ago severed all relations with South Africa in accordance with the resolutions adopted by the United Nations, strongly opposes the continued occupation of Namibia and the permanent violation of inter-

national obligations by the Government of the Republic of South Africa. Although the United Nations has repeatedly condemned and declared illegal the *apartheid* régime's refusal to withdraw from Namibia, the South African Government continues to challenge world public opinion and to violate most grossly the Namibian people's rights. In doing so, South Africa is committing aggression. The Government of the German Democratic Republic expects the Security Council, the body of the United Nations competent to safeguard world peace, to take effective decisions against the peace-endangering policies of the South African racists and the extensive assistance they receive from certain States. The Charter of the United Nations has vested the Security Council with the necessary powers to make the racist minority régime at last respect and carry out the decisions of the world Organization. In accordance with paragraph 133, subparagraph 3, of the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice of 21 June 1971, which refers to the obligation of non-Member States of the United Nations to support action by the United Nations relating to Namibia, the German

\* Circulated at the direction of the President of the Security Council.

<sup>8</sup> *Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council resolution 276 (1970)*, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971, p. 16.

Democratic Republic assures you that it will also in the future work for an unrestricted observance of the measures adopted by the Security Council and the General Assembly with a view to liquidating the suppression of Namibia. In harmony with the purposes and principles of the United Nations the German Democratic Republic insists that the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV))

and the programme of action for the implementation of that Declaration (General Assembly resolution 2621 (XXV)) be fully put into practice to meet all the interests of the Namibian people. Request you have this telegram circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

Otto WINZER  
*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the  
German Democratic Republic*

#### DOCUMENT S/10390

Letter dated 16 November 1971 from the representative of Pakistan to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English]  
[16 November 1971]

I am instructed by my Government, in continuation of my letters of 29 October [S/10380] and 4 November 1971, [S/10383], to draw the attention of the Security Council to the fact that, since the beginning of this month, two major attacks have been launched by the armed forces of India, supported by tanks and field guns, on Pakistan territory. The first one was near Kamalpur along the border of Sylhet and the second on the village of Belonia in the district of Noakhali—both in East Pakistan. In each case, Indian troops crossed the international frontier.

These grave occurrences are to be viewed in the context of the following ominous developments:

(a) The Prime Minister of India has acknowledged in recent statements reported in the press that India's objective is to bring about the secession of East Pakistan;

(b) India has received large supplies of arms and military equipment from a foreign source in recent weeks;

(c) India has substantially increased military assistance to the insurgent forces operating from Indian bases and staging armed incursions into the territory of East Pakistan;

- (d) Indian reservists have been called up;  
(e) Villages in Indian territory near the border have been evacuated;  
(f) Arms have been distributed to the population in the states of Rajasthan and East Punjab in India;  
(g) Blackout exercises are being carried out in all major Indian cities and, according to reports, a state of emergency is to be declared soon.

It is clear from these facts that the Government of India seems to have chosen to escalate the conflict with Pakistan. This is the only explanation of the fact that the Government of India has rejected all constructive proposals put forward by the Secretary-General of the United Nations and by Pakistan, including the proposal for a mutual pull-back of the troops on the borders, which would defuse the situation and avert the otherwise imminent possibility of large-scale warfare in the India-Pakistan subcontinent.

I have the honour to request that this letter be circulated as a Security Council document.

(Signed) A. SHAHI  
*Permanent Representative of Pakistan  
to the United Nations*

#### DOCUMENT S/10392

Report of the Secretary-General under Security Council resolution 298 (1971)

[Original: English]  
[19 November 1971]

1. This report is submitted in pursuance of Security Council resolution 298 (1971) of 25 September 1971 concerning Jerusalem, which requested the Secretary-General "in consultation with the President of the Security Council, and using such instrumentalities as he may choose, including a representative or a mission, to report to the Security Council as appropriate and in any event within sixty days on the implementation of this resolution". I communicated this resolution to the Government of Israel by cable on the day of its adoption.

2. On 27 September, I met the President of the Security Council Mr. Toru Nakagawa of Japan, and discussed with him the implementation of Security Council resolution 298 (1971).

3. On 28 September, I addressed a letter to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel, informing him

that, in accordance with the request addressed to me by the Security Council, it was my intention to nominate, in consultation with the President of the Security Council and at an early date, a mission consisting of three members of the Security Council with a view to enabling me to report to the Security Council on the implementation of resolution 298 (1971) within the time-limit provided in that resolution.

4. On 1 October, at a meeting with the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel, I indicated to him that I had in mind as members of the mission the representatives of Argentina, Italy and Sierra Leone.

5. During the first half of October, after consultation with the President of the Security Council, Mr. Guillermo Sevilla Sacasa of Nicaragua, I approached the permanent representatives of Argentina, Italy and Sierra Leone and inquired about the willing-

ness of their respective Governments to serve on the mission. All three Governments signified to me their willingness to serve on the mission in the event that circumstances arose in which it would be desirable to establish it.

6. On 18 October, I addressed another letter to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel in which, after referring to my letter of 28 September and to our meeting on 1 October, I indicated that the representatives of Argentina, Italy and Sierra Leone had signified to me the willingness of their Governments to serve on such a mission in the event that circumstances arose in which it would be desirable to establish it. This letter was handed by me to the representative of Israel on the same day. On this occasion, the representative indicated that Israel would be forwarding its comments on the Security Council resolution in due course and I reminded him that, under this resolution, I had a sixty-day time-limit for reporting and was bound to report within that period.

7. On 19 October, and again on 27 October, I met with the President of the Security Council and the representatives of Argentina, Italy and Sierra Leone to discuss my reporting responsibility under Security Council resolution 298 (1971).

8. Following the meeting of 27 October, the President of the Security Council saw the representative of Israel and discussed this matter with him.

9. On 28 October, having received no reply from the Government of Israel, I addressed a letter to the representative of Israel, drawing his attention to the fact that a month had passed since the adoption of Security Council resolution 298 (1971) which, among other things, requested me to report to the Security Council "as appropriate and in any event within sixty days on the implementation of this resolution". I added that in view of that stipulation by the Security Council, I would be grateful to receive the comments of the Government of Israel as soon as possible. I also stated that I had, as a matter of course, been in consultation both with the representatives of Argentina, Italy and Sierra Leone who had signified their willingness to serve on the mission and, as required by the resolution, with the President of the Security Council regarding this matter.

10. Subsequently, I received a note dated 2 November 1971 from the representative of Israel stating that the comments of the Government of Israel were under preparation and would be conveyed to me as soon as possible.

11. On 11 November, the Under-Secretaries-General for Political and Security Council Affairs and for Special Political Affairs, on my behalf, met with the President of the Security Council and the representatives of Argentina, Italy and Sierra Leone to discuss again the implementation of the Security Council resolution. In an oral message conveyed to the representative of Israel on 11 November, the President of the Security Council, Mr. Engeniusz Kułaga of Poland, and myself expressed our concern over the absence of a reply from the Government of Israel regarding the implementation of paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 298 (1971).

12. On 15 November, the representative of Israel transmitted to me a letter of the same date from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel. In his letter, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel referred to my cable of 25 September 1971, transmitting the text

of resolution 298 (1971) adopted by the Security Council, and gave his Government's views concerning paragraph 4 of the resolution which calls upon Israel "to rescind all previous measures and actions and take no further steps in the occupied section of Jerusalem which may purport to change the status of the City, or which would prejudice the rights of the inhabitants and the interests of the international community, or a just and lasting peace". However, the letter did not touch upon the question of the Government of Israel's response to my proposal for a mission to Jerusalem in order to enable me to discharge my mandate under paragraph 5 of resolution 298 (1971).

13. On 16 November, in a letter addressed to the representative of Israel, I acknowledged receipt of the letter of 15 November from the Government of Israel and noted that the reply of the Israel Government did not refer to paragraph 5 of the Security Council resolution in which the possibility of a mission was mentioned; nor did it refer to my letter of 28 September and subsequent letters to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel, regarding the mission proposed by me, in consultation with the President of the Council. I stated that in the absence of a response by the Government of Israel on this matter, and in view of the fact that the time-limit for my report was to expire on 24 November 1971, I had no alternative but to submit my report to the Security Council without taking any further action to activate the mission of the three members of the Council mentioned in my earlier letters.

14. It will be recalled that since the termination of the mission of my Personal Representative in Jerusalem, Mr. Ernesto A. Thalmann, in September 1967, I have had no means of obtaining first-hand information which is required to fulfil the reporting responsibilities conferred upon me by Security Council resolution 298 (1971). After careful consideration of this resolution, the President of the Security Council and myself concluded that the best way of fulfilling my reporting responsibilities under the resolution was through a mission of three members of the Security Council. It is obvious that the co-operation of the Israel Government is required for such a mission to function usefully.

15. As will be seen from the above account of the exchange of correspondence with the Government of Israel, the texts of which are annexed to this report, there has been no indication on the part of the Government of Israel of its willingness to comply with Security Council resolution 298 (1971).

16. In the light of the failure of the Government of Israel to abide by the decision of the Security Council, I have not been able to fulfil my mandate under Security Council resolution 298 (1971).

#### ANNEX

##### Exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the Government of Israel

###### 1. LETTER DATED 28 SEPTEMBER 1971 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF ISRAEL

As you will recall, paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 298 (1971) adopted by the Security Council at its 1582nd meeting on 25 September 1971 "requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with the President of the Security Council and using such instrumentalities as he may choose, including a representative or a mission, to report to the Security Council as appropriate and in any event within sixty days on the implementation of this resolution".

I wish to inform you that, in accordance with the request addressed to me by the Security Council, it is my intention to nominate in consultation with the President of the Security Council and at an early date a mission consisting of three members of the Security Council with a view to enabling me to report to the Security Council on the implementation of resolution 298 (1971) within the time-limit provided in that resolution.

**2. LETTER DATED 18 OCTOBER 1971 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF ISRAEL**

I have the honour to refer to my letter of 28 September 1971 concerning Security Council resolution 298 (1971). In that letter I informed you that it was my intention to nominate, in consultation with the President of the Security Council, a mission consisting of three members of the Council with a view to enabling me to report to the Council on the implementation of the above-mentioned resolution.

In our meeting on 1 October I indicated to you that I had in mind as members of this mission the representatives of Argentina, Italy and Sierra Leone. These members have now signified to me their willingness to serve on such a mission in the event that circumstances arise in which it would be desirable to establish it.

**3. LETTER DATED 28 OCTOBER 1971 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF ISRAEL TO THE UNITED NATIONS**

I have the honour to refer to my cable of 25 September and to my letters of 28 September and 18 October 1971 to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel, Mr. Abba Eban, concerning Security Council resolution 298 (1971).

You will recall that, in our meeting on 1 October, the Minister for Foreign Affairs undertook to transmit to me his detailed comments on this matter. More than one month has now passed since the adoption by the Security Council of the above-mentioned resolution, which, among other things, requests me to report to the Security Council "as appropriate and in any event within sixty days on the implementation of this resolution". In view of this stipulation by the Security Council, I would be grateful to receive the comments of the Government of Israel as soon as possible.

You will also recall that in my letter of 18 October I informed the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel of the willingness of the representatives of Argentina, Italy and Sierra Leone to serve on a mission to assist me in my reporting duties under the Security Council resolution. I have, as a matter of course, been in consultation both with the three representatives concerned and, as required by the resolution, with the President of the Security Council. The present letter is sent with their full knowledge and agreement.

**4. LETTER DATED 2 NOVEMBER 1971 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF ISRAEL TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL**

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter of 28 October 1971, the contents of which I have transmitted to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

I am instructed to inform you that the comments of the Government of Israel are under preparation and will be conveyed to you as soon as possible.

**5. LETTER DATED 15 NOVEMBER 1971 FROM THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF ISRAEL TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL**

I have the honour to reply to your telegram of 26 September 1971, transmitting the text of resolution 298 (1971) adopted by the Security Council at its 1582nd meeting on the previous day. The central operative paragraph of the resolution calls upon Israel "to rescind all previous measures and actions and to take no further steps in the occupied section of Jerusalem which may purport to change the status of the city, or which would prejudice the rights of the inhabitants and the interests of the international community, or a just and lasting

peace". I propose to analyse the main provisions of this paragraph in order to place the situation in Jerusalem in its true light.

*(a) The status of the city*

If the "status of the city" referred to in the resolution means the situation existing before 5 June 1967, the renewal of that "status" would involve the restoration of a military demarcation line and other barriers cutting through the centre of the city, the cancellation of free access to their Holy Places for Jews and Israeli Moslems, which has prevailed only since June 1967, and the re-imposition of a ban on residence or visit by anyone of Jewish faith in the Old City. Moreover, in order to restore the previous status Israel would have to demolish the synagogues and other sites destroyed by the Jordan authorities and restored since then, and to close the cultural, humanitarian and educational institutions on Mount Scopus which have been reopened since June 1967. Thus the restoration of the previous status would involve rescinding the unity, peace and sanctity of Jerusalem today in order to restore the divisions, conflict and sacrilege which made the period 1948-1967 one of the darkest ages in Jerusalem's long history.

It is inconceivable that the majority of Security Council members could wish to restore that situation. Some of them have indicated that they do not.

The position of Jordan in a part of Jerusalem for 19 years resulted from an aggressive invasion carried out against the injunctions of the Security Council in the first half of 1948. That position was never recognized by the world community. Thus it is not the case that an internationally accepted or valid status for Jerusalem has been set aside by anything done in the city since 1967.

If one dismisses as inherently untenable the proposition that the Security Council wishes to tear Jerusalem apart again, one is left with the assumption that the concern expressed by the Council is for the effective status of the ethnic and religious communities. It has been asserted in some quarters that Israel is undertaking or planning action with the aim of annulling the present heterogeneous character of the population. I can give assurance that this is not the case. Since 1967 the flight of Christian Arabs from Jerusalem under Jordanian occupation has been stemmed. The figures in 1967 were 10,800. Today they are 11,500. At the same time the Moslem population has grown from 54,963 in 1967 to 61,600 at the end of 1970, while the Jews, who numbered 195,700 in 1967 are now 215,500. There is nothing to indicate that these relative proportions are likely to be substantially changed in the coming years, and in absolute terms the Christian and Moslem populations are likely to increase and not to dwindle. Israel's view is that development by the city's services and amenities should be undertaken for all its communities, and not for one community alone.

*(b) The rights of the inhabitants*

Jerusalem has a population of 300,000, about three quarters of which are Jews; 61,600 are Moslems and 11,500 are Christians. For the past 200 years the Jews have formed the largest community. The "rights of the inhabitants", whether Jews, Arabs or Moslems, include the right to administer their own city, to develop it, and to repair the havoc of war. Jerusalem has the right to normal existence. As a living city its life and institutions must be allowed to grow in the interests of all its inhabitants, and it cannot be artificially frozen at the point which it had reached over four years ago.

Since 1967, all Jerusalem's citizens have had their due voice in the administration of the city. In the last municipal election under the Jordan occupation in 1963 there were only 5,000 eligible voters in a total Arab population of some 60,000. Only males over 21, property owners and rate-payers could vote. No political parties were permitted. Irrespective of the results of the voting the Mayor was appointed by the Jordanian Government in Amman. On the other hand, in the 1969 election for the municipal council, universal suffrage for those over 18 years of age was introduced in the sector formerly under Jordanian occupation. The number of Arab citizens who actually cast their vote for the administration of

the united city in that election was greater than the total of those eligible to vote in 1963 during the Jordanian occupation.

All the citizens of Jerusalem, both in the western and eastern parts of the city, have the right to normal municipal services. All the city's inhabitants now receive such services, which were non-existent or inadequate during the 19 years of illegal Jordanian military occupation.

Since 1967 compulsory education laws have been strictly applied. A system of kindergartens, which did not exist under the Jordanian conquest, has been extended to the eastern part of the city. Vocational training has been expanded, including the opening of a night school for working boys. The network of free medical services for school children, new mothers and babies has spread to this section of Jerusalem. In a special programme carried out in 1967, all children in east Jerusalem were given thorough medical check-ups, including skin, tuberculosis and eye tests, as well as vaccinations against diphtheria and tetanus and second shots against smallpox. Trachoma and malnutrition have now all but been eliminated. A new 300-bed hospital on Mount Scopus, to serve the northern and eastern parts of the city, will soon be opened.

The eastern section has been connected to the Jerusalem water-mains, providing round-the-clock water supply for the first time in history. A central sewage system has been introduced. The municipality of Jerusalem has provided playgrounds, parks, libraries and youth clubs where there were none before. An Arabic language theatre has begun performances. A developed social welfare system has been applied for the first time to this part of the city. The citizens living in eastern Jerusalem have the services of a Government Labour Exchange; 40 per cent of the section's workers have joined and are protected by the Israel Labour Federation. There is no unemployment in Jerusalem. Low-cost public housing and generous mortgage opportunities are being provided by the municipality to Arab residents.

Nothing, therefore, could be more inaccurate than to assert that the rights of the inhabitants of Jerusalem have been adversely affected by anything done or planned by Israel. Their rights to peaceful life and development and to a voice in Jerusalem's affairs, have been fully respected and indeed advanced only since June 1967.

#### *(c) The interests of the international community*

For 22 years Jerusalem has been Israel's capital and seat of Government. It is the unique spiritual centre of Judaism, as of no other faith. At the same time the Government has always been conscious of the fact that the city is of deep concern to other faiths. Its religious and historical sites are precious to Christians and Moslems, as well as to Jews. This concern was expressed by the Prime Minister of Israel on 27 June 1967:

"All the Holy Places in Jerusalem are now open to all who wish to pray in them and to the faithful of all religions without discrimination. It is our intention to place the internal administration and arrangements for the Holy Places in the hands of the religious leaders of the communities to which these places belong."

The protection of the Holy Places is ensured by law. The Protection of Holy Places Law, 5727-1967, states in its first paragraph:

"The Holy Places shall be protected from desecration and any other violation and from anything likely to violate the freedom of access of the members of the different religions to the place sacred to them or their feelings with regard to those places."

No such law protected the Holy Places during the Jordanian occupation. The intentions expressed by the Prime Minister, as well as the dispositions of the law, are now part of the new reality in Jerusalem. The desecration of historic synagogues in the Old City and of the ancient cemetery on the Mount of Olives was carried out by the Jordanian authorities, and the denial of free access stopped. The churches, mosques, synagogues and other shrines are administered by each religious community. In Jerusalem today everyone is free to visit and pray at the Holy Places of the three great faiths. Pilgrims and visitors to the city, Government leaders, church dignitaries,

parliamentarians, journalists, men of letters, tourists in their thousands have testified that Jerusalem and the Holy Places are secure and open to all. In developing the living city of Jerusalem we are and shall be constantly mindful of its historical treasures and spiritual heritage and care is and will be taken to preserve them for the inhabitants and for the world.

The policy of Israel concerning universal spiritual interests in Jerusalem is as follows: the measures taken to secure the protection of the Holy Places are only a part of Israel's effort to ensure respect for universal interests in Jerusalem. It is evident from United Nations discussions and documents that the international interest in Jerusalem has always been understood to derive from the presence of the Holy Places. Israel does not doubt her own will and capacity to secure the respect of universal spiritual interests. It has forthwith ensured that the Holy Places of Judaism, Christianity and Islam be administered under the responsibility of the religions which hold them sacred.

In addition, in a spirit of concern for historic and spiritual traditions my Government has taken steps with a view to reaching arrangements to assure the universal character of the Holy Places. In pursuance of this objective the Government of Israel has now embarked on a constructive and detailed dialogue with universal religious interests. If these explorations are as fruitful as we hope, the universal character of the Holy Places will for the first time in recent decades find comprehensive expression.

As I informed you on 10 July 1967 [see S/8052], Israel does not wish to exercise unilateral jurisdiction or exclusive responsibility in the Holy Places of Christianity and Islam, and is willing in consultation with the religious interests traditionally concerned to give due expression to that principle.

The changes which have affected Jerusalem's life and destiny as a result of the measures recently adopted may, therefore, be summarized as follows: where there was a hostile separation there is now intermingling and constructive civic union; where there was a constant threat of violence there is now peace; where there was once an assertion of exclusive and unilateral control over the Holy Places exercised in sacrilegious discrimination there is a willingness to work out arrangements with the world's religious bodies, Christian, Moslem and Jewish, which will ensure the universal religious character of the Holy Places.

This is the first time that a Government in Jerusalem offers special expression for universal interests in Jerusalem instead of asserting its exclusive jurisdiction over all of them. The apprehension expressed in the resolution that the interests of the international community, or the principles of peaceful coexistence may have been adversely affected is thus without any foundation whatever.

#### *(d) A just and lasting peace*

The previous division of the city did not bring the Middle East closer to peace. On the contrary that division was an open wound constantly exacerbated by outbursts of hostility and by recurrent Jordanian violation of the fragile armistice which caused the murder of Jerusalem citizens and made life in the city a frequent terror for many residents on both sides of the barbed wire.

Today, for the first time since 1948, Jerusalem is a city in which Jews and Arabs live together in peace and mingle in their thousands in the daily pursuits of their lives. Jerusalem has become an example of communal civic and regional existence and is thus an augury of just and lasting peace to which enlightened men aspire.

Jerusalem is for Israel the focal point of Jewish history, the symbol of ancient glory, of longing, of prayer, of modern renewal. It is also a source of universal inspiration.

Israel's policy is to promote the rights of Jerusalem's inhabitants to advance the interests of the international community and thus to contribute to the promotion of a just and lasting peace. The sharp discrepancy between the Jerusalem reality and the resolution presented by Jordan and adopted by the Security Council has profoundly shocked the people of

Jerusalem. This sentiment was expressed in the Prime Minister's statement of 26 October 1971 which remains valid.

At the same time I can give assurance that nothing has been done or will be done to violate the rights of the inhabitants, the interests of international community or the principles of peaceful coexistence. There are many difficulties in Jerusalem as elsewhere arising from regional tensions and hostilities as well as from economic and social factors. But in general men of peace and goodwill will have reason to be gratified by the peace, serenity, union and spiritual harmony which have been strengthened in Jerusalem since the barbed wire fence went down and the Jews and Arabs of Jerusalem came together in a common devotion to their city.

6. LETTER DATED 16 NOVEMBER 1971 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF ISRAEL TO THE UNITED NATIONS

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter of 15 November 1971 in which you transmit to me the reply of the Government of Israel to my telegram of 26 September 1971 concerning Security Council resolution 298 (1971)

on Jerusalem. The reply of the Government of Israel will be included in the report on this matter which I am required by the above-mentioned resolution to make to the Security Council.

I note that the reply of the Israel Government does not refer to paragraph 5 of the Security Council resolution in which the possibility of a mission is mentioned; nor does it refer to my letter of 28 September 1971 and subsequent letters to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel which include, among other things, the announcement of my intention to nominate, in consultation with the President of the Security Council, a mission consisting of three members of the Security Council with a view to enabling me to report under the terms of resolution 298 (1971).

In the absence of a response by the Government of Israel on this matter, and in view of the fact that the time-limit for my report will expire on 24 November 1971, I have no alternative but to submit my report to the Security Council without taking any further action to activate the mission of three members of the Security Council mentioned in my letters referred to above.

DOCUMENT S/10393

Letter dated 19 November 1971 from the representative of the Ivory Coast to the President of the Security Council

[Original: French]  
[19 November 1971]

Upon my Government's instructions, and referring to the report dated 15 September 1971 of the Security Council Special Mission to the Republic of Guinea established under resolution 295 (1971)<sup>9</sup>, I have the honour to bring the following matter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

The consideration of the report and the analysis of the statements made by high Guinean authorities to the members of the Security Council Special Mission call for an explanation on the part of the Government of the Republic of the Ivory Coast.

Although the Guinean authorities directly accuse only Portugal and certain Western Powers which support it of plotting to overthrow the Guinean régime by force by means of a politico-military operation, they nevertheless frequently implicate the Ivory Coast in the preparation of that operation.

The Ivory Coast is in fact accused, *inter alia*, of allowing training camps for subversion to be established on its territory, as well as bases of departure for commandos, mercenaries and the presence of aggressive forces along the frontier between the Ivory Coast and Guinea.

The Ivory Coast, which has set as its rules of conduct the untiring pursuit of peace, respect for the sovereignty of States, systematic recourse to discussion and negotiation for the peaceful settlement of any dispute and non-interference in the domestic affairs of other States, categorically denies the accusations made against it by the Guinean authorities, the more so in that there is no training camp for subversion on its territory, no commando base and no mercenary forces along any of its frontiers.

To accuse it, without producing the slightest evidence, of malicious acts towards a neighbouring brother country to which it is linked by so many ties is not only an unfriendly attitude but in addition contrary to the truth.

Since, however, in such serious matters it is not enough to make assertions, however unanswerable they may be, and since it is necessary to produce irrefutable evidence to invalidate those accusations, the Government of the Ivory Coast is ready to receive any mission that the Security Council might wish to send to its territory.

Such a mission, which would remain in the Ivory Coast for as long as it thought useful and necessary, would be able to move freely throughout the territory of the Ivory Coast and to talk in all freedom to any person it chose in order to throw full light on those allegations.

The Government of the Ivory Coast promises, moreover, to give the mission all the necessary assistance to enable it to carry out its task, which will make it possible to establish the truth.

I reserve the right of my delegation to ask, if necessary, to participate without the right to vote in the forthcoming debate of the Security Council on the report in question, in order to provide more details of the position of the Ivory Coast Government on this question.

I ask you to be so good as to arrange for the text of this letter to be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Siméon Aké

Permanent Representative of the Ivory Coast  
to the United Nations

<sup>9</sup> Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-Sixth Year, Special Supplement No. 4.

## Burundi, Sierra Leone and Somalia: draft resolution

[Original: English]  
[23 November 1971]

*The Security Council,*

Considering the complaints by the Republic of Senegal against Portugal contained in documents S/10182 of 27 April 1971 and S/10251 of 6 July 1971,

Recalling its resolutions 178 (1963) of 24 April 1963, 204 (1965) of 19 May 1965 and 273 (1969) of 9 December 1969,

Having considered the report of the Special Mission of the Security Council established in accordance with resolution 294 (1971) of 15 July 1971 [S/10308 and Corr.1],

Deeply concerned at the climate of insecurity and instability fraught with a threat to peace and security in the region,

Affirming the need to ensure prerequisites for eliminating the causes of tension in the region and creating an atmosphere of trust, peace and security as recommended by the Special Mission in its report.

1. Takes note with satisfaction of the recommendations of the Special Mission of the Security Council established under resolution 294 (1971) contained in paragraph 128 of its report;

2. Reaffirms the provisions of its resolution 294 (1971) condemning the acts of violence and destruction perpetrated since 1963 by the Portuguese armed forces of Guinea (Bissau) against the population and villages of Senegal;

3. Strongly deplures the lack of co-operation with the Special Mission on the part of the Portuguese Gov-

ernment, which prevented the Special Mission from implementing fully the mandate given to it under paragraph 4 of resolution 294 (1971);

4. Calls upon the Government of Portugal to take all the necessary measures so that:

(a) The sovereignty and territorial integrity of Senegal shall be fully respected;

(b) The acts of violence and destruction against the territory and people of the Senegal shall be immediately ceased in order to contribute to the safeguarding of peace and security in the region;

5. Calls upon the Government of Portugal to respect fully the inalienable right to self-determination and independence of the people of Guinea (Bissau);

6. Calls upon the Government of Portugal to take the necessary measures, taking fully into account General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), so that this inalienable right of the people of Guinea (Bissau) shall be exercised without further delay;

7. Requests the President of the Security Council and the Secretary-General to keep this question under review and report on the implementation of the present resolution to the Security Council within an appropriate period and at the latest within six months;

8. Declares that in the event of failure by Portugal to comply with the provisions of the present resolution, the Security Council will meet to consider the initiatives and steps that the situation requires;

9. Decides to remain seized of the question.

## DOCUMENT S/10396

Letter dated 24 November 1971 from the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English]  
[24 November 1971]

I have the honour to inform you that, in connexion with the matter of which the Security Council is seized concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia, I expect to be ready by 11.30 tomorrow, Thursday, 25 November, to make a statement to the Council about the results of the recent discussions which the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs has had in Salisbury.

On behalf of the United Kingdom Government, I request you to be so good as to call a meeting of the Security Council at that time or as soon as possible thereafter for this purpose.

(Signed) C. T. CROWE  
Permanent Representative of the  
United Kingdom of Great Britain  
and Northern Ireland  
to the United Nations

Letter dated 24 November 1971 from the representative of China to  
the Secretary-General

[Original: Chinese/English]  
[24 November 1971]

I would request you to arrange to have the attached statement of the Government of the People's Republic of China, dated 30 July 1971, circulated as official documents of the Security Council and the General Assembly.

(Signed) HUANG Hua  
Permanent Representative of the  
People's Republic of China  
to the United Nations

STATEMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE  
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

On 15 June 1971, the Soviet Government delivered a statement to the Government of the People's Republic of China, proposing to "convene a conference of the five Powers possessing nuclear weapons—the Soviet Union, the United States of America, the People's Republic of China, France and Great Britain", at which "the problems of nuclear disarmament as a whole should be considered". In this connexion, the Chinese Government hereby makes the following statement.

All countries in the world, big or small, should be equal. Matters affecting various countries in the world should be jointly discussed and settled by all of them and permit of no monopoly by a few big Powers. This is a principle guiding international relations which all countries must abide by. The prevention of nuclear war, the elimination of nuclear threats and the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons are matters affecting the peace and security of all countries of the world, and a few nuclear countries have no right to brush aside the majority of countries in the world and arbitrarily hold a conference to consider and decide upon matters of such great importance.

The history following the Second World War shows that it is absolutely impossible to settle questions of nuclear disarmament by relying on negotiations only between a few big Powers possessing nuclear weapons. In August 1963, the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union concluded the "partial nuclear test ban treaty." Subsequently, the Soviet Union and the United States jointly concocted a series of treaties on so-called nuclear arms "limitation", including the treaty on the "non-proliferation of nuclear weapons". In November 1969, the Soviet Union and the United States started their "strategic arms limitation" talks. But none of them have restricted in any way the nuclear arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union. On the contrary, the United States and the Soviet Union have continued their nuclear weapon tests without let-up, their production of nuclear weapons is becoming ever more developed, their stockpiles of nuclear weapons are becoming greater and greater and they are stationing in many other countries their troops armed with nuclear weapons; this seriously threatens world

peace and the security of the people of all countries. The peoples of the world have long lost their confidence in the disarmament talks between the nuclear Powers. They rightly hold that it is impossible to settle the question of nuclear disarmament as a whole by depending on two nuclear super-Powers, nor can it be settled by the addition of some more nuclear Powers.

China develops nuclear weapons because it is compelled to do so under imperialist nuclear threats, and it does so entirely for the purpose of defence and for breaking the imperialist nuclear monopoly and finally eliminating nuclear weapons. China's nuclear weapons are still in the experimental stage, and at present it is not yet a nuclear Power, nor will it ever be a "nuclear super-Power" practising the policies of nuclear monopoly, nuclear threats and nuclear blackmail. At no time will China ever agree to participate in the so-called nuclear disarmament talks between the nuclear Powers behind the backs of the non-nuclear countries.

Therefore, the Chinese Government cannot accept the Soviet Government's proposal on the convening of a conference of the five nuclear Powers.

The Chinese Government's stand on the question of nuclear weapons has always been clear. First, the Chinese Government has consistently stood for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons; secondly, the Chinese Government has declared on many occasions that at no time and in no circumstances will China be the first to use nuclear weapons; thirdly, the Chinese Government has consistently stood for the convening of a summit conference of all countries of the world to discuss the question of the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons and, as the first step, to reach an agreement on the non-use of nuclear weapons. The Chinese Government hereby once again solemnly reaffirms its above stand.

The Chinese Government holds that, in order to realize the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, the United States and the Soviet Union, which possess large quantities of nuclear weapons, should issue statements separately or jointly to undertake openly the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time or in any circumstances; and to dismantle all nuclear bases set up on the territories of other countries and withdraw to their own countries the nuclear weapons stockpiled and nuclear armed forces stationed on those territories. Whether this is carried out or not will be a test as to whether they have the desire to realize nuclear disarmament.

The Chinese people will, as always, continue to make joint efforts with the peoples of the world, persevere in the struggle and strive for the noble aim of the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons.

\* Also circulated as a General Assembly document under the symbol A/8536.

**Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus  
for the period 20 May to 30 November 1971**

[Original: English]  
[30 November 1971]

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**INTRODUCTION**

1. This report on the United Nations operation in Cyprus covers developments from 20 May to 30 November 1971 and brings up to date the record of the activities of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) pursuant to the mandate laid down in Security Council resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 and subsequent resolutions of the Council relating to Cyprus.

2. Developments in the island in the last six months have been affected by uncertainties relating to the future of the intercommunal talks. Although there has been no recurrence of fighting, there has been a marked increase in tension and in the number of provocative incidents and this has prevented progress towards a return to more normal conditions.

**I. THE UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING FORCE  
IN CYPRUS**

**A. COMPOSITION AND DEPLOYMENT**

3. At the end of the period covered by my last report, the strength of UNFICYP was 3,007 military

personnel and 170 civilian police.<sup>10</sup> On 27 November 1971, the composition of the Force was as follows:

<i>Military personnel</i>		<i>Total</i>
<b>Austria</b>		
Headquarters UNFICYP .....	1	
Field hospital .....	55	56
<b>Canada</b>		
Headquarters UNFICYP and military police .....	37	
Battalion .....	548	585
<b>Denmark</b>		
Headquarters UNFICYP and military police .....	17	
Battalion .....	279	296
<b>Finland</b>		
Headquarters UNFICYP and military police .....	11	
Battalion .....	277	288
<b>Ireland</b>		
Headquarters UNFICYP and military police .....	10	
Battalion .....	381	391
<b>Sweden</b>		
Headquarters UNFICYP and military police .....	9	
Battalion .....	277	286
<b>United Kingdom</b>		
Headquarters UNFICYP and military police .....	145	
Battalion .....	588	
Reconnaissance Squadron .....	119	
UNFICYP logistic support units .....	155	
Helicopter support .....	38	
Contingent Headquarters .....	4	1,049
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>2,951</b>
<b>Civilian police</b>		
Australia .....	38	
Austria .....	49	
Denmark .....	41	
Sweden .....	40	
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>168</b>
	<b>GRAND TOTAL OF UNFICYP</b>	<b>3,119</b>

4. The following changes took place during the period covered by this report:

(a) *Austria*: A partial rotation was carried out;

(b) *Canada*: The 2nd Battalion, the Royal 22nd Regiment replaced the 1st Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry;

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, Supplement for April, May and June 1971, document S/10199, para. 3.

(c) *Denmark*: The 16th Battalion replaced the 15th Battalion;

(d) *Finland*: A partial rotation took place; the incoming troops form part of the 16th Finnish Battalion;

(e) *Ireland*: The 21st Infantry Group replaced the 20th Infantry Group;

(f) *Sweden*: The 47th Battalion replaced the 46th Battalion;

(g) *United Kingdom*: The 1st Battalion, the Royal Irish Rangers, replaced the 1st Battalion, the Gordon Highlanders; A Squadron, the Royal Hussars (PWO), replaced C Squadron, the Royal Hussars (PWO); and 8 Squadron, the Royal Corps of Transport, replaced 1 Squadron, the Royal Corps of Transport.

(h) The Australian Police unit has completed the second phase of its reduction;<sup>11</sup>

(i) At the request of the Secretary-General, the Government of Austria has agreed to increase the Austrian Police unit from 45 to 55; this increase will compensate for the reduction in the Australian Police unit referred to above.

5. Because of an increase in tension in the area, it has been necessary to man the static UNFICYP observation post on the Nicosia golf course day and night. This brings to 55 the number of permanently manned posts maintained by UNFICYP throughout the island.

6. The Force is now deployed as follows [see annexed map below]:

Headquarters UNFICYP, including Headquarters United Nations civilian police (UNCIVPOL)  
Combined staff

*Force Reserve* (British reconnaissance squadron)

*Austrian field hospital*

*Nicosia district*

Canadian contingent

Austrian civilian police

*Famagusta district*

Swedish contingent

Swedish civilian police

*Larnaca district*

Irish contingent

Swedish civilian police

*Limassol Zone*

British contingent

Australian civilian police

*Lefka district*

Danish contingent

Danish civilian police

*Kyrenia district*

Finnish contingent

Austrian civilian police

7. The armoured car section of the Irish contingent was withdrawn by decision of the Government of Ireland prior to the rotation of the 20th and 21st Infantry Groups. As a result, the over-all strength of the Irish contingent has been reduced by 36 all ranks.

8. A further review of locally employed civilians has been carried out and certain additional savings in

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 4(h).

personnel to those referred to in my last report<sup>12</sup> have been achieved.

9. The number of UNCIVPOL police stations and sub-stations has remained unchanged during the period covered by this report. However, in view of the increase in the strength of the Austrian police unit, and in order to improve the co-ordination of police activities between the Kyrenia and Nicosia districts, the Austrian civilian police have taken over responsibility for Nicosia district from the Danish civilian police, and the latter have replaced the Austrian police in Lefka district.

10. The Force remains under the command of Major-General D. Prem Chand. My Special Representative in Cyprus continues to be Mr. B.F. Osorio-Tafall.

#### *Casualties*

11. During the period under review, UNFICYP has suffered no casualties attributable to intercommunal incidents. One Danish and one British soldier and one Australian police officer died as a result of accidents, and one Irish soldier died of natural causes.

#### *Discipline*

12. The over-all discipline and bearing of the officers and men of the United Nations Force have continued to be of a high order and reflect credit on the contingent commanders, their staffs and the armed forces of the contributing nations.

#### B. FUNCTION AND GUIDING PRINCIPLES

13. The function of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus was defined by the Security Council in its resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 in the following terms:

"in the interest of preserving international peace and security, to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and return to normal conditions".

14. That resolution was reaffirmed by the Council in its subsequent resolutions 187 (1964) of 13 March, 192 (1964) of 20 June, 193 (1964) of 9 August, 194 (1964) of 25 September and 198 (1964) of 18 December 1964, 201 (1965) of 19 March, 206 (1965) of 15 June, 207 (1965) of 10 August and 219 (1965) of 17 December 1965, 220 (1966) of 16 March, 222 (1966) of 16 June and 231 (1966) of 15 December 1966, 238 (1967) of 19 June and 244 (1967) of 22 December 1967, 247 (1968) of 18 March, 254 (1968) of 18 June and 261 (1968) of 10 December 1968, 266 (1969) of 10 June and 274 (1969) of 11 December 1969, 281 (1970) of 9 June and 291 (1970) of 10 December 1970, and 293 (1971) of 26 May 1971.

15. The guiding principles governing the operation of the Force, as summarized in my report of 10 September 1964 [S/5950, para. 7], remain in effect. The duties of UNCIVPOL are as outlined in my report of 2 May 1964 [S/5679, para. 4].

#### C. RELATIONS WITH THE GOVERNMENT AND WITH THE TURKISH CYPRIOT LEADERSHIP

16. UNFICYP has maintained, as in the past, close liaison and kept good working relations with the

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 7.

Government of Cyprus and the Turkish Cypriot leadership. The Political Liaison Committee continues to meet as a rule every two weeks. The UNFICYP Deputy Chief of Staff, who acts as Chairman, the Senior Political Adviser and his staff, the Police Adviser and the Force Economics Officer meet separately with liaison officers representing the Government and the Turkish Cypriot leadership, with a view to sorting out specific current intercommunal problems through liaison and discussion. Between 20 May 1971 and 30 November 1971 the Committee held 14 meetings with the Government Political Liaison Officer and 13 with the Turkish Cypriot Liaison Officer. It is relevant to an understanding of certain aspects of liaison with the Turkish Cypriot community to recall the Secretary-General's special report to the Security Council of 3 January 1968 [S/8323] on the subject of the decision by the Turkish Cypriot leadership to establish a "provisional Cyprus Turkish administration". There has been a tendency during the past few months on the part of the Turkish Cypriots to omit the word "provisional" whenever references to this body are made in Turkish Cypriot publications, but UNFICYP has received no official information from the leadership on this subject.

#### D. FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT OF THE UNITED NATIONS FORCE

17. Since my last report, there have been eight incidents in which UNFICYP has been denied freedom of movement. Four of these incidents may be attributed to members of the National Guard and four to Turkish Cypriot fighters. Three cases appear to have arisen as a result of local Turkish Cypriot fighters acting contrary to local understandings. Four other cases were caused by ignorance or misunderstanding of orders, and one resulted from an order from the Headquarters National Guard, the effect of which would have been to alter the interpretation of restricted areas.

### II. ACTIVITIES TOWARDS PREVENTING A RECURRENCE OF FIGHTING AND CONTRIBUTING TO THE RESTORATION AND MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER

#### A. MILITARY SITUATION

##### *Armed forces in Cyprus other than UNFICYP*

##### (a) *Government armed forces*

18. The strength of the National Guard appears to have been increased substantially during the past six months. Its organization and deployment have not materially altered. The call-up of the second half of the 1953 age group took place on 20 July, and the second half of the 1951 age group was demobilized.

19. Training activity has shown a marked increase, and a higher standard of training has been apparent. Summer training camps on the north and east coasts of the island started later than usual and some closed down earlier than in previous years. UNFICYP has been notified in advance of all live range firing, and in most cases of field exercises.

##### (b) *Turkish Cypriot armed elements*

20. There are indications of a substantial increase in the strength of the Turkish Cypriot fighters. No major change has taken place in either the organization or the deployment of Turkish Cypriot fighter units. However, there has been a significant improvement in the over-all combat efficiency and capability of the fighter units.

21. Training activity has continued to increase; in particular, two major island-wide alert exercises have been held. In most instances, UNFICYP has been informed of live range firing and field exercises.

##### (c) *Greek and Turkish national contingents*

22. The strength and locations of both national contingents remain unchanged.

23. A partial rotation of the Greek national contingent took place on 19 July 1971 UNFICYP was given advance notice of the rotation and was advised of quantities and types of military stores imported.

24. On 29 September 1971, half of the Turkish national contingent was rotated; in this connexion, as in past years, both the Government of Cyprus and the Government of Turkey requested UNFICYP's good offices. UNFICYP facilitated the rotation by negotiating the quantities of ammunition and military stores to be imported, providing observers to assist on the wharf and furnishing transport and escorts. The rotation took place without incident, owing in large measure to the co-operation extended to UNFICYP by both parties in adhering to past practice.

##### *General assessment of the situation with regard to preventing a recurrence of fighting*

25. The military situation has been noticeably more tense, particularly in the areas of direct confrontation. While there has been no progress in UNFICYP efforts to produce an effective disengagement of the opposing armed forces, UNFICYP has been able, through prompt action, to prevent local incidents from becoming more serious. Nevertheless, the period under review has been characterized by a considerable degree of military activity, resulting in some periods of acute sensitivity. The tendency on the part of both sides to give increasing prominence to military parades on the many days of national celebration often gives rise to apprehension and is a constant cause of concern to UNFICYP.

26. The Government has continued to express its apprehension at the increasing Turkish Cypriot fighter presence and activities throughout the island, particularly in Limassol, Famagusta, Nicosia, in the area around Chatos village and in parts of Lefka district. It has also regularly drawn attention to the training programmes carried out openly by the Turkish Cypriot fighters which have greatly improved their military capability, and to what it characterizes as efforts to extend the limits of the Turkish Cypriot-controlled areas throughout the island. The Turkish Cypriot leadership, for its part, has expressed concern at the increased activities of the National Guard and the impact of the increased military capability of the National Guard on the present and future security of the Turkish community.

27. Both the Government and the Turkish Cypriot leadership have, as in the past, brought to the attention of UNFICYP any moves which they consider to be a breach of the *status quo*. UNFICYP investigates each of these complaints with the greatest care and attention with a view to ensuring that neither side gains a unilateral advantage over the other with the inevitable resultant increase in tension and danger of a recurrence of fighting.

28. Most of the activities complained of are of a military character, but in sensitive areas certain civilian activities can also add to suspicion and tension and

become the subject of complaints. UNFICYP has continued to perform the difficult task of investigation and evaluation of situations brought to its notice in order to ascertain the *status quo ante*, which, it should be noted, can be most difficult in cases where complete records are not available and where each side presents a totally different version. On this basis UNFICYP can give advice or make requests to one side or the other with a view to restoring or improving the situation. Whatever success UNFICYP may have had in preventing attempted changes in the *status quo* from escalating into serious military confrontations can be attributed to the co-operation it received from both sides and their willingness to accept UNFICYP's independent judgement and to follow its advice. Unfortunately, there have been a number of instances during the period under review where UNFICYP's recommendations have not been accepted and its advice and requests have either not been followed or have been responded to only after a considerable lapse of time.

29. In this connexion UNFICYP is bound to note that during the period under review there have been 8 instances of unilateral attempts by the Government to change the *status quo* to which UNFICYP has objected, of which 3 remain outstanding; while on the Turkish Cypriot leadership side there have been 24 instances, of which 10 remain outstanding. This apparent lack of co-operation with UNFICYP regarding a basic aspect of its mandate, namely to prevent the recurrence of fighting, is a matter of deep concern to UNFICYP because it is bound to affect UNFICYP's ability to settle disputes and ease tensions that might arise in the future. UNFICYP trusts that both sides appreciate the need to support UNFICYP's position and that they will endeavour to respond more positively than heretofore to the advice and requests it finds it necessary to proffer from time to time in the interests of maintaining peace.

30. At present there is considerable tension arising from situations along the Green Line in Nicosia, in Selemani and in the Chatos/Marathovouno area. Each of these problems is being actively pursued by UNFICYP by patient negotiation and persuasion.

31. Tension developed along the Green Line in Nicosia when, in August, Turkish Cypriot fighters took retaliatory action against a move by the National Guard which involved only a change in accommodation and had therefore been approved by UNFICYP as being of no military significance. Turkish Cypriots retaliated by starting to build a new fortification, to which the National Guard took exception, warning that it might lead to retaliatory measures on its part. Despite requests by UNFICYP, the Turkish Cypriot fighters declined to halt their work and eventually UNFICYP was obliged to place an observation post on the site in order to neutralize the effect of the construction. Negotiations are still proceeding.

32. Further tension developed in the same general area when in October the Turkish Cypriot Football Association began staging football matches on a field situated in the area of the Green Line in the western part of Nicosia. No games had been played on this field since the beginning of the intercommunal troubles, and previous requests for permission to use the field for this purpose had been denied by UNFICYP. The Government has objected to the use of the field on the grounds that it constitutes a forward move and a

significant change in the *status quo* along the Green Line. While UNFICYP has no inherent objection to activities of this kind if they are and remain of a genuinely civilian character, it has been acutely conscious of the grave security risks that are involved with large crowds congregating in an area which is literally between military positions occupied by armed personnel of both sides. It also considers that the appearance anywhere in the field of Turkish Cypriot uniformed personnel, whether for purposes of crowd control or otherwise, would constitute a violation by the party concerned of its obligations in this sensitive area of the Green Line, involving the responsibilities of UNFICYP. The Turkish Cypriot leadership has given assurances that the field will be used for sporting purposes only and that no uniformed personnel will appear on the field forward of their existing positions, but this undertaking has not been fully observed. The leadership has also accepted full responsibility for any situation that might develop affecting the safety of the spectators. UNFICYP is continuing to negotiate in the hope of finding a solution satisfactory to both sides, and in this connexion the Turkish Cypriot leadership recently found it possible, at UNFICYP's request, to suspend the games for three weeks.

33. Selemani is a village situated just outside the Turkish Cypriot enclave of Limnitis; it was abandoned during the troubles in 1963 and 1964. Although it has been unoccupied since then, the Turkish Cypriot villagers have continued to work their fields. Early this year, the villagers began to repair their houses and to take up residence in some of them again. No objection was raised to this activity, but it was agreed locally by all parties that the resettlement could proceed on condition that the village was not fortified and that there would be no armed or uniformed personnel in it. To ensure security, since the village is situated between opposing military positions and to assist UNFICYP in ensuring that the terms of the agreement were kept, UNFICYP established an observation post in the village. Subsequently the Government informed UNFICYP of its intention to send in a Cyprus Police patrol in order to reassert its authority over the village. In this connexion, the Government drew attention to its general policy regarding the resettlement of abandoned villages which included the stipulation that returning villagers would be subject to the Government's normal administrative and police authority. When the question was raised with the Turkish Cypriot leadership, they informed UNFICYP that there could be no question of the Cyprus police (CYPOL) exercising any authority in Selemani, which was a Turkish Cypriot village and which, if not within the Turkish Cypriot enclave, was within the area they controlled. The Government did not accept this argument and insisted on the need to send in a CYPOL patrol. However, UNFICYP advised restraint and suggested that the best solution would be for UNFICYP to continue to ensure that no military forward move should take place and that the village should not be occupied or fortified by uniformed and armed fighters. While the Government has not accepted this suggestion, it has not in fact attempted to send CYPOL patrols into the village. On the other hand, to UNFICYP's regret, armed and uniformed Turkish Cypriot fighters have been appearing in the village for the past few months and despite UNFICYP's strongest protests continue to do so. UNFICYP is still pressing the leadership on this matter, which is daily becoming of increasing gravity.

34. The tension in the Chatos/Marathovouno area has arisen in connexion with difficulties experienced by Greek Cypriot farmers in cultivating some of their fields close to and within areas controlled by Turkish Cypriots. This is not a new problem; when it arose in 1969, UNFICYP assisted in arriving at a local arrangement whereby the number of farmers intending to work in their fields the next day would be notified to UNFICYP, which would pass on this information to the Turkish Cypriots. When the problem arose again at the beginning of this summer, UNFICYP attempted to persuade both sides to abide by the existing arrangement. It was able to convince the Turkish Cypriots to do so, but not all of the Greek Cypriots. As a result, Greek Cypriot farmers who went to their fields without prior notification through UNFICYP were warned off by members of the Turkish Cypriot police element. The Government protested that farmers were being denied access to their fields and that the Turkish Cypriots, armed and in uniform, were moving forward and thus expanding the areas they controlled. In the event, the harvest was completed, despite a number of incidents.

35. Now that the sowing and ploughing season has arrived, the Government has complained that Greek Cypriot farmers not only of Marathovouno but also of Trypimeni are being denied access to their fields and has stated that if this continues, it will have no alternative but to give them police protection. The Turkish Cypriots are also dissatisfied with the "notification" arrangement and have begun to insist locally that, in future, names must also be given or, failing that, that the farmers should individually seek the permission of the Turkish Cypriot police element. In the face of these opposed positions, UNFICYP is endeavouring to arrive at an arrangement satisfactory to both sides, which would enable the farmers to go about their work without unnecessary impediment.

36. A serious incident occurred on 22 July 1971 when a Turkish Cypriot shepherd grazing his sheep near Kokkina was shot at from a National Guard post and was wounded in the leg. Because UNFICYP observed the whole of this incident it was able to give a speedy and independent account of it and therefore to prevent any escalation. It is understood that the National Guardsman responsible was disciplined.

37. There was another serious incident on 27 August. On that day a bus carrying 28 uniformed Turkish Cypriot fighters, one of whom had a pistol, and 2 other

Turkish Cypriots in civilian clothes, was intercepted by CYPOL and the Turkish Cypriot fighters arrested. The bus was travelling from one Turkish Cypriot village, Sinda to another, Yenagra, through a Government-controlled area on the main Nicosia-Famagusta road. One hour later Turkish Cypriots from the village of Sinda took hostages at gun point on the same road. This action was apparently taken as a result of a local decision and, according to the Turkish Cypriots involved, was a reprisal for the earlier arrest of Turkish Cypriot fighters. Only the prompt intervention of UNFICYP and the co-operation it received from both the Government and the Turkish Cypriot leadership prevented an even more serious situation from developing and made possible the speedy release of all the individuals, with the exception of the pistol carrying fighter. The latter was subsequently brought to court and released on bail.

#### *Observance of the cease-fire*

38. There were 10 shooting incidents confirmed by UNFICYP during the period under review. After investigation by UNFICYP, 5 of these were attributed to Government security forces and 3 to Turkish Cypriot fighters, while the remaining 2 involved both sides. One of these cases involved an exchange of fire which took place on the Kyrenia road between Cyprus Navy personnel, who claimed to have lost their way, and Turkish Cypriot police elements; each side maintained that the other was the first to open fire. In another case, shots are believed to have been exchanged near Larnaca between National Guardsmen and Turkish Cypriots who, it was claimed, were poaching. Still another incident occurred in the Lefka District, when a National Guardsman fired 1 round at 2 UNFICYP soldiers. Although the soldiers were wearing United Nations headress, the Guardsman claimed that he mistook them for Turkish Cypriots. In all 10 cases, the shootings could be considered violations of the cease-fire.

39. In addition, there were 3 cases of accidental discharge of weapons by Government security forces and 9 cases by Turkish Cypriot fighters. Though emphasis continues to be placed on the prevention of incidents, as well as on the maintenance of the *status quo* in sensitive areas, the period under review has seen the largest number of shooting incidents since December 1969. A tabulation of shooting incidents, covering the period since March 1968 is reproduced below.

SUMMARY OF SHOOTING INCIDENTS

	20 May to 30 November 1971	2 December 1970 to 19 May 1971	2 June to 1 December 1970	2 December 1969 to 1 June 1970	3 June to 1 December 1969	3 December 1968 to 2 June 1969	8 June to 2 December 1968	8 March to 7 June 1968
Nicosia district (from 23 February 1970) .....	8	6	8	5	10	5	16	6
Famagusta district (until 28 February 1970) .....	—	—	—	3	6	1	1	3
Famagusta district (from 1 March 1970) .....	2	2	3	2	—	—	—	—
Larnaca district (from 9 March 1970) .....	1	2	—	1	—	—	—	—
Limassol zone (less Kophinou district) (from 9 March 1970) .....	3	1	1	3	5	7	4	1
Lefka district .....	6	—	—	—	3	7	11	8
Kyrenia District .....	2	2	—	2	6	5	33	21
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>39</b>

40. The civilian police element of UNFICYP (UNCIVPOL) has continued to contribute to the maintenance of law and order in Cyprus. UNCIVPOL has maintained close liaison with the Cyprus Police and the Turkish Cypriot police element. Both Greek and Turkish Cypriots have continued to show confidence in UNCIVPOL and this has greatly facilitated its task.

41. During the period 16 May to 30 November 1971, UNCIVPOL has submitted approximately 750 reports arising from observations or investigations of incidents which have had some intercommunal connotation. The volume of work has remained fairly steady during the past 2 years. Inquiries covered a variety of subjects, such as deaths from different causes, woundings, accidents, assaults, straying and theft of livestock, illegal cultivation, damage to crops and property, and police activities generally. UNCIVPOL continued to lend support to other activities of UNFICYP, especially in such matters as agriculture and public services.

42. During the period under review, the Government pursued its determination to assert authority over the whole of the area under its control. It has done so by establishing new police posts and increasing its patrolling. It also continues to maintain its right to carry out police patrols in sensitive areas, but UNFICYP is pleased to note that, in most instances, prior warning has been given to it when such patrols were contemplated. This has enabled UNFICYP to exercise its good offices and, with the co-operation of both sides, to avoid confrontations. There was an exception, however, at Alekhtora in June, when CYPOL officers carried out an early morning arrest in a purely Turkish Cypriot village without notifying UNFICYP. This action gave rise to tension, which subsided only after UNFICYP's intervention.

43. CYPOL has been very active in endeavouring to bring narcotics trafficking and road accident problems under control. This has given rise to complaints from Turkish Cypriots of discriminatory and aggressive conduct at roadblocks and traffic checks. However, in the main, there was little evidence produced to substantiate these allegations. Having regard to the number of Turkish Cypriots moving daily in Government-controlled areas during times when intercommunal tension and suspicion was acute, the number of such incidents leading to protests was relatively small and indicates a certain improvement in the situation.

44. The Turkish Cypriot leadership has also increased the level of activities of its police element. Road checks have been carried out within the areas under its control to ensure that Turkish Cypriots carry licences of various kinds issued by the leadership. There has been a tendency for members of the Turkish Cypriot police element to appear in uniform on the fringes of areas they control, and especially in sensitive areas. UNFICYP has protested these developments, though with only limited success. The Government sees these trends as a significant attempt to change the *status quo* and to erode its authority.

45. UNFICYP has also noted increased efficiency within the Turkish Cypriot police element and possibly higher morale, which has had the effect of better policing within Turkish Cypriot enclaves and controlled areas.

46. There was a commendable example of co-operation with UNFICYP by CYPOL and the Turkish police element, coupled with restraint by the higher leadership on both sides, when, on 30 July, during a period of extreme tension, a 17-year-old boy from a village in the Chatos area apparently ran amok and shot and killed his grandmother. He ran away and subsequently shot and killed an aged Greek Cypriot shepherd before he was arrested by the Turkish Cypriot police element. Both sides co-operated fully with UNFICYP and exercised restraint to ensure that this unfortunate incident did not exacerbate the existing tense situation.

### III. ACTIVITIES TOWARDS A RETURN TO NORMAL CONDITIONS

47. Since my last report, there has been little to indicate a reversal in the trend towards separate development of the economies of the two communities on the island. Moreover, the two public services remain quite separate.

48. Again I have to report that in the economic field, though contacts are still maintained in private, semi-autonomous and non-governmental institutions, the Turkish Cypriots appear to be intent on building up their own economy rather than seeking ways of integrating their activities with those of the Government. An exception to this has been the increased interest of Turkish Cypriot farmers in United Nations sponsored development schemes such as the mixed farming project (UNDP and the World Food Programme), the project to strengthen veterinary services (UNDP and FAO) and the soil conservation project (UNDP and the World Food Programme). Interest has also been shown, though to a lesser degree, in participation in such UNDP-assisted projects as the Cyprus Productivity Centre (UNDP and the ILO) and the Higher Technical Institute (UNDP, UNESCO and the ILO). At present, Turkish Cypriots seem to be showing little or no interest in courses offered by the Hotel and Catering Institute, which is assisted by UNDP and the ILO.

49. The economic disparity between the two communities is still apparent and there are indications of a serious unemployment problem among certain sections of the Turkish Cypriot population. Both the Government and the Greek Cypriot private business sector have called for closer co-operation in order to raise the economic level of the Turkish Cypriot community, but so far the Turkish Cypriots have been hesitant to respond fully to these overtures. The Cyprus Development Bank continues to offer its services to Turkish Cypriots but it will not offer loans unless it has over-all financial control in the implementation of projects supported by its credits. The Turkish Cypriot leadership will not agree to this as they see it as an attempt to encroach on their authority in the areas they control.

50. There is still some co-operation through the marketing boards, though the Turkish Cypriots claim that they do not have enough say in the activities of those boards. The Turkish Cypriot grain crop was again sold through the Cyprus Grain Commission this year, though the Turkish Cypriots have asked for a change in the existing arrangements. In particular, they charge that the Commission discriminates against Turkish Cypriot producers by refusing to give them the same credits and advantageous terms it extends to Greek

Cypriot producers. Relations between the co-operative movements on the two sides do not appear to have been strengthened to any extent, although there was a hopeful sign early in November when discussions took place between representatives of the two co-operative movements. It is believed that the possibility of co-operation between the two movements was one of the subjects discussed.

51. At the time of writing, the new Five Year Plan, from 1972 to 1976, has not been completed, but there appears to be little hope for an integrated economic development of the two communities through this scheme. Each side continues to maintain its own planning office and there is still a complete lack of contact between them.

52. As anticipated in my last report, the heavy spring rains resulted in a satisfactory cereal crop. Potato, grape and olive harvests were also good. However, unseasonal summer rains caused considerable damage to the almond crop and to soft fruit crops such as apricots, plums and cherries, and the carob harvest, an important source of income in certain areas, was not as large as was hoped.

53. An important part of the work of UNFICYP continues to be investigating and giving assistance in disputes between the two communities over land encroachment, unauthorized grazing and cultivation and crop damage.

54. There has been little progress in the normalization of public services. There has been no change in the problem of water supply to Turkish Cypriot villages in need since my last report. The villages of Kivisil, Alaminos and Temblos, about which optimism was previously expressed, appear to be no better off than in the past, though bore-holes are being drilled around Temblos which could serve that village. In the face of continuing shortages, Turkish Cypriots are now beginning to establish their own water schemes. UNFICYP has continued to assist the two communities to solve disputes over the use of jointly operated water schemes.

55. In February 1971, Electricity Authority of Cyprus completed plans for the electrification of 23 Turkish Cypriot villages as part of the preparation for carrying out a technical agreement for the normalization of electricity distribution. The plans, however, as well as the agreement itself, are still subject to ratification by the Government. Work is in progress in connexion with the electrification of Limnitis and Evdhimou, which was agreed to outside the above-mentioned normalization plan. In the case of Limnitis, however, the Government has refused to grant financial assistance normally given to villages for installing street lighting on the grounds that to do so it must have the right to inspect the village books, a right the Turkish Cypriot leadership is not willing to concede. This dispute and the Government's delay in ratifying the agreement have caused resentment amongst the Turkish Cypriot community, and incidents concerning meter reading and bill collections have increased since my last report. The Government has complained that Turkish Cypriots do not pay for the electricity they consume and has expressed concern over the means used to supply Turkish Cypriot industrial units with electricity. The Government has repeatedly objected to Turkish Cypriots making unauthorized electrical connexions which it contends have placed a dangerous strain on local grids. The Turkish Cypriot leadership has defended this prac-

tice on the grounds of necessity, in view of the refusal of the Government to extend the required facilities. According to the Electricity Authority, the Turkish Cypriot community ignored an invitation to appoint one of their number to the Electricity Authority Board.

56. The Turkish Cypriot leadership has expressed little interest in normalizing the telephone system until the electricity agreement is ratified.

57. A further request has been made by the Turkish Cypriot leadership for improvements to postal services in Ktima. The Government, however, has maintained that it regards the present services as adequate. The Government has also alleged that the leadership is operating its own postal services in areas under Turkish Cypriot control and has said that in these circumstances it may become necessary for it to reconsider the agreements made in 1966 towards normalization of postal services.<sup>13</sup>

58. During the period under review, a Government team of land registry clerks entered the Turkish Cypriot-controlled area around Louroujina to settle land claims. The work was completed without incident, requiring minimum UNFICYP supervision. It is the first example of this type of joint action since December 1963.

59. No further progress has been made towards the reintegration of Turkish Cypriots into the national social insurance scheme. In my last report, I stressed the need to settle this matter speedily in view of the further backlog of complications which arise with the passage of time.

60. Little progress was made during the period under review towards solving the problem of Turkish Cypriot displaced persons. As mentioned in paragraph 33 above, about 20 families returned to the village of Selemani, near Limnitis. Beyond this there have been no significant moves towards resettlement and no progress has been made towards implementing the Government's resettlement scheme mentioned in my last report.<sup>14</sup> It is reported, however, that a refugee accommodation project involving 1,470 houses, which was launched in 1966 by the Turkish Cypriot leadership, is now nearing completion.

61. As emphasized in my previous reports, the question of freedom of movement for unarmed Cypriot civilians is one of the most serious irritants to Cypriots of both communities. The barring of access to land and the restrictions imposed over the use of certain roads have been a constant source of frustration and encumbrance to the individual Cypriot in his day-to-day social and economic pursuits. The Turkish Cypriot leadership maintains that the restrictions on access to areas under their control are primarily a matter of the security of their community and cannot be relaxed until the over-all problem is resolved. The leadership also claims that there are many areas controlled by the Government to which they are denied access. The Government, however, maintains that these are military restricted areas to which all Cypriots, whether Greek or Turkish, are denied access. In the absence of a marked improvement in relations between the two communities at the political level, there would seem to be little likelihood of a mutually satisfactory agreement on this question being reached in the near future.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, *Twenty-first Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1966*, document S/7611, paras. 145-148.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, *Twenty-sixth Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1971*, document S/10199, para. 51.

62. UNFICYP continues to operate convoys on the Nicosia-Kyrenia road, provides emergency escorts through certain Turkish Cypriot-controlled areas, and accompanies farmers wishing to harvest crops in sensitive places. It continues to be called on to use its good offices in securing the release of Greek Cypriot individuals who stray into certain Turkish Cypriot-controlled areas.

#### IV. INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS

63. Mr. Clerides and Mr. Denktash have continued to meet in private. They have now had 18 meetings in the fourth round of their talks which began on 21 September 1970, having met five times during the period under review—on 31 May, 26 June, 9 and 24 August and 20 September 1971.

64. At all but the first of these meetings, Mr. Clerides or Mr. Denktash delivered replies to letters previously received from one another. On June 26, Mr. Clerides handed Mr. Denktash his reply to the proposals made by Mr. Denktash in his letter of 28 April. Subsequent correspondence was handed over on 9 August by Mr. Denktash, on 24 August by Mr. Clerides, and on 20 September by Mr. Denktash.

65. Before reviewing developments concerning the talks, I should like first to report on the reaction to the following suggestion contained in my last report to the Security Council:

"In my view, what is needed to overcome this difficulty is an exercise of statesmanship by leaders of all the parties concerned whereby they would restate publicly their determination that the problem of Cyprus must be solved by arriving, through peaceful means, at a lasting agreement based on the independence and sovereignty of a unitary State of Cyprus. An undertaking of this kind could do much to clear up the present atmosphere of suspicion and hesitation and might thus serve to give a renewed impetus to the intercommunal talks."<sup>15</sup>

66. Commenting on this suggestion, Mr. Clerides said that he did not disagree with it. His side was willing to continue constructively the exchange of views with the Turkish Cypriot community in a bid to bridge the differences and find a lasting solution based on the principle contained in that suggestion. He added however that recent statements by Turkish officials did not hold out promise of any such intention on the part of Turkey; indeed, Turkish policy seemed to be directed towards getting his side to agree to the principle that the solution to be arrived at would be a lasting one without Turkey agreeing that Cyprus should be sovereign and unitary.

67. Mr. Denktash denied the implication in Mr. Clerides' statement that his side was not seeking a permanent solution based on the independence and sovereignty of Cyprus. The main difficulty so far had been that the Greek Cypriots had been seeking a solution based on an independence which had its door open to *enosis*. A restatement by them that they were ready to agree to an independence which was closed permanently and effectively to any form of union with any other country, as was the case under the 1960 Agreements, would be a constructive step in the right direction. With regard to the term "unitary State", his side was not averse to a State which had the structure set out in the 1960 Agreements whereby the partnership

status and rights of the Turkish Cypriot community were fully safeguarded and their security of life and property guaranteed. But, having regard to the way the Greek Cypriots had misused the term, his side was not prepared to tie itself to any terminology on the exact interpretation of which there had not yet been an agreement.

68. With regard to the developments concerning the intercommunal talks, it is with deep regret that I have to report that they have now reached a point which President Makarios has described as deadlock. The two interlocutors have spoken to the press from time to time disclosing, to some extent, the substance of the letters exchanged between them and giving their views on the progress of their talks. From these statements, it may be inferred that the letters exchanged, on which the recent discussions have been based, contain little that might indicate significant progress towards agreement. Rather, they appear to contain reviews of the ground covered during the talks over the past three years and restatements of the respective positions, as well as a consideration of the usefulness of continuing the talks on the present basis.

69. From the statements made by the two interlocutors, it is apparent that there is disagreement on two main issues, local government and guarantees for the independence of Cyprus.

70. On the issue of local government, Mr. Denktash has proposed a form of local autonomy for each community under the control of central communal authorities. In support of his proposals he has pointed out that his side has accepted a number of changes proposed by the Greek Cypriots concerning the Central Government of the Republic. Mr. Clerides has said that he is willing to accept separate authorities for communal affairs such as education, culture and personal status, as indeed is the case in many countries; matters of administration, however, are governmental affairs and in no country are they considered communal.

71. Each side has placed on the other the responsibility for raising the question of guarantees, which both agree was not a matter within their terms of reference. Mr. Clerides has stated that it had always been understood that the question of guarantees would be considered at a different stage and level, should the interlocutors reach provisional agreement on constitutional issues. Mr. Denktash, for his part, has asserted that the question of guarantees had been introduced not by his side but by Archbishop Makarios who, earlier in 1971, had stated publicly that he would never sign an agreement that barred the way to *enosis*. This had made the issue a fundamental one for the Turkish Cypriot side, which would accept no agreement unless it closed the door to *enosis*.

72. With regard to the future of the intercommunal talks, both interlocutors have indicated their willingness to continue them although each has made it clear that the gap between their respective positions is considerable. Mr. Denktash has expressed his willingness to begin a "new exercise" based on agreed "new principles" if the other side should wish it, and provided that a time-limit is set.

73. The progress of the intercommunal talks has also been commented upon by members of the Greek and Turkish Governments. At the beginning of June, the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Greece, Mr. Palamas, and the Foreign Minister of Turkey, Mr. Olcay, held discussions in Lisbon during which

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 83.

they considered the question of Cyprus. Official statements issued by both embassies on 3 June said that the two leaders had emphasized the need for a speedy solution to the Cyprus question and expressed the hope that the intercommunal talks would be continued at a quicker tempo and in a constructive spirit. In a statement made on 6 June, Mr. Olcay said that he and Mr. Palamas appreciated that the Turkish and Greek Governments had to show understanding and make every endeavour to bring the talks to a successful conclusion.

74. At a press interview given on 17 June, Mr. Palamas was reported to have said that if the intercommunal talks failed to produce a solution, Greece and Turkey would begin consultations for the further handling of the issue. He added however that the talks were progressing and that no other process for the search for a solution was being considered.

75. In an interview given on 15 July, Mr. Olcay was reported to have said that there was a need to fix a time-limit for solving the Cyprus problem since the intercommunal talks could not drag on indefinitely. He said that Turkey was not seeking the partition of Cyprus provided the status of Cyprus was not changed fundamentally and the partnership of the two communities was maintained, as defined in the 1960 Agreements. In a further statement reported on 6 August, Mr. Olcay said that he would discuss the Cyprus issue with Mr. Palamas in September when they met in New York during the session of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

76. The President of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, held discussions in Athens from 3 to 5 September 1971 with the Prime Minister of Greece, Mr. Papadopoulos, on the question of Cyprus. A joint communiqué stated that during the discussions there was a broad, mutual briefing and exchange of views which would prove particularly useful in the further handling of the Cyprus question. Speaking on his return to Cyprus, in reply to a question whether there had been any decision on a new procedure to be followed in case the local talks reached a deadlock, the President said that various alternative procedures had been discussed and the one to be followed would be decided following consultations with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. With this aim in view, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Kyprianou, would be going to New York later in September.

#### V. GOOD OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

77. As indicated in paragraphs 75 and 76 above, the Foreign Minister of Cyprus, the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Greece and the Foreign Minister of Turkey came to United Nations Headquarters in September 1971 to attend the twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly. While in New York, they continued their consultations on the Cyprus question and exchanged views with me on this subject in a constructive spirit.

78. In the course of their conversations with me, the current impasse in the intercommunal talks was reviewed in the light of the responsibilities of the United Nations and of the parties concerned. Mr. Kyprianou outlined the Cyprus Government's views on the impasse reached in the local talks as well as on ways of dealing with other aspects of the problem within the framework of the United Nations. Mr. Olcay and Mr. Palamas, on behalf of their Governments,

put forward certain views held in common by them on methods of helping the interlocutors in the intercommunal talks to overcome their deadlock and make a new start. As a consequence of these exchanges of views, I had occasion to put forward certain procedural suggestions, which however did not prove immediately acceptable in all their aspects to all the parties concerned.

79. After careful consideration of the positions of the Governments concerned, I handed on 18 October to the Foreign Minister of Cyprus and to the Permanent Representatives of Greece and Turkey identical copies of an aide-mémoire which formalized my procedural suggestions referred to in the preceding paragraph. The aide-mémoire reads as follows:

"The presence at United Nations Headquarters of the Foreign Ministers of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey and of the Secretary-General's Special Representative in Cyprus made possible an exchange of views with the Secretary-General on steps that might usefully be taken to facilitate the search for a settlement of the long-term problems of Cyprus. As a consequence of these conversations the Secretary-General made a suggestion designed to reactivate and make more effective the intercommunal talks in Cyprus. Although certain aspects of this suggestion did not prove immediately acceptable to all the parties concerned, the proposal as a whole still seems to the Secretary-General to provide a new basis for achieving the ends which all the parties have in mind. For this reason the Secretary-General feels that it may be useful to put his suggestion in writing for the convenience and continued consideration of the parties.

"The Secretary-General's suggestion is that with a view to facilitating the future conduct of the intercommunal talks, his Special Representative in Cyprus, Mr. B. F. Osorio-Tafall, should, in the exercise of the Secretary-General's good offices, take part in the talks between the representatives of the two communities. It is also suggested that the Governments of Greece and Turkey should each make available a constitutional expert who would attend the talks in an advisory capacity."

80. I had occasion in this connexion to make it clear the role in the intercommunal talks of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, as envisaged in the aide-mémoire, would be in the context of the good offices which he had been exercising on my behalf and which had continued to be available to the parties directly concerned. There was no intention that the Special Representative should act as a mediator or put forward substantive proposals concerning solutions to the problem.

81. The reaction of the Government of Greece to my aide-mémoire was conveyed to me by its Permanent Representative on 19 October 1971; that of the Government of Cyprus, by its Foreign Minister on 19 October, and that of the Government of Turkey, by its Permanent Representative on 24 November. Of the two parties to the intercommunal talks, the Turkish Cypriot community's reaction was transmitted by Vice-President Küçük, through my Special Representative, on 29 November 1971, and that of Mr. Clerides on behalf of the Greek Cypriot community on 30 November. The Government of Greece fully accepted the suggestion in my aide-mémoire; the Government of Cyprus accepted it only in so far as the Special Repre-

sentative of the Secretary-General was concerned and the Government of Turkey accepted it with significant modifications. The Turkish Cypriot community accepted my suggestion with modifications and has placed on record certain understandings in this connexion. The reaction of the Greek Cypriot community was the same as that of the Cyprus Government.

82. Since the suggestion made in my aide-mémoire of 18 October is still under active discussion among the parties, and since certain aspects of the matter are still under consideration by some of them, it has seemed to me that it would be premature to publish at this time a detailed account of the reactions received by me so far. I hope however to be in a position to report more fully to the Council on this matter by the time it meets to consider my report.

83. It should be added that on 17 November, the Foreign Minister of Cyprus presented to me a number of additional points and alternative suggestions. Thus he indicated that the expanded local talks should concern themselves with the internal aspects of the Cyprus problem. In these talks, technical advice on constitutional matters could well be provided by experts appointed by the Secretary-General from United Nations personnel or countries not involved in the Cyprus problem. Such international aspects of the problem as the independence, equal sovereignty, territorial integrity and security of Cyprus might be dealt with on a governmental level in New York. As envisaged by the Cyprus Government, both the talks in Nicosia on the constitutional problem and those in New York on the international aspects would be within the framework of the Secretary-General's good offices and would be based upon specific terms of reference in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter. Alternative procedural solutions, such as the active participation of the Security Council, might also be considered.

84. In conveying his Government's views, the representative of Turkey stressed that the intercommunal talks were of an exploratory nature and limited to constitutional matters, and arrangements to broaden them could not alter this status nor affect in any way the validity of the agreements on Cyprus. He further indicated that in his Government's view, the representatives of Greece and Turkey would take part in the talks in the exercise of their respective Governments' good offices, just as the Special Representative of the Secretary-General would take part in the exercise of the Secretary-General's good offices.

85. Vice-President Küçük, on behalf of his community, similarly is of the view that the talks should continue to be informal and exploratory, that they should be confined to constitutional matters, and that the broadening of the talks should not affect his community's position about the validity of the 1960 Agreements and the Constitution of Cyprus, whose letter and spirit should be the point of departure and the basis of the talks in their new phase. Mr. Küçük also suggested measures to alleviate the hardships suffered by his community through the establishment, within the context of the Secretary-General's good offices of mixed *ad hoc* committees with the participation of representatives of the United Nations and of the two communities.

## VI. MEDIATION EFFORT

86. The situation regarding a resumption of the mediation function under paragraph 7 of Security Council

resolution 186 (1964) has remained unchanged since my last report, owing primarily to the widely differing and firmly held views on the matter of the three Governments most directly concerned.

## VII. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

87. Voluntary contributions in the amount of approximately \$107.3 million have been paid to the UNFICYP Special Account by 49 Member States and four non-member Governments in respect of the periods from the inception of the Force on 27 March 1964 to 15 December 1971. In addition, voluntary contributions from public sources, interest earned on investment of temporarily undisbursed funds and other miscellaneous income received by the Account have totalled about \$1.2 million. Accordingly, some \$108.5 million have been made available to the UNFICYP Special Account towards meeting the costs of UNFICYP to the United Nations for the period through 15 December 1971.

88. The costs to be borne by the United Nations for the operation of UNFICYP for the period from the inception of the Force to 15 December 1971 are estimated at \$134.5 million. This figure includes the direct costs to the United Nations of maintaining the Force in Cyprus as well as the amounts to be paid to Governments providing contingents in respect of their extra and extraordinary costs for which they seek to be reimbursed by the United Nations, but it does not include the amount that would be required for the final repatriation of contingents and the liquidation of the Force.

89. The amount of \$108.5 million so far received by the UNFICYP Special Account falls short of the requirement for \$134.5 million indicated above by approximately \$26 million. However, in addition to the voluntary contributions that have been paid already to the Account, a number of Governments have pledged but not yet paid voluntary contributions totalling approximately \$19.7 million. Of these unpaid pledges, some \$9.6 million are expected to be paid eventually. Unfortunately, this leaves a balance of approximately \$10.1 million for which contributions are not in any way assured.

90. If to the amount of \$108.5 million so far received the amount of \$9.6 million for assured pledges is added, the UNFICYP Special Account can be expected to have available to it approximately \$118.1 million. The difference between this figure and the costs to be met of approximately \$134.5 million is \$16.4 million. Accordingly, unless additional contributions from existing or from new pledges are received before 15 December 1971, the UNFICYP Special Account deficit as of that date will be \$16.4 million. A later paragraph of this report deals further with this deficit and the importance of its elimination.

91. If the Security Council should decide to extend for six months beyond 15 December 1971 the period during which the Force is to be stationed in Cyprus, it is estimated that the additional cost to the Organization, assuming continuance of present reimbursement commitments, would amount to approximately \$6.5 million as detailed below. The estimated \$500,000 which would be required for the final repatriation of contingents and liquidation costs has been excluded from the figures below for purposes of convenience.

UNFICYP COST ESTIMATES BY MAJOR CATEGORY OF EXPENSE

(in thousands of US dollars)

I. Operation costs incurred by the United Nations	
Movement of contingents .....	164
Operational expenses .....	535
Rental of premises .....	96
Rations .....	380
Non-military personnel, salaries, travel, etc. ...	612
Miscellaneous and contingencies .....	205
	TOTAL 1,992
II. Reimbursement of extra costs to Governments providing contingents	
Pay and allowances .....	4,100
Contingent-owned equipment .....	350
Death and disability awards .....	50
	TOTAL 4,500
	GRAND TOTAL 6,492

92. The above costs do not reflect the full costs of UNFICYP to Member and non-member States, since they exclude the extra costs which Members providing contingents or police units to the Force have agreed to absorb at their own expense rather than seek as reimbursement from the United Nations. Based on reports received from certain of the Governments providing contingents or police units to the Force, the estimated amount of such extra costs which Governments would absorb at their own expense for an additional six-month period, if the mandate of UNFICYP is extended and the Governments concerned agree to continue the present arrangements, are as follows: Australia \$200,000, Austria \$160,000, Canada (exclusive of the normal cost of pay and allowances) \$863,755, Denmark \$230,000, Sweden \$325,000 and United Kingdom \$678,000. Finland and Ireland are also absorbing certain UNFICYP costs at their own expense.

93. In order to finance the costs to the Organization of maintaining the Force for a period of six months after 15 December 1971 and to meet all costs and outstanding claims up to that date, it will be necessary for the Secretary-General to receive contributions totalling \$22.9 million.

VIII. OBSERVATIONS

94. The period under review has been marked by a deterioration of the general situation in Cyprus. Tension between the two communities of the island has noticeably increased and there have been a number of intercommunal incidents, some of them serious.

95. However, thanks largely to the presence of UNFICYP and its constant efforts to minimize incidents and defuse tense situations whenever they occur, a relative, though superficial, calm has been maintained. The task of UNFICYP has become increasingly difficult. It has been able to achieve only limited progress in the normalization of conditions in the island and none at all in the important fields of freedom of movement and deconfrontation.

96. Despite UNFICYP's efforts, the Turkish Cypriot leadership has continued to deny freedom of movement in the area it controls to unarmed Greek Cypriot civilians. The leadership ascribes its negative attitude to security reasons, but the fact remains that some 80 per cent of the population of Cyprus are deprived of their basic right to travel freely on the public roads of that area.

97. UNFICYP has not been able to achieve any progress either with regard to deconfrontation. The persistent confrontation between the Cyprus National Guard and the Turkish Cypriot fighters has become more dangerous with the passage of time as the two opposing forces have continued to improve their military efficiency and capability. An additional disturbing factor is that this increase in military efficiency and capability has led to a periodic tendency on the part of one side or the other to attempt to alter to its advantage the very delicate balance of military and police dispositions and patterns of activity along the Green Line and in other sensitive areas. In each such case UNFICYP has endeavoured to maintain the *status quo*, or when possible to make new arrangements in agreement with both sides. In this connexion, while the Cyprus Government has continued to co-operate with UNFICYP in most cases, the Turkish Cypriot leadership has been reluctant to extend to UNFICYP the same measure of co-operation as in the past. I wish to emphasize once again that UNFICYP can fulfil its responsibilities only if it has the co-operation of both sides. It is to be hoped that such co-operation will be extended to it in the future.

98. There can be little doubt that much of the present climate of uneasiness is due to the uncertainties regarding the search for a solution to the Cyprus problem. As the intercommunal talks have gradually reached a deadlock, the hopes of three years ago have given way to frustration and tension. This tension has been recently deepened by rumours of the presence of General Grivas in the island and a related resurgence of the pro-*enosis* campaign among some sections of the Greek Cypriot population. As the prospect of an agreed solution has appeared to wane, the danger of a recurrence of violence has increased.

99. I remain convinced that the best way of achieving a solution to the Cyprus problem is through a negotiated agreement between the two communities on its constitutional aspects. On the other hand, I have come to the conclusion that the intercommunal talks in their present form have reached an impasse which cannot be overcome without some new impetus being given to them. Two considerations have led me to believe that it is possible to reactivate these talks. First, all the parties have agreed that the intercommunal talks should continue in modified form with a view to promoting the search for a solution to outstanding problems; and secondly, the discussions between the Governments of Greece and Turkey have recently led to joint efforts by them aimed at reactivating the intercommunal talks.

100. I have described in chapter V above my efforts, in consultation with the Foreign Ministers of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey—and later the representatives to the intercommunal talks—to give these talks a new form which might serve to reactivate them and to facilitate progress. With this in mind I made a suggestion which, although it did not wholly satisfy two of the original parties, was calculated to take their various preoccupations enough into account to be acceptable to all. Initially, my suggestion was fully accepted by one of these parties, accepted only in part by another, and accepted with modifications by a third. One of the two parties to the intercommunal talks also accepted my suggestions with modifications, and the other party accepted them only in part. Discussions on this matter are proceeding. I still feel that my suggestion has merit and I would hope that after further consideration

by, and discussion with, the parties concerned, it might yet prove acceptable as a new starting-point for the intercommunal talks. If such an outcome is achieved, I shall of course inform the Security Council immediately.

101. In my last report to the Security Council I stated that "what is lacking, and needs to be restored, is the parties' mutual confidence in each other's good faith and ultimate political objectives".<sup>16</sup> Since that time we have seen one step forward in the field of mutual confidence, as evidenced by the joint efforts of Greece and Turkey to remove some of the obstacles to a peaceful and just settlement of the Cyprus problem. As I have previously indicated, the basis for such a settlement should be found in the concept of an independent, sovereign and unitary state with the adequate participation of the two communities.

102. It is no secret that two fears especially dominate the Cyprus problem—on the Greek Cypriot side the fear of partition and on the Turkish Cypriot side the fear of *enosis*. I know that both these concepts are deeply in the history of the problem and that it is difficult for some of the parties concerned to disown them. The truth is, however, that if the apprehensions aroused by these two ideas could be laid to rest, a large cloud would cease to hang over all efforts to reach a settlement. It seems to me that if the Security Council were able in some way to assist the parties in dispelling the difficulties created by these two ideas and, in doing so, to reaffirm its own determination to ensure that a just settlement was reached in Cyprus within the principles of the Charter and the spirit and letter of its resolutions on the subject, a great improvement in the atmosphere of the talks and in the relations between the parties might result.

103. I should like here to add that it would seem to me to be appropriate, and indeed most desirable, at this juncture, when the United Nations has been involved in this problem for so many years, and with considerable expenditure both of effort and resources, that the Security Council should become more actively involved in assisting the parties in the search for a solution to the Cyprus problem. On some of the basic issues it seems to me that the Council's advice, guidance and new initiatives, of course with the agreement of the parties, would be a reassuring and constructive element in their efforts to reach a settlement. It would be, of course, for the Council itself to consider how best it might play such a role.

104. As the search for a solution to the Cyprus problem continues, it is essential that every effort should be made to maintain quiet in the island. In view of the present tension in Cyprus, I have no alternative but to recommend an extension of the mandate of UNFICYP for a further period of six months, until 15 June 1972. The Government of Cyprus and the Governments of Greece and Turkey have conveyed to me their agreement with this recommendation.

105. In making this recommendation I must refer once again to the financial problem facing UNFICYP. I have become increasingly concerned because collective action has not yet resulted in the working-out of sound and effective arrangements for the adequate financing of the Force. This concern is shared both by the Governments contributing troops to UNFICYP and by others who have supported it financially. The deficit, even after taking full account of contributions

which are eventually expected to be paid, has reached the substantial sum of \$16.4 million. As a result, the United Nations is not able to pay, on anything approaching a current basis, the amounts it owes to Governments which have in good faith furnished contingents and incurred extra costs in connexion with the UNFICYP operation. This situation obviously must not continue. In this connexion, I understand that certain interested Governments are working together informally on methods to ensure the required financing on a more regular basis. I sincerely appreciate the efforts being made and hope that they will prove successful.

106. In the past I have repeatedly voiced my misgivings about the present method of financing by voluntary contributions. I feel strongly that the maintenance of international peace and security is a collective responsibility of the United Nations which must be shared by all its Members. In the case of UNFICYP, the financial burden has been borne by a limited number of Governments, including some States not Members of the Organization. Many Members of the United Nations, on the other hand, including some of those who have special responsibilities for the United Nations action in Cyprus, have not contributed to UNFICYP or have omitted to do so for a long period of time. The present system of financing results in obvious inequities which seem difficult to reconcile with the spirit of the Charter. Compared with the consequences of a recurrence of fighting in Cyprus, the cost of maintaining UNFICYP is relatively small. In view of the important task entrusted to UNFICYP by the Security Council and the results it has achieved, it would seem appropriate that all Members of the United Nations should give it the modest support it requires.

107. In paragraph 87 of my last report, I observed that the prospect of an apparently indefinite commitment for the United Nations in Cyprus posed fundamental problems to the Organization in facing its responsibilities for the maintenance of international peace and security. I expressed the hope that members of the Security Council would give this problem the most serious consideration in the coming months and would give thought especially to constructive alternatives to the present arrangement. I have not put forward any suggestions on this score, as at the present time the possibility of such alternatives would depend on the outcome of the current efforts to reactivate the intercommunal talks and on the effect of such a development on the situation in the island. This matter will be kept under review.

108. This is the last report which it is incumbent upon me, as Secretary-General, to submit to the Security Council on the question of Cyprus. It will be one of my lasting regrets that I cannot report, in accordance with the Security Council's resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964, that "a peaceful solution and an agreed settlement of the problem confronting Cyprus, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, having in mind the well-being of the people of Cyprus as a whole and the preservation of international peace and security" has been found.

109. I remember well the hopes and expectations engendered by the unanimous adoption of the Council resolution of 4 March 1964. It provided both for a United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus and for mediation. The Force, intended to be of only the most

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 82.

temporary nature—indeed, three months—was “to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions”. The mediator, in the meantime, was to “use his best endeavours with the representatives of the communities” and with the Governments concerned to achieve the peaceful solution and agreed settlement to which I have already referred. Not only did the mediation called for in the Security Council meet with no success but it also proved impossible to resume the search for an agreed solution in full measure.

110. Thus the hopes and expectations of 1964 are yet to be fulfilled. After nearly eight years, the solution of the Cyprus problem is still not in sight, conditions in the island remain precarious and I have to come once more before the Security Council—in fact for the twentieth time—to recommend a further extension of the mandate of UNFICYP. It is obvious that this situation cannot continue indefinitely, to the detriment of the people of Cyprus and as a lingering threat to international peace and security.

111. Despite the difficulties involved, I am deeply convinced that, given the necessary goodwill, the Cyprus problem is capable of solution. It is my earnest hope that, in accordance with the principles of the Charter, the parties to this problem will soon find it possible, in the interest of the well-being of the people of Cyprus and the cause of international peace and security, to make those necessary compromises and accommodations without which no settlement can be achieved.

112. In concluding this report, I wish to express my deep appreciation to the Governments which have provided contingents and personnel for UNFICYP and to those which have made voluntary contributions for the support of the operation. I also wish to pay tribute to my Special Representative, to the Force Commander and to all the officers and men of UNFICYP as well as its civilian staff. They have continued to carry out with exemplary efficiency and devotion the important task assigned to them by the Security Council.

#### ANNEX

[Map showing the deployment of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus on 1 December 1971. See page 55.]

### DOCUMENT S/10403\*

#### Report of the Secretary-General on the activities of his Special Representative to the Middle East

[Original: English]  
[30 November 1971]

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#### INTRODUCTION

1. By its resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, the Security Council affirmed the principles and provisions which should be applied in establishing a just and lasting peace in the Middle East and requested me to designate a special representative to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with these provisions and principles. I designated Ambassador Gunnar V. Jarring of Sweden as my Special Representative and submitted progress reports from time to time to the Security Council on his efforts.<sup>17</sup>

\* Also circulated as a General Assembly document under the symbol A/8541.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, *Twenty-second Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1967*, document S/8309; *ibid.*, *Twenty-third Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1968*, documents S/8309/Add.1 and 2; *ibid.*, *Supplement for July, August and September 1968*, document S/8309/Add.3; *ibid.*, *Supplement for October, November and December 1968*, document S/8309/Add.4; and *ibid.*, *Twenty-fifth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1970*, document S/9902.

2. By its resolution 2628 (XXV) of 4 November 1970, the General Assembly, after expressing its views on the principles which should govern the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, called upon the parties directly concerned to resume contact with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General with a view to giving effect to Security Council resolution 242 (1967) and requested me to report to the Security Council within a period of two months, and to the General Assembly as appropriate, on the efforts of the Special Representative and on the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967).

3. In accordance with my responsibilities under Security Council resolution 242 (1967) and with the request contained in General Assembly resolution 2628 (XXV), I submitted to the Security Council on 4 January 1971 a comprehensive report [S/10070] on the activities of the Special Representative up to that date. Subsequently, on 1 February and 5 March, I submitted further progress reports [S/10070/Add.1 and 2] on his activities.

4. In view of the fact that the General Assembly is about to debate again the situation in the Middle East and of the request contained in General Assembly resolution 2628 (XXV) that I should report to it as appropriate on the efforts of the Special Representative and on the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967), I am arranging to have my report of 4 January 1971 available to the Members of the General Assembly; I am also submitting the present report on the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) to both the Security Council and the General Assembly in order to give a more comprehensive account of the activities of the Special Representative at the beginning of 1971 than that given in documents S/10070/Add.1 and 2 and to bring that account up to date.



I. THE HOLDING OF DISCUSSIONS UNDER THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE'S AUSPICES (JANUARY-MARCH 1971)

5. It will be recalled that at the close of 1970 it was possible to arrange for the resumption of the discussions under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring with Israel, Jordan and the United Arab Republic for the purpose of reaching agreement on a just and lasting peace between them.

6. Ambassador Jarring resumed his discussions with the parties at Headquarters on 5 January 1971 and pursued them actively. He held a series of meetings with the representatives of Israel (including meetings with the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister during a brief visit to Israel made from 8 to 10 January 1971 at the request of that Government), of Jordan, and of the United Arab Republic. In addition, he held meetings with the Permanent Representative of Lebanon, which is also one of the States directly concerned with the Middle East settlement.

7. At an early stage in these meetings Israel presented to Ambassador Jarring, for transmission to the Governments concerned, papers containing its views on the "Essentials of peace". Subsequently, the United Arab Republic and Jordan having received the respective Israeli views, presented papers containing their own views concerning the implementation of the provisions of Security Council resolution 242 (1967).

8. During the remainder of January, Ambassador Jarring held further meetings with the representatives of Israel, Jordan and the United Arab Republic, in the course of which he received further memoranda elaborating the positions of the parties. Unfortunately, these indicated that the parties held differing views on the order in which items should be discussed. More importantly, each side was insisting that the other should be ready to make certain commitments before being ready to proceed to the stage of formulating the provisions of a peace settlement.

9. On the Israeli side there was insistence that the United Arab Republic should give specific, direct and reciprocal commitments towards Israel that it would be ready to enter into a peace agreement with Israel and to make towards Israel the various undertakings referred to in paragraph 1 (ii) of Security Council resolution 242 (1967). When agreement was reached on those points, it would be possible to discuss others, including the refugee problem; such items as secure and recognized boundaries, withdrawal and additional arrangements for ensuring security should be discussed in due course.

10. The United Arab Republic continued to regard the Security Council resolution as containing provisions to be implemented by the parties and to express its readiness to carry out its obligations under the resolution in full, provided that Israel did likewise. However it held that Israel persisted in its refusal to implement the Security Council resolution, since it would not commit itself to withdraw from all Arab territories occupied in June 1967. Furthermore in the view of the United Arab Republic Israel had not committed itself to the implementation of the United Nations resolutions relevant to a just settlement to the refugee problem.

11. The papers received by Ambassador Jarring from Israel and Jordan relating to peace between these two countries showed a similar divergence of views. Israel stressed the importance of Jordan's giving an undertaking to enter into a peace agreement with it

which would specify the direct and reciprocal obligations undertaken by each of them. Jordan emphasized the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and expressed the view that the essential first step towards peace lay in an Israeli commitment to evacuate all Arab territories.

12. Ambassador Jarring felt that at this stage of the talks he should make clear his views on what he believed to be the necessary steps to be taken in order to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles of Security Council resolution 242 (1967), which the parties had agreed to carry out in all its parts. He reached the conclusion, which I shared, that the only possibility of breaking the imminent deadlock arising from the differing views of Israel and the United Arab Republic as to the priority to be given to commitments and undertakings—which seemed to him to be the real cause for the existing immobility in the talks—was for him to seek from each side the parallel and simultaneous commitments which seemed to be inevitable prerequisites of an eventual peace settlement between them. It should thereafter be possible to proceed at once to formulate the provisions and terms of a peace agreement not only for those topics covered by the commitments, but with equal priority for other topics, and in particular the refugee question.

13. In identical aide-mémoires handed to the representatives of the United Arab Republic and Israel on 8 February 1971 Ambassador Jarring requested those Governments to make to him certain prior commitments. Ambassador Jarring's initiative was on the basis that the commitments should be made simultaneously and reciprocally and subject to the eventual satisfactory determination of all other aspects of a peace settlement, including in particular a just settlement of the refugee problem. Israel would give a commitment to withdraw its forces from occupied United Arab Republic territory to the former international boundary between Egypt and the British Mandate of Palestine. The United Arab Republic would give a commitment to enter into a peace agreement with Israel and to make explicitly therein to Israel, on a reciprocal basis, various undertakings and acknowledgements arising directly or indirectly from paragraph 1 (ii) of Security Council resolution 242 (1967). [*For the full text of the aide-mémoires, see annex I below.*]

14. On 15 February, Ambassador Jarring received from the representative of the United Arab Republic an aide-mémoire in which it was indicated that the United Arab Republic would accept the specific commitments requested of it, as well as other commitments arising directly or indirectly from Security Council resolution 242 (1967). If Israel would give, likewise, commitments covering its own obligations under the Security Council resolution, including commitments for the withdrawal of its armed forces from Sinai and the Gaza Strip and for the achievement of a just settlement for the refugee problem in accordance with United Nations resolutions, the United Arab Republic would be ready to enter into a peace agreement with Israel. Finally the United Arab Republic expressed the view that a just and lasting peace could not be realized without the full and scrupulous implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) and the withdrawal of the Israeli armed forces from all the territories occupied since 5 June 1967. [*For the full text of the United Arab Republic reply, see annex II below.*]

15. On 17 February, Ambassador Jarring informed the Israeli representative of the contents of the United Arab Republic reply to his aide-mémoire.

16. On 26 February, Ambassador Jarring received a communication from the representative of Israel, in which, without specific reference to the commitment which he had sought from that Government, Israel stated that it viewed favourably "the expression by the United Arab Republic of its readiness to enter into a peace agreement with Israel" and reiterated that it was prepared for meaningful negotiations on all subjects relevant to a peace agreement between the two countries. Israel gave details of the undertakings which in its opinion should be given by the two countries in such a peace agreement, which should be expressed in a binding treaty in accordance with normal international law and precedent. Israel considered that both parties, having presented their basic positions, should now pursue the negotiations in a detailed and concrete manner without prior conditions.

17. On the crucial question of withdrawal on which Ambassador Jarring had sought a commitment from Israel, the Israeli position was that it would give an undertaking covering withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from "the Israeli-United Arab Republic cease-fire line" to the secure, recognized and agreed boundaries to be established in the peace agreement; Israel would not withdraw to the pre-5 June 1967 lines. [*For the full text of the Israeli paper, see annex III below.*]

18. On 28 February, Ambassador Jarring informed the United Arab Republic representative of the contents of the Israeli communication. The latter held that it was improper for the Israeli authorities to have responded to his Government's reply, which had been addressed to Ambassador Jarring and would have full effect only if the Israeli authorities gave the commitment requested of them by Ambassador Jarring.

19. In accepting the United States proposal for renewed discussions under Ambassador Jarring's auspices [*see S/10070, paras. 33 and 34*], the parties had agreed that they would observe strictly, for a period of 90 days from 7 August 1970, the cease-fire resolutions of the Security Council. In response to the recommendation of the General Assembly in resolution 2628 (XXV), the cease-fire had been extended for a further period of three months. In my report of 1 February submitted as that period was expiring, I appealed to the parties at that stage of the discussions, to withhold fire, to exercise military restraint and to maintain the quiet which had prevailed in the area since August 1970.

20. In response to that appeal, the Foreign Ministry of Israel, in a communiqué released in Jerusalem on 2 February, announced that Israel would observe the cease-fire on a mutual basis; in a speech to the National Assembly on 4 February, the President of the United Arab Republic declared the decision of the United Arab Republic to refrain from opening fire for a period of 30 days ending on 7 March.

21. In submitting my report of 5 March 1971, I commented as follows:

"Ambassador Jarring has been very active over the past month and some further progress has been made towards a peaceful solution of the Middle East question. The problems to be settled have been more clearly identified and on some there is general agreement. I wish moreover to note with satisfaction the positive reply given by the United Arab Re-

public to Ambassador Jarring's initiative. However, the Government of Israel has so far not responded to the request of Ambassador Jarring that it should give a commitment on withdrawal to the international boundary of the United Arab Republic.

"While I still consider that the situation has considerable elements of promise, it is a matter for increasing concern that Ambassador Jarring's attempt to break the deadlock has not so far been successful. I appeal, therefore, to the Government of Israel to give further consideration to this question and to respond favourably to Ambassador Jarring's initiative.

"To give time for further consideration and in the hope that the way forward may be reopened, I once more appeal to the parties to withhold fire, to exercise military restraint and to maintain the quiet which has prevailed in the area since August 1970." [*S/10070/Add.2, paras. 14-16.*]

## II. FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS (MARCH-NOVEMBER 1971)

22. In response to my appeal, the Israeli Government once again made clear its willingness to continue to observe the cease-fire on a basis of reciprocity. The President of the United Arab Republic, in a statement to the nation on 7 March 1971, declared that his country no longer considered itself further committed to a cease-fire or to withholding fire. This did not, however, mean that political action would cease.

23. On 11 March, the Israeli representative informed Ambassador Jarring that his Government was awaiting the reaction of the United Arab Republic Government to the Israeli invitation in its reply of 26 February to enter into detailed and concrete discussions. When that statement of the Israeli representative was brought to the attention of the United Arab Republic representative, he maintained that his Government was still awaiting an Israeli reply to Ambassador Jarring's aide-mémoire.

24. Subsequently, the talks under Ambassador Jarring's auspices lapsed. He therefore left Headquarters to resume his post as Ambassador of Sweden in Moscow on 25 March.

25. Although he returned to Headquarters from 5 to 12 May and from 21 September to 27 October and has held certain consultations elsewhere, he has found himself faced with the same deadlock and with no possibility of actively pursuing his mission.

26. Indeed, during much of this time the promotion of agreement between the parties was the object of two separate initiatives, first, an effort by the United States of America to promote an interim agreement providing for the reopening of the Suez Canal, which has not, so far, achieved any positive results, and, secondly, a mission of inquiry conducted by certain African Heads of States on behalf of the Organization of African Unity, which is still in progress as this report is being prepared. Both initiatives were described to Ambassador Jarring and myself by the sponsors as designed to facilitate the resumption of Ambassador Jarring's mission. Nevertheless, while they were being pursued, they obviously constituted an additional reason for him not to take personal initiatives.

27. In the introduction to my report on the work of the Organization I expressed certain views on the situation in the Middle East. After recalling the responses of the United Arab Republic and Israel to Ambassador Jarring's initiative of 8 February, I said

that I continued to hope—as I still do—that Israel would find it possible before too long to make a response that would enable the search for a peaceful settlement under Ambassador Jarring's auspices to continue.

28. After noting the relative quiet which has continued to exist in the area, I went on to say:

"It is not possible to predict how long this quiet will last, but there can be little doubt that, if the present impasse in the search for a peaceful settlement persists, new fighting will break out sooner or later. Since the parties have taken advantage of the present lull to strengthen considerably their military capabilities, it is only too likely that the new round of fighting will be more violent and dangerous than the previous ones, and there is always the danger that it may not be possible to limit it to the present antagonists and to the confines of the Middle East.

"I see no other way to forestall such a disastrous eventuality than by intensifying the search for a peaceful and agreed settlement. I believe there is still a chance of achieving such a settlement. I do not overlook the formidable difficulty of the problems to be tackled, but there exist several important assets on the side of peace efforts as well. The Security Council's cease-fire resolutions of June 1967 and its resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, if implemented simultaneously and fully, should provide the framework for achieving a peaceful and agreed settlement of the present conflict. To promote agreement for such a settlement, we are fortunate to have the services of Ambassador Jarring, who is uniquely qualified for this almost impossible task.

"Ambassador Jarring has clearly defined the minimum conditions that are required to move the peace talks ahead and, until those conditions are met, it is hard to see what else he can do to further his efforts. Steps to ensure that those conditions are met must be taken by the parties concerned and, failing this, by the Security Council itself or by States Members of the United Nations and, particularly, the permanent members of the Security Council, both because of their special responsibility within the United Nations and of their influence on the parties concerned."<sup>18</sup>

29. Recent developments have added to the urgency of my remarks. It therefore seems to me that the appropriate organs of the United Nations must review the situation once again and find ways and means to enable the Jarring mission to move forward.

## ANNEXES

### ANNEX I

Aide-mémoire presented to Israel and the United Arab Republic by Ambassador Jarring on 8 February 1971<sup>a</sup>

I have been following with a mixture of restrained optimism and growing concern the resumed discussions under my auspices for the purpose of arriving at a peaceful settlement of the Middle East question. My restrained optimism arises from the fact that in my view the parties are seriously defining their positions and wish to move forward to a permanent

<sup>18</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 1A*, paras. 221-223.

<sup>a</sup> In presenting the aide-mémoire, Ambassador Jarring added the following interpretation:

"I interpret practical security measures in the Sharm el Sheikh area for guaranteeing freedom of navigation through the Straits of Tiran to mean arrangements for stationing a United Nations force in the area for this purpose."

peace. My growing concern is that each side unyieldingly insists that the other make certain commitments before being ready to proceed to the stage of formulating the provisions to be included in a final peace agreement. There is, as I see it, a serious risk that we shall find ourselves in the same deadlock that existed during the first three years of my mission.

I therefore feel that I should at this stage make clear my views on what I believe to be the necessary steps to be taken in order to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles of Security Council resolution 242 (1967), which the parties have agreed to carry out in all its parts.

I have come to the conclusion that the only possibility to break the imminent deadlock arising from the differing views of Israel and the United Arab Republic as to the priority to be given to commitments and undertakings—which seems to me to be the real cause for the present immobility—is for me to seek from each side the parallel and simultaneous commitments which seem to be inevitable prerequisites of an eventual peace settlement between them. It should thereafter be possible to proceed at once to formulate the provisions and terms of a peace agreement not only for those topics covered by the commitments, but with equal priority for other topics, and in particular the refugee question.

Specifically, I wish to request the Governments of Israel and the United Arab Republic to make to me at this stage the following prior commitments simultaneously and on condition that the other party makes its commitment and subject to the eventual satisfactory determination of all other aspects of a peace settlement, including in particular a just settlement of the refugee problem.

#### 1. Israel

Israel would give a commitment to withdraw its forces from occupied United Arab Republic territory to the former international boundary between Egypt and the British Mandate of Palestine on the understanding that satisfactory arrangements are made for:

- (a) Establishing demilitarized zones;
- (b) Practical security arrangements in the Sharm el Sheikh area for guaranteeing freedom of navigation through the Straits of Tiran;
- (c) Freedom of navigation through the Suez Canal.

#### 2. United Arab Republic

The United Arab Republic would give a commitment to enter into a peace agreement with Israel and to make explicitly therein to Israel, on a reciprocal basis, undertakings and acknowledgements covering the following subjects:

- (a) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency;
- (b) Respect for and acknowledgement of each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence;
- (c) Respect for and acknowledgement of each other's right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries;
- (d) Responsibility to do all in their power to ensure that acts of belligerency or hostility do not originate from or are not committed from within their respective territories against the population, citizens or property of the other party;
- (e) Non-interference in each other's domestic affairs.

In making the above-mentioned suggestion I am conscious that I am requesting both sides to make serious commitments but I am convinced that the present situation requires me to take this step.

### ANNEX II

Aide-mémoire presented to Ambassador Jarring by the United Arab Republic on 15 February 1971

The United Arab Republic has informed you that it accepts to carry out—on a reciprocal basis—all its obligations as provided for in Security Council resolution 242 (1967) with a view to achieving a peaceful settlement in the Middle East. On the same basis, Israel should carry out all its obligations contained in this resolution.

Referring to your aide-mémoire of 8 February 1971, the United Arab Republic would give a commitment covering the following:

1. Termination of all claims of states of belligerency.
2. Respect for and acknowledgement of each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence.
3. Respect for and acknowledgement of each other's right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries.
4. Responsibility to do all in their power to ensure that acts of belligerency or hostility do not originate from or are committed from within the respective territories against the population, citizens or property of the other party.
5. Non-interference in each other's domestic affairs.

The United Arab Republic would also give a commitment that:

6. It ensures the freedom of navigation in the Suez Canal in accordance with the 1888 Constantinople Convention.
7. It ensures the freedom of navigation in the Straits of Tiran in accordance with the principles of international law.
8. It accepts the stationing of a United Nations peace-keeping force in the Sharm el Seikh.
9. To guarantee the peaceful settlement and the territorial inviolability of every State in the area, the United Arab Republic would accept:

(a) The establishment of demilitarized zones astride the borders in equal distances;

(b) The establishment of a United Nations peace-keeping force in which the four permanent members of the Security Council would participate.

Israel should, likewise, give a commitment to implement all the provisions of Security Council resolution 242 (1967). Hence, Israel should give a commitment covering the following:

1. Withdrawal of its armed forces from Sinai and the Gaza Strip.
2. Achievement of a just settlement for the refugee problem in accordance with United Nations resolutions.
3. Termination of all claims of states of belligerency.
4. Respect for and acknowledgement of each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence.
5. Respect for and acknowledgement of each other's right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries.
6. Responsibility to do all in their power to ensure that acts of belligerency or hostility do not originate from or are committed from within the respective territories against the population, citizens or property of the other party.
7. Non-interference in each other's domestic affairs.

8. To guarantee the peaceful settlement and the territorial inviolability of every State in the area, Israel would accept:

(a) The establishment of demilitarized zones astride the borders in equal distances;

(b) The establishment of a United Nations peace-keeping force in which the four permanent members of the Security Council would participate.

When Israel gives these commitments, the United Arab Republic will be ready to enter into a peace agreement with Israel containing all the aforementioned obligations as provided for in Security Council resolution 242 (1967).

The United Arab Republic considers that the just and lasting peace cannot be realized without the full and scrupulous implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) and the withdrawal of the Israel armed forces from all the territories occupied since 5 June 1967.

### ANNEX III

Communication presented to Ambassador Jarring by Israel on 26 February 1971

Pursuant to our meetings on 8 and 17 February, I am instructed to convey the following to you, and through you to the United Arab Republic.

Israel views favourably the expression by the United Arab Republic of its readiness to enter into a peace agreement with Israel and reiterates that it is prepared for meaningful negotiations on all subjects relevant to a peace agreement between the two countries.

The Government of Israel wishes to state that the peace agreement to be concluded between Israel and the United Arab Republic should, *inter alia*, include the provisions set out below.

#### A. Israel

Israel would give undertakings covering the following:

1. Declared and explicit decision to regard the conflict between Israel and the United Arab Republic as finally ended, and termination of all claims and states of war and acts of hostility or belligerency between Israel and the United Arab Republic.

2. Respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of the United Arab Republic.

3. Respect for and acknowledgement of the right of the United Arab Republic to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries.

4. Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from the Israel-United Arab Republic cease-fire line to the secure, recognized and agreed boundaries to be established in the peace agreement. Israel will not withdraw to the pre-5 June 1967 lines.

5. In the matter of the refugees and the claims of both parties in this connexion, Israel is prepared to negotiate with the Governments directly involved on:

(a) The payment of compensation for abandoned lands and property;

(b) Participation in the planning of the rehabilitation of the refugees in the region. Once the obligation of the parties towards the settlement of the refugee issue has been agreed neither party shall be under claims from the other inconsistent with its sovereignty.

6. The responsibility for ensuring that no war-like act, or act of violence, by any organization, group or individual originates from or is committed in the territory of Israel against the population, armed forces or property of the United Arab Republic.

7. Non-interference in the domestic affairs of the United Arab Republic.

8. Non-participation by Israel in hostile alliances against the United Arab Republic and the prohibition of stationing of troops of other parties which maintain a state of belligerency against the United Arab Republic.

#### B. United Arab Republic

The United Arab Republic undertakings in the peace agreement with Israel would include:

1. Declared and explicit decision to regard the conflict between the United Arab Republic and Israel as finally ended and termination of all claims and states of war and acts of hostility or belligerency between the United Arab Republic and Israel.

2. Respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Israel.

3. Respect for and acknowledgement of the right of Israel to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries to be determined in the peace agreement.

4. The responsibility for ensuring that no war-like act, or act of violence, by any organization, group or individual originates from or is committed in the territory of the United Arab Republic against the population, armed forces or property of Israel.

5. Non-interference in the domestic affairs of Israel.

6. An explicit undertaking to guarantee free passage for Israel ships and cargoes through the Suez Canal.

7. Termination of economic warfare in all its manifestations, including boycott, and of interference in the normal international relations of Israel.

8. Non-participation by the United Arab Republic in hostile alliances against Israel and the prohibition of stationing of troops of other parties which maintain a state of belligerency against Israel.

The United Arab Republic and Israel should enter into a peace agreement with each other to be expressed in a binding treaty in accordance with normal international law and precedent, and containing the above undertakings.

The Government of Israel believes that now that the United Arab Republic has through Ambassador Jarring expressed its willingness to enter into a peace agreement with Israel, and both parties have presented their basic positions, they should now pursue their negotiations in a detailed and concrete manner without prior conditions so as to cover all the points listed in their respective documents with a view to concluding a peace agreement.

## DOCUMENT S/10405

Letter dated 1 December 1971 from the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English]  
[1 December 1971]

I have the honour to transmit herewith for the information of the members of the Security Council the text of a White Paper entitled "Rhodesia: Proposals for a Settlement"<sup>19</sup> presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs on 26 November 1971. This contains the text of the proposals which I told the Council on 25 November that I should make available as soon as possible. As several delegations have told me that they would find it convenient to have this and other information available in the working languages, I should be grateful if you could arrange for the translation and circulation of this letter and its enclosure.

(Signed) C. T. CROWE

*Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations*

### RHODESIA: PROPOSALS FOR A SETTLEMENT

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### RHODESIA

Report on discussions with the régime since November 1970

#### The five Principles

1. Successive British Governments have been prepared to grant independence to Southern Rhodesia if certain essential requirements were met. These formed the basis of discussions with the Rhodesians during 1963 and 1964 and were subsequently formulated as the Five Principles. They are:

1. The principle and intention of unimpeded progress to majority rule, already enshrined in the 1961 Constitution, would have to be maintained and guaranteed.
2. There would also have to be guarantees against retrogressive amendment of the Constitution.
3. There would have to be immediate improvement in the political status of the African population.
4. There would have to be progress towards ending racial discrimination.
5. The British Government would need to be satisfied that any basis proposed for independence was acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole.

#### Previous negotiations

2. A series of negotiations conducted by the previous Administration with the Rhodesians failed to reach an agreement in accordance with these Principles.<sup>(1)</sup> Contacts were finally discontinued in May 1969.<sup>(2)</sup>

#### Subsequent developments in Rhodesia

3. In a referendum in June 1969 the predominantly European electorate in Rhodesia endorsed proposals for a republican form of Government and a new Constitution. Shortly afterwards the Governor, Sir Humphrey Gibbs, obtained The Queen's permission to resign and both the British residual mission in Salisbury and its counterpart in London were withdrawn. The Republican Constitution had no legal status, but it was brought into effect by the Rhodesians on 2 March, 1970. Its main provisions are summarised at Annex A.

#### Her Majesty's Government's policy

4. When the present Government took office in June 1970, they confirmed their determination to seek a just and sensible solution to the Rhodesian problem in accordance with the Five Principles. For they recognised that while sanctions and international ostracism were having some effect on the economic situation in Rhodesia these measures had not brought about, nor seemed likely to bring about, the political changes that were confidently expected at the outset. Moreover, it was evident that the prospects for the African population as a whole could only deteriorate if the present situation remained unchanged. The economic, social and political advance of the Africans could take place

<sup>19</sup> London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1971, Cmnd. 4835.

(1) Cmnd. 3159, Cmnd. 3171 and Cmnd. 3793.

(2) Cmnd. 4065.

only after a return to economic normality and the restoration of conditions in which orderly change would be possible. A settlement would open the way to a comprehensive aid and technical assistance programme directed to expanding African opportunities in employment and education in the widest senses which would make an important contribution to this advance.

### The exploratory exchanges

5. On 9 November, 1970 the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary announced in the House of Commons that he had the previous week sent a preliminary message to Mr. Smith. This was the first of a series of written exchanges between the British Government and Mr. Smith designed to establish whether a basis for negotiations in accordance with the Five Principles could be found. These exchanges were sufficiently encouraging to justify further probing in greater depth. Thus in April 1971 Lord Goodman, assisted by a small team of senior officials, paid the first of four visits to Salisbury for detailed exploratory discussions. These visits continued at intervals throughout the summer and were concluded by a final round of talks at official level in October 1971. In the light of these discussions the British Government decided that a basis for negotiation with the Rhodesians had been established.

### The negotiations

6. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Attorney-General therefore flew to Salisbury on 14 November for these negotiations. While there they also held discussions with a wide cross-section of representative Africans and other leaders of opinion.

7. The subsequent negotiations at which the Rhodesian representatives were Mr. Ian Smith, Mr. Lardner-Burke and Mr. Howman led to provisional agreement being reached on proposals for a settlement. Both sides undertook to take steps to implement these proposals provided that the British Government had first satisfied themselves that they would be acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole. These proposals are set out in full at Annex B. A synopsis of the changes in Parliamentary representation, the franchise and the blocking mechanism which would arise from these proposals is given in the following paragraphs.

### The proposed terms

8. The proposals for a settlement contain provisions which are summarised below under each of the Five Principles.

#### THE FIRST PRINCIPLE

The 1969 Constitution expressly precludes the Africans from ever attaining more than parity of representation with the Europeans in the House of Assembly. It also relates any increase in African representation to the amount of income tax paid by the Africans. Under the proposed terms for a settlement, these provisions will be repealed and replaced by new provisions securing unimpeded progress to majority rule. The Africans will proceed to parity of representation in the House of Assembly through the creation of a new African higher roll, with the same income, property and educational qualifications as the European roll. As the numbers registered on this roll increase, additional seats will be created on

a basis that will ensure that when parity of representation is reached the number of voters on the African higher and the European rolls will be approximately equal. The first two additional African members will be elected by the voters registered on the new African higher roll and the next two by indirect election under the existing system of Electoral Colleges, of Chiefs, Headmen and elected Councillors, and this sequence will be repeated in relation to further additional African members. By this means parity of representation will be reached with 50 European members and 50 African members in the House of Assembly. The latter will then comprise 24 indirectly elected, 18 directly elected by the new African higher roll and 8 directly elected, as at present, by the African lower roll. At this point a referendum will be held among all Africans registered on the two African rolls to decide whether or not the indirectly elected Africans should be replaced by directly elected Africans.

The Constitution will provide that, after the referendum and any elections necessary to give effect to the result, ten Common Roll seats will be created in the House of Assembly. After the result of this referendum has been implemented an independent Commission will be appointed to ascertain whether the creation of the Common Roll seats provided for in the Constitution is acceptable to the Rhodesian people at that time. But the adoption of any recommendation of this Commission to vary these arrangements will be a matter for the Rhodesian Parliament and will be subject to the normal procedure for amending specially entrenched provisions of the Constitution. Failing any such agreed amendment, the Common Roll seats will be filled by an election in a single nationwide constituency by the voters on a roll consisting of all registered voters on the African higher and the European rolls. As the number of African voters increases, they will be able to determine the result of elections to a majority of these seats, thus achieving majority rule.

#### THE SECOND PRINCIPLE

At all stages in the progress to majority rule it will be necessary to obtain the approval of a substantial proportion of the African representatives in the House of Assembly for any amendment to the special entrenched provisions of the Constitution which will include all the arrangements which affect African political advance. Until the Commission appointed after parity reports, such Constitutional amendments will require, in addition to a two-thirds majority of all the members of the House of Assembly and the Senate voting separately, the affirmative votes of a majority of the total European membership and of a majority of the total African membership in the House of Assembly. This will ensure that, in the unlike event of all the indirectly elected Africans voting in favour of a retrogressive amendment to the specially entrenched provisions of the Constitution, the blocking mechanism will still rest in the hands of the directly elected African members of the Lower House. As African representation increases the two-thirds majority will require an increasing number of African votes. Thus after parity has been reached and the referendum on the future of the indirectly elected Africans has taken place, the need for an additional safeguard over and above

the requirement of a two-thirds majority will disappear and it will be dropped. At this stage the support of at least 17 African members in the House of Assembly will be required to pass any amendment of a specially entrenched provision.

### THE THIRD PRINCIPLE

The creation of the new African higher roll will bring with it the prospect in the near future of increased African representation in the House of Assembly. The reduction in the franchise qualifications for the existing African lower roll will enfranchise a large number of additional Africans. These two measures amount to a substantial improvement in the political status of the Africans. In addition there is provision for the British Government to allocate substantial sums of money for an aid programme for Rhodesia over the next ten years in order to improve educational facilities for Africans and to help with the economic development of the Tribal Trust Lands, thus increasing job opportunities available for Africans. As a result of this aid the rate at which additional Africans will attain the income and educational qualifications required for the franchise will be accelerated. There will also be a new special Review of the cases of the remaining detainees by the existing Tribunal with a British observer present.

### THE FOURTH PRINCIPLE

There will be a new and strengthened Declaration of Rights, which will be enforceable in the courts (see Appendix III to Annex B). There will also be an independent Review Commission to examine forthwith the problem of racial discrimination in all fields, including the special problem of the allocation and use of land. The Rhodesians have undertaken to commend to Parliament legislation to give effect to the recommendations of this Commission subject to considerations that any Government would regard as overriding. Meanwhile they have made it clear that they are prepared to allocate additional land for African use as the need arises and have given an assurance that with the exception of a limited number of unauthorised occupants in certain areas, there will be no further evictions of Africans until the recommendations of the Review Commission have been considered.

### THE FIFTH PRINCIPLE

These proposals for a settlement will only be confirmed and implemented after the British Government have satisfied themselves that they are acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole. Accordingly, the British Government have appointed a Commission with Lord Pearce as Chairman to canvass as thoroughly and as impartially as possible the views of all sections of Rhodesian opinion, including Rhodesians resident abroad or in detention. The Commission will start its work in the near future. Before and during this test of acceptability normal political activities will be permitted to the satisfaction of the Commission provided they are conducted in a peaceful and democratic manner. The Rhodesians will be releasing a substantial number of detainees. If the British Government are satisfied that the proposed terms are acceptable to the Rhodesian people as a whole, the

Rhodesians will take the necessary steps to enact the legislative changes required to implement them. After these have been completed the British Government will recommend to Parliament that independence should be granted to Southern Rhodesia on this basis and that in these circumstances sanctions will no longer be required.

## ANNEX A

### Summary of the 1969 Constitution Legislature

#### THE HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY

##### 1. (i) *Composition*

50 European members

16 African members (8 directly elected, 8 indirectly elected by electoral colleges of Chiefs, Headmen and Councillors—4 each in Mashonaland and Matabeleland)

—  
66 members

##### (ii) *Increase in African representation*

When the proportion of income tax assessed on Africans exceeds sixteen sixtieths of the total of income tax assessed on Europeans and Africans the number of African members will be increased so that it bears the same proportion to the total number of members as the proportion of income tax that is assessed on Africans. The first two additional Africans will be indirectly elected and the next two additional seats will be filled by direct election; additional seats thereafter to be allocated in this sequence. When parity of representation with the Europeans is reached there is to be no further increase in African representation.

#### SENATE

##### 2. (i) *Composition*

10 Europeans chosen by the European Members of the House of Assembly

10 African Chiefs—5 each from Matabeleland and Mashonaland chosen by the Council of Chiefs of the two provinces

3 appointed by the President (one is a Coloured and the others are Europeans)

—  
23 members

##### (ii) *Powers*

(a) To recommend amendments to money Bills but not to delay them.

(b) To prevent the enactment of Bills to amend the Constitution or entrenched provisions of the electoral or land tenure laws (see paragraph 11 below).

(c) To delay other Bills for 180 days. This delaying power may be overridden if the Prime Minister certifies that a Bill originating in and passed by the House of Assembly is so urgent that it should not be delayed.

#### The President

##### 3. (i) *Appointment*

Appointed by the Executive Council (Cabinet) for a term of office not exceeding five years.

##### (ii) *Powers*

(a) The Constitution vests the executive government of Rhodesia in the President and confers on him a number of specific powers, such as powers to

appoint and receive diplomatic officers and consuls, to conclude treaties, to pardon offenders and to proclaim a state of emergency.

- (b) In general he is required to exercise his functions in accordance with ministerial advice.

#### The electoral system

##### 4. (i) *Constituencies*

The country is divided into 50 European constituencies (of which not less than 18 must be rural) and 8 African constituencies (4 of each in Matabeleland and Mashonaland). The Electoral Act 1969 requires boundaries of the European constituencies and of African constituencies in Matabeleland and Mashonaland respectively to be drawn so that they contain, as nearly as may be, equal numbers of European or, as the case may be, African voters.

##### (ii) *Franchise qualifications*

These are provided for in entrenched provisions of the Electoral Act 1969.

##### (a) *European roll*

Either income £900 or property value £1,800; or income £600 or property value £1,200 AND four years' secondary education.

##### (b) *African roll*

Either income £300 or property value £600; or income £200 or property value £400 AND two years' secondary education.

##### (c) *Common to both rolls*

Citizens of Rhodesia over 21 with an adequate knowledge of English and able to complete the application form in own writing.

#### Constitutional amendments

5. (i) Provisions of the Constitution dealing with the composition to the two Houses of the Legislature, the Judicature, amendment procedures and the Declaration of Rights and fundamental provisions of the land tenure laws are specially entrenched and Bills amending them require the approval of each House by a two-thirds majority of its total membership.
- (ii) Bills amending other provisions of the Constitution or entrenched provisions of electoral law require the approval of a two-thirds majority of the House of Assembly and either a two-thirds majority of the total membership of the Senate or, if the Bill fails to receive such votes but is sent back by the Assembly after 180 days, the approval of at least one-half of the members of the Senate.

#### Other safeguards

6. (i) A Senate Legal Committee, appointed by the President of the Senate and which need not contain any Africans (although a majority must be legally qualified) is required to scrutinise all Bills (other than money and constitutional Bills) coming before the Senate and report to the Senate whether in its opinion any provision is inconsistent with the Declaration of Rights. If the Senate upholds the Committee's finding of inconsistency then, unless they resolve by a simple majority that enactment is necessary in the national interest, the Bill may not be passed by the Senate. However the Bill may still be enacted after 180 days (see paragraph 2 (ii)(c) above). When a Bill certified by the Prime Minister to be urgent is enacted but the Senate has resolved that a provision of it is inconsistent with the Declaration of Rights and is not necessary in the national interest, the House of Assembly must, by a two-thirds majority of all the Members resolve that the provision shall remain in force if it is to do so beyond the period of 270 days. There are corresponding provisions for the scrutiny in the Senate of subsidiary legislation, which may

result in annulment of such legislation, but here also the House of Assembly can override the Senate by a two-thirds majority.

##### (ii) *Declaration of Rights*

The Declaration, which is expressed to have effect for the purpose of prescribing the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual is specially entrenched but it is not enforceable in the courts and legislation inconsistent with it is not thereby rendered invalid.

## ANNEX B

### Proposals for a settlement

#### I. *The test of acceptability*

The proposals set out below are conditional upon the British Government being satisfied that they are acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole. The British Government will therefore appoint a Commission to ascertain directly from all sections of the population of Rhodesia whether or not these proposals are acceptable and to report accordingly to the British Government. It will consist of a Chairman, Deputy Chairmen and a number of Commissioners. The report will be signed by the Chairman and the Deputy Chairmen. The members of the Commission will travel extensively throughout the country visiting in particular all centres of population, local councils and traditional meeting places in the Tribal Trust Lands.

In the period before and during the test of acceptability normal political activities will be permitted to the satisfaction of the Commission, provided they are conducted in a peaceful democratic manner. Radio and television time will be made available to political parties represented in the House of Assembly.

The Commission will carry out its enquiries in public or in private as it deems appropriate. There will be immunity for witnesses heard by the Commission in respect of their evidence and freedom for persons resident in Rhodesia, whatever their political views or affiliations, to enable them to appear before the Commission. All Rhodesian Government employees will be permitted to express their views to the Commission. Persons in detention or under restriction will be similarly permitted. Arrangements will be made in London and elsewhere as necessary for Rhodesians resident abroad to submit their views to the Commission.

The Rhodesian Government will provide the Commission with such assistance as may reasonably be required to enable them to carry out their functions.

#### II. *The Constitution*

The Constitution of Rhodesia will be the Constitution adopted in Rhodesia in 1969 modified in the following respects. The Rhodesian Government will introduce legislation to make the necessary modifications in the Constitution and related electoral legislation with effect from the date on which independence is conferred by the British Parliament.

##### (1) *The House of Assembly*

(a) The existing provisions governing the increase of African representation in the House will be repealed and replaced by provisions to give effect to the arrangements set out in the following subparagraphs.

(b) A new roll of African voters (the African higher roll) will be created with the same qualifications as those for the roll of European voters. The relevant means and educational qualifications are set out in Appendix I.

(c) Additional African seats will be created in accordance with the arrangements set out in the following subparagraphs, with effect from the dissolution of Parliament following the date on which it is established that any such seats are due. The seats will be filled at the general election consequent upon the dissolution of Parliament. However, the first four additional seats will be created and elections held to fill them as soon as it is established that they are due.

(d) When the number of voters registered on the African higher roll equals 6 per cent of the number of voters then registered on the European roll, two additional African seats will become due; when the number of voters registered on the African higher roll equals 12 per cent of the number of voters then registered on the European roll, a further two additional African seats will become due; further additional African seats will become due, two at a time, for each such proportionate increase of 6 per cent in the number of voters registered on the African higher roll, until 34 additional African seats have been created, thus resulting in parity in the numbers of African and European members in the House of Assembly. This arrangement will ensure that at parity there are approximately equal numbers of voters on the African higher and European rolls.

(e) The first two additional African seats will be filled by direct election for single-member constituencies by the voters registered on the African higher roll and the next two will be filled by indirect election by electoral colleges on the same basis as the existing eight African seats filled by indirect election. This sequence will be repeated in relation to subsequent additional African seats.

(f) For the purpose of giving effect to the above arrangement the Registrar-General of Voters will review the number of voters registered on the African higher roll and the European roll at not more than six-monthly intervals, and whenever additional African seats have become due he will issue a certificate to that effect to the President and the President will then be required to make an order providing for the creation of those seats as described above.

(g) The qualifications for the existing roll of African voters (the African lower roll) will be replaced by qualifications equivalent to those for the "B" roll under the 1961 Constitution subject to the financial qualifications being increased twice by 10 per cent. The relevant means and educational qualifications are set out in Appendix II.

(h) The Rhodesian Government have agreed to a simplified application form for enrolment on the African lower roll, and to an amendment to the Electoral Act to provide that an applicant for the African lower roll shall, if he so requests, receive assistance from the Registering Officer in completing the form.

(i) A candidate for election to an African higher roll seat will have to be registered as a voter on that roll, and a candidate for election to an African lower roll seat will have to be registered as a voter on one of the two African rolls.

(j) Within one year after the holding of the general election at which parity is attained a referendum will be held among all enrolled African voters to determine whether or not the seats filled by indirect election should be abolished and replaced by an equal number of seats filled by direct election.

The new seats will all be African higher roll seats unless the Legislature has before the referendum provided for up to one-quarter of the new seats to be African lower roll seats. The Legislature may also provide that a specific number of the extra seats should be rural constituencies.

Laws providing for any of the matters mentioned in this subparagraph, including the procedural arrangements for the holding of the referendum, would not have to be passed in accordance with the requirements for amending the Constitution; the only special requirement would be that in the House of Assembly they must be approved by a majority of all the African members.

If the majority of voters at the referendum is in favour of the abolition of the indirectly elected seats, an election to give effect to the change will be held within one year thereafter. It will be possible for an election to be held for this purpose without the dissolution of Parliament. If this course is adopted the indirectly elected African members and the African higher roll members and also, if the number of African lower roll seats is to be increased, the African lower roll members, will vacate their seats on the date appointed for the nomination of candidates in the election and Parliament will be prorogued from that date until the completion of the election.

(k) Not later than six months after the holding of that election or, if the result of the referendum is that the seats filled by indirect election are retained, after the completion of the referendum, an independent Commission will be appointed to ascertain whether the creation of Common Roll seats in accordance with the constitutional provisions described in subparagraph (l) below is acceptable to the people of Rhodesia and, if this is not so acceptable, whether any alternative arrangements would command general support. The commission will consist of a Chairman who holds or has held high judicial office, and equal numbers of European and African members appointed by the Government after consultation with all parties represented in the House of Assembly. The Commission will be required to report to the Legislature within one year of its appointment. A law to give effect to any recommendation of the Commission would have to be passed in accordance with the requirements for the amendment of the Constitution.

(l) The Constitution will provide that, with effect from the dissolution of Parliament following the date by which the Commission is required to report, 10 Common Roll seats will be created. The Common Roll seats will be filled by direct election by the voters on a roll consisting of all the voters for the time being registered on the European roll and the African higher roll. Elections to these seats will be conducted on the basis that the whole of Rhodesia will form a single constituency returning all the Common Roll members, and that each voter will have 10 votes which he may cast as he chooses amongst the candidates.

#### (2) *The Senate*

The Senate will continue to be constituted as at present. As a consequence of the establishment (see paragraph (3) below) of a new Declaration of Rights enforceable by the courts the Senate Legal Committee will be abolished.

#### (3) *The Declaration of Rights*

The existing Declaration of Rights will be replaced by a new Declaration affording protection to the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual and conferring a right of access to the High Court for the purpose of obtaining redress on any person who alleges that its provisions have been contravened in relation to him. The text of the Declaration and the provisions for its enforcement are set out in Appendix III.

#### (4) *Renewal of Declarations of Emergency*

Section 61 of the Constitution will be amended so as to reduce the period within which a Declaration of Emergency requires renewal by resolution of the House of Assembly from 12 months to 9 months.

#### (5) *Amendment of the Constitution*

(a) The Rhodesian Government have given an assurance to the British Government that they will not introduce or support in the Rhodesian Parliament any amendment of the specially entrenched provisions of the Constitution relating to the composition of the House of Assembly or of the specially entrenched provisions of the Electoral Act until the first two African higher roll seats have been created and filled or until three years have elapsed since the Constitutional changes provided for by these proposals have come into force, whichever is the sooner.

(b) Until the date by which the Commission referred to in subparagraph (l) (k) above is required to report, or the date on which it reports if that is earlier, a Bill to amend any of the specially entrenched provisions of the Constitution will require, in addition to the existing requirements of the affirmative votes in each House of the Legislature of not less than two-thirds of the total membership of the House, the affirmative votes in the House of Assembly of a majority of the total European membership and of a majority of the total African membership.

(c) The existing provision to the effect that a Bill to increase the number of members of the House of Assembly without altering the proportion of African members to the total number of members shall not on that account be regarded as amending a specially entrenched provision will be repealed.

(d) The specially entrenched provisions of the Constitution will include:

- (i) The new provisions to give effect to the proposals in paragraph II (1) above;
- (ii) The new Declaration of Rights, including the provisions for its enforcement by the High Court; and
- (iii) The amended Section 61 relating to Declarations of Emergency.

(e) The following provisions of the Electoral Act will be subject to the same requirements as regards amendment as the specially entrenched provisions of the Constitution—

- (i) Those prescribing the qualifications and disqualifications for registration of voters on the European roll and both African rolls;
- (ii) Those prescribing the qualifications and disqualifications for candidates for election to the House of Assembly;
- (iii) The provision for variation of the means qualifications for voters in consequence of changes in prices; and
- (iv) The provisions prescribing the composition of the Tribal Electoral Colleges.

Section 26 of the Electoral Act, which provides for the gradual increase of means and educational qualifications for the existing African roll so that, when parity is reached, they are the same as those for the European roll, will be repealed.

### III. Review of existing legislation

The Rhodesian Government have intimated to the British Government their firm intention, within the spirit of these proposals, to make progress towards ending racial discrimination. Accordingly an independent Commission will be set up to examine the question of racial discrimination. It will be required to consider existing legislation and to make recommendations to the Rhodesian Government on ways of making progress towards ending any racial discrimination. There shall be included in the functions of the Commission a special duty to scrutinise the provisions of the Land Tenure Act and to consider the possible creation of an independent and permanent Land Board to preside over the long-term resolutions of the problems involved. The terms of reference of the Commission, which will consist of three members, one of whom will be an African, are set out in Appendix IV. Its membership will be agreed with the British Government. The Commission will be established as soon as possible after the test of acceptability has been completed. Its findings will be published.

The Rhodesian Government recognise that the findings of the Commission will carry special authority and have given an assurance that they will commend to Parliament such changes in existing legislation as are required to give effect to its recommendations, subject only to considerations that any Government would be obliged to regard as of an overriding character.

### IV. Review of cases of detainees and restrictees

The Rhodesian Government stated that 23 detainees have been released since the end of March 1971, leaving 93 detainees and 2 restrictees (excluding 34 detainees who have been released on conditions). It is the Rhodesian Government's intention to release a further 31 detainees as soon as the necessary arrangements can be made.

Since the settlement will have created a new situation there will be a new special review of the cases of all detainees and restrictees to see whether, in the light of changed circumstances, they can be released or the restrictions can be removed without prejudice to the maintenance of public safety and public order. This review will be carried out by the existing tribunal, of which the Chairman is a Judge of the Rhodesian High Court, as soon as possible after the test of acceptability has been completed. The recommendations of the tribunal will be binding on the detaining or restricting authority. For the purposes of this special review an observer appointed by the British Government in agreement with the Rhodesian Government will be entitled to be present.

## V. Land

In the African area there is at present approximately 5 million acres of unoccupied land which is available for settlement by Africans, 3½ million in the Tribal Trust Lands and 1½ million in the purchase area. Provision exists under which significant additional land can be made available and the Rhodesian Government intend to make it available as the need arises.

Both Governments agree that they will immediately devote a proportion of the aid referred to in paragraph VI of these proposals to the improvement of areas currently occupied or intended for occupation by Africans.

With the exception of certain forest and national park areas the development of which may involve the removal of a limited number of occupants without established rights, the only two cases in which the Rhodesian Government are considering the eviction of Africans from land in the European area are Epworth and Chishawasha Missions. The Rhodesian Government have given an assurance that they will not take steps to evict African tenants or other occupants from these two areas or from other areas in which they are living until such time as the Commission referred to in paragraph III above has reported and its recommendations have been fully considered.

## VI. Development programme

The two Governments attach the greatest importance to the expansion of the economy of Rhodesia and, in particular, to stimulating economic growth in the Tribal Trust Lands. There will therefore be a development programme to increase significantly educational and job opportunities for Africans in order to enable them to play a growing part in the country's future development, and early discussions between the two Governments will be held to agree on this programme and the best means of implementing it.

The British Government will provide up to £5 million per year for a period of 10 years in capital aid and technical assistance to be applied to purposes and projects to be agreed with the Rhodesian Government to be matched appropriately by sums provided by the Rhodesian Government for this development programme. This will be in addition to the annual expenditure currently planned by the Rhodesian Government for African education and housing and for development projects in the Tribal Trust Lands and African Purchase Areas. Part of this development programme will be devoted to the establishment of new irrigation schemes, intensive cultivation projects, industrial projects and the improvement of communications in the Tribal Trust Lands and African Purchase Areas. As regards education, the moneys will be used to improve and expand facilities for Africans in agriculture, technical and vocational training, teacher training and training in administration and for other educational purposes in the field of primary, secondary and higher education.

The parallel development of the two elements in this programme will thus help to ensure that new job opportunities for Africans will become available as the economy expands and additional educational facilities are provided for them.

## VII. Other matters

(1) As vacancies occur in the Rhodesian Public Service they will be filled according to the criteria of merit and suitability, regardless of race. The Rhodesian Government have undertaken to take steps to enable an increasing number of Africans to fit themselves to compete on equal terms with candidates of other races so far as appointments or promotions are concerned.

(2) Rhodesian citizens who have left Rhodesia for any reason will be allowed to return freely and without being subjected to any restrictions by reason of their past activities, but without amnesty in respect of any criminal offence.

(3) The Rhodesian Government wish to revoke the state of emergency at the earliest opportunity. In the absence of unforeseen circumstances they will do so after sanctions against Rhodesia have been lifted.

### VIII. Implementation

As soon as the British Government are satisfied that the legislation referred to in paragraph II above has been enacted and steps taken to give effect to the proposals in paragraphs III and IV above they will introduce legislation to confer independence on Rhodesia as a republic and will commend this legislation to the British Parliament. They will also terminate their economic and other sanctions when this legislation takes effect. Both Governments will take steps to settle outstanding financial and other issues and to regularise relations between the two countries and matters affecting the personal status of individuals.

\* \* \*

Nothing in these proposals shall be regarded as implying any change in the current attitude of either side to the present status of Rhodesia or of the 1969 Constitution.

The above proposals are acceptable to the British and the Rhodesian Governments.

24 November, 1971.

#### ANNEX B APPENDIX I

##### *European roll and African higher roll qualifications*

(a) Income at the rate of not less than \$1,800 per annum during the two years preceding date of claim for enrolment, *or* ownership of immovable property of value of not less than \$3,600.

*or*

(b) (i) Income at the rate of not less than \$1,200 per annum during the two years preceding date of claim for enrolment, *or* ownership of immovable property of value of not less than \$2,400; *and*

(ii) four years secondary education of prescribed standard.

#### ANNEX D APPENDIX II

##### *African lower roll qualifications*

(a) Income at the rate of not less than \$600 per annum during the two years preceding date of claim for enrolment, *or* ownership of immovable property of value of not less than \$1,100.

*or*

(b) (i) Income at the rate of not less than \$300 per annum during the two years preceding date of claim for enrolment, *or* ownership of immovable property of value of not less than \$600; *and*

(ii) two years' secondary education of prescribed standard.

*or*

(c) Persons over 30 years of age with—

(i) Income at the rate of not less than \$300 per annum during the two years preceding the date of claim for enrolment, *or* ownership of immovable property of value of not less than \$600; *and*

(ii) completion of a course of primary education of a prescribed standard.

*or*

(d) Persons over 30 years of age with—

Income at the rate of not less than \$430 per annum during the two years preceding the date of claim for enrolment, *or* ownership of immovable property of value of not less than \$800.

*or*

(e) All kraal heads with a following of 20 or more heads of families.

### ANNEX B

#### APPENDIX III

##### *Declaration of Rights and enforcement provisions*

*(Sections to replace present section 84)*

##### **Declaration of Rights**

84. WHEREAS it is desirable to ensure that every person in Rhodesia enjoys the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual, that is to say, the right, whatever his race, tribe, political opinions, colour or creed, to life, liberty, security of the person, the protection of the privacy of his home, protection from deprivation of his property without payment of compensation, the protection of the law, and to freedom of conscience, of expression and of assembly and association;

AND WHEREAS the exercise of these rights and freedoms should be subject to certain limitations that are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, being limitations designed to ensure that the enjoyment of the said rights and freedoms by any person does not prejudice the rights and freedoms of others or the public interest;

AND WHEREAS it is the duty of every person to respect and abide by the Constitution and the laws of Rhodesia;

AND WHEREAS loyalty to Rhodesia is a fundamental duty of every citizen;

The provisions of the Second Schedule, as read with section *eighty-four A*, shall have effect for the purpose of affording protection of the aforesaid rights and freedoms, subject to the limitations of that protection contained in those provisions.

##### **Enforcement of protective provisions of Declaration of Rights**

84A. (1) Subject to the provisions of subsection (8), if any person alleges that any of the provisions of the Declaration of Rights has been or is being contravened in relation to him, then, without prejudice to any other action with respect to the same matter which is lawfully available, that person may, subject to the provisions of subsection (3), apply to the Appellate Division for redress.

(2) If in any proceedings in the General Division of the High Court or in any court subordinate to the High Court any question arises as to the contravention of any of the provisions of the Declaration of Rights, the person presiding in that court may, and if so requested by any party to the proceedings shall, refer the question to the Appellate Division so, however, that he shall not be required to comply with any such request which, in his opinion, is merely frivolous or vexatious.

(3) Where in any proceedings such as are mentioned in subsection (2), any such question as is therein mentioned is not referred to the Appellate Division, then, without prejudice to the right to raise that question on any appeal from the determination of the court in those proceedings, no application for the determination of that question shall lie to the Appellate Division under subsection (1).

(4) The Appellate Division shall have original jurisdiction—

(a) to hear and determine any application made by any person in pursuance of the provisions of subsection (1) or to determine without hearing any such application which, in its opinion, is merely frivolous or vexatious;

(b) to determine any question arising in the case of any person which is referred to it in pursuance of the provisions of subsection (2);

and may make such orders, issue such writs and give such directions as it may consider appropriate for the purpose of enforcing or securing the enforcement of any of the provisions of the Declaration of Rights;

Provided that the Appellate Division shall not exercise its powers under this subsection if it is satisfied that adequate means of redress are or have been available to the person concerned under any other law.

(5) If in any proceedings in any court it falls to be determined whether any law is inconsistent with any of the provisions of the Declaration of Rights, the Attorney-General shall be entitled to be heard by the court on that question and if in any such proceedings any law is determined by the court to be so inconsistent, then, whether or not he has exercised his right to be heard in those proceedings, the Attorney-General shall have the like right with respect to an appeal from that determination as if he had been a party to the proceedings.

(6) Where any provision of any law is held by a competent court to be inconsistent with any of the provisions of the Declaration of Rights, any person detained in custody under that provision shall be entitled as of right to make an application to the Appellate Division for the purpose of questioning the validity of his further detention, notwithstanding that he may have previously appealed against his conviction or sentence or that any time prescribed for the filing of such an appeal may have expired.

(7) A law of the Legislature may confer upon the Appellate Division such powers, in addition to those conferred by this section, as many appear to be necessary or desirable for the purpose of enabling the Appellate Division more effectively to exercise the jurisdiction conferred upon it by this section.

(8) A law of the Legislature may make provision with respect to the practice and procedure—

(a) of the Appellate Division in relation to the jurisdiction and powers conferred upon it by or under this section;

(b) of subordinate courts in relation to references to the Appellate Division under subsection (2);

including provision with respect to the time within which any application or reference shall or may be made or brought and, subject to any provisions so made, provision may be made with respect to the matters referred to above by rules of court made in terms of any Act governing the practice and procedure in the Appellate Division.

(9) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this section, the court shall not declare any provision of an Act enacted or statutory instrument made after the fixed date as defined in paragraph 14 of the Declaration of Rights to be inconsistent with any provision of the Declaration of Rights if the provision concerned has been in force for a period of at least ten years, whether as part of the Act or statutory instrument concerned or of any previous Act or statutory instrument repealed or amended and substituted by the Act or statutory instrument concerned.

(10) For the purposes of this section—

“Appellate Division” means the Appellate Division of the High Court of Rhodesia.

#### Validity of existing laws

84B. No court shall declare any provision of an Act enacted or statutory instrument made before the fixed date as defined in paragraph 14 of the Declaration of Rights to be *ultra vires* on the grounds that that provision is inconsistent with the provisions of the Declaration of Rights set out in Chapter VI of the Constitution of Rhodesia, 1961, or Chapter VII of the Constitution of Rhodesia, 1965, as the case may be.

### SECOND SCHEDULE (section 84)

#### DECLARATION OF RIGHTS

##### Protection of right to life

1. (1) No person shall be deprived of his life intentionally, save in execution of the sentence of a court in respect of a criminal offence of which he has been convicted.

(2) Without prejudice to any liability for a contravention of any other law with respect to the use of force in such cases as are hereinafter mentioned, a person shall not be regarded as having been deprived of his life in contravention of this paragraph if he dies as the result of the use of force to such extent as is reasonably justifiable in the circumstances of the case—

(a) for the defence of any person from violence or for the defence of property;

(b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained;

(c) for the purpose of suppressing a riot, insurrection or mutiny or for dispersing an unlawful gathering;

(d) in order to prevent the commission by that person of a criminal offence; or if he dies as the result of a lawful act of war.

(3) It shall be sufficient justification for the purposes of subparagraph (2) of this paragraph in any case to which that subparagraph applies if it is shown that the force used did not exceed that which might lawfully have been used in the circumstances of that case under the law in force immediately before the fixed date.

##### Protection of right to personal liberty

2. (1) No person shall be deprived of his personal liberty, save as may be authorised by law in any of the following cases, that is to say—

(a) in consequence of his unfitness to plead to a criminal charge or in execution of the sentence or order of a court, whether in Rhodesia or elsewhere, in respect of a criminal offence of which he has been convicted;

(b) in execution of the order of a court punishing him for contempt of that court or of another court or tribunal or in execution of the order of the Senate or the House of Assembly punishing him for contempt of itself or of its members or for breach of privilege;

(c) in execution of the order of a court made in order to secure the fulfilment of an obligation imposed on him by law, including any African customary law;

(d) for the purpose of bringing him before a court in execution of the order of a court or an officer of a court or before the Senate or the House of Assembly in execution of the order of the Senate or that House;

(e) upon reasonable suspicion of his having committed, or being about to commit, a criminal offence;

(f) under the order of a court or with the consent of his parent or guardian, for the purpose of his education or welfare during a period beginning before he attains the age of twenty-one years and ending not later than the date when he attains the age of twenty-three years;

(g) for the purpose of preventing the spread of an infectious or contagious disease;

(h) if he is, or is reasonably suspected to be, of unsound mind, addicted to drugs or alcohol, or a vagrant, for the purpose of his care, treatment or rehabilitation, or the protection of the community;

(i) for the purpose of preventing the unlawful entry of that person into Rhodesia, or for the purpose of effecting the expulsion, extradition or other lawful removal of that person from Rhodesia, or the taking of proceedings relating thereto;

(j) to such extent as may be necessary for the execution of a lawful order requiring that person to remain within a specified area within Rhodesia or prohibiting him from being within such an area, or to such extent as may be reasonably justifiable—

(i) for the taking of proceedings against that person relating to the making of such an order; or

(ii) for restraining that person during any visit which he is permitted to make to any part of Rhodesia in which, in consequence of such an order, his presence would otherwise be unlawful;

(k) subject to the provisions of subparagraphs (4), (5), (6) and (7), for the purposes of his preventive detention in the interests of defence, public safety or public order.

(2) Any person who is arrested or detained shall be informed as soon as reasonably practicable in a language that he understands of the reasons for his arrest or detention and shall be permitted at his own expense to obtain and instruct without delay a legal adviser of his own choice, being a person entitled to practise in Rhodesia as an advocate or attorney, and to hold communication with him.

(3) Any person who is arrested or detained—

(a) for the purpose of bringing him before a court in execution of the order of a court or an officer of a court; or

(b) upon reasonable suspicion of his having committed, or being about to commit, a criminal offence;

and who is not released shall be brought without undue delay before a court, and if any person arrested or detained as mentioned in subparagraph (b) of this subparagraph is not tried within a reasonable time, then, without prejudice to any further proceedings which may be brought against him, he shall be released either unconditionally or upon reasonable conditions, including in particular such conditions as are reasonably necessary to ensure that he appears at a later date for trial or for proceedings preliminary to trial.

(4) No law providing for preventive detention shall authorise the detention of a person for a longer period than—

(a) fourteen days unless the Minister designated for the purpose has issued an order providing for the preventive detention of that person; or

(b) forty-two days unless the case of that person has, before the expiration of the said period of forty-two days, been submitted to a tribunal established for the purposes of this paragraph, and if such tribunal reports that, in its opinion, there is not sufficient cause for such detention, that person shall forthwith be released.

(5) Where a person has been detained by virtue of the provisions of a law providing for preventive detention for a period of more than forty-two days, his case shall be submitted for review at intervals of not more than nine months by a tribunal established for the purposes of this paragraph, and if such tribunal—

(a) orders, either because that person satisfies the tribunal that new circumstances have arisen or because the tribunal considers it to be desirable, that the case of that person should be submitted to the tribunal for review before the expiration of nine months from the previous review of his case, the case of that person shall be submitted for review when so ordered by the tribunal;

(b) reports that, in its opinion, there is not sufficient cause for the continued detention of that person, he shall forthwith be released.

(6) A person who has been detained by virtue of the provisions of any law providing for preventive detention and who has been released from detention in consequence of a report of a tribunal established for the purposes of this paragraph that there is, in its opinion, insufficient cause for his detention shall not be again detained by virtue of such provisions within the period of six months from his release on the same grounds as those on which he was originally detained.

(7) A tribunal established for the purposes of this paragraph shall be established by law and shall consist of—

(a) a chairman who shall be a person who is or has been a judge of the High Court of Rhodesia or is qualified in terms of section *sixty-five* to be appointed as such; and

(b) two other persons, one of whom—

(i) is or has been a judge of the High Court of Rhodesia or is qualified in terms of section *sixty-five* to be appointed as such; or

(ii) has been a magistrate in Rhodesia for not less than ten years; or

(iii) is, and has been for not less than ten years, qualified to practise as an attorney in Rhodesia.

(8) The references in subparagraph (4) of this paragraph to a period of forty-two days include references to any lesser periods that amount in the aggregate to forty-two days:

Provided that no two such lesser periods shall be aggregated for this purpose if the period between the expiration of the first and the commencement of the second is more than one month.

(9) For the purposes of subparagraph (6) of this paragraph, a person shall be deemed to have been detained on the same grounds as those on which he was originally detained unless a tribunal established for the purposes of this para-

graph has reported that, in its opinion, there appear *prima facie* to be new and reasonable grounds for the detention, but the giving of any such report shall be without prejudice to the provisions of subparagraph (4) of this paragraph.

(10) Any person who is unlawfully arrested or detained by any other person shall be entitled to compensation therefor from that other person:

Provided that any judicial officer acting in his judicial capacity reasonably and in good faith and any other person acting reasonably and in good faith and without culpable ignorance or negligence may be protected by law from liability for such compensation.

### Protection from slavery and forced labour

3. (1) No person shall be held in slavery or servitude or required to perform forced labour.

(2) For the purposes of this paragraph, the expression "forced labour" does not include—

(a) any labour required in consequence of the sentence or order of a court;

(b) labour required of any person while he is lawfully detained which though not required in consequence of the sentence or order of a court—

(i) is reasonably necessary in the interests of hygiene or for the maintenance or management of the place at which he is detained; or

(ii) if he is detained for the purpose of his care, treatment, rehabilitation, education or welfare, is reasonably required for that purpose;

(c) any labour required of a person who is a member of any naval, military or air force, or who is otherwise subject to any disciplinary law in pursuance of his duties as a member of that force or under that law, or any labour required of any person by virtue of a written law in lieu of service as a member of such a force;

(d) any labour required by way of parental discipline;

(e) any labour required by virtue of a written law during a period of public emergency or in the event of any other emergency or calamity which threatens the life or well-being of any section of the community;

(f) any labour which forms part of normal communal or other civic obligations.

### Protection from inhuman treatment

4. (1) No person shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading punishment or other such treatment.

(2) No treatment reasonably justifiable in the circumstances of the case to prevent the escape from custody of a person who has been lawfully detained shall be held to be in contravention of this paragraph on the ground that it is degrading.

(3) Nothing contained in or done under the authority of any written law shall be held to be inconsistent with or in contravention of this paragraph to the extent that the law in question authorises the doing of anything by way of punishment or other treatment which might lawfully have been so done in Rhodesia immediately before the fixed date.

### Protection from deprivation of property

5. (1) No property of any description shall be compulsorily taken possession of, and no interest in or right over property of any description shall be compulsorily acquired, except by or under the authority of a written law and where provision applying to that acquisition or taking of possession is made by a written law—

(a) requiring that reasonable notice of the intention to take possession of, or acquire the interest in or right over, the property is given to any person owning the property or having any other interest or right therein that would be affected by such taking of possession or acquisition; and

(b) providing for the payment of proper compensation within a reasonable time.

(2) Every person having an interest in or right over property which is compulsorily taken possession of or whose interest

in or right over any property is compulsorily acquired shall have a right of direct access to the High Court or another adjudicating authority provided for in the law referred to in subparagraph (1) of this paragraph for the determination of his interest or right, if any, the legality of the taking of possession or the acquisition of the property, interest or right and the amount of any compensation to which he is entitled and for the purpose of obtaining payment of that compensation within a reasonable time.

(3) Nothing contained in or done under the authority of any law shall be held to be inconsistent with or in contravention of this paragraph to the extent that the law in question makes provision for the taking of possession or the acquisition of any interest in or right over property—

(a) by way of imposition or enforcement of any tax, duty, rate or due;

(b) by way of penalty for breach of any law, including any African customary law, whether under civil process or after conviction of an offence or forfeiture in consequence of a breach of the law;

(c) upon the attempted removal of the property in question out of or into Rhodesia in contravention of any law;

(d) as an incident of a contract, including a lease or mortgage, or of a title deed to land;

(e) for the purpose of its administration, care or custody on behalf and for the benefit of the person entitled to the beneficial interest therein;

(f) by way of the vesting or administration of any property belonging to or used by or on behalf of an enemy or an organisation which is proscribed or declared by or in terms of a written law to be an unlawful organisation;

(g) by way of the administration of moneys payable or owing to a person outside Rhodesia or to the Government of a country other than Rhodesia where restrictions have been placed by law on the transfer of such moneys outside Rhodesia;

(h) as an incident of—

(i) a composition in insolvency accepted or agreed to by a majority in number of creditors who have proved claims and by a number of creditors whose proved claims represent in value more than fifty *per centum* of the total value of proved claims; or

(ii) a deed of assignment entered into by a debtor with his creditors;

(i) in the execution of judgment or orders of courts;

(j) by reason of the property in question being in a dangerous state or prejudicial to the health or safety of human, animal or vegetable life;

(k) in consequence of any law with respect to the limitation of actions, acquisitive prescription or derelict land;

(l) as a condition in connection with the granting of permission for the utilisation of that or other property in any particular manner;

(m) by way of the taking of a sample for the purposes of a law;

(n) by way of the acquisition of the shares, or a class of shares, in a body corporate on terms agreed to by the holders of not less than nine-tenths in value of those shares or that class thereof;

(o) where the property consists of an animal, upon its being found trespassing or straying;

(p) for so long only as may be necessary for the purpose of any examination, investigation, trial or inquiry;

(q) in the case of land, for so long only as may be necessary for the purpose of the carrying out thereon—

(i) of work for the purpose of the conservation of natural resources of any description; or

(ii) of agricultural development or improvement which the owner or occupier of the land has been required, and has without reasonable or lawful excuse refused or failed, to carry out;

(r) in consequence of any law requiring copies of any book or other publication published in Rhodesia to be lodged with the National Archives or a public library;

(s) for the purpose of, or in connection with, the prospecting for or exploitation of minerals, mineral oils, natural gases, precious metals or precious stones which are vested in the President on terms which provide for the respective interests of the persons affected;

(t) for the purpose of, or in connection with, the exploitation of underground water or public water which is vested in the President on terms which provide for the respective interests of the persons affected.

(4) Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed as affecting the making or operation of any law—

(a) in so far as it provides for the orderly marketing, production, growth or extraction of any agricultural product or mineral or any article or thing prepared for market or manufactured therefor or for the reasonable restriction of the use of any property in the interests of safeguarding the interests of others or the protection of lessees or other persons having rights in or over such property; or

(b) in so far as it provides for the compulsory taking of possession in the public interest of any property, or the compulsory acquisition in the public interest of any interest in or right over property where that property, interest or right is held by a body corporate established directly by law for public purposes in which no moneys are invested other than moneys provided from public funds.

#### Protection from arbitrary search or entry

6. (1) Except with his own consent or by way of parental discipline, no person shall be subjected to the search of his person or to entry into or the search of his dwelling-house.

(2) Nothing contained in or done under the authority of any law shall be held to be inconsistent with or in contravention of this paragraph to the extent that the law in question makes provision which is reasonably justifiable in a democratic society—

(a) in the interests of defence, public safety, public order, public morality, public health or town and country planning, or

(b) without derogation from the generality of the provisions of subparagraph (a) of this subparagraph, for the enforcement of the law in circumstances where there are reasonable grounds for believing that the entry or search is necessary for the prevention, investigation or detection of a criminal offence or for the lawful arrest of a person; or

(c) to enable any public authority or any body corporate established directly by law to enter the dwelling-house in question in order to carry out work connected with any property of that authority or body which is lawfully in that dwelling-house; or

(d) for the purpose of the valuation of the dwelling-house in question in connection with any tax, rate or due; or

(e) for the purpose of protecting the rights and freedoms of other persons; or

(f) to authorise, for the purpose of enforcing the judgment or order of a court in any civil proceedings, the search of any person by order of a court or the entry into any dwelling-house by such order.

(3) If in any proceedings it is alleged that anything contained in or done under the authority of any law is inconsistent with or in contravention of subparagraph (1) of this paragraph and the court decides as a result of hearing the parties that the complainant has shown that the court should not accept that the provision of the law concerned is reasonably justifiable in a democratic society on such of the grounds mentioned in subparagraph (2) of this paragraph as are relied upon by the other party without proof to its satisfaction, it shall issue a rule *nisi* calling upon the responsible Minister to show cause why that provision should not be declared to be inconsistent with the Constitution.

## Provisions to secure protection of law

7. (1) If any person is charged with a criminal offence, then, unless the charge is withdrawn, the case shall be afforded a fair hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial court established by law.

(2) Every person who is charged with a criminal offence—

(a) shall be presumed to be innocent until he is proved or has pleaded guilty;

(b) shall be informed as soon as reasonably practicable, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature of the offence charged;

(c) shall be given adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence;

(d) shall be permitted to defend himself in person or, save in proceedings before a tribal court or at a trial such as is referred to in subparagraph (12) of this paragraph, at his own expense by a legal representative of his own choice;

(e) shall be afforded facilities to examine in person or, save in proceedings before a tribal court or at a trial such as is referred to in subparagraph (12) of this paragraph, by his legal representative the witnesses called by the prosecution before any court and to obtain the attendance and carry out the examination of witnesses to testify on his behalf before that court on the same conditions as those applying to witnesses called by the prosecution;

(f) shall be permitted to have without payment the assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand the language used at the trial of the charge;

and except with his own consent the trial shall not take place in his absence unless he so conducts himself as to render the continuance of the proceedings in his presence impracticable and the court has ordered him to be removed and the trial to proceed in his absence.

(3) Save in the case of a trial as is referred to in subparagraph (12) of this paragraph, when a person is tried for any criminal offence the accused person or any person authorised by him in that behalf shall, if he so requires and subject to payment of such reasonable fee as may be prescribed by law, be given within a reasonable time after judgment a copy for the use of the accused person of any record of the proceedings made by or on behalf of the court.

(4) No person shall be held to be guilty of a criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not, at the time it took place, constitute such an offence, and no penalty shall be imposed for any criminal offence which is severer in degree or description than the maximum penalty which might have been imposed for that offence at the time when it was committed.

(5) No person who shows that he has been tried by a competent court for a criminal offence upon a good indictment, summons or charge upon which a valid judgment could be entered, and either convicted or acquitted, shall again be tried for that offence or for any other criminal offence of which he could have been convicted at the trial for that offence, save—

(a) where a conviction and sentence of the General Division of the High Court or of a court subordinate to the High Court are set aside on appeal or review on the ground that evidence was admitted which should not have been admitted or that evidence was rejected which should have been admitted or on the ground of any other irregularity or defect in the procedure; or

(b) otherwise upon the order of the High Court in the course of appeal or review proceedings relating to the conviction or acquittal.

(6) No person shall be tried for a criminal offence if he shows that he has been pardoned for that offence.

(7) Any court or other adjudicating authority prescribed by law for the determination of the existence or extent of any civil right or obligation shall be established by law and shall be independent and impartial, and where proceedings for such a determination are instituted by any person before such a court or other adjudicating authority, the case shall be given a fair hearing within a reasonable time.

(8) Except in the case of a trial such as is referred to in subparagraph (12) of this paragraph or with the agreement of all the parties thereto, all proceedings of every court and proceedings for the determination of the existence or extent of any civil right or obligation before any other adjudicating authority, including the announcement of the decision of the court or other authority, shall be held in public.

(9) Nothing in subparagraph (8) of this paragraph shall prevent—

(a) the court or other adjudicating authority from excluding from the proceedings, except the announcement of the decision of the court or other authority, persons other than the parties thereto and their legal representatives to such extent as the court or other authority—

(i) may by law be empowered so to do and may consider necessary or expedient in circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice, or in interlocutory proceedings, or in the interests of public morality, the welfare of persons under the age of twenty-one years or the protection of the private lives of persons concerned in the proceedings; or

(ii) may by law be empowered or required so to do in the interests of defence, public safety, public order or the economic interests of the State; or

(b) the court from excluding from proceedings preliminary to trial in respect of a criminal offence persons other than the accused person and his legal representative when so required by law, unless the accused person otherwise requests.

(10) Notwithstanding anything contained in subparagraph (3), (8) or (9) of this paragraph, if in any proceedings before a court or other adjudicating authority such as is referred to in subparagraph (1) or (7) of this paragraph, including any proceedings by virtue of section *eighty-four A*, a certificate in writing is produced to the court or other authority signed by a Minister that it would not be in the public interest for any matter to be publicly disclosed, the court or other authority shall make arrangements for evidence relating to that matter to be heard *in camera* and shall take such other action as may be necessary or expedient to prevent the disclosure of that matter.

(11) Nothing contained in or done under the authority of any law shall be held to be inconsistent with or in contravention of—

(a) subparagraph (a) of subparagraph (2) of this paragraph to the extent that the law in question imposes upon any person charged with a criminal offence the burden of proving particular facts; or

(b) subparagraph (e) of the said subparagraph (2) to the extent that the law in question imposes conditions which must be satisfied if witnesses called to testify on behalf of an accused person are to be paid their expenses out of public funds; or

(c) subparagraph (5) of this paragraph to the extent that the law in question authorises a court to try a member of a disciplined force for a criminal offence, notwithstanding any trial and conviction or acquittal of that member under the appropriate disciplinary law, so, however, that any court so trying such a member and convicting him shall in sentencing him to any punishment take into account any punishment awarded him under that disciplinary law.

(12) In the case of any person who is held in lawful detention, the provisions of subparagraph (1) of this paragraph shall not apply in relation to his trial for a criminal offence under the law regulating the discipline of persons held in such detention, save that the case of such person shall be afforded a fair hearing within a reasonable time, and the person or authority conducting the trial shall be regarded as a court for the purposes of this paragraph.

(13) For the purposes of this paragraph, a tribal court shall not be regarded as not being an independent and impartial court by reason of—

(a) the fact that a member of the court has an interest in the proceedings because of his position in the tribal society; or

(b) the traditional or customary tribal practices and procedures.

(14) In this paragraph, the expression "legal representative" means a person entitled to practise in Rhodesia as an advocate or, except in relation to proceedings before a court in which an attorney has no right of audience, as an attorney.

#### Protection of freedom of conscience

8. (1) Except with his own consent, no person shall be hindered in the enjoyment of his freedom of conscience, that is to say, freedom of thought and of religion, freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, whether alone or in community with others, and whether in public or in private, to manifest and propagate his religion or belief through worship, teaching practice and observance.

(2) Except with his own consent or, if he is a minor, the consent of his guardian, no person attending any place of education shall be required to receive religious instruction or to take part in or attend any religious ceremony or observance if that instruction, ceremony or observance relates to a religion other than his own.

(3) No religious community or denomination shall be prevented from making provision for the giving, by persons lawfully in Rhodesia, of religious instruction to persons of that community or denomination in the course of any education provided by that community or denomination.

(4) Nothing contained in, and nothing done under the authority of, any law shall be held to be inconsistent with or in contravention of subparagraph (1) of this paragraph to the extent that the law in question makes provision which is reasonably justifiable in a democratic society—

(a) in the interests of defence, public safety, public order, public morality or public health; or

(b) for the purpose of protecting the rights and freedoms of other persons, including the right to observe and practise any religion or belief without the unsolicited intervention of persons professing any other religion or belief.

(5) If, in any proceedings it is alleged that anything contained in or done under the authority of any law is inconsistent with or in contravention of subparagraph (1) of this paragraph and the court decides as a result of hearing the parties that the complainant has shown that the court should not accept that the provision of the law concerned is reasonably justifiable in a democratic society on such of the grounds mentioned in subparagraph (4) of this paragraph as are relied upon by the other party without proof to its satisfaction, it shall issue a rule *nisi* calling upon the responsible Minister to show cause why that provision should not be declared to be inconsistent with the Constitution.

#### Protection of freedom of expression

9. (1) Except with his own consent or by way of parental discipline, no person shall be hindered in the enjoyment of his freedom of expression, that is to say, freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart ideas and information without interference, and freedom from interference with his correspondence.

(2) Nothing contained in, and nothing done under the authority of, any law shall be held to be inconsistent with or in contravention of subparagraph (1) of this paragraph to the extent that the law in question makes provision—

(a) which is reasonably justifiable in a democratic society—

(i) in the interests of defence, public safety, public order, the economic interests of the State, public morality or public health; or

(ii) for the purpose of—

A. protecting the reputations, rights and freedoms of other persons or the private lives of persons concerned in legal proceedings; or

B. preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence; or

C. maintaining the authority and independence of the courts, tribunals, the Senate or the House of Assembly; or

D. regulating the technical administration, technical operation or general efficiency of telephony, telegraphy, posts, wireless broadcasting or television or creating or regulating any monopoly in these fields;

or

(iii) in the case of correspondence, for the purpose of preventing the unlawful dispatch therewith of other matter; or

(b) which imposes restrictions upon public officers which are reasonably justifiable in the public interest.

(3) If in any proceedings it is alleged that anything contained in or done under the authority of any law is inconsistent with or in contravention of subparagraph (1) of this paragraph and the court decides as a result of hearing the parties that the complainant has shown that the court should not accept that—

(a) the provision of the law concerned is reasonably justifiable in a democratic society on such of the grounds mentioned in subparagraph (a) of subparagraph (2) of this paragraph as are relied upon by the other party; or as the case may be

(b) the restrictions imposed by the law in question on public officers are reasonably justifiable in the public interest; without proof to its satisfaction it shall issue a rule *nisi* calling upon the responsible Minister to show cause why that provision should not be declared to be inconsistent with the Constitution.

#### Protection of freedom of assembly and association

10. (1) Except with his own consent or by way of parental discipline, no person shall be hindered in the enjoyment of his freedom of assembly and association, that is to say, his right to assemble freely and associate with other persons and in particular to form or belong to political parties or trade unions or other associations for the protection of his interests.

(2) Nothing contained in, and nothing done under the authority of, any law shall be held to be inconsistent with or in contravention of subparagraph (1) of this paragraph to the extent that the law in question makes provision—

(a) which is reasonably justifiable in a democratic society—

(i) in the interests of defence, public safety, public order, public morality or public health; or

(ii) for the purpose of protecting the rights and freedoms of other persons; or

(b) which imposes restrictions upon public officers which are reasonably justifiable in the public interest.

(3) Without prejudice to the generality of subparagraph (2) of this paragraph, nothing contained in or done under the authority of any law shall be held to be inconsistent with or in contravention of the provisions of subparagraph (1) of this paragraph to the extent that the law in question makes provision in relation to companies, partnerships, societies or other associations of persons, other than trade unions, employers' organisations or political parties, for—

(a) the registration thereof, the procedure for registration and the qualifications for registration and authorising refusal of registration on the grounds that the prescribed qualifications are not fulfilled; and

(b) prohibiting or restricting the performance of any function or the carrying on of any business by any such association which is not registered.

(4) If in any proceedings it is alleged that anything contained in or done under the authority of any law is inconsistent with or in contravention of subparagraph (1) of this paragraph and the court decides as a result of hearing the parties that the complainant has shown that the court should not accept that—

(a) the provision of the law concerned is reasonably justifiable in a democratic society on such of the grounds mentioned in subparagraph (a) of subparagraph (2) of this paragraph as are relied upon by the other party; or, as the case may be

(b) the restrictions imposed by the law in question on public officers are reasonably justifiable in the public interest

without proof to its satisfaction, it shall issue a rule *nisi* calling upon the responsible Minister to show cause why that provision should not be declared to be inconsistent with the Constitution.

#### Protection from discrimination

11. (1) Subject to the provisions of this paragraph—

(a) no written law shall contain any provision that is discriminatory;

(b) no person acting by virtue of any written law in the capacity of a public officer or officer of any public authority shall perform any executive or administrative act in a discriminatory manner.

(2) For the purposes of subparagraph (1) of this paragraph, a provision of a written law shall be regarded as discriminatory and an executive or administrative act shall be regarded as having been performed in a discriminatory manner only if by or as an inevitable consequence of that provision or that act, as the case may be, persons of a particular description by race, tribe, colour or creed are prejudiced—

(a) by being subjected to a condition, restriction or disability to which persons of another such description are not made subject; or

(b) by the according to persons of another such description of a privilege or advantage which is not accorded to persons of the first-mentioned description; and the imposition of that condition, restriction or disability or the according of that privilege or advantage is wholly or mainly attributable to the description by race, tribe colour or creed of the persons concerned.

(3) Nothing contained in any law shall be held to be inconsistent with the provisions of subparagraph (a) of subparagraph (1) of this paragraph to the extent that the law in question relates to any of the following matters, that is to say—

(a) any matter such as is mentioned in any of paragraphs (a) to (i) of the definition of a Money Bill contained in subsection (1) of section *ninety-two*; or

(b) adoption, marriage, divorce, burial, devolution of property on death or other matters of personal law; or

(c) the application in the case of Africans of a particular race or tribe indigenous to Rhodesia of their customary law with respect to any matter to the exclusion of any law with respect to that matter which is applicable in the case of other persons; or

(d) persons who are not citizens of Rhodesia; or

(e) a naval, military or air force, including liability to undergo naval, military or air force training; or

(f) qualifications, not being qualifications specifically relating to race, tribe, colour or creed, for service as a public officer otherwise than in a naval, military or air force or for service with any public authority or any body corporate established directly by a written law.

(4) The provisions of subparagraph (a) of subparagraph (1) of this section shall not apply to any law to the extent that it makes provision whereby persons of a particular description are subjected to any condition, restriction or disability or are accorded any privilege or advantage which, having regard to such of the following matters as are relevant to the circumstances of the case, that is to say—

(a) the nature of the condition, restriction, disability, privilege or advantage, as the case may be;

(b) any special circumstances appertaining to persons of that or any other description;

(c) the stage of social or economic development for the time being reached by the various descriptions of persons affected; and

(d) the state for the time being of the economy of Rhodesia; is reasonably justifiable either in the interests of Rhodesia as a whole or in order to secure the protection, in an equitable manner as between the various descriptions of persons affected, of their respective interests:

Provided that this subparagraph shall not apply to the extent that the law in question results in the laws with respect to the

matter in question affording greater difference of treatment of different descriptions of persons than immediately before the date of the making of the law in question.

(5) The provisions of subparagraph (b) of subparagraph (1) of this paragraph shall not apply to—

(a) anything that is expressly or by necessary implication authorised to be done by any provision of a law that is referred to in subparagraph (3) or (4) of this paragraph; or

(b) anything that is done under the authority of any other law in such circumstances that if the doing of that thing in those circumstances had been expressly or by necessary implication authorised by that law the provisions of subparagraph (4) of this paragraph would have applied thereto; or

(c) the exercise of any discretion relating to the institution, conduct or discontinuance of civil or criminal proceedings in any court vested in any person by or under this Constitution or any other law.

(6) Nothing contained in or done under the authority of any law shall be held to be inconsistent with or in contravention of this paragraph to the extent that the law in question makes provision whereby persons of any such description as is mentioned in subparagraph (2) of this paragraph may be subjected to any restrictions on the rights and freedoms guaranteed by paragraphs 6, 8 9 and 10 of this Schedule, being such a restriction as is authorised by subparagraph (2) of paragraph 6, subparagraph (4) of paragraph 8, subparagraph (2) of paragraph 9 or subparagraph (2) of paragraph 10, as the case may be, of this Schedule.

#### Savings for periods of public emergency

12. (1) Nothing contained in any law shall be held to be inconsistent with or in contravention of any of the following provisions of this Schedule, that is to say, paragraph 2, 5, 6, 7, other than subparagraph (4) thereof, 8 9, 10 or 11 to the extent that the law in question makes provision with respect to the taking, during any period of public emergency, of action for the purpose of dealing with any situation arising during that period, and nothing done by any person under the authority of any such law shall be held to be in contravention of any of the said provisions unless it is shown that the action taken exceeded anything which, having due regard to the circumstances prevailing at the time, could reasonably have been thought to be required for the purpose of dealing with the situation in question.

(2) Where any person is lawfully detained by virtue of such a provision as is referred to in subparagraph (1) of this paragraph, his case shall be reviewed by a tribunal established in accordance with the provisions of subparagraph (7) of paragraph 2 not later than three months after the commencement of the detention and thereafter at intervals of not more than nine months from the date on which his case was last reviewed by that tribunal.

(3) On any review by a tribunal in pursuance of the provisions of subparagraph (2) of this paragraph of the case of any person, the tribunal may make recommendations concerning the necessity or expedience of continuing the detention to the authority by whom it was ordered and that authority shall be obliged to act in accordance with any recommendations of that tribunal unless the President otherwise directs.

(4) Where the President has directed that the authority referred to in subparagraph (3) of this paragraph shall not act in accordance with any recommendation of the tribunal referred to in that subparagraph, that authority shall cause to be published in the *Gazette* a notice that the President has so directed.

#### Other special savings

13. (1) Nothing contained in or done under the authority of any written law shall be held to be inconsistent with or in contravention of any of the provisions of paragraphs 1 to 11 of this Schedule to the extent that the law in question—

(a) is a law with respect to which the requirements of subsection (1) of section *seventy-eight* were applicable and were complied with; or

(b) is a law (hereinafter in this paragraph referred to as an existing law) that has had effect as part of the law of

Rhodesia before the fixed date and has continued to have effect as part of the law of Rhodesia at all times since that date; or

(c) repeals and re-enacts an existing law without alteration; or

(d) alters an existing law and does not thereby render that law inconsistent with any provision of paragraphs 1 to 11 of this Schedule in a manner in which or to an extent to which it was not previously so inconsistent.

(2) For the purposes of this paragraph the reference—

(a) in subparagraph (d) of subparagraph (1) to altering an existing law includes references to repealing it and re-enacting it with modifications or making different provisions in lieu thereof, and to modifying it;

(b) in subparagraph (1) to a written law includes any instrument having the force of law; and the reference to re-enacting an existing law shall be construed accordingly.

(3) In relation to any person who is a member of a disciplined force of Rhodesia, nothing contained in or done under the authority of the disciplinary law of that force shall be held to be inconsistent with or in contravention of any of the provisions of this Schedule other than paragraphs 3 and 4 thereof.

(4) In relation to any person who is a member of a disciplined force that is not a disciplined force of Rhodesia and who is present in Rhodesia in pursuance of arrangements made between the Government of Rhodesia and another Government or an international organisation, nothing contained in or done under the authority of the disciplinary law of that force shall be held to be inconsistent with or in contravention of any of the provisions of this Schedule.

(5) No measures taken in relation to a person who is a member of a disciplined force of a country with which Rhodesia is at war and no law, to the extent that it authorises the taking of any such measures, shall be held to be inconsistent with or in contravention of any of the provisions of this Schedule.

#### Interpretation of Declarations of Rights

14. In this Schedule, unless the context otherwise requires—

"African customary law" means the tribal law and custom of Africans, whether or not indigenous to Rhodesia;

"contravention", in relation to any requirement, includes a failure to comply with that requirement, and cognate expressions shall be construed accordingly;

"court" means any court of law in Rhodesia, including a tribal court but not including a court established under a disciplinary law;

"disciplinary law" means a law providing for the regulation of the discipline—

(a) of any disciplined force; or

(b) of persons in prison awaiting trial or serving prison sentences; or

(c) of persons whose detention has been authorised in terms of a law;

"disciplined force" means—

(a) a naval, military or air force; or

(b) a police force; or

(c) a prison service; or

(d) any other body established for public purposes by a written law providing for the regulation of the discipline of that body and declared by that law to be a disciplined force for the purposes of this Schedule;

"fixed date" means the date of commencement of the Constitution Amendment Act, 1972;

"law" means—

(a) any provision of an Act of the Legislature or of the former Federal Legislature and any statute included in the Revised Edition of the Statutes prepared under the authority of the Revised Edition of the Laws Act, 1962, which is in force in Rhodesia;

(b) any provision of an instrument having the force of law made in terms of an Act or statute referred to in paragraph (a) of this definition;

(c) any unwritten law in force in Rhodesia other than African customary law; and "lawful" and "lawfully" shall be construed accordingly;

"member", in relation to a disciplined force, includes any person who, under a written law relating to the discipline of that force, is subject to that discipline;

"Minister" means a Minister of the Government appointed in terms of section *fifty-five*;

"parental discipline" includes school or other quasi-parental discipline;

"period of public emergency" means—

(a) any period during which Rhodesia is engaged in any war and the period immediately following thereon until such date as may be declared by the President by proclamation as the end of the period of public emergency caused by that war; or

(b) any period during which there is in force a declaration under section *sixty-one* declaring that a state of public emergency exists;

"tribal court" means a tribal court or tribal appeal court constituted by or under a written law.

## ANNEX B

### APPENDIX IV

*Terms of reference of the independent Commission to examine the question of racial discrimination*

1. The Commission will carry out an examination of all aspects of the question of racial discrimination in Rhodesia. The Commission will review all existing laws (including subsidiary legislation and the administrative practices thereunder) to determine which such provisions or practices are, in its opinion, discriminatory. The Commission may receive evidence from any relevant source and the Government of Rhodesia will ensure that its officials will co-operate fully with the Commission in this respect.

2. The Commission will make recommendations to the Rhodesian Government on ways of making progress towards the ending of any racial discrimination and its Report will be published.

3. The Commission is required to give special attention to the provisions of the Land Tenure Act. The Commission shall consider *inter alia*—

(a) the question of removing any restrictions on the entry into European areas of Africans wishing to attend multi-racial places of education or to be admitted to multi-racial hospitals, and any other restrictions on occupation;

(b) the question of removing any restrictions on the right of an African member of the professions to practise in a European area;

(c) in the light of the national interest, the question of the equitable allocation of land in relation to the needs of the respective sections of the population; and

(d) the possible creation of an independent and permanent multi-racial Land Board to preside over the long-term resolution of the problems involved.

Letter dated 30 November 1971 from the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Secretary-General transmitting a Soviet-Viet-Nameese statement

[Original: Russian]  
[2 December 1971]

I should be grateful if you would arrange for the circulation, as a Security Council document, of the attached Soviet-Viet-Nameese statement of 7 October 1971.

(Signed) Y. MALIK  
Permanent Representative of the  
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics  
to the United Nations

THE UNSHAKABLE BROTHERHOOD OF THE USSR AND  
THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM

SOVIET-VIET-NAMESE STATEMENT

A Soviet Party-Government delegation, headed by N. V. Podgorny, member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, made an official visit to the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam from 3 to 8 October 1971, at the invitation of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Viet-Nam and of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam.

During its stay in the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, the Soviet delegation participated in a ceremonial meeting of representatives of the people of Hanoi, had many meetings with workers and soldiers of the people's armed forces, visited industrial enterprises and cultural institutions in Hanoi, travelled to Haiphong and the coal-field in Quang Ninh province, took part in opening ceremonies for the first stage of the Tkhakba hydro-electric power station, constructed with assistance from the Soviet Union, and visited a unit of the Viet-Nameese People's Army.

Members of the delegation travelled to the flood-devastated area. At Hanoi, the delegation visited the Ho Chi Minh memorial home and placed a wreath on the monument in the Hanoi cemetery to fallen fighters of the revolution. The Soviet delegation was given an exceptionally warm and brotherly welcome by the Workers' Party of Viet-Nam, the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and the workers of that country.

In the course of the visit, Soviet and Viet-Nameese Party-Government delegations held talks on the subject of future friendly co-operation between the Soviet Union and the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and the situation in Viet-Nam and on the Indo-Chinese peninsula created by the continuing United States aggression. Other international problems of mutual interest were also discussed.

The Soviet participants in the talks were: N. V. Podgorny, member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, President of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, heading the delegation; K. T. Mazurov, member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers; K. F. Katushev, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union; V. N. Novikov, member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the

Soviet Union, Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers; S. A. Skachkov, member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Chairman of the State Committee of the USSR Council of Ministers on Foreign Economic Relations; S. L. Sokolov, member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, First Deputy Minister of Defence of the USSR, Army General; N. P. Firyubin, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR; I. T. Grishin, Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade of the USSR; I. S. Shcherbakov, member of the Central Audit Commission of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the USSR to the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam.

The Viet-Nameese participants were: Le Duan, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Viet-Nam, heading the delegation; Truong Tinh, member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Viet-Nam, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National Assembly of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam; Pham Van Dong, member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Viet-Nam, Prime Minister of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam; Vo Nguyen Giap, member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Viet-Nam, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Defence; Nguyen Duy Chinh, member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Viet-Nam, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign Affairs; Le Thanh Nghi, member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Viet-Nam, Deputy Prime Minister; Nguyen Lam, member of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Viet-Nam, Minister, Deputy Chairman of the State Planning Commission; Nguyen Tho Tyan, candidate for membership in the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Viet-Nam, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The exchange of views took place in an atmosphere of brotherly friendship, cordiality and comradely frankness. After expressing unanimity on all the questions discussed, the participants in the talks decided henceforth to do everything possible to strengthen and develop friendship between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam on the basis of the principles of Marxism-Leninism and socialist internationalism.

\* \* \*

The Soviet Union and the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam note that the contemporary development of society is characterized by an intensification of the world revolutionary process. The historical initiative is firmly in the hands of the revolutionary forces—the world system of socialism, the international working class and the national liberation movement. The fraternal socialist States are making ever greater gains in socialist and communist construction and enhancing the role of the world socialist system as a decisive factor in the

progressive development of mankind. The working class movement has acquired considerable importance in the capitalist countries. Step by step, uniting all workers and all progressive strata, this movement is steadily eroding the power of State monopoly capital. The national liberation movement of the peoples has grown into a huge force. In Asia, Africa and Latin America, the struggle for independence and freedom, for the elimination of all sequels of the colonial past and for the complete frustration of the neo-colonialist policy of imperialism is being waged on broader fronts.

At the same time, present-day reality demonstrates that the imperialists have not given up attempts to place obstacles in the way of revolutionary transformations of the world. They are making desperate efforts, directed against the socialist countries, to stop class battles from developing in the capitalist countries. They will go to any criminal lengths in the hope of thwarting the national liberation movement and, by the use of new methods and devices, establishing neo-colonialist régimes in Asia, Africa and Latin America. The imperialist reactionaries are trying to create a split in the ranks of the anti-imperialist front and to undermine the unity of the socialist States and the world communist and workers' movement.

The actions of the imperialists on the international scene are directed against the interests of the peace and security of peoples. Through the fault of imperialism, there are still hotbeds of military conflict, and tension is being maintained and exacerbated in a number of areas of the world.

Both parties consider that the current international situation is highly favourable to the revolutionary struggle of the peoples. The forces of socialism, national independence, democracy and peace are far superior to the forces of reaction and war; they are dealing crushing blows to imperialism, headed by the United States, and are thwarting its aggressive and bellicose plans.

## I

For many years, the United States imperialists have pursued a policy of constant interference and aggression in Viet-Nam with the aim of transforming South Viet-Nam into a new type of colony and a military base of the United States and of perpetuating the division of Viet-Nam. They have waged an extremely brutal war of destruction on Viet-Nameese soil, committing grave crimes against the population of both parts of Viet-Nam.

Confronted with the growing anti-imperialist struggle of the peoples of the countries of Indo-China, the United States has been stubbornly pursuing a policy of "vietnamizing" the war and applying the "Nixon doctrine", using Indo-Chinese against Indo-Chinese and Asians against Asians for that purpose. The United States is prolonging, intensifying and expanding the aggressive war in South Viet-Nam, Laos and Cambodia, while at the same time continuing military operations against a socialist country, the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam.

Under the glorious banner of the National Liberation Front and the Provisional Revolutionary Government, the people of South Viet-Nam have defeated the strategic plan for a "special war" and are frustrating United States plans for a "local war". After the glorious victories of the spring of 1968, which changed the military situation in South Viet-Nam, the people of

South Viet-Nam have been launching offensive operations and rising up in revolt. They have been dealing one blow after another at the policy of "pacification", seriously setting back the plans for "vietnamizing" the war.

The people of North Viet-Nam have triumphed in the devastating war unleashed by the United States imperialists and have achieved great successes in socialist construction. Constantly increasing their vigilance, the people of North Viet-Nam are filled with determination to defeat any adventurist military operations by the United States imperialists and, at the same time, to strengthen in every way their military and economic potential, carry out the duty of the sturdy home front towards the great military front in South Viet-Nam, and fully support the struggle of the Laotian and Cambodian peoples.

Carrying forward its tradition of self-sacrificing struggle against foreign aggression, the Viet-Nameese people are prepared to surmount all difficulties and privations, are filled with determination to continue the war of resistance against the United States in order to save the motherland, liberate the South, defend the socialist North and advance towards peaceful unification of the motherland, and are prepared to make their contribution to the defence of peace in Asia and throughout the world.

The Soviet Union will provide vigorous support on three fronts, military, political and diplomatic, until total victory is won in the struggle which the Viet-Nameese people are carrying on against the United States for the salvation of its motherland.

Both parties sharply condemn the United States imperialists, who are prolonging, intensifying and expanding the aggressive war in Indo-China and violating the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Indo-China and the 1962 Geneva Agreements on Laos.

Both parties strongly demand that the United States Government should halt its interference and aggression, completely withdraw its troops, advisers and military personnel from South Viet-Nam, Laos and Cambodia, and halt all United States military operations on the Indo-China peninsula so as to permit each of the countries of Indo-China to settle its internal affairs for itself without outside interference.

Both parties consider that the seven-point proposals put forward by the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Viet-Nam provide a reasonable and fair basis for settling the Viet-Nameese question. These proposals contain two main points: the United States Government must put an end to the war of aggression, effect the rapid, total and unconditional withdrawal from South Viet-Nam of all armed forces, advisers, military personnel weapons and military *matériel* of the United States and its allies, and dismantle the United States military bases in South Viet-Nam; the United States Government must end its support of the warlike puppet régime headed by the dictator Nguyen Van Thieu and open the way to the creation in Saigon of a new administration which favours peace, independence, neutrality and democracy and is prepared to conduct serious negotiations with the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Viet-Nam on matters connected with the formation of a broad government of national conciliation in South Viet-Nam.

Both parties fully support the just struggle of the peoples of Laos and Cambodia against United States imperialism and its puppets and support the five-point position of the Patriotic Front of Laos for a political settlement and the political programme of the National United Front of Cambodia.

Both parties consider that the struggle of the peoples of Viet-Nam, Laos and Cambodia is an important and inseparable part of the revolutionary struggle of the peoples of the entire world. In bravely defending their own national interests, the peoples of Viet-Nam, Laos and Cambodia are making a historic contribution to the total and final triumph of the forces of peace, national independence, democracy and social progress.

Guided by the interests of the struggle for peace, national independence, democracy and socialism, both parties emphasized the need to strengthen solidarity, friendship and co-operation among the fraternal socialist countries and expressed determination to make every effort to further the restoration and strengthening of solidarity among the socialist countries and the Communist and Workers' Parties on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism.

The Soviet Union and the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam proclaim their support for the struggle of the socialist countries of Europe to consolidate the results of the war against fascism and to further the trend—so appropriate to the present era—towards the achievement of peace and security in Europe, which represents an important contribution to the struggle for peace throughout the world. The parties consider that the steady, all-round consolidation of the power of the socialist countries is a decisive factor in gaining victory in this struggle. The parties believe that the signing of treaties between the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Germany and between the Polish People's Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany and also the quadripartite agreement on matters relating to West Berlin confirm the inviolability of the frontiers of the States of Europe, enhance the international position of the German Democratic Republic, create the necessary preconditions for the establishment under international law of relations based on equal rights between the German Democratic Republic and other countries, and make a positive contribution to the defence of peace and security in Europe.

Both parties resolutely support the struggle for the restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations and the expulsion of the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek from that Organization.

The parties strongly condemn the unceasing provocation by the imperialists against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. They declare their full support for the eight-point programme of the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea which is aimed at securing the peaceful unification of that country.

Both parties resolutely support the Cuban people in their struggle to preserve the security and sovereignty of the Republic of Cuba.

The parties express their solidarity with the Arab peoples. They are strongly in favour of the elimination of the consequences of Israeli aggression, the full withdrawal of Israel's armed forces from the occupied Arab lands and the restoration of the lawful rights of the Arab people of Palestine.

The Soviet Union and the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam are solidly behind the struggle of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America against imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism, for the independence, honour and freedom of their countries and for the right to choose freely their path of social development.

The Soviet Union and the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam consider that any solution to current international problems must take into account the fundamental national aspirations of the peoples.

## II

The close friendship and co-operation which have been established between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam are based on the common social structure and the unity of aims of the two countries and are responsive to the fundamental aspirations of the Soviet and Viet-Nameese peoples. Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism lie at the basis of Soviet-Viet-Nameese friendship, which is genuinely national in character, and serve as a basis for the relations between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Workers' Party of Viet-Nam.

The Soviet Party-Government delegation, on behalf of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Council of Ministers of the USSR, and all the Soviet people, expresses its admiration of the heroic struggle of the Viet-Nameese people for the independence and freedom of their homeland and against the United States interventionists and their accomplices. The word Viet-Nam is synonymous with steadfastness, selfless courage and heroism.

The Viet-Nameese people, carrying out the precepts of that outstanding revolutionary and internationalist, their beloved leader, President Ho Chi Minh, are winning remarkable victories both in the struggle against the United States aggressors and in peaceful socialist construction. The historic achievements gained under the proven leadership of the militant *avant-garde* of the Viet-Nameese people—the Workers' Party of Viet-Nam—are a powerful inspiration to the peoples' liberation movement.

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the whole Soviet people reaffirm their unwavering determination to continue to support the Viet-Nameese people in their struggle against the United States aggressors and for the national salvation of their homeland and the further development and consolidation of the socialist achievement of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam.

The Soviet Union has been, is, and will always be on the side of struggling Viet-Nam, alongside the courageous Viet-Nameese people.

The Workers' Party of Viet-Nam, the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and the Viet-Nameese people constantly remember that, both earlier during the war of resistance against the French colonizers and now in the war against the United States to save their homeland and in the construction of socialism, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Government of the USSR and the fraternal Soviet people have given the Viet-Nameese people powerful support and tremendous and effective assistance of many

kinds. The powerful political support, which was strongly reflected in the Statement of the Twenty-fourth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union supporting the struggle of the Viet-Nameese people and the peoples of Indo-China against United States aggression, and also the tremendous economic and military assistance, assistance in the form of experts and equipment, and assistance in the training of cadres and workers which the Party and Government of the Soviet Union have rendered to the Viet-Nameese people in past years have demonstrated quite clearly the militant solidarity and the lofty internationalism of the Soviet people in relation to the people of Viet-Nam. This is a powerful inspiration to the Viet-Nameese people actively to pursue their just cause until complete victory.

On behalf of the Workers' Party of Viet-Nam, the National Assembly, the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and the Viet-Nameese people, the Viet-Nameese delegation expresses to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Soviet Government and the fraternal Soviet people their sincere and profound gratitude for their support and invaluable assistance.

The Viet-Nameese party expresses the most sincere and warm feelings of the Viet-Nameese people towards the Soviet Union—the homeland of the October Revolution, the greatest revolution of all time, which marked a new era in the history of mankind and showed the peoples the path of struggle for their liberation; it expresses feelings of boundless love and gratitude to Lenin—that leader of genius, that great teacher of world revolution. The ideas of Lenin light up the path of the victorious revolutionary struggle of the international working class and the oppressed peoples.

The Viet-Nameese party hails the remarkable successes in all fields achieved by the fraternal Soviet people over the past 54 years. The Viet-Nameese people are convinced that under the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, founded and tempered by V. I. Lenin, the Soviet people, who have blazed the trail to socialism and are paving the way to communism, who opened the age of the conquest of space for the benefit of mankind, will unquestionably achieve still greater successes in the building of their country. The material and technical basis for communism is being built in the Soviet Union on an ever increasing scale and at an ever increasing tempo. The tremendous accomplishments of the Soviet people in the establishment of new social relations, the building of a new material and technical basis and the forming of a new man, having strengthened the might of the Soviet Union in the economic, defence and other fields, are daily enhancing the role and strengthening the position and authority of the Soviet Union on the international scene. The power of the Soviet Union and the socialist camp is a reliable guarantee for the revolutionary cause of the peoples, a guarantee that the provocative and aggressive plans of imperialism, and above all American imperialism will be thwarted and a pledge for the preservation of peace and security.

The Viet-Nameese people rejoice at the outstanding victories of the fraternal Soviet people and see in them a source of great inspiration for their revolutionary cause. The Viet-Nameese people sincerely hope that the Soviet people will win ever greater victories in the attainment of the objectives which were set by the Twenty-fourth Congress of the Communist Party of the

Soviet Union for the more rapid advancement of the Soviet Union in the building of communism, and will thereby actively contribute to the strengthening of the power of socialist society and to the cause of the maintenance of peace throughout the world.

### III

Both parties note with satisfaction the further development in the past years of relations between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Workers' Party of Viet-Nam and between the two Governments on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism. Favourable conditions have been established for the still more rapid strengthening and expanding of these relations.

The Viet-Nameese Party-Government delegation notes the enormous significance of the assistance of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries for the successful building of socialism in the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and for the strengthening of its defence capacity. Both sides express their determination to continue to do their utmost to ensure that the brotherly friendship and co-operation between the two Parties and Governments, based on the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, are further strengthened and extended.

For the attainment of these objectives, the two parties agreed to instruct the competent organizations and departments to formulate measures for the long-term development of economic co-operation and trade, cultural, scientific, technical and other ties between the two countries. Proposals for such measures will be submitted to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Viet-Nam, the Government of the USSR and the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam. Both parties expressed confidence that the establishment of a joint Soviet-Viet-Nameese commission for economic and scientific and technical co-operation will contribute to the further strengthening of ties between the Soviet Union and Viet-Nam in the economic sphere.

The Soviet and the Viet-Nameese parties agreed to continue to study the possibility of building a hydroelectric power station on the Black River and it was arranged that the competent Soviet organizations would send a team of experts to the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam to carry out comprehensive engineering, geological and exploratory operations and other necessary preparations.

During past years the two parties have exchanged numerous high-level delegations and have held numerous useful talks on problems of concern to both sides. Both parties confirm that they will expand such contacts and exchanges of views in a spirit of friendship, solidarity and mutual trust in the interests of the two countries and the cause of socialism.

As a result of the talks, the parties signed relevant agreements. These documents testify to the firm friendship and militant solidarity between the peoples of the Soviet Union and Viet-Nam.

The two parties express great satisfaction at the outcome of the talks, and of the meetings and conversations held, and consider that the visit of the Soviet Party-Government delegation greatly contributed to the further strengthening of relations of fraternal

friendship, militant solidarity and close co-operation between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Workers' Party of Viet-Nam, between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam.

In the name of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Government of the USSR, Comrade N. V. Podgorny invited the leaders of the Workers' Party of Viet-Nam and the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam to send a Viet-Nameese Party-Government delegation on an official visit to the Soviet Union. The Viet-Nameese side gratefully accepted the invitation. The precise dates of the visit will be decided upon later.

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

(Signed) N. PODGORNYY

*Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, President of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Head of Soviet Party-Government Delegation*

For the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam:

(Signed) LE DUAN

*First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Viet-Nam, Head of the Viet-Nameese Party-Government Delegation*

## DOCUMENT S/10408

### Interim report of the Committee established in pursuance of Security Council resolution 253 (1968)

[Original: English]  
[3 December 1971]

#### I. INTRODUCTION

1. Since the submission of its fourth report on 16 June 1971,<sup>20</sup> the Committee established in pursuance of Security Council resolution 253 (1968) has held four meetings.

2. At its 60th meeting on 6 July, the Committee considered replies from States concerning 27 cases of suspected violations of the provisions of resolution 253 (1968) listed in its fourth report, as well as a reply concerning one new such case subsequently brought to its attention. The Committee's work on these and other cases will be dealt with in a forthcoming report.

3. At the 61st to 63rd meetings, the Committee considered the question of the importing of chrome ore from Southern Rhodesia.

4. The Committee's 61st meeting, held on 22 November 1971, was called at the request of the representative of Somalia, who had put forward the request on behalf of the three African members of the Committee (Burundi, Sierra Leone and Somalia) in view of the fact that importing chrome ore from Southern Rhodesia into the United States might become permissible as of 1 January 1972, after a reported Act of the United States Congress to that effect entered into force. The African members of the Committee wished to seize the Committee of that problem as a matter of urgency, because such a development, if permitted to occur, might seriously undermine the effectiveness of the United Nations sanctions against the rebel régime.

5. The Committee had before it press information gathered by the Secretariat indicating that both the United States Senate and House of Representatives had adopted an amendment to a military procurement bill that could permit the importing of chrome ore from Southern Rhodesia into the United States after 1 January 1972 and that the President of the United States had signed that bill into an Act of Congress on 17 November 1971.

<sup>20</sup> *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-sixth Year, Special Supplement No. 2 and 2A.* The third report of the Committee was issued on 15 June 1970 (*ibid.*, *Twenty-fifth Year, Special Supplement No. 3*), the second on 12 June 1969 (S/9252 and Add.1) and the first on 30 December 1968 (S/8954).

#### II. CONSIDERATION BY THE COMMITTEE

6. Introducing the subject, the representative of Somalia recalled that at the 1948th meeting of the Fourth Committee on 11 November 1971, the United States representative had stated that, with one exception, which involved a prior contract, his country had not imported any chrome from Southern Rhodesia since 1965, and he had reaffirmed that his country would continue to apply its over-all sanctions against that Territory. The representative of Somalia also recalled that on 16 November 1971, the General Assembly had adopted resolution 2765 (XXVI) by 106 votes to 2, with 13 abstentions, calling on the United States Government to prevent the importing of chrome into the United States from Southern Rhodesia, as such imports would violate the sanctions imposed by the Security Council against that country. The representative of Somalia said that the three African members of the Committee were extremely concerned about the consequential developments of the new Act of the United States Congress and proposed that the Committee should formally bring the matter to the attention of the Security Council.

7. The representatives of Burundi, Sierra Leone, the Syrian Arab Republic and Poland supported the views put forward by the representative of Somalia. The representative of the USSR noted that in the case under consideration, it was not merely a private firm which was involved, as in the cases which usually came before the Committee, but the Government of a Member State, which intended to violate Security Council resolutions 253 (1968), 277 (1970) and 288 (1970).

8. The representative of the United States reaffirmed that his country had scrupulously observed the sanctions; since their imposition, the value of United States trade with Southern Rhodesia had fallen from \$30 million to \$600,000 a year, the latter figure covering items allowed under the exempting clauses contained in resolution 253 (1968). He did not think that the new law, which would not come into force until 1 January 1972, would mean a serious break in observance of the sanctions in the United States or in the world, particularly as the quantities of chrome ore likely to be imported into the United States would be insig-

nificant compared to the contraband quantities already being imported by other countries, a situation that should also be considered by the Committee. Moreover, before the the new law came into effect, the United States Government would be studying the legal ramifications of the amendment within the terms of both United States and international law. He stressed furthermore that, regardless of any law, there could be no violations of the sanctions until chrome ore from Southern Rhodesia was actually imported into the United States. He also expressed caution that the Committee should not exceed its terms of reference by taking it upon itself to interpret resolutions of the Security Council or to encroach on its functions.

9. The representative of France stated that the Committee lacked sufficient information to prepare a report; he therefore suggested that, in view of the unusual nature of the case before the Committee, the United States delegation should be given enough time to make a more detailed statement concerning the matter, if it wished to do so. The representative of Italy suggested that, in accordance with the usual procedure, the United States delegation should be requested to furnish copies of the text of the relevant amendment incorporated into the Act of the United States Congress.

10. It was agreed, with the consent of the representative of the United States, that the full text of the relevant amendment and of his statements to the Committee should be made available to all members of the Committee.

11. At the 62nd meeting, on 29 November 1971, the Committee continued consideration of the question. The representative of Somalia introduced a working paper, jointly sponsored by the delegations of Sierra Leone, Somalia and the Syrian Arab Republic, suggesting a course of action for the Committee, including recommendations that might be considered for submission to the Security Council. The representatives of Argentina, Italy and Japan expressed support for the suggestions contained in the working paper. The representative of Somalia then formally proposed

that the Committee should immediately report the matter to the Security Council. That proposal was supported by the representatives of the Syrian Arab Republic and the USSR. It was adopted by the Committee.

### III. RECOMMENDATIONS

12. After carefully considering the matter, the Committee decided to submit a report to the Security Council as a matter of urgency and to make the following recommendations:

(a) The Security Council should recall resolution 253 (1968) of 29 May 1968, in which, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council decided that, "in furtherance of the objective of ending the rebellion, all States Members of the United Nations [should] prevent the import into their territories of all commodities and products originating in Southern Rhodesia and exported therefrom after the date of [that] resolution";

(b) The Security Council should state that if any legislation were passed, or act taken, by a Member State with a view to permitting the importing from Southern Rhodesia of any commodity falling within the scope of the obligations imposed by resolution 253 (1968), including chrome ore, then that would set a dangerous precedent and weaken the effectiveness of the sanctions;

(c) The Security Council should call upon all States not to pass or implement legislation or take any other act that would permit the importing from Southern Rhodesia of commodities falling under the scope of the obligations imposed by resolution 253 (1968), including chrome ore;

(d) Taking into account the fact that the sanctions against Southern Rhodesia remain in force, as confirmed by resolution 288 (1970), the Security Council should emphasize the need to increase vigilance in this field and, accordingly, call upon all States to take more effective measures to ensure full implementation of the sanctions.

### DOCUMENT S/10409

**Letter dated 3 December 1971 from the representatives of Algeria, Iraq, the Libyan Arab Republic and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen to the President of the Security Council**

[Original: English]  
[3 December 1971]

Upon instructions from our Governments, we request an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the dangerous situation in the Arabian Gulf area arising from the occupation by the armed forces of Iran of the islands of Abu Musa, the Greater Tunb and the Lesser Tunb, on 30 November 1971.

We also request to be allowed to participate without a vote in the proceedings of the Council.

(Signed) A. RAHAL  
Permanent Representative of Algeria to  
the United Nations

T. EL-SHIBIB  
Permanent Representative of Iraq to  
the United Nations

M. S. MAGHRIBI  
Permanent Representative  
of the Libyan Arab Republic to  
the United Nations

A. M. ISMAIL  
Permanent Representative  
of the People's Democratic Republic  
of Yemen to  
the United Nations

## Report of the Secretary-General

## DOCUMENT S/10410

[Original: English]  
[3 December 1971]

1. Recent reports received by the Secretary-General from various sources indicate that there has been a further grave deterioration in the situation along the borders of East Pakistan and elsewhere in the sub-continent. In view of his conviction that this situation constitutes a threat to the maintenance of international peace and security, the Secretary-General feels that he should report to the Security Council on the efforts he has made so far in regard to this problem. The Secretary-General has kept the President of the Security Council informed of these efforts under the broad terms of Article 99 of the United Nations Charter, which provides that "The Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security". The Secretary-General feels that an initiative on this matter in the Security Council can best be taken by the parties themselves or by the members of the Council.

2. The present report does not cover the humanitarian efforts already launched by the Secretary-General to assist both the East Pakistan refugees in India and the distressed people of East Pakistan. Information on this effort was submitted to the Economic and Social Council in July 1971 and to the Third Committee of the General Assembly in November 1971. On 22 November the Third Committee unanimously approved a draft resolution whereby the General Assembly would endorse the initiatives of the Secretary-General and request the Secretary-General and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to continue their efforts to co-ordinate international assistance and to ensure that it is used to the maximum advantage to relieve the suffering of the refugees in India and of the people of East Pakistan. At the time of writing, the General Assembly has not yet considered the draft resolution recommended by the Third Committee.

3. On 20 July 1971 the Secretary-General submitted the following memorandum to the President of the Security Council:

"For some months now the members of the Security Council, and many other members of the United Nations, have been deeply preoccupied with developments in East Pakistan and the adjacent Indian states and their consequences, or possible consequences. I myself expressed my concern over the situation to President Yahya Khan shortly after the events of March 1971 and have been in continuous touch with the Governments of Pakistan and India, both through their Permanent Representatives at the United Nations and through other contacts. In these exchanges I have been acutely aware of the dual responsibility of the United Nations, including the Secretary-General, under the Charter, both to observe the provisions of its Article 2, paragraph 7, and to work, within the framework of international economic and social co-operation, to help promote and ensure human well-being and humanitarian principles.

"It was with this latter responsibility in mind that I appealed for assistance both for the refugees from East Pakistan in India and for the population of East Pakistan. In order to channel the assistance given in response to those appeals, I designated the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees as the focal point for assistance to the refugees in India and appointed, with the agreement of the Government of Pakistan, a representative in Dacca, in order to make as effective use as possible of the international assistance made available for the relief of the population of East Pakistan. Both of these humanitarian efforts have been reported upon in detail elsewhere, and the Economic and Social Council held a full discussion on both operations on 16 July 1971, based on statements to the Council by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the Assistant Secretary-General for Inter-Agency Affairs. I take this opportunity to express my warm gratitude to the Governments, the United Nations agencies and programmes, and to the voluntary organizations which have responded generously to my appeals. I also wish to express my appreciation to the Governments of India and Pakistan for their co-operation with my representatives in the field.

"As the weeks have passed since last March, I have become increasingly uneasy and apprehensive at the steady deterioration of the situation in the region in almost all its aspects. In spite of the generous response of the international community to my appeals for assistance for the refugees from East Pakistan now in India, the money and supplies made available are still nowhere near sufficient, and the Indian Government still faces the appalling and disruptive problem of caring, for an unforeseeable period of time, for millions of refugees, whose number is still increasing. In East Pakistan international and governmental efforts to cope with the results of two successive disasters, one of them natural, are increasingly hampered by the lack of substantial progress towards a political reconciliation and the consequent effect on law, order and public administration in East Pakistan. There is a danger that serious food shortages, and even famine, could soon add to the sufferings of the population, unless conditions can be improved to the point where a large-scale relief programme can be effective. Equally serious is the undoubted fact that reconciliation, an improved political atmosphere and the success of relief efforts are indispensable prerequisites for the return of any large proportion of the refugees now in India. The situation is one in which political, economic and social factors have produced a series of vicious circles which largely frustrate the efforts of the authorities concerned and of the international community to deal with the vast humanitarian problems involved.

"These human tragedies have consequences in a far wider sphere. The violent emotions aroused could have repercussions on the relations of religious and ethnic groups in the subcontinent as a whole, and the relationship of the Governments of India and Pakistan is also a major component of the problem. The conflict between the principles of the territorial

integrity of States and of self-determination has often before in history given rise to fratricidal strife and has provoked in recent years highly emotional reactions in the international community. In the present case there is an additional element of danger, for the crisis is unfolding in the context of the long-standing and unresolved differences between India and Pakistan—differences which gave rise to open warfare only six years ago. Although there can be no question of the deep desire of both Governments for peace, tension between them shows no sign of subsiding. The situation on the borders of East Pakistan is particularly disturbing. Border clashes, clandestine raids and acts of sabotage appear to be becoming more frequent, and this is all the more serious since refugees must cross this disturbed border if repatriation is to become a reality; nor can any of us here in the United Nations afford to forget that a major conflict in the subcontinent could all too easily expand.

"In tragic circumstances such as those prevailing in the subcontinent, it is all too easy to make moral judgements. It is far more difficult to face up to the political and human realities of the situation and to help the peoples concerned to find a way out of their enormous difficulties. It is this latter course which, in my view, the United Nations must follow.

"I do not think that I have painted too dark a picture of the present situation and of its possible consequences. In the light of the information available to me, I have reluctantly come to the conclusion that the time is past when the international community can continue to stand by, watching the situation deteriorate and hoping that relief programmes, humanitarian efforts and good intentions will be enough to turn the tide of human misery and potential disaster. I am deeply concerned about the possible consequences of the present situation, not only in the humanitarian sense, but also as a potential threat to peace and security and for its bearing on the future of the United Nations as an effective instrument for international co-operation and action. It seems to me that the present tragic situation, in which humanitarian, economic and political problems are mixed in such a way as almost to defy any distinction between them, presents a challenge to the United Nations as a whole which must be met. Other situations of this kind may well occur in the future. If the Organization faces up to such a situation now, it may be able to develop the new skill and the new strength required to face future situations of this kind.

"It is for these reasons that I am taking the unusual step of reporting to the President of the Security Council on a question which has not been inscribed on the Council's agenda. The political aspects of this matter are of such far-reaching importance that the Secretary-General is not in a position to suggest precise courses of action before the members of the Security Council have taken note of the problem. I believe, however, that the United Nations, with its long experience in peace-keeping and with its varied resources for conciliation and persuasion, must, and should, now play a more forthright role in attempting both to mitigate the human tragedy which has already taken place and to avert the further deterioration of the situation.

"The Security Council, the world's highest body for the maintenance of international peace and security, is in a position to consider, with the utmost attention and concern, the present situation and to reach some agreed conclusions as to measures which might be taken. Naturally, it is for the members of the Council themselves to decide whether such consideration should take place formally or informally, in public or in private. My primary purpose at this stage is to provide a basis and an opportunity for such discussions to take place and to express my grave concern that all possible ways and means should be explored which might help to resolve this tragic situation."

4. On 17 September 1971, in the introduction to my report to the twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly, I brought this problem in all its aspects to the Assembly's attention. I concluded my report with the following observation:

"In a disaster of such vast proportions, the international community has a clear obligation to help the Governments and peoples concerned in every possible way. But, as I have indicated, the basic problem can be solved only if a political solution based on reconciliation and the respect of humanitarian principles is achieved."<sup>21</sup>

With this end in view, I have used my good offices in various ways ever since the events of March in East Pakistan. For obvious reasons I did this with complete lack of publicity. Because of the special importance of the problem, I made an exception to this rule with regard to the case of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, in connexion with which I had the following statement issued on 10 August 1971:

"The Secretary-General feels that it is an extremely sensitive and delicate matter which falls within the competence of the judicial system of a Member State—in this case, Pakistan. It is also a matter of extraordinary interest and concern in many quarters, from a humanitarian as well as from a political point of view. The Secretary-General has received and is still receiving almost every day expressions of serious concern from representatives of Governments about the situation in East Pakistan and there is a general feeling that the restoration of peace and normalcy in the region is remote unless some kind of accommodation is reached. The Secretary-General shares the feelings of many representatives that any developments concerning the fate of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman will inevitably have repercussions outside the borders of Pakistan."

I had previously addressed a letter to the President of Pakistan on this subject.

5. On 20 October the Secretary-General, having in mind the possible usefulness of comprehensive discussions with the heads of the Governments of India and Pakistan on all the aspects of the problem as set forth in his memorandum of 20 July [see para. 3 above], addressed identical messages to the Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan. The text of these messages reads as follows:

"On 20 July 1971, as you will recall, I addressed a memorandum to the President of the Security Council concerning the situation in East Pakistan and the

<sup>21</sup> Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 1A, para. 191.

adjacent Indian states. In that memorandum I expressed my concern at the possible consequences for international peace and security of the situation in that area of the world.

"Recent developments have only served to increase my anxiety that this situation could all too easily give rise to open hostilities which would not only be disastrous to the two countries principally concerned, but might also constitute a major threat to the wider peace. I have in mind both recent indications of a worsening situation on the borders of East Pakistan and reports of growing tension on the border between West Pakistan and India and on the cease-fire line in Jammu and Kashmir.

"I wish to emphasize that I have full confidence in the sincere desire of both Governments to avoid a senseless and destructive war. I have noted the efforts which leaders on both sides have made, in spite of the severe pressures upon them, to discourage developments which might lead to open conflict. In the prevailing circumstances, however, where feelings run high and where both Governments are under exceptional stress and strain, a small and unintentional incident could all too easily lead to more widespread conflict.

"The Chief Military Observer of UNMOGIP, with my full backing, is doing all that he can on the cease-fire line in Jammu and Kashmir to ease tensions, to avert misunderstandings, to prevent military escalation and to avoid confrontations that might lead to open hostilities. On the borders of East Pakistan and on the international frontier between India and West Pakistan there is, of course, no comparable United Nations mechanism.

"In this potentially very dangerous situation, I feel that it is my duty as Secretary-General to do all that I can to assist the Governments immediately concerned in avoiding any development which might lead to disaster. I wish you to know, therefore, that my good offices are entirely at your disposal if you believe that they could be helpful at any time. Naturally the Chief Military Observer of UNMOGIP will continue to do his utmost to assist in maintaining the peace in the area of his responsibility.

"I have addressed a similar communication to the President of Pakistan/Prime Minister of India."

6. On 22 October the President of Pakistan replied to the Secretary-General's message of 20 October as follows:

"I have today received your message of October 20, 1971, through my Ambassador.

"I fully agree with your appreciation of the gravity of situation which is worsening rapidly on Indo-Pakistan borders. I also fully share your concern for the preservation of peace and prevention of a disastrous situation developing for both countries which could only result in suffering for millions of people. Already as a result of shelling of border villages on our side hundreds of men, women and children have been killed and wounded and large numbers rendered homeless.

"It is a pity that at a press conference in New Delhi on 19 October 1971 the Indian Prime Minister has summarily rejected the proposal for withdrawal of forces of both countries from borders. The reason advanced for this is that Pakistan's lines of communications to borders are shorter than those of

India. I do not wish to enter into a controversy on this point and would suggest that withdrawals of manpower along with armour and artillery may take place all along the Indo-Pakistan international frontiers both in east and west, if not to peace-time stations, then at least to a mutually agreed safe distance on either side of the border to provide a sense of security on both sides. At the same time armed infiltration and shelling into our borders in East Pakistan should cease.

"I further recommend that United Nations observers on both sides of border should oversee the withdrawals and supervise the maintenance of peace. Only the recognized Border Security and Police Forces should then remain at border posts which they have traditionally occupied.

"I also welcome the offer you have made for making your good offices available and very much hope that you can pay an immediate visit to India and Pakistan to discuss the ways and means of withdrawal of forces. This I am sure will have a salutary and desirable effect and further the cause of peace.

"In view of the urgency and gravity of the situation confirmed by Indian leaders on 19 October last, threatening to occupy and hold the border cities of Lahore and Sialkot a public declaration by you of your intention to visit India and Pakistan to seek a settlement of differences would be most desirable.

"In conclusion I assure you of full co-operation on the part of my country in all your efforts directed toward the preservation of peace."

7. On 16 November the Prime Minister of India addressed the following reply to the Secretary-General's message of 20 October:

"Your letter of 20 October was received two days before my departure on a long tour abroad. It was not possible to reply until my return to Delhi. My trip gave me the opportunity of discussing the crisis in Pakistan with a number of leaders in different countries.

"We have avoided any hasty reaction to the recent events in Pakistan which have naturally caused you and us great concern. I am sure you will appreciate our anxiety as the military authorities in Pakistan continue to pursue a deliberate policy of suppressing the fundamental freedom and human rights of the people in East Bengal and driving out millions of their citizens into India, thus placing intolerable political, social and economic burdens on us. In spite of the repeated declarations of amnesty, and "invitations" for the return of the refugees and claims regarding the return of normal conditions in East Bengal made by the military régime of Pakistan, the flight of the people of East Bengal into India has not stopped and provides tragic testimony to the continuing military repression and denial of basic human rights in East Bengal. The consequences of the activities of the military régime of Pakistan threaten and distort the entire fabric of our national life and pose a serious threat to our security.

Consistent attempts have been made by the Government of Pakistan to divert attention from the prevailing situation inside East Bengal and its own refusal to reach a settlement with the people of East Bengal and their representatives who were elected in a fair and free election held by the present

Government of Pakistan by projecting the issue as an Indo-Pakistan dispute. The most recent manifestation of this policy is the movement of Pakistani troops and armour to our borders, threatening India with total war, and simultaneously launching a vicious crush-and-conquer-India campaign. These steps confirm our belief that Pakistan is seriously preparing to launch a large-scale armed conflict with India and that we have therefore to take all necessary defensive measures.

"I should like to assure you that we have no desire to provoke an armed conflict with Pakistan. Such measures as we have taken are entirely defensive. We have been constrained to take them because of the movement and positioning for offensive combat of the Pakistani military machine. We have had to bear in mind that Pakistan has moved her forces right up to the border although the cantonments where they are normally based are only a few hours distance from the border, while the bases of our own troops are located at several days distance. Indeed, we waited long enough before we moved our troops to the frontiers.

"The root of the problem is the fate of the 75 million people of East Bengal and their inalienable rights. This is what must be kept in mind, instead of the present attempt to save the military régime. To sidetrack this main problem and to convert it into an Indo-Pakistan dispute can only aggravate tensions.

"During these difficult months, we have taken every opportunity to advocate strongly that the problem of East Bengal can be solved only by peaceful negotiations between the military rulers of West Pakistan and the elected and accepted leaders of East Bengal. A first step towards the opening of such negotiations is the release of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, as demanded by the people of East Bengal and their elected representatives. Instead, there is an attempt to establish phantom governments and legislatures. Indeed, I learn that 55 persons have been declared elected "unopposed". Such undemocratic and entirely indefensible action cannot but increase bitterness. This farcical re-election should be stopped.

"If the military régime in Pakistan persists in its policies, the situation in East Bengal is bound to deteriorate. Yet, there is no evidence of the wisdom or the desire necessary to seek a political solution of the problem. I believe that statesmen of goodwill all over the world are convinced that only such a solution could bring normalcy to that tormented region, stop the further influx of refugees and enable those now in India to return. You yourself have made several statements emphasizing the need for such a settlement. It is tragic that the Pakistan Government has turned a deaf ear to all such appeals. Your offer of good offices could play a significant role in this situation.

"It is always a pleasure to meet you and to exchange views. Whatever efforts you can make to bring about a political settlement in East Bengal which meets the declared wishes of the people there will be welcome, and if you are prepared to view the problem in perspective you will have our support in your initiatives.

"I have stated my views frankly. It would not be fair to you not to do so, for I know how anxious you are to prevent the aggravation of the grim tragedy of

East Bengal. I had hoped to discuss these matters with you in New York but was very sorry to learn of your illness. I hope that you are quite well again."

8. On 22 November the Secretary-General sent the following message to the Prime Minister of India in reply to her letter of 16 November:

"I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter of 16 November 1971 in which you send me your reply to my letter of 20 October 1971. I appreciate the thoughtful and detailed exposition of the views of your Government concerning the situation which gave rise to my offer of good offices, and, in particular, your statement that your Government has no desire to provoke an armed conflict with Pakistan.

"I am, however, puzzled by the reference in the fifth paragraph of your letter to 'the present attempt to save the military régime' of Pakistan and by the statement that 'to sidetrack this main problem and to convert it into an Indo-Pakistan dispute can only aggravate tensions'. I am also puzzled by the statement in the eighth paragraph that if I am prepared to 'view the problem in perspective' I shall have the support of the Indian Government.

"In view of these statements, I feel obliged to make clear to you my intentions in offering my good offices. My letter of 20 October was deliberately written in the context of my memorandum of 20 July 1971 addressed to the President of the Security Council which took into account those aspects of the situation which you mention in your letter. In fact I had intended that this memorandum would serve as the term of reference for the exercise of my good offices.

"I had naturally intended to view this very serious situation in the broadest possible perspective and had hoped to have the opportunity to review it with the leaders of both Governments. It was not my intention to sidetrack any of the main issues nor to confine the problem to any single particular issue, although naturally, as Secretary-General, I cannot under the Charter ignore a potential threat to international peace and security such as now seems to exist in the subcontinent.

"As you know, the exercise of good offices requires the assent and co-operation of all the parties concerned. Under the present circumstances, much to my regret, there does not seem to be a basis for the exercise of the Secretary-General's good offices in this infinitely serious and complicated problem."

9. On 23 November the Secretary-General received a further letter from the President of Pakistan as follows:

"I am addressing this message to you with a deep sense of urgency in view of the grave situation which has arisen in my country as a result of unprovoked and large-scale attacks by Indian armed forces in various parts of Pakistan.

"On 21 November, an Indian army brigade group supported by armed helicopters entered Chittagong Hill Tracts, overran our border outposts and penetrated approximately 10 miles into our territory. The same day, another brigade group of the 23rd Indian Division, supported by the rest of the division, launched an attack in the Belonia salient of Noakhali District, pushing eight miles deep into Pakistan territory. In the Brahmanbaria subdivision also attacks

were launched by a battalion group each from the 57th Division against two of our border posts at Mukandpur and Saldanadi which were overrun. In Sylhet District, Maulvi Bazaar subdivision, two battalion groups attacked and overran border outposts at Dhalai, Athgram and Zakigang. The battalion groups included two companies of Gurkhas. Another attack was launched in Rangpur District in the Burangamari salient where an Indian brigade group penetrated 15 miles into Pakistan territory up to Nageshwari. In Jessore District, a major offensive was launched by a brigade group of the 9th Indian Division, supported by armour and air cover opposite Chaugacha. Indian tanks penetrated about eight miles into Pakistan territory.

"An Indian air attack was challenged by the Pakistan Air Force. One Indian aircraft was destroyed and we lost two. Six Indian tanks were destroyed in the engagement and eight of ours were disabled.

"Intermittent shelling of Jessore air field continues.

"In Mymensingh District repeated attacks against our border outposts at Karitola have been repulsed.

"As many as 12 Indian Divisions have been deployed around East Pakistan. In addition there are 38 battalions of the Indian Border Security Force. The 2nd and 5th Indian Mountain Divisions which were previously deployed on the borders with China have also been moved towards East Pakistan. The 8th Mountain Division (of six brigades) has also been moved to the East Pakistan border towards Sylhet from Nagaland where only one brigade is now left.

"Twelve squadrons of the Indian Air Force are now placed around East Pakistan. A sizeable Indian Naval Force comprising an aircraft carrier, frigates, landing ships and two submarines is standing by, near Vizagapattam, in the Bay of Bengal posing an amphibious threat to Chittagong and Chalna ports. The approaches to Chalna port have been mined by the Indian forces with the result that two merchant ships chartered for carrying foodgrains and other essential supplies have been damaged. This will seriously disrupt food supplies to East Pakistan.

"As you are aware, Indian armed forces in the last few months have maintained pressure all along Pakistan's eastern borders. Apart from training and equipping rebels and launching their attacks supported by Indian Border Security Forces personnel, into Pakistan territory, Indian artillery units have been constantly shelling areas in East Pakistan. But, as I have pointed out above, in the last three or four days, the Indian armed forces have turned from localized attacks to open and large-scale warfare on several fronts. They have further escalated the conflict by introducing armour and air force. Pakistan Army and Air Force units in East Pakistan have been under strict orders not to cross the frontiers and to exercise the utmost restraint, in the face of continued grave provocations.

"The present situation, however, is such that the offensive launched by the Indian armed forces must be met by us with all the force at our command in the defence of our territorial integrity.

"We were assured from time to time that India did not intend to launch open and large-scale warfare against Pakistan. It is now evident that, far from exercising restraint, India has chosen the path

of unabashed and unprovoked aggression. India continues to harp on the theme that the inroads into Pakistan are being made by the so-called 'Mukti Bahini'—a rebel force created, maintained and sustained by India. No one will be deceived by the Indian claim which stands disproved by the scale of present operations and by the equipment, including armour and air force elements, now being used.

"You will recall that on 20 July last you addressed an informal and confidential memorandum to the President of the Security Council informing him of the steady deterioration of the situation on the borders of East Pakistan and drawing attention to the possibility of a major conflict in the subcontinent. I welcomed your initiative and agreed to accept the representative of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to supervise the return of East Pakistani displaced persons to East Pakistan. Since then Pakistan has also sought the establishment of a good offices committee of the Security Council to defuse the prevailing tension in the subcontinent. I agreed at a subsequent date to a mutual withdrawal of forces from borders but the proposal was summarily rejected by the Indian Prime Minister on 19 October 1971. More recently I responded positively to your letter of 20 October, in which you made a realistic assessment of the current Indo-Pakistan situation and expressed your concern at the prospect of 'a senseless and destructive war'. At that time you offered your good offices 'to assist the Governments immediately concerned in avoiding any development which might lead to disaster' and you stated that your good offices were entirely at our disposal if we believed that they could be helpful any time. I was happy to welcome this offer and to invite you to visit India and Pakistan to discuss ways and means of securing peace in the region.

"You will see that Pakistan has consistently expressed her willingness to accept the assistance of the United Nations in the solution of the present crisis in the subcontinent and India has consistently rejected it. Our position continues to be the same but I fear India is not interested in a peaceful settlement. The developing situation as I have described is fast reaching a point of no return. At this juncture your personal initiative could still avert a catastrophe.

"Conscious of your continuing concern for the well-being of the peoples of India and Pakistan and the preservation of peace and stability in the subcontinent, I await your good counsel."

10. On 26 November the Secretary-General replied to the President of Pakistan as follows:

"I wish to thank you for your letters of 22 October and 23 November 1971. I have noted with appreciation your prompt response to my offer of good offices, as well as to the suggestions which I made previously. I have also noted with great interest the suggestions in your letter of 22 October concerning other actions which might be taken to reduce tension and the threat to peace and security in the subcontinent.

"My letter of 20 October was written in the context of my memorandum of 20 July 1971 addressed to the President of the Security Council. Within this broad perspective I had hoped to have the opportunity to review the whole situation with the leaders of both Governments in an effort to find ways in which solutions to some of the pressing and critical

problems, which both governments face, could be found.

"As you know, the exercise of good offices requires the assent and co-operation of all parties concerned. Under the present circumstances, to my regret, there does not seem to be a basis for the exercise of the Secretary-General's good offices. Nonetheless, I am still anxious to be of whatever assistance the parties may find useful.

"I have read with deep concern the description of the situation contained in your letter of 23 November. I most earnestly hope that the United Nations will prove able to be of assistance to both governments in avoiding a further escalation of violence into a senseless and destructive war.

"I note your statement that a personal initiative by me could still avert a catastrophe. While I am deeply anxious to do anything that I can to avert a further catastrophe, I have been obliged to conclude that I have gone, for the moment, as far as my authority under the Charter permits me, usefully and meaningfully, to go in the present circumstances. As you mentioned in your letter of 23 November, I have brought this situation to the attention of the members of the Security Council, both in July, through my memorandum to the President of the Security Council, and in October, when I offered my good offices. I will, of course, remain in touch with the representatives of both Pakistan and India concerning ways in which the United Nations may prove able to assist both in attempting to preserve international peace and security and in working out a peaceful and lasting solution to the fundamental problems which underlie the present tragic situation."

11. The President of the Security Council was kept continuously informed of the action of the Secretary-General relating to his offer of good offices. Copies of all the messages addressed by the Secretary-General in this regard to the Prime Minister of India or the President of Pakistan were immediately communicated to the President of the Security Council for his information.

12. On 29 November the Permanent Representative of Pakistan conveyed to the Secretary-General message from the President of Pakistan as follows:

"I have the honour to convey to you the following message from the President of Pakistan. This message was received yesterday and was orally conveyed to Under Secretary-General Roberto Guyer at 9 p.m. last night:

"As you will have seen from my letter of 23 November, a grave situation prevails at present on the borders of East Pakistan as a result of unprovoked and large-scale attacks by the Indian Armed Forces. As you are aware, while accepting your offer of good offices I had proposed a simultaneous withdrawal of Indian and Pakistani forces and suggested that this might be supervised by United Nations observers. India unfortunately did not accept the proposal. In order to obviate a threat to peace and to arrest the deteriorating situation, I now request you to consider stationing a force of United Nations observers on our side of the East Pakistan border immediately, to observe and report upon violations of our territory.

*(Signed)* General Agha Muhammad Yahya KHAN  
*'President of Pakistan'* "

13. With regard to the President of Pakistan's letter of 29 November, the Secretary-General addressed on the same day the following message to the President of the Security Council:

"As I have been keeping the President of the Security Council continuously informed of my exchanges of communications with the Governments of India and Pakistan concerning the situation in the subcontinent, I am sending you a copy of a message which I have today received from President Yahya Khan of Pakistan. You will observe that this message contains a request to me to consider stationing a force of United Nations observers on the Pakistan side of the East Pakistan border immediately.

"In my memorandum of 20 July 1971 to the President of the Security Council I wrote that 'the political aspects of this matter are of such far-reaching importance that the Secretary-General is not in a position to suggest precise courses of action before the members of the Security Council have taken note of the problem'. In the context of the present military conflict, the stationing of observers by the United Nations on the territory of a sovereign state, even at the request of that state, is obviously an action for which the authority of the Security Council should be obtained. I believe therefore that the members of the Security Council should be informed, in whatever manner you as President might deem desirable, of the request of President Yahya Khan for the stationing of United Nations observers.

"I also feel that, in the light of its primary responsibility under the Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security, the Security Council should give serious consideration to the situation prevailing in the subcontinent. In this connexion I would wish to add that I have been obliged to conclude that in this matter I have gone, for the moment, as far as the Secretary-General may usefully and meaningfully go in the present circumstances."

14. At the same time, the Secretary-General sent the following letter to the representative of Pakistan:

"I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter of 29 November 1971 in which you convey to me a message from General Agha Muhammad Khan, President of Pakistan. I should be grateful if you would inform the President of Pakistan that I am giving careful consideration to his message, which relates to a situation of the gravest concern to me.

"I enclose, for your information, a copy of a letter which I have today addressed to the President of the Security Council on the subject of President Yahya Khan's message. Since this letter states clearly my position concerning the request which President Yahya Khan has made, I should be grateful if you would convey the substance of it to your Government."

#### DOCUMENT S/10410/ADD.1

[Original: English]  
[4 December 1971]

1. Since the completion of the report of the Secretary-General dated 3 December 1971 [S/10410], two messages have been received by the Secretary-General, one from the Prime Minister of India and the other from the President of Pakistan.

2. The message from the Prime Minister of India, which was orally delivered on the afternoon of 3 December, is as follows:

"Subsequent to Pakistani air attacks on Pathankot, Srinagar and Amritsar in the afternoon of 2 December, there were three further Pakistani air attacks on the morning of 3 December on Faridkot (Punjab), Jaisalmer (Rajasthan) and Jodhpur (Rajasthan).

"A special session of the Indian Parliament has been convened for 4 December.

"The Prime Minister is broadcasting to the nation at midnight tonight.

"Pakistani sources have reported that India has launched an attack on West Pakistan. This is totally false."

3. The letter from the President of Pakistan, dated 3 December, was transmitted to the Secretary-General by the Permanent Representative of Pakistan on 4 December. It reads as follows:

"I draw your attention to the following grave situation which has arisen between India and Pakistan. Today, between 1530 and 1600 hours, West Pakistan Standard Time, Indian Army launched simultaneous attacks on Sialkot and an area between Jessar bridge and Lahore and on the Rajasthan front opposite Rahim Yar Khan in West Pakistan, and on Chhamb in Jammu and Kashmir. The Indian ground force attackers were supported by the Indian Air Force. These attacks were preceded for the last three or four days by aggressive reconnaissance carried out by Indian aircraft over West Pakistan territory.

"The Pakistan Forces are taking necessary counter measures.

"The Pakistan Air Force late this evening took defensive measures against some of the forward airfields close to the Pakistan borders at Srinagar and Avantipur in Indian-occupied Kashmir and Pathankot and Amritsar.

"Considerable Indian military activity has also been noticed in the Poonch and Uri sectors in Indian occupied Kashmir.

"As you are aware I have done everything possible to avoid an extension of the conflict between India and Pakistan in spite of grave provocations. For weeks the situation in East Pakistan has been a matter of deep concern. Due to open Indian aggression along the borders of East Pakistan and intrusion into our territory at several points, there has been a state of virtual war. But we have tried to contain the situation and defuse the mounting tensions as much as possible. My efforts in this direction are within your knowledge, the latest being my proposal for the stationing of United Nations observers within East Pakistan's borders to observe and report upon violations of our territory.

"Now that Indian aggression has resulted in a conflagration which can have incalculable dimensions, the international community must take note of the situation. Otherwise it can only result in disastrous consequences for peace and stability of the entire region.

"In bringing this situation to your notice, it is my earnest hope that the international community will exert itself on the side of justice and peace and uphold the sacred principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations which safeguards the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all nations, big and small, and which forbids the use of force by one nation against another."

#### DOCUMENT S/10411

Letter dated 4 December 1971 from the representatives of Argentina, Belgium, Burundi, Italy, Japan, Nicaragua, Somalia, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English]  
[4 December 1971]

We have the honour, on behalf of our respective Governments, to request you to convene immediately an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the recent deteriorating situation which has led to armed clashes between India and Pakistan.

(Signed) Carlos ORTIZ DE ROZAS  
Permanent Representative  
of Argentina to the  
United Nations

Michel van USSEL  
Deputy Permanent Representative  
of Belgium to the United Nations

Nsanzé TÉRENCE  
Permanent Representative of  
Burundi to the United Nations

Piero VINCI  
Permanent Representative of Italy  
to the United Nations

Toru NAKAGAWA  
Permanent Representative of  
Japan to the United Nations

José ROMÁN  
Deputy Permanent Representative  
of Nicaragua to the United Nations

Abdulrahim Abby FARAH  
Permanent Representative of Somalia  
to the United Nations

Sir Colin CROWE  
Permanent Representative of  
Permanent Representative of the  
United Kingdom of Great Britain and  
Northern Ireland  
to the United Nations

George BUSH  
Permanent Representative of  
the United States of America  
to the United Nations

## Report of the Secretary-General on the situation along the cease-fire line in Kashmir

## DOCUMENT S/10412

[Original: English]  
[4 December 1971]

1. In view of the request submitted by nine members of the Security Council for an urgent meeting of the Council "to consider the recent deteriorating situation which has led to armed clashes between India and Pakistan" [S/10411], the Secretary-General considers it appropriate to make available to the members of the Council the following information regarding the situation along the cease-fire line in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. This information is based on reports from Lieutenant-General Luis Tassara González, the Chief Military Observer of the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), which is charged with the supervision of the cease-fire Agreement entered into by the parties at Karachi on 27 July 1949.<sup>22</sup> The United Nations has no military observation machinery in any other part of the subcontinent.

2. The Chief Military Observer reported that the situation as of 29 November 1971 was as follows:

(a) Forces of both sides were deployed in battle positions for the stated purpose of meeting a threat from the opposite side. All formation (i.e. divisional) headquarters had also moved into tactical positions in the field.

(b) Both parties had contravened the Karachi Agreement by strengthening their forward defended localities, by laying minefields, constructing new unauthorized positions and constructing additional defences in authorized positions. The Indian military authorities stated that they had authorized commanders to prepare or construct any defences considered necessary for the security of their areas. The Pakistan military authorities asserted that they were taking defensive measures only as a reaction to a threat from India and would continue to do so as necessary, irrespective of the provisions of the Karachi Agreement.

(c) The Indian military authorities had admitted that, since 20 October 1971, they had strengthened their forces in Jammu and Kashmir by a considerable number, thus exceeding the authorized level of troops in Jammu and Kashmir under the Karachi Agreement, and that they would continue to do so as considered necessary for the security of Indian territory.

(d) The Chief Military Observer found that Pakistan had also introduced additional forces on its side of the cease-fire line in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, without (as of 29 November) exceeding the permissible level. This finding was not denied by the Pakistan military authorities.

(e) As from 21 October 1971 the Chief Military Observer had awarded "over-all" violations to both India and Pakistan for their breaches of the Karachi

Agreement under the following categories, in respect of which one or both of the parties had in effect admitted systematic non-observance of the Agreement (see (a) and (b) above):

- (i) Laying of new minefields;
- (ii) Reinforcing of existing defended localities with men and warlike stores;
- (iii) Strengthening of defences;
- (iv) The forward movement from outside the State of Jammu and Kashmir of personnel other than for reliefs and maintenance.

Complaints of individual violations under these categories were being kept on record but, in view of the positions of the parties as indicated in (a) and (b) above, they would not as a rule be investigated until the parties resumed full observance of the Karachi Agreement.

(f) Complaints of individual breaches were still being investigated as usual, and violations awarded as appropriate, under the following categories:

- (i) Overflights;
- (ii) Entering the 500-yard zone;
- (iii) Crossing the cease-fire line;
- (iv) Firing and use of explosives within five miles of the cease-fire line;
- (v) Construction of new positions in the 500-yard zone or increase of defences in existing positions in that zone.

(g) Both India and Pakistan were continuing to use the machinery of UNMOGIP for lodging complaints of alleged cease-fire violations, and both were affording facilities and permitting the movement of United Nations military observers to carry out investigations. Apart from complaints alleging the strengthening of defences, complaints had been lodged since 21 October 1971 as follows:

- (i) Complaints by India alleging firing by Pakistan forces, 49; entering 500-yard zone, 5; crossing cease-fire line, 10.
- (ii) Complaints by Pakistan alleging firing by Indian forces, 28; entering 500-yard zone, 6; crossing cease-fire line, 2.

Violations have been awarded as appropriate.

(h) Current developments in East Pakistan naturally affected the climate along the cease-fire line in Kashmir and have caused tension to run high, resulting in a tendency by both sides to exchange fire at the slightest provocation. However, such firing was in the main confined to small patrol clashes or firing from a post at a patrol moving into the 500-yard zone. Apart from one instance on 12 November 1971 where 81mm mortars were used, firing was confined to small arms and some 2-inch mortars.

(i) Both parties admitted that breaches of the Karachi Agreement were being committed by them for reasons which were said to be outside their military control, but they continued for the time being to use the machinery of UNMOGIP to prevent further escalation of the tense situation existing on the cease-fire line or a direct open confrontation between the two armies.

<sup>22</sup> For the text of the Agreement, see *Official Records of the Security Council, Fourth Year, Special Supplement No. 7*, annex 26. For information concerning the functions of UNMOGIP, *ibid.*, *Twentieth Year Supplement for July, August, and September 1965*, document S/6651, para. 3 and *ibid.*, *Supplement for October, November and December 1965*, document S/6888, paras. 2-5.

3. At 1300 hours WPT<sup>23</sup> on 3 December 1971, United Nations Military Observers reported movements of tanks and infantry in the Bhimber sector of the cease-fire line. Shortly thereafter, the Pakistan Liaison Officer informed UNMOGIP that Indian forces had launched attacks along the cease-fire line and along the border.

4. On 3 December 1971, the Chief Military Observer, on the basis of reports from United Nations Military Observers, reported as follows:

(a) Srinagar airfield bombed at 1745 hours on 3 December.

(b) United Nations Military Observers at Field Station Punch reported at 2020 hours that Pakistan troops had crossed the cease-fire line at the Punch crossing point (NR 0567) at 1910 hours. At 2140 hours, the station reported that shelling had commenced from the India side of the line toward the Pakistan side and at 2256 hours it reported that the area of Punch was under fire from Pakistan artillery.

(c) Field Station Kotli reported at 2145 hours that small-arms fire from Pakistan pickets towards Indian pickets had commenced at 1930 hours and was continuing.

(d) Field Station Jammu reported at 2245 hours that heavy artillery fire from both sides had commenced at 2215 hours and was continuing.

(e) Field station Sialkot reported at 2250 hours that rounds of artillery were landing in their vicinity.

(f) Field Station Rajouri reported at 2250 hours that they had been informed by the local military authority that fighting was taking place along the cease-fire line from Punch to Naushera.

(g) The Chief Military Observer considers that hostilities along the cease-fire line have commenced, and he will instruct the military observers to remain at their stations.

5. At 1315 hours on 4 December 1971, the following communication from the Chief of Army Staff India was received by the Chief Military Observer:

"Pakistan without any provocation attacked from 1630 India Standard Time on 3 December all through the night our airfields Srinagar, Amritsar, Ambala (Punjab) Agra, Faridkot, Jodhpur (Rajasthan), Alwar (Rajasthan), Pathankot, and others.

"After these air attacks, Pakistani troops crossed the cease-fire line in many locations and crossed the border at West Fazilkot, West Ferozepore and West Dera Baba Nanak along the Amritsar-Lahore road. Pakistanis are still on the India side. Indians have not yet crossed the cease-fire line and the border, but Indian planes went for air attacks on the Pakistan side. An emergency is in effect in India from the night of 3 to 4 December."

6. On 4 December 1971, the Chief Military Observer reported at 1100 hours that during the past six hours ground activity along the cease-fire line had been relatively quiet, with no major incidents reported. There had been considerable isolated air activity on both sides. Reports from United Nations military observers were received as follows:

(a) Field Station Jammu reported at 0850 hours that Pakistan aircraft were over the city and being engaged by anti-aircraft artillery.

(b) Field Station Kotli reported at 0900 hours that two Indian jets were over the town, heading south west.

(c) Field Station Jammu reported at 0905 hours an air fight approximately 10 miles north west of Jammu.

(d) Field Station Bhimber reported at 0950 hours that two Indian jets had bombed the town. One bomb fell 200 yards from the Field Station, which is now operating from an underground shelter.

(e) Field Station Jammu again reported at 1010 hours Pakistan aircraft over-flying the city.

(f) UNMOGIP Headquarters Rawalpindi reported that at 1030 hours two Indian aircraft attacked Chaklala Airport, Rawalpindi, with rockets and cannon.

(g) Field Station Kotli reported at 1045 hours Indian aircraft attacking the airfield. Field Station Sialkot also reported Indian aircraft strafing the city.

#### DOCUMENT S/10412/ADD.1

[Original: English]  
[5 December 1971]

1. The Chief Military Observer of UNMOGIP, Lieutenant-General Luis Tassara González, reported on 5 December 1971 at 1100 hours that sporadic air activity by both sides was continuing. Ground activity along the cease-fire line was very active during the past 24 hours, with almost continuous artillery, mortar and small arms fire. Reports from United Nations military observers were received as follows:

(a) Field Station Punch reported at 1306 hours on 4 December continuous artillery shelling between sectors Punch and Rawalakot.

(b) Field Station Baramula reported at 1405 hours on 4 December that Chakothi/Uri checkpoint (NL 950110) had been closed owing to continuous firing across the cease-fire line.

(c) Field Station Punch reported at 1645 hours on 4 December sporadic artillery and mortar fire.

(d) UNMOGIP Office Srinagar reported at 1700 hours on 4 December that two Pakistan jets had overflown Srinagar at 1400 hours without attacking.

(e) Field Stations Sialkot and Jammu reported at 1700 hours on 4 December that one United Nations military observer had been permitted to cross the border between the two stations. The military authorities on both sides had been reluctant to permit the crossing on the grounds that the observer's safety could not be guaranteed.

(f) Field Station Baramula reported at 0700 hours on 5 December continuous artillery and small-arms exchanges between the Baramula sector and the Domel and Rawalakot sectors.

(g) UNMOGIP Office Srinagar reported at 0700 hours on 5 December that three air raids had been carried out on Srinagar during the night. There were no further details.

(h) Field Station Punch reported at 0700 hours on 5 December continuous artillery fire.

(i) Field Station Rajouri and Bhimber reported at 0700 hours on 5 December continuous exchanges of artillery and small-arms fire across the cease-fire line.

(j) Field Stations Rajouri and Bhimber reported at 0700 hours on 5 December heavy artillery fire across the cease-fire line.

<sup>23</sup> West Pakistan Time. All times are West Pakistan Time unless otherwise indicated.

(k) UNMOGIP Headquarters Rawalpindi reported that at 0715 hours on 5 December two Indian jet aircraft attacked Chaklala airport, Rawalpindi, and destroyed the UNMOGIP aircraft (see para. 2 (b) below).

2. Damage to United Nations facilities:

(a) Field Station Punch reported at 1645 hours on 4 December that one UNMOGIP jeep had been damaged, apparently by Pakistan artillery fire. There were no casualties.

(b) The Chief Military Observer reported on 5 December as follows:

"The United Nations aircraft Twin Otter 13808 was completely destroyed on the ground at Chaklala airport, Rawalpindi, at 0715 hours due to strafing by the Indian Air Force. There were no casualties."

The Twin Otter, which was the only aircraft available for the use of UNMOGIP, was chartered to the United Nations by the Canadian Government. That Government also provides the air crew, whose members have the status of United Nations military observers. UNMOGIP's headquarters is established in Rawalpindi during the winter and in Srinagar during the summer.

(c) All vehicles and aircraft used by the United Nations in its peace-keeping operations are painted white and carry large blue United Nations markings.

**DOCUMENT S/10412/ADD.2**

[Original: English]  
[6 December 1971]

1. The Chief Military Observer of UNMOGIP, Lieutenant-General Luis Tassara González reported on 6 December 1971 at 1100 hours that no major change in the pattern of air and ground activity had taken place since his previous report. The area along the cease-fire line had been active, but no ground moves had been made by either the Indian or Pakistan military forces.

2. Reports from United Nations military observers as of 1700 hours on 5 December were received as follows:

(a) Field Station Baramula reported continuous artillery and small-arms exchanges between its sector and the Domel and Rawalakot sectors:

(b) Field Station Punch reported heavy artillery fire on the town of Punch throughout the day.

3. Reports from United Nations military observers as of 0700 hours on 6 December were received as follows:

(a) Field Station Punch again reported continuous and heavy artillery shelling in its sector. It also reported fifteen overflights by Pakistan aircraft, one of which bombed the town.

(b) Field Station Sialkot reported continuous heavy exchanges of artillery fire between its sector and the Jammu sector throughout the night. It also reported four raids by Indian aircraft in the Sialkot area.

(c) Field Station Jammu confirmed the exchanges of artillery fire between the Jammu and Sialkot sectors. The local military authority had advised the Station that the border crossing point on the road to Sialkot was closed. At first light in the morning of 6 December, tanks and armoured personnel carriers were seen moving west towards the border.

(d) Field Station Baramula reported continuous exchanges of artillery and small arms fire in its sector. It also reported that eight Pakistan jets raided Baramula and Patan (NM 6021) at 0430 hours India Standard Time.

(e) UNMOGIP Office Srinagar reported that the Srinagar airport was strafed by Pakistan planes, but no action was observed against the city itself.

4. Periodic raids by Indian aircraft on Rawalpindi continued day and night. At 0715 hours on 6 December, three Indian jets attacked a fuel storage area near UNMOGIP headquarters. There was no damage to United Nations property.

**DOCUMENT S/10413**

**Letter dated 4 December 1971 from the representative of Tunisia  
to the President of the Security Council**

[Original: French]  
[4 December 1971]

I have the honour, on behalf of my Government, to support the request that the Security Council be convened to consider the deteriorating situation between India and Pakistan.

(Signed) Rachid DRISS  
Permanent Representative of Tunisia  
to the United Nations

**DOCUMENT S/10415**

**Letter dated 4 December 1971 from the representative of India  
to the President of the Security Council**

[Original: English]  
[4 December 1971]

I attach a copy of a letter dated 4 December 1971 addressed to you, which I understand was handed over to you this morning. I should be grateful if this letter from Mr. Justice Abu Sayeed Chowdhury could kindly be circulated as a Security Council document.

(Signed) S. SEN  
Permanent Representative of India  
to the United Nations

TEXT OF THE LETTER FROM MR. JUSTICE CHOWDHURY  
TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I understand that the Security Council will be meeting to consider the tensions and conflicts which have been developing in the India-Pakistan subcontinent.

At the heart of these developments lies the war which has been waged since 25 March 1971 by the

Government of Pakistan against the 75 million people of Bangla Desh, formerly East Pakistan. Despite the full reports which have been appearing in the international press regarding this war, and the resulting flight of millions of people from Bangla Desh into the neighbouring territories of India and consequent international tension, the United Nations has not addressed itself so far to this basic problem, nor has it so far taken into account the party most concerned in this tragic and dangerous crisis, namely, the 75 million people of Bangla Desh. There can be no proper evaluation of the present situation, its causes, present state

and future solution, without Bangla Desh being given a hearing.

As the representative of the people and Government of Bangla Desh, I have already requested you to allow me to make a statement before the Council on behalf of the people and Government of Bangla Desh, as and when the Council is convened to discuss this crisis. Now that the Council is likely to be convened, I have the honour to reiterate the request.

(Signed) Justice Abu Sayeed CHOWDHURY

Leader

Bangla Desh delegation to the United Nations

✓ DOCUMENT S/10416

United States of America: draft resolution

[Original: English]

[4 December 1971]

*The Security Council,*

*Having heard* the statements of the representatives of India and Pakistan,

*Convinced* that hostilities along the India-Pakistan border constitute an immediate threat to international peace and security,

1. *Calls upon* the Governments of India and Pakistan to take all steps required for an immediate cessation of hostilities;

2. *Calls for* an immediate withdrawal of armed personnel present on the territory of the other to their own sides of the India-Pakistan borders;

3. *Authorizes* the Secretary-General, at the request of the Government of India or Pakistan, to place observers along the India-Pakistan borders to report on the implementation of the cease-fire and troop withdrawals, drawing as necessary on UNMOGIP personnel;

4. *Calls upon* the Governments of India and Pakistan and others concerned to exert their best efforts towards the creation of a climate conducive to the voluntary return of refugees to East Pakistan;

5. *Calls upon* all States to refrain from any action that would endanger the peace in the area;

6. *Invites* the Governments of India and Pakistan to respond affirmatively to the proposal of the Secretary-General offering good offices to secure and maintain peace in the subcontinent;

7. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council as soon as possible on the implementation of this resolution.

DOCUMENT S/10417

Belgium, Italy and Japan: draft resolution

[Original: English]

[4 December 1971]

*The Security Council,*

*Noting* the reports of the Secretary-General of 3 and 4 December 1971 [S/10410 and Add.1, S/10412],

*Having heard* the statements of the representatives of India and Pakistan,

*Gravely concerned* that hostilities have broken out between India and Pakistan which constitute an immediate threat to international peace and security,

*Mindful* of its responsibility under the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Calls upon* the Governments concerned forthwith, as a first step, for an immediate cease-fire and for a cessation of all military activities;

2. *Urges* the Governments concerned, in accordance with the principles envisaged in the United Nations Charter, to intensify their efforts to bring about conditions necessary for the speedy and voluntary repatriation of the millions of refugees to their homes;

3. *Calls for* the full co-operation of all States with the Secretary-General for rendering assistance to and relieving the distress of those refugees;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to keep the Council promptly and currently informed on the situation;

5. *Decides* to follow closely the situation and to meet again as soon as necessary.

#### DOCUMENT S/10418

##### Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: draft resolution

[Original: Russian]

[4 December 1971]

*The Security Council,*

*Having considered* the letter of nine members of the Security Council [S/10411] and the report of the Secretary-General [S/10410],

1. *Calls for* a political settlement in East Pakistan which would inevitably result in a cessation of hostilities;

22. *Calls upon* the Government of Pakistan to take measures to cease all acts of violence by Pakistani forces in East Pakistan which have led to a deterioration of the situation.

#### DOCUMENT S/10419

##### Argentina, Burundi, Nicaragua, Sierra Leone and Somalia: draft resolution

[Original: English]

[4 December 1971]

*The Security Council,*

*Noting* the report of the Secretary-General of 3 December 1971 [S/10410 and Add.I],

*Having heard* the statements of the representatives of India and Pakistan,

*Gravely concerned* at the outbreak of hostilities along the borders of India and Pakistan,

*Convinced* that hostilities along the India-Pakistan border constitute an immediate threat to international peace and security,

*Recognizing* the need to deal appropriately at a subsequent stage, within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations, with the issues which have given rise to the hostilities,

*Recognizing further* the need to take preliminary measures to bring about an immediate cessation of hostilities and effect a withdrawal of armed forces to their own side of the India-Pakistan borders,

1. *Calls upon* the Governments of India and Pakistan to take forthwith all measures for an immediate cease-fire and withdrawal of their armed forces on the territory of the other to their own side of the India-Pakistan border;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to keep the Council promptly and currently informed on the situation.

#### DOCUMENT S/10420

##### Letter dated 2 December 1971 from the President of the United Arab Emirates to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]

[5 December 1971]

I have the honour to inform you that following the agreements reached on 1 December 1971 between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Emirates of Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Umm Al Quwain, Ajman and Fujairah, terminating the Special Treaty relations between the Emirates and the United Kingdom, the Rulers of the above-mentioned six Emirates have promulgated the Constitution of the United Arab Emirates and proclaimed it as an independent and sovereign State on 2 December 1971.

I have the honour to submit on behalf of the United Arab Emirates this application for admission to membership of the United Nations in accordance with Article 4 of the United Nations Charter.

I would be grateful if you would place this application before the Security Council and the General Assembly at the earliest opportunity.

Under rule 58 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, I have the honour to attach herewith a Declaration made in accordance with that rule.

(Signed) Zaid bin Sultan AL NAHAYYAN  
President of the United Arab Emirates

#### DECLARATION

In connexion with the application of the United Arab Emirates for membership of the United Nations, I hereby declare our acceptance of the obligations contained in the Charter of the United Nations and solemnly undertake to fulfil them.

#### DOCUMENT S/10421

#### China: draft resolution

[Original: English]  
[5 December 1971]

*The Security Council,*

*Having heard* the statements of the representatives of Pakistan and India,

*Noting in particular* that India has launched large-scale attacks on Pakistan, thus gravely undermining the peace in the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent,

*Strongly condemning* the Indian Government's acts of creating a so-called "Bangla Desh" and of subverting, dismembering and committing aggression against Pakistan,

1. *Calls upon* the Government of India to withdraw its armed forces and armed personnel sent by it from Pakistan territory immediately and unconditionally and calls upon the Government of Pakistan to withdraw the armed forces which it has sent into Indian territory for counter-attacks;

2. *Calls upon* India and Pakistan to cease hostilities and to withdraw respectively from the international border between India and Pakistan and to disengage from each other so as to create conditions for a peaceful settlement of the disputes between India and Pakistan;

3. *Calls upon* all States to support the Pakistan people in their just struggle to resist Indian aggression;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit as early as possible a report to the Security Council on the implementation of this resolution.

#### DOCUMENT S/10422

#### Letter dated 5 December 1971 from the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the President of the Security Council

[Original: Russian]  
[5 December 1971]

I request you to circulate the attached TASS statement of 5 December 1971 as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Y. MALIK  
Permanent Representative of the  
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics  
to the United Nations

#### TEXT OF THE TASS STATEMENT

Reports are coming in about an acute deterioration of the situation in the Indian subcontinent. On 3 December, Pakistan aircraft bombed and strafed a number of towns in north-west India. Armed clashes are taking place on the India-Pakistan border.

It is well known that the situation created in East Pakistan as a result of the Pakistan Government's actions against the population of that part of the country was the main cause of the tension that has been mounting lately in relations between Pakistan and India.

A mass movement for autonomy, for elementary civil rights and freedom has developed in East Pakistan in recent years. The Awami League headed by Mujibur Rahman received the unanimous support of the population of East Pakistan in the elections to legislative bodies held in December 1970. After the elections, talks began between the President of Pakistan and the leaders of the Awami League on the question of a future State structure providing for the autonomy of East Pakistan.

However, evidently not desiring to bring matters to agreement, the Government of Pakistan suddenly broke off the talks on 25 March 1971. Mujibur Rahman and other leaders of the Awami League were arrested and thrown into prison. Cruel repression was immediately started against the population, thousands of people were killed, and many millions of East Pakistan citizens were forced to flee to neighbouring India in fear of their lives. An atmosphere of mass terror and lawlessness began to reign in East Pakistan. Encountering growing resistance by the East Pakistan population to the mass repression and persecution, the Government of Pakistan tried to put the blame on India for the situation that had arisen and embarked on a course of aggravating relations with that country.

Guided by concern for the maintenance of peace, the Soviet Government repeatedly expressed to President Yahya Khan of Pakistan and to the Government of Pakistan its concern over the situation that had developed in the Indian subcontinent in connexion with the events in East Pakistan. Condemning the policy of repression and persecution as a method of solving political questions, it drew the Pakistan Government's attention to the need for a political settlement in East Pakistan. In so doing, the Soviet side expressed the conviction that renunciation of the policy of repression, the release of Mujibur Rahman and the immediate resumption of talks with a view to finding a solution that would accord with the wishes expressed by the population of East Pakistan at the elections in December 1970 was the only possible realistic way. That would also ensure conditions for the return to their homes of the millions of East Pakistan refugees who had found refuge in India.

In approaching the Government of Pakistan with these considerations, the Soviet Government acted in accordance with the principle of humanitarianism, wishing the Pakistan people well in solving, in a democratic way, the complex problems facing the country. However, since the Pakistan Government did not take measures for a political settlement in East Pakistan and continued to build up military preparations against India, the Soviet leaders informed President Yaya Khan that an armed attack by Pakistan against India, under whatever pretext, would be most strongly condemned in the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union cannot remain indifferent to these events, in view of the fact also that they are taking place in direct proximity to the USSR's borders and, therefore affect the interests of its security. Consistently calling for the maintenance of peace in the Indian sub-continent, the Soviet Government deems it necessary to state to the leaders of Pakistan with all clarity that they are assuming a grave responsibility in following this dangerous course.

In the face of the military threat now hanging over the Indian subcontinent, to which not a single peace-loving country can remain indifferent, the Soviet Union calls for a speedy end to the bloodshed and for a political settlement in East Pakistan on the basis of respect for the lawful rights and interests of its people.

The Soviet Government also believes that the Governments of all countries should refrain from steps which in one way or another would mean their involvement in the conflict and would lead to a further aggravation of the situation in the Indian subcontinent.

## DOCUMENT S/10423

### Argentina, Belgium, Burundi, Italy, Japan, Nicaragua, Sierra Leone and Somalia: draft resolution

[Original: English]  
[5 December 1971]

#### *The Security Council,*

Noting the reports of the Secretary-General of 3 and 4 December 1971 [S/10410 and Add.I, S/10412],

Having heard the statements of the representatives of India and Pakistan,

Gravely concerned that hostilities have broken out between India and Pakistan which constitute an immediate threat to international peace and security,

Recognizing the need to deal appropriately at a subsequent stage, within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations, with the issues which have given rise to the hostilities,

Convinced that an early political solution would be necessary for the restoration of conditions of normalcy in the area of conflict and for the return of the refugees to their homes,

Mindful of the provisions of the Charter, in particular of Article 2, paragraph 4,

Recalling the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security, particularly paragraphs 4, 5 and 6,

Recognizing further the need to take immediate measures to bring about an immediate cessation of

hostilities and effect a withdrawal of armed forces to their own side of the India-Pakistan borders,

Mindful of its responsibility under the relevant provisions of the Charter,

1. Calls upon the Governments of India and Pakistan to take forthwith all measures for an immediate cease-fire and withdrawal of their armed forces on the territory of the other to their own side of the India-Pakistan borders;

2. Urges that efforts be intensified in order to bring about, speedily and in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, conditions necessary for the voluntary return of the East Pakistan refugees to their homes;

3. Calls for the full co-operation of all States with the Secretary-General for rendering assistance to and relieving the distress of those refugees;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Council promptly and currently informed on the implementation of this resolution;

5. Decides to follow the situation closely and to meet again as soon as necessary.

DOCUMENT S/10425

Belgium, Italy, Japan, Nicaragua, Sierra Leone and Tunisia:  
draft resolution

[Original: English]  
[5 December 1971]

*The Security Council,*

*Gravely concerned* that hostilities have broken out between India and Pakistan which constitute an immediate threat to international peace and security,

1. *Calls upon* the Governments concerned forthwith, as a first step, for an immediate cease-fire;
2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to keep the Council promptly and currently informed of the implementation of this resolution;
3. *Decides* to continue to discuss the further measures to be taken in order to restore peace in the area.

DOCUMENT S/10426

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: amendments to document S/10425

[Original: Russian]  
[6 December 1971]

1. In operative paragraph 1, replace the words "the Governments concerned" by the words "all parties concerned"; at the end of the same paragraph, add the words "and cessation of all military operations".
2. Between operative paragraphs 1 and 2, insert the following as operative paragraphs 2 and 3:  
"2. *Calls upon* the Government of Pakistan simultaneously to take effective action towards a political settlement in East Pakistan, giving immediate recognition to the will of the East Pakistan population as expressed in the elections of December 1970;  
"3. *Declares* that the provisions of operative paragraphs 1 and 2 of this resolution constitute a single whole;"
3. Renumber the remaining operative paragraphs accordingly.

DOCUMENT S/10426/REV.1

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: revised amendments to  
document S/10425

[Original: Russian]  
[6 December 1971]

1. In operative paragraph 1, replace the words "the Governments concerned" by the words "all parties concerned"; at the end of the same paragraph, add the words "and cessation of all hostilities".
2. Between operative paragraphs 1 and 2, insert the following as operative paragraphs 2 and 3:  
"2. *Calls upon* the Government of Pakistan simultaneously to take effective action towards a political settlement in East Pakistan, giving immediate recognition to the will of the East Pakistan population as expressed in the elections of December 1970;  
"3. *Declares* that the provisions of operative paragraphs 1 and 2 of this resolution constitute a single whole;"
3. Renumber the remaining operative paragraphs accordingly.

Letter dated 6 December 1971 from the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Secretary-General

[Original: Russian]  
[6 December 1971]

I request you to arrange for the circulation of the attached TASS statement of 3 December 1971 as official documents of the Security Council and General Assembly.

(Signed) Y. MALIK  
Permanent Representative of the  
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics  
to the United Nations

TEXT OF THE TASS STATEMENT

The British Government has announced that as a result of the talks of British Foreign Secretary Douglas-Home with the leader of the racist régime in Southern Rhodesia, Smith, an agreement has been reached on "settling the constitutional conflict" between London and Salisbury. This action is nothing but an ignominious deal of the British Government with the Southern Rhodesian racists aimed at consolidating and maintaining practically indefinitely the racist régime in Southern Rhodesia, which is carrying out a policy of racial discrimination, segregation and *apartheid* against the 5 million indigenous inhabitants of Southern Rhodesia, the Zimbabwe people. This is a direct infringement of the Zimbabwe people's inalienable rights to freedom and independence and an open challenge to the African peoples and world public opinion.

Back in 1961 the British Government put into effect a "constitution" for Southern Rhodesia which it itself had worked out and which laid the basis of the present régime of racist colonial domination. It is not by chance, therefore, that when the Smith régime a few years later illegally and unilaterally declared the "independence" of Southern Rhodesia and then played out the farce by proclaiming a "republic", the British Government, far from undertaking any measures to put an end to the arbitrary rule of the white colonialists and do away with their illegal régime, impeded in

\* Also circulated as a General Assembly document under the symbol A/8551.

every way the adoption of such measures by the United Nations.

The British Government ignored the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly on the Rhodesian question, as well as the demands of the Organization of African Unity and of world public opinion that the most energetic measures, down to the use of armed force, should be taken to eliminate the Smith régime. It was precisely because of this that in January 1971 the United Kingdom announced its withdrawal from the United Nations Committee on decolonization.

The logic of the entire policy of the British Conservative Government on this question is clear. It is trying to knock together a military-colonialist bloc in southern Africa comprising the Republic of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, as well as Portugal with her colonial strong-points in that region, in order to place a barrier in the path of the national liberation movement of the African peoples still oppressed by the colonialists, and to threaten the independence and sovereignty of the African States.

Quite naturally, these actions of the British Government provoke the wrath and indignation of the Governments of the African countries, the leaders of the national liberation movements in southern Africa and broad circles of world public opinion.

TASS is authorized to state that in Soviet leading circles London's ignominious deal with the Rhodesian racists is resolutely condemned. The Soviet Union does not recognize the racist régime that has usurped power in Southern Rhodesia and rejects any manoeuvres to impart to that régime a "lawful" character.

The Soviet Union has consistently stood for the adoption—in accordance with the resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations—of effective measures aimed at the removal of the racist régime in Rhodesia and the immediate transfer of power to its legitimate master—the people of Zimbabwe.

## DOCUMENT S/10428

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: draft resolution

[Original: Russian]  
[6 December 1971]

*The Security Council,*

*Gravely concerned* that hostilities have broken out between India and Pakistan which constitute an immediate threat to international peace and security,

1. *Calls upon* all parties concerned forthwith, as a first step, for an immediate cease-fire and cessation of all hostilities;

2. *Calls upon* the Government of Pakistan simultaneously to take effective action towards a political settlement in East Pakistan, giving immediate recognition to the will of the East Pakistan population as expressed in the elections of December 1970;

3. *Declares* that the provisions of operative paragraphs 1 and 2 of this resolution constitute a single whole;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to keep the Council promptly and currently informed of the implementation of this resolution;

5. *Decides* to continue to discuss the further measures to be taken in order to restore peace in the area.

**Report of the Committee on the Admission of New Members concerning the application of the United Arab Emirates for membership in the United Nations**

[Original: English/French/Russian/Spanish]  
[7 December 1971]

1. At the 1608th meeting on 6 December 1971, the Security Council had before it the application of the United Arab Emirates [S/10420] for admission to membership in the United Nations. In accordance with rule 59 of the provisional rules of procedure, the President of the Security Council referred the application to the Committee for examination and report.

2. At its 39th meeting, held on 7 December 1971, the Committee considered the application of the United Arab Emirates and unanimously decided to recommend to the Security Council that it should be admitted to membership in the United Nations.

3. The Committee further decided to recommend to the Security Council that it should have recourse to the provisions of the last paragraph of rule 60 of the provisional rules of procedure.

4. Accordingly, the Committee decided to recommend to the Security Council the adoption of the following draft resolution:

*"The Security Council,*

*"Having examined the application of the United Arab Emirates for admission to the United Nations, [10420],*

*"Recommends to the General Assembly that the United Arab Emirates be admitted to membership in the United Nations."*

**DOCUMENTS S/10432 AND ADD.1-II\***

**Report of the Secretary-General on the situation along the cease-fire line in Kashmir**

**DOCUMENT S/10432**

[Original: English]  
[7 December 1971]

1. The Chief Military Observer of the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), Lieutenant-General Luis Tassara González, reported on 7 December 1971 at 1100 hours WPT<sup>24</sup> that no major change in the pattern of air and ground activity had taken place since his previous report [S/10412/Add.2]. The area along the cease-fire line had been active, but no significant ground moves by either the Indian or Pakistan military forces had been ascertained.

2. Reports from United Nations military observers as of 1700 hours on 6 December were received as follows:

(a) Field Station Kotli reported that the area around the field station had been strafed by three Indian aircraft at 1505 hours. There was no damage to the field station.

(b) Field Station Rawalakot reported firing on the cease-fire line and one overflight.

(c) Field Station Bhimber reported that firing on the cease-fire line was continuing.

(d) Field Station Sialkot reported that artillery fire was slackening and that three air raids had taken place in the area of the city.

3. Reports from United Nations military observers as of 0700 hours on 7 December were received as follows:

(a) UNMOGIP Office Srinagar reported one air raid at 1740 India Standard Time on 6 December and an overflight at approximately 0030 India Standard Time on 7 December.

(b) Field Station Baramula reported Pakistan artillery, mortar, machine-gun, recoilless gun and small-arms fire along the whole cease-fire line in its area.

(c) Field Station Punch reported that 1100 rounds of Indian artillery and mortar had been fired during the night of 6 to 7 December. There had been no Pakistan artillery fire near the station during the night.

(d) Field Station Bhimber reported firing along the cease-fire line but that no details were available.

(e) Field Station Jammu reported shelling of the area 12 miles south of the town of Jammu and air attacks with bombing at 0030 and 0430.

(f) Field Station Sialkot reported two air raids as well as artillery fire in the border areas during the night of 6 to 7 December.

(g) UNMOGIP Headquarters Rawalpindi reported that periodic air raids by Indian aircraft continued in the city area during the day and night.

4. While there were records of military activity all along the cease-fire line there were no indications as yet of any large-scale ground thrusts by either the Indian or Pakistan military forces, with the exception of the Punch area which continued to be very active. The Pakistan Liaison Officer informed UNMOGIP that Pakistan troops had captured Chhamb (NW 5462); but no information to this effect has been received so far from United Nations military observers.

\* Also Circulated as General Assembly documents under the symbol A/8556 and Add.1-11.

<sup>24</sup> West Pakistan time. All time indications are West Pakistan Time unless otherwise indicated.

**DOCUMENT S/10432/ADD.1**

[Original: English]  
[8 December 1971]

1. The Chief Military Observer of UNMOGIP, Lieutenant-General Luis Tassara González, reported on 8 December 1971 at 1100 hours that the situation along the cease-fire line was stable, but sporadic artillery, mortar and small-arms fire along the whole cease-fire line by both Indian and Pakistan military forces was continuing. United Nations military observers have received information that crossings of the cease-fire line in limited strength have been made by Indian troops south of Uri (NM 1008) and by Pakistan troops in the area of the Punch check-post (NR 0667), but UNMOGIP has not been in a position to verify these reports. Major military action along the cease-fire line and the adjacent border area between India and Pakistan was centred on the Jammu, Sialkot and Bhimber sectors, with considerable tank actions in progress. The town of Chhamb (NW 5462) has been occupied by Pakistan forces.

2. Reports from United Nations military observers as of 1700 hours on 7 December were received as follows:

(a) Field Station Bhimber reported that fighting was in progress in its sector and that the town of Gujrat had been bombed at 1100 hours.

(b) Field Station Sialkot reported intense tank, artillery and machine-gun fire along the border, particularly in the area north of the Jammu-Sialkot road. Sialkot was raided three times during the day by Indian aircraft.

(c) The other parts of the cease-fire line were relatively quiet. The heavy artillery duels previously reported in the Punch/Rawalakot sectors had subsided.

3. Reports from United Nations military observers as of 0700 hours on 8 December were received as follows:

(a) Field Stations Bhimber and Sialkot reported heavy artillery and small-arms fire from the Jammu sector.

(b) Sporadic firing took place in other sectors of the cease-fire line to the north, but no major activity was reported.

(c) Air raids on Rawalpindi continued as previously reported. The latest raid took place at 0700 hours on 8 December, when two Indian jets again attacked a fuel storage area near UNMOGIP headquarters. There was no report of damage to UNMOGIP installations.

**DOCUMENT S/10432/ADD.2**

[Original: English]  
[9 December 1971]

1. The Chief Military Observer of UNMOGIP, Lieutenant-General Luis Tassara González, reported on 9 December 1971 at 1100 hours that there had been no change in the over-all situation along the cease-fire line during the past 24 hours. There were indications that heavy fighting was continuing in the border area adjacent to the cease-fire line following the occupation of Chhamb (NW 5461) by Pakistan troops. Pakistan sources reported for the first time on fighting along the northern sector of the cease-fire line around Kargil, but United Nations military observers were not in a position to verify these reports.

There was a general decrease in air activity along the cease-fire line. In particular, no raids had been carried out on Rawalpindi.

2. Since hostilities commenced on a large scale, United Nations military observers have as a rule limited their observations to the immediate areas of their field stations. Furthermore, all formation headquarters are now operating from tactical locations in the field, thus severely restricting contact between military observers and the respective military authorities. Consequently, reports from field stations do not cover all military activities taking place in their respective sectors.

3. Reports from United Nations military observers as of 1700 hours on 8 December were received as follows:

(a) All field stations reported that the cease-fire line had been relatively quiet during the day, with only sporadic artillery, mortar and small-arms fire. There were no reports of air raids during this period.

(b) Field Station Bhimber reported an increase in casualties arriving at the field hospital in Bhimber as a result of the heavy fighting which had taken place in that sector.

4. Reports from United Nations military observers as of 0700 hours on 9 December were received as follows:

(a) All field stations reported that artillery and mortar shellings had increased along the cease-fire line during the night of 8 to 9 December.

(b) Field Station Baramula reported heavy shelling and small-arms fire throughout the sector. It also reported that some attempts at infiltration had been made from Rawalakot sector.

(c) UNMOGIP Office Srinagar reported that Awantipura airport (NS 0895) had been raided by six Pakistan jet planes at dusk on 8 December.

(d) Field Station Punch reported an increase in artillery fire on the town during the night.

**DOCUMENT S/10432/ADD.3**

[Original: English]  
[10 December 1971]

1. The Chief Military Observer of UNMOGIP, Lieutenant-General Luis Tassara González, reported on 10 December 1971 at 1100 hours that the situation along the cease-fire line during the past 24 hours had been generally quiet, with only sporadic artillery and mortar fire. The significant reduction in the intensity of fighting along the cease-fire line and adjacent border area extended also to the Jammu-Sialkot border sector, which had been the scene of the heaviest fighting to date. Aerial activity was also quiet.

2. Reports from United Nations military observers were received as follows:

(a) At 1700 hours, on 9 December, all field stations reported intermittent artillery and mortar shelling, but no other significant activity. The only air activity, reported by the UNMOGIP Office, Srinagar, was a raid by Pakistan jet planes on Srinagar Airport at 0900 hours.

(b) At 0700 hours, on 10 December, all field stations reported that the entire cease-fire line was quiet, with only sporadic artillery and mortar shelling. No air activity was reported.

**DOCUMENT S/10432/ADD.4**

[Original: English]  
[11 December 1971]

1. The Chief Military Observer of UNMOGIP, Lieutenant-General Luis Tassara González reported on 11 December 1971 at 1100 hours that there had been no change in the situation along the cease-fire line, although both sides continued to shell each other with artillery and mortars. Activity in the border areas of Sialkot and Jammu had intensified slightly, but aerial activity had remained quiet.

2. Reports from United Nations military observers were received as follows:

(a) At 1700 hours on 10 December, all field stations reported continuous artillery and mortar fire in every sector. Field Stations Jammu and Sialkot reported heavy shelling. There were no reports of aerial activity.

(b) At 0700 hours on 11 December, all field stations reported continuous artillery and mortar fire, with reports of the heaviest shelling coming from Field Station Sialkot. No air activity was reported.

**DOCUMENT S/10432/ADD.5**

[Original: English]  
[12 December 1971]

1. The Chief Military Observer of UNMOGIP, Lieutenant-General Luis Tassara González, reported on 12 December 1971 at 1100 hours that the situation along the cease-fire line remained generally unchanged, with both sides continuing to harass each other with artillery and mortar fire. There were reports of small ground actions in the Domel-Baramula and Punch-Rawalakot sectors, but the only major ground activity appeared to be taking place in the Jammu-Sialkot area, where continuing heavy fighting was reported. It is relevant to note that all the crossing points of the cease-fire line and border normally available to United Nations military observers in the UNMOGIP area have now been closed, and the local military authorities are no longer willing to agree to cease-fire arrangements for such crossings.

2. Reports from United Nations military observers were received as follows:

(a) At 1700 hours on 11 December, all field stations reported continuous artillery and mortar fire, with the heaviest shelling in the Bhimber, Jammu and Sialkot sectors. Field Station Punch reported an increase in the shelling of the town as well as some ground fighting in the vicinity of the Punch checkpoint. UNMOGIP Office Srinagar reported an attack by four Pakistan jets on the airfield at 1320 hours.

(b) At 0700 hours on 12 December, all field stations reported that action had decreased in intensity during the night, but picked up again at first light. Field Station Sialkot reported particularly heavy artillery and tank fire in the Jammu-Sialkot sector. There were no reports of aerial activity.

**DOCUMENT S/10432/ADD.6**

[Original: English]  
[13 December 1971]

1. The Chief Military Observer of UNMOGIP, Lieutenant-General Luis Tassara González, reported

on 13 December 1971 at 1100 hours that the situation along the cease-fire line was relatively quiet, but that there had been a slight increase in air activity. Artillery and mortar exchanges were continuing. Both Indian and Pakistan military forces were, however, refraining from any ground offensive action.

2. Reports from United Nations military observers were received as follows:

(a) At 1700 hours on 12 December, all field stations reported sporadic shelling but no other activity along the cease-fire line and the border. The UNMOGIP Office Srinagar reported an attack on the airfield by four Pakistan jet planes at 1135 hours.

(b) At 1100 hours on 13 December, all field stations again reported intermittent artillery and mortar fire. Field Station Bhimber reported that six Indian jet planes had bombed and strafed the town at 0745 hours. There was no damage to United Nations installations.

**DOCUMENT S/10432/ADD.7**

[Original: English]  
[14 December 1971]

1. The Chief Military Observer of UNMOGIP, Lieutenant-General Luis Tassara González, reported on 14 December 1971 at 1100 hours that the general situation along the cease-fire line remained unchanged. Artillery harassing fire by both Indian and Pakistan forces was continuing; in particular, Pakistan forces intensified their shelling of the town of Punch, making necessary the evacuation of the UNMOGIP Field Station at 1500 hours. Air activity had also increased along the cease-fire line and the border. In addition, there were reports of stepped-up activity by Indian forces in the Kargil area, but these reports have not been confirmed by United Nations military observers.

2. Reports from United Nations military observers were received as follows:

(a) At 1700 hours on 13 December, all field stations reported a continuation of artillery fire along the whole cease-fire line and the border.

(b) Field Station Punch reported concentrated shelling of the town beginning at 1400 hours, and the evacuation of the Field Station at 1500 hours. The personnel of this station and all essential equipment were removed to Rajouri.

(c) Field Station Jammu reported an overflight by Pakistan jet planes at 1140 hours, but there was no attack.

(d) The UNMOGIP Office, Srinagar, reported that the airport was raided by Pakistan jet planes at 1218 hours.

(e) Field Station Kotli reported that Indian jet planes strafed the town at 1230 hours. There was no damage to the Field Station.

3. At 1100 hours on 14 December, all field stations reported a continuation of artillery and mortar fire. No other military activity was reported.

**DOCUMENT S/10432/ADD.8**

[Original: English]  
[15 December 1971]

1. The Chief Military Observer of UNMOGIP, Lieutenant-General Luis Tassara González, reported 15 December 1971 at 1100 hours that there was no

change in the over-all situation along the cease-fire line. Although there had been continuous shelling along the whole cease-fire line, the reports of the parties indicated that most of the ground fighting had taken place in the Kargil area, at Punch and in the southern part of the cease-fire line and the border, in the Bhimber, Jammu and Sialkot sectors. Air activity in the past 24 hours remained moderate.

2. Reports from United Nations military observers as of 1700 hours on 14 December were received as follows:

(a) Field Stations Bhimber, Sialkot and Jammu reported heavy artillery and tank fire during the day.

(b) Field Station Kotli reported that there had been heavy fighting in the northern sector during the night and that Indian forces had attacked the area with aircraft at 1050 hours.

(c) UNMOGIP Office Srinagar reported that the airport had been raided by six Pakistan jet planes at 0805 hours.

3. At 1100 hours on 15 December all field stations reported that the night had been quiet, with only sporadic shelling. Field Station Sialkot reported that at 0905 hours, three Indian jet planes had bombed the town of Sialkot. There was no damage to UNMOGIP installations.

#### DOCUMENT S/10432/ADD.9

[Original: English]  
[16 December 1971]

1. The Chief Military Observer of UNMOGIP, Lieutenant-General Luis Tassara González, reported on 16 December 1971 at 1100 hours that there was no change in the over-all situation along the cease-fire line. Shelling by both Indian and Pakistan forces was continuing, but no ground offensive action was reported. There had been an increase in Indian air attacks against Sialkot, but in general the level of air activity remained moderate.

2. Reports from United Nations military observers as of 1700 hours on 15 December were received as follows:

(a) All field stations reported sporadic artillery and mortar fire.

(b) Field Station Sialkot reported a bombing and strafing attack by Indian Air Force planes on the city area at 0905 hours. This attack was followed by three more air attacks during the afternoon, the last attack taking place at 1520 hours. There was no damage to the United Nations Field Station.

(c) UNMOGIP Office Srinagar reported that the airport had been attacked by Pakistan Air Force planes at 1235 hours.

#### DOCUMENT S/10433\*

#### Report of the Secretary-General on his efforts to evacuate the United Nations and other international personnel from Dacca

[Original: English]  
[7 December 1971]

1. The following report concerning the Secretary-General's efforts to evacuate the staff of the United Nations East Pakistan Relief Operation (UNEPRO)

\* Also circulated as a General Assembly document under the symbol A/8557.

3. At 1100 hours on 16 December, all field stations reported that there had been sporadic artillery and mortar fire during the night. No air activity was reported.

#### DOCUMENT S/10432/ADD.10

[Original: English]  
[17 December 1971]

1. The Chief Military Observer of UNMOGIP, Lieutenant-General Luis Tassara González, reported on 17 December 1971 at 1100 hours that the cease-fire line and the border had been relatively quiet during the past twenty-four hours. There had been only intermittent artillery exchanges. Air activity had also been light.

2. At 1700 hours on 16 December, all field stations reported sporadic artillery fire throughout the day. The UNMOGIP Office Srinagar reported that the airport had been raided by Pakistan Air Force planes at 1430 hours.

3. At 1100 hours on 17 December, Field Stations Jammu and Sialkot reported continuous artillery fire along the border. All other field stations reported a quiet night. No air activity was reported.

#### DOCUMENT S/10432/ADD.11

[Original: English]  
[18 December 1971]

1. The Chief Military Observer of UNMOGIP, Lieutenant-General Luis Tassara González, reported on 18 December 1971 at 1100 hours that the low level of activity along the cease-fire line and the border had continued until 1930 hours on 17 December, at which time the cease-fire announced by the two Governments came into effect. Air activity was almost negligible.

2. At 1700 hours on 17 December, all field stations reported a quiet day, with only sporadic artillery exchanges. Field Station Jammu reported an overflight of the town at 1000 hours by Pakistan Air Force planes which did not attack but were engaged by anti-aircraft fire. Most field stations were informed by the local military authorities that the cease-fire would be effective at 1930 hours.

3. At 1100 hours on 18 December, all field stations reported that there had been no activity during the night. The military observer team which had been withdrawn from Field Station Punch to Rajouri on 13 December left for Punch at 1845 hours on 17 December to reopen the Field Station.

and other international personnel from Dacca is submitted to the General Assembly and the Security Council because of the Secretary-General's concern about their safety and the importance he attaches to this question. The evacuation operation affects some

240 international personnel, including 46 United Nations personnel, now stranded in Dacca.

2. During the latter part of November 1971, it was decided to continue the activities of UNEPRO as long as and to the extent possible despite the continuing deterioration of the situation in East Pakistan. Non-essential personnel of UNEPRO were evacuated to Bangkok and to Singapore, which was established as a staging area for the operation, or to other neighbouring safe havens, but 47 officials remained, all of them concentrated in Dacca.

3. On 3 December, when a further grave deterioration of the situation in East Pakistan took place, including air attacks on its main cities, it became obvious that UNEPRO was no longer in a position to undertake any useful activities under its mandate at that time, and it was decided to evacuate 46 United Nations personnel. The forty-seventh, an official of the International Labour Office who is a resident of East Pakistan, was designated as custodian of all UNEPRO and UNICEF premises and equipment during the temporary absence of the staff.

4. Arrangements for the evacuation of these personnel were initiated by the Secretary-General at United Nations Headquarters in New York, with the assistance of United Nations representatives in Dacca, New Delhi and Bangkok. For some time already all road and river connexions with Dacca had been severed and the only outlet was by air. But evacuation by air presented great difficulties as well. Dacca airport had recently been attacked by the Indian Air Force and the two UNEPRO planes there were disabled. All commercial flights to and from Dacca had been cancelled and, understandably, air companies were reluctant to arrange charter flights.

5. On 4 December, the Canadian Government agreed to make available to the United Nations for the evacuation operation a C-130 aircraft, which was standing by at Bangkok, two and a half hours flying time from Dacca. It was decided to undertake the evacuation operation on 5 December. In view of the special circumstances, it was necessary to obtain, in addition to the usual clearance from the Pakistan authorities, the agreement of both the Governments of India and Pakistan for a cease-fire, including a complete cessation of air activity in, above and around the Dacca airport area as well as the Bangkok-Dacca air corridor. The Secretary-General initially requested the cease-fire for the period from 1030 to 1830 (East Pakistan time (EPT)) on 5 December, with a view to making possible the unimpeded and safe arrival, loading and take-off of the aircraft.

6. By the evening of 4 December, the Pakistan Government had agreed to the Secretary-General's request, but the Indian Government was not able to make the necessary arrangements in time. It was therefore necessary to postpone the evacuation operation by 24 hours.

7. Meanwhile, the Assistant Secretary-General in charge of UNEPRO, who was among the personnel stranded in Dacca, had received numerous requests from the various consulates to assist them in the evacuation of their officials and other nationals, including women and children. The Assistant Secretary-General, with the full approval of the Secretary-General, decided to grant their request. Thus in addition to the 46 United Nations personnel, 4 officials of the International Red

Cross and 87 persons sponsored by various consulates, as well as 80 dependent women and children, were included in the evacuation plan on 5 December. The total number of personnel to be evacuated later increased to approximately 240. The enlarged group included nationals of Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Hungary, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Nepal, Romania, Singapore, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, the United Republic of Tanzania, the United States of America and Yugoslavia. To accommodate the increased passenger load, the United Nations chartered an additional aircraft, a Boeing 707, from Pan American Airways. This second aircraft was scheduled to proceed to Dacca on 7 December.

8. In the evening of 5 December, the Secretary-General was informed that the Indian authorities had agreed to the requested cease-fire arrangements, but for a shorter period, that is from 1030 hours to 1230 hours EPT on 6 December. Instructions were immediately given to the Canadian C-130 to proceed with the evacuation operation, which would take place during the period indicated by the Indian authorities.

9. On 6 December, UNEPRO in Dacca reported to the Secretary-General that when the Canadian C-130 was 70 miles (within 10 minutes' flying time) from Dacca, the airport was attacked by the Indian Air Force and the airport defences opened intensive anti-aircraft fire. At that moment, busloads of the personnel to be evacuated were approaching the airfield, and the passengers in the lead bus, most of whom were women and children, had to seek shelter in nearby trenches. A bomb exploded about 25 metres from them, but fortunately there were no casualties. The Canadian aircraft was ordered by the Control Tower to turn away from the airport, and it flew back towards Bangkok.

10. The following details are from a report submitted on this incident by the UNEPRO Air Adviser:

"(a) On 6 December 1971 I was at Dacca Civil Airport expecting the arrival of the Canadian C-130 305, flight number 501, which was on its way to Dacca from Bangkok on an evacuation mission. The object of the flight was the evacuation of women, children, United Nations staff and as many members as possible of other missions.

"(b) The time of clearance obtained from the Indian authorities and the authorities of Pakistan was 1030 hours local time (LT) Dacca.

"(c) The aircraft was in contact with Dacca approach control about 45 minutes before reaching it. The time of arrival, given by the Captain, was 1050 LT. The first attack on the airfield, by the Indian Air Force, began at 0930 LT and ended at 0942 LT. The second attack lasted for 7 minutes. Bombs were dropped on the runway, hitting it at three points. At 1041 LT, during another attack, the aircraft was told by the regional controller of civil aviation that the attack was in full force and that the airfield was being bombed. The aircraft was told by him to return to base in Bangkok.

"(d) The first attack ended with the runway damaged only by bombs. . . The craters were caused by bombs, presumably of the deep penetration type and with delayed fuses. I heard the delayed explosions occurring some time after the impact of the bombs and after the aircraft were clear of the airport.

"(c) The second bombing attack which damaged the runway occurred at 1310 LT."

11. Representations were immediately made on behalf of the Secretary-General to the Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations. The Secretary-General also decided to make new arrangements for the evacuation of the stranded personnel on 7 December using both the Canadian C-130 and the Pan American Boeing 707 aircraft. A cease-fire in and around Dacca from 0830 to 1230 hours EPT and guarantees for the safe flight of the two aircraft in the air corridor from Dacca to Bangkok were requested and obtained from both the Governments of India and Pakistan.

12. On 7 December, having been informed by UNEPRO in Dacca that there were reasons to believe that the Dacca airport runway could be made sufficiently serviceable for the landing of both aircraft by 0930 hours EPT, instructions were issued by United Nations Headquarters to proceed with the new evacuation plan. The C-130 aircraft was to proceed first to Dacca and thus would have an opportunity to check the state of the runway before the arrival of the Boeing 707.

13. The C-130 aircraft left Bangkok at 0645 hours local time (2345 hours GMT) but had to turn back before reaching Dacca. The report of the aircraft commander may be summarized as follows:

(a) The aircraft left Bangkok airport at 2345 GMT and proceeded according to the plan agreed upon by the United Nations. When in the Rangoon area, it was informed by Dacca air control that it would not be permitted to land at Dacca because the runway was not available. After orbiting Rangoon for one hour and twenty-six minutes, permission was finally granted for the aircraft to overfly Dacca airport to make a visual inspection of the runway but not to land.

(b) The aircraft resumed the agreed upon course. At 0345 GMT when the aircraft was 21° 05' north

and 91° 15' east at an altitude of 20,000 feet, the aircraft commander sighted an aircraft carrier and two escorts heading in a north-easterly direction. He noticed a fighter aircraft flying along the carrier and assumed that it was taking off to escort the Canadian aircraft. He also noticed a second aircraft approaching the stern of the carrier and at the same time the carrier began to smoke. By the time the second aircraft had passed over the carrier, large clouds of black smoke were visible.

(c) The commander next noticed an anti-aircraft burst well below to the left of the aircraft which appeared to be directed at the aircraft. He heard external explosions which he concluded were directed at the aircraft. He then broadcast "May Day" and distress signals and altered the aircraft's course for Bangkok.

(d) At the same time the commander received a call from Bangkok Radio relaying a message from the Air Transport Command Operations Centre ordering the aircraft to return to Bangkok immediately. The aircraft returned to Bangkok without further incidents, landing at 0615 GMT. A cursory examination reveals no damage.

14. It is relevant to note that when the incident just mentioned took place, the C-130 aircraft was well within the agreed air corridor between Dacca and Bangkok. With the recall of this aircraft it was decided to cancel the projected flight of the Boeing 707.

15. The possibility of a further attempt at air evacuation is now being actively explored. The Secretary-General is maintaining close contact with the International Committee of the Red Cross and has instructed his Representative in Dacca to examine urgently, in full co-operation with the International Committee, what practical measures can be taken for the protection of the United Nations and other international personnel there.

#### DOCUMENT S/10434

Letter dated 7 December 1971 from the representative of Iraq  
to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]  
[7 December 1971]

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of a cable received by my Government from the Ruler of Ras Al-Khaima, Sheikh Saqr Bin Mohamad Ali Al-Qasini.

I request that this letter with the accompanying text be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Talib EL-SHIBIB  
Permanent Representative of Iraq  
to the United Nations

#### TEXT OF THE CABLE

This morning Tuesday the 30th November 1971, Iranian troops have invaded the two islands of Tunb and thus violated the brotherly rights of neighbourliness and transgressed against our historical and national rights. The small garrison stationed for the defence of the islands and composed of six policemen valiantly resisted the invasion; four of them were killed and the other two injured. The two islands of Tunb are and have always been, since ancient times, an indivisible part of the territory of Ras Al-Khaima, and their occupation by Iran is a blatant aggression not only against Ras Al-Khaima alone, but against all the Arab people in all their countries. We call upon you to take immediate and effective measures to repulse the aggressors and to unite in support of Arab

rights. We appeal to you to shoulder your full national responsibilities before God and history. We request you to submit the call to the United Nations, the Security Council and the Council of the League of Arab States. Awaiting your speedy reply, we wish you success.

## DOCUMENT S/10438\*

### Letter dated 9 December 1971 from the representative of Israel to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]  
[9 December 1971]

Further to the statement by Mr. Abba Eban, Minister for Foreign Affairs, made in the General Assembly on 6 December 1971 [2000th plenary meeting] in the debate on the situation in the Middle East, I have the honour to transmit to you the text of the Israeli reply to the proposals made by the Committee of Ten of the Organization of African Unity.

Mrs. Golda Meir, the Prime Minister of Israel, replied to those proposals in a letter dated 28 November 1971 addressed to President Léopold Sédar Senghor of the Republic of Senegal. Her reply was as follows:

"Permit me to express to you and to your colleagues of the Committee of Ten African Heads of State, and in particular the Sub-Committee of Four headed by you, my profound appreciation for the sincere and devoted efforts that you have made to help promote peace in the Middle East by resumption of negotiations.

"In response to your request, and further to the clarification of Israel's position as I conveyed to you orally and as recorded in the verbatim minutes, I have the honour to present to you the views of the Government of Israel on the suggestions contained in the memorandum of the Committee of Ten, which you, Mr. President, handed to me on 24 November 1971. These views are as follows:

"(a) Israel agrees to resume negotiations without prior conditions under the auspices of Mr. Jarring within the terms of resolution 242 (1967) in order to reach a peace agreement. This undertaking was given to Mr. Jarring in August 1970.

"(b) Israel agrees to work out a Suez Canal agreement, the details of which will be negotiated and agreed. In the negotiation of such an agreement we would be prepared to discuss measures to ensure supervision and observance of a Suez Canal accord.

"(c) Israel agrees that the secure and recognized boundaries should be determined by negotiation between the parties and embodied in the peace agreement.

"(d) Israel agrees that in addition to the determination of agreed, secure and recognized boundaries, further arrangements for ensuring security could be negotiated.

"(e) Israel agrees that the terms of withdrawal to the boundaries negotiated and agreed should be embodied in the peace treaty.

"(f) The question of Sharm el Sheikh will be included in the peace negotiations as specified in paragraph (c) above. In accordance with Security Council resolution 242 (1967), free navigation in all international waterways, such as the Suez Canal

and the Strait of Tiran, for all ships and cargoes, including those of Israel, will be provided for in the peace agreement.

"May I add, Mr. President, that it was a great pleasure to welcome you and your colleagues in Jerusalem and to hold with you frank and searching discussions, in a spirit of friendship and a common quest for peace."

The proposals to which the aforesaid reply was made are enclosed herewith. They were signed by Maître Moktar Ould Daddah, current Chairman of the Organization of African Unity, President of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania; Haile Selassie I, Emperor of Ethiopia; Léopold Sédar Senghor, Chairman of the Sub-Committee of the OAU, President of the Republic of Senegal; El Hadj Ahmadou Ahidjo, President of the Federal Republic of Cameroon; Lieutenant General Joseph Désiré Mobutu, President of the Republic of Zaire; General Yakubu Gowon, Head of the Federal Military Government, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Federal Republic of Nigeria; William Tolbert, President of the Republic of Liberia; for Mr. Jomo Kenyatta, President of the Republic of Kenya and by delegation, Arap Moi, Vice-President; for Mr. Félix Houphouët Boigny, President of the Republic of the Ivory Coast and by delegation, Arsène Assouan Usher, Minister for Foreign Affairs; Julius Nyerere, President of the United Republic of Tanzania (unable to attend).

I have the honour to request that this letter and its enclosure be circulated as official documents of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Yosef TEKOAH  
Permanent Representative of Israel  
to the United Nations

#### ANNEX

#### PROPOSALS BY THE COMMITTEE OF TEN OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY

"13. ... The Committee of Ten of the Organization of African Unity submits to the two parties the following proposals for their consideration:

"(a) Acceptance by the two parties to resume indirect negotiations under the auspices of Mr. Jarring and within the terms of resolution 242 (1967), in order to reach a peace agreement;

"(b) Acceptance by the two parties of an interim agreement for the opening of the Suez Canal and the stationing, on the eastern bank of the Canal, of United Nations forces between the Egyptian and Israeli lines;

"(c) Acceptance by the two parties that 'secure and recognized boundaries' be determined in the peace agreement;

"(d) Acceptance by the two parties that solution to security problems be found;

\* Also circulated as a General Assembly document under the symbol A/8566.

- "(i) - within the guarantee of the United Nations;
- "(ii) in the creation of demilitarized zones;
- "(iii) in the presence of international forces at some strategic points;
- "(e) Acceptance by the two parties that the terms of withdrawal from occupied territories be embodied in the peace agreement;
- "(f) Acceptance by the two parties in order to guarantee freedom of navigation to all ships through the Strait of Tiran, the stationing of international forces at Sharm el Sheikh.

"14. The Heads of State members of the OAU Committee are of the view that these suggestions reconcile the essentials in the respective positions of the two parties.

"15. They rely on their being accepted by the Israeli and Egyptian authorities whose yearning for peace was clearly manifested.

"16. They earnestly appeal to the President of the Arab Republic of Egypt and to the Prime Minister of the State of Israel to accept these suggestions and thereby allow the resumption of the Jarring negotiations and the establishment in that region, of a just peace, which they wish to be lasting as between brothers."

#### DOCUMENT S/10440\*

#### Letter dated 9 December 1971 from the representative of Pakistan to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]  
[9 December 1971]

Under instructions of my Government, I have the honour to state that, even though resolution 2793 (XXVI) adopted by the General Assembly on 7 December 1971 fails to take note of Indian aggression against Pakistan (which has been admitted by India), the Government of Pakistan has decided to accept the call for an immediate cease-fire and withdrawal of troops contained in that resolution. Inasmuch as the resolution provides for an immediate withdrawal of the troops of each party to its own side of the border and thus would stop bloodshed, Pakistan is willing to overlook its inadequacies at this time. The Government of Pakistan attaches due importance to the fifth and sixth preambular paragraphs of the resolution, which, besides reaffirming the provisions of the Charter, in particular of Article 2, paragraph 4, recall paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security [*General Assembly resolution 2734 (XXV)*] which read:

"The General Assembly,

"...

"4. Solemnly reaffirms that States must fully respect the sovereignty of other States and the right of peoples to determine their own destinies, free of external intervention, coercion or constraint, especially involving the threat or use of force, overt or covert, and refrain from any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and territorial integrity of any other State or country;

"5. Solemnly reaffirms that every State has the duty to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity and political independence of any other State, and that the territory of a State shall not be the object of military occupation resulting from the use of force in contravention of the provisions of the Charter, that the territory of a State shall not be the object of acquisition

by another State resulting from the threat or use of force, that no territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or use of force shall be recognized as legal and that every State has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in another State;

"6. Urges Member States to make full use and seek improved implementation of the means and methods provided for in the Charter for the exclusively peaceful settlement of any dispute or any situation, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, including negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, good offices including those of the Secretary-General, or other peaceful means of their own choice, it being understood that the Security Council in dealing with such disputes or situations should also take into consideration that legal disputes should as a general rule be referred by the parties to the International Court of Justice in accordance with the provisions of the Statute of the Court."

It is the hope of the Government of Pakistan that strengthened by a pronouncement unmistakably supported by the overwhelming majority of its membership, the United Nations will now decide upon concrete and binding measures to secure and maintain the cessation of hostilities with immediate effect, the withdrawal of all armed personnel and the stationing of United Nations observers on both sides of the border to supervise the cease-fire and to oversee the withdrawal of forces.

I should be grateful if this letter could be circulated immediately as a document of both the General Assembly and the Security Council.

(Signed) A. SHAHI

Permanent Representative of Pakistan  
to the United Nations

\* Also circulated as a General Assembly document under the symbol A/8567.

#### DOCUMENT S/10443\*

#### Letter dated 10 December 1971 from the representative of Egypt to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]  
[10 December 1971]

On instructions from my Government and with reference to my statement in the General Assembly on

\* Also circulated as a General Assembly document under the symbol A/8576.

8 December 1971 [2006th plenary meeting] I have the honour to request that the attached full text of the memorandum submitted by the Arab Republic of Egypt to President Léopold Sédar Senghor in his

capacity as Chairman of the Sub-Committee of the four African Heads of State be circulated as a General Assembly and Security Council document.

(Signed) Mohamed H. EL ZAYYAT  
Permanent Representative of Egypt  
to the United Nations

#### MEMORANDUM

The Arab Republic of Egypt welcomes the Committee of African Heads of State and expresses its gratitude for the efforts they have exerted to implement the resolution of the Organization of African Unity adopted in Addis Ababa on 23 June 1971. This resolution called for the immediate withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from all Arab territories to the lines of 5 June 1967 in implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, and expressed the full support of the African Heads of State in the efforts of the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General to implement the Security Council resolution and particularly his initiative for peace of 8 February 1971 [see S/10403, annex I]. The resolution reaffirmed solidarity with the Arab Republic of Egypt, appreciated the positive attitude reflected in its reply of 15 February 1971, to the Special Representative's initiative for peace, deplored Israel's defiance to that initiative and called upon it to make a similar positive reply to Jarring's initiative.

The Arab Republic of Egypt expresses its appreciation to the President of the current session of the Organization of Arab Unity, and the members of the Committee of African Heads of State who have responded to the OAU resolution which requested the President of the Organization of African Unity to consult the Heads of State and Government so that they use their influence to ensure the full implementation of this resolution.

Egypt has extended full co-operation to the Committee in all the phases of its mission in the belief that the successful conclusion of its endeavours to implement Security Council resolution 242 (1967), and the resumption of the Jarring mission, currently deadlocked due to Israel's refusal to make a positive reply to his initiative for peace, would contribute to the achievement of a lasting peace in the Middle East.

During its meetings in Cairo, the Committee defined its mandate as seeking to implement Security Council resolution 242 (1967), and fully supporting Amba-

sador Jarring's mission to implement the Security Council resolution as well as his initiative to the two parties of 8 February 1971—all this in application of the OAU resolution. The Committee also emphasized that it was not replacing Ambassador Jarring but that its mandate was to help him implement the Security Council resolution in accordance with his initiative for peace.

The President of the Arab Republic of Egypt has stressed in his talks with the Sub-Committee of four Heads of State Egypt's complete readiness to implement Security Council resolution 242 (1967) in all its parts and its acceptance of Ambassador Jarring's aide-mémoire of 8 February 1971.

In response to the Committee's request the Arab Republic of Egypt clarified its position on the points raised during the talks in the following manner.

1. Acceptance to hold indirect negotiations under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring for the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967), in all its parts, and the implementation of Ambassador Jarring's initiative of 8 February for the conclusion of a peace agreement.

2. Egypt was ready to undertake the required arrangements for reopening the Canal in return for the first stage of Israeli withdrawal in conformity with the initiative underlined by the President of the Republic on condition that Israel responded positively to Ambassador Jarring's aide-mémoire of 8 February 1971.

3. Agreement that secure and recognized boundaries should be embodied in the peace agreement in accordance with the OAU resolution which provides for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from all the Arab territories to the lines of 5 June 1967, and in conformity with the borders specified in the Jarring initiative which underlined the necessity of the withdrawal of Israeli forces to Egypt's international borders.

4. Acceptance of the following guarantees for peace:

(a) United Nations guarantee;

(b) Establishment of demilitarized zones astride the borders;

(c) Stationing of international forces at some strategic points.

5. Acceptance of the stationing of international forces in Sharm El Sheikh to guarantee the freedom of navigation in the Straits of Tiran.

#### DOCUMENT S/10444

Letter dated 12 December 1971 from the representative of the United States of America to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English]  
[12 December 1971]

The war on the Indian subcontinent continues to rage unabated. Urgent efforts by the Security Council to effect a cease-fire and withdrawal at its 1606th, 1607th and 1608th meetings failed, thus necessitating immediate referral of the crisis to the General Assembly under the "Uniting for Peace" procedure [see General Assembly resolution 377 (V)]. The Assembly considered this grave situation at its 2002nd and 2003rd meetings and on December 7, and by a vote of 104 to 11 with 10 abstentions adopted resolution 2793 (XXVI) which *inter alia* called on India and Pakistan to institute a cease-fire and to withdraw troops from each other's territories.

One of the parties, Pakistan, has accepted the resolution. The other party, India, has not yet done so.

The United States believes that the Security Council has an obligation to end this threat to world peace on a most urgent basis.

On instructions from my Government, I request that you convene a meeting of the Security Council immediately.

(Signed) George BUSH  
Permanent Representative of the United States of America  
to the United Nations

#### DOCUMENT S/10445\*

#### Letter dated 12 December 1971 from the representative of India to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]  
[12 December 1971]

The General Assembly adopted resolution 2793 (XXVI) entitled "Question considered by the Security Council at its 1606th, 1607th and 1608th meetings, on 4, 5 and 6 December 1971", on 7 December 1971. This was telegraphically forwarded to the Government of India direct by the Secretary-General. I have now been instructed to send the reply of the Government of India. It reads as follows:

"India's dedication to the purposes and principles of the Charter is well known. It is borne out by our record over the last 26 years. India has not been content merely to give verbal or moral support to the United Nations but has been in the forefront of a selfless struggle in the defence of peace, against colonialism, imperialism and racism. Indian soldiers have sacrificed their lives carrying out missions of peace in Korea, the Congo and West Asia.

"Decisions of the United Nations and resolutions adopted by its various organs and agencies have always received our most earnest and careful consideration. Consequently, the Government of India has studied with great care the resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 7 December 1971 on the present grave situation in the Indian subcontinent.

"We are glad to note that the resolution acknowledges the crucial importance of the voluntary return of the refugees to their homes. It may be worthwhile to recall briefly the circumstances in which these millions of refugees were driven out of their homeland.

"On 25 March 1971, the Government of Pakistan launched an assault on the people of their Eastern Province, whose only crime was that they had voted democratically. Millions of innocent, unarmed citizens were uprooted from their homes, and hundreds of thousands were killed or maimed. However great our concern for justice and sympathy for human suffering, we could perhaps have taken a detached view, had these terrible events not occurred along the borders of several of our eastern states. More than 10 million people have so far sought shelter in our territory to escape death and dishonour at the hands of the West Pakistan army. The burden of taking care of such a large influx in so short a time has been a crushing one. Our entire administration in the eastern region is at a standstill and the daily life of the people dislocated, because of schools, hospitals and other public buildings being occupied

by the refugees. Social and political tensions have been generated throughout the country and our economy has been disrupted, adversely affecting our growth. Even more serious, our security has been imperilled. Has the United Nations considered the unprecedented situation created by one Member of the United Nations for another Member?

"India has always stood for total non-interference by one State into the domestic affairs of another State. However, if one State deliberately drives millions of its citizens across the territory of another State and casts upon the receiving State unconscionable burdens, what remedies are open to the receiving State which has become a victim of domestic policies of a Member State of the United Nations?

"Has any country faced such a gigantic problem through no fault of its own? For nine long months India staggered under this load and exercised the utmost self-restraint. Even if other countries were not moved by the agony of the people of East Bengal or the difficulties created for India, we had hoped that their desire to preserve peace in this area would lead them to take some steps to reduce the tension.

"However, India's efforts were in vain. The military rulers of Pakistan have not been able to comprehend the forces of history and the people's deep desire for justice and democratic rights. The military rulers are impervious to the fact that through their callous policies they have irrevocably alienated the people of East Bengal.

"Pakistan has based its propaganda on two points.

"First, it is alleged that the entire trouble is of Indian instigation. This allegation has been proved false by the democratic elections in which the Awami League won 167 out of 169 seats and by the many Dacca-based foreign correspondents who have been sending eye-witness reports of what is happening there. Secondly, the whole question is projected as one of religion. It is relevant to remember that the bulk of the people of East Bengal, who have revolted against the military Government of West Pakistan, are of the Islamic faith and no less devoted Muslims. In fact, the majority of the total population of both wings of Pakistan lived in its Eastern Province.

"Despite the Pakistan Government's effort to explain away their predicament as the result of alleged interference, India on her part did everything to prevent the issue from becoming internationalized,

\* Also circulated as a General Assembly document under the symbol A/8580.

and consistently advocated a political solution between the Government of Pakistan and the genuinely elected leaders of East Bengal. If the world were anxious to treat this as an internal question of Pakistan, it should have ensured that such vast proportions of the population of East Bengal were not driven out of their homes and their homeland into our country.

"When nations have talked to us of peace, they have overlooked the slaughter of men, women and children; they have forgotten the fate of 10 million refugees and thus totally ignored the moral and legal responsibility of the rulers of Pakistan. A call to cease fire coupled with expressions of hope that the refugees would voluntarily return appears to India to have no purpose other than to cover up the annihilation of an entire nation. How can foundations of peace be built on such a basis? India cannot be a party to the violent suppression of the rights of the aggrieved people of Bangla Desh. If the United Nations is interested in the whole truth, the representatives of the Bangla Desh Government should be heard. Why should it depart from this tradition?

"Any objective consideration would show that the conditions necessary for the restoration of peace and the return of millions of refugees can be created only through the withdrawal of West Pakistani forces. It is cruel to expect that these refugees who have suffered so much at the hands of the West Pakistani forces should contemplate return to their homeland while it is still under their occupation. As far as the armed forces of India are concerned, there can be a cease-fire and withdrawal of India's forces to its own territory, if the rulers of West Pakistan withdraw their own forces from Bangla Desh and reach a peaceful settlement with those who were until recently their fellow-citizens, but now owe allegiance to the Government of Bangla Desh which has been duly constituted by the representatives chosen freely in the elections held in December 1970. Merely to express a wish for the return of the refugees without taking into account the necessary pre-conditions is to show a callous disregard for the immense suffering which these people have endured.

"The Government of India is prepared to consider the call for cease-fire. Indeed, India concluded cease-fire agreements with Pakistan in 1948 and 1965. Neither gave assurance of continued peace. The last one of 1965, which was followed by a solemn inter-state agreement signed at Tashkent, failed to bring about the peaceful relations we so ardently desire.

"India feels legitimately aggrieved that in calling for a cease-fire, the United Nations makes no distinc-

tion between the aggressor and its victims. It is, therefore, necessary to restate the facts.

"On 3 December 1971 when the Prime Minister of India was in Calcutta, the Defence Minister in Patna and the Finance Minister in Bombay, Pakistan's armed forces launched aggression against India. On that day around 5.30 p.m. the Air Force of Pakistan made simultaneous attacks on India's air-fields in the following towns: Amritsar, Pathankot, Srinagar, Avantipur, Uttarlai, Jodhpur, Ambala and Agra. The West Pakistan army opened an attack by continuous shelling of our defensive positions on a wide front including Sulaimanki, Khemkaran, Poonch and other sectors. The Government of West Pakistan has alleged that India attacked at 12 noon, but since there was no basis whatever for their allegation, it could obviously not mention the places. These are uncontested facts. India, which is exercising the inherent right of self-defence, cannot be equated with Pakistan. India is a victim of yet another unprovoked Pakistani aggression and is engaged in defending its national sovereignty and territorial integrity in the exercise of its legitimate right of self-defence.

"There is one other consideration of fundamental importance which India would like to urge. International law recognizes that where a mother-State has irrevocably lost allegiance of such a large section of its people as represented by Bangla Desh and cannot bring them under its sway, conditions for the separate existence of such a state comes into being. It is India's assessment that this is precisely what has happened in Bangla Desh. The overwhelming majority of the elected representatives of Bangla Desh have irrevocably declared themselves in favour of separation from the mother-State of Pakistan and have set up a new state of Bangla Desh. India has recognized this new State. The armed forces of the new State have long been engaged in a struggle against the forces of West Pakistan in Bangla Desh. In these circumstances, is it realistic to call upon India to cease fire without, at the same time, giving a hearing to the representatives of Bangla Desh whose armed forces are engaged against the forces of West Pakistan?

"India earnestly hopes that in the light of the facts set out above, the United Nations will consider once again the realities of the situation, so that the basic causes of the conflict are removed and peace is restored. Given an assurance of a desire to examine these basic causes with objectivity, India will not be found wanting in offering its utmost co-operation."

(Signed) Samar SEN  
Permanent Representative of India  
to the United Nations

## DOCUMENT S/10446

### United States of America: draft resolution

[Original: English]  
[12 December 1971]

*The Security Council,*  
Noting the reports of the Secretary-General of 3 and 4 December 1971 [S/10410 and Add.1, S/10412 and Add.1 and 2] and Security Council resolution 303 (1971) of 6 December 1971,

Noting General Assembly resolution 2793 (XXVI) of 7 December 1971, adopted by a vote of 104 to 11, with 10 abstentions,

Noting further that the Government of Pakistan has accepted a cease-fire and withdrawal of armed forces

as set forth in General Assembly resolution 2793 (XXVI), and India's failure to do so,

*Gravely concerned* that hostilities continue between India and Pakistan which constitute an immediate threat to international peace and security,

*Recognizing* the need to deal appropriately at a subsequent stage, within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations, with the issues which have given rise to the hostilities,

*Convinced* that an early political solution would be necessary for the restoration of conditions of normalcy in the area of conflict and for the return of the refugees to their homes,

*Mindful* of the provisions of the Charter, in particular of Article 2, paragraph 4,

*Recalling* the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security,<sup>25</sup> particularly paragraphs 4, 5 and 6,

*Recognizing further* the need to take immediate measures to bring about an immediate cessation of hostilities between India and Pakistan and effect a withdrawal of their armed forces to their own side of the India-Pakistan borders,

*Mindful* of the purposes and principles of the Charter and of the Security Council's responsibilities under the relevant provisions of the Charter,

<sup>25</sup> General Assembly resolution 2734 (XXV).

1. *Calls upon* the Government of India forthwith to accept a cease-fire and withdrawal of armed forces as set forth in General Assembly resolution 2793 (XXVI);

2. *Calls upon* the Governments of India and Pakistan to take forthwith all measures for an immediate cease-fire and withdrawal of their armed forces on the territory of the other to their own side of the India-Pakistan borders;

3. *Urges* that efforts be intensified in order to bring about, speedily and in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, conditions necessary for the voluntary return of the East Pakistan refugees to their homes;

4. *Calls for* the full co-operation of all States with the Secretary-General for rendering assistance to and relieving the distress of those refugees;

5. *Calls upon* all parties concerned to take all possible measures and precautions to safeguard the lives and well-being of the civilian population in the area;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to keep the Security Council promptly and currently informed on the implementation of the present resolution;

7. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter and to meet again as circumstances warrant.

## DOCUMENT S/10446/REV.1

### United States of America: revised draft resolution

[Original: English]  
[13 December 1971]

#### *The Security Council,*

*Noting* the reports of the Secretary-General of 3 and 4 December [S/10410 and Add.1, S/10412 and Add.1 and 2] and Security Council resolution 303 (1971) of 6 December 1971,

*Noting* General Assembly resolution 2793 (XXVI) of 7 December 1971, adopted by a vote of 104 to 11, with 10 abstentions,

*Noting further* that the Government of Pakistan has accepted a cease-fire and withdrawal of armed forces as set forth in General Assembly resolution 2793 (XXVI), and the Government of India's letter in document S/10445,

*Regretting* that the Government of India has not yet accepted an unconditional and immediate cease-fire and withdrawal as set forth in General Assembly resolution 2793 (XXVI),

*Gravely concerned* that hostilities continue between India and Pakistan which constitute an immediate threat to international peace and security,

*Recognizing* the need to deal appropriately at a subsequent stage, within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations, with the issues which have given rise to the hostilities,

*Convinced* that an early political solution would be necessary for the restoration of conditions of normalcy in the area of conflict and for the return of the refugees to their homes,

*Mindful* of the provisions of the Charter, in particular of Article 2, paragraph 4,

*Recalling* the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security,<sup>25</sup> particularly paragraphs 4, 5 and 6,

*Recognizing further* the need to take immediate measures to bring about an immediate cessation of hostilities between India and Pakistan and effect a withdrawal of their armed forces to their own side of the India-Pakistan borders,

*Mindful* of the purposes and principles of the Charter and of the Security Council's responsibilities under the relevant provisions of the Charter,

1. *Calls upon* the Governments of India and Pakistan to take forthwith all measures for an immediate cease-fire and withdrawal of their armed forces on the territory of the other to their own side of the India-Pakistan borders;

2. *Urges* that efforts be intensified in order to bring about speedily and in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, conditions necessary for the voluntary return of the East Pakistan refugees to their homes;

3. *Calls for* the full co-operation of all States with the Secretary-General for rendering assistance to and relieving the distress of those refugees;

4. *Calls upon* all parties concerned to take all possible measures and precautions to safeguard the lives and well-being of the civilian population in the area;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to keep the Security Council promptly and currently informed on the implementation of the present resolution;

6. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter and to meet again as circumstances warrant.

Letter dated 8 December 1971 from the representative of the Khmer Republic to  
the President of the Security Council

[Original: French]  
[13 December 1971]

On instructions from my Government and further to my letter of 27 September 1971 [S/10349], I have the honour to communicate the following to you for the information of the members of the Security Council.

The North Viet-Nameese and the Viet Cong, who are at present invading the Khmer Republic, have committed numerous crimes against the Khmer population. During the night of 29 to 30 October 1971, these foreign North Viet-Nameese and Viet Cong aggressors used poison gas shells against Khmer positions at Rum-long, Kompong Thom province, causing serious injuries in the Khmer armed forces and the local civilian population.

Among the numerous victims of the poison gas, a Khmer woman and seven members of the armed forces were evacuated to the Preah Monivong Hospital at Phnom Penh. The main symptoms observed by the doctors treating the victims are as follows: coughing, bloody expectoration, nervous disorders, irritation of the eyes, vomiting, etc. These injured persons were also presented to the national and international press on

the morning of 3 November 1971 at Preah Monivong Hospital at Phnom Penh.

I wish once again to bring before world opinion the vehement protest of the Government of the Khmer Republic against these heinous crimes, condemned by the entire world, which have been committed by the North Viet-Nameese and Viet Cong aggressors against the Khmer population.

The Government of the Khmer Republic holds the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and the so-called Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Viet-Nam wholly responsible for all the very serious consequences of these acts and reserves the right to adopt appropriate measures for the defence of its population.

I should be grateful if you would have this communication circulated as a Security Council document.

(Signed) TRUONG CANG  
Permanent Representative of the  
Khmer Republic  
to the United Nations

## DOCUMENT S/10451

## Italy and Japan: draft resolution

[Original: English]  
[13 December 1971]

*The Security Council,*

Noting the reports of the Secretary-General of 3 and 4 December 1971 [S/10410 and Add.1, S/10412 and Add.1 and 2] and Security Council resolution 303 (1971) of 6 December 1971,

Mindful of the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter and of the Security Council's responsibilities under the relevant provisions of the Charter,

Noting General Assembly resolution 2793 (XXVI) of 7 December 1971,

Noting with appreciation the reply of the Government of Pakistan to the letter of the Secretary-General concerning General Assembly resolution 2793 (XXVI) contained in document S/10440,

Noting further the reply of the Government of India contained in document S/10445,

Gravely concerned that hostilities continue between India and Pakistan which constitute an immediate threat to international peace and security,

Recognizing the need to deal also, within the framework of the Charter, with the issues which have given rise to these hostilities,

Recognizing that a lasting solution must be based on a political settlement in Pakistan which respects the rights and interests of its people,

Recalling the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security,<sup>25</sup> particularly paragraphs 4, 5 and 6,

Recognizing further the need to take immediate measures to bring about an immediate cessation of hostilities and withdrawal of all armed forces,

1. Calls upon all Member States, in conformity with their obligations under the Charter of the United

Nations, to refrain from any action or threat of action likely to worsen the situation in the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent or to endanger international peace;

2. Calls upon all parties concerned to take forthwith, as a first step, all measures to bring about an immediate cease-fire and cessation of all hostilities;

3. Urges India and Pakistan both to carry on operations of disengagement and withdrawal so as to bring about the end of confrontation and the return to normalcy in the area of conflict;

4. Calls for immediate steps aimed at achieving a comprehensive political settlement;

5. Calls for the full co-operation of all States with the Secretary-General for rendering assistance to and relieving the distress of the East Pakistan refugees;

6. Calls upon all parties concerned to take all possible measures and precautions to safeguard the lives and well-being of the civilian population in the area and to ensure the full observation of all the Geneva Conventions;

7. Decides to appoint, with the consent of India and Pakistan, a Committee composed (of three Members) of the Security Council to assist them in their efforts to bring about normalcy in the area of conflict as well as to achieve reconciliation in accordance with the principles of the Charter and in keeping with the aforesaid resolutions and to report to the Council;

8. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Security Council promptly and currently informed on the implementation of the present resolution;

9. Decides to remain seized of the matter and to meet again as circumstances warrant.

Note verbale dated 13 December 1971 from the representative of  
Pakistan to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]  
[13 December 1971]

1. The Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General and under instructions of his Government has the honour to draw attention to a serious breach of the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949<sup>20</sup> committed by the Government of India and its armed forces in the present conflict in the subcontinent.

2. One of the officers of the Pakistan Armed Forces who had been taken prisoner by the Indian Army was returned to the Comilla fortress with the following message to the Pakistan Army:

"If you all do not surrender we will hand over all your prisoners [i.e. Pakistan prisoners of war] to the Mukti Bahini for butchery."

3. The sinister aspects of this threat justify all the fears that the Government and people of Pakistan have entertained about the intentions of the Indian Army and the Mukti Bahini. In addition the threat is in clear violation of Article 13 of the Geneva Convention which states:

"Prisoners of war must at all times be humanely treated. Any unlawful act or omission by the Detaining Power causing death or seriously endangering the health of a prisoner of war in its custody is prohibited, and will be regarded as a serious breach of the present Convention."

\* Also circulated as a General Assembly document under the symbol A/8587.

<sup>20</sup> United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 75 (1950), No. 972.

Article 13 continues:

"Likewise, prisoners of war must at all times be protected, particularly against acts of violence or intimidation and against insults and public curiosity.

"Measures of reprisal against prisoners of war are prohibited."

4. Not only are India's actions in clear violation of the above provisions relating to humane treatment, they also contravene the very spirit and purpose of the whole Convention that prisoners of war should not be utilized in order to attain the military objectives of the parties to the conflict.

5. Lest the Government of India be tempted, at some stage, to take the plea that it cannot be held responsible for the acts of the Mukti Bahini, the Permanent Representative of Pakistan wishes to state that such an excuse will not hold as the Mukti Bahini is officially under the authority of India's Army Commanders and Article 12 of the Convention expressly provides that:

"Prisoners of war are in the hands of the enemy Power, but not of the individuals or military units who have captured them. Irrespective of the individual responsibilities that may exist, the Detaining Power is responsible for the treatment given them."

6. The Permanent Representative of Pakistan requests that this note be circulated as an official document of the Security Council and the General Assembly.

## DOCUMENT S/10453

### Poland: draft resolution

[Original: English]  
[14 December 1971]

#### *The Security Council,*

*Gravely concerned* over the military conflict on the Indian subcontinent, which constitutes an immediate threat to international peace and security,

*Having heard* the statements by the Foreign Minister of India and the Deputy Prime Minister of Pakistan,

#### *Decides* that:

(a) In the eastern theatre of conflict, the power will be peacefully transferred to the lawfully elected representatives of the people headed by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, who would immediately be released;

(b) Immediately after the beginning of the process of Power transfer, the military actions in all the areas will be ceased and an initial cease-fire will start for a period of 72 hours;

(c) After the immediate commencement of the initial period of cease-fire, the Pakistan armed forces will start withdrawal to the pre-set locations in the eastern theatre of conflict with a view to evacuation from the eastern theatre of conflict;

(d) Similarly, the entire West Pakistan civilian personnel and other persons willing to return to West Pakistan, as well as the entire East Pakistan civilian

personnel and other persons in West Pakistan willing to return home, will be given an opportunity to do so under the supervision of the United Nations, with the guarantees on the part of all appropriate authorities concerned that nobody will be subjected to repressions;

(e) As soon as within the period of 72 hours the withdrawal of the Pakistan troops and their concentration for that purpose will have started, the cease-fire will become permanent. As soon as the evacuation of the West Pakistan armed forces will have started, the Indian armed forces will start their withdrawal from the eastern theatre of military operations. Such withdrawal of troops will begin actually upon consultations with the newly established authorities organized as a result of the transfer of power to the lawfully elected representatives of the people headed by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman;

(f) Recognizing the principle according to which territorial acquisitions made through the use of force will not be retained by either party to the conflict, the Governments of India and Pakistan will immediately begin negotiations through appropriate representatives of their armed forces with a view to the speediest possible implementation of this principle in the western theatre of military operations.

## Poland: revised draft resolution

[Original: English]  
[15 December 1971]

*The Security Council,*

*Gravely concerned* over the military conflict on the Indian subcontinent, which constitutes an immediate threat to international peace and security,

*Having heard* the statements by the Foreign Minister of India and the Deputy Primer Minister of Pakistan,

*Decides that:*

(a) In the eastern theatre of conflict, the power will be peacefully transferred to the representatives of the people, lawfully elected in December 1970;

(b) Immediately after the beginning of the process of power transfer, the military actions in all the areas will be ceased and an initial cease-fire will start for a period of 72 hours;

(c) After the immediate commencement of the initial period of cease-fire, the Pakistan armed forces will start withdrawal to the pre-set locations in the eastern theatre of conflict with a view to evacuation from the eastern theatre of conflict;

(d) Similarly, the entire West Pakistan civilian personnel and other persons willing to return to West Pakistan, as well as the entire East Pakistan civilian

personnel and other persons in West Pakistan willing to return home, will be given an opportunity to do so under the supervision of the United Nations, with the guarantees on the part of all appropriate authorities concerned that nobody will be subjected to repression;

(e) As soon as within the period of 72 hours the withdrawal of the Pakistan troops and their concentration for that purpose will have started, the cease-fire will become permanent. The Indian armed forces will be withdrawn from East Pakistan. Such withdrawal of troops will begin upon consultations with the newly established authorities organized as a result of the transfer of power to the lawfully elected representatives of the people;

(f) Recognizing the principle, according to which territorial acquisitions made through the use of force will not be retained by either party to the conflict, the Governments of India and Pakistan will immediately begin negotiations through appropriate representatives of their armed forces with a view to the speediest possible implementation of this principle in the western theatre of military operations.

## DOCUMENT S/10455

## France and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: draft resolution

[Original: English]  
[15 December 1971]

*The Security Council,*

*Gravely concerned* at the situation in South Asia, which constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

*Mindful* of its responsibilities under the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations,

*Recognizing* the urgent need to deal effectively with the basic causes of the present conflict,

*Recognizing further* that any lasting solution must include a political settlement which respects the fundamental rights and interests of the people,

*Deeply distressed* at the enormity of human suffering that has occurred in the area in recent months and resulted in the wholesale displacement of millions of people from East Pakistan,

*Gravely concerned* that all necessary measures should be taken for the preservation of human life and the observance of the Geneva Conventions of 1949,

1. *Calls upon* the Governments of India and Pakistan to institute forthwith an immediate and durable cease-fire and cessation of all hostilities in all areas of conflict in the western theatre and similarly calls for an immediate and durable cease-fire and cessation of all hostilities by all forces in East Pakistan, to remain in effect until operations of disengagement leading to withdrawal have taken place in both theatres;

2. *Calls for* the urgent conclusion of a comprehensive political settlement in accordance with the wishes of the people concerned as declared through their elected and acknowledged representatives and in conformity with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter;

3. *Calls upon* all Member States to refrain from any action which may aggravate the situation in the subcontinent or endanger international peace;

4. *Calls upon* all those concerned to take all measures necessary to preserve human life and for the observance of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and to apply fully their provisions as regards the protection of wounded and sick, prisoners of war and civilian population;

5. *Calls for* full international assistance in the relief of suffering and the rehabilitation of refugees and their return in safety and dignity to their homes;

6. *Invites* the Secretary-General to appoint a special representative to lend his good offices in particular for the solution of humanitarian problems;

7. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council as soon as possible on the implementation of this resolution.

DOCUMENT S/10456

Syrian Arab Republic: draft resolution

[Original: English]  
[15 December 1971]

The Security Council,

Gravely concerned with the situation in the India-Pakistan subcontinent, which constitutes an immediate threat to peace.

Noting General Assembly resolution 2793 (XXVI) of 7 December 1971,

1. Urges the Government of Pakistan to immediately release all political prisoners so that the elected representatives of East Pakistan resume their mandate;

2. Decides:

(a) An immediate cease-fire on all fronts;

(b) A disengagement of all those engaged in hostilities, including the withdrawal of the armed forces under the respective command of India and Pakistan to their own side of the border and the cease-fire line in Jammu and Kashmir;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to appoint a special representative with a view to:

(a) Supervising the orderly process of the above-mentioned operations;

(b) Assisting the elected representatives of East Pakistan and the Government of Pakistan to reach a comprehensive settlement, compatible with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations;

(c) Establishing the propitious conditions for the voluntary return of the refugees;

(d) Normalizing the relations between India and Pakistan;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Council constantly informed of the implementation of this resolution.

DOCUMENT S/10457

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: draft resolution

[Original: English]  
[15 December 1971]

The Security Council,

Gravely concerned by the conflict in the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent, which constitutes an immediate threat to international peace and security,

1. Calls upon all the parties concerned to take steps for bringing about immediate cease-fire and cessation of all hostilities on the eastern and western fronts;

2. Calls for the simultaneous conclusion of a political settlement in accordance with the wishes of the people of East Pakistan as declared through their already elected representatives;

3. Calls upon all those concerned to take all measures necessary to preserve human life and to observe the Geneva Conventions of 1949;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Council promptly and currently informed of the implementation of this resolution;

5. Decides to continue to discuss the further measures to be taken in order to restore peace in the whole area.

DOCUMENT S/10458

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: draft resolution

[Original: Russian\*]  
[16 December 1971]

The Security Council,

For the purpose of restoration of peace on the Indostan subcontinent,

1. Welcomes the cessation of hostilities in East Pakistan and expresses the hope that the state of cease-fire will be observed by both sides, which would guarantee, without delay, unimpeded transfer of power to the lawful representatives of the people elected in December 1970, and appropriate settlement of problems related to the conflict in this area;

\* English text provided by the submitting delegation.

2. *Calls for* immediate cease-fire and cessation of all other military actions along the entire border between India and West Pakistan and along the cease-fire line of 1965 in Jammu and Kashmir. Welcoming in this connexion the statement of the Government of India about their decision to cease fire unilaterally and cease all other military actions in this area beginning from 1430 hours GMT on 17 December 1971, urgently calls upon the Government of Pakistan to take an identical decision without delay;

3. *Calls upon* all Member States of the United Nations to render comprehensive assistance for the speediest cessation of military actions and to refrain from any steps which could impede normalization of the situation on the Indostan subcontinent.

## DOCUMENT S/10459

### Japan and United States of America: draft resolution

[Original: English]  
[16 December 1971]

*The Security Council,*

*Gravely concerned* with the situation in the India-Pakistan subcontinent which constitutes an immediate threat to international peace and security,

*Noting* General Assembly resolution 2793 (XXVI) of 7 December 1971,

*Taking note* of the statement made at the 1617th meeting of the Security Council by the Foreign Minister of India, that his country has no territorial ambitions,

1. *Demands* that a durable cease-fire and cessation of all hostilities in all areas of conflict be strictly observed and remain in effect until operations of disengagement take place, leading to prompt withdrawal of the armed forces from all the occupied territories;

2. *Calls upon* all Member States to refrain from any action which may aggravate the situation in the subcontinent or endanger international peace;

3. *Calls upon* all those concerned to take all measures necessary to preserve human life and for the observance of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and to apply in full their provisions as regards the protection of wounded and sick, prisoners of war and civilian population;

4. *Calls for* international assistance in the relief of suffering and the rehabilitation of refugees and their return in safety and dignity to their homes and for full co-operation with the Secretary-General to that effect;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to strengthen as appropriate the staff of the United Nations East Pakistan Relief Operation, headed by his special representative, in order to provide all possible assistance for the solution of humanitarian problems;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to keep the Council promptly and currently informed on the implementation of this resolution;

7. *Decides* to continue to discuss the further measures to be taken in order to restore peace in the whole area.

## DOCUMENT S/10459/REV.1

### Japan and United States of America: revised draft resolution

[Original: English]  
[16 December 1971]

*The Security Council,*

*Gravely concerned* with the situation in the India-Pakistan subcontinent which constitutes an immediate threat to international peace and security,

*Noting* General Assembly resolution 2793 (XXVI) of 7 December 1971,

*Taking note* of the statement made at the 1617th meeting of the Security Council by the Foreign Minister of India, that this country has no territorial ambitions,

1. *Demands* that an immediate and durable cease-fire and cessation of all hostilities in all areas of conflict be strictly observed and remain in effect until operations of disengagement take place, leading to prompt withdrawal of the armed forces from all the occupied territories;

2. *Calls upon* all Member States to refrain from any action which may aggravate the situation in the subcontinent or endanger international peace;

3. *Calls upon* all those concerned to take all measures necessary to preserve human life and for the observance of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and to apply in full their provisions as regards the protection of wounded and sick, prisoners of war and civilian population;

4. *Calls for* international assistance in the relief of suffering and the rehabilitation of refugees and their return in safety and dignity to their homes and for full co-operation with the Secretary-General to that effect;

5. *Invites* the Secretary-General to appoint a special representative to lend his good offices in particular for the solution of humanitarian problems;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to keep the Council promptly and currently informed on the implementation of this resolution;

7. *Decides* to continue to discuss the further measures to be taken in order to restore peace in the whole area.

#### DOCUMENT S/10460\*

#### Letter dated 16 December 1971 from the representative of the Libyan Arab Republic to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]  
[16 December 1971]

Upon the instructions of my Government, I have the honour to convey to you my Government's deep concern at the bloodshed and destruction caused by the Indian aggression against Pakistan.

The failure of the United Nations to exercise its responsibilities in bringing to an end the aggression by one Member State against another, in spite of General Assembly resolution 2793 (XXVI) of 7 December 1971, adopted by an overwhelming majority of the States Members of the United Nations, and in spite of the repeated efforts of the majority of the members of the Security Council, constitutes a direct and grave challenge to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, to international law and to humanity as a whole.

The situation that existed in the eastern part of Pakistan was not without its mistakes, as was acknowledged by the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Pakistan in his statement of 15 December 1971 before the Security Council [*resumed 1614th meeting*]. These mistakes and the flow of refugees to India could not constitute a justification for a premeditated and executed full-scale invasion by the forces of a neighbouring State to Pakistan. This practice, if allowed to succeed with impunity, will undoubtedly jeopardize the course of normal relations among States and will constitute an open invitation to every State to interfere in the internal affairs of others.

The allegations by India that the international community did nothing to alleviate the sufferings of the refugees are unfounded. It was India who rejected the Secretary-General's proposal. For, while the international community, including my Government, contributed hundreds of millions of dollars for the refugees, India imposed severe limitations on the work of international relief organizations. And, despite the promising discussions that were under way between Pakistan and certain other Governments to rectify the situation in the eastern part of Pakistan, India showed that its goal is the dismemberment of Pakistan by military

invasion, and not a solution to the problem by peaceful means, as required by the Charter.

It is regrettable that India, which has on many occasions been militant in its support of the principles of the Charter and international law, has become militaristic and aggressive, not only in its designs and pronouncements, which contributed greatly to the creation of the present tragedy, but in its armed and brutal invasion of Pakistan.

While the General Assembly and the Security Council were rendered ineffective and paralysed, tens of thousands of men, women and children were being killed and maimed, millions were made homeless and untold misery and suffering inflicted upon the innocent population.

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics should assume a major part of the responsibility for its clear complicity with the aggressor. The failure of the Security Council to reach a decision when the aggression was first launched was the sole responsibility of the USSR, without whose support India could not have continued its defiance of the collective will of the international community. As we have been witnessing the delaying tactics, the manoeuvres and the utilization of the veto by the representative of the USSR to further the chauvinistic designs of his country and in support of the aggressor with little regard for the killings and brutalities inflicted upon the population, one cannot but remember that the same position was taken by the representative of the imperialist United States of America in 1967 with regard to the Israeli aggression in the Middle East. The roles are identical, but the actors are different.

This deplorable behaviour could not be conducive to the creation and maintenance of an atmosphere of just peace and security which man is striving to achieve.

I request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the Security Council and the General Assembly.

(Signed) Mahmood Suleiman MAGHRIBI  
Permanent Representative of the  
Libyan Arab Republic  
to the United Nations

\* Also circulated as a General Assembly document under the symbol A/8614.

Letter dated 16 December 1971 from the representative of China  
to the Secretary-General

[Original: Chinese\*]  
[16 December 1971]

Attached herewith is a copy of the Statement of the Government of the People's Republic of China dated 16 December 1971. I would request you kindly to have it distributed as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) HUANG Hua  
Permanent Representative of the  
People's Republic of China  
to the United Nations

STATEMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF  
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

A large-scale war of aggression against Pakistan was brazenly launched by the Indian Government on 21 November 1971 with the active encouragement and energetic support of the Government of the Soviet Union. This has gravely disrupted peace on the South Asian subcontinent, given a tremendous shock and caused serious anxiety to the people throughout the world. On 7 December, the United Nations General Assembly adopted by the overwhelming majority of 104 votes to 11, with 10 abstentions, a most urgent resolution [2793 (XXVI)] which, being very magnanimous to India, calls upon India and Pakistan to bring about a cease-fire and withdraw their armed forces to their own side of the India-Pakistan borders. This resolution reflects the common desire of the people of the whole world and all the countries which love peace and uphold justice to oppose aggression and interference, be concerned for the security of nations and safeguard the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the countries of the world.

After its adoption, the resolution of the General Assembly was immediately accepted by the Pakistan Government but categorically rejected by the Indian Government. Who wants peace and who wants war? Who is acting in self-defence and who is committing aggression? Is all this not crystal clear? Ignoring the opposition of the overwhelming majority of the countries of the world, the Indian Government is continuing to expand its war of aggression, moving massive troops to press on the capital of East Pakistan, Dacca, blockading the ports and sea lanes in East and West Pakistan with its naval forces, and carrying out continuous wanton bombing with its air force against East and West Pakistan, stopping at nothing in committing most brutal atrocities. These acts have completely laid bare the wild ambitions of the Indian expansionists. Cherishing the pipe dream of a greater Indian empire, they want not only to swallow up East Pakistan but also to destroy Pakistan as a whole. If a timely stop is not put to such aggression committed by the Indian Government, Pakistan will not be the only country to fall victim; inevitably other countries neighbouring on India will also be endangered. Such a state of affairs is absolutely impermissible, whether from the point of view of the United Nations Charter, of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence initiated by China and India, or of the Ten Principles of the Asian-African Bandung Conference.

\* English text provided by the submitting delegation.

The Indian Government asserts that it has launched the war in order to realize the national aspirations of the people in East Pakistan and bring about the return of East Pakistan refugees to their homeland. This assertion is indeed absurd to the extreme. Many countries in the world have nationality problems, which need to be solved properly and reasonably in conformity with the desires and interests of the people, but these are the internal affairs of the respective countries, which can be solved only by their own Governments and people, and in which no foreign country has the right to interfere. The Pakistan Government has repeatedly expressed its willingness to seek a political solution to the East Pakistan question in a spirit of understanding and co-operation. What right has India to take over the affairs of others into its own hands, flagrantly interfere in Pakistan's internal affairs, and even employ powerful armed forces to invade and occupy East Pakistan? It is known to all that India too has its own nationality problems, whose complexity and acuteness are rarely seen elsewhere in the world. It may be asked how India would react if other countries should deal with India in the same way that India is today dealing with Pakistan and use armed force against India. The Indian Government has shown such "thoughtful concern" for the so-called realization of the aspirations of the people in East Pakistan as expressed in the 1970 elections. But peoples' memories are not so short as to forget that India and Pakistan agreed long ago to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir to decide its ownership but that both the Governments of Nehru the father and of his daughter have gone back on their word and refused to do so. Why is it then that the Indian Government is so indifferent to the national aspirations of the Kashmiri people?

As for the question of the return of the East Pakistan refugees to their homeland, it should, and can only, be settled by India and Pakistan through consultation, and it is absolutely unjustifiable to resort to force. Has there not been much interflow of refugees between India and Pakistan over the past two decades and more since the India-Pakistan partition? Because of this conflicts have often occurred on the India-Pakistan borders. All these sufferings of the Indian and Pakistan peoples stem from the roots of trouble left over by the British Empire in carrying out India-Pakistan partition after World War II. Colonialism has brought calamities on us Afro-Asian peoples. Is this lesson not bitter enough to arouse us to concentrate our national hatred on imperialism instead of slaughtering our own brothers and sisters? However, India has now used armed force in a big way and spread the flames of its war of aggression throughout East Pakistan. As a result, it is not only turning all the 75 million people in East Pakistan into refugees but has brought war disasters upon both the Indian and Pakistan peoples. The Indian Government has single-handedly manufactured a so-called "Bangla Desh" and inserted it into East Pakistan by armed force. The Indian Minister for External Affairs, Swaran Singh, has said that the Indian armed forces will remain in Pakistan territory for as long as this régime

requires them. This proves that this régime is a puppet régime which can hardly exist without the protection of Indian bayonets. In this sense, it is totally the same stuff as the so-called "Manchukuo" of the thirties and forties, which was under the aegis of Japanese militarism.

The Soviet Government has played a shameful role in this war of aggression launched by India against Pakistan. The whole world has seen clearly that it is the backstage manager of the Indian expansionists. For many years, the Soviet Government has been energetically fostering the Indian reactionaries and abetting India in its outward expansion. In August last the Soviet Union and India signed the treaty which is labelled as one of "peace, friendship and co-operation" but is in substance a treaty of military alliance. They claimed that this treaty was not directed against any country, but actually it is precisely under their joint conspiracy that the subversion, interference and aggression against Pakistan have been intensified. Since the outbreak of the war of aggression, the Soviet Union has stepped up its efforts in pouring a steady stream of arms and equipment into India to bolster and pep up the Indian aggressors. What makes people particularly indignant is that the representative of the Soviet Government in the Security Council should have time and again used the veto to obstruct the cease-fire and troop withdrawal which are desired by the overwhelming majority of countries and the people all over the world. The Soviet Government has wantonly vilified China, alleging that it is China that has stirred up the conflict between India and Pakistan and "set Asians to fight Asians". Actually, it is the Soviet Government itself that has really and truly "set Asians to fight Asians". The purpose of the Soviet Union in so doing is known to all, that is, to further strengthen its control over India and thereby proceed to contend with the other super-Power for hegemony in the whole of the South Asian subcontinent and the Indian Ocean and at the same time to foster India and turn it into a sub-super-Power on the South Asian subcontinent as its assistant and partner in committing aggression against Asia. The present sudden invasion of Pakistan by India with the support of the Soviet Union is precisely a repetition on the South Asian subcontinent of the 1968 Soviet invasion and occupation of Czechoslovakia. The acts of the Soviet Government have once again revealed its hideous features as social-imperialism and its expansionist ambition. We must for ever maintain high vigilance against imperialism and expansionism, and we would here advise our friendly countries on the South Asian subcontinent as well as all the countries in the world which are subjected to injury and threat by super-Powers or sub-super-Powers that they should by no means relax their vigilance but should contin-

uously strengthen their defence capabilities and be ready at all times to hit back at the enemy who may seek every opportunity to attack them.

The Chinese Government and people consistently oppose imperialism, expansionism, colonialism and neo-colonialism and firmly support the people of all countries in their just struggle in defence of their state sovereignty and territorial integrity and against foreign aggression, subversion, interference, control and bullying. The war between India and Pakistan is a struggle between aggression and anti-aggression, between division and anti-division, and between subversion and anti-subversion. Under the leadership of President Yahya Khan, the people and armed forces of Pakistan have displayed an admirable spirit of heroism in this struggle. The Chinese Government and people firmly support the Pakistan Government and people in their struggle against aggression, division and subversion; we not only are doing this politically, but will continue to give them material assistance. The Chinese Government firmly maintains that the 7 December 1971 resolution of the General Assembly must be carried out immediately. We hold that there can be no neutrality on the question of aggression versus anti-aggression, of division versus anti-division, and of subversion versus anti-subversion. Certain big Powers, making no distinction between right and wrong and remaining inactive and silent, have all along condoned and allowed the aggressor to grow through appeasement. The result can only be to tread again on the wrong path of Munich and the former League of Nations.

History has repeatedly proved that no aggressor comes to a good end. Relying on the support of Soviet revisionist social-imperialism, the Indian expansionists have now invaded and occupied large tracts of Pakistan territory and are acting truculently in a wild attempt to lord it over the subcontinent, fancying that they will get their way. However, contrary to the subjective wishes of the Indian Government, its crimes of aggression will certainly arouse even stronger dissatisfaction and resistance on the part of the Pakistan people and the other peoples of the South Asian subcontinent, the Indian people included, and henceforth there will be no tranquillity for it on the South Asian subcontinent. He who plays with fire will be consumed by fire. The Indian expansionists and their backstage manager will surely eat the bitter fruit of their own making. Victory surely belongs to the great Pakistan people fighting against aggression! Victory surely belongs to the great peoples of India and the other South Asian countries, who love independence, peace and freedom! Victory surely belongs to all the peoples of the world that love peace and uphold justice!

#### DOCUMENT S/10463/REV.1\*

Letter dated 18 December 1971 from the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Secretary-General

[Original: Russian]  
[20 December 1971]

I request you to arrange for the attached statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR issue dated 18 December to be circulated as an official docu-

ment of the Security Council and the General Assembly.

(Signed) Y. MALIK  
Permanent Representative of the  
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics  
to the United Nations

\* Also circulated as a General Assembly document under the symbol A/8637/Rev.1.

STATEMENT BY THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
OF THE USSR

In connexion with the current situation in the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR is authorized to make the following statement.

In the Soviet Union, as in other peace-loving countries, the armed conflict in the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent has given rise to the gravest concern. The USSR had given a clear assessment of the causes that led to the conflict. Proceeding from the main principles of its foreign policy aimed at strengthening security and peace among peoples, the Soviet Union, from the very beginning of the complications in the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent engendered by the events in East Pakistan, has consistently and vigorously advocated a peaceful political settlement in East Pakistan based on the will of its people expressed in the elections of December 1970.

In the conditions of the conflict that broke out, the USSR did its utmost to achieve an immediate end to the bloodshed and a return to peace based on the lawful rights of the people. In the spirit of this position of principle, it kept in constant touch with other countries and took appropriate steps in the United Nations. Despite the opposition to this peaceful initiative on the part of some countries in the Security Council, the Soviet Union consistently upheld the positions that would realistically take account of the situation that had arisen and would contribute to a speedy cessation of the conflict on a truly just and effective basis.

The Soviet Union did not slacken its efforts to find a solution on the basis of peace and a guarantee of

the lawful interests of the people. A change can now be seen towards a relaxation of the dangerous turn of events. On 16 December this year, a cessation of military operations in East Pakistan was achieved; this ensures conditions for the normal transfer of power into the hands of the legally elected representatives of the people of East Pakistan. On the same day, the Government of India took a unilateral decision to cease fire along the entire border between India and West Pakistan and the 1965 cease-fire line in Kashmir. At the same time, as the Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, stated, India has no territorial claims. This important initiative by India, confirming its peaceful intentions, is welcomed in the Soviet Union. The decision of the Government of Pakistan that followed on 17 December to respond to this constructive step taken by India and to cease fire on the western front also causes satisfaction.

Thus, the necessary conditions are now being created for a complete cessation of the armed conflict in the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent and for an effective political settlement of the problems relating to the conflict. The end of the war in that subcontinent responds to the vital interests of the people of the region, creates the necessary conditions for their advancement along the path of national development and progress and eliminates this seat of grave tension in the world.

The USSR appeals to all countries to do their utmost to assist in the speedy restoration of peace in the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent and to refrain from any steps that might hamper the return to normal conditions there.

DOCUMENT S/10464\*

Letter dated 20 December 1971 from the representative of  
Poland to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]  
[20 December 1971]

I have the honour to request you to circulate the attached resolution of the Sixth Polish United Workers' Party Congress on security and co-operation in Europe as an official document of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

(Signed) Eugeniusz KULAGA  
Permanent Representative of Poland  
to the United Nations

RESOLUTION ON SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE  
ADOPTED BY THE SIX POLISH UNITED WORKERS' PARTY CONGRESS

The Sixth Congress of the Polish United Workers' Party, expressing the will of the Polish nation and with a sense of responsibility for the further peaceful development of the socialist motherland, confirms Poland's determined will to build a Europe of security, co-operation and peaceful co-existence of nations. Poland's voice and activity in this spirit have been known for years to world public opinion and to the Governments of all countries. Our policy stems from the principles of the socialist system, from the experience of the Pol-

\* Also circulated as a General Assembly document under the symbol A/8639.

ish nation, paid for in blood, from its vital interests and most profound aspirations.

The consolidation of peace and co-operation in Europe—today and in the future—is the duty of nations and the responsibility of Governments. We Communists have assumed this responsibility. We bear it together with the Soviet Union, which plays a decisive role in the struggle for peaceful co-existence, together with the other fraternal countries of the socialist community.

We are striving for this aim in unity with the Communist Parties of Europe. This was confirmed in the declaration of the conference at Karlovy-Vary and other joint documents. We are working together for this aim with all peaceful and realistically thinking forces on our continent.

The consistent policy and united activity of the socialist community have made it possible to preserve peace in Europe for over a quarter of a century and have created prospects of lasting peace and wide co-operation on our continent. A favourable climate for this is created by the activity of progressive and peaceful forces and the realistic policy of many European States.

In the place of the cold war, a climate of *détente* and co-operation is being created in Europe. A start has been made in the important process of normalizing relations in Central Europe. The basis of this was and is the recognition of the irrevocable character and inviolability of the post-war frontiers on our continent. Of fundamental significance for this process are the treaties between the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Germany and between Poland and the Federal Republic of Germany concluded in 1970. Thanks to this, the possibility was created for the four-Power Agreement on the question of West Berlin, and also the agreements between the Governments of the German Democratic Republic and Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic and the Senate of West Berlin.

So all the essential conditions have been created for passing to a new stage in the building of a Europe of peace, security and co-operation.

What is necessary is an early ratification by the Federal Republic of Germany of the treaties concluded with the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics and Poland, as well as the favourable conclusion of the negotiations between Czechoslovakia and the Federal Republic of Germany, a condition of which is the recognition by the Federal Republic of Germany of the invalidity of the Munich Agreement from the very beginning. Also necessary is international recognition of both the German States—the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany—as well as their admission to the United Nations and the establishment of relations between them in accordance with the norms of international law.

We consider the early convening of a conference on security and co-operation in Europe to be very important. The idea of this conference has gained the general support of the nations of Europe and the majority of Governments concerned. The time is now ripe to start active and all-round preparations to hold the conference in 1972. On behalf of all the member States of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, the recent Warsaw Conference of Foreign Ministers appealed for this to all the European countries concerned.

All the conditions exist for this conference to become a momentous event for Europe in consolidating relations of security and co-operation. It can and should greatly contribute to the creation of a system of commitments between the States of Europe that would exclude any use of force or the threat of its use, guarantee the observance of the principles of territorial integrity, respect for their sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs, the equal rights and independence of all States.

Our general aim is the building of an all-European system of collective security that would make it pos-

sible to overcome the division of the continent into military-political groupings.

The aim of our foreign policy is to ensure the conditions for all-round and friendly co-operation between the States and nations of Europe based on the principle of peaceful coexistence.

We are in favour of the elaboration of the principles for the development of co-operation in economy, science, technology and other fields on the basis of equal rights and unhampered by discriminatory barriers. We see the necessity for all-European planning and development of the infrastructure of this continent. We support constructive ideas for *rapprochement* between nations, the overcoming of accumulated prejudices, the creation of a climate of common action and responsibility for the future.

Of great importance for the realization of these intentions would be the expansion of co-operation based on long-term bilateral agreements that would create possibilities for the development of mutual economic relations, scientific and technological co-operation, cultural exchange, tourism and also political contacts.

Problems imposed by the needs of contemporary development too should be settled multilaterally within the regional framework. In particular, the time has come for the Baltic countries to do everything in their power to guarantee lasting peace in this region and, at the same time, to undertake joint efforts to regulate problems of shipping, fishing and protection of the waters of the Baltic.

We shall develop our relations with all countries. We shall continue to combat consistently the forces of cold war, revenge and militarism that have not yet given up resistance and are thinking up new plans designed to create antagonisms and cause the disintegration of Europe, poisoning the international atmosphere. We shall support everything that promotes peace and co-operation. We shall continue our endeavours to put a stop to the arms race and relieve the nations of its burden to undertake efforts for disarmament. This is the future we see for Europe on the threshold of the seventies. It is such a Europe that we want to create for the young generation of the Polish nation and all the nations of the continent on which we live.

Our Party, together with other communist parties, People's Poland, together with other socialist countries, and above all in friendship, alliance and co-operation with the land of the Soviets, will do everything to make this vision of the favourable, peaceful development of Europe become a reality. In order to attain this end, we shall act together with all peaceful forces and with all States which share our concern for the future of Europe, which are ready to build together lasting peace, security and co-operation on our continent.

#### DOCUMENT S/10466\*

#### Report of the Secretary-General concerning the implementation of General Assembly resolution 2790 (XXVI) and Security Council resolution 307 (1971)

[Original: English]  
[21 December 1971]

1. On 6 December 1971, the General Assembly unanimously adopted resolution 2790 (XXVI) in

\* Also circulated as a General Assembly document under the symbol A/8640.

which it endorsed the designation by the Secretary-General of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to be the focal point for the co-ordination of assistance to East Pakistan refugees in India from

and through the United Nations system, as well as the Secretary-General's initiative in establishing the United Nations East Pakistan Relief Operation (UNEPRO). The Assembly also requested "the Secretary-General and the High Commissioner to continue their efforts to co-ordinate international assistance and to ensure that it is used to the maximum advantage to relieve the suffering of the refugees in India and of the people of East Pakistan".

2. On 21 December, the Security Council adopted resolution 307 (1971) in which, among other things, the Council:

"3. *Calls upon* all those concerned to take all measures necessary to preserve human life and for the observance of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and to apply in full their provisions as regards the protection of wounded and sick, prisoners of war and civilian population;

"4. *Calls for* international assistance in the relief of suffering and the rehabilitation of refugees and their return in safety and dignity to their homes and for full co-operation with the Secretary-General to that effect;

"5. *Authorizes* the Secretary-General to appoint if necessary a special representative to lend his good offices for the solution of humanitarian problems."

3. The Secretary-General considers it appropriate to submit at this time a report on the implementation of the resolution of the General Assembly in view of the recent tragic developments in the area, which brought to a temporary halt the efforts to carry out the above mandate, and which have created an even greater need for international humanitarian assistance to the people of the area. This report now also has a bearing on the implementation of Security Council resolution 307 (1971).

4. Even before the adoption of General Assembly resolution 2790 (XXVI), the situation in the area had gravely deteriorated, culminating in the outbreak of large-scale hostilities between India and Pakistan on 3 December 1971. Immediately following the adoption of the resolution, the Assembly was informed by the Secretary-General, at its 2001st plenary meeting, that the humanitarian activities of the United Nations in East Pakistan had had to be suspended, since it was impossible to move supplies in a situation of active hostilities and there was no practical possibility of ensuring the reasonable safety of the international staff; nor was he any longer in a position to assure the donors that the relief supplies would reach those for whom they were intended. The Secretary-General added in this connexion that he planned to evacuate the remaining personnel of UNEPRO, but that the necessary arrangements were being made for the United Nations to be in a position to resume its humanitarian operations in the area as soon as conditions permitted, in compliance with the wish unanimously expressed by the General Assembly.

5. An account of the efforts initiated by the Secretary-General to arrange for the evacuation from Dacca of the remaining United Nations personnel, as well as other international personnel, may be found in his report of 7 December 1971 [S/10433], in which he describes the two unsuccessful attempts, on 6 and 7 December, to evacuate these persons by means of aircraft made available to the United Nations by the Canadian Government. After a third unsuccessful attempt, on 11 December, an evacuation operation was

finally carried out on 12 December by British aircraft under arrangements made by the Government of the United Kingdom in co-operation with the United Nations. Four hundred and thirty-seven international personnel, including 10 United Nations officials, were evacuated. Thirty-seven United Nations officials remained in Dacca, headed by Mr. Paul-Marc Henry, the Assistant Secretary-General in charge of the operation. Among these were 20 United Nations officials, including Field Service staff; 12 staff of the United Nations Children's Fund, three doctors of the World Health Organization, one official of the International Labour Organisation and one representative of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

6. The retention of a small volunteer group of United Nations personnel in Dacca had been decided upon by the Secretary-General on 7 December, because he considered that, in the increasingly chaotic situation prevailing in the city, certain humanitarian functions must continue to be carried out by the United Nations. On that day, as the fighting increased in intensity, the Secretary-General made a statement to the General Assembly, at its 2003rd plenary meeting, in which he appealed to all the parties to the conflict, no matter what their allegiance, to take every possible measure to spare the lives of the innocent civilian population, which was afflicted and threatened by the hostilities. In this connexion, the Secretary-General indicated that he was maintaining close contact with the International Committee of the Red Cross which, in its traditional humanitarian role, would endeavour to implement as fully as possible the terms of the Geneva Conventions of 1949. The Secretary-General appealed to all parties to observe the terms of those Conventions and to do their utmost to ensure that the present developments did not give rise to yet another senseless sacrifice of human lives on a vast scale. He went on to say that he had instructed his representative in Dacca to examine urgently, in full co-operation with the International Committee of the Red Cross, what practical measures could be taken to this end.

7. The following day the Secretary-General informed the Governments of India and Pakistan that he hoped that it would be possible to set up neutral zones in Dacca at the local United Nations headquarters and other suitable places in order to establish a base of operation for the United Nations and the International Red Cross, in pursuance of the objectives mentioned in his statement of 7 December, and also to provide a temporary safe haven for the stranded evacuee groups. The Secretary-General requested the two Governments to take all necessary measures to help the United Nations and the International Red Cross in this endeavour for the duration of the hostilities. Eventually, four neutral zones were established in Dacca under the protection of the United Nations and the International Red Cross.

8. Before the hostilities there were 106 international personnel of UNEPRO in the area. When the situation began to deteriorate, the staff was first concentrated in Dacca; of these, 69 were later evacuated, leaving 37 in the city. The evacuated staff were for the most part concentrated in Bangkok, while a small group was assigned to Singapore to establish a staging area, where supplies and equipment have been stored pending the resumption of relief operations. The group in Dacca will shortly be rotated and strengthened in

order to undertake an inventory of existing United Nations assets and to reassess as soon as possible the requirements for international assistance in the light of the changed situation.

9. Regrettably, some losses were sustained by the United Nations operation during the hostilities. The most tragic was the death of two captains of vessels transporting humanitarian supplies under United Nations auspices; four other crew members were seriously wounded. Two light aircraft under United Nations charter were destroyed at the Dacca airport. Four tugs under contract to the United Nations were sunk, and the whereabouts of another is unknown; two minibulkers were destroyed. The whereabouts and condition of some other vessels carrying humanitarian supplies under United Nations auspices remain to be determined. The state of United Nations vehicles and other equipment and supplies likewise remains to be assessed.

10. In Singapore, a significant amount of supplies have been stockpiled in recent weeks. These include over 35,000 tons of wheat shipped by Canada; 183 trucks and other vehicles; quantities of oil, brake-fluid and tires. In addition, various vessels carrying humanitarian supplies, including minibulkers, tugs and tank landing craft, lie anchored in the port.

11. En route are items purchased by UNICEF, totalling over \$1 million, which are to be used in connexion with the over-all relief operation. In addition, UNICEF is procuring from its own resources blankets, medical supplies and drugs, vehicles, high-protein food supplements and cloth valued at about \$1.5 million as an immediate action for early delivery. A World Food Programme shipment of 588 tons of vegetable oil is also on the way.

12. Commitments made by a number of donors will augment stocks already in the pipeline. These include Japanese and Australian rice, wheat from the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany and dairy products from the Netherlands. Although the above supplies are available or on the way, they are very small in proportion to the great and as yet unassessed needs of the situation. Nearly \$95 million has been pledged by 16 donors. The bulk of this amount, \$76.6 million, is committed for specific items, such as food, medical drugs and vehicles. The balance, which is earmarked for operational needs, will be exhausted rapidly in the coming weeks. The financial situation is aggravated somewhat because only \$14,547,025 of the \$18,017,092 pledged as cash contributions has so far actually been deposited with the United Nations. It should be recalled that earlier projections of requirements were based on a purely relief operation.

13. The efforts of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, in his capacity as focal point,

"to relieve the suffering of the refugees in India" were also temporarily affected by the outbreak of hostilities between India and Pakistan. After consultations with the Secretary-General, the High Commissioner announced on 7 December that in view of the prevailing situation shipments of relief commodities and equipment to India were being diverted for practical reasons until the situation permitted a resumption of deliveries. This situation improved rapidly and within three days the High Commissioner received reports from the focal point representative in New Delhi and assurances from the Government of India that conditions now permitted the resumption of the normal flow of relief supplies. On this basis, the High Commissioner announced on 10 December that shipments of relief commodities and equipment to India were being resumed.

14. Since the beginning of the United Nations humanitarian action in India and East Pakistan, it has been recognized that the solution of the problem would necessarily involve the voluntary repatriation of the refugees from India, and efforts to facilitate such repatriation were undertaken by the High Commissioner. A representative of the High Commissioner as focal point had been stationed in Dacca and was a member of the United Nations team which remained in the city throughout the period of hostilities. It is anticipated that activities in connexion with the repatriation and resettlement of refugees will receive a high priority in the continuing work both of the High Commissioner as focal point and in the resumed activities of the United Nations relief operation in Dacca. Any indication of the extent and nature of these activities will obviously have to await detailed consultations with the authorities concerned.

15. As soon as a more precise assessment of needs is available, the Secretary-General, in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 2790 (XXVI) and Security Council resolution 307 (1971), will be making further and more specific appeals for international assistance. He is also giving serious consideration to the provision in paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 307 (1971) concerning the appointment of a special representative to lend his good offices for the solution of humanitarian problems.

16. In concluding this report, the Secretary-General wishes to express his deep appreciation to all the personnel of the United Nations, its specialized agencies and programmes, the voluntary agencies as well as the associated personnel of the operation, who have, in the most difficult and often dangerous circumstances, tried to bring help and relief to the afflicted peoples of the area. A special tribute must be paid to the memory of those who have lost their lives and to those who have been wounded in the course of this humanitarian operation.

## DOCUMENTS S/10467 AND ADD.1

### Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 307 (1971)

#### DOCUMENT S/10467

[Original: English]  
[22 December 1971]

1. In paragraph 1 of its resolution 307 (1971) of 21 December 1971, the Security Council demanded that

"a durable cease-fire and cessation of all hostilities in all areas of conflict be strictly observed and remain in effect until withdrawals take place, as soon as practicable, of all armed forces to their respective territories and to positions which fully respect the cease-fire line in Jammu and Kashmir supervised

[Original: English]  
[29 December 1971]

In paragraph 6 of the same resolution the Council requested the Secretary-General to keep the Council informed without delay on developments relating to the implementation of the resolution.

2. Upon the commencement of large-scale hostilities between India and Pakistan on 3 December 1971, the Secretary-General began transmitting to the Security Council the reports of the Chief Military Observer of the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) on the situation along the cease-fire line in Kashmir, as he had done at the time of the events of 1965-1966. This practice was discontinued with the entry into effect of the cease-fire at 1930 hours<sup>27</sup> on 17 December. The present report is submitted, and further reports will be circulated as necessary, in compliance with the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 6 of Security Council resolution 307 (1971).

3. The Chief Military Observer of UNMOGIP, Lieutenant-General Luis Tassara González, reports that since entry into effect of the cease-fire the situation along the cease-fire line in Jammu and Kashmir has been generally quiet, with the exception of occasional exchanges of shelling and small-arms fire reported from the Baramula-Domel-Rawalakot and Rajouri sectors. As of 1700 hours on 21 December, Field Stations Baramula, Domel and Rawalakot again reported sporadic exchanges of artillery and small-arms fire during the day. All other sectors were quiet. At 1100 hours on 22 December the Chief Military Observer reported that all sectors had been quiet during the night and morning.

4. The Chief Military Observer is making every effort to return to normal practice in the area of operation of UNMOGIP. Thus the Chief of Army Staff of India and the Pakistan Army command have agreed to the reopening of the Jammu-Sialkot check-post at certain specified times for the purpose of allowing the crossing of the cease-fire line by United Nations military observers. A crossing took place at that check-post at 1300 hours on 21 December.

5. As the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council on 4 December 1971 [S/10412], the United Nations has no military observation machinery in any part of the subcontinent other than the cease-fire line and adjacent border in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, which are supervised by UNMOGIP. The Secretary-General is therefore not in a position to report to the Council on developments relating to the implementation of paragraph 1 of resolution 307 (1971) in respect of any other of the areas of conflict in the subcontinent.

6. As indicated in his report of 21 December to the General Assembly and the Security Council [S/10466], a small group of officials of the United Nations relief operation in Dacca has been maintained in that city and will be strengthened shortly in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 2790 (XXVI) and paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution 307 (1971). It goes without saying that the activities of these officials have been, and will be, strictly limited to the humanitarian field.

<sup>27</sup> All time indications are West Pakistan Time.

1. The present report, based on information received from the Chief Military Observer of the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan on the situation along the cease-fire line in Kashmir and the adjacent border area, is submitted in compliance with the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 6 of Security Council resolution 307 (1971). It covers the period between 1100 hours on 22 December and 1100 hours on 29 December 1971.

2. During the period under review, the situation along the cease-fire line and the adjacent border was generally quiet. There were however intermittent exchanges of fire in several sectors.

3. At 1700 hours on 22 December, Field Stations Bhimber and Jamu reported occasional artillery fire in their sectors during the day.

4. (a) On 25 December, Field Stations Punch and Rawalakot reported that an exchange of artillery and mortar fire had taken place from 1315 to 1645 hours on 24 December;

(b) The Indian military authorities in Punch reported that their troops had received Pakistan fire and returned it. The Pakistan military authorities in Rawalakot reported that Indian troops fired small arms and attempted to intrude across the cease-fire line.

5. At 1200 hours on 25 December, Field Station Rawalakot reported that several rounds of artillery had been fired north of the station.

6. On 27 December, Field Stations Punch and Rawalakot reported that sporadic artillery and mortar firing had taken place between 0900 and 1800 hours on 26 December.

7. On 28 December, Field Stations Punch and Rawalakot reported that sporadic mortar and artillery fire had taken place between 0930 and 1500 hours on 27 December.

8. (a) Field Station Baramula heard sporadic artillery fire throughout the night of 28 to 29 December;

(b) At 0800 hours on 29 December, the Indian military authorities in Baramula informed UNMOGIP that Pakistan forces had attacked Indian positions in that sector between 1630 and 1930 hours on 28 December. They stated that the attack had been repulsed by artillery fire, and that some Pakistan prisoners and weapons had been captured.

9. On 29 December, Field Stations Punch and Rawalakot reported that sporadic artillery fire had taken place between 1100 and 1400 hours on 28 December. Field Station Punch reported further firing at 2045 hours on 28 December.

10. At 1100 hours on 29 December, all sectors were quiet.

11. The Chief Military Observer has held discussions with the Indian and Pakistan High Commands in New Delhi and Rawalpindi on the subject of the observance and supervision of the cease-fire.

Letter dated 21 December 1971 from the representative of Pakistan to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]  
[22 December 1971]

Under instructions of my Government, I have the honour to forward to you the enclosed letter from the President of Pakistan dated 21 December 1971.<sup>28</sup>

(Signed) A. SHAHI  
Permanent Representative of Pakistan  
to the United Nations

TEXT OF THE LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT OF  
PAKISTAN TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have today addressed the following earnest appeal to Heads of State of Government of the countries that are the members of the Security Council. I am sure that this appeal will have your whole-hearted support and that you will use your influence in impressing upon the Security Council the need for most urgent action to stop the carnage and human suffering in East Pakistan.

(Signed) Zulfikar Ali BHUTTO  
President of Pakistan

*Text of the appeal*

It is with a very heavy heart that I address this, my first message to you, to ask for your assistance to alleviate human suffering.

The news from Dacca is grim. Reports from independent sources, which must have reached you by now, speak of inhuman atrocities and mass murders of innocent people in a part of Pakistan which is now under India's military occupation. To say that these killings and atrocities are being perpetrated by the so-called "Mukti Bahini" does not, and cannot, absolve India of

\* Also circulated as a General Assembly document under the symbol A/8641.

<sup>28</sup> Circulated to the members of the General Assembly and the Security Council in accordance with a note verbale dated 22 December 1971 from the representative of Pakistan.

its responsibility to ensure the safety of the life and property of the people. The Commanding General of India has publicly stated that the "Mukti Bahini" and all other forces now in East Pakistan are under his effective command.

What is happening in Dacca is by no means an isolated affair. Reports of similar incidents are also being received from other cities in East Pakistan.

The news of this indiscriminate carnage has been received with the gravest concern in Pakistan, and cannot but be viewed with horror throughout the world. I am therefore addressing this earnest appeal to you on behalf of the people of Pakistan, and on my own behalf, to use your influence with India most urgently to prevent further carnage. Otherwise that province could soon be engulfed in a widespread blood-bath.

My Government has already approached the International Red Cross, which has sent some personnel and supplies to Dacca. The need of the hour, however, is for Red Cross presence in greater strength, for assistance by way of medicines and field hospitals in a more massive form. Apart from requesting the International Red Cross to do what is needed, and in particular, to ensure compliance with the Geneva Conventions of 1949, my Government has also enlisted the support of other friendly Governments to lend their weight in moving the Red Cross and also to take action themselves through humanitarian organizations.

An urgent appeal to India by all permanent members of the Security Council and action by them individually in pursuance of these humanitarian objectives would go a long way towards bringing peace to that strife-torn land.

I would in particular ask you immediately to approach the Government of India to take effective measures with all the means at their command to ensure that this carnage stops without loss of time.

## DOCUMENT S/10469\*

Letter dated 15 December 1971 from the representatives of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Secretary-General

[Original: Russian]  
[21 December 1971]

We request you to arrange for the circulation as Security Council and General Assembly documents of the attached communiqué issued on 1 December 1971 by the Conference of Foreign Ministers of States Parties to the Treaty of Warsaw.

(Signed) G. GROZEV  
Permanent Representative of the  
People's Republic of Bulgaria  
to the United Nations

Z. ČERNÍK  
Permanent Representative of the  
Czechoslovak Socialist Republic  
to the United Nations

\* Also circulated as a General Assembly document under the symbol A/8642.

K. SZARKA  
Permanent Representative of the  
Hungarian People's Republic  
to the United Nations

E. KULAGA  
Permanent Representative of the  
Polish People's Republic  
to the United Nations

G. DIACONESCU  
Permanent Representative of the  
Socialist Republic of Romania  
to the United Nations

Y. MALIK  
Permanent Representative of the  
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics  
to the United Nations

## COMMUNIQUE

In Warsaw from 30 November to 1 December 1971 a conference was held of Foreign Ministers of the States Parties to the Treaty of Warsaw—the People's Republic of Bulgaria, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, the German Democratic Republic, the Hungarian People's Republic, the Polish People's Republic, the Socialist Republic of Romania and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The Ministers considered the question of preparing for the convening of an all-European conference on questions of security and co-operation.

They noted with satisfaction that a further positive movement has recently been witnessed towards an improved political situation in Europe as shown by increased contacts, progress in easing tensions and in developing co-operation, and greater confidence in the relations between European States irrespective of their political and social systems. This movement is the product of the efforts and constructive contribution by States participating in the present conference, and of the efforts and constructive contribution by a number of other States. Major new milestones in this regard are the signing of the quadripartite agreement on matters relating to West Berlin, the deepening of political co-operation between the USSR and France and the widening of bilateral contacts between socialist and other European States. The treaties between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Federal Republic of Germany, and between the Polish People's Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany, which were signed during 1970 have already begun to improve the political atmosphere in relations between these States and to exert a positive influence on the course of European events. The Governments of the States Parties to these treaties are now taking steps towards ratifying them. An exchange of views is in progress between the Governments of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany with a view to regularizing their mutual relations, for which a precondition is that the Federal Republic recognize the Munich agreement as being invalid *ab initio*.

The Ministers expressed their gratification at the fact that the business-like and constructive approach taken by the German Democratic Republic contributed to the favourable conduct of negotiations between it and the Federal Republic of Germany, and also between the German Democratic Republic and the West Berlin Senate.

The Ministers further noted the widening of agreement among the States concerned, on the desirability of convening an all-European conference on questions of security and co-operation at an early date. There is heightened understanding that the holding of such a conference would serve the objective of a gradual transformation of relations between European States, enabling the division of the continent into military-political groupings to be overcome. There has been a

considerable *rapprochement* of views in relation to the content of the work to be done at the conference, which should contribute to the establishment of a system of obligations precluding any threat or use of force in the relations between States in Europe and ensuring compliance with the principles of territorial integrity of States, respect for their sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs and equality of rights and independence of all States. Views have also drawn closer on the question of expanding the economic, scientific, technical and cultural co-operation between European countries.

In view of these developments, the Governments of the States Parties to the Treaty of Warsaw came to the conclusion that an auspicious situation is forming for the all-European conference to take place during 1972. At the same time they realize that certain forces are still exerting pressure against the convening of an all-European conference and are engaged in attempts to complicate the situation in Europe. The Ministers nevertheless expressed the conviction of their Governments that if active steps are taken by all those interested in turning a Europe of tension and conflicts into a Europe of lasting peace the influence exerted by such forces can be overcome.

The Ministers exchanged views on the practical ways and means of preparing for the convening of an all-European conference. They stated on behalf of their Governments that they considered it desirable to act on the suggestion of the Government of Finland to hold multilateral preparatory consultations among all the States concerned. In the course of such consultations agreement could be reached on the agenda for the all-European conference, the procedure for its work, the specific dates and the manner in which the conference should be convened. The Ministers announced that their Governments had decided to designate plenipotentiary representatives to participate with plenipotentiary representatives of other States in the multilateral consultations for the purpose of reaching agreement on questions involved in the preparation and organization of the conference, and they invite the Governments of other States concerned to proceed in the same manner. They start from the premise that the consultations should be held in such a way as to hasten the convening of an all-European conference and contribute to its success.

On the instructions of their Governments the Ministers urge the Governments of all European States, and also the Governments of the United States and Canada, to proceed without delay to the practical preparation for an all-European conference in order that it may be convened in 1972.

The Ministers also exchanged views on certain international questions which are aggravating the international situation and, on behalf of their Governments, took a firm position in favour of resolving those questions by the method of political settlement, observing the legitimate rights and interests of the peoples.

## DOCUMENT S/10470

### Note by the President of the Security Council

[Original: English]  
[23 December 1971]

1. At its 1604th meeting held on 2 December 1971, the Security Council, while discussing the question

concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia, decided, in accordance with rule 39 of the provisional rules of

procedure of the Security Council, that Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Sithole should be invited to appear before the Council to state their views of the proposals on Southern Rhodesia.

2. Following that decision, the President of the Security Council addressed a letter on the same day to the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations. The text of this letter is as follows:

"As you are aware, at its 1604th meeting held today, the Security Council, without objection, took a decision in support of the invitation of Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Sithole, to appear before the Security Council.

"This decision was taken following a proposal made at the 1602nd meeting of the Security Council, held on 25 November 1971, by the representative of the Soviet Union. At that meeting, the representative of the Soviet Union proposed that the leaders of the parties, ZAPU and ZANU, Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Sithole, should be invited to the meetings of the Security Council so that the Council could hear them and obtain from them information concerning the true position in Southern Rhodesia and their appraisal of the Home-Smith agreements. The representative of Somalia associated himself with the proposal.

"I consider it my duty to draw your attention to this decision of the Security Council. I would hope

that your Government, as the administering authority of the Territory, will take the appropriate steps to ensure compliance with this decision of the Security Council."

3. On 21 December 1971, the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations addressed a letter to the President of the Security Council. The text of this letter is as follows:

"I have the honour to acknowledge your letter of 2 December, in which you drew my attention to the Security Council's invitation to Mr. Nkomo and the Reverend Sithole to appear before the Security Council, which I accordingly referred to my Government.

"I am instructed by my Government to say that it has considered carefully the hope expressed in your letter that it would take appropriate steps to ensure that Mr. Nkomo and the Reverend Sithole were able to respond to the invitation to address the Council. As you know, however, Mr. Nkomo is in detention and the Reverend Sithole is serving a prison sentence in Rhodesia. In these circumstances my Government regrets that, as I said during our consultations before you announced that there were no objections to the issuance of the invitation, it is not in a position to require the Rhodesian authorities to allow either Mr. Nkomo or the Reverend Sithole to come to New York."

#### DOCUMENT S/10472

##### Letter dated 23 December 1971 from the representative of Pakistan to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]  
[23 December 1971]

Under the instructions of my Government, I have the honour to draw your attention to the following cease-fire violations by the Indian armed forces on 18, 19 and 20 December 1971:

(a) On 18 December, Indian armed personnel attacked Pul Kanjari in Attari-Wagah sector. They also attacked a Pakistan post south of Hussainiwala and captured 26 Pakistan soldiers. In the Rajasthan sector, they attacked and captured three Pakistan posts. They also kept firing intermittently across the cease-fire line in Jammu and Kashmir.

(b) On the night of 19 to 20 December, two Indian Army platoons attacked the Pakistan position in the Burki sector in a bid to capture Pakistan posts there.

To draw the attention of the Security Council to these attacks soon after the cease-fire, it is requested that this should be circulated as a Security Council document.

(Signed) A. SHAHI  
Permanent Representative of Pakistan  
to the United Nations

#### DOCUMENT S/10473

##### Report of the Secretary-General concerning the implementation of Security Council resolution 307 (1971)

[Original: English]  
[25 December 1971]

1. In paragraph 5 of resolution 307 (1971) adopted on 21 December 1971, the Security Council authorized the Secretary-General "to appoint if necessary a special representative to lend his good offices for the solution of humanitarian problems".

2. In the light of developments in the subcontinent, and after consultation with the Secretary-General designate, the Secretary-General decided, on 23 December, to appoint Mr. Vittorio Winspeare Guicciardi, Under-Secretary-General and Director-General of the United Nations Office at Geneva, as his special representative. The Secretary-General so informed the Permanent Representatives of India and Pakistan on the evening of 23 December and asked for the concurrence and co-operation of their Governments in the mission of the special representative.

3. The Permanent Representative of Pakistan has signified the concurrence of his Government in Mr. Winspeare's mission. The Permanent Representative of India has informed the Secretary-General that the Indian Government will extend its co-operation to the special representative within the limits of its legal and practical possibilities.

4. In view of the urgent nature of some of the humanitarian problems in the subcontinent, the Secretary-General has instructed Mr. Winspeare to proceed to the subcontinent immediately.

#### DOCUMENT S/10474

#### Letter dated 24 December 1971 from the representative of China to the President of the Security Council

[Original: Chinese/English]  
[25 December 1971]

In view of the barbarous persecution and massacre of the Pakistan people being carried out by the Indian aggressor troops and the East Pakistan rebels under their command in many parts of East Pakistan, I have the honour to request you to ask the Secretary-General, in pursuance of paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 307 (1971) immediately to submit a report to the Council on the implementation of the resolution and to keep the member States of the Council informed without delay on developments relating to the implementation of the resolution.

Attached herewith is a copy of the English text of the 22 December news release of China's Hsinhua News Agency on the massacre of the Pakistan people by the Indian aggressor troops and the East Pakistan rebels. I would request you kindly to have this news release together with this letter circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) HUANG Hua  
Permanent Representative of  
the People's Republic of China  
to the United Nations

TEXT OF THE NEWS RELEASE ISSUED BY CHINA'S HSINHUA NEWS AGENCY ENTITLED "INDIAN AGGRESSOR TROOPS AND EAST PAKISTAN REBELS BARBAROUSLY MASSACRE PAKISTAN PEOPLE"

*Peking, 22 December.* The Indian aggressor troops and the East Pakistan rebels under their command began to massacre and persecute the Pakistan people barbarously after the Indian reactionaries occupied Dacca, capital of East Pakistan, and other cities with the support of Soviet revisionist social-imperialism.

A foreign news agency dispatch from Dacca yesterday said that the Indian aggressor troops and the East Pakistan rebels sealed off by armed force a housing colony where there are "at least 10,000 men, women and children". The charge levelled at the residents by the Indian aggressor troops is that they had "supported and worked with the West Pakistan authorities". The Indian aggressor troops authorities clamoured that "the area would remain cordoned off" until the residents turned themselves in. It was reported that the residents

resolved to arm themselves for self-defence. They said that though they had no food or water they would hold out in their struggle.

DPA reported from Dacca on 20 December: "The 'Mukti Bahini' (meaning the East Pakistan rebels under the eastern command of the Indian army) are rampaging on a merciless purge against the people they term 'Razakars'—collaborators".

The report said that six alleged "Razakars" were beaten up before foreign journalists, and when the Pakistan men were helpless and semi-conscious on the ground, the "Mukti Bahini" massacred them with bayonets as they lay there. The report went on: "The dead are everywhere in the streets of this town, probably one of the ugliest places in the world".

Sarin, correspondent of the *Indian Express*, also disclosed in a report from Dacca on 21 December the large-scale massacre of the Pakistan people in Dacca. A foreign news agency quoted his report as saying that "in a period of 48 hours he had counted 70 bodies of West Pakistanis in just one area of the East Pakistan capital".

On 18 December, the third day of the invasion of Dacca by the Indian aggressors, some East Pakistan rebels held a meeting of some 5,000 people at the race course of Dacca to see the bloody execution of four Pakistan people by bayonets without specific charges. The executioners clamoured that it was a warning to those who refuse to submit. The bloody incident aroused immense indignation from many of the witnesses. It was reported that a Pakistan youth just returned to Dacca from abroad said: "I don't think they should have been so brutal."

In Khulna, south-western East Pakistan, the Indian aggressors and the East Pakistan rebels under their command, started massive arrests and slaughtering of the local people. An AFP report from Khulna on 20 December said that the Bihari District of the town was deserted. Four thousand people have been arrested by the Indian aggressor troops. Some were killed and many have gone into hiding with their weapons.

Reports also disclosed that terror reigns in a number of cities of East Pakistan including Sylhet and Mymensingh.

DOCUMENT S/10475

Letter dated 27 December 1971 from the representative of Pakistan  
to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]  
[28 December 1971]

I have the honour to communicate to you the enclosed letter dated 26 December from Foreign Secretary Sultan M. Khan in reply to your communication of 22 December 1971 addressed to him.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a Security Council document.

(Signed) A. SHAHI  
Permanent Representative of Pakistan  
to the United Nations

LETTER FROM THE FOREIGN SECRETARY OF PAKISTAN  
TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I acknowledge receipt of your communication dated 22 December 1971 conveying the text of resolution 307 (1971) adopted by the Security Council at its 1621st meeting on 21 December.

It is noted that the Security Council has demanded a durable cease-fire and cessation of all hostilities in all areas of conflict until withdrawals take place, as soon as practicable, of all armed forces to their respective territories and to positions which fully respect the cease-fire line in Jammu and Kashmir supervised by UNMOGIP. I also note that the resolution has called upon all Member States to refrain from any action which may aggravate the situation in the subcontinent or endanger international peace.

We have been heartened by the Security Council's call upon all concerned to take all measures necessary

to preserve human life and for observance of the Geneva Convention of 1949 in respect of the protection of the wounded and the sick and of prisoners of war and civilian population. The President of Pakistan has already addressed you on the subject and emphasized the gravity of the situation in the prevailing conditions of East Pakistan. It is our hope that the resolution will strengthen your hand in devising immediate measures for the protection of human life and to bring to an end the bloodshed which is taking place there.

We similarly welcome the Security Council's call for international assistance in the relief of suffering and the rehabilitation of refugees and their return in safety to their homes and its authorizing you to appoint, if necessary, a special representative to lend his good offices for the solution of the humanitarian problems involved.

It must be emphasized in this connexion that the Government of Pakistan interprets the Security Council's resolution to be under the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations and that it is only the cessation of aggression without delay by India in East Pakistan and in all other areas of conflict including the recognized positions along the cease-fire line, as in 1965, in Jammu and Kashmir, that will restore peace and stability in the subcontinent. Pakistan expects that India will promptly respond to the demand of the international community as expressed by General Assembly resolution 2793 (XXVI) by an overwhelming majority.

DOCUMENT S/10476

Letter dated 28 December 1971 from the representative of China  
to the President of the Security Council

[Original: Chinese]  
[28 December 1971]

In recent days, the Indian aggressor troops and the East Pakistan rebels under their command, far from stopping their barbarous slaughter and persecution of the Pakistan people in many parts of East Pakistan, have further aggravated this slaughter and persecution, which has reached appalling proportions. Obviously, such a state of affairs is in serious violation of the provisions of Security Council resolution 307 (1971) and calls for immediate attention and appropriate action by the Security Council and the Secretary-General.

Attached herewith is a copy of the 26 December news release of China's Hsinhua News Agency on the continued persecution of the Pakistan people by the Indian aggressor troops and the East Pakistan rebels. I would request you kindly to have this news release together with this letter circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) HUANG Hua  
Permanent Representative of the  
People's Republic of China  
to the United Nations

TEXT OF THE NEWS RELEASE ISSUED BY CHINA'S HSIHUA NEWS AGENCY ENTITLED "INDIAN AGGRESSOR TROOPS AND EAST PAKISTAN REBELS CONTINUE TO PERSECUTE EAST PAKISTAN PEOPLE"

*Peking, 26 December.* The Indian aggressor troops and East Pakistan rebels under their command are continuing to encircle Mirpur and Mohammedpur, towns in the suburbs of Dacca, where large numbers of people are starving to death because of water and food shortages, according to reports from Dacca.

Foreign news agencies reported that since early last week, the Indian occupation troops and East Pakistan rebels have cut off supplies of food, water and electricity to several thousand residents of Mirpur in an attempt to besiege the town and starve them to death on the charge of their "co-operation with Pakistan Government troops". The Mirpur residents said that they were afraid to go out of the town to look for food because the roads were guarded by joint patrols of Indian and "Mukti Bahini" (East Pakistan rebels) soldiers who stopped and searched all vehicles. One

resident said to newsmen: "Anyone who goes out on the road gets his throat slit". The residents revealed that every night five to ten residents were killed by the Indian troops and the East Pakistan rebels. The International Red Cross tried to bring some food and medicine to Mirpur, but it was stopped by the Indian troops and East Pakistan rebels. A rebel chief yelled that "this is an internal affair for Bangla Desh and not for the Red Cross".

In speaking to foreign correspondents, Mirpur inhabitants angrily accused the Indian aggressor troops and East Pakistan rebels of atrocities. Many people told foreign correspondents on 24 December that they had eaten nothing for five days. Some mothers holding sick and dying babies in their arms pleaded for help from the International Red Cross. A woman in tears said that her husband had been kidnapped by the rebels. A foreign news agency noted: "Hundreds of

men driven by desperation physically held newsmen and demanded they 'tell the world what is happening'. Several screamed they would rather be bombed to death than face slow death by starvation."

Even the Indian press had to admit the grave atrocities perpetrated in the vicinity of Dacca. A dispatch of the *Indian Express* correspondent from Dacca on 20 December said that the "Mukti Bahini" (East Pakistan rebels) encircled Mirpur and Mohammedpur in the outskirts of Dacca in their search for "collaborators". The dispatch admitted that the Indian aggressors were also on the spot and that the situation "might erupt any moment into a holocaust".

It was reported that many corpses of the massacred Pakistan people were found in the streets of Dacca and nearby farmland. Hordes of crows and dogs were devouring the rotting corpses.

#### DOCUMENT S/10477

Letter dated 23 December 1971 from the representative of Guinea to the President of the Security Council

[Original: French]  
[29 December 1971]

On instructions from my Government, I refer to the resolution adopted by the General Assembly at its twenty-sixth session [2863 (XXVI)], on co-operation between the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity.

The Government of the Republic of Guinea regards that resolution as an important step towards the implementation of United Nations resolutions dealing with African problems.

By deciding to invite the Security Council to consider the request of the Organization of African Unity concerning the holding of meetings of the Council in Africa, the General Assembly expressed the virtually unanimous desire of the Members of the Organization to find practical solutions to African problems based on African realities as they exist on the spot.

Guinea is anxious to continue its fruitful co-operation with the Security Council and regards its election to membership of the Council as an honour and a definite token of confidence.

Acting within the framework of the above-mentioned resolution on co-operation with the Organization of African Unity, Guinea wishes to be the first to extend a formal invitation to the Security Council to hold its meetings at Conakry, its capital.

Conakry, which has endured colonialist aggression, has a better understanding than any other African

city of the reality and magnitude of the problems with which the Council should deal.

Moreover, Conakry is the headquarters of the Subcommittee of the important Liberation Committee of the Organization of African Unity.

In order to assist the Security Council in its task, the Government of the Republic of Guinea has decided to place at its disposal all the technical and practical facilities which it will require for its meetings. Those facilities include, *inter alia*, the use of the conference rooms of the Palais du Peuple, its simultaneous interpretation equipment and any other installations necessary for the efficient conduct of the work of the Council.

Furthermore, the Government of the Republic of Guinea will bear the costs involved.

Guinea hopes that its gesture will be viewed as a concrete step and an effective and direct contribution to the cause of peace and justice in Africa, and as evidence of its unwavering devotion to the United Nations and the principles of the Charter.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) El Hadj Abdoulaye TOURE  
Permanent Representative of the  
Republic of Guinea to the United Nations

#### DOCUMENT S/10481\*

Letter dated 29 December 1971 from the representative of Nigeria to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]  
[30 December 1971]

I have the honour to forward, on the instructions of my Government, the attached copy of the statement on Rhodesia made by the Nigerian Commissioner for External Affairs, Mr. Okoi Arikpo, on 23 December 1971.

\* Also circulated as a General Assembly document under the symbol A/8650.

I should be grateful if you would circulate this statement as an official document of both the Security Council and the General Assembly.

(Signed) E. O. OGBU  
Permanent Representative of Nigeria  
to the United Nations

## TEXT OF THE STATEMENT

After the most careful examination, the Federal Military Government has concluded that the new British proposals for a settlement of the Rhodesian problem are completely unacceptable to Nigeria and cannot be recommended for acceptance by the African population of Zimbabwe as they are neither designed to prevent the perpetuation of white minority rule nor to guarantee progress towards majority rule in Rhodesia.

The proposals do not even satisfy the so-called five principles promised by the British Government as a basis for the settlement of the Rhodesian problem. Indeed, one of the five principles—progress towards ending racial discrimination implicit in the 1961 Constitution—has been abandoned. All that remains of it is Mr. Smith's reported promise to make progress towards ending racial discrimination.

The new proposals will not eliminate racialism and inequality in Zimbabwe. The two main racial groups will operate parallel and separate electoral rolls and even after parity has been achieved, there will be no legal guarantee to secure a unified multiracial electorate.

On a more basic level, the proposals violate General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples, which principally declares that "the subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and is an impediment to the promotion of world peace and co-operation".

All the disguises of the proposed electoral reforms do not conceal the most important truth about the new arrangements which will enable Mr. Smith to frustrate and prevent African advancement. They leave him with the control of the economy and the schools and the power to regulate the number of Africans to be admitted to the electoral register.

The Federal Government recalls that the then British Government under Lord Balfour similarly abandoned the African and coloured population in 1909-1910 by agreeing to constitutional guarantees undertaken by the South African Government to respect African interests and promote African advancement. After independence, the South African Government fundamentally changed the 1919 Constitution. The result today is total *apartheid* and the enslavement of Africans.

In the circumstances, the Nigerian Government reaffirms its stand with regard to the principle of no independence before majority rule in Zimbabwe. It will not support the admission of an independent Zimbabwe, under a minority régime, into the United Nations, the Commonwealth or any other international organization of sovereign States; nor will it agree to the lifting of United Nations sanctions against the minority régime in Zimbabwe.

The Federal Government, therefore, urges:

(a) Effective United Nations intervention in Zimbabwe;

(b) The immediate introduction of a constitution in Zimbabwe which will provide for majority rule under the supervision of a United Nations commission;

(c) Arrangement for massive international aid for economic reconstruction and educational development of the African population in Zimbabwe;

(d) The provision of United Nations guarantee of the territorial integrity of the new independent Zimbabwe.

If Britain rejects these just demands and persists in opposing African aspirations in collusion with racist régimes and in threatening thereby the security of Nigeria and other African countries, the Federal Government will be constrained to re-examine its obligations as a member of the Commonwealth and will take other appropriate measures to safeguard Nigerian and African interests and security.

## DOCUMENT S/10485\*

### Note verbale dated 15 December 1971 from the representative of Pakistan to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]  
[30 December 1971]

The Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General and under instructions from the Government of Pakistan is constrained to bring to the attention of the Secretary-General some deplorable aspects of the actions undertaken by the Government of India in its present aggression against Pakistan.

The General Assembly, in paragraph 4 of its resolution 2793 (XXVI), urged "that every effort be made to safeguard the lives and well-being of the civilian population in the area of conflict". From a purely legal point of view, a blockade is considered a legitimate instrument once a state of war exists between two countries. However, in its blockade of East Pakistan, India has detained a large number of coasters and minibulkers engaged in the transportation of foodgrains and relief supplies from the seaports to up-country stations. Though there are adequate stocks of food supply available, the means of supplying these to the areas experiencing shortages have been seriously disrupted. As a direct consequence of this, the United Nations relief operations in East Pakistan have come to an end. India's action in deliberately and callously inducing widespread starvation and famine in East Pakistan cannot but be considered an outrage to world conscience.

The Permanent Representative of Pakistan requests that this note be circulated as a document of the Security Council and the General Assembly.

\* Also circulated as a General Assembly document under the symbol A/8644.

**DOCUMENT S/10486\***

**Note verbale dated 16 December 1971 from the representative of  
Pakistan to the Secretary-General**

*[Original: English]*  
*[30 December 1971]*

The Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General and under instructions from his Government wishes to bring to the attention of the Secretary-General certain deplorable aspects of India's present aggression against Pakistan.

The Indian Air Force has resorted to systematic and deliberate bombing of civilian targets in Pakistan, particularly in the Lahore area. On 14 December 1971 four 500-pound bombs were dropped over civilian areas in Cotelkhat, a suburb of Lahore. Twenty-five civilians, including 15 children, were killed in this raid and another 28 were seriously injured. Next day, the Indian Air Force dropped eleven 500-pound bombs and four 1,000-pound bombs over Misrishah in the heart of Lahore. Fifty-four dead bodies were recovered and more are still being unearthed from under the debris. A total of 125 people received serious injuries in the bombing of Misrishah. Among the people killed and injured are several children from a boys' school situated in the locality.

The representative of Pakistan requests that this note verbale be circulated as a document of the Security Council and the General Assembly.

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\* Also circulated as a General Assembly document under the symbol A/8645.

**DOCUMENT S/10487**

**Letter dated 30 December 1971 from the representative of  
Pakistan to the Secretary-General**

*[Original: English]*  
*[30 December 1971]*

I am instructed by the Government of Pakistan to put on record the fact, already reported in the world press, that on 27 December 1971 the President of Pakistan initiated direct discussions with Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, an elected leader of Pakistan who represents the people of East Pakistan, with regard to a political settlement of the East Pakistan problem. The President stated that the talks would continue and would be guided by the wishes and aspirations of the people.

The Government of Pakistan considers it appropriate to declare that any act by any government with regard to a part of the territory of Pakistan forcibly occupied by a foreign power which would prejudice or prejudice the outcome of these negotiations or be detrimental to the integrity of Pakistan would not only be a hostile act against Pakistan but also unwarranted and wholly contrary to the basic norms of international relations.

I should be grateful if this letter could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

*(Signed) A. SHAHI*  
*Permanent Representative of Pakistan*  
*to the United Nations*

**DOCUMENT S/10488**

**Letter dated 30 December 1971 from the representative of India  
to the Secretary-General**

*[Original: English]*  
*[30 December 1971]*

Under the instructions of my Government, I have the honour to draw your attention to the following instances of serious violations by Pakistani armed forces of the cease-fire since the adoption of Security Council resolution 307 (1971) on 21 December 1971:

(a) On 21 December 1971, Pakistani troops attacked Indian troops from an area 9 miles south-west of Uri. The attack was repulsed.

(b) On 22 December, Pakistani troops opened fire with artillery and armour on Indian troops in the area

5½ miles west-north-west and 5 miles north-west of Karanpur in Punjab. The fire was returned.

(c) On 25 December, Pakistani troops opened fire with light machine guns and 2-inch mortars on Indian troops from the area 7 miles south of Atari in Punjab. The fire was returned and the action continued on the night of 25 to 26 December 1971.

(d) On 26 December, one Pakistani light aircraft intruded approximately 200 yards into Indian territory in the area 7 miles north-west of Ajnala in Punjab. The aircraft was engaged with small arms fire.

(e) On the night of 26 to 27 December, Pakistani troops shelled intermittently the area 20 miles south-west of Amritsar.

(f) On 27 December, one Pakistani light aircraft flew over Indian border posts in the area 22 miles north-west of Amritsar.

(g) On 27 December, 10 Pakistani armed personnel intruded into Indian territory in the area 15 miles north of Khemkaran, and retreated when fired upon.

(h) On 27 December, at about 1820 hours Pakistani troops of one platoon strength supported by six tanks and elements of reconnaissance and support battalion, intruded about 50 yards inside Indian territory across the international boundary about 32 miles west of Ganganagar, Rajasthan. At 0400 hours on 28 December, Indian troops took action against the intruders

throwing them off Indian territory. Indian casualties on the occasion were 2 officers and 2 other ranks killed and 2 officers and 28 other ranks wounded. Details of Pakistani casualties are not yet known. However, three Pakistani personnel belonging to 36 Frontier Force Regiment were captured in this action.

(i) On 27 December, 36 Pakistani troops were seen on the Indian side of the cease-fire line 4 miles north-west of Punch. They dispersed when engaged by Indian troops. The same evening they fired with mortars and medium machine guns in the same area.

(j) On 28 December, at 1130 hours one Pakistani light aircraft intruded into Indian territory from the area 8 miles west-north-west of Ajnala. The aircraft was engaged by ground fire and it flew back.

As direct wireless and telephone links have now been established between the Indian Army Headquarters in New Delhi and Pakistani Army Headquarters in Rawalpindi, and as local commanders on both sides of the cease-fire line have started holding flag meetings, it is hoped that cease-fire violations will decrease in the future.

I should be grateful if this letter could be circulated as a Security Council document.

(Signed) S. SEN  
Permanent Representative of India  
to the United Nations

## DOCUMENT S/10489

### Burundi, Sierra Leone, Somalia and Syrian Arab Republic: draft resolution

[Original: English]  
[30 December 1971]

#### *The Security Council,*

*Having considered* the "proposals for a settlement" agreed upon by the Government of the United Kingdom and the rebel régime in Southern Rhodesia on the political and constitutional future of the Territory,

*Having noted* that these proposals were not negotiated in consultation with the accredited political leaders of the majority of the people of Southern Rhodesia,

*Taking note* of General Assembly resolution 2877 (XXVI),

*Reaffirming* Security Council resolution 288 (1970) of 17 November 1970, and in particular its paragraph 2 in which the Council called upon "the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, as the administering Power in the discharge of its responsibility, to take urgent and effective measures to bring to an end the illegal rebellion in Southern Rhodesia and enable the people to exercise their right to self-determination, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and in conformity with the objectives of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960",

*Mindful* of the conditions necessary to permit the free expression of the right to self-determination,

*Recalling* Security Council resolution 202 (1965) of 6 May 1965 which endorsed the request of the General Assembly, addressed to the United Kingdom, to obtain:

(a) The release of all political prisoners, detainees and restrictees,

(b) The repeal of all repressive and discriminatory legislation, and in particular the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act and the Land Apportionment Act,

(c) The removal of all restrictions on political activity and the establishment of full democratic freedom and equality of political rights,

*Recognizing*, without prejudice to the primary role of the administering Power, the special responsibilities of the United Nations towards the people of Southern Rhodesia in securing their inalienable rights,

1. *Decides* that the terms of these proposals do not fulfil the conditions necessary to ensure that all the people of Southern Rhodesia would be able to exercise freely and equally their right to self-determination;

2. *Rejects* the "proposals for a settlement" as they do not guarantee the inalienable rights of the majority of the people of Southern Rhodesia;

3. *Considers* that the principle of universal adult suffrage for the people of Southern Rhodesia without regard to colour or race must be the basis for any constitutional and political arrangements for the Territory;

4. *Urges* the United Kingdom, pursuant to paragraph 3 above, not to accord any form of recognition to an independent State of Southern Rhodesia which is not based on majority rule or on the will of the majority as determined by universal adult suffrage;

5. *Calls upon* the United Kingdom to ensure that in any exercise to ascertain the wishes of the people of Southern Rhodesia as to their political future, the procedure to be followed will be by secret referendum on the basis of one man, one vote, without regard to

race or colour or to educational, property or income considerations;

6. *Further calls upon* the United Kingdom, after ensuring the establishment of conditions under which all the people of Southern Rhodesia are able to exercise freely and equally their right to self-determination on the basis of paragraphs 3 and 5 above, to facilitate the participation of a United Nations team of observers during the preparation for, and in the actual conduct of, any exercise to ascertain the wishes of the people of Southern Rhodesia as to their political future;

7. *Decides* to continue with the imposition of political, diplomatic and economic sanctions on Southern Rhodesia until the rebellious régime in that territory is brought to an end;

8. *Requests* the Government of the United Kingdom not to transfer under any circumstances to its colony of Southern Rhodesia, as at present governed, any of the powers or attributes of sovereignty, but to promote the country's attainment of independence by a democratic system of Government in accordance with the aspirations of the majority of the population.



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