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# **SECURITY COUNCIL OFFICIAL RECORDS**

**TWENTY-SIXTH YEAR**

***SUPPLEMENT FOR APRIL, MAY AND JUNE 1971***

**UNITED NATIONS**





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***New York, 1972***

## NOTE

*Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.*

Documents of the Security Council (symbol S/ . . .) are normally published in quarterly *Supplements of the Official Records of the Security Council*. The date of the document indicates the supplement in which it appears or in which information about it is given.

The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a system adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council*. The new system, which has been applied retroactively to resolutions adopted before 1 January 1965, became fully operative on that date.

**CHECK LIST OF SECURITY COUNCIL DOCUMENTS ISSUED DURING THE PERIOD  
1 APRIL-30 JUNE 1971**

The titles of the documents printed in the present *Supplement* appear in bold type.

<i>Document No.</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Subject index*</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Observations and references</i>	<i>Page</i>
S/7930/ Add.1132- 1242	1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 26, 27, 28, 29 and 30 April, 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30 and 31 May and 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, 29 and 30 June 1971	a	<b>Supplemental information received by the Secretary-General on the situation in the Middle East</b>		1
S/10124/ Add.1	20 April 1971	a	<b>Report of the Secretary-General under Security Council resolutions 252 (1968), 267 (1969) and 271 (1969) and General Assembly resolution 2254 (ES-V)</b>		20
S/10169	2 April 1971	a	<b>Letter dated 1 April 1971 from the representative of Jordan to the Secretary-General</b>		21
S/10170	5 April 1971		Summary statement by the Secretary-General on matters of which the Security Council is seized and on the stage reached in their consideration	Mimeographed	
S/10171	8 April 1971	b	<b>Letter dated 8 April 1971 from the representative of India to the President of the Security Council</b>		23
S/10172	8 April 1971	a	<b>Letter dated 8 April 1971 from the representative of Lebanon to the President of the Security Council</b>		25
S/10173	12 April 1971		Summary statement by the Secretary-General on matters of which the Security Council is seized and on the stage reached in their consideration	Ditto	
S/10174	12 April 1971	c	<b>Letter dated 10 April 1971 from the representative of Turkey to the Secretary-General</b>		26
S/10175	12 April 1971	a	<b>Letter dated 12 April 1971 from the representative of Israel to the President of the Security Council</b>		27
S/10176	15 April 1971		<b>Letter dated 13 April 1971 from the Chairman of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples to the President of the Security Council, concerning the situation in the Territories under Portuguese administration</b>		28
S/10177	19 April 1971		Summary statement by the Secretary-General on matters of which the Security Council is seized and on the stage reached in their consideration	Ditto	
S/10178	22 April 1971	d	<b>Letter dated 16 April 1971 from the representative of Chile to the Secretary-General</b>		28

\* The letters in this column correspond to those in the index on page vii and indicate the subject matter of the documents to which they refer.

Document No.	Date	Subject index*	Title	Observations and references	Page
S/10179	22 April 1971	c	Letter dated 19 April 1971 from the representative of Turkey to the Secretary-General		29
S/10180	23 April 1971		Note by the Secretary-General transmitting replies from the Governments to his note verbale of 18 December 1970 requesting information on the implementation of resolution 290 (1970), concerning the complaint by Guinea		30
S/10181	26 April 1971		Summary statement by the Secretary-General on matters of which the Security Council is seized and on the stage reached in their consideration	Mimeographed	
S/10182	27 April 1971	e	Letter dated 27 April 1971 from the representative of Senegal to the President of the Security Council		33
S/10183	29 April 1971	f	Letter dated 27 April 1971 from the representative of the Khmer Republic to the President of the Security Council		34
S/10184	3 May 1971		Summary statement by the Secretary-General on matters of which the Security Council is seized and on the stage reached in their consideration	Ditto	
S/10185	4 May 1971	c	Letter dated 3 May 1971 from the representative of Cyprus to the Secretary-General		36
S/10186	6 May 1971	f	Letter dated 5 May 1971 from the representative of the Khmer Republic to the President of the Security Council		36
S/10187	7 May 1971	c	Letter dated 6 May 1971 from the representative of Cyprus to the Secretary-General		38
S/10188	7 May 1971	a	Letter dated 6 May 1971 from the representative of Iraq to the Secretary-General		39
S/10189	10 May 1971		Summary statement by the Secretary-General on matters of which the Security Council is seized and on the stage reached in their consideration	Ditto	
S/10190	10 May 1971	g	Letter dated 7 May 1971 from the Chairman of the Special Committee on <i>Apartheid</i> to the President of the Security Council		39
S/10191	10 May 1971	e	Letter dated 10 May 1971 from the representative of Guinea to the President of the Security Council		40
S/10192	11 May 1971	f	Letter dated 10 May 1971 from the representative of the Khmer Republic to the President of the Security Council		41
S/10193	11 May 1971	b	Letter dated 10 May 1971 from the representative of Pakistan to the President of the Security Council		43
S/10194	14 May 1971	c	Letter dated 12 May 1971 from the representative of Turkey to the Secretary-General		45
S/10195	14 May 1971	g	Letter dated 14 May 1971 from the representative of Israel to the President of the Security Council		46
S/10196	17 May 1971		Note by the Secretary-General transmitting the report of the Government of the United States of America on the administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands for the period 1 July 1969 to 30 June 1970	Mimeographed. For the text of the report see <i>Twenty-third Annual Report to the United Nations on the Administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, July 1, 1969 to June 30, 1970</i> , Department of State Publication 8520 (Washington D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971)	
S/10197	17 May 1971		Summary statement by the Secretary-General on matters of which the Security Council is seized and on the stage reached in their consideration	Mimeographed	
S/10198	17 May 1971	f	Letter dated 14 May 1971 from the representative of the Khmer Republic to the President of the Security Council		47

<i>Document No.</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Subject index*</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Observations and references</i>	<i>Page</i>
S/10199	20 May 1971	c	Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus for the period 2 December 1970 to 19 May 1971		50
S/10200	19 May 1971	c	Letter dated 18 May 1971 from the representative of Turkey to the Secretary-General		61
S/10201	20 May 1971	g	Letter dated 19 May 1971 from the representative of Belgium to the President of the Security Council		62
S/10202	21 May 1971	g	Letter dated 20 May 1971 from the Vice-Chairman of the Special Committee on Apartheid to the President of the Security Council		63
S/10203	21 May 1971	a	Letter dated 21 May 1971 from the representative of Jordan to the Secretary-General		63
S/10204	24 May 1971	c, h	Letter dated 24 May 1971 from the representative of Greece to the Secretary-General	Mimeographed	
S/10205	24 May 1971		Summary statement by the Secretary-General on matters of which the Security Council is seized and on the stage reached in their consideration	Ditto	
S/10206	24 May 1971	f	Letter dated 20 May 1971 from the representative of the Khmer Republic to the President of the Security Council		64
S/10207	25 May 1971	c, h	Letter dated 25 May 1971 from the representative of Turkey to the Secretary-General	Ditto	
S/10208	25 May 1971	c, h	Letter dated 25 May 1971 from the representative of Cyprus to the President of the Security Council	Ditto	
S/10209	25 May 1971	c	Draft resolution	Adopted without change. See resolution 293 (1971) of the Council	
S/10210	25 May 1971	a	Letter dated 25 May 1971 from the representative of Israel to the Secretary-General		65
S/10211	27 May 1971	g	Note by the President of the Security Council		66
S/10212	27 May 1971	g	Letter dated 25 May 1971 from the representative of the United States of America to the President of the Security Council		66
S/10213	28 May 1971	a	Letter dated 28 May 1971 from the representative of Syria to the Secretary-General		67
S/10214	1 June 1971		Summary statement by the Secretary-General on matters of which the Security Council is seized and on the stage reached in their consideration	Mimeographed	
S/10215	1 June 1971	a	Letter dated 1 June 1971 from the representative of Syria to the Secretary-General		68
S/10216	2 June 1971		Letter dated 24 May 1971 from the Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Sultanate of Oman to the Secretary-General submitting an application for admission to the United Nations		69
S/10217	2 June 1971	c	Letter dated 26 May 1971 from the representative of Turkey to the Secretary-General		69
S/10218	7 June 1971		Summary statement by the Secretary-General on matters of which the Security Council is seized and on the stage reached in their consideration	Ditto	
S/10219	8 June 1971	a	Letter dated 8 June 1971 from the representative of Syria to the Secretary-General		70
S/10220	10 June 1971	a	Letter dated 10 June 1971 from the representative of Israel to the Secretary-General		71
S/10221	14 June 1971	f	Letter dated 9 June 1971 from the representative of the Khmer Republic to the President of the Security Council		72
S/10222	14 June 1971		Summary statement by the Secretary-General on matters of which the Security Council is seized and on the stage reached in their consideration	Ditto	
S/10223	14 June 1971		Report of the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council concerning the credentials of the deputy representative of the United States of America on the Security Council	Ditto	
S/10224	15 June 1971	a	Letter dated 15 June 1971 from the representative of Syria to the Secretary-General		77

<i>Document No.</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Subject index<sup>a</sup></i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Observations and references</i>	<i>Page</i>
S/10225	16 June 1971		Letter dated 15 June 1971 from the representative of Zambia to the Secretary-General concerning the implementation of sanctions against Southern Rhodesia		79
S/10226	16 June 1971	a	Letter dated 16 June 1971 from the representative of Lebanon to the President of the Security Council		80
S/10227	17 June 1971	e	Letter dated 16 June 1971 from the representative of Senegal to the President of the Security Council		81
S/10228	17 June 1971	a	Letter dated 17 June 1971 from the representative of Israel to the Secretary-General		82
S/10229 and Add.1 and 2	16 June and 13 July 1971		Fourth report of the Committee established in pursuance of Security Council resolution 253 (1968) of 29 May 1968, concerning Southern Rhodesia	<i>Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-sixth Year, Special Supplement No. 2</i>	
S/10230	21 June 1971	c	Letter dated 21 June 1971 from the representative of Cyprus to the Secretary-General		83
S/10231	21 June 1971	a	Letter dated 21 June 1971 from the representative of Israel to the President of the Security Council		84
S/10232	21 June 1971	a	Letter dated 21 June 1971 from the representative of Syria to the Secretary-General		85
S/10233	21 June 1971		Summary statement by the Secretary-General on matters of which the Security Council is seized and on the stage reached in their consideration	Mimeographed	
S/10234	23 June 1971	a	Letter dated 23 June 1971 from the representative of Israel to the Secretary-General		86
S/10235	23 June 1971	a	Letter dated 23 June 1971 from the representative of Lebanon to the President of the Security Council		86
S/10236	25 June 1971		Letter dated 23 June 1971 from the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Secretary-General on the question of convening a conference of the five nuclear-weapon Powers		87
S/10237	June 1971		Report of the Trusteeship Council to the Security Council on the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands covering the period from 20 June 1970 to 19 June 1971	<i>Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-sixth Year, Special Supplement No. 1</i>	
S/10238	25 June 1971	a	Letter dated 25 June 1971 from the representative of Syria to the Secretary-General		88
S/10239	25 June 1971	e	Letter dated 24 June 1971 from the representative of Turkey to the Secretary-General		89
S/10240	25 June 1971	d	Letter dated 22 June 1971 from the representative of Finland to the Secretary-General		90
S/10242	28 June 1971		Summary statement by the Secretary-General on matters of which the Security Council is seized and on the stage reached in their consideration	Mimeographed	
S/10243	28 June 1971	g	Letter dated 25 June 1971 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council transmitting the text of Economic and Social Council resolution 1591 (L)	For the text of the resolution, see <i>Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, Fiftieth Session, Supplement No. 1</i>	
S/10244	30 June 1971	a	Letter dated 30 June 1971 from the representative of Israel to the President of the Security Council		90
S/10245	30 June 1971		Report of the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council concerning the credentials of the deputy and alternate representatives of Argentina on the Security Council	Mimeographed	



<i>Document No.</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Subject index*</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Observations and references</i>	<i>Page</i>
S/10246	30 June 1971		Letter dated 30 June 1971 from the representative of Malta to the President of the Security Council transmitting the text of a statement by the Government of Malta concerning its relations with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization		91

#### INDEX

*to matters discussed by, or brought before, the Security Council during the period covering this Supplement*

- a The situation in the Middle East.
- b The India-Pakistan question.
- c The Cyprus question.
- d The situation in Namibia.
- e Complaint by Senegal.
- f Complaint by the Khmer Republic.
- g The policies of *apartheid* of the Government of the Republic of South Africa.
- h Participation by States not members of the Council in the discussion of a question.



## DOCUMENTS S/7930/ADD.1132-1242\*

### Supplemental information received by the Secretary-General on the situation in the Middle East

#### DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1132

[Original: English]  
[1 April 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 31 March 1971 was received on 1 April from the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine (UNTSO), Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP One (Map reference 2249-2960): at 0423<sup>1</sup> one round of mortar fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP November (MR 2316-2564): between 0632 and 0635 four rounds of mortar fire and machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Five (MR 2290-2787): between 1003 and 1011 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(d) OP Two (MR 2306-2736): between 1132 and 1139 sporadic mortar fire and between 1735 and 1740 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(e) OP Three (MR 2308-2678): between 1949 and 1950 intense machine-gun fire and one flare by Israel forces."

#### DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1133

[Original: English]  
[2 April 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 1 April 1971 was received on 2 April from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

\* For documents S/7930 and Add.1-17, see *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-second Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1967*; for documents S/7930/Add.18-41, *ibid.*, *Supplement for July, August and September 1967*; for documents S/7930/Add.42-61, *ibid.*, *Supplement for October, November and December 1967*; for documents S/7930/Add.62-66, *ibid.*, *Twenty-third Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1968*; for documents S/7930/Add.67-72, *ibid.*, *Supplement for April, May and June 1968*; for documents S/7930/Add.73-92, *ibid.*, *Supplement for July, August and September 1968*; for documents S/7930/Add.93-108, *ibid.*, *Supplement for October, November and December 1968*; for documents S/7930/Add.109-146, *ibid.*, *Twenty-fourth Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1969*; for documents S/7930/Add.147-249, *ibid.*, *Supplement for April, May and June 1969*; for documents S/7930/Add.250-367, *ibid.*, *Supplement for July, August and September 1969*; for documents S/7930/Add.368-480, *ibid.*, *Supplement for October, November and December 1969*; for documents S/7930/Add.481-625, *ibid.*, *Twenty-fifth Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1970*; for documents S/7930/Add.626-808, *ibid.*, *Supplement for April, May and June 1970*; for documents S/7930/Add.809-945, *ibid.*, *Supplement for July, August and September 1970*; for documents S/7930/Add.946-1030, *ibid.*, *Supplement for October, November and December 1970*; for documents S/7930/Add.1031-1131, *ibid.*, *Twenty-sixth Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1971*.

<sup>1</sup> All times GMT.

"(a) OP November (MR 2316-2564): between 0616 and 0618 four rounds of mortar fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Six (MR 2300-2847): between 1110 and 1117 and between 1135 and 1140 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Four (MA 2327-2596): between 1850 and 1853 intense machine-gun fire by Israel forces."

#### DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1134

[Original: English]  
[2 April 1971]

The following report on incidents in the Suez Canal sector on 1 April 1971 was received on 2 April from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"1. OP reports on ground activity: nil.

"2. OP reports on air activity.

"(a) OP Orange (MR 7604-8415): at 1305 one Israel forces Phantom and one Mirage aircraft flying north to south crossed Great Bitter Lake. At 1308 aircraft recrossed canal from west to east near OP Lima (MR 7662-8173). Overflight confirmed by OP Silver (MR 7452-8583), OP Pink (MR 7661-8278), OP Lima, OP Red (MR 7675-8125), OP Blue (MR 7677-8055) and OP Mike (MR 7657-8037).

"(b) OP Foxtrot (MR 7430-8674): at 1306 one Israel forces Phantom and one Mirage aircraft crossed canal east to west over OP."

#### DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1135

[Original: English]  
[3 April 1971]

The following report on incidents in the Israel-Syria sector on 2 April 1971 was received on 3 April from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"1. OP reports on ground activity.

"(a) OP One (MR 2249-2960): at 0406 one round mortar fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Yoke (MR 2271-2914): between 0522 and 0546 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP November (MR 2316-2564): between 0617 and 0623 sporadic mortar and machine-gun fire by Israel forces. Between 1212 and 1213 seven rifle shots by Syrian forces. Between 1317 and 1327 five rifle shots by Syrian forces.

"(d) OP Seven (MR 2203-2408): between 1857 and 1859 machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"2. OP reports on air activity.

"OP Winter (MR 2320-2792): between 1110 and 1111 two Israel forces phantom aircraft and two

unidentified aircraft (United Nations military observers could not identify aircraft due to very high altitude) observed flying north to south over OP. Report confirmed by OP November (MR 2316-2564), OP Uniform (MR 2366-2621), OP Victor (MR 2328-2668) and OP Three (MR 2308-2678), but type unidentified due to altitude."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1136**

[Original: English]  
[5 April 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 3 April 1971 was received on 4 April from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP One (MR 2249-2960): between 0455 and 0500 three rounds of artillery fire and between 0630 and 0635 three rounds of mortar fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Two (MR 2306-2736): between 1141 and 1143 machine-gun fire by Israel forces."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1137**

[Original: English]  
[5 April 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 4 April 1971 was received on 5 April from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"Report from OP November (MR 2316-2564): between 0615 and 0627 three rounds of mortar fire, at 1403 one round of mortar fire and between 1731 and 1734 machine-gun fire, all by Israel forces."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1138**

[Original: English]  
[6 April 1971]

The following report on incidents in the Suez Canal sector on 5 April 1971 was received on 6 April from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"1. OP reports on ground activity: nil.

"2. OP reports on air activity.

"(a) OP Mike (MR 7657-8037): between 1008 and 1009 one UAR forces Sukhoi-7 aircraft crossed canal west to east over OP and recrossed east to west south of OP.

"(b) OP Silver (MR 7452-8583): between 1303 and 1305 one Israel forces Phantom and one Mirage aircraft flying north to south crossed east to west over OP and recrossed west to east, north of OP Pink (MR 7661-8278). This report confirmed by OP Orange (MR 7604-8415), OP Pink, OP Red (MR 7675-8125), OP Kilo (MR 7660-8225) and OP Lima (MR 7662-8173).

"3. Complaints by the parties.

"The following Israel complaint was received from Israel Defence Forces liaison officer: 'I have been instructed to protest strongly against the following violations of the cease-fire by the UAR which took place on 5 April 1971: between 1211 LT (1011 GMT) and 1212 LT (1012 GMT) a pair of UAR

Sukhoi-7 aircraft flew over Israeli positions from a point east of Kabrit to a point east of Suez.'"

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1139**

[Original: English]  
[6 April 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 5 April 1971 was received on 6 April from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP Three (MR 2308-2678): between 0750 and 0752 two rounds of mortar fire, between 0935 and 0940 and between 1012 and 1019 three rounds of mortar fire each time and between 1502 and 1515 sporadic mortar fire, all by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Two (MR 2306-2736): between 1205 and 1217 three rounds of mortar fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Four (MR 2327-2596): between 1621 and 1624 three rounds of mortar fire by Israel forces.

"(d) OP Uniform (MR 2366-2621): between 2230 and 2232 sporadic machine-gun fire and flares by Israel forces."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1140**

[Original: English]  
[7 April 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 6 April 1971 was received on 7 April from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP Four (MR 2327-2596): between 0024 and 0026 sporadic machine-gun and small-arms fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Yoke (MR 2271-2914): at 0648 one round of mortar fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Romeo (MR 2294-2459): at 0857 one round of mortar fire by Israel forces.

"(d) OP Three (MR 2308-2678): between 0911 and 0918 two rounds of mortar fire by Israel forces."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1141**

[Original: English]  
[8 April 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 7 April 1971 was received on 8 April from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"1. OP reports on ground activity.

"(a) OP Two (MR 2306-2736): between 0646 and 0651 two rounds of mortar fire and between 1445 and 1455 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Six (MR 2300-2847): between 1115 and 1122 three rounds of mortar fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP November (MR 2316-2564): between 1717 and 1718 hand grenades and machine-gun and mortar fire by Israel forces (see para. 2).

"(d) OP Four (MR 2327-2596): between 1718 and 1748 sporadic machine-gun fire and five rounds

of mortar fire and between 2354 and 0013 (8 April), sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(e) OP One (MR 2249-2960): between 1804 and 1810 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"2. Firing on or close to United Nations installations.

"OP November: between 1717 and 1718 during machine-gun fire by Israel forces, ten rounds passed within 10 metres of OP compound. Tracers were seen. OP was illuminated. No Syrian troops were in vicinity."

#### DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1142

[Original: English]  
[9 April 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 8 April 1971 was received on 9 April from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP Two (MR 2306-2736): between 0335 and 0350 sporadic machine-gun fire and between 1343 and 1353 four rounds of mortar fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Five (MR 2290-2787): between 1112 and 1125 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP One (MR 2249-2960): between 1206 and 1225 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(d) OP Six (MR 2300-2847): between 1238 and 1242 and between 1300 and 1330 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(e) OP Four (MR 2327-2596): between 1309 and 1312 two rounds of mortar fire by Israel forces."

#### DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1143

[Original: English]  
[10 April 1971]

The following report on incidents in the Israel-Syria sector on 9 April 1971 was received on 10 April from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"1. OP reports on ground activity.

"(a) OP One. (MR 2249-2960): between 0216 and 0235 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Five. (MR 2290-2787): between 1304 and 1317 three rounds of mortar fire and at 1517 one round of mortar fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Four. (MR 2327-2596): between 1315 and 1321 two rounds of mortar fire by Israel forces.

"(d) OP Victor. (MR 2328-2668): between 2353 and 0005 (10 April) sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"2. OP report on air activity.

"OP November (MR 2316-2564): between 0802 and 0804 one Israel forces Phantom and two unidentified aircraft (United Nations military observers could not determine type or nationality of aircraft due to high altitude) crossed the area between the forward defended localities indicating the cease-fire lines from west to east, northwest of OP and re-crossed from east to west, south of OP."

#### DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1144

[Original: English]  
[11 April 1971]

The following report on incidents in the Suez Canal sector on 10 April 1971 was received on 11 April from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"1. OP Reports.

"(a) OP Red (MR 7675-8125): at 1007 one UAR Sukhoi-7 aircraft observed north of OP. Aircraft flew north to south over canal and then turned west, south of OP. At 1007 machine-gun fire heard north of OP on east side. Note: OP Pink and Blue reported two UAR Sukhoi-7 aircraft flying north to south on west side of canal at 1007.

"(b) OP Mike (MR 7657-8037): at 1009 two unidentified aircraft (United Nations military observers could not determine type or nationality of aircraft due to low altitude) crossed canal from east to west, south of OP. At 1009 machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"2. Complaints by the parties.

"The following complaint was received from Israel authorities: 'Between 1153 LT (0953 GMT) and 1210 LT (1010 GMT) a pair of UAR Sukhoi-7 aircraft flew over Israel positions from a point east of Kabrit to a point east of Suez'.

"3. Other matters.

"Senior Israel representative was queried reference firing incident reported by OP Red and stated: 'At 1207 LT (1007 GMT) two UAR Sukhoi-7 aircraft flew over the water of the canal in the vicinity of OP Orange and flew over the water of the canal in the vicinity of OP Blue. They crossed over east side in OP Blue area, and Israel forces machine-guns fired at them from the vicinity of OP Blue.'"

#### DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1145

[Original: English]  
[12 April 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 10 April 1971 was received on 11 April from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"Report from OP Four (MR 2327-2596): between 1919 and 1923 intense machine-gun fire and flares by Israel forces."

#### DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1146

[Original: English]  
[12 April 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 11 April 1971 was received on 12 April from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP Five (MR 2290-2787): between 1317 and 1323 three rounds of mortar fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Two (MR 2306-2736): between 1343 and 1354 four rounds of mortar fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Six (MR 2300-2847): at 1724 machine-gun fire, which ceased immediately by Syrian forces."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1147**

[Original: English]  
[13 April 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 12 April 1971 was received on 13 April from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP Six (MR 2300-2847): between 1222 and 1224 two rounds of mortar fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Two (MR 2306-2736): between 1747 and 1753 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1148**

[Original: English]  
[15 April 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 14 April 1971 was received on 15 April from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"1. OP reports.

"(a) OP Five (MR 2290-2787): between 0331 and 0333 machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Two (MR 2306-2736): between 0547 and 0549 two rounds of mortar fire by Israel forces.

"2. Complaints by the parties.

"Following complaint from senior Syrian Arab delegate was received by Chairman of Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission on 14 April.

"(a) On 4 April 1971 at about 1105 LT (0905 GMT) Israeli military positions situated at approximate MR 2309-2557 BZ (buffer zone) fired a mortar shell across the Syrian CFPs (cease-fire positions) towards Syrian positions in that area. Fire was not returned.

"(b) On 4 April 1971 at about 1935 LT (1735 GMT) Israeli military positions situated at approximate MR 2309-2557 BZ opened machine-gun fire across the Syrian CFPs towards Syrian positions in the area. Fire was not returned.

"(c) On 8 April 1971 at about 1000 LT (0800 GMT) two Israeli jet fighters crossed the Israeli and Syrian CFPs in area approximate MR 231-277.

"Complaints mentioned in sub-paragraphs (a) and (c) above not confirmed by United Nations observation. Complaint mentioned in sub-paragraph (b) confirmed [see S/7930/Add.1137]."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1149**

[Original: English]  
[16 April 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 15 April 1971 was received on 16 April from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP Uniform (MR 2366-2621): between 1353 and 1356 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Seven (MR 2203-2408): between 1400 and 1412 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Sierra (MR 2312-2523): at 1425 one rifle shot by Syrian forces.

"(d) OP November (MR 2316-2564): at 1727 machine-gun fire, which ceased immediately, by Israel forces."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1150**

[Original: English]  
[17 April 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 16 April 1971 was received on 17 April from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP Six (MR 2300-2847): at 0920 machine-gun fire, which ceased immediately, and between 0940 and 0950 four mortar rounds by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Five (MR 2290-2787): between 1250 and 1315 four mortar rounds and sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Two (MR 2306-2736): between 1407 and 1418 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(d) OP November (MR 2316-2564): between 2033 and 2054 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1151**

[Original: English]  
[19 April 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 17 April 1971 was received on 18 April from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP November (MR 2316-2564): between 0039 and 0041 and between 0320 and 0321 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP One (MR 2249-2960): between 1258 and 1309 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1152**

[Original: English]  
[19 April 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 18 April 1971 was received on 19 April from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP One (MR 2249-2960): between 1053 and 1103 three rounds of mortar fire and at 1921 machine-gun fire, which ceased immediately, by Israel forces. Between 1920 and 1933 sporadic machine-gun fire by Syrian forces.

"(b) OP November (MR 2316-2564): between 1940 and 1954 mortar flares and machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Uniform (MR 2366-2621): between 2230 and 2233 mortar flares and machine-gun fire by Israel forces."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1153**

[Original: English]  
[19 April 1971]

The following report on incidents in the Suez Canal sector on 18 April 1971 was received on 19 April from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

- "1. OP reports on ground activity: nil.
- "2. OP reports on air activity: nil.
- "3. Complaints by the parties.

"Following complaint received on 18 April from assistant Israel Defence Forces liaison officer: 'I have been instructed to complain strongly against the following violation of the cease-fire by the UAR: Between 1440 LT (1240 GMT) and 1444 LT (1244 GMT) a pair of UAR Sukhoi-7 aircraft violated the cease-fire by flying over Israeli positions from a point east of Port Said to a point east of El Tina.'

"Complaint not confirmed by OP reports."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1154**

[Original: English]  
[20 April 1971]

The following report on incidents in the Suez Canal sector on 19 April 1971 was received on 20 April from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

- "1. OP reports on ground activity: nil.
- "2. OP reports on air activity.

"OP Silver (MR 7452-8583): at 1307 one Israel forces Phantom aircraft flying north to south crossed over Great Bitter Lake recrossed from west to east 10 kilometres south-east of OP at 1308. Overflight confirmed by OP Orange (MR 7604-8415)."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1155**

[Original: English]  
[20 April 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 19 April 1971 was received on 20 April from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP Victor (MR 2328-2668): at 0802 two bursts of machine-gun fire, between 0825 and 0826 and between 0917 and 0918 machine-gun fire, all by Israel forces. Reports confirmed by OP Uniform (MR 2366-2621).

"(b) OP Yoke (MR 2271-2914): between 0954 and 1001 four smoke mortar rounds by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Three (MR 2308-2678): between 1024 and 1036 three mortar rounds by Israel forces.

"(d) OP Five (MR 2290-2787): at 1313 four mortar rounds by Israel forces."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1156**

[Original: English]  
[21 April 1971]

The following report on incidents in the Israel-Syria sector on 20 April 1971 was received on 21 April from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"1. OP Reports on ground activity.

"(a) OP Romeo (MR 2294-2459): between 0542 and 0604 sporadic machine-gun fire and later three rounds of mortar fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP November (MR 2316-2564): between 0717 and 0722 and between 0749 and 0753 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Four (MR 2327-2596): between 0725 and 0755 and between 2247 and 2250 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(d) OP Two (MR 2306-2736): between 0750 and 0759 and between 0824 and 0827 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"2. OP reports on air activity.

"OP Uniform (MR 2366-2621): at 0642 one Israel forces Phantom aircraft recrossed area between the limits of the forward defended localities indicating the cease-fire lines, from south-east to north-west two kilometres north of OP."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1157**

[Original: English]  
[22 April 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 21 April 1971 was received on 22 April from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"Report from OP Two (MR 2306-2736): between 1812 and 1813 four rounds of mortar fire and between 1854 and 1856 machine-gun fire by Israel forces."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1158**

[Original: English]  
[23 April 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 22 April 1971 was received on 23 April from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP Uniform (MR 2366-2621): between 1000 and 1007 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP November (MR 2316-2564): between 1150 and 1205 four rounds of mortar fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Five (MR 2290-2787): between 1339 and 1343 sporadic machine-gun fire, between 1906 and 1910 two rounds of mortar fire and between 2044 and 2047 mortar flares and machine-gun fire, all by Israel forces.

"(d) OP Two (MR 2306-2736): between 1904 and 1918 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1159**

[Original: English]  
[24 April 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 23 April 1971 was received on 24 April from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP Five (MR 2290-2787): between 1110 and 1114 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Yoke (MR 2271-2914): between 1225 and 1235 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Two (MR 2306-2736): between 1314 and 1327 five rounds of mortar fire and between 2015 and 2045 11 rounds of artillery fire by Israel forces.

"(d) OP One (MR 2249-2960): at 1353 one round of mortar fire by Israel forces.

"(e) OP Uniform (MR 2366-2621): between 1740 and 1746 intense machine-gun fire by Syrian forces and between 1741 and 1752 flare activity by Israel forces."

#### **DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1160**

[Original: English]  
[26 April 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 24 April 1971 was received on 25 April from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP Uniform (MR 2366-2621): at 0557 machine-gun fire, which ceased immediately, by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Two (MR 2306-2736): between 0939 and 0944 two rounds of mortar fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Six (MR 2300-2847): between 1233 and 1255 four rounds of mortar fire by Israel forces. At 2000 tank, mortar and artillery fire, first intense, later sporadic, by Israel forces and at 2000 plus, artillery fire, first intense, later sporadic, by Syrian forces. Fire ceased at 2020 by Syrian forces and at 2042 by Israel forces. This exchange was confirmed by OP Five (MR 2290-2787) and OP Winter (MR 2320-2792).

"(d) OP November (MR 2316-2564): between 2100 and 2110 mortar flares and intense machine-gun fire by Israel forces."

#### **DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1161**

[Original: English]  
[26 April 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 25 April 1971 was received on 26 April from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP Three (MR 2308-2678): between 0814 and 0820 three rounds of mortar fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Uniform (MR 2366-2621): between 1924 and 1926 machine-gun fire and one flare by Israel forces."

#### **DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1162**

[Original: English]  
[26 April 1971]

The following report on incidents in the Suez Canal sector on 25 April 1971 was received on 26 April from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"1. OP reports on ground activity: nil.

"2. OP reports on air activity.

"OP Silver (MR 7452-8583): between 1318 and 1321 one Israel forces, Phantom and one Mirage aircraft crossed canal from east to west, north of OP and recrossed south of OP Pink (MR 7661-8278). Report confirmed by OP Orange (MR 7604-8415), OP Pink, OP Red (MR 7675-8125) and OP Blue (MR 7677-8055).

"3) Complaints by the parties.

"The following complaint was received on 25 April from Israel Defence Forces liaison officer: 'I have been instructed to complain strongly against the following violations of the cease-fire by the UAR: on 25 April 1971 between 1235 LT (1035 GMT) and 1238 LT (1038 GMT) a pair of Sukhoi-7 aircraft violated the cease-fire by flying over Israeli positions from El Kantara to Port Said.'

"Complaint not confirmed by OP reports."

#### **DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1163**

[Original: English]  
[27 April 1971]

The following report on incidents in the Israel-Syria sector on 26 April 1971 was received on 27 April from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"1. OP reports on ground activity.

"(a) OP Yoke (MR 2271-2914): between 0344 and 0352 machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Victor (MR 2328-2668): between 0718 and 0739 machine-gun fire and sporadic mortar fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Four (MR 2327-2596): between 1745 and 1758 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(d) OP Romeo (MR 2294-2459): at 1940 one round of rocket fire by Syrian forces. At 1945 three rounds of mortar fire by Israel forces.

"(e) OP Six (MR 2300-2847): between 1947 and 2001 approximately 15 rounds of artillery fire by Israel forces. Report confirmed by OP Yoke and OP X-Ray (MR 2304-2891).

"2. OP reports on air activity.

"OP November (MR 2316-2564): between 1225 and 1230 one Israel forces light aircraft crossed the limits of the Israel forward defended localities indicating the cease-fire line on the Israel side, from west to east, northeast of OP and recrossed three kilometres south-south-west."

#### **DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1164**

[Original: English]  
[27 April 1971]

The following report on incidents in the Suez Canal sector on 26 April 1971 was received on 27 April from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"1. OP reports on ground activity.

"OP Foxtrot (MR 7430-8674): between 0456 and 0457 machine-gun fire by Israel forces. When queried, Israel Defence Forces liaison officer stated that he could not confirm any firing in the area at the time.



"2. OP reports on air activity.

"OP Green (MR 7394-9401): at 1152 one UAR forces MIG-21 aircraft crossed canal from east to west over OP and at the same time 10 seconds of machine-gun fire directed at the aircraft by Israel forces.

"3. Complaints by the parties.

"The following complaint was received from Israel Defence Forces liaison officer on 26 April. 'I have been instructed to complain strongly against the following violations of the cease-fire by the UAR: On 26 April 1971, at 1400 LT (1200 GMT) a UAR MIG-21 aircraft violated the cease-fire by flying over Israeli positions east of Ras-El-Ish.'

"Complaint confirmed by OP Green (see para. 2)."

#### DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1165

[Original: English]  
[28 April 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 27 April 1971 was received on 28 April from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP Yoke (MR 2271-2914): between 0408 and 0422 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Three (MR 2308-2678): between 0635 and 0645 five rounds of mortar fire and between 1539 and 1541 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Uniform (MR 2366-2621): between 0646 and 0649 mortar fire by Israel forces.

"(d) OP Romeo (MR 2294-2459): between 0832 and 0842 mortar fire by Israel forces.

"(e) OP One (MR 2249-2960): between 1002 and 1018 and between 1135 and 1140 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(f) OP Five (MR 2290-2787): between 1247 and 1248 machine-gun fire and between 1945 and 1947 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(g) OP Six (MR 2300-2847): between 1433 and 1435 machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(h) OP Four (MR 2327-2596): at 1542 machine-gun fire, which ceased immediately, and between 1752 and 1754 intense machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(i) OP Two (MR 2306-2736): between 1725 and 1727 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces."

#### DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1166

[Original: English]  
[28 April 1971]

The following report on incidents in the Suez Canal sector on 27 April 1971 was received on 28 April from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"1. OP reports on ground activity: nil.

"2. OP reports on air activity.

"OP Mike (MR 7657-8037): between 1318 and 1320 one Israel forces Phantom and one Mirage

aircraft flying on west side of canal crossed canal from west to east over OP."

#### DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1167

[Original: English]  
[29 April 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 28 April 1971 was received on 29 April from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP Yoke (MR 2271-2914): between 0221 and 0224 and between 0320 and 0322 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces. At 0654 mortar and sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces and at 0656 sporadic machine-gun fire by unidentified party (United Nations military observers could not identify the firing party). Firing ceased at 0657 by unidentified party and at 0658 by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Two (MR 2306-2736): between 0345 and 0347 and between 0542 and 0544 machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Four (MR 2327-2596): between 0553 and 0554 machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(d) OP Three (MR 2308-2678): between 0602 and 0608 five rounds of artillery fire by Israel forces. Report confirmed by OP Uniform (MR 2366-2621). At 1128 one round of mortar fire and between 1412 and 1428 machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(e) OP Six (MR 2300-2847): between 1453 and 1454 machine-gun fire by Israel forces."

#### DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1168

[Original: English]  
[29 April 1971]

The following report on incidents in the Suez Canal sector on 28 April 1971 was received on 29 April from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"1. OP reports on ground activity: nil.

"2. OP reports on air activity: nil.

"3. Complaints by the parties.

"On 28 April the officer-in-charge, Ismailia Control Centre, received the following complaint from the senior UAR liaison officer: 'At 1237 two Phantoms entered UAR territory at Ras al Barr approximately 10 kilometres and returned at 1240 at Baltim area towards Mediterranean.'

"The officer-in-charge, Ismailia Control Centre, stated that Ras al Barr is approximately 25 kilometres north-west of Port Said."

#### DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1169

[Original: English]  
[30 April 1971]

The following report on incidents in the Israel-Syria sector on 29 April 1971 was received on 30 April from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"1. OP reports on ground activity.

"(a) OP Two (MR 2306-2736): between 0532 and 0533 machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Uniform (MR 2366-2621): between 0625 and 0630 sporadic artillery fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Four (MR 2327-2596): between 0627 and 0630 three rounds of mortar fire, between 1641 and 1644 and between 2200 and 2201 machine-gun fire, all by Israel forces.

"(d) OP November (MR 2316-2564): between 1850 and 1854 sporadic machine-gun fire and flares by Israel forces.

"(e) OP Five (MR 2290-2787): between 2320 and 2325 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"2. OP reports on air activity.

"OP Four: between 0711 and 0716 one Israel forces light aircraft crossed the limits of the Israel forward defended localities indicating the cease-fire line on the Israel side, south of OP, flew over the area between the limits of the forward defended localities indicating the cease-fire lines and recrossed south of OP Five. Confirmed by OP Five."

#### DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1170

[Original: English]  
[1 May 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 30 April 1971 was received on 1 May from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP Three (MR 2308-2678): between 0420 and 0423 machine-gun fire, between 0725 and 0728 four mortar rounds and between 2310 and 2312 machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Uniform (MR 2366-2621): between 0725 and 0730 sporadic artillery fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP November (MR 2316-2564): between 0745 and 0753 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(d) OP Seven (MR 2203-2408): between 0826 and 0830 sporadic machine gun fire by Israel forces."

#### DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1171\*

[Original: English]  
[3 May 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 1 May 1971 was received on 2 May from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP Yoke (MR 2271-2914): at 0457 one round of mortar fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP One (MR 2249-2960): between 0958 and 1000 machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Three (MR 2308-2678): between 1421 and 1426 three mortar rounds by Israel forces.

"(d) OP Six (MR 2300-2847): between 1526 and 1528 machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(e) OP Five (MR 2290-2787): between 1917 and 1929 and between 2003 and 2005 GMT machine-gun fire by Israel forces."

\* Incorporating document S/7930/Add.1171/Corr.1.

#### DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1172

[Original: English]  
[3 May 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 2 May 1971 was received on 3 May from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP Four (MR 2327-2596): between 0050 and 0051 machine-gun fire and at 1404 machine-gun fire, which ceased immediately, by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Two (MR 2306-2736): at 0645 machine-gun fire, which ceased immediately, by Israel forces.

#### DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1173

[Original: English]  
[4 May 1971]

The following report on incidents in the Israel-Syria sector on 3 May 1971 was received on 4 May from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP Three (MR 2308-2678): at 0725 two Israel forces APCs (Armoured Personnel carriers) and six armed soldiers were observed at MR 2329-2650 entering village of Es Sbah (MR 2332-2652). APCs and personnel recrossed the limits of the Israel forward defended localities indicating the cease-fire line on the Israel side at MR 2324-2646 at 0735. Maximum penetration 900 metres.

"(b) OP One (MR 2249-2960): between 0802 and 0821 sporadic machine-gun fire, between 0845 and 0848 machine-gun fire and between 1504 and 1509 three mortar rounds, all by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Four (MR 2327-2596): between 1231 and 1238 four rifle shots by Syrian forces.

"(d) OP Six (MR 2300-2847): between 1638 and 1640 machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(e) OP Two (MR 2306-2736): at 1705 two bursts of machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(f) OP Uniform (MR 2366-2621): between 1715 and 1716 intense machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(g) OP November (MR 2316-2564): between 1830 and 1842 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces."

#### DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1174

[Original: English]  
[4 May 1971]

The following report on incidents in the Suez Canal sector on 3 May 1971 was received on 4 May from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"1. OP reports on ground activity: nil.

"2. OP reports on air activity.

"(a) OP Pink (MR 7661-8278): at 1319 one Mirage and one Phantom both Israel forces aircraft, were observed flying over west side of canal, north of OP. Aircraft recrossed from west to east three kilometres north of OP at 1323. Report confirmed by OP Lima.

“(b) OP Orange (MR 7604-8415): at 1323 one Mirage and one Phantom both Israel forces aircraft, crossed from east to west over OP and recrossed from west to east, south-east of OP at 1325. Report confirmed by OP Red.

“(c) OP Mike (MR 7657-8037): at 1329 one Mirage and one Phantom both Israel forces aircraft, were observed flying over west side of canal north of OP. Aircraft recrossed from west to east over OP at 1330.”

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1175**

[Original: English]  
[5 May 1971]

The following report on incidents in the Israel-Syria sector on 4 May 1971 was received on 5 May from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

“OP reports.

“(a) OP Four (MR 2327-2596): between 0017 and 0019 one flare and machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

“(b) OP Three (MR 2308-2678): at 0727 two Israel forces APCs (armoured personnel carriers) were observed at MR 2329-2651 entering village of Es Sbah (MR 2332-2652). APCs recrossed the limits of the Israel forward defended localities indicating the cease-fire line on the Israel side at MR 2324-2646 at 0737. Maximum penetration 900 metres.

“(c) OP Uniform (MR 2366-2621): at 1355 three bursts of machine-gun fire by Israel forces.”

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1176**

[Original: English]  
[6 May 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 5 May 1971 was received on 6 May from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

“OP reports.

“(a) OP Seven (MR 2203-2408): between 0539 and 0543 sporadic machine-gun fire and between 0658 and 0703 sporadic machine-gun and small-arms fire by Israel forces.

“(b) OP Yoke (MR 2271-2914): at 0628 two bursts of machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

“(c) OP Two (MR 2306-2736): between 2020 and 2030 machine-gun fire by Israel forces.”

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1177**

[Original: English]  
[7 May 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 6 May 1971 was received on 7 May from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

“OP reports.

“(a) OP Two (MR 2306-2736): between 0438 and 0439 machine-gun fire, between 0458 and 0510 sporadic machine-gun fire, between 1440 and 1500 two rounds of artillery and sporadic machine-gun fire and between 1538 and 1548 three rounds of artillery fire, all by Israel forces.

“(b) OP Four (MR 2327-2596): between 1122 and 1128 two rounds of artillery fire by Israel forces. Between 1230 and 1234 two rounds of artillery fire by Syrian forces. At 1910 machine-gun fire, which ceased immediately, and between 2115 and 2152 sporadic machine-gun fire and flares by Israel forces.

“(c) OP Three (MR 2308-2678): between 1352 and 1355 two rounds of artillery fire by Israel forces.

“(d) OP November (MR 2316-2564): between 1442 and 1445 two rounds of rocket fire by Syrian forces and between 1916 and 1925 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.”

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1178**

[Original: English]  
[8 May 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 7 May 1971 was received on 8 May from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

“OP reports.

“(a) OP Two (MR 2306-2736): between 0440 and 0506 and between 1305 and 1310 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

“(b) OP Uniform (MR 2366-2621): between 0615 and 0622 three mortar rounds by Israel forces.

“(c) OP Seven (MR 2203-2408): between 1006 and 1021 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

“(d) OP Six (MR 2300-2847): at 1442 one mortar round by Israel forces.”

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1179**

[Original: English]  
[8 May 1971]

The following report on firing in the Suez Canal sector on 7 May 1971 was received on 8 May from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

“Report from OP Lima (MR 7662-8173): at 1859 two rifle shots by UAR forces. When queried, senior UAR liaison officer stated that he could not confirm any firing in the area at that time.”

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1180**

[Original: English]  
[10 May 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 8 May 1971 was received on 9 May from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

“OP reports.

“(a) OP Seven (MR 2203-2408): between 0545 and 0546 and between 0628 and 0629 two rounds of artillery fire each time by Syrian forces.

“(b) OP Two (MR 2306-2736): between 0553 and 0600 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

“(c) OP November (MR 2316-2564): between 1949 and 1956 sporadic small arms-fire and flares by Israel forces.”

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1181**

[Original: English]  
[10 May 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 9 May 1971 was received on 10 May from

"1. OP reports.

"(a) OP Romeo (MR 2294-2459): at 0528 mortar fire by Israel forces and at same time mortar fire by unidentified party (United Nations military observers could not identify firing party). Firing ceased by Israel forces at 0532 and by unidentified party at 0534.

"(b) OP Four (MR 2327-2596): at 1602 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces and at 1608 sporadic machine-gun fire by Syrian forces. Fire ceased by both parties at 1632. (See also para. 2.)

"(c) OP Two (MR 2306-2736): at 1650 machine-gun fire by Israel forces, which ceased immediately. Between 2228 and 2245 seven rounds of mortar fire by Israel forces.

"2. Firing on or close to United Nations installations.

"OP Four: at 1631 during machine-gun fire by Syrian forces, approximately 10 rounds passed within 10 metres of OP caravan. There were no Israel forces personnel in the vicinity."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1182**

[Original: English]  
[10 May 1971]

The following report on incidents in the Suez Canal sector on 9 May 1971 was received on 10 May from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"1. OP reports on ground activity.

"OP Charlie (MR 7396-9264): at 1009 one burst of sub-machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"2. OP reports on air activity.

"OP Green (MR 7394-9401): between 1012 and 1013 one UAR Sukhoi-7 aircraft flying from south to north at low altitude crossed canal from east to west over OP.

"3. Complaints by the parties.

"The following complaint was received from assistant Israel Defence Forces liaison officer on 9 May: 'I have been instructed to complain strongly against the following violation of the cease-fire by the UAR: On 9 May 1971 between 1207 LT (1007 GMT) and 1210 LT (1010 GMT) two UAR Sukhoi-7 aircraft violated the cease-fire by flying over Israeli positions from El Kantara to Port Said.'

"OP reports confirm this violation but only one UAR Sukhoi-7 aircraft was observed on east side of canal (see para. 2 above)."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1183**

[Original: English]  
[11 May 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 10 May 1971 was received on 11 May from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"Report from OP One (MR 2249-2960): between 1035 and 1040 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1184**

[Original: English]  
[12 May 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 11 May 1971 was received on 12 May from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"Report from OP Two (MR 2306-2736): between 0728 and 0736 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1185**

[Original: English]  
[13 May 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 12 May 1971 was received on 13 May from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP Two (MR 2306-2736): between 0440 and 0445 sporadic machine-gun fire and one mortar round, between 0828 and 0830 sporadic machine-gun fire and at 1833 machine-gun fire which ceased immediately, all by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Uniform (MR 2366-2621): between 1810 and 1817 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1186**

[Original: English]  
[13 May 1971]

The following report on incidents in the Suez Canal sector on 12 May 1971 was received on 13 May from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"1. OP reports on ground activity.

"OP Charlie (MR 7396-9264): between 1241 and 1242 machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"2. OP reports on air activity.

"(a) OP Copper (MR 7409-9075): at 1241 two unidentified aircraft (United Nations military observers could not determine type and nationality of aircraft due to bright sun) flying low south to north on east side of canal. Between 1241 and 1242 intense machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Hotel (MR 7391-8718): at 1317 one Israel forces Phantom and one Mirage aircraft, flying north to south, crossed canal from east to west over OP. Report confirmed by OP Foxtrot (MR 7430-8674).

"(c) OP Orange (MR 7604-8415): between 1318 and 1320 one Israel Phantom and one Mirage aircraft, flying north to south, crossed canal east to west, north of OP and recrossed west to east over OP Lima (MR 7662-8173). Report confirmed by OP Silver (MR 7452-8583), OP Pink (MR 7661-8278), OP Kilo (MR 7660-8225), OP Lima, OP Red (MR 7675-8125) and OP Blue (MR 7677-8055).

"(d) OP Mike (MR 7657-8037): between 1327 and 1329 one Israel forces Phantom and one Mirage aircraft, flying north to south, on west side of canal, recrossed canal west to east over OP."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1187**

[Original: English]  
[14 May 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 13 May 1971 was received on 14 May from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"Report from OP Seven (MR 2203-2408): between 0550 and 0603 machine-gun fire and between 1450 and 1456 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1188**

[Original: English]  
[15 May 1971]

The following report on firing in the Suez Canal sector on 14 May 1971 was received on 15 May from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"Report from OP Lima (MR 7662-8173): between 1531 and 1534 two rifle shots by UAR forces."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1189**

[Original: English]  
[15 May 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 14 May 1971 was received on 15 May from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"Report from OP Uniform (MR 2366-2621): At 1755 machine-gun fire, which ceased immediately, and between 2035 and 2036 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1190**

[Original: English]  
[17 May 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 15 May 1971 was received on 16 May from the Acting Chief of Staff of UNTSO:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP Five (MR 2290-2787): between 0911 and 0922 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Winter (MR 2320-2792): between 0955 and 0956 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Two (MR 2306-2736): between 1701 and 1714 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(d) OP Uniform (MR 2366-2621): at 1850 machine-gun fire, which ceased immediately, by Israel forces.

"(e) OP Four (MR 2327-2596): between 1902 and 1906 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1191**

[Original: English]  
[17 May 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 16 May 1971 was received on 17 May from the Acting Chief of Staff of UNTSO:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP One (MR 2249-2960): between 0953 and 0956 sporadic machine-gun fire by Syrian forces. Between 1445 and 1455 sporadic small arms fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Uniform (MR 2366-2621): between 1842 and 1855 sporadic machine-gun fire and mortar flares by Israel forces."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1192**

[Original: English]  
[18 May 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 17 May 1971 was received on 18 May from the Acting Chief of Staff of UNTSO:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP Two (MR 2306-2736): between 1651 and 1656 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP November (MR 2316-2564): between 1822 and 1830 and between 1850 and 1856 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Uniform (MR 2366-2621): between 1828 and 1835 machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(d) OP Four (MR 2327-2596): between 2003 and 2007 one flare and sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(e) OP Romeo (MR 2294-2459): between 2005 and 2020 mortar fire by Syrian forces."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1193**

[Original: English]  
[19 May 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 18 May 1971 was received on 19 May from the Acting Chief of Staff of UNTSO:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP Two (MR 2306-2736): between 0127 and 0130 and between 0409 and 0432 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Four (MR 2327-2596): between 1856 and 1904 and between 2305 and 2307 machine-gun fire and flares by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Uniform (MR 2366-2621): between 1903 and 1908 sporadic machine-gun fire and flares by Israel forces."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1194**

[Original: English]  
[20 May 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 19 May 1971 was received on 20 May from the Acting Chief of Staff of UNTSO:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP Seven (MR 2203-2408): between 0238 and 0252 six rounds of mortar fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Two (MR 2306-2736): between 0357 and 0424 machine-gun fire and two rounds of mortar fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Uniform (MR 2366-2621): between 1725 and 1727 sporadic machine-gun fire, between 1836 and 1837 machine-gun fire and flares and be-

tween 1853 and 1901 sporadic machine-gun fire and flares, all by Israel forces.

“(d) OP Four (MR 2327-2596): between 2127 and 2132 sporadic machine-gun fire and flares by Israel forces.”

#### **DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1195**

[Original: English]  
[21 May 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 20 May 1971 was received on 21 May from the Acting Chief of Staff of UNTSO:

“OP reports.

“(a) OP Five (MR 2290-2787): between 0010 and 0020 two rounds of mortar fire and sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

“(b) OP November (MR 2316-2564): between 0209 and 0211 machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

“(c) OP Two (MR 2306-2736): between 0427 and 0452, between 0640 and 0645, between 0855 and 0903 and between 1705 and 1708 sporadic machine-gun fire, all by Israel forces.

“(d) OP Romeo (MR 2294-2459): between 0809 and 0812 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

“(e) OP Four (MR 2327-2596): between 1814 and 1815 machine-gun fire and flares and between 2154 and 2200 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.”

#### **DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1196**

[Original: English]  
[22 May 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 21 May 1971 was received on 22 May from the Acting Chief of Staff of UNTSO:

“OP reports.

“(a) OP Five (MR 2290-2787): between 0402 and 0423 sporadic machine-gun fire by unidentified party (United Nations military observers could not identify the firing party). Between 2105 and 2112 12 mortar rounds by Israel forces.

“(b) OP Six (MR 2300-2847): between 0648 and 0655 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

“(c) OP Two (MR 2306-2736): between 1639 and 1653 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

“(d) OP Four (MR 2327-2596): between 1735 and 1736 machine-gun fire by Israel forces.”

#### **DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1197**

[Original: English]  
[24 May 1971]

The following report on incidents in the Israel-Syria sector on 22 May 1971 was received on 23 May from the Acting Chief of Staff of UNTSO:

“1. OP reports on ground activity.

“(a) OP Four (MR 2327-2596): between 0015 and 0024 and between 2247 and 2254 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

“(b) OP Two (MR 2306-2736): between 0408 and 0419 and between 1647 and 1650 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

“(c) OP Yoke (MR 2271-2914): between 0502 and 0515 eight mortar rounds by Israel forces.

“(d) OP Romeo (MR 2294-2459): between 1134 and 1155 sporadic rifle fire by Israel forces.

“(e) OP Five (MR 2290-2787): between 2009 and 2015 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

“(f) OP Three (MR 2308-2678): between 2238 and 2305 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

“2. OP reports on air activity.

(a) OP Four: at 0938 two Syrian aircraft crossed the area between the limits of the forward defended localities indicating the cease-fire lines, flying north to south over OP at low altitude (Syrian markings positively identified). This report confirmed by OP Sierra (MR 2312-2523) and OP November (MR 2316-2564) who stated aircraft were probably Sukhoi-7.

“(b) OP One (MR 2249-2960): at 0939 two Syrian Sukhoi-7 aircraft flying north to south at low altitude were observed east of OP, in the area between the limits of the forward defended localities indicating the cease-fire lines. Aircraft were observed at 0939 by OP Yoke but could not be identified due to very low altitude.

“3. Complaints by the parties.

“Following complaint was received 22 May from assistant Israel Defence Forces liaison officer: ‘I have been instructed to complain strongly against the following violation of the cease-fire by Syria: on 22 May 1971 at 1140 LT (0940 GMT) a pair of Syrian Sukhoi-7 aircraft violated the cease-fire by flying over Israel positions from a point north-east of Birket-Ram to a point south-east of Khisfine.’

“Assistant IDF liaison officer Lt. Colonel Paz has requested that the complaint be passed to the Syrian authorities.

“Map references for Birket-Ram are map square 2220-2930 and for Khisfine approximate MR 2267-2507.”

#### **DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1198**

[Original: English]  
[24 May 1971]

The following report on incidents in the Israel-Syria sector on 23 May 1971 was received on 24 May from the Acting Chief of Staff of UNTSO:

“1. OP reports on ground activity.

“(a) OP November (MR 2316-2564): between 0255 and 0312 intense machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

“(b) OP Four (MR 2327-2596): between 0300 and 0313, between 1950 and 1955 and between 2010 and 2024 machine-gun fire, all by Israel forces.

“(c) OP Two (MR 2306-2736): between 1653 and 1658 sporadic machine-gun fire and between 1903 and 1904 machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

“(d) OP Three (MR 2308-2678): at 1808 machine-gun fire which ceased immediately, between 1848 and 1849, between 2005 and 2006 and between 2050 and 2051 machine-gun fire, all by Israel forces.

“(e) OP Uniform (MR 2366-2621): at 2136 heavy machine-gun fire, which ceased immediately, by Israel forces.

"2. OP reports on air activity.

"OP One (MR 2249-2960): at 1339 one Israel forces Skyhawk aircraft crossed the area between the limits of the forward defended localities indicating the cease-fire lines from west to east over OP."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1199**

[Original: English]  
[25 May 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 24 May 1971 was received on 25 May from the Acting Chief of Staff of UNTSO:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP Three (MR 2308-2678): between 0054 and 0056 sporadic machine-gun fire and between 1917 and 1919 intense machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP One (MR 2249-2960): at 0949 machine-gun fire, which ceased immediately, by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Two (MR 2306-2736): between 1044 and 1045 one mortar round and sporadic machine-gun fire, between 1617 and 1620 sporadic machine-gun fire and between 1646 and 1650 intense machine-gun fire, all by Israel forces.

"(d) OP November (MR 2316-2564): between 1800 and 1803 and between 1820 and 1841 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1200**

[Original: English]  
[26 May 1971]

The following report on incidents in the Israel-Syria sector on 25 May 1971 was received on 26 May from the Acting Chief of Staff of UNTSO:

"1. OP reports on ground activity.

"(a) OP Two (MR 2306-2736): between 0402 and 0426 and between 1653 and 1700 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP November (MR 2316-2564): between 0648 and 0655 and between 1817 and 1820 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Six (MR 2300-2847): between 1410 and 1435 five rounds of mortar fire by Israel forces.

"(d) OP Three (MR 2308-2678): at 1929 machine-gun fire, which ceased immediately, by Israel forces.

"2. OP reports on air activity.

"OP Three: at 1138 one Israel forces Skyhawk aircraft flying from south to north crossed the limits of the Israel forward defended localities indicating the cease-fire line on the Israel side, south of OP and recrossed north of OP. Overflight confirmed by OP Victor (MR 2328-2668)."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1201**

[Original: English]  
[27 May 1971]

The following report on incidents in the Israel-Syria sector on 26 May 1971 was received on 27 May from the Acting Chief of Staff of UNTSO:

"1. OP reports on ground activity.

"(a) OP Two (MR 2306-2736): between 0434 and 0439 sporadic machine-gun fire and between 2155 and 2158 three rounds of artillery fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Four (MR 2327-2596): between 1733 and 1743 and between 1822 and 1830 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP November (MR 2316-2564): between 1821 and 1839 machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"2. OP reports on air activity.

"(a) OP Yoke (MR 2271-2914): at 1305 one Syrian forces MIG-17 jet aircraft crossed the area between the limits of the forward defended localities indicating the cease-fire lines from west to east, north of OP.

"(b) OP Three (MR 2308-2678): at 1305 one unidentified jet aircraft (United Nations military observers could not determine type and nationality of aircraft due to high speed and low altitude) crossed the above-mentioned area from east to west, east-south-east of OP.

"(c) OP Victor (MR 2328-2668): at 1309 one Syrian forces MIG-17 jet aircraft crossed the above-mentioned area from east to west, north of OP."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1202**

[Original: English]  
[28 May 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 27 May 1971 was received on 28 May from the Acting Chief of Staff of UNTSO:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP Six (MR 2300-2847): between 1354 and 1400 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP One (MR 2249-2960): at 2005 one mortar flare by Israel forces and at the same time machine-gun fire by an unidentified party (United Nations military observers were unable to identify the firing party). Fire by the unidentified party ceased at 2007.

"(c) OP Two (MR 2306-2736): between 2035 and 2043 sporadic to intense machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(d) OP Five (MR 2290-2787): between 2050 and 2054 sporadic machine-gun fire and one flare and between 2111 and 2112 machine-gun fire and flares by Israel forces."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1203**

[Original: English]  
[29 May 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 28 May 1971 was received on 29 May from the Acting Chief of Staff of UNTSO:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP November (MR 2316-2564): between 0320 and 0325 machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Romeo (MR 2294-2459): at 0655 machine-gun fire which ceased immediately by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Six (MR 2300-2847): at 0543 three rounds of rocket fire and intense light machine-gun and small arms fire by unidentified party (United Nations military observers could not identify

firing party). At same time three rounds of artillery fire, three rounds of mortar fire and intense machine-gun fire by Israel forces (United Nations military observers could not determine which party fired first). Fire ceased by unidentified party at 0547 and by Israel forces at 0552. Between 0622 and 0623 five rounds of heavy mortar fire by Israel forces. Between 2030 and 2032 two rounds of artillery and four rounds of mortar fire by Israel forces."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1204**

[Original: English]  
[30 May 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 29 May 1971 was received on 30 May 1971 from the Acting Chief of Staff of UNTSO:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP Five (MR 2290-2787): between 0327 and 0331 intense machine-gun fire and between 1705 and 1715 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Zodiac (MR 2253-2976): at 0531 machine-gun fire, which ceased immediately, by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Six (MR 2300-2847): between 0611 and 0616 sporadic machine-gun fire and one round mortar fire and between 0712 and 0725 four rounds mortar fire by Israel forces.

"(d) OP Romeo (MR 2294-2459): between 0811 and 0813 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(e) OP Two (MR 2306-2736): between 1305 and 1308 machine-gun fire and between 1705 and 1715 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1205**

[Original: English]  
[31 May 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 30 May 1971 was received on 31 May 1971 from the Acting Chief of Staff of UNTSO:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP Six (MR 2300-2847): between 0528 and 0543 two rounds mortar fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Two (MR 2306-2736): between 1240 and 1250 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Uniform (MR 2366-2621): between 1455 and 1538 sporadic machine-gun fire by Syrian forces. Between 1900 and 1904 and between 2105 and 2118 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(d) OP Five (MR 2290-2787): between 1655 and 1806 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(e) OP Four (MR 2327-2596): between 1755 and 1800 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1206**

[Original: English]  
[1 June 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 31 May 1971 was received on 1 June

from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP Five (MR 2290-2787): between 1705 and 1708 sporadic machine-gun fire and between 1810 and 1815 sporadic machine-gun fire and one mortar round by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Uniform (MR 2366-2621): between 1832 and 1840 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Three (MR 2308-2678): between 1847 and 1848 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(d) OP Two (MR 2306-2736): between 1909 and 1912 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1207**

[Original: English]  
[2 June 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 1 June 1971 was received on 2 June from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP Five (MR 2290-2787): between 0020 and 0025 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Six (MR 2300-2847): between 0342 and 0344 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP November (MR 2316-2564): between 1813 and 1831 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(d) OP Four (MR 2327-2596): between 1821 and 1823 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(e) OP One (MR 2249-2960): between 2017 and 2027 sporadic machine-gun fire and mortar flares by Israel forces."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1208**

[Original: English]  
[3 June 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 2 June 1971 was received on 3 June from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP Six (MR 2300-2847): between 0445 and 0446 two rounds of mortar fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Two (MR 2306-2736): between 1705 and 1711 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Uniform (MR 2366-2621): between 1743 and 1747 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(d) OP One (MR 2249-2960): between 1755 and 1810 one round mortar fire and sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(e) OP Four (MR 2327-2596): between 1805 and 1807 machine-gun fire by Israel forces."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1209**

[Original: English]  
[3 June 1971]

The following report on incidents in the Suez Canal sector on 2 June 1971 was received on 3 June from



the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"1. OP reports on ground activity: nil.

"2. OP reports on air activity.

"(a) OP Kilo (MR 7660-8225): between 1259 and 1302 two unidentified jet aircraft (United Nations military observers could not determine type or nationality of aircraft due to high altitude) crossed canal from west to east north of OP.

"(b) OP Silver (MR 7452-8533): at 1304 one Israel forces Phantom and one Mirage aircraft crossed Great Bitter Lake from east to west south-east of OP."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1210**

[Original: English]  
[4 June 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 3 June 1971 was received on 4 June from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP Seven (MR 2203-2408): at 0536 machine-gun fire, which ceased immediately, by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Six (MR 2300-2847): between 0555 and 0602 sporadic machine-gun and small-arms fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Four (MR 2327-2596): between 1853 and 1901 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1211**

[Original: English]  
[5 June 1971]

The following report on firing in the Suez Canal sector on 4 June 1971 was received on 5 June from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"Report from OP Pink (MR 7661-8278): between 1939 and 1945 machine-gun fire and flares by Israel forces. (When queried senior Israel representative stated that he could not confirm firing in the area at that time)."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1212**

[Original: English]  
[5 June 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 4 June 1971 was received on 5 June from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"Report from OP Three (MR 2308-2678): at 0545 two rounds of mortar fire and between 2105 and 2107 machine-gun fire by Israel forces."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1213**

[Original: English]  
[7 June 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 5 June 1971 was received on 6 June from

the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP Uniform (MR 2366-2621): between 0627 and 0633 sporadic machine-gun and mortar fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP One (MR 2249-2960): between 1447 and 1514 six rounds mortar fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Four (MR 2327-2596): between 1750 and 1755 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1214**

[Original: English]  
[7 June 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 6 June 1971 was received on 7 June from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"Report from OP November (MR 2316-2564): between 1820 and 1835 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1215**

[Original: English]  
[8 June 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 7 June 1971 was received on 8 June from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"Report from OP Two (MR 2306-2736): at 1046 machine-gun fire, which ceased immediately, by Israel forces."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1216**

[Original: English]  
[10 June 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 9 June 1971 was received on 10 June from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP Two (MR 2306-2736): between 0810 and 0820 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Romeo (MR 2294-2459): between 1406 and 1410 three rounds of mortar fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Three (MR 2308-2678): at 2103 machine-gun fire, which ceased immediately, by Israel forces."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1217**

[Original: English]  
[11 June 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 10 June 1971 was received on 11 June from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"Report from OP One (MR 2249-2960): between 1730 and 1733 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1218**

[Original: English]  
[12 June 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 11 June 1971 was received on 12 June from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP November (MR 2316-2564): between 0748 and 0749 three bursts of machine-gun fire and between 1754 and 1755 machine-gun and rifle fire and flares activity by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Two (MR 2306-2736): between 0923 and 0935 three rounds of mortar fire and sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1219**

[Original: English]  
[14 June 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 12 June 1971 was received on 13 June from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP One (MR 2249-2960): between 1515 and 1541 sporadic machine-gun and small-arms fire by unidentified party (United Nations military observers could not identify the firing party). At 1942 small-arms fire by unidentified party (UNMOs could not identify the firing party) followed by machine-gun fire by Israel forces. Firing by both parties ceased immediately.

(b) OP Uniform (MR 2366-2621): between 1730 and 1744 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Sierra (MR 2312-2523): at 1848 machine-gun fire, which ceased immediately, by Israel forces."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1220**

[Original: English]  
[14 June 1971]

The following report on incidents in the Suez Canal sector on 13 June 1971 was received on 14 June from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"1. OP reports on ground activity: nil.

"2. OP reports on air activity.

"(a) OP Silver (MR 7452-8583): between 1320 and 1323 one Israel forces Phantom and one Mirage aircraft crossed canal from east to west south of OP and recrossed west to east in OP Pink (MR 7661-8278) area. Report confirmed by OPs Hotel (MR 7391-8718), Foxtrot (MR 7430-8674), Pink, Red (MR 7675-8125) and Lima (MR 7662-8173).

"(b) OP Orange (MR 7604-8415): between 1327 and 1330 one Israel forces Phantom and one Mirage aircraft flying north to south crossed canal east to west over OP. Aircraft circled above area between OP Kilo (MR 7660-8225) and OP Mike (MR 7657-8037), crossing and recrossing canal several times. This report confirmed by OPs Lima, Kilo and Red.

"3. Complaints by the parties.

"Following complaint was received from assistant Israel Defence Forces liaison officer 13 June: 'I have been instructed to complain strongly against the following violation of the cease-fire by the UAR: on 13 June 1971 between 1208 LT (1008 GMT) and 1209 LT (1009 GMT) two UAR Sukhoi-7 aircraft violated the cease-fire by flying over Israeli positions from a point north-east of Kantara to a point south-east of Kantara.'

"OP reports do not confirm this violation."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1221**

[Original: English]  
[14 June 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 13 June 1971 was received on 14 June from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP Seven (MR 2203-2408): between 0828 and 0835 small-arms fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP One (MR 2249-2960): between 1655 and 1705 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Six (MR 2300-2847): between 1829 and 1831 machine-gun fire by Israel forces."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1222**

[Original: English]  
[15 June 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 14 June 1971 was received on 15 June from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP Three (MR 2308-2678): between 0435 and 0440 and between 1745 and 1752 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Five (MR 2290-2787): between 2010 and 2017 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1223**

[Original: English]  
[16 June 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 15 June 1971 was received on 16 June from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP Romeo (MR 2294-2459): between 1033 and 1038 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Four (MR 2327-2596): at 1220 machine-gun fire, which ceased immediately, by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Two (MR 2306-2736): between 1445 and 1455 four rounds mortar fire by Israel forces.

"(d) OP Three (MR 2308-2678): between 1806 and 1824 sporadic machine-gun fire and flares by Israel forces."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1224**

[Original: English]  
[17 June 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 16 June 1971 was received on 17 June from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"1. OP reports.

"OP Two (MR 2306-2736): between 0100 and 0115 25 rounds of mortar fire by Syrian forces (see para. 2).

"2. Firing on or close to United Nations installations.

"OP Two: between 0100 and 0105 during mortar fire by Syrian forces four rounds impacted less than 100 metres from OP. There were no Israel forces personnel in the immediate vicinity."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1225**

[Original: English]  
[18 June 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 17 June 1971 was received on 18 June from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP Four (MR 2327-2596): at 1556 machine-gun fire, which ceased immediately, by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Uniform (MR 2366-2621): between 2100 and 2108 intense machine-gun fire with flares by Israel forces."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1226**

[Original: English]  
[19 June 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 18 June 1971 was received on 19 June from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"1. OP reports.

"(a) OP Sierra (MR 2312-2523): between 0501 and 0503 machine-gun fire (see para. 2) and between 1508 and 1516 sporadic mortar fire by Israel forces, between 2114 and 2116 machine-gun fire by Syrian forces.

"(b) OP Yoke (MR 2271-2914): between 1120 and 1128 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces, report confirmed by OP X-Ray (MR 2304-2891).

"(c) OP Two (MR 2306-2736): between 1344 and 1350 and again between 1500 and 1514 machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(d) OP Four (MR 2327-2596): at 1509 four rounds of heavy mortar fire, between 1915 and 1916 machine-gun fire, and at 2044 machine-gun fire, which ceased immediately, all by Israel forces.

"(e) OP Six (MR 2300-2847): Between 1543 and 1550 three rounds of tank fire by Israel forces.

"(f) OP Three (MR 2308-2678): between 1952 and 1953 machine-gun fire and flares by Israel forces.

"2. Firing on or close to United Nations installations.

"OP Sierra: between 0501 and 0503, 20 rounds of machine-gun fire by Israel forces passed within 40 metres of OP. There were no Syrian forces personnel in the immediate vicinity."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1227**

[Original: English]  
[21 June 1971]

The following report on incidents in the Suez Canal sector on 19 June 1971 was received on 20 June from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"1. OP reports on ground activity.

"OP Charlie (MR 7396-9264): between 0913 and 0914 intense machine-gun fire by Israel forces. At the same time sound of jet aircraft was heard in the area. When senior Israel representative was informed he stated it was practice shooting.

"2. OP reports on air activity.

"OP Green (MR 7394-9401): at 0919 one UAR Sukhoi-7 aircraft flying low south to north over the water of the canal first observed six kilometres south of OP. Aircraft recrossed at 0920 one kilometre north of OP. At the same time another UAR Sukhoi-7 aircraft was flying south to north on west side of canal.

"3. Complaints by the parties.

"The following complaint was received from assistant Israel Defence Forces liaison officer, 19 June: 'I have been instructed to complain strongly against the following violation of the ceasefire by the UAR: on 19 June 1971 between 1109 LT (0909 GMT) and 1115 LT (0915 GMT) two UAR Sukhoi-7 aircraft violated the cease-fire by flying over Israeli positions from a point east of Kantara to a point north-east of Ras El Eish.' (See para. 2 above.)"

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1228**

[Original: English]  
[21 June 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 19 June 1971 was received on 20 June from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"1. OP reports.

"(a) OP Six (MR 2300-2847): between 0427 and 0428 machine-gun fire by Israel forces (see para. 2).

"(b) OP Uniform (MR 2366-2621): between 1719 and 1725 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"2. Firing on or close to United Nations installations.

"OP Six: between 0427 and 0428 five bursts of machine-gun fire by Israel forces passed over and through the OP site."

**DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1229**

[Original: English]  
[21 June 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 20 June 1971 was received on 21 June from

the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"1. OP reports.

"(a) OP Three (MR 2308-2678): between 0708 and 0721 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Two (MR 2306-2736): at 0820 machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Six (MR 2300-2847): between 1012 and 1035 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(d) OP One (MR 2249-2960): at 1828 machine-gun fire, which ceased immediately, by Israel forces."

#### **DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1230**

[Original: English]  
[21 June 1971]

The following report on incidents in the Suez Canal sector on 20 June 1971 was received on 21 June from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"1. OP reports on ground activity: nil.

"2. OP reports on air activity.

"OP Yellow (MR 7432-8861): between 1310 and 1317 one Israel forces Phantom and one Mirage aircraft flying north to south crossed canal east to west north of OP. Aircraft then continued southwards crossing and recrossing canal several times, finally recrossing from west to east in OP Blue (MR 7677-8055) area. Report confirmed by OPs Echo (MR 7408-9005), Hotel (MR 7391-8718), Orange (MR 7604-8415), Pink (MR 7661-8278), Kilo (MR 7660-8225), Red (MR 7675-8125) and Blue (MR 7677-8055)."

#### **DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1231**

[Original: English]  
[22 June 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 21 June 1971 was received on 22 June from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP November (MR 2316-2564): between 0517 and 0542 sporadic sub-machine-gun fire and between 1106 and 1107 heavy machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Six (MR 2300-2847): between 1447 and 1529 machine-gun and rifle fire by Israel forces. Senior Israel representative was contacted and stated it was practice shooting."

#### **DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1232**

[Original: English]  
[23 June 1971]

The following report on incidents in the Suez Canal sector on 22 June 1971 was received on 23 June from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"I. OP reports.

"(a) OP Orange (MR 7604-8415): between 0938 and 0939 two UAR Sukhoi-7 aircraft were observed flying low west to east, south-west of OP

over Little Bitter Lake. Aircraft turned south-south-east then south-west and were last observed south-west of OP on west side.

"(b) OP Pink (MR 7661-8278): at 0938 two UAR Sukhoi-7 aircraft were observed flying low north to south over the canal from north of OP to south of OP. Israel forces machine-gun fire was directed against them for five seconds from north of OP.

"(c) OP Red (MR 7675-8125): between 0940 and 0941 one UAR Sukhoi-7 aircraft was observed flying low north to south over canal from north of OP to south of OP. A second UAR Sukhoi-7 aircraft was observed over west side of canal. This report confirmed by OP Blue (MR 7677-8055).

"Note: Above-mentioned OPs confirmed that aircraft did not cross east side of canal.

"2. Complaints by the parties.

"Following complaint was received from assistant Israel Defence Forces liaison officer 22 June: 'I have been instructed to complain strongly against the following violation of the cease-fire in the Suez Canal area by the UAR: on 22 June 1971 between 1140 LT (0940 GMT) and 1145 LT (0945 GMT) a pair of UAR Sukhoi-7 aircraft violated the cease-fire by flying over Israeli positions from a point east of Deversoir to a point east of Suez.' (See para. 1 above.)"

#### **DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1233**

[Original: English]  
[23 June 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 22 June 1971 was received on 23 June from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP Six (MR 2300-2847): at 0442 mortar, machine-gun and later tank and artillery fire by Israel forces and at 0459 machine-gun fire by unidentified party from location 600 metres south-east of OP (United Nations military observers could not identify firing party). Fire ceased by unidentified party at 0532 and by Israel forces at 0542.

"(b) OP Five (MR 2290-2787): between 1622 and 1625 two rounds mortar fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Two (MR 2306-2736): between 2021 and 2044 sporadic machine-gun fire and flares by Israel forces."

#### **DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1234**

[Original: English]  
[24 June 1971]

The following report on incidents in the Israel-Syria sector on 23 June 1971 was received on 24 June from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"1. OP reports on ground activity.

"(a) OP Romeo (MR 2294-2459): between 0325 and 0355 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Six (MR 2300-2847): between 0455 and 0503 one mortar round and sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP November (MR 2316-2564): between 0917 and 0927 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"2. OP reports on air activity.

"OP November: between 1026 and 1030 one Israel forces light aircraft flying from north-north-west to south-south-east crossed the area between the limits of the forward defended localities indicating the cease-fire lines, north-north-east of OP."

#### **DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1235**

[Original: English]  
[24 June 1971]

The following report on firing in the Suez Canal sector on 23 June 1971 was received on 24 June from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP Orange (MR 7604-8415): between 1255 and 1257 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Lima (MR 7662-8173): at 1257 machine-gun fire by Israel forces, which ceased immediately.

"(c) OP Red (MR 7675-8125): between 1258 and 1304 intense machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"Note: When queried, senior Israel representative stated that he could not confirm above-mentioned firings."

#### **DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1236**

[Original: English]  
[25 June 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 24 June 1971 was received on 25 June from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP November (MR 2316-2564): between 0007 and 0009 intense machine-gun fire and one mortar flare, between 0352 and 0410 sporadic machine-gun fire and between 1845 and 1848 sporadic machine-gun fire and two flares, all by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Four (MR 2327-2596): between 0323 and 0330 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP One (MR 2249-2960): at 0445 machine-gun fire, which ceased immediately, by Israel forces.

"(d) OP Three (MR 2308-2678): between 1554 and 1558 three rounds artillery fire by Israel forces."

#### **DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1237**

[Original: English]  
[26 June 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 25 June 1971 was received on 26 June from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP November (MR 2316-2564): between 0225 and 0240 and between 0352 and 0409 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Four (MR 2327-2596): between 0331 and 0339 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Six (MR 2300-2847): at 0500 machine-gun fire which ceased immediately by Israel forces.

"(d) OP Two (MR 2306-2736): at 0945 and at 1151 machine-gun fire which ceased immediately, each time by Israel forces.

"(e) OP Romeo (MR 2294-2459): between 1605 and 1608 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

#### **DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1238**

[Original: English]  
[28 June 1971]

The following report on incidents in the Suez Canal sector on 26 June 1971 was received on 27 June from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"1. OP reports.

"(a) OP Pink (MR 7661-8278): at 0842 one UAR Sukhoi-7 aircraft flying low north to south over the canal. At the same time machine-gun fire by Israel forces from north of OP. This report confirmed by OP Red (MR 7675-8125).

"(b) OP Blue (MR 7677-8055): at 0844 one UAR Sukhoi-7 aircraft flying low north to south over the canal crossed the canal west to east one kilometre south of OP and recrossed approximately seven kilometres south of OP. Machine-gun fire by Israel forces at 0845 from south of OP.

"2. Complaints by the parties.

"Following complaint was received from assistant Israel Defence Forces liaison officer 26 June: 'I have been instructed to complain strongly against the following violation of the cease-fire in the Suez Canal area by the UAR: on 26 June 1971 between 1041 LT (0841 GMT) and 1044 LT (0844 GMT) two UAR Sukhoi-7 aircraft flew over Israeli positions from a point east of Kabrit to a point east of Port Tawfiq.' (See para. 1 above.)"

#### **DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1239**

[Original: English]  
[28 June 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 26 June 1971 was received on 27 June from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP Four (MR 2327-2596): between 0317 and 0327 machine-gun and small-arms fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP November (MR 2316-2564): between 0344 and 0358 sporadic machine-gun fire and at 1653 machine-gun fire, which ceased immediately, by Israel forces.

"(c) OP X-Ray (MR 2304-2891): between 0412 and 0419 sporadic rifle fire by Syrian forces.

"(d) OP Six (MR 2300-2847): between 0635 and 0643 sporadic machine-gun fire and between 1820 and 1824 sporadic machine-gun fire and one flare by Israel forces.

“(e) OP Two (MR 2306-2736): between 1410 and 1425 five mortar rounds by Israel forces.

“(f) OP Five (MR 2290-2787): between 1500 and 1507 three mortar rounds and at 1528 one mortar round by Israel forces.

“(g) OP Uniform (MR 2366-2621): between 1728 and 1749 sporadic machine-gun fire and flares by Israel forces.”

#### DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1240

[Original: English]  
[28 June 1971]

The following report on incidents in the Israel-Syria sector on 27 June 1971 was received on 28 June from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

“OP reports.

“(a) OP November (MR 2316-2564): between 0336 and 0346 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

“(b) OP Romeo (MR 2294-2459): between 0433 and 0435 sporadic machine-gun and small-arms fire by Israel forces.

“(c) OP Uniform (MR 2366-2621): between 0540 and 0547 sporadic machine-gun and small-arms fire by Israel forces and between 0550 and 0603 one tank, one armoured personnel carrier and four soldiers, all from Israel forces, crossed and recrossed the limits of the Israel forward defended localities indicating the cease-fire line on the Israel side at approximate map reference 2317-2647. Penetration 800 metres.

“(d) OP Yoke (MR 2271-2914): at 1939 sporadic mortar fire by Israel forces and at 1945 sporadic rocket fire by unidentified party (United Nations military observers could not identify firing party). Fire ceased by unidentified party at 1946 and by Israel forces at 1947.”

#### DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1241

[Original: English]  
[29 June 1971]

The following report on incidents in the Israel-Syria sector on 28 June 1971 was received on 29 June from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

#### DOCUMENT S/10124/ADD.1\*

Report of the Secretary-General under Security Council resolutions 252 (1968), 267 (1969) and 271 (1969) and General Assembly resolution 2254 (ES-V)

[Original: English]  
[20 April 1971]

1. Since the publication of the report of 18 February 1971 [S/10124], a further exchange of communications concerning the status of Jerusalem and the United Nations premises at Government House in Jerusalem has taken place between the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations.

\* Also circulated as a General Assembly document under the symbol A/8282/Add.1.

“OP reports.

“(a) OP Uniform (MR 2366-2621): between 0542 and 0547 one tank, one armoured personnel carrier and five soldiers, all from Israel forces, crossed the limits of the Israel forward defended localities indicating the cease-fire line on the Israel side at approximate map reference 2316-2647, fired two tank rounds and intense machine-gun fire between 0530 and 0532 and recrossed the above-mentioned limits at original point. Penetration 1,000 metres.

“(b) OP Zodiac (MR 2253-2976): between 0841 and 0843 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

“(c) OP Three (MR 2308-2678): between 1420 and 1430 three mortar rounds by Israel forces.”

#### DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1242

[Original: English]  
[30 June 1971]

The following report on incidents in the Israel-Syria sector on 29 June 1971 was received on 30 June from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

“1. OP reports on ground activity.

“(a) OP November (MR 2316-2564): at 0358 two rifle shots by Syrian forces.

“(b) OP Uniform (MR 2366-2621): between 0525 and 0553 two tanks and one armoured personnel carrier, all from Israel forces, crossed the limits of the Israel forward defended localities indicating the cease-fire line on the Israel side at approximate map reference 2316-2647, penetrated approximately 1,000 metres, and recrossed the above-mentioned limits at approximate map reference 2325-2645. Confirmed by OP Three (MR 2308-2678).

“(c) OP Uniform: between 0536 and 0547 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

“(d) OP Three: between 1222 and 1234 sporadic machine-gun fire and two mortar rounds by Israel forces.

“2. OP reports on air activity.

“OP November: between 0358 and 0359 one Israel forces Piper Cub aircraft flying from south-west to north-east crossed the area between the limits of the forward defended localities indicating the cease-fire lines south-west of OP and recrossed north-north-east of OP.”

2. On 8 March 1971, the representative of Israel addressed the following note to the Secretary-General in reply to the latter's two communications of 26 January 1971 [S/10124, para. 4]:

“The Permanent representative of Israel to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and has the honour, on instructions of his Government, to refer to the Secretary-General's two notes dated 26 Jan-

uary 1971 [S/10124], one dealing with the premises known as Government House and the other dealing more generally with building construction in Jerusalem.

"The representative of Israel is instructed to state that these two communications have been carefully examined and that the Government of Israel's position remains as it has been conveyed to the Secretary-General in its various communications on the subject. At the same time, the Government of Israel wishes to place on record its reservations to the various legal and other considerations advanced in those two notes and more particularly to the references made in them to claims of the United Nations 'to the occupancy and possession of the whole of the premises' of Government House."

3. On 12 April, the Secretary-General sent the following note to the representative of Israel:

"The Secretary-General of the United Nations presents his compliments to the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations and has the honour to refer to the representative's note of 8 March 1971 in response to two notes from the Secretary-General of 26 January 1971, one relating to the status of Jerusalem and the other to the question of the return to the United Nations of the whole of its premises, as constituted on 5 June 1967, at Government House in Jerusalem.

"The representative's reply of 8 March 1971 is to the effect that the Secretary-General's

"... two communications have been carefully examined and that the Government of Israel's position remains as it has been conveyed to the Secretary-General in its various communications on the subject. At the same time, the Government of Israel wishes to place on record its reservations to the various legal and other considerations advanced in those two notes, and more particularly to the references made in them to claims of the United Nations "to the occupancy and possession of the whole of the premises" of Government House."

"The Secretary-General notes that, presumably because of the reservations referred to in the above reply, no copy of the reported Jerusalem 'master plan' has been provided, nor has any information regarding it been furnished to the Secretary-General, notwithstanding the requests contained in his notes of 10 December 1970 and 26 January 1971.

"I

"In so far as the representative's reply of 8 March 1971 relates to the Secretary-General's note of 26 January 1971 regarding the status of Jerusalem,

that reply will be communicated to the Security Council and the General Assembly pursuant to the Secretary-General's obligations to report under the relevant resolutions.

"II

"In so far as the representative's reply relates to the Secretary-General's communication of 26 January 1971 requesting the return of the whole of the United Nations premises at Government House as constituted on 5 June 1967, the Secretary-General notes that the reply contains no direct response to this request. Nor is any precise information given on the exact terms of the reservations which are at present held by the Government of Israel regarding the Secretary-General's request.

"The Secretary-General observes that the reservations referred to in the representative's note are now raised for the first time. They were not mentioned when part only of the Government House premises was returned to the United Nations. At that time the position of the Government of Israel, set out in the representative's letter of 22 August 1967, indicated no such reservations, although the Secretary-General had previously expressly preserved the rights of the United Nations to the occupancy and possession of the whole of the Government House premises as constituted when UNTSO was forced to evacuate them on 5 June 1967. The Secretary-General would also observe that it was in reliance on the preservation of these United Nations rights that the Secretary-General authorized the return of the Chief of Staff of UNTSO and his staff to the lesser area, in the circumstances and under the conditions indicated in the Secretary-General's report to the Security Council of 11 August 1967 [S/7930/Add.27]. As the reservations referred to in the note under reply relate in part to 'legal... considerations', it may be mentioned that one way of resolving any differences now arising would be to have resort to the procedure for settlement laid down in section 30 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations.

"In all the circumstances of the case, and taking into account both current works by the Israel authorities within and bordering upon Government House property as constituted on 5 June 1967 as well as the absence of a direct reply to the specific request of the Secretary-General in his note of 26 January 1971, the Secretary-General is constrained to reiterate that request, namely, for the unreserved return to the United Nations of the remainder of its Government House premises."

#### DOCUMENT S/10169\*

Letter dated 1 April 1971 from the representative of Jordan to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]  
[2 April 1971]

Upon instructions from my Government I have the honour to bring to your attention present and impending Israeli violations concerning religious, historical and cultural sites in Jerusalem.

The illegal excavations carried out by the Israeli authorities adjacent to the southern and western parts of the wall of Haram Esh-Sharif are now seriously endangering Al Aqsa Mosque, the Moslem Museum and El-Fakhariyya Minaret.

Reports emanating from the area speak of Israeli attempts in the Knesset (Israeli parliament) to enact

\* Also circulated as a General Assembly document under the symbol A/8307.

a law in order to confine holy Moslem religious places in Haram Esh-Sharif area to Al Aqsa and the Dome of the Rock mosques. Thus, the Plaza of Haram Esh-Sharif and other religious and cultural buildings which are held sacred by some 600 million Moslems all over the world will not be considered holy any more and would therefore be at the mercy of future illegal Israeli regulations and excavations.

Ever since the establishment of the Zionist movement, Zionist organizations have made no secret of their resolve to take over Jerusalem and to transform it into a Jewish community. Since the June 1967 aggression, the Israeli road to Arab Jerusalem and its Christian and Moslem holy places has been a tortuous one from an avowed position of non-annexation to "administrative unity", then to "reunification" and finally to *de facto* "annexation", which was combined with a declaration "ensuring the welfare of the city and the happiness of its people"! However, the Israeli destruction of private property and the violations of religious and cultural sites that ensued are hardly consistent with Israeli promises. In the period following the illegal annexation, a great number of complaints were filed with the Israeli authorities by Moslem religious organizations and leaders pertaining to the transgression involving Moslem holy places. In August 1967, the Chief Rabbi of the Israeli Army, Shlomo Goren, and associates conducted prayers in the area of Haram Esh-Sharif near Al Aqsa Mosque. According to the Israeli paper *Ha'aretz* of 8 August 1967, he declared his determination to keep conducting such prayers in different places of Al Haram Esh-Sharif Plaza. The Chief Rabbi further declared his determination to build a synagogue there.

On 6 January 1971, a group of Jewish leaders conducted prayers in the Haram Esh-Sharif area, as reported in the Israeli paper *Ma'ariv* of 8 January 1971. The prayers were led by a former Chief Rabbi of South Africa, now a member of the municipal council of Jerusalem, as well as other rabbis and professors from the universities of Jerusalem and Tel Aviv.

The premeditated burning of the holy Al Aqsa Mosque on 21 August 1969 is a grim reminder of what awaits these holy shrines under Israeli military occupation. The circumstances that led to such premeditated action blends with the outlook and pronouncements of Israeli zealots and religious academicians who pursue messianic goals.

The Israeli policy to change the character of Jerusalem at the expense of the Christian and Moslem communities prompted an editorial in the Vatican City newspaper, *L'Osservatore Romano* of 22/23 March, which referred to these persistent Israeli policies against the Christians and Moslems in the following terms: "their existence and development is threatened by a policy which seems to aim at slow suffocation".

As early as 22 August 1967, the Moslem religious leaders on the west bank of Jordan anticipated Israeli designs and issued a *fatwa* (religious decree). The *fatwa* restated an already established historical and

religious fact by declaring that the whole Haram Esh-Sharif area and whatever is built on it is sacred to Moslems. This same *fatwa* was endorsed by the Fourth and Fifth Islamic Conferences for Religious Research held in Cairo in 1968 and 1970, respectively.

The excavations and the impending legislation are in direct violation of The Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict of 14 May 1954, particularly article 5, which stipulates that:

"Any High Contracting Party in occupation of the whole or part of the territory of another High Contracting Party shall as far as possible support the competent national authorities of the occupied country in safeguarding and preserving its cultural property."<sup>2</sup>

The Executive Board of UNESCO, on 10 October 1969, by a vote of 26 to none adopted resolution 4.3.1 concerning illegal excavations in Jerusalem, which called upon Israel "to preserve scrupulously all the sites, buildings and other cultural properties, especially in the old city of Jerusalem" and "to desist from any archaeological excavations, the transfer of such properties and any change of their features of their cultural and historical character".

However, those excavations persisted with intensity. The attached map<sup>3</sup> depicts the different stages of excavations endangering religious and cultural property. Israeli contemplated plans would, if permitted, be of more far-reaching consequences.

Security Council resolution 267 (1969) of 3 July 1969 deplored Israel's disregard for previous United Nations resolutions, censured in the strongest terms all measures taken to change the status of the City of Jerusalem, considered such measures illegal and determined that "in the event of a negative response or no response from Israel, the Security Council shall reconvene without delay to consider what further action should be taken in this matter".

Israel failed to comply with the above-mentioned resolution. It continues to follow a defiant policy vis-à-vis the provisions of international law and conventions governing its obligations as an occupying Power. Israeli designs on the Holy Places can only create more anguish and revulsion on the part of Moslems all over the world.

In view of the gravity of this matter, I appeal to you to anticipate these sinister Israeli designs on the sanctity of the Holy Places and their surroundings.

I have the honour to request that this letter and the attached map be circulated as official documents of the Security Council and General Assembly.

(Signed) Anton A. NABER  
Chargé d'Affaires a.i.  
of Jordan to the United Nations

<sup>2</sup> United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 249 (1956), No. 3511.

<sup>3</sup> The map attached to the mimeographed version of this document is not reproduced here; it has been deposited in the archives of the United Nations Secretariat, where it is available for consultation.



**Letter dated 8 April 1971 from the representative of India  
to the President of the Security Council**

[Original: English]  
[8 April 1971]

I have the honour to refer to the letter of the representative of Pakistan dated 13 February 1971 [S/10116] and, in reply thereto, to state as follows.

My Government has viewed with concern and amazement the attempt made by the representative of Pakistan in his letter to magnify a situation far beyond its true proportions, to suppress the truth and to implant a number of mis-statements.

This letter from the representative of Pakistan would not merit a lengthy reply but for the necessity of exposing some of the gross mis-statements made in it, as follows:

(a) Contrary to the assertion made by the representative of Pakistan, the Government of Pakistan never deplored the act of hijacking of the Indian Airlines aircraft.

(b) Contrary again to the claim made in the letter under reference, Pakistan authorities delayed the return of the passengers and the crew to India—a distance of 36 miles—by 50 hours, citing difficulties which are not confirmed by eye-witnesses, and they have failed to return the baggage, cargo, mail and other contents of the hijacked aircraft.

(c) Contrary once more to the statement made in the letter in question, the Pakistan authorities made no effort to disarm the hijackers and remove them from the aircraft and to take them into custody; on the other hand, they aided and encouraged them in various ways—not the least of which was the act of transmitting their so-called demands to my Government.

The serious concern of my Government over the possibility of the crime of air piracy being committed in the air space of the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent was communicated to the Government of Pakistan last year. On 1 September 1970 the High Commissioner for Pakistan at New Delhi was informed by my Government that there was reliable information that there existed a conspiracy in Pakistan to hijack Indian aircraft to Pakistan. The High Commissioner was requested to convey this information to his Government with the request that they take necessary measures to prevent such a happening. Instead of taking action as requested by my Government, the Government of Pakistan simply asked for disclosure of the source of information. After careful consideration of the sequence of facts and circumstances of the incident of the hijacking of the Indian aircraft to Pakistan and its deliberate destruction, my Government came to the conclusion that there was active and direct complicity of the Pakistan authorities, not only in the hijacking of the aircraft but also in its eventual destruction by burning which, curiously enough, was televised by the Government-controlled Lahore station of Pakistan Television, by extending its normal programme by half an hour. The grounds and the conclusion were communicated in clear terms to the Government of Pakistan in the note dated 9 February 1971 [see annex I].

The President of the Council of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) was informed by my Government about the hijacking on 1 February 1971, and to the best knowledge of my Government,

Pakistan has yet to take action on the suggestions made by him to the Pakistan authorities. I enclose a copy of the message sent by the President of the Council of ICAO [see annex II].

In suspending overflights by Pakistan civil and military aircraft, the Government of India acted in the interest of maintaining the minimum necessary standards of safety and security of international civil aviation against hijacking and its attendant dangers to life and property. It is universally acknowledged that a material breach by a State of its obligations arising from treaties and agreements entitles a party specially affected by the breach to invoke it as grounds for suspending the operations of the rights and obligations flowing from the treaty, in whole or in part, in the relations between itself and the defaulting State. Pakistan cannot, therefore, take advantage of its own default and pose as an aggrieved party, after violating its own international obligations. India has not prohibited overflights by aircraft of any other State except Pakistan as no other country has engaged in conduct similar to that of Pakistan. Freedom of transit and transport is extended in the context of the broad and universally accepted objective of fostering international friendship and good neighbourliness. This particular objective has unfortunately been totally negated by Pakistan in the pursuit of its policy of hostility towards my country. It will be recalled that after the unfortunate conflict of August to September 1965, my Government had, on a specific request from the then President of Pakistan, agreed to the resumption of overflights even without insisting on prior normalization of relations—which it would have been well within its rights to do. Pakistan has, much to our regret, reciprocated this unilateral gesture of friendship only by a continuation of its policy of confrontation and interference in our internal affairs.

I have been instructed also to place on record my Government's position that the situation arising out of Pakistan's complicity in the hijacking and wanton destruction of our aircraft is a matter entirely amenable to settlement through bilateral negotiations. This has been reiterated in my Government's communication to the Pakistan Government dated 3 March 1971 [see annex III].

I have, for obvious reasons, refrained from engaging in an argument over the irrelevant and extraneous matter introduced by the representative of Pakistan for the purpose of confusing the issue. It will no doubt be observed that the allegation of a "serious situation" being created by my Government has no substance in fact; indeed, the situation itself can be resolved through Pakistan fulfilling its obligation and entering into purposeful negotiations with my Government with the object of arriving at a settlement, and not with that of increasing tension.

I request that this letter be circulated as a Security Council document.

(Signed) S. SEN  
Permanent Representative of India  
to the United Nations

## ANNEX I

Note dated 9 February 1971, from the Ministry of External Affairs of India to the High Commission of Pakistan in India

No. PSP/411/6/71

The Ministry of External Affairs presents its compliments to the High Commission for Pakistan in India and with reference to the note verbale dated 5 February 1971, handed over to the High Commissioner for India, by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Government of Pakistan, has the honour to state as follows.

The Government of India categorically rejects the disclaimer of the Government of Pakistan of its responsibility for and involvement in the crime of hijacking of the Indian Airlines aircraft to Lahore airport, on 30 January 1971, and its blowing up on 2 February 1971. Instead of showing a willingness to settle the matter amicably and agreeing to pay compensation for the loss and damage caused, the Government of Pakistan has sought to confuse the issue by introducing wholly extraneous matters and has even gone to the extent of questioning the sovereignty and territorial integrity of India. The Government of India regards this attitude of the Government of Pakistan as totally unco-operative, negative and obstructive. If the Government of Pakistan is not willing to settle the matter of compensation and to return the two hijackers to face their trial in India, the situation may deteriorate, and the Government of Pakistan will be wholly responsible for any consequences that may follow.

The Government of India is fully convinced, on the basis of evidence, that the premeditated criminal act of hijacking and wanton destruction of the Indian Airlines aircraft within the protected area of Lahore International Airport was the direct result of the Government of Pakistan having permitted its territory to be used for instigating, abetting and encouraging unlawful and subversive activities against India. The Government of India wishes to remind the Government of Pakistan that on 1 September 1970, it had informed the Government of Pakistan through its High Commissioner in New Delhi about the existence of a conspiracy in Pakistan to hijack Indian aircraft to that country. It was because of the active involvement of agencies of the Government of Pakistan in such subversive activities that the Government of India had recently to declare a member of the diplomatic personnel of the Pakistan High Commission in India *persona non grata*.

The responsibility of the Government of Pakistan for the criminal hijacking and deliberate destruction of the Indian Airlines aircraft is borne out, *inter alia*, by the following facts:

(i) The Government of Pakistan gave asylum to the two self-confessed criminals even while they were threatening to blow up the plane and before they had been disarmed and had surrendered themselves to the Pakistan authorities;

(ii) It has publicly expressed its solidarity with these criminals and their associates;

(iii) It refused to disarm the hijackers and take them into custody;

(iv) It failed to take adequate measures to protect the aircraft and its contents;

(v) It permitted the two criminals to move and act freely in the airport area and terminal building, including making long-distance telephone calls to their accomplices in Pakistan and meeting political leaders like Mr. Z. A. Bhutto, Mian Mahmood Ali Kasuri, etc., journalists and others freely;

(vi) The criminals were provided with food and other amenities for three and a half days, thus facilitating their continued unlawful occupation of the plane;

(vii) The Lahore station of Pakistan Television—a Government organization—was, obviously with foreknowledge, able to film and later televise the entire sequence of the blowing up of the aircraft;

(viii) The two criminals, even after they had come out of the aircraft, were allowed to prevent the local fire brigade from fighting the flames engulfing the aircraft;

(ix) Crowds were permitted to congregate in the protected area of an international airport when the authorities had all the resources of a martial law administration available to them;

(x) The two criminals were allowed to destroy the aircraft in full view of the troops, police and other airport personnel; and

(xi) The Government of Pakistan created unnecessary delays and difficulties frustrating the attempts of the Government of India to be of assistance in bringing back to India the passengers, crew and contents of the aircraft besides the aircraft itself.

The conduct of the Government of Pakistan in relation to this act of air piracy compelled the Government of India to enforce certain measures for ensuring safety of aviation and the restoration of public confidence in air transit. Accordingly, it was compelled to reroute its own services to avoid overflying Pakistan and to suspend overflights across Indian territory by Pakistan aircraft, both civil and military. The violation by the Government of Pakistan of its international obligations under the Tokyo Convention on Offences and certain Other Acts committed on Board Aircraft of 14 December 1963,<sup>a</sup> the solemn declaration (resolution A17-1) of the seventeenth session (extraordinary) of the Assembly of the International Civil Aviation Organization held at Montreal in June 1970, United Nations General Assembly resolution 2645 (XXV), and the Hague Convention of 16 December 1970,<sup>b</sup> and its failure even now to give compensation for the loss and damage caused to India, to prosecute the two hijackers and return them to India, make it clear that the Government of Pakistan is not willing to ensure the safety and security of aviation and air transit over the subcontinent. It is therefore necessary to continue these restrictions until the Government of Pakistan accepts its responsibility and makes amends for what has been done and give assurances about the future.

The Government of India is amazed at the accusation made by the Government of Pakistan that India's action will interfere in the carriage of essential supplies for relief work in East Pakistan. It would like to remind the Government of Pakistan that it had given the extraordinary facilities of a blanket clearance, covering an unrestricted number of overflights, even at night, by Pakistan Air Force aircraft across Indian territory, for ferrying relief supplies to East Pakistan, for a period of over two months. Further, it was the Government of Pakistan that created all kinds of difficulties and obstructions in the way of commencing and maintaining the deliveries of relief supplies from India for the cyclone-affected people of East Pakistan. In any case, if the Government of Pakistan wishes to fly any relief supplies to East Pakistan, it can still do so in foreign aircraft. Instead of accusing the Government of India, the Government of Pakistan should ponder whether through its wilful interference in the internal affairs of India it is not creating a situation of confrontation which is not in the interests of the people of India or Pakistan.

The Government of India takes serious objection to the reference to the internal affairs of India in the note under reference, and wishes to remind the Government of Pakistan of its obligation to cease its aggression on Indian territory in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir. If the Government of Pakistan persists in its attitude of openly or clandestinely interfering in India's internal affairs, it will be wholly responsible for the consequences of this policy.

The Government of India categorically rejects the insinuation in the same note that the Pakistan High Commission in India and its personnel were deliberately subjected to demonstrations and draws the attention of the Government of Pakistan to the extraordinary behaviour of the personnel of the mission whose fusillade of brickbats and bottles injured the police and other personnel engaged in the duty of protecting the mission and its personnel. The Government of Pakistan should realize that these spontaneous demonstrations were

<sup>a</sup> United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 704 (1969), No. 10106.

<sup>b</sup> Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft.

only a natural expression of the indignation of all sections of the Indian people against the deliberate provocation of the Government of Pakistan. The Government of India categorically denies that any member of the Pakistani mission was injured or even touched by the demonstrators. The Government of India had assured the Pakistani mission that all possible measures had been taken and would continue to be taken to safeguard its security and this assurance has been fully implemented by the Government of India through the very elaborate preventive measures it took.

The demands made by the Government of India are logical and simple: first, the Government of India should be compensated for the loss of the aircraft, and secondly, the two criminals who hijacked the aircraft should be surrendered to Indian authorities so that they can stand their trial.

## ANNEX II

### Message from the President of the Council of the International Civil Aviation Organization to the Director General of General Civil Aviation, Karachi

Regarding unlawful seizure Indian Airlines aircraft. Confident Pakistan acting in accordance with ICAO Assembly resolution A17-5. Has permitted or will permit aircraft, occupants and cargo continue their journey immediately. Would appreciate your information regarding present situation. I am also very concerned by possibility proliferation hijacking in that part of the world unless severe measures taken. Therefore trust Pakistan will follow Assembly declaration A17-1 and prosecute perpetrators so as to deter repetition similar acts.

## ANNEX III

### Note dated 3 March 1971, from the Ministry of External Affairs of India to the High Commission of Pakistan in India

No. PSP/411/6/71

The Ministry of External Affairs presents its compliments to the High Commission for Pakistan in India and, with reference to the note dated 13 February 1971 handed over to the High Commission for India in Islamabad by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Pakistan, has the honour to state as follows.

The Government of India regrets to note that instead of making any effort to seek an amicable settlement of the situation arising from the hijacking and eventual destruction of the Indian Airlines aircraft on the lines suggested in the note of 9 February 1971, the Government of Pakistan has again sought to confuse the issue by introducing extraneous and irrelevant matters and by making obviously incorrect statements, e.g. that Indian aircraft continued to overfly

Pakistan even after overflights by Pakistani aircraft had been banned. The Government of Pakistan is well aware that overflights of Pakistan territory by Indian aircraft had completely ceased before the ban in question was imposed.

The Government of India has already stated its position to the Government of Pakistan. The Government of Pakistan's failure to deal with the two hijackers and the manner in which it has dealt with the whole matter cannot but be an open encouragement to the repetition of such criminal acts in future.

The Government of India wishes to remind the Government of Pakistan that after the Indo-Pakistan conflict of August-September 1965, it would have been well within its rights to disallow the resumption of overflights so long as relations between India and Pakistan had not been fully normalized. However, on a specific request made by the then President of Pakistan, the Government of India agreed, in February 1966, to forgo its right to demand prior settlement of outstanding issues and consented to resume mutual overflights. Such overflights by the scheduled services of the civil airlines of one country across the territory of another are, as the Government of Pakistan is aware, a matter of privilege. They constitute a facet of the normal relations between the countries concerned and the privilege in question is extended in the context of the broad and universally accepted objective of fostering better relations and friendliness within the family of nations. In this context, the Government of India would reiterate that the hijacking of the Indian Airlines aircraft and its destruction were the direct result of the policy of confrontation and interference pursued by the Government of Pakistan over the years. In the circumstances, the Government of India is constrained to conclude that the hostile policy of the Government of Pakistan against India and the manner in which it has dealt with the recent hijacking of the Indian aircraft pose a direct threat to the safety of aviation and air transit and the national security of India. The Government of India is therefore perfectly within its rights to demand action against the hijackers, compensation for loss and adequate assurances from the Government of Pakistan regarding the future.

The Government of India takes serious objection to the slanderous accusations contained in the note under reply and categorically rejects them. It further wishes to state that should the Government of Pakistan genuinely desire an amicable settlement of the present question and restoration of normal relations, it should refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of India. For its part, the Government of India would be willing to receive from the Government of Pakistan directly through normal diplomatic channels any concrete indications of the willingness of the Government of Pakistan to proceed towards a settlement of the question of compensation for the loss of the Indian Airlines aircraft, the punishment of the two criminals who hijacked it and adequate assurances regarding the future.

## DOCUMENT S/10172\*

### Letter dated 8 April 1971 from the representative of Lebanon to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English]  
[8 April 1971]

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to bring to your attention the following.

At 1 a.m. local time, Monday, 5 April 1971, an Israeli patrol crossed the Lebanese border to the village of Duhayra in the region of Sour and blew up three houses.

At 2 a.m. local time, another Israeli patrol crossed the Lebanese border to the village of Mays-Al-Jabal in the region of Marjayoun and blew up three houses and destroyed property.

\* Incorporating document S/10172/Corr.1.

At 11 a.m. local time, Israeli artillery shelled villages in the Arkoub region causing damage to property.

At midnight, Monday, 5 April to Tuesday, 6 April 1971, an Israeli patrol crossed the Lebanese border to the village of Yaroun in the region of Bint Jbail and blew up one house.

These new premeditated Israeli acts of aggression are aimed at disturbing the peace and security of Lebanon. They constitute another flagrant violation of the Lebanon-Israel armistice agreement and a defiance of the Charter of the United Nations and the Security Council resolutions—especially those resolutions adopted following the repeated acts of aggression committed by Israel against Lebanon.

I respectfully request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Edouard GHORRA  
Permanent Representative of Lebanon  
to the United Nations

#### DOCUMENT S/I0174

#### Letter dated 10 April 1971 from the representative of Turkey to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]  
[12 April 1971]

I have the honour to enclose herewith a letter addressed to you by Mr. Fazil Küçük, Vice-President of the Republic of Cyprus, concerning the situation in Cyprus.

I should be grateful if you would kindly have Mr. Küçük's letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) U. Halûk BAYÜLKEN  
Permanent Representative of Turkey  
to the United Nations

#### LETTER DATED 24 MARCH 1971 FROM THE VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS, MR. FAZIL KÜÇÜK, TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Knowing as I do your deep concern about the events in Cyprus and the outcome of the intercommunal talks, I feel it my duty to bring to your notice certain ominous developments in the island which are giving cause for anxiety to the Turkish community.

The outspoken declarations of policy by Archbishop Makarios and his Greek ministers form the crux of our complaints. On 14 March 1971 Archbishop Makarios made a speech at the Greek Cypriot village of Yialoussa in which he emphatically stressed that his policy continues to be *enosis* (union of Cyprus with Greece) in the following terms:

"Cyprus is Greek. Cyprus has been Greek since the dawn of its history and will remain Greek. Greek and undivided we have taken it over. Greek and undivided we shall preserve it. Greek and undivided we shall deliver it to Greece."

According to reports published in the local Greek press on 16 March 1971, Archbishop Makarios gave a categorical assurance to certain members of the underground organization, the National Front, at a meeting he had with them on 9 March 1971, that he has "never ceased to work for *enosis* and that he will never sign an agreement which excludes *enosis*".

In the meantime Mr. Komodromos, the Minister of Interior of the Greek Cypriot Administration, has continued to tour the island delivering fiery speeches

on *enosis* and declaring that the Turks of Cyprus are "guests" on the island and they should not interfere in the affairs of Cyprus. In line with this outspokenness of the leadership, the Greek Cypriot press has increased its virulent anti-Turkish and pro-*enosis* campaign while the Greek Cypriot administrators have hardened their attitude towards members of the Turkish Cypriot community. The number of molestations, arrests and maltreatment on sham charges and questioning of Turks on matters unconnected with such charges, assaulting Turks and indiscriminate search of vehicles owned by Turks who travel in Greek-controlled areas have increased considerably.

In addition unilateral action, in violation of the Constitution, has been taken in appointing a new judge to "the Supreme Court" and in designating one of its members as "Chief Justice of Cyprus".

All these add up to the intensive activity of Greek Cypriot organizations to affiliate themselves with similar organizations in Greece, and the most provocative manner in which the 1821 Greek uprising against the Ottoman Empire is being celebrated gives us reason to believe that we may soon be faced with more provocative overt acts by the Greek Cypriot leadership.

It is in this atmosphere of ever-increasing *enosis* agitation that the intercommunal talks have been going on for the last two and a half years.

You will recall that the intercommunal talks started in June 1968 on the understanding that a peaceful and just solution should be sought on the basis of the *continued independence of Cyprus*. The Greek Cypriot leadership, including Archbishop Makarios, have recently made several statements falsely accusing the Turkish side of intransigence and have repeatedly predicted that these talks will end in failure "because of Turkish intransigence". I have pointed out above the categorical statement made by the Archbishop that he will not sign any agreement which will exclude *enosis*. The truth of the matter is that it is as a result of this policy of the Greek side that there has been no progress in the talks. The Turkish Cypriot side is acting within its rights in rejecting any solution which

will leave the door open to *enosis*; because *enosis* means the dissolution of an independent State Member of the United Nations and the Turkish Cypriot community's complete ruin. The Greek Cypriot side has already tried to use the independent status of Cyprus as a spring-board for *enosis*, with the ensuing chaos and human suffering in the island, since December 1963, with grave consequences threatening international peace. We cannot agree to any solution which will give the *enosis*-minded Greek Cypriot leaders a better starting point in their untenable race for *enosis*; thus we cannot agree to yield to their demands to create a purely Greek Cypriot State based on the permanent capitulation of the Turkish community.

In view of the declared policy of Archbishop Makarios that he will not sign any agreement which bars *enosis* and that his whole aim is "to hand Cyprus over to Greece as a whole", I am sure that you will support our determination to safeguard the independence of Cyprus by not accepting proposals which are designed to bring about *enosis* at an opportune time at the will of the Greek side.

Greek Cypriot policy of, and overt acts for, *enosis* have brought intercommunal strife and caused much bloodshed in the island. This period, which we thought had closed with the foundation of the Republic in 1960, was, unfortunately and unwisely, reopened by the 1963 events. We had believed that the continued interest shown in Cyprus by the world Organization

and the situation created after the 1967 crisis had brought about a change of heart on the Greek Cypriot side and we had banked all our hopes on the intercommunal talks which aimed, we thought, at finding a solution based on independence as an end in itself and not as a means to an end, i.e. *enosis*.

The matters enumerated above have diminished our hopes and have caused grave concern amongst my community. Letters protesting against the Greek Cypriot leadership's attitude, particularly the recent *enosis* statements by Archbishop Makarios, are pouring in from all Turkish organizations and villages. I believe that if the serious mistake which the Greek Cypriot leadership is making in resuscitating the *enosis* policy is not brought home to them in unequivocal terms and this ever-growing tendency is permitted to develop further all chances of finding a peaceful solution to the Cyprus problem will be lost.

I wish to reiterate my community's stand that we are all for finding a peaceful solution on the basis of independence, guaranteed fully and effectively against *enosis*, and retaining the political status of partnership of the two communities. It goes without saying that we shall do our utmost in co-operation with the Greek Cypriot side to find such a solution, as long as *enosis* is put out of our way as an ultimate Greek Cypriot objective.

I should be grateful if this communication could be circulated as a Security Council document.

#### DOCUMENT S/10175

##### Letter dated 12 April 1971 from the representative of Israel to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English]  
[12 April 1948]

On instructions from my Government I have the honour to draw your attention to the recent intensification of acts of aggression committed against Israel from Lebanese territory.

Between 11 March and 10 April 1971, terror organizations operating from bases in Lebanon carried out nineteen attacks against Israeli villages and vehicles. The following are some of them.

On 14 March a terror squad opened small arms fire from Lebanese territory on the town of Metulla in Upper Galilee.

On 16 March a similar attack was carried out on the village of Zarit in Upper Galilee.

On 20 March the town of Metulla was shelled from bazookas stationed in Lebanese territory.

On 22 March Metulla was attacked again with mortar fire.

On 26 March a terror unit penetrated into Israel from Lebanon and planted an anti-vehicle mine on a road used by civilian workers near the village of Maalot in Upper Galilee. A vehicle transporting workers was blown up resulting in the death of one civilian and the wounding of four others.

On 29 March a marauder unit which had infiltrated from Lebanon opened fire on the village of Margaliyot.

An 11-year-old boy was wounded. The unit was intercepted by Israel forces and fled across the Lebanese cease-fire line leaving one dead behind.

On 1 April Metulla came again under bazooka fire from Lebanese territory.

On the same day an anti-vehicle mine planted by a marauder unit in a track near Har Amiram exploded under an Israeli tractor.

On 4 April the kibbutz of Hanita was shelled by bazookas.

On 5 April bazooka fire was directed against the village of Safsufa.

It is incumbent on the Government of Lebanon to abide by its obligations under the cease-fire established by the Security Council and unconditionally accepted by Lebanon on 31 July 1967 [S/8106]. When Lebanon fails to fulfil its international undertakings, the Government of Israel is duty bound to take the necessary measures to defend the lives and property of its citizens.

I have the honour to request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Yosef TEKOAH  
Permanent Representative of Israel  
to the United Nations

Letter dated 13 April 1971 from the Chairman of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples to the President of the Security Council, concerning the situation in Territories under Portuguese administration

[Original: French]  
[15 April 1971]

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith, for the attention of the Security Council, the text of a resolution<sup>4</sup> concerning the question of Territories under Portuguese administration, which was adopted by the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples at its 791st meeting on 13 April 1971.

The operative paragraphs of this resolution read as follows:

*"The Special Committee,*

*"...*

*"1. Condemns any use of chemical substances, such as herbicides and defoliants, by the Government of Portugal, either in Angola or in other Territories under its domination in violation of General Assembly resolution 2707 (XXV);*

*"2. Calls upon the Government of Portugal to cease forthwith the use of chemical and biological methods of warfare against the peoples of Angola and the other Territories under its domination, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the above-mentioned General Assembly resolution and with the generally recognized rules of international law embodied in the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925;*

*"3. Draws the attention of the Security Council to the urgent need to take the necessary measures to ensure the immediate cessation by Portugal of its colonial wars in Africa and its use of herbicides*

<sup>4</sup> For the full text of the resolution see document A/AC.109/368.

and defoliants to the detriment of the peoples of the Territories;

*"4. Endorses the request for assistance contained in the communication referred to above, and requests the Chairman to bring it to the attention of the Organization of African Unity, with an appeal that urgent action be taken thereon, in accordance with paragraph 5 of General Assembly resolution 2704 (XXV);*

*"5. Appeals to the Food and Agriculture Organization and the World Health Organization, as well as other organizations concerned within the United Nations system, in accordance with the above-mentioned General Assembly resolution, to give urgent and favourable consideration to the request for assistance in consultation with the Organization of African Unity;*

*"6. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit the text of the present resolution to the above-mentioned organizations and to report to the Special Committee on the action taken or envisaged by those organizations in its implementation;*

*"7. Decides to keep under constant review these and other aspects of the question of Territories under Portuguese administration."*

The opinions expressed by the members of the Special Committee during consideration of this item are contained in the records of the 790th and 791st meetings of the Committee.

(Signed) Germán NAVA CARRILLO  
Chairman of the Special Committee on  
the Situation with regard to the  
Implementation of the Declaration  
on the Granting of Independence to  
Colonial Countries and Peoples

## DOCUMENT S/10178

Letter dated 16 April 1971 from the representative of Chile to the Secretary-General

[Original: Spanish]  
[22 April 1971]

I have the honour to refer to your note PO/230/SOAF (5) of 7 August 1970, in which you transmitted the text of resolution 283 (1970), adopted by the Security Council at its meeting of 29 July 1970, with regard to the situation in Namibia.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Chile, in order to reaffirm the Chilean Government's policy with regard to this situation and in response to the appeal made by the Security Council in resolution 283 (1970), has informed the Government of the Republic of South Africa that the Government of Chile does not recognize its authority over the Territory of Namibia and regards its presence there as illegal. The text of the Chilean

Government's note, dated 3 March 1971, is given below:

"I have the honour to inform you of the position of the Government of Chile with regard to the Territory of South West Africa, now Namibia, in accordance with the provisions of resolution 283 (1970) of the United Nations Security Council.

"The preambular part of resolution 283 (1970) reaffirms resolutions 264 (1969) and 276 (1970), in which the Security Council recognized the decision of the General Assembly to terminate the Mandate for South West Africa and assume direct responsibility for the Territory until its independence and

in which the continued presence of the South African authorities in Namibia, as well as all acts taken by that Government on behalf of or concerning Namibia after the termination of the Mandate, were declared illegal and invalid.

"The Government of Chile, in pursuance of the above-mentioned resolution and in keeping with its policy of support for the process of decolonization and the self-determination of peoples, wishes to inform you and, through you, the Government of South Africa that it does not recognize South Africa's authority over the Territory of Namibia and considers the South African presence in that Territory illegal.

"By virtue of the decisions taken in this matter by the General Assembly and the Security Council, the Government of Chile recognizes only the United

Nations as the sole authority with jurisdiction over the Territory of Namibia until such time as the Namibian people can freely exercise its right of self-determination.

"The Government of Chile is convinced that compliance with United Nations resolutions on the part of the South African Government constitutes an important requirement for the maintenance of international peace and security and for a reduction of the tensions caused by the situation resulting from South Africa's presence in the Territory of Namibia."

I should be grateful if you would have this note circulated as an official Security Council document.

(Signed) Humberto DIAZ-CASANUEVA  
Permanent Representative of Chile  
to the United Nations

## DOCUMENT S/10179

### Letter dated 19 April 1971 from the representative of Turkey to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]  
[22 April 1971]

I have the honour to enclose herewith a letter addressed to you by Mr. Fazıl Küçük, Vice-President of the Republic of Cyprus, concerning the situation in Cyprus.

I should be grateful if you would kindly have Mr. Küçük's letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) U. Halûk BAYÜLKEN  
Permanent Representative of Turkey  
to the United Nations

#### LETTER DATED 1 APRIL FROM THE VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS, MR. FAZIL KÜÇÜK, TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Since my communication of even reference dated 24 March 1971, the Greek Cypriot leaders have continued with their provocative and pro-*enosis* speeches.

Mr. Kyprianou, Mr. Komodromos and Mr. Petrides, all occupying ministerial posts in the Greek Cypriot Administration, joined Archbishop Makarios in declaring in unequivocal terms that their aim continues to be *enosis* (union of Cyprus with Greece).

Mr. Kyprianou, in a speech delivered at Limassol on 24 March 1971 declared, *inter alia*, the following:

"The most basic ambition that must occupy the soul, the heart, the conscience and the mind of all Greek Cypriots, is the national ambition. The national duty, the interest of the motherland, must always serve as our compass . . . The responsibility of our generation is very great. Cyprus, where Greek virtue is being tested, is today the place where Greek history and Greek struggles are continuing . . . It is here that Hellenism will continue its glorious march. It is here that Hellenism is being tested. It is here that it must now be glorified and achieve great things . . . We shall not betray our ideals, and we shall not renounce our race and national obligations."

Mr. Komodromos, Archbishop Makarios's Minister of Interior, who claims to be responsible for internal security, manifested his loyalty to *enosis* in speeches he delivered on 27 and 28 March at the Greek villages of Pallouriotissa and Kato Zodhia in the following terms, which can mean nothing but open instigation to violence:

"We shall continue our struggle for the real freedom of self-determination and then *enosis*. *Enosis* will be the climax and the end of the long years of struggle of our people. Our patriotic forces, united under our capable and honourable Ethnarch, is waging a struggle for the national liberation of Cyprus. The path of our struggle is uphill and difficult. The part near success is steep and hard. But we are determined not to accept any condition of slavery or any degradation and to proceed along the honourable path leading to our national liberation. We are not alone in this struggle. The people of Greece, with all its vigour and dignity, is standing by our side. . . Let us struggle, as an indivisible whole, keeping in our hearts the spirit of 1821 and 1955, to overcome all impediments which are keeping us away from the greatest of all feasts, the feast of freedom. The Greek Cypriot people is yearning for this feast. *The Greek Cypriot people has not yet been able to enjoy the blessings of uniting this Greek island with its motherland Greece.*"

Mr. Petrides, the member in charge of education in the Greek Cypriot Administration, was equally outspoken in his pro-*enosis* declaration on 24 March 1971. He told his audience in Nicosia that the 1955 EOKA struggle was the continuation of the 1821 struggle and that *it was the duty of the Greek Cypriots to unite Cyprus with Greece along with northern Epirus, which is now a part of Albania.*

While these speeches were being delivered in Cyprus, Mr. Kranidiotis, Archbishop Makarios's Ambassador in Greece, informed the Greek nation on behalf of

Archbishop Makarios that "the blood of the Greek Cypriot fighters had sealed the holy contract of union of Cyprus with Greece".

You will appreciate that these declarations openly defy the Security Council's resolutions on Cyprus and can have only one object, that is to undermine completely the meaning and effect of the intercommunal

talks and plunge Cyprus into another period of bloodshed and disaster, with all its grave consequences, threatening international peace which the world body is taking so much pain to preserve.

In view of the gravity of the situation, I shall be grateful if these deplorable developments may also be brought to the notice of the Security Council.

## DOCUMENT S/10180

Note by the Secretary-General transmitting replies from Governments to his note verbale of 18 December 1970 requesting information on the implementation of resolution 290 (1970), concerning the complaint of Guinea

[Original: English/French/Russian/Spanish]  
[23 April 1971]

1. It will be recalled that at its 1563rd meeting on 8 December 1970, the Security Council, after considering the item entitled "Complaint by Guinea" together with the report of the Security Council Special Mission established under resolution 289 (1970),<sup>5</sup> adopted resolution 290 (1970).

2. By a note verbale of 18 December 1970, the Secretary-General transmitted the text of resolution 290 (1970) to the Governments of all States Members of the United Nations or members of the specialized agencies, drawing their particular attention to paragraphs 4, 6 and 10 thereof and requesting them to provide him with relevant information on the implementation of the resolution.

3. On 22 December 1970, the President of the Security Council and the Secretary-General issued an interim report [S/10054] in pursuance of resolution 290 (1970). It reproduced the texts of a number of relevant communications which had been addressed to the President of the Security Council or to the Secretary-General, in connexion with the question discussed by the Security Council.

4. As of 23 April 1971, the Secretary-General has received a total of 29 replies to his note verbale of 18 December 1970. Five of these were simple acknowledgements (Kenya, Nauru, Nicaragua, Panama, United Kingdom). The substantive part of the other 24 replies are reproduced hereafter.

### BULGARIA

[Original: French]  
[25 January 1971]

In implementation of Security Council resolution 290 (1970) and in particular paragraph 4 thereof, which "Appeals to all States to render moral and material assistance to the Republic of Guinea to strengthen and defend its independence and territorial integrity", and in response to the appeal from President Sékou Touré for assistance to the Republic of Guinea against imperialist aggression, the Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, pursuing its policy of solidarity with and support for the just struggle of the African peoples for independence, sent drugs and other medical supplies to the friendly country of Guinea in December 1970.

With regard to paragraph 6 of the aforementioned resolution, which "Urges all States to refrain from providing the Government of Portugal with any military and material assistance", the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of Bulgaria would like to lay special stress on the fact

that Bulgaria has no diplomatic or other relations with Portugal. The Bulgarian Government strongly condemns Portugal's policy of colonial oppression and racial discrimination, which is a flagrant violation of the purpose and principles of the United Nations Charter and of numerous documents and resolutions adopted by the General Assembly with a view to achieving the total and permanent elimination of colonialism, particularly the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and the programme of action for its full implementation.

As an active member of the Committee of Twenty-Four,<sup>a</sup> the People's Republic of Bulgaria participates in the implementation of its decisions and initiatives and, in pursuance of the relevant General Assembly resolutions, is rendering moral and material assistance to the people of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau) in their struggle against Portuguese colonial domination for their freedom and national independence.

### CAMEROON

[Original: French]  
[25 January 1971]

For the purpose of implementing the resolution, the Government of Cameroon has taken the following decisions.

As a matter of general policy and in pursuance of the pertinent resolutions of the United Nations and of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), Cameroon has no relations whatsoever with Portugal. The attitude towards the Lisbon régime of the Cameroonian Government and of its representatives both at home and abroad has been set forth clearly in various documents. Cameroon is adamant in its opinion on Portuguese colonialism and accepts no extenuating circumstances.

As soon as the news of the aggression against the Republic of Guinea reached Cameroon, the Head of State sent a message of solidarity to President Sékou Touré and the people of Guinea.

Cameroon then played an active part in the Seventh Extraordinary Session of the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity, held in Lagos from 9 to 11 December 1970, which examined the situation created in Guinea by Portugal's aggression. Cameroon accepted all the conclusions reached by the Council of Ministers, and its action will be based not only on the Security Council resolution but also on the resolutions adopted at the extraordinary session of the OAU Council of Ministers.

### CANADA

[Original: French]  
[22 March 1971]

The Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs explained Canada's attitude in a statement in the House of

<sup>a</sup> Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

<sup>5</sup> Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-fifth Year, Special Supplement No. 2.



Commons on 15 January 1971. He stated that the Canadian Government was opposed to the maintenance of Portuguese colonialism in Africa. He said that Canada maintained a complete embargo on the sales of military equipment to the Portuguese Territories and had long since ceased providing military assistance to Portugal under the Canadian programme of mutual aid to its NATO allies. Lastly, he informed the House that the Government of Portugal was in no doubt about the Canadian Government's views on Portuguese policies in Africa.

The text of the statement made by the Honorable Mitchell Sharp, Secretary of State for External Affairs, is given below.

"The Canadian Government's opposition to the maintenance of Portuguese colonialism in Africa has been firmly declared and abundantly demonstrated. It has been reflected in our support for United Nations resolutions calling on Portugal to grant those Territories self-determination. It was specifically enunciated in the Government's paper on foreign policy.

"Moreover, and this relates directly to a major clause of Security Council resolution 290 (1970) of 8 December 1970, Canada maintains a complete embargo on the sales of military equipment to the Portuguese Territories, and it has long since ceased providing military assistance to Portugal under NATO mutual aid.

"The resolution also asks Portugal's allies to influence the Government of Portugal to comply with its terms.

"The Government of Portugal is in no doubt about the Canadian Government's views on Portuguese policies in Africa."

#### CHAD

[Original: French]  
[15 April 1971]

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Chad presents its compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and... has the honour to inform him that the Government of Chad reacted with indignation and bitterness to the news of the aggression committed on 22 November 1970 by neo-colonialist forces against its sister Republic of Guinea.

As a country that respects the principles of the United Nations Charter, the Republic of Chad cannot approve such actions, which impair international peace and security.

It would therefore be grateful if the United Nations Secretary-General would urge Member Governments to send contributions to the Government of Guinea, so that it can obtain arms for the defence of its national territory in the event of a second act of aggression.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Chad would also be grateful if the United Nations Secretary-General would take measures to cope with any future imperialist invasions of independent countries in Africa and Asia.

#### CUBA

[Original: Spanish]  
[15 April 1971]

On 7 December 1970, in the Security Council, the Revolutionary Government of Cuba expressed its solidarity with the people and Government of Guinea and condemned the armed aggression against them by Portuguese forces and mercenaries under their command. In addition to being a flagrant violation of the San Francisco Charter, this aggression constitutes an intolerable attempt to undermine the sacred right of a nation to decide its own destiny, as well as a threat to international peace and security. True to its principles of solidarity with the victims of aggression, therefore, Cuba has already taken all appropriate measures to support the Guinean cause.

#### CYPRUS

[Original: English]  
[9 January 1971]

The Government of the Republic of Cyprus is not in a position to offer any material assistance to the Republic of Guinea

in pursuance of paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution 290 (1970); it strongly condemns, however, the armed intervention in the Republic of Guinea and expresses its grief at the loss of life and property caused by the armed attack and invasion of the Republic of Guinea.

In accordance with paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 290 (1970) and other previous similar resolutions of the General Assembly, the Government of the Republic of Cyprus does not provide the Government of Portugal with any military and material assistance.

The Republic of Cyprus has no relations with Portugal and, consequently, is unable to exert any influence on the Government of Portugal, as requested by paragraph 10 of the Security Council resolution 290 (1970).

#### DENMARK

[Original: English]  
[20 April 1971]

The Permanent Representative of Denmark... has the honour... to draw attention to the joint statement of Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden made during the 1928th plenary meeting of the General Assembly held on 14 December 1970, on the question of Territories under Portuguese administration.

Furthermore, it is recalled that the Danish Government administers its legislation on exports of arms and military equipment in line with the request in paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 218 (1965) concerning the situation in Territories under Portuguese administration. This policy has been pursued over several years and will be continued.

#### IRAN

[Original: English]  
[12 February 1971]

The Imperial Government of Iran, in line with its policy inspired by the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, has always opposed any aggression on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of States, which in its opinion constitutes a threat to international peace and security, and has sustained any action taken by the United Nations aimed at restoring and consolidating the rights of the peoples and territories of Africa.

While giving its full support to resolutions adopted by the United Nations, the Iranian Government has invariably voted for all the resolutions which defend the rights of African peoples and territories, and will continue the same policy in the future.

The Government of Iran has considered with great interest Security Council resolution 290 (1970) and will undertake appropriate measures in order to ensure its implementation.

#### IRAQ

[Original: English]  
[25 January 1971]

Iraq has neither military nor material transactions with Portugal which would enable the Government of Portugal to continue its repressive actions against the peoples of the territories under its domination and against independent African States. The Government of Iraq has already declared its support for Guinea's just position and its readiness to render every possible assistance required by the Republic of Guinea to strengthen and defend its independence and territorial integrity.

#### ISRAEL

[Original: English]  
[14 January 1971]

The Government of Israel provides no military or material assistance to the Government of Portugal.

Israel does not maintain diplomatic relations with Portugal.

## JAPAN

[Original: English]  
[28 December 1970]

The Government of Japan maintains the position that all problems, including those of the granting of independence to colonial territories, should be settled peacefully. It greatly regrets the recent invasion carried out on the territory of the Republic of Guinea and hopes that no similar incidents will take place in the future.

The export of all arms and military materials from Japan is subject to the requirement of an export licence under the Export Trade Control Order. The Government of Japan has consistently followed the policy of not approving any sale or supply to the Government of Portugal of arms and military equipment and materials which may be used for the repression of the people of the territories under its administration.

In compliance with Security Council resolution 290 (1970), the Government of Japan will continue to implement faithfully the arms embargo provided for in paragraph 6 of that resolution and is prepared to co-operate as much as possible in implementing the other paragraphs of the resolution to which the Secretary-General drew the attention of the Government.

## KHMER REPUBLIC

[Original: French]  
[11 February 1971]

The Khmer Republic, as a matter of principle, gives moral support to all countries defending their independence and territorial integrity.

It has no diplomatic or other relations with Portugal.

The position of the Khmer Republic in all international meetings is always in conformity with the spirit of the resolution.

## KUWAIT

[Original: English]  
[5 February 1971]

The Government of Kuwait extended moral and material support to the Government of the Republic of Guinea while its territory was the object of invasion and proclaimed its indignation over this aggression and its denunciation of the foreign invasion troops.

## LAOS

[Original: French]  
[11 January 1971]

The Kingdom of Laos has no relations with Portugal.

## MEXICO

[Original: Spanish]  
[19 January 1971]

The Government of Mexico reaffirms its decision to maintain in effect the measures reported to the United Nations in document S/7471, dated 23 August 1966.

## NETHERLANDS

[Original: English]  
[28 January 1971]

The Netherlands Government has taken note of resolution 290 (1970) adopted by the Security Council and the appeal to all States which this resolution contains. The Netherlands recognizes and respects the independence and territorial integrity of Guinea and maintains diplomatic relations with that country. The Netherlands has always faithfully executed Security Council resolutions concerning the arms embargo

against Portugal. The Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs has already carried out the request contained in paragraph 10 of Security Council resolution 290 (1970).

## PAKISTAN

[Original: English]  
[4 March 1971]

Pakistan is deeply concerned at the recent happenings in Guinea and condemns the aggression against that country. Pakistan has associated itself with the cause of the people of the Republic of Guinea in their struggle to strengthen and defend their independence and their territorial integrity. Pakistan is prepared to extend moral and material assistance to the Government and the people of Guinea in their hour of need.

Pakistan has not in the past provided the Government of Portugal with any military and material assistance enabling it to continue its repressive actions against the peoples of the Territories under its domination and against independent African States, nor will it do so in the future.

## PHILIPPINES

[Original: English]  
[22 March 1971]

... the Secretary for Foreign Affairs of the Philippines has issued Foreign Service Circular No. 23-71 dated 19 February 1971 and has addressed letters to the Departments of National Defense, Finance, and Commerce and Industry, requesting them to take appropriate steps towards the implementation of the restrictive measures contained in the ... resolution [290 (1970)].

## POLAND

[Original: English]  
[3 February 1971]

It has been the consistent policy of the Polish People's Republic to support and strictly implement all resolutions adopted by the Security Council, the General Assembly and other organs of the United Nations which are directed against colonialism and its various manifestations and this position of principle fully applies to resolution 290 (1970) for which Poland gave its active support in the Security Council. The Polish People's Republic severely condemned Portuguese aggression against the Republic of Guinea and assured the latter of its firm support and full solidarity with the people of Guinea in the just struggle to protect their freedom and sovereignty. Once again Poland also pledges its support for efforts aimed at the complete elimination of colonialism.

## SINGAPORE

[Original: English]  
[11 February 1971]

The Singapore Government has rendered and will continue to render to the Government of the Republic of Guinea all appropriate moral and diplomatic support for the defence of the independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Guinea against any foreign aggression. In this connexion, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Singapore wishes to draw the Secretary-General's attention to document S/10039 dated 15 December 1970. With respect to paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 290 (1970), the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Singapore wishes to inform the Secretary-General that Singapore has not in the past and will not in the future provide the Government of Portugal with any military and material assistance. With respect to paragraph 10 of the said resolution, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Singapore has the honour to inform the Secretary-General that Singapore, which is not, and has never been, an ally of Portugal, will nevertheless explore all diplomatic channels to persuade the Government of Portugal to comply with the provisions of the said resolution.

## SUDAN

[Original: English]  
[1 February 1971]

With regard to paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution 290 (1970), the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan has extended military assistance to the Republic of Guinea in the form of 1,000 rifles and a quarter of a million cartridges. Furthermore, the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan expresses its readiness to provide military training in the Sudan to personnel of the Republic of Guinea.

With regard to paragraphs 6 and 10 of Security Council resolution 290 (1970), the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan declares that it does not maintain either diplomatic, economic or cultural relations with the Government of Portugal. The Government of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan has co-ordinated its assistance to the Republic of Guinea with other African member States of the Organization of African Unity in the Seventh Extraordinary Session of the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity, held in Lagos from 9 to 11 December 1970.

## SWEDEN

[Original: English]  
[16 April 1971]

In reply to your request for information on any measures taken by my Government in accordance with the resolution, I have the honour to refer you to the statement that I made on behalf of Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden in connexion with the debate of the General Assembly on 14 December 1970 on the question of Territories under Portuguese administration, from which I quote the following.

"We stand firmly behind the resolution of the Security Council and join our voices to that of the Council in its strong condemnation of the Portuguese Government and its solemn warning to that Government. We therefore welcome the decision of the Council to remain actively seized of the matter.

"This latest action of the Portuguese Government illustrates only too clearly the grave dangers inherent in the course it is at present following. It is high time for the Portuguese Government to do some rethinking and to realize that a colonial policy which leads to conflict and tension with independent sovereign States is tantamount to courting disaster. Our previous appeal to the Portuguese Government to change its present course has assumed an increased urgency on account of recent events."<sup>b</sup>

With reference to paragraph 6 of the resolution, I should like to point to the fact that Sweden, in accordance with longstanding practice, does not permit exportation of war materials or military equipment of any kind to Portugal.

## UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

[Original: Russian]  
[22 April 1971]

The position of the Soviet Union on this question was explained with great detail and clarity in the statement by the

<sup>b</sup> See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fifth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 1928th meeting, paras. 59 and 60.

## DOCUMENT S/10182

Letter dated 27 April 1971 from the representative of Senegal to the President of the Security Council

[Original: French]  
[27 April 1971]

On the instructions of my Government, I have the honour to inform you of the following facts.

On the night of 31 March to 1 April 1971, units of the Portuguese regular army based at Guidaji and Fa-

Soviet Government of 23 November 1970 [see below] and in the special statement on the aggression by the colonialists against the Republic of Guinea which was adopted at Berlin on 2 December 1970 by the participants in the Conference of the Political Consultative Committee of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty and was circulated as an official document of the Security Council [S/10032].

"On 22 November 1970, Portugal committed a criminal act of armed aggression against an independent sovereign State—the Republic of Guinea.

"A landing party was dispatched from the territory of the Portuguese colony of Guinea (Bissau) to commit an armed attack on Conakry, the capital of the Republic of Guinea. The attack, carried out by forces of European and African mercenaries, was premeditated and prepared on the assumption that support would be provided by reactionary elements inside the country.

"The Guinean people and their armed forces are suitably repulsing the interventionists.

"Whatever false statements the Portuguese colonialists may have used to conceal their action, this is a clear attempt to demolish the progressive régime of Guinea and to strike a blow against the national liberation movement in Africa. This is an example of the colonial robbery and international banditry which the imperialists are now practising in various parts of the world against the peoples fighting for freedom and social progress. It is quite obvious that Portugal would not have taken the risk of embarking on such a criminal act against the progressive régime of an African State, unless it had received outside support.

"In the Soviet Union, the news of the armed aggression by the Portuguese colonialists was received with profound indignation. The Soviet Government strongly condemns the criminal actions of the interventionists and their protectors, which are a challenge to the African States and to all peoples fighting for national independence. This is a blatant and defiant violation of the principles of the United Nations and of internal law.

"In accordance with its fundamental policy, the Soviet Union strongly supports the struggle of the Guinean people against the interventionists and the efforts of the African States to repulse the aggressors.

"The imperialist aggression against the Guinean people must cease forthwith and the colonialists' mercenaries must be immediately withdrawn from the territory of that independent State."

## YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC

[Original: English]  
[11 February 1971]

The position of the Government of the Yemen Arab Republic in this matter is well known and has emanated from its faithful observation of the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other nations. However, it must be put on record that the Government of Yemen condemns aggression and all types of premeditated violation of the territorial integrity and national independence of any State.

The Yemen Government asserts emphatically that it has not and does not intend to enter into relations of any sort with the Government of Portugal.

rime attacked and burnt the village of Kandjenou (district of Tanaff). The casualties caused by these attacks amounted to one killed, five seriously wounded and 12 slightly wounded. The list of victims is as follows:

**Killed:** Miss Mawa Couniba Madiang, aged 18.

**Seriously wounded:** Mr. Landing Towe, aged 70, Mr. Yoro Madiang, aged 40, Mr. Bakari Madiang, aged 35, Mr. Insa Mandiang, aged 20, Mr. N'Fandiang Mandiang, aged 42.

**Slightly wounded:** Mr. Malang Dramé, Mr. Dian Seydi, Mr. Nière Mandiang, Mr. Sidi Sonko.

The other wounded persons left the village before the arrival of the local authorities.

In addition, 22 compounds containing 130 adobe huts were burned, 200 tons of ground-nuts in a storehouse were destroyed, 200 head of cattle were lost and a wing of the Kandjenou village school was destroyed by rockets. According to the evidence collected locally during the inquiry, a Portuguese aircraft overflew the village of Kandjenou between 8 a.m. and 9.45 a.m. on 31 March 1971.

On the night of 16 to 17 April 1971, there was a further attack on the Senegalese villages of Tankanto and Karoumbo (district of Tanaff) by units of the Portuguese regular army from the same base at Guidaji.

The following damage was caused:

Village of Tankanto: three seriously wounded; 75 huts, 6 tons of rice and 12 tons of millet burned.

Village of Karoumbo: three killed.

The victims were identified as: Landiag Touré, aged 68, Amadou Touré, aged 40, Moro Touré, aged 7.

I should like to draw the special attention of the members of the Council to the fact that, notwithstanding the pertinent resolutions of the Security Council, Portugal is still pursuing its policy of aggression against Senegalese villages in the region of the Casamance, causing the deaths of women and children. Its actions show an attitude of contempt towards Security Council resolution 273 (1969) of 9 December 1969.

As you are aware, the Security Council has not completed its consideration of the question of Portuguese aggression against Senegal, and I therefore request you to issue a strong warning to the Government of Portugal that in future Senegal will not fail to take whatever measures are necessary to defend its frontiers and its people.

If peace and security are to prevail in that area, it is essential that the Council, and particularly its permanent members, should firmly and formally call upon Portugal to end its serious violations of Senegal's territorial integrity and to halt the bombing of the peaceful and innocent people of the area.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a Security Council document.

(Signed) Ibrahima BOYE  
Permanent Representative of Senegal  
to the United Nations

## DOCUMENT S/10183

### Letter dated 27 April 1971 from the representative of the Khmer Republic to the President of the Security Council

[Original: French]  
[29 April 1971]

On the instructions of my Government and further to my letter of 9 March 1971 [S/10153], I have the honour to bring the following to your attention for the information of the members of the Security Council.

On 10 February 1971, at about 10.30 a.m., a Khmer patrol clashed with Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors at a point six kilometres south-west of the town of Prey Vèng; as a result, one man was wounded on the Khmer side and a number of killed and wounded were carried away on the aggressor's side.

On the same day, there was another encounter twelve kilometres south-west of the town of Prey Vèng.

During the night of 10 to 11 February 1971, the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors fired on a Khmer position four kilometres east of Siemreap, causing injuries to two persons on the Khmer side.

During the same night, the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors attacked the Khmer National Naval Base at Chrouy Changvar with 122 mm rockets. After vigorous retaliation, the aggressors ceased firing at about 1.35 a.m.

On 11 February 1971, at about 6 a.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors again fired on the base at Chrouy Changvar.

On the same day, at about 4 a.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors attacked the town of Kompong Cham with 122 mm rockets.

On the same day, Khmer troops carrying out a sweep clashed with approximately a hundred Viet-Cong-

North Viet-Nameese aggressors at Phum Okhna Champa, 33 kilometres south-east of Neak Loeung, in Prey Vèng. After half an hour of fighting, the aggressors retreated, leaving behind five dead. The Khmer forces captured one carbine, one B40 rocket-launcher, and three PM/AC.

On the same day, the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors attacked a Khmer convoy on National Highway 4, between kilometre markers 94 and 96. After an hour's fighting, four persons on the Khmer side were wounded. On the same day, the enemy fired on Stung Chhay, in Kompong Seila, with 82 mm mortars.

On the same day, the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors attacked Phum Angkunh, 20 kilometres south-east of the town of Takeo. After five hours of hard fighting, there were 15 dead and 15 wounded on the Khmer side and 27 dead left behind and several dead and wounded carried away on the aggressor's side. The Khmer troops seized one PM, four rifles and a number of grenades.

During the night of 11 to 12 February 1971, a Khmer position at Tuk Chhou, eight kilometres north-west of the town of Kampot, was fired on by the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors.

During the same night, at about 8.40 p.m., a Khmer position at Dangkor, about 25 kilometres from Phnom-Penh, in Kandal, was fired on by the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors.

During the same night, the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors fired on a Khmer position at Srang, 25 kilometres south-east of the town of Kompong Speu.

On 12 February 1971, at 12 noon, there was a clash between a Khmer patrol and the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese 35 kilometres west of the town of Kompong Speu, as a result of which one of the aggressors was killed and left behind, and three were wounded and carried away.

During the night of 12 to 13 February 1971, the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors attacked Prek Tatèn, in Kandal. During the same night, there was also an encounter at Peam Sathar, six kilometres south-east of Prek Kdam, in Kandal.

During the same night, the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors fired on a Khmer position at Prey Phdau, 10 kilometres east of the town of Kompong Speu.

During the same night, they attacked a Khmer defence position in the vicinity of the town of Kompong Cham.

During the same night, there was also a clash at Kbal Po, 10 kilometres east of the town of Takeo.

During the same night, there was a brief encounter at Svay Thom, eight kilometres east of the town of Siemreap.

In the morning of 13 February 1971, Svay Thom was again attacked. The Khmer casualties amounted to five wounded. The Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors left behind one dead. The Khmer forces captured one AC rifle and one spade.

On the same day, Khmer forces clashed with some 300 Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese on the Samdech Yos airfield, 25 kilometres from Pursat.

In the morning of 13 February 1971, the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors attacked a Khmer position four kilometres west of Trapeang Kraloeung, in Kompong Speu.

On 13 February 1971, there was a clash between Khmer forces and the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors 7½ kilometres north-east of the town of Svay Rieng. The encounter lasted one hour, and the aggressor's casualties amounted to one wounded.

During the night of 13 to 14 February 1971, the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors fired three 122 mm rockets at the Khmer air base at Pochentong. Two rockets exploded without, however, causing any damage.

During the same night, they also attacked Khmer forces at Phnom Khiev, 25 kilometres west of Phnom-Penh, in Kandal.

On 14 February 1971, the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors fired on Khmer forces at Sala Lèk Pram, 35 kilometres south of the village of Kompong Chhnang.

On the same day, Khmer troops carrying out an operation clashed with the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors at Kirivong, in Takeo.

On the same day, there was a clash three kilometres north of Tani; as a result, one man was killed and one wounded on the Khmer side.

During the night of 14 to 15 February 1971, the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors clashed with a Khmer patrol at a point 18 kilometres north-west of Phnom-Penh, in Kandal. The encounter lasted about 50 minutes, and the casualties were one wounded on the Khmer side and one killed and left behind, and eight wounded and carried away on the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese side. The Khmer forces captured two PA/AC, a rifle, five grenades and three military belts of North Viet-Nameese manufacture.

During the same night, two clashes occurred, one on the outskirts of Tonlé Bet and the other in the vicinity of Vat Prey Khloi, five kilometres south-east of Prey Totung, in Kompong Cham.

During the same night, the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors attacked Kompong Seila.

During the night of 15 to 16 February 1971, the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors fired on a Khmer position at O Dar, in Kompong Cham.

During the same night, at about 7.35 p.m., they fired on the town of Kompong Chhnang and Salasrok from Kompong Tralach, 11 kilometres north-west of Prèk Kdam.

On 16 February 1971, a clash between Khmer forces and the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors was reported at O Tapong, 30 kilometres north-west of Pursat. The losses amounted to two killed and two wounded on the Khmer side.

On the same day, there was another clash 18 kilometres north-west of Pursat, as a result of which Khmer casualties amounted to two killed and two wounded.

I wish to reiterate the firm and vigorous protest of the Government of the Khmer Republic at the illegal and continuing occupation of Khmer territory, followed by savage attacks perpetrated by the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese forces against a neutral and peace-loving country to which they have no right and with which they have no ethnic affinity, in flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter, of international law and of the 1954 Geneva Agreements.<sup>6</sup> These criminal attacks reveal for all to see the annexationist aims of the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese communist imperialists, and represent a dangerous threat to peace and security not only in the Khmer Republic, but throughout the region of South-East Asia.

The Government of the Khmer Republic holds the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and the so-called Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Viet-Nam entirely responsible for all the extremely grave consequences resulting from this situation and reserves the right to take any necessary action to defend the independence, neutrality, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this communication circulated as a Security Council document.

(Signed) KHIM TIT  
Permanent Representative of the  
Khmer Republic to the United Nations

<sup>6</sup> Agreements on the Cessation of Hostilities in Indo-China.

**Letter dated 3 May 1971 from the representative of Cyprus  
to the Secretary-General**

[Original: English]  
[4 May 1971]

On instructions from my Government I have the honour to draw your attention to a statement made by the Prime Minister of Turkey, Mr. Erim, in an interview broadcast by the Turkish Radio Television on 23 March 1971, wherein he spoke of the "energetic action undertaken in 1964" by Turkey in which he concurred, adding that "any new move against the rights of our fellow citizens in Cyprus will meet with the same energetic retaliation". The words "energetic action" refer to Turkey's airstrikes of August 1964, killing and maiming hundreds of unarmed innocent men, women and children.

Such use of force and violence and threats of force in international relations are flagrant violations of the Charter and of the resolutions on Cyprus by the Security Council and the General Assembly. Furthermore, such bellicose statements made during a period of calm and peaceful negotiations in Cyprus seem singularly out of place and calculated to create and intensify tension.

Does Ankara need to be reminded that Cyprus is not a vassal State of Turkey but a sovereign State Member of the United Nations, entitled to equal rights of sovereignty and to United Nations protection "against any foreign intervention or interference"?

It is indeed regrettable that expressions of disregard for the United Nations and its Charter and for contemporary international law should come from so distinguished a jurist as Mr. Erim. Particularly is this unfortunate at a time in human history when as never before peace through an international legal order has become a moral imperative and an objective to be dedicatedly sought by world jurists.

Further, in that statement Mr. Erim chose to refer to the Turkish Cypriots as "our fellow citizens" and, in the same spirit on 16 April 1971 a spokesman of the Turkish Foreign Ministry referred to Cyprus as "the sixty-eighth province of Turkey". By these statements Ankara in effect reveals once more its unavowed aims of territorial expansion over Cyprus, pursued through a policy of partition with an eye to annexation.

It is in consequence of Turkey's insistence on such a policy and on imposing it on the Turkish Cypriots that the problem of Cyprus remains to this day unresolved. If it were not for such Turkish aims, the report of the United Nations Mediator,<sup>†</sup> Dr. Plaza, a construc-

tive middle course proposal, fully consistent with Security Council resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 and endorsed by the Secretary-General, would have led to a timely settlement of the problem as early as 1965. As, however, the report wisely gave no encouragement to negative concepts of division, it was rejected out of hand by the Government of Turkey—the Turkish Cypriot leadership, as usual, following suit.

Similarly, the present local talks, hopefully initiated in 1968 within the framework of the Secretary-General's good offices, on the agreed basis of an independent unitary State and with a view to overcoming unworkable provisions in the constitution, have run into difficulties springing from the same causes. The talks have been practically stalled through the insistence of the Turkish Cypriot side on introducing new and more partitionist elements under the guise of "local government"; such government would in effect not be local but would cause the total unworkability of a State within a State. Such proposals run counter to the agreed basis of the talks and are wholly unacceptable to the Government of Cyprus. Their obvious result would be the collapse of the State itself, bringing about a situation fraught with the gravest of dangers and threats to international peace and, worse still, leading to the disaster of partition.

Partition in the last 25 years has definitely proved itself to be the worst of all possible calamities that can befall any country. A glance around the world will amply show that the scourge of war rages today and that untold human suffering has become endemic in those countries that have had the ill fate of being partitioned.

The Government and the people of Cyprus are determined to avert at all cost and sacrifice a misfortune of such magnitude befalling their country.

We hope and trust that it will eventually be realized that anachronistic concepts of division and partition lead to hopeless destructiveness. Beyond any transient differences the common interest of all concerned lies in conciliation and co-operation, so that Cyprus may become not a focus of strife and human suffering but a bridge of unity and a centre of progress and peace.

I should be grateful if this letter could be circulated to all States Members as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Zenon ROSSIDES

*Permanent Representative of Cyprus  
to the United Nations*

## DOCUMENT S/10186

**Letter dated 5 May 1971 from the representative of the Khmer Republic  
to the President of the Security Council**

[Original: French]  
[6 May 1971]

On the instruction of my Government and further to my letter of 27 April 1971 [S/10183], I have the honour to bring the following to your attention for the information of the members of the Security Council.

During the night of 16 to 17 February 1971, at about 8.40 p.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors harassed for several minutes an advance position of Khmer forces at a point five kilometres south-east of Prey Totung, in Kompong Cham.

\* Incorporating document S/10185/Corr.1.  
<sup>†</sup> See *Official Records of the Security Council, Twentieth Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1965*, document S/6253.

During the same night, Khmer forces based some five kilometres north-west of the town of Kompong Cham were subjected to several rounds of automatic weapon fire, without suffering any casualties.

On 17 February 1971, at 1.15 p.m., Khmer forces on operations in the south-west area of Kompong Cham, eleven kilometres from the town, were harassed by the Viet-cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors. Enemy fire was quickly silenced by the counteraction of the Khmer forces, which sustained one wounded.

On the same day, at 11.20 a.m., Khmer forces at the Srê Khlong camp 27 kilometres south-west of the town of Kompong Speu vigorously countered the harassing fire of 75 mm recoilless ordnance from the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors, compelling the enemy to stop firing within 10 minutes. The Khmer side suffered two persons wounded.

On the same day, at 11.10 a.m., two adjoining positions of Khmer forces situated seven and eight kilometres west of the chalet at Pich Nil, in Kompong Seila, were harassed by the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors, leaving four wounded on the Khmer side.

During the night of 17 to 18 February 1971, at about 12.35 a.m., Khmer forces based at Phum Mien, some four kilometres east of Prey Totung on National Highway 7 in Kompong Cham vigorously countered the harassing fire from the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors. The enemy, forced to withdraw, carried away several wounded.

During the same night, at 8.40 p.m., Khmer forces based at Trâpeang Chhouk, situated some 20 kilometres north-west of Phnom Penh, in Kandal, were harassed by the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors. Vigorous counteraction by the Khmer forces compelled the enemy to withdraw at about 9 p.m.

During the same night, at about 12.40 a.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors fired about 20 82 mm mortar shells on a Khmer position outside the town of Svay Rieng.

During the same night, between 8.00 and 8.30 p.m., four Khmer positions in the Pursat area—at Svay Ath six kilometres north-east of the town, at Sala Srok de Pursat three kilometres north of the town, at the railway station near the western edge of the town, and at Phum Siar 14 kilometres north-east of the town—were harassed by the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors.

On 18 February 1971, at 12.20 p.m., Khmer forces on a search operation 27 kilometres north-west of Phnom Penh, in Kandal, clashed, with an undetermined number of Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors.

On the same day, Khmer forces on operations clashed with Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese forces at Trapeang Chhouk, 20 kilometres north-east of Phnom Penh, in Kandal. The ensuing engagement left one enemy killed. One Chinese rifle was recovered by the Khmer forces.

On the same day, another clash occurred between Khmer forces on patrol at Phum Thlork Trâbek 8½ kilometres north-east of Bat Deng, in Kandal. The Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors disengaged after half an hour of fighting and carried away with them a number of dead and wounded. There were three persons wounded on the Khmer side.

During the night of 18 to 19 February 1971, a Khmer position situated approximately 16 kilometres

north of the town of Kompong Speu was harassed by the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors. When the Khmer forces returned the fire, the aggressors stopped firing.

During the same night, at 7.00 p.m., a Khmer position at Stung Chral was harassed by the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors.

During the same night, at 8.30 p.m., a Khmer position at O Bak Rotès situated at kilometre 96 on National Highway 4, in Kompong Speu, was harassed by the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors, whose fire was quickly silenced by the counteraction of Khmer forces.

On 19 February 1971, at 6.20 p.m., Khmer forces based 20 kilometres west of the town of Kompong Chhnang vigorously countered an enemy attack. The Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors were forced to withdraw after several unsuccessful attempts at assault.

During the night of 19 to 20 February 1971, at about 8.30 p.m., a Khmer advance position defending the town of Siemreap was harassed by the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors. The Khmer forces returned heavy fire for 30 minutes, forcing the aggressors to withdraw. The enemy carried away a number of dead and wounded.

During the same night, at about 8.00 p.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors harassed the Khmer position at Néak Ta Samrong two kilometres north of Saang, in Kandal. The Khmer forces vigorously countered, compelling the aggressors to withdraw shortly after Khmer air intervention.

On 20 February 1971, at 12 noon, Khmer forces on a search operation at Lovéa Sâr approximately 32 kilometres south-east of Phnom Penh, in Kandal, on the east bank of the Mekong, engaged the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors. With support from heavy weapons, the Khmer forces took vigorous action and forced the aggressors to withdraw. The enemy carried away a number of dead and wounded. The Khmer side suffered one dead and one wounded.

On the same day, Khmer forces on a search operation at Khum Bun Saing 10 kilometres south-west of Prék Phneou, in Kandal, clashed with Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors.

On the same day, at 3.00 a.m., Khmer forces on patrol 28 kilometres south of the town of Kompong Chhnang engaged Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors at Phum Snay on National Highway 5, as a result of which there were several wounded on the Khmer side.

I wish to reiterate the firm and vigorous protest of the Government of the Khmer Republic at the illegal and continuing occupation of Khmer territory, followed by savage attacks perpetrated by the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese forces against a neutral and peace-loving country to which they have no right and with which they have no ethnic affinity, in flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter, of international law and of the 1954 Geneva Agreements.<sup>8</sup> These criminal attacks reveal for all to see the annexationist aims of the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese communist imperialists, and represent a dangerous threat to peace and security

<sup>8</sup> Agreements on the Cessation of Hostilities in Indo-China.

not only in the Khmer Republic, but throughout the region of South-East Asia.

The Government of the Khmer Republic holds the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and the so-called Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Viet-Nam entirely responsible for all the extremely grave consequences resulting from this situation and reserves the right to take any necessary

action to defend the independence, neutrality, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this communication circulated as a Security Council document.

(Signed) KHIM TIT  
Permanent Representative of the  
Khmer Republic to the United Nations

## DOCUMENT S/10187

### Letter dated 6 May 1971 from the representative of Cyprus to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]  
[7 May 1971]

I have the honour to refer to the communications addressed to you by the representative of Turkey [S/10174 and S/10179] enclosing two letters from Mr. Küçük in which the latter highlights speeches made during the national celebrations on the occasion of the anniversary of Greek Independence, in an attempt on the one hand to present them as though they were something new, and on the other to shift to them the responsibility for the long-standing difficulties in the progress of the local talks, which lies squarely at the door of the Turkish side.

That Cyprus has been predominantly Greek in character through the millennia is a historic reality. The preservation of Cyprus as a single, undivided unit is a historic responsibility. The natural ethnic sentiments of the large majority of the Cypriot people for union with Greece were never concealed and are well known in the United Nations. Nevertheless, the Government of Cyprus decided to exert every effort for the achievement of a peaceful and lasting solution of the problem on the basis of a sovereign, independent and unitary State, as provided in General Assembly resolution 2077 (XX) of 18 December 1965, which the Government of Cyprus is ready and willing to implement in its entirety. It has been considered that union is not realistically achievable. The Turkish side, however, during the last 30 months has been striving to demonstrate that it is bent on rendering the solution of an independent unitary State non-achievable also.

The sincerity of the Government in the local talks for an independent Cyprus is beyond doubt. Its positive and constructive proposals and its generous concessions towards reaching accommodation on the agreed basis of an independent State, are on record and cannot be disputed. Response in any positive sense from the other side, however, has not been forthcoming. In particular, the Government proposals of 30 November 1970, on the over-all issue, and those of March 1971 on Government assistance for the rehabilitation of displaced Turkish Cypriot persons, have made all too obvious the continued lack of such positive response.

It may be recalled that the constructive report of the United Nations Mediator,<sup>9</sup> Dr. Plaza, based on the independence of Cyprus, was accepted by the Cypriot Government. Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot

leadership rejected it. Likewise, General Assembly resolution 2077 (XX), which also provides for a balanced solution based on independence, was accepted by the Cyprus Government but not by the Turkish side.

It is thus futile for Mr. Küçük to attempt by devious means to reverse the roles. The differences and difficulties in the talks have not been related to the union concept but have arisen over the issue of independent unitary State on the one hand, and that of unworkable provisions for a divided State on the other. The outright rejection of the report of the United Nations Mediator for a sovereign independent Cyprus, subsequently, followed by the intransigent divisive policy of the Turkish side during the local talks, also made manifest by their other actions, prove beyond doubt that the policy of Ankara and its satellite, the Turkish Cypriot leadership, is one calculated to lead not to the independence of Cyprus but to its partitionist destruction.

In this connexion it should be made clear that the Government of Cyprus can in no case accept any constitutional dispensations that would create a State within a State as a prelude to partition.

I need hardly dwell upon Mr. Küçük's unfounded allegations of arrests and ill-treatment of Turkish Cypriots. The recent arrests referred presumably to those in respect to trade in narcotics, in which both Greek and Turkish Cypriots were implicated and were treated equally under the law by being placed under arrest. Surely Mr. Küçük could not expect immunity from criminal prosecution for the Turkish Cypriots.

On the aspect of conciliation and normalization, so vital for promoting a peaceful solution, gestures of goodwill and normalization measures taken by the Government even at the risk of impairing internal security also met with no response from the Turkish Cypriot leadership, in spite of repeated appeals for such response by the Secretary-General in his reports contained in documents S/9233 of 3 June 1969 and S/9521 and Add.1 of 3 and 16 December 1969. As a result of those Government measures, all Turkish Cypriots, without exception, have enjoyed full freedom of movement in all parts and all roads of the island since 1968. In contrast, the Greek Cypriots—80 per cent of the population—are forcibly prevented from entering Turkish enclaves and from using a number of public, and even main communication, roads. This situation is due to the fact that in its policy of retaining peaceful conditions on the island, the Government refrains from resorting to measures of force (notwithstanding its unquestionable right to do so) in order to

<sup>9</sup> See *Official Records of the Security Council, Twentieth Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1965*, document S/6253.



ensure freedom of movement to all the inhabitants of Cyprus, as is now enjoyed by Turkish Cypriots only, as a result of the unilateral normalization measures of the Government still remaining without due response.

Furthermore, in a policy of discriminatory separatism, the Turkish Cypriot leadership forbids and forcibly prevents Turkish Cypriots from having any social relations or other contacts with the Greek people of Cyprus. To take a recent example, Dr. Küçük speaking at Alaminos, on 10 April 1971, said:

"What we want, we shall achieve. Cyprus will become Turkish, and we shall throw out the Greeks. In this effort mother Turkey stands by our side and will continue to do so. She has proved it by the military, economic and material assistance to our fighters."

In the same speech, Mr. Küçük exhorted the inhabitants of Alaminos to avoid any economic, social or other contacts with the Greeks, to whom he said they should not speak except in very exceptional circumstances. It is difficult to reconcile Mr. Küçük's words of professed attachment to a "peaceful and just solution on the basis of the continued independence of Cyprus" (as he stated in his above mentioned letters) with his practice of cultivating artificial racial hate and

separatism in the furtherance of alien motivations and in a policy aimed at the destruction of the independent existence of Cyprus and its subjugation to Turkey.

Notwithstanding all adversities, however, the Government of Cyprus is determined to continue in its policy of goodwill towards the Turkish Cypriots and intensify all efforts for a workable and enduring solution within the principles of the Charter and the universally recognized democratic norms. In this sense the Government will continue the current local talks with determination within the framework of the good offices of the Secretary-General.

In following the positive road to understanding, conciliation and peace, we confidently hope that our Turkish fellow citizens will eventually realize where their true interest lies and join us in working toward a peaceful solution based on co-operation within an independent unitary State to the benefit of all concerned and that of international peace.

I should be grateful if this letter could be circulated to all State Members as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Zenon ROSSIDES  
Permanent Representative of Cyprus  
to the United Nations

#### DOCUMENT S/10188\*

Letter dated 6 May 1971 from the representative of Iraq  
to the Secretary-General

[Original: English/Arabic]  
[7 May 1971]

I have the honour to forward herewith a letter dated 28 April 1971 and addressed to you by Sassoon Khadoury, Grand Rabbi of the Jewish Community in Iraq, together with its English translation, rendered and authenticated by the Office of the Grand Rabbi.

I should appreciate it if this letter could be circulated as an official document of the Security Council and the General Assembly, together with the enclosures reproduced in their original form.<sup>10</sup>

As indicated in the letter of the Grand Rabbi, I also request that the letter should be brought to the attention of the Commission on Human Rights.

(Signed) Talib EL-SHIBIB  
Permanent Representative of Iraq  
to the United Nations

LETTER DATED 28 APRIL 1971 FROM THE GRAND  
RABBI OF THE JEWISH COMMUNITY IN IRAQ,  
MR. SASSOON KHADOURY, TO THE SECRETARY-GEN-  
ERAL

Israel wages always a vicious campaign against Iraq,

\* Also circulated as a General Assembly document under the symbol A/8310.

and the Iraqi citizens of the Jewish faith. I would like to assure you in this connexion that there is a vast difference between Zionism and Judaism. Zionism is a political and racial ideology. It is a colonial and expansionist movement which negates the essence and teachings of Judaism, as one of the three divine religions in the world. Zionism has all too often done Judaism and its followers a disservice, by distorting its conceptions and history, and by resorting to violence against Jews, in order to force them to emigrate to Israel.

Allow me at the same time, to express to you the feelings of all Iraqi citizens of the Jewish faith, of their loyalty to Iraq, a loyalty which Zionism can never change, and thereby involve them in the whirlpool of dual allegiance.

The Jews of Iraq are accorded equal treatment with the other citizens, in fact and before the law, and there is no ground for allegations that they are denied the right to free movement within and outside the country.

I request you to bring this declaration to the attention of all United Nations organs concerned, particularly the Commission on Human Rights.

<sup>10</sup> The Arabic original attached to the mimeographed version of this document is not reproduced here; it has been deposited in the archives of the United Nations Secretariat where it is available for consultation.

#### DOCUMENT S/10190

Letter dated 7 May 1971 from the Chairman of the Special Committee on Apartheid  
to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English]  
[10 May 1971]

On behalf of the Special Committee on Apartheid, I have the honour to transmit a note on the developments concerning the implementation of the arms embargo

against South Africa,<sup>11</sup> and press release GA/AP/206, which contains the text of a communiqué issued by the

<sup>11</sup> Documents A/AC.115/L.285/Add.1 and 2.

Special Committee on 24 February 1971, regarding the resumption of arms sales to South Africa by the United Kingdom.

It may be recalled that on 2 July 1970, the Chairman of the Special Committee addressed a letter to the President of the Security Council [S/9858] bringing to the attention of the Council available information on the violations and circumventing of the arms embargo against South Africa, and suggesting measures to strengthen the embargo.

On 23 July 1970, the Security Council adopted resolution 282 (1970) by which it called upon all States to strengthen the arms embargo against South Africa without reservation. The resolution, *inter alia*, called on States specifically to withhold the supply of all vehicles and equipment for use of the armed forces and paramilitary organizations of South Africa, and to cease the supply of spare parts for that purpose.

As the Special Committee has repeatedly emphasized, South Africa has been encouraged to carry out its inhuman racial policies by the assistance it has received from certain countries and foreign economic interests in building up its military strength. The deployment of South African forces in Namibia and in Southern Rhodesia is but one proof of South Africa's aggressive designs, and its determination to resist by force the United Nations efforts to promote the independence of neighbouring colonial countries. Moreover, it has been reported in the press that the South African Government has at least twice offered ground and air units for Portuguese military campaigns against the legitimate struggle of the peoples of Angola and Mozambique for independence. It is therefore a matter of great regret to the Special Committee that three permanent members of the Security Council—France, the United Kingdom and the United States—failed to support resolution 282 (1970).

In its resolution 2624 (XXV), the General Assembly called upon all States to implement fully the provisions of the Security Council resolution. It expressed deep concern over the increasing military build-up of South Africa which constitutes a grave danger for the cause of peace and security on the African continent. In its resolution 2671 F (XXV), the General Assembly again drew the attention of the Security Council to the grave situation in South Africa and in southern Africa as a whole, and recommended that the council should resume urgently the consideration of effective measures, including those under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.

Despite these resolutions, adopted by overwhelming majorities, serious breaches of the arms embargo have

continued. On 22 February 1971 the United Kingdom Government announced, under various pretexts, its decision to grant export licences for WASP helicopters and certain spare parts to South Africa, thus signalling the resumption of arms sales to that country.

The Special Committee views the decision of the United Kingdom as a clear breach of the provisions of Security Council resolutions 181 (1963), 182 (1963), 191 (1964) and 282 (1970) and of its international obligations under the Charter. It rejects the contention of the United Kingdom Government that a legal obligation exists for it to supply the helicopters and spare parts. It notes, moreover, that the United Kingdom Government has yet to give its assurance that it will not consider further sales of military equipment beyond those defined in its White Paper annexed to document S/10162 of 23 March 1971.

Information concerning the involvement of the United Kingdom has been more readily available than that of other countries because of the public and political controversy it has created and because of the extensive coverage given to the matter by the national and international press. In the case of France, currently the main supplier of arms, the Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, Switzerland, Belgium, the United States of America and others, information has been restricted, so that the amount of coverage given in the report of the Rapporteur to the collaboration of these countries does not necessarily reflect the full extent to which they are involved in the arms trade.

Thus it is obvious that French sales of military aircraft have continued and that the supply of other defence equipment from France is being envisaged. Helicopters made in the United States are being openly advertised and sold in South Africa. These can be adapted for military use, as has been the experience in other parts of the world. The involvement of the Federal Republic of Germany and Israel is becoming more apparent.

The Special Committee on *Apartheid* considers it essential that all breaches of the arms embargo by States concerned should be stopped forthwith if the purpose of the measure is not to be defeated. It will continue its efforts to obtain fuller information concerning any breach of the arms embargo and to expose its authors. Such information will be incorporated in subsequent reports and made available to the Security Council and the General Assembly.

(Signed) Abdulrahim Abby FARAH  
Chairman  
Special Committee on Apartheid

## DOCUMENT S/10191

Letter dated 10 May 1971 from the representative of Guinea  
to the President of the Security Council

[Original: French]  
[10 May 1971]

In his letter dated 27 April 1971 [S/10182] the representative of Senegal informed you of certain facts concerning the barbarous acts committed by Portuguese soldiery against the territory of Senegal and the peaceful Senegalese peasants of the village of Kandjenou (district of Tanaff), in the Casamance region of Senegal.

These acts of criminal aggression, which obviously violate international law and practice, have, as you have seen, caused the death of a girl of 18, brought about substantial damage to property, injured old men and young people, and set fire to farms and crops.

These practices show the inhuman and brutal nature of Portuguese rule in Africa.

On the instructions of my Government, I have the honour hereby to corroborate all the facts related in the letter dated 27 April 1971 from the representative of Senegal.

The Republic of Guinea is not at all surprised by these heinous crimes of the Portuguese soldiery. We know from experience that aggression is the basic characteristic of any decadent political régime heading for destruction. Portugal's conduct is the logical outcome of the colonialism which thinks it can check the aspirations of the people of Guinea (Bissau) by treacherously attacking the fraternal republic of Senegal and making preparations for armed invasions of the Republic of Guinea.

The Government, people and Democratic Party of Guinea, united under Comrade Ahmed Sékou Touré, the supreme leader of the Revolution, express their active solidarity and unquenchable support to the

valiant people of Senegal in this new trouble created by Portugal, which is supported by its powerful friends in NATO.

If peace and security are to reign in all the regions of Africa in which Portuguese colonialism still prevails, it is essential that the Security Council, and its permanent members in particular, should act firmly to ensure that their client, Portugal, puts an end to its continual serious violations of the territorial integrity of African countries, and stops bombing peaceful populations and devising infamous plans to invade the Republic of Guinea.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a Security Council document.

(Signed) Abdoulaye TOURE  
Permanent Representative of Guinea  
to the United Nations

## DOCUMENT S/10192

### Letter dated 10 May 1971 from the representative of the Khmer Republic to the President of the Security Council

[Original: French]  
[11 May 1971]

On instructions from my Government and further to my letter of 5 May 1971 [S/10186], I have the honour to transmit the following for the information of the members of the Security Council.

On 21 February 1971, the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors harassed a Khmer position at Pich Nil, in Kompong Seila.

The same day, a clash occurred at Phum Chiro, four kilometres north-east of the town of Kompong Cham, in which two Khmer soldiers were killed.

The same day, at 7 p.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors attacked Khmer elements operating in the region of Kompong Chamlâng, 24 kilometres north-east of Phnom-Penh, in Kandal. The Khmer forces suffered one dead and nine wounded.

During the night of 21 to 22 February 1971, they harassed a Khmer position for 10 minutes at Trapeang Thnot, 21 kilometres north-west of Phnom-Penh, in Kandal.

During the same night, they harassed a Khmer position at Prasat Neang Khmau, 22 kilometres north of the town of Takeo.

During the same night, another Khmer position at Prey Sandek, eight kilometres south of the town of Takeo, was harassed.

During the same night, the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors subjected a Khmer position to harassment by heavy weapons fire for a few minutes at Kar Andoeuk, 30 kilometres south-east of Neak Loeng, in Prey Veng, wounding six Khmer soldiers.

On 22 February 1971, there was a clash between Khmer forces and the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors at a point 10 kilometres north of Neak Luong, in Kandal.

The same day, another 20-minute clash was reported at a point three kilometres south-east of Lovear Sâr, in Kandal, on the east bank of the Mekong, which killed one Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese and resulted in several killed and wounded which were carried away by

the enemy. On the Khmer side, three soldiers were wounded.

The same day, the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors attacked Kompong Chamlâng, in Kandal. They withdrew after heavy fighting leaving behind two dead. One Khmer soldier was killed.

The same day, a clash was also reported at a point 18 kilometres east of Phnom-Penh on the east bank of the Mekong, in Kandal, in which the Khmer forces suffered 12 wounded.

The same day, two Khmer positions in Prey Veng, one at a point 14 kilometres south-east of the town and the other at a point six kilometres east of the town, were subjected to harassment.

During the night of 22 to 23 February 1971, the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors harassed Rokar Kong, 32 kilometres north of Phnom-Penh, on the west bank of the Mekong, in Kandal.

During the same night, they also harassed a Khmer position at Thmat Pong, 24 kilometres west of Phnom-Penh, in Kandal.

On 23 February 1971, several clashes were reported in the region between Phum Prek Ta Ong and Phum Phlaur Trey on the east bank of the Mekong, in Kandal, between the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors and Khmer forces carrying out a sweep between 8 a.m. and 5 p.m. The Khmer forces suffered one dead and four wounded and the aggressor lost 31 dead and carried away several dead and wounded. The Khmer forces also managed to seize 2 B40 rocket-launchers, 1 B41, 1 30-machine-gun, 1 CKC rifle, 6 AK rifles, 1 79 mm rifle, 12 B40 shells, 24 79 mm shells, 3 cases of cartridges for 30 mm machine-guns and 13 knapsacks.

The same day, at about midnight, the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors launched an attack on a Khmer position at Bavet, 40 kilometres east of the chief town of Svay Rieng, on National Highway 1. After four hours of fighting, they withdrew, leaving behind

eight dead and carrying off several dead and wounded. The Khmer forces lost nine men.

During the night of 23 to 24 February 1971, they launched a harassing attack on Kompong Yaul 15 kilometres south-east of the town of Takeo.

During the same night, they harassed a Khmer position of Kompong Boeng, in Kompong Chhnang.

On 24 February 1971, they subjected to harassment Sâang, in Kandal, wounding three Khmer soldiers.

The same day they derailed a passenger train at a point near Phum Prey Smol, 4½ kilometres north-west of the face of Tuol Leap, in Kandal, killing one, wounding seven and damaging a number of cars.

The same day, they harassed Han Chey, 18 kilometres north-east of the town of Kompong Cham.

The same day, at about 1 a.m., they attacked Bavet, in Svay Rieng, and withdrew at about 5 a.m., leaving behind 10 dead. The Khmer forces lost four men.

During the night of 24 to 25 February 1971, they subjected to harassment Khmer elements protecting gasoline storage dumps at Prek Phneou 15 kilometres north-west of Phnom-Penh, in Kandal.

During the same night, the training centre at Kam-baul, 15 kilometres south-west of Phnom-Penh, in Kandal, was harassed by fire from 82 mm mortars and automatic weapons, but it was not damaged.

On 25 February 1971, the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors harassed Sala Lek Pram, 35 kilometres south of the chief town of Kompong Chhnang.

During the night of 25 to 26 February 1971, Khmer elements at Srang, in Kompong Speu, were attacked.

During the same night, at about 8 p.m., two Khmer positions, situated about 25 kilometres north-east of the capital, one at Prek Tamak and the other at Prek Prasâp, in Kandal, were harassed for one hour by the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese forces.

On 26 February 1971, the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors harassed Khmer elements protecting the bridge of Koh Kuy, situated 19 kilometres west of Phnom-Penh, in Kandal.

On 27 February 1971, a clash was reported at Kompong Chamlâng, 8½ kilometres east of Vihear Suor, in Kandal.

The same day, Tram Khnar, in Takeo, was subjected to harassing fire from the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors.

The same day, Khmer elements at Tuk Chhou, eight kilometres north-west of the town of Kampot, were attacked by the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors. After six hours of heavy fighting, the enemy withdrew, leaving behind 21 dead. The Khmer forces suffered two wounded.

During the night of 27 to 28 February 1971, the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors launched an attack lasting 40 minutes on Khmer elements guarding the Bak Không bridge, which is situated four kilometres north of Prek Leap in Kandal. The aggressors lost four dead. The Khmer casualties were one dead and four wounded.

During the same night, Sala Lek Pram, situated 35 kilometres south of the town of Kompong Chhnang, was subjected to harassing attacks by the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors.

During the same night, at midnight, the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors attacked the bridge at Entanou, two kilometres east of Kompong Trabèk on

National Highway 1, in Prey Vêng. During four hours of heavy fighting, the Khmer side suffered three dead and four wounded and the aggressor lost three dead. The Khmer forces also captured three PM/ACs and 50 grenades.

During the same night, Kirivong, situated 40 kilometres south of the town of Takeo, was subjected to harassing fire for several minutes.

During the night of 28 February to 1 March 1971, a clash was reported in the area of Prek Eng, six kilometres north-east of Takhmau, in Kandal.

During the same night, the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors subjected Chiphou, 24 kilometres east of the town of Svay Rieng, to harassing fire with 82 mm mortars.

During the same night, harassing fire was also reported at Prey Phdau, 10 kilometres south-west of the town of Svay Rieng, causing the Khmer side to suffer five wounded.

During the same night, Khmer positions in Kandal—the position at Phnôm Thmar Dos, 33 kilometres south of Phnom-Penh; the position at Sâang, 24 kilometres south-east of Phnom-Penh, and the position at Phum Prey Bang, six kilometres east of Vihear Suor—were subjected to harassing fire by the enemy.

During the same night, O Roung, situated 25 kilometres south of Phnom-Penh, in Kandal, was also subjected to harassing attacks. Counteraction by the Khmer forces caused the aggressor to suffer two dead.

During the night of 1 to 2 March 1971, the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors launched harassing attacks on Prey Phdau, 10 kilometres south-west of the town of Svay Rieng, causing the Khmer side to suffer one dead.

On 2 March 1971, a clash was reported at Chiphou, in Svay Rieng.

The same day, from 4 to 6 a.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors attacked the oil refinery, causing the Khmer side to suffer three dead and six wounded. Four tanks were set afire.

The same day, at about noon, the airfield at the town of Kompong Som was also subjected to harassing fire with mortars. One truck was damaged.

The same day, at 7 a.m., a three-hour engagement took place at a point 10 kilometres south-west of the town of Kompong Speu between the Khmer forces and the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors, resulting in two dead and five wounded on the Khmer side and causing the aggressor to lose seven dead.

During the night of 2 to 3 March 1971, the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors launched harassing attacks with mortars on Phum Wat Phnom, 25 kilometres west of Phnom-Penh, in Kompong Speu.

During the same night, Trapeang Krâlœung, 16 kilometres west of the town of Kompong Speu, was also subjected to harassment.

During the same night, the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors launched harassing attacks with mortars on Phum Thnâl Bât, which is situated on National Highway 2, 17 kilometres north of the town of Takeo, causing the Khmer side to suffer three wounded.

On 3 March 1971, they attacked Chiphou, in Svay Rieng.

During the night of 3 to 4 March 1971, they attacked Khmer elements at Phum Vat Phnom, 24 kilometres west of Phnom-Penh, in Kandal.

During the same night, they launched harassing attacks on a Khmer defence position three kilometres east of the town of Kompong Chhnang and on another position two kilometres south of that town, causing the Khmer side to suffer one wounded.

During the same night, they launched three harassing attacks on Khmer elements holding a position 10 kilometres north-east of the town of Kompong Som.

During the same night, they launched harassing attacks on the Khmer defence positions at the town of Takeo.

During the same night, they launched harassing attacks on Angtasom, which is situated 15 kilometres west of the town of Takeo.

On 4 March 1971, a force of about 100 Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors attacked the locality of Puok, in Siemreap.

The same day, at about noon, another Khmer position situated 3½ kilometres north of Puok, in Siemreap, was also attacked. During an engagement lasting one hour, the Khmer side suffered one wounded and the aggressors lost one dead.

The same day, they attacked Prek Yuon, in Kandal, for 15 minutes, causing the Khmer side to suffer one wounded.

During the night of 4 to 5 March 1971, they launched harassing attacks on Lovear Sâr 30 kilometres south-east of Phnom-Penh, in Kandal.

On 5 March 1971, a clash took place at a point six kilometres north-west of the town of Kompong Cham, causing the Khmer side to suffer one dead.

The same day, the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors launched harassing attacks on Kompong Dangkor, 24 kilometres south of Phnom-Penh, in Kandal, causing the Khmer side to suffer three wounded.

During the night of 5 to 6 March 1971, they launched harassing attacks on a Khmer position situated 14 kilometres north-west of Phnom-Penh, in Kandal.

During the same night, they launched harassing attacks on a Khmer position at Pich Nil on National Highway 4, in Kompong Seila.

On 6 March 1971, a clash took place at a point five kilometres east of Peam Chikâng, in Kompong

Cham, between the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors and Khmer troops conducting an operation on the west bank of the Mekong. After half an hour, the aggressors withdrew, leaving behind two dead.

The same day, at 6 p.m., the university at Kompong Cham was subjected to harassing fire with mortars and 75 mm artillery.

The same day, at 6 p.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese launched harassing attacks on Pich Nil.

During the night of 6 to 7 March 1971, Khmer elements at the experimental school at Kompong Kantuot, 20 kilometres south-west of Phnom-Penh, in Kandal, were subjected to harassing fire with mortars and automatic weapons.

I wish to reiterate the firm and vigorous protest of the Government of the Khmer Republic against the illegal and permanent occupation of Khmer territory, followed by savage attacks perpetrated by the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors against a neutral and peace-loving country to which they have no right and with which they have no ethnic affinity, in flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter, international law and the 1954 Geneva Agreements.<sup>12</sup> These criminal attacks reveal clearly the annexation aims of the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese communist imperialists and represent a dangerous threat to peace and security not only in the Khmer Republic but throughout the region of South-East Asia.

The Government of the Khmer Republic holds the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and the so-called Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Viet-Nam fully responsible for all the extremely grave consequences resulting from this situation and reserves the right to take the necessary action to defend the independence, neutrality, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this communication circulated as a Security Council document.

(Signed) KHIM TIT  
Permanent Representative of the Khmer Republic  
to the United Nations

<sup>12</sup> Agreements on the Cessation of Hostilities in Indo-China.

## DOCUMENT S/10193

### Letter dated 10 May 1971 from the representative of Pakistan to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English]  
[11 May 1971]

Under instructions from the Government of Pakistan, I have the honour to refer to the letter from the representative of India dated 8 April 1971 [S/10171] and in reply thereof to state as follows.

My Government has viewed with concern and regret the attempt made by the representative of India in his letter to side-track the issue arising out of his Government's arbitrary and illegal action in banning overflights of Pakistani aircraft across Indian territory by linking it with the question of the hijacking of the Indian aircraft. The two issues are totally unconnected.

The ban on overflights of Pakistani aircraft was imposed by India in violation of the Convention on International Civil Aviation<sup>13</sup> the International Air Services Transit Agreement<sup>14</sup> and the bilateral Agreement relating to air services<sup>15</sup> between India and Pakistan signed in 1948. The conditions under which India could suspend Pakistan's right of overflying are clearly spelt out in these conventions.

<sup>13</sup> United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 15 (1948), No. 102.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. 84 (1951), No. 252.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. 28 (1949), No. 423.

The obligations and responsibilities of Pakistan in so far as the hijacking issue is concerned are governed by a different set of conventions and resolutions. In my letter of 13 February 1971 [S/10116], I enumerated the steps taken by my Government in fulfilment of these obligations to repatriate the passengers and crew to India as also to save the aircraft from being blown up by the hijackers. My Government has since initiated legal proceedings against the hijackers for their action. Thus my Government has fully discharged the obligations imposed under international law.

The Indian representative referred to his Government's intimation to the High Commissioner of Pakistan in New Delhi on 1 September 1970 about the possibility of a "conspiracy" to hijack an Indian aircraft. He adduced this as evidence of Pakistan's complicity in the hijacking. The fact of the matter is that when the Pakistan High Commissioner in New Delhi was informed of a "conspiracy" to hijack an Indian aircraft, the High Commissioner asked the Government of India to indicate in what manner Pakistan could help to thwart it. Furthermore he requested particulars of the alleged conspiracy to enable the Government of Pakistan to take the necessary measures. On refusal by the Government of India to disclose any details, the High Commissioner advised the Government of India to bring the facts to the notice of Interpol if it felt any hesitation in taking the Government of Pakistan into confidence in this matter. It is therefore surprising that the Government of India should even mention this incident to suggest Pakistan's complicity in the hijacking.

The representative of India has further accused Pakistan of material breach of obligations in regard to maintaining the minimum necessary standards of safety and security of international civil aviation against hijacking. This accusation has been made in order to justify India's suspension of overflights by Pakistan aircraft. My Government is amazed at how India could allege a material breach by Pakistan of the obligations arising from treaties and agreements. The true position is that it is India which is in serious breach of the obligations arising from its international and bilateral agreements and is alleging a fictitious material breach to provide a pretext for its arbitrary action. The Indian position is untenable in law. If nations were allowed freely to decide whether or not there is a breach of an agreement and then arbitrarily retaliate in a field of their own choosing, the very basis of international legal order would fall apart.

It will thus be seen that the Indian action in banning overflights was unwarranted, indefensible and illegal. It would have been so even if the act of hijacking had in fact been what it at first appeared to be. However, a Judicial Inquiry Commission set up by the Government of Pakistan has determined that the hijackers were agents of Indian Intelligence. The Commission came to the conclusion that the hijackers were planted by the Government of India itself to hijack the aircraft to Pakistan. In doing so, the aim of the Indian Government was to provide itself with an excuse, however slender, to obstruct communications between the two wings of Pakistan, to disrupt Pakistan's national integrity and to cause financial hardship to the people of Pakistan. The incident also served as a pretext for the Government of India to take harsher repressive measures in occupied Kashmir. (Extracts from the report of the Commission are enclosed in annex I.)

I have been instructed to place on record my Government's position that, in spite of the fact that the hijacking was engineered by the Government of India itself, the Government of Pakistan would be willing to discuss all aspects of the issue bilaterally with the Government of India. This would require that the Government of India should lift the ban on overflights of Pakistan aircraft which was imposed in violation of specific international and bilateral agreements and thus reinstitute favourable conditions for an amicable settlement. This position has been reiterated in my Government's communication to the Government of India dated 22 March 1971, of which I enclose a copy in annex II.

I should be grateful if this letter could be circulated as a Security Council document.

(Signed) A. SHAHI  
Permanent Representative of Pakistan  
to the United Nations

#### ANNEX I

The conclusions of the Commission of Inquiry constituted by the Government of Pakistan to inquire into the hijacking of an Indian civil aircraft into Pakistan which landed at Lahore on 30 January 1971

(a) The circumstances of the hijacking of the Indian aircraft are, firstly, to justify repressive measures in the face of widespread resentment and feeling of frustration amongst the people of Indian-held Kashmir, arising out of policies pursued in the territory by the Government of India and the Indian-held Kashmir régime, and, secondly, to create a situation whereby policies of the two wings of Pakistan could be spelt out differently by the majority leaders of two wings, thereby frustrating any possibility of understanding between them.

(b) The persons directly responsible for the hijacking are:

(i) Mohammad Hashim Qureshi, who is known agent of Indian Intelligence Services, and who held post of Sub-Inspector in the Indian Border Security Force and who visited Pakistan in 1969 as such agent, and was again put across the Cease-Fire Line in April 1970, by the Intelligence Services of India, apparently to play the role of an agent-provocateur, and his accomplice, Mohammad Ashraf Qureshi;

(ii) The Indian Intelligence Services, the Indian Border Security Force and other governmental authorities in Indian-held Kashmir without whose active complicity, encouragement and assistance the plan for hijacking could not have been put into execution at all. It is probable that Mohammad Hashim Qureshi was even trained within India—to hijack the aircraft, probably during his posting at the Srinagar Airport. Maqbool Butt and his National Liberation Front do not appear to have made any significant or material contribution to hijacking except to fall in with the suggestion made to this effect by Mohammad Hashim Qureshi, and then, when hijacking occurred, to claim credit therefor.

(c) The motives behind the hijacking of the aircraft are these:

(i) The desire of the Indian political leaders to bring about a state of confrontation between India and Pakistan and to accentuate the tension between these two countries;

(ii) To take political advantage, for purpose of the mid-term general elections in India, of the anti-Pakistan sentiment prevailing in India, which purpose was given effect by the various steps taken by the Government of India, such as the attack on Pakistani enclave in West Bengal and expulsion from India of Mr. Zafar Iqbal Rathore, First Secretary of the Pakistan High Commission in India.

(iii) To create justification for the repressive measures pursued by the Indian authorities in Indian-held Kashmir territory, the arrest of political workers, the exterritorial of Sheikh Abdullah and Mirza Afzal Baig from Indian-held Kashmir, the imposition of ban on the Plebiscite Front and otherwise to bring discredit to the opposition parties in the

Indian-held Kashmir territory, particularly to the movement led by Sheikh Abdullah and Mirza Afzal Baig and to the Plebiscite Front, which organization was declared an unlawful association on 12 January 1971;

(iv) To disrupt communications between East Pakistan and West Pakistan, and to dislocate the movement of people and supplies between these two wings;

(v) To create tension between the various regions and political parties in Pakistan; and

(vi) To weaken Pakistan financially and to permit India to interfere actively in the internal affairs of Pakistan.

(d) Under this term of reference the Commission has to report that Pakistan was in no way responsible for, or in any way connected with, the hijacking incident. As soon as the hijacked aircraft landed at the Lahore Airport, the governmental authorities in Pakistan took every possible step to protect the members of the crew, the passengers and the aircraft. The passengers and the members of the crew were immediately removed from the aircraft to the airport lounge, where they were given lunch by the Pakistan International Airlines. They were then boarded and lodged in Hotel Ambassador, Lahore, until their departure on 1 February 1971 for India through land route. The governmental authorities in Pakistan extended every co-operation, assistance and facility to the Indian High Commission in Pakistan to remain in contact with the passengers and the members of the crew. Mr. Kapoor, the Attaché of the Indian High Commission, was even permitted to live with the passengers and the members of the crew in Hotel Ambassador. Further, the authorities in Pakistan took every possible step to protect the Indian aircraft. Immediate possession of the aircraft could not be taken for the following reasons:

(i) The hijackers were reported to be armed with a revolver and hand-grenade, which were discovered to be dummy weapons only after the destruction of the aircraft;

(ii) The news of the landing of the hijacked aircraft at the Lahore Airport spread very quickly in the city of Lahore and very soon huge crowds collected at the airport, and remained there until the aircraft was set to fire by the hijackers. A serious law and order situation developed which necessitated resort to "Lathi charge" and tear-gassing;

(iii) Notwithstanding this serious situation, the governmental authorities took steps on 2 February 1971 to isolate the hijackers, so that conditions could be created which would permit taking possession of the aircraft. But as soon as the hijackers realized that the aircraft might be released to India, they destroyed it by setting fire thereto. Mohammad Hashim Qureshi, the principal hijacker, intended from the very beginning to destroy the aircraft at all costs, as he himself admitted in question before the Commission. The governmental authorities in Pakistan cannot, therefore, be fixed with any responsibility for this incident.

## ANNEX II

**Note dated 22 March 1971 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan to the High Commission for India in Islamabad**

No. 1N(III)—14/1/71

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents its compliments to the High Commission for India in Islamabad and with

reference to the note dated 3 March 1971, handed over to the High Commission for Pakistan in New Delhi by the Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, has the honour to state as follows.

The Government of Pakistan notes with regret that the Government of India has so far not agreed to withdraw its unjustified ban on flights of Pakistani aircraft over the Indian territory. Instead, the Government of India has suggested that these overflights are in the nature of "privilege" extended to Pakistan in 1966 and that India was within its rights to withdraw it unilaterally. The Government of Pakistan cannot accept this position and is firmly of the opinion that the mutual overflying rights are governed by the 1948 Agreement between Pakistan and India as well as international conventions on the subject. Even if, for the sake of argument, the Government of India could claim that after the 1965 conflict it was "well within its right to disallow the resumption of overflights so long as relations between India and Pakistan had not been fully normalized", the Government of India has, in the note under reference, acknowledged that the "Government of India agreed, in February 1966, to forgo its right to demand prior settlement of outstanding issues and consented to resume mutual overflights". As far as outstanding disputes are concerned it has always been the endeavour of the Government of Pakistan to settle them in a peaceful, just and equitable manner.

In regard to the Government of India's allegation of Pakistan's "failure" to deal with the hijackers and its complaint about the "manner in which Pakistan dealt with the whole matter", the helpful action taken by the Government of Pakistan has already been explained fully in the notes of 5 February [S/10102] and 13 February 1971 [S/10116]. Besides, the Government of Pakistan would invite the attention of the Government of India to the recent announcement in which it has been stated that a judicial inquiry, headed by a High Court Judge, is being held to investigate the hijacking incident.

The Government of Pakistan rejects the contention of the Government of India that the Government of Pakistan has in any way interfered in the internal affairs of India. Without wishing to enter into a controversy, the Government of Pakistan invites attention to the fact that it is the Government of India which has on occasions interfered in the internal affairs of Pakistan. In this context, attention is drawn to a statement reported to have been made by the Government of India spokesman on 8 March 1971, in which, referring to the question of rescinding the ban on overflights, it was remarked that "it is obvious the people of East Pakistan would view any sudden ending of the ban with deep misgivings".

The Government of Pakistan once again invites the Government of India to withdraw the ban on overflights of Pakistani aircraft across Indian territory imposed in violation of the provisions of the international conventions and bilateral agreement. This step will also create favourable conditions for an amicable discussion of the hijacking incident and related issues for which Pakistan remains ready as before. With this end in view, the Government of Pakistan invites the Government of India to instruct its High Commission in Islamabad to enter into negotiations with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Government of Pakistan.

## DOCUMENT S/10194

**Letter dated 12 May 1971 from the representative of Turkey to the Secretary-General**

[Original: English]  
[14 May 1971]

I have the honour to refer to the letter addressed to you by Mr. Rossides [S/10185]. I have read the letter with a sense of disappointment, not only because it is

transparent propaganda but also because this propagandistic approach contradicts, both in spirit and letter, the conclusion of his communication which states:

"Beyond any transient differences the common interest of all concerned lies in conciliation and co-operation, so that Cyprus may become not a focus of strife and human suffering but a bridge of unity and a centre of progress and peace".

It is a matter of regret that the usual method of putting the cart before the horse is maintained. In fact it is common knowledge that *enosis*—the annexation of the island to Greece—is the core of the problem of Cyprus. No amount of propaganda can ever conceal or obviate the fact that the problem of Cyprus was thrust into the international arena by the demand for *enosis*. The pact, as well as the recent history of the Cyprus problem is an unequivocal proof that it was the annexation of the island to another country and not partition which was the real issue. The international treaties, which gave birth to the Republic of Cyprus prohibited both *enosis* and partition and guaranteed the independence, the territorial integrity and the constitution of Cyprus.

The unswerving respect of Turkey and the Turkish Community for these international undertakings is a fact established beyond any question. It was the Greek Cypriot community which tried to get rid of these international commitments by using all means, including force. From the continuous stream of statements emanating from the most responsible members of the Greek Cypriot Administration, it is clear that *enosis* has been their real aim in their efforts to subvert the independence of Cyprus.

This incontrovertible fact was further confirmed on 14 March 1971 by Archbishop Makarios at Yialousa, when he declared about Cyprus that "Greek and undivided, we shall deliver it to Greece". Ambassador Rossides's effort to discover other reasons for the stalling of the intercommunal talks is obviously a futile diversionary effort.

As to some other inaccuracies contained in the letter of Ambassador Rossides, I could wish that they stemmed from lack of correct information. His misquoting of the Turkish Prime Minister's statement in answer to questions from news reporters in Ankara, on 23 March 1971, is an example at hand. Prime Minister Erim did not speak of "fellow citizens" when he

referred to the Turkish Cypriots. He used the term "fellow kinsmen" which is everyday usage in Turkish and Greek languages in reference to their kinsfolk in the mainlands. Unfortunately the misinformation is carried on further as a direct quotation from a non-existent statement by an unidentified, imaginary Turkish spokesman in which he is made to refer to Cyprus as "the sixty-eighth province of Turkey".

I am equally puzzled by another reference to the same statement of the Prime Minister of Turkey and to the subsequent deductions and logic therein. First of all, the Turkish Prime Minister pointed to "energetic actions", the latter word used in the plural not in the singular, as Ambassador Rossides asserts in his letter. I would have hoped that Mr. Rossides would have known by now that the "energetic actions" of 1964 referred to the actions undertaken to prevent the massacres against the Turkish community following the tragic events of December 1963 and thereafter, and the actions in question also included the convening of the Conference of London, many other international efforts and numerous meetings of the Security Council during that year.

The Republic of Turkey is a peace-loving country which has always meticulously honoured its international commitments. No one, including Mr Rossides, with all his bias, can validly question its spotless record as a faithful Member of the United Nations, of which it is among the founders.

The Turkish Government has repeatedly expressed its wish to see an early and peaceful solution to the Cyprus problem. The Turkish Government has always been ready to work constructively for a final, just and equitable solution of this problem, effectively safeguarding the independence of Cyprus as well as maintaining the balance of rights and interests between the two communities of the island as foreseen at the inception of the State.

I should be grateful if you would kindly have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Ü Halûk BAYÜLKEN  
Permanent Representative of Turkey  
to the United Nations

## DOCUMENT S/10195

Letter dated 14 May 1971 from the representative of Israel  
to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English]  
[14 May 1971]

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to refer to the note of the Special Committee on *Apartheid* dated 6 May 1971,<sup>16</sup> and to the letter addressed to you on 7 May 1971 by the representative of Somalia, Chairman of the Special Committee [S/10190], and to state the following.

The press reports, referred to in these documents, of alleged Israeli involvement with South Africa in the field of military supplies, are false and unfounded. It is regrettable that such misleading allegations should be incorporated in documents of a United Nations committee.

I have the honour to request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Yosef TEKOAH  
Permanent Representative of Israel  
to the United Nations

<sup>16</sup> Document A/AC.115/L.285/Add.2.



**Letter dated 14 May 1971 from the representative of the Khmer Republic  
to the President of the Security Council**

[Original: French]  
[17 May 1971]

On instructions from my Government and further to my letter of 10 May 1971 [S/10192], I have the honour to transmit the following for the information of the members of the Security Council.

During the night of 7 to 8 March 1971, at about 7 and 8 p.m., Khmer forces based at Kompong Chamlang, seven kilometres east of Vihear Suor, in Kandal, responded vigorously to continuous fire from the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors.

On 8 March 1971, at about 2 a.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors subjected Troeung, 13 kilometres north-west of the provincial capital, Kompong Cham, to continuous fire, wounding one Khmer citizen.

On the same day, there was a clash at Phum Moan Hoeur, 16 kilometres north-east of the town of Kompong Cham. One of the Khmer party was wounded.

On 9 March 1971, at 10.10 a.m., Khmer forces carrying out an operation clashed with the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors at Phum Bat Lovear, 22 kilometres south-west of Phnom-Penh, in Kandal. After an exchange of fire lasting about 10 minutes, the aggressors withdrew, leaving behind one M2 carbine, one grenade, one knapsack, 200 cartridges, five black suits and a large supply of medicines.

On the same day, at about 4.30 a.m., approximately 200 Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors launched an attack against the Khmer forces defending the bridge of Tuk Laäk, 22 kilometres south-east of the town of Kompong Chhnang, causing two Khmer deaths and leaving behind one enemy dead. One Chinese automatic pistol (PA/AC) was seized.

During the night of 9 to 10 March 1971, Khmer forces based 12 kilometres south of the town of Pursat were subjected to continuous fire from the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors.

During the same night, from 10.40 to 11.40 p.m., Phum Kraing Ponhea, 23 kilometres north-west of Phnom-Penh, in Kandal, came under continuous fire from the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors.

On 10 March 1971, at 10.35 a.m., Khmer forces clashed with the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors for 15 minutes at a spot four kilometres south-east of Srang, in Kompong Speu.

On the same day, at about 10 a.m., there was a clash at Phum Sandol, five kilometres west of Tram Khnar, in Kompong Speu.

On the same day, there was a clash between Khmer forces on patrol and the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors four kilometres south of Tram Khnar, in Takeo, in which two of the Khmer forces were wounded.

On the same day, at about 3 p.m., Khmer forces on patrol clashed with the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors at Phum Sragne, 56 kilometres west of the town of Siemreap.

During the night of 10 to 11 March 1971, the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors subjected Ang Tassom, 12 kilometres west of the town of Takeo, to continuous fire.

On 11 March 1971, at about 3 a.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese fired two 122 rockets at Phoum Boeung Krum, 28 kilometres south-east of Phnom-Penh, on the east bank of the Mekong, in Kandal, killing one Khmer and wounding seven.

On the same day, at about 6 p.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors brought a Khmer defence position at Tonlé Om, in Kompong Cham under continuous fire.

During the night of 11 to 12 March 1971, they brought Troeung, in Kompong Cham, under continuous fire, wounding one Khmer.

During the same night, Prey Totung, in Kompong Cham, was also fired on. There was another clash at O Dar, between Prey Totung and Phum Mien, in which two of the aggressors were killed.

During the same night, at 8 p.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors brought Pich Nil, in Kompong Speu, under continuous fire, wounding five Khmers.

During the same night, they attacked Khmer forces on patrol 11 kilometres south-west of Phsar Oudong, in Kandal, wounding four Khmer soldiers.

On 12 March 1971, they attacked Khmer forces on patrol nine kilometres south-east of Ang Snoul, in Kompong Speu, wounding one Khmer soldier.

On 13 March 1971, they attacked Phum Sdok Krol, 35 kilometres north-east of the town of Kompong Speu. After some 35 minutes of fighting, the aggressors withdrew, carrying with them their dead and wounded. Three Khmers were wounded.

On the same day, two clashes were reported south-east of Vihear Suor, at Kompong Chamlang and Phum Tbooq Damrey, in Kandal, in which two Khmer soldiers were killed and three wounded.

On the same day, Khmer troops carrying out an operation clashed with approximately 150 Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors in the region of Wat Angkor Thom, 10 kilometres north of the town of Kampot.

During the night of 13 to 14 March 1971, the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors brought Kompong Yaul, 15 kilometres south-east of the town of Takeo under continuous fire, wounding one Khmer.

During the same night, they brought Prasat Neang Khmau, 22 kilometres north of the town of Takeo on National Highway 2, under continuous fire.

During the same night, at 8 p.m., Bat Doeng, 25 kilometres west of Phnom-Penh, in Kandal, came under continuous fire from the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese.

During the same night, the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors directed continuous fire at a Khmer position 10 kilometres east of Tram Khnar, in Takeo.

On 14 March 1971, at about 11.20 a.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors attacked Phum Pong Tuk, seven kilometres north-west of Thmat Pong, in Kompong Speu. After several minutes of fighting, the Khmer forces were able to seize one light machine-gun, one 30 mm machine-gun and one Chinese sub-machine-gun (PM/AC).

During the night of 14 to 15 March 1971, they subjected to continuous fire a position of the Khmer forces at Prek Prâsâp, 25 kilometres south-east of Phnom-Penh, on the east bank of the Mekong, in Kandal.

During the same night, they directed continuous fire from 75 mm recoilless artillery at a position of the Khmer 2½ kilometres east of Prey Totung on National Highway 7, in Kompong Cham.

During the same night, they attacked a Khmer position at Mien, six kilometres west of Troeung on National Highway 2, in Kompong Cham, killing one Khmer soldier and wounding six; 15 of the aggressors were found dead.

During the same night, at about 8 p.m., they fired on Stung Chhay, 22 kilometres north of Veal Rinh, and another Khmer position situated 34 kilometres south-west of Srè Khlong, in Kompong Seila.

On 15 March 1971, the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors clashed violently with Khmer forces carrying out an operation in the area of Kompong Chamlâng, 12 kilometres south-east of Vihear Suor, in Kandal. Khmer casualties were five dead and 10 wounded, while the aggressors left behind 47 dead and carried away with them several dead and wounded. In addition, the Khmer forces were able to seize a large quantity of weapons of all calibres, including B 40s, AK 47s, 12 mm and 7 mm machine-guns, light machine-guns and hand guns.

On the same day, they clashed with Khmer forces carrying out a search operation one kilometre north-east of Trapeang Kraloeung, on National Highway 4, in Kompong Speu. After half an hour of fighting, Khmer casualties were two dead and one wounded.

On the same day, they clashed with Khmer forces carrying out a search operation 13 kilometres north-east of Chambâk, in Takeo. Khmer casualties were four wounded.

During the night of 15 to 16 March 1971, the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors attacked Phum Kbal Po, 10 kilometres east of the town and Khmer defence forces in the vicinity of Sala Srok, Prey Sandek, in Takeo.

On 16 March 1971, at 1 p.m., there was a brief clash at Phum Prek Yuon, two kilometres west of Saâng, in Kandal, in which one Khmer soldier was wounded.

On the same day, at about 9 a.m., there was a clash six kilometres south-west of Svay Rieng between the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors and Khmer forces carrying out a search operation.

During the night of 16 to 17 March 1971, the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors fired five 122 mm rocket shells at the town of Kompong Speu leaving six wounded.

On 17 March 1971, there was a fierce clash 6½ kilometres north-east of Troeung, in Kompong Cham, in which three Khmers were killed and six wounded, and Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese losses were 16 dead. The Khmer forces were able to seize two sub-machine-guns and one automatic pistol.

On the same day, at 2 p.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors clashed with Khmer forces carrying out an operation seven kilometres north-east of Chhnoc Trou, in Kompong Chhnang, wounding five Khmers; the enemy carried away several dead and wounded.

During the night of 18 to 19 March 1971, at 11 p.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors brought a Khmer position at Mien, in Kompong Cham, under continuous fire.

During the same night, at about 8 p.m., they fired on Phum Thmar Dos, 14 kilometres south of Kompong Kantuot, in Kandal.

During the same night, Kauk Banh Chân, 10 kilometres south-west of the capital and another Khmer position three kilometres east of Tonlé Bati, in Kandal, were fired on by the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors.

On 19 March 1971, at about 3.20 p.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors fired continuously for several minutes on Rokar Kong, 32 kilometres north-east of Phnom-Penh in Kandal.

On the same day a fierce engagement took place nine kilometres north of the town of Kompong Cham. It lasted the whole day and left one killed and five wounded on the Khmer side; the enemy left behind one killed and carried away a number of dead and wounded.

On the same day a Khmer position at Thnâl Totung, 17 kilometres to the north of the town of Kompong Speu, came under continuous mortar and rocket fire.

On the same day Khmer forces at Spean Po, six kilometres north-west of the Long Vek camp in Kompong Chhnang, came under automatic weapons fire from the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors. Two villagers were killed and two others wounded.

During the night of 19 to 20 March 1971 the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors attacked a Khmer defensive position at Dangkor, 25 kilometres south of Phnom-Penh, in Kandal; the Khmer forces lost one dead and five wounded.

On 20 March 1971 Khmer troops on a search operation clashed with the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors for approximately 20 minutes at a point 8.6 kilometres south of Prakhâm, in Kompong Cham.

On the same day a Khmer position defending the Svay Tayean bridge, 18 kilometres to the east of the town of Svay Rieng, was attacked by the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors.

On the same day a clash was reported seven kilometres south-east of Romeas, in Kompong Chhnang, between Khmer forces conducting an operation and the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors.

During the night of 20 to 21 March 1971, the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors twice fired on Phum Arey Khsat, situated opposite Phnom-Penh and a few kilometres away from it, on the east bank of the Mekong, in Kandal.

During the same night they also fired on Phum Koh Chen, 1½ kilometres north of the Prek Kdam ferry, in Kandal.

During the same night, at about 10 p.m., they fell into an ambush set by Khmer troops conducting an operation 4½ kilometres north-west of the provincial capital of Takeo. The enemy left behind three dead and one Chinese sub-machine-gun.

During the same night they fired continuously for several minutes on Khmer forces at Thnâl Totung, 17 kilometres north of the town of Takeo.

During the same night, at about 8 p.m., they attacked Sala Lek Pram, 17 kilometres north-west of Prek Kdam, in Kompong Chhnang.

On 21 March 1971 they fired on Khmer forces protecting the Chrâlong Mao bridge 3½ kilometres south of Sala Lek Pram, in Kompong Chhnang, one Khmer was wounded.

On the same day, at about 1 p.m., approximately 100 Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors clashed with Khmer forces on reconnaissance patrol 22 kilometres north-west of the provincial capital of Siemreap on National Highway 6.

On the same day, at about 6.30 p.m., there was a clash 3½ kilometres north-east of Phum Prey Chrouk, 38 kilometres to the north-west of the town of Siemreap.

On the same day, at about 1.30 a.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors fired on the Prek Kdam ferry in Kandal. One scow was sunk and four workmen were wounded.

During the night of 21 to 22 March 1971 they fired continuously for 14 minutes on Khmer forces protecting the Kompong Som oil refinery.

On 22 March 1971 they fired two 75 mm. recoilless artillery shells on the town of Siemreap, killing one woman and one child and wounding another child.

On the same day, at 6.15 p.m., they fired 15 75 mm recoilless artillery shells on Rocar Koy, seven kilometres east of Peam Chikang, in Kompong Cham.

On the same day, at 2 p.m., an engagement took place between Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese forces and Khmer troops conducting an operation at Phum Prèk Tabèn, 6½ kilometres north-east of Saang, in Kandal. The Khmer side lost one killed and four wounded.

During the night of 22 to 23 March 1971 the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors also fired on the Chuon Nath *lycée* in Kompong Cham.

During the same night they fired on a Khmer defensive position 22½ kilometres north of Veal Rinh, in Kompong Seila.

On 23 March 1971, at about 7.30 p.m., they fired on Trapeang Krâloeuang, 17 kilometres south-west of the provincial capital of Kompong Speu, on National Highway 4.

On the same day a clash was reported at Phum O Pong Ro, five kilometres north-west of Srang, in Kompong Speu.

On the same day two clashes took place in the Saang region, one at Phum Chrauy Russey, at about 1 p.m., and the other at Phum Prek Teahean Sau, at about 2 p.m., in Kandal.

On the same day the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors opened fire with 122 mm rockets on a Khmer defensive position at Phlaur Trei, three kilometres north-west of Tuk Khleang, in Kandal, wounding five persons on the Khmer side.

On the same day Prek Tameak, in Kandal, was fired on. The return fire of the Khmer troops left one aggressor killed on the spot.

On 24 March 1971 the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors fired five rockets at Khmer defence

forces near the Transport Brigade grounds in Pochentong, wounding five persons.

On the same day they attacked Khmer forces conducting an operation 6½ kilometres north-west of Srang, in Kompong Speu.

On 25 March 1971, at about 8 p.m., Phum Baren, situated opposite Saang, in Kandal, was harassed by the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors.

On the same day a clash took place at Phum Prahout, nine kilometres north-west of Puok, in Siemreap. Two persons were wounded on the Khmer side and two of the aggressors were found dead.

On the same day the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors clashed with Khmer forces conducting an operation to open National Highway 4, near Pich Nil.

On 26 March 1971, at about 11 a.m., a fierce engagement took place at Phum Baren, leaving one killed on the Khmer side and 10 of the enemy killed on the spot.

On the same day, at about 11 a.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors attacked a munitions convoy of the Khmer National Armed Forces on National Highway 4 in the Pich Nil area. The Khmer forces sustained about 30 wounded and three trucks set afire.

On the same day, at about 5 p.m., they harassed the Khmer positions at Srè Khlong and Trèng Trayeang, in Kompong Speu.

I wish to reiterate the firm and vigorous protest of the Government of the Khmer Republic against the illegal and permanent occupation of Khmer territory, followed by savage attacks perpetrated by the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors against a neutral and peace-loving country to which they have no right and with which they have no ethnic affinity, in flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter, international law and the 1954 Geneva Agreements.<sup>17</sup> These criminal attacks reveal clearly the annexationist aims of the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese communist imperialists and represent a dangerous threat to peace and security not only in the Khmer Republic but throughout the region of South-East Asia.

The Government of the Khmer Republic holds the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and the so-called Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Viet-Nam fully responsible for all the extremely grave consequences resulting from this situation and reserves the right to take the necessary action to defend the independence, neutrality, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this communication circulated as a Security Council document.

(Signed) KHIM TIT

*Permanent Representative of the Khmer Republic  
to the United Nations*

<sup>17</sup> Agreements on the Cessation of Hostilities in Indo-China.

**Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus  
for the period 2 December 1970 to 19 May 1971**

[Original: English]  
[20 May 1971]

## CONTENTS

	<i>Paragraphs</i>
INTRODUCTION .....	1-2
I. THE UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING FORCE IN CYPRUS .....	3-17
A. Composition and deployment .....	3-9
B. Function and guiding principles .....	10-15
C. Relations with the Government and with the Turkish Cypriot leadership ..	16
D. Freedom of movement of the United Nations Force .....	17
II. ACTIVITIES TOWARDS PREVENTING A RECUR- RENCE OF FIGHTING AND CONTRIBUTING TO THE RESTORATION AND MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER .....	18-37
A. Military situation .....	18-32
B. Developments relating to the mainten- ance of law and order .....	33-37
III. ACTIVITIES TOWARDS A RETURN TO NORMAL CONDITIONS .....	38-58
IV. INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS .....	59-69
V. GOOD OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL	70
VI. MEDIATION EFFORT .....	71
VII. FINANCIAL ASPECTS .....	72-77
VIII. OBSERVATIONS .....	78-88

## ANNEX

	<i>Page</i>
Map. Deployment of the United Nations Peace- keeping Force in Cyprus in May 1971 .....	60

## INTRODUCTION

1. This report on the United Nations operation in Cyprus covers developments from 2 December 1970 to 19 May 1971 and brings up to date the record of the activities of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) pursuant to the mandate laid down in Security Council resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 and subsequent resolutions of the Council relating to Cyprus.

2. The situation in the last six months with regard to the prevention of a recurrence of fighting has remained generally calm. However, the marked lack of progress in the intercommunal talks and in efforts towards a return to normal conditions has resulted in an increase in tension and a deterioration of the political atmosphere.

I. THE UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING FORCE  
IN CYPRUS

## A. COMPOSITION AND DEPLOYMENT

3. At the end of the period covered by my last report, the strength of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) was 3,007

military personnel and 175 civilian police.<sup>18</sup> On 19 May 1971, the composition of the Force was as follows:

<i>Military personnel</i>		<i>Total</i>
<i>Austria</i>		
Headquarters UNFICYP .....	1	
Field hospital .....	54	55
<i>Canada</i>		
Headquarters UNFICYP and military police .....	47	
Battalion .....	534	581
<i>Denmark</i>		
Headquarters UNFICYP and military police .....	15	
Battalion .....	277	292
<i>Finland</i>		
Headquarters UNFICYP and military police .....	11	
Battalion .....	273	284
<i>Ireland</i>		
Headquarters UNFICYP and military police .....	13	
Battalion .....	416	429
<i>Sweden</i>		
Headquarters UNFICYP and military police .....	10	
Battalion .....	263	273
<i>United Kingdom</i>		
Headquarters UNFICYP and military police .....	148	
Battalion .....	619	
Reconnaissance squadron .....	124	
UNFICYP logistic support units .....	154	
Helicopter support .....	44	
Contingent Headquarters .....	4	1,093
		TOTAL 3,007
<i>Civilian police</i>		
Australia .....	45	
Austria .....	45	
Denmark .....	40	
Sweden .....	40	
		TOTAL 170
		GRAND TOTAL UNFICYP 3,177

4. The following changes took place during the period covered by this report.

(a) *Austria*: A partial rotation was carried out.

(b) *Canada*: The 1st Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, replaced the 3rd Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry.

(c) *Denmark*: The 15th Battalion replaced the 14th Battalion.

<sup>18</sup> See *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-fifth Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1970*, document S/10005, para. 3.

\* Incorporating document S/10199/Corr.1.

(d) *Finland*: A partial rotation took place. The incoming troops form part of the 15th Finnish Battalion.

(e) *Ireland*: The 20th Infantry Group replaced the 19th Infantry Group.

(f) *Sweden*: The 46th Battalion replaced the 45th Battalion.

(g) *United Kingdom*: The 1st Battalion, the Gordon Highlanders, replaced the 3rd Battalion, the Royal Green Jackets; C Squadron, the Royal Hussars (PWO), replaced C Squadron, the Royal Scots Greys; 1 Squadron, the Royal Corps of Transport, replaced 60 Squadron, the Royal Corps of Transport.

(h) The Government of *Australia* has informed the Secretary-General of its intention to reduce the Australian police unit from 50 to 40 men. The first five-man reduction took place in May, in connexion with the replacement of one half of the members of the unit. The second reduction is scheduled for November 1971.

5. The number of manned military observation posts has been reduced from fifty-six to fifty-four.

6. The Force is now deployed as follows [see annex]:

*Headquarters, UNFICYP, including Headquarters United Nations civilian police (UNCIVPOL): combined staff*

<i>Force reserve</i> (British reconnaissance squadron)	<i>Larnaca district</i> Irish contingent
<i>Austrian field hospital</i>	<i>Limassol zone</i> British contingent Austrian civilian police
<i>Nicosia district</i> Canadian contingent Danish civilian police	<i>Lefka district</i> Danish contingent Austrian civilian police
<i>Famagusta district</i> Swedish contingent Swedish civilian police	<i>Kyrenia district</i> Finnish contingent Austrian civilian police

7. A further review of certain aspects of the Force to make a more economical use of the administrative effort has been completed. As a result, certain reductions have been achieved in the number of vehicles assigned to the Force.

8. The number of UNCIVPOL police stations and sub-stations has remained unchanged during the period covered by this report.

9. The Force remains under the command of Major General D. Prem Chand. My special representative in Cyprus continues to be Mr. B. F. Osorio-Tafall.

#### B. FUNCTION AND GUIDING PRINCIPLES

10. The function of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus was defined by the Security Council in its resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 in the following terms:

"...in the interest of preserving international peace and security, to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions."

11. That resolution was reaffirmed by the Council in its subsequent resolutions 187 (1964) of 13 March, 192 (1964) of 20 June, 193 (1964) of 9 August, 194 (1964) of 25 September and 198 (1964) of 18 December 1964, 201 (1965) of 19 March, 206 (1965) of 15 June, 207 (1965) of 10 August and 219 (1965) of 17 December 1965, 220 (1966) of 16 March, 222 (1966) of 16 June and 231 (1966)

of 15 December 1966, 238 (1967) of 19 June and 244 (1967) of 22 December 1967, 247 (1968) of 18 March, 254 (1968) of 18 June and 261 (1968) of 10 December 1968, 266 (1969) of 10 June, and 274 (1969) of 11 December 1969, 281 (1970) of 9 June and 291 (1970) of 10 December 1970.

12. The guiding principles governing the operation of the Force, as summarized in my report of 10 September 1964 [S/5950, para. 7], remain in effect. The duties of UNCIVPOL are as outlined in my report of 2 May 1964 [S/5679, para. 4].

13. The Political Liaison Committee continues to meet, as a rule, every two weeks. The UNFICYP Deputy Chief of Staff, who acts as Chairman, the Senior Political and Legal Adviser and his staff, the Police Adviser and the Force Economics Officer meet separately with liaison officers representing the Government and the Turkish Cypriot leadership, with a view to sorting out specific current intercommunal problems through liaison and discussions. UNFICYP considers that the Committee should not normally be regarded as the venue for the discussion of the basic issues involved in the Cyprus situation, as higher channels are always available for that purpose. Between 2 December 1970 and 19 May 1971, the Committee held 13 meetings with the Government Political Liaison Officer and 12 with the Turkish Cypriot Political Liaison Officer.

#### Casualties

14. During the period under review, UNFICYP suffered no casualties attributable to intercommunal incidents. Three British soldiers and one British airman have died as a result of accidents.

#### Discipline

15. The over-all discipline and bearing of the officers and men of the United Nations Force have continued to be of a high order, and reflect credit on the contingent commanders, their staffs and the armed forces of the contributing countries.

#### C. RELATIONS WITH THE GOVERNMENT AND WITH THE TURKISH CYPRIOT LEADERSHIP

16. UNFICYP has maintained, as in the past, close liaison and kept good working relations with the Government of Cyprus and the Turkish Cypriot leadership.

#### D. FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT OF THE UNITED NATIONS FORCE

17. During the period covered by this report, there were eight incidents involving a denial of freedom of movement to UNFICYP elements. Three may be attributed to members of the National Guard and five to Turkish Cypriot fighters. Seven cases were the result of local actions by subordinate commanders and were caused by misunderstandings and, in one instance, was allegedly due to orders not having been received.

#### II. ACTIVITIES TOWARDS PREVENTING A RECURRENCE OF FIGHTING AND CONTRIBUTING TO THE RESTORATION AND MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER

##### A. MILITARY SITUATION

##### 1. Armed forces in Cyprus other than UNFICYP

###### (a) Government armed forces

18. The over-all strength, organization and deployment of the National Guard has not changed significantly during the past six months. The call-up of the first half of the 1953 age group took place between

20 and 22 January 1971, while the first half of the 1951 age group was demobilized.

19. Training activity has remained at the same level as in the past and UNFICYP has been notified in advance of field exercises and live-range firing. As usual, summer training camps are being organized on the north and east coasts of the island.

(b) *Turkish Cypriot armed elements*

20. There has been no significant change in the over-all strength or deployment of fighter units. The organization is now firmly based on a standard infantry pattern, with a number of districts commanded by the headquarters in Nicosia.

21. Training activity has continued to increase and UNFICYP has been given notice of field exercises and live firing.

(c) *UNFICYP assessment*

22. Although there have been no major changes in the strengths of the National Guard and the Turkish Cypriot fighters, the standards of discipline, training and organization have continued to improve with the passage of time.

(d) *Greek and Turkish national contingents*

23. The two national contingents have remained in the locations they occupied in 1963 and their strengths remain unchanged. A partial rotation of the Greek national contingent took place on 15 January 1971. UNFICYP was given advance notice of this rotation and was advised of quantities and types of military stores imported. Further notifications of the arrival of certain military stores for the contingent were subsequently received and an UNFICYP representative was invited to view the stores at the docks.

24. Half of the Turkish national contingent was rotated on 26 February 1971. The quantity of ammunition and stores to be imported was negotiated with the Government of Cyprus through UNFICYP's good offices. UNFICYP provided escorts, observers and transport. A major problem arose when the disembarkation of the troops had to be suspended for more than two hours, at the request of the Cyprus Government, as three Turkish patrol boats which had escorted the troop transport approached the coast in the vicinity of Boghaz, to the north of Famagusta. One of the boats came to some 150 metres from the shore, while the other two remained at a distance of about one and a half miles. Turkish Embassy officials on the quay explained to UNFICYP and Cyprus Government representatives that the patrol boat had drifted owing to mechanical trouble; as it was in danger of running aground, they sought the Cyprus Government's consent for the two other patrol boats to render assistance. Permission was granted and the rotation was resumed as soon as all three boats had left the area. There were no further delays but, later in the day, the Cyprus Government complained that one of the Turkish patrol boats was cruising within 12 miles of the coast, the territorial waters limit adopted by Cyprus. These incidents caused tension to rise.

25. The semi-annual rotations of the Turkish national contingent are strictly speaking a matter between the Governments of Cyprus and Turkey. UNFICYP's good offices and assistance are extended, at the request of both parties, in the context of paragraph 1 of Security Council resolution 186 (1964). Each rotation is a delicate operation, requiring considerable preliminary negotiations and preparations by

UNFICYP, as well as special security precautions to prevent untoward incidents. Any unusual activities are liable to make this task more difficult; it is hoped therefore that UNFICYP will receive a maximum degree of co-operation in adhering to past practice, so as to facilitate the smooth completion of the rotations. In the exercise of its good offices, UNFICYP specifically checks, in the presence of Cyprus Government officials, the numbers of Turkish military personnel disembarking during each such operation.

2. *General assessment of the situation with regard to preventing a recurrence of fighting*

26. The military situation has continued to be relatively calm on the surface, but UNFICYP's efforts to bring about a relaxation in the areas of direct confrontation have failed, as in the past, to produce any positive results. While the level of tension has fluctuated, the atmosphere of mutual trust and confidence, so essential to achieving an improvement of the situation, is still noticeably lacking. Instead, there have been periods of considerable military display and acute sensitivity.

27. The Government has repeatedly expressed its concern at an apparent increase in Turkish Cypriot fighter presence and activity throughout the island, particularly in Limassol and the neighbouring villages. It has also been perturbed at the intensive overt training programmes now being carried out in Turkish Cypriot-controlled areas, coupled with what it believes to be a considerable stepping up of the distribution of locally manufactured arms and ammunition, since full freedom of movement was restored by the Government early in 1968.

28. UNFICYP has maintained a close and constant watch on the situation and, by anticipation and prompt intervention, has on several occasions prevented changes in the *status quo* that were attempted by local commanders. One such situation developed suddenly in early March 1971 in Paphos district, where the Government Forestry Department was carrying out work on a new track for afforestation purposes which would have passed in the vicinity of Turkish Cypriot fighter positions east of Yallia. UNFICYP wishes to place on record the excellent co-operation received from both sides on that occasion.

29. Throughout most of the period, uniformed Turkish Cypriot fighters, as mentioned in the preceding reports, continued to appear in the Turkish Cypriot quarter of Limassol, marching to and from their training area. Strong protests by UNFICYP have now had the desired effect and the *status quo ante* has been restored. There were also quite a few instances of Turkish Cypriot fighters appearing in full uniform and parading with weapons outside the Limassol stadium, thereby changing the *status quo*.

30. Three shooting incidents have taken place on the Nicosia Green Line during the past six months. Both National Guard and Turkish Cypriot fighters continue to appear on the Green Line from time to time, and work on essential repairs to positions has been carried out. The direct confrontation in this densely populated area continues to be a matter of serious concern to UNFICYP.

3. *Observance of the cease-fire*

31. There were four shooting incidents confirmed by UNFICYP during the period under review. After

investigation by UNFICYP, one of these was attributed to Government security forces and three to Turkish Cypriot fighters. In all four cases the shootings could be considered as violations of the cease-fire. In addition, there were six cases of accidental discharge of weapons

by National Guard and three cases by Turkish Cypriot fighters.

32. Emphasis continues to be given with encouraging results to the prevention of incidents, as well as to the maintenance of the *status quo* in sensitive areas.

#### SUMMARY OF SHOOTING INCIDENTS

	2 December 1970 to 19 May 1971	2 June to 1 December 1970	2 December 1969 to 1 June 1970	3 June to 1 December 1969	3 December 1968 to 2 June 1969	8 June to 2 December 1968	8 March to 7 June 1968	7 December 1967 to 7 March 1968
Nicosia district (from 23 February 1970)	6	8	5	10	5	16	6	8
Famagusta zone (until 28 February 1970)	—	—	3	6	1	1	3	5
Famagusta district (from 1 March 1970) ..	2	3	2	—	—	—	—	—
Larnaca district (from 9 March 1970) ....	2	—	1	—	—	—	—	—
Limassol zone (less Kophinou district from 9 March 1970) .....	1	1	3	5	7	4	1	6
Lefka district .....	—	—	—	3	7	11	8	23
Kyrenia district .....	2	—	2	6	5	33	21	25
TOTAL	13	12	16	30	25	65	39	67

#### B. DEVELOPMENTS RELATING TO THE MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER

33. The UNFICYP civilian police (UNCIVPOL) has continued to contribute to the maintenance of law and order in Cyprus.

34. UNCIVPOL has kept close liaison with the Cyprus police and the Turkish Cypriot Police element. Both Greek and Turkish Cypriots have continued to show confidence in UNCIVPOL and this has greatly facilitated its task.

35. During the period under review, UNCIVPOL has conducted about 700 investigations into incidents that might have intercommunal aspects. The variety of inquiries was considerable. Deaths from different causes, accidents, assaults, straying and theft of livestock, illegal cultivation of land, damage to crops and property, as well as unlawful digging for antiquities in the Turkish Cypriot-controlled areas, were the subject of the more frequent investigations. UNCIVPOL continued to lend support to other branches of UNFICYP, e.g., in the field of agriculture and public services [see paras. 42-48 below].

36. Twenty-one Greek Cypriots accused of taking part in the raid on the Limassol central police station in May 1970<sup>19</sup> were convicted and sentenced by the Nicosia Assize Court to terms of imprisonment. On 19 January 1971, the President of the Republic suspended the remainder of these prison sentences, as well as those of 10 other persons convicted for their participation in the "National Front" illegal organization.<sup>20</sup> The suspension might be ended at the President's direction at any time. Since then, one of the probationers has been rearrested upon being found carrying a weapon illegally. On the other hand, a Turkish Cypriot, convicted of carrying a machine-gun in a Government-controlled area, and sentenced to four years' imprisonment,<sup>21</sup> was also released.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 70.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, Supplement for April, May and June 1970, document S/9814, para. 39.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, Supplement for October, November and December 1970, document S/10005, para. 51.

37. Since early February, the Cyprus police has been conducting a vigorous campaign against illegal cultivation of, and trafficking in, narcotics, particularly cannabis. Many arrests of both Greek and Turkish Cypriots have been effected. This increase in police activity, especially the stopping and searching of persons and vehicles at temporary roadblocks, and the interrogations at police stations, has led to some complaints from Turkish Cypriots, particularly in March. UNCIVPOL investigated all such complaints brought to its attention and helped to ease the resulting tensions. At present, the number of complaints is considerably lower. For its part, the Turkish Cypriot police element has also taken special measures in Turkish Cypriot-controlled areas to combat narcotics offences.

#### III. ACTIVITIES TOWARDS A RETURN TO NORMAL CONDITIONS

38. Since my last report, there have been no significant changes in regard to a return to normal conditions, with the exception of some developments towards a restoration of public services and in the field of economic co-operation.

39. In the economic field, contacts between Greek and Turkish Cypriots have been maintained, especially in the private sector and in a number of semi-autonomous and non-governmental institutions. The tendency towards separate economic development has, however, not been reversed. On account of poor agricultural production, the rate of growth of the Cyprus economy as a whole was slower in 1970 than in 1969, but other sectors have maintained their upward trend and, except for Turkish Cypriot-controlled areas, conditions of full employment have prevailed. To meet the acute demand for skilled workers in certain trades, various courses open to Greek and Turkish Cypriots alike have been conducted by the Cyprus Productivity Centre. For example, 35 Turkish Cypriots participated in an accelerated training programme for specialization in trades related to the building industry, under the supervision of a Turkish Cypriot instructor especially engaged for the purpose. Twenty Greek and 27 Turkish Cypriots completed courses for welders, auto mechanics, electricians and

metal smiths at the Dhekelia Trade Training Centre organized under an agreement concluded between the Cyprus and United Kingdom Governments. Similarly, Turkish Cypriot students have been attending courses at the Higher Technical Institute and the Hotel and Catering Institute, sponsored by the Government and the United Nations Development Programme with the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization and the International Labour Organisation as executing agencies, respectively.

40. No rapprochement has been noticed on such basic issues as investments and economic policy. The Turkish Cypriot leadership continues to hold the position that, pending an over-all solution of the Cyprus problem, it remains responsible for the economic development of areas under its control, using for this purpose the financial assistance provided by Turkey. Among other measures, a fund has been established to subsidize Turkish Cypriot investment projects and provide medium- and long-term agricultural, industrial and commercial credit with the help of co-operatives which have been given increased responsibility in development schemes. For its part, the Cyprus Government, which is fully aware of the great economic inequality between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, has reiterated its willingness to help raise the latter's living standards and to allocate funds for investments in Turkish Cypriot-controlled areas, provided it has over-all supervision and financial control over such projects.

41. It would seem that it will be difficult to utilize fully and rationally the human and other resources of the island if the present trend towards separate economic development is maintained, especially when the preparation of the new Five-Year Plan for 1972 to 1976 is in its final stages. It has been suggested in this connexion that one way to foster some form of intercommunal economic co-operation would be the establishment of closer links between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot co-operative movements and regular exchanges of views between Greek and Turkish Cypriots within economic planning institutions.

42. The severe drought conditions which last year affected the crops in the island's central plain have been alleviated by this year's heavy rainfall. Above average harvests are expected from grape and other fruit crops and from cereals.

43. Turkish Cypriots appear to be taking greater interest in agricultural projects undertaken by the Government with the assistance of the World Food Programme and the Food and Agriculture Organization. Thus, at the end of April 1971, out of a total of 1,476 participants in an important mixed farming project, 245 were Turkish Cypriots. In the soil and conservation project, 1069 out of an estimated 10,000 applicants approved for the period October 1970 to July 1971 were Turkish Cypriots. It is believed that there is still room for considerably increased Turkish Cypriot participation in this project. It is also anticipated that Turkish Cypriots will take even greater advantage of courses and other activities offered in the project to strengthen veterinary services. Co-operation of the Turkish Cypriot farmers with various produce marketing boards and the Grain Commission continues to be good, but the Turkish Cypriot co-operatives feel that there are still opportunities for further improvement here.

44. As in the past, UNFICYP has assisted in solving disputes between Greek and Turkish Cypriots

over such problems as land encroachment and damages due to unauthorized grazing and cultivation. In most cases, complaints have been dealt with promptly at the local level and settled by payment of compensation to the injured party.

45. Since my last report, there has been further progress towards normalization of public services. Talks on a technical level, initiated by UNFICYP late in 1970 to resume the provision of electricity in Turkish Cypriot villages, are progressing and the Electricity Authority of Cyprus is at present carrying out preparatory village surveys. If this whole scheme can be implemented, it will affect about 20 Turkish Cypriot or mixed villages.

46. Though long-standing difficulties over water supply and irrigation still exist, there have been encouraging developments. Chronic water shortages in such Turkish Cypriot villages as Temblos (Kyrenia district), Kivisil, Melousha and Alaminos (Larnaca district) appear on the way to being overcome through new water schemes. These arrangements were facilitated by the readiness of some Turkish Cypriot villages to make payments on long-standing water bills and debts. UNFICYP has assisted in these negotiations and, as in the past, has continued to help in solving a variety of disputes over water.

47. With the assistance of UNFICYP, further efforts have been made to normalize the Cyprus telephone services.

48. Extension of other public services to Turkish Cypriots is envisaged. Negotiations have been initiated concerning postal service facilities, particularly with reference to Ktima and Larnaca, and it is hoped that agreements will soon be reached.

49. There has been little change with regard to the reintegration of Turkish Cypriots into the social insurance scheme, although discussions on the matter are continuing between Greek and Turkish Cypriot experts. It is to be hoped that an agreement on this long-standing issue will soon be forthcoming, because the longer this problem remains unsettled, the greater the difficulties in arriving at a solution.

50. UNFICYP has continued its efforts towards assisting the authorities concerned in checking and preventing illegal excavations and also, within the limited resources available to it, in restoration work on certain places of worship.

51. There has been a new development on the question of Turkish Cypriot displaced persons. The Government, through its representative at the intercommunal talks, has put forward a programme for their return to their villages. This plan envisages initially a return to 13 villages by 31 August 1971, when the Government estimates that housing repairs will be completed there. A further eight villages are scheduled to be ready for resettlement by the end of 1971, depending on the willingness of the Turkish Cypriots to return to the first 13 villages. The Government also states that repair work has been completed already in a further 14 villages and that these villages are ready for immediate resettlement.

52. In its programme, the Government reiterates that returning Turkish Cypriots will come under Government administrative control and policing as well as being subject to the jurisdiction of its courts. It also reserves the right to restrict temporarily the return to mixed villages of certain individuals whose presence in its view might cause difficulties to peaceful village



coexistence. The Government has further renewed its offer of some provisional resettlement aid, but feels that it cannot consider compensation and damage claims of Turkish Cypriots without at the same time considering Greek Cypriot claims. Furthermore, the assistance given will be based on current needs and not on damage suffered in the past.

53. It is understood that Mr. Denktash has asked Mr. Clerides for a number of clarifications and that the two interlocutors are currently reviewing certain details in the Government proposals. Among other items, Mr. Denktash has suggested that a mixed committee should be formed to examine the question of rehabilitation aid, preferably with UNFICYP participation. However, the Government is of the opinion that the administrative machinery and procedure used by Greek Cypriot displaced persons should also be adequate for Turkish Cypriots. This means that each displaced person would submit an application for assistance to his district officer who, after a preliminary investigation, would refer it for evaluation to a committee of three civil servants from the Ministries of Finance, Interior and Labour and Social Insurance.

54. The current exchange of views on the Government's proposals is receiving wide coverage from both the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot media and reactions on both sides have been varied.

55. Apart from its proposals for resettlement, the Government reports that it has spent considerable funds on repairs to Turkish Cypriot buildings in a number of villages over the past four years. However, in some villages such as Nisou, Kithasi, Prastio (Limassol), Peristerona, only a small number of displaced persons have returned. In others, such as Skylloura, Ayios Vasilios, Lapithos and Dhorios, the Government reports that it has made repairs to damaged buildings, but no Turkish Cypriots appear to be returning.

56. An encouraging trend towards the resettlement of the mixed village of Potamia (Nicosia district) appears to have been marred by some unfortunate incidents which occurred between November 1970 and March 1971, involving Turkish Cypriots and the local Cyprus police. These incidents have been investigated by UNCIVPOL and have been discussed with appropriate ministries and the Turkish Cypriot leadership, and UNFICYP has made efforts to remove the sources of friction. It is hoped that the tensions in Potamia and, to a lesser degree, in some other villages, have now been eased and that they will not impair the progress towards reaching a general solution to this long-standing problem.

57. Again it is regretted that there has been no improvement on the problem of freedom of movement. The Government has repeatedly expressed its disapproval of the policy of the Turkish Cypriot leadership in denying to Greek Cypriots the use of a number of major public roads. Complaints are also still being received from areas where Greek Cypriot farmers are being denied access to fields which lie in Turkish Cypriot-controlled areas, particularly in the Chatos/Lefkoniko region. The Turkish Cypriot leadership has made it clear that its position on the question of freedom of movement remains unchanged, and that the passage of Greek Cypriots through Turkish Cypriot-controlled areas is linked with the security of its community as well as other aspects of the Cyprus problem which are under discussion at the intercommunal talks.

58. UNFICYP continues to operate convoys on the Nicosia-Kyronia road and to provide emergency escorts for Greek Cypriots through certain Turkish Cypriot-controlled areas. It is also called upon to use its good offices in securing the release of Greek Cypriot individuals who stray outside Government-controlled areas. UNFICYP continues to hold the view expressed in previous reports that it should be possible, pending a solution to the political problems, to arrange the opening to civilian traffic of at least some main public roads, such as the Famagusta-Chatos-Nicosia road and the Pyrgos-Kokkina-Pelis road which are at present closed to Greek Cypriots.

#### IV. INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS

59. Mr. Clerides and Mr. Denktash have continued to meet in private. They have had 12 meetings in the fourth round of their talks, which began on 21 September 1970. On 30 November 1970, Mr. Clerides was reported to have put forward certain views aimed at bridging, through a "package deal", remaining differences concerning the executive, legislative and judiciary as well as on the public service, the police and "local government". During the ensuing meetings, the interlocutors were said to have focused their attention primarily on the issue of "local government", but the question of displaced persons also came under considerable review, particularly in February and early March [see paras. 51-55 above].

60. There were no meetings between 29 March and 28 April, as Mr. Denktash had gone to Ankara for consultations with the new Turkish Government. Prior to Mr. Denktash's departure, Mr. Clerides conveyed to him in writing his Government's position on a number of pending issues as well as clarifications of the proposals he had submitted to him on 30 November 1970. Shortly after Mr. Denktash's return it was announced that he had communicated to Mr. Clerides his side's stand on various matters, including an outline of a "package deal".

61. In a number of public statements, Mr. Clerides and Mr. Denktash made it clear that, although they still disagreed on fundamental principles, they would continue the talks in an effort to find a peaceful solution. In replying to a question put to him by a journalist, Mr. Denktash, in the presence of Mr. Clerides, made it clear that there would be no time-limit to their discussions and that they did not think they had wasted time since June 1968 when the talks started; however, it had to be borne in mind that any unnecessary prolongation was harmful as new factors might come up, causing increased difficulties. For his part, Mr. Clerides stressed that it was imperative to continue the talks because they constituted the only way to a peaceful settlement. He reiterated in public, *inter alia*, that the solution to be found must be based on the principle of a unitary State and that a partitionist, federal, cantonal or any other such arrangement would not be acceptable, as this would be tantamount to the creation of a State within a State. Mr. Clerides said that, within the framework of these principles, his side had formulated and presented the proposals of 30 November 1970, safeguarding the Turkish Cypriot representation in a single executive, legislative and judiciary, and their participation in State administrative organs in proportion to their population strength, as well as envisaging an expansion of "local government". These proposals, in which, Mr. Clerides said, he had moved from his original position, exhausted the negotiating

margins; any conciliatory move would therefore have to come from the Turkish Cypriots. He added that if there was no constructive response, the local talks would be led into a state of stagnation and would run the risk of being turned into a high level "liaison committee" engaged in problems of a current nature. For his part, Mr. Denktash stated that the Turkish Cypriots wanted a solution which would not be used by the Greek Cypriots as a springboard to the union of Cyprus with Greece (*enosis*) and which would be based on the separate existence and partnership of the two communities. He emphasized in this context that since the start of the intercommunal talks all Turkish Cypriot proposals were calculated to keep the door to *enosis* closed, through permanent and guaranteed independence. Mr. Denktash explained to the press that, in his latest letter of 28 April to Mr. Clerides, he had offered certain suggestions which he hoped would be viewed in the spirit in which they were made.

62. In two letters dated 24 March [S/10174] and 1 April 1971 [S/10179] respectively, addressed to the Secretary-General through the Permanent Mission of Turkey, Vice-President Küçük spoke of certain ominous developments which were giving his community cause for anxiety. In particular, he took exception to a passage of a speech delivered by President Makarios on 14 March in a village of the Karpas Peninsula (Famagusta district) in which the President was quoted as saying that Cyprus was Greek and would be delivered undivided to Greece. Mr. Küçük stressed that this statement and similar pro-*enosis* statements by other leading Greek Cypriot personalities could only undermine the meaning and effect of the intercommunal talks and lead to grave consequences for international peace. He re-emphasized in this connexion that his community stood for a peaceful solution on the basis of independence, guaranteed fully and effectively against *enosis*, and retaining the political status of partnership of the two communities. Similar views were expressed by the Turkish Government, e.g. in the communiqué of 17 April on Mr. Denktash's talks in Ankara, which made it known that the Turkish Government and the Turkish Cypriot community would continue constructive and patient efforts for finding a peaceful solution which, apart from securing the balance of rights and interests set up between the two communities under the Agreements, would also have to be placed within a framework that would effectively preserve the independence of Cyprus and would prevent any new interference with the international status of Cyprus or its Constitution.

63. On 6 April the Cyprus Government, following a special Council of Ministers meeting, announced that its basic line of policy remained unchanged and continued to be the pursuit of the local talks, which were the only correct procedure for a solution of the Cyprus problem. When questioned shortly thereafter by a journalist on the matter of *enosis*, President Makarios replied that the national aspirations of a people could not be repudiated but that the question of *enosis* did not depend on the will and the desire of the Greek Cypriot people alone. His Foreign Minister, Mr. Kyprianou, in an interview on 24 April, declared that the aim of the local talks was a constitutional restructure of a unitary State; the talks did not aim at examining the nature of independence and the external aspect of the Cyprus question generally, which would be the subject of deliberations at another level. He added that the Turkish stand for fettered independence was

a basic element in the policy for the creation of a situation which would promote partition by means of outside interventions.

64. As to the Greek Government, its Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Xanthopoulos-Palamas, emphasized in a press conference on 24 April that his Government was doing everything possible to promote progress in the intercommunal talks, and expressed the hope that both sides would show a spirit of constructive contribution towards finding a peaceful solution.

65. On 6 May the representative of Cyprus, Mr. Rossides, in a letter addressed to the Secretary-General [S/10187], alluded to Mr. Küçük's communications of 24 March and 1 April and indicated *inter alia* that, Cyprus having been predominantly Greek in character through the millenia, its preservation as a single undivided unit was a historical responsibility, and that the natural ethnic sentiments of a large majority of Cypriot people for union with Greece had never been concealed and were well known in the United Nations. Mr. Rossides stressed that the Government of Cyprus had nevertheless decided to exert every effort for the achievement of a peaceful and lasting solution of the problem on the basis of a sovereign, independent and unitary State, as provided in General Assembly resolution 2077 (XX) of 18 December 1965, which the Government of Cyprus was ready and willing to implement in its entirety. It had been considered, the representative continued, that union with Greece was not realistically achievable; it was the Turkish side which during the last 30 months had been striving to demonstrate that it was bent on rendering the solution of an independent unitary State non-achievable also. In his letter, the representative of Cyprus also complained about the Turkish Cypriots' refusal to reciprocate the gestures of goodwill and the normalization measures taken by the Government. He further took exception to certain parts of a speech made by Mr. Küçük at Alaminos on 10 April 1971 in which, according to Ambassador Rossides, Mr. Küçük said that Cyprus would become Turkish and the Greeks would be thrown out, and that the Turkish Cypriot villagers should avoid any economic, social and other contacts with the Greeks.<sup>22</sup>

66. In another letter, dated 3 May 1971, addressed to the Secretary-General [S/10185], the representative of Cyprus, on instructions from his Government, drew attention to a number of statements made by high Turkish Government officials, which he described as bellicose and seemingly calculated to create and intensify tension. Mr. Rossides objected to the Turkish Cypriots being called by Prime Minister Erim "our fellow citizens" and to Cyprus being referred to by the spokesman of the Turkish Foreign Ministry as the "sixty-eighth province of Turkey". The representative's letter reiterated moreover that the local talks had been practically stalled by Turkish Cypriot insistence on introducing new and more partitionist elements under the guise of "local government".

67. The representative of Turkey replied to Mr. Rossides's communication of 3 May in a letter which he addressed to the Secretary-General on 12 May 1971 [S/10194]. He wrote that the Turkish side stood

<sup>22</sup> In a letter to the Secretary-General dated 17 May 1971 [S/10200], Mr. Küçük indicated that this statement was "concocted" by the Greek Cypriot press and had been publicly refuted by him.

firmly by the 1960 Treaties which prohibited both *enosis* and partition, while the Greek Cypriot leaders had made it plain that *enosis* was their real aim. Mr. Bayülken said that Prime Minister Erim had been misquoted by Mr. Rossides since Mr. Erim had referred to the Turkish Cypriots not as "fellow citizens" but as "fellow kinsmen". Mr. Bayülken added that the reference to Cyprus as the "sixty-eighth province of Turkey" was a "non-existent statement by an unidentified, imaginary Turkish spokesman".

68. On his return from Ankara on 19 April 1971, Mr. Denktash said that no one could stop the Greek side from finding out what the Greek Cypriots wanted about the future of Cyprus. This was their right. But there arose at the same time the right of the Turkish Cypriots to determine their own future vis-à-vis the independence which they owned together with the Greek Cypriots.

69. In a statement issued on 5 May, Mr. Denktash said with reference to the concepts of "unitary state" and "unfettered independence" that the intercommunal balance set out by the 1959-1960 Agreements must be maintained, thus respecting the political and juridical status of the Turkish Cypriot community. The Agreements had created a bicomunal unitary sovereign State. Mr. Denktash stressed on the same occasion that what his side wanted was not to fetter the independence of Cyprus but to continue the present guarantees which had saved the independence of Cyprus during the past seven years.

#### V. GOOD OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

70. As in the past, the good offices exercised on my behalf by my Special Representative in Cyprus, Mr. Osorio-Tafall, have, during the period covered by this report, continued to be available to the parties directly concerned. He has maintained close contact with the Government and the Turkish Cypriot leadership and has continued to be informed by Mr. Clerides and Mr. Denktash, whom he has met regularly, of the substance and prospects of their discussions.

#### VI. MEDIATION EFFORT

71. The situation regarding a resumption of the mediation function under paragraph 7 of Security Council resolution 186 (1964) has remained unchanged since my last report, owing primarily to the widely differing and firmly held views on the matter of the three Governments most directly concerned.

#### VII. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

72. The costs to be borne by the Organization for the operation of UNFICYP for the period from its inception on 27 March 1964 to 15 June 1971 are estimated at \$128,514,000. This total does not include the amounts which would be required for the final repatriation of contingents and liquidation costs.

73. As at 19 May 1971, payments and pledges of voluntary contributions received from 49 Member States and four non-member Governments to cover those costs total the equivalent of \$120,826,582. To the above may be added \$1,102,000 which have been received as at 31 March 1971 from interest earned on investment of temporarily surplus funds, public contributions, gains on exchange and other miscellaneous income.

74. Accordingly, unless additional contributions are received, there will be a deficit on 15 June 1971

in the amount of approximately \$6,585,000, on the assumption that all pledges will be paid in full. It is necessary to point out, however, that this foreseeable deficit could increase to approximately \$16,868,000 in view of the limitation upon which the ultimate contribution of one Government against its pledges is conditioned; in consequence of this position, the United Nations cannot safely count on receiving payment of the full amount pledged by that Government unless additional contributions are received from other Governments.

75. If the Security Council should decide to extend for six months beyond 15 June 1971 the period during which the Force is to be stationed in Cyprus, it is estimated that the additional cost to the Organization, including the amount of \$458,000 as the cost of final repatriation of contingents and liquidation costs and assuming continuance of present reimbursement commitments, would be as follows:

#### UNFICYP COST ESTIMATE BY MAJOR CATEGORIES OF EXPENSE (In thousands of US dollars)

<b>I. Operation costs incurred by the United Nations</b>	
Movement of contingents .....	448
Operational expenses .....	555
Rental of premises .....	96
Rations .....	380
Non-military personnel, salaries, travel, etc. . .	775
Miscellaneous and contingencies .....	205
	TOTAL 2,459
<b>II. Reimbursement of extra costs of Governments providing contingents</b>	
Pay and allowances .....	3,600
Contingent-owned equipment .....	320
Death and disability awards .....	50
	TOTAL 3,970
	GRAND TOTAL 6,429

76. The above costs do not reflect the full costs of UNFICYP to Member and non-member States, since they exclude the extra costs which Members providing contingents or police units to the Force have agreed to absorb at their own expense rather than to seek as reimbursement from the United Nations. Based on reports received from certain of the Governments providing contingents or police units to the Force, the estimated amount of such extra costs which Governments would absorb at their own expense for an additional six-month period, if the mandate of UNFICYP is extended and the Governments concerned agree to continue the present arrangements, are as follows: Australia \$200,000, Austria \$160,000, Canada \$904,707,<sup>23</sup> Denmark \$230,000, Sweden \$485,000 and United Kingdom \$780,000. Finland and Ireland are also absorbing certain UNFICYP costs at their own expense.

77. In order to finance the costs to the Organization of maintaining the Force for a period of six months after 15 June 1971 and to meet all costs and outstanding claims up to that date, it will be necessary for the Secretary-General to receive contributions totalling \$13,014,000, on the assumption that all pledges made so far will be paid in full.

<sup>23</sup> Exclusive of the cost of normal pay and allowances.

## VIII. OBSERVATIONS

78. It is with concern that I am compelled to report to the Security Council that in the period under review there has been little perceptible improvement in the situation in Cyprus and no indication of progress towards a negotiated solution of the underlying problems of the island. On the contrary, there has, on occasion, been a tendency on the part of spokesmen both for the Cyprus Government and for the Turkish Cypriot community to adopt uncompromising attitudes in their public statements. This has resulted in an aggravation of tension rather than in the relaxation which can best provide the climate for progress towards basic solutions.

79. Although the situation in the island remains apparently calm, recent developments have served to show once again the depth of feeling which still divides the two communities. The continuation of this situation is all the more hazardous because of the persistent confrontation of two well-armed military forces which continue to improve in operational capability with the passage of time. UNFICYP has continued, in pursuit of its mandate, to exert its best efforts to bring about a change in this situation and to prevent a recurrence of fighting.

80. I and my collaborators in UNFICYP have repeatedly urged all the parties concerned in the Cyprus problem to exercise restraint and moderation and especially to avoid the threat, or the use, of drastic retaliatory measures, which at worst would give rise to a renewed and acute conflict and at best can only cause a prolonged period of tension in the island. It is, in my view, essential to preserve the present calm in an effort to foster a genuine improvement in the relations between all the people of the island. Indeed, the increased co-operation in economic matters among various sections of the Cyprus population and the progressive extension of public services to the Turkish Cypriots are among the few really encouraging features of the period under review.

81. Despite the difficulties of the present situation, I remain firmly convinced that the best interest of all parties lies in continuing—in a genuine spirit of give and take—the intercommunal talks. These talks are unquestionably not only the best but in the present circumstances probably the only way to an agreed settlement. It seems more than likely that if the intercommunal talks were to break down or to end in complete and admitted failure, a new and major crisis would shortly erupt in Cyprus. Such a crisis would not only have the gravest consequences for the people of the island, but might well also constitute a serious threat to peace and security in the eastern Mediterranean. This is an additional reason why progress in the intercommunal talks is so crucially important.

82. I sincerely hope that both of the above-mentioned considerations will give impetus to the efforts of the parties to the talks to reach agreement on the substantive issues under discussion, on some of which their positions, while still far apart in substance, have in fact been clarified and even brought somewhat closer together in the course of the past six months. What is lacking, and needs to be restored, is the parties' mutual confidence in each other's good faith and ultimate political objectives. I have noted with concern statements both by Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders which have lent themselves to serious misapprehension in this regard and have tended

to erode mutual confidence. The fact is that Greek Cypriots find it difficult to accept any agreement which they fear will result, sooner or later, in partition. Similarly, Turkish Cypriots are alarmed at statements suggesting that some Greek Cypriots hope to arrive at the kind of settlement which will be a direct stepping stone to *enosis*.

83. In my view, what is needed to overcome this difficulty is an exercise of statesmanship by leaders of all the parties concerned whereby they would restate publicly their determination that the problem of Cyprus must be solved by arriving, through peaceful means, at a lasting agreement based on the independence and sovereignty of a unitary State of Cyprus. An undertaking of this kind could do much to clear up the present atmosphere of suspicion and hesitation and might thus serve to give a renewed impetus to the intercommunal talks.

84. In my last report to the Security Council I recommended for special attention two problems of crucial importance for a return to normal conditions. The first of these is the long-standing question of the Turkish Cypriot displaced persons. On this matter the Government has put forward a formula designed to be a first step toward the solution of the problem. At the time of writing the Turkish Cypriot leadership, although it has requested clarification of the Government's formula, has stated its disagreement with some of its basic provisions. As a result there has, so far, been little progress in the resettlement and rehabilitation of a substantial number of refugees. The second problem is the question of de-escalation and elimination of confrontation by the military forces in the island. Although this has for a long time now been the subject of persistent efforts by UNFICYP, I regret to have to report that no substantial progress has been made during the period under review. An important factor in this impasse is the contention of the Turkish Cypriot leadership that a return to normal conditions in this field cannot take place without impairing its position with regard to the basic issues of the Cyprus problem which are under discussion in the intercommunal talks.

85. Another aspect of normalization is the question of freedom of movement through Turkish Cypriot-controlled areas for unarmed Greek Cypriot civilians. I take this opportunity to restate my hope that an early solution of this problem may be forthcoming.

86. There are strong indications that, unless a bold, imaginative and sincere effort is made on all sides to bridge the existing difficulties, Cyprus may be entering a new period of tension in which little substantial progress towards the solution of the main problems can be expected and the danger of renewed unrest is seriously to be feared. In such a situation I have no alternative but to recommend the extension of UNFICYP's mandate for a further period of six months until 15 December 1971. It is my understanding that all the parties principally concerned are in agreement with this recommendation. Although the possibility of a further reduction in the strength of the Force has been under constant consideration, it has become increasingly clear that, despite the highly unsatisfactory budgetary situation of UNFICYP, any sizable reduction of the operation would be inadvisable until an appreciable degree of elimination of confrontation between the forces on the island, at least in the more sensitive areas, can be achieved.


87. This is the nineteenth time that I have recommended to the Security Council the extension of the mandate of UNFICYP. The prospect of an apparently indefinite commitment for the United Nations in Cyprus poses fundamental problems for the Organization in facing its responsibilities for the maintenance of international peace and security. I do not believe that it would be either possible or wise to postpone for very much longer a comprehensive review of this problem. I hope that members of the Security Council will give it the most serious consideration in the coming months and will give thought especially to constructive alternatives to the present arrangement.

88. In concluding this report, I wish to express my warm appreciation to the Governments which have

provided contingents and personnel for UNFICYP, and to those who have made voluntary contributions for the support of the operation. I also take this opportunity to pay tribute to my Special Representative, to the Force Commander, to all the officers and men and to the civilian staff of UNFICYP, who have continued to carry out, with exemplary efficiency and devotion, the important task assigned to them by the Security Council.

#### ANNEX

[Map: "Deployment of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus in May 1971". See page 60.]



Letter dated 18 May 1971 from the representative of Turkey  
to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]  
[19 May 1971]

I have the honour to present herewith a copy of the telegraphic letter which Mr. Fazıl Küçük, Vice President of the Republic of Cyprus, has sent to you through my Government. I am informed that the original copy of this letter will soon be presented to you.

I should be grateful if you would kindly have the enclosed text of Mr. Küçük's letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nuri EREN  
Acting Permanent Representative of Turkey  
to the United Nations

LETTER DATED 17 MAY 1971 FROM THE VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS, MR. FAZIL KÜÇÜK, TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

In an attempt to confuse the issue and detract attention from the very grave situation created in Cyprus by Archbishop Makarios's Yialousa speech and the Greek Cypriot leaders' *enosis* agitation which formed the subject matter of my letters circulated under reference symbols S/10174 and S/10179 and in order to conceal the neo-colonialist and expansionist tendencies of the Greek Orthodox church and the militant Greek Cypriot elements, Mr. Zenon Rossides, the Greek Cypriot Administration's representative at the United Nations, addressed a letter to you which has been circulated under the symbol S/10187. In this communication, which is full of irrelevant as well as false statements and imputations to which I shall refer later on, Mr. Rossides has sought to discredit me personally by attributing to me a statement which the Greek Cypriot press, under guidance, has concocted for obvious reasons. You are no doubt aware that this statement, which the local Greek press alleged was made by me during my visit to Alaminos village, was publicly refuted by me as soon as it was brought to my notice.

Mr. Rossides has been at great pains to exonerate the Greek Cypriot Administration of the charges contained in my said letters and claimed that the Greek side has exerted every effort for the achievement of a peaceful and lasting solution of the problem of Cyprus "on the basis of a sovereign, independent and unitary state" while blaming the Turkish leadership for obstructing a solution on this basis. The Turkish side's position in this matter has been thoroughly explained, in unequivocal terms, in the memorandum given to Mr. Clerides by Mr. Denktash, the Turkish representative in the intercommunal talks, dated 27th April 1971. If the local talks have so far failed to produce any positive result, this failure is entirely due to the untenable *enosis* policy pursued by the Greek Cypriot side. You and the world at large know very well that the Greek Cypriot onslaught of December 1963, which rendered 25,000 Turks homeless refugees, caused the destruction and looting of 105 Turkish villages and the damage of extensive Turkish owned properties, as well as other untold atrocities committed against the Turkish community thereafter, were all executed in the name of *enosis* and with the actual participation of

the present Greek Cypriot leadership which Mr. Rossides has tried in vain to absolve of any responsibility by drawing a misleading picture that union with Greece is merely a pious hope or an innocent ethnic sentiment of the Greek Cypriot people and that "the Cyprus Government" is not party to this movement. If this were the case, why did Archbishop Makarios and the Greek Government, at the conclusion of the former's state visit to Athens, issue a joint communiqué on 2 February 1966 (i.e. soon after General Assembly resolution 2077 (XX) of 18 December 1965 appended to Mr. Rossides's letter) declaring categorically that they would not agree to any settlement which would close the door to *enosis*? Why did Archbishop Makarios reaffirm this policy at a secret meeting he recently had with the leaders of the underground organization known as the National Front? Why did the Greek Cypriot members of the House of Representatives unanimously resolve at their meeting of 6 June 1967, to continue the present struggle "until this struggle ends in success through the union of Cyprus whole and undivided with the motherland" see my letter of protest to you dated 28 June 1967<sup>24</sup>? Why have all the political parties who contested the Greek Cypriot elections of 1970 declared in their election campaigns, in unequivocal terms, that they would, if elected, work for the materialization of *enosis* and would stand against the creation of a Cypriot consciousness? Why is the Greek national anthem played at official ceremonies (such as state visits and presentations of credentials) as if it were the national anthem of Cyprus? Why are the members of the Greek Cypriot National Guard and armed forces unlawfully established after the commencement of the intercommunal troubles and still commanded by about 2,000 officers from the Greek army, taking, on recruitment, an oath of allegiance to the Kingdom of Greece? And finally why all this creeping Hellenization of Greek Cypriot football federations, trade unions, telecommunications services, banking institutions, student and youth organizations etc., by affiliating them with similar organizations on the Greek mainland?

In view of all this overwhelming evidence of the Greek Cypriot Administration's actual participation in the implementation of *enosis* policy, it is apparent that Mr. Rossides's allegations are intended to mislead world public opinion. In the circumstances I need hardly dwell at any length on other allegations contained in Mr. Rossides's communication except to say a few words to show that they are equally misleading.

In this communication, Mr. Rossides referred to the Galo Plaza report<sup>25</sup> and stated that the Cypriot Government (meaning the Greek Cypriot Administration) accepted this report which was based on independence whereas Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leadership rejected it. If Mr. Rossides had cared to read the

<sup>24</sup> Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-second Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1967, document S/8028.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, Twentieth Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1965, document S/6253.

official communiqué issued by the public information office of the Greek Cypriot Administration, he would have seen that his administration had not accepted the report in its entirety and had objected to that part of the report which recommended that the Greeks should shelve their demand for *enosis* for a transitional period. This shows that the Greek Cypriot Administration was not prepared to shelve their demands for *enosis* even a temporary period and corroborates our view that their intention was, as it is now, to secure an independence which could be used, at the expense of the vested rights of the Turkish community, as a spring-board to *enosis*. It is true that the Turkish community rejected the Galo Plaza report but it did so for good reasons, including the one given above, which were circulated in Security Council document S/6279 of 9 April 1965.

The normalization measures taken by the Greek Cypriot Administration to which Mr. Rossides refers are no more than the removal of the inhuman economic blockades and other restrictions imposed on the Turkish community in defiance of Security Council resolution 186 (1964) dated 4 March 1964. The Turkish Cypriot Administration, apart from taking certain self-defence measures, had not imposed any such wholesale restrictions on the Greek Cypriots which it could remove. As regards Mr. Rossides's allegation concerning freedom of movement, it is not correct to say that Turks enjoy freedom of movement in all parts and on all roads of the island. For example, the Turkish inhabitants of the village of Omorphita numbering about 5,000, and the inhabitants of five purely Turkish villages in the Tylliria area are officially banned from returning to their homes on the pretext that their villages are in a sensitive or military area. Similarly, Turkish inhabitants are not allowed to enter, even for the purpose of a temporary visit to their properties, certain so-called restricted areas under Greek control which are much larger in extent than the areas under the military control of the Turkish Cypriot Administration. Even in the case of the resettlement of Turkish refugees, the Greek Cypriot Administration has reserved to itself the right to veto the return to his village of origin any Turkish refugee considered unwanted by the Greeks. Furthermore, Turks proceed to the Greek-controlled areas subject to the unconstitutional control

of the Greek police and into the illegal and unconstitutional jurisdiction of exclusively Greek courts of law. As regards Turkish-controlled areas, Greek Cypriot civilians who have a legitimate business can enter these areas. As explained to Mr. Guyer, your Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs, during his recent visit to Cyprus, the intention of the Greek Cypriot Administration is to impose, under the banner of "freedom of movement", its unconstitutional authority on the Turkish-controlled areas.

Finally, regarding Mr. Rossides's imputation that the Turkish Cypriot side is given to the idea of separatism or divisiveness and is cultivating hatred, I can do no better than refer him to this year's island-wide and exceptionally prolonged official celebrations held on the occasion of the anniversary of Greek national independence at which every platform and media—from the pulpit of the church to sound and vision broadcasting—have been used to sharpen the feelings of enmity and hatred against the Turks in a most provocative manner; if there is any divisiveness in Cyprus it is solely due to this sort of mentality and to the policy of bringing about *enosis* as part of the Greek racist policy of "Megali idea" which belongs to a bygone era.

In conclusion, I should like to join issue with Mr. Rossides's statement that his side is following a positive road of understanding, conciliation and peace and invite him to state whether they are ready and willing to renounce *enosis* and work for the permanent independence of Cyprus based on a compromise solution, which should include both political and economic elements and protect the vested rights and the legitimate interests of both communities.

I wish to assure you that the Turkish community and its leadership have all along, and during the inter-communal talks, been guided by these principles and will continue to be so irrespective of whether the Greek side chooses to misrepresent our policy of defending the Turkish community's vested rights and interests as "divisive" or as an attempt to create a "state within a state" in order to justify their own uncompromising and aggressive attitude.

I should be grateful if this communication could be circulated as a Security Council document.

## DOCUMENT S/10201

### Letter dated 19 May 1971 from the representative of Belgium to the President of the Security Council

[Original: French]  
[20 May 1971]

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to refer to the letter dated 7 May 1971 addressed to you by the representative of Somalia in his capacity as Chairman of the Special Committee on *Apartheid* [S/10190].

I attach a copy of a letter sent by me today to him.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this communication and the annex to it circulated as a Security Council document.

(Signed) E. LONGERSTAEY  
Permanent Representative of Belgium  
to the United Nations

LETTER DATED 19 MAY 1971 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF BELGIUM TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON *Apartheid*

I have the honour to refer to the note dated 6 May 1971, of the Special Committee on *Apartheid*,<sup>26</sup> and to your letter dated 7 May 1971 addressed to the President of the Security Council [S/10190].

The former document mentions a press report according to which a licence to manufacture an Israeli light gun was granted to South Africa through Belgium.

<sup>26</sup> Document A/AC.115/L.285/Add.2.



On the instructions of my Government, I have the honour to inform you that, contrary to the implication in the title of the note of the Special Committee on *Apartheid*, this event is not a new development concerning the implementation of the arms embargo against South Africa. It was in 1960, i.e., long before the embargo, that the Belgian firm concerned granted South Africa the manufacturing licence in question.

I take this opportunity to reiterate that, since the Security Council resolutions of 1963 and 1964, Belgium

is no longer exporting arms to South Africa and no licence for the manufacture of weapons has been granted to that country. These facts were restated in my letter of 12 February last to the Secretary-General of the United Nations concerning the implementation of Security Council resolution 282 (1970) and General Assembly resolution 2624 (XXV).

I should be grateful if you would have the note by the Special Committee on *Apartheid* corrected accordingly.

## DOCUMENT S/10202

### Letter dated 20 May 1971 from the Vice-Chairman of the Special Committee on *Apartheid* to the President of the Security Council

[Original: French]  
[21 May 1971]

I have the honour to refer to the letter which the Chairman of the Special Committee on *Apartheid* addressed to you on 7 May 1971 [S/10190], transmitting the Note on developments concerning the implementation of the arms embargo against South Africa.<sup>27</sup>

On behalf of the Special Committee, I have the honour to transmit to you an addendum<sup>28</sup> to the above-mentioned note, in accordance with the decision taken by the Committee at its 172nd meeting.

(Signed) Raoul STCLAIR  
Vice-Chairman of the Special Committee  
on *Apartheid*

<sup>27</sup> Documents A/AC.115/L.285/Add.1 and 2.

<sup>28</sup> Document A/AC.115/L.285/Add.3.

## DOCUMENT S/10203\*

### Letter dated 21 May 1971 from the representative of Jordan to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]  
[21 May 1971]

Further to my delegation's letter of 26 March 1971 [S/10165] concerning Israel's forcible and inhuman deportation of Jordanians from territories occupied since 5 June 1967, I regret to bring to your attention further waves of deportations.

As early as 14 June 1967, the Security Council in its resolution 237 (1967) called upon Israel "to ensure the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of the areas where military operations have taken place and to facilitate the return of those inhabitants who have fled the areas since the outbreak of hostilities".

Instead, Israel continues to intimidate, harass and suppress the inhabitants, confiscate their property and destroy their houses and deport them in great numbers to the east bank of Jordan.

On 18 March 1971, the following twelve persons were expelled through Wadi Araba, south of the Dead Sea:

Dhiab Ahmed Khalil (Dehaishah/Bethlehem), Mohammad Ali Omar, Jasir Yousif Mohammad (Gaza), Hasan Abdul-Karim Ahmad (Nablus), Rabah Mohammad Ali (Gaza), Abdul-Karim Fleihan, Harbi Ibrahim Dhiab (Jerusalem), Mohammad Ahmad Daoud (Ramallah), Mohammad Yousif Mohammad (Nablus), Rabiḥ Mohammad Mohammad (Gaza), Khalil Isa Suleiman and Attallah Hanna Attallah (Bethlehem).

Recently, on 20 April 1971, sixteen persons were deported through Ghor Es-Safi. Their names are:

Hamid Hassan Isa Nassar (Ras-Karkar/Ramallah), Ibrahim Mohammad Khalil Abu-Jarrad (Beit Lahiya), Mohammad Rashid Ahmad Nawfal (Deir As-Sudan), Rasim Hashim Badr Mousa (Ras-Karkar/Ramallah), Naim Ibrahim Ulayyan (Battar), Suleiman Mahmoud Uwadia As-Swarqa (Bethlehem), Shafiq Said Nimr Abu Quwaidra (Hebron), Ibrahim Salim Musalam As-Swarqa (Sinai), Mohammad Hassan Dhiab (Jerusalem), Mohammad Ibrahim Mohammad Al-Wahsh (Taamra/Bethlehem), Radi Abid Rida Kamri

\* Also circulated as a General Assembly document under the symbol A/8315.

(Nablus), Hilmi Khalil Abdul-Rasul Mizhir (Ramleh), Abdullah Tomeh Abu-Sharkh (Hebron), Ahmad Mohammad Ulayyan As-Safi (Ibediah/Bethlehem), Said Judah Mughanam (Sinai) and Yasin Ibrahim Mohammad (Iraq As-Sudan/Gaza).

May I ask you to bring this matter to the attention of the Commission on Human Rights and of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting

the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories.

I shall be grateful if this letter is circulated as a document of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

(Signed) Baha Ud-Din TOUKAN  
Permanent Representative of Jordan  
to the United Nations

## DOCUMENT S/10206

### Letter dated 20 May 1971 from the representative of the Khmer Republic to the President of the Security Council

[Original: French]  
[24 May 1971]

On instructions from my Government and further to my letter of 14 May 1971 [S/10198], I have the honour to transmit the following for the information of the members of the Security Council.

On 28 March 1971, at 2 p.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors fired two shells from a 75 mm recoilless gun at the eastern side of the Grand Hotel in the town of Siemreap; no damage was inflicted.

During the night of 28 to 29 March 1971, at 7 p.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese ambushed Khmer troops in Phum Kandal Krom eight kilometres south-east of Dey-Eth, in Kandal, wounding 12 men.

During the same night, the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese fired three 82 mm mortar shells at the armoured vehicle camp at Srê-Khlong, in Kompong Speu, without causing any damage.

During the same night at about 7 p.m. and 9 p.m. respectively, the Khmer positions at Veal Rinh, 36 kilometres north-east of Kompong-Som and at O Chamnar, 28 kilometres from Kompong-Som, were attacked by the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors.

During the morning of 29 March 1971, a clash occurred between the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors and Khmer troops at Phum Kompong-Lovea and Phum Chumnik, 25 kilometres north-east of Phnom-Penh, in Kandal. The toll of casualties was as follows:

On the Khmer side, three dead and 14 wounded; on the enemy side 23 left dead; one Chinese light machine-gun, three CKCs and three AK-47s seized by the Khmer forces.

On the same day, at 10 a.m., Khmer forces conducting a search operation clashed with the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors four kilometres south of Srang, in Kandal. As a result of vigorous retaliation by the Khmer forces, backed up by air support, the enemy was forced to withdraw at about 10.35 a.m., carrying with them dead and wounded; two members of the Khmer forces were wounded.

On the same day, at 10 a.m., Khmer troops advancing along National Highway 4 at kilometre marker 94.3 clashed with the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors and six of their number were wounded, including two journalists. The enemy carried away seven dead and wounded; several enemy bunkers were destroyed as a result of air force intervention.

On the same day, at 6.30 p.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors fired five 82 mm mortar shells

at the Khmer position at Rocakoy 14 kilometres south-east of the town of Kompong Cham.

During the afternoon of the same day, the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors attacked Khmer troops who were clearing a stretch of road at the Kirirom intersection in the Pich Nil Pass; about 20 members of the Khmer troops were wounded.

On 30 March 1971, at 8 a.m., a clash occurred between Khmer forces and the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors at Prêk Taong, 12 kilometres east of Phnom-Penh, in Kandal; the toll on the Khmer side amounted to one dead and four wounded. After a 30 minute engagement the aggressors withdrew, carrying with them their dead and wounded.

On the same day, at 9 a.m., a further clash occurred between Khmer forces and Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese at Moat Krasas Khnong, 10 kilometres east of Phnom-Penh, in Kandal, in the course of which three Khmer soldiers were wounded.

On the same day, at 6.15 p.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors harassed the Khmer position at Phum Psar Kor, 15 kilometres north-east of Phnom-Penh, in Kandal, using 122 mm rockets.

During the night of 30 to 31 March 1971, at 9.30 p.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors attacked Kraing Chèk, 15 kilometres from the town of Kompong Speu. The Khmer forces retaliated and the enemy fire ceased 15 minutes later.

During the same night, the Khmer position at Thnâl Totung, 18 kilometres north of the town of Takeo, was attacked by the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors.

During the same night, between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors harassed the Khmer position at Pich Nil with mortar fire.

On 31 March 1971, at about 5.30 a.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors harassed the camp at Treng Traying with 82 mm mortar fire.

During the night of 31 March to 1 April 1971, at 10 p.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors launched an attack on the Khmer position five kilometres north-west of Troeung, in Kompong Cham, withdrawing at about 6 a.m., on 1 April after making several unsuccessful attempts to storm the position. There were five dead and 13 wounded on the Khmer side, while the enemy left behind 22 dead and carried several dead and wounded away with them. The Khmer forces seized five automatic pistols, five B-40 shells,

one 60 mm mortar, five Chinese sub-machine-guns, one B-40 and various articles of clothing.

On 1 April 1971, at 6 a.m., Khmer forces conducting an operation clashed with an estimated 400 Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors seven kilometres south-west of the town of Pursat. The aggressors withdrew at about 12.30 p.m., after fierce fighting. A further clash between Khmer forces and Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese occurred at 4 p.m.; the toll on the Khmer side amounted to one dead and seven wounded, and the enemy left behind seven dead.

During the night of 1 to 2 April 1971, at about 1 a.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors harassed O Chamnar, 12 kilometres south of Veal Rinh, in Kompong Som. Counter-fire by the Khmer troops forced the enemy to withdraw after a 15-minute engagement.

During the same night, the enemy fell into an ambush laid by the Khmer forces two kilometres north-east of Kirivong, in Takeo, and left behind four dead and five grenades.

During the same night, enemy forces attacked the Khmer position at Tonle Bet, in Kompong Cham and were forced to withdraw after a 30-minute engagement, leaving behind seven wounded. Two members of the Khmer forces were killed.

During the same night, at about 11 p.m., enemy forces attacked the Khmer position at Phnom Khieu, in Kompong Speu, with 82 mm mortar fire.

During the night of 2 to 3 April 1971, at about 9 p.m., enemy forces fired three 82 mm mortar shells at the Khmer defence position guarding the petrol depot at Prèk Phnéou.

During the same night, at about 1 a.m., there was also an attack on the Khmer position at Moat Krasas, nine kilometres east of Phnom-Penh on the east bank of the Mekong, in Kandal.

During the same night, at about 12.30 a.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors harassed the

Khmer position at Pich Nil, wounding two Khmer soldiers.

On 3 April, at about 7 a.m., Khmer forces engaged in a search operation clashed with the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors at Phum Khléang Sambath, 26 kilometres south of Phnom-Penh, in Kandal. After an exchange of fire lasting 20 minutes, the aggressors withdrew.

I wish to reiterate the firm and vigorous protest of the Government of the Khmer Republic against the illegal and permanent occupation of Khmer territory, followed by savage attacks perpetrated by the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors against a neutral and peace-loving country to which they have no right and with which they have no ethnic affinity, in flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter, international law and the 1954 Geneva Agreements<sup>29</sup>. These criminal attacks reveal clearly the annexationist aims of the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese communist imperialists and represent a dangerous threat to peace and security not only in the Khmer Republic but throughout the region of South-East Asia.

The Government of the Khmer Republic holds the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and the so-called Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Viet-Nam fully responsible for all the extremely grave consequences resulting from this situation and reserves the right to take the necessary action to defend the independence, neutrality, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this communication circulated as a Security Council document.

(Signed) KHIM TIT  
Permanent Representative of the  
Khmer Republic to the United Nations

<sup>29</sup> Agreements on the Cessation of Hostilities in Indo-China.

#### DOCUMENT S/10210\*

Letter dated 25 May 1971 from the representative of Israel  
to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]  
[25 May 1971]

On instructions from my Government I have the honour to refer to the letter addressed to you on 21 May 1971 by the representative of Jordan [S/10203].

It is precisely because Israel's policy is "to ensure the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants" of the areas referred to in the Jordanian letter, that steps are being taken to prevent terrorism and to hinder individuals engaged in terrorist activities from disturbing peace in these areas. The Jordanian Government, as is well known, is not unfamiliar with problems of public order within its own territory. It is unavoidable in the general interest to take necessary measures to prevent terrorists from creating the conditions of disorder and public chaos at which they aim. The Government of Israel prides itself on having achieved this purpose and on maintaining normal civilian life in the areas in question with a minimum resort to security measures and in as humane a manner as possible.

I have the honour to request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

(Signed) Yosef TEKOAH  
Permanent Representative of Israel  
to the United Nations

\* Also circulated as a General Assembly document under the symbol A/8316.

## DOCUMENT S/10211

### Note by the President of the Security Council

[Original: English]  
[27 May 1971]

The attached letter dated 26 May 1971 from the observer of the Federal Republic of Germany was addressed to the President of the Security Council with reference to the letter dated 7 May 1971 from the Chairman of the Special Committee on *Apartheid* [S/10190].

LETTER DATED 26 MAY 1971 FROM THE OBSERVER OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to refer to the letter dated 7 May 1971 addressed to you by the Chairman of the Special Committee on *Apartheid* [S/10190]. The letter contains a statement that "the involvement of the Federal Republic of Germany and Israel (i.e. in the arms trade with South Africa) is becoming more apparent".

I wish to repeat what has been officially stated by my Government on several occasions, i.e. that the Federal Republic of Germany has strictly and consistently observed the arms embargo against South Africa in compliance with the decisions of the Security Council.

My Government is therefore surprised at the Special Committee's above-mentioned conclusion. Neither the Committee's main report of 16 March 1971 on the development of arms trade with South Africa since 23 July 1970<sup>80</sup> nor the addenda of 19 April and 6 May 1971<sup>81</sup> contain any facts that would justify such an

inference. In the main report allegations previously raised against the Federal Republic of Germany figure together with my Government's official denials. The assertion contained in addendum 2 (assistance in the development of a South African rocket) is not only entirely unfounded but has never been brought to my Government's attention for comment.

On instructions from my Government, I therefore wish to protest against the Special Committee's conclusion pertaining to the Federal Republic of Germany, which is unfounded and in no way consistent with the facts presented in the Committee's report.

I likewise wish to protest against the statement in the letter that, in the case of the Federal Republic of Germany, information with regard to arms trade with South Africa has been restricted. In view of the fact that my Government has always given complete and correct information to all United Nations bodies—a fact that has never been disputed—this statement is totally unwarranted.

In exercising my Government's right of reply, I should be grateful if you could have this letter circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Walter GEHLHOFF  
Permanent Observer of the Federal Republic of  
Germany to the United Nations

<sup>80</sup> Document A/AC.115/L.285.

<sup>81</sup> Documents A/AC.115/L.285/Add.1 and 2.

## DOCUMENT S/10212

### Letter dated 25 May 1971 from the representative of the United States of America to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English]  
[27 May 1971]

I have the honor to refer to the letter dated 7 May 1971 [S/10190], addressed to you by the representative of Somalia in his capacity as Chairman of the Special Committee on *Apartheid* in which it is alleged that United States-made helicopters are being openly advertised and sold in South Africa and that they can be adapted for military use.

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to state that the United States enforcement of the arms embargo against South Africa has been second to none. Despite the markedly liberal embargo policies of other countries, the United States has exercised particular care in the implementation of the embargo on both arms and military equipment. The United States exports neither military helicopters nor civilian helicopters for military use to South Africa. The sale of American helicopters to South Africa is carefully regulated to ensure that such sales as do occur do not violate the letter or spirit of the embargo. To this end, the United States licenses the export of helicopters to South Africa only for civilian commercial use. The United States has no evidence, nor does the Special Committee on *Apartheid* present any, that United States helicopters being sold or advertised in South Africa are being adapted for military use. If it should be ascertained that such conversion was being carried out, the United States would take prompt measures to deal with the situation.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this communication circulated as a Security Council document.

(Signed) George BUSH  
Permanent Representative of the United States of  
America to the United Nations

Letter dated 28 May 1971 from the representative of Syria  
to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]  
[28 May 1971]

Acting upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to state that, despite repeated complaints and pleas to you on Israel's unlawful behaviour in the Golan Heights since June 1967, the Israeli occupying authorities have never desisted from continuing their systematic policy aiming at the colonization of Arab land with intensive settlement coupled with the demolition of Syrian towns and villages and the forcible eviction of the inhabitants.

Despite numerous resolutions condemning Israeli violations of international law and norms of civilized behaviour, the occupiers have persisted in their adventurist course. Following are some samples of their sinister behaviour:

(1) *The Israel Digest*, American Edition, an official publication of the Israeli Government, in its issue of 30 April 1971, reported the following:

**"BUILDING ALLOCATION FOR GOLAN  
HEIGHTS**

"The Housing Ministry has allocated I£ 50m. (50m. Israeli pounds) for building in the Golan Heights in 1971, the Ministry's Director-General, Mr. Yosef Sharon, announced recently. The new houses would fill the needs of the present population, and allow for a 20 to 30 per cent growth. Seven new settlements will be started and three existing ones expanded, while a village center is to be established."

(2) In a special dispatch from Tel Aviv dated 18 May 1971, published in the *Daily News* of 19 May, it is stated that:

"An auxiliary plant of Israel Aircraft Industries, which is owned by Israel's Defense Ministry, is being built on the Golan Heights, captured from Syria in the June 1967 war.

"This first construction by a military industry in an occupied territory was regarded by observers as a diplomatic signal of Israel's determination to keep the Golan Heights an integral part of Israel."

(3) On 11 March 1971, two Israeli bulldozers razed to the ground all houses north of the military hospital in the occupied city El-Kuneitra.

(4) On 16 February 1971, the Israel occupying authorities bulldozed all new houses at El-Kuneitra City and pulled out the doors and windows of big buildings in that city, including those of the military hospital of the Golan.

(5) On 13 December 1970, they completely bulldozed the two villages of Ain Aisha and Jwezeh.

(6) On 19 October 1970, they opened fire at 1415 local time on shepherds living east of El-Kuneitra, killing one of them. They then took away 324 sheep and 81 goats.

(7) In mid-October 1970 the Syrian delegation to the Mixed Armistice Commission learnt through the Red Cross that some students from the Syrian University had been captured by the Israeli occupying authorities. Following are their names:

(a) Adnan Ibrahim Asaad Youssef Badran (Department of Arabic Language—second year);

(b) Hamdan Ali Mahmoud Isefan (Department of English—first year);

(c) Naim Mohammed Rashid Farsat (Faculty of Law—first year);

(d) Adnan Abdul Rahman Youssef Omar (Faculty of Business Administration—first year).

(8) On the nights of 13 and 14 August no less than 20 houses were demolished in the occupied village of El-Rafid.

(9) On 1 August 1970, the Israeli occupying authorities destroyed a large number of low cost houses east of the El-Kuneitra City and forced the inhabitants to cross to Syria.

To conclude, I should like to draw your attention to the fact that Israeli destructive and repressive acts in the occupied territory of the Golan are not only in contradiction to Security Council resolution 237 (1967) and scores of other United Nations resolutions, but they constitute a grave violation of articles 49 and 53 of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilians in Time of War.<sup>82</sup>

I also request you to bring the present letter to the attention of both the Commission on Human Rights and of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories.

I shall be grateful if this letter is circulated as a document of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

(Signed) George J. TOMEH  
Permanent Representative of Syria  
to the United Nations

\* Also circulated as a General Assembly document under the symbol A/8317.

<sup>82</sup> United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 75 (1950), No. 973.

**Letter dated 1 June 1971 from the representative of Syria  
to the Secretary-General**

[Original: English]  
[1 June 1971]

Acting upon instructions of my Government, I have the honour to inform you of the following.

The spiritual leaders, eight patriarchs and pastors, of all Christian communities in Syria, being greatly alarmed and profoundly distressed by the illegal measures the Israeli Zionist authorities are taking to zionize the Holy City of Jerusalem, and expel its Arab Christian and Moslem inhabitants in violation of Security Council decisions and General Assembly resolutions, adopted on 10 May "An appeal to Christian conscience". The text of the appeal is attached.

I should be grateful if this letter, and the attached appeal, could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

*(Signed)* George J. TOMEH  
*Permanent Representative of Syria  
to the United Nations*

#### AN APPEAL TO CHRISTIAN CONSCIENCE

The events which are currently taking place in the city of Jerusalem are so grave that their dimensions and implications go beyond the local aspects to the framework of which biased propaganda is trying to confine them. Spiritually and morally, however, they are of the level of human civilization, which they are seriously threatening with destruction, as they are threatening the creative power of man.

The process of expelling the Christian and Moslem inhabitants of the city, their physical liquidation and their replacement by Jews—this process, in addition to being tragic and brutal, exceeds the political and demographic aspects of the subject.

Palestine, and more specifically Jerusalem, was the cradle of civilization in its human and divine sides: spirit was once incarnated in it and thereby gave its land a unique place in history.

For centuries the Jews, as a group, lived in this land with other communities and religious groups. There were centuries of peace and amity. Indeed, the Holy City was, and still is, the place in which the tradition of Abraham—the source of the three monotheistic religions—developed and from which it spread its light to the world. The civilization of the spirit thus replaced barbarism; man entered history and came to know the Lord of History.

What we are witnessing today represents a complete and radical distortion of the human and spiritual significance of civilization. For the goal of Zionism—implicitly or explicitly stated—is to destroy this human and spiritual heritage in merging it in a fanatical racist State. It claims that a haven is being founded for the Jews, but the whole world knows that this is being done at the expense of the Arabs. The farther goal of zionism is even worse and much more serious: to uproot civilization; for Abraham was not a founder of a race or a state.

Real and true civilization emanated from a covenant, a genuine covenant between God and Abraham, in

which this great prophet, called "the father of the believers", represented all believers. What is the tenor of this covenant? Surely it is the belief in the one God and his message of peace and love. The message was addressed to all men; and this made them all equal before God and the sons of the same Father.

What the world is witnessing today—knowingly or unknowingly—is an abrogation of this covenant, the covenant of truth and freedom . . . That proves decisively that zionism, when its logic is carried to its very limits, has in it the seeds of a new barbarism, or to use more modern terminology, the seeds of an anti-revolution.

In its political aspects, the conflict is one concerning a land and a people, who have been uprooted and replaced by aliens; but the farther goal of zionism is in fact to destroy a civilization which is the Civilization.

Therefore, we Patriarchs and Pastors of the Christian communities have met at the Orthodox Patriarchate in Damascus. After revealing the true dimensions of the Palestine conflict and its concealed aims, we address this appeal to human conscience—Christian and non-Christian alike, but Christian first—to place it face to face with its historical responsibilities. The Christian, Moslem and Jewish communities, believers and unbelievers, are all equally concerned with the unfortunate consequences of zionism. In short, it is the man as a man who is put in doubt.

We hope that our voice will break through the thick wall of Zionist propaganda which is not allowing world conscience to see the truth and join with us, living witnesses of the tragedy, in defending a cause which is as universal as it is sacred.

Greek Orthodox Patriarch

*(Signed)* ELIAS IV

*Patriarch of Antioch and all the East*

Syrian Orthodox Patriarch

*(Signed)* MORAN MAR IGNATIUS YACOB III

Armenian Catholic Patriarchate

*(Signed)* PAUL, Archbishop Coussey

*Armenian Catholic Patriarchal Vicar in Damascus*

Catholic Chaldean Vicar

*(Signed)* Emmanuel AL-RAYES

*Chaldean Pastor in Damascus*

Protestant Evangelic Church

*(Signed)* Daoud MITIR

Greek Catholic Patriarch

*(Signed)* MAXIMOS V HAKIM

*Patriarch of Antioch, Alexandria and Jerusalem*

Syrian Catholic Archbishop

*(Signed)* Clement Adbulla RAHAL

*Syrian Catholic Archbishop of Damascus*

Maronite Patriarchate

Latin Apostolic Vicar

*(Signed)* Louis HARFOUCHE

*Patriarchal Vicar in Damascus*

\* Also circulated as a General Assembly document under the symbol A/8318.

DOCUMENT S/10216

Letter dated 24 May 1971 from the Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Sultanate of Oman to the Secretary-General submitting an application for admission to the United Nations

[Original: English]  
[2 June 1971]

I have the honour to submit this application, on behalf of the Government of the Sultanate of Oman, for admission to the United Nations.

My Government endorses the purposes and principles stated in the United Nations Charter and declares that it accepts the obligations contained therein and solemnly undertakes to fulfil them.

The Government and the people of Oman are aware of the value of the United Nations and its continuous efforts to promote peace, social progress, better standard of life and larger freedom in our world.

In accordance with Article 4, paragraphs 1 and 2, of the Charter, I should be grateful if you would arrange for this application to be placed before the Security Council and the General Assembly during its coming session in September 1971.

(Signed) Tarik Bin TAIMUR  
Prime Minister and Minister  
for Foreign Affairs  
of the Sultanate of Oman

DOCUMENT S/10217

Letter dated 26 May 1971 from the representative of Turkey to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]  
[2 June 1971]

I have the honour to present herewith a copy of the telegraphic letter which Mr. Fazil Küçük, Vice-President of the Republic of Cyprus, has sent to you through my Government. I am informed that the original copy of this letter will soon be presented to you.

I should be grateful if you would kindly have the enclosed text of Mr. Küçük's letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Ü Halûk BAYÜLKEN  
Permanent Representative of Turkey  
to the United Nations

LETTER DATED 25 MAY 1971 FROM THE VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS, MR. FAZIL KÜÇÜK, TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Further to my letter of 24 March 1971 [S/10174] I am sorry to have to repeat that Mr. İsmet Kotak, MP and member for labour, co-operatives and rehabilitation of the Turkish Cypriot Administration, Mr. Hüseyin Sabri MP, Mr. Ali Özel, Assistant District Officer of Famagusta, and Mr. Turgut Ali, representative of the Turkish Farmers' Union, while travelling from Yenegra to Famagusta on 23 May 1971 at about 2220 hours, were stopped by about 30 armed policemen at the locality Sakaria about two miles north of Famagusta. They were dragged out of the car and seriously assaulted on the allegation that they had not

stopped when ordered to do so by other policemen on the way. This allegation, of course, was utterly untrue. The Greek policemen hit Mr. Kotak and his friends with the muzzles and butts of loaded firearms and one of the policemen, who has been identified by Mr. Kotak, seized Mr. Kotak by the throat and nearly strangled him while hitting him with his gun. After this treatment, Mr. Kotak and his friends were taken to the Greek police station of Famagusta and later released without even an apology. Upon release Mr. Kotak and his friends reported the matter to the UNFICYP police at Famagusta and were examined by an UNFICYP doctor who verified their injuries.

This unprovoked and unjustified attack has caused great anger and anxiety amongst my community, messages of protests are pouring into my office. This incident, no doubt, proves once again that the Greek Cypriot allegation about freedom of movement in Greek areas is nothing but a myth. The Greek Cypriot Administration has just issued an official communiqué alleging that the complaint of Mr. Kotak and his friends is false. We look upon this as adding insult to injury and you can draw your own conclusions as to the treatment meted out to ordinary folk when the Greek Administration can so easily and most provocatively deny a serious assault on the official representatives of the Turkish community.

I should be grateful if this communication could be circulated as Security Council document.

Letter dated 8 June 1971 from the representative of Syria  
to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]  
[8 June 1971]

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to bring to your attention a new act of inhuman cruelty committed by the Israeli authorities against the Arab inhabitants of the occupied territories. Reports published by competent organizations reveal that the Israeli Zionist occupiers bar the distribution of medicaments by the International Committee of the Red Cross to the inhabitants of the occupied territories. This has been confirmed by resolution WHA24.33 adopted on 18 May 1971 by the twenty-fourth World Health Assembly. Its paragraphs 3 and 4 state the following:

"The Twenty-fourth World Health Assembly,  
"...

"3. **DRAWS THE ATTENTION** that Israel's violations of basic human rights of the refugees, displaced persons and the inhabitants of the Occupied Territories constitute a serious impediment to the health of the population of the Occupied Territories, a matter the continuation of which would necessitate that the Organization should consider the application of Article 7 of its Constitution;

"4. **CALLS UPON** Israel to refrain from any interference with the activities of the International Committee of the Red Cross in the Occupied Territories."

Article 7 of the Constitution of the World Health Organization stipulates, *inter alia*, that this organization may suspend, in exceptional circumstances, the voting privileges and services to which a member is entitled. Israel itself passed a law in 1950 on "The Crime of Genocide (Prevention and Punishment) law". Article 1 of that law states:

"1. (a) In this Law, 'genocide' means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group (hereinafter referred to as 'group'), as such—

"(1) killing members of the group;

"(2) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;

"(3) inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction, in whole or in part."

What Israel has been doing against the civilian Arab population in occupied territories, against the Arab refugees from Palestine and the new displaced persons constitute acts of genocide in terms of Israeli legislation itself.

The text of resolution WHA24.33 mentioned above is attached as an annex to my letter.

I request that the present letter should be brought to the attention of both the Commission on Human Rights and of the Special Committee to Investigate

Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories and to circulate it as a document of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

(Signed) George J. TOMEH  
Permanent Representative of Syria  
to the United Nations

## ANNEX

World Health Assembly resolution WHA24.33, adopted by the twenty-fourth World Health Assembly on 18 May 1971

HEALTH ASSISTANCE TO REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The Twenty-fourth World Health Assembly,  
Bearing in mind that the health of all peoples is fundamental to the attainment of peace and security;  
Mindful of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights;  
Recalling its resolutions WHA21.38, WHA22.43 and WHA23.52 on health assistance to refugees and displaced persons in the Middle East;

Having considered the report of the Director-General (A/24/B/19) and the annual report of the Director of Health of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA);

Further recalling resolution 9 (XXVII) of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights;

Noting that the Commissioner General of UNRWA has drawn attention that any further lowering of the already austere provisions of health services to refugees under his mandate would jeopardize the health of refugees and of the general public with whom they live;

Recalling General Assembly resolution 2672 (XXV) in which attention was drawn to the continuing critical financial position of UNRWA and the serious effects of this crisis on the health activities of UNRWA;

Noting further that the reports published by competent organizations reveal that the occupying authorities bar the distribution of medicaments by the International Committee of the Red Cross to the inhabitants of the Occupied Territories,

1. *Reaffirms* that the protection of the life and physical and mental health of the refugees and displaced persons require that they immediately be afforded to return to their homes, in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the United Nations;

2. *Calls upon* Israel to abide by the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949, which provides for essential safeguards for the protection of physical and mental health of the inhabitants of the Occupied Territories;

3. *Draws the attention* that Israel's violations of basic human rights of the refugees, displaced persons and the inhabitants of the Occupied Territories constitute a serious impediment to the health of the population of the Occupied Territories, a matter the continuation of which would necessitate that the Organization should consider the application of Article 7 of its Constitution;

4. *Calls upon* Israel to refrain from any interference with the activities of the International Committee of the Red Cross in the Occupied Territories;

\* Also circulated as a General Assembly document under the symbol A/8321.



5. Expresses its appreciation to the Director-General of the World Health Organization, the Director of Health of UNRWA and to the specialized and other organizations that provide assistance to the refugees, displaced persons and the inhabitants of the Occupied Territories in the Middle East; and

6. Requests the Director-General of the World Health Organization:

(a) to take all other effective measures in his power to safeguard health conditions amongst refugees, displaced per-

sons and the inhabitants of the Occupied Territories in the Middle East;

(b) to continue and strengthen his co-operation with the International Committee of the Red Cross to provide material and human aid to the population of the Occupied Territories;

(c) to submit a comprehensive report to the Twenty-fifth World Health Assembly on the conditions of physical and mental health of the population of the Occupied Territories;

(d) to bring this resolution to the attention of all governmental and non-governmental organizations concerned.

## DOCUMENT S/10220\* \*\*

### Letter dated 10 June 1971 from the representative of Israel to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]  
[10 June 1971]

I have the honour, on instructions of my Government, to refer to the letters addressed to you by the representative of Syria on 28 May [S/10213], 1 June [S/10215] and 8 June 1971 [S/10219].

Syria's international conduct has earned it a place of special notoriety in the United Nations. The Syrian Government has barred all thought of peace with Israel. It has rejected Security Council resolution 242 (1967) which calls for the establishment of a just and lasting peace between Israel and the Arab States. It has refused to participate in the peace-making efforts under the auspices of the Secretary-General's Special Representative, Ambassador Gunnar Jarring. It continues to pursue active belligerency against Israel, in particular by means of terror warfare. Thus, since 1 August 1970, 216 acts of aggression have been perpetrated from Syrian territory, resulting in the death of 5 and the wounding of 10 Israelis.

Unable to justify or even explain this behaviour, the Syrian Government has tried time and again to veil it by a smokescreen of false or distorted charges levelled at Israel. Member States have become familiar with this method.

The Syrian letter of 28 May purports to deal with the situation in the Golan Heights. Its true character is illustrated for instance by the charge contained in paragraph (7) that four "students from the Syrian University had been captured by the Israeli occupying authorities". The letter fails to mention that the four youths are residents of Tulkarem on the west bank who received permission to leave Tulkarem for Damascus, pursue their studies at the Syrian University, visit their homes every summer and return to them upon completion of their studies. In Damascus they joined the El-Fatah terror organization and were arrested during a summer visit to Tulkarem in 1970. One of them was released and the others brought to trial. Two of the latter have since been freed, after having served their sentences, and the third, sentenced to 14 months imprisonment, will be released shortly.

The Syrian letter of 1 June transmitting a statement by eight religious personalities, all of whom with the exception of one are Arab, is typical of a Government which despoils and discriminates against its religious and ethnic minorities but is not loath to use them, whenever needed, as instruments of propaganda. The

tragic fate of the Jewish community in Syria, oppressed and terrorized, denied access to sources of livelihood, restricted to ghettos from which they are prohibited to move, is a constant reminder of the Syrian Government's attitude to its minorities. In view of this situation it is not surprising that the statement which the religious leaders were "persuaded" by the Syrian Government to publish is couched in a spirit which recalls the Dark Ages. To assess its value and credibility it is sufficient to note its reference to the "physical liquidation" of Christians and Moslems in Jerusalem. The 80,000 visitors from Arab States which this summer are touring Israeli-held territories and Jerusalem do not seem to give much credence to such absurd pronouncements.

The third letter, dated 8 June 1971, alleges that Israel bars the distribution of medicaments by the International Committee of the Red Cross to the inhabitants of Israeli-controlled territories. To support this charge the letter makes reference to a resolution of the World Health Organization (WHA24.33 of 18 May 1971). It does not, of course, say that the resolution was proposed by such standard-bearers of humaneness as Pakistan and others and was supported by only 43 delegations representing Arab and Soviet States and their traditional followers, while the majority of member States dissociated themselves from this text. The Syrian representative's grotesque attachment to falsehood made him close his eyes entirely to the fact that the International Committee of the Red Cross itself denied the allegations contained in the World Health Organization resolution. A spokesman of the Committee declared in Geneva on 19 May 1971 that "it is completely untrue to assert that we have been barred from this distribution work by the Israeli authorities". An even more telling rebuttal came in a letter of 2 June from the International Committee of the Red Cross to the Director-General of WHO, a copy of which is attached.

The above Syrian letters strengthen the generally-held view that it is incumbent on Syria to modify the course it has pursued thus far, to abandon its brutish belligerency and to turn its attention to constructive efforts towards the attainment of peace.

I have the honour to request that this letter and its enclosure be circulated as official documents of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

(Signed) Yosef TEKOAH  
Permanent Representative of Israel  
to the United Nations

\* Also circulated as a General Assembly document under the symbol A/8323.

\*\* Also incorporating document S/10220/Corr.1.

LETTER DATED 2 JUNE 1971 FROM THE INTERNATIONAL  
COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS TO THE DIRECTOR-  
GENERAL OF THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION

I have the honour to inform you that the International Committee of the Red Cross has just received details of the resolution WHA24.33 of the twenty-fourth World Health Assembly concerning health assistance to refugees and displaced persons in the Middle East.

In particular, the International Committee learnt that the Assembly, after having noted that "the occupying authorities bar the distribution of medicaments by the International Committee of the Red Cross to the inhabitants of the Occupied Territories", calls upon Israel to "refrain from any interference with the activities of the International Committee in the Occupied Territories".

In this connexion, we feel that it should be stated that, notwithstanding certain difficulties that it has generally been possible to overcome, the International Committee has been able, since the June 1967 conflict, to import into the territories occupied by Israel several thousands of tons of assistance of various descriptions.

This assistance has been distributed by the competent authorities to those in need on the basis of priorities established by the delegates of the International Committee. The latter have received all the necessary information on how the assistance has been used and they have also been able to participate in the distribution.

Since details of the general conditions in which the International Committee is able to carry out its humanitarian mission in the Occupied Territories have been published in the relevant activity reports, we shall not devote further space to them.

The International Committee regrets that its position on this matter cannot be communicated to the World Health Assembly, but would be grateful if you would be kind enough to bring the contents of this communication to the members of the World Health Organization in whatever manner you deem appropriate.

(Signed) A. Dominique MICHELI  
*Delegate of the International  
Committee of the Red Cross*

DOCUMENT S/10221

Letter dated 9 June 1971 from the representative of the Khmer Republic  
to the President of the Security Council

[Original: French]  
[14 June 1971]

On instructions from my Government and further to my letter of 14 May 1971 [S/10198], I have the honour to communicate the following to you for the information of the members of the Security Council.

On 3 April 1971, at about 4 p.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors launched an attack against the Khmer position at Leach, 26 kilometres south-west of the town of Pursat. After 40 minutes of fighting, the aggressors were forced to withdraw.

During the night of 3 to 4 April 1971, at 7.45 p.m., the Khmer elements based at Phum Khnor Kar, six kilometres south of Vihear Suor, in Kandal, were subjected to harassing mortar fire by the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors for several minutes.

During the same night, at about 8 p.m., the Khmer position at Moat Krâsas Khnong, nine kilometres east of Phnom-Penh, and the one at Phum Peam Ta Ek, 11 kilometres east of Phnom-Penh, in Kandal, were subjected to harassing fire with automatic weapons, resulting in one wounded at Moat Krâsas Khnong and four wounded at Phum Peam Ta Ek.

During the same night, at 9.30 p.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors fired on the Khmer position situated eight kilometres south-east of Salalek Pram, in Kompong Chhnang. The enemy fire was silenced by the Khmer forces.

On 4 April 1971, at 7 a.m., Khmer elements fought an engagement with the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors north-east of Chiphou, in Svay Rieng.

During the night of 4 to 5 April 1971, at about 11.35 p.m., four Khmer positions—one at Kompong Russey, nine kilometres north of Tonlébet; one at Rokar Thom, three kilometres north of Tonlébet; one at the Moat Khmong bridge, 4½ kilometres south-east of

Tonlébet, and one situated four kilometres south of Tonlébet, in Kompong Cham—were simultaneously attacked by the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors.

On 5 April 1971, at about 2.15 a.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors attacked the Khmer position at Phlaur Trey, 22 kilometres south-east of Phnom-Penh, in Kandal. The Khmer forces took vigorous counter-action and forced the enemy to withdraw, leaving behind four dead, four sub-machine-guns, four CKC rifles, two carbines, three LR 72s, two 82 mm mortars, three M-60 shells, eight grenades, one mine and one knife. There were six wounded on the Khmer side.

The same day, at 6.15 p.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors fired on Kompong Luong, 2½ kilometres north-west of Prek Kdam, on the west bank of Tonlé Sap, in Kandal, wounding one villager.

The same day, at 6.30 p.m. a clash occurred between the Khmer forces and the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors at a point five kilometres east of the town of Svay Rieng. After half an hour, the aggressors withdrew, taking their dead and wounded with them; there was one dead on the Khmer side.

During the night of 5 to 6 April 1971, at 8 p.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors directed harassing fire at a Khmer position situated four kilometres north-east of the camp of Longvek, in Kandal.

During the same night, at about midnight, they attacked the Khmer position at Tonlébet, in Kompong Cham, wounding seven of the defenders.

During the same night, at about 1.30 a.m., the Khmer position at Rocar Thom, three kilometres north of Tonlébet, was again attacked by the Viet-Cong-

North Viet-Nameese aggressors. Supported by Khmer aircraft, the Khmer forces fiercely defended themselves, inflicting heavy losses on the aggressors. There were four dead and three wounded on the Khmer side. The enemy left 160 dead behind and carried away a number of dead and wounded. Ten B-40s and thirty AK-47s were captured by the Khmer forces.

On 6 April 1971, at 9 p.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors subjected a Khmer position at Tonlébet, in Kompong Cham, to harassing fire with 82 mm mortars.

The same day, at 10.30 p.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors fired on Thmat Pong, 25 kilometres west of Phnom-Penh, in Kandal.

On 7 April 1971, at 2 a.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors directed automatic weapons fire at the Khmer position at Prek Dach, 11 kilometres south-west of Neak Luong, in Kandal, wounding one of the defenders.

The same day, the Khmer position at Rocar Kong, 14 kilometres south-west of the town of Kompong Cham, was harassed with mortar fire.

The same day, at 12.30 p.m., Khmer forces engaged in clearing National Highway 4 fought a sharp engagement with several hundred Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese at the Tréng Traying crossroads. A brief exchange of rifle fire was followed by hand-to-hand fighting, at the end of which the aggressors were forced to withdraw under bombing and machine-gun fire by Khmer aircraft supporting the ground forces.

The losses were as follows: on the Khmer side: 20 dead and approximately 100 wounded; 10 trucks set afire; on the enemy side: more than 200 dead.

During the night of 8 to 9 April 1971, at 8.30 p.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors harassed the Khmer position at Prey Nop, nine kilometres south-east of Veal Rinh, in Kampot.

During the same night, the Khmer forces at Boeng Prey, 22 kilometres north-west of Phnom-Penh, and those at Boeng Mean Chey, 25 kilometres north-west of Phnom-Penh, in Kandal, were subjected to harassing fire by the enemy.

On 9 April 1971, at 2.25 a.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors directed harassing fire with 82 mm mortars, B-40s and 75 mm recoilless artillery against the Khmer position at Rocar Thom, three kilometres north of Tonlébet, in Kompong Cham. Vigorous counter-action by the Khmer forces promptly silenced the enemy fire.

During the night of 9 to 10 April 1971, at 9 p.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors directed automatic weapons fire for several minutes at the Khmer position at Svay Chrum, in Kandal, north-east of the Khmer National Navy base at Chruoi Changvar, wounding one of the defenders.

During the same night, at about 8 p.m., they launched an attack against the Khmer position at O-Chral. The aggressors were forced to withdraw at about 8.20 p.m. after Khmer aircraft joined in the fighting.

During the same night, at 8.30 p.m., Khmer forces engaged in clearing National Highway 4 at the Kirirom crossroads and those based at Pich Nil were attacked with 82 mm mortars, 75 mm recoilless artillery and 122 mm rockets.

On 10 April 1971, two engagements were fought between the Khmer forces and approximately 100 Viet-

Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors in Svay Rieng. The first took place between 5 and 8 a.m. at Chhoeu Teal, 20 kilometres west of the town. The second lasted five hours, from 5 to 10 a.m., in the Kompong Chak area, eight kilometres north-east of the town.

The losses were as follows: on the Khmer side: two dead and two wounded at Chhoeu Teal; one dead and two wounded at Kompong Chak; on the enemy side: four dead were left on the battlefield and three PM/ACs and one CKC were captured by the Khmer forces at Chhoeu Teal; one dead and two wounded at Kompong Chak; the enemy carried away a number of dead and wounded.

On 10 April 1971, at 7 a.m., the Khmer position at Pich Nil was again subjected to harassing fire with mortars and rockets.

On 10 April 1971, at about 6 p.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors fired 82 mm mortars and 75 mm recoilless artillery at the Khmer position at Stung Chral in the Pich Nil area, killing one of the defenders.

During the night of 10 to 11 April 1971, they directed harassing fire with automatic weapons at the military position at Phlauh Trey, three kilometres north-west of Tuk Khleang, on the east bank of the Mekong, in Kandal.

During the same night, the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors carried out two minor harassing attacks with 82 mm mortars in Kompong Cham. The first, which occurred at 7.50 p.m., was directed against the Khmer position at the Moat Khmung bridge, four and a half kilometres south-east of Tonlébet; the second, which lasted from 8.40 p.m. to 8.45 p.m. was directed against the Khmer position at Rocar Thom, three kilometres north of Tonlébet.

During the same night, at about 9.50 p.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors launched an attack against the Khmer position at Leach, 25 kilometres south-west of the town of Pursat. After making a number of unsuccessful attempts to overrun the position, the aggressors were forced to withdraw by the fire of the Khmer forces.

During the same night, at 8 p.m., Khmer elements based at O-Chamnar, 15 kilometres south-west of Veal Rinh, and at Pich Nil were attacked with 82 mm mortars, 75 mm recoilless artillery and 122 mm rockets, resulting in eight wounded at O-Chamnar and five wounded at Stung Chral.

On 11 April 1971, at 6.15 a.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors directed harassing fire with 82 mm mortars against a Khmer position at Tonlébet, in Kompong Cham.

During the night of 11 to 12 April 1971, they harassed the armoured *demi-brigade* camp at Sré Khlong without causing any damage.

During the same night, at about 2 a.m., they harassed the position at Pich Nil, firing some 30 82 mm mortar rounds and 75 mm recoilless artillery shells and causing six wounded.

On 12 April 1971, at about 8 a.m., the Khmer position at Stung Chral was subjected to harassing fire with 82 mm mortars. Two members of the Khmer forces were wounded.

The same day, at 7.40 p.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors fired about 10 122 mm rockets at the Khmer position at Prek Tameak, in Kandal, killing one of the defenders.

During the night of 12 to 13 April 1971, the Khmer positions at Rocar, in Kompong Cham, and at the airfield at the town of Kompong Cham were subjected to harassing fire with automatic weapons without suffering any losses.

During the same night, the Khmer position at Troeung was also subjected to harassing fire with mortars for several minutes.

On 14 April 1971, at 5.30 p.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors directed harassing fire with 82 mm mortars at the Khmer position at Roluos, five kilometres north of Troeung, in Kompong Cham. Vigorous counter-action by the Khmer forces caused them to withdraw at once, leaving behind four dead; a B-40 was also captured. There was one wounded on the Khmer side.

During the night of 14 to 15 April 1971, there was harassing fire by the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors at Wath Phniek Somaly, 13 kilometres north-west of Phnom-Penh, at Thmat Pong and at Chhoeu Teal Chrum, four kilometres south-east of Tram Khnar, in Kandal.

During the same night, at 8.10 p.m., Khmer elements at Phum Svay ROUNG, four kilometres south-west of Tram-Khnar in Kandal, repelled attacks by the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors and forced them to withdraw after some 40 minutes of fighting, leaving behind two dead. One AK-47 rifle and one CKC were captured.

During the same night, the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors directed harassing fire with B-40s and 75 mm recoilless artillery at the Khmer position at Rocar Thom, three kilometres north of Tonlébet, and at Moat Khmong, 4½ kilometres south-east of Tonlébet, in Kompong Cham.

During the same night, they directed harassing fire with mortars against Phum Ponley and Phum Kandieng, 14 kilometres south of Prey Veng, and against Phum Sdau, five kilometres south of Prey Veng, wounding three persons, including a monk.

On 17 April 1971, at 9 p.m., a clash occurred between Khmer elements and the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors at a point 800 metres south-east of the Moat Khmong bridge, approximately five kilometres south-east of Tonlébet, in Kompong Cham.

The same day, at 7.30 p.m., Khmer elements holding a position two kilometres north-east of Prey Veng were subjected to automatic weapons fire by the enemy for several minutes.

The same day, at 12.30 p.m., a Khmer convoy was attacked by the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors near Wat Srê Khlong, seven kilometres east of the armoured *demi-brigade* camp on National Highway 4. Heavy fighting resulted in the following losses: on the Khmer side: two dead and 14 wounded; on the enemy side: one dead, left on the battlefield.

During the night of 17 to 18 April 1971, at about midnight, the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors attacked the Khmer elements protecting the Oknha Heng bridge, 16 kilometres south of Veal Rinh, in Kampot.

During the night of 18 to 19 April 1971, at midnight, the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors launched an attack against the Khmer position at Pich Nil. The Khmer forces took counter-action, forcing the enemy to withdraw at about 5 a.m. Khmer aircraft also joined in the fighting.

During the same night, the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese directed harassing fire against Khmer elements at kilometre markers 91, 92 and 93 on National Highway 4.

On 19 April 1971, at 4 a.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors fired about 10 75 mm recoilless artillery shells at the armoured *demi-brigade* camp in Kompong Speu.

The same day, at about 7 a.m., Khmer elements carrying out an operation fought an engagement with the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors at a point 19 kilometres south-east of Chiphou, in Svay Rieng.

During the night of 20 to 21 April 1971, at 9 p.m., a Khmer position situated 18 kilometres south-west of the town of Kampot was harassed by the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors.

During the same night, a Khmer position situated between kilometre markers 90.5 and 92.5 on National Highway 4 was harassed by the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors. Two of the defenders were killed, and another was wounded.

During the same night, Khmer elements holding a position at Prasaut, eight kilometres east of Svay Rieng, were harassed with 60 mm mortars for 15 minutes by the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors.

On 21 April 1971, at 8.20 p.m., a clash occurred between Khmer elements and the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors; after brief fighting, the aggressors were forced to break off the action. There was one wounded on the Khmer side.

The same day, at 9.30 a.m., Khmer elements carrying out an operation fought an engagement with the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors at a point 19 kilometres north-west of the town of Svay Rieng. The fighting went on until 7.30 p.m., with Khmer aircraft joining in. The losses were as follows: on the Khmer side: 17 dead and 16 wounded; on the enemy side: approximately 50 dead; one sub-machine-gun and one automatic pistol were captured by the Khmer forces.

On 22 April 1971, at 8 p.m., a Khmer position situated 20 kilometres west of the town of Kampot came under enemy attack.

The same day, at about 5 a.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors harassed the Khmer position at the Moat Khmuong bridge in Kompong Cham.

During the night of 22 to 23 April 1971, the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors twice directed harassing fire at the Khmer position at Veal Rinh, in Kampot.

During the same night, Khmer elements at Snam Préah, eight kilometres north-west of the town, were subjected to enemy harassing fire for several minutes.

On 23 April 1971, at about 4 p.m., and again at 8.35 p.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors subjected the Khmer position at Pich Nil to harassing fire with 82 mm mortars and 122 mm rockets. The Khmer forces took counter-action, silencing the enemy fire.

The same day, at 12.30 p.m., Khmer elements on patrol clashed with Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors at a point six kilometres south-east of Tonlébet, approximately 1½ kilometres east of the Moat Khmuong bridge, in Kompong Cham. The enemy was forced to break off the engagement after an exchange of fire lasting for about 10 minutes.

The same day, three clashes occurred between Khmer elements conducting an operation and the communist aggressors at points situated four, six and seven kilometres south-east of the town of Kompong Cham. The Khmer forces suffered four dead and eight wounded.

The same day, at 8 p.m., Khmer elements protecting the Trapeang Lean bridge, 1½ kilometres south of Chambak, in Takéo, replied to harassing fire by the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors, forcing the enemy to withdraw.

During the night of 24 to 25 April 1971, the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors walked into an ambush set by Khmer forces at a point 40 kilometres west of the town of Svay Rieng. The enemy left behind two dead and one Chinese sub-machine-gun (PM/AC).

On 25 April 1971, at about 5 p.m., a Viet-Cong threw a grenade at a group of priests who were praying in the Prey-Koki pagoda, six kilometres south-west of Chiphou, in Svay Rieng; one priest was killed, and two others were wounded.

On 26 April 1971, at 8.25 a.m., Khmer elements conducting an operation engaged a force of Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors at a point 11 kilometres south-west of the town of Kompong Speu. The enemy was forced to withdraw after half an hour, leaving behind two dead and carrying away four wounded with him. One member of the Khmer forces was killed.

The same day, at about 12.15 p.m., a Khmer convoy was attacked near the pagoda at Trapeang Kraloeng, 18 kilometres south-west of the town on National Highway 4, in Kompong Speu. The Khmer forces took counter-action, forcing the aggressors to withdraw shortly after aircraft had joined in the fighting. The Khmer side suffered eight wounded and the loss of a truck.

The same day, at about 7 p.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors directed harassing fire with 122 mm rockets against the Khmer position at Pich Nil, in Kompong Seila. Counter-action by the Khmer forces compelled the enemy to cease firing.

During the night of 26 to 27 April 1971, at about 2 a.m., the Khmer position at Ang Snuol, approximately 23 kilometres south-west of the capital on National Highway 4, in Kandal, was attacked by the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors. Aircraft came to the support of the ground forces. The losses were as follows: on the Khmer side: nine dead and 25 wounded; on the enemy side; unknown.

On 27 April 1971, at about 4.20 a.m., Khmer elements at Thmat Pong, 26 kilometres west of Phnom-Penh, in Kandal, acted to repel an enemy attack. The communist aggressors were forced to withdraw after about 50 minutes of fighting. There were no losses on either side.

The same day, at 10.45 a.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors harassed a Khmer position in the southern part of the town of Siemréap by firing four 75 mm recoilless artillery shells. There were no losses.

The same day, at about 10.20 a.m., Khmer elements engaged a force of Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors near Voat Ang Taloeuk, at a point three kilometres south of Thmat Pong in Kandal. After half an hour, the aggressors were forced to break off the engagement under fire by aircraft which had come

to the support of the Khmer troops; the latter continued to pursue the enemy, who left behind four dead.

During the night of 27 to 28 April 1971, at about 8 p.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors launched an attack against a Khmer position situated 11 kilometres east of Pich. There were one dead and 17 wounded on the Khmer side. The enemy carried away a number of dead and wounded.

During the same night, Khmer elements based at Trapeang Thnot, 22 kilometres north-west of Phnom-Penh, at Siemréap, 13 kilometres south-west of Takh-mau, and at Sambo, seven kilometres north-east of Prék-Kdam, replied vigorously to harassing fire with automatic weapons by the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors. There were no losses.

On 28 April 1971, at about 9.40 a.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors directed harassing fire with 82 mm mortars at the Khmer elements based at Trapeang Thnot, 22 kilometres north-west of Phnom-Penh, in Kandal, wounding three Khmer soldiers.

The same day, at 2 a.m., an attack launched by the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors against Khmer elements holding a position 11 kilometres east of Pich Nil, in Kompong Speu, was decisively defeated by the Khmer forces. The aggressors were forced to withdraw at about 6 a.m. after sustaining heavy casualties.

The losses were as follows: on the Khmer side: 14 dead and 51 wounded; on the enemy side: 57 dead left on the battlefield and a number of dead and wounded who were carried away; 17 Chinese sub-machine-guns (PM/AC), one Chinese automatic pistol (PA/AC), 20 B-40 shells and a number of important documents were captured by the Khmer forces.

The same day, at 7 a.m., Khmer elements conducting an operation fought an engagement with about 100 Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors at a point 11 kilometres south-east of the town of Pursat; the enemy left behind four dead and carried off one wounded soldier with him. One PM/AC, one AC rifle, two grenades and a quantity of military equipment were captured. There were no losses on the Khmer side.

During the night of 28 to 29 April 1971, at about 9 p.m., Khmer elements at Trapeang Thnot once again came under harassing fire by the enemy. Four Khmer soldiers were wounded.

During the same night, the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors harassed Khmer elements at Préah Prasap, 25 kilometres north-east of Phnom-Penh on the east bank of the Mékong, and other elements at Kambaul, 15 kilometres south-west of Phnom-Penh, in Kandal. The Khmer side suffered one dead and two wounded at Préah Prasap.

During the same night, Khmer elements conducting an operation between kilometre markers 92 and 93 and other elements at Stung Chral came under harassing fire by the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors. One Khmer soldier was killed at Stung Chral.

On 29 April 1971, at about 5.30 a.m., Khmer elements holding a position at Tréng Traying, in Kompong Seila, replied vigorously to harassing fire by the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors, forcing the latter to cease firing at about 6 a.m. One Khmer soldier was wounded.

On 30 April 1971, at 8.30 a.m., Khmer elements engaged a force of Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese

aggressors at a point 4½ kilometres south-east of Tram Khnar, in Takéo. The enemy was forced to withdraw after about 20 minutes of fighting.

The same day, at about 3 p.m. a brief clash occurred between Khmer elements and the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors at Pong Tuk, 11 kilometres south of Ang Snuol, in Kandal.

During the same night, at about 9 p.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors fired several 82 mm mortar rounds at the Khmer camp at Ang Snuol, in Kandal, without causing any damage.

On 1 May 1971, at about 10 a.m., Khmer elements fought an engagement with the communist Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors at a point situated between kilometre markers 96 and 97 on National Highway 4, in Kompong Speu. The enemy left behind 32 dead. The Khmer forces captured one B-40 rocket-launcher, four PM/ACs, one M-1 carbine, 45 B-40 shells, 15 sub-machine-gun clips, 10 bags of rice and seven knapsacks. There were eight dead and 46 wounded on the Khmer side.

The same day, between 7 and 9 a.m., a clash occurred between Khmer elements and the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors on the northern outskirts of the town of Siemréap.

The same day, at about 8.15 and 10.15 a.m., the enemy fired two 75 mm recoilless artillery shells and two 82 mm mortar rounds at the town of Siemréap without causing any casualties or damage.

During the night of 1 to 2 May, at about 1.45 a.m., the communist Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors directed harassing fire with 82 mm mortars at a Khmer position at Dey-Eth, 16 kilometres south-east of Phnom-Penh, in Kandal. There were one dead and six wounded on the Khmer side.

During the same night, at the same hour, the communist Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors directed harassing fire with automatic weapons and 82 mm mortars against Khmer elements at Phlaur Trei, three kilometres north-west of Tuk Khleang on the east bank of the Mékong. There were two wounded on the Khmer side.

During the same night, between 9.25 and 10 p.m., a clash occurred between Khmer elements conducting an operation and the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors at a point 12½ kilometres west of the town of Kampong Thom, near Phum Kampong-Kô.

On 2 May 1971, at about noon, Khmer troops conducting a clearing operation fought an engagement with the communist Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors at Phum Rong, six kilometres south of Tram Khnar, in Takéo.

The same day, at 10.45 a.m., a clash occurred at a point four kilometres east of Srang, in Kompong Speu, between the communist Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors and Khmer elements.

During the night of 2 to 3 May 1971, the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors directed harassing fire with mortars at two Khmer positions, one of them situated at kilometre marker 94 and the other at Doh Kanchor, 17 kilometres north-east of Pich Nil, in Kompong Speu. There were 10 wounded on the Khmer side at Doh Kanchor.

During the same night, at about 8 p.m., and again at about 1 a.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors directed harassing fire with automatic

weapons at the Khmer position at Romchék, 12 kilometres north-east of the town of Kompong Cham.

During the night of 3 to 4 May 1971, the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors harassed the Khmer positions at Kompong Dangkor, 24 kilometres south of Phnom-Penh, and at Siemréap, 13 kilometres south-west of Takhmau, in Kandal. There were two wounded on the Khmer side at Kompong Dangkor.

During the same night, the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors directed harassing fire with automatic weapons and grenades at Khmer elements holding positions at kilometre markers 93 and 94 on National Highway 4, in Kompong-Speu.

On 4 May 1971, at 5.15 a.m., they directed harassing fire with 82 mm mortars at Khmer elements at the armoured *demi-brigade* camp in Kompong Speu.

During the night of 4 to 5 May 1971, they harassed for several minutes the Khmer positions at Troeung, 13 kilometres north-west of the town, and at Rocar Thom, three kilometres north of Tonlébet, in Kompong Cham.

During the same night, at about 9 p.m., Khmer elements holding a position three kilometres south-west of the town of Siemréap came under enemy harassing fire with automatic weapons without suffering any losses.

On 5 May 1971, at 9 a.m., the enemy fired two 75 mm recoilless artillery shells at a Khmer position at the town of Siemréap, wounding a priest and a woman.

The same day, at 6.15 a.m., Khmer elements at Puok, 14 kilometres north-west of the town of Siemréap, came under automatic weapons fire.

The same day, at about 9.30 p.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors harassed the Khmer position at Rocar Thom, in Kompong Cham.

On 6 May 1971, at about 6.20 a.m., another Khmer position situated five kilometres north-west of the town of Siemréap was subjected to harassing fire with 75 mm recoilless artillery. One Khmer soldier was wounded.

The same day, at 4 a.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors fired a 122 mm rocket at the Khmer elements at Romduol, five kilometres north of the town of Kompong Cham.

During the night of 6 to 7 May 1971, they harassed the Khmer elements at Kompong Châk, nine kilometres north of the town, and at Chantréa, 10 kilometres east of Chiphou, in Svay Rieng. One Khmer soldier was wounded at Chiphou.

During the night of 7 to 8 May 1971, the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors harassed a Khmer position at the town of Siemréap for several minutes without causing any casualties.

During the same night, they directed several bursts of automatic weapons fire at the Khmer elements at Tram Khnar, in Takéo.

On 9 May 1971, at 10.45 a.m., Khmer elements on reconnaissance patrol fought an engagement with the communist Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors at a point two kilometres north-east of the airfield. One Khmer soldier was wounded.

The same day, at 11.45 a.m., the enemy fired two 82 mm mortar rounds at the Khmer position at Moan Hœur, approximately 16 kilometres north-east of the town of Kompong Cham on the east bank of the Mékong, wounding one of the defenders.

During the night of 9 to 10 May 1971, at 8.30 p.m., a Khmer position at O-Dar, several kilometres east of Prey-Totung in Kompong Cham, was subjected to harassing fire with three 82 mm mortar rounds without suffering any losses.

On 10 May 1971, at 5 a.m., the communist Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors directed harassing fire with automatic weapons at the Khmer position at O-Dar, in Kompong Cham, without causing any damage.

During the night of 11 to 12 May 1971, they harassed a Khmer position situated 15 kilometres north-east of the town of Kompong Cham.

During the same night, they harassed the Khmer position at Phum Boeung Khnar, 24 kilometres north-west of the town of Pursat.

On 12 May 1971, at 7.30 p.m., they directed harassing fire with automatic weapons at a Khmer position situated two kilometres south of the town of Svay Rieng.

During the night of 12 to 13 May 1971, at one minute past midnight, they attacked Khmer elements holding a position at Préah Prâsâp, 26 kilometres north-east of Phnom-Penh, in Kandal.

During the same night, at about 7.30 p.m., a clash occurred between Khmer elements and the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors at a point eight kilometres west of the town of Svay Rieng. There were two dead on the Khmer side; the enemy left behind one dead and carried away six wounded.

During the same night, at about 11 p.m., another clash occurred between Khmer elements on patrol and the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors at a point 12 kilometres east of Chiphou, in Svay Rieng, resulting in the wounding of one Khmer soldier.

During the same night, at about 7.10 p.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors fired 14 82 mm mortar rounds at the Khmer position at Phum Kandal, three kilometres north of Bêk Chan, in Kandal.

On 13 May 1971, at about 1.10 p.m., a clash occurred between the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors and Khmer elements at Phum Ta Nuot, 1½ kilometres east of Kompong Dangkor, in Kandal; the aggressors left behind two dead.

The same day, at about 6.30 p.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors walked into an ambush set by Khmer elements at a point 12 kilometres south of the town of Takéo. They left behind six dead, one Garand M-1 rifle and one Enfield rifle.

During the night of 13 to 14 May 1971, they fired several mortar rounds at two Khmer positions situated

five and six kilometres north-west of the town of Kompong Cham, wounding four Khmer soldiers.

On 14 May 1971, at about 7.45 p.m., they harassed the Khmer position at Kirivong, in Takéo, wounding one soldier.

The same day, at 8 p.m., they attacked the Khmer position at Phum Boeung Khnar, 24 kilometres north-west of the town of Pursat.

The same day, at about 6 p.m., they attacked the Khmer position at Préah Prâsâp, in Kandal; there were eight wounded on the Khmer side and some 20 on the enemy side.

The same day, at about 6.15 p.m., they launched simultaneous harassing attacks on the Khmer positions at Bat Doeng, 25 kilometres north-west of Phnom-Penh, and at Trapeang Thnot, 23 kilometres north-west of Phnom-Penh, in Kandal.

On 15 May 1971, at 3 a.m., they attacked Khmer elements at Chongkal, 70 kilometres north-west of the town of Siemréap, in Oddor-Méanchey.

I wish to reiterate the firm and vigorous protest of the Government of the Khmer Republic against the illegal and permanent occupation of Khmer territory, followed by savage attacks perpetrated by the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors against a neutral and peace-loving country to which they have no right and with which they have no ethnic affinity, in flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter, international law and the 1954 Geneva Agreements.<sup>83</sup> These criminal attacks reveal clearly the annexationist aims of the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese communist imperialists and represent a dangerous threat to peace and security not only in the Khmer Republic but throughout the region of South-East Asia.

The Government of the Khmer Republic holds the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and the so-called Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Viet-Nam fully responsible for all the extremely grave consequences resulting from this situation and reserves the right to take the necessary action to defend the independence, neutrality, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this communication circulated as a Security Council document.

(Signed) KHIM TIT

*Permanent Representative of the Khmer Republic  
to the United Nations*

<sup>83</sup> Agreements on the Cessation of Hostilities in Indo-China.

## DOCUMENT S/10224\*

Letter dated 15 June 1971 from the representative of Syria  
to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]  
[15 June 1971]

With reference to the letter of the Israeli representative of 10 June 1971 [S/10220], I have the honour to state the following on instructions from my Government.

\* Also circulated as a General Assembly document under the symbol A/8324.

(1) Speaking of "international conduct" it is an irrefutable fact that Israel's notoriety in lawlessness and uncivilized behaviour is only equal if not superior to that of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. It suffices to recall that as from 14 June 1967 up to date no less than 39 resolutions adopted by different organs of the

United Nations have either condemned or deplored Israeli lawlessness. On 15 March 1971, before the World Health Assembly pronounced itself on Israel's "violations of basic human rights", the Commission on Human Rights by resolution 9 (XXVII) condemned Israel in the following terms:

"1. *Condemns* Israel's continued violations of human rights in the occupied territories, including policies aimed at changing the status of these territories;

"2. *Condemns* specifically the following policies and practices of Israel:

"(a) Denial of the right of the refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes;

"(b) Resort to collective punishment;

"(c) The deportation and expulsion of the citizens of the occupied territories;

"(d) Arbitrary arrest and detention of the citizens of the occupied territories;

"(e) Ill-treatment and torture of prisoners;

"(f) Destruction and demolition of villages, town quarters, houses and confiscation and expropriation of property;

"(g) Evacuation and transfer of sections of the population of the occupied territories;

"(h) Transfer of parts of its own civilian population into the occupied territories;

"3. *Strongly deplores* Israel's policies in the occupied territories aimed at placing the population in a general state of repression, fear and deprivation, and particularly deplores:

"(a) *Requisition of hospitals and their transformation into police stations; [writer's italics].*

"(b) Abrogation of the national laws and interference with the judicial system;

"(c) Refusal to allow the text books approved by the Director-General of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization for schools in the occupied territories, and the insistence on forcing upon school children an alien system of education."

(2) Since 1 July 1970, the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine (UNTSO) reported to the Security Council in no less than 320 supplemental information reports on acts of aggression invariably committed by Israeli forces against Syria. The reports of UNTSO are contained in addenda to document S/7930.

(3) Unable to reject any of the facts brought to your attention on Israeli flagrant violations of articles 49 and 53 of the fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,<sup>34</sup> namely the activities of the Israeli Housing Ministry in colonizing the occupied Golan Heights as well as other occupied territories, the building of an auxiliary plant of the Israeli Aircraft Industries in the same area and

the wanton destruction of Syrian towns and villages, the Israeli representative sought to veil Israeli war crimes and crimes against humanity by referring to Arab resistance to Israeli occupation on the west bank of Jordan. This in itself illustrates the extent of Israeli deceitfulness when confronted with facts.

(4) Reared in the Zionist doctrine of double loyalty, it is difficult for a Zionist to think of one people with various creeds but one loyalty. That there are millions of Christian Arabs in Arab countries whose sole loyalty is to their Arab homeland is something which the racial, exclusionist, chauvinistic doctrine of Zionism cannot understand. Zionism is a negation of any democratic pluralistic society. Mr. Tekoah had better instruct himself on the treatment of Oriental Jews in Israel, this not to speak of the plight of the Arabs in that country, Christians and Moslems alike. Hence the Israeli slanderous attack on the Arab Christian leaders of Syrian churches. It should be recalled that the plight of Jerusalem and its Arab inhabitants has drawn world sympathy. Thus the Vatican City daily *L'Osservatore Romano* of 22-23 March had the following to say on Israeli annexationist measures in Jerusalem:

"This determination to acquire the Arab sector as well for its own sovereignty has manifested itself ever since in measures of a legislative, fiscal and urban nature which are impressing on Jerusalem an ever more special character at the expense of the non-Jewish population—Moslems and Christians—who are compelled for reasons of urban expansion to live in ever increasingly restricted spaces and finally to look elsewhere for a future they feel they no longer can find in their homeland's environment."

(5) Israel notoriety in quoting selectively from resolutions and other official documents hardly needs elaboration. The Israeli representative completely ignored the fact that the International Committee of the Red Cross had admitted that there were "certain difficulties" created by Israel but that despite these difficulties it was able to import into the territories occupied by Israel several thousand tons of assistance. A careful reading of the letter of the representative of the International Committee dated 2 June 1971 reveals that the credit for removing these difficulties goes to the efforts of ICRC and not to the Israeli occupiers who are legally bound to perform their objectives under the Geneva conventions. Had the Israeli representative any respect for objectivity, he could not have overlooked the fact that the International Committee of the Red Cross did not contend paragraph 3 of the World Health Assembly resolution 24.33 of 18 May 1971, which draws Israel's attention to the fact that "violations of basic human rights of the refugees, displaced persons and the inhabitants of the Occupied Territories constitute a serious impediment to the health of the population of the Occupied Territories".

I should be grateful if this letter could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

(Signed) George J. TOMEH  
Permanent Representative of Syria  
to the United Nations

<sup>34</sup> United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 75 (1950), No. 973.



Letter dated 15 June 1971 from the representative of Zambia to the Secretary-General concerning the implementation of sanctions against Southern Rhodesia

[Original: English]  
[16 June 1971]

Under the express instructions of my Government, I have the honour, through your good offices, urgently to apprise members of the Security Council of the profoundly serious situation with which the Republic of Zambia is currently confronted. I am referring to the acute shortage of food and other imports resulting from the action by Portuguese authorities since January this year, which cut almost completely the flow of all categories of Zambian imports through the Portuguese-controlled sea-ports of Beira, Nacala and Lourenço Marques in Mozambique and Lobito in Angola. For purposes of this letter, I shall confine myself strictly to the question of imports, since it is the virtual blockade of the Zambian imports in the last few months which has created the current serious situation.

As you might already be aware, the aforesaid Portuguese-controlled sea-ports were for many years before independence our traditional outlets to the sea. They remain so to date. Besides the distant South African ports, the ports of Beira and Lobito are linked to Zambia by railway *via* either the rebel colony of Southern Rhodesia or the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Nacala is, on the other hand, linked to Zambia by railway up to the Republic of Malawi and by road from there on.

#### 1. THE MAIZE SHORTAGE

Maize is the main staple diet of the people of the Republic of Zambia. Zambia's estimated total national needs of this crop for the period July 1970 to June 1971 was approximately 4,000,000 bags of 200 pounds each. Unfortunately, due to the bad season caused by a series of droughts, the country's harvest in 1970 was only 1,520,490 bags. In the meantime, there had been a carry-over of only 500,000 bags from the period 1969 to 1970. This, therefore, meant that we had to import slightly over 2,000,000 bags of maize fully to meet our needs. This was done accordingly.

As a result of the acute problems encountered in the flow of Zambia's imports, including stocks of maize, at the Portuguese-controlled ports, emergency measures were taken to import an additional quantity of maize from South Africa and elsewhere urgently to replace the stocks held by the Portuguese port authorities. That additional requirement which was over and above the 1970 to 1971 estimated national requirements brought the total figure of maize imports required to 2,700,000 bags.

##### (a) Sources of imports

The 2,700,000 bags were imported from the following countries:

United States of America .....	855,400 bags
South Africa .....	892,400 bags
United Republic of Tanzania .....	495,000 bags
Angola .....	220,000 bags
El Salvador .....	117,000 bags
Albania .....	67,000 bags
Malawi .....	53,200 bags

##### (b) Purchase price

The total purchase price (excluding transportation costs) for 2,700,000 bags was 18,119,440 kwachas

(\$US25,367,216) in contrast to the normal cost of about 10,800,000 kwachas (\$US15,120,000) including transportation costs, for the same quantity. The virtual blockade of Zambian imports has been accompanied by increase in storage and demurrage charges at these ports.

##### (c) Transport costs

Owing to the various difficulties progressively encountered subsequently in bringing in the maize through Beira and Lobito, several other routes had to be used. Some ships originally scheduled for Beira and Lobito ports had to be diverted to Nacala and Dar es Salaam. To meet Zambia's present contingency, efforts have been made to use all the following six supply routes to the maximum:

- (i) Beira-Zambia (railway);
- (ii) Beira-Rhodesia (railway) and then Rhodesia-Zambia (road);
- (iii) Lobito-Zambia (railway);
- (iv) United Republic of Tanzania-Zambia (road);
- (v) Nacala-Malawi (railway) and then Malawi-Zambia (road);
- (vi) South Africa-Zambia (railway).

Except for routes (i), (iii) and (vi), transportation costs were comparatively high. For instance, the United Republic of Tanzania (Dar es Salaam) route was approximately 4½ times more than the Beira-Rhodesia route (i.e., 1.86 kwachas or \$US2.60 per 200 pound bag on the Beira-Rhodesian route compared to 8.75 kwachas or \$US12.25 per 200 pound bag on the Dar es Salaam route). The Malawi (Nacala) route was approximately 3½ times dearer (i.e., 6.02 kwachas or \$US8.42 per bag compared to 1.86 kwachas or \$US2.60 per bag on the Beira-Rhodesian route). The Lobito and South African routes are dearer in comparison with the Beira-Rhodesian route.

In total, Zambia thus paid or is about to pay 47,150,074 kwachas or \$US66,010,103.60 by using these more expensive routes. For example, transportation costs of 2,700,000 bags by the Beira-Rhodesian route amounts to 3,861,000 kwachas or \$US4,405,400, compared with 11,011,074 kwachas or \$US15,451,503.60 involving other routes. The rebel régime in Southern Rhodesia has also imposed a surcharge of 1 kwacha or \$US1.40 per 200 pound bag. A surcharge on other Zambian-bound goods is also in force.

##### (d) Requirements for 1971 to 1972

The country's maize requirements for the period 1971 to 1972 is estimated at 4.5 million bags of 200 pounds. Although the country's 1971 harvest for the crop is expected to be approximately 3,000,000 bags, which is better than last year's, about 1,500,000 bags will, however, have to be imported in order to fully meet the country's needs.

Should the quantity 1,500,000 bags be obtained from elsewhere and at the present price rates and transportation costs, etc., through the Dar es Salaam or Malawi routes, the cost is estimated at about

23,000,000 kwachas (\$US32,200,000) in contrast to the normal cost of 14,000,000 kwachas (\$US19,600,000). Zambia cannot afford the unnecessary loss of foreign exchange through actions taken against her imports in traditional ports and countries of transit over the last few months.

## 2. OTHER IMPORTS

Maize is not the only commodity seriously affected by the action of the Portuguese port authorities since early this year. Considerable quantities of wheat supplies have also been held up in Beira, for so long that this wheat is now not suitable for human consumption. More fresh supplies of Zambian wheat which have been delivered in Beira have also been held up.

Following Zambia's ban on the importation of fruits and vegetables from South Africa, Zambia has recently been importing some of the fruits and vegetables from Europe and Australia. These commodities and other highly perishable supplies from Europe and Australia can no longer be imported by sea through the traditional ports because previous consignments were deliberately left to rot, with a consequent loss of foreign exchange on Zambia's part. There are other imported

goods such as medicine, medical supplies, motor vehicles, industrial and related goods required for economic development programmes which have been the subject of considerable delay by port authorities at various ports under Portuguese control.

## 3. CONCLUSION

In apprising members of the Security Council, I also take this opportunity, again through your good offices, of requesting them to take note of Zambia's special circumstances already duly recognized in paragraph 15 of resolution 253 (1968) and paragraph 16 of resolution 277 (1970). It is, however, deeply regretted that notwithstanding these Security Council resolutions on this matter and, in spite of the very serious situation under reference to which I have previously drawn your attention, Zambia has not received any assistance of the nature envisaged by the Security Council.

I request that this letter be published as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Vernon J. MWAANGA  
Permanent Representative of Zambia  
to the United Nations

## DOCUMENT S/10226

### Letter dated 16 June 1971 from the representative of Lebanon to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English]  
[16 June 1971]

On instructions from my Government I have the honour to bring to your attention the following acts of aggression committed by Israel against Lebanon between 1 May and 7 June 1971.

(1) On 3 May at 1330 hours, Israeli armed forces shelled the area between the villages of El-Majidieh and Abu-Zeylh with mortars.

(2) On 6 May at 1100 hours, an Israeli armoured vehicle, accompanied by four soldiers, crossed the Lebanese border southeast of the village of Aiteroun and undertook fortification work on Lebanese soil.

(3) On 7 May at 2100 hours, Israeli armed forces shelled the area between Tel-el-Nahas military post and the village of Kfar Kala with mortars.

(4) On 11 May at 0905 hours, Israeli armed forces shelled a herd of goats in the vicinity of the village of Mays-al-Jabal.

(5) On 13 May at 1045 hours, the Israeli air force violated Lebanese air space east of the village of El-Taybeh.

On the same day at 1105 hours, Israeli armed forces shelled a military post near the village of El-Taybeh with mortars, damaging military properties. At 1845 hours, they shelled the area north-west of Hula and the area west of Muhceb with mortars.

(6) On 21 May at 1625 hours, Israeli armed forces fired at the area near the village of El-Kouzch with automatic weapons.

(7) On 31 May at 1400 hours, Israeli armed forces fired at shepherds east of the village of Kfar Shuba. One shepherd was wounded.

(8) On 4 June at 1400 hours, Israeli armed forces crossed the Lebanese border and blew up one house in the village of Yaroun.

(9) On 5 June at 2400 hours, Israeli armed forces shelled the village of Ramya with mortars, killing one civilian.

(10) On 7 June at 2350 hours, Israeli forces crossed the Lebanese border and blew up two houses and one car in the village of Ramya.

These new premeditated acts of aggression are aimed at disturbing peace and security in southern Lebanon and at maintaining a state of tension and instability in the Middle East. They constitute flagrant violations of the Lebanon-Israel Armistice Agreement<sup>35</sup> and a defiance of the Charter of the United Nations and of Security Council resolutions—especially resolution 262 (1968) of 31 December 1968; resolution 270 (1969) of 26 August 1969; and resolution 280 (1970) of 19 May 1970, which condemned Israel for her acts of aggression against Lebanon and solemnly warned her against the repetition of such acts.

I respectfully request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Edouard GHORRA  
Permanent Representative of Lebanon  
to the United Nations

<sup>35</sup> Official Records of the Security Council, Fourth Year, Special Supplement No. 4.

**Letter dated 16 June 1971 from the representative of Senegal  
to the President of the Security Council**

[Original: French]  
[17 June 1971]

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you of the extremely grave events which have occurred on the border between Senegal and Guinea (Bissau) during the month of June 1971.

On 5 June 1971, a military vehicle of the 7th CFV, based at Samine, struck a mine which had been laid in Senegalese territory by the Portuguese forces. Seven persons were wounded, two of them seriously. (One sustained a severe head injury.) All were evacuated to Dakar by military aircraft.

On 6 June 1971, the village of Simbour, district of Diatta Coumda, department of Sedhiou, was attacked by elements of the Portuguese Army. Grenades were thrown, killing a 17 year-old girl, and four head of cattle were stolen.

Previously—on 26 April 1971—the village of Salikégné, district of Dabo, department of Kolda, had been attacked by elements of the Portuguese regular army. Six shells were fired on that occasion, wounding two persons.

On 4 May 1971, it was discovered that explosives had been set for the purpose of destroying the bridge situated between the localities of Salikégné and Saré Sissao, district of Dabo. There were two explosive devices on and under the bridge, each composed of nine bags of yellow powder together with 750 gramme sticks of TNT bearing the inscription "Petardo Ted Pex No. ASRO/68"; each charge had a detonator cord ending in a detonator and a slow fuse. The two fuses had been lit and had burned to within 10 centimetres of the detonators. The devices had unquestionably been placed there by a 25 man Portuguese patrol which had been seen in the area.

On 9 May 1971, an anti-personnel mine was discovered in the village of Bambato, district of Diatta Coumda, department of Sedhiou, and an anti-vehicle mine was found near the same village on the right side of the Ziguinchor-Tanaff road. The mines had apparently been laid by soldiers from the Bediene base in Guinea (Bissau), since there is a trail leading from the Senegalese locality in question to the base and footprints left by ranger boots, found at the place where the mines had been laid, were followed along the trail towards Bediene as far as the frontier.

On 21 May 1971, a mine-clearing operation was carried out between the villages of Saré Mansaly and Tidelly, Coumbacara sector, district of Dabo. The operation took three hours. Two anti-personnel mines were removed at a point 800 metres from Saré Mansaly; their removal was witnessed by the prefect of the

department of Kolda, the sector chief, a non-commissioned officer in the Gendarmerie and the captain serving as commandant, the GMI at Kolda. Before the arrival of the prefect and his aides, a third anti-personnel mine was discovered on a heavily travelled trail. Three policemen, Oumar Samb, Oumar Cisse and Moussa Sy, exploded it so that there would be no danger to the villagers. Two anti-vehicle mines were also removed at a point 200 metres north-west of the village of Tidelly; they bore the inscription "NULOZKA 116/53 200 C format 30 cm x 15 cm, grey colour" and were in a rectangular wooden box. They were designed to explode on pressure. The footprints (Pataugas shoes) found around the mines led to the village of Saré Bakary in Guinea (Bissau), where there is a Portuguese base. The mines had apparently been laid during the night of 19 May 1971.

On 23 May 1971, in connexion with the preparations for the visit to be made on 24 May by the departmental prefect, the frontier sector chief, Abdou Diasse, left Kolda at 2 p.m. in his official vehicle (No. 3889 SO) together with a policeman, Daouda Bâ. At a point four kilometres from the village of Saré N'Diaye, the vehicle struck a mine which had been laid between the latter village and the village of Medina Alpha Sadio. The explosion hurled the vehicle a distance of 7½ metres; the sector chief was thrown two metres from the spot where the vehicle landed to a point one metre north of the trail, and the policeman was thrown six metres in the direction of Medina Alpha Sadio. The two were taken by military ambulance to Kolda, where sector chief Abdou Diasse died of his wounds during the evening of 23 May. The policeman was seriously wounded and the vehicle completely destroyed.

The laying of mines in Senegalese territory by the regular Portuguese armed forces constitutes an obvious and flagrant violation of Senegal's sovereignty and territorial integrity.

This complaint is further to the complaint communicated to you on 27 April 1971 [S/10182], which we are, of course, still pressing.

I reserve the right to request a meeting of the Security Council when I have received fuller information from my Government.

In the meantime, I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as an official Security Council document.

(Signed) Ibrahima BOYE  
Permanent Representative of Senegal  
to the United Nations

Letter dated 17 June 1971 from the representative of Israel  
to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]  
[17 June 1971]

On instructions from my Government I have the honour to refer to the letter addressed to you on 15 June 1971 by the representative of Syria [S/10224] in reply to my letter of 10 June 1971 [S/10220].

A letter which stoops to abuse of the national liberation movement of another nation does not deserve serious attention. The Syrian letter's vilification of the Jewish people's liberation movement—zionism—is a mere reflection of Syria's persistent warfare against the rights of the Jewish people to equality with other nations and to independence in the Jewish homeland.

The Syrian representative ignores the reminder contained in my letter of 10 June, that Syria has barred all thought of peace with Israel, rejected the Security Council resolution 242 (1967), which called for peace with Israel, refused to participate in the peace-making efforts under the auspices of Ambassador Gunnar Jarring, continues to wage terror warfare against Israel and cruelly oppresses the Jewish community of Syria. These are the fundamental facts of the situation. Instead of dealing with them, the Syrian letter continues to quibble over one-sided resolutions known to be creations of Arab propaganda.

The absurdity of the references in the previous Syrian letter of 8 June 1971 [S/10219] to resolution WHA24.33 of the World Health Organization having been exposed, the new Syrian letter of 15 June resorts to another text which is equally oblivious of the truth. It quotes from resolution 9 (XXVII) of the Commission on Human Rights, alleging violations of human rights in Israeli-controlled territory. The majority of the members of the Commission refused to support this resolution. Only representatives of Arab, Soviet, and Moslem States and their traditional followers voted for it. The resolution expresses solely their biased views.

Even Arab sources, when not called upon to distort facts for propaganda purposes, acknowledge the true situation in Israeli-administered territories.

Thus the Beirut newspaper *Al-Hawadess* of 27 April 1971 described the conditions of life in these territories as follows:

"Talking to a Lebanese journalist, west bank Arabs visiting Kuwait contrasted their experience of Jordanian rule with conditions prevailing under Israeli administration:

"A small minority of the people are merchants while the overwhelming majority are farmers, labourers or Government employees. The merchants face the choice of trading or starving. They can neither import nor export without co-operating (with the administration).

"Government employees now enjoy such economic well-being as never before. They receive salaries from the Jordanian Treasury, which is known and agreed by Israel. They also receive Israeli salaries, so that their income has doubled since 1967. Government

employees have paid off their debts and raised their standard of living beyond anything dreamt of before.

"Farmers continue to work their land and gather the harvest. Israel has helped them with marketing their produce.

"As for the labourers—Israel, as is well known, suffers from a lack of manpower, which has become even more severe owing to the increase in building and development projects . . . therefore, Israel gave work to the unemployed. Israel offered work at four times the wages they had earned under Jordanian rule, for an eight-hour day, while previously hours were unlimited.

"The property owners and professionals, doctors and lawyers continue as usual, unaffected by the occupation. They are flooded with tempting proposals of large loans for improvement.

"This is the naked truth and reality, without the adornments of patriotism, the holy cause, etc."

In fact, the above-mentioned resolutions, cited in the Syrian letters, clearly demonstrate the impossibility of dealing with the Middle East situation equitably and effectively by means of United Nations resolutions that are not based on the agreement of the parties to the conflict. In an organization in which Israel with its single vote has to defend itself against the continued hostility of the Arab-Soviet bloc commanding approximately 45 votes, Israel's case is repeatedly denied judgement on its merits. World public opinion is aware of this and evaluates United Nations debates and resolutions accordingly.

With regard to the Syrian allegations concerning the situation in Jerusalem, I should like to bring to your attention a statement adopted on 9 June 1971 at the Conference of Catholic, Protestant and Evangelical leaders of the United States on Jerusalem and Israel. The statement declares, *inter alia*:

"Our inquiry into the question of public housing in the Old City and environs has convinced us that the construction of these buildings is a legitimate effort on the part of the Israeli Government to effectuate a renewal of certain slum areas of the City, to rehouse in new apartments Arabs from these quarters, to provide living space for a Jewish population increased by immigration, and to reintroduce a Jewish presence into the Old City from which it had been forcibly barred after the war of 1948. The development plans are in no sense designed to oust the Arabs, nor to 'suffocate' the Christian and Moslem population. While we are concerned about the sacred character of the City, we believe that this housing is sufficiently removed from the holy places to avoid the charge of diminishing the sanctity of the City.

"We believe, further, that the claim that the Christian-Arab population is diminishing in Israel is incorrect. Since the end of the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, the Christian and Moslem population of Israel has more than doubled. The trickle of Christian emigration has not affected this upward trend. In

\* Also circulated as a General Assembly document under the symbol A/8325.

Jerusalem, the non-Jewish total (Christian and Moslem) has increased steadily in the last three years. The question of emigration should be judged in contrast with the actual exodus of many Arab Christians from Arab countries, particularly from Lebanon and Egypt.

"We are encouraged by such creative efforts as those already initiated by Israeli officials with Christian ecumenical and Arab civic leaders for special jurisdictional arrangements over the holy places and

in Arab areas of Jerusalem. On the other hand, we regret all interventions that fail to take into account the political rights and sovereignty of the State of Israel."

I have the honour to request that this letter should be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Yosef TEKOAH  
Permanent Representative of Israel  
to the United Nations

## DOCUMENT S/10230

### Letter dated 21 June 1971 from the representative of Cyprus to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]  
[21 June 1971]

I have the honour to invite your attention to the unwarranted and provocative statements in regard to Cyprus made recently in Ankara by high Turkish officials which are a matter of serious concern to my Government.

The Turkish Foreign Minister, Mr. Olcay, in a statement on 23 May 1971, said that the "Cyprus issue is *our national cause*;" it is also important for our international relations". In addressing the Union of Foreign Writers and Correspondents in Ankara on 17 May 1971, he said that the state of the intercommunal talks was not satisfactory and added that it has now become very difficult to view these talks with hope. Mr. Olcay spoke of the "determination of our Government to protect the rights based on the agreements and the interests of the Turkish community and Turkey. Every measure has been taken and is being taken in this respect. We are fully aware"—he said—"of the importance of the problem and the unlimited extent of our responsibility. We must be sure that, thanks to the sensitivity shown by our nation towards *its cause*\* and the heroic resistance and super-human patience and self-sacrifice of the Turkish Cypriot community on the island, we shall fulfil *our cause*\* in this issue which is of concern to our foreign policy in every respect". In an interview to the Voice of Germany on 11 June 1971 he stated: "The Cyprus problem is a new factor that could considerably upset the balance established between the Turkish and Greek nations by the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, and it has vital importance for Turkey's security needs. A look at Turkey's map is sufficient to understand this fact. Therefore, the Cyprus question is a dispute between the Turkish and Greek nations, to which the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities are tied."

According to Turkish Cypriot press reports (*Halkin Sesi and Bozkurt*), Mr. Olcay, speaking at the NATO Ministerial Council meeting in Lisbon on 4 June 1971, said that the intercommunal talks, which have been going on for a long time now, had not yielded the expected outcome. He added that unless a favourable result was obtained within a reasonable period of time Turkey and Greece would confront each other.

The President of Turkey, Mr. Sunay, speaking at a dinner on 7 June 1971 in honour of the Finnish President, reiterated that "the Cyprus issue constitutes a *national cause*\* for our country".

Such aggressive and provocative statements can hardly be intended to contribute to the improvement of the climate or the progress of the talks, in favour of which all members of the Security Council spoke at its 1567th and 1568th meetings. These statements are, instead, calculated to create apprehensions and tension on the island, leading the talks to a deadlock; and it is perhaps no secret that it is the escalating intransigence of the Turkish Cypriot side, presumably on Ankara's instructions, that has been the stumbling block in these talks.

What, however, is particularly ominous in those statements is the reference to Cyprus as the "national cause" of Turkey, to which my Government takes strong objection. It is in itself a threat to the independence and sovereignty of Cyprus, and constitutes an open indication of Turkey's imperialist designs for territorial expansion over the island, through the use of the Turkish Cypriot community, in a policy of partition. The national cause of every State—and Cyprus is no exception—is the prerogative of its own people and of no other nation or people.

It may be observed that declarations by a State that the internal affairs of another State are its "national cause", were heard in the past as a prelude to aggression, particularly in the period preceding to, and culminating in, the Second World War. If they are heard again in a resurgent imperialism, they are but the lingering concepts of a past age and cannot survive for long. For we are now in a new, a United Nations, era, characterized by a growing world desire for peace and freedom. This is the important change that, through the Charter, has brought into being a new concept of rights and obligations of States. The right of States to be free from such threats of force and the obligation of States to refrain from making them. And, more important still, such obligations are declared by the Charter as prevailing over those under any other international agreement, if in conflict with the Charter obligations.

Non-intervention in the internal affairs of Cyprus is the key to the solution of the present problem of the

\* Writer's italics.

island. As the President of the Republic, Archbishop Makarios, recently stated: "Cyprus belongs to its inhabitants, Greek and Turkish, and we recognize no right of Turkey to have a say in the future of the island".

If the people of Cyprus are given the chance to look at their internal problems in their true perspective without the coercive influence of alien interests, the whole problem could, in the resulting atmosphere of

growing conciliation and mutual trust, find proper solution within the Charter of the United Nations.

I should be grateful if this letter could be circulated to all States Members as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Zenon ROSSIDES  
Permanent Representative of Cyprus  
to the United Nations

#### DOCUMENT S/10231

#### Letter dated 21 June 1971 from the representative of Israel to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English]  
[21 June 1971]

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to refer to the letter addressed to you by the representative of Lebanon on 16 June 1971 [S/10226].

It is regrettable that the representative of Lebanon should deem it opportune to try and mislead the Council regarding the situation along the Israel-Lebanon cease-fire line. Such attempts cannot conceal Lebanon's responsibility for the incidents which continue to occur in that area. While in letters to the United Nations the Lebanese Government cloaks this responsibility in distortions of fact and false charges, the truth is more evident in other official pronouncements and in Lebanese information media.

Thus the Lebanese daily *al-Jarida* reported on 9 June 1971 that the cease-fire is observed in all sectors except for Lebanon, from which *fedayeen* operations are being launched. It explained that the terror organizations are using southern Lebanon as a base for their attacks against Israel because of the area's convenient topographical conditions. The newspaper reminded its readers that the Lebanese Government is still bound by the Cairo Agreement of 3 November 1969 which defined the relations of co-operation between the Lebanese authorities and the terrorist organizations.

According to the Middle East News Agency, on 17 February Lebanon's Prime Minister stated as follows:

"*Fedayeen* action in Lebanon is not obstructed in any way and there is full and intimate co-operation between the Lebanese authorities and the *fedayeen*."

According to the same agency, on 27 May he declared:

"Lebanon will strengthen and support the *fedayeen* to the best of its ability and the *fedayeen* will cooperate with Lebanon in carrying out their activities in the appropriate manner."

It is also noteworthy that a terror organization whose headquarters are located in Beirut claimed responsibility for the attack on 11 June on a Liberian tanker which was on its way to the Israeli port of Elat. Beirut is known to be the seat of a number of Arab terror organizations which feel free to pursue their nefarious activities from the Lebanese capital.

This dangerous policy of the Lebanese Government has resulted in the following acts of aggression perpetrated against Israel from bases in Lebanon, in the period since 12 May 1971 referred to in the Lebanese letter.

On 12 May, the town of Metulla was attacked by bazooka and small arms fire.

On 13 May, bazooka and small arms fire was opened from Lebanese territory on Israeli vehicles near the village of Misgav Am.

Israeli vehicles were again attacked from Lebanon in the same area on 18 May.

On 20 May, small arms fire from Lebanese territory was directed at Mitzpe Pe'er.

On 21 May, Israeli vehicles in the area of Har Amiram were attacked with small arms from Lebanese territory.

On 24 May, a terror squad which tried to penetrate into Israel from Lebanon near the village of Biranit was intercepted by an Israeli patrol. Two of the attackers were killed.

On 25 May, the village of Margaliyot was shelled by bazookas stationed on Lebanese territory.

On 29 May, a terror squad crossed the cease-fire line into Israel from Lebanon and planted explosive charges at a building in the town of Carmiel. The building was damaged.

On 31 May, a saboteur unit infiltrated into Israel from Lebanon and mined a road used by civilian traffic near the village of Avdon. A civilian vehicle was blown up and its driver wounded.

On 6 June the area of Har Amiram was subjected to bazooka fire from Lebanese territory.

On 10 June, a terrorist unit crossed into Israel from Lebanon and opened bazooka fire on a civilian vehicle near Netuah. One of the passengers was wounded.

On 15 June, a terror squad infiltrated from Lebanon and was intercepted by the Israeli Defence Forces near Tel Dan. Two of the attackers were killed.

On the night of 16 June, an Israeli soldier was wounded by attackers who had penetrated from Lebanon in the vicinity of Shomera.

It is natural that Israel should have taken defensive action against these attacks.

The cease-fire established in June 1967 is based on reciprocity. The Lebanese Government is bound by it to prevent armed attacks of any kind whatever from its territory against the territory and population of Israel. When it fails to do so it cannot legitimately complain that Israel exercises its right of self-defence. The Government of Israel reserves its right to continue to protect its territory and its citizens.

I have the honour to request that this letter should be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Yosef TEKOAH  
Permanent Representative of Israel  
to the United Nations

Letter dated 21 June 1971 from the representative of Syria  
to the Secretary-General[Original: English]  
[21 June 1971]

On instructions of my Government and with reference to the letter addressed to you on 17 June 1971 [S/10228] in reply to my letter of 15 June 1971 [S/10224], I have the honour to state the following:

(1) To dare call Zionism a "liberation movement" is the greatest insult that could be levelled against any liberation movement anywhere in the world and against the intelligence of the international community.

From its very inception to this day, Zionism has been a colonial movement. The first instrument created by the World Zionist Organization was named "The Jewish Colonial Trust Limited", formed by the Second Zionist Congress in 1898.

*The American Jewish Yearbook* of 1970 defines the Jewish Agency as "recognized by the State of Israel as the authorized agency to work in Israel for the development and colonization, the absorption and settlement of immigrants, and the co-ordination of activities of Jewish institutions and associations operating in these fields".

That Israel is a colonial settler régime bent on the destitution of the original inhabitants of the land was recognized by General Moshe Dayan, the Israeli Minister of War. In a speech rebroadcast by the Israeli radio on the eve of the June 1967 war of aggression, Dayan uttered the following words:

"Let us not today fling accusations at the murderers. Who are we that we should argue against their hatred?"

"For eight years now, they sit in their refugee camps in Gaza, and before their very eyes, we turn into our homestead the land and the villages in which they and their forefathers have lived.

". . . We are a generation of settlers, and without the steel helmet and the cannon we cannot plant a tree and build a house."<sup>36</sup>

When the Zionists themselves openly and officially recognize the colonial nature of their movement, one can easily dismiss Mr. Tckoah's false arguments.

(2) The Israeli representative calls "absurd" any reference to United Nations resolutions that do not accommodate Israeli lawlessness, on the ground that these resolutions do not command the support of the "majority", and because Israel has "one single vote". The legal absurdity of such a remark is only matched by its unfounded assumptions.

The Israeli representative should be reminded that once a draft resolution is adopted by the required majority, it becomes a resolution that must be heeded. If Israeli distortions of the law of the Charter were to be followed the first party to be affected would be Israel itself, since resolution 181 (II) of 29 November 1947 is far from commanding the support of the "peoples of the United Nations".

Yet, Israel defiantly rejects and violates even those resolutions that command overwhelming or unanimous

support. It suffices to recall only the few following instances:

(a) Security Council resolution 237 (1967) of 14 June 1967—unanimously adopted—which *inter alia* calls upon Israel to facilitate the return of the new refugees and to ensure the safety, welfare and the security of the inhabitants of the occupied territories;

(b) General Assembly resolutions 2253 (ES-V) and 2254 (ES-V) of 4 and 14 July 1967 declaring the Israeli annexation of Jerusalem "invalid" and calling upon Israel to rescind all measures already taken and "desist forthwith from taking any action which would alter the status of Jerusalem";

(c) Security Council resolution 267 (1969), unanimously adopted on 3 July 1969, the relevant paragraphs of which provide:

"The Security Council,

...

"1. Reaffirms its resolution 252 (1968);

"2. Deplores the failure of Israel to show any regard for the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council mentioned above;

"3. Censures in the strongest terms all measures taken to change the status of the City of Jerusalem;

"4. Confirms that all legislative and administrative measures and actions taken by Israel which purport to alter the status of Jerusalem, including expropriation of land and properties thereon, are invalid and cannot change that status";

(d) General Assembly resolution 2452 A (XXIII) of 19 December 1968—adopted by 100 votes in favour, with only Israel voting against—calling upon the Government of Israel to take effective and immediate steps for the return without delay of the new refugees.

The Israeli "respect" for United Nations resolutions was best illustrated on two occasions. The first one was when the Foreign Minister of Israel was quoted in *The New York Times* of 19 June 1967 as saying: "If the General Assembly were to vote 121 votes to 1 in favour of Israel returning to the armistice lines, tomorrow, Israel would refuse to comply with that decision." The second occasion was when the Israeli representative to the United Nations, commenting on Security Council resolution 262 (1968) condemning Israel for its attack on the international airport of Beirut, said: "The resolution reflects the moral, political and juridical bankruptcy of the Security Council in respect of the Middle East situation." [1462nd meeting, para. 118.]

(3) Quoting from the statement of a body of clergymen does not constitute an answer to the still standing resolutions on Jerusalem, the last of which was the above-mentioned Security Council resolution 267 (1969), adopted unanimously on 3 July 1969.

(4) Loyal to the tradition followed by all colonialists and occupiers, the Israeli representative attempted—without much success—to glorify the Israeli occupation. The article he chose to quote from illustrates two symptoms inherent in colonial occupation: the im-

\* Also circulated as a General Assembly document under the symbol A/8326.

<sup>36</sup> Uri Avnery, *Israel without Zionists* (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1968), p. 134.

poverishment of those who cannot compete with the occupier and an extensive exploitation of the working class.

Dr. Arthur Hertzberg, a leading Zionist American, described poverty and exploitation in Israel itself in these words, which were quoted in *The New York Times* of 15 June 1971:

"We American Jews are being told that Israel is a country under siege, and so it is, and so we want to help keep it strong enough to survive.

"But during the four years from 1967 when the country was under siege, the standard of living of

the middle class has doubled; the number of cars on the roads of the country has doubled, and so has the rate of travel abroad by prosperous Israelis.

"It seems the country is only under siege when it comes to the needs of the 20 per cent of population who are below the poverty line."

I should be grateful if this letter could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

(Signed) George J. TOMEH  
Permanent Representative of Syria  
to the United Nations

#### DOCUMENT S/10234\*

Letter dated 23 June 1971 from the representative of Israel  
to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]  
[23 June 1971]

On instructions of my Government I have the honour to refer to the letter addressed to you on 21 June 1971 by the representative of Syria [S/10232].

Note is taken of the fact that the Syrian representative has turned his attention from raising false allegations regarding the situation of Arab inhabitants in Israeli-controlled territories to certain social questions which confront the Jewish population of Israel. Were it not for the warfare pursued against Israel by the Arab States, including Syria, since 1948, the resources available to the Government of Israel to cope with those questions would have been considerably greater and the Syrian Government itself would have been able to begin dealing with the problems of poverty and backwardness in Syria.

The Syrian letter persists in the attempt to employ one-sided resolutions of United Nations organs as instruments of belligerency against Israel. These texts are products of debates and proposals initiated or inspired by Arab States as a means of evading the obligation and the need to seek a settlement of the Middle East conflict by negotiation and agreement with Israel. Their one-sided character deprives such resolutions of any effect in the efforts to advance solutions of problems that have arisen out of the situation in the area. There is a growing realization that the Israel-Arab conflict can be resolved solely by agreement between the parties

\* Also circulated as a General Assembly document under the symbol A/8327.

concerned and that sterile and acrimonious debates in United Nations organs resulting in resolutions which take into account the stand of only one of the parties cannot make any constructive contribution whatever to the situation. Syria continues to use these texts because, contrary to its obligations under the United Nations Charter, it refuses to make peace with Israel.

Note is taken also of the fact that the Syrian letter carries on with the slanderous attack against Zionism, the Jewish people's national liberation movement, by resorting this time to brazen distortions of the meaning of words in the English language. It is perhaps not surprising that a State which oppresses its Jewish inhabitants and denies them their human rights as individuals should negate also the collective right of the Jewish people to independent existence. An international conflict cannot be settled unless the parties to it are at the very least imbued with respect for each other's national values. The representative of Syria has consistently besmirched and denied the national values of the Jewish people. In these circumstances no useful purpose can be served by pursuing the present exchange of views with him.

I have the honour to request that this letter should be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Yosef TEKOAH  
Permanent Representative of Israel  
to the United Nations

#### DOCUMENT S/10235

Letter dated 23 June 1971 from the representative of Lebanon  
to the President of the Security Council

[Original: French]  
[23 June 1971]

Further to my letter of 16 June 1971 [S/10226] and on the instructions of my Government I have the honour to bring the following to your attention.

On Monday, 21 June 1971, at 1 a.m., Israeli forces crossed into Lebanese territory and reached the village of Yarine. They made the villagers leave their homes and then destroyed five houses.



By its very nature, this new act of aggression perpetrated by the regular armed forces of Israel has the effect of terrorizing the peaceful population of southern Lebanon. Moreover, it is another premeditated attack against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon in violation of the Armistice Agreement between Lebanon and Israel,<sup>37</sup> in defiance of international law and in contempt of the United Nations Charter and the resolutions of the Security Council.

In his letter of 21 June 1971 [S/10231] the representative of Israel follows his usual practice of giving explanations of events for which since the beginning Israel itself has been solely responsible. Yet to re-establish, in the region as a whole, peace based on justice, which is the only possible peace, all that is required is for Israel to respect international law and the resolutions of the United Nations, particularly those of the Security Council.

The obstructionist policy adopted by Israel towards all efforts to establish a just and lasting peace in the Middle East is now, as in the past, the cause of the tension which prevails in the region. Israel cannot shirk its responsibility and persist in its attempt to wash its hands of the injustices and tragedies it has created by relying on its military arrogance and its denial of the most elementary principles of law and justice.

I have the honour to request that this letter should be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Edouard GHORRA  
Permanent Representative of Lebanon  
to the United Nations

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<sup>37</sup> Official Records of the Security Council, Fourth Year, Special Supplement No. 4

## DOCUMENT S/10236\*

**Letter dated 23 June 1971 from the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Secretary-General on the question of convening a conference of the five nuclear-weapon Powers**

[Original: Russian]  
[25 June 1971]

I would request that you should arrange to have the attached statement of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, on the question of convening a Conference of the five nuclear-weapon Powers, circulated as an official document of the Security Council and of the General Assembly.

(Signed) Y. MALIK  
Permanent Representative of the  
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics  
to the United Nations

### STATEMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

1. For over a quarter of a century now, mankind has been spared a world war. Yet peace remains precarious. In one part of the world after another armed conflicts arise and military tension builds up, while the danger of a military confrontation on a global scale persists.

2. The arms race is one of the factors having an especially negative effect on all aspects of international life. It is creating an increasingly serious threat to peace, apart from absorbing enormous material and intellectual resources which in other circumstances could be used to accelerate economic and social progress and further the well-being of peoples. It is clear that the greatest danger lies in the nuclear arms race. It is the primary reason for the anxiety of peoples and their worries about the future.

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\* Also circulated as a General Assembly document under the symbol A/8328.

3. In addressing this statement to the Governments of nuclear-weapon Powers, the Government of the USSR does not consider it necessary to dwell on the great power of destruction that such weapons possess, on the devastating consequences of their use, or on the suffering and misfortune that a nuclear war, if one were to break out, would cause to all the peoples of the world. However, the Soviet Government does wish to draw the attention of the Governments of all nuclear Powers to the fact that, although the efforts to limit the nuclear arms race have led to the adoption of some positive steps, it has not yet proved possible to reverse the process of stockpiling of increasingly powerful means of mass destruction in the arsenals of nuclear Powers. Consequently, there is a need to make even more determined efforts to adopt effective measures conducive to nuclear disarmament.

4. The Government of the USSR considers that all nuclear Powers have the duty and the responsibility to make such efforts. It is precisely those Powers that can and should work out and implement a practical programme for nuclear disarmament.

5. It goes without saying that such an objective cannot be attained if efforts in that direction are made by only one or a few of the nuclear Powers. It is essential that all nuclear-weapon States act in a concerted manner to arrive at the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons.

6. Of course, the nuclear Powers do not at present have a common approach to the resolution of questions involved in nuclear disarmament and their views on such questions differ in many respects. But that should not prevent them from initiating concerted action aimed

at bringing their views closer together and jointly paving the way to nuclear disarmament. Such action is demanded by the interests of all peoples and all States including the nuclear Powers themselves, since their security too will be more reliably guaranteed by the elimination of nuclear weapons than by a continuation of the nuclear arms race.

7. In view of the foregoing, the Soviet Government proposes the convening as early as possible of a conference of the five nuclear-weapon Powers: the Soviet Union, the United States, the People's Republic of China, France and the United Kingdom. Such a conference should consider questions of nuclear disarmament as a whole. The understanding that would result from the negotiations could cover both the entire range of measures relating to nuclear disarmament and the individual steps progressively leading to the achievement of that end.

8. There is no doubt that progress in the matter of nuclear disarmament would assist in settling the problem of general and complete disarmament, would have a salutary effect on the international situation

generally and would contribute to the strengthening of confidence in relations among States.

9. The Soviet Government proposes that there should be initiated, through the diplomatic channel, an exchange of views on questions relating to the date and place of the conference, the agenda and procedure.

10. As far as the Government of the USSR is concerned, it feels that the earlier a conference of the five nuclear Powers is convened, the better.

11. With regard to the site of the conference, its position remains open. It could accept any place convenient to all the participants. Should it be the general view, the Soviet Government would also not be opposed to the establishment of a preparatory committee to discuss the convening of the conference.

12. The Government of the USSR looks forward with interest to learning the views which each of the nuclear Powers may have with regard to these various matters. It hopes that this statement will be studied with all the attention that the problem of nuclear disarmament deserves and that as a result of concerted efforts by the nuclear Powers progress will be made in resolving this problem.

#### DOCUMENT S/10238\* \*\*

#### Letter dated 25 June 1971 from the representative of Syria to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]  
[25 June 1971]

On instructions from my Government and with reference to the letter addressed to you on 23 June 1971 [S/10234] by the representative of Israel in reply to my letter of 21 June 1971 [S/10232], I have the honour to state the following.

(1) The representative of Israel, who "sees no useful purpose in answering letters" addressed to you has once more attempted to undermine the validity of United Nations resolutions. In calling decisions unanimously adopted "one-sided", he is admitting that Israel—like South Africa—stands on one side and the international community on the other.

(2) The representative of Israel has always avoided answering facts and figures taken from Israeli sources concerning Israeli expansionist plans in the occupied Golan heights, particularly the building of dozens of Israeli colonies, and the razing to the ground of Syrian towns and villages. Israeli official silence on these matters reveals the degree of contempt that Israel bears towards the world Organization, its Charter and its resolutions.

(3) To speak of peace and practise war and lawlessness has always been an "interesting" facet of Israeli diplomacy. The Israeli concept of peace was not long ago reiterated by Mr. Tekoah himself. On the occasion of the "twenty-third anniversary of Israel"—which corresponds to the twenty-third anniversary of the destitution of the Arab people of Palestine—Mr. Tekoah had the following to say as reported by the *Israel Digest* (Volume XIV, No. 9) of 30 April 1971:

"[The] Great Powers and international organizations still erroneously believe that the idea that

Israel might yet agree to a settlement 'contrary to its will and interests has not yet been abandoned'.

"Declaring that 'in no part of the world have international borders been eternally frozen and immutable, that there have been boundary changes on all continents, and that Israel will be an exception . . .'"

(4) In his attempt to impose Zionist tutelage over Syrian citizens of the Jewish faith, the Israeli representative sought to divert attention from the plight of oriental Jews in Israel itself.

Official Israeli pronouncements, press and eyewitness reports from Israel amply substantiate the fact that the Israeli authorities are practising racial discrimination, economic deprivation, social and cultural segregation against Jews of oriental descent. World public opinion, which was shocked by these revelations, was also able to draw its own conclusions as to the treatment of Arabs in Israel and in territories occupied since June 1967.

(5) Mr. Tekoah chose to reiterate a deceitful propagandistic slogan which seeks to smear national liberation movements. To pretend that zionism may have any affinity whatsoever with "liberation movements" is tantamount to accepting the claim that the racist exclusivist colonial-settlers' régimes of Pretoria and Salisbury are also liberation movements.

The common denominator among these three régimes is that, in their distorted conception of life, "liberation" is synonymous with usurpation of the rights of the original inhabitants of the land they occupy by force. As long as their exclusivist racist aims are not entirely fulfilled, these régimes will continue to wage their colonial aggression under the guise of "national liberation".

\* Also circulated as a General Assembly document under the symbol A/8329.

\*\* Incorporating document S/10238/Corr.1.

C. L. Sulzberger reported in his editorial article "Strange nonalliance" in *The New York Times* of 30 April 1971, that "Prime Minister Vorster even goes so far as to say Israel is now faced with an *apartheid* problem—how to handle its Arab inhabitants". The article added, "Both South Africa and Israel are in a sense intruded States".

The only deduction from such a view is that as the original inhabitants are intruders, they should therefore be evicted and segregated. The best elucidation of the Israel lexicon on "liberation" is to be found in Israeli sources criticizing the imperialist policies of Israel. The following is quoted from *Israel Imperial News* of 1/9 March 1968:

"Liberated areas have a magnificent history. During the Second World War, for example, Hitler liberated a large part of the Soviet Union from the Communists. He also liberated Austria from the

Austrians, France from the French, the Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia, and so on. At the end, of course, the Allies liberated Germany from Hitler and created two German States (so that Germany would never again be able to liberate). Previously, Mussolini had liberated Libya from the Libyans and Ethiopia from the Ethiopians. In Jerusalem, a few months ago, an attempt was made to liberate several houses in Abu-Tor, but the police did not allow this: it is illegal to liberate unless it is done to entire countries or at least to sizable portions of them."

I should be grateful if this letter could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

(Signed) Rafic JOUEJATI  
Chargé d'Affaires a.i.  
of Syria to the United Nations

## DOCUMENT S/10239

### Letter dated 24 June 1971 from the representative of Turkey to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]  
[25 June 1971]

Mr. Rossides's custom in epistolary endeavour for dissolving the historical, contractual, multinational realities of Cyprus behind a screen of verbal emotionalism seems to have reached its peak in his latest letter addressed to you [S/10230].

With a broad sweep of the pen, he dubs Turkey's continued interest in its kinsmen in the creation of the independent State of Cyprus as "imperialistic design", obviously trying to obscure reality behind this well-known emotional battle cry. Likewise, with a black smear, he tries to convert Turkey's contractually and universally acknowledged legitimate relationship with the Turkish Cypriots as "interventionism", obviously seeking the same emotive response in order to hide the fact that the Turkish Cypriot community constitutes one of the two indispensable pillars on which the continued independence of Cyprus rests. Finally, he attempts to subvert Turkey's "national cause" in the perpetuation of the independence of the Cypriot State, obviously gambling on the historical disrespect of "national causes" as a magic inversion of his readers' logic. If semblance could be taken for reality, Mr. Rossides's latest epistolary brick-laying could, indeed, build an unassailable castle; but, unfortunately, the pressure of reality, both historic and actual, is too grave to allow even a momentary illusion.

Historically, the international acts that gave birth to Cyprus as an independent State and on which the independence of Cyprus inevitably necessarily continues to rest, record Turkey's unavoidable national interest in Cyprus. More precisely, the Treaty of

Alliance<sup>38</sup> affirms the link between the security of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey. Furthermore, in the same treaty, the Republic of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey assert that their mutual efforts for the preservation of their security are in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

The main theme and the supplementary arguments of Mr. Rossides are also refuted by the records and resolutions of the United Nations itself. It suffices to cite one example. Security Council resolution 186 (1964) of 14 March 1964 records and affirms lucidly Turkey's national connexion and national interest in the past, present and future status of Cyprus.

Mr. Rossides must entertain a very healthy respect indeed for his epistolary powers of obfuscation when he seeks to deny Turkey all interest in Cyprus, in face of the international acts of inception as well as the records and resolutions of the United Nations, which require Turkey's participation in every phase of the solution of the problem of Cyprus. Turkey's only desire remains, as always, the re-establishment of the order based on law, human rights and freedom, and of the peace disturbed by the Greek Cypriot side.

I should be grateful if this letter could be circulated to all Member States as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) U. Halûk BAYÜLKEN  
Permanent Representative of  
Turkey to the United Nations

<sup>38</sup> Treaty of Alliance between the Kingdom of Greece, the Republic of Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 397 (1961), No. 5712).

DOCUMENT S/10240

Letter dated 22 June 1971 from the representative of Finland  
to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]  
[25 June 1971]

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you the following statement of the Government of Finland, issued on 22 June 1971:

"The Government of Finland has noted with satisfaction the opinion of the International Court of Justice given on 21 June 1971, in answer to the question put by the Security Council of the United Nations on the legal consequences for States of the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia notwithstanding Security Council resolution 276 (1970). It will be recalled that the Security Council decision to request an opinion from the International Court of Justice was adopted on the initiative of Finland.

"The International Court of Justice has now stated unequivocally that, the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia being illegal, South Africa is under obligation to withdraw its administration from Namibia immediately and thus put an end to its occupation of the Territory. The Court has also given clear guidance to other States on their obligation with respect to Namibia.

"The Finnish Government has already made it clear to the Government of South Africa that it considers South Africa's presence in Namibia illegal. The Finnish Government will of course continue to refrain from any acts, and in particular any dealings with the Government of South Africa, im-

plying recognition of the legality of, or lending support or assistance to, the South African presence and administration in Namibia.

"In presenting to the Security Council the proposal to request an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice, the representative of Finland said:

"It is important . . . to expose the false front of legality which South African authorities attempt to present to the world. This would help the United Nations and the Governments of Member States to mobilize public opinion in their countries—especially in those countries which have the power to influence events in southern Africa in a decisive way.' [1550th meeting, para. 41.]

"The Finnish Government believes that the opinion now delivered by the Court effectively disposes of the issue of legality and should have a powerful impact on world public opinion. It will also provide an important element for the further consideration of the question of Namibia in the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations."

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Max JAKOBSON  
Permanent Representative of Finland  
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/10244

Letter dated 30 June 1971 from the representative of Israel  
to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English]  
[30 June 1971]

On instructions from my Government I have the honour to refer to my letter to you of 21 June 1971 [S/10231], concerning acts of aggression committed against Israel from Lebanese territory and to draw your urgent attention to the fact that such attacks are continuing and have been intensified.

Yesterday, 29 June, fire was opened from Lebanese territory on an Israel patrol in the Misgav Am area. The Israeli forces returned fire. In the ensuing clash the Israeli forces crossed the cease-fire line in pursuit after the attackers.

This latest act of aggression from Lebanese territory was preceded by a series of other assaults. The armed attacks reported in my letter of 21 June were followed by almost daily acts of hostility:

On 20 June, bazooka and small-arms fire was opened from Lebanese territory on an army patrol in the Zarit area.

On 22 June, a terror squad crossed the cease-fire line and sabotaged a generator in the El Ajar village.

On 24 June, a terror squad tried to penetrate into Israel in the Har Dov area. It was intercepted by an Israeli patrol. Three of the attackers were killed, one wounded.

On 25 June, saboteurs from Lebanon placed explosive charges under a water culvert near the village of Malkia.

The intensification of aggression from Lebanon is explained as follows by the Lebanese newspaper *Nida Al Watan* of 15 March 1971:

"Three thousand armed terrorist entered Lebanon during the month of February. They continued to enter Lebanon also after February and are concentrating with arms and equipment in sensitive areas."

As stated in previous letters, Israel's policy is based on the scrupulous observance of the cease-fire on condition of reciprocity. This entails the obligation of the Government of Lebanon to prevent armed attacks of any kind whatsoever from Lebanese territory against the territory and population of Israel. I must reiterate that the Government of Israel reserves its right of self-defence to protect its territory and citizens from such attacks.

I have the honour to request that this letter should be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Yosef TEKOAH  
Permanent Representative of Israel  
to the United Nations

Letter dated 30 June 1971 from the representative of Malta to the President of the Security Council transmitting the text of a statement by the Government of Malta concerning its relations with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

[Original: English]  
[30 June 1971]

On the instructions of my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of a statement by the Government of Malta concerning certain misleading reports which have appeared recently in the foreign press in connexion with Malta's relations with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this communication circulated as a Security Council document.

(Signed) A. J. BELLIZI  
*Acting Permanent Representative of Malta  
to the United Nations*

#### STATEMENT BY THE GOVERNMENT OF MALTA

Contrary to what has appeared recently in the foreign press concerning the 1964 Defence Agreement,<sup>39</sup> this agreement is no longer in being. It was denounced by the Maltese Nationalist Government in 1967 during the run-down dispute and was only replaced by verbal arrangements. These arrangements may, according to international law, be terminated by a simple notice. Therefore the question of a unilateral abrogation of a treaty by the Maltese Government does not arise.

The Labour Government was recently returned to power on the strength of an electoral programme which clearly outlined its foreign policy. The position of British forces in Malta must now be governed by fresh arrangements which will safeguard Malta's sovereignty and ensure a secure and higher living standard for the Maltese people.

No action has been taken by the Maltese Government to which it is not entitled under international law and for which it has no clear mandate.

<sup>39</sup> See *Malta: Proposed Agreement on Mutual Defence and Assistance* (London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1964, Cmnd. 2410).

The Maltese Government could even have ordered the withdrawal of all British forces from Malta; it has preferred not to do so in order that Britain could be given an opportunity for new arrangements to be properly discussed and finalized.

The British Government, after having reluctantly accepted to hold talks, is now trying to play for time. For reasons best known to Britain, the British High Commissioner has gone back on his promise and delayed his consultations with his Government by 24 hours. In the meantime the British press has undertaken a campaign to browbeat the Government of Malta into submission.

The position of NATO is even weaker than that of the British forces. All NATO has is a provisional and limited permission which should have led to some form of arrangements that were never concluded. The great interest now shown by NATO in its relations with Malta is not understood by the Maltese Government. NATO in the past refused Malta membership or associate status and was not even prepared to consider an observer status.

It is also useful to clarify the position of the American Fleet. There is no treaty or agreement between the Government of Malta and the United States Government giving the American Sixth Fleet the right to take shelter in Maltese harbours. A request by the American Ambassador for units of this fleet to enter Malta was submitted to the Maltese Government on 9 June 1971. The Maltese Government does not consider such visits to be in the interests of Malta for the time being. The State Department has not asked for any further explanations and is not entitled to any.

This statement is being issued to make the main facts known to the foreign press, in particular to the British and Italian press to whom biased information was purposely leaked to bring pressure upon the Maltese Government.



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