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NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

Documents of the Security Council (symbol S/. . .) are normally published in quarterly *Supplements of the Official Records of the Security Council*. The date of the document indicates the supplement in which it appears or in which information about it is given.

The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a system adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council*. The new system, which has been applied retroactively to resolutions adopted before 1 January 1965, became fully operative on that date.

THIRTEEN HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-FIFTH MEETING

Held in New York on Wednesday, 20 December 1967, at 3 p.m.

President: Chief S. O. ADEBO (Nigeria).

Present: The representatives of the following States: Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Denmark, Ethiopia, France, India, Japan, Mali, Nigeria, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1385/Rev.2)

1. Adoption of the agenda
2. Letter dated 26 December 1963 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/5488):
Report by the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus (S/8286).

**Tribute to the memory of Mr. Harold Holt,
Prime Minister of Australia**

**Tribute to the memory of Mr. Leon M'Ba,
President of the Gabonese Republic**

**Tribute to the memory of Mr. V. I. Kozlov, Chairman of
the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Byelorussian
Soviet Socialist Republic**

**Tribute to the memory of General Oscar D. Gestido,
President of the Eastern Republic of Uruguay**

1. The PRESIDENT: Members of the Security Council have learned with deepest regret of the tragic death last Sunday of the Prime Minister of Australia, Mr. Harold Holt. I feel that the Council would wish me to express the condolences of all present here to the Australian delegation and to ask it to be good enough to convey them to Mrs. Holt and to the Government and people of Australia.

2. In this connexion I also feel it incumbent on me as President of the Council to express the sympathy that we all feel on the loss in the course of the present month of His Excellency Mr. Leon M'Ba, President of the Gabonese Republic, of His Excellency Mr. Vasily Ivanovich Kozlov, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, and of His Excellency Mr. Oscar D. Gestido, President of the Eastern Republic of Uruguay.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

Letter dated 26 December 1963 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/5488):

Report by the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus (S/8286)

3. The PRESIDENT: Communications have been received from the representatives of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey requesting to be invited to participate, without vote, in the Council's discussion of this agenda item. Those communications are contained in documents S/8298, S/8299 and S/8305. In accordance with the usual practice of the Council, if I hear no objection I propose to invite those three representatives to take their places at the Council table in order to participate in the discussion.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. S. Kyprianou (Cyprus), Mr. O. Eralp (Turkey) and Mr. A. S. Bitsios (Greece) took places at the Council table.

4. The PRESIDENT: I should like to draw the attention of the Council to the communication dated 12 December 1967 [S/8293]¹ from the Permanent Representative of Turkey in which it is requested that Mr. Osman Örek be given an opportunity to be heard.

5. In this connexion, I should like to recall that on a previous occasion—in February 1964 to be exact—the representative of Turkey made a similar request to the Council in respect of another Cypriot. On that occasion the Council decided [1098th meeting] after some discussion, to grant a hearing to the person concerned under rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure, and he was so heard. Again in August 1965 [1235th meeting] an application was made on behalf of the same person to be heard under rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure, and again the application was so granted.

6. On the present occasion, I have had consultations with members of the Council. It is my understanding that, in view of the past precedents on the question of Cyprus to which I have drawn attention, the Council is agreeable, on the same basis as before, to hear Mr. Örek, that is to say, to hear him under rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure. In order to avoid any obscurity in the matter I shall read out rule 39:

“The Security Council may invite members of the Secretariat or other persons, whom it considers com-

¹ Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-second Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1967.

petent for the purpose, to supply it with information or to give other assistance in examining matters within its competence."

7. Unless I hear any objection, I shall take it that the Council is prepared to give a hearing to Mr. Örek under rule 39.

It was so decided.

8. The PRESIDENT: I shall call upon Mr. Örek when his time comes to address the Council.

9. The Security Council will now take up the examination of the question in the light of the report on the United Nations operations in Cyprus [S/8286] for the period 13 June to 8 December 1967 submitted by the Secretary-General. The first speaker inscribed on the list of speakers is the Foreign Minister of Cyprus. I now give him the floor.

10. Mr. KYPRIANOU (Cyprus): First of all I wish to express my Government's and my country's deep appreciation for the continuous interest of the Security Council in the Cyprus problem. It is not my intention at this stage to make a long speech. I should merely like to make a statement of position in the light of the report of the Secretary-General and in the light of the present situation.

11. It is the feeling, I believe, that the Security Council has been convened today not merely for the purpose of extending the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force—although this is the immediate objective—nor to examine conflicting arguments—that is my feeling—relating to any specific incidents that have taken place. It is my firm impression that all members of the Council share the same deep concern and agree on the urgent need for positive progress towards removing the danger to peace and thus paving the way to a peaceful and lasting solution.

12. We have before us today two courses open. One is to engage in an acrimonious and endless debate, full of polemics, on the rights and wrongs relating to the recent crisis or on other related issues. This would mean in a way reopening the debate which took place in the Council on 24 and 25 November 1967 [1383rd meeting]. As a result of that debate, the Council stated its views through the expression of its consensus. It would not therefore serve, in my view, any useful purpose to reopen the same debate.

13. The second course which is open to us is to start from the conclusion of the previous debate and approach the present situation in a constructive, objective and responsible manner, and try to reach conclusions as to how best we can create the necessary peaceful conditions in which a lasting and just solution could be arrived at. I am determined, in so far as it depends on me, to follow the second course.

14. In assessing the outcome of the recent crisis, of which the Council is well aware, much has been said and written as to who came out of it victorious and who was defeated. This may be of some value in terms of the internal politics of each Government, but it is not the issue with which

responsible people should be primarily concerned. Especially it is not of any interest to the Security Council. The Security Council is concerned, as indeed we are, with removing the basic causes of this conflict, for it is realized that as long as this is not accomplished peace cannot be secure, and the objectives of the Council, wider and specific, cannot be achieved.

15. There are, in our view, certain basic elements that must be borne in mind, some of which relate in the same way to any similar situation, and some of which relate to the particular case of Cyprus. One of the basic elements, one of the basic foundations, one of the basic underlying factors in the Cyprus situation, is that it must be accepted that the problem cannot be solved through war.

16. It must also be accepted that talks or negotiations cannot be conducted fruitfully under the threat of an ultimatum or under the threat of invasion. This method cannot be condoned. If this method is tolerated or allowed by the Security Council, the responsibility for the grave consequences thereof will have to be borne not alone by the country that employs it.

17. Another basic element in the situation is that it is the imperative duty of all of us to do our utmost for the preservation and safeguarding of peace. That is a cause that is not ours alone; it is the cause of all humanity.

18. We, for our part, are fully conscious of our responsibilities, which we are prepared to discharge in the most constructive way possible. If we all agree that this is to be our starting-point, if we accept this genuinely and in good faith, I am confident we can succeed.

19. It must also be borne in mind that in any conflict the cause of peace does not call for one-sided concessions, particularly on the part of the weaker party.

20. This brings me to the outcome of the recent crisis, or to the issues relating to that outcome. The Greek Government and the Turkish Government have agreed to withdraw from Cyprus troops in excess of their respective contingents, as a first step, along the lines of the appeal made by the Secretary-General on 24 November 1967, addressed to the Governments of Greece, Turkey and Cyprus [S/8248/Add.5]. What is the meaning of this action? Its meaning is that a quite considerable number of Greek troops are withdrawing from Cyprus. And what is the result? The result is a vacuum.

21. It may be argued that the withdrawal of Greek forces from Cyprus along the lines agreed upon may be a contribution to the cause of peace. I would be prepared to agree with that if that action did not stop there, if that decision and that action were not related to something else and were not complemented. The fact that there has also been a need for an essential and effective guarantee against the possibility of external attack against Cyprus comes out more imperatively now than ever before. No one can deny or question the right of the Greek Government to withdraw its troops from Cyprus; but neither can anyone deny our anxiety regarding the vacuum that has been created. It is therefore more imperative now than ever before that an

effective guarantee be provided against the possibility of an external attack upon Cyprus. This would indeed be a contribution to the cause of peace. We are aware of the fact that a number of countries were not displeased with the agreement for the withdrawal of Greek troops; but it is essential that the same attitude be shown with regard to the necessity for the guarantee.

22. Our position has been and still is as described in the reply of the President of the Republic of Cyprus to the relevant appeal of the Secretary-General. We acknowledge the agreement between Greece and Turkey to withdraw their troops in excess of their contingents as a first step along the lines of that appeal. Starting from that basis, we take the view that it would be in the interest of peace if there were a complete withdrawal of Greek and Turkish troops from Cyprus accompanied by a guarantee against external attack.

23. What is the reason for leaving in Cyprus a few Greek troops and a few Turkish troops? Is it a legal problem? Our position on the Treaty is well known in this Council and I shall not repeat it unless it is necessary. But even if we take the other line, that the two contingents have gone to Cyprus on the basis of the Treaty, there still is nothing in the Treaty which obliged Greece and Turkey to have troops in Cyprus. Therefore, it is a question of willingness to make a contribution to the cause of peace.

24. Having said what I had to say on the question of the withdrawal of troops, as the matter stands at the moment, I must emphasize that it is, in our view, absolutely essential that the withdrawal of non-Cypriot troops from Cyprus be complete, if the cause of peace is to be served.

25. We have been asked to disarm internally. We have been asked to dismantle the National Guard. However, the idea that the National Guard should be dismantled, with Greek and Turkish troops still remaining in Cyprus and with Cyprus having no guarantee against external attack, would be, in my humble submission, neither logical nor proper.

26. But we would say this: in our effort, in our desire, in our earnest endeavour to contribute to the maximum possible degree to the cause of peace and the removal of the sources of conflict, we would be prepared to consider the question of complete internal disarmament if this were accompanied by the complete withdrawal of non-Cypriot troops and by the necessary security against external attack.

27. It has been said, again, that if we disarm internally, there will be no possibility of internal conflict, and therefore there will be no need for any external guarantee because there will be no threat from outside. But even if this is the construction which some place on the situation, what harm would there be, in their view, in having a guarantee against external attack, a guarantee which would make people in Cyprus feel safe?

28. We have to tackle this vicious circle, otherwise we shall not get anywhere. I can argue the question, but for argument's sake I accept, that a large number of the Turkish minority in Cyprus fear the majority. I repeat, I

could argue on that, but I accept it for argument's sake. But who can deny that there is also a fear felt by the majority of the population of Cyprus against the possibility of external danger and external attack? For anyone to propose that we deal with one fear and leave the other aside does not—with all due respect—contribute to the cause of peace. The cause of peace, as I said at the beginning, does not call for one-sided concessions. This has always been so, with every problem in history, but it is particularly true in the case of Cyprus.

29. Questions of an internal nature in Cyprus, questions of an internal nature in relation to any country, would have been properly regarded by the Government of that country as internal and, therefore, would not constitute a subject for discussion. However, we would be prepared to discuss and consult on internal questions such as that of disarmament, as we have made quite clear; but we should not be expected to discuss and consult on questions of an internal nature unrelated to the other issues which are of vital importance to us. We are ready to discuss, within the framework of the United Nations, any constructive proposal, any objective proposal, if it is aimed at reducing tensions and removing the causes of friction which in turn, as we believe, would pave the way towards a peaceful solution. We have proved this in the deliberations both in this Council and in the General Assembly. We have proved it in the course of the mediation efforts by the United Nations Mediator who was appointed by the Secretary-General on the basis of the Council's resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964. And may I remind the Council that the mediation efforts were not interrupted because of our stand. We are ready to discuss in good faith and with goodwill, but we refused in the past, and we refuse now, to be committed to anything before discussion takes place. We shall discuss everything, subject to the basic necessity of the sovereignty of Cyprus and the sovereign rights of the Government of Cyprus.

30. We realize that the general opinion is that this recent crisis, unfortunate though it was, at least gave some impetus to an effort to reach a solution of the Cyprus problem, and it is the duty of statesmen, the duty of responsible people, to try to make the best of a bad situation. We are ready to go forward within the framework of the United Nations.

31. The question has been asked: why within the framework of the United Nations? Both for reasons of principle as well as for reasons of realism. First of all, we are dedicated to the United Nations and its principles. Second, the Security Council is seized of the problem and it maintains a peace-keeping force in Cyprus. Third, the Security Council, when taking a decision on stationing a peace-keeping force in Cyprus, also decided on the procedure to be followed to reach a solution to the problem. Fourth, Cyprus is a small country and solutions to the problems of small countries can and should be found within the framework of the United Nations and its Charter.

32. In this context, having several times stated clearly the position of my Government on the question of external threat, on the question of the withdrawal of all non-Cypriot troops, on the internal questions, and on the question of our attitude concerning the procedure for reaching a

solution to the problem of Cyprus, I should like to make it quite clear that, although in the past, for reasons which we explained on the appropriate occasions, we did not raise any objections, we shall not now consent to any new bilateral effort between Greece and Turkey with regard to the Cyprus problem.

33. We must emphasize that the Cyprus problem is not a problem between Greece and Turkey; it is not a dispute between Greece and Turkey. It is a problem that concerns the people of Cyprus. This is the framework of our position.

34. Depending on the development of the debates and on the deliberations and the views expressed by the members of this Council—which we are ready to hear with an open mind—I shall present any further opinions that I may have.

35. The PRESIDENT: I call on the representative of Turkey to make a statement.

36. Mr. ERALP (Turkey): This is perhaps the most momentous meeting of the Security Council on the question of Cyprus since the meetings in early March 1964 when the United Nations embarked on one of its most spectacular efforts at peace-keeping. We meet in the aftermath of a crisis which brought the parties involved to the brink of a calamity which has been avoided for the immediate future through a timely appeal of the Secretary-General and the discreet but extremely valuable intercession of his Special Representative for the occasion, the able Under-Secretary, Mr. Rolz-Bennett; through the untiring efforts of Governments which are friends of all the parties and have the peace of the area at heart; through the persistent and valuable efforts of Mr. Cyrus Vance, the personal representative of President Johnson, and finally, through the realistic and statesmanlike approach of two neighbouring countries to a situation fraught with danger for both of them.

37. What makes this meeting of the Security Council on Cyprus crucial to the settlement of the problem is the fact that it is the outcome of this session which will decide whether, in the words of the Secretary-General, we shall continue "from crisis to deeper crisis and from danger to graver danger", or whether the Council will face its responsibilities and provide for the adoption of effective measures for the maintenance of peace on the Island.

38. The events of the last six months, as well as the bloody incidents of the last few weeks, have been thoroughly reported to the Council in the usually objective manner in the reports of the Secretary-General, so that there is no need for me to go into them again. My Government is grateful to the Secretary-General, and to his able collaborators—the Commander of UNFICYP, General Martola, and his Special Representative in Cyprus, Mr. Osorio-Tafall—for all they have done in these troubled days in order to dispel tensions on the Island. We also continue to appreciate the contribution to the cause of peace afforded by those countries which provide troops and other facilities to UNFICYP.

39. The reports of the Secretary-General, while they convey accurate and factual accounts of the eventful days

in mid-November, do not of course contain any analysis of the political background and motives behind the pre-meditated assault on the two Turkish villages in Cyprus. Nor perhaps is it proper that they should. But it would be appropriate for me once again to point to the root of the trouble, and for that reason I was glad when Foreign Minister Kyprianou referred to the removal of the basic causes of the conflict.

40. The recent violent eruption against the two villages in Cyprus is but a symptom of the real disease; it is but a link in the chain of events which relentlessly pushes the Island towards calamity. The real disease is the unshaken and unshakable determination that lies in the hearts of the Greek-Cypriot ruling clique to bring about *enosis*—the annexation of the Island to Greece by any means, fair or foul. It is a credit to the resourcefulness of the political archbishop who rules the Greek part of Cyprus that he has succeeded in convincing even the most discerning observers of the proposition that he is merely paying lip-service to the cause of *enosis*, while in fact he wishes to maintain the independence of the island republic. Those countries and statesmen who sincerely wish to see the Island remain independent are too ready to believe that the desire for *enosis* is on the wane. They either ignore, or find it convenient to ignore, the solemn oath on the Holy Trinity taken by Archbishop Makarios, a prince of the church, to work for ever for *enosis*—an oath which was renewed in the Saint Synod of the Greek Orthodox Church only two years ago—to say nothing of the unanimous decision taken by the Greek members of the Cyprus Parliament only last June to pursue relentlessly the cause of *enosis*.

41. Such countries and statements, by lending themselves to the international machinations of the Greek-Cypriot Administration, are, perhaps unwittingly, lending their services to the realization of a cause which they abhor.

42. The attack on the two Turkish villages last month was a well-calculated, premeditated step in the systematic march towards *enosis*. If the recurrence of such acts is not effectively prevented by the Council, the fanatical urge for *enosis* will strike again and again with a view to wearing out the resistance of the beleaguered but unsubmissive Turkish citizens of the Republic.

43. It is entirely wrong to lay the blame for the attack on Ayios Theodoros or Kophinou on the impulsive action of an impulsive general. The Greek-Cypriot Administration is involved in it up to the hilt, as they, too, give their blessing to the assault. The general in question has now left the Island, but the Council should know that the cause for which he strived, the struggle which has brought us to the brink of calamity, has not gone with him. It is up to the Council to take measures to prevent the recurrence of such international crimes in the name of territorial aggrandizement.

44. Ever since the beginning of the recent crisis, my Government has acted with the ultimate objective of bringing peace to the Island, and a peaceful settlement to the problem of Cyprus. We had conceived this action in three stages. The first was the obvious and immediate necessity for the withdrawal from the Island of foreign

troops infiltrated over and above the Greek and Turkish contingents which are stationed there under valid international treaties, and which shall remain there unless and until a negotiated final settlement of the question may stipulate otherwise. This first stage is now, happily, in the process of realization.

45. The second stage must, of necessity, be that of bringing genuine peaceful and normal conditions to the Island, with the disarming and disbanding of illegal troops mustered in violation of the Island's Constitution in order to subdue by force of arms the Turkish community. This stage will necessarily involve, in our view, a more active role for the UNFICYP. And the realization of this second stage will depend on the constructive directions which this Council might wish to issue in its resolution.

46. The final stage will come when, under peaceful conditions and without any attempts at the forcible imposition of political views, the parties—all the parties, including the Turkish community—will proceed, either under the institutions provided by the United Nations, or otherwise, to negotiate for an agreed solution and a peaceful settlement.

47. This meeting of the Council will therefore be decisive as to the realization of the second stage—namely, the pacification of the Island.

48. The Council will have to face the bitter fact that, ever since its creation in March 1964, the Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus, while it has been able to avert escalations into a major holocaust and has worked assiduously for bringing about normal conditions, has been unable to prevent major military aggression by the Greek Cypriots every time the spirit moved them to attack. It is sad but true that the recent assault on the two villages, which cost the lives of twenty-nine Turks, including women and children, could have been averted had the UNFICYP had the necessary authority at its disposal. How could it have been averted?

49. In the first place, at least the permanent members of the Security Council will recall that, in the early days of its deliberations on this subject, I submitted to the Council, and I submit again, that the mandate of the UNFICYP, as spelled out in the Council resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964, gave it much more authority than it chose to exercise. One obvious case in point was the illegal infiltration of foreign troops and heavy armaments into the Island. Resolution 186 (1964), in calling upon "the communities in Cyprus and their leaders to act with the utmost restraint", certainly did not intend one of those communities to bring a foreign army of occupation onto its soil or to purchase from abroad weapons of mass destruction to be used against the other community. Again, under its mandate of "preventing a recurrence of fighting", it seemed to us, as I then submitted to the Council, that the UNFICYP was in duty bound to prevent the importation of arms which were destined to be used in such fighting. The explanation that those arms were imported for defence against external attack has been exploded time and again when such heavy weapons were used in each case of Greek Cypriot assault against the Turkish community, such as in the most recent incidents. And, even in the latest incidents,

the UNFICYP was or must have been fully aware of the large-scale military preparations of the Greek Cypriots obviously about to be sent against the two Turkish villages, but could not even inform the Cypriot-Turks of such preparations so that they might have had immediate recourse to the Security Council. Such information was denied to them on the grounds that it would constitute the divulging of military information of the Government of Cyprus. Not only did UNFICYP not prevent the import of murder weapons to the Island, but was even reluctant to report it to the Security Council on the same grounds.

50. Such implementation of the mandate of the Peace-keeping Force stems from a strict interpretation of the concept of sovereignty. As I have submitted to the Council of previous occasions, one thing should be clear: If a Government feels the need for a peace-keeping force on its soil and invites such a force, that Government has thereby voluntarily and inevitably limited its sovereignty to the extent that it can no longer act in such a way as to make it impossible for that force to keep the peace. When your children are fighting with knives in your garden and you ask a policeman to come in and stop the fight, you cannot ask him not to use his stick or not to walk on your flower beds. Such narrow concepts have brought us to the edge of a holocaust time and again, and are certain to bring us there again.

51. A grave responsibility lies on the shoulders of the Greek Cypriot Administration, not only for its misdeeds of the past but also for the policy which it may choose to follow in the crucial months or even weeks ahead. If it persists in its dogged march towards *enosis*, if it continues to plead sovereignty for criminal assault, if it continues to attempt to tear up valid international treaties solemnly and freely signed by its President and Vice-President in the name of the people of Cyprus, to resort to violence in order to impose its political concepts by force, and if it refuses to proceed peacefully to disarm the illegal bands which may again be used as an instrument of policy, we shall without a doubt be faced again with another crisis, or other crises. Such a crisis will be due not to anything which Turkey may do but to the intransigence of the Greek Cypriot régime which has never, I repeat never, heeded the many calls of this Council for moderation and restraint. On the other hand, if the Greek Administration chooses the path of peaceful solution and agreed settlement, as envisaged in resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964, the functions of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus will be clearly defined.

52. Here are some of the points which the Council might wish to ponder with regard to the functions of the force:

(1) The force was never intended to be and never can be an instrument of either of the parties locked in communal strife in Cyprus, whether it calls itself the Government of Cyprus or the Turkish community.

(2) The force should be instructed and allowed formally to observe and report to the Secretary-General and thereby to the Council any influx of arms into or from the Island. It is inconceivable that it would be able to function effective-

ly for peace-keeping behind a veil of secrecy as to arms built up on the Island.

(3) The force should be in a position to inform the Council instantly of any troop concentrations obviously poised for assault on the other community, as in the case of Ayios Theodoros.

(4) The force should be called upon to observe and supervise the disarming of all forces on the Island illegally constituted after December 1963, in accordance with an agreed time-table, and should take into custody the arms so abandoned.

(5) The force should have complete and unhindered freedom of access to all parts of the Island.

(6) The force should ensure the safety and freedoms of all citizens on all roads.

(7) It should be clearly understood that neither before nor after the measures of disarmament the force is not, I repeat not, intended to supplant the authority of either the Greek-Cypriot Government or the Turkish community in areas under their respective control. It is intended not to act as an international police force but to prevent communal strife and to forestall the preparations for continued strife. After disarmament each community will obviously continue to maintain law and order in areas under its control until such time as a peaceful settlement is negotiated and the Republic can return to constitutional government with authority over the entire territory of the Republic.

53. Those are in our view the minimum functions which the UNFICYP must be called upon to perform, either through an unequivocal clarification of its existing mandate or under new and broader functions which may be assigned to it, through agreement between the parties, with a clear call from this Council and, as necessary, with the proffered good offices of the Secretary-General.

54. A United Nations peace-keeping force hamstrung by narrow concepts can do no more than maintain a growingly explosive *status quo*, and may even prolong for ever a final peaceful settlement, by giving a false sense of security.

55. I submit, that it is up to the Council at this crucial session to face its responsibilities. If the Council chooses to evade the issues and bring forth a resolution which—as has, alas, happened all too often in the past—the parties may interpret in their own tendentious way and which would provide a licence for them to continue to strive by means of their own choosing, then without a doubt the grounds for new and graver crises will have been laid.

56. I urgently appeal to the Council to face the issues and prepare the terrain not only for effective peace-keeping but for voluntary peace-making, in good faith.

57. The PRESIDENT: I call upon the representative of Greece.

58. Mr. BITSIOS (Greece) (*translated from French*): The Security Council has before it the Secretary-General's

report of 8 December (S/8286). Among the questions raised in this document, the most urgent is that which concerns the extension of the mandate of the United Nations Emergency Force.

59. The Secretary-General notes that the situation in Cyprus remains precarious. He adds that the renewal of the mandate of the Emergency Force is one obvious step towards the maintenance of peace in Cyprus and recommends that the mandate be extended for another period of six or three months.

60. The Secretary-General has first-hand knowledge of the situation and has largely contributed to preventing the outbreak of armed conflict. On behalf of the Greek Government I should like to thank him, as well as the Under-Secretary, Mr. Rolz-Bennett, whose contribution to the solution of the crisis was greatly appreciated in Greece.

61. Given the present situation in Cyprus, as described in the Secretary-General's report, and in view of the recommendation which resulted from that situation, it is obvious that the Greek Government cannot but hope for the continued presence of the Force on the Island. But the Force is not an end in itself. It was sent to Cyprus to help restore peace in the region and facilitate the search for a solution to the Cyprus problem.

62. Quite recently I had the opportunity to tell the Council of the Greek Government's efforts to that end. Greece has deferred to the appeals made by the Secretary-General and has complied with the requests of the United Nations. In so doing, it has in turn acquired the moral right to call on the Security Council to fill the existing gap in the Island's defences against an attack from abroad; for we must not harbour the illusion that the threat against Cyprus will miraculously disappear through the very fact of the withdrawal of the Greek forces. That threat existed long before the presence of those forces on the Island and was in fact the very reason for their presence. Cyprus has been living under the threat of invasion ever since 1963. That was the date of the first offensive movement of the Turkish armed forces. Haunted by the constant presence of the Turkish fleet in its territorial waters and of Turkish aircraft in its air space, Cyprus was bombarded in August 1964, and, in the absence of effective international protection, appealed to Greece. If such protection had been forthcoming, Cyprus would not have needed to turn to Greece for help.

63. I leave it to the members of the Council to reflect upon this and to lay the blame where it is due. What we are asking from the Council at the moment is that it should not repeat the errors of the past, that it should take the necessary preventative measures today so that we shall not need tomorrow to bemoan a *fait accompli*.

64. When the time comes, my delegation will propose to the Council the measures which we believe should be taken. For the present, I shall merely draw attention to the serious threat which continues to hang over Cyprus and point out the path which the United Nations should follow, after the positive response Greece has given to this appeal.

65. The Secretary-General's report contains certain elements which, with the assistance of the Council, might encourage us to embark upon a constructive phase of common effort, instead of undergoing a series of ever-recurring crises, each one more acute and more dangerous than the last. In Part VII of the report, under the heading "Observations", the Secretary-General, drawing upon his wealth of experience of the complexities of the problem, outlines three main ideas: (1) the expeditious withdrawal of all Greek and Turkish forces in excess of their respective contingents, and the ultimate withdrawal of all non-Cypriot armed forces, other than those of the United Nations; (2) the positive demilitarization of Cyprus under United Nations control and the devising of practical arrangements to safeguard the internal security of the people of Cyprus; (3) positive steps in the search for a durable solution of the Cyprus question. To that end, the good offices of the Secretary-General are available to the parties and to the Security Council.

66. Here we have a sufficiently broad field of action to enable positive steps to be taken in the right direction. It should be the task of each one of us to work out arrangements which would consolidate peace and security in the region, taking into account the sovereign right of the Republic of Cyprus. Above all we need goodwill. Here I should like to offer assurances that Greece, for its part, will give positive support to such an effort. I should like to express the hope that we all have the same objective at heart.

67. I had formulated that hope on paper, and so I was very disappointed just now upon hearing the Turkish representative's statement; I was disappointed both by its tone and by its content. Mr. Eralp has gone back to the old refrain which we are so accustomed to hearing on his lips, that of *enosis*. He clings to that argument because it works in his favour. I have given my reply so many times since 1963 to 1964 that I shall now confine myself to asking him a question in return: what does Turkey propose as a solution to the problem? Mr. Eralp has never explained this to the Council. Would it be what the Turkish leaders proposed in the Thrace, namely, to abolish the State of Cyprus and to divide the Island between Greece and Turkey? I should like to have Mr. Eralp's answer.

68. At this moment we may be entering upon a certain phase in the consultations taking place under the aegis of the Secretary-General: namely, the phase of discussing the possible extension of the Force's mandate. I think that, before we enter into negotiations, we should be ready to approach them with an open mind. A few moments ago you heard Mr. Eralp's staccato tones, giving the count; before he reached ten the victim would surely fall to the ground, and need fanning by Mr. Eralp in order to be revived.

69. This is not the spirit in which one should approach negotiations, my dear colleague, because if we approach them armed with such an ultimatum, they are instantly doomed to failure. I hope that this will not be the case and that when the time comes we shall all be able to approach the question with a more open mind and see what is possible and what is not. In conclusion, however, I cannot

fail to mention that practically every sentence spoken by the Turkish representative contained a threat that the crisis atmosphere which we have just experienced would be revived.

70. The PRESIDENT: I call on the representative of Turkey to make a statement in right of reply.

71. Mr. ERALP (Turkey): I asked for the floor to reply as quickly as possible to a question which has been addressed to me. My colleague from Greece asked whether I had a solution to suggest to the problem of Cyprus. I submit that this is not the place for us to go into the merits of the question. We are now dealing with the possibilities of pacification of the Island. There have been other places where the merits of the question—the substance of the problem—have been discussed, and I hope that there will be other occasions when they will be discussed.

72. As to the reference made by my colleague from Greece to the talks which took place between the two Governments, he is obviously much better informed about the contents of those talks than I am. As far as I know, the offer to annex the Island to Greece, in return for considerations to be given to Turkey, was made by the Greek Government. As far as I know, Turkey has always insisted on the basis of the independence of the Island of Cyprus.

73. Now I have been chided for having cited a number of things which I thought it would be useful for the Council to consider: one to seven, namely. I have also been rebuked for having taken the tone of "ultimatum" in negotiations. As far as I understand it now, we are not in the middle of negotiations; we are here as parties before the Council to expose to the Council the way in which we think it should handle the immediate crisis. And the points one to seven, which I have submitted for the consideration of the Council, were in our understanding a useful way of tackling this problem. I did not intend to lay down conditions or items to be negotiated between the parties.

74.. While I have the floor, if the Council will bear with me another five minutes, I might as well refer to certain statements made by Foreign Minister Kyprianou. Briefly, he said that negotiations cannot be conducted fruitfully under the threat of intervention. I wish to point out that it is our view that negotiations can never be fruitfully conducted under the threat of force. And that is why up to now there has not been the possibility of conducting fruitful negotiations because in the Island one of the parties, the party mostly aggrieved and principally concerned, has been under the constant threat of annihilation.

75. Reference was also made to the withdrawal of Turkish and Greek troops from Cyprus as a first step. We also view this as a first and constructive step, but a step in the direction of the removal from the Island of all means of violence, of all means of imposing the political will of one party on the other—namely, the illegal forces constituted after 1963. We certainly do not view it as a first step towards helping one of the parties brush aside unilaterally its treaty obligations.

76. Foreign Minister Kyprianou made it very clear that he was asking for guarantees for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus. I have often made it clear to the Council that the only danger directed against the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus comes not from Turkey but comes from the relentless drive for *enosis*. This determination to relinquish the inalienable sovereignty of the Republic by annexation to Greece is still very strong in the ruling Greek Cypriot clique. Although the phased withdrawal of the army of occupation imported from Greece in order to realize this ambition may have somewhat removed the prospects of immediate *enosis*, nevertheless, the so-called National Guard of 14,000 men armed with heavy weapons and bent upon breaking the will of the Turkish community still stands as an instrument of *enosis*.

77. If Cyprus is today still independent it is not because its Greek Government wishes it to be so, nor is it due to the presence of a United Nations Peace-keeping Force. It is only due to the determination of Turkey to prevent any encroachment upon the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus. The only guarantee for the independence of Cyprus is the determination of Turkey to maintain its solemn treaty obligation to safeguard the independence of the Republic.

78. There are guarantees, however, which the Council is called upon to provide—and we call upon it to provide. They are guarantees that the UNFICYP will function effectively in order to see to it that such criminal action as in the case of the recent incidents will not occur again, and that the means of perpetrating such aggression shall be denied to the party in question.

79. The question of the Greek and Turkish contingents on the Island has been raised again in the context of the ultimate withdrawal of all non-Cypriot forces from Cyprus. Foreign Minister Kyprianou called for the withdrawal of the Turkish contingent stationed in Cyprus in accordance with the Treaty of Guarantee of 16 August 1960. If he meant that, then obviously my Government cannot agree with it in any context. Such a suggestion would strike at the basis of the validity of solemn international covenants which I am sure the Council has no intention of doing.

80. I doubt if any member of the Council maintains the view that any organ of the United Nations has the authority to override or declare invalid international rights and obligations solemnly and freely negotiated and assumed. This does not, of course, mean that the Treaty stipulations cannot ever be renegotiated or altered, but this can only be done in the context of new international arrangements again freely negotiated and agreed to.

81. Quite apart from these valid legal considerations, we frankly fail to see in what way the removal of a Turkish contingent of 650 men, which has not fired a single shot in the course of the last four troubled years, can advance the cause of peaceful conditions in the Island.

82. The PRESIDENT: The representative of Cyprus has asked to speak in exercise of his right of reply, and I shall call on him to do so. But I hope that, following that

exercise of the right of reply, representatives wishing to exercise their rights of reply will postpone their requests until we have exhausted the list of speakers for this meeting.

83. Mr. KYPRIANOU (Cyprus): I shall try to be very brief. I shall continue to ignore certain matters which might aggravate the climate in this Chamber and I shall not reply to accusations the answers to which can easily be found in the reports of the Secretary-General concerning recent events and the recent crisis.

84. When we spoke we used the expression “to discuss”; the representative of Turkey spoke in terms of “it should”. I think those two small words emphasize the approach. How do we approach the situation? We said that we would be prepared to discuss the contents of the appeals of the Secretary-General and other related issues and the issues raised in his report, even issues including internal matters. But the representative of Turkey said “this should be done by UNFICYP”, “this is how the mandate should be enlarged”, “this is what the United Nations Force should do”, and so on.

85. But what is most important is the relationship which he discovered in the recent events in Cyprus with the question of the political solution of the Cyprus problem. He said that the attack against the two villages was due to the idea of *enosis*. Then he went on to say that Turkey is the country which carries the banner of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus, while all three of those noble principles have been violated in the worst possible manner in his own speech from beginning to end, as can be seen from a brief analysis of it. He said, “We agree to remove the causes of conflict and friction in Cyprus, but the two contingents”—and now he spoke also on behalf of Greece—“shall remain in Cyprus”. Well, in the appeal of the Secretary-General there is a call for their removal.

86. Let us not go into legalistic arguments about treaties. If that is what he wants, we can do so. But is the cause of peace less important than a doubtful legalistic argument, the position on which, if one so wishes, can be reserved? That is the issue on this particular point.

87. Then we come to the question of *enosis*. It is not my intention to go into the substance of this matter, but it is true that an answer is necessary to the question put by the representative of Greece. I could add another question to that one. If Turkey says that it stands for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus, what is its objection to having an international guarantee about those things, and not Turkey's guarantee? What is the objection to having an international guarantee to exclude the possibility of any outside intervention? He spoke of the Treaty of Guarantee and said that the Turkish contingent in Cyprus is there by virtue of that Treaty. First of all, it was not by virtue of that Treaty that the contingent was in Cyprus, but it was by virtue of the Treaty of Alliance, the purpose of which was to defend Cyprus against outside attack. Now Cyprus does not want that alliance. We do not want an alliance. We want a guarantee by the international community, in the most effective

possible way, against an external threat. Even in the view of Turkey the issue is that Turkey is the protector of Cyprus, but Cyprus does not want that. It is as simple as that. We would like the protection of the United Nations and the protection of the Security Council with respect to those principles which the representative of Turkey professes to uphold in the case of Cyprus.

88. Throughout his speech the representative of Turkey spoke in the following manner—I do not have the text of his speech and I cannot quote his exact words, but this is the impression that I formed—“If these things are not done or if those things are done, then we shall have a new crisis.” Are we here to precipitate a new crisis? Are we here to lay the ground for a new crisis, or are we here to remove the causes of the existing crisis?

89. The representative of Turkey states: “These are our points: internal disarmament, enlargement of the mandate of the Force”—not external guarantees and no withdrawal of the two contingents. We say that there should be internal disarmament, but withdrawal of the contingents and external guarantees.

90. Is it intended to remove the fear, the doubtful fear—and I insist on this “doubtful fear”—and I am quite willing to debate it at length—of a section of the Turkish minority, and then leave, remaining, the fear of Cyprus as a whole and of the vast majority of its population concerning the possibility of external attack? Is that a way to contribute to peace?

91. And yet, we have said let us discuss everything, let us make use of the good offices of the Secretary-General. All of us have had the occasion more than once—and I am glad to say that there is agreement on one point, to express our appreciation of the keen interest and objectivity of the Secretary-General as well as of his collaborators both here and in Cyprus. Let us make use of his good offices and discuss all these matters. But let us not dictate terms in advance.

92. We have simply laid down the framework in which we see the situation, the manner in which we see the issues related to each other and the manner in which we think they should be discussed. But I must admit that I never expected that these tactics and this practice of negotiating under threats and ultimatums would have been brought from the Mediterranean area into this Council. I never expected that and I am surprised by it. We are ready to discuss everything connected with the Cyprus problem within the framework of the United Nations, and particularly with the good offices of the Secretary-General, which we have welcomed, without any pre-conditions and in a spirit open to any ideas, in good faith and with good-will. But we cannot be expected, in view of how small we are, to negotiate under threats.

93. The PRESIDENT: In accordance with the previous decision of the Council, I shall now invite Mr. Örek to take his seat at the Council table in order to make a statement.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Örek took a place at the Council table.

94. Mr. ÖREK: Mr. President, I thank you and the members of the Council for affording me this opportunity to speak before you and plead the views of the main aggrieved party in the long drawn-out problem of Cyprus. The party in question is the Turkish community which has been forced to put up a struggle for self-preservation and survival in the face of organized armed attacks and other methods of violence and economic warfare since 21 December 1963.

95. In the course of the last four years, Turks in Cyprus have been victimized, almost in every sphere of life, on account of a policy of violence and use of force persistently pursued by the Greek Cypriot leaders at home, while abroad they have been engaged in a campaign of propaganda aimed at twisting the facts and shielding, behind the generality of certain principles, their misdeeds and wanton disregard of their obligations arising from the treaties, the Charter of the United Nations and the resolutions of this Council.

96. Thanks to the impartial reporting of the international press and the presence of the UNFICYP in Cyprus—despite the adverse conditions imposed on them by the Greek Cypriot régime—the whole world has come to realize the true nature of the Cypriot problem in all its nakedness. The recent events in Cyprus, which culminated from the almost habitual tendency of the Greek Cypriot régime to resort to use of armed force and violence, is a typical illustration of the whole problem. For that reason, I shall not take up the time of the members to go into the details of similar events in the past which have been repeating themselves at regular intervals since December 1963 with added ferocity and impunity.

97. Each time the perpetrators of these dastardly crimes are led to believe or think that they can get away with whatever they do and reap the benefits of their aggression. Each time such a crisis is over, the Turks are left with more dead, with more Turkish homes destroyed, with more Turkish children and families left in agony and tears for having lost their loved ones. On the other hand, the aggressors having escaped any condemnation or censure, they tend to advance further their position of *fait accompli* emanating from the use of force and violence, and thus become all the more uncompromising in the matter of finding an agreed settlement of the problem.

98. This state of affairs and this sort of mentality is, in our view, the main threat to the peace-keeping operations in Cyprus, which tends to threaten peace on a bigger and all the more ferocious scale. A cursory glance at the Greek Cypriot papers, following the latest merciless attacks on the villages of Ayios Theodoros and Kophinou is enough to illustrate this point. In fact, all the Greek papers for 16 November 1967 presented outrageous acts of massacre, pillage, arson and looting committed in these villages against the Turks as a victory and carried large-scale photographs demonstrating some of the armed Greek bandits that were engaged in action in a jubilant manner. Some of these papers even criticized the withdrawal of the Greek occupation force from these two villages upon the warning of Turkey and attempted to blame this withdrawal on the Greek Government, while praising President

Makarios who, according to these papers, refused to order immediate withdrawal. On the other hand, some prominent members of the Greek Cypriot leadership were heard by diplomatic circles to say, in a jubilant manner, that this manner of action is the correct way of dealing with the Cyprus problem.

99. This mentality, in our humble submission, is the very essence of the Cyprus problem and, as such, it not only endangers the peace, both in and around Cyprus, but it is an audacious challenge to the efforts of the Security Council to find a peaceful solution to the problem. It has also been a very real and direct threat to the security of life and property of the Turkish Community in Cyprus for the last four years, as demonstrated anew in the very recent crisis in the Island. Unless effective steps are taken to remove this threat and create conditions of genuine peace in Cyprus, all our efforts will be wasted.

100. Our experience of the past shows that in the very near future we may find ourselves in exactly the same position we were in in the middle of November 1967, unless these effective measures are carried out and practised.

101. In order not to be misunderstood, I would seek the Council's indulgence to expand on this point in more detail, because I believe that in trying to solve a problem, one has to take into consideration the true facts of any given situation in all its nakedness, whether one likes them or not, or whether they appeal to one's utopian instincts or outlook, or not. First and foremost, it must be understood that Cyprus is a small place inhabited by Greeks and Turks who are the extension of the two nations over this Island. The main point dividing the people of Cyprus for the last century or so has been the age-old ambition of the Kingdom of Greece to add Cyprus to its own territory and thus expand its borders to the "shores of north Africa" or to "materialize the dreams of Alexander the Great", as it was claimed by the then Prime Minister, Mr. Papandreou.

102. Turks, for their part, have all along opposed this idea, having in mind the fate of the Turkish communities which had the misfortune of falling under Greek rule, such as the Turks who lived in the Island of Crete and the Dodecanese Islands, which are now extinct in the case of Crete and on the way to extinction in the case of the Dodecanese Islands. This division in outlook, added to the natural division of the two communities, in the spheres of social, cultural, linguistic and religious affairs, led to strife and even open violence. This strife and violence was linked to the degree of agitation for *enosis* created since the end of the British colonial régime, and to the armed attempts of a faction of the Greek Cypriot community to impose *enosis*—which is the colonial rule of Greece—on Cyprus, and also to the refusal of the Turkish community to agree to be colonized in this way by Greece. The situation in the Island developed into an inter-communal civil war, which nearly dragged both Greece and Turkey into an armed conflict. Fortunately, reason then prevailed over passion and statesmanship over selfish ambitions, and a minimum basis for the coexistence of the two communities was found by the mutual agreement of all parties concerned.

103. The main consideration for the Turkish community in agreeing to the present independent State of Cyprus was the guarantee that it could live in peace and security free from attacks or threats of attacks on the part of the Greek community which had openly declared its intention to unite Cyprus to Greece by force of arms, in relying on its numerical strength. For this reason, certain arrangements had to be devised to guarantee not only the safety and security of the Turkish community, which was the weaker party to the dispute and which needed such guarantees in view of the open policy of hostility by the Greek Cypriots, but guarantees had also to be devised for the protection of the independence and sovereignty of Cyprus, which was equally endangered by the policy of annexing Cyprus to Greece.

104. Hence, special treaties had to be agreed upon by all the parties concerned, including the two communities in Cyprus, and the Constitution of the Republic had to take cognizance of these realities. As I have already stated, the main reality taken into consideration was the fact that on account of the claim of *enosis* in the past by the Greeks in Cyprus and their declared intention to go ahead with it, a strong sense of community, which brings with it a tacit agreement that "the issues which divide men are of less importance than the issues which unite them", was seriously lacking in Cyprus.

105. So a system had to be devised whereby the issues dividing the members of the two communities would reciprocally be restricted and compromised in the hope that, in the long run, the main divisive issue—that is, *enosis*—would be abandoned and thus the way would be paved for co-operation in mutual trust and goodwill for the creation of a sense of nationhood among the members of the two communities.

106. But these necessary concepts underlying the Constitution were nipped in the bud by the Greeks, who, no sooner had the Republic assumed its independent status, began to clamor for *enosis*. Thus, the required atmosphere of mutual trust and goodwill was jeopardized by the dark clouds of *enosis* hanging over the blue skies of Cyprus, and the Constitution, which was the product of very long negotiations and very stiff diplomatic activities both within and outside the United Nations, was not given a chance to succeed because of the Greek demands.

107. Soon after independence, it transpired that the Greek leaders had in fact agreed to disagree with the Treaties and the Constitution, and that their sole aim was to misuse the independent status of Cyprus and its membership in the United Nations as an instrument for bringing about *enosis*. During the first years of independence the Greek leaders tried to force their will on the Turkish community through political pressure and non-implementation of the Constitution. When they failed in this, they unleashed their pre-planned, organized armed attack against the Turks in a most ferocious manner on 21 December 1963. General Karayannis, who, as a mercenary officer from Greece headed the Greek-Cypriot armed forces in their attacks against the Turks, wrote this in his memoirs: "When the Turks objected to the amendment of the Constitution,

Archbishop Makarios put his plans into effect and the Greek attacks began in December 1963".

108. The ensuing four years have been for the Turks in Cyprus years of death, destruction, fear and terror, of deprivation of all means of livelihood, of misery, and, at times, even of condemnation to starvation. Thanks to the impartial reporting of the United Nations field officers in Cyprus and to several reports by the Secretary-General to this Council, the world has come to know the manifold brutalities committed against the Turks in Cyprus, so I need not go into the details of all this at this stage. What is significant to note is that when the Greek leaders in Cyprus decided to resort to the use of force and violence, in complicity with the Greek Government, in order to materialize their sinister objective which is aimed at the dissolution of the independence of Cyprus, they had to take care of two things: first, to prepare a ruse for the inhuman treatment of the Turkish community, for the purpose of robbing them of their constitutional rights; and second, to render inoperative the Treaty of Guarantee and Alliance, which provides against such developments. In order to achieve these two objectives, all the governmental machinery, ports, airports and other government resources, were taken over by force of arms and the Turks were presented to the world as rebels, while a false alarm was raised in the international arena accusing Turkey of endangering or threatening the territorial integrity of Cyprus.

109. Behind this window-dressing, however, *enosis* was sought to be imposed on a *fait accompli* basis, and despite the fact that the Security Council was seized of the problem of settling the dispute by peaceful means and that a peace-keeping force was stationed in Cyprus. Both the Greeks and the Greek Cypriots embarked on the preparation of a huge military force in Cyprus, under the very eyes of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force, thus placing the Greek-Cypriot-controlled areas of Cyprus under the virtual military occupation of Greece. Hand in hand with these military activities which turned Cyprus into an arms arsenal, the Greek-Cypriot leaders embarked upon a series of *faits accomplis* aimed at consolidating their position and usurping all powers of the State as a "Government" of Cyprus, with a view to relying on the term "the Government of Cyprus", occurring in the Security Council resolution 186 (1964), and rendering the UNFICYP an arm of the Greek administration in its effort to subjugate or eliminate the Turks, under the flimsy excuse of law enforcement.

110. With this end in view, no sooner had the UNFICYP become operational in Cyprus than the Greek leaders started tearing up the pages of the Constitution one after another, in a most surreptitious and cunning way so that they could not be faced with much resistance in the international sphere. Those sinister ambitions of the leaders of the Greek community became apparent even before the UNFICYP had become operational in Cyprus.

111. It is worth noting here that soon after resolution 186 (1964) was adopted, the Greek Cypriot leaders, declaring that they were the sole government in Cyprus and under the pretext of enforcing law and order, started a campaign of armed attacks against Turks all over Cyprus. The most

serious of those attacks took place in Ktima, despite their earlier undertakings given to the United Nations Observer, General Gyani, that they would observe the cease-fire. Similar attacks took place in the Tylliria area and Ghaziveran. As an impartial observer writing in the *Baltimore Sun* on 10 March 1964 explained, "The fighting in Ktima appeared to be an effort to show that the Greek Cypriots were running the show on the Island".

112. UNFICYP became operational only after the Turkish community raised its voice and after Turkey warned that it could not be expected to sit and watch while the Turkish community in Cyprus was being eliminated.

113. A close analysis of the present situation, to which I shall presently turn, will reveal that we are back at the same point where we started nearly four years ago, and that those who have no regard for the maintenance of peace and no appreciation for the genuine efforts of the United Nations authorities, as well as those of friendly nations, are out to create obstacles to the materialization in practice, on the field, of genuine conditions of peace by resorting to the same hypothetical arguments, the same political jargon and the same wild accusations. The inescapable conclusion to be drawn from this attitude is that the Greek side in Cyprus is not yet prepared to renounce its well-known attempts to solve the problem of Cyprus by the use of arms.

114. That is why, though I may have sounded rather pessimistic, I had to say a few minutes ago that within a very short time we might find ourselves faced with the same crisis again. I entirely agree with the view that the current events in Cyprus cannot be viewed in isolation. The first attacks against the Turks in Ayios Theodoros took place in April 1964 as a diversionary operation when a large detachment of Greek-Cypriot forces moved into the area, as reported in the Secretary-General's report [S/5679, para. 13].² That attack came as a diversionary move when the Turks were attacked in the Kyrenia Mountains, which made the then UNFICYP Commander, General Gyani, state, on 28 April 1964 in an official *communiqué*, that the attacks at the Kyrenia range were a complete surprise to UNFICYP. From that time on, General Grivas had his eye on this area and he looked for an excuse to occupy it by force. In January 1967, all of a sudden and under the pretext that a name-plate on the road had been changed, he sent a battalion of National Guardsmen, headed by Greek army officers, into the area and occupied high-vantage positions around the village of Kophinou, threatening the lives and property of the Turkish inhabitants thereof in a most menacing manner. This point is borne out in the Secretary-General's report, document S/7969, paragraph 60.³

115. The Turkish leadership, being aware of the impending plans of action, had to bring the matter to the notice of the Security Council under document S/7713⁴ of 28 January 1967, through the Vice-President of the Republic of Cyprus.

² *Ibid.*, Nineteenth Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1964.

³ *Ibid.*, Twenty-second Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1967.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Supplement for January, February and March 1967.

116. The efforts of UNFICYP to have the aggressive Greek forces withdrawn from the area achieved no positive results and the tension in the area continued to escalate. This point is again borne out by the report of the Secretary-General (S/7969), paragraph 60 of which reads as follows:

"A further underlying source of tension in the area is the continued presence of the National Guard force. UNFICYP remains convinced that had the National Guard force been withdrawn when this was suggested by UNFICYP, the United Nations Force's task of restoring tranquillity to the area and ensuring freedom of movement on the highways would have been greatly facilitated."

117. In April 1967 the same forces attacked, without provocation, the Turkish village of Mari in the same area, with heavy weapons and armoured cars for about four hours. It was hardly possible for UNFICYP to persuade the Greeks to cease fire because UNFICYP was not allowed in the Mari area.

118. Soon after the Mari incident, the National Guard surrounded the Turkish sector Larnaca on 12-13 May 1967 from Artemis Avenue and began to build up new fortifications in a most threatening manner at a distance of about twenty feet from the Turkish houses. All efforts to remove the Greek and Greek Cypriot troops from these newly aggressive positions failed, as is borne out in paragraphs 68, 69 and 72 of document S/7969 and in the latest report, document S/8286, paragraph 53. On the contrary, the National Guard continued to consolidate its newly threatening positions in defiance of the efforts of the United Nations.

119. In August, a spree of booby-traps and booby-trap attacks was organized against Turks by the Greek terrorists in the same area, between the villages of Alaminos and Lefka. In one such attack five Turks were brutally murdered—one man, two youths and two children aged five and seven respectively. Another boy of eleven was seriously wounded and blinded.

120. On 19 August a civilian car driven by two Turks was mined and the driver lost his left leg while his passenger was seriously injured in the eyes and lost one of them. While these outrageous attacks were being investigated another booby trap was found 200 yards away under the bucket of a water well by its Turkish owner when he lifted the bucket to take up some water. Fortunately, he escaped certain death by throwing himself to the ground.

121. The Secretary-General's report on this question verifies our contention that these attacks were organized with a view to worsening the situation in the area; and in this connexion paragraph 70 of document S/8286 reads as follows:

"... UNFICYP therefore maintains, although it has not been possible to discover the perpetrators, that these were well-planned attacks originated by people who had access to efficient and sophisticated mechanisms. Such criminal actions would not be possible if the terrorists who committed them were not supported or at least covered

by some type of organization. The purpose appears obvious: to maintain tension in an area which is one of the most troublesome in the Island."

122. That the organization referred to by the Secretary-General was the National Guard came to light during the subsequent events when they attacked Kophinou and, before withdrawing, placed a number of other booby traps to kill more Turks in such places as a telephone apparatus in certain homes and even under the dead bodies of Turks. Fortunately, these were discovered in time by United Nations personnel.

123. Meanwhile, heavy arms and war materials, including new shipments of armoured vehicles, continued to pour in through Boghaz in complete defiance of the resolutions of the Security Council and the warnings of the Secretary-General, up to the first week in November—according to paragraphs 26, 28 and 31 of the Secretary-General's report. The repeated remarks of the Secretary-General that the influx of arms and other military-type equipment into Cyprus is a cause for concern to UNFICYP with regard to the discharge of its mandate fell on deaf ears, and no one dared to ask these gentlemen who, in times of crisis, posed as angels of peace, what their purpose was in continuing to turn Cyprus into an arms depot. The feeble excuse that this preparation was in defence of the territorial integrity of Cyprus against invasion cannot be accepted by men of good faith who know too well that Turkey has never sought to intervene in Cyprus except on occasions when UNFICYP was rendered inoperative and the Turkish community was on the verge of being completely annihilated by the Greek and Greek-Cypriot forces.

124. Hand in hand with this accelerated military activity, which indicated an imminent breach of the tenuous peace in Cyprus, agitation for *enosis* took on a more palpable nature.

125. On 26 June 1967 the Greek members of the House of Representatives unanimously adopted a resolution, with the participation of AKEL members that "they would not suspend the struggle which is being conducted with the support of all Greeks until this struggle ends in success through the union of the whole and undivided Cyprus with the motherland without any intermediary stage".

126. Turkish leadership's protests against this new violation of the sovereignty of the Republic was brought to this Council's notice by the Vice-President of the Republic on 3 July (S/8028).⁵ It is stated in this document that "In view of this resolution of the Greek members of the House of Representatives"—which was contrary to the resolution 186 (1964) as well as to the Charter of the United Nations itself—"the consensus of opinion among Turkish Cypriots is that it would be futile to expect that Greeks will ever agree to a peaceful and agreed settlement of the Cyprus problem".

127. On 11 July 1967, the same Greek members of the House of Representatives purported to pass a law authorizing the recruitment into the so-called National Guard of

⁵ *Ibid.*, Supplement for July, August and September 1967.

officers and men from Greece, who were not citizens of the Republic. The obvious implication of this legislation was to integrate the Greek occupation force in Cyprus with the National Guard, whose declared objective was to unite Cyprus with Greece by the use of force and whose members, as stated by the Secretary-General in paragraphs 14 and 19 of document S/7969, were swearing an oath of allegiance to the King of Greece and not to any Cypriot authority.

128. What is significant is that this purported legislation, which undermines the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus, was adopted in Cyprus a day after this Council unanimously adopted resolution 239 (1967) on 10 July condemning any State participating in sending mercenaries—that is, paid soldiers—to any country. And that country in question was the Congo. Is there any difference between the paid Greek troops in Cyprus who are, as we have seen, engaged in armed attacks against the Turks under the banner of the National Guard, and the paid soldiers in the Congo?

129. On the following day—that is, 12 July—my colleague Mr. Kyprianou declared to the newspaper *Democratia*, published in London, that:

“The Cypriot people’s struggle has always been aimed at *enosis* of Cyprus with Greece. *Enosis* was the object of the struggle against British colonialism. *Enosis* is the aim of the struggle today.”

130. Mr. Papadopoulos, Greek-Cypriot Minister of Labour, expanded further on that revealing statement of Mr. Kyprianou in a statement published as an official document of the Greek-Cypriot Public Information Office. I quote:

“Freedom for us means only the integration of this southern outpost of Hellenism with the national entity—union of Cyprus with Greece. For Cyprus is too small and too insignificant to develop outside the national framework, historical tradition, and national civilization as a national awareness of its own—three fundamental and indispensable elements of nationhood. Away from Greece, we shall always be, if we ever survive as a State, ‘nationless’—a country, maybe, but never a nation or a part of a national entity. Our smallness does not allow us to be a country without belonging to a nation. Bigger countries may perhaps survive as only a ‘country’, not ‘nation’, but Cyprus cannot.”

131. That statement is very revealing indeed. I invite representatives to judge for themselves whether any of the above statements is compatible with the false concern and anxiety which have been concocted by the Greek-Cypriot representatives here in this Council over the need to protect the national sovereignty of Cyprus—which, in their own words, is nothing but the national sovereignty of Greece itself—and their sinister attempts to curtail the peace-keeping efforts behind the ostensibly impenetrable doctrine of national sovereignty when it so suits them in furtherance of their policy of violence.

132. These intensive political moves for *enosis* reached their climax in August, September and October 1967 with

the visit to Cyprus of some prominent members of the Greek junta and Greek spiritual leaders from Greece.

133. Colonel G. Papadopoulos, who was the holder of the portfolio to the Prime Minister’s Office, on his visit to the sovereign Republic of Cyprus on 12 August 1967, stated, *inter alia*, categorically and in most provocative and threatening language: “It is *enosis* that all of us are demanding, and it is for *enosis* that we are fighting and will continue to fight, because *enosis* alone is the only, first, and historically acceptable solution.”

134. May I ask against whom Colonel Papadopoulos threatened to continue to fight? Is it not evident that that grave threat, coming from the mouth of a person occupying a most responsible position in Greece, was directed against the Turkish community in Cyprus? And what about the obligations of Greece under the Treaties and the Charter and the resolutions of the Security Council? Or are we to understand that Colonel Papadopoulos was threatening to fight the Republic of Cyprus? If that was the case, where were our Greek colleagues to raise a hue and cry against that actual, physical intervention into the affairs of Cyprus?

135. Then came Archbishop Hieronymos, the head of the Greek Church in Greece, who, on 21 September, officially stated the following:

“Today, when with God’s blessing I have stepped for the first time on the sacred soil of our heroic big island, I confirm that only one national unity exists, only one glory, only one historic continuation: the glorified and eternal Greece.”

136. Those outrageous claims that Cyprus had already become part of Greece culminated in the preparation of a new plan of action.

137. The visit to Cyprus of the then Deputy Premier of Greece, General Spandidakis, was made in October 1967 in order to work out the details of that new plan of action to resort anew to the use of force and violence against the Turkish community. After those heinous plans had been prepared—of which we have reliable information in our hands—this is what General Spandidakis, the then Deputy Premier of Greece, declared in Nicosia on 21 October 1967:

“Mother Greece looks forward only to the moment when her daughter, Cyprus, will throw herself into her arms—that is to say, the moment of *enosis*. And indeed there can be no solution other than this. This is the inevitable, the historical evolution of events. It is there that developments will lead.”

138. In this statement, though General Spandidakis hinted of new developments in the direction of *enosis*, he was very careful—as well he should be, being a member of the junta which toppled democracy in Greece—not to reveal the nature of that new development. But soon after General Spandidakis left Cyprus, Mr. Tasos Papadopoulos, the Greek-Cypriot Minister of Labour, revealed the new plan of action of the Greek-Cypriot Administration, which was prepared in conjunction with the Greek junta and which

was termed the so-called "iron fist" policy. This is what Mr. Papadopoulos stated in Nicosia on 27 October 1967. I quote from the official press release of the Greek-Cypriot Public Information Office of that date:

"And there can be no freedom for Cyprus outside the boundaries of Greece. . . . Freedom and *Enosis* is and will remain our main pursuit The tactics, the methodisation of the struggle may vary and differ according to circumstances, but the ultimate goal, *enosis*, shall remain unchanged. . . . The struggle of Cyprus will be won in Cyprus. The existence of State authority and the complete control of the State by the Greeks of Cyprus becomes the most precious means in our hands. . . . In this new phase of the struggle it is not enough to endure and wait. We must prevail. We must prevail by co-ordination of political and military action, by co-ordination of political appeasement and military strength, by well-considered and simultaneous peace campaigns and military power. And we shall prevail"

139. This co-ordinated plan of action, based on the military might of the Greek Cypriots, intended to be put into operation as a new phase, was publicly confirmed by General Grivas in his statement in Limassol on 30 October 1967, when he said: "If *enosis* is denied to them, then the Greeks will conquer it with their swords."

140. As it turned out, however, the process of conquering *enosis*, as usual, was initiated by Grivas with the conquering of Kophinou and Ayios Theodoros, where he once again unleashed in a most ferocious manner the racial fanaticism of his Greek-Cypriot compatriots against innocent civilians—women, children and elderly people included—in the village of Kophinou. In the course of that occupation he used the armoured cars newly sent from Greece by General Spandidakis and all sorts of heavy weapons, such as twenty-five field guns, two tanks, 105 and 81 mm mortars, all sorts of heavy machine-guns and other war materiel which the Greek Cypriot leaders had obtained by hoodwinking certain quarters in pretending that those weapons were intended to be used exclusively against what were imaginary threats from outside, despite timely warnings by the Turkish Cypriot leadership, as well as by the Secretary-General in his reports to this Council.

141. The official policy statement of the present Greek-Cypriot régime in Cyprus, expressed from the mouth of a Greek Cypriot minister and through the official information media to which I have just referred, explains a number of things clearly related to the problems facing us in Cyprus. First and foremost, it explains, beyond the shadow of any doubt, the fact that the Greek Cypriot leaders are trying, with some success, to outsmart the whole world by defying all the principles of humanity in their actions, and yet to appear from their words to be the most ardent defenders of those very principles so that they can go on with the process of eliminating the Turkish community. Second, it explains why the Cyprus problem has been dragging on for the last four years while the Turkish community has been victimized all the time. Third, it explains why the appeal of the Secretary-General of 3 December [see S/8248/Add.6] had to be made, and why we are here today.

142. All of these things emanate from the fallacious idea that the Treaties which gave birth to the independence of Cyprus, the resolutions of this Council, as well as the obligations of the Government of every Member State arising from the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, can be trampled upon, under the pretext of adhering to certain principles, such as sovereignty, while in practice acting in complete disregard of that sovereignty.

143. There is authority for saying as some eminent jurists have said, that in the modern world fundamental human rights of peoples cannot be shrouded behind the ostensibly impenetrable cloak of sovereignty, despite those numerous provisions incorporated in the Charter of the United Nations which recognize that the treatment of even a single individual cannot be and is no longer a matter solely of domestic concern. In the very special circumstances of Cyprus that is the more so, because the Turkish community of Cyprus has its own undeniable existence and identity both juridically and in actual fact, and has enjoyed that juridical status for four centuries. That being so, the Turkish community has a vested interest and share in the sovereignty of Cyprus and has been trying to defend it at great cost to life and property for the last four years. Therefore, the demand of the Greek Cypriot leaders to be recognized as the sole arbiters of the question of the sovereignty of Cyprus, when they are on record as saying that their interest in that sovereignty is none other than to misuse it as a tool for dissolving the State and forcing the Turks to abandon their vested rights, and at the same time the Greek Cypriot attempt to seek the assistance of this august body in order to carry out that sinister plan, can no longer be tolerated if we have the interests of peace at heart. It is about time to remind the Greek Cypriot leaders that they cannot eat their cake and have it. The principles of justice and morality demand that no one should be allowed to take advantage of his own wrongs, and that he who comes to equity must come with clean hands. That is exactly what the Greek Cypriots have not been doing, ever since the beginning of the troubles.

144. As an aftermath of the brutal attacks on the two Turkish villages in Cyprus on 15 November we have gone through a new series of crises. They were temporarily averted as a result of strenuous efforts on the part of the Secretary-General and his distinguished representative, Mr. Rolz-Bennett, as well as the Secretary-General of NATO and the President of the United States and his special representative.

145. In our view, the final averting of the crisis will depend to a great extent on the decision of this Council, because we believe that peace cannot be established simply by the cessation of the actual shooting. For the preservation of genuine peace, conditions of peace must be established in Cyprus.

146. For the last four years, members of the Turkish community have been forced to live in conditions worse than those of war. For that reason, we applaud the interest and efforts exerted to preserve the peace in Cyprus, from whatever quarter they may come. But it must be appreciated that sacrifices by one party alone are not enough for the preservation of a durable peace.

147. Recent events proved, before the very eyes of the United Nations personnel in Cyprus, who were also attacked and disarmed by the Greeks, that the need for the protection of the Turkish community is ever more necessary in order to preserve genuine peace. For that reason we welcomed the agreement and the decision of the Greek Government to withdraw its illegal troops of occupation from our soil, as a first step in the right direction. In the same spirit we welcomed the Secretary-General's appeal of 3 December 1967 as a long awaited step in the right direction. However, as I have already explained and as has been explained by the Vice-President in his message [S/8294]⁶ the matter does not end there and should not be allowed to end there.

148. The vicious circle into which all efforts for the preservation of peace have been drawn by the Greek Cypriot leadership must be broken. That can be done by agreeing to the appeal of the Secretary-General without trying to put the cart before the horse—that is, without trying to get concessions, on the validity of the treaties which gave birth to the Republic and its present Constitution and without seeking to predetermine the issue from the position of a *fait accompli* brought about by the use of force and by disregarding the constitutional rights of the Turks.

149. We are encouraged by the statement of the representative of the Soviet Union on 24 November, to the effect that the Soviet Government had made a statement to the Government of Greece in which it expressed its categorical protest against the lawlessness and arbitrary rule which was being carried on in Greece, and against the flouting of the elementary principles of humanity and the flagrant violation of universally acknowledged standards enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights [1383rd meeting, para. 80].

150. We earnestly hope, and we beseech this Council, that the same concern may be forthcoming from all members in the case of Cyprus, so that those who try to put themselves above the highest law of the land may be deterred from pressing further with their irresponsible actions, so that UNFICYP may be given a chance to be effective and so that normal conditions of peace and security of life and property of the Turkish community may be taken care of, at least until such time as an agreed settlement can be reached, in an atmosphere of peace and calm, between the interested parties.

151. On the question of the preservation of peace and calm in Cyprus it is our humble submission that practical arrangements could be made, having in mind always past experiences and causes of tension in Cyprus, and empowering UNFICYP to act in time, effectively, before tension has led to a recurrence of fighting, without hurting the principles of anyone.

152. Among those practical measures the questions of preventing the inflow of arms and heavy war material—as is very rightly pointed out by the Secretary-General—and the disbanding of the illegal and unconstitutional Greek

Cypriot striking force, the National Guard, are decisive factors for the success of the United Nations in its peace-keeping mission.

153. So far, although UNFICYP has been able, though only to a certain degree, to keep the inner ring between the parties, the flow of arms, troops and war materials has continued, since the outer ring has not been kept, particularly in the case of armaments, with the result that now, as we have seen in the Kophinou affair, when the Greek Cypriot régime decides to launch an attack it is in a position to over-run the United Nations posts as well, at any given moment, and endanger peace.

154. In our view—and I have to put this across because I do not think Mr. Kyprianou is representing the views of the Turkish community—to prevent a recurrence of fighting, first and foremost UNFICYP must be in a position to reduce the tools of fighting. If UNFICYP is not empowered to stop the flow of arms into Cyprus and supervise the disarmament of unconstitutional forces, such as the National Guard which is the main threat to peace in Cyprus, the mere withdrawal of Greek troops from Cyprus will mean nothing as long as the mercenary officers from Greece in the National Guard are allowed to continue to endanger peace.

155. The danger to peace is confirmed in paragraphs 29, 30, 31, 46, 49, 53 and 59 of the Secretary-General's report [S/8286]. Paragraph 49 is most illuminating, and I shall quote it.

“UNFICYP is especially concerned over the large number of inland fortifications being constructed by the National Guard, which for the past year has not limited itself as it used to do to the strengthening of coastal defences, but has turned its attention to the interior of the island.”

A careful scrutiny of the report will show that these are places such as the Turkish quarter of Limassol, the Turkish quarter of Larnaca, the village of Temblo and Ambelikou.

156. Secondly, the well-known method of the Greek-Cypriot régime in Cyprus to try and trade the political rights of Turks with their basic right to live and survive as decent human beings has to be brought to an end.

157. It is revelant to note that all these economic and other restrictions imposed on the Turkish community, which include restrictions on such vital items as water pipes, firewood, straw and many other necessities of life and all building materials, are applied as a punitive discriminatory measure without the force of any law but on the force of arms with the sole object of compelling the Turkish community to abandon the defence of its basic rights.

158. The argument that the Greek-Cypriot régime is justified in applying these measures because they fear that the Turkish refugees may build permanent dwellings in the areas where they are now, cannot be accepted. Under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as well as the Constitution of the Republic, it is one of the basic rights of

⁶ *Ibid.*, Supplement for October, November and December 1967.

every individual to decide his place of residence or abode, and this very basic right of the individual should not be allowed to be subjected to any punitive restrictions or political bargaining. People settle where they feel secure. It is only the human instinct of people faced with a common danger that makes them stick together. It is up to those who force those people to abandon their homes through fear and terrorism to let the United Nations re-establish conditions of security in these areas if they really want the refugees to return to their habitations. What happened to Kophinou and Ayios Theodoros is certainly not an inducement to the Turkish refugees to return to the Greek dominated areas. More so, when one considers the fact that whenever there is a crisis, the Greek-Cypriots threaten to cut the throats of all Turks in Cyprus if Turkey attempts to take counter measures against the Greek forces of aggression. This abominable threat was made in August 1964; it has been repeated during the recent crisis.

159. So far, UNFICYP, apart from not being able, as recent events proved, to stop major attacks against Turks, had been only an onlooker to the outrageous and most humiliating searches and other harassments of Turkish civilians—women and children alike—on check points when the Turks at times had been forced to wait for hours under the scorching sun and while Turks were abducted, arbitrarily arrested or maltreated under false or trumped-up charges. It is our hope that UNFICYP would feel so empowered as to prevent such inhuman and arbitrary treatment of Turks on the roads. It is true that from time to time we heard unilateral declarations by the Greek-Cypriot leaders in the form of a peace offensive that those restrictions should be relaxed. But in our view, to leave the matter merely to the declaration of one side to remove those inhuman restrictions as it suits them, turning the screw on and off according to the political climate, is tantamount to accepting the fallacious argument that they are entitled as of right to apply those restrictions whenever they so decide, thereby agreeing to permit these inhuman measures to be exploited as a political lever of oppression endangering peace which, as we have seen in the past, may become deadlier than conventional arms.

160. To give an example, I should like to refer to the letter dated 15 September 1964 from Archbishop Makarios to the Secretary-General. Though it was professed in that letter that economic blockades and other inhuman measures would be withdrawn, yet it is evident from the reports of the Secretary-General submitted to this Council since that time, that most of those restrictions continue to be applied up to the present time.

161. I can give hundreds and thousands of such instances which have been the daily ordeal to which the members of the Turkish community have been and are being subjected. But it should be sufficient to mention here that even tar for the necessary repair of the Kyrenia road which is mostly used by the members of the Greek community as well as that of UNFICYP, and which because of its lack of repair over the past four years presents a danger to the safety of its users, has consistently been denied to us.

162. The following passage from the Secretary-General's latest report suffices to illustrate the situation:

"... a request to the District Office (Nicosia) for clearance to supply to Kokkina some asbestos piping needed for the irrigation of a small vegetable plot was first submitted in the spring of 1967, in the hope that clearance would be granted in time for the piping to be used for irrigation that summer, but clearance was not granted until October 1967, when irrigation was no longer needed. Still more serious are the almost invariably long delays in considering applications for clearance for small quantities of building materials needed for repairs to the few permanent dwellings in Kokkina. Such delays cannot even be explained by the Government's policy of preventing the entry into refugee areas of materials which could be used for building permanent accommodation, for the quantities involved are so small that it is evident that the materials are required only for emergency repairs. Nevertheless, even though it was accompanied by an UNFICYP Medical Officer's report stating that defective roofing in Kokkina was a hazard to the refugees' health, and notwithstanding the diagnosis of two cases of tuberculosis among the inhabitants, a request for clearance for some tiles to repair the faulty roofs of existing houses has not yet been approved by the District Office (Nicosia) in spite of the fact that winter is drawing nearer." [Ibid., para. 128.]

163. Under what standard of humanity or moral decency can such treatment be justified or tolerated. The fact should not be lost sight of that if the Turkish community has tolerated all this, it is because it has the interest of peace at heart and on no other account. So, I submit that it would be very wrong, if not inhuman, to expect them to go on tolerating such conditions indefinitely under the thin veil of hypothetical arguments which, as I have endeavoured to show, have become an inadmissible vicious circle.

164. The instances I just mentioned are by no means exhaustive, but I had to mention them in order to give an idea of what can be done in the form of practical measures to render the efforts of the United Nations more effective for the preservation of peace and calm in Cyprus.

165. As to the question of the final settlement of the problem it is our considered opinion that the degree of co-operation of the parties in actual practice, in carrying out the suggestions of the Secretary-General for establishing peace and calm in Cyprus, will be a vital factor in determining whether they are for settling this problem, as directed by this Council, by peaceful means or by the use of arms. We are glad to see that Turkey and Greece have already agreed to those proposals. What is important for us, as the Turkish community, is to be saved from the victimization, oppression and actual armed attacks which we have been forced to put up with for the last four years.

166. Mere utterances of goodwill and peaceful intentions are not enough; this is obvious from the past record of events. The armed threat levelled against the Turkish community must be speedily and effectively removed. If the Greek Cypriot leadership has no intention of imposing an armed settlement on the Turks, this is the golden opportunity for them to lay down their arms, to respect the constitutional rights of Turks and to prepare the ground for an agreed, not an imposed, settlement. On this score I am

sure they will find the Turks co-operative. The Turkish community, however, cannot go along with the proposition that it has to forego its vested rights as a condition precedent to the silencing or the removal of the threat of the Greek guns or in exchange for their bread and butter. The removal of these threats is the main role of the United Nations at this juncture. An agreement on the final solution within the framework of paragraph 7 of resolution 186 (1964) of this Council can only be achieved if the Turkish community is free to exercise its will in an atmosphere of peace and security and if the leaders of the Greek community were to respond positively to the call of this Council as embodied in paragraph 3 of the said resolution.

167. It is my earnest hope that, taking all these points into consideration, as well as the appeal of the Secretary-General of 3 December 1967, the Council will give the necessary guidance to all the parties as well as to the Secretary-General so that the present precarious situation may be averted and settled and so that efforts for the finding of a final solution can be started in a peaceful atmosphere.

Mr. Örek withdrew.

168. Lord CARADON (United Kingdom): It is not my intention to keep the Council this evening, but I think it might be well, before we disperse, to speak not about the main issues before us or the problems which have to be settled in the Island of Cyprus, but about our duty here in the Security Council. I believe that it would be right that we should remind ourselves, if that were necessary, of the pressing urgency under which we work.

169. Within five or six days the existing mandate of the United Nations Force in Cyprus will expire. Those of us who supply forces to make up the United Nations Force must reach our decisions within a day or two at the most. And indeed, so great is the urgency that I hope we can continue in this Council to reach a conclusion. I believe that we should make every effort to do so if not tonight, then by tomorrow. If that is not done, then there will be a dangerous delay running up to the time-limit which we have to keep in mind.

170. My second point is that, as we all know, following the Secretary-General's report none of us has been idle. Intensive consultations have been proceeding day by day since that report was presented. And you, Sir, as our President, have, as we would have expected, given us a lead in those consultations. Many members of this Council, even in the crowded days of the end of the session of the General Assembly, have been devoting their minds to the course which should now be set by this Council.

171. The results of those consultations are not yet available. But I would be bold enough to go on to say that the consultations which have been taking place, I believe, have already indicated a very wide measure of agreement in this Council as to what should be done. I believe that there is no doubt in the minds of any of us that it is essential that, without any delay, the existing mandate of the United Nations Force should be extended in time.

172. We have closely considered the period, and I believe that there is a general feeling that the period should be one of three months. If we were to extend it for a full period of six months, it might well give the impression that we are returning to the unsatisfactory and uneasy situation that we had before. None of us would wish to give that impression. But all of us at the same time recognize that it is necessary to have an adequate period for all these difficult and dangerous problems which have been brought to our notice today to be dealt with in a new spirit of determination. Therefore, that is the first purpose on which I believe there is already general agreement.

173. The second purpose on which I believe we are all agreed and on which we should not delay a decision is that we should take up the suggestions which have been put to us by the Secretary-General. I believe that all the members of the Council would join with me in paying respect to the Secretary-General for the role that he has played throughout the recent crisis. Indeed the crisis could not have been dealt with effectively without the Secretary-General's intervention. Those of us who believe in the United Nations are glad to see that yet again the United Nations is essential in order to prevent conflict. I think that the Secretary-General acted wisely and with a good sense of timing in the actions he took. And all of us would wish to pay our respects to the part which Mr. Rolz-Bennett played by going to the area and taking part in the urgent efforts to prevent a conflict from taking place. I believe that there is no disagreement on this second purpose. I have discovered no disagreement on the desire to act on the Secretary-General's offer of his good offices to find the right way forward.

174. Certainly we are not going to discover the final solution to the problems which excite such intense feelings and such intense disagreement, to which we have had reference in the speeches made today. We are not going to find a solution here and now, today or tomorrow. What we can do and what I am sure we shall do, and I believe that we must do it with the utmost dispatch, is to find the right course which can enable us to prevent the recurrence of such crises in the future and to get us to move in the direction of the permanent settlement which has been so long postponed.

175. Often we have met in this Council and agreed to renew the mandate of the Force. All of us have felt every time that we did so that it was wholly inadequate merely to renew the mandate of the Force and to take no step towards a reduction of the tension and an advance towards some settlement.

176. Therefore, I believe that there is wide agreement amongst us on the twin purposes: renewal of the Force for the period of three months and the acceptance of the offer of good offices which the Secretary-General has put before us.

177. It may indeed be that the serious crisis through which we have come may, when we look back on it in future years, be the occasion for causing this Council not to be content merely with keeping the peace, but to make a

determined effort to set a course which can make peace for the future.

178. The PRESIDENT: In the light of consultations which I have carried out, I gather that members are agreeable to our adjourning the debate at this point and resuming it at

10.30 a.m. tomorrow. If I hear no objection, it will be so decided.

It was so decided.

The meeting rose at 6.20 p.m.